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Quotes of the Day:
"We grow tyrannical fighting tyranny. The most alarming spectacle today is not the spectacle of the atomic bomb in an unfederated world, it is the spectacle of the Americans beginning to accept the device of loyalty oaths and witchhunts, beginning to call anybody they don't like a Communist."
– E. B. White
"It is wonderful what strength of purpose and boldness and energy of will are roused by the assurance that we are doing our duty."
– Walter Scott
"There is no worse tyranny than to force a man to pay for what he does not want merely because you think it would be good for him."
– Robert Heinlein
1. Biden’s opportunity? Some see opening for U.S. in warming North Korea-Russia ties
2. S. Korean envoy stresses N.K. children exposed to 'egregious' human rights violations
3. Biden, Kishida to discuss N. Korean threats, trilateral cooperation with S. Korea: White House
4. North Korea aims to adopt solid-fuel missiles for faster launches
5. Explainer: Why is North Korea testing hypersonic missiles and how do they work?
6. N. Korea says Q1 economic goals attained as it holds cabinet plenary meeting
7. The Crisis in East Asia: Korea or Taiwan?
8. Biden stresses 'enduring' U.S. commitment to Korean Peninsula denuclearization to Xi: White House
9. Russia Just Gutted the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea – What Now?
10. Casualties reported during N. Korea's military drills involving paratroopers last month
11. S. Korea to chair first UN Security Council meeting with focus on cyber threats
12. A Vigilante Hacker Took Down North Korea’s Internet. Now He’s Taking Off His Mask
13. Free textbooks for North Korean students who can pay for them in scrap paper
14. North Korea moves to promote closer relations with China
15. North Korea orders hunt to capture “impure elements” in Russia
1. Biden’s opportunity? Some see opening for U.S. in warming North Korea-Russia ties
Again, I am a broken record. We need to understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the regime if we are going to engage.
I think this may be wishful thinking and we may be seeing things as we want to see them rather as they really are.
Biden’s opportunity? Some see opening for U.S. in warming North Korea-Russia ties
washingtontimes.com · by Ben Wolfgang
By - The Washington Times - Tuesday, April 2, 2024
A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.
Direct U.S.-North Korea diplomacy appears nearly nonexistent as Pyongyang rapidly deepens its military and political relationships with Russia, one of Washington’s leading geopolitical adversaries.
Those realities seem to eliminate any room for President Biden to negotiate with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, but some analysts say this moment may offer the administration a golden opportunity.
“I still believe Kim Jong-un has ambitions to drag the DPRK out of economic backwardness,” said John Delury, a professor of Chinese studies at the Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies, referring to the North by the initials of its formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
“If the Biden administration showed up with serious willingness to let the DPRK prosper, I’m convinced Kim Jong-un would be interested and start movement in a direction we haven’t really seen,” Mr. Delury said Tuesday at The Washington Brief, a monthly forum hosted by The Washington Times Foundation.
Some analysts say the administration’s diplomatic approach to North Korea is unimaginative. The White House said Tuesday that Mr. Biden discussed North Korea during a phone call with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, and “emphasized the United States’ enduring commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
Mr. Biden has done little in public to counter a lengthy diplomatic freeze-out from Pyongyang in recent years. Conservative South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has also rejected the previous government’s policy of trying to engage with the North.
The focus on denuclearization has been a hallmark of U.S. policy toward North Korea for years. President Trump held face-to-face meetings with Mr. Kim in the hopes of securing a deal to end Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program in exchange for major economic sanctions relief and international investment into North Korea.
Since the Trump-Kim diplomatic dance fell apart without an agreement, specialists say it might be time to approach the situation differently. Mr. Delury argued that Washington may have an opportunity to capitalize on animosity and distrust between Pyongyang and Beijing and to use that as a carrot to draw North Korea toward negotiations.
“The distrust and dislike that pervades China-North Korea relations is a condition of possibility, of peace and normalization, and real improvement of relations between North Korea and the United States,” he said. “But this would require a pretty profound … shift in U.S. foreign policy thinking, which conceives of Beijing playing the role of helping to coerce North Korea into denuclearization.”
A growing number of foreign policy analysts and insiders argue that complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula may now be more of an impediment to diplomacy than a realistic policy goal. In the years since the Trump-Kim meetings, analysts say, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has grown more dangerous, with Pyongyang routinely conducting missile tests and seeking to diversify its platforms of weapons of mass destruction beyond its ground-based missile units. On Wednesday, North Korea said it tested a new hypersonic intermediate-range missile.
“I have become an advocate for recognizing reality and acknowledging, officially, [the North Koreans] have nuclear capabilities,” former Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper said at The Washington Brief forum in February. “Doing so doesn’t raise or lower the intrinsic threat that they pose one bit and plays to their need for face, for respect, and maybe puts them in a better mood to negotiate.”
The Russia question
The North Korea-Russia relationship, which has grown considerably over the past two years, hangs over any discussion involving Pyongyang. Wooed heavily by Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korea has given Moscow badly needed arms and ammunition for its war in Ukraine.
In return, Russia appears willing to use its geopolitical leverage to help Pyongyang. Russia last week vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution to continue a monitoring mission of U.N. economic sanctions tied to North Korea’s nuclear program.
Alexandre Mansourov, a professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies, who also spoke at Tuesday’s event, described the unfolding dynamic as North Korea’s “pivot to the north.”
“That pivot to the north is obviously a major new reality with which we have to deal,” he said.
Could North Korea’s pivot toward Russia also provide a diplomatic opening? Mr. Delury said the Pyongyang-Moscow relationship could offer a valuable topic of discussion in a theoretical U.S.-North Korea meeting and, ironically, could give Washington a bit of leverage.
“I do think strangely, paradoxically, this fairly recent real uptick in North Korea-Russia relations actually gives something for them to talk about,” he said. The U.S. side could ask whether there is a “way we could fill the gap” in what Russia provides to North Korea.
“And here’s where you start to put things like relief on [economic] sanctions enforcement” on the table, he said. “Opening them up in the other direction to sort of compensate essentially for the loss that North Korea would suffer from curtailing that developing relationship with Russia. So, I think there is an element there that could be used toward peace.”
Many observers say that kind of outside-the-box thinking is desperately needed in the U.S. approach to North Korea. Pyongyang has a long history of becoming a front-burner problem at inconvenient times.
The laserlike U.S. focus on denuclearization and the notion of “deterrence” toward the Kim regime have accomplished little outside the brief diplomatic progress of the Trump years.
“I have to wonder, when we say and have said we want to contain, we’ll have a policy of containing North Korea — and what?” said former CIA official Joseph DeTrani, who moderated Tuesday’s event. “We haven’t deterred North Korea from building nuclear weapons. We haven’t deterred North Korea from building more missiles to deliver those weapons.”
• Ben Wolfgang can be reached at bwolfgang@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2024 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
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2. S. Korean envoy stresses N.K. children exposed to 'egregious' human rights violations
Excellent. The ROK is executing a human rights upfront approach and is not afraid to call out th eKim family regime for its human rights abuses. We need the international community to follow the ROK lead now.v m
S. Korean envoy stresses N.K. children exposed to 'egregious' human rights violations | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 4, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 3 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top envoy to the U.N. expressed concerns Wednesday over "egregious" human rights violations facing children in North Korea, including what he called the death penalty for distributing South Korean dramas.
Citing public sources, including North Korean defectors' testimonies, Ambassador Hwang Joon-kook highlighted the "grim" situation for North Korean children during a meeting of the U.N. Security Council held under the theme of "Children and Armed Conflict."
"Children in the DPRK are exposed to egregious human rights violations, including the death penalty for distributing South Korean dramas, detention to political prisoners alongside their family members as a collective punishment, and widespread use of child labor," he said.
DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
South Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Hwang Joon-kook speaks during a meeting of the U.N. Security Council at U.N. headquarters in New York on April 3, 2023 in this photo captured from U.N. Web TV. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
"Moreover, children in the DPRK face a devastating humanitarian crisis as the DPRK regime relentlessly pursues its nuclear and ballistic missile program and its leadership squanders their scarce resources on luxury items," he added.
Hwang also pointed out that 17 percent of children in the North are reported to suffer from stunted growth due to rampant undernourishment as he cited a recent publication by the U.N. Children's Fund, the World Health Organization and the World Bank.
In addition, the ambassador stressed that under international humanitarian law, children affected by armed conflict are entitled to "special respect and protection."
"It is deeply deplorable that this sacrosanct principle is violated too often as parties to conflict attack humanitarian workers and use seizure and blockade tactics to deny the delivery of vital relief supplies," he said.
"A striking example is the dire situation in the Gaza Strip, where the number of U.N. workers killed in the past six months has surpassed the total number of U.N. staff fatalities in all conflict zones and terrorist incidents worldwide over the last 12 years," he added.
He also said that South Korea is "appalled" by the recent tragic deaths of seven aid workers of World Central Kitchen, a non-profit organization that has been delivering life-saving humanitarian assistance in the Gaza Strip.
"In the face of these dismaying challenges, it is imperative first and foremost that the Security Council stand firm on its zero tolerance against the denial of humanitarian access to children," he said, "There can be no room for geopolitical considerations in this regard."
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 4, 2024
3. Biden, Kishida to discuss N. Korean threats, trilateral cooperation with S. Korea: White House
(LEAD) Biden, Kishida to discuss N. Korean threats, trilateral cooperation with S. Korea: White House | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 4, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with Campbell's remarks in paras 7-9)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 3 (Yonhap) -- President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will discuss an array of issues, including North Korean threats and the two countries' trilateral cooperation with South Korea, during their summit next week, a White House official said Wednesday.
The two leaders are set to hold the summit on April 10 as Washington and Tokyo are stepping up defense cooperation amid growing security uncertainties stemming from North Korea's evolving military threats, China's growing assertiveness and Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine.
"The president is very much looking forward to the state visit. There is an awful lot of important things to talk about," National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby told a virtual press briefing.
"There will be issues in terms of the security environment -- concerns about the DPRK, concerns about aggressive PRC actions," he added.
DPRK and PRC stand for the official names of North Korea and China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, respectively.
Kirby also said that the two leaders will discuss how the two countries can advance their bilateral cooperation as well as their trilateral cooperation with South Korea.
Speaking in a forum, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said that there will be a summit announcement on collaboration between the U.S. and Japan over joint development and production of military equipment.
"One of things that I think you will see next week are steps for the first time that will allow the U.S. and Japan to work more collaboratively on joint development and potentially co-production of vital military and defense equipment," he said at the forum hosted by the Center for a New American Security.
Campbell cast Kishida's upcoming visit as a "seminal and historical," saying that Washington and Tokyo seek to "modernize and update the critical and dynamic U.S.-Japan partnership."
Kishida's upcoming trip to Washington will mark the first official visit by a Japanese prime minister since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit in 2015.
Kishida's official visit is regarded as the same as a state visit, the highest diplomatic reception given to a visiting foreign leader. The expression, state visit, is usually used for a visit by a foreign president or head of state.
This photo, released by EPA, shows U.S. President Joe Biden (R) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida walking through the colonnade of the White House in Washington on Jan. 13, 2023.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 4, 2024
4. North Korea aims to adopt solid-fuel missiles for faster launches
Graphic and photos at the link.
North Korea aims to adopt solid-fuel missiles for faster launches
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-says-it-test-fired-new-solid-fuel-hypersonic-missile-2024-04-02/?utm
By Joyce Lee and Josh Smith
April 3, 20244:15 AM EDTUpdated a day ago
Item 1 of 6 A missile is launched, as the state media reports North Korea test-fired a new mid- to long-range solid-fuel hypersonic missile, at an unknown location in North Korea, April 2, 2024, in this picture released on April 3, 2024, by the Korean Central News Agency. KCNA via REUTERS
[1/6]A missile is launched, as the state media reports North Korea test-fired a new mid- to long-range solid-fuel hypersonic missile, at an unknown location in North Korea, April 2, 2024, in this picture released on April 3, 2024, by the Korean Central News Agency. KCNA via REUTERS Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab
Summary
- Tuesday's launch condemned by Japan, S.Korea and U.S.Missile shows superiority of North's defence tech, leader saysImplications for stocks of liquid-fuel weapons seen unclear
SEOUL, April 3 (Reuters) - North Korea successfully test-fired a new hypersonic missile, state news agency KCNA said on Wednesday, the latest step in a plan its leader Kim Jong Un described as aimed at using solid fuel to power missiles of all ranges.
The North is developing missiles and nuclear weapons undeterred by sanctions in the wake of U.N. Security Council bans, while analysts say solid-fuel missiles can be faster to deploy than liquid-fuel variants.
It drew swift condemnation from neighbours South Korea and Japan, as well as the United States for firing the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) into the sea on Tuesday.
Kim oversaw the launch of the new Hwasong-16B missile, KCNA said, calling it a strategic weapon showcasing the "absolute superiority" of the North's defence technology.
It perfects the North's project for "putting all the tactical, operational and strategic missiles with various ranges on solid-fuelled, warhead-controlled and nuclear warhead-carrying basis," Kim said, according to KCNA.
That would give North Korea the capacity for "rapidly, accurately and powerfully striking any target in the enemy side worldwide," Kim said.
South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the launch probably focused on testing the missile's flight performance in the early stage of development, an area in which North Korea appeared to have made partial progress.
But it "exaggerated" several specifications, from flight range to a delay in igniting the second-stage engine and quickly changing flight orbit, the JCS said.
Analysts said it was unclear if the North would exclusively build solid-fuel missiles in future, and what a switch would mean for its arsenal of liquid-fuel weapons, such as its largest Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
North Korea may heavily favour solid-fuel systems where possible, but actually phasing out liquid-fuel weapons would likely only play out over years, said Ankit Panda of the U.S.-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
"There are obvious strategic advantages to an all-solid-fuel force for them in the form of greater promptness, responsiveness, and survivability," he added.
A graphic showing the difference between liquid fuel and solid fuel rockets
North Korea would need to have high confidence in its production capabilities to allow solid-fuel missiles to sit for a number of years, during which they may develop imperfections that lead to in-flight failures, Panda added.
"India and other countries have had problems with this sort of thing with solid-fuel missiles," he said. "Liquid-fuel missiles, despite their strategic disadvantages, don't face this particular long-term handling problem."
A move away from liquid fuel would be surprising, given recent state media coverage of such weapons, but would make sense if North Korea wants an extremely responsive missile force, said Decker Eveleth of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California.
"Solid-fuel missiles are much, much faster to get off the ground in an emergency," he said in a post on X.
Such a shift could also see North Korea place some ICBMs in silos, in addition to the mobile launch vehicles it has exclusively used so far, Eveleth added.
North Korea's pursuit of hypersonic vehicles helps its broader effort to field warheads tougher to intercept.
Warheads typically launched by such missiles travel at more than five times the speed of sound or about 6,200 kph (3,850 mph), often manoeuvring at relatively low altitudes.
That manoeuvrability, not speed, is the most attractive feature of such weapons, analysts say, as the latter can sometimes be matched or exceeded by traditional ballistic missile warheads.
Tuesday's launch, which followed a ground test late in March of a solid-fuel engine for a new type of intermediate-range hypersonic missile, was also condemned by Britain, which said it breached UN Security Council resolutions.
In a rare step, South Korea seized a ship off its coast for suspected violations of the North Korean sanctions, the Donga Ilbo newspaper said on Wednesday.
The South's foreign ministry confirmed it was investigating the vessel for possible violations in co-operation with the United States, but declined further comment.
The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here.
Reporting by Joyce Lee and Josh Smith; Additional reporting by Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Clarence Fernandez
5. Explainer: Why is North Korea testing hypersonic missiles and how do they work?
Explainer: Why is North Korea testing hypersonic missiles and how do they work?
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/why-is-north-korea-testing-hypersonic-missiles-how-do-they-work-2024-04-03/?utm
By Hyonhee Shin
April 3, 20241:10 AM EDTUpdated a day ago
Ballistic missile, said to be solid-fuel and hypersonic, launches during a test at an unspecified location in North Korea in this picture released by the Korean Central News Agency on January 14, 2024. KCNA via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. REUTERS IS UNABLE TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THIS... Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab Read more
SEOUL, April 3 (Reuters) - North Korea has tested a new solid-fuel hypersonic missile with intermediate range, it said on Wednesday, in an intensifying race for the next generation of long-range rockets hard to track and intercept.
The United States, China, Russia and other countries have also been developing hypersonic weapons in recent years.
HOW DO THE MISSILES WORK?
The warheads they launch typically travel at more than five times the speed of sound or about 6,200 kph (3,850 mph), often at relatively low altitudes.
Despite their name, analysts say the main feature of hypersonic weapons is not speed - which can sometimes be matched or exceeded by traditional ballistic missile warheads - but manoeuvrability.
North Korea's first hypersonic missile test in 2021 featured a glider-shaped warhead, while a 2022 launch used what South Korean military officials and analysts said was actually a conical manoeuvrable reentry vehicle (MaRV), or a ballistic missile warhead capable of manoeuvring to hit a target.
State media said the North's latest test was aimed at perfecting an arsenal for "rapidly, accurately and powerfully striking any target in the enemy side worldwide".
Combining a glide vehicle with a missile that can launch it partially into orbit - a so-called fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) - could further strip adversaries of reaction time and traditional defence mechanisms.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), by contrast, carry nuclear warheads on ballistic trajectories that travel into space but never reach orbit.
WHO LEADS THE RACE?
In February Russia for the first time fired its Zircon hypersonic cruise missile against Ukraine, researchers said. President Vladimir Putin has touted the weapon as part of a new generation and Moscow has also tested it from a submarine and a frigate.
China launched a rocket carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle that flew through space in 2021, circling the globe before cruising down toward its target, which it missed by about two dozen miles, however.
In Sept 2021, the United States said it had tested an air-breathing hypersonic weapon - meaning it flies on its own through the atmosphere like a cruise missile - in the first successful test of that class of weapon since 2013.
WHAT IS NORTH KOREA'S HYPERSONIC GOAL?
At a Jan. 2021 meeting of the ruling Workers' Party, leader Kim Jong Un set securing the weapons as one of five key objectives of a five-year plan to boost military power, alongside developing solid-fuel ICBMs and a nuclear submarine.
In Sept. 2021, the North described its first hypersonic missile as a "strategic weapon" designed to bolster its defence capabilities, though some South Korean analysts called the test a failure.
In early 2022, Seoul officials said the North tested another missile, potentially another hypersonic one, that flew at relatively low altitudes at up to 10 times the speed of sound (12,340 kmh/7,670 mph).
In January Pyongyang launched its first such missile powered by solid fuel to ensure a quicker launch with less preparation.
On a rare trip to Russia last September, Kim inspected Moscow's hypersonic missiles, among other weapons.
WHY DOES IT MATTER?
The global push for hypersonic weapons is part of an arms race in which smaller Asian nations are striving to develop advanced long-range missiles alongside major military powers.
Hypersonic weapons and FOBS could be a concern as they can potentially evade missile shields and early warning systems.
"Mid- to long-range hypersonic missiles would be useful for striking Guam while evading the U.S. missile defence system," said Chang Young-keun, a professor at Korea Aerospace University.
The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here.
Reporting by Josh Smith; Editing by Clarence Fernandez
6. N. Korea says Q1 economic goals attained as it holds cabinet plenary meeting
Figures lie and liars figure. That saying probably applies to north Korea more than most countries.
N. Korea says Q1 economic goals attained as it holds cabinet plenary meeting | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 4, 2024
SEOUL, April 4 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Thursday it has accomplished major economic plans for the first quarter as it held a plenary meeting of the cabinet to review economic performances and discuss measures.
The North made the assessment on performances in 12 major sectors during a video conference presided over by Premier Kim Tok-hun on Wednesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
In 2022, North Korea laid out 12 major economic goals, putting top priority on boosting grain production amid the country's chronic food shortages.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has called for developing backward provinces by building modernized factories in 20 counties over the next decade to raise the "basic material and cultural living standards of the people."
The South Korean government has voiced skepticism over the plan, raising questions about whether the resource-scarce country would have sufficient equipment and funds to implement the project.
North Korea holds a cabinet plenary meeting via video link on April 20, 2022, in this file photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 4, 2024
7. The Crisis in East Asia: Korea or Taiwan?
Important analysis from our good friend Dr. Cho.
However, I disagree with this excerpt. Strength is the best way to prevent escalation. If the "three axis" system was going to be employed prior to war the ROK would have done so already. Despite the rhetoric and interpretation by pundits the three axis will be employed in response to north Korean attacks. We have seen for 70 years that the alliance has rejected preemptive strikes mostly due to the "tyranny of proximity:" the proximity of Seoul to the DMZ and the potential response by north Korea with attacks on Seoul. Few talk about it, but this tyranny of proximity has been the biggest deterrent capability for north Korea.
A conflict on the Korean Peninsula can also spiral out of control faster due to South Korean doctrine being more offensive than that of Taiwan. According to 2022 defense white paper, the South Korean military has developed a strategy called “the three-axis system” since 2012. This offensive military strategy features preemptive strikes against North Korean bases associated with nuclear or missile attacks and retaliatory attack such as precision missile attacks or infiltration of special operation forces for leadership decapitation. In comparison, Taiwan’s military strategy is defensive in nature. According to Taiwan’s defense white paper, its strategy is designed to “fully take advantage of Taiwan Strait’s geography” and attack the enemy during “its most vulnerable strait-crossing phase.” Taiwan’s strategy does not envision preemptive or retaliatory strikes against key facilities on the Chinese mainland or leaders in Beijing, like South Korea’s does.
The Crisis in East Asia: Korea or Taiwan? - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Sungmin Cho · April 4, 2024
During his New Year’s Eve address, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping said that “China will surely be reunified” and that “all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common purpose.” In stark contrast, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that “re-unification with South Korea is no longer possible” and that the constitution should be revised to designate the South as “principle enemy.” One might ponder which of these statements is a more ominous sign: Xi Jinping’s usual remark to pursue unification, or Kim Jong-un’s unusual statement to abandon it?
By comparing changing perspectives and the conditions that will enable or hinder a surprise attack, one can evaluate where a contingency is more likely to occur between the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. The comparative analysis suggests that a crisis in northeast Asia is more likely to start on the Korean Peninsula, not in Taiwan.
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Comparing the Changing Perspectives
For the past two months, Kim Jong-un has conveyed unusually aggressive messages. During a year-end policy meeting in December 2023, Kim said to “newly formulate” North Korea’s stance toward South Korea, labeling it as “the enemy.” Then, at the Supreme People’s Assembly on Jan. 15, 2024, he announced the dismantling of all organizations engaging with South Korea, such as the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification. Beyond rhetoric, through January 2024, North Korea tested a nuclear-capable underwater attack drone and a hypersonic glide vehicle, and it fired approximately 200 artillery shells into the sea near South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island, prompting the evacuation of South Korean citizens to shelters.
Why has Kim Jong-un heightened his aggression toward South Korea at the start of 2024? Scholars have proposed various interpretations. First, it may be related to South Korea’s general elections in April and the U.S. presidential election in November. According to data compiled by researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, North Korea tends to increase provocations in election years. Second, increased support from Russia and China might have emboldened Pyongyang in confronting South Korea and the United States further than it otherwise would. Third, identifying South Korea as an enemy would help justify North Korea’s further aggression and weapons development. Fourth, the North Korean people’s growing admiration of rich and democratic South Korea, especially among young North Koreans, might compel Kim Jong-un to eradicate the concept of “fellow countrymen” with South Koreans.
While there is no consensus on which cause is the most significant among these, scholars generally agree on one observation: Regardless of the cause, a surge in North Korea’s belligerence is highly likely in 2024. Han Ki-bum, a former analyst with over 30 years of service at South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, anticipates that North Korea will engage in “high-intensity provocations that hold South Korea hostage, creating a sense of threat even for American citizens.” Such a provocation could take the form of a seventh nuclear test, missile tests near Guam or Hawaii, a limited attack on South Korean territory, or a combination of these events. For a surprise attack, Pyongyang may engage in something that analysts in Seoul and Washington have not contemplated before.
Compared to these developments on the Korean Peninsula, the situation across the Taiwan Strait suddenly appears more stable. Although Beijing is expected to maintain a military presence around Taiwan and continue economic and diplomatic offensives, as demonstrated by Nauru’s cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan, no surprising crisis is anticipated. Taiwan watchers also agree that the new Democratic Progressive Party administration is unlikely to make any radical moves toward formal independence.
There are several reasons to believe that a major crisis is unlikely to occur in the Taiwan Strait for the time being. First, the Chinese Communist Party is preoccupied with domestic issues, particularly economic challenges. It needs to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the United States and its developed allies, especially when seeking foreign investments. Second, the Chinese leaders should be concerned about the combat readiness of the People’s Liberation Army. Recent reports of widespread corruption suggest that it is not the best time for the Chinese military to attack Taiwan and face the risk of potential conflict with U.S. forces. Third, the new administration in Taipei will also be busy handling domestic affairs. It must tackle Taiwan’s economic challenges, such as stagnant wages and high housing prices. This task is further complicated with a divided legislature, as the opposition Kuomintang Party holds one more seat than the Democratic Progressive Party, while the Taiwan People’s Party holds eight seats, positioning this third party as the swing caucus.
In short, although there are few indications that tension will decrease in the Taiwan Strait, both Beijing and Taipei would prefer to maintain a status quo without a major crisis, largely for domestic reasons. In contrast, Kim Jong-un seems determined to take riskier actions than his already belligerent provocations. North Korea’s changing perspective is particularly concerning, when comparing the conditions and pathways to crisis between the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.
Comparing the Conditions and Pathways to Crisis
In terms of geography, Taiwan enjoys the advantage of the protection of the Taiwan Strait. For the People’s Liberation Army to invade Taiwan, it has to cross the 80-mile-wide strait, which has difficult weather for most of the year. Further, an amphibious attack requires time for mobilization, which would be detectable by intelligence means such as satellite imagery. Chinese preparations for what would be the largest and most distant amphibious invasion in modern history would therefore hardly go unnoticed. In contrast, North and South Korea share an approximately 160-mile-long border on land, densely packed with ammunition and weaponry in the demilitarized zone. Additionally, the two countries have a track record of naval skirmishes near the northern limit line in the Yellow Sea. This comparison of geographical features indicates that the North and South Korean militaries have more chances of accidental clashes on land or at sea adjacent to the peninsula than the Chinese and the Taiwan militaries across the Taiwan Strait.
The Korean Peninsula also presents more pathways to a major crisis compared to the Taiwan Strait due to the scale and frequency of military exercises. Past records show that North Korea increases military provocations around U.S.-South Korean military exercises. The People’s Liberation Army also tends to conduct military exercises whenever Taiwan does. However, Taiwan’s conventional forces are no match for the size of the Chinese military. Therefore, Taiwan’s exercise is unlikely to evoke the same sense of threat in Beijing that the U.S.-South Korean military exercises might in Pyongyang. In terms of frequency, South Korea conducts two combined exercises with U.S. forces and three national-level joint exercises annually. Taiwan executes one national-level joint exercise named Han Kuang per year. This implies that North Korea has five times more opportunities to use South Korea’s exercises as an excuse to justify its military provocations than China does with Taiwan’s exercises.
A conflict on the Korean Peninsula can also spiral out of control faster due to South Korean doctrine being more offensive than that of Taiwan. According to 2022 defense white paper, the South Korean military has developed a strategy called “the three-axis system” since 2012. This offensive military strategy features preemptive strikes against North Korean bases associated with nuclear or missile attacks and retaliatory attack such as precision missile attacks or infiltration of special operation forces for leadership decapitation. In comparison, Taiwan’s military strategy is defensive in nature. According to Taiwan’s defense white paper, its strategy is designed to “fully take advantage of Taiwan Strait’s geography” and attack the enemy during “its most vulnerable strait-crossing phase.” Taiwan’s strategy does not envision preemptive or retaliatory strikes against key facilities on the Chinese mainland or leaders in Beijing, like South Korea’s does.
Strategic Assessment and Adjustment
All these elements — the geographical features of the Korean Peninsula, the heightened state of military confrontation, and South Korea’s offensive military strategy — suggest that, first, the Korean Peninsula has a greater likelihood of a military conflict, whether intentional or accidental, than the Taiwan Strait, and, second, such a conflict can escalate into a larger crisis more rapidly than a conflict might over Taiwan.
Some might disagree. A critic might argue that China could be planning to escalate tensions soon, around May 20, the inauguration day of the new president in Taipei. Beijing might use the occasion to manufacture a crisis with Taiwan to divert the Chinese people’s attention away from internal problems and bolster support for Xi Jinping’s nationalist legitimacy. And the increasing activity of the Chinese Coast Guard near Taiwan’s Kinmen Island in February might signal this outcome. A critic might also argue that Kim Jong-un has no intent to initiate a major crisis. Given the asymmetry between North Korea’s military power and the combined forces of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, Kim stands to lose more than he would gain by instigating a crisis on the peninsula. Many analysts point to North Korea’s provision of large amounts of munitions to Russia as evidence that Kim Jong-un is not preparing to start a war against South Korea. As such, critics might surmise that a crisis and war over Taiwan are more likely than one involving the Korean Peninsula.
However, the nature of potential crises in these two regions needs to be reassessed in terms of predictability and controllability. Indeed, China will likely continue a “new normal” level of military activities around Taiwan. Beijing will adhere to its playbook, employing various tools in economic, diplomatic, legal, and psychological realms, in addition to military measures. Nonetheless, the People’s Liberation Army is unlikely to launch a military attack against Taiwanese islands or kill Taiwanese citizens, as North Korea did against South Korea. As Robert Sutter argues, China’s actions leading up to Lai Ching-Te’s inauguration in May seem likely to fall “within the parameters of pressure and intimidation Beijing has applied to the Democratic Progressive Party administration since the party assumed leadership in 2016.” Historical records also show a pattern that Beijing prefers to control an external crisis rather than initiate one when faced with domestic challenges. The geography of the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s defensive military strategy would be helpful in controlling an escalation of the crisis.
The Korean Peninsula has an opposite structure: North Korea’s behavior is unpredictable, and a crisis is likely to be uncontrollable this time. Yes, Kim Jong-un might have no intent to start a war on the peninsula, but a provocation short of war or a local conflict is still likely in 2024. Kim’s announcement of abandoning unification is a sign of an unusual level or type of provocation: Whether to match his announcement with military actions for the domestic audience or to use the new rhetoric to justify further aggression, either way, Kim Jong-un would do something. The challenge is that the level or type of provocations he would undertake is highly unpredictable. The unpredictability worsens due to the geographical feature of South and North Korea’s shared border and both Koreas’ highly offensive military strategies. A crisis will quickly spiral out of control through an action-reaction dynamic. Even if Kim Jong-un does not intend to initiate a major crisis, a limited conflict can rapidly escalate into a bigger crisis than Kim himself may anticipate.
In recent years, analysts concerned about simultaneous crises in these two regions have debated the question of what North Korea would do if there is a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. Now they need to ask the question in reversed order: If there is a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, what would Beijing do in the Taiwan Strait? Would China exploit the Korean crisis and take opportunistic actions against Taiwan? If not, would Beijing be willing to discuss with Washington how to control a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, as it did in 2017, instead? The reassessment of threat levels on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait raises these significant questions that will impact U.S. deterrence and diplomacy vis-á-vis China.
Become a Member
Sungmin Cho, PhD, is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, an academic institute of the U.S. Department of Defense, based in Honolulu, Hawaii. This essay was presented at a workshop organized by the Perry World House and has benefited from the feedback received. The views expressed in this essay represent only those of the author, not those of the U.S. Department of Defense.
Image: 51st Fighter Wing
warontherocks.com · by Sungmin Cho · April 4, 2024
8. Biden stresses 'enduring' U.S. commitment to Korean Peninsula denuclearization to Xi: White House
Biden stresses 'enduring' U.S. commitment to Korean Peninsula denuclearization to Xi: White House | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 3, 2024
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; ADDS more info in last para)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 2 (Yonhap) -- President Joe Biden underscored the United States' "enduring" commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula during phone talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday, the White House said.
The call came amid growing concerns over North Korea's continued saber-rattling, including its missile launch this week, and a potential erosion of the sanctions regime against the North due to Russia's veto last week of a resolution to extend the mandate of a U.N. panel monitoring sanctions enforcement.
The leaders' engagement followed their in-person summit in California in November, where they agreed on the resumption of bilateral military communications and other areas of cooperation in a display of their desire to stably manage the great-power relationship despite a hardening rivalry over security, technology and trade.
U.S. President Joe Biden (L) meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Filoli estate in Woodside, California, on Nov. 15, 2023, in this file photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)
"(Biden) emphasized the United States' enduring commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," the White House said in a readout on the call, which it portrayed as "candid and constructive."
On the eve of the leaders' talks, a senior U.S. official told reporters that Biden planned to discuss with Xi efforts to advance the denuclearization of the peninsula, as the official highlighted rising concerns about Pyongyang's provocative moves.
"(There is) certainly growing concern about the DPRK's provocations and the risks of its growing economic, military, technological partnership with Russia," the official said. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"We certainly continue to underscore those concerns to China while also reiterating our readiness to conduct diplomacy with North Korea and our determination to take steps to deter further provocations by the DPRK."
Concerns have persisted that the intensifying competition between the two superpowers could shrink room for tighter cooperation on North Korea-related issues, particularly at a time of North Korea's burgeoning military cooperation with Russia, which boasts its "no-limits" partnership with Beijing.
Those concerns deepened last week when Russia vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution to extend the mandate of the expert panel, which is set to expire on April 30 absent its passage. China abstained in the vote -- a move that cast a pall over the future of international cooperation on sanctions enforcement.
In Tuesday's call, Biden also emphasized "the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the rule of law and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea," while raising concerns over China's support for Russia's defense industrial base, according to the White House.
In addition, Biden raised concerns about what the U.S. termed China's unfair trade policies and non-market economic practices.
"The president emphasized that the United States will continue to take necessary actions to prevent advanced U.S. technologies from being used to undermine our national security, without unduly limiting trade and investment," it said.
Biden and Xi welcomed ongoing efforts to maintain open channels of communication and responsibly manage the relationship through high-level diplomacy and other consultations in the weeks and months ahead, including during upcoming visits to China by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
During their call, the two sides also reviewed and encouraged progress from their California summit, including counternarcotics cooperation, ongoing military-to-military communication, talks to address AI-related risks, and continuing efforts on climate change, the White House said.
In Monday's pre-summit briefing, the senior U.S. official stressed, "Intense competition requires intense diplomacy to manage tensions, address misperception and prevent unintended conflict. This call is one way to do that."
The official also underlined the U.S.' unchanged approach to China based on its framework of "invest, align and compete." The approach refers to Washington's strategy to make investments to reinforce its strength, and pursue alignment with allies and partners in its increasingly intense competition with China.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 3, 2024
9. Russia Just Gutted the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea – What Now?
Excerpts:
What’s left is ultimately a sanctions regime with no enforcement or monitoring mechanism, and enough political disagreement to ensure stagnation for the foreseeable future.
Of course, Western governments and civil society will step in to provide intelligence on North Korea’s activities and shore-up unilateral sanctions. Just this month, for example, RUSI’s Open Source Intelligence and Analysis team released a report showing North Korean tankers loading oil in Russian ports – another blatant violation of international sanctions. Yet, despite the clear evidence presented in this report and reports like it, many countries will still view them with suspicion, seeing them as instruments of Western intelligence propaganda. They will not enjoy the near universal trust that Panel reports have been able to garner.
This, unfortunately, is what makes Russia’s veto so devastating – not only does it fundamentally reject and undermine non-proliferation norms, but it also exacerbates distrust. There can be little doubt that North Korea will once again prove itself capable of exploiting that distrust to advance its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programmes.
Russia Just Gutted the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea – What Now?
Dr Aaron Arnold3 April 2024
rusi.org
In what amounts to a significant turning point in the international sanctions regime against North Korea, Russia recently vetoed a UN Security Council resolution to extend the North Korea UN Panel of Experts’ mandate for another year – breaking 14 years of unanimous support. Russia’s UN Ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, lambasted the UN sanctions against North Korea as ineffective, before launching an attack on the UN Panel of Experts’ work, claiming its investigations were biased products of Western influence.
In a joint statement following the vote, the US, France, Japan, South Korea and the UK criticised Russia’s action as ‘nothing more than an attempt to silence independent, objective investigations’ – specifically those concerned with Russia’s acquisition of conventional weapons from North Korea – and an affront to upholding global non-proliferation norms.
Unfortunately, Russia’s actions have far more dire consequences than merely bringing an end to a UN body responsible for monitoring compliance with one of the world’s largest and most complex sanctions regimes. Not only will countries lose access to authoritative sources of information, but it is likely that the sanctions against North Korea will now persist in a zombie-like state – neither updated nor monitored.
14 Years of Authoritative Reporting
First established in 2009 with the adoption of Resolution 1874, the Panel of Experts for North Korea is tasked with gathering, analysing and reporting on incidents of non-compliance with the UN sanctions against North Korea. The Panel itself is made up of eight independent experts, each appointed by the UN Secretary General to serve terms of at least one year but no more than five. I personally served as the finance expert on the Panel from 2019 to 2021.
During each mandate period, which lasts one year, the Panel produces two key documents – the midterm and final reports, which detail North Korea’s sanctions evasion activities, highlight emerging trends, and document the country’s progress on its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programmes.
Up until 2017, when the Security Council made its last designation, the reports and accompanying recommendations played a critical role in identifying new targets for the Security Council to designate. Importantly, the reports are consensus-based, meaning that – while Russia argues that they are biased – the reports are in fact agreed upon by all members of the Panel, including those from Russia and China.
What is clear is that Russia would rather burn down institutions that support international peace and security than work in good faith
While the reports were never meant to assess the efficacy of the sanctions regime, they do have a hand when it comes to implementation. Countries’ national authorities and their private sector institutions have relied on cases outlined in the reports over the years to inform their own domestic rules and regulations related to implementation. Also, the cases presented in the reports have provided clarity on sometimes complex and vague obligations, together with practical information for countries to pursue legal and criminal enforcement. This was especially true for countries that lacked significant resources to put behind sanctions implementation – an often costly endeavour.
Furthermore, in the absence of a direct enforcement mechanism, the reports have acted as something of an incentive for countries to follow UN sanctions through naming and shaming. It was often in a country's interest to avoid being named in a report.
Why Did Russia Sink the Panel?
Russia’s veto on extending the Panel’s mandate is just another episode in a long history of chipping away at the Panel’s autonomy and its ability to follow through on its mandate. Working with China, for example, Russia was able to leverage its influence to hamstring the Panel’s ability to effectively conduct investigations, slashing budgets and imposing pointless administrative travel restrictions.
While China attracts a lot of criticism for its blatant attempts to control any content in the reports that it perceives to be a threat to its sovereignty or territorial integrity, Russia is guilty, too. Should it really come as a surprise that Russia is effectively ending the Panel that is charged with investigating and making public its acquisition of ballistic missiles and conventional weapons from North Korea – a blatant and egregious violation of its international obligations?
Russia’s interference also extends beyond just the North Korea Panel of Experts. Seeking to hide its mercenary activities in Africa, Russia deliberately held up the appointment of experts to the South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Mali expert panels in 2021.
What is clear is that Russia would rather burn down institutions that support international peace and security than work in good faith.
A Grim Future
An 11th-hour fix is possible, but unlikely. Russia and China have, in the past, threatened not to renew the mandate unless the 1718 Committee agreed to changes to the Panel’s mandate. Most of these were relatively insignificant, but cumulatively chipped away at the Panel’s autonomy. Nonetheless, a second bite of the apple may be too bitter for the US, the UK and France to accept.
Without an effective monitoring mechanism, countries may have little incentive to implement sanctions as robustly
The UN sanctions regime against North Korea is in trouble, too. The Security Council has been ineffective at making even modest changes, like new designations, since 2017. It seems unlikely now that the permanent members of the Security Council will find any sort of political agreement, leaving sanctions implementation in a state of limbo. Furthermore, without an effective monitoring mechanism, countries may have little incentive to implement sanctions as robustly.
What’s left is ultimately a sanctions regime with no enforcement or monitoring mechanism, and enough political disagreement to ensure stagnation for the foreseeable future.
Of course, Western governments and civil society will step in to provide intelligence on North Korea’s activities and shore-up unilateral sanctions. Just this month, for example, RUSI’s Open Source Intelligence and Analysis team released a report showing North Korean tankers loading oil in Russian ports – another blatant violation of international sanctions. Yet, despite the clear evidence presented in this report and reports like it, many countries will still view them with suspicion, seeing them as instruments of Western intelligence propaganda. They will not enjoy the near universal trust that Panel reports have been able to garner.
This, unfortunately, is what makes Russia’s veto so devastating – not only does it fundamentally reject and undermine non-proliferation norms, but it also exacerbates distrust. There can be little doubt that North Korea will once again prove itself capable of exploiting that distrust to advance its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programmes.
The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.
Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we’ll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. Full guidelines for contributors can be found here.
rusi.org
10. Casualties reported during N. Korea's military drills involving paratroopers last month
Airborne operations in high winds are always dangerous.
There is a photo at the link. Those are some strange looking parachutes. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240404003800315?section=nk/nk
Casualties reported during N. Korea's military drills involving paratroopers last month | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 4, 2024
SEOUL, April 4 (Yonhap) -- Multiple casualties occurred during military drills involving paratroopers supervised by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last month, South Korean government sources said Thursday.
Pyongyang's state media reported on March 16 that Kim guided the training of airborne military units the previous day and called for war preparations. He was accompanied by his teen daughter, Ju-ae.
The drills apparently took place despite strong winds, blocking parachutes from opening properly and causing collisions, according to the sources.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on March 16, 2024, shows the North staging military drills of paratroopers, guided by its leader Kim Jong-un, the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
State media said Kim observed with great satisfaction the paratroopers "fully demonstrating their perfect combat capability," without addressing the incident.
A military official said authorities are closely monitoring the North Korean military's activities and drills.
An official at the unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs told reporters Thursday the ministry has no details to confirm.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on March 16, 2024, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attending military drills of paratroopers the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 4, 2024
11. S. Korea to chair first UN Security Council meeting with focus on cyber threats
Excellent. Of course two of the biggest cyber threats come from two P5 members, CHina and Russia.
S. Korea to chair first UN Security Council meeting with focus on cyber threats
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · April 4, 2024
By Ji Da-gyum
Published : April 4, 2024 - 18:41
Members of the United Nations Security Council meet on the day of a vote on a Gaza resolution that demanded an immediate cease-fire for the month of Ramadan leading to a permanent cease-fire and the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, at UN headquarters in New York on March 25. (Reuters)
South Korea is poised to chair a UN Security Council meeting on cybersecurity on Thursday to shed light on the repercussions of cyber threats and malicious cyber activities, including North Korea's sanctions-busting maneuvers in cyberspace, on international peace and security.
The chairing of South Korea's first Arria-formula meeting — an informal gathering convened by a Security Council member or members — represents a significant milestone for Korea since assuming its position as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in January.
Although cybersecurity is not officially on the Security Council's agenda, the members have convened Arria-formula meetings, separate from formal sessions, to discuss the critical issue and its implications for international peace and security. The 15-member Security Council's primary responsibility is to maintain international peace and security.
South Korea is organizing the Arria-formula meeting titled "Evolving Cyber Threat Landscape and Its Implications for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security," with the United States and Japan serving as co-hosts.
The Arria-formula meeting will address the evolving cyber threat landscape, including topics such as ransomware and cryptocurrency theft, as outlined in a concept note for the meeting provided by the missions of South Korea, the US and Japan to the UN on Wednesday.
Other topics for discussion include the proliferation of malicious actors in cyberspace and the necessity for international cooperation to confront the growing complexity of cyber threats.
Cybersecurity is one of the key thematic issues South Korea seeks to highlight at the Security Council as a member, alongside peacekeeping and peacebuilding; women, peace and security; and climate and security.
Seoul's focus on cybersecurity is particularly pertinent given that the UN reports on North Korea's sanctions evasions in March said 40 percent of the weapons of mass destruction programs in North Korea are funded by illicit cyber means.
The goal of the meeting is to "promote better understanding of the impact of various malicious cyber activities, that were characterized as cybercrime, on international peace and security, including WMD non-proliferation, which includes actions characterized as cybercrime and other existing disarmament architecture, and Security Council-mandated sanctions," according to the note.
The concept note of the meeting also identifies North Korea’s cybercrimes aimed at circumventing UN Security Council resolutions as a key agenda item for discussion.
The concept note notably quoted a UN report stating that "one member state's illicit gains from malicious cyber activity account for approximately half of its foreign currency revenue, and about 40 percent of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs are known to be funded by illicit cyber means," without explicitly naming North Korea.
"Nation states and non-state actors sanctioned by the UN Security Council are increasingly leveraging gains from cybercrimes as a vital tool to evade UN Security Council-mandated sanctions regimes, undermining the effectiveness of the collective work of the Security Council," the concept note read.
The meeting's other key goal is to "discuss and provide possible recommendations on enhancing the UN Security Council's pivotal role and comprehensive engagement in addressing the multifaceted nature of cyber threats."
South Korean Ambassador to the UN, Hwang Joon-kook, has previously highlighted the urgent need for addressing cyber issues at the UN Security Council, citing North Korea's illicit revenue generation in cyberspace as a primary concern.
"Cyber security is not yet officially on the Security Council's agenda. However, there is a broad consensus nowadays that cyberattacks pose a significant threat to peace and security for all countries at all levels," Hwang said during an event organized by the New York-headquartered Korea Society in March.
Hwang then stated that North Korea is currently generating approximately a billion dollars in revenue annually solely through cyber hacking of foreign banks and cryptocurrency exchanges to fund its WMD programs.
"Despite the lack of consensus in the Security Council on how to address emerging cyber security issues, the Republic of Korea aims to elevate its profile in the Council’s work," Hwang emphasized.
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · April 4, 2024
12. A Vigilante Hacker Took Down North Korea’s Internet. Now He’s Taking Off His Mask
I bet there are more than a few like this gentleman. I hope we can effectively exploit them. We do need to be more aggressive, especially toward north Korea. But it seems like so much else we "self-deter" out of fear of escalation.
Excerpts:
As for Caceres himself, he says he’s not opposed to American hacking agencies taking a conservative approach to limiting their damage or protecting civilians—as long as they take action. “There's being conservative,” he says, “and then there's doing fuck all.”
On the argument that more aggressive cyberattacks would lead to escalation and counterattacks from foreign hackers, Caceres points to the attacks those foreign hackers are already carrying out. The ransomware group AlphV's catastrophic attack on Change Healthcare in February, for instance, crippled medical claim platforms for hundreds of providers and hospitals, effects about as disruptive for civilians as any cyberattack can be. “That escalation is already happening,” Caceres says. “We’re not doing anything, and they’re still escalating.”
Caceres says he hasn’t entirely given up on convincing someone in the US government to adopt his more gloves-off approach. Ditching the P4x handle and revealing his real name is, in some sense, his last-ditch attempt to get the US government’s attention and restart the conversation.
But he also says he won’t be waiting for the Pentagon’s approval before he continues that approach on his own. “If I keep going with this alone, or with just a few people that I trust, I can move a lot faster,” he says. “I can fuck shit up for the people who deserve it, and I don't have to report to anyone.”
The P4x handle may be dead, in other words. But the P4x doctrine of cyberwarfare lives on.
A Vigilante Hacker Took Down North Korea’s Internet. Now He’s Taking Off His Mask
As “P4x,” Alejandro Caceres single-handedly disrupted the internet of an entire country. Then he tried to show the US military how it can—and should—adopt his methods.
Wired · by Andy Greenberg · April 4, 2024
A little over two years have passed since the online vigilante who would call himself P4x fired the first shot in his own one-man cyberwar. Working alone in his coastal Florida home in late January of 2022, wearing slippers and pajama pants and periodically munching on Takis corn snacks, he spun up a set of custom-built programs on his laptop and a collection of cloud-based servers that intermittently tore offline every publicly visible website in North Korea and would ultimately keep them down for more than a week.
P4x’s real identity, revealed here for the first time, is Alejandro Caceres, a 38-year-old Colombian-American cybersecurity entrepreneur with hacker tattoos on both arms, unruly dark brown hair, a very high tolerance for risk, and a very personal grudge. Like many other US hackers and security researchers, Caceres had been personally targeted by North Korean spies who aimed to steal his intrusion tools. He had detailed that targeting to the FBI but received no real government support. So he decided to take matters into his own hands and to send a message to the regime of Kim Jong Un: Messing with American hackers would have consequences. “It felt like the right thing to do here,” Caceres told WIRED at the time. “If they don’t see we have teeth, it’s just going to keep coming.”
As he sought an outlet to broadcast that message to the Kim regime, Caceres told his story to WIRED while he carried out his attack, providing screen-capture videos and other evidence that he was, in fact, single-handedly disrupting the internet of an entire country in real time. But it was only just before going public that he decided to invent the P4x pseudonym for himself. The handle, pronounced “pax,” was a cheeky allusion to his intention of forcing a kind of peace with North Korea through the threat of his own punitive measures. He hoped that by hiding behind that name, he might evade not just North Korean retaliation but also criminal hacking charges from his own government.
Instead of prosecuting him, however, Caceres was surprised to find, in the wake of his North Korean cyberattacks, the US government was more interested in recruiting him. Caceres would spend much of the next year on a strange journey into the secretive world of America’s state-sponsored hacking agencies. Adopted informally by a Pentagon contractor, he was invited to present his techniques to high-level US defense and intelligence officials. He carried out a long-term hacking project designed to impress his new audience, hitting real foreign targets. And he pitched Department of Defense officials on a mode of US government-sanctioned cyberattacks that, like his solo North Korean takedown, would be far leaner, faster, and arguably more effective than Washington’s slow and risk-averse model of cyberwar.
Caceres worried after his attack on North Korea that the US government might prosecute him. Instead, he was surprised to find that it was more interested in recruiting him.
Photograph: Devin Christopher
Caceres’ pitch never got the green light. Now, partly due to his frustration with that experience, he’s finally dropping his pseudonym to send a new message, this one aimed at his fellow Americans: that the US government needs to wield its hacking powers far more aggressively. “Both the NSA and the DOD have a ton of talented hackers, yet when it comes to actually performing disruptive cyber operations, for some reason we as a country are just frozen and scared,” Caceres says. “And that needs to change.”
He points to ransomware actors, mostly based in Russia, who extracted more than a billion dollars of extortion fees from victim companies in 2023 while crippling hospitals and government agencies. North Korea–affiliated hackers, meanwhile, stole another $1 billion in cryptocurrency last year, funneling profits into the coffers of the Kim regime. All of that hacking against the West, he argues, has been carried out with relative impunity. “We sit there while they hack us,” Caceres says.
So Caceres is now arguing that it’s time for the US to try the P4x approach: that a part of the solution to foreign cybersecurity threats is for the American government’s own hackers to show their teeth—and to use them far more often.
Caceres and the Pentagon contractor that partnered with him—whose founder agreed to talk to WIRED on the condition we not name him or his company—spent much of the past two years advocating within the US government for that far-more-brazen approach to state-sponsored cyberattacks. They describe it as a special forces model: single hackers or small teams carrying out nimble, targeted digital disruptions, in contrast to the US’s traditionally slower and more bureaucratic approach to cyberwarfare.
“You can have an impact here, and it can be asymmetrical, and it can occur on a much faster timescale,” summarizes the founder of the hacker startup that worked with Caceres to pitch the Pentagon.
He cites a military principle that each member of a special forces unit should have the effect of 16 conventional soldiers. “With what we and P4x were doing, we wanted to increase that ratio a hundredfold,” he says. “And P4x would teach other operators how to do it.”
P4x Americana
In his public life as a security researcher, Caceres is known as a talented and sometimes brash figure in the hacker community: The second-generation Colombian-American, who used the hacker handle _hyp3ri0n long before he adopted the P4x pseudonym, is the founder of the cybersecurity startup Hyperion Gray and a frequent speaker at events like the Defcon hacker conference, where he has shared methods for lone hackers to amplify their reach and effects through cloud services and high-performance computing clusters. He’s also the creator of a somewhat controversial vulnerability scanning tool called PunkSpider, which he announced at Defcon in 2021 that he intended to use to scan every website in the world and publicly reveal all of their hackable vulnerabilities.
From the beginning of his hacker career, Caceres has never been one to shy away from the most aggressive applications of the digital dark arts. His first job out of college, while he pursued a graduate degree in international science and technology policy, was working for a subsidiary of the notorious military contractor formerly known as Blackwater, doing open-source intelligence investigations for corporate security and executive protection—what he describes as a “Google sweatshop.” Within a few years, however, Caceres and his startup Hyperion Gray were getting grants from the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, using his growing prowess in cloud and high-performance computing to scan the dark web as part of Darpa’s Memex program devoted to advancing search technologies for national security applications.
In that dark-web scouring, Caceres says, he regularly came upon child sexual abuse materials forums and even violent extremist content. He admits that he didn’t hesitate to hack some of those sites, pulling data off their backend servers and anonymously handing it to contacts at the Department of Homeland Security. “That probably wasn’t 100 percent legal,” he says, “but I didn’t necessarily give a fuck.”
Even his startup’s name, Hyperion Gray, reflected Caceres’ sense of the murky territory in which he traveled: It combined his _hyp3ri0n hacker handle, the name of a Titan from Greek mythology, with a shade in the middle of the spectrum between ideas of whitehat and blackhat hacking.
So when North Korean hackers chose Caceres as one of their targets in 2021, it was inevitable that he wouldn’t let that slight go unanswered. In January of that year, a fellow hacker whom Caceres didn’t know approached him online through a friend and asked if he’d take a look at what appeared to be an interesting software exploitation program, offering it to Caceres to download. A day or so later, Caceres read a blog post from Google’s Threat Analysis Group warning that North Korean hackers were going after US security researchers in what appeared to be an effort to steal their hacking tools and intel. Sure enough, when Caceres checked the file he’d downloaded and run on his own computer, he saw that it included a backdoor—only the fact that he’d quarantined the program on his machine had protected him from being fully compromised.
A portrait Wired took of Caceres before he decided to publicly reveal his identity as P4x.
Photograph: Devin Christopher
Caceres, appalled, reported the hacking attempt to the FBI. He says the bureau ultimately did little more than a fact-finding interview with him, with no real follow-up. So after nursing his grudge for a full year, he decided to take matters into his own hands. In late January of 2022, he began running custom hacking scripts designed to target a few key North Korean routers responsible for internet traffic into and out of the country, repeatedly checking whether they were online and, if they were, amplifying his waves of malicious data requests to cause them to crash. He described the project to WIRED at the time as about equivalent in workload to a “small-to-medium” size penetration test of the kind Hyperion Gray would carry out for clients.
North Korean watchers soon began to notice that the Hermit Kingdom’s entire web, from its government portal to its state-run airline booking site, had been knocked offline for days on end by an apparent cyberattack. News outlets published stories that pointed to the country’s recent missile tests, implying that the attack was perhaps the work of another country’s cyber forces—one news site suggested the US or possibly China—to signal to North Korea that it should stop threatening its neighbors. In reality, it was all the work of one aggrieved Florida man in his pajamas.
A Cyber Army of One
The US government may have had nothing to do with North Korea’s man-made internet outage, but it quietly took an interest in it. In the weeks after WIRED published its story about P4x’s solo hacking feat, Caceres began to receive messages from hacker friends with connections to the Pentagon and intelligence agencies—sent not to P4x but to Caceres’ own true-name accounts. Several agencies, he was told, were intrigued by his work and interested in talking to him.
For those in the know, identifying Caceres had been worryingly easy: He had given away hints in posts to his Twitter account about his North Korean targeting prior to his decision to hide it behind the P4x pseudonym. After P4x’s public statements on the cyberattack, one fellow hacker had even posted screenshots of Caceres’ now-deleted tweets, though without spelling out what exactly they revealed.
One friend had discussed Caceres’ work with a high-ranking military official and told Caceres there was someone the official now wanted Caceres to talk to: a longtime military intelligence contractor who had done contract work for the Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees groups like the Army’s Delta Force and the Navy’s Seal Team Six. WIRED agreed to call him Angus, though that isn’t his real name.
A few weeks after his North Korea attack, Caceres met Angus in the offices of Angus’ Pentagon-funded hacker startup. Angus began by warning Caceres that he was potentially in danger of reprisal from the North Korean state and that he should be wary of the possibility of a physical attack that might be made to look like a mugging, or of someone tampering with his prescription medications. “Before that, I was nervous,” Caceres says. “After that, I was shit-scared.” Angus suggested the hacker ought to arm himself. (Caceres, not one for half measures, later bought three guns and multiple bulletproof vests.)
Angus quizzed Caceres about his past hacking activities, his allegiance to other governments—he said he didn’t have any—and his politics. He specifically asked Caceres if he was a Marxist. Caceres confirmed he was not. With that brief vetting out of the way, they went out for drinks and talked late into that night about what a P4x-style US special forces hacker team might look like and what sort of work they might do together to demonstrate that model to the Department of Defense.
Soon after, Angus convened a meeting of military and intelligence staff at his startup’s office, where they listened to a presentation from Caceres. Standing before an audience of officials from Cyber Command, Special Operations Command, the NSA, and the Marines' Cyberspace Command known as Marforcyber, he detailed his North Korean hacking project as a case study and laid out principles for how it could be replicated: Aim for “easy and impactful.” Minimize the number of “cooks in the kitchen.” Iterate rapidly. He laid out a timeline for operations that suggested assembling teams of two to four hackers, with support from researchers and analysts, and taking just a few days to plan an operation.
“For the US government, any execution on target is typically a six-month process. P4x did it in two weeks,” says Angus. “The whole point was that he can show them how to do it, and if they wanted to they could fund it and see it happen.”
The response to the presentation was positive, if somewhat cynical, according to Angus. “Most of them put their faces in their palms when they realized what he’d done and how he did it, and the only thing that stopped them from doing it was bureaucracy,” he says. Caceres remembers that one audience member responded with a joke: that Caceres forgot the step where he presents a 100-slide PowerPoint deck to someone who doesn’t understand what he’s talking about and then denies him authorization.
Too Hot for the DOD
After that initial presentation, Caceres gave a similar talk at MIT Lincoln Laboratory, a Pentagon-funded R&D lab, and then was invited to speak again near DC, this time to a larger audience of military and intelligence officials. That last speaking engagement was delayed due to paperwork and would ultimately never happen—in part because Caceres was by then busy with a more hands-on demonstration.
In fact, while Angus sought funding for their project, Caceres was targeting another foreign adversary to show the full extent of the cyber mayhem a small team could inflict. Over the next year, he and another hacker who goes by the handle tu3sday undertook a broad intrusion campaign whose details they both declined to describe.
Caceres and tu3sday did much of that hacking in the offices of Angus’ startup, visiting the site dozens of times over the next year. But Caceres says that the work was never officially carried out with the company’s approval or involvement, much less the Pentagon’s. “The message I got was that it was a ‘don’t get caught, we’ll disavow all knowledge’ sort of thing," Caceres says.
Meanwhile, Angus found that he was running into roadblocks in his attempts to get more official support for their experiment. “The initial response was, ‘We should be doing that,’” he says. But as he “talked it up a very long chain, all the way to very senior people to see if they were amenable to it, most of them were not.”
Angus says he’s still not sure why their project didn’t gain traction. He believes it was only partly a considered decision by the Pentagon not to engage in the more aggressive and freewheeling hacking operations that they’d proposed. He thinks the resistance can be explained at least as much by the Department of Defense’s sclerotic management and the difficulty of convincing it to try anything new that involves risk. “There were forces that were nebulous even to me, and people wanted different things, and there was a lot of risk-aversion,” says Angus. “Bureaucracy was 100 percent a factor. They were trying to dilute liability.”
After nearly a year of Angus’ efforts to find funding for the project and failing, Caceres says he gave up and ended his visits to the startup. “We had something really powerful to share here, and something they really need,” he says of the US military. “And nothing really came of it.”
WIRED reached out to the Department of Defense, Cyber Command, and the NSA, but none responded to our requests for comment.
A Tricky Trilemma
Even after hitting that brick wall, Caceres hasn’t given up on his pitch. He has come forward, now speaking to WIRED under his own name, in an attempt to rekindle the idea of American “special forces” hackers: He still imagines small teams who make the lives of ransomware gangs hell by repeatedly targeting and destroying their servers and personal computers, or breaking into the wallets of North Korea–linked hackers to steal back the hundreds of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency that they routinely take from US victims. He also suggests that US cyber forces could easily, like P4x, take down North Korea’s internet for extended periods in response to every major theft until Kim’s state-sponsored thieves are forced to stop. “Like, every time they steal a hundred million dollars we shut down their internet for a year,” says Caceres. “Let’s figure out what kind of disruption makes them think twice about doing this.”
Caceres even argues that this sort of deterrent response could be used in answer to Russian or North Korean misbehavior in the physical world, such as war crimes or human rights abuses. Most radically, he argues that US cyber targeting shouldn’t be confined to military, government, or even criminal targets: that civilian infrastructure should be fair game, too. He says the effects of those attacks should be thought of not as “cyberwar” but as simply another kind of trade embargo or sanctions. “Exactly as we’re withholding certain goods and businesses from Russia right now,” Caceres says, “we could be withholding the internet.”
On his right arm, Caceres has tattoos of his pre-P4x hacker handles. On his left, he has a cryptographic hash—a long string of numbers and letters—that encodes a word. He invites WIRED readers to try to crack it.
Photograph: Devin Christopher
Those with a less run-and-gun approach to cyber policy, of course, cite some valid reasons why the Pentagon might hesitate to adopt the P4x model of state-sponsored hacking. If US Cyber Command took up Caceres’ notion of attacking civilian targets, for instance, it could be accused of war crimes, just as some have said about Russia’s cyberattacks against Ukraine, argues Jacquelyn Schneider, a cyber conflict researcher at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Not only would indiscriminate attacks on civilians be arguably immoral, she points out, they’d potentially invite other countries to do the same, or worse.
“That's not nice, and it’s not a good norm,” says Schneider. She says that much of the US government’s slow approach to cyberattacks stems from its care to ensure it avoids unintentionally hitting civilians as well as breaking international law or triggering dangerous blowback.
Still, Schneider concedes that Caceres and Angus have a point: The US could be using its cyber forces more, and some of the explanations for why it doesn’t amount to bureaucracy. “There are good reasons, and then there are bad reasons,” says Schneider. "Like, we have complicated organizational politics, we don’t know how to do things differently, we’re bad at using this type of talent, we’ve been doing it this way for 50 years, and it worked well for dropping bombs.”
America’s offensive hacking has, by all appearances, gotten less aggressive and less nimble over the past half decade, Schneider points out. Starting in 2018, for instance, General Paul Nakasone, then the head of Cyber Command, advocated a “defend forward” strategy aimed at taking cyber conflict to the enemy’s network rather than waiting for it to occur on America’s turf. In those years, Cyber Command launched disruptive hacking operations designed to cripple Russia’s disinformation-spouting Internet Research Agency troll farm and take down the infrastructure of the Trickbot ransomware group, which some feared at the time might be used to interfere in the 2020 election. Since then, however, Cyber Command and other US military hackers appear to have gone relatively quiet, often leaving the response to foreign hackers to law enforcement agencies like the FBI, which face far more legal constraints.
Caceres isn’t entirely wrong to criticize that more conservative stance, says Jason Healey, who until February served as a senior cybersecurity strategist at the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. He responds to Caceres’ cyberhawk arguments by citing the Subversive Trilemma, an idea laid out in a 2021 paper by the researcher Lennart Maschmeyer: Hacking operations have to choose among intensity, speed, and control. Even in earlier, more aggressive years, US Cyber Command has tended to turn up the dial for control, Healey says, prioritizing it over those other variables. But he notes there may in fact be certain targets—such as ransomware gangs or hackers working for Russia’s no-holds-barred GRU military intelligence agency—who might warrant resetting those dials. “For those targets,” says Healey, “you really can release the hounds.”
P4x Is Dead, Viva P4x
As for Caceres himself, he says he’s not opposed to American hacking agencies taking a conservative approach to limiting their damage or protecting civilians—as long as they take action. “There's being conservative,” he says, “and then there's doing fuck all.”
On the argument that more aggressive cyberattacks would lead to escalation and counterattacks from foreign hackers, Caceres points to the attacks those foreign hackers are already carrying out. The ransomware group AlphV's catastrophic attack on Change Healthcare in February, for instance, crippled medical claim platforms for hundreds of providers and hospitals, effects about as disruptive for civilians as any cyberattack can be. “That escalation is already happening,” Caceres says. “We’re not doing anything, and they’re still escalating.”
Caceres says he hasn’t entirely given up on convincing someone in the US government to adopt his more gloves-off approach. Ditching the P4x handle and revealing his real name is, in some sense, his last-ditch attempt to get the US government’s attention and restart the conversation.
But he also says he won’t be waiting for the Pentagon’s approval before he continues that approach on his own. “If I keep going with this alone, or with just a few people that I trust, I can move a lot faster,” he says. “I can fuck shit up for the people who deserve it, and I don't have to report to anyone.”
The P4x handle may be dead, in other words. But the P4x doctrine of cyberwarfare lives on.
Wired · by Andy Greenberg · April 4, 2024
13. Free textbooks for North Korean students who can pay for them in scrap paper
There is probably no country better at recycling than north Korea.
Free textbooks for North Korean students who can pay for them in scrap paper
With a shortage in raw materials, valuable paper must be recycled and it’s on students to provide it for book printing.
By Son Hyemin for RFA Korean
2024.04.03
rfa.org
North Korea is offering free textbooks to school children for the first time since the 1990s, but only on the condition that they provide the raw materials for the books in the form of scrap paper that is good enough to recycle, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.
The students were instructed to bring 2 kilograms (4.4 pounds) of “high-quality” scrap paper to school on April 1, the first day of the new school year. Those who brought less than 2 kilograms did not receive all the textbooks, a resident of the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“For students who cannot afford even 1 kilo of high-quality scrap paper, they will only receive three textbooks about the revolutionary activities (of members of the Kim Dynasty,)” she said. “They will only receive the remaining textbooks if they complete the scrap paper assignment.”
The last time the country offered free textbooks to students was when it was still being propped up by Soviet aid. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and aid from Moscow dried up, and North Korea’s centrally planned economy tanked, resulting in the 1994-1998 famine that killed hundreds of thousands of people, or as many as 2.2 million – about 10% of the population – by some estimates.
Students attend a class at the Kang Pan Sok revolutionary school outside Pyongyang, June 15, 2018. (Ed Jones/AFP)
But the government in recent years has recognized the disparity of educational opportunities between the capital Pyongyang and the provinces. The national budget has therefore been amended to include textbook production.
Valuable commodity
The problem is that North Korea does not have adequate raw materials to make enough textbooks out of new paper, and scrap paper good enough to recycle into textbooks is itself a valuable commodity.
A kilogram of high quality paper is worth 5,000 won (58 U.S. cents) in the local marketplace, whereas low quality paper can get 2,000 won (23 cents) – which is still expensive for most North Koreans.
Failure to bring enough paper will mean that the students will not receive the textbooks for English, math, information technology and physics, among other subjects that are key for a scientific education.
“Parents have to buy the high-quality scrap paper at the marketplace,” the resident said. “ But if the textbooks are only provided in exchange for the scrap paper, are they really free?”
In South Pyongan province, the quota was given to entire schools, and if the student body did not meet their quota then none of the students in their school would get all the books, a resident there told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
“Starting March 25, textbooks for each grade were supplied to educational institutions in each city and county, but schools that did not meet the scrap paper assignment did not receive some textbooks,” he said.
According to the South Pyongan resident, parents there complained that the revolutionary activities of the Kim Dynasty were propaganda, and therefore less important than math and science, but the authorities consider these to be important to instill loyalty into young people.
“The authorities defined the revolutionary activities as basic subjects, because they only care about ideological education,” he said.
Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
14. North Korea moves to promote closer relations with China
China and north Korea are treaty allies. (the only ones for both)
North Korea moves to promote closer relations with China
On the educational and cultural front, there are plans to hold cultural events aimed at promoting Sino-Korean friendship
By Jeong Tae Joo - April 4, 2024
https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-moves-to-promote-closer-relations-with-china/
Kim Song Nam, head of the International Department of the Workers' Party of Korea, who led a delegation to China, met with Wang Hu Ning, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, on Mar. 21, Rodong Sinmun reported. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
The North Korean authorities recently issued a directive through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare concrete proposals to promote closer cooperation with China, Daily NK has learned.
On Wednesday, a source inside North Korea told Daily NK that “on Apr. 1, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a party directive to the ministry’s various departments, field units in China and departments related to the Cabinet to make this year, the 75th anniversary of the establishment of DPRK-China relations, a turning point in strengthening cooperation with China in various fields.”
The orders called on officials to come up with plans to boost economic, trade, educational and cultural exchanges between the two countries.
The directive instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work with the Ministry of External Economic Relations to review trade agreements and joint economic projects with China and seek new opportunities for cooperation.
North Korea appears to be seeking to develop its own economy by stabilizing bilateral trade with China, particularly the export of natural resources and the import of food, energy, medicine, and consumer goods. This would make the two countries’ economies more interdependent, the source explained.
Plans include efforts to expand educational and cultural relations
On the educational and cultural front, there are also plans to hold cultural events aimed at cultivating future generations and promoting Sino-Korean friendship.
To this end, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has given its offices in China and other ministry-affiliated departments until April 10 to develop plans for language training, academic exchanges, cultural exchanges and other similar programs.
“The foreign ministry said that ‘the party and the state expect that exchanges and cooperation in various fields can build on the historical and cultural solidarity between North Korea and China and serve to promote mutual understanding and friendship between the two countries and have a positive impact on the development of North Korean-Chinese relations. [As a result] the ministry has asked staff in relevant departments to do their utmost in their roles and responsibilities [related to the initiative].”
These developments appear to be directly related to a recent delegation to China led by Kim Song Nam, director of the International Department and a veteran of Chinese affairs. Kim’s visit was seen as a party-level overture to restore and strengthen DPRK-China relations in time for the 75th anniversary, despite the weakening of Sino-North Korean relations as North Korea has moved closer to Russia.
According to Rodong Sinmun and other media outlets, Kim Song Nam led a delegation to China on Mar. 23 and met with several high-ranking Chinese officials, including Wang Hu Ning (chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), Liu Jianchao (head of the CCP’s International Department) and Wang Yi (director of the Foreign Affairs Commission Office of the CCP Central Committee). The two sides discussed the further development of relations between the DPRK and the People’s Republic of China and vowed to cooperate in the international arena.
Translated by Rose Adams. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
15. North Korea orders hunt to capture “impure elements” in Russia
Eat South Korea noodles or access the internet and get your wrists broken.
North Korea orders hunt to capture “impure elements” in Russia
"Security agents say they will break the wrists of anyone who eats instant noodles from the South Korean puppets or accesses the Internet," a source told Daily NK
By Lee Ho Jin - April 4, 2024
dailynk.com
North Korea orders hunt to capture “impure elements” in Russia - Daily NK English
FILE PHOTO: A construction site in Russia photographed in June 2019. North Korean workers were reportedly working there at the time. (Daily NK)
North Korean authorities have issued an order calling on North Korean workers in Russia to step up mutual surveillance and “track down internal impure elements secretly communicating with enemies,” Daily NK has learned.
The order comes after Daily NK, acting on a tip, exposed the corruption of a security officer at a North Korean construction company in the Siberian city of Irkutsk.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Daily NK source in Russia said Tuesday that the overseas counterintelligence bureau of the Ministry of State Security issued the order in mid-May. The order appears to be based on the ministry’s judgment that factual news reports based on inside information must stop.
More importantly, the Ministry of State Security believes that as contacts, in whatever form, with South Koreans increase, North Korean workers’ dissatisfaction with the regime and the likelihood of defection could grow – and that this is a danger that must be dealt with at all costs.
Indeed, since the order, security agents on the ground in Russia have stepped up their crackdown on North Korean workers.
“Security agents say they will break the wrists of anyone who eats instant noodles from the South Korean puppets or accesses the Internet, and they threaten to arrest anyone caught and send them back to North Korea to make an example of them,” the source said.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of State Security’s overseas counterintelligence bureau has been quietly handling the corruption case of the security agent reported by Daily NK.
Also speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in North Korea said North Korean leader Kim Jong Un considered the case a matter that the Ministry of State Security should handle on its own. He said that while the Ministry of State Security had not reported the latest incident to the party, it would consider repeated such exposures overseas as matters of grave concern that must be reported up the chain of command.
“The ministry considers the mere raising and discussion of problems to be a national disgrace, regardless of whether the news reports are true or not,” the source said. “It also tries to deal with such problems as quietly as possible, because if other problems arise, international attention could focus on them.”
Media reports can help prevent high-handed behavior by security officials
As for the possible punishment of the security officer involved in the latest corruption scandal, the source said the ministry would have a hard time replacing him immediately “because it would seem to prove that the news report is true.”
However, he also said that because the matter has tarnished the image of the security services, “it will be dealt with one way or another, perhaps by recalling the agent in a year or two under some other pretext.”
The source in Russia said that even if the agent were fired, “frankly, it’s like one thief leaving and another coming in – they’re all bastards.” He added, “Ultimately, the North Korean government has to change its perception.”
He added: “If there are more reports following up on the issue, it will give hope to the workers to know that it’s not the North Korean government but the media that cares about the injustices and bitterness suffered by overseas workers. [The reports] will also help in preventing high-handed behavior by security officials.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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