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1. Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ Faces Moment of Truth After Attacks on Israel, U.S. Base

2. Three Ways the U.S. Could Punish Iran After Fatal Drone Attack

3. Fatal drone attack similar to recent incidents in Iraq and Syria

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22.

1. Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ Faces Moment of Truth After Attacks on Israel, U.S. Base

Do not cede "resistance" to the axis of totalitarians. We need to protect resistance for resistance against totalitarian regimes. and oppressors

Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ Faces Moment of Truth After Attacks on Israel, U.S. Base

Regional militias such as Hamas have escalated bloodshed, presenting a dilemma for Tehran over how much support to give without drawing retaliation

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-axis-of-resistance-attacks-israel-u-s-base-7e795b44?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Sune Engel RasmussenFollow

, Summer SaidFollow

, Benoit FauconFollow

and Stacy MeichtryFollow

Jan. 30, 2024 5:31 am ET

Weeks after Israel invaded Gaza in response to Hamas’s deadly attack on Oct. 7, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei convened a meeting of militia leaders across an alliance Tehran calls “the axis of resistance.”

The attack, which Khamenei had publicly praised as an “epic victory,” marked a crescendo of four decades of Iranian efforts to train and arm a network of nonstate militant groups as a way to threaten its enemies and extend its influence in the Middle East.

But behind closed doors, the Iranian leader told senior Hamas representatives, along with Lebanese, Iraqi, Yemeni and other Palestinian militia leaders, that Tehran had no intention of directly entering the conflict and widening the war, according to two high-ranking officials from Hamas and two from Hezbollah. Side battles, he told the delegates, risked distracting the world from Israel’s devastating incursions in Gaza. The message: Hamas was on its own.

Now the axis faces a moment of truth. As Iran’s allies stoke even more fires across the region—from attacks on shipping in the Red Sea to Sunday’s drone strike that killed three U.S. troops in Jordan—they are pushing their benefactor closer to the brink of a direct conflict with Washington that it has long sought to avoid.

Iranian military and financial power forms the backbone of the alliance, but Tehran doesn’t exert full command and control over it. Not every member shares Iran’s Shiite ideology, and all the groups have domestic agendas that sometimes conflict with Tehran’s. Some operate in geographically isolated areas, making it tricky for Iran to provide weapons, advisers and training. That includes Hamas, which is a Sunni movement, or the Houthis in Yemen, whose attacks on shipping have upended global trade flows and triggered U.S. and U.K. counterstrikes.

U.S. officials blamed Sunday’s drone strike on an Iran-backed group, and the White House on Monday said it believed the perpetrators were supported by Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian militia ally based in Iraq, with forces in Syria. President Biden said he was weighing how to retaliate. Iran rejected any involvement.

For Tehran, the power of the axis lies in the plausible deniability that comes from each member’s operational and territorial autonomy. Iran gets to distance itself from the militias even as they serve Iran’s strategic interests, countering U.S. and Israeli power in the region.

The approach has allowed Tehran to avoid sweeping retaliation from Israel and the U.S. that might destabilize its clerical rule, said Norman Roule, a former Middle East expert with the Central Intelligence Agency. Iranian aggression, he said, “now invariably involves actions that are attributable to Tehran but which Iran can deny sufficiently.”

The Oct. 7 attack is testing that model like never before. In dealing the biggest single blow ever to Israel—killing more than 1,200 people, most of them civilians—the assault has triggered a massive Israeli military campaign aimed at eradicating Hamas. Israel has laid waste to swaths of the Gaza Strip and targeted Hamas leaders, most brazenly in an airstrike in Beirut in January that killed Saleh al-Arouri, the group’s political deputy, who weeks earlier had participated in the meeting in Tehran with Khamenei.

Israeli soldiers walk past a house destroyed in the Oct. 7 attack by Palestinian militants. PHOTO: THOMAS COEX/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Women wave Hezbollah flags from the window of their car in Beirut after an Oct. 20 rally supporting Palestinians in Gaza. PHOTO: MANU BRABO/GETTY IMAGES

That has created a major dilemma for Tehran: Come to the defense of its Palestinian ally, risking a regional war that could engulf Iran proper, or stand aside and watch the potential decimation of a vital partner in the alliance?

“What happens if Hamas is completely eliminated? And then, if they are eliminated, would not that mean that the balance of power has shifted to Israel’s favor?” a senior Hezbollah official said. He described the Oct. 7 assault as a “catastrophic success.”

The attack served Tehran’s interests, pausing a diplomatic rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia—another regional rival—and allowing Iran to cast itself as the champion of the Palestinian cause.

Iran’s leadership moved to head off any retaliation by Israel or the U.S. by swiftly denying any involvement in the planning or execution of the assault. Hamas and Hezbollah officials offered conflicting accounts of Iran’s possible prior knowledge. The Wall Street Journal has reported that some Hamas and Hezbollah officials said Iranian security officials greenlighted the attack, noting that others questioned that account.

In either case, the attack couldn’t have happened without many years of Iranian support for Hamas in the form of weapons, money and training, said Afshon Ostovar, an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., who specializes in Iran’s military ventures in the Middle East.

“Whether they move in lockstep in this action or that action is less important than how they move collectively over time,” Ostovar said. “Iran armed them to do this: to take the war to Israel in a way that Iran couldn’t.”

The axis rises

Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis: Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance,’ Explained

The road to Oct. 7

Hamas fighters march in Gaza City in 2021. PHOTO: FATIMA SHBAIR/GETTY IMAGES

The leader of the Hamas movement in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, attended a festival in April. PHOTO: SAHER ELGHORRA/ZUMA PRESS

In early 2020, Soleimani was killed in a U.S. drone strike outside Baghdad’s international airport. The U.S. and Israel hoped the death of Soleimani, who had assumed an almost mythical status among his followers, would curtail the Quds Force as a regional power. That didn’t happen.

Soleimani’s successor and longtime deputy, Esmail Qaani, was less well-known to the public, but he quickly stepped into the role.

“The Quds Force is an enterprise and he is the CEO. At the end of the day, he’s the guy who pays their salaries,” Ostovar said of Qaani.

Under Qaani, Iran increasingly began to promote the idea of a unified front with its militia allies. Palestinian groups became more closely aligned internally as well. Under Hamas leadership, nearly a dozen Palestinian groups began conducting wargames exercises, overseen and publicized on a channel on the Telegram messaging app. Israeli intelligence noticed the exercises but didn’t take them seriously, according to current and former Israeli security officials.

In May 2021, Israeli police forces stormed the compound of the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, firing tear gas and stun grenades after clashes with Palestinians protesting the eviction of residents in the eastern part of the city. The conflagration at Al Aqsa, a mosque that is central to both Shia and Sunni Muslims, prompted widespread regional condemnation of Israel.

In a speech broadcast on Al Jazeera, Sinwar warned “the multitudes of our people and nation will set out, cross the borders, and swarm like a flood to uproot your entity.” Sinwar added that Hamas was grateful to Iran in providing money, weapons, and expertise over the years, adding: “They have supported us in everything.”

In late 2021, Hamas officials met with Hezbollah leader Nasrallah and his deputy, Naim Qassem, in Beirut to discuss ways to retaliate against Israel for the storming of Al Aqsa, according to the two Hamas and two Hezbollah officials. Iranian security officials didn’t participate in the meeting, the officials said.

Israeli security forces advance amid clashes with Palestinian protesters at the Al Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem on May 7, 2021. PHOTO: AHMAD GHARABLI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Meanwhile, animosity between Israel and Iran was heating up. In May 2022, an Iranian commander in charge of a Quds Force unit tasked with kidnapping and killing Israelis abroad was shot dead on the street in Tehran.

His was the latest in a string of assassinations in Iran presumed to be the work of Israel, including the killing two years earlier of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, regarded as the father of Iran’s nuclear-weapons program. Israel hasn’t confirmed or denied any involvement.

The rash of assassinations piled pressure on the Quds Force to respond. That summer, officials from Hamas, the Quds Force and Hezbollah met regularly to draft scenarios to attack Israel, including one from Gaza, one from south Lebanon and one from Syria, the latter of which was quickly ruled out, according to the two Hamas and two Hezbollah officials. A fourth option involved simultaneous infiltrations from south Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank, the officials said. Another senior Hamas official said general plans for action against Israel were discussed, but no timing was set for an attack.

In the spring of last year, five Revolutionary Guard commanders were killed in an Israeli airstrike in Syria, among them an adviser to Qaani. The Quds Force commander held a series of meetings with militant leaders across the region with the aim of launching a fresh wave of attacks on Israeli targets, the Journal reported at the time. One of the meetings, which was also reported in Lebanese and Israeli media, was held at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut and attended by Qaani, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh and al-Arouri, his deputy.

Hezbollah had come to play a central role in coordinating activities in the alliance, particularly since the killing of Soleimani. It had helped the Revolutionary Guard train militias to fight Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, where military bases usually housed Iranians on one floor and Hezbollah on another, a Hezbollah security insider said. It also allowed Palestinian militants to fire at Israel from territory Hezbollah controlled in southern Lebanon.

“This year, more than ever, we have seen the axis of the resistance be strong, capable and cohesive, as we have seen on the ground in recent weeks,” the Hezbollah chief said in a speech last spring after Palestinian militants fired a barrage of more than 30 rockets at Israel, the largest such attack from Lebanese soil since the country’s 2006 war with Hezbollah, although his group claimed not to have been informed beforehand.

Iran, meanwhile, was growing concerned about a broader diplomatic realignment in the Middle East, after Israel in 2020 had signed a watershed agreement known as the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to normalize diplomatic relations. The deal was meant to reset regional power dynamics and sideline Tehran. An even bigger agreement was now in the works between Israel and Saudi Arabia in what would be the most momentous Middle East peace deal in a generation.

Artwork in San’a, Yemen, depicts, from left to right, Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, former Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in January. PHOTO: MOHAMMED HAMOUD/GETTY IMAGES

Iran worried that Israel’s deals with Arab nations would allow it to expand its influence in the region. In internal discussions, the Quds Force vowed to spoil normalization efforts, according to an Iranian official and an adviser to the Guard. Quds officials feared a rapprochement would limit the axis in carrying out attacks on the Arab Peninsula or the Red Sea, where the Houthis and the Revolutionary Guard routinely have hijacked vessels and disrupted global shipping, said the Iranian official and the Guard adviser.

By September, Israeli intelligence began to detect an uptick in hostility from Palestinian militants, including Hamas, which posted a video showing a drill for a commando operation that included an amphibious attack using divers. Hamas even constructed a replica of an Israeli kibbutz and trained to storm it in full view of Israeli security forces—a scenario eerily similar to what would happen on Oct. 7.

Still, Israel remained convinced that the real threat was on its northern border. “We could see these exercises, but they repeated them every two months. We thought this was just a statement reiterating their stand as a resistance movement,” said an Israeli official.

In a speech on Oct. 3, Khamenei, the Iranian supreme leader, warned Arab governments trying to mend ties with Israel that they were making a mistake. Khamenei told an Islamic unity conference in Tehran that “resistance forces throughout the region” would eradicate Israel. “Defeat awaits them,” he said.

The attack

In the early hours of the morning on Oct. 7, a barrage of at least 3,000 rockets rained over Israel in the span of about 20 minutes.

Nearly 3,000 Palestinian militants, most of them Hamas members, breached the barrier from Gaza on pickup trucks, motorcycles and in paragliders. Heavily armed and in black fatigues, they entered kibbutzim in the south and gunned down unarmed civilians, recording the atrocities with body cameras. They burned Israeli military vehicles and stopped cars on highways, executing drivers and passengers. At an outdoor music festival near Re’im, militants embarked on a massacre and killed at least 360 participants. When they left, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members took more than 200 hostages with them into Gaza. It was the most serious breach of Israel’s borders since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The scope and scale of the attack left governments around the world wondering how Hamas managed to blow through the defenses of one of the Middle East’s most powerful militaries, despite having been under a strict blockade for nearly two decades.

American intelligence agencies maintain that while Iran likely knew that Hamas was planning operations against Israel, it didn’t know the precise timing or scope of the Oct. 7 attack. Israeli intelligence agencies also say they don’t have evidence of direct Iranian involvement in the attack.

The Journal reported that Iranian security officials had given the green light for the assault at a meeting in Beirut the week before, on Oct. 2, citing senior Hamas and Hezbollah officials, who also said officers of the Revolutionary Guard had worked with Hamas since August to devise the attack. Those officials and an additional high-ranking Hamas member continue to stand by those assertions.

Other Hamas and Hezbollah officials, however, have contended that all details about the attack, including the scope and the date, were kept tightly under wraps by the military wing of Hamas.

Current Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani speaks during a ceremony marking the anniversary of the 2020 killing of Soleimani, shown on a screen. PHOTO: ATTA KENARE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

“Everyone was aware of the need to carry out an extraordinary action,” Husam Badran, a senior member of Hamas’s political wing based in Doha, said in an interview. But “details of the military operation were up to the Qassam Brigades,” he said, referring to the military wing.

Some parties to the alliance have an interest in expanding the war by drawing Iran into it, while others, including Iran itself, seek to prevent further escalations. The compartmentalized nature of the alliance members’ interactions may mean that even senior officials don’t always have a complete picture of events.

The aftermath

While Iran initially hailed the Oct. 7 attack as a tremendous victory for its axis of resistance, its leaders quickly distanced themselves from any notion that it had been involved.

Other allies also denied prior knowledge. Hezbollah chief Nasrallah was angered by news of the attack, according to a Western official who speaks to senior Hezbollah figures. After remaining silent for nearly a month, Nasrallah delivered a speech insisting that Hezbollah hadn’t taken part. He said the time wasn’t right for Hezbollah to wage all-out war with Israel but warned that calculation could change.

The U.S. warned Iran, publicly and through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, which handles U.S. interests in the country, that it would retaliate against any aggression. Iran told the U.S. that it couldn’t control how its allied groups across the region would react to the Israeli offensive in Gaza, said a person briefed on the Swiss backchannel, and that, “those groups may take it upon themselves to escalate if there is no cease fire.”

Quds Force commander Qaani shuttled between Iran, Syria and Lebanon to try to keep actions by Iran’s allies from spiraling out of control, according to a Western security official, a senior Lebanese official and the Revolutionary Guard adviser.

From Lebanon, Palestinian groups and Hezbollah shot missiles and small-arms fire at northern Israel, hitting population centers, forcing Israel to evacuate towns and displacing tens of thousands from the border area.

The Houthis in Yemen, in a rare intervention against Israel, fired rockets at the southern Israeli city of Eilat and attacked Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea.

In recent weeks, the Houthis have launched fresh attacks against commercial ships around Yemen, including a missile strike on the Gibraltar Eagle, a U.S. bulk carrier. The U.S. and the U.K. have responded with airstrikes on Houthi positions inside Yemen. The Biden administration said it would again designate the Houthis as a terrorist organization, following years off its terror list.

The exchanges have rattled global markets, upended international shipping routes and pulled the Biden administration into a wider conflict that risks exacerbating regional tensions. Still, the calculated skirmishes have steered clear of a direct confrontation between Iran and the U.S., stopping short of a full-blown regional war.

After the deadly drone strike on U.S. troops in Jordan Sunday, the Biden administration said it would respond forcefully against the perpetrators.

“But we don’t seek a war with Iran,” National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told CNN Monday. “We’re not looking for a wider conflict in the Middle East.”

Analysts say that the Hamas attack went against the way Iran for four decades has kept the conflict against its enemies at low intensity to avoid retaliation that could topple the Islamic Republic.

Flames erupt from the oil tanker Marlin Luanda after it was struck by a missile launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels. PHOTO: INDIAN NAVY/ASSOCIATED PRESS

“Iran has survived for so long, unlike Saddam Hussein and other authoritarian regimes, because they understand the balance of power in the region,” said Hage Ali, of Carnegie in Beirut. He called Iran’s strategy one of “long-term attrition.”

The attack has also hurt Iranian interests. A monthslong truce collapsed between Iranian-backed militias and U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. The U.S. held up the delivery of $6 billion in funds it had parked in Qatar as part of a prisoner swap that was completed in September, and any hopes Tehran had of further relief from sanctions imposed on its nuclear program appear extremely slim for now.

“They got trapped at their own game,” said the Western security official.

When Hamas political chief Haniyeh and his deputy Arouri in November traveled to Tehran for a meeting with Khamenei, they were told the Islamic Republic supported Hamas but didn’t play any role in the militants’ surprise attack on Israel, according to Iranian state media.

Haniyeh and Arouri left the meeting disappointed but provided Iran with a list of weapons they might need if the war continues beyond six months, including antitank missiles and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, Hamas officials said.

Shortly after the meeting, according to senior Hamas and Hezbollah officials, a larger gathering of Iran’s allies took place in Tehran. Attendees included Haniyeh and Arouri as well as Quds Force commander Qaani, senior Hezbollah official Hashem Safi al-Din, Houthi ambassador to Tehran Ibrahim al-Dulaimi and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah.

In the meeting, Khamenei told the group he was aware of growing discontent with Nasrallah’s speech saying the time wasn’t right for a wider conflict, the Hamas and Hezbollah officials said. Khamenei defended the strategy of avoiding an all-out war, saying that he didn’t want to take away attention from the Palestinian struggle, which he said was playing out in Hamas’s favor despite the continuing losses in Gaza, the officials said.

Iran had built its axis of resistance to ensure its own survival, not that of Hamas. While the Palestinian group is an important ally, Iran wasn’t going to risk the destruction of its strongest partner, Hezbollah, to save it, said Emile Hokayem, an expert on security and nonstate actors in the Middle East with the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

“They’re not going to deploy Hezbollah in a war the Iranians don’t see as existential,” he said.

Dov Lieber, Max Colchester, Adam Chamseddine and Fatima AbdulKarim contributed to this article.

Write to Sune Engel Rasmussen at sune.rasmussen@wsj.com, Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com, Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com and Stacy Meichtry at Stacy.Meichtry@wsj.com

2. Three Ways the U.S. Could Punish Iran After Fatal Drone Attack

Strike hard.

Three Ways the U.S. Could Punish Iran After Fatal Drone Attack

Direct strikes, attacks on proxies or Tehran’s personnel abroad, and economic measures are all options

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/jordan-drone-attack-iranian-backed-militia-us-response-393c49b2?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By William Mauldin

, Benoit Faucon

and Ian Talley

Updated Jan. 29, 2024 5:23 pm ET

Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters that the U.S. would ‘respond decisively to any aggression.’ PHOTO: EVELYN HOCKSTEIN/REUTERS

WASHINGTON—The U.S. range of options for responding to Sunday’s deadly Iranian-backed militia attack includes a direct strike against Iran, hitting the regime’s proxy groups or personnel abroad, and ratcheting up financial pressure on Tehran’s battered economy.

The strike that killed three U.S. Army reserve service members in a military outpost in Jordan has led to calls for a firm response against Iran, which backs an array of militant groups around the Middle East that have targeted Americans. In seeking an appropriate response, the White House must weigh its desire to send a strong signal to Iran and its proxies, congressional pressure for decisive action, and the Biden administration’s desire to prevent sparking a broader regional war.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella of pro-Iranian militias, claimed responsibility for attacks on three U.S. bases in Syria, including Al Tanf, which is close to the Iraqi and Jordanian borders. Iran has denied involvement in the attacks.

While the Biden administration has sought to prevent Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza from escalating into a regional war, top U.S. officials have previously warned that they would respond to attacks that harm U.S. troops. The White House on Monday confirmed that a reaction to the attack should be expected.

“We will respond decisively to any aggression, and we will hold responsible the people who attacked our troops,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters Monday. “That response could be multileveled, come in stages and be sustained over time.”

So far, officials haven’t previewed their response, but there are at least three broad groups of options the U.S. has in its arsenal.

U.S. base

TURKEY

Mosul

IRAQ

Deir ez-Zor

Med. Sea

SYRIA

LEBANON

Tower 22

Damascus

Al Tanf

Tower 22

(shown at right)

WEST

BANK

JORDAN

Amman

100 miles

ISRAEL

Between Jan. 19 and Jan. 21 a convoy loaded with militiamen and rocket supplies transferred from eastern Syria to the Iranian-controlled Ain al-Sahib Camp outside Damascus.

The Pro-Iranian Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade transferred its headquarters to the Deir ez-Zor city center.

Iranian Revolutionary Guards moved the contents of a warehouse to underground bunkers on Jan. 24 out of fear of airstrikes.

On Jan. 28 Iraqi militias target Tower 22, a U.S. army base with a suicide drone. The drone was launched from near the base of Al Tanf in Syria.

Sources: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project (bases); Planet Labs PBC/Associated Press (Tower 22 image); staff reports

Carl Churchill/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Strikes on Iranian territory or waters

A direct U.S. strike on Iran’s territory, which some Republicans are calling for, would be unprecedented. The Reagan administration attacked Iranian ships and offshore oil platforms in retaliation for Tehran’s mining of a U.S. warship, but the U.S. military hasn’t previously attacked targets on Iranian territory.

Even former President Donald Trump, who led a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran during his time in the White House, planned but then called off direct strikes on Iran in 2019 after Iran shot down a U.S. surveillance drone.

The Biden administration has sought a less confrontational approach to Iran, greatly reducing the chances of a strike inside Iran or its territorial waters. But in an election year, the Biden administration risks being seen as weak on Iran if it doesn’t formulate a strong response to the death of U.S. troops, analysts say.

“We must respond to these repeated attacks by Iran and its proxies by striking directly against Iranian targets and its leadership,” said Sen. Roger Wicker (R., Miss.), the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Gabriel Noronha, a former Iran adviser in the Trump administration, says that Iran believes its proxy groups can force the U.S. to withdraw from the Middle East, and that only a strong response can address that. “Hitting inside Iran creates a sense of vulnerability for the regime it desperately wants to avoid,” said Noronha, now an analyst at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, a Washington-based group that supports close military cooperation between the U.S. and Israel.

But direct strikes on Iran risk triggering an all-out regional war, which the White House says it is eager to avoid. “We are not looking for a war with Iran,” National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Monday.

Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis: Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance,’ Explained

Strikes on Iranian proxy groups or Iranians abroad

The U.S. can respond proportionally by targeting Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance,” its networks of proxies across the region, rather than Tehran itself.

The Biden administration could choose from a range of options that stop short of hitting Iran directly, such as striking its paramilitary Quds Force personnel in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, hitting Iranian ships at sea or mounting a major attack on the Iranian-backed militia group that was deemed to be responsible.“They will attack Iranian proxies in Iraq,” predicted Hamid Hosseini, the spokesman for Iran’s oil exporters’ union, which is close to the government.

An Iranian official also said he doesn’t expect any strikes in Iran. “But there will be attacks on pro-Iran militias,” the official said, warning that such strikes would “fuel a cycle of revenge that could spiral out of control.“

A U.S. intelligence adviser said the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies in Deir ez-Zor and other parts of East Syria are at the top of the list for U.S. strikes and that their movements are closely monitored by drones and satellites. “It’s going to be a shooting range,” the person said.

The administration’s most recent retaliatory blow took place Jan. 24 local time, when the U.S. struck three facilities used by the Iranian-backed group Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq. That group has been behind many of the attacks on U.S. troops, including one on Al-Asad base in Iraq.

U.S. Misidentified Enemy Drone in Attack That Killed Three in Jordan

Sanctions or financial enforcement

While Iran is already heavily sanctioned, there is room to pursue more economic retaliatory measures against Tehran. The U.S. has imposed harsher sanctions on Iran than any well-sized economy in the world, but not all of them are enforced, say some current and former Western officials, especially when third countries are involved.

The existing U.S. sanctions were meant to squeeze Tehran into compliance on its nuclear program, stunt its ballistic missile development and curb the regime’s ability to fund regional instability through its array of militant proxies. Yet the regime has developed an international trade and finance system that helps insulate its economy from these financial measures.

Still, some lawmakers and former U.S. security officials say the U.S. could step up enforcement of the existing sanctions, especially disrupting energy sales and sanctioning the foreign companies and banks that are aiding Iran. That includes entities in China, the country’s biggest oil buyer.

“The Biden administration must hit Iran where it hurts, the very pocketbooks that fuel and fund Tehran’s terrorist proxies,” said Sen. Joni Ernst, the Iowa Republican who sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee and has led a bipartisan effort to press the administration on sanctions enforcement.

One problem with this approach is that the Biden administration has sought to reduce overall economic pressure on China as part of an effort to re-establish communications and avoid missteps over Taiwan, while saving economic confrontation for strategic new sectors, such as advanced semiconductors.

Another option for the U.S. to respond to the strikes that killed three soldiers in Jordan would be seeking support from its Western allies to adopt the broad-ranging sanctions the U.S. has levied across Iran’s economy. Given Iran’s military cooperation with Russia, and the targeting by Iran and its proxies of energy trade through the critical global shipping hub off Iran’s shores, some European countries have grown more hawkish on Tehran, analysts say.

Vivian Salama and Michael R. Gordon contributed to this article.

Write to William Mauldin at william.mauldin@wsj.com, Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com and Ian Talley at Ian.Talley@wsj.com

3. Fatal drone attack similar to recent incidents in Iraq and Syria

Per Cohen and Gooch: Do we have. failure to learn, a failure to adapt, or a failure to anticipate?

Fatal drone attack similar to recent incidents in Iraq and Syria

militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · January 29, 2024

There was “nothing new” about the way in which an airborne drone attacked U.S. troops in Jordan on Sunday, killing three U.S. soldiers, a Pentagon spokeswoman told reporters on Monday.

But while the attack bore similarities to dozens of recent strikes against U.S. bases in the region since October, it remained unclear precisely why Sunday’s attack was successful when prior attacks were either shot down or landed away from populated areas of American bases.

U.S. Central Command is investigating exactly what happened, Sabrina Singh said, and she declined to confirm or deny media reports that the drone used in the attack was mistaken for a U.S. drone that had been airborne at the same time.

The Pentagon believes it’s possible that the more than 160 similar attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria in recent months also intended to kill, even if they previously had not.

“Unfortunately, this attack was successful,” Singh said of Sunday’s attack on the base known as Tower 22 on the Jordan-Syria border.

That attack drone struck a housing building early in the morning, Singh said, which helps explain why it caused so many casualties, including the deaths of three soldiers assigned to a Georgia-based Reserve unit.

Pentagon IDs Army Reserve soldiers killed in Jordan Tower 22 attack

All three were members of the Army Reserve’s 718th Engineer Company.

They are Army Sgt. William Jerome Rivers, 46, of Carrollton, Spc. Kennedy Ladon Sanders, 24, of Waycross, and Spc. Breonna Alexsondria Moffett, 23, of Savannah of the 718th Engineer Company, 926th Engineer Battalion, 926th Engineer Brigade, out of Fort Moore.

Eight additional troops were medically evacuated to Baghdad for evaluation, and three of those will fly on to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany for continued care, according to Singh.

More than 40 troops in all were injured in the attack, Singh said, a number that could continue to rise if troops experience delayed traumatic brain injury symptoms.

President Joe Biden on Sunday blamed Iran-backed militias for the first U.S. fatalities after months of strikes by such groups against American forces across the Middle East since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.

What is Tower 22, the base in Jordan where 3 US troops were killed?

34 U.S. service members were also injured in Sunday's attack.

By Jon Gambrell, The Associated Press

The attack brings the total attacks on bases housing U.S. troops in the Middle East to 165, including 98 in Syria and 66 in Iraq, with 80 non-life-threatening injuries between them.

Both the White House and Pentagon have described the attack in Jordan as an escalation of tensions, though Singh repeatedly said the Pentagon does not consider the attack in Jordan an expansion of any conflict.

The attack has the hallmarks of similar Iran-backed militia attacks in Iraq and Syria, Singh said, specifically those carried out by Khata’ib Hizballah.

The administration has said it will launch retaliatory strikes, but hasn’t offered details of when or where. Previous retaliatory U.S. strikes have targeted weapons and training facilities Syria and Iraq.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

About Meghann Myers

Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.

4. Special Operations News - January 29, 2024 | SOF News

Special Operations News - January 29, 2024 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · January 29, 2024

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: The guided missile destroyer USS Michael Murphy fires an SM-2 Block III missile during a live-fire exercise in the Pacific Ocean, Jan. 23, 2024. Photo by Navy Chief Petty Officer Alan Doerter. Read more about this surface to air missile in “A $2M missile vs. a $2,000 drone: Pentagon worried over cost of Houthi attacks”, Politico, December 19, 2023.

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Three U.S. Service Members Killed by Drone

CENTCOM announced that three U.S. service members were killed in a one-way drone attack in northeastern Jordan on Saturday night, January 27, 2024. CENTCOM also said that 34 were wounded in the attack – some with TBI and eight that had to be evacuated to a higher-level medical facility. A White House statement blamed the attack on radical Iran-backed militant groups. The drone is reported to have detonated near sleeping quarters.

The location of the attack is a small military post known as “Tower 22” (The Intel Crab, Twitter) very close to the tri-border area of Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. The Al Tanf garrison, which in the past has served as a launch pad for an American SOF contingent, is just across the border in Syria. The Al Tanf garrison is also a site of conventional troops as well. Tower 22 is part of a cluster of smaller bases supporting Al Tanf. According to CENTCOM, it is a logistics base with approximately 350 U.S. Army and Air Force personnel that support the effort to defeat ISIS.

SOF News

Missing SEALs Identified. The search and rescue efforts to locate Navy Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Christopher J. Chambers and Navy Special Warfare Operator 2nd Class Nathan Gage Ingram concluded January 21, 2024. The two SEALs were reported missing at sea while they were conducting a night-time seizure (SOF News) of a vessel (VBSS) illegally transporting advanced lethal aid from Iran to resupply Houthi forces in Yemen. Their status, after a long search, had been changed to deceased by CENTCOM on January 21, 2024.

WMD, SOF, and the Maritime Environment. A highly mobile and flexible capability for detecting CBRNE indicators is a national defense capability that needs to be expanded and refined. The CANARY SoS is a program that is designed to solve provide this capability. The concept includes a Navy EOD team as part of a forward SOF element employing a UAS capability linked with comms to transmit data. Read more in “Engineering Special Operations”, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, January 2024.

Robin Sage – 50 Years Later. Special Forces candidates are in the woods and mountains of North Carolina participating in an unconventional warfare exercise. 2024 marks 50 years since the Green Beret exercise called Robin Sage has been held. The field exercise actually dates back to the 1950s – but under a different name. “50 Years of Robin Sage”, CBS17.com, January 27, 2024.

Enhancing AFSOC’s C-130s. Some off the shelf radar solutions could increase the capabilities of the Air Force Special Operations Command’s Ghostrider and Commando II platforms. “AESA Radars For AC-130J, MC-130J Sought By SOCOM”, The Drive WarZone, January 26, 2024.

PSYOP Selection. Before entering the ranks of PSYOP, soldiers must pass through the Psychological Operations Assessment and Selection course. Read about it in “What is PSYOP Assessment and Selection like?”, Task & Purpose, January 26, 2024.

ELR-SR Program. The Extreme Long Range – Sniper Rifle program is looking for a replacement for the M107 Barret and MK15 sniper rifles. Read the details in this article published by Business Insider on January 28, 2024.

Marine Raiders. The Critical Skills Operators of the Marine Corps Force Special Operations Command (MARSOC) that pass the Individual Training Course (ITC) and then serve in Marine Raider position. Read up on the history, organization, TTPs, training pipeline, equipment, weapons, and vehicles of the Marine Raiders. “MARSOC Marine Raiders: Always Faithful, Always Forward”, by Michael Ellmer, Grey Dynamics, January 25, 2024.

SOCPAC Maritime Training. Philippine government agencies and U.S. Special Operations Task Force 511.2 participated in a Joint Maritime Security Training Exercise (DVIDS, Nov 2023) Nov. 20-24, 2023, in the Philippines. Some of the training events were maintaining maritime domain awareness and VBSS (NSI) scenarios.

International SOF

CANSOF Departs Niger. As of January 2024, Canada no longer has special operations forces in Niger. As many as fifty CANSOF personnel have been deployed to Niger for the past ten years on Operation Naberius. “Canada withdraws its last special-forces troops from Niger”, The Globe and Mail, January 22, 2024.

UK SF. The Commander of Strategic Command, General Sir Jim Hockenhull, states that Britain’s Special Forces act as a “vanguard for defence”. The UK SF helps the wider military to evolve leading to new and different ways of working. The UK Special Forces consist of the Special Air Service (SAS), Special Boat Service (SBS), Special Reconnaissance Regiment and 18 (UKSF) Signals Regiment. “UK Special Forces a Vanguard for Defence”, Forces.net, January 22, 2024.

SOF History

AC-119 Gunship. Read up on the early history of cargo planes converted into airborne gunships. “How Cargo Haulers Turned into Gunships Rained Fire on the Enemy in Vietnam”, by Barry Levine, History.net, January 22, 2024.

WWII PoW Rescue. On January 30, 1945, over 500 prisoners of war were rescued at the Cabanatuan prisoner of war camp during WWII in the Philippines by a combined force of 6th Ranger Battalion, Alamo Scouts, and Philippine guerrillas. https://arsof-history.org/articles/v14n2_cabanatuan_page_1.html

Battle of Najaf. On January 28-29, 2007, a fierce fight took place in Najaf, Iraq. Three special operations combat controllers were key to the unleashing of air power on the enemy. They directed F-16s, A-10s, AC-130s, AH-64s, F/A-18s, and RAF Tornados onto targets – dropping more than 10,500 lbs. of bombs. “The Battle of Najaf”, Combat Control Foundation, January 28, 2007.

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

Defunding of UNRWA. Israeli authorities have provided the United Nations Relief and Works Agency with information about the alleged involvement of twelve UNRWA employees in the terror attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023. The UNRWA is the UN agency that provides humanitarian assistance to Palestine refugees in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and other locations throughout the region. The United States (DoS, 26 Jan 2024), seven European nations, Canada, and Australia have decided to temporarily suspend funding the UNRWA. The UNRWA has terminated (UNRWA, 26 Jan 2024) the contracts of the staff members and is launching an investigation into the incident. “More countries pause funds for UN Palestinian agency”, Reuters, January 27, 2024.

References:
Map Gaza Strip (2005), and more maps of Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel.
Israel-Hamas War: Insights from RAND

Ukraine Conflict

Situation Update. Constanze Stelzenmuller provides an update on the current situation in Ukraine. The Kremlin is redoubling its attacks on the ground and in the air. Russia has made modest gains in northeast Ukraine, but at a very high cost in personnel and equipment. The Russian air campaign has stepped up in recent months with numerous drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles hitting a variety of targets in Ukraine. “A midwinter update on Ukraine”, Brookings Institute, January 26, 2024.

Russian Transport Plane Crashes. A Russian IL-76 cargo plane crashed Belgorod Oblast, Russia near the Ukrainian border. On board, according to Russian press releases, were over 60 captured Ukrainian prisoners of war to be exchanged in a POW swap. The circumstances of the crash remain unclear. “Russian military plane crashes near Ukraine border”, Washington Examiner, January 24, 2024.

Drone Warfare. Both sides have found offensive campaigns are costly and only modest territory is the net result. Drones have a lot to do with this outcome. “Cheap but lethally accurate: how drones froze Ukraine’s frontlines”, The Guardian, January 25, 2024.

FPV Drones Changing the Battlefield. “First-Person-View” (FPV) drones, some only costing $500, have reshaped modern warfare. These cheap and small UAVs can accurately deliver a warfare against personnel, vehicles, and equipment. Both the Ukrainians and Russians are using them to great effect. Ukraine initially led in FPV technology, but the Russians have caught and can scale up drone production much quicker. This very comprehensive article explains in in detail: “Inside Ukraine’s secret FPV drone labs racing to stay ahead of Russia”, Euromaiden Press, January 25, 2024.

U.S. Money to Ukraine – Not So Much. The U.S. Congress seems to be unable to come to an agreement that would allow additional funding for Ukraine. Republicans are tying the funds for Ukraine to increasing the U.S. southern border security and reforming immigration policy. Democrats are reluctant to adopt the border security measures desired by the Republicans. Some political commentators are speculating that former President Trump doesn’t want the border situation fixed until he is elected President. Trump’s intention, according to some, is that immigration remain an issue until the November elections.

Crimea’s Isthmus of Perekop. The retaking of Crimea (if it happens) from the Russian occupiers will most certainly see Ukrainian forces crossing the Isthmus of Perekop – a narrow land mass connecting Crimea to Ukraine (map CRS) proper. This “Gateway to Crimea” has been fought for throughout history – one notable time was during the time of the Russian Civil War in 1920. Read more in “Battle of Perekop”, by Glenn Corn, Military Review, November 2023. (also in PDF, six pages)

Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Insitute for the Study of War and Critical Threats.

On storymaps.arcgis.com

National Security

Writing and the CIA. Zachary Griffiths provides a description of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Studies in Intelligence journal. See “Professional (and creative) writing at the CIA”, Harding Project, January 23, 2024.

Training Troops in Coup States. The Pentagon has abandoned plans to train the militaries of several countries that have been accused of human rights violations or involved in the overthrow of democratic governments. Six African countries are barred from participating in U.S. exercises. One major exercise, known as Flintlock, is conducted annually by AFRICOM and SOCAFRICA. “The Pentagon planned to train troops from coup states. It backed off after scrutiny”, The Washington Post, January 26, 2024. (subscription)

Drone Production. Russia has used loitering munitions, as well as different command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, to meet its need for precision targeting. “How the West Can Match Russia in Drone Production”, War on the Rocks.

WinTAK. An application that is commercially available enables soldiers to mark enemies and send texts. U.S. Special Forces have been using ATAK for a number of years in both training, exercises, and on deployments. Looks like the conventional Army is catching on. “In a first, Army uses Slack-style battlefield software in field exercises”, by Sam Skove, Defense One, January 24, 2024.

Border Crisis.

“New Hampshire prioritized immigration because northern border crossings are up 600%”, Washington Examiner, January 24, 2024.
“Top migration adviser to depart White House after three years”, NBC News, January 26, 2024.
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has released its December 2023 Monthly Update. December 2023 saw over 300,000 border encounters by the CBP breaking previous records over the past 20 years. This included over 250,000 illegal crossings. (The Washington Post, 27 Jan 2024)
12th Border Security & Intelligence Summit, National Harbor, MD, April 24-25, 2024, presented by Defense Strategies. https://bordersecuritysummit.dsigroup.org/
The Texas border dispute between the Texas governor and the federal government has highlighted calls for reform of the Insurrection Act. Reform of the act is viewed as an anti-Trump measure by some sectors of the political arena; however, there are possibly bi-partisan reasons for reform according to Jack Goldsmith. “The Texas Border and Insurrection Act Reform”, Lawfare Blog, January 27, 2024.

NATO and Sweden. Months ago, Finland was approved for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, another Scandinavian country has had difficulty in that same path. Turkey’s parliament has finally approved Sweden’s NATO membership after more than a year of waiting; but Hungary remains a holdout.

Haiti Update. The government of Kenya has volunteered to be the lead for a Multinational Security Support mission for Haiti – one authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2699. This mission would assist the Haitian government in tamping down the levels of gang violence and restore democratic order in Haiti. However, there has been a bump in the road. The Republic of Kenya’s High Court has ruled the deployment of Kenyan police to be unconstitutional. (DoS Press Statement, 27 Jan 2024) See also “UN warns of growing power of gangs in Haiti igniting tensions across the Caribbean”, Jurist, January 26, 2024.

Russian Information Warfare. This article provides insights into how Russian scholars and practitioners view information warfare. “Russian Information Warfare Strategy: New IWC Translation Gives Insights into Vulnerabilities”, Irregular Warfare Center, January 23, 2024.

Report – More than a Century of Antisemitism. A report by the Global Engagement Center of the U.S. Department of State describes how successive occupants of the Kremlin have used antisemitism to spread disinformation and propaganda. This two-part report provides a historical overview of how Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union used this technique to further their ends. It also details the contemporary Kremlin’s use of antisemitic disinformation in the context of its war against Ukraine. January 2024, PDF, 51 pages.

Blacksmith Publishing is a media partner of SOF News. They are a book publishing firm, sell ‘Pinelander Swag’, have a weekly podcast called The Pinelander.

Middle East

Yemen Houthis. The Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen (map NSI) learned and adopted the tactics of irregular warfare while in conflict with a Saudi-led coalition. “How a Ragtag Militia in Yemen Became a Nimble U.S. Foe”, The New York Times, January 24, 2024. (subscription)

Oil Tanker Attacked. An oil tanker, the M/V Marlin Luanda, was targeted by Houthis on Friday evening, January 26, 2024. Iranian-backed Houthis fired one anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Initial reports say that the tanker was on fire and the crew had abandoned the vessel. The incident happened 60 nautical miles southeast of Aden. US and French warships were in the area to rescue the crew. Since November, the Houthis have launched numerous attacks against commercial ships traveling in the region.

U.S. Stepping Back from Iraq? Representatives from the United States and Iraq are currently engaged in talks aimed at winding down the mission of a U.S.-led military coalition. Since the October 7th terrorist attack against Israel and subsequent Israeli Defense Forces military offensive in Gaza U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria have been hit by rockets, missiles, and drones from Iranian-backed militant groups. The U.S. has responded with strikes against these groups in Syria and Iraq. “Iraq, US in Talks to End Coalition Mission Targeting Islamic State”, Voice of America, January 27, 2024. See also “U.S., Iraqi Officials to Hold Talks”, DoD, January 25, 2024.

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Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Video – CIA Recruitment. The latest Central Intelligence Agency recruitment video has been posted. It is targeting Russian intelligence workers and highlights the corruption within Russian government. Securely Contacting CIA, January 22, 2024, YouTube, 3 minutes. (Editor’s note: my Russian has deteriorated but I got the jist of it). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJvVYW3eQvY

Video – Carrier Seal. watch a 2-minute-long video about an advanced tactical diving vehicle designed for covert operations that will give SOF operators extra stealth. Forces News, YouTube, January 27, 2024.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IkpN11rFjsA

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sof.news · by SOF News · January 29, 2024

5. Drone Attack Kills Three U.S. Soldiers | SOF News

Drone Attack Kills Three U.S. Soldiers | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · January 29, 2024

On Saturday, January 27, 2024, a one-way drone armed with an explosive was launched by an Iranian-backed militia group that killed three U.S. Army soldiers in northeastern Jordan. In addition to the three deaths, more than 40 U.S. service members were injured. Eight of the injured were in stable condition but were flown to further medical treatment to the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center in Iraq. Three of those patients are scheduled to be transported to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany for follow-on care.

The three soldiers were assigned to the 718th Engineer Company, 926th Engineer Battalion, 926th Engineer Brigade, Fort Moore, Georgia. The brigade is part of the U.S. Army Reserve. They were deployed to Jordan in support of Operation Inherent Resolve and the international coalition working to ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS.

The deceased soldiers are:

Sgt. William Jerome Rivers, 46, of Carrollton, Georgia
Spc. Kennedy Ladon Sanders, 24, of Waycross, Georgia
Spc. Breonna Alexsondria Moffett, 23, of Savannah, Georgia

The one-way unmanned aerial system (OWUAS) impacted their container housing units. Some news reports state that the OWUAS followed or arrived at the Tower 22 location the same time that a U.S. military drone was returning to the outpost. This contributed to the attacking drone not being engaged by the U.S. forces base air defense systems. It is speculated that the drone attack came from Iraq. A White House statement blamed the attack on radical Iran-backed militant groups. The Iraq border is only ten miles away.

The location of the attack is a small military post known as “Tower 22” (The Intel Crab, Twitter) very close to the tri-border area of Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. The area is known as Rukban and there was a large refugee camp in the area at one time during the occupation of much of Syria by the Islamic State several years ago. It is believed that U.S. forces have been at the Tower 22 location since 2015.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed responsibility for the attack. This group emerged after the October 7 Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel. It was formed from several militias that are aligned with Iran, some with a history of attacking U.S. interests in Iraq and Syria.

The Al Tanf garrison, which in the past has served as a launch pad for an American SOF contingent, is just across the border in Syria – about 12 miles north. The Al Tanf garrison is also a site of U.S. conventional troops. Al Tanf, in Syria, sits on a key highway that links Iraq with Syria. Tower 22, in Jordan, is part of a cluster of smaller bases supporting Al Tanf. According to CENTCOM, Tower 22 is a logistics base with approximately 350 U.S. Army and Air Force personnel that support the effort to defeat ISIS.

Jordan has been a key ally for the United States in the Middle East. A number of military exercises, such as Exercise Eager Lion, take place each year. In 2016 three Green Berets were killed in Jordan. The three were members of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) who came under fire while entering a Jordanian airbase. in 2017 another member of the 5th SFG(A) died in a non-combat related incident. Currently there are over 2,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Jordan.

In response to this drone attack the Biden administration has convened a series of meetings in the White House Situation Room with members of the national security team. They have been discussing the latest developments in the Middle East and this recent attack in Jordan. On the table is exactly how to respond to the attack. Most likely, according to national security ‘experts’, there will be U.S. attacks against Iranian proxies in the region.

The number of attacks against the U.S. in the Middle East have increased significantly since the Israeli response to the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023. From October 17th to January 29th, there have been 165 attacks against U.S. troops and facilities. Iraq – 66, Syria – 98, and this one in Jordan.

There is a lot for the U.S. to consider in its search for a response. How to deter Iran from future attacks yet, at the same time, not escalate the tense Middle East situation into a wider conflict? To what extent is the U.S. already involved in a wider Middle East conflict? What level of response should take place – one that is ‘proportional’ or one that would punish Iran and its proxies? Should the U.S. scale back its presence in the Middle East, leaving it less exposed? Should the U.S. hit leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps?

****

“DoD Identifies Army Casualties”, DOD, January 29, 2024.

sof.news · by SOF News · January 29, 2024

6. In Memoriam: Anthony H. Cordesman

The loss of a leading strategic thinker. Rest in peace, Sir.

From CSIS: https://www.csis.org/analysis/memoriam-anthony-h-cordesman

Commentary — January 29, 2024

In Memoriam: Anthony H. Cordesman

WASHINGTON, January 29, 2024: CSIS president and CEO John J. Hamre released a statement on the passing of CSIS Emeritus Chair Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman:

“Today, all of his colleagues at CSIS mourn the death of Tony Cordesman. Tony was one of the most prolific and engaged scholars we have had in over 25 years. Tony drew on his deep experience in government to share insights with the world. He thought deeply and creatively about some of the most challenging problems of our days. He was a towering figure in national security circles because of his unflinching honesty and candor. At the same time, he mentored dozens and dozens of young professionals who were inspired to focus their careers on national security because of Tony’s inspirational career. Tony’s remarkably productive life was focused on one thing—strengthening America, which he loved with all his heart. But he was not narrow in his scholarship. Tony saw the vital role and contribution that allied and partner nations played in protecting and advancing a peaceful world. While we mourn his passing today, we celebrate his remarkable career and all that he did for CSIS."

7. Exclusive: US disabled Chinese hacking network targeting critical infrastructure

Small victory or big win?

Exclusive: US disabled Chinese hacking network targeting critical infrastructure

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-disabled-chinese-hacking-network-targeting-critical-infrastructure-sources-2024-01-29/?utm

By Christopher Bing and Karen Freifeld

January 30, 20245:57 PM GMT+9Updated 5 hours ago

China's and U.S.' flags are seen printed on paper in this illustration taken January 27, 2022. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Jan 29 (Reuters) - The U.S. government in recent months launched an operation to fight a pervasive Chinese hacking operation that successfully compromised thousands of internet-connected devices, according to two Western security officials and one person familiar with the matter.

The Justice Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation sought and received legal authorization to remotely disable aspects of the Chinese hacking campaign, the sources told Reuters.

The Biden administration has increasingly focused on hacking, not only for fear nation states may try to disrupt the U.S. election in November, but because ransomware wreaked havoc on Corporate America in 2023.

The hacking group at the center of recent activity, Volt Typhoon, has especially alarmed intelligence officials who say it is part of a larger effort to compromise Western critical infrastructure, including naval ports, internet service providers and utilities.

While the Volt Typhoon campaign initially came to light in May 2023, the hackers expanded the scope of their operations late last year and changed some of their techniques, according to three people familiar with the matter.

The widespread nature of the hacks led to a series of meetings between the White House and private technology industry, including several telecommunications and cloud commuting companies, where the U.S. government asked for assistance in tracking the activity.

Such breaches could enable China, national security experts said, to remotely disrupt important facilities in the Indo-Pacific region that in some form support or service U.S. military operations. Sources said U.S. officials are concerned the hackers were working to hurt U.S. readiness in case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

China, which claims democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory, has increased its military activities near the island in recent years in response to what Beijing calls "collusion" between Taiwan and the United States.

The Justice Department and FBI declined to comment. The Chinese embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

When Western nations first warned about Volt Typhoon in May, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said the hacking allegations were a "collective disinformation campaign" from the Five Eyes countries, a reference to the intelligence sharing grouping of countries made up of the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the UK.

Volt Typhoon has functioned by taking control of swaths of vulnerable digital devices around the world - such as routers, modems, and even internet-connected security cameras - to hide later, downstream attacks into more sensitive targets, security researchers told Reuters. This constellation of remotely controlled systems, known as a botnet, are of primary concern to security officials because they limit the visibility of cyber defenders that monitor for foreign footprints in their computer networks.

"How it works is the Chinese are taking control of a camera or modem that is positioned geographically right next to a port or ISP (internet service provider) and then using that destination to route their intrusions into the real target," said a former official familiar with the matter. "To the IT team at the downstream target it just looks like a normal, native user that's sitting nearby."

The use of so-called botnets by both government and criminal hackers to launder their cyber operations is not new. The approach is often used when an attacker wants to quickly target numerous victims simultaneously or seeks to hide their origins.

Reporting by Christopher Bing in Washington, Karen Freifeld in New York and James Pearson in London; Editing by Chris Sanders and Lisa Shumaker

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab

Christopher Bing

Thomson Reuters

Award-winning reporter covering the intersection between technology and national security with a focus on how the evolving cybersecurity landscape affects government and business.

8. Spycraft and Statecraft y William J. Burns

Excerpts:

Every day, as I read through cables from stations around the world, travel to foreign capitals, or speak with colleagues at headquarters, I’m reminded of the skill and courage of CIA officers, as well as the unrelenting challenges they face. They are doing hard jobs in hard places. Especially since 9/11, they have been operating at an incredibly fast tempo. Indeed, taking care of the CIA’s mission in this new and daunting era depends on taking care of our people. That’s why the CIA has strengthened its medical resources at headquarters and in the field; improved programs for families, remote workers, and two-career couples; and explored more flexible career paths, especially for technologists, so that officers can move into the private sector and later return to the agency.

We’ve streamlined our recruiting process for new officers. It now takes a quarter of the time it took two years ago to move from application to final offer and security clearance. These improvements have contributed to a surge of interest in the CIA. In 2023, we had more applicants than in any year since the immediate aftermath of 9/11. We’re also working hard to diversify our workforce, reaching historic highs in 2023 in terms of the number of women and minority officers hired, as well as the number promoted into the agency’s most senior ranks.

By necessity, CIA officers operate in the shadows, usually out of sight and out of mind; the risks they take and the sacrifices they make are rarely well understood. At a moment when trust in the United States’ public institutions is often in short supply, the CIA remains a resolutely apolitical institution, bound by the oath I and everyone else at the agency have taken to defend the Constitution and by our obligations under the law.

CIA officers are also bound together by a sense of community, and by a deep, shared commitment to public service at this crucial moment in American history. They know the truth in the advice I got many years ago from my father, who had a distinguished military career. As I was wrestling with what to do with my professional life, he sent me a handwritten note: “Nothing can make you prouder than to serve your country with honor.” That helped launch me into a long and fortunate career in government, first in the Foreign Service and now at the CIA. I’ve never regretted the choice I made. I take enormous pride in serving with thousands of other CIA officers who feel the same about theirs—and are rising to the challenge of a new era.

Spycraft and Statecraft

Transforming the CIA for an Age of Competition

By William J. Burns

January 30, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by William J. Burns · January 30, 2024

For as long as countries have kept secrets from one another, they have tried to steal them from one another. Espionage has been and will remain an integral part of statecraft, even as its techniques continually evolve. America’s first spies spent the Revolutionary War using ciphers, clandestine courier networks, and invisible ink to correspond with each other and their foreign allies. In World War II, the emerging field of signals intelligence helped uncover Japanese war plans. During the early Cold War, the United States’ intelligence capabilities literally went into the stratosphere, with the advent of the U-2 and other high-altitude spy planes that could photograph Soviet military installations with impressive clarity.

The simple stars etched on the memorial wall at the CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia, honor the 140 agency officers who gave their lives serving their country. The memorial offers an enduring reminder of countless acts of courage. Yet those instances of heroism and the CIA’s many quiet successes remain far less well known to the American public than the mistakes that have sometimes marred the agency’s history. The defining test for intelligence has always been to anticipate and help policymakers navigate profound shifts in the international landscape—the plastic moments that come along only a few times each century.

As President Joe Biden has reiterated, the United States faces one of those rare moments today, as consequential as the dawn of the Cold War or the post-9/11 period. China’s rise and Russia’s revanchism pose daunting geopolitical challenges in a world of intense strategic competition in which the United States no longer enjoys uncontested primacy and in which existential climate threats are mounting. Complicating matters further is a revolution in technology even more sweeping than the Industrial Revolution or the beginning of the nuclear age. From microchips to artificial intelligence to quantum computing, emerging technologies are transforming the world, including the profession of intelligence. In many ways, these developments make the CIA’s job harder than ever, giving adversaries powerful new tools to confuse us, evade us, and spy on us.

And yet as much as the world is changing, espionage remains an interplay between humans and technology. There will continue to be secrets that only humans can collect and clandestine operations that only humans can conduct. Technological advances, particularly in signals intelligence, have not made such human operations irrelevant, as some have predicted, but have instead revolutionized their practice. To be an effective twenty-first-century intelligence service, the CIA must blend a mastery of emerging technologies with the people-to-people skills and individual daring that have always been at the heart of our profession. That means equipping operations officers with the tools and tradecraft to conduct espionage in a world of constant technological surveillance—and equipping analysts with sophisticated artificial intelligence models that can digest mammoth amounts of open-source and clandestinely acquired information so that they can make their best human judgments.

At the same time, what the CIA does with the intelligence it gathers is also changing. “Strategic declassification,” the intentional public disclosure of certain secrets to undercut rivals and rally allies, has become an even more powerful tool for policymakers. Using it doesn’t mean recklessly jeopardizing the sources or methods used to collect the intelligence, but it does mean judiciously resisting the reflexive urge to keep everything classified. The U.S. intelligence community is also learning the increasing value of intelligence diplomacy, gaining a new understanding of how its efforts to bolster allies and counter foes can support policymakers.

This is a time of historic challenges for the CIA and the entire intelligence profession, with geopolitical and technological shifts posing as big a test as we’ve ever faced. Success will depend on blending traditional human intelligence with emerging technologies in creative ways. It will require, in other words, adapting to a world where the only safe prediction about change is that it will accelerate.

PUTIN UNBOUND

The post–Cold War era came to a definitive end the moment Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. I have spent much of the past two decades trying to understand the combustible combination of grievance, ambition, and insecurity that Russian President Vladimir Putin embodies. One thing I have learned is that it is always a mistake to underestimate his fixation on controlling Ukraine and its choices. Without that control, he believes it is impossible for Russia to be a great power or for him to be a great Russian leader. That tragic and brutish fixation has already brought shame to Russia and exposed its weaknesses, from its one-dimensional economy to its inflated military prowess to its corrupt political system. Putin’s invasion has also prompted breathtaking determination and resolve from the Ukrainian people. I have seen their courage firsthand on frequent wartime trips to Ukraine, punctuated by Russian air raids and vivid images of Ukrainian battlefield tenacity and ingenuity.

Putin’s war has already been a failure for Russia on many levels. His original goal of seizing Kyiv and subjugating Ukraine proved foolish and illusory. His military has suffered immense damage. At least 315,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded, two-thirds of Russia’s prewar tank inventory has been destroyed, and Putin’s vaunted decades-long military modernization program has been hollowed out. All this is a direct result of Ukrainian soldiers’ valor and skill, backed up by Western support. Meanwhile, Russia’s economy is suffering long-term setbacks, and the country is sealing its fate as China’s economic vassal. Putin’s overblown ambitions have backfired in another way, too: they have prompted NATO to grow larger and stronger.

Espionage remains an interplay between humans and technology.

Although Putin’s repressive grip does not seem likely to weaken anytime soon, his war in Ukraine is quietly corroding his power at home. The short-lived mutiny launched last June by the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin offered a glimpse at some of the dysfunction lurking behind Putin’s carefully polished image of control. For a leader who painstakingly crafted a reputation as the arbiter of order, Putin looked detached and indecisive as Prigozhin’s ragtag mutineers made their way up the road to Moscow. For many in the Russian elite, the question was not so much whether the emperor had no clothes as why he was taking so long to get dressed. The ultimate apostle of payback, Putin eventually settled his score with Prigozhin, who was killed in a suspicious plane crash two months to the day after starting his rebellion. But Prigozhin’s biting critique of the lies and military misjudgments at the core of Putin’s war, and of the corruption at the heart of the Russian political system, will not soon disappear.

This year is likely to be a tough one on the battlefield in Ukraine, a test of staying power whose consequences will go well beyond the country’s heroic struggle to sustain its freedom and independence. As Putin regenerates Russia’s defense production—with critical components from China, as well as weaponry and munitions from Iran and North Korea—he continues to bet that time is on his side, that he can grind down Ukraine and wear down its Western supporters. Ukraine’s challenge is to puncture Putin’s arrogance and demonstrate the high cost for Russia of continued conflict, not just by making progress on the frontlines but also by launching deeper strikes behind them and making steady gains in the Black Sea. In this environment, Putin might engage again in nuclear saber-rattling, and it would be foolish to dismiss escalatory risks entirely. But it would be equally foolish to be unnecessarily intimidated by them.

The key to success lies in preserving Western aid for Ukraine. At less than five percent of the U.S. defense budget, it is a relatively modest investment with significant geopolitical returns for the United States and notable returns for American industry. Keeping the arms flowing will put Ukraine in a stronger position if an opportunity for serious negotiations emerges. It offers a chance to ensure a long-term win for Ukraine and a strategic loss for Russia; Ukraine could safeguard its sovereignty and rebuild, while Russia would be left to deal with the enduring costs of Putin’s folly. For the United States to walk away from the conflict at this crucial moment and cut off support to Ukraine would be an own goal of historic proportions.

XI’S POWER PLAY

No one is watching U.S. support for Ukraine more closely than Chinese leaders. China remains the only U.S. rival with both the intent to reshape the international order and the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. The country’s economic transformation over the past five decades has been extraordinary. It is one for which the Chinese people deserve great credit and one that the rest of the world has broadly supported in the belief that a prosperous China is a global good. The issue is not China’s rise in itself but the threatening actions that increasingly accompany it. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has begun his third presidential term with more power than any of his predecessors since Mao Zedong. Rather than use that power to reinforce and revitalize the international system that enabled China’s transformation, Xi is seeking to rewrite it. In the intelligence profession, we study carefully what leaders say. But we pay even more attention to what they do. Xi’s growing repression at home and his aggressiveness abroad, from his “no limits” partnership with Putin to his threats to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, are impossible to ignore.

So, too, however, is the impact of Western solidarity on Xi’s calculus about the risks of using force against Taiwan, which elected a new president, Lai Ching-te, in January. For Xi, a man inclined to see the United States as a fading power, American leadership on Ukraine has surely come as a surprise. The United States’ willingness to inflict and absorb economic pain to counter Putin’s aggression—and its ability to rally its allies to do the same—powerfully contradicted Beijing’s belief that America was in terminal decline. Closer to Chinese shores, the resilience of the American network of allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific has had a sobering effect on Beijing’s thinking. One of the surest ways to rekindle Chinese perceptions of American fecklessness and stoke Chinese aggressiveness would be to abandon support for Ukraine. Continued material backing for Ukraine doesn’t come at the expense of Taiwan; it sends an important message of U.S. resolve that helps Taiwan.

Competition with China is taking place against the backdrop of thick economic interdependence and commercial ties between it and the United States. Such connections have served the two countries and the rest of the world remarkably well, but they have also created critical vulnerabilities and serious risks for American security and prosperity. The COVID-19 pandemic made clear to every government the danger of being dependent on any one country for life-saving medical supplies, just as Russia’s war in Ukraine has made clear to Europe the risks of being dependent on one country for energy. In today’s world, no country wants to find itself at the mercy of a single supplier of critical minerals and technologies—especially if that supplier is intent on weaponizing those dependencies. As American policymakers have argued, the best answer is to sensibly “de-risk” and diversify—securing the United States’ supply chains, protecting its technological edge, and investing in its industrial capacity.

In this volatile, divided world, the weight of the “hedging middle” is growing. Democracies and autocracies, developed economies and developing ones, and countries across the global South are increasingly intent on diversifying their relationships to maximize their options. They see little benefit and plenty of risk in sticking to monogamous geopolitical relationships with either the United States or China. More countries are likely to be attracted to an “open” geopolitical relationship status (or at least an “it’s complicated” one), following the United States’ lead on some issues while cultivating relations with China. And if past is precedent, Washington ought to be attentive to rivalries between the growing number of middle powers, which have historically helped spark collisions between major ones.

A FAMILIAR ENTANGLEMENT

The crisis precipitated by Hamas’s butchery in Israel on October 7, 2023, is a painful reminder of the complexity of the choices that the Middle East continues to pose for the United States. Competition with China will remain Washington’s highest priority, but that doesn’t mean it can evade other challenges. It means only that the United States has to navigate with care and discipline, avoid overreach, and use its influence wisely.

I have spent much of the last four decades working in and on the Middle East, and I have rarely seen it more tangled or explosive. Winding down the intense Israeli ground operation in the Gaza Strip, meeting the deep humanitarian needs of suffering Palestinian civilians, freeing hostages, preventing the spread of conflict to other fronts in the region, and shaping a workable approach for the “day after” in Gaza are all incredibly difficult problems. So is resurrecting hope for a durable peace that ensures Israel’s security as well as Palestinian statehood and takes advantage of historic opportunities for normalization with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Hard as it may be to imagine those possibilities amid the current crisis, it is even harder to imagine getting out of the crisis without pursuing them seriously.

Key to Israel’s—and the region’s—security is dealing with Iran. The Iranian regime has been emboldened by the crisis and seems ready to fight to its last regional proxy, all while expanding its nuclear program and enabling Russian aggression. In the months after October 7, the Houthis, the Yemeni rebel group allied with Iran, began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, and the risks of escalation on other fronts persist.

The United States is not exclusively responsible for resolving any of the Middle East’s vexing problems. But none of them can be managed, let alone solved, without active U.S. leadership.

SPIES LIKE US

Geopolitical competition and uncertainty—not to mention shared challenges such as climate change and unprecedented technological advances such as artificial intelligence—make for a fiendishly complicated international landscape. The imperative for the CIA is to transform its approach to intelligence to keep pace with this rapidly transforming world. The CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community—led by Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence—are working hard to meet this moment with the urgency and creativity it requires.

This new landscape presents particular challenges for an organization focused on human intelligence. In a world in which the United States’ principal rivals—China and Russia—are led by personalistic autocrats operating within small and insular circles of advisers, gaining insight into leaders’ intentions is both more important and more difficult than ever.

Just as 9/11 ushered in a new era for the CIA, so did Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I’m deeply proud of the work that the CIA and our intelligence partners have done to assist the president and senior U.S. policymakers—and especially the Ukrainians themselves—to thwart Putin. Together, we provided early and accurate warning of the coming invasion. That knowledge also enabled the president to decide to send me to Moscow to warn Putin and his advisers in November 2021 about the consequences of the attack we knew they were planning. Convinced that their window for dominating Ukraine was closing and that the upcoming winter offered a favorable opportunity, they were unmoved and unapologetic—badly overestimating their own position and underestimating Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve.

Good intelligence has since helped the president mobilize and sustain a strong coalition of countries in support of Ukraine. It has also helped Ukraine defend itself with remarkable bravery and perseverance. The president has also made creative use of strategic declassification. Before the invasion, the administration, along with the British government, exposed Russian plans for “false flag” operations that were designed to pin blame on Ukrainians and provide a pretext for Russian military action. These and subsequent disclosures have denied Putin the false narratives that I have watched him so often weaponize in the past. They have put him in the uncomfortable and unaccustomed position of being on the back foot. And they have bolstered both Ukraine and the coalition supporting it.

Biden and Burns speaking in front of the memorial wall at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, July 2022

Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Meanwhile, disaffection with the war is continuing to gnaw away at the Russian leadership and the Russian people, beneath the thick surface of state propaganda and repression. That undercurrent of disaffection is creating a once-in-a-generation recruiting opportunity for the CIA. We’re not letting it go to waste.

While Russia may pose the most immediate challenge, China is the bigger long-term threat, and over the past two years, the CIA has been reorganizing itself to reflect that priority. We have started by acknowledging an organizational fact I learned long ago: priorities aren’t real unless budgets reflect them. Accordingly, the CIA has committed substantially more resources toward China-related intelligence collection, operations, and analysis around the world—more than doubling the percentage of our overall budget focused on China over just the last two years. We’re hiring and training more Mandarin speakers while stepping up efforts across the world to compete with China, from Latin America to Africa to the Indo-Pacific.

The CIA has a dozen or so “mission centers,” issue-specific groups that bring together officers from across the agencies’ various directorates. In 2021, we set up a new mission center focused exclusively on China. The only single-country mission center, it provides a central mechanism for coordinating work on China, a job that extends today to every corner of the CIA. And we’re also quietly strengthening intelligence channels to our counterparts in Beijing, an important means of helping policymakers avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and inadvertent collisions between the United States and China.

Even as China and Russia consume much of the CIA’s attention, the agency can’t afford to neglect other challenges, from counterterrorism to regional instability. The successful U.S. strike in Afghanistan in July 2022 against Ayman al-Zawahiri, the co-founder and former leader of al Qaeda, demonstrated that the CIA remains sharply focused on—and retains significant capabilities to combat—terrorist threats. The CIA is also devoting substantial resources to help fight the invasion of fentanyl, the synthetic opioid that kills tens of thousands of Americans every year. And familiar regional challenges loom, not just in places long considered strategically important, such as North Korea and the South China Sea, but also in parts of the world whose geopolitical significance will only grow in the years ahead, such as Latin America and Africa.

SMARTER SPIES

Meanwhile, we’re transforming our approach to emerging technology. The CIA has been working to blend high-tech tools with age-old techniques for collecting intelligence from individuals—human intelligence, or HUMINT. Technology is, of course, making many aspects of spycraft harder than ever. In an era of smart cities, with video cameras on every street and facial recognition technology increasingly ubiquitous, spying has become much harder. For a CIA officer working overseas in a hostile country, meeting sources who are risking their own safety to offer valuable information, constant surveillance poses an acute threat. But the same technology that sometimes works against the CIA—whether it’s the mining of big data to expose patterns in the agency’s activities or massive camera networks that can track an operative’s every move—can also be made to work for it and against others. The CIA is racing against its rivals to put emerging technologies to use. The agency has appointed its first chief technology officer. And it has established another new mission center focused on building better partnerships with the private sector, where American innovation offers a significant competitive advantage.

The CIA’s in-house scientific and technological talent remains superb. The agency has developed warehouses’ worth of spy gadgetry over the years, my favorite being the Cold War camera designed to look and hover like a dragonfly. The revolution in artificial intelligence, and the avalanche of open-source information alongside what we collect clandestinely, creates historic new opportunities for the CIA’s analysts. We’re developing new AI tools to help digest all that material faster and more efficiently, freeing officers to focus on what they do best: providing reasoned judgments and insights on what matters most to policymakers and what means most for American interests. AI won’t replace human analysts, but it is already empowering them.

Another priority in this new era is to deepen the CIA’s unmatched network of intelligence partnerships around the world, an asset the United States’ lonelier rivals currently lack. The CIA’s ability to benefit from its partners—from their collection, their expertise, their perspectives, and their capacity to operate more easily in many places than the agency can—is critical to its success. Just as diplomacy depends on revitalizing these old and new partnerships, so does intelligence. At its core, the intelligence profession is about human interactions, and there is no substitute for direct contact to strengthen ties with our closest allies, communicate with our fiercest adversaries, and cultivate everyone in between. In more than 50 overseas trips in nearly three years as director, I’ve run the gamut of those relationships.

Sometimes, it’s more convenient for intelligence officers to deal with historic enemies in situations in which diplomatic contact might connote formal recognition. That’s why the president sent me to Kabul in late August of 2021 to engage with the Taliban leadership just before the final withdrawal of U.S. troops. Sometimes, the CIA’s relationships in complicated parts of the world can offer practical possibilities, as in the ongoing negotiations with Egypt, Israel, Qatar, and Hamas over a humanitarian cease-fire and the release of hostages from Gaza. Sometimes, such ties can provide discreet ballast in relationships full of political ups and downs. And sometimes, intelligence diplomacy can encourage a convergence of interests and quietly support the efforts of U.S. diplomats and policymakers.

IN THE SHADOWS

Every day, as I read through cables from stations around the world, travel to foreign capitals, or speak with colleagues at headquarters, I’m reminded of the skill and courage of CIA officers, as well as the unrelenting challenges they face. They are doing hard jobs in hard places. Especially since 9/11, they have been operating at an incredibly fast tempo. Indeed, taking care of the CIA’s mission in this new and daunting era depends on taking care of our people. That’s why the CIA has strengthened its medical resources at headquarters and in the field; improved programs for families, remote workers, and two-career couples; and explored more flexible career paths, especially for technologists, so that officers can move into the private sector and later return to the agency.

We’ve streamlined our recruiting process for new officers. It now takes a quarter of the time it took two years ago to move from application to final offer and security clearance. These improvements have contributed to a surge of interest in the CIA. In 2023, we had more applicants than in any year since the immediate aftermath of 9/11. We’re also working hard to diversify our workforce, reaching historic highs in 2023 in terms of the number of women and minority officers hired, as well as the number promoted into the agency’s most senior ranks.

By necessity, CIA officers operate in the shadows, usually out of sight and out of mind; the risks they take and the sacrifices they make are rarely well understood. At a moment when trust in the United States’ public institutions is often in short supply, the CIA remains a resolutely apolitical institution, bound by the oath I and everyone else at the agency have taken to defend the Constitution and by our obligations under the law.

CIA officers are also bound together by a sense of community, and by a deep, shared commitment to public service at this crucial moment in American history. They know the truth in the advice I got many years ago from my father, who had a distinguished military career. As I was wrestling with what to do with my professional life, he sent me a handwritten note: “Nothing can make you prouder than to serve your country with honor.” That helped launch me into a long and fortunate career in government, first in the Foreign Service and now at the CIA. I’ve never regretted the choice I made. I take enormous pride in serving with thousands of other CIA officers who feel the same about theirs—and are rising to the challenge of a new era.

WILLIAM J. BURNS is Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Foreign Affairs · by William J. Burns · January 30, 2024

9. The bane of Western military strategy – Technological Determinism

The bane of Western military strategy – Technological Determinism

Excerpts;

I have attempted to demonstrate that the current Western understanding of military capability is too technically constrained leading a strange strategic logic ignoring the realities of warfare. Additionally, it concurrently lacks the nuance to present a thorough understanding of justification and acquisition. We need to be deeply aware of this deficiency and not cast an incomplete paradigm over the problem, thinking it will suffice. Nor believe that this technology based determinism isn’t already unbalancing strategic thought as it has in the past.

A better context is to recognise that a military capability is ambivalent to the tasks set before it. Likewise, their effectiveness is not constrained or amplified solely by the levers of technology. It may be that, technically, a capability is not ‘optimally employed’ in a particular conflict, but that is moot. What is essential in capability acquisition is ensuring the best chance in the worst environment; the enemy (not a ‘threat’ but a ruthless enemy) gets a say. Of course, it is not the ultimate solution, but the underlying themes that propel this idea perhaps are at least a good place to start on this issue and more broadly. Capability doesn’t care if it ‘projects impactfully’, ‘manoeuvres littorally’, ‘partners allies’, ‘covers NATO flank’ (which seems to change compass points often), ‘fights for shared values’, ‘competes jointly’, or sits in the splendid isolation of neutral national defence. Likewise, reality’s horrible ambivalence to any predictive concept du jour will lead to an inevitable praxis gap, which technology alone will not bridge.

In the Australian context, the nation has an undebated strategy simply through the cost and lead time of some major equipment decisions. This lack of public debate is grounds for concern, as Australia is now setting down a road with fewer forks than before. It may be the right path, but that is not readily apparent. This vacuity, as Peter Layton, through the work of David Horner, has recently asserted, is symptomatic of Australia’s historical difficulty in acknowledging the massive uncertainty in war.

Likewise, UK soldiers clad in the best body armour, personal role radios and advanced assault weapons, perfect for the last war, are arguably symptomatic of technological determinism. This equipment upgrade should occur; it is good news but not a panacea. Again, lethality isn’t solely decisive. More people need to spend more time reading Stephen Biddle’s work.

When seeking equipment, understand it is just that: equipment. Capability requires greater understanding and detachment from strategy regarding process than currently. Operational ambivalence in technical solutions must be embraced and detached from strategic shifts. Then perhaps we can focus on debating what truly matters: a good, clear, and flexible strategy while equipping service people fittingly.

The bane of Western military strategy – Technological Determinism » Wavell Room

wavellroom.com · by Jason Thomas · January 17, 2024

Experimental Feature: Audio Read Version

In war, new technology matters, but adaptations dramatically dampen its effects

Stephen Biddle

As Stephen Biddle has so presciently stated, we have witnessed both the confirmation and denial of the importance of technology in war over the past two years. Heavy combat assets and indirect firepower matter, but only if used correctly. No amount of drone wizardry seems to mitigate the need for soldiers to get ‘knee-deep in the big muddy.’ The dominance of systems in one environment (maritime) does not mean that others cannot destroy them.

None of it is new to even the most casual students of war. Yet, pundits sing praises for the next weapon system ‘game changer’ to be belatedly provided to Ukraine, this one promising apparently to snap the Russian camel’s back finally. Yet still, drunk, poorly trained and equipped, Ivan stays curled up sodden in his partially dug trench on Ukrainian soil. Ukrainian combat cohesion is remarkable, Russian is miraculous.

Why do defence equipment exhibitions abound with the latest technical toys and receive disproportionate attention compared to other important aspects of military capability? The simple answer is money, personnel, and strategic conferencing are less likely to benefit corporate balance sheets. Still, I believe there is a bigger trap Western militaries have fallen into: that of technological determinism.

The UK Infantry Trials and Development Unit operating the AtlasPro drone. Credit: MOD. .

I will use an Australian example of this entrapment in the persistent over-reliance on technology as a poor surrogate for strategic thought. I will leave you to decide if the case applies to your nation.

The current Australian Department of Defence definition of capability is the capacity or ability to achieve an operational effect. An operational effect may be defined or described in terms of the nature of the effect and of how, when, where and for how long it is produced. Both UK and US definitions appear broader; however, they can soon fall into the equipment solution mindset or, in the case of the myriad US agencies, follow the Australian example.

Narrow definitions

This Australian definition is too narrow in meaning for complete understanding and too prescriptive to serve the organisational process of capability development and to inform public debate. It ignores the stark realities of conflict and is servile to the ‘technological edge’ over other aspects of capability.

Australia is not alone in this phenomenon, as others have similarly commented. Like most Western nations, Australia fell in love with technical advantage as an intellectual sunscreen to the harsh light of warfare. raming fighting concepts as technical capability descriptions, avoiding war’s visceral nature and ignoring other important aspects of warfare, such as mass. Such language additionally sanitises the language of war; most of the time, ‘effects’ mean destruction and suffering.

The other sign of this malaise is the seeking of the asymmetric edge. Asymmetry in military operations occurs against a specific enemy force at a particular time and space. An infantry soldier with an anti-armoured weapon well concealed in an urban environment is asymmetric to an unsupported tank. The same soldier is not when walking an open plain at night with the same weapon. The assumption that a new technology is automatically asymmetric and grants a Star Wars ‘force’ like advantage over an adversary shows a lack of understanding of the conduct of war and the hard limits of science.

MoD Abbey Wood. The UK centre for procurement. Credit: MOD.

I am in no way marginalising the unavoidable complexity of material procurement. But the conduct of war is chaotic; seeking high certainty in technical solutions before a profoundly uncertain event is a somewhat tenuous approach. This paradox does not mean the best possible equipment should not be pursued. Still, this need should be based on the lessons of rigorous historical analysis, recent conflicts, and substantiated trends, not ‘leading-edge’ concepts or wonder weapons. There is a need to avoid ideas that missile gaps are bridged with more missiles alone or services self-serving declarations that lethality is somehow automatically decisive.

There are two ways to resolve this inadequacy of definition and start to break determinism. The first is to develop a more complex and nuanced understanding of capability. The second is to accept that most military capabilities are operationally ambivalent.

In the first case, Stephen Biddle provides perhaps some of the most rigorous studies of military capability in state and non-state warfare. Biddle’s understanding of capability is far more profound and broader than the Australian definition, and he concedes it is still a work in progress. His later work even considers social issues, such as internal politics among non-state actors, having a marked effect on military capability. However, I believe it is too complex a theory for easy application inside a bureaucracy, but it is well worth such bureaucracies checking his conclusions now and again. Moreover, it raises an important point: why aren’t non-technical factors in warfare given greater transparency when we discuss capability?

Operationally ambivalent

We must, therefore, treat military technology and capabilities as operationally ambivalent. The rediscovery of the long-neglected self-propelled anti-aircraft capability (something Australia has always neglected) to help defeat the drone threat in Ukraine is an excellent case study. Initially designed for the Cold War, these systems are now highly effective against mass-produced, off-the-shelf, and military drones they were never planned to counter—something a recent Australian strategic review ignored, dazzled by the distant light of nuclear submarines.

An excellent example of operational ambivalence was the Australian Defence Force’s maritime patrol capability to provide surveillance support to ground troops in urban operations in Iraq. Imagination and permission are the only limitations to employing military capability; in many cases, those in combat won’t even seek permission. To use an adage, if it works and it’s stupid, it isn’t stupid.

Will Leben proved, at least within the Australian forum, that discussion could occur without a solely technical cant; he asks, what do we want the Army to do? This approach was necessary for stabilising the deeply polarised debate, which was initially narrow and ill-informed, with no in-depth consideration of the capability.

More broadly, many senior Western commanders comment on ‘gaps’, whether hypersonics, space, cyber, drones, or grey zone. Strangely, most of these commanders oversee said assets and only suggest more of their own as a solution, not even remotely seeking alternative counters. They may be correct, but history shows that missile and ship gaps have been sensationalist before (the current hypersonics gap, in particular, is highly contentious). Still, more worryingly, it shows an abject failure of imagination.

I have attempted to demonstrate that the current Western understanding of military capability is too technically constrained leading a strange strategic logic ignoring the realities of warfare. Additionally, it concurrently lacks the nuance to present a thorough understanding of justification and acquisition. We need to be deeply aware of this deficiency and not cast an incomplete paradigm over the problem, thinking it will suffice. Nor believe that this technology based determinism isn’t already unbalancing strategic thought as it has in the past.

A better context is to recognise that a military capability is ambivalent to the tasks set before it. Likewise, their effectiveness is not constrained or amplified solely by the levers of technology. It may be that, technically, a capability is not ‘optimally employed’ in a particular conflict, but that is moot. What is essential in capability acquisition is ensuring the best chance in the worst environment; the enemy (not a ‘threat’ but a ruthless enemy) gets a say. Of course, it is not the ultimate solution, but the underlying themes that propel this idea perhaps are at least a good place to start on this issue and more broadly. Capability doesn’t care if it ‘projects impactfully’, ‘manoeuvres littorally’, ‘partners allies’, ‘covers NATO flank’ (which seems to change compass points often), ‘fights for shared values’, ‘competes jointly’, or sits in the splendid isolation of neutral national defence. Likewise, reality’s horrible ambivalence to any predictive concept du jour will lead to an inevitable praxis gap, which technology alone will not bridge.

In the Australian context, the nation has an undebated strategy simply through the cost and lead time of some major equipment decisions. This lack of public debate is grounds for concern, as Australia is now setting down a road with fewer forks than before. It may be the right path, but that is not readily apparent. This vacuity, as Peter Layton, through the work of David Horner, has recently asserted, is symptomatic of Australia’s historical difficulty in acknowledging the massive uncertainty in war.

Likewise, UK soldiers clad in the best body armour, personal role radios and advanced assault weapons, perfect for the last war, are arguably symptomatic of technological determinism. This equipment upgrade should occur; it is good news but not a panacea. Again, lethality isn’t solely decisive. More people need to spend more time reading Stephen Biddle’s work.

When seeking equipment, understand it is just that: equipment. Capability requires greater understanding and detachment from strategy regarding process than currently. Operational ambivalence in technical solutions must be embraced and detached from strategic shifts. Then perhaps we can focus on debating what truly matters: a good, clear, and flexible strategy while equipping service people fittingly.

About the author Related Posts

Jason Thomas

Website

Jason is a retired Australian Armoured Corps Officer who served in a variety of command and staff appointments. Including capability development and future warfare positions. He holds a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering, a Master of Science in military vehicle technology, and a Master of Arts in strategy and policy. Currently, he is living in Copenhagen where besides reading for a PhD in Mission Command at the University of Sydney, and being a house dad, he occasionally writes on military topics with a focus on leadership and strategy.

wavellroom.com · by Jason Thomas · January 17, 2024

10. Putin Isn’t Hitler, He’s Mussolini—and Ukraine Is His Abyssinia

Excerpts;

A successful deterrence now may prevent the next aggressor. Hitler watched gleefully as the League of Nations self-imploded. Mussolini’s success in Abyssinia emboldened Hitler along his path toward European domination. The primary modern comparison that comes to mind is the threat of China and President Xi Jinping deciding to employ military force to reclaim dominion over Taiwan. By understanding the dynamics in play in 1935, it becomes clear that if the United States and other members of the international community want to deter aggression against the island, then it is in their collective security interest to continue to support Ukraine. But the China-Taiwan scenario is far from the only risk. Other potential aggressors, such as Iran and North Korea, are also watching to see whether Ukraine’s international supporters will remain steadfast over the long term.

Turning specifically to the United States, the debate continues in Washington with respect to passing a new aid package for Ukraine. There are legitimate reservations within Congress on passing this funding. Concern over the accountability of aid provided to Ukraine is reasonable and the desire to have an end-game strategy for the conflict is understandable. But the fear that continued aid to Ukraine will only increase the likelihood of direct conflict between NATO and Russia misses the mark. It is the absence of continued aid, which would precipitate a weakened Ukraine and potential collapse that enables a larger Russian victory, that raises the risk of a NATO-Russia, US-China, or other large-scale war. The only lesson Vladimir Putin and other potential aggressors will learn from an end to US aid to Ukraine and a complete Russian victory in Ukraine is that aggression works and that authoritarian systems can outlast the West.

Britain declared it had no vital interests at stake in Abyssinia. Some argue the same with respect to US interests in Ukraine today. But maintaining support for Ukraine through the continuation of military and economic aid may not only guarantee a more just peace in Ukraine; it may also help prevent the next, larger war from occurring.

Putin Isn’t Hitler, He’s Mussolini—and Ukraine Is His Abyssinia - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Dean D. LaGattuta · January 29, 2024

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It was bitterly cold. Soldiers huddled together wearing heavy winter jackets and black, Army-issued beanies underneath their helmets. The engines of Humvees and trucks hummed collectively, a cacophony of noise that drowned out conversations. The battalion convoy was ready to step off from Germany for a NATO exercise in Latvia. My battalion commander approached as I hopped into my Humvee. Somewhat jokingly, over the din of running engines and soldiers preparing to move out, he asked, “Which day do you think it is going to happen? I think Friday.” I responded, “My bet is on Wednesday, sir.” The date was February 13, 2022.

Both of our guesses missed the mark, but not by much. The following week, on Thursday, Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, kicking off the war that has raged for nearly two years.

During the six-day convoy I read a book that I had started in December 2021 as the Russian military buildup along the border with Ukraine continued. Titled Appeasing Hitler, the historical work by Tim Bouverie provides insight into the rationale behind the British policy of appeasement in the period leading up to World War II. It also serves as a cautionary tale of the appeasement strategy’s failure. A policy premised on acquiescing to a tyrant’s demands in the hopes of avoiding war accomplished the opposite. Instead, appeasement served to increase Hitler’s appetite for conquest and contributed to the eruption of the most destructive conflict in human history.

There have been many comparisons between Russian President Vladimir Putin’s words and those of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both asserted the importance of reclaiming historical lands, protecting their respective countries’ ethnic populations living in the near abroad, and the fact that their aggressive actions were defensive—that they were the victims instead of the aggressors. And although it is understandable why many compare Putin’s invasion of Ukraine to the actions of Adolf Hitler in the lead up to World War II, Bouverie’s Appeasing Hitler provides an opportunity for a different comparison, to a much lesser-known war.

The Italo-Abyssinian War of 1935 is an obscure conflict, overshadowed by the world war that would shortly follow. However, the parallels between Benito Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia) and Putin’s invasion of Ukraine are striking. Historical comparisons are inherently imperfect. We cannot replicate the political, economic, social, and technological conditions that existed in the past. However, we can extract and examine themes and notable decisions in history to provide the foundation for important lessons for today’s leaders. A reexamination of the Italian conquest provides such lessons that underscore mistakes to avoid and the possible consequences the West faces if support for Ukraine falters.

First, however, a basic understanding of Italy’s imperial war is necessary. Before Mussolini and Hitler officially formed an alliance, Italy actually worked alongside Britain and France in the early 1930s. Mussolini’s Italy even joined the Stresa Front in April 1935 alongside Britain and France to counter Nazi Germany’s Versailles Treaty violations. But despite pledging to maintain peace in Europe, Mussolini had other intentions in Africa. Disregarding warnings of an Italian offensive in late 1934 and early 1935, the British government refused to confront Mussolini. Britain viewed Nazi Germany as the threat of the future and believed Italy was a crucial ally.

Britain and France’s refusal to deter Italian aggression threatened more than the sovereignty of Abyssinia. Following World War I, the League of Nations emerged and introduced a new age of international law. The league, which Abyssinia had joined in 1923, provided the protection of Article 16. This article stipulated that all members would join in common action against states that made war against another member.

The British political leadership, however, did not want to embroil Britain in a war with Italy. Britain, they argued, had no vital interests at stake. Thus, convinced neither France nor Britain would intervene, Mussolini launched the invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935.

In November 1935, France and Britain sought a negotiated end to the conflict that would have ceded the majority of Abyssinian territory to Italy. News leaked of this backdoor diplomacy and league members were outraged. France and Britain’s fiasco meant the death of the credibility of the league and the abandonment of Abyssinia to its fate at the hands of a stronger power. By May 1936 Italian forces entered Addis Ababa and declared victory.

Throughout the entire Italian-Abyssinian conflict, there was one keen observer: Adolf Hitler. He watched as the authority of the League of Nations vanished before his eyes. Most importantly, he witnessed Italy use aggression to achieve political goals and face no severe consequences.

As we return to the present day, one may argue that the United States now fits Britain’s role as the declining global power. The specter of a looming global threat is no longer Germany, but China. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, challenging international norms, is Mussolini’s Italy. The state sovereignty threatened is not Abyssinia’s, but Ukraine’s. It is not the League of Nations at risk, but the pillars of the US-led post–World War II order—the United Nations, NATO, and even the international norms that have ruled since the conclusion of World War II.

We can draw numerous lessons from the Italian-Abyssinian debacle: from the necessity of major global powers abstaining from negotiating away the sovereignty of smaller states, to the importance of conventional military deterrence in complicating the political calculations of would-be aggressors, to the need for preemptive and sustained economic punishments for aggressor states in violation of international norms and laws. But there is one main lesson that is most important and applicable to our world today.

A successful deterrence now may prevent the next aggressor. Hitler watched gleefully as the League of Nations self-imploded. Mussolini’s success in Abyssinia emboldened Hitler along his path toward European domination. The primary modern comparison that comes to mind is the threat of China and President Xi Jinping deciding to employ military force to reclaim dominion over Taiwan. By understanding the dynamics in play in 1935, it becomes clear that if the United States and other members of the international community want to deter aggression against the island, then it is in their collective security interest to continue to support Ukraine. But the China-Taiwan scenario is far from the only risk. Other potential aggressors, such as Iran and North Korea, are also watching to see whether Ukraine’s international supporters will remain steadfast over the long term.

Turning specifically to the United States, the debate continues in Washington with respect to passing a new aid package for Ukraine. There are legitimate reservations within Congress on passing this funding. Concern over the accountability of aid provided to Ukraine is reasonable and the desire to have an end-game strategy for the conflict is understandable. But the fear that continued aid to Ukraine will only increase the likelihood of direct conflict between NATO and Russia misses the mark. It is the absence of continued aid, which would precipitate a weakened Ukraine and potential collapse that enables a larger Russian victory, that raises the risk of a NATO-Russia, US-China, or other large-scale war. The only lesson Vladimir Putin and other potential aggressors will learn from an end to US aid to Ukraine and a complete Russian victory in Ukraine is that aggression works and that authoritarian systems can outlast the West.

Britain declared it had no vital interests at stake in Abyssinia. Some argue the same with respect to US interests in Ukraine today. But maintaining support for Ukraine through the continuation of military and economic aid may not only guarantee a more just peace in Ukraine; it may also help prevent the next, larger war from occurring.

First Lieutenant Dean D. LaGattuta is a 2020 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, majoring in political science and minoring in Eurasian studies. He serves as a military intelligence officer in the United States Army.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Dean D. LaGattuta · January 29, 2024

11. War with China would be an unmitigated strategic catastrophe

War with China would be an unmitigated strategic catastrophe

BY HARLAN ULLMAN, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 01/29/24 1:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4434512-war-with-china-would-be-an-unmitigated-strategic-catastrophe/?utm

The United States too often suffers from historical amnesia and technological hubris. One striking example proves this point.

Since World War II ended, America has lost every war it started. Yes, America has lost every war it started — Vietnam, Afghanistan and the second Iraq War. And it won the Cold War, which it did not start.

Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait provoked an overwhelming response by a large international coalition led by the U.S. After Sept. 11, the U.S. did not have to invade Afghanistan to destroy al Qaeda or kill Osama bin Laden. After all, where was bin Laden killed? In Pakistan, not Afghanistan.

Now the U.S. is repeating these huge misjudgments in its strategic thinking and planning for national security and defense. Since Barack Obama’s strategic pivot to Asia, both the Trump and Biden administrations have followed suit. As a result, the U.S. now has a military force designed to fight one war, presumably against China, at a cost of about $900 billion a year.

And this is a war the U.S. will not or cannot win for many reasons. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was correct when he warned that anyone considering fighting a land war in Asia “needed to have his or her mind examined.” In this case, what is the meaning of victory and winning? Either it is yet to be defined or there is none.

Furthermore, given likely weapons expenditure rates should a war with China erupt, the U.S. has the capacity for about a month before, as in Ukraine, it runs out of inventory. The most discussed scenario is the so-called battle of the Taiwan Straits and defeating a Chinese military invasion and assault on that island. This needs to be carefully reexamined.

Based on actual past invasions in World War II and Korea, particularly Normandy in 1944 and Okinawa a year later, upwards of 5,000 or more ships and small craft and several hundreds of thousands of soldiers and marines would be required. In the short term, China will not have this capacity.

But suppose China launched an invasion or bombarded Taiwan with massive air and missile attacks. How would the U.S. defend Taiwan? Today detecting a target makes its destruction likely. No matter the countermeasures, if carrier strike groups were to close Taiwan within, say, 1,000 miles, they would be targeted and probably hit by Chinese missiles. U.S. submarines would be limited to magazine capacity and would depart the fight once weapons were expended.

If the U.S. were to attack China’s mainland, why would China not strike Guam, Hawaii or the continental U.S.? In the latter case, would that invoke NATO’s Article 5 in which an “attack on one is to be considered an attack against all?” NATO did invoke Article 5 for the first time after 9/11. What would NATO do in this case?

Given China as the “pacing” or principal threat, what happens if the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the effort to protect the Red Sea from Houthi attacks escalate? Is the U.S. one-war, China-biased military strategy prepared for other contingencies? If not, is it time to reexamine that strategy?

War with China would be a strategic catastrophe. The U.S. has not explained how such a war could be fought and won. The economic consequences would be disastrous. And how would such a war end? Can anyone answer these questions?

A strategic solution is so obvious that no one sees it. The U.S. needs to change its focus from assuming the burdens for “competing, deterring and defeating or prevailing” over specific adversaries outlined in the National Defense Strategy to working through and with allies in NATO and Asia to prevent war and its escalation.

Prevention is not deterrence; it is more proactive. Simply put, instead of taking the lead role in war the U.S. strategic aim must be to defend treaty allies by helping them to defend themselves. Further, the U.S. must stop naming specific enemies. If China, Russia, Iran or others declared that their strategies were to deter and defeat America if war arose, what would be our reaction?

Such a revised strategic optic would allow a smaller, less expensive force tailored for more than one contingency because of greater reliance on allies. But if the U.S. persists in shouldering the entire burden, again directed against China, it will repeat strategic blunders of the past.

The worst of all would be a war with China that never needed to be fought. But will anyone listen?

Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” military doctrine. His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. Twitter/X: @harlankullman.

12. Setting the Record Straight on Attrition

Conclusion

As the wars in Gaza and Ukraine illustrate, attrition is a characterization of conflict and not a form of warfare. Attrition is an adjective used to provide meaning to engagements, battles, campaigns, operations, and wars in which destruction is high. Moreover, attrition lacks a coherent body of knowledge and an accepted set of practical applications that would allow it to be considered a form of warfare. Therefore, it is prudent to accept that attrition warfare is not actually a typology. Rather, it is a misnomer that needs to be rectified. Replacing attrition in all cases in which the defense and security studies community, as well as military practitioners, are not outlining an activity’s character is paramount. The term destruction-oriented warfare is an appropriate replacement for attrition’s use in regard to a form of warfare.

Further, Western militaries must graduate beyond fanciful and idealist thinking about armed conflict. The destruction of hostile armies is how a military creates the situation required for their policymakers to pursue strategic victory. In some instances, however, that is not the case. The threat of, or the bludgeoning push toward the destruction of, a hostile army generates the signal for hostile policymakers to negotiate an end to armed conflict.

So long as large-scale wars between industrialized states continue, and destruction-oriented methods remain the path to military, and subsequently political, victory, then the defense and security studies communities must come around to understanding attrition and its place in the conduct of armed conflict. As Nolan reminds us, the destruction of armies, or the push toward destroying armies, is the most effective and historically supportable way in which to drive policymakers to the negotiating table.

Setting the Record Straight on Attrition - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Amos Fox · January 30, 2024

Alarms regarding the number of casualties and the depth of destruction to Gaza’s physical infrastructure continue to ring loudly in the throes of the Israel-Hamas conflict. At the time of writing, more than 23,000 people have been killed in the conflict, and a staggering amount of collateral damage has made everything from medical care to burial in death exceedingly challenging in the war-torn area. This is the level of death and destruction despite the Israeli government’s assertion that it has conducted a “precision, focused and process-based campaign.” The rub here is that whether a precision strategy is used or not, a destruction-oriented strategy focused on eliminating an adversary force, especially if it is in an urban area (or areas), will create attritional effects. This logic tends to be missing from most discussions of precision strike strategy and maneuver warfare today.

Attrition should be appreciated for what it is. Attrition is not the product of a poor strategy, bad tactics, or ineffectual military. Nor is attrition inferior to maneuver or the discussion between the competing ideas an irrelevant distraction, as some commenters assert. As Christopher Tuck writes, attrition is a characterization of armed conflict in which both sides possess the means and will to fight for their policy aims while remaining elusive enough to extend a conflict’s duration beyond a quick and simple initial battle. Christopher Denzel posits that maneuver warfare is operational art and that positional warfare and attrition all work together to unlock military success on the battlefield. Policymakers, military practitioners, and analysts should accept that attrition is a general characterization of war and warfare in which destruction — whether it is focused on an army, an insurgent network, or any other type of adversary — is the primary method through which combatants pursue their political and military goals. As Heather Venable and David Alman note, technology does not elevate the attrition factor either. As such, attrition should not be categorically discarded because it does not mesh with casualty-averse sensibilities.

There are a number of misunderstandings about attrition and its rightful place in warfare. The failed Ukrainian counteroffensive from the summer of 2023 is instructive. Blinded by a maneuver bias, the U.S. military advised the Ukrainian armed forces to conduct a maneuver-oriented counteroffensive against entrenched, fortified, and multidomain Russian defense in depth along the contact line. Commentary today still suggests that maneuver and attrition sit on opposite ends of a spectrum of warfare and that militaries that can execute maneuver warfare will fight less deadly wars — both being incorrect distinctions. Nonetheless, with no assailable flanks present, Ukrainian forces attacked headlong into the face of Russian defenses with an inappropriate approach for the situation at hand. As a result, Russia’s destruction-oriented defense thwarted Ukraine’s maneuver-centric attack, further contributing to the conflict’s highly attritional character. This further highlights the strategic, tactical, and institutional misunderstandings about the relationship between maneuver warfare, positional warfare, and attrition.

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Additionally, it is important to consider that regardless of how precise a weapon system is, so long as it is accompanied by an explosion of any kind, it will destroy things in proximity to its blast. As more strikes are aggregated across an area, those destructive effects compound and create an engagement, battle, operation, or campaign that can be characterized — among any other number of adjectives that fit the situation — as attritional. If a military force like Israel relies on a blend of stand-off strike in conjunction with highly mobile ground operations, all focused on destroying a political-military adversary such as Hamas, then staggering casualties should be expected. This is increasingly pertinent when groups such as Hamas use urban terrain to attempt to offset military overmatch. Thus, the hype that surrounds much of what maneuver warfare and precision strike strategies can do is just that: hype. Buying into the hype without hedging one’s bets against the idea that both maneuver and precision strike strategy can prevent battlefield death, collateral damage, and civilian casualties causes policymakers, institutions, and military practitioners to remain perpetually unprepared for the reality of wars of attrition.

It is important to understand these broadly held myths about conflict because, if left unchecked, they will continue to lead to calamitous missteps in planning policy and executing military strategy. They also prevent international organizations from properly preparing for the deleterious impact of warfighting, precision strategy or not. Those four myths include: 1) attrition is a form of warfare, 2) attrition is a correlation of forces and means battle, 3) attrition is focused on a one-to-one exchange ratio between adversaries, and 4) attrition is a lesser form of warfare. Examining these misunderstandings about attrition reveals two critical things: First, attrition is not a form of warfare, but a characterization of conflict in which one or more sides uses the pragmatic employment of destruction-based tactics and operations to create or take advantage of tactical and strategic opportunities on the battlefield. Further, it is important to remember that destruction-based warfare is not movement-agnostic. Rather, destruction-based approaches are grounded in the combination of movement to enable firepower.

Second, one form of warfare does not carry an inherent advantage over another. Rather, forms of warfare organically evolve to the situational requirement(s). As a result, a form of warfare’s value resides in its ability to best address the military situation at hand, and not in its adherence to a state military’s preferred doctrine.

Moreover, the forms of warfare, as a rule, correspond to three factors. First, the forms of warfare reflect a state or nonstate actor’s military goals. If the goal is removing a hostile force from the sovereign territory of another state — as is the case in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict — then destruction-based warfare is required to push the hostile army out of their neighbor’s sovereign territory. However, if a combatant’s goal is a dash to take control of another combatant’s capital, then a more movement-centric approach to warfare is required.

Second, the battlefield’s situation influences the type of warfare a combatant might employ. A situation can be defined many ways but in this case includes the physical terrain in which the conflict is occurring, the location of all forces — regular and irregular — throughout the theater of war, the availability of time, and the military objective. A combatant’s choice on how it wants to fight withers away when weighed against the situation at hand. Thus, the situation has a deterministic effect on campaigns and operations and, subsequently, the tactics therein.

Third, the forms of warfare are reflective of a state’s tools of war. A state military heavily invested in a reconnaissance-strike complex and mechanized forces will tend toward firepower and a destruction-based approach to warfighting more so than a state military that cannot support a robust strike and mechanized force. Likewise, nonstate actors tend to operate not so much on firepower and destruction as on movement and making the best use of position.

Defining Attrition

Trevor Dupuy provides one of the most useful and unbiased examinations of attrition. Dupuy writes that “attrition is a reduction in the number of personnel, weapons, and equipment in a military unit, organization, or force.” He defines attrition as “the difference between losses and returns to duty.” Dupuy does not define attrition as a form of war, but rather, he defines attrition as a result of combat, and therefore as a characterization of warfare in which destruction is the currency and wars focused on exhausting an adversary by increasing the material costs of war beyond what the adversary can sustain. Further, he states that enemy action and accidents are the primary methods through which attrition materializes.

More recent literature builds on Dupuy’s work and describes attrition as a state of being; put another way, attrition is a characterization, and not a form, of warfare. The characterization of “attrition” can be applied situationally or generally. For instance, an analyst can describe two tactical forces engaged in destruction-based fighting as a battle of attrition. This term can also apply if one side is using destruction-based methods against its adversary but is not putting its force in situations that allow for a comparable destruction-based approach from the opponent. Further, a combatant might use a destruction-based method, combined with the pragmatic use of terrain, force disposition within the terrain, and timing to avoid having its own force attritted, while inflicting high degrees of destruction on the adversary. This dynamic — the operational and tactical interplay between a force’s location on the battlefield, firepower, and movement — is positional warfare.

Nonetheless, some situations require headlong fighting in which both adversarial forces have no recourse or method of escape from battering combat. In these instances, in which both forces are engaged in methodical destruction-based warfighting, like the international community witnessed in the latter phase of Operation Inherent Resolve’s siege of Mosul, the watchful onlooker can classify this dynamic as a battle of attrition. When combined with the similar dynamic that occurred during the 2015–16 battle of Ramadi, this campaign can be defined as a war of attrition.

In a conflict in which the entire theater is engulfed in destruction-based warfighting, the war itself can be defined as a war of attrition. Wars of attrition, as Cathal Nolan and other scholars remind us, are the womb in which military victory develops.

Examining Attrition’s Detractions: Assertion 1: Attrition is a form of warfare

Many individuals engaged in the defense and security studies space community imply that attrition is a form or method of warfare. This cannot be further from the truth. In a military thinking sense, a “form,” “method,” or “type” implies that the subject possesses a cohered body of knowledge and a set of operations and tactics. These ideas — the body of knowledge and operations and tactics — might be institutionally developed and maintained, or organically developed by a theorist working outside the confines of an institution. These ideas might be codified as strategy, concepts, or doctrine, if maintained by an institution, such as a Western military force. On the other hand, these ideas might be codified as theory, if they are maintained by scholars, analysts, or theorists. A review of both U.S. and U.K. army operations doctrine finds no substantial mention of attrition or attrition warfare.

Given the absence in Western military doctrine, as well as defense and security studies or international relations scholarship, of discussion regarding “attrition warfare,” one must surmise that the word attrition is describing an environment in which destruction is the currency of conflict, and not a form, style, or type of warfare.

In other publications, scholars have provided an alternative framework for defining the mechanics of armed conflict. In this framework for warfare (see figure 1), contact serves as the X-axis and movement serves as the Y-axis. Contact (i.e., direct engagement with an adversary) is rated from heavy to light. Movement (i.e., the ability to use or the actual use of movement more than firepower) is also rated from heavy to light. The process of comparing movement and contact from heavy to light along each of those variables yields two primary forms of warfare — positional and roving warfare. Two subordinate forms of warfare exist beneath positional and roving warfare. Attrition, for its part, is not a form of warfare. Rather, attrition is a descriptor used to highlight armed conflicts, campaigns, battles, or engagements in which destruction-based warfighting is high, and at least one side in the conflict is inflicting significant casualties on the other.

Figure 1: Framework for Warfare

Further, a large amount of the literature on forms of warfare suggests that the goal of “attrition warfare” is to wear an opponent down and outlast them on the battlefield. The problem here is that is a goal, not a method, of warfare. Semantics aside, the differentiation is important. The goal of outlasting an adversary while preserving one’s own combat power is inherent to any actor operating in a competitive environment. Accepting that attrition is an adjective and not a noun, and thus moving forward with a more detailed framework for warfare, might well help kickstart the much-needed reset.

Assertion 2: Attrition is a correlation of forces and means battle

Dupuy found that “there is no direct relationship between force ratios and attrition rates.” He states that many factors influence attrition rates, to include weather, physical terrain, a force’s location, and relative combat effectiveness. Dupuy posits that the combination of variables, not one specific variable, influences attrition rates. His analysis on the subject concludes that neither personnel strength nor force strength ratios impact attrition rates in a meaningful way. Moreover, Wayne Hughes writes that destruction-oriented warfare is vital to suppressing a combatant which provides the suppressor with movement opportunities. In turn, attrition creates more situational opportunities for mobile exploitation. That is, attrition creates many opportunities for deft military commanders to exploit. This position — that attrition creates opportunities for mobile exploitation — is echoed by many prominent conflict analysts and scholars to include Heather Venable, Christopher Tuck, Anthony King, and Cathal Nolan. Considering this wide range of analysis, it is safe to say that attrition is not a correlation of forces and means battle. This is not to suggest that correlation of forces and means battle analysis does not matter, because it does, but it needs to be placed in the appropriate context.

Nonetheless, no compelling or empirical scholarship has emerged to refute the veracity of attrition’s utility in war and warfare. Further, many contributors’ uses of attrition in relation to a rate implies its descriptive (i.e., adjective) nature, and not a form, method, or style (i.e., noun). Considering the fact that attrition is an adjective and not a noun, it is safe to say that attrition is not a correlation of forces and means battle, but rather, a descriptive term used to describe destruction-oriented warfare.

Assertion 3: Attrition is focused on a one-to-one exchange ratio between combatants

To continue to dissect the idea that attrition is focused on a one-to-one exchange ratio between combatants, it is important to assume that attrition is a form of warfare. Let’s assume two combatants, both of which are industrialized states, are engaged in armed conflict. For the sake of argument, these combatants are state military forces, and not subunits, individuals, or nonstate forces. A degree of parity exists between both combatants; neither combatant A nor combatant B possesses a significant advantage over the other in terms of the elements of national power or combat power. Both combatants operate on the logic of systems theory (i.e., their first goal is survival, and their second goal is victory), they are both economic, rational actors (i.e., they each operate with their self-interest at the fore, but will not sacrifice their survival for self-interest), which includes avoiding large-scale troop deployments and the wanton use of their forces. Viewed collectively, these ideas form the causal mechanism that dictates a military force’s form of warfare.

Combatant B is combatant A’s adjacent territorial neighbor. Combatant B has invaded combatant A, and it is occupying one-sixth of combatant A’s territory with a large joint force made primarily of a large land army. Diplomacy is at a dead end. Military options, at least for the time being, are combatant A’s only recourse to its geopolitical problem.

Militarily, combatant A has a more open command system in which senior leadership empowers its junior leadership to make on-the-spot decisions. This ethos permeates combatant A’s military force. Combatant B, on the other hand, has a closed command system in which decision-making is hierarchical. As a result, combatant B operates a command system that is slower, less informed, and less responsive to a current tactical or operational situation than combatant A’s.

Combatant A wants to use a destruction-based approach to fighting and defeating combatant B. Combatant A wants to fight this way because the existence of combatant B’s military force is the object of combatant A’s military strategy and the primary challenge that its policymakers must address. Thus, combatant A assumes that the physical destruction of combatant B’s land force will trigger combatant B’s policymakers to change their state’s policy and end the conflict posthaste. Moreover, it is also wise to assume that combatant B will call for a negotiated end to the conflict at a point far removed from the outright destruction of its land army. Therefore, combatant A is correct to assume that a destruction-based approach is best for addressing combatant B.

Yet combatant A’s caveats — avoid large-scale troop deployments and the wanton loss of one’s forces and equipment — mean that it is not interested in using bad operations or poor tactics. Bad in this case means methods of warfare that drive up its own casualties. Combatant A’s true military interest is in destroying as much of combatant B’s military force as possible, in the shortest amount of time feasible, while protecting its own force and preventing its destruction.

As a result, combatant A’s operations and tactics will be a blend of movement, striking (i.e., attacking), and protection that best delivers a destructive effect on combatant B, while preserving its own force. Preserving one’s own force is the important thing to remember here. Any rational and economically minded combatant will operate, to its best ability, in a self-preserving way while striving to achieve its military objectives.

History does nonetheless provide a few instances in which a state’s military was forced into a relative reciprocal scenario with its adversary. World War II’s Eastern Front, for instance, provides many examples in which exchange rates between the Soviet Union’s armed forces and those of Nazi Germany were relatively equal. This was more the result of situational factors than preferential methods.

Nevertheless, one would have to eliminate one or more of warfighting’s causal mechanisms to assume that combatant A or B would willingly engage in combat that allowed for a “one-for-one” exchange rate. At the same time, one would have to assume that a combatant is irrational if it were to remove one or more of the elements of causality. Causality aside, it is dishonest to assume that a state military — fictitious or otherwise — would intentionally operate in an irrational manner, and this is the third assertion’s most egregious leap of logic. States and their militaries do not operate illogically — at least not intentionally.

Assertion 4: Attrition is a lesser form of warfare

Many of the strawmen provided by late 20th-century theorists continue to erode clear thinking about attrition. Writing in 1979, Edward Luttwak disparages attrition as firepower-centric warfare that is out of step with the direction the United States and NATO should be headed. Luttwak writes:

We all know what attrition is. It is war in the administrative manner, of Eisenhower rather than Patton, in which the important command decisions are in fact logistic decisions. The enemy is treated as a mere inventory of targets and warfare is a matter of mustering superior resources to destroy his forces by sheer firepower and weight of materiel.

Luttwak offers that more movement-oriented forms of warfare are better than firepower-based forms of warfare. Luttwak provides this opinion without providing empirical evidence to support his argument. Further, he asserts that Western militaries would be best served using an alternative, movement-centric form of warfare, rather than the laborious and synchronized attritional style.

In the mid-1980s, William Lind emerged on the scene as another attrition-detractor. Lind decries attrition as a slow, ponderous approach to warfare that places synchronization, timing, and centralized command and control ahead of responsiveness and surprise. Writing in the early 1990s, John Antal states that armies that adopt an attritional style of warfighting emphasize firepower ahead of movement, and that by doing so, attrition-oriented armies are less capable of inflicting cognitive paralysis on an adversary and winning in a more cost-effective manner. Lind’s, Antal’s, and Luttwak’s theses, in addition to institutional recalcitrance toward the concept’s utility, remain today’s static that interferes with a clear picture about destruction-oriented warfare.

Many of the points made by individuals such as Luttwak, Lind, and Antal do not stand up to analytical rigor. The empirical work of Wayne Hughes, for instance, finds that firepower and destruction are quintessential elements of battlefield victory. Moreover, terrain, more than anything, dictates the speed at which a combatant operates. Terrain further defines whether a military operation or tactical engagement is a headlong clash of forces, or if one combatant is capable of flanking the other combatant and reaching the rear of its formation. Terrain, when combined with an adversary’s actions, further complicates matters. An adversary in open terrain might contract into restrictive terrain, such as mountains, dense woods, and urban areas, to offset the advantages of a mobile adversary who possesses fire and combat power overmatch.

A combatant’s training proficiency is another factor that determines the swiftness of its combat operations. To this point, it is also important to convey that combat losses over time change an army. Michael Kofman notes that as a conflict elongates over time, the original, highly trained army of regulars tends to be replaced by hastily trained conscripts. As a result, the combatants both become less adept at synchronized combined arms warfare, and thus sequential combined arms warfare overtakes the former. It is therefore disingenuous to assert that attrition is a lesser form of warfare. Instead, destruction-oriented warfare often results from necessity.

What’s more, Alexander Svechin offers that destruction-oriented approaches to warfare are the next logical option when a war cannot be won in a single, decisive strike or battle of annihilation. Svechin writes that destruction-oriented approaches are directed toward obtaining and maintaining material superiority, while depriving a hostile combatant of the means that they need for continued resistance.

Since history demonstrates that most wars are not won in a singular, decisive strike, it thus makes sense for destruction-oriented operations to take center stage in armed conflict. Thus, attrition, although not actually a form of warfare, is not a lesser form of warfighting. Those who make this suggestion are selectively ignoring the impact that deterministic elements such as terrain, time, an adversary’s action, and training have on combat.

Conclusion

As the wars in Gaza and Ukraine illustrate, attrition is a characterization of conflict and not a form of warfare. Attrition is an adjective used to provide meaning to engagements, battles, campaigns, operations, and wars in which destruction is high. Moreover, attrition lacks a coherent body of knowledge and an accepted set of practical applications that would allow it to be considered a form of warfare. Therefore, it is prudent to accept that attrition warfare is not actually a typology. Rather, it is a misnomer that needs to be rectified. Replacing attrition in all cases in which the defense and security studies community, as well as military practitioners, are not outlining an activity’s character is paramount. The term destruction-oriented warfare is an appropriate replacement for attrition’s use in regard to a form of warfare.

Further, Western militaries must graduate beyond fanciful and idealist thinking about armed conflict. The destruction of hostile armies is how a military creates the situation required for their policymakers to pursue strategic victory. In some instances, however, that is not the case. The threat of, or the bludgeoning push toward the destruction of, a hostile army generates the signal for hostile policymakers to negotiate an end to armed conflict.

So long as large-scale wars between industrialized states continue, and destruction-oriented methods remain the path to military, and subsequently political, victory, then the defense and security studies communities must come around to understanding attrition and its place in the conduct of armed conflict. As Nolan reminds us, the destruction of armies, or the push toward destroying armies, is the most effective and historically supportable way in which to drive policymakers to the negotiating table.

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Amos C. Fox is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Reading. Additionally, Amos is the chief human resources officer for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, and he hosts the Revolution in Military Affairs podcast.

Image: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. James R. Smith

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Amos Fox · January 30, 2024

13. Biden’s response to Jordan attack is likely to be powerful, but US is wary of triggering a wider war with Iran, officials say

The declaration of our fears of escalation undermines every aspect of our foreign policy especially when actions by our adversaries demand a swift decisive response by our military. When we telegraph this fear our adversaries know they can continue to push the limits with us.

Biden’s response to Jordan attack is likely to be powerful, but US is wary of triggering a wider war with Iran, officials say | CNN Politics

CNN · by Oren Liebermann, Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis · January 29, 2024

Retired colonel on a 'warning' to Iran in aftermath of the attack

01:10 - Source: CNN

CNN —

The US’ response to the drone attack in Jordan that killed and wounded US service members on Sunday is likely to be more powerful than previous American retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria, officials told CNN, though the Pentagon and White House are being careful not to telegraph the administration’s plans.

President Joe Biden is under increasing pressure to respond in a way that stops these attacks for good. Iran-backed militants have targeted US military facilities in Iraq and Syria over 160 times since October, and several Republican lawmakers have called for the US to hit inside Iran directly to send a clear message.

But the biggest challenge now for the Biden administration is how to respond to the drone strike – the deadliest attack on US forces in the region since the bombing at Abbey Gate killed 13 US service members in the closing days of the Afghanistan withdrawal – without sparking a regional war.

The US has in recent months carried out several strikes targeting Iranian proxies’ weapons depots in Iraq and Syria. To date, none of those strikes have deterred the militants, whose 165 attacks have injured over 120 US service members across the region since October.

Retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling said the deaths of US service members “certainly crossed the president’s red line,” and both officials and analysts are expecting a more robust response that is not necessarily confined to one country or one day. But officials have suggested it is unlikely the US will strike within Iran.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the environment in the Middle East is as dangerous as it’s been in the region “since at least 1973, and arguably even before that.”

Blinken added that the US response “could be multileveled, come in stages and be sustained over time.”

The Biden administration could decide to again strike the militant groups in Iraq, Syria or both countries, and could also target the leadership of the regional militias. In at least one case in early January, the US targeted a senior member of Harakat al-Nujaba, an Iranian proxy that has attacked US forces. An offensive cyberattack is another option, officials noted.

A US official said the US is being careful not to be too specific about the origin of the drone or which militants launched it, in order to preserve some element of surprise when the US responds. US officials have said only that the Iranian proxy group Kataib Hezbollah appears to have supported the strike.

“We’re not taking anything off the table,” a US defense official told CNN.

‘We don’t seek a war with Iran’

Still, striking Iran is one of the least likely options at this point, officials said. Biden officials said repeatedly on Monday that the US does not want to go to war with Iran, which would be the likely outcome of a US strike within Iran’s borders.

“We don’t seek a war with Iran. We’re not looking for a wider conflict in the Middle East,” John Kirby, the strategic communications coordinator for the National Security Council, told CNN on Monday. “In fact, every action the president has taken has been designed to de-escalate, to try to bring the tensions down.”

While the US holds Iran ultimately responsible for the attacks given Tehran’s financial and military support for its proxy groups, there are no indications yet that Iran explicitly directed the deadly attack on Sunday or intended it as a deliberate escalation against the US, multiple sources told CNN.

The Iranian government has also denied being involved.

“I don’t think this was intended as an escalation,” said a US official. “It is the same type of attack they’ve done 163 times before and on 164 they get lucky.”

The attack bore many of the hallmarks of the previous 160-plus strikes by the Iran-backed militants, officials said — the only difference being that this one successfully hit a housing container at the US base, called Tower 22, early on Sunday when service members were still in their beds and had little time to evacuate.

The drone also flew low, potentially allowing it to evade the base’s air defenses, and approached the base around the same time as an American drone was returning from a mission. That likely caused confusion and may have delayed a response, officials said.

“We know these groups are supported by Iran, and therefore they do have their fingerprints on this, but I can’t tell you more in terms of who directed it,” Sabrina Singh, deputy Pentagon press secretary, said at a briefing Monday.

Still, if the US attempts to de-escalate through proportionate and limited retaliatory strikes, that could be perceived as weak to Iran and its proxies, said Jon Alterman, the Middle East Program director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“If everything is deliberate and proportionate, it creates an incentive for people to go right up to the red line and to make sure they know exactly where that red line is,” Alterman told CNN.

Iran has spent years investing in its regional proxies, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen to the militant groups in Iraq and Syria. Tehran has supplied these proxies, informally known as the “axis of resistance,” with money, weapons, training and supplies as it seeks to broaden its influence in the Middle East and pressure the United States to disengage from the region.

“In the last three months, Iran has benefited profoundly from its years of investment in the axis of resistance,” Alterman said. Tehran has watched as anti-US and anti-Israel protests swept across the Middle East after the Israel-Hamas war started. Iran has grown increasingly closer to Russia and China, and Iraqi officials have recently begun to more loudly call for an end to the US military presence in the country.

These are measures of victory for Iran.

“Every message you see talks about the fear of escalation from the administration,” said a former senior military official who has closely followed developments in the region. “We have managed to deter ourselves here.”

CNN · by Oren Liebermann, Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis · January 29, 2024

14. Broad framework for a potential hostage release and ceasefire in Gaza is being presented to Hamas

Broad framework for a potential hostage release and ceasefire in Gaza is being presented to Hamas | CNN Politics

CNN · by Alex Marquardt, Jennifer Hansler · January 29, 2024

Qatar's Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, in the Treaty Room at the State Department on Monday, January 29, in Washington, DC.

Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP

CNN —

A broad framework for a hostage release and potential ceasefire in the war between Hamas and Israel was agreed to among negotiators in Paris this weekend, according to an official familiar with the talks.

While there is a basic framework that negotiators feel they can move forward with, the “details are going to be very difficult” to work out, the official said. Even though negotiators came to terms on the broad strokes, the office of Israel’s prime minister indicated Monday that there are concerns about “conditions that are not acceptable.”

Egyptian intelligence delivered the framework to Hamas in Rafah on Monday, the official said.

The framework would call for a first phase of civilian hostage releases to take place over a six-week pause with three Palestinian prisoners held by Israel released for each civilian hostage returned from Gaza. That ratio would be expected to go up for Israel Defense Forces soldiers and a longer pause is possible beyond the six weeks for the later phases.

It is a melding of different proposals from Israel, Hamas, Qatar and Egypt, along with additional ideas from the United States. The proposals differed on the length of the pause and ratios for swapping prisoners and hostages.

Multiple officials have voiced optimism that the proposal could advance a process toward an eventual release of the remaining hostages held by Hamas and a sustained cessation of fighting in Gaza. However, they have cautioned that there are still many details that need to be fleshed out – and Hamas still needs to engage in a constructive way.

“I believe the proposal is a strong one, and a compelling one that, again, offers some hope that we can get back to this process,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on Monday. “But Hamas will have to make its own decisions.”

The top US diplomat did not offer details about the proposal.

Sunday’s discussions made “good progress to get things back in shape and at least to lay a foundation for the way forward,” Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said earlier Monday.

“We are in much better place than where we were a few weeks ago,” Al Thani said at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.

Al Thani described the framework emerging from the discussions in France with himself, US CIA Director Bill Burns and the Israeli and Egyptian intelligence chiefs as a combination of “what’s been proposed by the Israelis and what’s been a counter-proposal from Hamas.”

“We tried to blend things together to come up with some sort of reasonable ground that brings everybody together,” he said.

However, the Qatari prime minister downplayed the prospect of immediate results coming out of the talks. “We don’t know and we cannot predict what (Hamas’ response) will be and we are sure that we will be faced with some challenges and obstacles.”

Hamas must get “to a place where they engage positively and constructively in the process,” Al Thani said.

The sides have been unable to reach an agreement to release more hostages since one in November collapsed. That agreement resulted in a weeklong pause in fighting in exchange for the release of more than 100 hostages and another deal to free the more than 100 who remain would be a major breakthrough at a time of huge tension in the Middle East as concerns grow about a wider regional conflict breaking out.

In the months since, the IDF has continued its offensive in Gaza aimed at eliminating Hamas in retaliation for the group’s October 7 attack, which killed more than 1,200 people. Another 250 were abducted in that attack.

Israeli attacks on Gaza since October 7 have killed at least 25,700 Palestinians, according to the Hamas-run Ministry of Health in Gaza. CNN cannot independently verify the figures due to the difficulty of reporting from the war zone.

US officials have repeatedly rebuffed the idea of a “ceasefire,” but have supported the notion of a “pause” that would allow hostages to be released and additional humanitarian aid to reach the war-torn strip.

Blinken said that he discussed the “ongoing efforts” to free Israeli hostages and create an “extended pause” in fighting in Gaza during his meeting with Al Thani on Monday.

“This is critical to them being able to get to the formula that we’ve been talking about for putting a durable end to the cycle of violence that we’ve seen in the region for generation after generation, and the opportunity that exists to actually achieve it, an integrated Israel with relations with all of its neighbors, security commitments, assurances that it needs to make sure that it can move forward in peace and security, Palestinian Authority that’s reformed and a clear pathway to a Palestinian state,” Blinken said at a news conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

Coming out of the discussions in France, Al Thani is in Washington this week for meetings with top Biden administration officials.

CNN’s Michael Conte contributed to this report.

CNN · by Alex Marquardt, Jennifer Hansler · January 29, 2024

15. "Oh So Social" Conversation: Gen. David Petraeus + Dr. Michael Vickers

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Thursday, February 29

"Oh So Social" Conversation: Gen. David Petraeus + Dr. Michael Vickers

Dr. Michael Vickers talks with Gen. David Petraeus about his newly released book, "Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine"

https://www.eventbrite.com/e/oh-so-social-conversation-gen-david-petraeus-dr-michael-vickers-registration-797041471497

16. IDF reveals how it floods Hamas underground world with anti-tunnel tool

IDF reveals how it floods Hamas underground world with anti-tunnel tool

Israeli officials have been leaking details to foreign media about what they called "Atlantis" for months.

By YONAH JEREMY BOB

JANUARY 30, 2024 18:30

Jerusalem Post

The IDF on Tuesday finally allowed the Israeli media to publish more comprehensive details about its anti-tunnel flooding project against Hamas in Gaza.

Israeli officials have been leaking details to foreign media about what they called "Atlantis" for months, but the censor has actively prevented The Jerusalem Post and others from disclosing these details.

The IDF said that the flooding tool is one of many for fighting Hamas's tunnels, including also explosives, robots, air strikes, and sending in soldiers.

While the system has made real contributions to combatting Hamas's tunnels in some areas, there are many limits, and it is not seen as a solution to the whole tunnel problem by "snapping one's fingers" type solution. It is well known that Hamas's tunnels move in many different directions and use blast doors and other items, which could thwart or reduce the effectiveness of the flooding system.

ISRAELI SOLDIERS walk, last week, through what the IDF said was an iron-girded tunnel designed by Hamas to disgorge carloads of Palestinian fighters for a surprise storming of the border, in the northern Gaza Strip (credit: AMIR COHEN/REUTERS)

Flooding system most effective closer to coast

The flooding system is most effective near the Mediterranean Sea and cannot be used in areas where the IDF has concerns that it could harm the Gaza land in the long term.

Special IDF analysts study different kinds of topography also to see where it is likely to be most valuable in destroying tunnels.

In addition, the IDF said that it took time to deploy the system since a whole specialized array of units had to be trained to deploy it.

A statement said that the system is " a breakthrough" for fighting Hamas's tunnels and exemplified positive cooperation between the Defense Ministry, the IDF, and other defense bodies.

The IDF declined to provide any data about how many tunnels have been destroyed by the system.

Jerusalem Post

17. Opinion | This Idaho plan to get rid of domestic terrorism doesn’t involve fighting it

Opinion | This Idaho plan to get rid of domestic terrorism doesn’t involve fighting it

The Idaho Senate's view of our domestic threat defies logic.

msnbc.com · by Frank Figliuzzi, MSNBC Columnist

I’ve got great news. Despite its notorious history of racist and anti-government violence carried out by militia groups, we may no longer need to worry about domestic terrorism in Idaho. The Idaho Senate voted Thursday 27-8 to advance a bill that defines “domestic terrorism” as requiring the involvement of foreign groups. According to the bill, if there’s no foreign involvement, then there can be no domestic terrorism.

According to the bill, if there’s no foreign involvement, then there can be no domestic terrorism.

If you think that sounds like it's opposite the meaning of “domestic,” you’re right. The problem is not only that this contortionist’s view of our domestic threat defies logic, but also that it seems aimed at clouding any perception of fellow Americans as a threat.

Idaho Senate Bill 1220’s statement of purpose explains that it would codify this bizarre definition of domestic terrorism while simultaneously ensuring that no one in Idaho could be called a domestic terrorist, or a terrorist of any kind, unless they’ve been convicted of or pleaded guilty to activities connected to a foreign terrorist group.

Idaho Senate Majority Leader Kelly Anthon, the Republican who sponsored the bill, wraps himself in a “free speech” defense when he explains his proposal to essentially erase the notion of domestic terrorism as we know it. To hear him tell it, terrorists are simply people who speak their minds and hang out with their peers.

“You have the right to say things that people don’t like,” Anthon said. People “have a right to assemble and protest the government for their grievances, even when you don’t like the group. There’s a lot of these groups I don’t like, but they have a constitutional right to do it.”

Of course, Anthon’s idea of free speech has its limits. You apparently don’t have the right to call someone a domestic terrorist. “If you are called a domestic terrorist it is going to affect your name, it’s going to affect your business, it’s going to affect your family,” he said. “And it’s not fair if you’ve never had your due process and you’ve never had your day in court.”

Anthon says his inspiration to erase the idea that there’s domestic terrorism came from Moms for Liberty, an activist outfit that bills itself as a “parental rights group” that he claims was targeted by the government when its members protested at school board meetings during Covid-19 school shutdowns.

Anthon noted the dust-up in 2021 when the National School Boards Association asked President Joe Biden to look into threats and intimidation against school boards. The school boards group claimed such threats might be domestic terrorism, but Attorney General Merrick Garland said, in writing, that federal law enforcement would investigate only criminal behavior. Apparently, Anthon missed that memo.

Is he also forgetting his state’s history? In 1986, in Coeur d’Alene, the domestic terrorist neo-Nazi group Aryan Nations, based in Idaho, bombed the residence of the Rev. Bill Wassmuth, a Catholic priest who led protests against white supremacists.

An Aryan Nations splinter group in Idaho later murdered a Jewish radio host in Denver and bombed a synagogue. In 1992, at Ruby Ridge in Boundary County, Idaho, Randy Weaver — believed to be associated with the Aryan Nations and indirectly linked to a terror group called The Covenant, The Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, and his friend engaged in a deadly shootout with U.S. marshals and the FBI.

At Ruby Ridge in Idaho, Randy Weaver and his friend engaged in a deadly shootout with U.S. marshals and the FBI.

Months after the Coeur d’Alene bombing, in 1987, Idaho passed the Idaho Terrorist Control Act. Anthon’s bill would amend — essentially, neuter — that law. Groups like those named above wouldn’t face the same state penalties for criminal acts they commit if the bill were to become law. They might be charged with and convicted of crimes, but, absent proven foreign connections, they’d no longer be subject to the 10-year minimum penalty Idaho currently reserves for domestic terrorists.

If this bill were to succeed and more states were to follow Idaho’s legislative lunacy, the reality of the threat and risk posed by domestic terrorism wouldn’t vanish. But the threat some Americans pose to other Americans would become yet another thing we couldn’t agree on. It would become a problem that law enforcement and the courts would be constrained from fully addressing.

Taken to its illogical extreme, other crimes could be counted as free speech. How about bank robbery as a free speech expression against the tyranny of global bankers and the grip of usurious interest rates on the common man? Should we ban police from describing an arrestee as a “bank robbery suspect” until they plead guilty or are convicted? If we don’t, the suspect’s feelings and reputation might be damaged. If we use the bill in Idaho as our guide, we’d have to instruct the police to call a fleeing suspect a free speech activist who merely lost his way.

Senators in Idaho, at least the 27 who advanced this bill, have lost their way. They apparently don’t like it when folks who look like them and live near them get called domestic terrorists. So instead of dealing with the threat, they’d rather outlaw a label. Let’s hope the full Legislature puts them back on the path to sanity.

msnbc.com · by Frank Figliuzzi, MSNBC Columnist

18. Opinion: Does Biden Have a Plan to Win the War in Ukraine?

Opinion: Does Biden Have a Plan to Win the War in Ukraine?

kyivpost.com · by Jonathan Sweet · January 30, 2024

It is all too easy to lay the blame on opposition republicans for the log jam in funding for Ukraine but even when the money is released how will it be used to ensure success for Kyiv?

By Jonathan Sweet

By Mark Toth

January 30, 2024, 12:29 pm | Comments (3)

It is all too easy to lay the blame on opposition republicans for the log jam in funding for Ukraine but even when the money is released how will it be used to ensure success for Kyiv?

January 30, 2024, 12:29 pm |

US President Joe Biden speaks during the South Carolina's First in the Nation Dinner at the South Carolina State Fairgrounds in Columbia, South Carolina, on January 27, 2024. (Photo by Kent Nishimura / AFP)

The narrative coming out of the White House as recently as last Tuesday continues to solely cast blame upon Congressional Republicans – especially Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-LA), for not passing a $60 billion supplemental budget to continue funding the Ukraine war.

There is some truth to the narrative. However, it conveniently leaves out probably the most significant point - President Joe Biden does not have a plan to win the war, other than to simply to keep arming Ukraine to defend itself. The US Army’s General George Patton gave his opinion on that course of action: “Nobody ever defended anything successfully, there is only attack and attack and attack some more.”

Biden’s avowed strategy to “stand for liberty and freedom today, tomorrow, and for as long as it takes” has become a toxic recipe for just another “forever war.” A war that Speaker Johnson compared to a recent conflict, “We need to know that Ukraine would not be another Afghanistan.”

When Biden entered the White House, his stated goal was “ending the forever wars that had consumed America for two decades and instead focusing on domestic priorities.” The war in Ukraine enters its third year in February; the southern US border remains unsecured as illegal migrants and fentanyl enter the country unabated.

Ukraine Says Two Killed in Overnight Russian Attacks

Ukrenergo, a Ukrainian energy provider, confirmed one of its substations in a central region had been hit.

On the surface, the House Speaker appears to be holding the President to his word. But this is Washington – and Ukraine has become political leverage for both Democrats and Republicans to play against one another as they pursue partisan agendas. The 2024 Presidential Election only exacerbates the crisis.

There is common ground though. The President and House Speaker are on the same page regarding no more forever wars.

There are two solutions – give Ukraine the weapons and ammunition they need to win the war or abandon the effort. The latter is not an option – the US would lose all credibility, putting Europe in peril and their leadership in NATO at risk.

A $60 billion blank check would equate to what then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi said concerning the passage of Obama Care in 2010, “we have to pass the bill so you can find out what's in it.” Republicans will not let that happen – they are demanding to see a plan, a strategy to win, the weapons and ammunition required, and an end state for Ukraine. The President does not have one.

But holding Ukraine funding hostage to border security and support to Israel in their war against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, is no better. Bundling the three is unmanageable. The attack on the US Tower 22 base in Jordan over the weekend aggravates the situation.

Both sides are derelict in their duties. While they continue their political jockeying – Ukrainian civilians are being killed in Russian missile and drone attacks, while Ukrainian soldiers in defensive positions fight off relentless ‘meat assaults’ in Avdiivka, wondering if they will have enough ammunition to fend off the next wave.

Killing more Russians will not win the war. Over 383,180 have reportedly been eliminated to date, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is prepared to conscript and send more. Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces General Valerii Zaluzhny acknowledged that reality in November: “That was my mistake. In any other country such casualties would have stopped the war.”

Meanwhile, as Washington struggles to come up with a solution, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his generals are “doggedly forging ahead and boldly implementing new military tactics” throughout the depth of the battlespace – to include Russia.

In the absence of U.S. funding, Zelensky returned to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland and travelled to European capitals to solicit additional support to stay in the fight. He came away with a few major wins – Ukraine entered into a security co-operation agreement with the United Kingdom, secured $8.5 billion in military aid for 2024 from Germany, secured a pledge from Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to “make his country the ‘most reliable’ backer of Ukraine,” while France committed to deliver an additional 40 long-range SCALP-EG missiles and, in Paris last week, stood-up an “artillery coalition” of 23 nations to address Ukraine’s ammunition shortfall.

And now the European Union is set to vote on a €50 billion assistance package for Ukraine after advising Hungary it would evoke Article 7 – suspending the right to vote on EU decisions – should Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán continue to block the vote.

Europe has stepped up, so where is the American plan?

Unfortunately, it is helplessly linked to a failing bipartisan southern border deal that Speaker Johnson announced was “dead on arrival” last Friday.

It is not the primary responsibility of Congress to present military plans to the White House. That responsibility is on the President of the United States, as the Commander-in-Chief, and his National Security team. The responsibility of Congress is to fund the plan when it is submitted.

Three powerful Republicans penned a plan in November 2023 entitled, “Proposed Plan for Victory in Ukraine.” The proposal was submitted by Michael McCaul (R-TX), Mike Rogers (R-AL), and Mike Turner (R-OH), Chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Armed Services Committee, and the House Permanent Selection Committee on Intelligence respectively.

The proposal calls for the President to “present a credible plan for victory and arm Ukraine with the weapons it needs to win as soon as possible.” They have even identified “the longest-range variant of ATACMS, F-16s and sufficient quantities of cluster munitions, artillery, air defenses, and armor to make a difference on the battlefield” as part of the solution.

It is not an unreasonable request. Defensive weapons cannot win wars – and Ukraine lacks the offensive capabilities right now needed to decisively expel Russian forces from the Donbas and Crimean Peninsula.

Washington urgently needs a commonsense compromise. Speaker Johnson must decouple southern border security from Ukraine funding and President Biden must present a plan to Congress on Ukraine and agree to work with Republicans on a comprehensive immigration plan that includes border security. Americans and Ukrainians deserve far better leadership from Washington.

The President needs to embrace and build off the Republican proposal, assemble his Flag Officers – active and retired (Keane, Petraeus, Stavridis, McCaffrey, Hodges, Hertling, and H. R. McMaster, to name but a few), then put together a plan the White House, Congress and American people can support. As with any endeavour - it starts with a plan.

The views expressed in this opinion article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as a military intelligence officer.

Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy.

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Jonathan Sweet

Army Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet (@JESweet2022) served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division and the Intelligence and Security Command. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14.

Mark Toth

Mark Toth (@MCTothSTL) writes on national security and foreign policy. Previously an economist and entrepreneur, he has worked in banking, insurance, publishing and global commerce. A former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis, he has lived in U.S. diplomatic and military communities around the world.

19. ABC News exclusive: Gen. CQ Brown, America's top military official, talks Iran, Israel, Trump and more

ABC News exclusive: Gen. CQ Brown, America's top military official, talks Iran, Israel, Trump and more

Brown said the goal in the Middle East is deterrence of a broader conflict.

ByLuis Martinez andMeghan MistryJanuary 28, 2024, 10:49 AM ET

• 10 min read

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

Gen. CQ Brown Jr., the country's top military officer, is an experienced U.S. Air Force fighter pilot who has surmounted many challenges in his nearly 40-year career, including once having to eject and land in the Florida Everglades, an experience that earned him the call sign "Swamp Thing."

"I didn't see any gators, so that was good," Brown said with a smile as he recounted the incident to ABC News "This Week" co-anchor Martha Raddatz in an exclusive interview that aired Sunday, in which Brown looked back at his work so far -- and what's ahead.

"That must have been quite the experience," Raddatz told Brown as she asked about what he lived through as a young captain in January 1991, when the F-16 he was flying over Florida caught on fire after being struck by lightning.

"A little bit," the general replied. "But all your training kicks in and the checklist says if fire persists -- eject. It was a pretty easy decision."

MORE: ABC News Exclusive: Joint Chiefs chairman says goal in Red Sea is to deter Iran-backed Houthis

Brown continued to rise through the ranks, assuming the Air Force's top jobs in the Middle East and the Pacific and then becoming the Air Force chief of staff before being nominated by President Joe Biden last year to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was overwhelmingly confirmed in September.

There's been much to do since then: Brown has worked nearly nonstop in dealing with overlapping crises that have consumed the Middle East after Hamas' Oct. 7 terror attack on Israel sparked a war just days after he took his new post.

Martha Raddatz interviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Charles Q. Brown, Jr. for ABC's "This Week," airing on Jan. 28, 2024. Al Drago/ABC

'A full-scale war?'

The United States has sought to contain the Israel-Hamas war from mushrooming into a regional conflict. But that has become more of a challenge as Iranian-backed fighters in Iraq, Syria and Yemen continue to launch attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and on American troops, citing support for Palestinians under bombardment in Gaza as Israel targets Hamas.

U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria have been attacked more than 150 times by Iranian-backed militia groups, according to the Pentagon, and the Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen have carried out more than 30 attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea.

That has prompted ongoing U.S. retaliatory strikes on the Houthis and other fighters but the attacks have continued, sparking questions and concern about the broader military strategy, as well as some criticism from lawmakers that Congress is not involved.

Brown acknowledged that there is a delicate balance to be struck between the U.S. goal of deterrence in the region while also protecting U.S. forces.

"We've got to be thoughtful about our approach in these areas, and we can't predict exactly how any one of these groups is going to respond," he said.

"I would also ask, what do they [critics of the current approach] want? A broader conflict? Do you want us in a full-scale war?" he said.

MORE: US, UK stage multiple airstrikes against Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen

Brown told Raddatz the American airstrikes have "had an impact" on the Houthis' ability to continue carrying out missile and drone attacks, though he declined to say by how much.

The U.S. strikes on Iranian-backed militia groups in Iraq have resulted in some political pressure there for America's decades-old military presence in the country to end.

Brown believes that while Iran would like for the U.S. to leave Iraq, he also does not believe that Iran -- a regional power with major rivals in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia -- wants a war with the United States.

Martha Raddatz interviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Charles Q. Brown, Jr. for ABC's "This Week," airing on Jan. 28, 2024. Al Drago/ABC

On the Israel-Hamas war, for which the U.S. is providing Israel various forms of assistance, Brown said that he is in regular contact with his Israeli counterpart to stress the importance of preventing civilian casualties in the fight against Hamas.

The number of Palestinian fatalities has risen to more than 25,000, according to figures released by the Gaza Ministry of Health.

That high number of casualties has fueled international criticism of Israel's war effort, even as Israeli officials stress that they seek ways to curb civilian deaths.

"What I've communicated to them from the very beginning and through my most recent communications is [that] as you conduct military operations, you've got to be sensitive to collateral damage," Brown told Raddatz. "And at the same time, you've got to bring in humanitarian assistance."

Focused 'on doing my job,' not Trump

Brown's predecessor, Gen. Mark Milley, has spoken at length about his fraught relationship with former President Donald Trump, apologizing for a controversial photo-op at the height of the George Floyd protests and seemingly referring to Trump as a "wannabe dictator" during his exit speech in September.

Trump has referred to Milley as a "traitor" because Milley reached out to China in late 2020 and early 2021 to privately reassure them that the U.S. wasn't going to attack, Milley has told Congress. Trump suggested that was an act, revealing the president's thinking, where previously "the punishment would have been death."

"When you hear things like that, what do you think?" Raddatz asked on Sunday.

"I don't listen to it," said Brown. "I'm focused on doing my job."

Raddatz also asked Brown what he learned from Milley's experience with Trump that could be helpful if the former president is reelected.

Brown said he had spoken with his predecessors and would take what he learned from them and their experiences to "be able to operate and support whoever the president may be."

"So you wouldn't have concerns about working under a president who thinks the election was stolen?" said Raddatz.

"I'm going to work for the -- whatever president gets elected," Brown said.

MORE: Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin makes 1st public appearance since secretive hospitalization

Reflecting on Floyd

Brown drew praise for a June 2020 video titled "Here's what I'm thinking about" that he released in response to the nationwide protests and unrest sparked by Floyd's murder by a Minneapolis police officer.

In the highly personal video, Brown recounted his own experiences with racism and his perspective as a Black man and Black military leader.

"I'm thinking about wearing the same flight suit, with the same wings on my chest, as my peers and then being questioned by another military member," Brown said in the video.

"I'm thinking about my mentors, and how I rarely had a mentor that looked like me, he said. "I'm thinking about the pressure I've felt to perform error-free, especially for supervisors I perceived had expected less from me as an African American."

In his interview on Sunday, Brown was asked about the video, "What really drove you to do that?"

"My son," he said, choking up. "My son called me about four days prior to that video. He was very much struggling with the death of George Floyd."

Brown shared that his son had asked him what the Pacific Air Forces was going to say, which Brown took to mean what he would say publicly, since he was the top U.S. Air Force commander in the Pacific.

He told Raddatz that he was torn about whether to say something, as he was still awaiting Senate confirmation to be the next Air Force chief of staff, but "then I just decided to say it and if I didn't get confirmed, so be it."

Now, nearly four years later, Brown said that he feels the country still has room to change.

"I think everybody wants to have a fair shot," he said. "I don't want to be disadvantaged or advantaged based on my background."

"I want to be judged based on my own accomplishments, based on my merits, and given an opportunity," he said.

"That's what I've asked for throughout my Air Force career. And hopefully, you know, I'm sitting in this chair as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs -- not because I'm African American -- because I'm a quality officer," he continued. "And that's what I want to be judged on."

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

20. Playing Chess With Iran: Deterrence Without Provocation – Analysis

Playing Chess With Iran: Deterrence Without Provocation – Analysis

January 30, 2024 0 Comments

By Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

By Leon Hadar

eurasiareview.com · January 30, 2024

By Leon Hadar

(FPRI) — The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 came out of the blue. The Palestinian terrorist group struck at a time when the White House believed there wasn’t any major threat to stability in the Middle East and was expecting a process of normalizing the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia. No one anticipated a new Arab-Israeli war.

President Joe Biden’s administration took time to assess the situation prior to formulating a geo-strategic response. It then drew up the outline of an American response, that would secure US interests and manage those of its regional partner, namely Israel and the Arab-Sunni states.

As the US government saw it, Hamas, a close partner of Tehran and financial and military dependent of Tehran, was the driving force in the crisis. The Palestinian terrorist group had hoped the surprise attack on Israel, coupled with the kidnapping of close to 250 hostages, would nullify the deterrence capability of its adversary and sabotage the American plan to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations.

In that context, in addition to giving Hamas the green light to attack Israel, the Iranian government also gave a green light to its regional allies, including Hizballah guerrillas in Lebanon, to launch a series of attacks on northern Israel. Shiite groups in Syria and Iraq and Yemen’s Houthi rebels also carried out attacks.

Policymakers in Washington were worried that Israel was distraught by the Hamas attack, the kidnapping of the hostages, Hizballah’s blitzes, and the loss of their deterrence power. As a result, US officials were concerned that Israel’s military response could transform into a major regional military conflagration involving Israel and Iran, especially if the Israel Defense Forces were to attack Hizballah’s bases in Lebanon.

In case of a war between Israel and Iran, the United States would have little choice but to come to the Jewish state’s assistance and find its military forces directly drawn into the new war in the Middle East.

Biden Bear-Hugs Netanyahu

Against this backdrop, Biden decided that to avert such a scenario the United States needed to provide a sense of security to its ally, thus giving US military and diplomatic support as it launched an attack aimed at destroying the Hamas military and political infrastructure.

Biden, therefore, flew to Israel to demonstrate American support. He also dispatched two American aircraft carriers and Marine units to the Middle East to deter Iran and Hizballah from making offensive moves against Israel.

The initial “bear-hug” that Biden gave Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as the media referred to it, proved to be an effective approach by Biden, who succeeded in pressing the Israeli leader to refrain from attacking Hizballah’s sites in Lebanon and to allow some humanitarian aid into the besieged Gaza Strip.

The US government has also expressed reservations about the way Israel has conducted military operations in Gaza, including the use of airstrikes that resulted in the killing of thousands of Palestinian civilians and the destruction of entire neighborhoods.

The Israeli approach was condemned by the majority of UN members, especially by those belonging to the so-called Global South. Some European governments also expressed reservations over Israel’s conduct. Israel was also criticized by left-leaning Democratic lawmakers, such as Sen. Bernie Sanders, who called on the White House to press the Israeli government to move towards a ceasefire in Gaza. The idea has been rejected by those who insist that they would not end the fighting without the destruction of Hamas.

Meanwhile, the Israeli government came under public pressure to negotiate the release of the hostages held by Hamas through Qatari and Egyptian mediation. And, indeed, it agreed to suspend fighting for a few days on November 30, 2023, to allow for the release of about 100 hostages.

Biden-Netanyahu Clash

There were signs of growing tensions between Washington and Jerusalem over postwar strategy.

The Biden administration has indicated that it wanted to see the Palestinian Authority—currently ruling the West Bank—take over control of the Gaza Strip after Hamas is removed from power. Washington has also hoped to launch a diplomatic initiative in support of Saudi Arabia and other Arab-Sunni governments. Under this plan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would become the nucleus of an independent Palestinian State that would live side by side in peace with Israel.

Netanyahu, who heads the most right-wing government in Israel’s history, has rejected the idea of handing over the control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority and expressed opposition to taking steps to establish an independent Palestinian state.

But Israel’s dependency on American military and diplomatic support has left the government no choice but to change tactics in the Gaza Strip and to shift to a new phase that relies less on airpower, has narrow targets, and results in fewer civilian casualties. In any case, while Israel may have killed hundreds of Hamas fighters there were no indications that the movement’s top leaders have been affected.

At the same time, around 130 people were abducted from Israel on October 7, including several Americans, are believed to be still in captivity in Gaza. Hamas has ruled out any further hostage releases until Israel agrees to a “full cessation of aggression.” Israel has rejected that demand, but may eventually have to agree if it wants to see the hostages return alive.

The Strategic Stakes

On one level, the war in Gaza could be seen as just another round of fighting between Israel and Palestine, or a phase in the century-old struggle between Jews and Arabs over the territory of Palestine/Land of Israel.

But this time the danger is that the war between Hamas and Israel could not be contained as a local ethnic-religious conflict. In a way, the role Iran played in orchestrating the war could lead to the regionalization of the conflict in the form of a military confrontation between Israel, a nuclear power, and Iran, which has come close to acquiring its own nuclear military capability.

At minimum, the Hamas attack has shifted the balance of power in the Middle East in the direction of Iran and its proxies, while weakening the position of the United States and its partners. Adding to a sense of Iranian aggressiveness, there were reports that Tehran has considerably ramped up its production of uranium in recent weeks, reviving fears that it may be speeding toward the capability of fabricating several nuclear weapons.

A failure to obstruct this Iranian drive for regional supremacy would be a geopolitical loss for the United States and undermine its global position relative to China and Russia. The nightmare scenario consists of Iran and its proxies succeeding in establishing a new balance of power in the Middle East under which Israel is left damaged, Hamas is not destroyed, and the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia remains stalled. While all this would not necessarily amount to Iranian “victory,” it would give Tehran more influence.

Containing Iran

Hizballah, coordinating its moves with Iran, has continued to attack Israeli targets. Iran also started providing intelligence and weaponry to its Houthi allies in Yemen who were starting to target ships, including commercial vessels passing through the Red Sea. At first, the Biden administration refrained from responding to strikes by Iran’s proxies against American forces in Syria and Iraq, or, for that matter, to the Houthis’ threat to international shipping, through direct military response.

The danger is that the Iranians may view this American caution as weakness and, notwithstanding Biden’s rhetoric and the deployment of US aircraft carriers to the Middle East, the American president is worried about the potential of direct US military intervention. That could lead to war with Iran at a time when the United States is confronting Russia in Ukraine and is worried about the threat of a Chinese attack against Taiwan.

Iran also recognized that the United States does not have the military resources to fight on three fronts and that the American people don’t want to be drawn into a new quagmire in the Middle East. And they wondered: When push comes to shove, would Biden be ready to pull the trigger?

Biden Pulls the Trigger—To a Point

After weeks of warning of retribution against the Houthi rebels, who were threatening vital maritime trade routes, the United States and United Kingdom responded in mid-January. The US Navy fired dozens of Tomahawk cruise missiles towards Yemen from the Red Sea, while British jets launched laser-guided Paveway bombs at selected targets.

Biden’s patience and fear of escalation apparently ran out. The strikes gave some credibility to the warning that the Houthis would face “consequences” if they kept up their piracy and likely helped restore American deterrence in the region. But it’s not clear whether they did, with the Houthis continuing their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Iranians arming them and providing them with real-time targeting intelligence.

In fact, when the United States took out Houthi launching facilities—radar and weapons depots in Yemen—it struck at night, after clearly telegraphing its intentions, and avoiding targeting the Houthi leadership behind the Red Sea shipping attacks.

The point is that Iranian officials seem to believe that an escalating conflict in the Middle East will increase the costs to the United States and the West without risking a wider war. From their perspective, continuing escalation of the conflict would be cost-effective, since the United States would never take steps that risk war with Iran and would do everything to minimize those already existing.

Averting a War and Making Peace

In a way, American policies during the Gaza war have been driven by an interest in averting a war with Iran: pressing Israel to avoid a full-blown military confrontation with Hizballah, restricting its military operations in the Gaza Strip, and trying to get Israel to avoid civilian casualties.

Ultimately, the United States would like to see Israel destroy the military power of Hamas and erode the power of Hizballah, but it is preventing Israel from taking the steps to do so, as they could escalate the conflict and make it more likely that Iran would be able to exert its influence.

At the same time, Biden administration officials believe that the most effective way for them to try to return to the pre-October 7 balance of power in the Middle East is, as national security advisor Jake Sullivan suggested during a presentation at Davos, by reaching a ceasefire in the Gaza War to be followed by the launching a diplomatic initiative. Under such a diplomatic plan Israel and Saudi Arabia would normalize their relationship as part of a process that would include an agreement by Israel to establish an independent Palestinian State and a commitment by the Saudis to rebuild Gaza’s economy.

This plan assumes a lot of things that aren’t necessarily going to happen. Could Hamas be disarmed and marginalized in this process? Would the Palestinians be able to come up with a new and effective leadership that would work with Israel? And in the aftermath of the trauma of October 7 would the Israeli government agree to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on their borders.

And perhaps most important from the perspective of the geo-strategic chess game between Washington and Tehran: Why would the Iranians and their proxies accept an arrangement that would allow the United States to reassert its position in the Middle East and reverse what they see as their win of October 7?

If anything, there have been growing concerns in Washington in late January that continuing actions against the United States by Iran and its proxies could force a more decisive retaliation on the part of the Americans, resulting in a broader regional war.

Or as national security advisor Sullivan put it, “We have to guard against and be vigilant against the possibility that, in fact, rather than heading towards de-escalation, we are in a path of escalation that we have to manage.” In other words, how to strengthen the chessboard and ensure the pieces don’t fall.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

About the author: Leon Hadar is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Insitute’s Middle East Program.
Source: This article was published by FPRI

eurasiareview.com · January 30, 2024

21. China Warns Students on Interrogation Reports at DC Airport

China Warns Students on Interrogation Reports at DC Airport

US border agents ‘interrogated, harassed’ students: embassy
Warning comes as two nations pledge efforts to boost exchanges

By Bloomberg News

January 29, 2024 at 1:38 PM GMT+9

Updated on January 29, 2024 at 3:19 PM GMT+9

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-29/china-warns-students-after-reports-of-questionings-at-dc-airport?utm_source=pocket_saves

The Chinese Embassy in the US warned students from the Asian nation to be careful when flying through Washington Dulles International Airport after it said “many” were interrogated there by border agents or sent back to China.

“The relevant practices of US border law enforcement officers have seriously affected the studies of Chinese students studying abroad and caused great psychological damage,” the embassy said in a statement Monday on its official WeChat account, adding that students have been “interrogated and harassed for no reason,” with some having been detained for several hours or had their visas revoked.

The incidents happened at Dulles airport outside Washington in Virginia, according to the embassy, which advised those who plan to study in the US to “carefully choose” whether they want to enter through that hub.

The US Embassy in Beijing and the Department of Homeland Security didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment from Bloomberg News.

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While the embassy didn’t give details on the students involved, the Chinese Students Association at Johns Hopkins University said four graduate students have had their F-1 academic visas revoked and were sent back to China after arriving at Dulles since November. Two of the students were studying international relations and two were in STEM programs, according to a notice sent by the association.

The embassy warning marks a potential snag in efforts to resume exchanges and boost communication between the world’s two largest economies following last November’s high-stakes summit in California between US President Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping.

During that meeting, both sides endorsed expanding educational, cultural and business exchanges. The result was seen as helping ease tensions that had built up in previous years. Scrutiny over Chinese students studying abroad increased during the Trump administration amid fears in the US about technology and intellectual property theft by China.

The Biden-Xi summit also contained other breakthroughs, including on restoring military-to-military communications and increasing flights and tourism cooperation. Over the weekend, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met in Bangkok and discussed scheduling a Xi-Biden call this spring.

China sent nearly 290,000 students to the US in the previous academic year — down more than 20% from a peak in 2019-2020, according to the Open Doors 2023 Report on International Educational Exchange.

Chinese media previously reported that some students from China have been questioned and temporarily detained at the US border.

Students have been asked whether they were sponsored by the government-linked China Scholarship Council, and whether they have participated in any research related to national secrets, according to China Science Daily. Some were sent back to China even if they had the right paperwork and their answers to the questions were negative.

The Chinese embassy said the US move in Washington “runs counter” to the consensus reached during the Xi-Biden summit about promoting people-to-people and cultural exchanges.

“We strongly urge the US to stop this wrong practice,” it added.

— With assistance from Josh Xiao, Jing Li, and Luz Ding

(Adds report on four Chinese students in fifth paragraph.)

22.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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