Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"We must never forget that art is not a form of propaganda; it is a form of truth."

– John F. Kennedy

"The world breaks everyone, and afterward, some are strong at the broken places."

– Ernest Hemingway

"I still find each day too short for all the thoughts I want to think, all the walks I want to take, all the books I want to read, and all the friends I want to see."

– John Burroughs

1. Korean Peninsula on Edge, as America-South Korea War Games Are Set To Begin Amid Rising Threats From North

2. A Distracted America Still Leads the World

3. North Korea threatens to take military moves in response to US-South Korean drills

4. China drops 'peaceful reunification' reference to Taiwan

5. Increasing Stability in a Deterrence Relationship with North Korea

6. Moon Chung-in on Escalating Inter-Korea Tensions and What Lies Ahead

7. Achieving Denuclearization On The Korean Peninsula

8. North Korea Helped Turn Iran Into a Missile Powerhouse

9. Ukraine military official: half of all North Korean shells are duds

10. Poland’s new nuclear plant to boost S. Korean industry in Europe

11. U.S. seeks talks with N. Korea to reduce risk of inadvertent conflict: NSC spokesperson

12. U.N. chief appoints new resident coordinator for N. Korea

13. N. Korea warns U.S.-S. Korea to pay 'dear price' for joint military drills

14. Nason party official arrested for leaking state secrets to friends

15. U.S. willing to take 'interim steps' toward North's denuclearization, says White House official

1. Korean Peninsula on Edge, as America-South Korea War Games Are Set To Begin Amid Rising Threats From North

So many questions.

Aren't these statements of our "fears" playing right into Kim's political warfare strategy? He is trying to drive a wedge in the alliance and hoping for the old paradigm as the South being proactive and aggressive while the US is trying to demonstrate restraint and these two differing vows might cause friction in the alliance. Even a blind man can see Kim's strategy.

Is there any evidence of Moon"restricting" exercises to computer driven? No. UFL/UFG/UFS has always been primarily a computer driven exercise.

Excerpt:

That scenario adds to the urgency of the upcoming exercises, a semi-annual show called “Freedom Shield” that South Korea’s conservative president, Yoon Suk-yeol, has enthusiastically endorsed after his liberal predecessor, Moon Jae-in, had restricted them largely to computer-driven war games.

What is Kim's objective here? Does he want escalation? Is he looking for a reason to "strike?" And if so, what is his objective for such a "strike?" We must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.

Excerpt:

A longtime Korea analyst at the RAND Corporation, Bruce Bennett, sees Mr. Kim as scheming to get the Americans and South Koreans to appear to be about to attack the North. He may be looking for a pretext to strike back, believing that China and Russia, the two powers on which his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, needed to stave off defeat in the Korean War, would be on his side.

“The vehemence of Kim’s latest threats,” Mr. Bennett said, may mean he’s hoping that Seoul and Washington “will overreact to his threats of attack on and annihilation of” South Korea.

“An overreaction would give him justification for some level of escalation,” Mr. Bennett, writing in the National Interest, said. He then could “claim that President Yoon is a warmonger.”

Why would anyone say this? Don't we know where the 100 missile test launch sites already are? Why are we concerned with test launch sites? I would think we are more concerned with their actual launch sites that they would use for an attack and war.

Excerpt:

A primary purpose of the upcoming war games, American and South Korean military officials said, will be to identify as targets the sites from which North Korea has test-fired more than 100 missiles over the past two-plus years. No way, they said, will they approach the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas — though the North is sure to accuse Washington and Seoul of plotting an “invasion.”

This is why we need the Northeast Asian Fusion Cell and its "kill web" process to manage effective influence operations (since no one else in the US government is). We need it to prevent the lack of understanding of nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and offer influence targeting solutions (appreciate the context, understand the problem and develop approaches e.g., support a real influence campaign). See information on USFK's kill web concept here: https://nsiteam.com/smaspeakerseries_09january2024/

Korean Peninsula on Edge, as America-South Korea War Games Are Set To Begin Amid Rising Threats From North

Top officers worry that North Korea’s strongman leader, Kim Jong-un, may actually live up to his word and hurl more than rhetoric against his enemies.

DONALD KIRK

Saturday, March 2, 202409:32:22 am

nysun.com

American and South Korean troops are poised to challenge the inflammatory rhetoric and dire threats of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, with 10 days of joint exercises beginning Monday.

The war games, featuring all services, are expected to come close but not too close to the North-South line in an atmosphere of mounting tension that has top officers worried that Mr. Kim may actually live up to his word and hurl more than rhetoric against his enemies.

The commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Anthony Cotton, sees North Korea’s increasingly tight relations with America’s greatest potential foes, Russia and China, as adding “new layers of complexity to our strategic calculus.” More simply, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, the rising confrontation “raises the possibility of simultaneous conflicts with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries.”

That scenario adds to the urgency of the upcoming exercises, a semi-annual show called “Freedom Shield” that South Korea’s conservative president, Yoon Suk-yeol, has enthusiastically endorsed after his liberal predecessor, Moon Jae-in, had restricted them largely to computer-driven war games. Mr. Kim has added to the sense of danger by cutting off all dialogue with Washington and Seoul, vowing to deploy nuclear weapons if needed, and proclaiming South Korea the North’s “primary foe.”

A longtime Korea analyst at the RAND Corporation, Bruce Bennett, sees Mr. Kim as scheming to get the Americans and South Koreans to appear to be about to attack the North. He may be looking for a pretext to strike back, believing that China and Russia, the two powers on which his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, needed to stave off defeat in the Korean War, would be on his side.

“The vehemence of Kim’s latest threats,” Mr. Bennett said, may mean he’s hoping that Seoul and Washington “will overreact to his threats of attack on and annihilation of” South Korea.

“An overreaction would give him justification for some level of escalation,” Mr. Bennett, writing in the National Interest, said. He then could “claim that President Yoon is a warmonger.”

That South Korean and American troops are joining in such significant exercises in the month before what are likely to be pivotal elections for the South’s national assembly adds to the risks of a strong North Korean response.

Mr. Yoon was elected president by a margin of less than 1 percent two years ago, and the opposition Democratic Party still has slightly more seats than his People Power Party in the assembly. Mr. Kim could hope to undermine Mr. Yoon’s party in the April election, Mr. Bennett said, making it difficult for Mr. Yoon to maintain a strong policy vis-à-vis North Korea.

Mr. Yoon, though, may also want to project his image as a tough guy standing up to the North as opposed to his predecessor, who sought dialogue. Mr. Kim saw Mr. Moon three times in 2018, when Mr. Kim also met President Trump in Singapore. but he refused to see Mr. Moon after the failure of the second Trump-Kim summit at Hanoi five years ago.

A primary purpose of the upcoming war games, American and South Korean military officials said, will be to identify as targets the sites from which North Korea has test-fired more than 100 missiles over the past two-plus years. No way, they said, will they approach the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas — though the North is sure to accuse Washington and Seoul of plotting an “invasion.”

nysun.com

2. A Distracted America Still Leads the World

China, Russia, and Iran (what about north Korea?). Yes, he includes Venezuela and north Korea as trying to undermine security and break American power. in the text. It is stillana afterthought and still listed last like in everyone else's list of threats (yes my bias is showing).

A Distracted America Still Leads the World

China, Russia and Iran see the U.S. as polarized and waning but underestimate the power of capitalism.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-distracted-america-still-leads-the-world-rivals-underestimate-power-of-capitalism-113009fc?

By Walter Russell Mead

March 4, 2024 5:47 pm ET

PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES/ISTOCKPHOTO

These are terrifying times. As a technological revolution propels the most dangerous arms race in human history, a coalition of powers ranging from China and Russia to Iran, Venezuela and North Korea is trying to undermine American security and break American power. In the U.S., the foreign-policy establishment in both political parties is widely discredited, but populist isolationism offers little in the way of constructive alternatives. Meanwhile, culture wars and bitter polarization have distracted and divided the one country that can lead the world back toward a more peaceful path. If the potential consequences of this mix of global crisis and American incapacity don’t trouble your sleep at times, you haven’t been paying attention.

Many factors contribute to this distressing situation, but the economic and social disruptions brought on by the Information Revolution are the heart of the matter. As social media upends political parties and systems across the world, and technological change transforms industries, political leaders are struggling to maintain the authority and legitimacy necessary for far-sighted foreign policy. At the same time, advances in drone warfare, artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles and cyberattacks are changing the nature of war and international competition. Global problems are getting more urgent and difficult even as political leaders in the U.S. and elsewhere are losing their ability to lead.

The U.S. remains the key actor in the international system, but American society is less focused on dealing with foreign challenges than in resolving economic, political and cultural issues at home. This has happened before. In the late 19th century, Americans were focused on managing the consequences of the Industrial Revolution, such as the rise of conglomerates, the centralization of financial power in Wall Street banks, and mass migration from Europe to the industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest. All the while, an agricultural crisis was unfolding as the economics of family farming became less favorable. International events commanded scant attention even as Europe drifted toward the disaster of World War I. In the 1930s, the Great Depression similarly led the U.S. to focus inward despite dangers beyond its borders.

Seeing a polarized America sliding toward less effective global engagement amid international conflict and crises, our adversaries in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang believe the clock is running out on the American Century. Their efforts to lower the curtain on the Pax Americana are growing more ambitious as Americans lose their sense of unity and purpose.

But the Pax Americana is more robust than it looks. Historically, these periods of internal dissention and social upheaval haven’t signaled the collapse of American power so much as prepared its resurgence. Between the Civil War and the early 20th century the inward-focused, polarized Americans created a massive industrial economy and a powerful financial sector that made us irresistible when we entered World War I. Ditto in World War II.

American power is grounded in capitalism, the most disruptive and revolutionary social system in the history of the world. Our openness to capitalism makes the U.S. quick to gain the benefits that capitalist development brings, and also quick to suffer the displacements effected by technological and economic change. Amid the struggle in American domestic politics today, we can still see the emergence of new industries, new forms of social organization, new technologies that are likely to make us a decisive actor in the 21st century.

Even as our politics descend into chaos, our farms and factories are becoming more productive. Our financial markets are becoming more sophisticated. Our computers are getting faster and more complex, our software more capable. More enterprises are harvesting productivity gains from new technology. Our struggles aren’t the death agonies of terminal decline. As I’ve written elsewhere, they are the awkward lunges of a butterfly struggling to escape a cocoon.

Those who expected a permanent peace and a long calm after the Cold War were profoundly mistaken about the impact of American power. America’s victory in the Cold War didn’t end history but accelerated it.

America’s internal dissensions are reaching a peak even as the world slides toward chaos. This is an explosive conjunction, and there is no guarantee of a smooth ride ahead. But if America remains a dynamic society filled with raucous, ambitious and impatient people, we are likely to continue to surprise ourselves and the rest of the world with the wealth we create—and the power that flows from it.

North Korea threatens to take military moves in response to US-South Korean drills

AP · March 5, 2024

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea called the ongoing South Korean-U.S. military drills a plot to invade the country, as it threatened Tuesday to take unspecified “responsible” military steps in response.

The North’s warning came a day after the South Korean and U.S. forces kicked off their annual computer-simulated command post training and a variety of field exercises for an 11-day run. This year’s drills were to involve 48 field exercises, twice the number conducted last year.

In a statement carried by state media, the North’s Defense Ministry said it “strongly denounces the reckless military drills of the U.S. and (South Korea) for getting more undisguised in their military threat to a sovereign state and attempt for invading it.”

An unidentified ministry spokesperson said North Korea’s military will “continue to watch the adventurist acts of the enemies and conduct responsible military activities to strongly control the unstable security environment on the Korean Peninsula.”

The spokesperson didn’t say what measures North Korea would take, but observers say North Korea will likely carry out missile tests or other steps to bolster its war capability.

South Korea’s Defense Ministry said later Tuesday that its drills with the United States is a regular, defensive training. A ministry statement said South Korea will make an overwhelming response if North Korea launches direct provocations against it during the drills.

North Korea views its rivals’ major military drills as invasion rehearsals, though South Korean and U.S. officials have repeatedly said they have no intentions of attacking the North. North Korea has previously reacted to South Korean-U.S. exercises with launches of a barrage of missiles into the sea.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said last week that this year’s military drills with the United States were designed to neutralize North Korean nuclear threats and would involve live-firing, bombing, air assault and missile interception drills.

Concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program have grown in the past two years, as the North has test-launched missiles at a record pace and openly threatened to use nuclear weapons preemptively. The U.S. and South Korea have expanded their military exercises and increased the deployment of powerful U.S. military assets like aircraft carriers and nuclear-capable bombers in response.

This year, North Korea performed six rounds of missile tests and artillery firing drills. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un also declared his country won’t seek reconciliation with South Korea and vowed to scrap the country’s long-running goal of peaceful unification with South Korea. Kim said North Korea would take a more aggressive military posture along the disputed sea boundary with South Korea.

Experts say North Korea could believe a bigger weapons arsenal would provide it with a greater leverage in future diplomacy with the United States. They say North Korea is desperate to win an international recognition as a nuclear state, a status that it would think helps it win relief of U.S.-led economic sanctions.

North Korea is expected to further dial up tensions with more missile tests and warlike rhetoric this year as the U.S. and South Korea head into major elections. North Korea may stage limited provocation near the tense border with South Korea this year, experts say.

AP · March 5, 2024

4. China drops 'peaceful reunification' reference to Taiwan

Hmmmm.....taking a page from north Korea. I bet Kim Jong Un thinks he is an international influencer.

But let's consider the political warfare here.

China drops 'peaceful reunification' reference to Taiwan

By Yew Lun Tian and Laurie Chen

March 5, 20244:32 AM ESTUpdated 4 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-drops-peaceful-reunification-reference-taiwan-raises-defence-spending-by-2024-03-05/

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BEIJING, March 5 (Reuters) - China will boost its defence spending by 7.2% this year, fuelling a military budget that has more than doubled under President Xi Jinping's 11 years in office as Beijing hardens its stance on Taiwan, according to official reports on Tuesday.

The increase mirrors the rate presented in last year's budget and again comes in well above the government's economic growth forecast for this year.

China also officially adopted tougher language against Taiwan as it released the budget figures, dropping the mention of "peaceful reunification" in a government report delivered by Premier Li Qiang at the opening of the National People's Congress (NPC), China's rubber-stamp parliament, on Tuesday.

Tensions have risen sharply in recent years over Taiwan, the democratically ruled island that China claims as its own, and elsewhere across East Asia as regional military deployments rise.

Li Mingjiang, a defence scholar at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, said that despite China's struggling economy, Taiwan is a major consideration in Beijing's defence spending.

"China is showing that in the coming decade it wants to grow its military to the point where it is prepared to win a war if it has no choice but to fight one," Li said.

Since Xi became president and commander-in-chief more than a decade ago, the defence budget has ballooned to 1.67 trillion yuan ($230 billion) this year from 720 billion yuan in 2013.

The percentage rise in military spending has consistently outpaced the annual domestic economic growth target during his time in office. This year the growth target for 2024 is about 5%, similar to last year's goal, according to the government report.

The defence budget is closely watched by China's neighbours and the United States, who are wary of Beijing's strategic intentions and the development of its armed forces.

Based on data from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), this year's budget marks the 30th consecutive year of Chinese defence spending increases.

Japanese government spokesperson Yoshimasa Hayashi on Tuesday urged greater openness from Beijing, warning of serious international concerns.

China's continuous military spending increases without sufficient transparency were "the greatest strategic challenge ever to ensure the peace and stability of Japan and the international community and strengthen international order", Hayashi said in Tokyo.

South Korea's defence ministry declined to comment. Australia's defence ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

James Char, a security scholar at the RSIS, said that despite the defence budget's outpacing GDP growth, it had remained at about 1.3% of overall gross domestic product in the last decade and had put no stress on the national coffers.

"Of course, the country's longer-term economic fortunes will determine whether this can be sustained going forward," Char said.

Soldiers of People's Liberation Army (PLA) march in formation past Tiananmen Square during a rehearsal before a military parade marking the 70th founding anniversary of People's Republic of China, on its National Day in Beijing, China October 1, 2019. REUTERS/Jason Lee/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

The purchase of new equipment is likely to take up the largest single chunk of the budget as the military works to meet Xi's goal of full modernisation by 2035, the IISS said in research published last month.

That push continues across several fronts, with China producing weapons ranging from warships and submarines to drones and advanced missiles that can be equipped with both nuclear and conventional warheads.

Char said tighter management would also be a priority for military leadership after high-profile personnel purges related to weapons procurement.

The Central Military Commission, China's top military body, last July ordered a "clean up" of the procurement process and invited the public to report irregularities.

The commission has not announced the results of its investigation, but at least nine generals, including four directly in charge of procurement, have been stripped of their title as parliamentarians, a necessary procedure before they can be charged in court.

Two former defence ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, have also gone missing without explanation, which in China often means they are under investigation.

Li had been in charge of military procurement from 2017 to 2022. When asked whether Li would attend the parliament sessions, parliament spokesman Lou Qinjian told Singapore paper Lianhe Zaobao on Monday that Li "cannot attend because he is no longer a delegate".

In the government work report, China reiterated a call for "reunification" with Taiwan, but added emphasis that it wants to "be firm" in doing so and dropped the descriptor "peaceful", which had been used in previous reports.

Although it is not the first time that China had omitted the word "peaceful", the change in language is closely watched as a possible sign of more assertive stance towards Taiwan.

Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council on Tuesday urged China to accept the fact that the two sides are not subordinate to each other, and urged China to create health cross-strait exchanges.

The island's defence minister had said on Tuesday Taiwan's armed forces would increase the number of missile drills they hold this year.

Wen-Ti Sung, a political scientist and fellow at the Atlantic Council, said that the language on Taiwan has "moderately hardened".

"Beijing appears to be balancing between projecting increased toughness on Taiwan with stabilising relations with Taiwan's international friends," he said.

After the Democratic Progressive Party's Lai Ching-te won the presidential election in Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party's fourth-ranked leader, Wang Huning, said at a high-level Taiwan policy meeting last month that China would "resolutely combat" any efforts towards Taiwan independence this year.

Previous statements from the annual meeting only vowed to "resolutely oppose" Taiwan independence.

($1 = 7.1987 Chinese yuan renminbi)

Reporting by Beijing newsroom, additional reporting by Yimou Lee in Taipei, Greg Torode in Hong Kong, Yoshifumi Takemoto in Tokyo Hyonhee Shin in Seoul and Kirsty Needham in Sydney; Editing by Tom Hogue, Christopher Cushing, Gerry Doyle and Kim COghill

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab

Yew Lun Tian

Thomson Reuters

Yew Lun Tian reports on China's politics, diplomacy, security and society. She was previously Beijing bureau chief for a Singapore paper Lianhe Zaobao.

Laurie Chen

Thomson Reuters

Laurie Chen is a China Correspondent at Reuters' Beijing bureau, covering politics and general news. Before joining Reuters, she reported on China for six years at Agence France-Presse and the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. She speaks fluent Mandarin.

5. Increasing Stability in a Deterrence Relationship with North Korea

Arms control negotiations equals success for Kim Jogn Un's political warfare strategy. On the other hand, I could accept arms control negotiations if they were part of a superior political warfare strategy that is built on "3+1" - an influence campaign with two lines of effort - human rights upfront and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea plus resting on a foundation of deterrence and defense.

Excepts:

Neither Seoul nor Washington should expect any arms control negotiations to obviate mutual vulnerability. Limiting other types of North Korean nuclear systems — for example, intercontinental or sea-launched missiles — may have other benefits for reducing the risk of accidents, the expected damage North Korea could impose on certain targets or the fiscal requirements for the alliance. However, Pyongyang is unlikely to limit the systems that it sees as necessary to preserve mutual vulnerability and ensure the regime’s survival. Instead, limiting North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons should be the alliance’s top priority as they are tasked not with increasing the aggregate quantity of expected damage — which is already unacceptable — but with providing qualitatively new missions for the arsenal that increase the risk of crisis onset or escalation. By decreasing crisis stability, North Korea’s tactical arsenal actually reduces the regime’s security.

Because the U.S.-South Korea alliance has not adopted stability as a guiding objective, its military posture has exceeded the requirements of deterrence and is maintaining an unnecessarily high risk of North Korean nuclear use. While the current strategy may well preserve a fragile and brittle peace, it carries a significant risk of failure. A durable and reliable peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the long-term goal of a nuclear-free North Korea, requires arms control.

Increasing Stability in a Deterrence Relationship with North Korea

Modest initiatives focused on North Korea’s tactical nuclear arsenal are the best way of moving beyond a fragile, unreliable standoff to a more stable peace.

Monday, March 4, 2024 / BY: Adam Mount

usip.org

The most common strategy is to increase the alliance’s margin of military advantage over North Korea. At best, this strategy will produce a fragile standoff marked by periodic crises, a constant risk of deterrence failure and little progress toward the goal of a nuclear-free peninsula. At worst, attempting to escape a mutual deterrence relationship with the regime by extending the alliance’s dominance undermines stability on the peninsula. The existing approach will incentivize North Korea to continually expand and improve its nuclear arsenal, adopt command and control arrangements that increase the risk of accidental escalation, and maintain doctrine and plans that increase the risk of intentional escalation.

To reduce the risk of nuclear use, the U.S.-South Korea alliance should adopt a strategy to maintain stability rather than degrade it. Though Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang have shown little interest in arms control, modest initiatives focused on North Korea’s tactical nuclear arsenal are the best way of moving beyond a fragile, unreliable standoff to a more stable peace.

A Rapidly Expanding North Korean Arsenal

Though North Korea will never be recognized as a “nuclear-weapon state” under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it will remain a nuclear-armed state for the foreseeable future. Since Kim Jong Un took power after his father’s death in 2011, he has transformed the country’s nuclear arsenal from a rudimentary, symbolic retaliatory capability to one that is diverse, sophisticated and postured not only for retaliation against an allied attack on the regime but also to fight and win a limited conflict and to coerce the allies into terminating that conflict on his terms.

In recent years, the North Korean regime has pursued a puzzling strategy for the development of its nuclear forces. Resource-constrained middle powers tend to concentrate on perfecting and demonstrating the reliability of a small handful of missile systems, benefitting from economies of scale in procurement and training. By contrast, North Korea has demonstrated a large constellation of different options, including multiple missiles each at intercontinental, intermediate and short ranges. Currently, or in the near future, North Korea may be able to deliver nuclear weapons by air-breathing, ballistic, aero-ballistic and hypersonic-glide vehicles that are based on some combination of mobile transporter-erector launchers, submarines, silos, railcars and launchers attached to the seabed.

It is unclear why North Korea has adopted such an expensive acquisition strategy. In North Korea’s centralized regime, a diverse arsenal is unlikely to be the product of competing bureaucratic interests between services (as in the United States) or defense contractors (as in the former Soviet Union). It is more likely to be the product of a desire to (a) confound the alliance’s planning for reconnaissance and strike operations, (b) hedge against the chance that a small number of systems could be compromised by a technical fault or by allied cyber or kinetic attacks or (c) portray the regime as a sophisticated nuclear nation (either for prestige or to underscore U.S. and South Korean vulnerability to the arsenal).

Stability in an Asymmetric Deterrence Relationship

Though North Korea’s advancements are alarming, neither they nor allied responses will qualitatively change the fact that the United States and South Korea are vulnerable to a North Korean attack. While the expected damage that the regime could inflict on the United States and its allies is lower than other major nuclear powers, it is still significant and rising rapidly in both quantity and probability. Though U.S. policy will not formally recognize mutual vulnerability with North Korea, the U.S.-South Korea alliance is now in a deterrence relationship with North Korea.

The critical characteristic of a deterrence relationship is its stability. A deterrence relationship is stable to the extent that neither side has an incentive to initiate conflict with nonnuclear forces or to escalate a crisis to the nuclear level. The alliance’s deterrence relationship with North Korea is extremely asymmetrical, far more than the rough parity of the U.S.-Soviet balance or even the current U.S.-China relationship. Pyongyang’s marked inferiority — both in its ability to detect incoming attacks against its nuclear forces and its leadership and to control its forces during an attack — means that the regime has high incentives to use nuclear weapons early in a crisis. In an extremely asymmetric deterrence relationship, stability is inherently low.

Deterrence can contribute to stability if it can provide disincentives to escalation while also assuring both countries that they can preserve a margin of safety if they demonstrate restraint. Unfortunately, the U.S.-South Korea alliance increasingly interprets the requirements of deterrence in ways that degrade rather than enhance stability. The alliance has sought to escape or deny the existing deterrence relationship by maximizing asymmetry on the peninsula, including by signaling an intention to kill Kim and undertaking an infeasible effort to prevent any and all damage to the United States and South Korea through preemptive strikes and missile defense.

In a relatively symmetrical deterrence relationship, as with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, attempts to gain an advantage may have shifted the balance of expected damage, leading to ongoing competition in strategic forces, but they did not meaningfully affect Moscow’s incentives to use nuclear weapons first. In an extremely asymmetric deterrence relationship, these efforts provide Kim strong incentives to expand and diversify his nuclear forces, to demonstrate their capability in increasingly prominent ways until U.S. leaders acknowledge them, to plan to use them for a variety of retaliatory and warfighting missions early in a crisis, and to posture them in ways that allow for rapid first use even in the event his nuclear command and control system is disrupted. Because attempts to gain advantage increase Kim’s incentives to use nuclear weapons first, the alliance’s current defense policy does not promote stability but instability.

An allied defense policy focused on maintaining stability would instead recognize that North Korea can inflict unacceptable damage on the alliance and concentrate on reducing its incentives to carry out those attacks or to posture its forces in ways that could cause those attacks to occur unintentionally. It would begin with U.S. and South Korean officials publicly communicating a tacit acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability. To reduce North Korean incentives for destabilizing action, the alliance should maintain an equilibrium of forces on the peninsula and reduce its reliance on a “decapitation” strategy in order to allow Kim a rational expectation of his own security.

Arms Control Can Promote Stability

Arms control is the central instrument for countries seeking to maintain stability in their deterrence relationship. The United States and Russia valued past arms control agreements as ways to acquire valuable information about each other’s capabilities and to prevent the deployment of destabilizing systems. In an asymmetric deterrence relationship, arms control becomes both more important and more difficult. It becomes more important because the relationship is inherently unstable. It becomes more difficult because it is harder for the more powerful side to credibly commit to limit its capabilities — not only because of political or psychological reasons that currently keep the alliance from pursuing arms control but because its forces will always contain some capabilities needed to attempt counterforce and decapitation.

The Korean Peninsula could benefit from a series of arms control negotiations that are predicated not on North Korea’s rapid disarmament but on a limitation of its arsenal in ways consistent with stability. The allies could, for example, seek modest limits on the number, types, location or readiness of North Korea’s new tactical nuclear arsenal, which are the systems that stand the highest risk of initiating or escalating a nuclear crisis but are not necessary to deter the major attacks that could threaten the regime’s survival. In turn, the allies should recognize that these gains require not just monetary payoffs from lifting sanctions, but analogous limits on their capabilities or operations on the peninsula that could reduce Kim’s dependence on nuclear first use. A modest, reciprocal agreement that restricted North Korea’s tactical nuclear arsenal could not only reduce the risk and severity of conflict but may potentially initiate a series of negotiations that could reduce the chance of crisis onset and lead to more ambitious agreements later.

Neither Seoul nor Washington should expect any arms control negotiations to obviate mutual vulnerability. Limiting other types of North Korean nuclear systems — for example, intercontinental or sea-launched missiles — may have other benefits for reducing the risk of accidents, the expected damage North Korea could impose on certain targets or the fiscal requirements for the alliance. However, Pyongyang is unlikely to limit the systems that it sees as necessary to preserve mutual vulnerability and ensure the regime’s survival. Instead, limiting North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons should be the alliance’s top priority as they are tasked not with increasing the aggregate quantity of expected damage — which is already unacceptable — but with providing qualitatively new missions for the arsenal that increase the risk of crisis onset or escalation. By decreasing crisis stability, North Korea’s tactical arsenal actually reduces the regime’s security.

Because the U.S.-South Korea alliance has not adopted stability as a guiding objective, its military posture has exceeded the requirements of deterrence and is maintaining an unnecessarily high risk of North Korean nuclear use. While the current strategy may well preserve a fragile and brittle peace, it carries a significant risk of failure. A durable and reliable peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the long-term goal of a nuclear-free North Korea, requires arms control.

Adam Mount is a nonresident senior fellow at the Federation of American Scientists.

usip.org

6. Moon Chung-in on Escalating Inter-Korea Tensions and What Lies Ahead

The regime has not given up on its objective to dominate the entire Korean peninsula. We must not overlook that. That is the real "normalcy" Moon Chung in does not address.

Excerpts:

The Diplomat asked Moon for his thoughts on the motives behind Kim’s sudden move and its implications.

“The 1992 Agreement on Non-aggression, Reconciliation, and Exchange and Cooperation signed between the two Koreas defined inter-Korean relations as a ‘special relation’ in the course of pursuing unification, yet they had different interpretations,” Moon said.

“North Korea aimed for a ‘federation or confederation’ (yonbang) of two Koreas based on the formula of one ethnic nation, one state, two systems, and two local governments. Meanwhile, South Korea proposed a ‘union of states’ model (gukga yonhap) composed of one Korean nation, two states, two systems, and two governments, resembling today’s European Union,” Moon added, clarifying the distinct initial aims of North and South.

Moon contended that the Kim dynasty had long sought reunification based on federation, but having realized its implausibility, Kim Jong Un has officially recognized the inevitability of the two-state formula, long adhered to by the South.

“I would say it is a return to normalcy, albeit with heightened antagonism,” Moon concluded.

Moon Chung-in on Escalating Inter-Korea Tensions and What Lies Ahead

thediplomat.com · by Kenji Yoshida

The former special adviser to the South Korean president believes recent moves by Kim Jong Un represent a “brave new world.”

March 04, 2024

In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaks at the Supreme People’s Assembly in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Jan. 15, 2024. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified.

Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File

As the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East grind on, another conflict brews miles away in East Asia.

Wrapping up 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered his military to “thoroughly annihilate” South Korea and the United States if provoked. The saber-rattling continued as Pyongyang fired some 350 artillery shells into a disputed sea in January, followed by a barrage of missile tests in recent weeks.

So far, South Korea’s response has been fighting fire with fire. President Yoon Suk-yeol has vowed that its retaliation will be “multiple times stronger” should the North take belligerent actions. Seoul’s deepening military pact with Washington and Tokyo since the Camp David Summit last August has amplified the Yoon administration’s resolve.

Rising tension in the Korean Peninsula has caused many experts to speculate on what lies ahead. Two leading experts in the United States argued that the Kim regime has made a “strategic decision” to wage war, whereas an ex-U.S. diplomat warned of a possible nuclear crisis in the region.

Amid the many uncertainties, The Diplomat spoke to Moon Chung-in, former special adviser for diplomacy and national security to President Moon Jae-in (no relation). Moon, now the James Laney Distinguished Professor at Yonsei University and vice chair of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, shared his views on the recent developments with The Diplomat.

Bracing for War?

Kim Jong Un’s warmongering is worsening by the day. This year alone, the regime has launched multiple cruise and ballistic missiles from its western coast, one of which is said to have been topped with a hypersonic glide vehicle.

In the backdrop is Pyongyang’s attempt to sway South Korea’s legislative elections in April and the U.S. presidential election in November by showcasing its advanced military capabilities.

The Diplomat asked Moon if Kim’s military pursuits were merely an attention-seeking maneuver or a forecast of a serious collision course with the South.

“Verbal cues by both Kim Jong Un and Yoon Suk-yeol indicate that planned, large-scale armed conflict between the two Koreas is unlikely,” Moon said.

“Take, for instance, Kim’s speech from the December 2023 plenary meeting or one from early January. While his language is bellicose in nature, everything is conditional. In other words, Pyongyang’s actions are contingent upon the actions of Seoul and vice versa.”

Moon, however, cautioned that an “accidental clash and escalation” is plausible given the fraying inter-Korean safety net and the strained dialogue between the two nations.

“Under Yoon’s presidency, the 9.19 Comprehensive Military Agreement between the two Koreas was terminated, a buffer zone in the West Sea was nullified, critical communications lines have been suspended, while rearmament in the demilitarized zone has restarted,” Moon pointed out, giving examples of how major cords of the safety net have snapped.

“With vital guardrails and infrastructures torn down and shrinking confidence-building measures, unplanned clash and escalation cannot be ruled out,” Moon added.

What the North’s Policy Shift Really Means

North Korea’s latest policy shifts vis-a-vis South Korea have been equally scrutinized by the expert community.

In his New Year’s declaration, Kim Jong Un ended the nation’s long-time policy of seeking reconciliation and reunification with the South. Besides calling for the demolition of the reunification monument, Kim also labeled South Korea his country’s “principal enemy,” diverging from decades of Pyongyang’s policy toward its neighbor.

The Diplomat asked Moon for his thoughts on the motives behind Kim’s sudden move and its implications.

“The 1992 Agreement on Non-aggression, Reconciliation, and Exchange and Cooperation signed between the two Koreas defined inter-Korean relations as a ‘special relation’ in the course of pursuing unification, yet they had different interpretations,” Moon said.

“North Korea aimed for a ‘federation or confederation’ (yonbang) of two Koreas based on the formula of one ethnic nation, one state, two systems, and two local governments. Meanwhile, South Korea proposed a ‘union of states’ model (gukga yonhap) composed of one Korean nation, two states, two systems, and two governments, resembling today’s European Union,” Moon added, clarifying the distinct initial aims of North and South.

Moon contended that the Kim dynasty had long sought reunification based on federation, but having realized its implausibility, Kim Jong Un has officially recognized the inevitability of the two-state formula, long adhered to by the South.

“I would say it is a return to normalcy, albeit with heightened antagonism,” Moon concluded.

Offensive or Defensive Move?

By altering the long-standing posture, Moon said, the Kim regime now treats the South as a separate state, which he believes is a defensive move, contrary to many conservative analysts in his country.

“Generally speaking, North Korea’s strategy vis-a-vis the South has been framed around the strategy of a ‘unified front’ (tongil jeonson junryak). Central to the strategy is the strengthening of revolutionary capabilities in the South for reunification under communist ideology by cultivating pro-North Korean forces and inciting their domestic uprisings,” Moon remarked.

“But the Eighth Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) held in January 2021 amended the preamble of its bylaw and removed its goal of reunifying the South through socialist revolution while setting the new goal of self-reliant and democratic development of North Korean society. Kim’s recent emphasis on the two-states approach can be seen as the continuation of this effort,” Moon added.

He argued that by dismantling major agencies dealing with the united front strategy, including the United Front Department of the WPK (a superior entity to the Foreign Ministry), the Kim regime appears to have given up its goal of changing the South Korean system. The Foreign Ministry is expected to handle inter-Korean affairs as the South is now being treated as a sovereign state, which Moon believes represents a “brave new world.”

“The Kim regime is demanding that North Korea be respected as a sovereign country under international law and norms, which prohibit interference in internal affairs such as regime change. The recent move suggests the North will likewise not meddle in South Korea’s domestic affairs and that the South should do the same. This, to me, seems more a defensive, rather than offensive, move,” Moon further elaborated.

Looming “New Continent”

Moscow and Pyongyang’s renewed relationship is another cause for concern. As the war in Ukraine pushes into its third year, the two states are increasingly working as tacit allies, likely trading vital military information and weapons in defiance of United Nations sanctions.

The Diplomat asked what this means for the South moving forward.

“If the cozying of Russia and North Korea continues, it will create two confronting tripartite pacts in Northeast Asia: the northern axis composed of China-Russia-DPRK and the southern one of ROK-US-Japan,” Moon said, expounding that this is tantamount to reverting back to the Cold War era.

“Such a geopolitical configuration will create a ‘new continent’ of opportunity for the North while forcing South Korea to be trapped again in an island of the old Cold War, adding security and diplomatic dilemmas for the South,” Moon added.

North Korea’s Nuclear Conundrum

In December of last year, Politico reported that if former U.S. President Donald Trump is re-elected, he may provide various incentives to North Korea in exchange for halting its nuclear arms build-up while tolerating its current possession of nuclear weapons.

Former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton wrote in his memoir that Trump might attempt a reckless negotiation on the North Korean nuclear issue if re-elected.

The Diplomat asked how Trump’s potential return to the White House could impact denuclearization efforts in the Korean Peninsula.

“I don’t think this view is merely confined to Trump,” Moon argued, suggesting that negotiating with a nuclear-armed North Korea is becoming more widely accepted as a practical approach.

“Basically, we should find ways to halt, roll back, and ultimately dismantle its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Although we cannot recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state as a signing party to the NPT regime, we should negotiate with it for practical purposes. But this will pose a major political dilemma since most South Koreans do not want any negotiations with a nuclear North,” Moon said.

Regarding Bolton’s remarks, Moon responded: “Under Moon Jae-in and Trump, we were only one step away from making a significant deal at the Hanoi Summit. The gist of the deal was that if North Korea dismantled the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and some of its hidden enriched uranium programs, the U.S. would ease sanctions quid pro quo. But it is known that officials like Bolton and Mike Pompeo sabotaged the deal by making ‘reckless’ demands of ‘all or nothing.’”

The former special advisor closed the interview by suggesting, “Some deals are better than no deals or even big deals.”

Jason Morgan of Reitaku University contributed to this report.

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Kenji Yoshida

Kenji Yoshida is an associate correspondent with JAPAN Forward based in Seoul, South Korea.

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thediplomat.com · by Kenji Yoshida

7. Achieving Denuclearization On The Korean Peninsula

The course of action outlined below means (I say again) that Kim Jong Un will assess his political warfare strategy a success.

Excerpts.

Keeping in view these arguments, an engagement strategy remains the best solution to undermine the North Korean nuclear threat. While the U.S. and ROK maintain their nuclear deterrence and defense capabilities, unconditional denuclearization should be off the table. Instead, a step-by-step denuclearization in exchange for warm relations in areas of economic cooperation, diplomatic relations, cultural exchange, and human rights can be the best course for averting a nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula.

Conclusion

The frozen conflict between the DPRK, ROK, and the U.S. has rendered instability and insecurity on the Korean peninsula, so much so that the situation has aggravated into a possible nuclear engagement. While the negotiations and harsh economic sanctions have failed to work in the past, it is now important to practice economic and political engagement whilst pushing down the hopes for total denuclearization. With new actors, especially China, the regional security architecture has changed and so, the U.S. and ROK need to tread accordingly to reduce the North Korean nuclear threat.

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

Although denuclearization of the north remains a worthy goal, it must be viewed as aspirational as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. The conventional wisdom has always been that denuclearization must come first and then unification will follow and that there should be no discussion of human rights out of fear that it would prevent Kim Jong Un from making a denuclearization agreement. Today even a blind man can read the tea leaves and know that Kim Jong Un will not denuclearize despite the fact that his policies have been an abject failure. His political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies completely failed in 2022/2023 because Presidents Yoon and Biden, like their predecessors, refused to make the political and economic concessions he demanded just to come to the negotiating table: namely to remove sanctions. It is time for the U.S and the ROK/U.S. alliance to execute a political warfare strategy that flips the conventional wisdom and seeks unification first and then denuclearization. Everyone must come to the understanding that the only way to end the nuclear program and the human rights abuses is through unification of the Korean peninsula. The ROK and U.S. must continue to maintain the highest state of military readiness to deter war and then adopt a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive and sophisticated information and influence activities campaign, and focus all efforts on the pursuit of a free and unified Korea- ultimately a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

Achieving Denuclearization On The Korean Peninsula – OpEd

March 4, 2024 0 Comments

By Simon Hutagalung

eurasiareview.com · March 4, 2024

Background

The threat spectrum in the Korean Peninsula has widened to include risks of a conventional confrontation escalating into a nuclear crisis as the DPRK, as of now, possesses 20-30 nuclear warheads and has conducted more than 100 ballistic missile tests (Cha). In 2018, both countries signed an inter-Korean agreement aimed at demilitarization in the region, strengthened by establishing no-fly zones along the border, buffer zones along land and sea borders, and no artillery or military drills close to the demilitarized zone (Sokolsky).

The nuclear threat, however, has raised tensions on the peninsula as South Korean conservative president, Yoon Suk-yeol, adopted a very strong policy against the DPRK, miring the possibility of preemptive actions and missile threats against North Korean nuclear facilities (Ahn). Until now, the joint military drills between the United States and the ROK were responded to by violations of the 2018 agreement where the DPRK is still testing nuclear weapons that could destabilize the Korean Peninsula. As a result of the action by the DPRK tensions grew on the Korean peninsula as for now.

Ways to solve the crisis

As the DPRK continues to conduct nuclear tests and test missiles which now include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with ranges long enough to hit Japan or the U.S. mainland, it has become utterly crucial to solving the North Korean crisis. According to U.S. officials, denuclearization talks with the DPRK have reached a dead end as the DPRK has violated the peace regime multiple times (Blank). However, it is pertinent to note here that only successful negotiations between the DPRK, ROK, the U.S., and new actors like China can lead to long-lasting peace on the peninsula.

Firstly, to build sustainable peace, a lot more than a simple agreement is needed as it no longer remains the challenge of conventional security but also includes non-conventional threats. The 1953 armistice agreement needs to be reformed into an institutionalized peace treaty with properly defined stakeholders, norms, declarations, rules, processes, and institutions that will govern peace on the Korean peninsula (Aum, et al. 4). The shortcomings of the armistice agreement or any other following agreement signed by the DPRK and the ROK revolve around the lack of diplomatic ties between stakeholders. So, in addition to divergent interests, the need to recreate diplomatic ties every time before launching a new round of negotiations creates a vacuum unable to improve the security challenges (Grzylczyk 36).

Secondly, both the U.S. and ROK need to adopt a realistic lens to the problem. Setting total denuclearization as a precondition to entering negotiations is a fool’s errand and is not supported by any other regional actor. The DPRK believes in the withdrawal of U.S. troops and weapons from the peninsula as a viable solution to the regional security problem; the U.S. and the ROK consider DPRK’s denuclearization as the only solution while other actors such as China and Russia view it from the lens of a frozen conflict where denuclearization is a situation too ideal to begin with (Barannikova 58). Instead, China’s opposition to the U.S. installation of THAAD in the Korean peninsula and consequent economic sanctions on the ROK in 2017 appears to be supporting the DPRK’s claim of American exclusion from the equation (Watts IV 88). To reduce the North Korean nuclear threat, the U.S. and ROK must consider the China factor and the role China can play in escalating or de-escalating the conflict.

Thirdly, it is important to consider the new security architecture of the region. The nuclear weapons held by the DPRK are the essential component of the new status quo. The only possible way to denuclearize the DPRK and avert a nuclear crisis is to view North Korean nuclear status as a stabilizer rather than a threat. This is significant because a continuous arms and nuclear race can be witnessed all across the globe therefore, DPRK’s denuclearization is in the interest of none, and negotiations for complete denuclearization will be just negotiations (Barannikova 62). If the U.S. continues to stress on denuclearization element completed by strict sanctions, China and Russia are likely to maintain trade relations thus, leading to a possibility of an emerging China-DPRK-Russia bloc against the U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance (Barranikova 62).

Keeping in view these arguments, an engagement strategy remains the best solution to undermine the North Korean nuclear threat. While the U.S. and ROK maintain their nuclear deterrence and defense capabilities, unconditional denuclearization should be off the table. Instead, a step-by-step denuclearization in exchange for warm relations in areas of economic cooperation, diplomatic relations, cultural exchange, and human rights can be the best course for averting a nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula.

Conclusion

The frozen conflict between the DPRK, ROK, and the U.S. has rendered instability and insecurity on the Korean peninsula, so much so that the situation has aggravated into a possible nuclear engagement. While the negotiations and harsh economic sanctions have failed to work in the past, it is now important to practice economic and political engagement whilst pushing down the hopes for total denuclearization. With new actors, especially China, the regional security architecture has changed and so, the U.S. and ROK need to tread accordingly to reduce the North Korean nuclear threat.

The opinions expressed in this article the author’s his own.

References

Ahn, Hae K. “A Long Road to Nowhere: 10 Years of the Kim Jong Un Regime.” The Diplomat, 24 Mar. 2022, thediplomat.com/2022/03/a-long-road-to-nowhere-10-years-of-the-kim-jong-un-regime/. Accessed 22 Oct. 2022.
Aum, Frank, et al. A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula. United States Institute of Peace, 2020. www.usip.org/publications/2020/02/peace-regime-korean-peninsula. Accessed 22 Oct. 2022.
Barannikova, Anastasia. “Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue: Challenges and Prospects.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, vol. 5, no. 1, 2022, pp. 50-68, DOI:10.1080/25751654.2022.2053409. Accessed 22 Oct. 2022.
Blank, Stephen J. “North Korea: Nuclear Threat or Security Problem?” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2432401/north-korea-nuclear-threat-or-security-problem/source/north-korea-nuclear-threat-or-security-problem/. Accessed 22 Oct. 2022.
Cha, Victor. Preventing a Crisis with North Korea. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020. www.csis.org/analysis/preventing-crisis-north-korea. Accessed 22 Oct. 2022.
Grzelczyk, Virginie. “Threading on thin ice? Conflict dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.” Asia Europe Journal, vol. 17, no. 1, 2018, pp. 31-45.
Sajid, Islamuddin. “South Korea urges North to honor 2018 agreement on reducing military tension.” AA News, 20 Oct. 2022, www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/south-korea-urges-north-to-honor-2018-agreement-on-reducing-military-tension/2715964. Accessed 22 Oct. 2022.

eurasiareview.com · March 4, 2024

8. North Korea Helped Turn Iran Into a Missile Powerhouse

Dr. Bruce Bechtol can say I told you so. Just read his books over the past decade plus.

North Korea Helped Turn Iran Into a Missile Powerhouse

The military cooperation between North Korea and Iran, detailed in a recent UN Security Council report, highlights a concerning trend in the exchange of long-range missile technologies and weaponry.

The National Interest · by Maya Carlin · March 4, 2024

Summary - North Korea's Role in Fueling Iran's Missile Ambitions: The military cooperation between North Korea and Iran, detailed in a recent UN Security Council report, highlights a concerning trend in the exchange of long-range missile technologies and weaponry. This partnership, rooted in a mutual opposition to the United States, has strengthened since the 1980s, particularly after North Korea became a significant arms supplier to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. North Korea's contributions have extended beyond sovereign states, supplying rogue proxy groups in the Middle East with weapons and missile technology. The cooperation includes the transfer of North Korean-made projectiles to Iran and its proxies, with evidence of North Korean weapons used in attacks against Israel. Notably, North Korea has supplied Iran with critical missile components, enabling the development of ballistic missiles capable of striking targets far beyond their borders. This alliance not only facilitates the evasion of international sanctions but also poses a significant threat to regional and global security, as it enhances the military capabilities of both nations and their affiliated proxy groups.

Amidst Sanctions, North Korea and Iran Forge Stronger Military Links

Earlier this month, an annual report submitted to the UN Security Council outlined the growing military cooperation between North Korea and Iran in 2023. While the two rogue allies have exchanged weapons and military systems in the past, resumed cooperation on the development of long-range missiles is concerning. According to the report, “This resumed cooperation is said to have included the transfer of critical parts, with the most recent shipment associated with this relationship taking place in 2020.” In 2024, Iran and its region-wide proxy groups are expected to deploy more North Korean-made projectiles. Following Hamas’ horrific October 7 attack against Israel last year, evidence that North Korean-made weapons were used surfaced. Specifically, images of Pyongyang’s F-7 rocket-propelled grenades used against the Israel Defense Forces circulated online, confirmed by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service.

The history of the North Korean-Iran partnership

Following the fall of the Shah in the late 1970s, the transactional relationship between Tehran and Pyongyang strengthened considerably. Both countries share a mutual disdain for the United States and external forces generally, cementing their strong bond. Since the international community largely sanctions both rogue states, Iran and North Korea turn to each other to evade trade restrictions and maintain strong networks of trade.

North Korea first became a major weapons supplier to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, supplying the regime with Soviet-designed T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks (MBTs), ammunition, and other essential military equipment. Additionally, Pyongyang sent military and technical advisers to Tehran to support the regime’s war effort. The first missiles provided by the hermit kingdom to Iran were also delivered among these transfers. Pyongyang provided Scud-C missiles equipped with a 500-km range to Tehran, followed by the Hwasong-7 medium-range ballistic missile, which Iranian engineers were able to reverse engineer into the Shahab-3 single-stage, liquid-fuel ballistic missile.

North Korea’s military contributions were not just limited to sovereign nations. Following the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Pyongyang began delivering supplies to rogue proxy groups, including non-state actors in Syria, Iran, Yemen, and Lebanon. As detailed by Brookings, North Korea was able to supply weapons and their components to Hezbollah by smuggling them through Iran and assembling them in Syria before being shipped to their final destination in Lebanon. Other instances of Pyongyang’s outreach to Iran’s proxy groups have been well documented: “In another example from 2015, Houthi militants fired 20 Scud-C missiles into Saudi Arabia that were identical to North Korea’s Hwasong-6 missile. As Samuel Ramani of the Royal United Services Institute argues, the Houthis likely captured the Scuds during battle against the Yemeni Armed Forces, which had purchased them from North Korea in 2002.”

How North Korea supports Iran’s ballistic missile programs

Around this time period, the U.S. intelligence community grew concerned that Tehran would become one of the first client states for North Korea’s 1,000 km Nodong missile. Pyongyang carried out its first successful test launch of the Nodong in 1993, a moment witnessed by a twenty-one-member Iranian delegation. To make matters worse, North Korea even increased the weapons’ range at Iran’s urging to 1,300 km, bringing Israel within Tehran’s striking distance if launched from inside the country. Into the late 2000s, Pyongyang’s cooperation with Tehran’s ballistic missile programs was ongoing. According to United Against Nuclear Iran, Tehran and its proxy groups still rely on Pyongyang for components to construct ballistic missiles. In 2014, a U.S. district court even ruled that both North Korea and Iran were liable for damages inflicted by Hezbollah in the 2006 war in Israel since they provided “material support and assistance” to the terror group.

The Tehran-Pyongyang military partnership extends beyond missiles

North Korea’s military contributions to Iran also extend to its naval fleet. Tehran’s Ghair-class submarines are licensed copies of Pyongyang’s Yono-class vessels. The submarines were first purchased by Iran in the 2000s and have remained a mainstay in its navy ever since. These miniature vessels give Tehran the capability to stage anti-access/area denial operations in the region. Notably, if Tehran is ever given the technology to test missiles using its Ghair submarines, the Strait of Hormuz would be severely threatened.

As the Israel-Hamas war continues and Iranian proxies press on with their barrages targeting Western warships in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf in addition to assets throughout the region, more North-Korean-originated weapons will likely surface.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

The National Interest · by Maya Carlin · March 4, 2024

9. Ukraine military official: half of all North Korean shells are duds

Ukraine military official: half of all North Korean shells are duds

North Korean artillery shells cannot be accurately aimed, South Korean military expert says.

By Cho Jinwoo for RFA Korean

2024.03.04

rfa.org

Russia has imported more than 1.5 million artillery shells from North Korea to cover its insufficient arms production as the war with Ukraine rages on, but about half of the shells are duds, a Ukrainian military official said.

South Korean military analysts also told Radio Free Asia that the shells that do fire cannot be aimed precisely, and sometimes even cause casualties among the Russian ranks.

“As of today, based on available statistical data, the Russians have already imported one and a half million shells from North Korea,” Maj. Gen. Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, told news outlet Interfax-Ukraine.

“But these munitions are from the 1970s and 1980s,” he said. “Half of them do not function, and the rest require refurbishment or verification before use.”

South Korea said last week that the number of artillery shells North Korea has sent to Russia could be as high as 3 million.

Kyiv has also alleged that North Korea has sent missiles to Russia and these have been used against Ukraine, which Pyongyang and Moscow deny. The transfer of North Korean arms to Russia has been condemned by the U.S. and almost 40 other countries.

Skibitskyi said that in exchange for the dated Soviet-era ammunition, North Korea is getting missile and submarine tech from Moscow.

“And the most important thing here for the international community is that North Korea is definitely asking for technologies related to nuclear weapons,” he said.

“It is necessary to call Russia to responsibility, because the whole world is fighting for non-proliferation, and Russia is openly starting to work in this direction in exchange for receiving additional ammunition, missiles and other types of weapons.”

The poor quality of North Korean ammunition used by Russia in Ukraine has been widely discussed.

In December, the Ukrainian Armed Forces Chief of Staff said on Facebook that the shells were so shoddy that often they exploded in the barrels of Russian cannons and mortars.

Lee Il-woo, secretary-general of the Seoul-based Korea Defense Network, told RFA Korean that the North Korean shells cannot be fired accurately.

If you look at the craters where the shells [fired by the Russian military] landed, they are spread out in a circular pattern with no consistent impact group,” Lee said.

“The fact that the shells are spread out like this means that the accuracy of the shells is very low,” he said. “Low precision means that when the shells are fired, they may even fall on the heads of their allies.”

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

10. Poland’s new nuclear plant to boost S. Korean industry in Europe

South Korea: the global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power and a partner in the arsenal of democracy who supports the rules based international order.

Poland’s new nuclear plant to boost S. Korean industry in Europe

https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2024/03/05/C6F4HGDSHNC65ADSWNAUPXCWXY/

By Park Sung-woo,

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2024.03.05. 16:11

Updated 2024.03.05. 16:39

The Polish government has reaffirmed its commitment to building a new nuclear power plant, despite a recent shift to a center-left government. Recognizing the necessity of nuclear power for ensuring stable electricity supply, the new administration has addressed concerns about local political risks within the South Korean nuclear industry.

In an interview with local broadcaster TVN24 on March 2 (local time), Maciej Bando, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Climate and Environment in Poland, affirmed that there is a “clear decision” to construct the power plant in the Choczewo commune, based on current indications. He said, “There is no way today for us to stop the nuclear project.”

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk addresses a joint press conference after a meeting with Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte (not seen) at the Chancellery of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania in Vilnius, Lithuania, 04 March 2024./Yonhap News

South Korea is actively pursuing nuclear power development in Poland through Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP). In late October 2022, KHNP signed a letter of intent (LOI) with Polish private power companies ZE PAK and Polska Grupa Energetyczna (PGE) to construct two Korean-designed APR1400 nuclear reactors.

KHNP plans to finalize the feasibility study and establish a special purpose entity with ZE PAK and PGE to kickstart nuclear power plant construction. Hwang Joo-ho, CEO of KHNP, visited Poland in January to present the technical capabilities and past achievements of KHNP.

The decision to invest in Poland is part of South Korea’s strategy to expand nuclear power exports to Central and Western Europe. The ongoing energy crises in Eastern Europe due to the war between Russia and Ukraine have heightened the region’s awareness of the importance of nuclear energy.

The Czech Republic, bordering Poland, is currently progressing with the construction of the Dukovany nuclear power plant, featuring four reactors with a combined capacity of 1200 MW. ‘Team Korea’, spearheaded by KHNP and including participants like Doosan Enerbility and Daewoo E&C, is in contention against Électricité de France (EDF). With the recent elimination of the United States’ Westinghouse Electric Company from the candidate list, the odds of winning the contract have significantly improved. The project’s scale is estimated to be around 30 trillion won.

In Bulgaria, Hyundai E&C has been chosen as the preferred negotiator for the Kozloduy nuclear power plant construction, with a total project cost of 18.7 trillion won. Last year, KHNP also secured a contract worth 260 billion won for the export of the Tritium Removal Facility (TRF) to Romania. Additionally, they are actively pursuing a contract to upgrade Cernavoda Unit 1, valued at 2.5 trillion won. Ukraine is also moving forward with a project to build four nuclear reactors to offset energy losses resulting from the war.

A South Korean government official emphasized that “Poland could serve as a gateway for expanding Korea’s nuclear power exports to Europe.” They highlighted plans for new nuclear power plant constructions not only in Eastern Europe but also in Western Europe, including the UK and the Netherlands. Thus, securing nuclear power plant contracts in Poland is deemed crucial.

11. U.S. seeks talks with N. Korea to reduce risk of inadvertent conflict: NSC spokesperson

U.S. seeks talks with N. Korea to reduce risk of inadvertent conflict: NSC spokesperson | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 5, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, March 4 (Yonhap) -- The United States seeks dialogue with North Korea, including on mitigating the risk of an inadvertent conflict on the Korean Peninsula, a National Security Council (NSC) spokesperson said Monday, stressing its goal for the "complete" denuclearization of the peninsula remains unchanged.

The remarks came after Mira Rapp-Hooper, the NSC senior director for East Asia and Oceania, said this week that Washington will consider "interim steps" on the pathway toward the North's denuclearization -- a statement that raised speculation about a potential U.S. policy shift.

In the negotiation lexicon for the North, interim steps usually involve such measures as Pyongyang's freeze of its nuclear weapons development in return for sanctions relief or other incentives to encourage the regime's denuclearization efforts.

"Our position on the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has not changed," the spokesperson said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"While we work towards this goal, there are a number of valuable discussions we seek to have with the DPRK, including on reducing the risk of inadvertent military conflict on the peninsula," the official added.

The spokesperson also said that the U.S. encourages the North to return to "substantive discussions on identifying ways to manage military risks and create lasting peace" on the peninsula.

The U.S. has recently highlighted the need for risk mitigation as the North's nullification of a 2018 inter-Korean tension reduction agreement has raised concerns about the possibility of an accidental clash between the two Koreas.

On Monday, Seoul and Washington kicked off a major combined military exercise amid concerns that Pyongyang could engage in provocative acts on the pretext of responding to the drills that the allies say are defensive in nature.

Meaningful nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang have been stalled since the no-deal Hanoi summit between the two countries in February 2019.

Mira Rapp-Hooper, the U.S. National Security Council senior director for East Asia and Oceania, speaks during a forum in Seoul co-hosted by South Korea's JoongAng Ilbo newspaper and the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on March 4, 2024, in this image captured from the YouTube channel of JTBC News. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · March 5, 2024

12. U.N. chief appoints new resident coordinator for N. Korea

(4th LD) U.N. chief appoints new resident coordinator for N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 5, 2024

(ATTN: RECASTS dateline; ADDS remarks in 14th para)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON/SEOUL, March 5 (Yonhap) -- U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres has appointed a new U.N. resident coordinator for North Korea in a personnel decision confirmed by the reclusive regime, his spokesperson said Monday.

Joe Colombano of Italy assumed his role on Friday, Stephane Dujarric said, in a development that raised hopes for Pyongyang to allow the entry of other personnel from key U.N. agencies, such as the World Health Organization and the U.N. Development Program.

There has been no presence of international U.N. staff in the North since early 2021, when Pyongyang imposed border closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

"In his new role, he will support the DPRK's commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, leading the U.N. team's efforts, including food and nutrition security, social development services, resilience and sustainability, as well as data and development management," Dujarric told a briefing.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"He also brings to his post over 25 years of experience at U.N. headquarters and in the field," the spokesperson added.

Asked if other personnel from U.N. agencies will be able to enter the North, Dujarric said that related discussions are under way with the North.

"Obviously, I think the presence of a resident coordinator would be critical, will be a very important symbol of the ability for international U.N. staff to return, but we are continuing to be in discussions with the authorities in Pyongyang," he said.

Colombano is currently working remotely from the U.N. office in Bangkok before his entry into the North, according to Dujarric.

This file photo, released by the Associated Press, shows U.N. headquarters in New York. (Yonhap)

There are currently around 50 North Korean personnel working for the U.N. team in North Korea, while some 25 international staffers are on standby to return to the North, according to Carolina Azevedo, chief of the Communications and Results Reporting at the U.N. Development Coordination Office.

"While a part of the U.N. Country Team operates remotely, national personnel ensure business continuity in Pyongyang," she told Yonhap News Agency via email.

Asked about when Colombano will fly to Pyongyang, she said, "This isn't something that he controls as he depends on the host government's decision."

His appointment came amid reports that some European countries sent their diplomats to the North or are working to do so in what appears to be a move to ultimately resume the operation of their missions in Pyongyang following pandemic-driven pauses.

An official at South Korea's unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs said Tuesday that North Korea opening its door to the international community and international organizations, in any form, is a process that should rightly take place.

Colombano has decades of experience in international relations and negotiations on political and development issues. He served most recently as the head of the Office of the U.N. Resident Coordinator to China in Beijing.

He holds a master's degree in public administration from Harvard University, a master's in international political economy from the University of Warwick in Britain and a master of laws in Chinese law from the University of Hong Kong.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · March 5, 2024

13. N. Korea warns U.S.-S. Korea to pay 'dear price' for joint military drills

Do not fear the words.

N. Korea warns U.S.-S. Korea to pay 'dear price' for joint military drills | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 5, 2024

SEOUL, March 5 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Tuesday denounced an annual joint military exercise that South Korea and the United States launched this week, warning they will pay a "dear price" for what it called their large-scale war drills.

An unnamed spokesperson at the North's defense ministry issued a statement condemning the annual Freedom Shield exercise that began Monday for an 11-day run to strengthen deterrence against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

"The large-scale war drills staged by the world's biggest nuclear weapons state and more than 10 satellite states against a state in the Korean peninsula where a nuclear war may be ignited even with a spark, can never be called 'defensive,'" read the English-language statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency.

The official said North Korea's army will monitor the enemies' "adventurist acts" and conduct "responsible military activities" to bring the unstable security situation under control.

"The U.S. and the Republic of Korea will be made to pay a dear price for their false choice while realizing that it causes their security uneasiness at a serious level every moment," the spokesperson said.

This year's military drills come as North Korea has ramped up weapons tests in recent months with the launches of cruise missiles from land and sea and artillery firing near the tense western sea border.

On Monday, South Korean and U.S. reconnaissance aircraft made a sortie in their apparent mission to closely monitor North Korea. During the military exercise, the U.S. is likely to send its strategic military assets to the Korean Peninsula in a show of force.

Pyongyang has long denounced the allies' joint military drills as rehearsals for an invasion and used them as a pretext for provocations. Seoul and Washington have said their military exercises are defensive in nature.

This photo, provided by the Air Force's 1st Fighter Wing on March 4, 2024, shows military aircraft taking off at an air base in Gwangju, 267 kilometers southwest of Seoul, as South Korea and the United States kicked off their annual joint military drills against North Korea's threats. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · March 5, 2024

14. Nason party official arrested for leaking state secrets to friends

Nason party official arrested for leaking state secrets to friends

While drinking, the man claimed that North Korea was "the best country at computer hacking, committing about half of the world's hacking incidents"

By Jong So Yong - March 5, 2024

https://www.dailynk.com/english/nason-party-official-arrested-leaking-state-secrets-friends/

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects the People's Army's 1313th Unit, part of the North Korean military's Reconnaissance General Bureau, in 2014. (Rodong Sinmun homepage)

A veteran of the Reconnaissance General Bureau who worked for the Nason Party Committee was recently arrested for leaking state secrets, Daily NK has learned.

Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in North Hamgyong Province said last Thursday that the man was arrested by security officials in mid-February after drunkenly discussing military secrets in public.

The individual had been deployed overseas during his time with the General Reconnaissance Bureau. After his discharge, he graduated from a Workers’ Party school and was sent to work for the Nason Party Committee.

During the Lunar New Year holiday, he was drinking with several people at a friend’s house when he allegedly said that “the money the state used to make nuclear weapons was earned by workers working overseas in places like China and Russia” and that “the state says it got money from Russia, but in fact, the funds were stolen through computer hacking.”

He also said that North Korea was “the best country at computer hacking, committing about half of the world’s hacking incidents” and that “many Reconnaissance General Bureau soldiers who are good at hacking have received commendations or letters of thanks from Kim Jong Un, or have been awarded Hero of the Republic medals.”

Since the Ministry of State Security directly managed the man when he was in the Reconnaissance General Bureau, it kept tabs on him and his close friends through its local branch in Nason. One of the friends he was drinking with that day was assigned to watch him and then informed on him, which led to the man’s arrest.

The man’s family was also put into a car and driven away. Since their whereabouts are unknown, they were presumably sent to a political prison camp.

“The other people who drank with him were also called to the city branch of the Ministry of State Security to write letters of self-criticism for several days,” the source said. “The city branch of the Ministry of State Security gave them ideological indoctrination, telling them that leaking important military secrets is an anti-party and anti-state act punishable by law and that everything he said was false propaganda that they shouldn’t be fooled by.”

Article 90 of North Korea’s criminal code, which was amended in 2015, calls for up to a year of forced labor for people who leak secrets related to national security. People who leak important secrets face up to five years in a re-education camp. In serious cases, offenders face five to 10 years of reeducation.

North Korea enacted the State Secrets Protection Law last year, which intensified punishments against those who leak state secrets. In December, Daily NK reported that many of the law’s violators were state security officials.

As rumors of the incident spread through Nason, thanks to local party committee officials and the city’s branch of the Ministry of State Security, curious locals asked, “What the heck is hacking?” and “How can you use it to steal money?”

“When they arrested the man for leaking secrets and sent his family away, the authorities sparked more rumors, and previously ignorant locals now say that North Korea is ‘one of the top countries in the world at cybertheft,'” the source said.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK. Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

15. U.S. willing to take 'interim steps' toward North's denuclearization, says White House official

Monday

March 4, 2024

dictionary + A - A

Published: 04 Mar. 2024, 19:15

Updated: 04 Mar. 2024, 23:02

U.S. willing to take 'interim steps' toward North's denuclearization, says White House official

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-03-04/national/diplomacy/US-willing-to-take-interim-steps-toward-Norths-denuclearization-says-senior-Washington-official/1994375

Former South Korean National Security Advisor Kim Sung-han, CSIS President John Hamre, former Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver, and Korea Peace Foundation Director Park Myung-lim take part in the first session of the JoongAng-CSIS Forum at the Shilla Hotel in Jung District, central Seoul, on Monday. [JOONGANG PHOTO]

The United States is willing to take “interim steps” toward the eventual denuclearization of North Korea but plans to continue strengthening trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan as military ties deepen between the North and Russia, a White House official said at the JoongAng–CSIS Forum in Seoul on Monday.

The comments by Mira Rapp-Hooper, the senior director for East Asia and Oceania on the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), underscored the Biden administration’s continuing commitment to hold talks with Pyongyang “without preconditions” to achieve the “eventual” denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but also marked the first time a U.S. official spoke about measures targeting “threat reduction” with regards to the North.

The forum, co-hosted by the JoongAng Ilbo and the Council on Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), took place at the Shilla Hotel in Jung District, central Seoul, and revolved around the theme “The Polycrisis in 2024.”

Discussions dealt with not only the North Korean threat to regional security, but also growing military-industrial cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow and the impact the U.S. presidential election in November may have on the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

The conference was opened by JoongAng Holdings Chairman Hong Seok-hyun and CSIS President John Hamre, with congratulatory remarks by Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and Defense Minister Shin Won-sik.

Mira Rapp-Hooper, senior director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House National Security Council, speaks during a featured conversation with CSIS Senior Vice President Victor Cha during the JoongAng-CSIS Forum on Monday. [SCREEN CAPTURE]

In his opening remarks, Hong called the growing cooperation between the North, China and Russia a “dangerous gamble” by the three countries and warned that a “nuclear-armed Kim Jong-un will mercilessly exploit a United States preoccupied with two wars on two different fronts” in reference to Ukraine and Israel.

During the opening dialogue with Victor Cha, CSIS Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea, Rapp-Hooper acknowledged that “burgeoning” military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow are a source of concern for Washington.

“We assess that Pyongyang is seeking direct military assistance, including fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment and materials and other advanced technology,” Rapp-Hooper said, adding that Russia’s use of North Korean missiles in Ukraine not only “provides valuable technical and military insights” to the North, but also “provides solvency to the regime” with “millions upon millions of dollars” in revenue, while also making North Korea “an increasingly attractive source for munitions, arms and missiles to other military regimes around the world.”

But Rapp-Hooper also said that such military cooperation has pushed the United States to implement more muscular policy action coordination with its regional allies in Asia and other “like-minded” countries.

“We’re sharing more intelligence [with allies], aligning our policies better and coordinating policy action to combat the most problematic aspects of this cooperation,” Rapp-Hooper said, noting that Washington is also “mounting a multilateral effort to push back against” cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow that includes reaching out to Beijing.

Matt Pottinger, a former U.S. deputy national security advisor who now serves as the chair of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said in his keynote speech that democracies “must urgently expand their capacity to manufacture munitions” and take after the example of Seoul, which he called an “arsenal of democracy,” to counter the emerging “axis” of authoritarian regimes in Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang, which he characterized as an “arsenal of autocracy” for its weapons shipments to Russia.

Pottinger also called on South Korea to “strengthen its exchanges with Taiwan,” warning that Chinese President Xi Jinping is eyeing reunification with the self-governing island as a focal point for China’s “rejuvenation.”

Experts who spoke at the morning session, which focused on the implications of the upcoming U.S. presidential election for the South Korea-U.S. alliance, expressed cautious optimism that ties between the two countries could remain strong even if Donald Trump wins in a rematch against President Joe Biden.

In his comments, Hamre noted that Korea could “struggle” to keep the United States from being “too exuberant about confronting China” and making “provocative gestures without a strategic framework” given the “real head of steam building up within the Republican Party,” but that South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol “could be a very effective counterpart” to a re-elected President Trump.

But Hamre also noted that a victory by Trump could bring about a “real crisis” among Washington’s European allies should he move to cease military aid to Kyiv.

Randall Schriver, who served as an assistant secretary for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the U.S. State Department under Trump, said there is an urgent need for South Korea and the United States “to lock in habits of cooperation,” such as their defense cost-sharing agreement, and “institutionalize” them now, rather than waiting until after the election.

But Schriver also said Seoul and Washington would likely still be “able to grind out a productive relationship” even if Trump is elected president, noting strong bipartisan support for the South Korea-U.S. alliance in Congress.

During the afternoon session, experts voiced how South Korea and the United States should approach growing ties between North Korea, China and Russia.

Allison Hooker, who formerly served as senior director for Asia in the U.S. NSC, noted that the closer relationship between the North and Russia “is reducing the leverage that China has over both countries,” but also said that Beijing would likely only cooperate with Washington and Seoul’s efforts to rein in Pyongyang’s “destabilizing” activities when its interests were aligned.

Cha, who characterized China as “jealously” guarding “what influence it has over North Korea,” said the latter’s deepening military cooperation with Russia would likely lead Beijing to make renewed overtures to Pyongyang.

Noting that Kim Jong-un likely “did not travel to Russia by train just to obtain food and fuel,” Cha expressed concern that Moscow could provide Pyongyang with nuclear submarine technology, citing recent state media reports from Pyongyang that said Kim was “pleased” after reviewing plans for such assets.

Cha argued that a North Korea with a burgeoning relationship with Russia to meet its economic and security needs has “no interest in talking to the United States,” and also predicted that such cooperation would likely cause China to reach out once more to the North, as it did after Trump announced he would meet with Kim in 2018.

Wi Sung-lac, the secretary general of the Korea Peace Foundation and the Foreign Ministry’s former special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, also called on South Korea to “strategically” exercise its existing “leverage” to induce Russia to reduce cooperation with the North, instead of “just pursuing bilateral talks.”

“In hard bargaining, South Korea can bring up what cards it could play that would cross Russia’s previously stated red lines,” Wi said without specifying what measures Seoul could float in response to a question from the Korea JoongAng Daily.

Previously, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned South Korea not to supply arms to Ukraine, saying it would view such actions as “unfriendly.”

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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