Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


"War: a massacre of people who don't know each other for the profit of people who know each other but don't massacre each other."
--Paul Valery


Your assumptions are your windows on the world. Scrub them off very once in a while or the light won’t come in.”
- Isaac Asimov


“I propose to raise a revolution against the lie that the majority has the monopoly of the truth.”
- Henrik Ibsen




1.  N. Korea slams Pelosi's Taiwan visit, backs China's position

2. Presidential office calls for regional peace through dialogue after Pelosi's visit to Taiwan

3. Amb. Goldberg hikes Mt. Bukhan in Seoul with S. Korea's top diplomat

4. S. Korean, U.S. military officers agree on timely strategic asset dispatch in case of N.K. nuke test

5. N.K. nuke missile progress outpacing U.S. missile defense modernization: U.S. expert

6. N. Korea reports no new suspected COVID-19 cases for 5th day

7. Rival parties' floor leaders to meet with U.S. House Speaker Pelosi this week

8. After Taiwan, Pelosi's welcome to Korea is muted

9. Time for a reinforced nuclear deterrence

10. ‘We’re willing to address the​ ​security concerns’ (Korea)

11. Pyongyang lashes out at Seoul’s appointment of NK human rights ambassador

12. Seoul wary of 'Pelosi effect' on ties with Beijing

13. Can Korea Join the Quad? How Should the Group Evolve?

14. Escaping N.Korea…History and Present State(1) Kim Jong Un’s war of extermination leads to the end of the defector era







1.  N. Korea slams Pelosi's Taiwan visit, backs China's position


No surprise. But the Propaganda and Agitation Department is acting quickly to get its message out to support the PRC.



(LEAD) N. Korea slams Pelosi's Taiwan visit, backs China's position | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 3, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details; ADDS photo)

By Chae Yun-hwan

SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea strongly denounced Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan on Wednesday, calling it an "impudent interference" by Washington into another nation's internal affairs.

The speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives arrived in Taiwan on Tuesday night despite fierce protests from China, becoming the highest-level official to make a formal trip there in decades. In a statement, she said her move "honors America's unwavering commitment to supporting Taiwan's vibrant democracy."

In a quick response, however, Pyongyang's foreign ministry said the visit is "arousing serious concern of the international community," as it stated support for China, which labeled Pelosi's trip as infringing its "sovereignty and territorial integrity."

"The current situation clearly shows that the impudent interference of the U.S. in internal affairs of other countries and its intentional political and military provocations are, indeed, the root cause of harassed peace and security in the region," a spokesperson for the ministry was quoted as saying by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). "Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and the issue of Taiwan pertains to the internal affairs of China."

"We vehemently denounce any external force's interference in the issue of Taiwan, and fully support the Chinese government's just stand to resolutely defend the sovereignty of the country and territorial integrity," the unnamed spokesperson added, according to the KCNA's English-language report. "The U.S. scheme to disturb the growth and development of China and its efforts for accomplishing the cause of reunification is bound to go bankrupt."

Pelosi is leading a congressional delegation in its Asia swing. It traveled to Singapore and Malaysia with plans to visit South Korea and Japan as well.

North Korea has openly stressed its strong ties with China amid an intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry.


yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 3, 2022



2. Presidential office calls for regional peace through dialogue after Pelosi's visit to Taiwan


Uh oh.


Excerpts:

Although some media reports raised the possibility of a meeting between Yoon and Pelosi, the presidential office denied the reports.
"Nothing has changed from this morning's briefing. A meeting between President Yoon and House Speaker Pelosi will not take place due to the president's vacation schedule," Yoon's office said.


(LEAD) Presidential office calls for regional peace through dialogue after Pelosi's visit to Taiwan | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김덕현 · August 3, 2022

(ATTN: ADDS presidential office's denial of possible meeting between Yoon and Pelosi in last 2 paras)

SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- The presidential office called Wednesday for regional peace and stability through dialogue as U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi made a high-profile visit to Taiwan.

Pelosi, who is set to arrive in South Korea as part of her Asian tour, visited Taiwan late Tuesday, becoming the highest-ranking elected U.S. official to visit self-ruled island in 25 years. China, which claims sovereignty over Taiwan, has strongly protested against Pelosi's visit.

Asked about Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, an official at the presidential office said, "Our government's stance is that we will maintain close communication with the nations concerned on all issues under the banner of the need for peace and stability in the region through dialogue and cooperation."

The presidential office "welcomes" Pelosi's visit to South Korea and hopes to make achievements during her talks with National Assembly Speaker Kim Jin-pyo, the official said.

Kim and Pelosi are scheduled to hold talks on Thursday and the two speakers will hold a joint press conference before having lunch together, Kim's office said.

President Yoon Suk-yeol, who is currently on summer vacation, has no plan to meet with Pelosi, the official said.

Although some media reports raised the possibility of a meeting between Yoon and Pelosi, the presidential office denied the reports.

"Nothing has changed from this morning's briefing. A meeting between President Yoon and House Speaker Pelosi will not take place due to the president's vacation schedule," Yoon's office said.


kdh@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김덕현 · August 3, 2022




3. Amb. Goldberg hikes Mt. Bukhan in Seoul with S. Korea's top diplomat




(LEAD) Amb. Goldberg hikes Mt. Bukhan in Seoul with S. Korea's top diplomat | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 황장진 · August 3, 2022

(ATTN: ADDS photo)

SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) --- New U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Philip Goldberg said Wednesday he hiked a Seoul mountain together with Foreign Minister Park Jin last weekend.

In a Twitter message, the envoy described Mount Bukhan in the northern part of the capital as a "perfect combination of beautiful nature & cultural sites." He posted some related photos.

"Can't wait to explore more," he added, asking the people to recommend other places to visit.

He assumed the post last month, having previously served as ambassador to Colombia and coordinator for implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea.



(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 황장진 · August 3, 2022



4. S. Korean, U.S. military officers agree on timely strategic asset dispatch in case of N.K. nuke test


We must demonstrate to Kim Jong Un that his political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and warfighting strategies cannot and will not be successful. 



S. Korean, U.S. military officers agree on timely strategic asset dispatch in case of N.K. nuke test | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · August 3, 2022

SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- The top military officers of South Korea and the United States agreed on the "timely" deployment of U.S. strategic assets here in case of a North Korean nuclear test during video talks Wednesday, Seoul officials said.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Kim Seung-kyum and his U.S. counterpart, Mark Milley, held the talks as the allies are gearing up for the upcoming regular combined training amid concerns about the possibility of the North conducting a nuclear test.

"The two countries' JCS chairmen agreed to show the alliance's stern resolve and capabilities through joint responses, including the timely deployment of U.S. strategic assets should the North press ahead with what would be its seventh nuclear test," the JCS said in a press release.

They also agreed to actively cooperate to enhance the credibility of extended deterrence, America's stated commitment to employing a full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear options, to defend its Asian ally.

In addition, the two sides agreed to prioritize solidifying the allies' combined defense posture through field training and other drills during the Ulchi Focus Shield (UFS) training set for Aug. 22-Sept. 1.

The UFS is considered a revival of the Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise abolished in 2018 amid the previous Moon Jae-in administration's efforts to facilitate diplomacy with the North.

During the meeting, Kim expressed his gratitude to Milley for his "active" support for the strengthening of the two countries' combined defense posture, according to the JCS.

In turn, Milley reaffirmed the U.S.' security commitment to South Korea has remained solid over the past 70 years and will remain unchanged.


colin@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · August 3, 2022




5. N.K. nuke missile progress outpacing U.S. missile defense modernization: U.S. expert



Missile defense is harder and more expensive than building offensive missiles.


N.K. nuke missile progress outpacing U.S. missile defense modernization: U.S. expert | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 3, 2022

By Chae Yun-hwan

SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's nuclear missile program appears to be "unstoppable," with its progress apparently moving faster than U.S. modernization of its missile defense systems, a U.S. expert said Wednesday.

Victor Cha, a senior vice president and Korea chair at the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, made the assessment during a forum here, while citing the nuclear-armed North's recent pushing for advancing its strategic weapons capabilities, including various types of missiles.

"I think we're currently in a situation where North Korea's nuclear missile programs really look like they're unstoppable right now," the former White House official said. Cha, who served as the director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007, joined the forum via video links.

"The United States is expanding and modernizing their missiles and augmenting and supplementing their missile defense system," Cha added. "But I would argue that North Korea's progress on their programs is moving faster than our modernization of our missile defense systems."

Still, he stressed the need for continued diplomatic efforts, saying military actions can't be an answer.

He described the current situation as "not a good one for certain," noting Pyongyang's refusal to respond to dialogue offers from the Joe Biden administration.

Pyongyang has carried out a string of missile launches since the start of this year amid reports that it has even completed preparations for what would be its seventh known nuclear test.


yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 3, 2022

6. N. Korea reports no new suspected COVID-19 cases for 5th day

Another day of complete control over the north Korean COVID narrative.


(LEAD) N. Korea reports no new suspected COVID-19 cases for 5th day | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 3, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details)

SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's new suspected COVID-19 cases remained at zero for the fifth consecutive day with only five fever patients under treatment, according to its state media Wednesday.

No new fever cases were reported over a 24-hour period until 6 p.m. the previous day, the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, citing data from the state emergency anti-epidemic headquarters.

It did not provide information on whether additional deaths have been reported. As of July 5, the death toll stood at 74, with the fatality rate at 0.002 percent.

The total number of fever cases from late April to 6 p.m. Tuesday stood at 4.77 million, of which 99.99 percent had recovered and five are being treated, it added.


The KCNA said the country's virus crisis is at its "terminal stage" although local health authorities are continuing measures for its stable control.

"With the nationwide spread of the epidemic at its terminal stage in the DPRK, work to further stably control and manage the overall anti-epidemic situation and strengthen the bulwark against epidemic is being pushed ahead with in all directions," it said in a separate English-language report. The DPRK is the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"Education and control are intensified to prevent officials, working people and residents from loosening vigilance towards the current phase of stability but make them maintain strong alertness and consciousness," it added.

The North disclosed its first COVID-19 case May 12, after claiming to be coronavirus-free for over two years and immediately declared a "maximum emergency" virus control system.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 3, 2022



7. Rival parties' floor leaders to meet with U.S. House Speaker Pelosi this week






Rival parties' floor leaders to meet with U.S. House Speaker Pelosi this week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · August 3, 2022

SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- The floor leaders of the ruling and the main opposition parties will join National Assembly Speaker Kim Jin-pyo in a meeting with U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi later this week, officials said Wednesday.

Rep. Kweon Seong-dong of the ruling People Power Party and Rep. Park Hong-geun of the main opposition Democratic Party will take part in the meeting between Kim and Pelosi to be held at the National Assembly on Thursday morning.

Regional security, economic cooperation and other pending issues are to be discussed in the meeting.

South Korea is one of the legs on Pelosi's Asian tour that also includes stops in Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan and Japan.


nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · August 3, 2022



8. After Taiwan, Pelosi's welcome to Korea is muted



Wednesday

August 3, 2022


After Taiwan, Pelosi's welcome to Korea is muted

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/03/national/diplomacy/korea-pelosi-taiwan/20220803184835879.html


In this photo released by the Taiwan Legislative Yuan, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, right, and Legislative Yuan Deputy Speaker Tsai Chi-chang arrive for a meeting in Taipei, Taiwan, Wednesday. [AP/YONHAP]

The presidential office gave U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi a muted welcome to Seoul after her highly controversial visit to Taiwan.


 

Asked whether Pelosi would get a meeting with President Yoon Suk-yeol, a presidential official said Wednesday morning, “At this point there are no plans.”  

 

Yoon is technically on holiday this week, although his plans to go out of Seoul were cancelled Monday because of plummeting approval ratings. So he will be in Seoul during Pelosi's trip, which lasts through Thursday. 

 

Pelosi and her parliamentary delegation flew into Seoul from Taiwan on Wednesday. Taiwan was an unconfirmed destination on their Indo-Pacific tour, which included Singapore, Malaysia, Korea and Japan.

 

Pelosi stayed there for around 24 hours, arriving late on Tuesday and leaving for Korea Wednesday night.

  

“Regarding Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, the Korean government is in such a position that it will maintain close communication with the relevant parties in the region on various issues,” said the presidential official. "We continue to believe that regional peace and security must be maintained through dialogue and cooperation."

 

Pelosi's trip to Taiwan was the first by a House speaker since Newt Gingrich’s in 1997 and was the highest-ranking U.S. official's visit since. The American parliamentary delegation includes House representatives Gregory Meeks, Mark Takano, Suzan DelBene and Andy Kim.  

 

In response to the delegation's visit to Taiwan, the Chinese government summoned the American ambassador in Beijing and ramped up military activities in the waters near Taiwan on Tuesday.  

 

Pelosi has been vocal about human rights violations in China, unfurling a pro-democracy banner in Tiananmen Square on a visit in 1991.  

 

“Our Congressional delegation’s visit to Taiwan honors America’s unwavering commitment to supporting Taiwan’s vibrant Democracy," Pelosi said in a statement on Tuesday upon her arrival in Taiwan. 

 

“Our visit is one of several Congressional delegations to Taiwan – and it in no way contradicts longstanding United States policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, U.S.-China Joint Communiques and the Six Assurances," she said. "The United States continues to oppose unilateral efforts to change the status quo.” 

 


This handout taken and released by Taiwan's Presidential Office on Wednesday shows U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, left, waving beside Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen at the Presidential Office in Taipei. [AP/YONHAP]

Pelosi met with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen and Vice President of the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan Tsai Chi-chang in Taipei on Wednesday. 

 

She was scheduled to meet with National Assembly Speaker Kim Jin-pyo in Seoul on Thursday, along with floor leaders of the People Power Party and Democratic Party. The meeting will focus on Seoul-Washington cooperation on security, economics and climate change, according to Speaker Kim’s office.  

 

U.S.-China tensions may be felt at a forum taking place in Asia this week, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Cambodia.

 

Top envoys from the United States, China, Japan, Russia and both Koreas were scheduled to attend the forum on Friday, as well as other sideline meetings through the week. 

 

Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin was scheduled to attend the ASEAN Plus Three foreign ministerial meeting on Thursday, which is a cooperative group between the ASEAN member states and Korea, Japan and China.

 

Representing North Korea at the ARF will be Ahn Kwang-il, Pyongyang’s ambassador to Indonesia and ASEAN. 

 

There were no plans to schedule a meeting between Ahn and Park, according to Seoul’s Foreign Ministry.

 

“During the ARF, the South Korean delegation is expected to put forward statements criticizing North Korean provocations, including the recently unprecedented level of ballistic missile launches,” a Foreign Ministry official told the press in Seoul last Thursday.  


BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]



9. Time for a reinforced nuclear deterrence


Interesting recommendations:


South Korea must seek detailed measures to raise the credibility of extended deterrence in light of the advances in North Korean weapons capacity. It must relieve the public, mitigate calls for nuclear armaments, and send a clear message to North Korea so as not to cause misjudgments. Since the government is reactivating the Edscg, I’d like to make a few suggestions.


First, South Korea must draw a consensus on enhancing the reliability of the extended deterrence through high-level talks and hand down orders to lower-level officials to overcome the U.S. bureaucratic reluctance to strategic nuclear employment.


Second, South Korea must build up its logic before entering negotiations with the U.S. to help bring about sincerity from America. Korea must present visions on the procedure to activate extended deterrence under various scenarios, strike targets, and sequences in action plans. The discussions must not stop at the theoretical and basic level.


Third, extended deterrence discussions must be reflected in Korea-U.S. joint military drills and operational command. It is undesirable to operate military drills without reference to extended deterrence.


Fourth, South Korea for the longer run must seek institutionalization of a NATO-like nuclear planning group in its security alliance with the U.S. It must carefully study the scope of cooperation with Japan.



Wednesday

August 3, 2022


Time for a reinforced nuclear deterrence

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/03/opinion/columns/nuclear-deterrence-South-Korea/20220803200927697.html


Wie Sung-rak

The author is a former South Korean representative to the six-party talks and head of the diplomacy and security division of the JoongAng Ilbo’s Reset Korea campaign.


North Korea has started saber-rattling at the new South Korean government. In a speech to mark the 69th anniversary of the July 27 end of the Korean War, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un blasted his new South Korean counterpart Yoon Suk-yeol for his remarks and behavior by threatening destruction of his government and military. Even for North Korea, public condemnation of a South Korean leader has not been common. The hostility signals a cold spell in inter-Korean relations.


It also could toughen Seoul’s policy on North Korea. Various hawkish opinions from outside could gain ground. Some could demand nuclear armaments or deployment of U.S. strategic weapons. But such ideas won’t likely be approved by the Yoon administration or the opposition-dominant legislature or the United States. Some advise greater efforts to renew dialogue with North Korea. Given its show of animosity toward the new conservative government, Pyongyang won’t likely take up the offer.


The policy on the North Korean nuclear issue must keep extremities at bay and seek a balanced and realistic solution. First of all, Seoul must not trigger a vicious hostility cycle by responding strongly to Pyongyang. It must keep command over the situation and leave the door open for dialogue without begging for talks. At the same time, Seoul must strengthen deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities. Since South Korean cannot go nuclear or employ tactical nukes, Seoul must leverage U.S. extended deterrence.


But a security alliance based on extended deterrence has raised questions as it has failed to contain the progress in North Korea nuclear and missile weapons program over the 10 years. Under Kim Jong-un’s command, North Korea has developed both strategic and tactical nukes and commands an array of missiles that can reach varying distances. It can target South Korea, Japan, Guam and the U.S. mainland.


The U.S. could worry about North Korea’s nuclear threat to the mainland more than its pledge of extended deterrence for South Korea. North Korea’s progress in nuclear and missile capacity has come to undermine U.S. deterrence ability and the South Korea-U.S. relationship.


Despite the challenges, there has not been meaningful change to the discussions on extended deterrence. In 2016, South Korea and the U.S. established the Extended Deterrence Strategy Coordination Group (Edscg). But Washington has been reluctant to consult on issues related to nuclear weapons with South Korea. But that does not apply to all allies. America has been running a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) within NATO for regular discussions on nuclear weapons employment.


South Korea must seek detailed measures to raise the credibility of extended deterrence in light of the advances in North Korean weapons capacity. It must relieve the public, mitigate calls for nuclear armaments, and send a clear message to North Korea so as not to cause misjudgments. Since the government is reactivating the Edscg, I’d like to make a few suggestions.


First, South Korea must draw a consensus on enhancing the reliability of the extended deterrence through high-level talks and hand down orders to lower-level officials to overcome the U.S. bureaucratic reluctance to strategic nuclear employment.


Second, South Korea must build up its logic before entering negotiations with the U.S. to help bring about sincerity from America. Korea must present visions on the procedure to activate extended deterrence under various scenarios, strike targets, and sequences in action plans. The discussions must not stop at the theoretical and basic level.


Third, extended deterrence discussions must be reflected in Korea-U.S. joint military drills and operational command. It is undesirable to operate military drills without reference to extended deterrence.


Fourth, South Korea for the longer run must seek institutionalization of a NATO-like nuclear planning group in its security alliance with the U.S. It must carefully study the scope of cooperation with Japan.


South Korea must prevent tensions from building up.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.  





10. ‘We’re willing to address the​ ​security concerns’ (Korea)


As long as it does not involve weakening the ROK/US military alliance and deterrence and defensive capabilities.


Wednesday

August 3, 2022


‘We’re willing to address the​ ​security concerns’

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/03/opinion/columns/unification-minister-Kwon-Youngse-North-Korea/20220803201227687.html


Jeong Yong-soo


The author is head of the Unification and Culture Research Institute of the JoongAng Ilbo.


The scar from a blister on the upper lip of Unification Minister Kwon Young-se pointed to the hard work he has faced since taking office in May. Despite the suspension of inter-Korean dialogue after the launch of the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration, Kwon has been busy drawing up so-called “bold plan” to deal with North Korea and the controversial repatriation of two North Korean defectors during the Moon Jae-in administration.


In an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo on July 27 — the day when the Armistice Agreement was signed between the UN Command and North Korea 69 years ago —Kwon stressed the need to normalize inter-Korean relations, maintain principles and have dialogue for future cooperation. He made clear the new administration’s position to correct — not entirely deny — the wrong practices in the previous administration to help break the deadlock in South-North relations. The following is the interview.


Q. Will the forced repatriation of North Koreans in 2019 affect inter-Korean relations in the future?


A. That’s an issue that should be dealt with according to our Constitution and law, not something North Korea should get involved in. The past administration often damaged our principles and yielded to North Korea’s demand for the sake of dialogue. The Yoon administration pursues practical and flexible policies toward North Korea while upholding principles. We need to let North Korea recognize that change, though it may take time.


What principles and flexibility does the Yoon administration want to show to North Korea?


We prioritize free democracy and human rights. But we can take a flexible approach to dialogue or negotiation. Despite the opposition from conservatives, we have an intention to offer the public access to North Korea’s media reports. On humanitarian aid, we can cooperate with North Korea without taking external conditions into account.


Have you said that with aid to North Korea in mind?


As North Korea said it needs help in public health and medical fields, we’ll provide what they need. We can help lift sanctions on North Korea if needed. If it requests food aid, we can provide it on humanitarian grounds. That will help build trust and draw denuclearization from North Korea.


The government expects that food production in North Korea will worsen this year in the wake of the pandemic and drought. The CIA recently projected that North Korea will suffer a food shortage of 860,000 tons, the amount to feed entire North Koreans for two months.


Is that what was meant by the bold plan?


Bold plan refers to a massive assistance to North Korea if it chooses to denuclearize. As Pyongyang mentions so-called “security concerns,” we also are willing to deal with the issue. That’s a big difference from the Lee Myung-bak administration. As North Korea says it developed nuclear missiles because of security concerns, the country will lose the cause for nuclear development if we remove the concern. When we have dialogue, I would ask North Korea what steps it wants South Korea to take. We are willing to help the North improve its relations with the United States.


North Korea has not respond to South Korea’s proposal for dialogue at all. Do you have any ideas about restoring relations?


We are trying to find a creative solution. No matter how sumptuous a feast a chef has prepared, it would be meaningless if the guests don’t eat. Allowing the private sector to open the door to dialogue could be an idea to facilitate the exchanges, followed by aggressive government support. Even under the past liberal administrations, there was a limit to civilian exchanges. That’s because the dialogue was led by the government. We will proactively encourage religious exchanges in particular.


Does Seoul have an effective means to prevent Pyongyang from launching an armed provocation?


A. Nuclear bombs and missiles are different. Over its missile launches, some countries vetoed UN sanctions on North Korea, but if it conducts another test, the situation will change. Even if additional UN sanctions are not imposed, South Korea can consider separate sanctions together with the U.S., Japan and the European Union.


What is your most important job?

 


Unification Minister Kwon Young-se talks with the JoongAng Ilbo about the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s North Korea policy.


That would be a division of roles between the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Ministry of Unification. So far, the ministry mostly played the role of executing decisions made by the NIS or the National Security Office (NSO) in the presidential office. Now is the time for the ministry to draw up — and set the direction for — North Korea policy rather than simply carrying it out. Strangely, the spy agency has been directly involved in negotiating — and making compromise — with North Korea even though it is a body aiming to collect information and engage in espionage activities since the July 4 South-North Joint Statement in 1972. We must put all of them back on track. We will pursue North Korea policy based on national consensus.


Do you have anything to say to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un or Ri Son-gwon, chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland?


The entire world, including South Korea, is having tough times after the pandemic and the start of the Ukraine war. South and North Korea under such harsh circumstances must have dialogue and cooperate to tackle challenges first. I hope North Korea comes to the negotiating table.





11. Pyongyang lashes out at Seoul’s appointment of NK human rights ambassador


Human rights is not only a moral imperative, it is a national security issue. Kim denies the human rights of the Korean people living in the north in order to survive.


The focus on human rights is an existential threat to the regime and the regime must attack the new South Korean human rights ambassador to sustain legitimacy.


Pyongyang lashes out at Seoul’s appointment of NK human rights ambassador

koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · August 3, 2022

By Jo He-rim

Published : Aug 3, 2022 - 14:24 Updated : Aug 3, 2022 - 14:24

Lee Shin-wha, new ambassador-at large on North Korean human rights issues (Yonhap)


North Korea lashed out at South Korea’s appointment of an ambassador-at-large on North Korean human rights issues on Wednesday, calling it “Seoul’s vicious political provocation to battle with Pyongyang until the end.”


North Korea’s propaganda radio station Echo of Unification strongly criticized the South, as Seoul has recently appointed Lee Shin-wha, an international relations professor at Korea University, to the post that has been vacant for the past five years.


“(South Korea) appointed a wicked combatant as ‘ambassador-at-large on North Korean human rights issues,’ a post that was vacant for the past five years, and it is ardently gathering international pressure against North Korea’s human rights (situation), puffed up like a grasshopper on a mugwort stalk,” the North Korean outlet said.


Seoul’s Foreign Ministry appointed Lee to the post on July 28, reviving the ambassador-at-large post, which was first created in line with the enactment of the North Korean Human Rights Act in September 2016.


“South Korea’s past puppet administrations that follow the United States have been carrying out the anti-Republic (anti-North) scheming, and the danger, craftiness and viciousness that the plots contain are the factors pushing the North-South relations into a quagmire of collapse,” the outlet said, firing back that South Korea, which it referred to as a “colony of the US” has more human rights problems.


In South Korea, the first ambassador-at-large was appointed in 2016 by the Park Geun-hye administration. The conservative government had tapped former human rights ambassador Lee Jung-hoon to the post, to increase pressure against the North Korean regime for its human rights violations.


After Lee stepped down in September 2017, the liberal Moon Jae-in administration, inaugurated in May of the same year and holding a friendlier stance towards Pyongyang, left the seat vacant throughout the five-year term.


The conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which takes a more hard-line standpoint against Pyongyang than its predecessor, appears to have revived the post, as it has been more vocal about improving the human rights situation in North Korea.


Lee Shin-wha is expected to work together with governments of other countries, international organizations and civic groups on human rights issues in North Korea, and also hold seminars and forums to raise awareness on the topic.


By Jo He-rim (herim@heraldcorp.com)




12.  Seoul wary of 'Pelosi effect' on ties with Beijing



Excerpt:


No meetings planned between No. 3 US politician and South Korean president, foreign minister


Seoul wary of 'Pelosi effect' on ties with Beijing

The Korea Times · by 2022-08-03 17:04 | Politics · August 3, 2022

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, right, and U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi waving as they pose for photos during their meeting in Taipei, Taiwan, Wednesday. EPA-Yonhap


No meetings planned between No. 3 US politician and South Korean president, foreign minister


By Kang Seung-woo

A visit by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to South Korea is likely to perplex Seoul further in the handling of its relations with China, which are already at an inflection point due to pending bilateral yet volatile issues.

Pelosi is widely expected to urge longtime ally South Korea to respond to the U.S.-led campaign against China's authoritarianism, according to diplomatic observers.

The U.S. house speaker, the third-highest official in the U.S. government, scheduled to arrive here, Wednesday, for a two-day trip following her visit to Taiwan.


Her visit to South Korea, the first time since 2015, comes as the United States has been seeking more coordination among its allies and partners to counter China, as evidenced by its proposal for Seoul to join the Chip 4 or Fab 4, an envisaged chip alliance with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. But the Chinese government has also pressured and persuaded Seoul against edging away from Beijing, its largest trading partner. The chip alliance is a platform apparently aimed at countering China's growing influence on global supply chains.


In addition, China has urged South Korea to uphold the previous administration's commitment to the "Three Nos" policy on the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment, which called for no additional THAAD missile battery deployments, no Korean integration into a U.S.-led regional missile defense system and no trilateral alliance with the U.S. and Japan.


"Amid the deepening U.S.-China rivalry, China has threatened military actions and it could invoke a U.S. response in kind, which would eventually affect South Korea, because of the South's alliance with the U.S.," said Kim Heung-kyu, the director of the U.S.-China Policy Institute at Ajou University.

"With Pelosi's visit to Taipei, the Chinese government could take retaliatory action against Taiwan, which would work to South Korea's advantage in the short term because South Korea and Taiwan compete in the semiconductor sector, but it would not necessarily be a good thing for us in the long run, so stable relations between the U.S. and China, and between Taiwan and China will be in the national interest here," Kim said.


Park Won-gon, a professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, also said Pelosi's visit could leave less diplomatic room for South Korea to maneuver in its ties with China.


"As the rivalry is intertwined with each country's respective domestic politics, both the U.S. and China cannot back off against each other," he said.


"In that respect, with the hegemonic competition between the two powerhouses further intensifying, if South Korea decides to commit to the Chip 4, possible Chinese responses could be fierier and inflammable," he said.



Nancy Pelosi vs. Lee Jun-seok


Park said Pelosi's op-ed, posted on The Washington Post, Tuesday (local time), summed up what her plan will be while in South Korea.


"She described the U.S.-China competition as a choice between autocracy and democracy and as an extension of the article, she is highly anticipated to discuss the issue here and hope that we pick the U.S. side," Park said.


"In addition, while taking issue with North Korea's human rights abuses, she is also likely to take issue with those of China, and we should deal with those issues in a smooth manner," he said.


Traditionally, when senior U.S. government officials visit here, they hold a meeting with either the president, the foreign minister or other senior ministry officials. But this time, National Assembly Speaker Kim Jin-pyo will be the lone senior official from the South Korean side ― a stark contrast to Pelosi's previous visit seven years ago when she met former President Park Geun-hye and former Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, as well as former National Assembly Speaker Chung Ui-hwa.


Currently, President Yoon Suk-yeol is on vacation, while Foreign Minister Park Jin left for Cambodia on Wednesday to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum.


A resident watches news about the expected visit of U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, in Taipei, Taiwan, Tuesday. EPA-Yonhap


However, diplomatic experts believe the absence of meetings with the president or foreign minister during Pelosi's visit here is due to the South Korean government's cautious stance on not provoking China.


"Pelosi is the No. 3 politician in the U.S. and if this were in the past, the president or the foreign minister would have tried to hold talks with her, but I think that this time the government seems to have decided not to excessively politicize the issue and unnecessarily antagonize China," Kim said.


Park also said, "If she makes a visit to the foreign ministry, they would be talking about foreign affairs, which will inevitably feature issues linked to Taiwan and China and weigh down on the ministry."


"In that sense, the foreign ministry may not have tried hard to arrange a meeting with Pelosi," he said.


As for the Pelosi visit, the presidential office just hoped that she might have successful talks with the Assembly speaker, Wednesday, while maintaining its stance that the nation will continue close communication with the nations concerned on all issues under the banner of the need for peace and stability in the region through dialogue and cooperation.


Kim said he thought the South Korean government should not get too involved in the U.S.-China rivalry on the occasion of Pelosi's visit, although he suggested that Seoul should also stay mindful of the Yoon administration's pledge to strengthen its alliance with Washington.


"Frankly speaking, her visit is more like seeking her own political gains, so I think that the South Korean government need not stretch the meaning of it to national interests," Kim said.



The Korea Times · by 2022-08-03 17:04 | Politics · August 3, 2022




13. Can Korea Join the Quad? How Should the Group Evolve?


Conclusion:


Asia does not need another talk shop. For the juice to be worth the squeeze, the Quad needs to deliver real benefits that offset the costs of engagement. The joint statements and the topics of the working groups show us that the Quad is moving towards issues at the intersection of security and economics, including supply chain resilience, freedom of navigation, public health, climate change, critical technology, and cyber. The Quad could also go into new and emerging domains like space and satellite cooperation. Korea’s ability to engage in this emerging security group will not merely be a test of its ambitions, but will also serve as a measure of the Quad’s durability and effectiveness. A track record of delivering tangible benefits is the best recruitment tool one could hope for. It would attract more members and more active participation. On the other hand, if the Quad fails to deliver tangible benefits, it will wither on the vine. The key is to engage in active listening to create a nimble yet effective agenda that incorporates the priorities of the membership and focuses on deliverables.


Can Korea Join the Quad? How Should the Group Evolve?

By Jonathan Corrado [Director of Policy, The Korea Society]

July 29, 2022

koreaonpoint.org

► For the immediate future, Korea’s role is likely to be limited to the “Quad Plus” arrangement, which joins regional partner countries in issue-specific subgroups, such as supply chain, technology, space, cyber, and vaccines due to Japan’s and China’s disapproval. But given some recent progress in Seoul-Tokyo relations, there is a prospect for deeper Korean involvement in the road ahead. The May 2022 Joint Leaders’ statement reaffirms the members’ “resolve to uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion.”

► The timing of Korea’s enhanced engagement will be shaped by domestic political factors, changes in the regional security environment, and the preferences of the Quad member countries. The early members will have a larger impact on determining the scope and direction of the Quad.

► Korea’s ability to engage in this emerging security group will not merely be a test of its ambitions, but will also serve as a measure of the Quad’s durability and effectiveness.

South Korea is ratcheting up its global security engagement, peeking its head beyond the immediate neighborhood to envision a broader application of its foreign policy muscle. One litmus test for this ambition is whether and how Seoul will be able to join the Indo-Pacific’s ascending security group, the Quad. At the same time, the manner in which the Quad responds to Korea’s interest will foreshadow the emerging institution’s future trajectory and reveal its adaptability and effectiveness.


The Quad, a regional multilateral security organization consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, was first promoted by the late former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe around 2007. It took over a decade for the group to come to fruition. The current iteration, an informal group committed to collective action on shared challenges, has convened two in-person leader-level summits and is less than two years old. In April of 2022, then President-elect Yoon said he would “positively review joining" the Quad given an invitation. This was a reversal of the Moon administration’s posture, which deferred on the question of the Quad, and overall struck a more conciliatory tone with China. Yoon’s turn toward the U.S. Alliance is supported by shifting public sentiment in Korea. Multiple surveys show increasingly negative views of China. For the first time, Koreans rated their favorability of China lower than Japan. Importantly, polling by Dr. Kuyoun Chung demonstrates that the shift is bipartisan: both progressives and moderates prefer the U.S. over China as Korea’s main foreign policy partner and support Korea joining the Quad. Hinting that the feeling is mutual, President Biden welcomed Korea’s “interest in the Quad” at his May 2022 summit meeting with President Yoon.


Unfortunately, the course since has not been smooth sailing. When asked if Korea will be officially invited to join the Quad, a White House official said “down the road, there may be some of that,” but only after the grouping “finds its legs” and “harmonizes the existing efforts.” There was some expectation that President Yoon would be invited to attend the Quad leaders’ summit in Tokyo as an “observer” or “partner,” but that didn’t happen either. It is possible that the Kishida administration in Tokyo put that idea on cold ice. “The opposition to Korea joining the Quad is… coming from Japan at the moment,” according to Dr. Victor Cha. For the immediate future, Korea’s role is likely to be limited to the “Quad Plus” arrangement, which joins regional partner countries in issue-specific subgroups, such as supply chain, technology, space, cyber, and vaccines. But given some recent progress in Seoul-Tokyo relations, there is a prospect for deeper Korean involvement in the road ahead. This possibility raises important questions. Do experts from the U.S. and Korea share perceptions about the scope for Korea’s enhanced engagement with the Quad? Do they agree on Korea’s potential contributions? To what extent, are their visions for the Quad aligned?


To find out, the author conducted an expert survey as part of a Pacific Forum fellowship, including 16 Korean respondents and 14 American respondents from academia, think tanks, the current government, media, former military, and intelligence officers, and former National Security Council staff, and former Commerce Department officials. Though the surveys are not statistically representative, they nonetheless highlight important takeaways. In terms of U.S. and Korean expert perceptions, the survey results show areas of both considerable symmetry and stark differences. It will be important to interrogate these divergences to optimize the Quad’s success.


Over 90% of American and Korean experts perceive a value in the Quad, and both anticipate that Korea will increase its engagement. However, there’s a perception gap on the reasons for Korea’s motivation to do so. Americans tend to overestimate the role of strengthening ties to regional powers. Both groups of experts agreed that strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance was the single most important motivation driving Korea’s interest in the Quad, but Korean experts tended to rate it as a higher priority.


When it comes to the future shape of the Quad, there are again differences. U.S. experts want to further develop the Quad Plus format, with flexible, issue-specific subgroups including the original four members and additional partners. Korean experts are more likely to favor increasing membership to include Korea. And, in the working groups, Koreans see more of a leadership role for Korea than the Americans tend to.





With regards to China, Korean experts are more likely to perceive the purpose of the Quad as containing China. It makes sense therefore that they are also more likely to anticipate a military response as a result of Korea’s engagement with the Quad. And it also makes sense that Korean experts are less willing to participate in security aspects of the Quad in the face of Chinese blowback. Compared to their U.S. counterparts, Korean experts were significantly more likely to want public assurance from the U.S. about protection against Chinese retaliation.



Going forward, the timing of Korea’s enhanced engagement will be shaped by domestic political factors, changes in the regional security environment, and the preferences of the Quad member countries. The early members will have a larger impact on determining the scope and direction of the Quad. As noted earlier, Japan’s opposition has slowed Korean engagement, but there have been some positive developments, including a leader-level trilateral U.S.-Korea-Japan meeting on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Madrid, a trilateral Foreign Ministers meeting on the sidelines of the G20 in Indonesia, and a Tokyo bilateral meeting in July. These are all productive steps to rebuilding Korea-Japan relations, but questions linger about how significant and quickly any rapprochement can be achieved. If Korea engages early, it will have a better chance to shape the Quad’s agenda. As the survey reflects, Korea feels like it has a lot to contribute to the Quad (more than U.S. experts perceive).


China may impose costs on Korea as punishment for Quad engagement, just as it did in 2017 when Korea installed a missile defense system aimed at defending rockets from North Korea. The Beijing leadership likely views the other Quad countries - the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia - as lost causes, countries that it has a limited ability to exert influence on, but it views Seoul differently. There are historical ties, a strong economic relationship, and a shared interest (if not agreement on how to address it) in the division of the Peninsula and North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Korea’s engagement in the Quad would signal to China that its grasp over regional security is slipping and that states seeking to escape its orbit are finding means to do so. The use of informal sanctions as a form of political coercion is a well-documented page from Beijing’s playbook, so we should anticipate that response.


For Korea, the short-term pain of informal economic sanctions from China could be offset by the added autonomy achieved through Quad engagement over the long term. Seoul will benefit from demonstrating that it will not be held hostage and pressured to abandon measures needed to shore up its security. For the existing Quad members, the time is now to contemplate how the Quad can facilitate and direct assistance to states that are subjected to coercion, economic and otherwise, from China or any other state that violates the core principles of the Quad. The May 2022 Joint Leaders’ statement reaffirms the members’ “resolve to uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion.” It’s important to develop a pragmatic means to turn that rhetoric into reality through forceful and principled measures that do not needlessly antagonize or escalate. Bonnie Glaser, director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund, recommends the creation of a “counter-coercion coalition” to organize collective action that could change the calculus that encourages China to undertake these actions.


Asia does not need another talk shop. For the juice to be worth the squeeze, the Quad needs to deliver real benefits that offset the costs of engagement. The joint statements and the topics of the working groups show us that the Quad is moving towards issues at the intersection of security and economics, including supply chain resilience, freedom of navigation, public health, climate change, critical technology, and cyber. The Quad could also go into new and emerging domains like space and satellite cooperation. Korea’s ability to engage in this emerging security group will not merely be a test of its ambitions, but will also serve as a measure of the Quad’s durability and effectiveness. A track record of delivering tangible benefits is the best recruitment tool one could hope for. It would attract more members and more active participation. On the other hand, if the Quad fails to deliver tangible benefits, it will wither on the vine. The key is to engage in active listening to create a nimble yet effective agenda that incorporates the priorities of the membership and focuses on deliverables.

AUTHORS

Jonathan Corrado is Director of Policy for The Korea Society. He produces programming and conducts research on a range of security, diplomacy, and socioeconomic issues impacting the U.S.-Korea Alliance, the Korean Peninsula, and Northeast Asia. Jonathan is a non-resident James A. Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum, an Emerging Leader at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and a contributor to NK Pro. He has published peer-reviewed articles in the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, the Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs, and Asian Politics & Policy. He has also published analysis in diverse outlets such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, War on the Rocks, 38 North, The Diplomat, The Japan Times, The National Interest, Yahoo News, Pacific Forum PacNet and Issues & Insights, NK News, and NK Pro. He has been quoted in Reuters, The South China Morning Post, The Korea Times, Radio Free Asia, and Voice of America. Jonathan was previously a translator for Daily NK (Korean to English), an FCPA due diligence investigator for Steele Compliance Solutions, a graduate fellow for McLarty Associates, and a volunteer analyst for the Congressional Research Service. Jonathan received an MA from Georgetown University's Asian Studies Program in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and a BA in anthropology and philosophy from the University of Maryland College Park.

koreaonpoint.org



14. Escaping N.Korea…History and Present State(1) Kim Jong Un’s war of extermination leads to the end of the defector era


Excerpts:


These defection routes also collapsed after Chinese authorities fortified the areas around foreign consulates. Since that time, the only real route available has been through Southeast Asia. Defectors depart from Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province to make it to Thailand through Laos, Myanmar or Vietnam. This is almost the only available route left for defectors wanting to go to South Korea.


The China-North Korea border in the 1990s was full of holes. People could cross over into China just by handing over a few hundred Chinese yuan as bribes to North Korea’s border patrol. There was also a Chinese-Korean community in China that sympathized with the defectors and protected them. (The defectors migrated to South Korea, Japan, and major cities in China, but this no longer happens).


In particular, North Korean defector women could obtain a safe haven by “getting married” to Chinese-Korean men living in agricultural villages. There was, in essence, a place for North Korean defectors to hide.


However, North Korean authorities believed that the massive number of border crossers was a major crisis, and intensified controls on movement in the country and security along the border with China. China also strengthened its border security following cases of robbery, murders, smuggling of illicit drugs, and human smuggling perpetrated by the border crossers from North Korea. Starting in 2005, there was a noticeable fall in the number of border crossers.



<Special Feature> Escaping N.Korea…History and Present State(1) Kim Jong Un’s war of extermination leads to the end of the defector era ISHIMARU Jiro

asiapress.org

A family that defected North Korea’s Chongjin in 1997. Chul-hun, the family’s son, died after being shot by a Chinese border guard while the family tried to escape through Mongolia in 2002. This photograph was taken in January 2001 by ISHIMARU Jiro while the family lived in hiding in a village in Heilongjiang.

The era in which people can defect from North Korea has almost ended.

That’s the strong feeling I’ve had as I have watched the situation over the past several years. It is not just the impact of COVID-19. While I will explain more about this later in the article, the defector era is in its twilight because the Kim Jong-un regime has ordered his authorities to implement a “zero defector” policy. This policy has led to an unprecedented level of security along the country’s border with China.

The highpoint in the number of defectors entering South Korea was 2,914 in 2009. While defections fell dramatically since Kim Jong-un gained power in 2012, there were at least 1,000 people who made it to South Korea up until 2019. Then, in 2020, the number of defections fell to 229, before falling further to just two percent of that 2009 highpoint to 63 people in 2021. There were only 11 defectors who entered South Korea from January to March 2022. (All of the previous figures are from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, as are those used below). Moreover, most of the defectors who made it to South Korea in the past couple of years are those who had resided for long periods of time in China. There were few cases in which the defectors had come more or less straight from North Korea.

One female reporting partner living in North Korea’s northern region lamented to me in March of this year, “I wish I had just bitten the bullet and escaped to South Korea three years ago. Now it’s impossible.”

A newly installed barbed wire fence on the Chinese side of the border across the Tumen River near Hoeryong, North Hamgyung Province. Taken in September 2012 by Nam Jung-hak (ASIAPRESS)

◆ Social disorder caused defections in the 1990s

While the dictionary definition of a “defector” from North Korea is a person who “escaped North Korean rule following the Korean War Armistice and settled domestically (South Korea) or abroad,” most defectors actually left North Korea after 1995. In July 1994, as the North Korean economy reached crisis point, Kim Il-sung – the country’s “living god” – died. Kim’s death led to the start of paralysis in the regime’s ability to maintain control, and North Korean society showed signs of crisis. Ultimately, the country’s food distribution system fell apart, leading to a massive famine. While there are different accounts on how many people died, I believe that more than two million people perished by the year 2000. Many people ran away to China to escape hunger and because they could no longer see a future in their country. This was the start of the defector issue, a problem that continues to this day.

I first went on a reporting trip to the China-North Korean border in July 1993. Since then, I have made around 100 such trips to report on conditions in North Korea. My most recent trip to the border region was in September 2019. The flow of people from North Korea to China reached its apex in 1997 to 1998. At the time, I was observing the agricultural villages of Chinese-Koreans along the Tumen and Yalu rivers, and was taken aback by dozens of North Koreans crossing over the border during just one night into a small village of around 1,000 people. I believe that, as of the year 2000, there were probably about one to two million North Koreans who had crossed into China. (There were a lot of people who crossed over multiple times or went back and forth over the border). Most of these people, however, returned to North Korea because they wanted to give their loved ones in North Korea money and food. The minority that abandoned life in North Korea became refugees and settled in China (around 10% of the total people who originally crossed over, I reckon). Ultimately, most of these people sought out a place to settle down for good and made it their goal to reach South Korea.

The moment Kim Han-mi and her family dashed into the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in May 2002. (Kyodo News)

◆ Defector routes opened by activist groups

The total number of defectors who entered South Korea by 1998 was only 947 people; however, that figure exploded after that, and there are now 33,826 defectors in South Korea as of March 2022. There is a ten-year gap between the highpoint of border crossers into China and the apex of defectors who entered South Korea. The North Koreans who gathered in China were all illegal residents of that country, which meant they had almost no way to make it to South Korea.

In the 2000s, a new defection route that offered protection by the South Korean government was opened by activist groups. This route had defectors walk through the Gobi Desert and into Mongolian territory. This route disappeared after a couple years due to efforts by the Chinese authorities, however. There were then activist groups that took radical steps to facilitate defections: defectors would dash into foreign consulates in Shenyang and Beijing to demand right-of-passage to South Korea. Apart from the so-called “Kim Han-mi Family Incident” of May 2002, when five people dashed into the Japanese consulate in Shenyang, other defectors tried similar attempts at Japanese-run schools.

Kim Han-mi and her mother Ri Song-hee, in a photograph taken by ISHIMARU Jiro a year before they dashed into the Japanese consulate in Shenyang. (ASIAPRESS)

These defection routes also collapsed after Chinese authorities fortified the areas around foreign consulates. Since that time, the only real route available has been through Southeast Asia. Defectors depart from Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province to make it to Thailand through Laos, Myanmar or Vietnam. This is almost the only available route left for defectors wanting to go to South Korea.

The China-North Korea border in the 1990s was full of holes. People could cross over into China just by handing over a few hundred Chinese yuan as bribes to North Korea’s border patrol. There was also a Chinese-Korean community in China that sympathized with the defectors and protected them. (The defectors migrated to South Korea, Japan, and major cities in China, but this no longer happens).

In particular, North Korean defector women could obtain a safe haven by “getting married” to Chinese-Korean men living in agricultural villages. There was, in essence, a place for North Korean defectors to hide.

However, North Korean authorities believed that the massive number of border crossers was a major crisis, and intensified controls on movement in the country and security along the border with China. China also strengthened its border security following cases of robbery, murders, smuggling of illicit drugs, and human smuggling perpetrated by the border crossers from North Korea. Starting in 2005, there was a noticeable fall in the number of border crossers.

asiapress.org














De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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