Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"If my doctor told me I had only six minutes to live, I wouldn't brood. I'd type a little faster."

– Isaac Asimov

"Fear paralyzes; curiosity empowers. Be more interested than afraid."

– Patricia Alexander

"Let no man pull you low enough to hate him."

– Martin Luther King Jr.

1. Is North Korea Really Getting Ready for a War Against America?

2. N.K. says it tested underwater nuclear weapons system in response to trilateral drills

3. UNSC holds closed-door meeting on N. Korean issues amid heightened peninsula tensions

4. N. Korean foreign minister returns home after trip to Russia

5. Top diplomats of N. Korea, Russia discuss 'upcoming political contacts': reports

6. S. Korea's military power 5th in world; N. Korea ranks 36th: index

7. North Korea’s Missiles Are Being Tested on the Battlefields of Ukraine

8. Assessing South Korea’s Nuclear Dilemma Amid Pyongyang’s Live-Drills

9. North Korea threat could change 'drastically' given Russia cooperation-US official

10. North Korea says it has tested another underwater nuclear drone

11. North Korea teens get 12 years' hard labour for watching K-pop - video

12. North Korea: Rare footage shows teens sentenced to hard labour over K-drama

13. North Koreans Executed By Kim Regime For Violating COVID Restrictions

14. Kim Jong Un is daring Seoul to escalate. Both Koreas must step back from brink.

15. North Korea Doesn’t Want Reunification — or War

16. Kim Jong Un’s Declaration of a Hostile Relationship Between North and South Korea Is a Big Deal

17. Kim Jong Un observed getting off Benz SUV worth 260 million won

18. S Korea calls for UN action amid escalating N Korean provocations

19. What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 2: The impact of the border closure…escape is now almost impossible

20. Inmates in North Korea’s prisons still face dire conditions

21. N. Koreans quietly speculate about Kim Jong Un’s successor

22. N. Korea’s police agency chastised for impolite language in reports to Kim Jong Un

23. Camp Humphreys gives all-clear on tap water following quality concerns

24. Triple threat: N Korea, Iran flaunt new missile tech to Russia

1. Is North Korea Really Getting Ready for a War Against America?

To answer the question in the subtitle: To improve and strengthen his position both domestically and internationally.

As I have written before we need to counter the nonsensical ideas about trading Seattle for Seoul. Those discussions and arguments play right into the hands of Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance (and create the ultimate condition he needs for successful execution of his campaign plan - US forces off the Korean peninsula).

And I fear that Dr. Bennett's conclusion is what Kim wants us to focus on e.g., "reining in his provocations, threats, and nuclear weapon development." He wants us to take the short term view while he focuses on the long term objective of domination of the peninsula by the guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. We need to stop trying to stop provocations and instead first, understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and take a long term view with our superior policy warfare strategy.

We need a new strategy that focuses on solving the Korea question, which is the only way to achieve denuclearization and end the crimes against humanity. It might be called a Three Plus One strategy: The Three: human rights up front, a sophisticated information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea resting on the Plus One of a strong ROK/US alliance that deters kinetic conventional and nuclear attacks.

Conclusion:

Against any of these actions, North Korea could potentially escalate. Thus the ROK and the U.S. would need to include in their planning how they might respond to such escalations. And in some cases, they should be open about such retaliatory threats. Unless Kim concludes that the ROK and the U.S. are finally serious about reining in his provocations, threats, and nuclear weapon development, Kim might eventually establish a form of dominance on the Korean Peninsula or push the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear war that no one wants.

Is North Korea Really Getting Ready for a War Against America?

So, what is Kim Jong-un trying to accomplish? Kim apparently has a longer-term plan that could explain his 2024 provocations, nuclear weapon production, and threats of war.

The National Interest · by Bruce W. Bennett · January 17, 2024

In late-2023, the South Korean National Intelligence Service warned that North Korea was likely “to engage in unexpected military and cyber provocations” in 2024. Then, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un told his people “to prepare for war with the U.S.” in 2024.

Is Kim planning to escalate his cold war on the United States and its allies to a hot war?

Only if doing so serves the “two consistent missions given to the military by the Kim family regime: preserve the North Korean state’s independent existence against any external power, and provide the means for North Korea to dominate the Korean Peninsula.”

But the United States has no intention of attacking North Korea: It has very little to gain and a lot to lose by engaging in war with North Korea. And it has made this attitude abundantly clear for decades by both saying so directly and avoiding potentially escalatory reactions to North Korean military attacks and provocations, fearing North Korean escalation.

So, what is Kim Jong-un trying to accomplish? Kim apparently has a longer-term plan that could explain his 2024 provocations, nuclear weapon production, and threats of war. Several years ago a leaked North Korean document for training senior military personnel described the North Korean plan’s objectives:

The dear supreme commander [Kim] will dominate the world with the nuclear weapons, will make the U.S. apologize and compensate us for decades of bullying our people, and will declare to the entire world that the world’s powerful order will be reshaped by the Juche-Korea, not the United States.

Yes, these objectives sound extreme. How might Kim try to achieve these long-term objectives?

North Korea would not need to become a U.S. nuclear weapon peer to leverage the United States. Consider a future in which North Korea has, say, 300 nuclear weapons and 100 ICBMs armed with nuclear weapons, something that may be possible within 10 years. With such a force, he could overwhelm currently planned U.S. homeland missile defenses and threaten one or more U.S. cities with nuclear attack if the United States does not repeal its sanctions against North Korea. If the United States refuses and Kim does attack U.S. cities, he could then threaten to destroy many more U.S. cities if the United States retaliates with nuclear weapons. Would a U.S. president take such a chance?

Kim could also threaten the United States with a limited nuclear attack unless it abandons its alliance with the ROK. And he could demand that the United States disengage from countries like Ukraine that the United States would be supporting against Russian or Chinese aggression. If Kim succeeds in such actions because the ROK/U.S. are afraid of escalation, wouldn’t the world order be radically reshaped by North Korea?

And regardless of what the U.S. president would do, what does Kim believe would happen? Does Kim feel that he would be in a position of real leverage given the passive U.S. reactions to North Korean provocations and his continued building of nuclear weapons and delivery means?

If Kim could leverage the United States, wouldn’t he also expect that he could leverage the ROK? For example, might he insist that the ROK pay him $100 billion per year and permanently discontinue producing K-pop, which Kim feels is a real threat to his regime? After all, wasn’t Kim already able to influence the former ROK President Moon Jae-in and his party to enact a law to stop ROK groups from sending leaflets into the North? Could North Korea reach a point where in effect it dominates the Korean Peninsula without requiring a hot war and all of the risks of “ideological contamination” of his personnel that such a war would pose?

And think: When Kim declared that he will exponentially increase his number of nuclear weapons and told his missile factories that they must “permanently expand production capacity,” Kim was clearly not just seeking 100 or so nuclear weapons. Why would he have his poor country expand production capacity if he only planned to use that capacity for one or two or three years to achieve a small nuclear force? How did the ROK/U.S. respond to these declarations?

To reach such leverage, in 2024 Kim will almost certainly continue provocations in which he launches theater and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, including tests of some new missiles. Kim is also escalating by threatening that “we have no intention of avoiding war if the Republic of Korea dares to attempt to use force against our country or threaten our sovereignty and security.” And Kim “warned he would have no hesitation in ‘annihilating’ South Korea.” In addition, Kim may launch ICBMs out over the Pacific, test one or more nuclear weapons underground or on a ballistic missile, carry out selective conventional force attacks against the ROK in which he threatens nuclear escalation if the ROK/U.S. retaliate (the North exercising its “nuclear shadow”), and continue production of nuclear weapons. The Kim family has historically conditioned the ROK/U.S. to accept escalating provocations and will almost surely continue to do so.

If Kim is seeking nuclear weapons to provide the coercive power and position to dominate the peninsula, why are the ROK and the U.S. avoiding responses to the North’s provocations which could lead to military escalation in the short-term? If North Korean confrontation with the ROK/U.S. is only a matter of time, isn’t it better for the ROK and the U.S. to confront Kim now when it is far less dangerous than when Kim has built a substantial nuclear weapon force?

That said, the vehemence of Kim’s latest threats suggests that he is also hoping that the ROK/U.S. will overreact to his threats of attack on and annihilation of the ROK. An overreaction would give him justification for some level of escalation, allowing him to claim that President Yoon is a warmonger putting the entire ROK at risk. Kim could do this hoping to undermine President Yoon’s party in the April National Assembly election.

Thus, the ROK and the U.S. need to take a deliberate and cautious approach. Because they have not really explained the hazards of North Korean nuclearization, they likely need to start with an information campaign to help their people understand why something must be done to rein-in North Korean nuclear weapon developments, its related provocations, and its threats despite the risks of doing so.

The ROK and the U.S. also need to develop plans for reining-in the North. For example, they might decide to seek an immediate freeze in North Korean nuclear weapon and ICBM production. These North Korean productions pose an existential threat to the ROK and the United States, justifying a response. To minimize escalation risks, they could use information, about which Kim seems to worry a great deal. That information might include clear descriptions of the lack of hostility by the ROK and the U.S. toward the North, why an invasion of the North by the a ROK and the U.S. makes no sense, and how Kim is wasting his people’s resources on building nuclear weapons and other military capabilities instead of feeding his people and providing them electricity, health care and other needs. The ROK and the U.S. could then openly offer to provide food, health resources, and electricity to North Korea if North Korea commits no provocations for six months.

There are other information options that the ROK and the U.S. could employ. For example, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, has recently claimed that ROK President Yoon’s policies have actually justified Pyongyang’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. Experts have called this, “an attempt to fan the flames of political division in South Korea.” The ROK could reply that Kim Jong-un’s provocations over the last couple of years that were designed to damage the ROK/US alliance have instead made the alliance much closer and brought Japan into a trilateral partnership. These outcomes demonstrate major failures of the Kim regime.

To make sure these messages reach especially the North Korean elites, the ROK and the U.S. may need to broadcast these messages from aircraft with fighter escorts operating over international waters off the east and west coasts of North Korea. The ROK and the U.S. may also decide to send high altitude balloons over the North to drop USB drives containing K-pop, K-dramas, and messages as discussed above. Even if the North destroys such balloons, many of the USB drives carried would likely be scattered over large areas in the North and become available to some of the North Korean people.

Because North Korean ballistic missiles pose an existential threat, the ROK and the U.S. could threaten Kim that each time he does a ballistic missile test, they will test one of their delivery systems that could pose an existential threat to Kim’s regime. These might include using Predator drones based in Japan to attack a simulated North Korean leadership target in the south of the ROK. According to one North Korean escapee, Kim particularly fears Predators because of their use to attack leadership targets in the Middle East. Or the United States could exercise a couple of fighter aircraft in the ROK that are capable of delivering tactical nuclear weapons.

So, what is Kim Jong-un trying to accomplish? Kim apparently has a longer-term plan that could explain his 2024 provocations, nuclear weapon production, and threats of war.

The ROK, the U.S., and Japan could also threaten Kim that if he launches an ICBM over the Pacific, they will constantly station one or more of their navy destroyers or cruisers in the East Sea (Sea of Japan) that will be ordered to shoot down any subsequent ICBMs Kim launches into the Pacific. They would need to publicly explain that such intercepts would be tests and could fail, but note that even failed intercepts would be useful in identifying and resolving potential problems with their missile defense systems against real North Korean missiles. And North Korea would be paying the cost of the targeted missile.

To balance the North’s continued nuclear weapon production the United States could threaten a four step escalating U.S. response to commit U.S. nuclear weapons for use in Korea as recently described in a RAND/Asan Institute report.

Against any of these actions, North Korea could potentially escalate. Thus the ROK and the U.S. would need to include in their planning how they might respond to such escalations. And in some cases, they should be open about such retaliatory threats. Unless Kim concludes that the ROK and the U.S. are finally serious about reining in his provocations, threats, and nuclear weapon development, Kim might eventually establish a form of dominance on the Korean Peninsula or push the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear war that no one wants.

About the Author: Bruce W. Bennett

Bruce W. Bennett is a senior international/defense researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center.

Main image is from KCNA/North Korean State Media. All others are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Bruce W. Bennett · January 17, 2024

2. N.K. says it tested underwater nuclear weapons system in response to trilateral drills

I look forward to assessments by experts on underwater nuclear weapons. I am curious.

Excerpts:

"Our army's underwater nuke-based countering posture is being further rounded off, and its various maritime and underwater responsive actions will continue to deter the hostile military maneuvers of the navies of the U.S. and its allies," a spokesman of the North's defense ministry said in a statement carried by the KCNA.

The official condemned the three nations for "seriously threatening the security" of North Korea and sternly warned of "catastrophic consequences" for their acts, the report said.

(2nd LD) N.K. says it tested underwater nuclear weapons system in response to trilateral drills | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 19, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS defense ministry's response in paras 6-7)

By Kim Soo-yeon

SEOUL, Jan. 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Friday it has tested an underwater nuclear weapons system under development in response to the latest joint maritime exercise involving South Korea, the United States and Japan.

North Korea's defense ministry said the country conducted an important test of the Haeil-5-23 in the East Sea, denouncing this week's naval drills involving a U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier as "reckless confrontation hysteria," according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

The KCNA did not disclose details, including the weapons's specifications and the test date.

South Korea, the United States and Japan jointly conduct naval drills in waters south of the Korean Peninsula, in this photo provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Jan. 17, 2024. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

"Our army's underwater nuke-based countering posture is being further rounded off, and its various maritime and underwater responsive actions will continue to deter the hostile military maneuvers of the navies of the U.S. and its allies," a spokesman of the North's defense ministry said in a statement carried by the KCNA.

The official condemned the three nations for "seriously threatening the security" of North Korea and sternly warned of "catastrophic consequences" for their acts, the report said.

In response, South Korea denounced the North's claimed weapons test as a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions and a provocative act that threatens peace on the Korean Peninsula and around the world.

"Under a robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture, our military has maintained a thorough readiness posture against North Korea's provocations and will respond overwhelmingly if the North stages a direct provocation against South Korea," the defense ministry said in a statement.

South Korea, the U.S. and Japan jointly conducted naval drills involving the USS Carl Vinson nuclear-powered aircraft carrier from Monday to Wednesday, following Pyongyang's latest launch of a hypersonic missile.

Pyongyang has long denounced joint military drills between Seoul and Washington as a rehearsal for an invasion.

In March last year, North Korea first made public a test of its underwater attack drone, the Haeil-1, claiming the "secret weapon" is capable of generating a "radioactive tsunami" and stealthily attacking enemies. In April, the country carried out a test of the Haeil-2 attack drone.

At a year-end party meeting, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called for stepped-up war preparedness to deter what he called "unprecedented" acts of U.S.-led confrontations. Kim also defined inter-Korean ties as relations between "two states hostile to each other."

A set of file photos, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 8, 2023, show the North testing an underwater nuclear-capable attack drone named the Haeil from April 4-7. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 19, 2024

3. UNSC holds closed-door meeting on N. Korean issues amid heightened peninsula tensions

How did China and Russia describe, protect, and support north Korean malign activities?

Excerpts:

"In-depth consultations took place," South Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Hwang Joon-kook told reporters. "Taking together North Korea's rhetoric and its action, the situation has gotten more serious, and all (UNSC) members are very concerned with respect to that."

At the meeting, South Korea reportedly noted changes in Pyongyang's nuclear policy and highlighted the need to pay attention to all kinds of North Korean threats undermining global peace -- in a departure from the UNSC's focus on the North's long-range ballistic missile launches.

UNSC holds closed-door meeting on N. Korean issues amid heightened peninsula tensions | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 19, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON/NEW YORK, Jan. 18 (Yonhap) -- The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) held closed-door consultations on North Korea-related issues on Thursday, sources said, amid tensions heightened by Pyongyang's recent launch of a claimed hypersonic missile and its hardening rhetoric against Seoul.

The informal UNSC meeting came as South Korea began its two-year term as a non-permanent member this month. Seoul, Washington and Tokyo are said to have requested the meeting -- this year's first UNSC consultations dedicated to North Korean issues.

The North launched what it claims was a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile tipped with a hypersonic warhead on Sunday. Later, it ratcheted up tensions by mentioning South Korea as the "invariable principal enemy."

"In-depth consultations took place," South Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Hwang Joon-kook told reporters. "Taking together North Korea's rhetoric and its action, the situation has gotten more serious, and all (UNSC) members are very concerned with respect to that."

At the meeting, South Korea reportedly noted changes in Pyongyang's nuclear policy and highlighted the need to pay attention to all kinds of North Korean threats undermining global peace -- in a departure from the UNSC's focus on the North's long-range ballistic missile launches.

Earlier this month, Hwang said that South Korea will directly request a UNSC meeting in the event of a North Korean provocation if needed, as its UNSC term started this month.

South Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Hwang Joon-kook speaks during a U.N. Security Council session at U.N. headquarters in New York on Jan. 10, 2024 in this photo captured from the U.N. Web TV. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 19, 2024

4. N. Korean foreign minister returns home after trip to Russia

We will know whether Choe Son-hui was successful in Kim Jong Un's eyes by whether or not she is sent (again) to a re-education camp.

(LEAD) N. Korean foreign minister returns home after trip to Russia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 19, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS unification ministry's response, details in last three paras)

SEOUL, Jan. 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui returned home Friday after a visit to Moscow that involved a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin amid deepening military cooperation between the two countries.

The delegation led by Choe arrived via Pyongyang International Airport, where they were greeted by Vice Foreign Minister Pak Chol-jun, Charge d'Affaires ad Interim Vladimir Topeha and Military Attache Valeri Isaenko of the Russian Embassy, the North's Korean Central News Agency said in a short dispatch.

Choe's trip to Moscow came as the countries have been seeking to strengthen military cooperation, with the North providing Russia with arms for use in its war against Ukraine in exchange for Russia's technical assistance for Pyongyang's weapons programs.

Choe, who visited Moscow at the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, held bilateral talks with Lavrov on Tuesday and briefed Putin on the results of their discussions later that day, the Kremlin said the following day.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) meets with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (R) in Moscow on Jan. 16, 2024, in this Kremlin photo by Sputnik via AP. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Following Choe's meeting with Putin, the Kremlin said Russia was keen on developing relations further with North Korea in all areas, including "sensitive ones."

Russia's foreign ministry released a statement that Choe and Lavrov discussed bilateral ties, including the implementation of agreements reached at the North Korea-Russia summit in September.

The two also discussed the schedule of "future political contacts," raising speculation over Putin's possible visit to Pyongyang.

During the rare summit between Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in eastern Russia, Putin accepted Kim's invitation to visit Pyongyang. Putin last visited North Korea in July 2000.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov also said Monday that Moscow hopes for Putin's visit to the North to materialize in the "foreseeable future," adding that further coordination, including its timing, will be discussed through diplomatic channels.

South Korea's unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs did not rule out such a possibility.

"As both countries have made official announcements in regard to Putin's visit to North Korea, it is probable. We will continue to closely monitor the situation," Kim In-ae, deputy ministry spokesperson, told a press briefing.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 19, 2024

5. Top diplomats of N. Korea, Russia discuss 'upcoming political contacts': reports

Translation: To talk about the future malign activities of the axis of authoritarians.

(LEAD) Top diplomats of N. Korea, Russia discuss 'upcoming political contacts': reports | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 18, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS more details in paras 11-13)

SEOUL, Jan. 18 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of North Korea and Russia discussed the schedule of "upcoming political contacts" between their countries during their talks earlier this week, Russian media reported Thursday.

North Korea's Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui held talks with her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Moscow on Tuesday before meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin later that day amid deepening bilateral ties after their leaders' summit last September.

"There was a thorough exchange of views on topical issues of development of bilateral relations with a focus on implementation of the agreements of the September summit of the leaders of the two countries at the Vostochny spaceport, including the schedule of upcoming political contacts," Russia's state-run news agency TASS quoted Lavrov's ministry as saying.

During the September summit in eastern Russia, Putin accepted North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's invitation to visit his country. The ministry, however, did not offer details on the "upcoming political contacts."

Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) meets with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (R) at the Kremlin on Jan. 16, 2024, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

On the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, the ministers confirmed their commitment to settling tensions in the region, which they described as being fueled by "irresponsible provocative actions of the United States and its satellites," TASS quoted the ministry as saying.

On Wednesday, Choe also met with Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak and discussed expanding cooperation in trade and the economy, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"The talk discussed the practical issues for revitalizing and expanding the bilateral exchange and cooperation in various fields including trade and economy as the DPRK-Russia friendly and cooperative relations have reached a new strategic level," the KCNA reported in an English-language dispatch.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Choe wrapped up her five-day trip to Russia on Thursday, according to the Russian ministry.

Following Choe's meeting with Putin, the Kremlin said Russia was keen on developing relations further with North Korea in all areas, including "sensitive ones."

In a photo released by foreign media before her meeting with Putin, one of the members of the North Korean delegation was pictured holding a document apparently titled, "Observation list in space technology field," in Korean.

The list appears to include the Progress Rocket Space Centre and the Voronezh Mechanical Plant, known to produce engines, although the writing is not completely clear.

The document suggests possible ongoing cooperation between the two sides in space technology after Putin indicated at the September summit that his country would help Pyongyang build satellites.

Washington and its allies have accused the North of providing arms support to Moscow for use in its war in Ukraine in return for Russia's assistance in Pyongyang's advanced weapons development.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 18, 2024

6. S. Korea's military power 5th in world; N. Korea ranks 36th: index

This may upset Kim Jong Un. It might cause him to continue to act out.

S. Korea's military power 5th in world; N. Korea ranks 36th: index | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 19, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea ranked fifth in the world in terms of military strength, while North Korea's standing was at 36th, an annual military power index showed Friday.

South Korea had a firepower score of 0.1416 to stand at fifth out of 145 countries, according to Global Firepower 2024. Its standing rose by one notch from a year earlier.

The index is calculated based on more than 60 factors, with categories ranging from military might and financial standing to logistical capability and geography. The lower the index is, the stronger a country's military is.

With a firepower score of 0.5313, North Korea ranked 36th in the world, down from 34th the previous year, according to the index.

The United States topped the list, followed by Russia, China and India.

This image, captured from the website of Global Firepower (GFP) on Jan. 19, 2024, shows the GFP index on global military strength of 145 countries. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 19, 2024

7. North Korea’s Missiles Are Being Tested on the Battlefields of Ukraine

One of the many secondary effects of the Russia-north Korea relationship. Ukraine is a "commercial" for north Korean weapons.

Excerpt;

The high-profile battlefield exposure is likely to afford the regime of leader Kim Jong Un new proliferation opportunities, security experts say. The country’s illicit-arms business stretches back decades, though it has trailed off in recent years. Traditional customers in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere shifted to lower-cost drones, which performed better than Pyongyang’s outdated offerings. Tighter sanctions elevated the risk that shipments en route would get intercepted.

North Korea’s Missiles Are Being Tested on the Battlefields of Ukraine

Russian use of weapons supplied by the Kim Jong Un regime could boost Pyongyang’s illicit-arms business

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/how-the-ukraine-war-is-aiding-north-koreas-illicit-arms-business-62e66fd8?mod=latest_headlines

By Dasl Yoon

Follow and Timothy W. Martin

Updated Jan. 19, 2024 12:47 am ET

North Korea hasn’t been able to gauge how its new generation of missiles performs on the battlefield—until now. PHOTO: JUNG YEON-JE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

SEOUL—One of the world’s biggest illicit-arms suppliers just got a major advertisement.

In recent weeks, Russian forces have fired short-range ballistic missiles in Ukraine provided by North Korea, according to assessments from Washington, Seoul and Kyiv. Pyongyang has provided Moscow with dozens of the weapons, the U.S. says.

Officials concluded that North Korean weapons were being used by analyzing debris collected in Ukraine. Russia is believed to have used Pyongyang’s new KN-23 and KN-24 short-range missiles, defense experts say. Both countries have denied engaging in arms transfers.

Despite a barrage of test launches, North Korea hasn’t been able to gauge how its new generation of short-range ballistic missiles performs on the battlefield—particularly against Western defenses—until now.

The high-profile battlefield exposure is likely to afford the regime of leader Kim Jong Un new proliferation opportunities, security experts say. The country’s illicit-arms business stretches back decades, though it has trailed off in recent years. Traditional customers in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere shifted to lower-cost drones, which performed better than Pyongyang’s outdated offerings. Tighter sanctions elevated the risk that shipments en route would get intercepted.

The site of a Russian missile attack on a hotel in Kharkiv, Ukraine. PHOTO: YEVHEN TITOV/ZUMA PRESS

The use of the short-range missiles hands fresh endorsement to North Korea’s weapons sales, as militarization is rising globally and creating new demand from nations without access to legitimate arms sales.

“North Korea will be able to command a premium for these systems in ways it wasn’t before,” said Toby Dalton, senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. “This is the cash cow.”

Kim, the 40-year-old dictator, recently toured the country’s largest munitions factories, ordering officials to ramp up production. An increase in arms sales could provide a much-needed boost for a North Korean economy still recovering from the pandemic.

The country’s precise missile-production capacity is difficult to assess, given the Kim regime’s penchant for secrecy. But North Korea is believed to operate more than 300 munitions factories, including another 100 civilian facilities that can shift to weapons production, according to South Korean estimates.

North Korea does have some advantages over the West, where arms makers have struggled to keep up with the demand created by the Ukraine war. Pyongyang’s weapons manufacturing is state-controlled. Kim can put people to work in factories if he wants to ramp up production.

Pyongyang leans on homegrown producers and illicit networks to feed its missile industry. But it also leans heavily on Russia and a few other allies for certain supplies and technological know-how, said Tushar Sudesh Mangure, a defense analyst at analytics firm

GlobalData. To supercharge production further, Russia could provide the raw materials that North Korea struggles to access, he added.

The remains of an unidentified missile in Ukraine, which authorities there said was made in North Korea. PHOTO: STRINGER/REUTERS

That Russia, a United Nations Security Council permanent member, has used North Korean missiles with apparent success sends some very clear messages to potential customers who may have been on the fence about conducting arms business with the Kim regime, said Darya Dolzikova, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defense and security think tank.

One such message is that Russia remains unlikely to interdict any such transactions shipped through its borders or greenlight punishment at the U.N. for buyers, she said. The other is that the North Korean missile systems may be more reliable than previously believed.

“If I were a potential customer of this, the technology is being used by the Russians, possibly improved by the Russians,” Dolzikova said. “I would assume these technologies are going to get better.”

The two countries’ closeness was on full display this week, as North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Moscow, meeting with her counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin. Lavrov expressed gratitude for North Korea’s support for Russia’s fight in Ukraine. Following a Putin-Kim summit last September, the two countries had pledged greater partnership in all areas.

Assessing South Korea’s Nuclear Dilemma Amid Pyongyang’s Live-Drills – Analysis

January 19, 2024 0 Comments

By Observer Research Foundation

By Abhishek Kumar Singh

eurasiareview.com · January 19, 2024

By Abhishek Kumar Singh

Amidst the ongoing conflicts between Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Hamas, the Korean Peninsula also faces a persistent crisis due to North Korea’s continual nuclear rhetoric. The recent artillery shells fired by Pyongyang near the sea border have created a furore in the region.

According to Seoul, Pyongyang fired over 350 rounds of artillery over the last weekend. The firing was a reaction to the military activities conducted by what was referred to as South Korea’s ‘military gangsters’ and the border-based drill exercises. Moreover, the launch of the Hwasong-18, an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in December 2023, and the declaration of a nuclear attack ‘anytime’ has marked a significant development. Kim Jong-Un also reiterated the threat to nuke the United States (US) if provoked and asserted that the launch was due to military confrontation hysteria against the former.

The recent heightened threat is particularly concerning for South Korea. Even in 2022, over 70 missiles were fired by Pyongyang leading to an increased demand for developing nuclear weapons by the South Korean public. This piece explores Seoul’s complexities of grappling with a nuclear challenge, domestic pressure for greater autonomy, external threats, and the developing facets of international security.

Navigating Seoul’s nuclear dilemma

Seoul depended largely on Washington for its security, however, in the post-Cold War era, to gain economic benefits and counter Pyongyang’s rising threat, it started engaging with Beijing. Seoul’s accommodating foreign policy has not allowed it to strike a balance between its alliance and autonomy, making it tougher to navigate its foreign policy independently, especially its nuclear policy. In light of growing Pyongyang’s nuclear threat, Seoul has found itself in a web of geopolitical situations depicting its complex and multifaceted nuclear issue.

To independently navigate its foreign policy, Seoul has been actively involved in multiple diplomatic engagements such as establishing closer ties with the QUAD and being vocal against Beijing’s aggressions, and multilateral initiatives like the New Southern Policy, and Indo-Pacific Strategy. South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol also recently discussed the potential for South Korea to develop its nuclear weapons or reintroduce US tactical nuclear weapons to counter the exponential rise of North Korea’s nuclear threat.

Previously under Park Chung-Hee’s rule, Seoul had initiated developing nuclear weapons only to get curtailed by Washington. Although Yoon has rejected the call for immediate nuclearisation, his statements have reshaped and initiated the domestic discourse on the country’s nuclear ambitions. Thus, it is important to explore the intricacies of this situation, considering the continuous threat posed by Pyongyang, internal factors pushing Seoul towards a nuclear defense, and the external factors advising caution.

Domestic pressures: Security anxieties and a desire for autonomy

North Korea’s looming nuclear shadow: A looming nuclear threat on Seoul emerges as Pyongyang persists in its missile barrage and unwavering pursuit of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang’s invariable rhetoric of a nuclear attack was amplified after the former fired dozens of missiles toward Seoul in November 2022. One of the missiles landed in South Korean territory, the island of Ulleungdo, for the first time since the end of the Korean War (1950-53). These missile launches heightened tensions, prompting the South Korean government to issue an air-raid warning on the island. This had a significant impact on South Koreans with polls showing a noticeable increase in support for developing its indigenous nuclear defense.

A survey carried out by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies revealed that 64.3 percent of Koreans vouch for independently developing nuclear weapons. Additionally, a joint survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies indicates that over 70 percent of Koreans favour the idea of their state developing nuclear capabilities in response to rising nuclear threats. This sentiment is heightened by Pyongyang’s blitzkrieg of missile attacks on Seoul and its revamped nuclear strategy, reinforcing the perceived necessity for indigenous nuclear weapons.

Chinese belligerence: Beijing, as a longstanding supporter of Pyongyang, has heightened tensions by endorsing the Kim regime. This position is further exacerbated by China’s recent declaration of a renewed threat to invade Taiwan. In case of an invasion of Taiwan, China might leverage North Korea’s defense power to unlock an additional military front, creating a dual threat for both the US and South Korea. This particular strategy will discourage the US from getting involved in the Taiwan dispute. Furthermore, Beijing’s strong objection to the installment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in Seoul, followed by punitive economic coercions has greatly restricted Seoul’s ability to deter and shield its security and economy. As a result, the South Koreans are considering China as a significant threat in the coming hence, want nuclear weapons to tackle the dual threats.

Eroding trust in the US nuclear umbrella: The protracted dependence on the US nuclear umbrella has encountered challenges attributed to perceived inconsistencies in American commitment. Notably, the “America First” policies of the Trump administration, which included the proposal to withdraw up to 4,000 US troops from South Korea for financial reasons and an ambiguous stance on denuclearisation, have engendered apprehensions regarding the reliability of the nuclear umbrella. These developments have fuelled pro-nuclear sentiments within South Korea.

Despite the recently signed Washington Declaration, aimed at mitigating the nuclear threat by deploying nuclear-armed submarines in South Korea, it has not adequately addressed concerns among South Koreans regarding the US’s ability to fully and credibly commit to their security, thus sustaining a robust nuclear debate in the country. There is a genuine concern that the US will prioritise its cities and citizens’ safety over those of Koreans, prompting contemplation of developing indigenous nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, potential nuclear technology sharing between Russia and North Korea raises the possibility of South Korea seeking to revise alliance agreements to initiate a nuclear-powered submarine programme, referred to as an SSN programme. Gabriela Bernal, an independent DPRK watcher, suggests that if South Korea perceives abandonment by the US, there is a likelihood of future disregard for US wishes and a pursuit of the nuclear option to safeguard its security.

Technological prowess and nationalist aspirations: The momentum behind the proposal to develop nuclear weapons surged following the rejection by the US of President Yoon’s suggestions, either to redeploy US tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula or for South Korea to acquire its independent nuclear capabilities. This has fuelled a growing sentiment of national pride and a desire for strategic autonomy, bolstering arguments in favour of an indigenous nuclear programme. Additionally, South Korea possessesadvanced scientific and technological capabilities crucial for potential nuclear weapons development, providing the country with greater control over its nuclear policies. However, the feasibility of South Korea emerging as a nuclear power in the current global context necessitates careful reconsideration, introducing uncertainties to the prospect of developing nuclear weapons at this juncture.

Traversing the tightrope: Finding a sustainable solution

The nuclear predicament in South Korea reflects the wider challenges of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Effectively addressing this requires South Korea to skillfully blend diplomatic efforts, regional collaboration, and a strong conventional defense, ensuring a secure future for both the nation and the broader region.

Revitalising the alliance can assuage South Korea’s security concerns through intensified security cooperation, joint military exercises, and a renewed commitment to extended deterrence, thus obviating the need for nuclear armament. In this vein, South Korea and the US recently finalised the establishment of guidelines for the planning and execution of a joint nuclear strategy by mid-2024. These guidelines encompass a broad spectrum of issues, including the sharing of sensitive nuclear information, the establishment of a pertinent security system, the formulation of consultation procedures for nuclear crises, the operation of a real-time leader-level communication channel, and plans for managing crises and reducing risks

Moreover, above bolstering Seoul’s defense potential, there is an important need for an increased focus on addressing nuclear threat denuclearisation through multilateral platforms like G20, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and diplomatic efforts such as increased trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the US, and the proposed resumption of trilateral talks between China, South Korea, and Japan. In addition, Seoul’s quest for inclusion in the Quad umbrella to discuss denuclearisation talks will apply pressure on Pyongyang beyond international sanctions. Although complete denuclearisation is not guaranteed, these efforts have the potential to reduce rhetoric and promote discussions on denuclearization.

Although Yoon’s recent weighing on nuclear development and striving to broaden diplomatic ties portrays Seoul’s refined strategic approach. However, to navigate this impending situation, a subtle balance must be maintained between the US-Korea nuclear alliance, addressing domestic security concerns, and engagement in diplomatic initiatives. The support of the US is important but even if the current US administration embraces a traditional method and offers reassurances to Korea, policymakers must remain vigilant of the future US administrations’ different approaches post-US elections in 2024.

Seoul’s challenge lies in finding a refined and comprehensive method that ensures its security and contributes to broader regional stability. Furthermore, South Korea’s economy is export-driven and any attempt of developing nuclear weapons can cripple its economy as it will be highly vulnerable to international sanctions. Moreover, it will destabilise regional security, promote an arms race, jeopardise its global standing, and aim to become a middle power. Therefore, the stance on developing nuclear weapons, despite being the best solution, remains vague but the demand will continue to grow in the future.

About the author: Abhishek Kumar Singh is a doctoral candidate in IR at Kookmin University Seoul.
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation

eurasiareview.com · January 19, 2024

9. North Korea threat could change 'drastically' given Russia cooperation-US official

Excerpts:

"And I say unprecedented very deliberately - We have never seen this before."

Vaddi said it was necessary to pay close attention not just to nuclear-armed North Korea's help for Russia war in Ukraine, primarily in the form of missile systems, but "what could be going in the other direction as well."

"How could that improve North Korea's capabilities? And what does that mean for our own extended deterrence posture in the region with both Korea and Japan?"

"I think the nature of North Korea as a threat in the region could drastically change over the coming decade as a result of this cooperation," Vaddi said.

Vaddi said the United States would continue to work with South Korea to make sure their combined "extended deterrence" was as credible as possible in the face of the evolving North Korea threat - a reference to the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" protecting allies.

North Korea threat could change 'drastically' given Russia cooperation-US official

David Brunnstrom and Arshad Mohammed

Thu, January 18, 2024 at 12:29 PM EST·2 min read

news.yahoo.com

By David Brunnstrom and Arshad Mohammed

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The nature of the security threat posed by North Korea could change "drastically" in the coming decade as a result of its unprecedented cooperation with Russia, the White House's senior director for arms control Pranay Vaddi said on Thursday.

"What we're seeing between Russia and North Korea is an unprecedented level of cooperation in the military sphere," Vaddi told Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank.

"And I say unprecedented very deliberately - We have never seen this before."

Vaddi said it was necessary to pay close attention not just to nuclear-armed North Korea's help for Russia war in Ukraine, primarily in the form of missile systems, but "what could be going in the other direction as well."

"How could that improve North Korea's capabilities? And what does that mean for our own extended deterrence posture in the region with both Korea and Japan?"

"I think the nature of North Korea as a threat in the region could drastically change over the coming decade as a result of this cooperation," Vaddi said.

Vaddi said the United States would continue to work with South Korea to make sure their combined "extended deterrence" was as credible as possible in the face of the evolving North Korea threat - a reference to the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" protecting allies.

Asked how much of a worry it was that such allies would pursue their own nuclear defense capabilities in the face of the growing North Korean threat, Vaddi said:

"We want to make sure that the U.S. nuclear umbrella system as it has existed remains sufficient for deterring threats, including emerging threats that are emanating in Europe and Asia."

Russia said on Wednesday it was developing its relations with North Korea in all areas, including "sensitive" ones after the North Korean foreign minister held rare talks in the Kremlin with President Vladimir Putin, who has been invited to visit the reclusive nuclear-armed country.

Putin has deepened ties with North Korea since sending troops into Ukraine in 2022, and Washington has condemned what it says have been significant North Korean missile deliveries to Russia, amid concerns that Russia could be sharing weapons technology with Pyongyang in return.

(Reporting by David Brunnstrom and Arshad Mohammed; Editing by Alistair Bell)

news.yahoo.com

10. North Korea says it has tested another underwater nuclear drone

North Korea says it has tested another underwater nuclear drone

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Min Joo Kim

Updated January 19, 2024 at 12:45 a.m. EST|Published January 18, 2024 at 9:56 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · January 19, 2024

SEOUL — North Korea on Friday claimed to have conducted a test of an “underwater nuclear weapons system,” a claim that would dramatically escalate concerns that Kim Jong Un is girding for war.

The official Korean Central News Agency on Friday reported that the test was carried out in response to joint military drills between the United States, South Korea and Japan, which it said were “seriously threatening the security” of the North.

North Korea claimed it tested a “Haeil 5-23” system that it has been developing in the East Sea, or Sea of Japan, according to KCNA.

This appears to be a new model of the unmanned, nuclear-capable underwater attack drone called “Haeil,” or “tsunami,” that North Korea claimed to have twice tested last year.

North Korea is developing a variety of nuclear-capable weapons as it builds up its arsenal, but analysts have said it is unclear whether its underwater system is ready for deployment and that it probably adds little to its existing military capabilities.

That didn’t stop North Korea from talking up the test. “Our army’s underwater nuke-based countering posture is being further rounded off,” KCNA said Friday, adding that it will continue actions to deter “hostile military maneuvers” by the United States and its allies.

The test comes in North Korea as tensions rise on the Korean Peninsula, with Pyongyang becoming increasingly fiery in its rhetoric on preparing the country for war. North Korea this week claimed to have fired a medium-range missile with a hypersonic warhead, a highly maneuverable weapon that could travel at five times the speed of sound.

Although the North Korean regime is notorious for bombastic threats, it has become increasingly aggressive in recent months, leading some analysts to question whether Kim wants to pick a fight with the United States.

The American, South Korean and Japanese militaries have this week been carrying out join naval exercises, involving the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier. They are aimed at bolstering the countries’ deterrence and response capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat as well as maritime threats, according to the South Korean military.

North Korea views the joint drills as hostile acts that justify building up its own nuclear deterrent. In Friday’s statement, North Korea described the drills as training conducted by “military gangs.”

“Our army’s underwater nuke-based countering posture is being further rounded off and its various maritime and underwater responsive actions will continue to deter the hostile military maneuvers of the navies of the U.S. and its allies,” an unnamed defense ministry spokesman said in a statement, according to KCNA.

North Korea said it “will never condone the enemy’s reckless military confrontation madness.” “We strongly condemn the reckless actions of the United States and its followers … and solemnly warn of the catastrophic consequences that will result from this,” it said.

North Korea first showcased its Haeil drones at a military parade in Pyongyang last year, allowing international observers a view of the purportedly nuclear-capable weapons.

Pyongyang has claimed that the underwater drones were designed to generate a “radioactive tsunami.” However, the weapons “still appear to be a work-in-progress and yet to be deployable,” said Choi Il, a retired South Korean submarine captain. North Korea still has to work on the drones’ precision, maneuverability and nuclear capability through further tests, he said.

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · January 19, 2024

11. North Korea teens get 12 years' hard labour for watching K-pop - video

The regime cannot win the soft power war. Information from the South is an existential threat to the regime. Ironically, the reverse is not true. Information from the north has no significant influence in the South.

North Korea teens get 12 years' hard labour for watching K-pop - video

By Minwoo Park and Jimin Jung

January 19, 20245:43 AM ESTUpdated 2 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-teens-get-12-years-hard-labour-watching-k-pop-video-2024-01-19/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm

SEOUL, Jan 19 (Reuters) - Video footage released by an organisation that works with North Korean defectors shows North Korean authorities publicly sentencing two teenagers to 12 years' hard labour for watching K-pop.

The footage, which shows the two 16-year-olds in Pyongyang convicted of watching South Korean movies and music videos, was released by the South and North Development (SAND) Institute.

Reuters was unable to independently verify the footage, which was first reported by the BBC.

North Korea has for years imposed tough sentences on anyone caught enjoying South Korean entertainment or copying the way South Koreans speak in a war on outside influences since a sweeping new "anti-reactionary thought" law was imposed in 2020.

"Judging from the heavy punishment, it seems that this is to be shown to people across North Korea to warn them. If so, it appears this lifestyle of South Korean culture is prevalent in North Korean society," said Choi Kyong-hui, president of SAND and Doctor of Political Science at Tokyo University, who defected from North Korea in 2001.

"I think this video was edited around 2022... What is troublesome for (North Korean leader) Kim Jong Un is that Millennials and Gen Z young people have changed their way of thinking. I think he's working on turning it back to the North Korean way."

The video, made by North Korean authorities, shows a large public trial in which the two students in grey scrubs are handcuffed while watched by about 1,000 students in an amphitheatre. All the students, including the two 16-year-olds, are wearing face masks, suggesting the footage was shot during the COVID pandemic.

The students were sentenced, according to the video, after being convicted of watching and spreading South Korean movies, music and music videos over three months.

"They were seduced by foreign culture... and ended up ruining their lives," the narrator states, as the video cut away to young girls being handcuffed and Pyongyang women wearing South Korean fashion and hairstyles.

Reclusive North Korea and the rich, democratic South are technically still at war after their 1950-53 conflict ended in a truce, not a peace treaty, and are divided by a heavily fortified demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Reporting by Minwoo Park and Jimin Jung; Writing by Joyce Lee; Editing by Nick Macfie

12. North Korea: Rare footage shows teens sentenced to hard labour over K-drama

Video at the link: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68015652

We must consider that Kim is under severe internal stress. We must observe for the indication of resistance to the regime and potential internal instability.

North Korea: Rare footage shows teens sentenced to hard labour over K-drama

BBC

By Sangmi HanBBC Korean, Seoul

Watch: Teens sentenced to hard labour for watching South Korean TV shows

Rare footage obtained by BBC Korean shows North Korea publicly sentencing two teenage boys to 12 years of hard labour for watching K-dramas.

The footage, which appears to have been filmed in 2022, shows two 16-year-old boys handcuffed in front of hundreds of students at an outdoor stadium.

It also shows uniformed officers reprimanding the boys for not "deeply reflecting on their mistakes".

South Korean entertainment, including TV, is banned in the North.

Despite that, some are prepared to risk severe punishment to access K-dramas, which have a huge global audience.

Footage such as this is rare, because North Korea forbids photos, videos and other evidence of life in the country from being leaked to the outside world.

This video was provided to the BBC by the South and North Development (Sand), a research institute that works with defectors from the North.

It suggests authorities are coming down harder on such incidents. The clip has reportedly been distributed in North Korea for ideology education and to warn citizens not to watch "decadent recordings".

The video includes a narrator who is repeating state propaganda. "The rotten puppet regime's culture has spread even to teenagers," says the voice, in an apparent reference to South Korea. "They are just 16 years old, but they ruined their own future," it adds.

The boys were also named by officers and had their addresses revealed.

In the past, minors who broke the law in this way would be sent to youth labour camps rather than put behind bars, and the punishment was usually less than five years.

In 2020, however, Pyongyang enacted a law to make watching or distributing South Korean entertainment punishable by death.

A defector previously told the BBC that he was forced to watch a 22-year-old man shot to death. He said the man was accused of listening to South Korean music and had shared films from the South with his friend.

Sand CEO Choi Kyong-hui said Pyongyang sees the spread of K-dramas and K-pop as a danger to its ideology.

"Admiration for South Korean society can soon lead to a weakening of the system... This goes against the monolithic ideology that makes North Koreans revere the Kim family," she said.

North Koreans started getting a taste of South Korean entertainment in the 2000s, during the years of the South's "sunshine policy" which saw it offering unconditional economic and humanitarian aid to the North.

Seoul ended the policy in 2010, saying it found the aid did not reach the ordinary North Koreans it was intended for, and that it had not resulted in any "positive changes" to Pyongyang's behaviour.

But South Korean entertainment continued to reach North Korea through China.

"If you get caught watching an American drama, you can get away with a bribe, but if you watch a Korean drama, you get shot," a North Korean defector told BBC Korean on Thursday.

"For North Korean people, Korean dramas are a 'drug' that helps them forget their difficult reality," the defector said.

"In North Korea, we learn that South Korea lives much worse than us, but when you watch South Korean dramas, it's a completely different world. It seems like the North Korean authorities are wary of that," said another North Korean defector in her 20s.

Additional reporting by Kelly Ng in Singapore

BBC

13. North Koreans Executed By Kim Regime For Violating COVID Restrictions

Harsh punishment? The COVID paradox - the regime remains deathly afraid of COVID for obvious reasons but is willing to exploit COVID to impose harsh and raconion population and resources control measures to oppress the people, prevent resistance, oppress the people in order to to keep the Kim family regime in power. Kim is experience severe internal stress and is using COVID to keep the people in check.

North Koreans Executed By Kim Regime For Violating COVID Restrictions

https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviaenos/2024/01/17/north-koreans-executed-by-kim-regime-for-violating-covid-restrictions/?sh=4b3ade806d8c

Olivia Enos

Contributor

I write about international human rights and national security.Jan 17, 2024,12:37pm EST

TOPSHOT - North Korean soldiers attend a mass rally to celebrate the North's declaration on November ... [+]AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Authoritarian governments seized on the pandemic era as an opportunity to deepen their crackdown on human rights. Unsurprisingly, the Kim regime’s tactics were among the most brutal. A new report from the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU) provides eyewitness testimony that the Kim regime publicly executed violators of Pyongyang’s draconian COVID-19 quarantine measures.

Reports of shoot-to-kill orders for anyone attempting to cross the North Korean border during the pandemic were previously covered by NKNews in October 2020, but new testimony in the KINU report grants further credence to these dark realities.

Public executions have long been a feature of the Kim regime’s policies – ranging from public executions of Christians for being caught with a Bible to the purging of Pyongyang’s elites to tamp down on any semblance of revolutionary spirit. A 2019 report from the Transitional Justice Working Group put a finer point on the matter – of the 600 defectors interviewed, they documented “323 reports of sites of state-sanctioned killings”. According to the same report, 83 percent of North Koreans surveyed said they witnessed a public execution.

While it has always been difficult to get information out of North Korea, the airtight seal the Kim regime placed on the North Korean border during the pandemic made a difficult task next to impossible. Although the Kim regime began loosening COVID border restrictions in 2022, the number of North Korean refugees successfully fleeing to freedom in South Korea dropped precipitously. According to South Korean government statistics, as of September 2023, only 139 North Korean refugees made it to freedom in South Korea last year. That’s up from an all-time low of 63 in 2021 and substantially down from the height of defections in 2009 when almost 3,000 individuals left North Korea in one year.

Emerging revelations about life in North Korea during the pandemic should lead policymakers to probe more deeply into the state of life in North Korea during this time period. There are already fears about food insecurity and restrictions on freedom of movement. The regime’s meticulously implemented border closure alone had the international community concerned that the North Korean people were cut off from the critical lifeline of the once-vibrant informal market economy in the North. Pre-pandemic, it was estimated that 60 percent of North Koreans relied on the informal economy to supplement food supply, for example.

Given the known deteriorations in conditions inside North Korea, the international community should consider next steps to provide support to the North Korean people. For one thing, the U.S. government should consider issuing an atrocity determination for North Korea saying whether the regime has committed or continues to commit crimes against humanity and even genocide. It should also consider extending more expedited forms of refugee relief to North Koreans who desire to resettle in the U.S. rather than in South Korea by extending Priority-2 refugee status. While there has never been any question about the brutality of the Kim regime, these latest report should increase the urgency of responses around the globe to support the North Korean people amidst their suffering.

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Olivia Enos

I am a Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute where I cover human rights and national security challenges in Asia. I am also an Adjunct Professor at... Read More

14. Kim Jong Un is daring Seoul to escalate. Both Koreas must step back from brink.

I disagree that the north is reacting to the South solely because of the South's tough talk.. It is using the South's words as an excuse but it is acting because of its strategy and that it is under severe stress internally. Unfortunately Kim Jong Un cannot step back from the brink. He needs to be on the brink for domestic political purposes. We must understand that and deal with Kim and understand his threats.

If the South is going to step back from the brink it must implement an aggressive information campaign and explain the reason for stepping back from the brink is because the South does not want to support the regime's internal and external political warfare campaign. It needs to explain that as long as the South is willing to stand on the brink that it actually strengthens Kim Jong Un, especially domestically. The South must say that it is no longer going to feed the regime's propaganda machine that helps to oppress the Korean people in the north.

Kim Jong Un is daring Seoul to escalate. Both Koreas must step back from brink.

https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/kim-jong-un-is-daring-seoul-to-escalate-both-koreas-must-step-back-from-brink/

North Korea’s rejection of unification and warnings of war are responses to Seoul’s tough talk, raising risk of conflict

Chun In-bum January 19, 2024

North Korean soldiers during a military parade in Pyongyang | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Feb. 2018)

The following article is an opinion piece by retired ROK Lieutenant General Chun In-Bum. Views expressed in opinion articles are exclusively the author’s own and do not represent those of NK News.

North Korea is well known for its verbal threats and intimidation tactics, which run the gamut from foul language and insults to military drills and hyperbolic claims.

And as the DPRK now intensifies its denunciations of Seoul, there is a risk that South Koreans have become immune to such actions and will miss a genuine message from the regime.

This has become clear in recent weeks following major speeches by leader Kim Jong Un at an end-of-year party plenum in Dec. 2023 and at a meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly on Jan. 15.

In his statements, Kim spent considerable time outlining the DPRK’s achievements in economics, pushing for expanded production in all sectors and identifying priority areas for the allocation of resources. He appeared to be focused on long-term plans to improve stability in his country.

Then, abruptly, the North Korean leader lashed out at South Korea. First, he declared that the DPRK would no longer consider South Koreans as of the same race. Then he identified the ROK as a hostile enemy nation that must be deterred and, if necessary, pacified.

Kim has followed his words with action. North Korea is disbanding organizations that handled relations with the South, and it is erasing all mention of peace and unification with the South from DPRK life, including from the country’s constitution.

There is a lot to unpack here, but suffice it to say these developments don’t bode well for efforts to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula.

Kim Jong Un appears to be upping the ante in response to the Yoon administration’s efforts to deter the DPRK, in essence daring Seoul to go further. And unless the two Koreas can take steps to deescalate, there’s a real danger that their confrontation could turn deadly.

Kim Jong Un makes a speech at the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK on Jan. 15 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 16, 2024)

A MESSAGE TO NORTH KOREANS …

North Korea’s rejection of the idea of a common racial identity with South Korea is concerning because it has long been the basis for peace talks, and it provided a sense of protection on the logic that Koreans would not use nuclear weapons against their own race.

While ROK society has increasingly downplayed the importance of race as it seeks closer connections with the rest of the world, North Korea has long valued its racial uniqueness. With this recent action, it has not only isolated itself from the world but from its own brothers and sisters in the South.

Pyongyang’s full intentions have yet to be revealed, but Kim Jong Un clearly directed his message in part toward the North Korean people.

The DPRK leader faces a changing world where his dictatorial rule is at risk. Even a tightly controlled society like North Korea faces a younger generation that is swayed by K-pop and secretly watchesviews South Korean dramas.

The nightmares that Kim must have at the thought of his people rising against him must be a great burden. His dilemma explains why he is intent to demonize the South in the eyes of the North Korean people, and ROK conservatives have made it easy for him with their public ridicule of the regime and tough talk that categorizes every North Korean action as a “provocation” and promises South Korean retaliation.

The second audience for Kim’s message is the North Korean military. His tough talk is likely aimed at keeping his generals and admirals in line and managing widespread corruption in the military. By defining South Korea as an “enemy,” the leader can provide a clear goal and sense of urgency to his commanders and ensure they remain under his control.

Yoon Suk-yeol at a Memorial Day commemoration | Image: ROK Presidential Office (June 2023)

… AND TO SOUTH KOREANS

Through his recent speeches, Kim Jong Un is also delivering a message to the world and South Korea, engaging in a worrying form of saber-rattling.

But the real concern might be that the international community and segments of South Korean society do not take Kim seriously and view his hostile rhetoric as all a bluff.

The conservative Yoon administration should be expected to issue a tough response, but it’s questionable whether this is a wise thing to do.

President Yoon Suk-yeol has said before that South Korea will respond a hundredfold if North Korea provokes Seoul. But Pyongyang likely perceived this as a dare that it must meet with a bigger dare.

The end result is worsening tensions on the peninsula that will impact soldiers and sailors along the inter-Korean border and raise the risk of an unintended class that will spiral out of control.

This comes amid a rise in nationalist and authoritarian tendencies worldwide and changes in the global balance of power due to China’s rise and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, all of which will play a role in shaping the actions and strategies of both North and South Korea.

In this context, the need for a nuanced and informed approach to the Korean Peninsula is more important than ever. Simplistic narratives that fail to consider the historical, cultural, economic and international dimensions of the situation are likely to be misleading and unproductive.

A comprehensive strategy that involves dialogue, understanding and long-term vision is essential for any hope of sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The peninsula remains one of the most complex and sensitive geopolitical areas in the world, a reality underscored by Kim Jong Un’s recent actions and statements spurning South Korea. While there are no easy solutions, a careful, informed and empathetic approach is crucial for any progress towards peace and stability.

Ultimately, both North and South Korea need to take a step back. There is no military solution to the issues that the Korean people face, and no one wins if there is an armed conflict on the peninsula.

15. North Korea Doesn’t Want Reunification — or War

I am sorry Admiral. I have to disagree. Kim is in deep trouble domestically and that is what is driving his current actions and rhetoric. And he does want "unificaiton" - but to Kim unification is defined as dmoinatation under his rule. he has not wavered from his father's and grandfather's objectives.

North Korea Doesn’t Want Reunification — or War

Kim is riding high thanks to his friends in Moscow and Beijing, but the last thing they need is a military confrontation on the peninsula.

January 17, 2024 at 7:00 PM EST

By James Stavridis

James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-01-18/north-korea-s-kim-rules-out-reunification-but-won-t-attack-the-south?sref=hhjZtX76

Kim Jong Un, the mercurial leader of North Korea, has suddenly announced that his nation will cease any efforts at reconciliation with South Korea. Given the 80-year separation of the peninsula and the fact that the two nations are still technically at war, this may not seem a big deal. But for South Koreans and their allies it is huge and troubling development.

Kim has indicated he will order a rewrite of North Korea’s constitution to eliminate any possibility of unity with the south. Previously, the stated policies of both North and South Korea were to work toward reunification, and it was to some extent sincere.

To underline his seriousness, Kim has abolished the various government organs — mostly created by his father, Kim Jong Il — that were charged with managing relations with South Korea. The north will curtail any national economic cooperation, dialogue, negotiations and exchanges of delegations focused on peaceful reunification. Kim called for the removal of words like “fellow countrymen” and “reconciliation” from all official documents.

In a widely publicized speech to the national assembly, Kim harshly criticized both South Korea and the US. He blamed the two treaty allies of conspiring to raise tensions on the peninsula. Kim pointed specifically to new rounds of military exercises, port visits by US nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines, and the increasing level of talks and military cooperation involving the two countries and Japan — another frequent target of Kim’s rhetoric.

The reaction from South Korea was swift and direct. After a cabinet meeting, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol called Kim’s new policy “anti-national and ahistorical” and said, “the North‘s fake peace tactic that threatened us to choose between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ no longer works.”

What is behind the sudden volte-face by the North Koreans? Is conflict imminent?

Partly, Russia is to blame. Relations between North Korea and the Kremlin are at a historic high. Following a luxury train trip last fall by Kim for meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok, the two nations have been rapidly increasing cooperation.

Kim is supplying Putin with much-needed ammunition and military equipment — artillery, spare parts, ammunition, machine guns — to support Russia’s ongoing illegal invasion of Ukraine. In return, Kim’s nation will receive not just food and oil, but also scientific information and support for higher-tech military needs, notably satellites, long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. With Russia supporting him so closely, Kim feels emboldened.

The Chinese — who have a complicated, and not always completely supportive, relationship with Pyongyang — are also ramping up their economic and diplomatic cooperation with the Hermit Kingdom. Beijing is mindful of the growing closeness between Kim and Putin, and does not want to see the North Koreans fall out of their sphere of influence.

The Chinese are perpetually worried about a war on the Korean peninsula — which would ultimately be lost by the north and probably generate millions of refugees flooding into China — and feel they need to remain Pyongyang’s primary sponsor.

Which suddenly puts North Korea, a pariah internationally, in the cozy position of having two big neighbors paying court. This comes alongside Kim’s normal modus operandi: muscle onto the global stage through provocative statements and missile testing, and demand concessions. He’s been out of the limelight for several years — with Ukraine, Taiwan and now the Middle East getting all the attention — and is hungry to wedge himself back into the crowded global security agenda.

None of this is welcome news to President Joe Biden’s administration in an election year. North Korean aid to Putin is increasing while Congress foolishly dithers over further assistance for Ukraine. Team Biden also has its hands full in the Middle East, and is trying to keep a solid floor in US-China relations following last fall’s successful summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in San Francisco.

The US is likely to take a “physician, do no harm” approach and aim to avoid provocative moves on the Korean peninsula. Military exercises between the US and South Korea will likely continue, but not increase in size or scale. Japan — which by 2027 will have the world’s third-largest defense budget, after the US and China — will continue to participate, but will keep a low profile. There will be upward pressure on South Korean defense spending, which is already set to increase sharply. Expect another round of North Korean missile testing, which will be condemned by the West but not actively countered.

Worst of all, given his growing confidence, Kim may conduct a nuclear test, either underground like the previous half dozen or perhaps, more provocatively, at sea. Given the miserable failure of the Trump-Kim summit of 2018 in Singapore, followed by the world’s harshest three-year Covid lockdown, you can almost feel the itchiness of Kim to get himself back into the international mix.

The good news is that while the North Korean dictator will leverage his new sense of importance, he will almost certainly stop short of military action against the south. That’s anathema to his sponsors in Beijing and Moscow. Still, for an America embroiled in two wars already, the increasingly angry rhetoric on the Korean peninsula is more than a distraction — it is another real threat to destabilize the American-led global order.

Stavridis is also vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is on the boards of Fortinet, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group and Neuberger Berman, and has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the cybersecurity sector.

Kim Jong Un’s Declaration of a Hostile Relationship Between North and South Korea Is a Big Deal

thediplomat.com

With a decisive change in the North’s policy toward the South, the Korean Peninsula has now devolved from a state of armistice to one where conflict could loom at any moment.

By Lee Min-yong

January 18, 2024

In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaks at the Supreme People’s Assembly in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Jan. 15, 2024. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified.

Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP

During recent visits to munitions factories, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un referred to South Korea as the “principal enemy” and stated that he had “no intention of avoiding a war,” threatening to annihilate the South if provoked. Right at the outset of the new year, Pyongyang launched around 200 artillery shells into the waters off its western coast near South Korea, prompting Seoul to reciprocate with some 400 rounds of artillery fire. North Korea then conducted live-fire artillery exercises for an unprecedented three consecutive days. These maneuvers further heightened tensions in the aftermath of Kim’s rhetoric characterizing inter-Korean relations as “a relationship between two hostiles at war.”

During the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea late last year, Kim unequivocally stated that North-South relations had shifted from being compatriots to entering a hostile state of war between two countries. He emphasized that North Korea would no longer pursue the notion of peaceful reunification, opting instead to reaffirm its commitment to conquer South Korean territory if deemed necessary. His rhetoric marks a decisive change in the North’s policy toward the South.

Against this backdrop, the Korean Peninsula has now devolved from a state of armistice to one where conflict looms at any moment.

The artillery shelling made good on Pyongyang’s earlier vow to abandon the inter-Korean military agreement signed on September 19, 2018. By targeting the buffer zone in the West Sea, as outlined in the agreement, the North’s artillery assault effectively nullified the framework. This development also undermines longstanding agreements, including the armistice and other military accords, which have historically buttressed the security of the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, the region is regressing into a state reminiscent of the Korean War.

Kim’s declaration of South Korea as an adversary holds significance in shaping his governing strategy. While Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il sought to subvert South Korean administrations using a mix of infiltration operations and deceptive peace offensives, all such efforts ended in failure. In contrast, Kim Jong Un has adopted the pursuit of a bold head-on confrontation, employing nuclear missile provocations and now culminating in the declaration of a state of war.

It is essential to pay attention to the political and diplomatic benefits that Kim intends to achieve by officially declaring a hostile relationship between the North and South. In terms of foreign policy, his primary goal is to solidify cooperation with China and Russia to enhance security, countering the alliance formed by South Korea, the United States, and Japan. As tensions escalate on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea believes it can capture the interest of China and Russia. Pyongyang is keenly aware that heightened tensions will prompt Beijing to take action. Given that China’s policy on the Korean Peninsula aims to maintain the regional status quo without disruptive elements, North Korea views creating instability as more advantageous than aligning with China’s goals.

The upcoming U.S. presidential election in November is a critical variable in forging North Korea’s foreign strategy. Regardless of the election outcome, North Korea recognizes that being in a state of war is more favorable than remaining in a crisis situation.

The primary drivers behind Kim’s declaration involve internal motives within his governance tactics. As highlighted by the unification minister of South Korea, North Korea has escalated the standoff with its opponents as a political strategy to divert domestic discontent over the North’s economic challenges. The critical question hinges on the severity of North Korea’s predicament, as the country has reached a state of disarray to the point where assessing its economic and social conditions is pointless.

For over two decades, the World Food Program (WFP) has consistently listed North Korea among the 20 countries facing the most significant challenges in food and nutrition security. During times of famine, Pyongyang tends to manufacture a war crisis, pushing its citizens into the Arduous March. When Kim asserts his willingness to go to war with South Korea, it reveals the gravity of internal discontent and anxiety within North Korea.

The Korean Peninsula has now emerged as a potential hotspot for an outbreak of war. The United States has long prepared for the worst-case scenario of escalating wars in two far-flung theaters – the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is also currently playing a supporting role in the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war, although it is avoiding direct involvement. Nonetheless, there are discernible signs of accumulating political and diplomatic fatigue.

In this context, the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula have thrust the United States and its allies into a triple spiral of crises. The latest developments orchestrated by North Korea are unveiling a new phase, characterized by a low-intensity conflict situation. This strategic approach seeks to control military conflict at a limited level, yet the inherent risk lies in its potential escalation into a full-scale war at any moment.

Reflecting on history is imperative: Just before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the North deliberately initiated limited military clashes along the border, providing the pretext for its surprise invasion of the South. The recent artillery provocations from North Korea mirror this tactical maneuver and are designed to lure South Korea into a military conflict. The deployment of such a strategy only underscores the seriousness of Kim Jong Un’s governing conditions.

The transformation of the Korean Peninsula into a conflict zone poses another challenge for the international community. Countermeasures against nuclear missiles and tests, despite ongoing debate about their effectiveness, have already been established in line with international agreements. The key question is how to respond when military engagement occurs. The immediate priority is to move beyond a deterrent strategy and explore strategic alternatives designed to dissuade North Korea from further provocations.

For instance, an immediate consideration could be to proactively set red lines, such as declaring forceful retaliation if North Korean naval vessels appear below the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea or if there are signs of coastal artillery shelling. In a state of engagement, the risk of escalation to a full-scale war increases with repeated retaliations and counter-retaliations. To prevent this, it is critical to deter any intention to instigate a state of war in the first place.

Expanding the alliance framework to exert more pressure on North Korea is also necessary. While the core alliance revolves around South Korea, the United States, and Japan, it should be extended to include a more comprehensive multilateral force. To effectively restrain an adversary, it is most impactful to involve numerous allies in forming a united front. In this regard, considerations can be made for the “Quad Plus” or even an expansion of NATO into the Asian region.

Now is the time to prevent North Korea, by any means necessary, from instigating yet another war alongside the ongoing conflicts in Israel and Ukraine. Allowing such a scenario to unfold could potentially compromise the cohesion of the U.S. and its allies.

Authors

Guest Author

Lee Min-yong

Lee Min-yong is a visiting professor at Sookmyung Women's University, Seoul, South Korea, researching North Korea issues.

thediplomat.com

17. Kim Jong Un observed getting off Benz SUV worth 260 million won

Photos of the Mercedes (and Kim) at the link.

Kim Jong Un observed getting off Benz SUV worth 260 million won

https://www.donga.com/en/home/article/all/20240119/4693045/1

Posted January. 19, 2024 07:45,

Updated January. 19, 2024 07:45

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was spotted using yet another Mercedes-Benz vehicle – the brand's SUV model on which the United Nations Security Council put an export ban. In spite of North Korea sanctions, Kim has shown his affection for the German luxury car brand by disclosing at least three models in official settings for the past month. Reportedly, the volume of luxury items smuggled by the regime through China and Russia made a significant rise last year. South Korean intelligence authorities assume that the regime smuggled luxury items worth a total of several millions dollars from Russia as of last year alone.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Monday aired a documentary film depicting Kim getting off a Mercedes-Benz SUV with the symbol of the General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea engraved on the back seat door. The car model is presumed to be the Mercedes-Maybach GLS 600, the carmaker's high-end sub-brand. Its retail price in the South Korean market is 260 million won.

Likewise, the North Korean leader was spotted on Dec. 8 last year using a first-generation Mercedes-Benz Maybach S-Class sedan that costs at least 300 million won in the National Conference of Mothers where he took pictures with participants. When he visited engineers in charge of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles on Dec. 20, he was seen in a Maybach S-Class limousine. The KCNA on Dec. 27 also showed the ruling Workers' Party's high-ranking officials arriving at a year-end general meeting in Mercedes-Benz cars.

Kyu-Jin Shin newjin@donga.com

18. S Korea calls for UN action amid escalating N Korean provocations

Of course China and Russia will continue to protect Kim Jong Un. I wish there was a rule that said if UN members are violating UNSC sanctions that they should not be able to vote on issues related to their violations. An impractical fantasy I know.

S Korea calls for UN action amid escalating N Korean provocations

Beijing and Moscow defended Pyongyang’s position in the latest U.N. Security Council meeting, says source.

By Lee Jeong-Ho for RFA

2024.01.18

Seoul, South Korea

rfa.org

South Korea has urged the United Nations to take action in response to North Korea’s escalating provocations, as Pyongyang intensifies tension in the Korean peninsula on multiple fronts ranging from verbal threats to military activities.

Speaking to reporters in New York Thursday, South Korea’s envoy to the U.N. Hwang Joon-kook said: “We need to break through the U.N. Security Council’s silence regarding our response. Figuring out the way forward presents a significant challenge.”

The statement came after the UNSC held this year’s first informal consultation on North Korea issues. The meeting also marked South Korea’s first participation in such a consultation since commencing its tenure as a non-permanent member of the council on Jan. 1.

Seoul is committed to utilizing its role in the UNSC to more proactively and regularly tackle the challenges presented by North Korea. It emphasizes its intention to use its status as a non-permanent member to significantly influence international discussions about Pyongyang.

“Given the combination of North Korea’s rhetoric and actions, the situation is increasingly alarming, and all member states are deeply worried,” Hwang added.

A senior government source in Seoul, who asked for anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, told Radio Free Asia on Friday that Beijing and Moscow defended Pyongyang’s position in the latest UNSC meeting. The source did not elaborate further.

The consultation came as North Korea tested an intermediate-range, solid-fueled ballistic missile, or IRBM, Sunday. The North’s IRBM, including its Musudan missiles, can reach Guam, where U.S. strategic assets, including B-52 bombers, are located. The U.N. bans North Korea from launching any ballistic rockets.

U.S. missile expert Vann H. Van Diepen pointed out in 38 North Thursday, that the IRBM North Korea test-launched Sunday appears to be a new type of missile equipped with a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MaRVs) – a system the allies’ current missile defense systems would find difficult to intercept.

The expert saw IRBMs equipped with MaRVs as a strategic response aimed at countering the U.S.’s efforts to enhance its missile defense system. This is particularly relevant in the context of defending against potential threats to Guam, which is located approximately 3,000 kilometers(1,864 miles) from North Korea.

Simultaneously, North Korea has also been ramping up its verbal threats to South Korea, with its leader Kim Jong Un pledging on Monday to amend the country’s constitution to declare Seoul as Pyongyang’s “primary and immutable enemy.”

Pyongyang has also beefed up its efforts to bolster ties with key regime backers, notably Russia, indicating its intent to solidify its support network amid the growing security cooperation among the U.S., South Korea and Japan.

Russian President Vladimir Putin met North Korea’s Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui in Moscow Tuesday, and vowed to closely collaborate on efforts to jointly deal with both regional and global security matters.

According to North Korea’s state-run Rodong Sinmun Thursday, the two agreed to “drive the dynamic development of overall bilateral relations,” labeling their relationship as “strategic” and “traditionally friendly.”

Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.

rfa.org

Obviously a troubling development. But it is another indicator of how fearful Kim is about the potential resistance among the population. We must try to understand what is actually happening inside north Korea.

What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 2: The impact of the border closure…escape is now almost impossible　ISHIMARU Jiro

asiapress.org

A man monitors crop thieves and villagers' access to the border from a guard post built in the middle of a field. He appears to be a farmer from the paramilitary “Worker-Peasant Red Guards.” Photographed from the Chinese side of the border across from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, in late September 2023. (ASIAPRESS)

What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 1 : A blind spot with no outside witnesses　ISHIMARU Jiro

◆ Defecting North Korea is now almost impossible

The era of defections has ended.

After watching the events of the past few years, I have watched how almost the entire 1,400 kilometers of the Tumen and Yalu rivers, which form the border between North Korea and China, have been covered with multiple layers of barbed wire. Under the pretext of "stopping the invasion of the coronavirus,” North Korea has constructed barbed wire and guard posts for several years by mobilizing local residents and the military. Equipment to distribute electricity to the wires has also been added.

In August 2020, a notice from the Ministry of Social Security (the national police agency) was posted at railroad stations and public places declaring that areas near the border have become buffer zones and that anyone approaching without permission would be shot without warning. One of our reporting partners took one down, photographed it, and emailed it to me.

The notice said that people and livestock entering the buffer zone would be shot without warning.

The notice obtained by ASIAPRESS. It reads, "Do not engage in acts that undermine the Northern Border Blockade Operation.” Obtained in late August 2020. (ASIAPRESS)

The notice reads: "People and livestock that intrude into our side of the Yalu and Tumen rivers will be shot at without warning.” Obtained in late August 2020. (ASIAPRESS)

"I should have fled to South Korea before the pandemic, but now it's impossible. I will regret my indecision for the rest of my life,” lamented the reporting partner, who is a single mother raising her middle-school daughter.

Preventing defections and smuggling isn't the only reason the Kim Jong-un regime has tightened security along the border with China. Since the mid-2000s, South Korean cultural content, such as movies and music, has become popular in North Korea, particularly dramas, and much of it comes from across the Chinese border.

At the time, the large number of Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea made it possible for people in South Korea and Japan to communicate with North Koreans. It also enabled North Korean defectors to send money to their families. The border with China became a conduit for people, goods, money, and information. For a regime that relies on isolation to survive, this was a situation that could not be ignored.

Layers of barbed wire line the riverbanks. The fields behind it are presumably a buffer zone. Since 2020, even people who farm the land in the buffer zone have had to ask permission to enter it. The buildings behind appear to be apartments. Photo taken in late September 2023, Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, from the Chinese side. (ASIAPRESS)

◆ A dramatic fall in defectors entering South Korea

The high point of North Korean defectors entering South Korea was in 2009 (2,914 people). After Kim Jong-un took power in 2012, the number dropped dramatically due to intensified patrols and security along the border, but remained in the 1,000 to 2,000s until 2019. However, the number dropped dramatically to 229 in 2020, falling even further to 63 in 2021, 67 in 2022, and then jumping up a bit to around 180 as of December 2023 (all of this information is from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification).

Moreover, most of the defectors who have entered the country in the past few years have been longtime residents of China and Russia; very few among them fled North Korea after the start of the pandemic.

South Korean researchers and NGO representatives have been able to interview only one defector in 2020 and two in 2021 who left North Korea after the start of the pandemic. They said that South Korea's research on North Korea was bolstered by interviewing new arrivals to update established knowledge, but after the start of the pandemic, obtaining new information became difficult.

(In May 2023, 10 people divided between two families defected to South Korea by boat, followed by another five people who defected by boat in October 2023)

China has also installed dense barbed wire along the "riverside roads.” This is the middle reaches of the Tumen River, near Samhapjin in Yongzheng City, Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin Province. Opposite is the city of Hoeryong and its suburbs in North Hamgyong Province. The mountains in the background are North Korea. Photo taken in August 2023 by ASIAPRESS.

◆ Japanese-Koreans wait forlornly for word from their relatives in North Korea

Currently, there are about 200 North Korean defectors living in the Osaka metropolitan area of Japan. During North Korea’s “repatriation program” that lasted from 1959 to 1984, more than 93,000 Koreans and their Japanese family members crossed into North Korea, and these returnees and their North Korean-born second and third generations are returning to Japan.

They have been exchanging letters with their sons, daughters, and brothers, pretending to be relatives in Japan, and sending cash and other items. In Japan, you can safely send up to 100,000 yen in cash via insured mail. You can also send luggage, although customs scrutinizes it for luxury goods due to economic sanctions on North Korea. These things, however, all stopped with the outbreak of the novel coronavirus.

Since late 2020, I've been getting a lot of inquiries from people asking if they can check up on their relatives, or if they can send money through non-traditional routes. I asked my reporting partners if they could call other people inside the country, but they refused.

"Calling the home of a repatriated person with no connections is like voluntarily putting yourself in the sights of the Ministry of State Security (the secret police)," they told me. In short, they believe that their domestic calls are being tapped.

Ms. A, an 80-year-old Korean-Japanese woman in a prefecture of Kansai - and whose parents and seven siblings returned to North Korea in the 60s and 70s - has been sending remittances to her relatives in North Korea for 60 years. She has lived a frugal life. But with the outbreak of the pandemic, she’s been unable to continue sending letters and money.

"My siblings may be dead. I'm preparing myself that this will be when I lose touch with them," she says.

Ms. A gave me hundreds of letters and photos from her siblings, saying, "Please use this as a resource.” In several albums, she organized photos of her siblings when they lived together in Japan and in their later years in a city in North Korea’s northern region. Ms. A's decision to give away her precious photos was a sign of how well she knew that she couldn’t contact them again. I couldn't help but wonder if the coronavirus pandemic had severed the thin threads that connected such people with their loved ones in North Korea. (To be continued in the next installment)

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 1 : A blind spot with no outside witnesses　ISHIMARU Jiro

What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 2 : The impact of the border closure…escape is now almost impossible　ISHIMARU Jiro

asiapress.org

20. Inmates in North Korea’s prisons still face dire conditions

The brutality of the Kim family regime. We must pursue a human rights upfront approach. It is a key line of effort for bringing about change from within north Korea.

Inmates in North Korea’s prisons still face dire conditions

“There’s not much space inside the cells for each crew, so inmates sleep very close together, with one person’s feet brushing against another’s head,” a source told Daily NK

By Mun Dong Hui - 2024.01.19 4:00pm

dailynk.com

Inmates in North Korea’s prisons still face dire conditions | Daily NK English

Image: pixabay

Inmates at North Korean prisons are still dealing with poor food and housing conditions, Daily NK has learned.

“The prison population is being supplied with food according to regulations,” a source in North Korea told Daily NK on Wednesday, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “Regulations state that inmates are to receive three meals for a combined total of 450 grams. They are given bowls of rice measuring 150 grams at each meal.”

In a 2021 report (in Korean), Daily NK quoted a source as saying that the daily supply of food for prisoners as mandated by the North Korean authorities was 450 grams of multigrain rice. It appears that North Korea’s regulations on prison food have not changed over the past three years.

Since a typical 210-gram bowl of rice contains 300 calories, 450 grams of rice would contain 640 calories. Assuming that prison inmates eat all their allotted rice, they are getting less than half of the recommended daily caloric intake for adults of 2,000 to 2,500 calories.

“Prisoners are also provided some thin soup that contains very little salt. While it’s not required, the prison sections and crews are also given a snack once a day,” the source said.

The typical prison snack, provided between meals, consists of some corn flour mixed in with vegetables or leafy greens.

“There are also separate regulations in the prison for people in each section who have received ‘speed battle powder’ [a concoction of corn flour and sugar] from visitors. They also get to eat at a designated location once every few days or once a week,” the source said.

Rule 22 of the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (also known as the Nelson Mandela Rules) states that “every prisoner shall be provided by the prison administration at the usual hours with food of nutritional value adequate for health and strength, of wholesome quality and well prepared and served.”

However, inmates at North Korean prisons are not being given decent food, jeopardizing their right to food.

“Punishing or rewarding prisoners with food, and no visitation if quotas are not met”

In addition, their living and sleeping quarters are also of poor quality, Daily NK was told.

“Prisoners are either housed with their crews or with separate teams from the crews. A prison crew can run from six to 60 people. When it’s time to sleep, they line up by crew or team for roll call and then sleep in rows inside their cells,” the source said.

“There’s not much space inside the cells for each crew, so inmates sleep very close together, with one person’s feet brushing against another’s head,” the source added.

A Daily NK report (in Korean) from 2021 quoted a source as saying that North Korea had enlarged the cells at some correctional facilities as part of an apparent effort to increase holding capacity. But amid a climate of tougher enforcement and punishment in a harshly controlled society, North Korea’s prisons still do not have enough room for their prisoners.

“During sleeping hours, pairs of prisoners take turns standing in the middle of the cell for two hours. When the prison guards make their nightly rounds, the pair on duty are supposed to stand at attention and report that the crew is asleep and all is well,” the source said.

Prisoners are required to follow the military practice of maintaining a night watch.

The source added that inmates do not have access to decent medical treatment or prescription drugs and that when a death occurs in prison, the inmate’s body is not sent to family members.

“While there is a doctor on the prison staff, inmates have to find ways to treat themselves for anything short of a fatal condition. Prisoners generally have to rely on their visitors for the medication they need. When they don’t have anyone to visit them, they have to do chores for other inmates who can have their visitors bring in medication on their behalf,” the source said.

“When prisoners die in prison, their bodies are never sent outside of the facility. Instead of being sent to family members, the bodies are disposed of on the premises according to internal protocol,” the source said.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Mun Dong Hui

Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

21. N. Koreans quietly speculate about Kim Jong Un’s successor

Succession. Perhaps we could get Netflix or HBO Max to make a streaming video series about succession in north Korea.

N. Koreans quietly speculate about Kim Jong Un’s successor

One possible reason for the speculation is Ju Ae's repeated presence at Kim Jong Un's on-the-spot inspections this year, following repeated appearances last year

By Lee Chae Un -

2024.01.19 3:42pm

dailynk.com

N. Koreans quietly speculate about Kim Jong Un’s successor | Daily NK English

So far this year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has brought his daughter Kim Ju Ae not only to military events but also to inspections of the economy and public livelihood, renewing speculation that Ju Ae may be the designated heir. Ju Ae’s increasing presence has also sparked quiet speculation about the succession issue among the North Korean public.

“There have been rumors in Sinuiju lately that the daughter who has been accompanying the marshal [Kim Jong Un] will inherit his position,” a source in North Pyongan Province told Daily NK on Friday, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

According to the source, rumors of uncertain origin are currently circulating in the public about the next transfer of power in the Kim dynasty. One possible reason for such rumors is Ju Ae’s repeated presence at Kim’s on-the-spot inspections this year, following repeated appearances last year.

But the rumors have been disheartening to some North Koreans, who wonder if the Kim dynasty will continue into a fourth generation and how much longer they will have to live as “slaves,” the source said.

The source shared one person’s reaction to the rumors: “Everyone thought that the emergence of a young leader would bring prosperity to our lives, but the exact opposite has happened. We’re hardly allowed to visit our parents, siblings, and relatives, and it’s getting harder and harder to put food on the table. It’s horrible to think that this kind of life will continue in the future.”

Another person expressed dissatisfaction with the North Korean regime, saying: “The people here have been slaves to the government and are still slaves to the government. We don’t want to live as slaves anymore. We want to be able to go where we want, when we want, and be paid a fair wage for the work we do, like people in other countries.”

However, the source said that other people were not inclined to take the rumors seriously. Some pointed out that it is impossible to know what the future holds, while others noted that letting a woman rule the country would end the patrilineal line, which is unthinkable in North Korea. Some suggested that the son who will take over Kim’s leadership could be out somewhere right now being educated.

In North Korea, it is very dangerous to comment on the Supreme Leader or his family, or to express opinions about the regime, as such comments are considered serious political issues. As a result, North Koreans only talk about such things in secret with people they know and trust, the source explained.

“In the past, people would only have these kinds of conversations with their family members, but now they’re doing it with people who share their opinions. I think this shows the strength of people’s desire for change.”

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Lee Chae Un

Lee Chae Un is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. She can be reached at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

22. N. Korea’s police agency chastised for impolite language in reports to Kim Jong Un

Subtle acts of resistance?

N. Korea’s police agency chastised for impolite language in reports to Kim Jong Un

A recent order demanded that the national police agency's managers take measures to eradicate improper expressions and intensively review reports written by lower-level officials

By Lee Chae Un - 2024.01.19 11:30am

dailynk.com

N. Korea’s police agency chastised for impolite language in reports to Kim Jong Un | Daily NK English

The Eighth Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was held at the headquarters of the party’s Central Committee from Dec. 26 to 30, 2023, according to the Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

North Korea’s leadership recently ordered officials at the country’s national police agency to use polite language about the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in documents and other materials reported to leader Kim Jong Un.

Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a Daily NK source in North Pyongan Province said Thursday that the provincial branch of the Ministry of Social Security conveyed an order from the ministry’s national headquarters at a meeting of prominent provincial, city, and county police officials in early January.

Emphasizing that the WPK’s Central Committee is the “supreme general staff of the revolution,” the order criticized some branches of the Ministry of Social Security for failing to use sufficiently polite language about the Central Committee when writing reports.

The order called on all branches of the Ministry of Social Security to use polite expressions referring to the Central Committee in documents reported to Kim Jong Un and to intensify command and control efforts so that officials write more politely. The directive also called for the branches to be held accountable, for the officials responsible to be punished severely politically and criminally if problems arise, and for measures to be thoroughly worked out to implement the order as soon as it is received.

The order also specified the language to be used in reports to Kim and the language to be used when police officials receive documents signed by Kim.

For example, instead of writing, “We agreed with the relevant department of the Central Committee,” the order instructed police officials to write, “Department X of the Central Committee reviewed and approved the proposal.” When forwarding documents signed by Kim to relevant departments, officers were instructed to write that they were “reporting” on the content of the documents instead of “delivering” them.

The order also called for efforts at the organizational level to ensure that officials use the correct phrases regarding the Central Committee as required. It also instructed officials at the management level to take responsibility for reviewing and returning relevant documents when officials fail to write them as required, and demanded that managers take measures to eradicate improper expressions and intensively review reports.

“The order stressed that all parts of the Ministry of Social Security must strictly follow party directives and that it is important to maintain absolute loyalty to the Workers’ Party,” the source said.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Lee Chae Un

Lee Chae Un is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. She can be reached at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

23. Camp Humphreys gives all-clear on tap water following quality concerns

Camp Humphreys gives all-clear on tap water following quality concerns

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · January 19, 2024

After a soldier expressed concern about his barracks room's tap water, the Directorate of Public Works at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, tested the water in several buildings starting Jan. 9, 2024. (U.S. Army)

CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — After nearly a week’s worth of further testing, the U.S. Army found no problems with water quality at the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea, according to a report from the garrison.

Water laboratory engineering technicians from the Directorate of Public Works at Humphreys tested the tap water in several buildings starting Jan. 9 after a soldier expressed concern about his barracks room’s tap water.

Unit leaders immediately advised troops not to drink the water out of an abundance of caution until the directorate and the 65th Medical Brigade could investigate, a 2nd Infantry Division spokesman said at the time.

Messages circulating among service members warning of a potential problem with the base’s water reached U.S. Army W.T.F! moments, a Facebook page with 1.4 million followers, which posted a screenshot of one of the messages on Jan. 10.

Analyses from samples taken Jan. 9-10 found no abnormalities in the water, according to the garrison’s reports. The analysis included testing for temperature, pH levels, chlorine levels, water clarity, coliform and E. coli in six randomly selected kitchens, bath sinks and laundry rooms in the barracks.

“These test results conclusively affirm the cleanliness and safety (potability) of the drinking water,” the report said.

The Directorate of Public Works conducted more tests in the barracks and adjacent buildings Jan. 11-13, with results within normal parameters, according to the report.

About 70% of Humphreys’ water is purchased from Pyeongtaek city and the remaining 30% is sourced from wells inside the base, which houses a water treatment plant, Directorate of Public Works chief of operations and maintenance Kim Jae-won said by phone Friday.

Water quality is assessed by taking public testing standards from the United States and South Korea, and then applying “all of the most stringent guidance” from both countries, Lt. Col. Julie Bridges, chief of Force Health Protection and Public Health at the Eighth Army’s Surgeon’s Office, said by phone Friday.

“All the water that is sent out into the water system here in the garrison is potable water,” she said. “It doesn’t matter if it’s from the shower or the sink, kitchen tap, water fountains — it’s all the same quality and it’s all potable.”

David Choi

David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · January 19, 2024

24. Triple threat: N Korea, Iran flaunt new missile tech to Russia

Excerpts:

In a December 2023 study for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Daniel Salisbury and Darya Dolzikova note that North Korea has long exported ballistic missile technology, making up 40% of all ballistic missile sales to developing countries from 1987 and 2009 for a total of 500 systems.

Salisbury and Dolzikova note that newly developed North Korean systems are more attractive to potential customers while phasing out older systems creates a surplus of goods and expertise for export.

They say that North Korean surplus missile technology could be tempting to clients with a limited capability to absorb new technology, constrained budgets, or systems that are inoperable or need spare parts.

However, they also point out that North Korea may choose not to export its latest missile technology including hypersonic weapons. Still, they note that North Korea’s missile collaboration with Iran has involved higher-end systems as Iran has an extensive missile manufacturing capacity and export capability.

As for Iran, Lara Jakes and David Sanger note in The New York Times this month that the use of an advanced missile such as the Kheiber Shekan in Syria when a less-advanced missile could do the same damage shows that Iran is interested in testing its missile technology in combat while also sending a warning to the US and Israel.

North Korea and Iran’s advances in missile technology may become increasingly attractive to Russia, which is known to have used North Korean missiles and Iranian drones in the ongoing Ukraine war.

This month, Asia Times reported on Russia’s use of North Korean short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to strike Ukraine and its efforts to source Iranian missiles to replenish its depleted stockpiles.

Russia most likely used North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 SRBMs, analogous to the Russian Iskander-M and US MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The KN-23 notably resembles the Iskander-M and may have been designed with Russian assistance.

Iran could sell ballistic missiles to Russia but it may be holding back for multiple reasons. These include a desire to keep critical technologies confidential, maintain a missile stockpile in case of a wider Middle East conflict as well as the doubtful military value of ballistic missiles to break the stalemate in Ukraine.

Triple threat: N Korea, Iran flaunt new missile tech to Russia - Asia Times

North Korea and Iran have long collaborated on missile development and recent progress could bolster Russia’s fight in Ukraine

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 19, 2024

In a striking display of advanced military capabilities, North Korea and Iran have made significant strides in their ballistic missile programs, posing new challenges to global security dynamics.

This month, Military Watch Magazine reported that North Korea had launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) to replace the Hwasong-12, which entered service in 2017 and has the potential to strike targets across the Pacific including US military facilities on Guam.

Military Watch Magazine cites the North Korean state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) saying that the test “was aimed at verifying the gliding and maneuvering characteristics of intermediate-range hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead and the reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines.”

The report says that the missile is estimated to have a range of over 4,000 kilometers and is developed as a direct successor to the Hwasong-12, an older liquid-fueled missile design expected to be replaced by the new type in 2025.

At the same time, The Warzone reported this month that Iran had used its new Kheiber Shekan medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) for the first time in Syria’s Idlib province, marking one of three attacks carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF) in three countries over the past two days.

The Warzone notes that the Kheiber Shekan MRBM strike was likely the longest ever by an Iranian ballistic missile. The report says the type is Iran’s most advanced solid-propellant missile, with a reported range of 1,450 kilometers and a separating warhead.

Solid-fuel missiles have several advantages over liquid-fuel designs. In particular, they do not need to be fueled before launch, are more accessible and safer to operate, and require less logistical support, which increases their survivability compared to liquid-fuel systems.

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Liquid-fuel systems generate more thrust and power but require more complex technology and extra weight. Solid missile fuel burns quickly, produces a large amount of thrust over a short time and can be stored without degradation for long periods.

Iran’s Kheiber Shekan missile. Photo: X Screengrab

North Korea and Iran are known to have mutually supported each other’s missile programs, swapping critical technologies in a transactional partnership made stronger by US sanctions and pressure.

In a November 2023 article for 38 North, Samuel Ramani mentions that while North Korea and Iran’s materiel assistance to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has generated global headlines, North Korea-Iran cooperation has continued under the radar.

Ramani says that North Korean technology transfer to Iran dates back to the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and subsequently weakened as Iran sought commercial ties with South Korea after the 2015 signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, he says those ties resurged after the 2018 US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement.

Asia Times reported in February 2021 that North Korea and Iran resumed cooperation in developing long-range missiles in 2020, citing a confidential UN report. The report stated that the continued collaboration included transferring critical parts, with parts shipments occurring that year.

Ramani notes that Iran’s Khorramshahr missile, first launched in 2017, resembles North Korea’s Musudan or Hwasong-10, which the latter tested in 2016.

He notes that while North Korea’s sale of R-27 rocket engines to Iran has yet to be confirmed, reports of Iran’s purchase of Hwasong-10 missiles go back to 2005. US intelligence has tracked Iran’s search for a high-performance North Korean propulsion system since 2010.

Jonathan Corrado mentions in a September 2023 article for War on the Rocks that Iran’s Shahab-3 missile could be based on North Korea’s Nodong missile and that Iran’s space launch vehicles bear similarity with North Korea’s Hwasong-14 missiles.

Given those examples, it is plausible that Iran may have developed its Kheibar Sheikan with North Korean assistance, despite Tehran’s insistence that the missile is an entirely indigenous weapon.

North Korea and Iran each have cause to advertise their progress in missile technology, ranging from weapons tests to threat signaling and showcasing their wares to potential buyers.

In a December 2023 study for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Daniel Salisbury and Darya Dolzikova note that North Korea has long exported ballistic missile technology, making up 40% of all ballistic missile sales to developing countries from 1987 and 2009 for a total of 500 systems.

Salisbury and Dolzikova note that newly developed North Korean systems are more attractive to potential customers while phasing out older systems creates a surplus of goods and expertise for export.

They say that North Korean surplus missile technology could be tempting to clients with a limited capability to absorb new technology, constrained budgets, or systems that are inoperable or need spare parts.

However, they also point out that North Korea may choose not to export its latest missile technology including hypersonic weapons. Still, they note that North Korea’s missile collaboration with Iran has involved higher-end systems as Iran has an extensive missile manufacturing capacity and export capability.

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This picture taken on September 28, 2021, and released from North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency on September 29, shows the country’s Academy of Defense Science test-firing a claimed hypersonic missile called the Hwasong-8. Photo; KCNA / KNS

As for Iran, Lara Jakes and David Sanger note in The New York Times this month that the use of an advanced missile such as the Kheiber Shekan in Syria when a less-advanced missile could do the same damage shows that Iran is interested in testing its missile technology in combat while also sending a warning to the US and Israel.

North Korea and Iran’s advances in missile technology may become increasingly attractive to Russia, which is known to have used North Korean missiles and Iranian drones in the ongoing Ukraine war.

This month, Asia Times reported on Russia’s use of North Korean short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to strike Ukraine and its efforts to source Iranian missiles to replenish its depleted stockpiles.

Russia most likely used North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 SRBMs, analogous to the Russian Iskander-M and US MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The KN-23 notably resembles the Iskander-M and may have been designed with Russian assistance.

Iran could sell ballistic missiles to Russia but it may be holding back for multiple reasons. These include a desire to keep critical technologies confidential, maintain a missile stockpile in case of a wider Middle East conflict as well as the doubtful military value of ballistic missiles to break the stalemate in Ukraine.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 19, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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Is North Korea Really Getting Ready for a War Against America?

About the Author: Bruce W. Bennett

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What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 2: The impact of the border closure…escape is now almost impossible ISHIMARU Jiro

◆ Defecting North Korea is now almost impossible

◆ A dramatic fall in defectors entering South Korea

◆ Japanese-Koreans wait forlornly for word from their relatives in North Korea

Inmates in North Korea’s prisons still face dire conditions

N. Koreans quietly speculate about Kim Jong Un’s successor

N. Korea’s police agency chastised for impolite language in reports to Kim Jong Un

Camp Humphreys gives all-clear on tap water following quality concerns

Triple threat: N Korea, Iran flaunt new missile tech to Russia - Asia Times

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What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime’s policies…Part 2: The impact of the border closure…escape is now almost impossible　ISHIMARU Jiro