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Quotes of the Day:
"If you kill a cockroach you are a hero, if you kill a butterfly you are bad. Morality has aesthetic standards."
– Nietzsche
"The skill of writing is to create a context in which other people can think."
– Edwin Schlossberg
"The most important scientific revolutions all include, as their only common feature, the dethronement of human arrogance from one pedestal after another of previous convictions about our centrality in the cosmos."
– Stephen Jay Gould
1. Expert proposes new unification strategies based on existing formula
2. N. Korea conducts ground engine test for new hypersonic missile
3. US hinting at 'interim steps' with NK doesn't indicate policy shift: experts
4. US lawmaker notes S. Korea’s primary concern on NK threats in Taiwan contingency
5. HII is Awarded $305 Million Contract to Protect U.S. Regional Interests in the Republic of Korea
6. Experts say NK's ground engine test for new hypersonic missile may still need improvement
7. North Korea’s Latest Missile Test May Be Show for Exports to Russia
8. North Koreans shocked as Cuba establishes ties with South Korea
9. With little leverage over North Korea, U.S. military drills hold key to negotiations
10. N. Korean infants not properly vaccinated: unification minister
11. What we know about Kim Ju Ae’s chances for succession so far
12. N. Korea tightens security around weapons factories to prevent information leaks
13. Kim Jong Un appears to have piled on the pounds after losing weight
14. N. Korea orders Russia-based companies to restrict workers’ contact with S. Koreans
15. South Korea Can Be a Democratic Leader
1. Expert proposes new unification strategies based on existing formula
Beware the Einstein curse: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.
Seriously, this is why you have to get assumptions right in strategy. Especially in this case the assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim Family regime. Based on an objective understanding of those assumptions can you make the assumption that the KFR will ever "normalize?"
Excerpt:
Cho proposed the "normalization of the North Korean regime" as the first-stage goal for the unification vision, saying North Korea's regime change could be considered if Pyongyang continues to reject unification.
On the other hand we do not want "regime change" (and all the baggage which comes from those two words). We want to see change occur from within north Korea with a new leadership that seeks peaceful unification.
And I agree with this statement:
"The idea of (the second stage of) a Korean commonwealth moving toward (the third stage) of unification is not valid anymore," Kim said.
Most importantly the Yoon administration and the Ministry of Unification are doing serious planning for unification.
Expert proposes new unification strategies based on existing formula | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 20, 2024
SEOUL, March 20 (Yonhap) -- South Korea should maintain its official unification formula adopted in 1994 but needs to recalibrate detailed strategies in pushing for unification with North Korea, an expert said Wednesday.
Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the state-run Korea Institute for National Unification, voiced concerns about a potential revision in the National Community Unification Formula (NCUF), citing a difficulty in bipartisan agreements and the possibility of an attempt to renew it depending on government changes.
The Yoon Suk Yeol administration plans to draw up a new unification vision based on liberal democracy, saying the existing unification formula leaves out such a principle and does not take into account changes in the security situation.
This photo, provided by the Korea Institute for National Unification on March 20, 2024, shows the state-run think tank holding a forum on South Korea's unification policy in Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
"In response to North Korea's vow to abandon its policy of seeking unification, we need to maintain the title and framework of the NCUF," Cho said at a forum hosted by the think tank.
The unification formula is based on three principles of seeking independence, peace and democracy. The three-stage vision calls for the pursuit of reconciliation and cooperation, the creation of a Korean commonwealth and the completion of a unified country.
Cho proposed the "normalization of the North Korean regime" as the first-stage goal for the unification vision, saying North Korea's regime change could be considered if Pyongyang continues to reject unification.
Kim Hyun-wook, a director-general at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, raised the need to set up a new unification vision that could replace the NCUF.
"The idea of (the second stage of) a Korean commonwealth moving toward (the third stage) of unification is not valid anymore," Kim said.
At a year-end party meeting, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said he will not regard South Korea as a counterpart for reconciliation and unification. He defined inter-Korean ties as relations between "two states hostile to each other."
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 20, 2024
2. N. Korea conducts ground engine test for new hypersonic missile
You cannot feed the people with a ground engine test, missiles, or nuclear weapons. All our responses should include statements about the humanitarian costs of missile and nuclear tests. In 2022 the 60+ missile tests cost the regime some $560 million while the food shortfall was $450 million. (see this article: North Korea spends money it needs for food on missiles https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/12/12/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-food-insecurity/20221212190148616.html.) This should be a consistent talking point - the Korean people in the north are suffering due to Kims deliberate policy decision to prioritize weapons over the welfare of the people.
The development of advanced military capabilities supports the regime objective to unify the peninsula by force. But these capabilities also support the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies to subvert the ROK and the ROK/US alliance as well as to coerce political and economic concessions. And some tests may also serve as "commercials" to advertise their epson capabilities for proliferation to other malign actors in return for hard currency for the regime.
(2nd LD) N. Korea conducts ground engine test for new hypersonic missile | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 20, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS more details in paras 8-12)
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, March 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Wednesday it has successfully conducted a ground jet test of a solid-fuel engine for a new type of intermediate hypersonic missile amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Hypersonic missiles are on the list of sophisticated weapons North Korean leader Kim Jong-un vowed to develop during a key party congress in 2021, along with nuclear-powered submarines, spy satellites and solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
Hypersonic missiles travel at a speed of at least Mach 5 -- five times the speed of sound -- and are designed to be maneuverable on unpredictable flight paths and fly at low altitudes. At Mach 5 or higher, such a missile would be able to traverse the 195 kilometers between Pyongyang and Seoul in just one to two minutes.
Kim said that "the military strategic value of this weapon system is appreciated as important as ICBM from the security environment of our state and the operational demand of the People's Army and enemies know better about it," the Korean Central News Agency quoted Kim as saying at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on the country's west coast on Tuesday.
North Korea conducts a ground jet test of a solid-fuel engine for a new type of intermediate-range hypersonic missile at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on March 19, 2024, in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Without providing further details, the KCNA said the North was able to set a timetable for completing the development of a new hypersonic missiles weapons system with the success of the latest ground engine test.
As part of efforts to advance its weapons system, North Korea carried out ground tests of what it called newly developed solid-fuel engines for a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in November last year.
On Jan. 14, the North test-fired a solid-fuel IRBM tipped with a hypersonic warhead in its first ballistic missile launch this year.
South Korea's military said the latest test appeared to be aimed at making improvements to the solid-fuel IRBM launched earlier this year.
"It is suspected to be a test to improve the performance of the propulsion system of the hypersonic missile launched on Jan. 14," a Joint Chiefs of Staff official said.
Observers said the test was likely intended to extend the missile's range to target U.S. military bases outside of the continental United States.
"It (appears) to be an attempt to increase the range to attack U.S. military reinforcement bases, such as in Guam," Shin Jong-woo, a senior researcher at the Korea Defense and Security Forum, said, noting that the flame from the new engine test appeared to be longer than the one in November.
IRBMs have a range of up to 5,500 kilometers, putting the U.S. base in Guam within striking distance.
North Korea conducts a ground jet test of a solid-fuel engine for a new type of intermediate-range hypersonic missile at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on March 19, 2024, in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The latest test came just a day after the North conducted firing drills involving super-large multiple rocket launchers, its second missile ballistic missile launch of the year. The South Korean military said Monday it detected the firing of multiple short-range ballistic missiles from areas near Pyongyang.
The North's Monday missile launch, which followed the annual Freedom Shield military exercise by Seoul and Washington, was also timed with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visit to Seoul. Blinken arrived in South Korea on Sunday to attend the third Summit of Democracy hosted by South Korea, a U.S.-led multinational gathering formed to boost solidarity and shared values among democratic countries.
In January, the North's leader called for revising the country's constitution to define South Korea as its "primary foe" and codify a commitment to subjugate the South Korean territory in the event of war.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) attends a ground jet test of a solid-fuel engine for a new type of intermediate-range hypersonic missile at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on March 19, 2024, in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · March 20, 2024
3. US hinting at 'interim steps' with NK doesn't indicate policy shift: experts
Are they courting Kim Jong Un's support to counter the Kim Trump relationship? (note sarcasm).
Excerpt:
Biden administration softens tone on Pyongyang as elections approach
...
"We want dialogue, and there are lots of valuable discussions that we can have with the DPRK, including on risk reduction to reduce the risk of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation," Jung Pak, the U.S. senior official for North Korea, said during a podcast hosted by the Center for Strategies and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, Monday. DPRK stands for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.
"We could also talk about sanctions, or confidence-building or humanitarian cooperation," she added.
...
Interim steps are perceived to mean discussions involving a freeze of North Korea's nuclear weapons development in exchange for sanctions relief. While this proposal is not new, as previous U.S. administrations — other than Donald Trump's — have typically taken a phased approach to denuclearization, the fact that the messages came amid stalled dialogue with Pyongyang raised speculation that the Joe Biden administration might be extending an olive branch to the reclusive regime.
However, experts say that the U.S. officials' change in tone does not indicate a change in stance.
...
Pacheco Pardo also commented that the softened tone from U.S. officials is likely influenced by the upcoming election.
"The Biden administration is aware that there is criticism in South Korea but also within the U.S. that it has neglected the North Korean issue. It has recently become more vocal and open about its preferred policy approach, which coincides with the start of the U.S. presidential campaign in which North Korea will be discussed, given that Trump is the Republican candidate," he said.
However, Roehrig cautioned against linking the North Korean issue with elections, saying, "I doubt this has much to do with the upcoming U.S. elections. North Korea policy is not a high priority for most Americans."
US hinting at 'interim steps' with NK doesn't indicate policy shift: experts
The Korea Times · March 20, 2024
A news program shows file images of U.S. President Joe Biden and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on a TV screen at Seoul Station in Seoul, July 22, 2023. AP-Yonhap
Biden administration softens tone on Pyongyang as elections approach
By Lee Hyo-jin
Recent remarks by senior U.S. officials indicating a readiness to consider taking "interim steps" toward denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula do not signify a major policy shift by the U.S. government, observers said, with some linking the Americans' softened rhetoric on Pyongyang to the upcoming presidential elections.
"We want dialogue, and there are lots of valuable discussions that we can have with the DPRK, including on risk reduction to reduce the risk of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation," Jung Pak, the U.S. senior official for North Korea, said during a podcast hosted by the Center for Strategies and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, Monday. DPRK stands for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.
"We could also talk about sanctions, or confidence-building or humanitarian cooperation," she added.
But at the same time, Pak stressed that the policy goal for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains unchanged.
She was referring to previous comments made by Mira Rapp-Hooper, the National Security Council senior director for East Asia and Oceania, during a forum held in Seoul earlier this month.
Rapp-Hooper said that Washington remains committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but would consider "interim steps" on that pathway to denuclearization, adding that these steps would make the region safer.
Interim steps are perceived to mean discussions involving a freeze of North Korea's nuclear weapons development in exchange for sanctions relief. While this proposal is not new, as previous U.S. administrations — other than Donald Trump's — have typically taken a phased approach to denuclearization, the fact that the messages came amid stalled dialogue with Pyongyang raised speculation that the Joe Biden administration might be extending an olive branch to the reclusive regime.
However, experts say that the U.S. officials' change in tone does not indicate a change in stance.
"Recent statements by U.S. officials do not signify a change in policy. Washington has explicitly left the door to diplomacy with North Korea open, even as it strengthens deterrence by upgrading the alliance with Seoul and fostering trilateral cooperation with Tokyo," said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University.
Terence Roehrig, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, said, "I think it is a formal acknowledgment of what many have concluded for some time, namely that North Korea is not going to give up its nuclear weapons, certainly not at the outset of any process and not anytime soon."
The professor also said that even if the U.S. did want to take interim measures, it would be a long journey at the moment as Washington has very little appetite for giving concessions to North Korea, and Pyongyang is highly unlikely to agree on any measures that would limit the growth of its nuclear and missile programs.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, watches a ground jet test of a solid-fuel engine for a new type of intermediate-range hypersonic missile at a launching site of Sohae Satellite Launching Station, Tuesday, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. Yonhap
North Korea launched multiple short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea, Tuesday, breaking the month-long absence of military provocations. The North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Wednesday that its leader Kim Jong-un supervised a live-fire drill involving nuclear-capable multiple rocket launchers designed to target South Korea's capital.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King's College London, viewed that a positive response from the Kim regime toward the U.S.' gestures for interim measures is highly unlikely in the immediate future.
"North Korea may be interested in exploring the possibility of diplomacy with the U.S. if the removal of sanctions is on the table, as one of the interim steps in exchange for North Korea taking its own interim steps, such as pausing missile tests," he said. "Having said that, I assume that North Korea will wait until the result of the U.S. presidential election to decide whether to engage in diplomacy."
Pacheco Pardo also commented that the softened tone from U.S. officials is likely influenced by the upcoming election.
"The Biden administration is aware that there is criticism in South Korea but also within the U.S. that it has neglected the North Korean issue. It has recently become more vocal and open about its preferred policy approach, which coincides with the start of the U.S. presidential campaign in which North Korea will be discussed, given that Trump is the Republican candidate," he said.
However, Roehrig cautioned against linking the North Korean issue with elections, saying, "I doubt this has much to do with the upcoming U.S. elections. North Korea policy is not a high priority for most Americans."
The Korea Times · March 20, 2024
4. US lawmaker notes S. Korea’s primary concern on NK threats in Taiwan contingency
Yes, if there is an attack on Taiwan then the first priority of the ROK and the ROK/US COmbined Forces Command must be to deter an attack from the north.
But we have to be able to deter and defend both the ROK and Taiwan but also be able to defend if there are simultaneous or sequential attacks. And this is why our alliances are so important. The US cannot do this alone (nor should we).
US lawmaker notes S. Korea’s primary concern on NK threats in Taiwan contingency - The Korea Times
koreatimes.co.kr
Rep. Young Kim (R-CA) in this file photo. Korea Times file
A U.S. lawmaker on Tuesday expressed expectation that South Korea would support Taiwan in the event of a contingency in the Taiwan Strait, but pointed out Seoul’s overarching concerns over the “immediate” threats from North Korea.
Rep. Young Kim (R-CA), chair of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific, made the remarks, stressing that Taiwan matters as a “beacon” of democracy at a time when she claimed China has a long-term ambition to become the “dominant economic and military superpower.”
“While they (South Korea) will, I believe, be there with the United States if something happens in the Taiwan Strait, but remember that South Korea is faced with the immediate threat of North Korea,” she said at a forum hosted by the Hudson Institute.
“So protecting the security concerns on the Korean Peninsula is probably the No. 1 concern in their mind,” she added.
Kim, a Korean American lawmaker, was referring to South Korea’s potential role in the event of a contingency concerning Taiwan, a self-governing democracy that China claims is part of its territory. Beijing has threatened to take over the island by force if necessary.
“Not caring for Taiwan and moving any support will be a grave mistake,” she said. “We need to stay in Taiwan and continue to be engaged and work on contingency efforts.”
Kim also warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping might look beyond Taiwan should Taiwan not be protected.
“We know Xi Jinping is not going to stop at Taiwan. All the other countries in the Indo-Pacific are at risk,” she said.
She also stressed that Taiwan matters due to its role as a hub for semiconductor manufacturing.
“If there is a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, obviously, our economy is going to be threatened. It is going to be a national security concern,” she said.
Kim went on to say that anything that happens overseas “affects us in all fields,” as she underscored the need to back Taiwan’s security.
“When we look at these conflicts around the world, I am really glad that Japan and South Korea have agreed to get beyond the historical challenges and moved ahead, looking forward,” she said,
She was referring to improved relations between Seoul and Tokyo after a thaw in heightened tensions over historical issues stemming from Japan’s 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. (Yonhap)
koreatimes.co.kr
5. HII is Awarded $305 Million Contract to Protect U.S. Regional Interests in the Republic of Korea
It is interesting what we can learn from contract announcements.
HII is Awarded $305 Million Contract to Protect U.S. Regional Interests in the Republic of Korea
March 19, 2024
HII is Awarded $305 Million Contract to Protect U.S. Regional Interests in the Republic of Korea
MCLEAN, Va., March 19, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- HII (NYSE: HII) announced today that its Mission Technologies division was awarded a $305 million contract by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to provide intelligence analysis and operational support services for the Joint Intelligence Operations Center-Korea (JIOC-K).
HII will provide timely analysis of relevant and actionable intelligence that will enable United States Forces Korea (USFK) to understand enemy capabilities, detect threats and determine enemy courses of action. HII will also assist USFK in organizing the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO) intelligence activities to better leverage theater and global intelligence communities to safeguard U.S. personnel and interests within the KTO.
"We are excited about the opportunity to expand our relationship with the USFK and support its important mission while working in close coordination with the joint staff, service components and intelligence agencies," said Todd Gentry, president of Mission Technologies' C5ISR business group. "Our experts have a long history assessing and advising on national security issues and are committed to protecting U.S. regional interests."
The recompeted task order has a five-year term and is an extension of work performed under a previous contract awarded by the DIA in 2019.
An image accompanying this release is available at: https://hii.com/news/hii-awarded-republic-of-korea-contract-2024/.
About HII
HII is a global, all-domain defense provider. HII's mission is to deliver the world's most powerful ships and all-domain solutions in service of the nation, creating the advantage for our customers to protect peace and freedom around the world. As the nation's largest military shipbuilder, and with a more than 135-year history of advancing U.S. national security, HII delivers critical capabilities extending from ships to unmanned systems, cyber, ISR, AI/ML and synthetic training. Headquartered in Virginia, HII's workforce is 44,000 strong. For more information, visit:
-- HII on the web: https://www.HII.com/
-- HII on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/TeamHII
-- HII on Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/WeAreHII
-- HII on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/WeAreHII
Contact:
Greg McCarthy
(202) 264-7126
gregory.j.mccarthy@hii-co.com
A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/b7269141-9729-4c4e-a57f-713c687f5ece
6. Experts say NK's ground engine test for new hypersonic missile may still need improvement
This is why you conduct tests.
Experts say NK's ground engine test for new hypersonic missile may still need improvement
The Korea Times · March 20, 2024
Kim Jong-un supervises a ground engine test for a new hypersonic missile at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in northwestern North Korea's Tongchang-ri, Tuesday. Yonhap
By Kwak Yeon-soo
North Korea has successfully conducted a ground test of a solid-fuel engine for its new intermediate-range hypersonic missile, drawing praise from its leader Kim Jong-un, who stressed the military strategic value of the weapon system, according to state media, Wednesday.
But defense watchers believe it may still need to work on maneuverability even though the technical nature of the missile engine seems to have improved since last November, when Pyongyang carried out ground tests of newly developed solid-fuel engines for a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).
Hypersonic missiles are on the list of sophisticated weapons Kim vowed to develop during a party congress in 2021, along with nuclear-powered submarines, spy satellites and solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The latest missile engine test, which was conducted under Kim's supervision at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station on the country's west coast, Tuesday, suggests “progress in North Korea’s efforts to develop a more powerful, agile missile designed to strike faraway U.S. targets in the region,” the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Wednesday.
"Speaking of the engine module, the fuel tank has been extended," said Shin Jong-woo, a senior researcher at the Korea Defense and Security Forum, a think tank. "The combustion duration becomes longer, allowing the engine to withstand high pressure and temperature. However, the successful engine test doesn’t guarantee the successful test of the hypersonic missile. We still need to keep our eyes on the hypersonic glide vehicle."
Shin explained that the solid-fuel engine can be fueled and remain in storage for a longer period with fewer concerns over corrosion caused by the propellant, and be fired more reliably if needed. Solid fuel offers greater mobility for missiles and reduces launch preparation time.
Experts said North Korea’s latest engine test is not part of its plan to escalate military provocations but to stick to its five-year plan for development of defense science and weapon systems.
"North Korea already carried out ground tests of what it identified as newly developed solid-fuel engines for a new type of IRBM last November and test-fired a solid-fuel IRBM tipped with a hypersonic warhead in its first ballistic missile launch in January," said Cho Han-bum, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a state-funded think tank.
"The fact that they are doing more testing suggests that something apparently is not working the way they want."
The Korea Times · March 20, 2024
7. North Korea’s Latest Missile Test May Be Show for Exports to Russia
Commercials.
North Korea’s Latest Missile Test May Be Show for Exports to Russia
- Kim Jong Un oversaw tests of super large rocket launchers
- Ukraine says Russia has used North Korean weapons in strikes
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-19/north-korea-s-latest-missile-test-may-be-show-for-exports-to-russia?sref=hhjZtX76
By Jon Herskovitz and Soo-Hyang Choi
March 19, 2024 at 4:00 AM EDT
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw tests of multiple rocket launcher systems that can deliver nuclear weapons in a drill this week that South Korea said could be a way for Pyongyang to market its newest missiles to Russia.
North Korea tested “super-large multiple rocket launchers” in drills Monday aimed at proving “the might and the real war capabilities of the weapon system,” the state’s official Korean Central News Agency reported on Tuesday. It also released pictures of Kim at the event watching six missiles take to the sky and celebrating later with a cigarette in his hand.
Listen • 14m11
Big Take: North Korea Helps Arm Russia, Helping Itself (Podcast)
The 600 millimeter rockets were fired in barrages from six launchers, according to KCNA. Weapons experts said the projectiles were likely KN-25 short-range ballistic missiles from the same family of weapons Kim has sent to Russia for use in its assault on Ukraine.
Before North Korea released details and photos of its latest weapons tests, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Wonsik said it wasn’t clear if the drills were for bolstering Pyongyang’s front-line forces or for a trial on how the Kremlin could use the missiles in attacking Ukraine.
“There is a good chance that they are a final performance test before exporting to Russia,” Shin told reporters.
The US, South Korea and others have accused North Korea of sending to Russia its newest nuclear-capable ballistic missiles that are easy to hide, quick to deploy and hard to shoot down. Images provided by the US indicate they are Hwasong-11s, a wide class of short-range ballistic missile that can reliably hit targets with a high degree of precision, weapons experts say.
The KN-25 is a part of this class. The missile has a range of about 380 kilometers (235 miles) and was first tested in 2019, when it was fired from a launcher with four tubes, according to the CSIS Missile Defense Project.
Prosecutors in Kharkiv said in March that Russian forces have fired North Korean missiles at Ukraine about 50 times since the start of its invasion, providing documentation for what it said included a Hwasong-11 family missile, specialist service NK News reported.
North Korea showed six missiles firing off at the same time in photos it released on state media. South Korea and Japan detected two launches about 40 minutes apart, with Tokyo saying it saw three missiles and Seoul saying more than six missiles were fired off. The differing numbers could indicate the difficulty in keeping track of missiles fired simultaneously in close proximity.
“What is a bit confusing and even disconcerting is how these multiple launchers were initially assessed by both ROK and Japan,” said Joseph Dempsey, a research associate for defense and military analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He referred to South Korea by its formal name.
Shin Jong-woo, a researcher at the Korea Defense and Security Forum think tank, said it’s hard to precisely detect all the missiles with radar when they are flying in such proximity.
The Hwasong-11 class of missiles have ranges of 380 to 800 kilometers and can increase the pool of weapons Russian President Vladimir Putin can draw upon as his invasion of Ukraine enters its third year.
South Korea’s defense minister Shin said North Korea has sent some 7,000 shipping containers of weapons since Kim and Putin met for a summit in September. They can hold about 3 million rounds of 152 mm shells.
Russia in return is providing North Korea with food, raw materials and parts used in weapons manufacturing, he said. The food aid has helped Kim stabilize prices for necessities, said Shin, the South Korean minister. If the arms transfers grow, Russia will likely send more military technology to Kim, increasing Pyongyang’s threat to the region, he added.
The value of the artillery alone is likely several billion dollars and the aid from Russia could represent the biggest boost to North Korea’s economy since Kim took power. Moscow and Pyongyang have denied the arms transfers accusations despite a multitude of satellite photos released by research groups and the US government showing the flow of weapons from North Korea to Russia and then to munitions dumps near the border with Ukraine.
The Hwasong-11 missiles have been priced at about $5 million each, according to data compiled by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and released in 2022. But since then, Kim has ramped up production, which is likely to drive down manufacturing costs.
The transfer of missiles has raised worries North Korea may look to export missiles to countries other than Russia. North Korea has been exporting missile technology and systems since the 1980s but saw opportunities dwindle due to sanctions and other issues, the UK think tank Royal United Services Institute said in a paper last year. It added that the trade with Moscow could open doors for Kim.
8. North Koreans shocked as Cuba establishes ties with South Korea
North Koreans shocked as Cuba establishes ties with South Korea
Silence from Pyongyang befuddles those who recall state media slamming China, Vietnam and Hungary for doing the same.
By Ahn Chang Gyu for RFA Korean
2024.03.19
rfa.org
North Koreans reacted in shock when they learned that their “socialist brethren” in Cuba established official relations with capitalistic South Korea, residents in the North told Radio Free Asia.
Seoul and Havana announced the move on Feb. 14, when their respective representatives to the United Nations in New York sent each other diplomatic notes acknowledging that the two countries would restore formal relations, which were stopped when Fidel Castro and the communists took control of the Caribbean island nation in 1959.
Since 1960, Cuba and North Korea have boasted of their “close brotherly ties.”
But the North Korean government has not yet announced Havana’s move to its citizens.
The news trickled into North Korea from China and is now spreading by word of mouth, shocking all who hear it, a resident of the central northern province of Ryanggang told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
He said he had heard the news several weeks ago from someone who had come from China, and he implied he kept to himself.
(It is common in North Korea for even married couples to not openly discuss potentially sensitive topics because it could be used against them if they ever wind up being interrogated by the authorities).
“A few days ago, my wife heard the news,” he said. “She was really upset and worried about what our country will be like in the future.”
The man said that his wife was worried that North Korea was becoming isolated as more countries that it considers to be its closest allies set up new embassies in Seoul.
North Korean propaganda up until this point praised the story of Cuba, which the resident said had been depicted as steadfast in its fight against imperialism despite being “firmly and directly under the nose” of the United States, referring to the U.S. embargo of the country.
“Who wouldn’t be surprised that such a country has established diplomatic relations with South Korea?” he said.
Some elderly people have fond memories of Castro visiting Pyongyang in 1986 to receive a gift of 100,000 automatic rifles along with tens of millions of rounds of ammunition, and how genuinely thankful he seemed when he discussed the exchange in a public address in a 20,000 seat stadium where he stood alongside then-leader Kim Il Sung, the resident said.
From then, high-level delegations, as well as exchange students, went back and forth between the two countries, he said. “There is even a school named after Kim Il Sung in Cuba. A lot of sugar from Cuba was also brought into North Korea.”
Another source, a resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong said that he could not believe that Cuba and South Korea established relations, especially because North Korean authorities had harshly criticized Hungary when it became the first Soviet-bloc country to forge ties with Seoul in 1989, announcing the decision at the 1988 Olympics in Seoul.
The act was strongly denounced in North Korean media as a “betrayal of socialism,” and Pyongyang lowered diplomatic relations with Budapest to just the ambassador level that year.
“It was the same [in 1992] when China and Vietnam each established diplomatic relations with South Korea,” the North Hamgyong resident said. “The authorities openly criticized China for giving up socialist principles for money.”
North Korea was especially angry at Vietnam, he said, as Pyongyang had sent soldiers to fight on the side of communist North Vietnam and many North Koreans had died in the war.
“The graves of the North Korean soldiers in Vietnam were relocated to North Korea,” he said.
The lack of official criticism of Cuba is perplexing, he said. “I think that the authorities are afraid of residents finding out that Cuba, the last socialist bastion in Latin America, has established diplomatic relations with South Korea.”
Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.
rfa.org
9. With little leverage over North Korea, U.S. military drills hold key to negotiations
Military exercises must not be a bargaining chip. Training is perishable and must be continually conducted to maintain readiness. If we are unable to train we cannot maintainUS forces on the Korean peninsula which of course is exactly one of Kim Jong Un's major objectives.
Trump unilaterally halted exercises and we subsequently postponed and scaled back others. How did that work out for us? Kim does not really fear our exercises. He focuses on them to support his political warfare strategy.
With little leverage over North Korea, U.S. military drills hold key to negotiations
Lack of leverage with Pyongyang puts new focus on diplomacy with Kim regime
By Andrew Salmon - The Washington Times - Monday, March 18, 2024
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
A TV screen shows a file image of North Korea’s missile launch during a news program at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, Monday, March 18, 2024. North Korea fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles toward its eastern waters … A TV screen shows a file … more >
By - The Washington Times - Monday, March 18, 2024
A version of this article appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.
SEOUL, South Korea — Monday was business as usual on the Korean Peninsula as North Korea, flouting U.N. Security Council resolutions, test-fired a trio of short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea/Sea of Japan a day after the top U.S. diplomat arrived for a summit in South Korea.
Pyongyang launched its latest missiles the morning after Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived to speak at the third Summit for Democracy, a signature Biden administration initiative that wraps up on Wednesday.
At the summit, Mr. Blinken talked up the dangers of disinformation warfare, and the office of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol released a statement noting that Mr. Blinken “said the United States will always be with South Korea to respond firmly to North Korea’s provocations and for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”
Yet analysts said the failure of the U.S. and its regional allies to halt North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs illustrates their lack of leverage over the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Without economic, diplomatic or political ties with Pyongyang, and with few channels of communication to the regime, the democracies’ ability to change North Korea’s behavior is minimal.
The fallback for the U.S., South Korea and Japan has been a policy heavily reliant on deterrence. Those who worked with previous Seoul governments and who have direct experience in and with North Korea suggest that another form of leverage exists: military drills.
SEE ALSO: Blinken underscores ‘ironclad’ support for the Philippines as it clashes with China in disputed sea
Offering the carrot of a suspension of joint U.S.-South Korean military drills could lure North Korea back to the negotiating table, they say. It has been done before with the approval of top U.S. military officials.
“Deterrence is a given. Nobody argues against the importance of deterrence — but it only works until it doesn’t,” said Choi Jong-keun, deputy minister of foreign affairs under Mr. Yoon’s immediate predecessor, Moon Jae-in. “To protect it, you need the wisdom of diplomacy.”
Relying on deterrence is especially dicey for South Korea. Its capital lies just 35 miles from the border, where North Korean long-range artillery is dug in. The Seoul-Incheon-Suwon metropolitan area is home to half of South Korea’s 51 million people and is almost entirely lacking in civil defense preparation.
North Korea’s capital, Pyongyang, home to 3 million people, lies 130 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone — beyond artillery range.
“We have an asymmetry of vulnerabilities between North and South,” said Moon Chung-in, a scholar who has advised all Seoul governments that engaged with Pyongyang. “There is no way to defend, our damage would be so high, and that is why I stress preventative diplomacy.”
Stepped-up drilling
No diplomacy is underway now, and both sides are instead stepping up military drills. Last week, Mr. Kim oversaw an artillery drill and an armored drill. His daughter Kim Ju-ae accompanied him for a landing drill by paratroopers.
South of the DMZ dividing the peninsula, joint U.S.-South Korean Freedom Shield 24 military exercises wound up last week, but more drills are on tap. A joint water crossing exercise is slated for Wednesday.
North Korea routinely criticizes the joint spring drills as rehearsals for a potential invasion. Seoul and Washington insist that their war games are defensive in nature.
Former members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which oversees the Korean War armistice, told The Washington Times that the drills are “not entirely” defensive in nature. They conclude with counterattacks, these members noted.
Moreover, Pyongyang, which follows Soviet and Russian doctrine, has reason to fear the drills. Moscow’s forces used exercises to disguise troop movements ahead of invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022.
Agreeing to a pause in the military exercises has attracted Pyongyang’s interest in the past. Mr. Moon cited 1992, when President George H.W. Bush suspended the drills. The same thing happened under President Trump in 2018. Both times opened windows for engagement.
Even the U.S. military got behind the pause in 2018. Gen. Vincent Brooks, commander in chief of U.S. Forces Korea, said the exercises and the publicity surrounding them could be scaled down “depending on what is needed to create traction diplomatically.”
If drills are scaled back again, perhaps under the next U.S. administration, “it could send a good signal,” Mr. Moon said.
Complicating variables
Mr. Moon cited two variables that complicate predictions of how a suspension of military drills would be received.
“Inter-Korean relations have hit bottom and North Korean hostility is very high, so they may not accept the gesture,” Mr. Moon said. “President Yoon Suk Yeol is not in a position to scale down exercises because of April’s general election. He would lose support of his [conservative] constituents.”
Mason Richey, a U.S. international relations scholar who teaches at Seoul’s Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, noted that the halt of drills in 2018 “happened with a constellation of Trump being experimental and Moon being on a peace and charm offensive. Mr. Yoon, he said, “is not willing to do that.”
President Biden has shown little interest in reviving diplomatic efforts toward Mr. Kim since taking office in 2021. Mr. Richey reckons that Mr. Trump may seek to rekindle his personal relationship with Mr. Kim if he returns to the White House after the election in November. His term included three personal meetings that ultimately failed to produce the denuclearization deal Mr. Trump wanted.
With most North Korean experts saying Pyongyang will never fully give up its nuclear arsenal, Washington would have to shift from its long-held stance to arms control, offering a de facto recognition that North Korea is a nuclear state.
“It is not impossible that Trump comes round to the idea that a nuclear North Korea is out of the barn and you will never get the horse back in, so let’s double down the focus on China, and one way to do that is build detente with their ally,” Mr. Richey said. “I can see a world in which Trump is no longer restrained by the chiefs of staff and the national security adviser and the secretary of state and is either left to his own instincts or has people far more willing to think outside the box than the establishment.”
Such radical moves might shake Capitol Hill, but Mr. Choi, the former foreign secretary, said engagement should be explored despite the risks.
Committed diplomacy with Pyongyang “requires courage of the top leaders in Seoul and Washington,” he said.
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2024 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
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10. N. Korean infants not properly vaccinated: unification minister
Another consideration for the unification process: How can we help overcome the medical challenges in north before the unification process begins? The medical conditions have the potential to create outbreaks throughout the entire peninsula during the unification process if not properly addressed.
N. Korean infants not properly vaccinated: unification minister | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 20, 2024
SEOUL, March 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korean infants have not received essential vaccinations during the COVID-19 pandemic in a sign of the country's poor health care system, Seoul's point man on Pyongyang said Wednesday.
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho made the remark at a lecture, called "talk concert," at Yonsei University in Seoul, as the unification ministry has been ramping up its campaign to raise public awareness of North Korea's real situation.
"North Korean children have not been properly vaccinated and the impact will become evident three to five years later. The situation is very serious," Kim said.
In a separate meeting with religious leaders, Kim said North Korean children had, in particular, failed to be inoculated during the COVID-19 pandemic, raising the need for humanitarian aid for the North's infants.
No North Korean children were vaccinated against measles, polio and tuberculosis in 2022, according to a report by UNICEF, the U.N. children's agency.
The minister also said North Korean officials have resumed taking part in events held by global health care organizations amid Pyongyang's partial border opening after years of its COVID-19 border shutdown.
This photo, provided by the Ministry of Unification on March 20, 2024, shows Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho meeting with students of Yonsei University in Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 20, 2024
11. What we know about Kim Ju Ae’s chances for succession so far
For the "Kimologists."
This provides a very useful list of indicators that we can observe for. And the key conclusion provides an important recommendation for themes and messages.
Excerpts:
Conclusions and how we should respond
As we have seen so far, the theory that Kim Ju Ae has been named successor seems plausible — to some extent — if seen merely from the outside, including her title and treatment. However, given a myriad of factors - the limits placed on her by her youth and gender; the creation and operation of a new first secretary position should something befall Kim Jong Un; the existence of Kim’s other children; the issue of the last name of a fifth-generation leader; and the vetting of Kim Ju Ae’s temperament and capacity as a leader - it is too early to conclude that the young girl has been designated her father’s successor.
On the other hand, looking at trends so far, Kim Ju Ae’s role strongly resembles a cameo, intro, or an ad balloon. That is to say, we can assume North Korea put Kim Ju Ae on stage to 1) bolster domestic and international interest in pending issues like the country’s nuclear and missile programs; 2) distract from the strengthening of international sanctions; 3) create an atmosphere in which the perpetual succession of the Mt. Paekdu Bloodline is taken for granted; 4) highlight Kim Jong Un’s love for the future generations; and 5) to prevent a potential U.S. surgical strike to decapitate the regime. In a nutshell, Kim Jong Un is only using his young daughter for his own needs.
This scheme might succeed in highlighting the regime’s “refusal to give up its nuclear weapons” or its “concern for the future generations” in the short term. However, in the long term, it’s clearly a gamble that could generate problems like lessening the mystery around the “royal family” and revealing the truth behind royal births, as well as encouraging speculation over the succession issue.
Accordingly, while leaving the possibility of Kim Ju Ae being the successor open, we must prepare for several scenarios regarding the succession issue under a “higher order” understanding that considers countless variables and a lot of time. More fundamentally, we must undertake a multi-faceted movement to awaken North Korea’s people about the abnormal nature of the country’s hereditary succession and the tangible and intangible harm that results from it.
What we know about Kim Ju Ae’s chances for succession so far
The theory that Kim Ju Ae has been named successor seems somewhat plausible if seen merely from the outside looking in
By Gil-sup Kwak -
March 20, 2024
dailynk.com
What we know about Kim Ju Ae’s chances for succession so far - Daily NK English
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was accompanied by his young daughter Kim Ju Ae at several public events, including the opening of a greenhouse and a training exercise by special forces paratroopers, on Mar. 15. The last time his daughter attended a public event was on Military Foundation Day, on Feb. 8.
The Korean Central News Agency did not specifically mention that Ju Ae had attended the event, as it did for key officials such as her father or Premier Kim Tok-hun. But it did print photos of father and daughter while mentioning that “the great persons of guidance, together with cadres of the Party, the government and the military, went round the farm.”
News media in South Korea and abroad subsequently quoted North Korean experts as saying that “the word hyangdo [translated here as ‘guidance’] has typically been used about the supreme leader and his heirs” and reported that the choice of words “demonstrates that Kim Ju Ae has definitely become a potential heir.”
One year and four months have already passed since Kim Ju Ae was first presented to the North Korean public. In that time, a large number of experts and news outlets both in Korea and overseas have aired speculation that she may be Kim Jong Un’s heir in light of the eye-popping titles and treatment she has been given.
But my opinion is that while we should remain open to that possibility, the evidence for deeming Ju Ae the heir remains highly insufficient in light of structural and fundamental factors such as age, titles, customs, culture and institutions. As such, I still think it is far too soon to jump to any conclusions.
Instead, I continue to emphasize the likelihood that Kim Ju Ae is supposed to serve two concurrent roles that I compare to the cinematic terms “cameo” and “intro.” She serves as a “cameo” to draw the attention of domestic and foreign audiences to Kim’s resolution to maintain a nuclear arsenal and his interest in the safety of future generations, and as an “intro” to instill in North Korean society a belief in the everlasting rule of what is called the “Mt. Paektu bloodline,” referring to the Kim dynasty.
The South Korean government’s official assessment
As the debate over Kim Ju Ae’s status heated up at the beginning of this year, the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) took the unusual step of submitting a written response to the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee on Jan. 2 in an attempt to restore calm. “Kim Ju Ae appears to be a likely heir, at least for the present, given her appearances and the treatment she is receiving. But since Kim Jong Un is still young, with no major health issues, and because there are many variables, we are watching the situation closely while keeping open all possibilities,” the NIS said in that document.
This circumspect and open-minded attitude adopted by the South Korean government’s highest intelligence agency is natural and commendable. Even assuming that there are noticeable signs that Kim Ju Ae may be the assumed heir, the question of naming an heir is a lengthy process, and we should therefore avoid any hasty assumptions. That process would involve five or six separate stages, including deliberation and decision, public and private preparations for succession, internal naming of the heir and involvement in policy-making, official declaration of the heir, joint rule, and handover of power.
Currently, we are only at the beginning of the first stage of that process, and numerous variables are still ahead of us.
And so when the claim is made in certain quarters that Kim Ju Ae has been named heir, I tend to regard that not as a multifaceted, comprehensive assessment that connects the dots to arrive at the whole, but rather as a hot take that reads way too much into a few scattered points of data.
My personal assessment
At the time of Kim Ju Ae’s first appearance, I wrote a column in which I argued that (1) Kim Jong Un had staged the whole event, (2) Kim Ju Ae’s role was that of a “cameo” or “intro,” and (3) the critical issue was not the daughter, but the provocations involving the illegal development of long-range strategic missiles. I also counseled the international community to focus on tightening sanctions on North Korea and warned that focusing on the daughter would amount to falling for Kim Jong Un’s scheme.
In this article, we will review the trends witnessed over the past year and four months, which I hope will help readers draw their own conclusions. But I should also make clear in advance that this analysis will be based solely on information in the public record, deductions and my personal experience, since I am not in a position to stumble across a “smoking gun.” While I cannot guarantee that my arguments are correct, I do think they will provide valuable food for thought.
Signs that Kim Ju Ae may be the heir apparent
A considerable number of experts offer three distinct reasons for regarding Kim Ju Ae as the intended heir: her public appearances, the titles and honorifics used for her, and the respectful treatment she enjoys (suggesting a cult of personality).
(1) Public appearances
Most of Kim Ju Ae’s public appearances (22 of 26 thus far) involve accompanying her father on visits to military sites, such as an ICBM test site. She is gradually paying more visits to sites connected to the economy. In the future, she is likely to visit revolutionary battlefields on Mt. Paektu and attend events linked to the cult of personality so as to reinforce her image as part of the Mt. Paektu bloodline.*
(2) Titles and honorifics
The titles and honorifics given to Kim Ju Ae have gradually been elevated, from “beloved” to “respected” and then to “precious.” In addition, there are also reports that she is being described by the terms “morning star” and “general,” which are generally reserved for the supreme leader and his heirs, in unconfirmed lecture materials being used inside North Korea. (One such document reportedly said, “The future of our status as a space power will be further illuminated by the lady general, the morning star of Joseon.”)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, accompanied by his daughter Kim Ju-ae, led a field tour of an “important military vehicle production plant,” according to Rodong Sinmun on Jan. 5. The newspaper also unveiled a launch pad vehicle (TEL) carrying a cylindrical tube for the Hwasong-18, a new solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
Furthermore, North Korean official coverage of the ribbon-cutting ceremony at the Kangdong Greenhouse Farm on Mar. 15 referred to the two Kims as “great persons of guidance.” But it is also possible that such expressions are designed to express respect for the Mt. Paektu bloodline or to pique interest in the leadership both at home and abroad.
Some points to bear in mind in regard to the greenhouse visit are that (1) Kim Ju Ae was not mentioned separately as in the past, (2) the title was used in the plural and not the singular, and (3) only related photographs were printed. And in contrast with coverage of the two Kims’ attendance at the greenhouse ground-breaking, Kim Ju Ae was not mentioned either directly or indirectly in an article about their attendance at a training session for paratroopers from the special forces.
(3) Respectful treatment
A remarkable cult of personality is said to be forming around Kim Ju Ae. She had a seat of honor at a military parade on Military Foundation Day in February 2023, and new slogans have been coined about “Kim Ju Ae’s white horse” and “defend Kim Jong Un to the death, protect the Mt. Paektu bloodline to the death.”
At a military parade for North Korea’s founding anniversary in September, Park Jong-chon, the number one figure in the North Korean military, was witnessed kneeling down to speak to Kim Ju Ae. In November, a commemorative stamp bearing the photograph of Kim Jong Un and Kim Ju Ae was issued on the first anniversary of the successful launch of the Hwasong-17 missiles, which is where Kim Ju Ae made her first appearance. The day of the missile launch was also designated as a public holiday.
That’s not all. When the two Kims visited the North Korean Air Force Command in November, the daughter shook hands with the military leaders and received their salutes even before her father. When the Rodong Sinmun covered Kim Jong Un’s visit to a factory of missile transporter vehicles on Jan. 5, it began the report by devoting a separate line to the title of Kim’s daughter before mentioning senior party officials such as Kim Yo Jong and Jo Yong Won.
(4) Related laws and institutions
Kim Ju Ae is a figure who not only fits within the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System, which states that leadership must be passed down to members of the Mt. Paektu bloodline, but also to the theories of succession I delineate below. In neither place is any distinction made between men and women.
(5) Miscellaneous
While some have claimed that Kim Jong Il selected Kim Jong Un to be his heir at the age of eight, that is unpersuasive because it probably overemphasizes affectionate remarks the senior Kim made about his son. That may also represent an arbitrary and selective reading of Kim Jong Il’s comparison of his two younger sons (“Jong Un looks exactly like me, while Jong Chul is too girly”) and of the assessment of Kenji Fujimoto, Kim Jong Il’s personal chef who spent time with Kim Jong Un in his childhood (“I concluded that Jong Un would be the heir”).
In regard to frequent speculation in the press about Kim Jong Un’s poor health, it is true that Kim is severely obese, weighing more than 140 kilograms, and that he has a family history of cardiovascular disease. But considering his youth (40 years old), the medical program dedicated to keeping him healthy, and his active lifestyle, he is unlikely to face any serious problems for the time being.
Evidence indicating she isn’t the successor
The phenomena we looked at earlier that support the theory that Kim Ju Ae was named successor could all be staged in the “theater state” that is North Korea if the authorities so choose. However, the issues we will examine — the new first secretary position, Kim Ju Ae’s youth, North Korea’s culture and customs, and the family name of the leader who would come after her — are more structural and elemental.
- The new position of first secretary
Kim Jong Un has been preparing for what comes after him, creating the new position of first secretary (“proxy general secretary”) at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021. Some people view the first secretary position as a successor, but it is merely a proxy position for the general secretary.
Kim does not need to name his 10-year-old daughter the nation’s number two and successor even as he creates apparatuses in preparation for war. Efforts to idolize her remain in the early stages, too.
The first secretary position has remained open because the Eighth Party Congress changed the party rules so that the five-person presidium of the politburo — which can call a meeting at any time — could discuss and name appointments for the first secretary position. That is to say, while the general secretary is elected at the party congress every five years, rendering the quick selection of a successor difficult, the presidium could name a first secretary at any time.
Allow me to stress this again. The first secretary position was created so that somebody could play the role of proxy for Kim Jong Un in a contingency. To be more specific, it was likely made for Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, his political and emotional partner and a “libero” who manages the so-called Mount Paektu Bloodline from behind the scenes.
From this perspective, the potential of a power struggle between Kim Yo Yong on the one hand and Ri Sol Ju and Kim Ju Ae on the other borders on fiction, and it is highly likely that the propping up of Kim Ju Ae is taking place under Kim Yo Jong’s direction.
- Kim Ju Ae’s youth
Kim Ju Ae was born in 2013. This is when a would-be successor would associate with their peers, build their character and receive royal education behind the scenes. If not, the successor might encounter various psychological impediments as they grow, including narcissism, and even if they succeed in power, they will likely become cruel dictators. Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un also began their education to become successors when they were young men after graduating from university.
- Method of appearance
Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un were active behind closed doors at first. After they were named successor, the state made their activities public. In contrast, Kim Ju Ae’s identity was revealed as soon as she appeared on the scene with the title of her father’s “most beloved.” Moreover, her puerile appearance was that of an ordinary little girl rather than a successor. If she was appearing as a successor, wouldn’t she have dressed, coiffured and acted more like an adult?
- Excessive direction
Kim Ju Ae’s reading of a text on the podium (she is too young to know what she is reading), her watching of a full football match (she is not old enough to like football), her uncomfortable walking in high heels (she looked pathetic), and her appearance with a leather coat, sunglasses and a perm (probably the only little girl in the world so adorned) were unbecoming of a 10-year-old girl.
Kim Jong Un was accompanied by his wife and daughter at a banquet celebrating the founding of the DPRK’s military on Feb. 7, 2023, according to state-run media. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
In particular, excessive actions like her stroking her father’s cheek or kissing or hugging him during official appearances, or Pak Chong Chon — the military’s No. 1 — getting down on his knee to talk with her could be seen as behavior indicating her status as successor, but one gets the feeling they are over-the-top.
- Culture and customs
North Korea is a patriarchal culture based on feudal Confucianism. We could call it a sort of monarchy. Some people say female members of the Mount Paektu Bloodline are an exception. However, does Kim Jong Un have to take that risk? In particular, in a nation engaged in military adventurism based on nuclear weapons, women are better suited to the first lady position than as the leader.
- Family name of the fifth leader
Let’s say Kim Ju Ae - in a surprise move - becomes North Korea’s fourth leader. However, this would have a fatal flaw, namely, that it would inevitably spell the end of the Mt. Paektu Bloodline centered on the Kim clan: Kim Ju Ae’s child would take his/her father’s last name. Such a development contradicts the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System,” which calls for passing down leadership along the Mt. Paektu Bloodline.
- Divide in power
Naming a successor amounts to dividing the unitary loyalty toward the supreme leader into two. Would 40-year-old Kim Jong Un begin allowing his authority to leak, exposing a fatal handicap? Party secretary Hwang Jang-yop, who defected to the South in 1996, once said that Kim Il Sung, staring down his 80th year in the late 1980s, regretted having overturned authority to Kim Jong Il too early.
- Other issues
North Korea has yet to officially call Kim Jong Un’s daughter by her name. After calling her “most beloved,” they simply call her “child” without revealing a title or name. This is evidence of the authorities’ wait-and-see approach.
Meanwhile, considering how North Korea used the plural term “great persons of guidance” and how defectors have testified that the country researched monarchies worldwide during the Kim Jong Il era, the government may be benchmarking the Japanese and British royal systems to develop its own succession system.
Conclusions and how we should respond
As we have seen so far, the theory that Kim Ju Ae has been named successor seems plausible — to some extent — if seen merely from the outside, including her title and treatment. However, given a myriad of factors - the limits placed on her by her youth and gender; the creation and operation of a new first secretary position should something befall Kim Jong Un; the existence of Kim’s other children; the issue of the last name of a fifth-generation leader; and the vetting of Kim Ju Ae’s temperament and capacity as a leader - it is too early to conclude that the young girl has been designated her father’s successor.
On the other hand, looking at trends so far, Kim Ju Ae’s role strongly resembles a cameo, intro, or an ad balloon. That is to say, we can assume North Korea put Kim Ju Ae on stage to 1) bolster domestic and international interest in pending issues like the country’s nuclear and missile programs; 2) distract from the strengthening of international sanctions; 3) create an atmosphere in which the perpetual succession of the Mt. Paekdu Bloodline is taken for granted; 4) highlight Kim Jong Un’s love for the future generations; and 5) to prevent a potential U.S. surgical strike to decapitate the regime. In a nutshell, Kim Jong Un is only using his young daughter for his own needs.
This scheme might succeed in highlighting the regime’s “refusal to give up its nuclear weapons” or its “concern for the future generations” in the short term. However, in the long term, it’s clearly a gamble that could generate problems like lessening the mystery around the “royal family” and revealing the truth behind royal births, as well as encouraging speculation over the succession issue.
Accordingly, while leaving the possibility of Kim Ju Ae being the successor open, we must prepare for several scenarios regarding the succession issue under a “higher order” understanding that considers countless variables and a lot of time. More fundamentally, we must undertake a multi-faceted movement to awaken North Korea’s people about the abnormal nature of the country’s hereditary succession and the tangible and intangible harm that results from it.
*The four non-military events attended by Kim Ju Ae were the groundbreaking ceremony for a new housing development in the Sopho area of Pyongyang in February 2023; a New Year’s concert in December 2023; a visit to the Kwangchon Chicken Farm in Hwangju County, North Hwanghae Province, in January 2024; and the ribbon-cutting ceremony at the Kangdong Greenhouse Farm in March 2024
Translated by David Carruth and David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK. Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
Gil-sup Kwak
Kwak is the president of One Korea Center and adjunct professor at Kookmin University’s Unification and Convergence Program. He currently serves as a policy advisory member at the Ministry of Unification and was the director of the North Korea Department at the Institute for National Security Strategy from 2014 to 2017. Before that, he served as a North Korea intelligence officer at the National Intelligence Service. His published works include “Yoon Seok-yeol vs. Kim Jong-un” (2022) and “Kim Jong-un and Biden’s Nuclear Clock.”
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12. N. Korea tightens security around weapons factories to prevent information leaks
Control. Control of information. Control of the people. More specifically, attempts to control the peoples' minds. It is all about 100% regime control of the north
N. Korea tightens security around weapons factories to prevent information leaks
The authorities have "intensified the ideological indoctrination of the workers at factories since the beginning of the year," a source told Daily NK
By Seulkee Jang - March 20, 2024
dailynk.com
N. Korea tightens security around weapons factories to prevent information leaks - Daily NK English
On Feb. 15, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un conducted field inspections of important armaments factories and made specific requests for modernization of production processes and current production conditions, Rodong Sinmun reported. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
North Korea has tightened security around major weapons factories to keep information about the facilities from leaking to the outside world.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Daily NK source in North Pyongan Province said Monday that the North Korean authorities have more than tripled the number of guard posts in and around North Pyongan Province and Chagang Province – where the weapons factories are concentrated – between the end of last year and the beginning of this year.
The source said that the authorities have increased the number of No. 10 guard posts only along roads in regions with weapons factories in the two provinces, not in ordinary civilian areas. Accordingly, people are required to undergo at least three searches when traveling to and from areas near munitions factories.
No. 10 guard posts, operated by the Ministry of State Security, inspect and search people traveling to and from certain regions.
In particular, the authorities have installed not only checkpoints but also dozens of CCTV cameras near major weapons factories in Ryongchon and Kusong, North Pyongan Province.
The North Korean authorities have doubled and tripled their searches by installing inspection facilities and equipment near the weapons factories, apparently to more thoroughly inspect all people and goods entering and leaving the facilities.
Above all, the North Korean authorities have taken these measures to prevent the leakage of internal information, including all information about production and activities at the factories.
Workers also face more ideological indoctrination
The source further reported that the authorities have “intensified the ideological indoctrination of the workers at the weapons factories since the beginning of the year.”
The ideological indoctrination focuses on “producing more weapons as the nation faces a situation where it has to strengthen its self-defense power due to the ever-worsening tension on the Korean peninsula,” he said.
At the end of the classes, the instructors order participants “not to disclose the contents of the lectures to the outside world,” the source added.
Meanwhile, North Korea’s major weapons factories continue to focus all their resources and personnel on producing artillery shells.
“The factories have been firing on all cylinders since last year,” the source said. “Supplies for grenade production continue to arrive, with so much piled up that they couldn’t use it all even if they continued production until the end of the year.”
The North Korean authorities have kept the ammunition factories running at 100% because of the “special situation” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In this regard, circumstantial evidence continues to emerge that North Korea is supplying shells and other weapons to Russia.
Even in North Korea’s weapons factories, workers say they have “never produced so many shells in decades” and that the factories have been “producing many more shells than North Korea needs for months.”
Speaking to reporters at the South Korean Defense Ministry headquarters in Yongsan, Seoul, on Feb. 26, Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said that “North Korea’s hundreds of weapons factories are operating at a low rate of about 30%, given the country’s shortage of raw materials and electricity,” adding that “factories producing shells to supply Russia are running at full capacity.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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Seulkee Jang
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time reporters and covers North Korean economic and diplomatic issues, including workers dispatched abroad. Jang has a M.A. in Sociology from University of North Korean Studies and a B.A. in Sociology from Yonsei University. She can be reached at skjang(at)uni-media.net.
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13. Kim Jong Un appears to have piled on the pounds after losing weight
Photos at the link: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13213475/Kim-Jong-piled-pounds-North-Korea-leader-shed-three-stone-Covid-leather-jacket.html
Kim Jong Un appears to have piled on the pounds after losing weight
Slim Kim no more: Kim Jong Un appears to have piled on the pounds - three years after North Korean leader shed almost three stone during Covid - as he's spotted in THAT leather jacket again
- The despot appeared in his trademark jacket alongside his daughter this week
- Kim disappeared from public view in 2021 before returning around 40lbs lighter
By ELENA SALVONI
PUBLISHED: 07:00 EDT, 19 March 2024 | UPDATED: 10:50 EDT, 19 March 2024
Daily Mail · by Elena Salvoni · March 19, 2024
Kim Jong Un appears to have piled on the pounds since he shed almost three stone during the Covid pandemic, with the latest pictures of the North Korean dictator showing him filling out his trademark leather jacket.
The despot was seen this week on an outing with his 'most beloved' daughter, named by South Korean intelligence as Ju Ae, who has been tipped to take the reigns of the hermit kingdom.
Speculation that he has chosen his heir apparent in his middle child - who is thought be aged between 10 and 12 years old - comes after experts suggested that the 40-year-old's ballooning weight means he could 'collapse' at any time.
Now, photographs released by state media appear to show him looking more rotund than in previous months - with a slimmer look even as recently as January - and noticeably larger than when he lost weight in 2021.
Kim disappeared from public view between January and May that year before returning 40lbs lighter, with officials saying he was eating less 'for the sake of the country' - as his people starved.
The latest pictures of the North Korean dictator show him filling out his trademark leather jacket (pictured right this week and left in 2022)
Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju Ae visit the Gangdong Greenhouse in North Korea, in this picture released on March 16, 2024
Kim appeared more slender as he attended a submarine-launched cruise missile test on January 28, 2024
Kim disappeared from public view in 2021 before returning 40lbs lighter (pictured in November 2021)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party in this photo released on December 28, 2021
There was speculation at the time over whether the dictator - who is known for his love of fine food and wine - was simply aiming to look trimmer or if he was in fact cutting the calories over health concerns amid the Covid pandemic.
While the regime keeps Kim's health a closely guarded secret, reports have emerged over the years that he could suffer from hypertension, diabetes and high cholesterol.
He is also a known smoker, with reports last year that he was indulging in 'heavy boozing and smoking',
In 2020, Dr Kenneth Dekleva suggested that Kim's weight and other 'risk factors' gave him a one in three chance of a heart attack in the next ten years.
But in 2021, he stunned the world with a slimmed-down physique, with South Korean intelligence saying he had shed a staggering 44 pounds.
The tyrant, who stands at 5ft 6in, weighed in at over 300lbs at his peak, before dropping to around 260lbs.
Regime officials told state media that Kim was eating less 'for the sake of the country' as it grappled with famine, insisting that he remained healthy.
State TV even spoke to someone who said his 'emaciated' condition was 'breaking our people's hearts'.
With the UN reporting that around 40 per cent of North Koreans faced malnourishment during the pandemic, such comments are considered to have been part of a propaganda campaign as many faced starvation.
Kim Jong Un is pictured inspecting a major operational training base in the western area of the Korean People's Army earlier this month
The North Korean despot was pictured standing next to a soldier during a training exercise this month
Speculation about Kim's health also forced the government to ban gossip about his weight as a 'reactionary act'.
Analysts have suggested that Kim's rapid weight loss would have been difficult to achieve had he not had a gastric band fitted.
Dr Dekleva told The Sun Online: 'The rapidity and amount of his recent weight loss is consistent with a bariatric surgery procedure, probably a gastric sleeve or bypass procedure.'
Pictures of Kim as a teenager and young man show him with a far more slender figure.
Undated picture shows Kim Jong Un as a slimmer young man
Kim was seen wearing his trademark leather jacket as he watched a military drill this week
After becoming leader of the PRK his waistline ballooned, with insiders claiming that he enjoys gorging on luxury food and drink.
But, according to a chef who worked for his late father, the dictator always had a taste for fine food and drink, including steak, sushi, champagne and cheese.
North Korean officials have good reason to worry about their Supreme Leader's health.
His father, Kim Jong Il, and his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, both died of heart attacks. The health of the dictator is always a closely guarded state secret.
Speculation is now mounting that Ju Ae is being prepared to inherit the leadership from her father, with South Korea's spy agency the National Intelligence Service (NIS) saying on Friday that it views her as his probable successor.
Cheong Seong-Chang, an analyst at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea, said that Kim likely believes his daughter has the capacity and resolve to succeed him as leader.
He said Kim Jong Un's obesity appears so serious that 'it won't be surprising even if he collapses tomorrow'.
This picture released on January 12, 2022 shows Kim Jong Un (R) speaking with military officials
A leather-clad Kim Jong Un (pictured, left) was seen pumping his fist in the air as he oversaw a live-fire drill of a series of 'newly-equipped super-large' rocket launcher
'By accompanying her father on major events, it's like she's learning kingship and building a human network at a tender age,' Cheong said.
South Korea's NIS said in January that the recent increased visibility of Ju Ae suggests she 'appears to be the most likely successor.'
But, it added: 'We are keeping our eyes open for all possibilities because Kim Jong Un is still young, has no major health problems, and there are many variables.'
Daily Mail · by Elena Salvoni · March 19, 2024
14. N. Korea orders Russia-based companies to restrict workers’ contact with S. Koreans
Control. Control access to information and people with information.
N. Korea orders Russia-based companies to restrict workers’ contact with S. Koreans
The president of one company urged those with wavering loyalties to come to their senses and commit themselves to fulfilling state-set production plans, according to a source in Russia
dailynk.com
N. Korea orders Russia-based companies to restrict workers’ contact with S. Koreans - Daily NK English
North Korean state media reported on Sept. 14 that Kim Jong Un met with Vladmir Putin the previous day. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
The North Korean authorities have ordered its companies in Russia to tightly restrict workers’ contact with South Koreans, Daily NK has learned.
According to a source in Russia on Mar. 19, employees of the Moscow-based Namgang Corporation, which is under the Seventh General Bureau, were assembled on Mar. 19 and notified of the new policy.
During the meeting, the president of the Namgang Corporation said that the focus of the policy is to “stomp out any instances in which workers of the Russia-based company interact with citizens of South Korea’s ‘puppet state’ for work or other reasons.”
While North Korea has always restricted its workers in Russia from contacting South Korean citizens, the new policy appears to be aimed at highlighting that workers should not be in contact with anyone who could encourage them to defect.
“In his announcement, the president of Namgang Corporation reminded the workers that Russia has close ties with North Korea and will arrest anyone who attempts to escape,” the source said. “He urged those with wavering loyalties to come to their senses and commit themselves to fulfilling state-set production plans.”
The company’s president further said that “in the past, Russia would simply deport South Korean citizens who hid runaway North Korean workers, but starting this year, it has chosen to promote justice and trust with our fatherland [North Korea] by detaining, arresting, and exposing the concealed places used by these South Koreans.” His statement suggests that the North Korean government believes the new policy will bring about a decline in efforts by South Koreans to rescue defectors.
During the meeting, a state security official also warned the workers that “Russian law enforcement is actively cooperating with North Korea to promote measures that will prevent workers from escaping. Those who knowingly attempt to contact South Korean citizens will endanger their families back home.”
After the meeting, workers said among themselves that the emphasis on North Korea’s close ties with Russian law enforcement was meant to inspire fear.
Amid deepening ties between the two countries, Daily NK has reported that increased cooperation between Russia and North Korea’s intelligence agencies is making it more difficult for North Korean workers in Russia to defect.
Translated by Audrey Gregg. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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Jeong Tae Joo
Jeong Tae Joo is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists.
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15. South Korea Can Be a Democratic Leader
South Korea will get another chance to create a model democracy when the Korean people in the north and South establish a United Republic of Korea (UROK). This will become the modern example of self determination and the UROK will be an Asian city on a hill.
Excerpts:
The countries that have been at the frontlines of democratic leadership should now help South Korea to play a leading role in strengthening global democratic infrastructure. This means using the Summit for Democracy to make clear to the Korean people and government that the world welcomes their ambition and expects the summit to translate these aspirations into action. South Korea will find its own pathway to regional and global leadership, and other democracies can provide valuable partnership along the way.
South Korea is already an impressive democracy and vibrant market economy. It can build on these achievements to emerge as a global democratic leader. One day, the Korean Wave may be known not only for its cultural capital, but also for spurring a more democratic future.
South Korea Can Be a Democratic Leader
As Seoul hosts the Summit for Democracy, it can show that the Korean model is one to emulate.
By Damon Wilson, the president and CEO of the National Endowment for Democracy, and Lynn Lee, the director of East Asia and regional programs at the National Endowment for Democracy.
Foreign Policy · by Damon Wilson, Lynn Lee
- Foreign & Public Diplomacy
- South Korea
March 18, 2024, 2:00 PM
As democracy faces a growing assault around the world, South Korea is emerging as a country that is uniquely positioned to help lead a global democratic renewal. When Seoul held the 1988 Summer Olympics, it helped introduce South Korea to the world as a modern nation. Hosting the third Summit for Democracy this week reflects South Korea’s new ambition to support the expansion of freedom around the world, especially in the Indo-Pacific and in the global south.
As democracy faces a growing assault around the world, South Korea is emerging as a country that is uniquely positioned to help lead a global democratic renewal. When Seoul held the 1988 Summer Olympics, it helped introduce South Korea to the world as a modern nation. Hosting the third Summit for Democracy this week reflects South Korea’s new ambition to support the expansion of freedom around the world, especially in the Indo-Pacific and in the global south.
South Korea’s transformation from devastation after the Korean War to economic powerhouse has inspired many developing countries. Successive Korean administrations have focused on economic development at home while maintaining an alliance with the United States and managing relations with regional powers to keep the peace on the Korean peninsula. But now Seoul is aiming higher: South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has written that he sees his country as a “global pivotal state,” taking on a bigger role in “expanding freedom and human rights, not just for ourselves, but also for others.”
Many people in the global south resist the idea of a world in which they must choose between the United States and China. In this sense, the Korean model is one to emulate: a non-Western country that has achieved economic development coupled with growing political and societal liberalization at home while navigating great power politics. As the need for global democratic solidarity grows more urgent, South Korea’s stepping up to host the Summit for Democracy underscores the important role that non-Western democracies have to play on the global stage.
South Korea has growing soft power, and the emergence of Korean pop culture as a global phenomenon (known as Hallyu, or the Korean Wave), along with South Korea’s technological prowess, can help its aspirations on the world stage. South Korea’s open society has enabled the production of both cultural and technological innovations that shape the daily life of so many people around the world. The unprecedented global reach of K-pop and K-dramas have shown the world the lifestyle attainable in today’s South Korea, and global consumers likely view the country’s freedoms positively.
Half of the world’s countries have seen a decline in at least one democracy indicator in the last five years, as measured by the Global State of Democracy Initiative. Meanwhile, authoritarian powers are learning from and supporting one another and using the international system to their advantage. Democratic leaders must take the initiative in revitalizing a global order that upholds people’s freedoms. And for democracy to thrive globally, governments beyond the United States and Europe must play a leading role in supporting it.
Yoon has warned that the “freedom and democracy we have built through sweat and sacrifice are being seriously undermined around the world and faced with grave challenges.” The Summit for Democracy provides an opportunity to demonstrate that democracies are united in defending democracy together. As host, South Korea sends a strong signal to those who continue to dismiss democracy as Western and therefore incompatible with other values. For countries that want to avoid taking sides amid global tensions, South Korea’s leadership can navigate these shoals.
South Korea’s own trajectory resonates with democracy advocates in the global south. The Korean people challenged their dictatorship in 1987 and peacefully transitioned the country to a liberal democracy. This “homegrown democracy” has enabled Seoul to flourish in economic development and innovation by ensuring the rule of law, protections of property rights, and fostering the freedom of expression so crucial to creative industries—fueling the Korean Wave. All of this makes the country’s choice to host the summit a potential game changer.
South Korea can show that although the path to democracy is context-specific, the values and institutions that sustain it—free speech, free markets, and political competition—are universal. In addition to the Summit for Democracy, Seoul will host other important meetings related to digital governance and artificial intelligence this year, including the Global AI Forum in May and the AI Summit Seoul in December. As Yoon has argued, “[W]e, as free citizens of the world, must unite in solidarity to stave off any misuse or any abuse of digital technology that could undermine our freedom.”
This week, South Korea has an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to democratic solidarity and articulate how it will intensify its support for democracy around the world. It should leverage its soft power to do so. By showcasing South Korea’s digital innovation and culture, made possible by such values as freedom of expression, the country can achieve outsized impact in making a case for democracy everywhere, not just in the West.
The countries that have been at the frontlines of democratic leadership should now help South Korea to play a leading role in strengthening global democratic infrastructure. This means using the Summit for Democracy to make clear to the Korean people and government that the world welcomes their ambition and expects the summit to translate these aspirations into action. South Korea will find its own pathway to regional and global leadership, and other democracies can provide valuable partnership along the way.
South Korea is already an impressive democracy and vibrant market economy. It can build on these achievements to emerge as a global democratic leader. One day, the Korean Wave may be known not only for its cultural capital, but also for spurring a more democratic future.
Foreign Policy · by Damon Wilson, Lynn Lee
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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