Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"A boxer derives the greatest advantage from his sparring partner – and my accuser is my sparring partner. He trains me in patience, civility and even temper."

- Marcus Aurelius

“If a country is lost to communism through propaganda and subversion it is lost to our side as irretrievably as if we had lost it in actual warfare.” The gray zone isn't new. It's cheap & effective, esp against a military-first national security mindset."

- George Gallup (1962)

"I couldn’t possibly write the variety of books I manage to do out of the knowledge I had gained in school alone. I had to keep a program of self-education in process. My library of reference books grew and I found I had to sweat over them in my constant fear that I might misunderstand a point that to someone knowledgeable in the subject would be a ludicrously simple one."

- Isaac Asimov

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 12 (Putin's War)

2. A Red Army of Private Ryans: What Wargaming Says about Chinese Willingness to Strike First and Stay Long

3. The Chinese Roots of Hybrid Warfare

4. How Zelensky Seized Control Over the Narrative in Ukraine

5. US-China rivalry dividing the world in two

6. Disinformation Trackers Say Myth-Spreading Sites Doubled After Russian Invasion Began

7. Which Asian Countries Support China in the Taiwan Strait Crisis – and Which Don’t?

8. Live Updates: Outgunned by Russia, Ukraine Aims for Death by a Thousand Cuts

9. The Beginning of History: Surviving the Era of Catastrophic Risk

10. The Realist Underpinnings of China’s Taiwan Strategy

11. Will an Attack on Crimea Change the Course of the Ukraine War?

12. How to prevent a war between America and China over Taiwan

13. Long-Range Missiles? Special Op? Regardless, Crimean Air Base Blasts Are A 'Real Quandary' For Russia

14. Opinion | It’s time the free world commits to the defense of Taiwan

15. The Biggest Challenge in Building Missile Defense Presence in Guam? Finding the Right Site

16. Taiwan can't be allowed to become another Ukraine | Opinion

17. Russia’s Brutal Honesty Has Destroyed the West’s Appeasers

18. Air Force will shut down program that trains foreign pilots

19. Carl Sagan's 1995 prediction of America's future is worryingly accurate

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 12 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-0

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 12

Aug 12, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Layne Philipson, Angela Howard, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 12, 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Kremlin is reportedly attempting to mobilize industry to support prolonged war efforts in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin initiated the “industrial mobilization” of the defense enterprises in early August, banning some employees and the entire leadership at the Russian state industrial conglomerate company Rostec from taking vacations.[1] The GUR added that the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin, is preparing to change the state defense order program by early September to increase expenditures by 600-700 billion rubles (approximately $10 billion). Russian outlet Ura also reported that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu likely visited the Uralvagonzavod factory, the largest tank manufacturer in Russia and the producer of Russia’s T-72 main battle tanks, on August 12.[2] The GUR previously reported that Uralvagonzavod faced financial issues due to Western-enforced sanctions and failure to meet state contract obligations.[3] If true, Shoigu’s visit could suggest that the Kremlin is attempting to restart or expand the operation of the military-industrial complex. ISW has previously reported that the Kremlin has been conducting a crypto-mobilization of the Russian economy by proposing an amendment to the federal laws on Russian Armed Forces supply matters to the Russian State Duma on June 30.[4] The amendment obliges Russian businesses, regardless of ownership, to fulfill Russian military orders and allows the Kremlin to change work conditions for employees. Putin signed the amendment on July 14, which indicates that the Kremlin will continue to introduce more measures to expand the Kremlin’s direct control over the operations of Russia’s military-industrial complex.[5]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Siversk and northeast and southeast of Bakhmut.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks southwest and northwest of Donetsk City.
Ukrainian forces destroyed the last functioning bridge Russian forces used to transport military equipment near the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant.
Ukrainian officials confirmed additional Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots and a logistics point in Kherson Oblast.
Russian regional officials may be misrepresenting percentage fill of newly formed volunteer battalions.
Ukrainian partisans are likely targeting Russian occupation officials and Ukrainian collaborators who are preparing for the sham annexation referenda to disrupt the Russian annexation of occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Donetsk-Kharkiv Oblast border on August 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack in the direction of Bohorodychne and Dolyna (both 20km northwest of Slovyansk).[6] Russian forces conducted airstrikes near Zalyman (30km northwest of Izyum), missile strikes on Kramatorsk (6km from the southern outskirts of Slovyansk) and continued to shell settlements along the Kharkiv-Donetsk border on August 12.[7]

Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Siversk on August 12. Russian troops withdrew following failed offensive operations in the direction of Verkhnokamyanske (3km east of Siversk), Ivano-Darivka (7km southeast of Siversk), Spirne (12km southeast of Siversk), and Vyimka (6km southeast of Siversk) and unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force missions in the Hryhorivka direction (7km northeast of Siversk) and near Spirne.[8] Russian forces also conducted eight airstrikes and continued routine shelling along the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border.[9]

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces had “partial success” in an attack in the direction of Horlivka - Zaytseve.[10] A Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official alleged that Russian-led forces gained a foothold in northeastern Bakhmut, but ISW cannot independently confirm the extent of Russian advances from Pokrovske.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian troops suffered losses and retreated from offensives in the vicinity of Yakovlivka (16km northeast of Bakhmut), Kodema (15 km southeast of Bakhmut), Vershyna (12km southeast of Bakhmut), and Vesela Dolyna (5 km southeast of Bakhmut).[12] Russian forces will likely continue attempting to advance on Bakhmut in the coming days.

Russian forces continued ground attacks pushing southwestward and northwestward from the outskirts of Donetsk City on August 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces defeated Russian ground attacks near Pavlivka (50km southwest of Donetsk City).[13] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Spartak, Pisky, and Marinka all within 5 miles of the western outskirts of Donetsk City.[14] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces "control" the "situation" in Pisky.[15] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are in the process of completing the seizure of Pisky.[16] Combat footage and satellite imagery indicate that heavy Russian fire with thermobaric artillery systems has visibly leveled Pisky.[17] Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian-held territory west of Donetsk City with airstrikes and shelling.[18]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults on the Kharkiv City on August 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Verkhnyi Saltiv, Ukrainka, and Bayrak, all northeast of Kharkiv City, and Rtyshivka, approximately 50km southeast of Kharkiv City.[19] Russian forces also continued shelling Kharkiv City and settlements to its north and northeast using tank, tube, and rocket artillery.[20]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued to launch air and artillery strikes along the Kherson Oblast administrative border but did not conduct offensive operations on August 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Andriivka, Lozove, and Velyke Artakove (near the bridgehead over the Inhulets River), and Blahodatne, Novohryhorivka, Bruskinske, and Myrne (north of Kherson City).[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued shelling civilian and military infrastructure using tank, tube, and rocket artillery and conducted aerial reconnaissance using UAVs along the entire line of contact.[22]

Russian forces continued to target settlements in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts using artillery and missiles. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched 40 missiles on Marhanets and fired approximately 10 tube artillery rounds at Nikopol, both across the Dnipro River from Russian-occupied positions in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[23] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces fired rockets from Uragan MLRS systems at port infrastructure in Mykolaiv City and continued shelling nearby settlements.[24]

Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian logistics points and ammunition depots in Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that a Ukrainian strike rendered the last bridge Russian forces used to transport military equipment and ammunition to the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant inoperable on August 12.[25] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command also reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in Vesele and in the Beryslav district of Kherson Oblast.[26] Ukrainian airstrikes struck a Russian stronghold near Andriivka and a concentration of Russian manpower and equipment near Bruskinske.[27]

A spokesperson for Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Andriy Usov, said on August 12 that forces belonging to the Wagner Private Military Company are present at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Usov suggested that the Kremlin trusts Wagner militants to plant mines on the territory of the NPP because the Russian military is either incapable of or refusing to do so.[28]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi stated on August 11 that the IAEA has been prepared to physically investigate the safety of the Zaporizhzhia NPP since June but that “political and other factors” have made a mission impossible.[29] Grossi emphasized that the IAEA’s preliminary assessment suggests that there is no immediate threat to nuclear safety but that “this could change at any moment.”[30] US officials called on Russia to demilitarize and cede the Zaporizhzhia NPP to Ukrainian authorities because there have been repeated strikes on the facility since August 5.[31]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian “volunteer” units are likely deploying piecemeal groups of soldiers to reinforce specific areas, and not deploying in their full organic structures. Russian federal subjects (regions) continued to announce the formation of new volunteer units, however Russian media is likely misrepresenting the percentage fill of these units. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona revealed that several federal subjects are misrepresenting their progress toward recruiting volunteers.[32] Mediazona found that Dagestan and Kalmykia Republics announced the formation of rifle and motorized rifle regiments in June but did not follow through with additional information following the original announcement, suggesting failures to generate regiment-sized units.[33] The report also highlighted inconsistencies in the announcement of the formation of volunteer battalions in Republic of Tatarstan, where local officials claimed that they had already recruited 300 volunteers and identified 400 prospective recruits as of June 23. Tatarstan officials continued to advertise contract service despite having claimed to have finished the formation of battalions and announced the deployment of five volunteers from the battalion to Ukraine. ISW has previously pointed out Tatarstan‘s inconsistent reporting on the timeframe of recruitment and deployment to Ukraine, and it is likely that Russian forces are deploying small groups of recruits to training grounds and Ukraine as they sign contracts. The Republic of Karelia also claimed that recruitment for local volunteer battalions ended on July 15, but Mediazona’s investigation found that the region is still actively recruiting for the battalions. It is possible that Karelia is recruiting replacements for casualties, although there is no evidence one way or the other. Chelyabinsk Oblast officials claimed to have recruited 514 volunteers split between two volunteer battalions, but then stated that only 125 recruits deployed to Ukraine.[34] The Mari El Republic initially required volunteers to have prior military experience, but Mediazona contacted the local military recruitment center and noted that the Republic offered to initiate enlistment procedures without such prior service.

Mediazona’s report supports ISW’s original assessment that the Kremlin is scrambling to find any reinforcements to maintain its prolonged war in Ukraine, but these efforts are unlikely to generate combat ready or cohesive force necessary for the Kremlin’s goal of seizing all of Ukraine.[35] Russian federal subjects are likely misreporting interest in these volunteer units to encourage more residents to enlist in the recruitment drives.

ISW has identified additional federal subjects that are forming new volunteer units. Mediazona reported that the Republic of Ingushetia created a volunteer motorized rifle company in the 503th Motorized Rifle Regiment based in Troiskoye and is forming a volunteer rifle company of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.[36] Social media users published a brochure calling on men ages 18 to 55 to serve in an unnamed reserve battalion based out of Moscow City for a six to twelve months.[37] Moscow City military recruitment center offered volunteers a monthly salary of 200,000 rubles (approximately $3,200). ISW has previously reported that Moscow City officials are forming the ”Sobyaniniskiy Polk” regiment, but it is unclear if the above-mentioned battalion is a different military unit from the ”Sobyaniniskiy Polk” regiment. Mediazona noted that Moscow City military recruitment centers denied that they are recruiting for the ”Sobyaniniskiy Polk.”

Russian forces are continuing to commit newly recruited volunteer forces directly to combat zones. Russian Telegram channel Readovka reported that volunteer Cossack “Yermak” and “Kuban” detachments operate in the Kharkiv Oblast direction, while “Tavrida” and “Zakharia Chepigi” are holding defensive positions on the Zaporizhzhia Oblast frontline.[38] The deployment of ill-trained volunteers supports ISW’s previous assessments that Russian forces are not prioritizing Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts frontlines.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities in Mariupol continued preparing for show trials and potential executions of Ukrainian Prisoners of War (POWs) from the Azovstal plant as ISW assessed on August 11.[39] Local sources shared images of construction on a Mariupol theater building to prepare for the sham tribunals on August 12. The advisor to the Ukrainian mayor of Mariupol, Petro Andryushchenko, and local Telegram channel Mariupol Now both reported on August 12 that occupation forces are "rushing" to turn Mariupol’s Chamber Philharmonic Theater into a prison and to build a special "garage/bunker" with cage-lined hallways to receive prisoners by the planned August 24 tribunal.”[40] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) issued a statement on August 12 on behalf of Ukraine's security and defense forces calling on “the entire civilized world to prevent the announced trial of Ukrainian defenders by executioners in Mariupol.”[41]

Ukrainian partisans are likely targeting Russian occupation officials and Ukrainian collaborators who are preparing for the sham annexation referenda, probably to disrupt the Russian annexation of occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that partisans targeted the head of a local election headquarters belonging to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party in Melitopol on August 12.[42] The official, Oleg Shostak, was hospitalized in unclear condition.[43] Russian outlets referred to Shostak as the public relations head for the Zaporizhzhia Oblast Occupation Administration and the head of the "humanitarian headquarters." Russian occupation officials have been using United Russia party members to distribute humanitarian aid in exchange for cooperation with occupation authorities, including giving up personal data that can be used to rig the sham referenda, as ISW has previously reported.[44] The Ukrainian head of the Luhansk Oblast Military Administration, Serhiy Haidai, reported on August 12 that partisans detonated a car bomb targeting the unnamed head of the Inter-district Registration and Examination Department in occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast.[45] Ukrainian officials and partisan outlets framed attacks in recent days as the beginning of the "hunt for the collaborators preparing the pseudo-referenda."[46] Ukraine’s Strategic Communications Center warned on August 12 that “the resistance movement closely monitors collaborators, knows everyone by sight and name, and will not leave anyone without proper attention.”[47]

Fear of Ukrainian partisan activity could very well be shaping the behavior of occupation forces. Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko claimed that Russian proxy Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces shot down a Russian helicopter in the Staryi Krym settlement just outside of Mariupol, allegedly because the DNR forces were jumpy due to "fear of resistance."[48] The Mariupol City Council linked reports of the shooting to claims of discord within occupation leadership.[49]

GUR Spokesperson Andriy Usov reported on August 12 that Russian forces do not have a final date for their pseudo-referenda to annex occupied Ukrainian territories because Russian forces "do not control the situation" and no longer feel safe in Ukraine.[50] He argued that two factors are preventing Russian occupiers from holding their referenda: Ukrainian forces continue to liberate occupied territories, and Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas do not support the referenda. Russian occupation authorities continue to produce pro-referendum propaganda, however. The Russian deputy head of the Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration, Kirill Stremousov, shared videos of his meetings with citizens of Kherson Oblast on Telegram on August 12 alongside a claim that his meetings prove the people of Kherson Oblast “unanimously” want to join Russia to attain “economic stability, social equality, and security.[51]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/kreml-provodyt-prykhovanu-promyslovu-mobilizatsiiu-ta-kontroliuie-peresuvannia-personalu-oboronnykh-pidpryiemstv.html

[2] https://amp dot ura.news/news/1052578160; https://ura dot news/news/1052578031; https://ura dot news/news/1052577268; https://ura dot news/news/1052577998

[5] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/155680-8#bh_histras

[28] https://apostrophe dot ua/ua/article/society/2022-08-12/myi-znaem-kto-zaminiroval-zaporojskuyu-aes-i-v-etom-est-ujasnaya-logika---predstavitel-gur-mo/47471

[32] https://zona dot media/article/2022/08/10/imeni-lenina

[33] https://chernovik dot net/news/dagestancev-priglashayut-v-novuyu-imennuyu-strelkovuyu-rotu-dlya-uchastiya-v-voennoy; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4mhZ6Da5ZQ

[34] https://kr-gazeta dot ru/obshchestvo/125-yuzhnouraltsev-otpravilis-na-donbass-dobrovoltsami/

[36] https://gazetaingush dot ru/news/v-gorode-nazrani-proydet-vstrecha-s-molodezhyu-po-voprosu-formirovaniya-imennoy-ingushskoy-roty

[41] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/spilna-zaiava-syl-bezpeky-ta-oborony-shchodo-polonenykh-zakhysnykiv-mariupolia.html

[42] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/12/v-melitopoli-pidirvaly-kolaboranta/

[43] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/17009; https://t.me/babel/20826; https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/12/v-melitopoli-pidirvaly-kolaboranta/

[46] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/396; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/394; https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/12/v-melitopoli-pidirvaly-kolaboranta/

[50] https://apostrophe dot ua/ua/article/society/2022-08-12/myi-znaem-kto-zaminiroval-zaporojskuyu-aes-i-v-etom-est-ujasnaya-logika---predstavitel-gur-mo/47471

understandingwar.org

2. A Red Army of Private Ryans: What Wargaming Says about Chinese Willingness to Strike First and Stay Long

A Red Army of Private Ryans: What Wargaming Says about Chinese Willingness to Strike First and Stay Long

By Major Jesse R. Humpal Ph.D.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/red-army-private-ryans-what-wargaming-says-about-chinese-willingness-strike-first-and-stay

A recent strategic wargame that pitted the People’s Republic of China against a U.S. backed Taiwan, resulted in the trading of intercontinental ballistic missiles, a 25-percent drop in the global economy, 10s of thousands of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Americans dead…and a protracted guerilla conflict on the small island. During the adjudication, leaders from both sides–who were played by some of U.S.’s most prominent academics, military leaders, politicians, and statesmen (they were all men)–concluded that their side behaved with restraint while the other acted as provocateur. Absent from their rationale, was an acknowledgment that in global conflict seeking manifest destiny, if just one of the sides actually acted with restraint, they would be steamrolled.

The resulting stalemate should act as a prophetic reminder that wars are not meant to be just, wars are meant to be won divisively. Countries owe it to their populations not to enter into fair fights. When countries enter into global combat with anything other than total victory as their intent, the conflict is already lost. Scholars have argued for a more humane way of fighting wars. Often with the caveat that if the survival of one’s own nation state is at risk, then the rules of just war can be abandoned. Comparable in nature retaliatory strikes or messaging before firing missiles does not make wars less deadly, they make wars protracted and unwinnable.

Wars are getting less violent but more frequent, and more protracted. Wars prior to 1945 almost always ended with regime change or removal of the occupying force. These wars were infrequent, costly, and short comparative to modern protracted conflict. Wars were brutal and lacked the rules that many argue make war more civilized today. This changed in the 1970s when U.S. President Jimmy Carter began willing into existence the idea of global human rights Carter was the first world leader to articulate human rights as a prerequisite for partnership and part of global order. These words shifted the global threat context from one of decisive victory to one of conditional war.

America will soon find itself in a precarious spot. How it responds to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan will signal to the world what shape the new world order will take. Strategic wargames and global exercises used to provide decision-makers a range of plausible outcomes continuously show that restrained conflict often only delays one of two outcomes–nuclear war or indefinite insurgency. This matters because the ways in which players explain how and why they wage war is dichotomous to how the games unfold. From these outcomes, China is better positioned to capitalize on all most likely outcomes. Wargames show that China is more likely to escalate first, more comfortable for a mutual destruction scenario, and more equipped for a protracted insurgency.

Critics may cite the several decade long decline in interstate wars globally or the relative stability of international order as evidence against this argument. The critics are wrong. The last two decades of relative peace was not due to the better angles of our nature but rather a once in history global anomaly. Unipolarity with a liberal hegemon has happened exactly once in human history and is rapidly changing. Multifront interstate wars should be expected and trained for. Emphasis on wargaming to train senior decision-makers is critical. Sobering truths about future how future wars will unfold is important—how to aggressively counter is even more so. The trends of these games are puzzling. Blue is unwilling to escalate to decisive victory until it loses the initiative and the game enters a no-victor possible point. The red behavior is different. Through strategic wargaming, Red is generally quicker to make a devastating move. This move either wins the game or takes any option of winning away from blue. This should change.

U.S. weapon development/procurement, military education, and senior leader pronouncements promote what is being observed in these games. There has been a renewed focus on non-kinetic and low collateral effects. Offensive cyber, for example, cripples an opponent’s capabilities but urges their hand to undertake more primitive and escalatory retaliations. When precision fires are rendered ineffective, brute force methods of coercion–such as dumb bombs, incendiaries, and biological weapons–are adopted. Iterative games show restraint early only delays savagery.

Optimists argue in adjudications that a Chinese public that is now over a generation into a one-child policy will quickly grow weary of a protracted conflict. One observer said the People’s Liberation Army is “a Red Army of Private Ryans”, noting that its fighting force is full of the last surviving heirs. By this logic, a Chinese populous with an emerging middle class will stand up against a war in a neighboring island. Despite the logic being there, China–for now anyway–continues to show their tolerance for discomfort especially juxtaposed to the United States. Over two and a half years into the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese government is still enforcing some of the world’s strictest restrictions and lockdowns. Keeping cities like Shanghai under near total lock down signals resolve and a willingness to ignore public opinion in the name of national interests.

America has approached war since 1991 from a privileged and narcissistic position. Ignoring millennia of evidence that subordinate powers don’t play by the artificial rules or under the terms the superpower makes. Just because the superpower conceptually changes the way of war, others don’t necessarily follow suit. The opposite is true, and that is why China security policy seems to show they are preparing to both be aggressive early and also maintain a discipline for a protracted sludge.

America should take the lessons from these wargames serious. If it decides to militarily act against China, aggressive strikes beyond proportional retaliatory ones should be considered early and often. If the U.S. finds this idea unpalatable, perhaps they have no business in the war at all. If the games conclusions manifest, delaying decisive actions likely ends in two ways, neither of which in America nor its allies favor.

The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Air Force, Joint Special Operations Command, or the DoD.

About the Author(s)

Jesse R. Humpal

Major Jesse R. Humpal Ph.D. is an Active-Duty Air Force officer assigned to Joint Special Operations Command in their Center for Counterterrorism Studies. Major Humpal earned his Ph.D. from Northwestern University in 2021 where he focused on Meta-Rationality, International Security, and Global Norms. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Air Force, Joint Special Operations Command, or the DoD. Twitter @jessehumpal

3. The Chinese Roots of Hybrid Warfare

Excerpts:

The Chinese in fact began waging hybrid warfare in the early 2000s or at least doing proof of concept tests using cyber exploits against businesses and critical infrastructure around the world. Today, this is evident when engineers evaluate risks to the supply chain. Hence the current concern about the Chinese telecommunications firm, Huawei. We can even see it in the impact Chinese companies have gained by investing in Hollywood, where movies have become a weapon of information warfare.

The threat of hybrid warfare is prolific and persistent. And, like fireworks and tea, it is a product that China has exported across the world.

Gerasimov and Russian military thinkers only developed Hybrid War 2.0. Is China now developing Hybrid War 5.0?

The Chinese Roots of Hybrid Warfare | CEPA

cepa.org · August 10, 2022

It has been more than two decades since a little-noticed text foreshadowed China’s exceptionally broad approach to conflict with enemies, notably the West.

“What is modern war? What should the army be prepared for? How should it be armed”? These are the questions General Valery Gerasimov raised in Voeynno-Promyshlenny Kurier (The Military-Industrial Courier) in 2013, and to which many attribute the foundation for the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine. More importantly, the article laid the theoretical foundation for Russia’s development and later its use of hybrid warfare.

Yet neither Russia nor Gerasimov were the first to ask these questions or to see the strategic imperative to adapt the strategic military doctrine to a new age typified by economic interdependency, technological interconnectivity, and the importance of sub-state as well as supra-state actors in aiding or hindering nation-states’ security.

Rather it was two Chinese military theorists, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, whose Unrestricted Warfare, published in 1999, who first asked the very same questions and presaged Gerasimov by more than 10 years in seeing that the First Gulf War had marked the end of the era of “might makes right” and that the world had entered into a new era of “unrestricted warfare”, one in which the network hacker, financial and trade transactions (or lack thereof), and the media have all become weapons of modern war, e.g. the means for a country to protect and realize its self-interest. As Qiao and Wang wrote: “All friendships are in flux; the only constant (in international relations) is self-interest”.

The pair defined the future battlefield as an “extended domain”, not a battlefield where lethality took precedence, but one in which the goal of any nation-state (or sub-state actors) is to “paralyze and to undermine the enemy” by degrading the will of its people and the state to wage an armed conflict in the first place. The “extended domain” is what we today refer to as cyberspace, but which they referred to as the electromagnetic spectrum. The modern warriors are the banks, and anybody whom the state can enlist or coerce to use to advance the state’s self-interest (think of all Chinese companies, whatever their public declarations of independence.) Not to be overlooked is the media or as they write “The information-sharing world creates the media as an integral and immediate part of war”.

Their third key assertion is nuclear weapons have made war both unfightable and unwinnable. Yet, paradoxically, the mere “unfightability” of war has not diminished competition among nation-states, and has instead pushed countries to find new methods to wage a fightable war that is played out not on the traditional battlefield, but on an extended domain. Hence, Qiao and Wang posit a “new concept of weaponry,” one which places less emphasis (especially less than the US) on lethality and more on the means to “inflict material and psychological casualties on the enemy.” This new weaponry includes the tools of the electromagnetic spectrum, i.e. hacking and information operations akin to media portrayals of slain US servicemembers being dragged naked through the streets of Mogadishu; trade warfare, and financial warfare, all of which they assert the US as having already employed.

If we accept the assumption that despite global interdependence and global interconnectivity, nations are still in competition to realize their self-interests and remember von Clausewitz’s dictum that, “war is a continuation of politics by other means”, then the words of Qiao and Wang surely also contain an echo of Sun Tzu’s words that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” and “victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.” The novelty in Qiao’s and Wang’s work is that there is no novelty. They simply adapt the age-old basic tenets of seminal military theorists to a new strategic environment awash with new technologies.

The most important lesson from Qiao and Wang is that while past military theoreticians and generals “fight the fight that fits the weapons, it is better to build the weapons to fit the fight.” The latter requires a vision that extends beyond adapting to leverage technology. Rather the true strategic thinker envisions the nature of new warfare, pushes the research and development community to build the next generation of weaponry, and develops the doctrine ahead of the strategy to achieve victory. Their words are, like Gerasimov's in 2013, a challenge to the military, the industrial base, and the government to see beyond the horizon into the potential of the extended domain.

Writing in 2022, after watching Western democracies struggle with hybrid warfare in all its permutations, be it “little Green men in Crimea”, disinformation operations to influence political outcomes, ransomware attacks on businesses, or denial of service attacks on critical infrastructure, none of this may seem like a revelation.

Hybrid warfare is simply now a fact of life, a staple in the nation-state’s national security diet. What stands out is it was not the Russians who first developed this vision of hybrid warfare. It was two Chinese thinkers writing two years before September 11, and five years before the US entered Iraq for the second time.

The Chinese in fact began waging hybrid warfare in the early 2000s or at least doing proof of concept tests using cyber exploits against businesses and critical infrastructure around the world. Today, this is evident when engineers evaluate risks to the supply chain. Hence the current concern about the Chinese telecommunications firm, Huawei. We can even see it in the impact Chinese companies have gained by investing in Hollywood, where movies have become a weapon of information warfare.

The threat of hybrid warfare is prolific and persistent. And, like fireworks and tea, it is a product that China has exported across the world.

Gerasimov and Russian military thinkers only developed Hybrid War 2.0. Is China now developing Hybrid War 5.0?

Dr. Mark Thomas is an assistant professor of Political Science. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Notre Dame, where he also completed an MA in International Relations. He also has an MBA from the American Graduate School of International Management.

cepa.org · August 10, 2022

4. How Zelensky Seized Control Over the Narrative in Ukraine

We can learn a lot from Zelensky. (and we must).

As Matt Armstrong has counseled me many times, we can only have effective strategic communications, information and influence activities, and psychological operations if the senior leader(s) (but most important the president) is all in in fighting the influence fight and yet also empowers and supports the "information forces." We can create myriad processes, establish working groups and task forces, hire contractors ,etc. But it takes his or her leadership at the national level to set the policy, tone of messaging, and priority for influence operations.

Excerpts:

Zelensky leaves military decisions to military professionals and focuses on his core strengths: maintaining control of the narrative, defining the stakes, and explaining what this conflict is about.

He has been pithy while summoning the world to higher ideals. Addressing the Grammy awards, he commented that “our musicians wear body armor instead of tuxedos.” His language and image effectively evoke themes of protest and national resistance.

It’s worth quoting Churchill again, who perhaps best expressed the current Ukrainian spirit of resolution and defiance. Warning the Canadian Parliament that the Nazis have “sown the wind; let them reap the whirlwind,” Churchill reminded his audience of the warning given that “in three weeks England will have her neck wrung like a chicken.”

Putin must have believed the same thing about Ukraine. And so it goes. As Churchill sardonically commented: “Some chicken; some neck.”

The Ukraine conflict is about control of the narrative as much as armed conflict, and Zelensky’s adroit leadership has seized the initiative and given his nation and its citizens hope and inspiration, essential to achieving victory.

How Zelensky Seized Control Over the Narrative in Ukraine

Zelensky intuitively grasps the nature of information warfare and focuses on his core strengths: maintaining control of the narrative, defining the stakes, and explaining what this conflict is about.

JAMES FARWELL AUGUST 11, 2022 4 MINUTES READ

thedefensepost.com · August 11, 2022

Winston Churchill said that a leader who enjoys the gift of oratory “wields a power more durable than that of a great king.” Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky is proving at least that bon mot from the late British icon correct, although examining how Zelensky has enabled Ukraine to seize control of the narrative in fighting the Russians goes deeper than that.

He’s used his narrative of victimhood externally to marshal support from NATO and other nations for weapons and political support. He’s used it internally to rally outgunned Ukrainians into a unified national effort and inspired the conviction that Ukraine can, as it must, prevail.

This conflict is about information as much as kinetic warfare. Zelensky understands that and is playing the role of president to the hilt. Battles are won in the heart, but warfare is fought by balancing values, historical experience, ideals, and practical reality. Zelensky has balanced these adroitly.

He intuitively grasps the nature of information warfare: the use of information and electronic communication technology to conduct warfare, and how to use it.

Strategic Communications

No one, least of all Vladimir Putin, expected such a performance. Educated as a lawyer, Zelensky achieved fame as the star of a TV comedy, Servant of the People, in which a school teacher who denounces corruption wins the presidency. The show gained high popularity, but no one took Zelensky seriously except as a showbiz star.

Fiction became reality. Forming a new political party, Zelensky won an upset victory over billionaire oligarch Petro Poroshenko, famous for selling chocolate candy.

Until Putin invaded Ukraine, critics dismissed Zelensky as a lightweight, which shows you can’t judge a leader’s mettle until they confront a life-and-death crisis.

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives to watch the Victory Day military parade at Red Square in central Moscow on May 9, 2022. Photo: Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP

Intuitively, he understood how to use strategic communication tactics to wage information warfare and create strategic effects. Strategic communication is the use of words, actions, images, or symbols to influence opinion to shape behavior to achieve defined effects, or, in military jargon, “end-states.” Zelensky uses all of them brilliantly.

Aided by his media colleagues, Zelensky has demonstrated pluck and both physical and mental courage. Telling the White House he needed “ammunition, not a ride,” he remained in the presidential quarters in Kyiv with his family as Russian troops tried to storm the place. His action sent a powerful message of leadership.

Freedom

Zelensky forged his narrative on the go. Speaking to his nation every day, his actions boosted morale and created unity with himself as the face of Ukraine, while his on-target rhetoric has championed freedom.

Freedom is the key value. Too often, Western politicians talk about democracy and upholding a rule-based international order. But democracy is a process, not a value.

The US and most NATO nations are not democracies. The US is a democratic republic. Others are forms of parliamentary democracy, while France is a hybrid. Many nations view the US discourse about a rules-based order as a shorthand for the US making the rules and demanding that other nations do what it orders.

Zelensky echoes John F. Kennedy and Franklin Roosevelt: his cause is freedom. Freedom from violence, tyranny, genocide, want. He stands for sovereignty, freedom of expression, and an independent Ukrainian cultural identity.

Resilience and Fortitude

As Kyiv survived the first day of the onslaught, dressed in army T-shirts – which became a trademark image and symbol – Zelensky appeared with members of his cabinet on the streets to make a simple but powerful declaration: “We’re all here. Defending our independence and our country.”

He called roll. Ukrainians and the world witnessed in real time the emergence of a strong leader, principled and brave.

He made trips to the front and shared food with the troops, reinforcing the narrative of resilience and fortitude in the face of aggression. Like Churchill, Zelensky embodied the spirit of a free nation. He used that to engage with parliaments, the UN, and others globally.

Seizing the moral high ground as a champion for freedom, he pleaded for weapons, a unified anti-Russian front, and like Churchill, made the case for why Ukraine’s victory mattered beyond its own borders, to all nations who value freedom.

Ukrainian soldiers sit on an armored military vehicle in the city of Severodonetsk, Donbas region, on April 7, 2022. Photo: Fadel Senna/AFP

He lacks JFK’s eloquence, manifested in JFK’s deeply moving Berlin speech, as powerful today as when first spoken. Yet Kennedy, who communicated to the world a sense of American idealism that only Ronald Reagan has matched – how many US Presidents could fill a square in Berlin with 300,000 cheering citizens – would have been proud.

Kennedy’s enjoinder against Russian repression applies as freshly today as in 1963. Zelensky has picked up the torch and carries it proudly and shrewdly. He has made the world experience the conflict as Ukrainians have, casting the stakes as nothing less than the survival of national identity and culture.

He communicates, as one writer put it, “integrity and humanity,” values that contrast starkly with Putin’s club-footed brutality. His notion of Ukrainian identity exposes the shallow quality of Putin’s third-rates efforts as a historian.

National Resilience

Zelensky leaves military decisions to military professionals and focuses on his core strengths: maintaining control of the narrative, defining the stakes, and explaining what this conflict is about.

He has been pithy while summoning the world to higher ideals. Addressing the Grammy awards, he commented that “our musicians wear body armor instead of tuxedos.” His language and image effectively evoke themes of protest and national resistance.

It’s worth quoting Churchill again, who perhaps best expressed the current Ukrainian spirit of resolution and defiance. Warning the Canadian Parliament that the Nazis have “sown the wind; let them reap the whirlwind,” Churchill reminded his audience of the warning given that “in three weeks England will have her neck wrung like a chicken.”

Putin must have believed the same thing about Ukraine. And so it goes. As Churchill sardonically commented: “Some chicken; some neck.”

The Ukraine conflict is about control of the narrative as much as armed conflict, and Zelensky’s adroit leadership has seized the initiative and given his nation and its citizens hope and inspiration, essential to achieving victory.

James Farwell (@JamespFarwell) is an Associate Fellow in the Dept of War Studies, King’s College, Univeristy of London; non-resident Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute; Senior Fellow at the Institute for BioDefense Research; Board of Editors, Defence Strategic Communications (the NATO peer-reviewed publication).

Has advised the Department of Defense, USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, and other USG entities.

Author of Persuasion and Power: The Art of Strategic Communication (Washington: Georgetown U. Press, 2012); The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability (Washington: Potomac Books, 2011); Information Warfare: Forging Communication Strategies for Twenty-First Century Operational Environments (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2020); The Corporate Warrior: Successful Strategies from Military Leaders to Win Your Business Battles (Rothstein Publishing, 2022); and numerous articles and commentaries in Parameters, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Survival, National Interest, and Defense One, among others.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

thedefensepost.com · August 11, 2022

Actually possibly into three. I think there will be a rise of a non-alignment movement. The question is whether India will revert to its historical non-aligned position or wil it remain a part of the Quad and the larger alignment of like minded democracies.

US-China rivalry dividing the world in two

US-China relations have moved from building bridges in 1972 to building walls in 2022. Global trade will never be the same

By MANMOHAN S SODHI And CHRISTOPHER S TANG

AUGUST 11, 2022

asiatimes.com · by ManMohan S Sodhi · August 11, 2022

Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has elicited a strong response from China: days of simulated attack on Taiwan with further drills announced, plus a withdrawal from critical ongoing conversations with the US on climate change and the military.

This strong reaction was predictable. President Xi had earlier warned President Biden not “to play with fire.” Of course, if Pelosi’s visit hadn’t gone ahead, the Biden administration would have faced a strong reaction from both parties in Congress for not standing up to China’s threat to Taiwan or human rights issues regarding Tibet and Xinjiang, not to mention Hong Kong.

So where does it leave trade between the world’s two leading powers?

Consider the not-too-distant past. The US supported the Republic of China against Japan in the Pacific war of 1941-45. When the Chinese leadership fled to Taiwan in 1949 following the victory of Mao Zedong’s communists in the Chinese civil war, Washington continued to recognize the exiled regime as China’s legitimate government, blocking the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from joining the United Nations.

This shifted in 1972 following President Nixon’s historic visit to China (in a move to isolate the Soviets). The US now recognized the PRC as China’s sole government and accepted its “One China” policy.

It downgraded its Taiwan relations to merely informal while affirming a peaceful settlement to the mainland communists’ claim that this was a breakaway province that had to be assimilated.

President Richard Nixon meeting Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1972. Photo: manhhai, CC BY-SA

This opened US-China trade, ending a US trade embargo in place since the 1940s. Economic ties proliferated in the 1980s under Mao’s eventual successor, Deng Xiaoping, helping the Chinese economy to multiply while the US enjoyed lower consumer prices and a stronger stock market.

Western manufacturing firms either outsourced to Chinese firms or set up operations themselves. They benefited from cheaper production and – for those outsourcing – not having to own factories or deal with labour issues. In turn, the Chinese gained tremendous manufacturing capability.

As China’s middle class grew wealthier, the country became a major target consumer market for US firms such as Apple and GM. The Chinese authorities insisted this was done through local partner firms, transferring technology in the process and further enhancing the nation’s manufacturing know-how.

Perceived Chinese threat

China and the US captured more than half the growth in GDP across the world from 1980 to 2020. US GDP grew nearly five times from US$4.4 trillion to $20.9 trillion in today’s money, while China’s grew from $310 billion to $14.7 trillion.

China is now the second largest economy, although the IMF, World Bank and CIA consider it the largest once purchasing power is taken into account (see chart below). The US is still well ahead on per capita income ($69,231 vs $12,359 in 2021), though China is now that of a “developed” country, having lifted 800 million people out of poverty in the process.

The US has become increasingly concerned about China’s faster economic growth and the fact that the US buys much more from its rival than the other way around. This drove the big decline in US domestic manufacturing that famously helped Donald Trump to win the US presidency.

Chinese and US GDP based on purchasing power parity 1990-2021

World Bank

Equally, the rivalry has extended to other areas as China has sought a leading role on the world stage. Both nations are nuclear powers, although the Chinese military has only 350 nuclear warheads to America’s 5,500.

China has a larger navy, with some 360 battle force ships compared to the US 297, although China’s are mostly smaller – only three aircraft carriers compared to America’s 11, for example. The two countries are also competing in space to bring astronauts to the Moon and establish the first lunar base.

All this has threatened American dominance, while President Xi has also been much more forthright both domestically and internationally than any Chinese leader since Mao.

The US has gradually become more hostile, starting with president Obama’s pivot towards other Asian nations in 2016 and then president Trump’s public complaints and eventual sanctioning of China’s “unfair” trade practices.

Trump imposed extra tariffs on goods imported from China in 2018 and restricted China’s access to various semiconductor manufacturing technologies in 2020, while the Chinese responded with countermeasures along the way.

When President Biden took office in 2021, he began highlighting long-simmering complaints about human rights issues in Xinjiang and the threat to Taiwan (while still endorsing the One China Policy).

He also imposed sanctions on certain Chinese companies of a kind not seen since the Mao-era trade embargo.

US trade in goods to China 2011-21

Note the US trade in services to China is about one-tenth that of goods. In 2020 the US exported US$40 billion in services to China and imported US$16 billion. Statista

Biden also banned goods from China’s Xinjiang region on the grounds of forced labor in 2022, affecting the purchasing of goods by many western companies. China reportedly moved workers to other parts of the country to enable western companies to keep purchasing.

Bipolarity is back

Covid-19 further increased the distance between the two countries. After China’s “Zero-Covid” policy helped to disrupt supply chains and cause product shortages, the Biden administration began calling for reduced dependency on its rival.

US firms have duly been restructuring their supply chains. In June, Apple moved some iPad production from China to Vietnam, albeit also because of growing demand in south-east Asia.

Near-shoring to Mexico is gaining momentum. Apple manufacturers Foxconn and Pegatron are considering producing iPhones for North America in Mexico rather than China to take advantage of lower labor costs and the free-trade agreement between the US and Mexico.

Two global blocs are increasingly emerging, with US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in April calling for “friend-shoring” with trusted partners, dividing countries into friends or foes. The Biden administration announced at the June G7 meeting a new “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.”

Aiming to mobilize $600 billion in investments over five years, this is an overture to various developing countries already being courted by China under its similar Belt and Road Initiative.

Days earlier, China had hosted the annual BRICS summit, which includes Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa. It welcomed leaders from 13 other countries: Algeria, Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Senegal, Uzbekistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Malaysia and Thailand. Xi urged the summit to build a “global community of security” based on multilateral cooperation. Iran and Argentina have since applied to join the bloc.

We are already seeing what bipolarity will mean for vital components and commodities. In nanochips, the US is leading a “chips 4” pact with Japan, Taiwan and possibly South Korea to develop next-generation technologies and manufacturing capacity. China is investing US$1.4 trillion between 2020 and 2025 in a bid to become self-reliant in this technology.

Another big issue is cobalt, which is essential for making lithium batteries for electric vehicles. To secure supply from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which produces 70% of world reserves, China has navigated Congolese politics, lobbying powerful politicians in mining regions. By 2020, Chinese firms owned or had a stake in 15 of the DRC’s 19 cobalt-producing mines.

As China hoards cobalt supplies, the US seeks alternatives. GM is developing its Ultium battery cell, which needs 70% less cobalt than today’s batteries, while Oak Ridge National Laboratory is developing a battery that doesn’t need the metal at all.

Silver linings

As US-China relations have moved from building bridges in 1972 to building walls in 2022, countries will increasingly be forced to choose sides and companies will have to plan supply chains accordingly. Those seeking to trade in both blocs will need to “divisionalize”, running parallel operations.

American companies wanting to serve Chinese consumers will still need to manufacture in China or other nations within that bloc, while Chinese companies will need to do the same in reverse. Interestingly, Chinese companies have been rapidly buying farmland and agriculture-based companies in the US and elsewhere.

Yet though the new supply chains will almost certainly increase costs for western consumers and dampen China’s growth, there will be benefits. Supply chains should be more resilient to future crises and also more transparent, while reduced transportation (and reliance on Chinese coal) should cut carbon emissions.

This should help to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals on environmental and social sustainability.

US President Joe Biden wants more advanced semiconductors produced in America. Image: Twitter

The cobalt and nanochips examples also show how the US-China rivalry is catalyzing innovation. And importantly, global trade will continue growing as countries depend on each other, even as trade links change.

It will certainly take time to find an equilibrium. It took years for the USSR and US to figure out how to co-exist without getting into direct military conflict. Hillary Clinton wrote in 2011 as secretary of state that “there is no handbook for the evolving US-China relationship”, and that remains the case today.

At any rate, the businesses that thrive in this new environment will likely be those that plan for a divided world with divisional supply chains. The recent Taiwan row will probably not lead to direct military conflict; rather it will reinforce a trend that has been gathering momentum for a decade or more.

ManMohan S Sodhi is Professor of Operations and Supply Chain Management, City, University of London and Christopher S Tang is Professor of Supply Chain Management, University of California, Los Angeles

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by ManMohan S Sodhi · August 11, 2022

5. US-China rivalry dividing the world in twoUS-China rivalry dividing the world in two

Actually possibly into three. I think there will be a rise of a non-alignment movement. The question is whether India will revert to its historical non-aligned position or will it remain a part of the Quad and the larger alignment of like minded democracies.

US-China rivalry dividing the world in two

US-China relations have moved from building bridges in 1972 to building walls in 2022. Global trade will never be the same

By MANMOHAN S SODHI And CHRISTOPHER S TANG

AUGUST 11, 2022

asiatimes.com · by ManMohan S Sodhi · August 11, 2022

So where does it leave trade between the world’s two leading powers?

It downgraded its Taiwan relations to merely informal while affirming a peaceful settlement to the mainland communists’ claim that this was a breakaway province that had to be assimilated.

President Richard Nixon meeting Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1972. Photo: manhhai, CC BY-SA

Perceived Chinese threat

Chinese and US GDP based on purchasing power parity 1990-2021

World Bank

All this has threatened American dominance, while President Xi has also been much more forthright both domestically and internationally than any Chinese leader since Mao.

When President Biden took office in 2021, he began highlighting long-simmering complaints about human rights issues in Xinjiang and the threat to Taiwan (while still endorsing the One China Policy).

He also imposed sanctions on certain Chinese companies of a kind not seen since the Mao-era trade embargo.

US trade in goods to China 2011-21

Note the US trade in services to China is about one-tenth that of goods. In 2020 the US exported US$40 billion in services to China and imported US$16 billion. Statista

Bipolarity is back

US firms have duly been restructuring their supply chains. In June, Apple moved some iPad production from China to Vietnam, albeit also because of growing demand in south-east Asia.

Aiming to mobilize $600 billion in investments over five years, this is an overture to various developing countries already being courted by China under its similar Belt and Road Initiative.

Silver linings

This should help to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals on environmental and social sustainability.

US President Joe Biden wants more advanced semiconductors produced in America. Image: Twitter

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by ManMohan S Sodhi · August 11, 2022

6. Disinformation Trackers Say Myth-Spreading Sites Doubled After Russian Invasion Began

Excerpts:

Many of the sites avoid disclosing ownership or control but claim -- without evidence -- to be independent think tanks or other nonprofits.

European Commission Vice President Vera Jourova recently described disinformation as "a growing problem in the EU, and we really have to take stronger measures."

NewsGuard launched a Russia-Ukraine Disinformation Tracking Center in March, days after tens of thousands of Russian troops rolled across Ukraine's border.

Disinformation Trackers Say Myth-Spreading Sites Doubled After Russian Invasion Began

rferl.org

August 09, 2022

By RFE/RL

Russian President Vladimir Putin visits the headquarters of the RT television channel in Moscow. The European Commission has banned distribution or advertising support for "propaganda sites" like RT and Sputnik News. (file photo)

The number of websites spreading Russia-Ukraine disinformation has more than doubled since Russia's unprovoked invasion was launched in late February, says a New York-based group that rates trustworthiness across media.

NewsGuard said on August 9 that its experts have identified 250 websites publishing disinformation related to those two combatant states, versus 116 in March.

It said digital platforms like Google, Twitter, Facebook, and TikTok have imposed "temporary measures in some countries against well-known Russian propaganda outlets such as RT and Sputnik News, after the European Commission prohibited distribution or advertising support for these Kremlin-funded and operated propaganda sites."

"However," it added, "the large number of other sites identified by NewsGuard continue to spread myths freely on the Internet."

Which Asian Countries Support China in the Taiwan Strait Crisis – and Which Don’t?

An analysis of foreign ministry statements from across the Asia-Pacific region reveals which countries are hewing close to China’s line, which lean toward the U.S., and which are staying neutral.

thediplomat.com · by Shannon Tiezzi · August 13, 2022

It seems every country in the Asia-Pacific region can agree on one thing: The current situation in the Taiwan Strait is concerning and poses a potential threat to peace and stability throughout the region. But beyond that baseline, countries diverge sharply, especially on who is to blame for the current tensions – the United States, for U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan; or China, for its provocative and precedent-breaking military drills around the island.

China claims that international consensus is on its side. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin told reporters on August 8 that “more than 170 countries… have voiced staunch support for China on the Taiwan question through various means.” China’s supporters “form an overwhelming majority versus the US and its few followers,” Wang added.

However, what China claims as “support” encompasses a wide range of nuance. Some partners, notably Russia and North Korea, have joined China in explicitly condemning the United States for Pelosi’s visit and blamed Washington for stirring up the current tensions, but they are few. Far more have voiced positions closely aligned with China’s without explicitly criticizing the United States, and many have stayed neutral, merely expressing “concerns” without ascribing blame.

On the other end of the scale, several countries – including some listed by China as among its supporters – have used rhetoric that more closely aligns with the position taken by the United States and Taiwan, emphasizing the risks of escalation over China’s claims that its sovereignty was violated. And a few countries, close U.S. allies Australia and Japan, have explicitly condemned China’s actions as destabilizing and escalatory.

To tease out these nuances, I examined official foreign ministry statements, press releases, and on-the-record comments to media outlets from 33 counties in the Asia-Pacific region, encompassing East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and Australia and New Zealand. I then rated their statements on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being rhetoric most closely aligned with China’s and 5 the least aligned (or, phrased another way, matching the U.S. and Taiwanese positions). The results are mapped below; countries closer to China’s position are in shades of red; those closer to the U.S. are in blue, with neutral countries in yellow.

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Three countries are most forward-leaning in their support of China: Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia. All three explicitly blame the United States for provoking the current tensions. The statement from Myanmar’s military government said that Pelosi’s visit “is causing escalation of tensions on the Taiwan Straits.” North Korea, meanwhile, railed against “the impudent interference of the U.S. in internal affairs of other countries and its intentional political and military provocation.” Russia spoke of “problems and crises created by Washington” and accused the United States of “violating” the “fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of states.”

This level of support is rare, but another 10 countries expressed positions closely in line with China’s without condemning the United States directly. These countries’ statements meet one or more of the following criteria: they express the position that Taiwan “is an inalienable part of China”; they express support for or concern about violations of “China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”; and/or they call for “non-interference” in China’s internal affairs. All of these closely match Beijing’s talking points.

Pakistan’s statement is a useful example of states in category 2:

Pakistan reaffirms its strong commitment to ‘One-China’ Policy and firmly supports China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan is deeply concerned over the evolving situation in the Taiwan Strait, which has serious implications for regional peace and stability… Pakistan strongly believes that inter-state relations should be based on mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful resolution of issues by upholding of principles of UN charter, international law and bilateral agreements.

Another six countries adopted what I would categorize as true neutral positions, a 3 on the 1-5 scale. These countries issued statements of “concern” and called on “all parties” to exercise restraint and caution and refrain from escalating the situation. Their statements may reference both “sovereignty” and “escalation” concerns, reflecting both Chinese and U.S. talking points. Indonesia’s statement, for example, says that “Indonesia is deeply concerned with the increasing rivalry among major powers” and “calls on all parties to refrain from provocative actions that may worsen the situation.” There is no mention of specific actions that sparked Indonesia’s concern.

Four countries – India, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam – positioned themselves closer to the United States, while not directly condemning China. These countries (category 4) mentioned the need to “de-escalate tensions” and “exercise restraint” – language used by Washington – without similar expressions of concern about sovereignty and territorial integrity. Singapore, for example, “emphasized the need to avoid miscalculation and accidents, which could lead to an escalatory spiral and destabilize the region.” India, which delayed making any comment at all for 10 days after Pelosi arrived in Taiwan, finally remarked that “We urge the exercise of restraint, avoidance of unilateral actions to change status quo, de-escalation of tensions and efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region.”

In the Asia-Pacific region, just two countries – Australia and Japan – joined the United States and Taiwan in directly criticizing China for its military exercises near Taiwan. Japan, in a joint statement with the other G-7 foreign ministers, denounced “threatening actions by the People’s Republic of China.” Australia said it was “deeply concerned about the launch of ballistic missiles by China into waters around Taiwan’s coastline,” which Canberra called “disproportionate and destabilizing.”

One final note: Reaffirmations of the “One China policy” do not factor into this scale, for the simple reason that every single country that issued a statement included such rhetoric – including the United States, which clearly disagrees with China’s position. China’s Foreign Ministry, however, routinely includes countries’ reiteration of their commitment to the “One China policy” as proof of their support, even when the rest of the statement clearly signals otherwise.

A number of Asia-Pacific countries did not issue formal statements at all, with South Korea, a U.S. ally, being the most notable omission.

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Countries’ positioning on the recent Taiwan Strait crisis maps closely onto broader geopolitical positioning. Governments that are generally aligned more closely to the U.S. or China matched those inclinations in their statements on Taiwan. But a large chunk of the region – including almost all of Southeast Asia – does not want to take sides at all.

Shannon Tiezzi

Shannon Tiezzi is Editor-in-Chief at The Diplomat.

Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show “China Forum.” She received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

thediplomat.com · by Shannon Tiezzi · August 13, 2022

8. Live Updates: Outgunned by Russia, Ukraine Aims for Death by a Thousand Cuts

Excerpts:

The strategy seems to be producing some results. While the Ukrainian military has not made major territorial gains, it has managed to slow the Russian advance across the country, for now, at least, and stanch the heavy losses Ukraine was suffering in recent months, which had led to wavering morale and some soldiers even deserting their platoons.

But the Russians have continued to apply pressure in the east and the south on Ukrainian frontline positions, with some that are slowly buckling. The incremental advances have indicated that despite setbacks from Ukraine’s attacks, the Russian military effort still has enough forces to continue offensive operations.

Live Updates: Outgunned by Russia, Ukraine Aims for Death by a Thousand Cuts

The New York Times · by Jack Nicas · August 13, 2022

An artillery unit from Ukraine’s 58th near the town of Bakhmut in the Donbas region on Wednesday.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

KYIV, Ukraine — From spring into summer, the Ukrainian military was pummeled by Russian artillery in eastern Ukraine, steadily losing ground and as many as 200 soldiers a day in a mismatched, head-to-head contest. But in recent weeks, Ukraine has shifted its strategy with the help of new weaponry and succeeded, at least for now, in slowing Russia’s advances.

Supplied with a growing arsenal of long-range Western weapons and aided by local fighters known as partisans, Ukraine has been able to hit Russian forces deep behind enemy lines, disrupting critical supply lines and, increasingly, striking targets that are key to Moscow’s combat potential.

The new weapons have also forced Russia to recalibrate on the battlefield, creating some breathing room for the Ukrainians to make more strategic decisions.

One blow to the Russians this week was a series of explosions at an air base on the occupied Crimean Peninsula that destroyed at least eight warplanes, and that a Ukrainian official said had resulted from a strike carried out by special forces troops aided by local partisan fighters.

The approach has been particularly well suited to the Kherson region in the south, where for weeks Ukrainian officials have been engaged in the opening salvos of a counteroffensive. The city of Kherson in particular, dependent for supplies on just four bridges spanning the Dnipro River, is considered more vulnerable than other occupied cities.

On Saturday, the Ukrainians claimed to have hit the last of those four key bridges, leaving thousands of Russian troops in danger of becoming isolated and cut off from resupply, according to Western intelligence officials.

“We do not have the resources to litter the territory with bodies and shells, as Russia does,” Ukraine’s defense minister, Oleksii Reznikov, said in an interview this past week with Pravda, a Ukrainian news media outlet. “Therefore it is necessary to change tactics, to fight in a different way.”

A satellite image by Planet Labs showing Saki Air Base in the Crimean Peninsula on Wednesday. A series of explosions there destroyed at least eight Russian combat jets, according to Western military analysts.Credit...Planet Labs Pbc/Planet Labs PBC, via Associated Press

The strategy seems to be producing some results. While the Ukrainian military has not made major territorial gains, it has managed to slow the Russian advance across the country, for now, at least, and stanch the heavy losses Ukraine was suffering in recent months, which had led to wavering morale and some soldiers even deserting their platoons.

But the Russians have continued to apply pressure in the east and the south on Ukrainian frontline positions, with some that are slowly buckling. The incremental advances have indicated that despite setbacks from Ukraine’s attacks, the Russian military effort still has enough forces to continue offensive operations.

Ukraine’s efforts in the south represent less a change in approach than an extension, with the aid of new longer-range weapons, of a strategy adopted at the start of the war meant to level the playing field with Russia. With the Russian army far outmatching Ukraine’s forces in the number of troops, weapons and ammunition, Ukraine’s military has had to be innovative and nimble.

“It’s clear the Ukrainians can’t match the Russians unit for unit and soldier for soldier. And Ukraine, like the Russians, is running out of soldiers,” said Samuel Bendett, a Russian weapons analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis. “So Ukraine has to be very judicial in how they draw out the Russian forces.”

Nataliia Novosolova contributed reporting.

9. The Beginning of History: Surviving the Era of Catastrophic Risk

Excerpts:

Just over 30 years ago, as the Cold War came to an end, some thinkers saw the future unfurling in a far more placid way. The threat of apocalypse, so vivid in the Cold War imagination, had begun to recede. The end of communism a few decades after the defeat of fascism during World War II seemed to have settled the major ideological debates. Capitalism and democracy would spread inexorably. The political theorist Francis Fukuyama divided the world into “post-historical” and “historical” societies. War might persist in certain parts of the world in the shape of ethnic and sectarian conflicts, for instance. But large-scale wars would become a thing of the past as more and more countries joined the likes of France, Japan, and the United States on the other side of history. The future offered a narrow range of political possibilities, as it promised relative peace, prosperity, and ever-widening individual freedoms.

The prospect of a timeless future has given way to visions of no future at all. Ideology remains a fault line in geopolitics, market globalization is fragmenting, and great-power conflict has become increasingly likely. But the threats to the future are bigger still, with the possibility of the eradication of the human species. In the face of that potential oblivion, the range of political and policy debates is likely to be wider in the years ahead than it has been in decades. The great ideological disputes are far from settled. In truth, we are likely to encounter bigger questions and be forced to consider more radical proposals that reflect the challenges posed by the transformations and perils ahead. Our horizons must expand, not shrink.

...

So we must walk a tightrope. We must ensure that global cooperation reduces the risks of global catastrophe to near zero while maintaining the freedom and diversity of thought and social structures that would enable us to build a future that our grandchildren’s grandchildren would thank us for. Contemplating large-scale political change is daunting, but past innovations in governance, such as the UN system and the EU, provide reasons for hope.

We are not used to seeing ourselves as one of history’s first generations; we tend to focus on what we have inherited from the past, not what we could bequeath to the future. This is a mistake. To tackle the task before us, we must reflect on where we stand in humanity’s full lineage. We in the present day recklessly gamble, not just with our lives and our children’s lives but with the very existence of all who are yet to come. Let us be the last generation to do so.

The Beginning of History

Surviving the Era of Catastrophic Risk

By William MacAskill

September/October 2022

The Beginning of History

Foreign Affairs · by What We Owe the Future · August 11, 2022

We stand at the beginning of history. For every person alive today, ten have lived and died in the past. But if human beings survive as long as the average mammal species, then for every person alive today, a thousand people will live in the future. We are the ancients. On the scale of a typical human life, humanity today is barely an infant struggling to walk.

Although the future of our species may yet be long, it may instead be fleeting. Of the many developments that have occurred since this magazine’s first issue a century ago, the most profound is humanity’s ability to end itself. From climate change to nuclear war, engineered pandemics, uncontrolled artificial intelligence (AI), and other destructive technologies not yet foreseen, a worrying number of risks conspire to threaten the end of humanity.

Just over 30 years ago, as the Cold War came to an end, some thinkers saw the future unfurling in a far more placid way. The threat of apocalypse, so vivid in the Cold War imagination, had begun to recede. The end of communism a few decades after the defeat of fascism during World War II seemed to have settled the major ideological debates. Capitalism and democracy would spread inexorably. The political theorist Francis Fukuyama divided the world into “post-historical” and “historical” societies. War might persist in certain parts of the world in the shape of ethnic and sectarian conflicts, for instance. But large-scale wars would become a thing of the past as more and more countries joined the likes of France, Japan, and the United States on the other side of history. The future offered a narrow range of political possibilities, as it promised relative peace, prosperity, and ever-widening individual freedoms.

The prospect of a timeless future has given way to visions of no future at all. Ideology remains a fault line in geopolitics, market globalization is fragmenting, and great-power conflict has become increasingly likely. But the threats to the future are bigger still, with the possibility of the eradication of the human species. In the face of that potential oblivion, the range of political and policy debates is likely to be wider in the years ahead than it has been in decades. The great ideological disputes are far from settled. In truth, we are likely to encounter bigger questions and be forced to consider more radical proposals that reflect the challenges posed by the transformations and perils ahead. Our horizons must expand, not shrink.

Chief among those challenges is how humanity manages the dangers of its own genius. Advances in weaponry, biology, and computing could spell the end of the species, either through deliberate misuse or a large-scale accident. Societies face risks whose sheer scale could paralyze any concerted action. But governments can and must take meaningful steps today to ensure the survival of the species without forgoing the benefits of technological progress. Indeed, the world will need innovation to overcome several cataclysmic dangers it already faces—humanity needs to be able to generate and store clean energy, detect novel diseases when they can still be contained, and maintain peace between the great powers without relying on a delicate balance of nuclear-enabled mutually assured destruction.

Far from a safe resting place, the technological and institutional status quo is a precarious predicament from which societies need to escape. To lay the groundwork for this escape, governments must become more aware of the risks they face and develop a robust institutional apparatus for managing them. This includes embedding a concern for worst-case scenarios into relevant areas of policymaking and embracing an idea known as “differential technological development”—reining in work that would produce potentially dangerous outcomes, such as biological research that can be weaponized, while funding and otherwise accelerating those technologies that would help reduce risk, such as wastewater monitoring for pathogen detection.

The greatest shift needed is one of perspective. Fukuyama looked to the future a little mournfully, seeing a gray, undramatic expanse—a tableau for technocrats. “The end of history will be a very sad time,” he wrote in 1989, in which “daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.” But at this beginning of history, this critical juncture in the human story, it will take daring and imagination to meet the various challenges ahead. Contrary to what Fukuyama foresaw, the political horizon has not narrowed to a sliver. Enormous economic, social, and political transformations remain possible—and necessary. If we act wisely, the coming century will be defined by the recognition of what we owe the future, and our grandchildren’s grandchildren will look back at us with gratitude and pride. If we mess up, they might never see the light of day.

THOSE WHO ARE YET TO COME

The fossil record indicates that the average mammal species lasts a million years. By this measure, we have about 700,000 years ahead of us. During this time, even if humanity remained earthbound at just one-tenth of the current world population, a staggering ten trillion people would be born in the future.

Moreover, our species is not the average mammal, and humans may well be able to outlast their relatives. If we survived until the expanding sun scorched the earth, humanity would persist for hundreds of millions of years. More time would separate us from our last descendants than from the earliest dinosaurs. And if one day we settled space—entirely conceivable on the scale of thousands of years—earth-originating intelligent life could continue until the last stars burned out in tens of trillions of years.

Far from being an idle exercise in juggling unfathomable numbers, appreciating the potential scale of humanity’s future is vital to understanding what is at stake. Actions today could affect whether and how trillions of our descendants might live—whether they will face poverty or abundance, war or peace, slavery or freedom—placing inordinate responsibility on the shoulders of the present. The profound consequences of such a shift in perspective are demonstrated by a striking experiment conducted in the small Japanese town of Yahaba. Before debating municipal policy, half the participants were asked to put on ceremonial robes and imagine they were from the future, representing the interests of the current citizens’ grandchildren. Not only did researchers observe a “stark contrast in deliberation styles and priorities between the groups,” the concern for future generations was infectious—among the measures on which consensus could be achieved, more than half were proposed by the imaginary grandchildren.

The story of humanity might end before it has truly begun.

Thinking in the long term reveals how much societies can still achieve. As little as 500 years ago, it would have been inconceivable that one day incomes would double every few generations, that most people would live to see their grandchildren grow up, and that the world’s leading countries would be secular societies whose leaders are chosen in free elections. Countries that now seem so permanent to their citizens may not last more than a few centuries. None of the world’s various modes of social organization appeared in history fully formed. A short-term focus on days, months, or years obscures the potential for fundamental long-term change.

The fact that humanity is only in its infancy highlights what a tragedy its untimely death would be. There is so much life left to live, but in our youth, our attention flits quickly from one thing to the next, and we stumble around not realizing that some of our actions place us at serious risk. Our powers increase by the day, but our self-awareness and wisdom lag behind. Our story might end before it has truly begun.

HOW WE COULD END HISTORY

In contrast to Fukuyama’s “end of history,” other observers of international affairs have focused on the more literal meaning of the phrase: the potential for humanity to perish altogether. Such views were especially prevalent at the dawn of the Cold War, shortly after nuclear scientists enabled a massive leap in humanity’s destructive potential. As the British statesman Winston Churchill put it in 1946 with characteristic verve, “The Stone Age may return on the gleaming wings of science, and what might now shower immeasurable material blessings upon mankind, may even bring about its total destruction.” A few years later, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower echoed these concerns during his first inaugural address, in which he warned that “science seems ready to confer upon us, as its final gift, the power to erase human life from this planet.”

Human history is rife with catastrophe, from the horrors of the Black Death to those of slavery and colonialism. But barring a few highly unlikely natural events, such as supervolcano eruptions or meteors crashing into the planet, there were no plausible mechanisms by which humanity as a whole could perish. In his book The Precipice, the Oxford philosopher Toby Ord estimated that even accepting all the most pessimistic assumptions, the accumulated risks of naturally occurring extinction still afford humanity an expected lifespan of at least 100,000 years.

Serious concerns about “existential catastrophe”—defined by Ord as the permanent destruction of humanity’s potential—emerged mainly in the second half of the twentieth century, hand in hand with an acceleration of technological progress. Lord Martin Rees, the former president of the Royal Society, wrote in 2003 that humanity’s odds of surviving this century are “no better than 50-50.” Ord estimated the likelihood of humanity wiping itself out or otherwise permanently derailing the course of civilization at one in six within the next hundred years. If either is right, the most likely way an American born today could die young is in a civilization-ending catastrophe.

Until recently, there were few ways that all of humanity could perish.

Nuclear weapons exhibit several crucial properties that future technological threats may also possess. When invented in the middle of the twentieth century, they presented a sudden jump in destructive capabilities: the atomic bomb was thousands of times more powerful than pre-nuclear explosives; hydrogen bombs allowed for yields thousands of times again more explosive. Compared with the pace of increases in destructive power in the pre-nuclear age, 10,000 years of advances occurred within just a few decades.

These developments were hard to anticipate: the eminent physicist Ernest Rutherford dismissed the idea of atomic energy as “moonshine” as late as 1933, one year before Leo Szilard, another acclaimed physicist, patented the idea of a nuclear fission reactor. Once nuclear bombs had arrived, destruction could have been unleashed either deliberately, such as when U.S. generals advocated for a nuclear first strike on China during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, or accidentally, as demonstrated by the harrowing track record of misfires in early warning systems. Even worse, measures to defend against a deliberate attack often came at the price of an increased risk of accidental nuclear Armageddon. Consider, for instance, the United States’ airborne alert, its launch-on-warning doctrine, or the Soviet “Dead Hand” system, which guaranteed that if Moscow suffered a nuclear attack, it would automatically launch an all-out nuclear retaliation. The end of the Cold War did not fundamentally change this deadly calculus, and nuclear powers still balance safety and force readiness at the heart of their policies. Future technologies might impose even more dangerous tradeoffs between safety and performance.

APOCALYPSE SOON?

But nuclear weapons are far from the only risks we face. Several future technologies could be more destructive, easier to obtain for a wider range of actors, pose more dual-use concerns, or require fewer missteps to trigger the extinction of our species—and hence be much harder to govern. A recent report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council identified runaway artificial intelligence, engineered pandemics, and nanotechnology weapons, in addition to nuclear war, as sources of existential risks—“threats that could damage life on a global scale” and “challenge our ability to imagine and comprehend their potential scope and scale.”

Take, for example, engineered pandemics. Progress in biotechnology has been extremely rapid, with key costs, such as for gene sequencing, falling ever faster. Further advances promise numerous benefits, such as gene therapies for as yet incurable diseases. But dual-use concerns loom large: some of the methods used in medical research could, in principle, be employed to identify or create pathogens that are more transmissible and lethal than anything in nature. This may be done as part of open scientific enterprises— in which scientists sometimes modify pathogens to learn how to combat them—or with less noble intentions in terrorist or state-run bioweapons programs. (Such programs are not a thing of the past: a 2021 U.S. State Department report concluded that both North Korea and Russia maintain an offensive bioweapons program.) Research published with pro-social intentions could also be misused by bad actors, perhaps in ways the original authors never considered.

The cranium and mandible of an early human species at the Museum of Human Evolution in Burgos, Spain, July 2010

Felix Ordonez / Reuters

Unlike nuclear weapons, bacteria and viruses are self-replicating. As the COVID-19 pandemic tragically proved, once a new pathogen has infected a single human being, there may be no way to put the genie back in the bottle. And although just nine states have nuclear weapons—with Russia and the United States controlling more than 90 percent of all warheads—the world has thousands of biological laboratories. Of these, dozens—spread out over five continents—are licensed to experiment with the world’s most dangerous pathogens.

Worse, the safety track record of biological research is even more dismal than that of nuclear weapons. In 2007, foot-and-mouth disease, which spreads rapidly through livestock populations and can easily cause billions of dollars of economic damage, leaked not once but twice from the same British laboratory within weeks, even after government intervention. And lab leaks have already led to the loss of human life, such as when weaponized anthrax escaped from a plant connected to the Soviet bioweapons program in Sverdlovsk in 1979, killing dozens. Perhaps most worrying, genetic evidence suggests that the 1977 “Russian flu” pandemic may have originated in human experiments involving an influenza strain that had circulated in the 1950s. Around 700,000 people died.

Altogether, hundreds of accidental infections have occurred in U.S. labs alone—one per 250 person-years of laboratory work. Since there are dozens of high-security labs in the world, each of which employs dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of scientists and other staff, such a rate amounts to multiple accidental infections per year. Societies must significantly reduce this rate. If these facilities ever start tinkering with extinction-level pathogens, humanity’s premature end will be just a matter of time.

GOVERNANCE AT THE END OF THE WORLD

Despite this rising level of risk, it is far from assured that humanity will be able to take the necessary steps to protect itself. In fact, there are several obstacles to adequate risk mitigation.

The most fundamental issue is painfully familiar from the struggles of climate diplomacy in recent years. When burning fossil fuels, individual countries reap most of the benefits, but other countries and future generations will bear most of the costs. Similarly, engaging in risky biological research holds the promise of patentable drugs that could boost a country’s economy and prestige—but a pathogen accidentally released in that country would not respect borders. In the language of economists, imposing a risk on the future is a negative externality, and providing risk-reduction measures, such as establishing an early warning system for novel diseases, is a global public good. (Consider how the whole world would have benefited if COVID-19, like SARS between 2002 and 2004, had been contained in a small number of countries and then eradicated.) This is precisely the sort of good that neither the market nor the international system will provide by default because countries have powerful incentives to free-ride on the contributions of others.

Humanity has a number of avenues for escaping this structural tragedy. To assuage concerns about losing ground in the struggle for security, countries could enter into agreements to collectively refrain from developing especially dangerous technologies such as bioweapons. Alternatively, a coalition of the willing could band together to form what the economist William Nordhaus has called a “club.” Members of a club jointly help provide the global public good the club was formed to promote. At the same time, they commit to providing benefits to one another (such as economic growth or peace) while imposing costs (through measures such as tariffs) on nonmembers, thereby enticing them to join. For instance, clubs could be based on safety standards for artificial intelligence systems or on a moratorium on risky biological research.

There are ways to escape structural tragedy.

Unfortunately, the resurgence of great-power competition casts doubt on the likelihood of these feats of global cooperation. Worse, geopolitical tensions could compel states to accept an increased level of risk to the world—and to themselves—if they perceive it as a gamble worth taking to further their security interests. (In the eight years during which the United States maintained bombers on continuous airborne alert, five aircraft crashed while carrying nuclear payloads.) And if even one state’s bioweapons program experimented with extinction-level pathogens—perhaps on a foolhardy quest to develop the ultimate deterrent—the next laboratory accident could precipitate a global pandemic much worse than that of COVID-19.

In the worst case, the great powers could, in their struggle for global hegemony, resort to outright war. For people who grew up in the West after World War II, this notion might seem far-fetched. The psychologist Steven Pinker has popularized the claim that violence—including among states—has long been on the decline. Subsequent analysis by the political scientist Bear Braumoeller and others, however, has substantially complicated the picture. The researchers have suggested that the intensity of conflict appears to follow what is known as a “power law,” meaning that after an interlude of relative peace, it is entirely possible that war might return in an even more deadly incarnation. Calculations by the computer scientist Aaron Clauset have indicated that the “long peace” that has followed World War II would need to endure for another century before it would constitute significant evidence of an actual long-term decline in war. Braumoeller asserted that it is “not at all unlikely that another war that would surpass the two World Wars in lethality will happen in your lifetime,” noting that in the conclusion of his book on the topic he “briefly considered typing, ‘We’re all going to die,’ and leaving it at that.”

Staving off the risk of World War III while also achieving unprecedented innovations in international governance is a tall order. But like it or not, that is the challenge we face.

INNOVATE TO SURVIVE

One response to this daunting challenge is retreat. If it is so difficult to safely govern emerging technologies, some argue, then why don’t we simply refrain from inventing them in the first place? Members of the “degrowth” movement take precisely this stance, decrying economic growth and technological progress as the main culprits behind alienation, environmental destruction, and all kinds of other harms. In 2019, 11,000 scientists from more than 150 countries signed an open letter demanding that the population of the world “be stabilized—and, ideally, gradually reduced” and that countries turn their priorities away “from GDP growth.”

Despite its intuitive appeal, this response is unrealistic and dangerous. It is unrealistic because it simply fails to engage with the interdependence of states in the international system. Even if the world’s countries came together temporarily to halt innovation, sooner or later someone would resume the pursuit of advanced technology.

Humanity must avoid the fate of Icarus—but still fly.

Be that as it may, technological stagnation is not desirable anyway. To see why, note that new technologies can both exacerbate and reduce risk. Once a new technological danger has been introduced—such as by nuclear weapons—governments might require additional technologies to manage that risk. For example, the threat nuclear weapons pose to the survival of the human species would be greatly reduced if, during a potential nuclear winter, people were able to produce food without sunlight or if early warning systems could more reliably distinguish between intercontinental ballistic missiles and small scientific rockets. But if societies stop technological progress altogether, new technological threats may emerge that cannot be contained because the commensurate strides in defense have not been made. For instance, a wide variety of actors may be able to create unprecedentedly dangerous pathogens at a time when people have not made much progress in the early detection and eradication of novel diseases.

The status quo, in other words, is already heavily mined with potential catastrophes. And in the absence of defensive measures, threats from nature might eventually lead to human extinction as they have for many other species: to survive to their full potential, human beings will need to learn to perform such feats as deflecting asteroids and quickly fighting off new pandemics. They must avoid the fate of Icarus—but still fly.

The challenge is to continue reaping the fruits of technological advancement while protecting humanity against its downsides. Some experts refer to this as “differential technological development,” the idea being that if people can’t prevent destructive technology or accidents from happening in the first place, they can, with foresight and careful planning, at least attempt to develop beneficial and protective technologies first.

We’re already in a game of what Richard Danzig, the former U.S. secretary of the navy, has called “technology roulette.” No bullet has been fired yet, but that doesn’t change how risky the game is. There are many more turns to pull the trigger in the future: a bad accident and perhaps a fatal one is inevitable unless our species changes the game.

WHAT WE OWE THE FUTURE

Game-changers have so far been in short supply. Given the stakes, societies have to date done scandalously little to protect their future. Consider, for instance, the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, storage, and acquisition of biological weapons. The national security expert Daniel Gerstein described it as “the most important arms control treaty of the twenty-first century,” yet it lacks a verification mechanism, and its budget is dwarfed by that of the Met Gala. As if this weren’t enough of a travesty, the BWC struggles to raise even the meager contributions it is due—a 2018 report by the convention’s chair lamented the “precarious and worsening state of the financial situation of the BWC . . . due to long-standing non-payment of assessed contributions by some States Parties.”

The management of nonbiological risks doesn’t inspire confidence, either. Research aimed at preventing the loss of control over artificially intelligent systems remains a minuscule fraction of overall AI research. And militaries are using lethal autonomous weapons on the battlefield, while efforts to limit such weapons systems have stalled for years at the UN. The domestic situation doesn’t look much better—less than one percent of the U.S. defense budget is dedicated to biodefense, and the majority of that goes to fending off chemical weapons such as anthrax. Even after COVID-19 killed one in every 500 people in the world and inflicted $16 trillion worth of economic damage in the United States alone, Congress couldn’t agree to provide a modest $15 billion to bolster pandemic preparedness.

This kind of risk reduction is so neglected that opportunities for positive change abound. One success story of existential risk mitigation is NASA’s Spaceguard program. At a cost of less than $5 million per year, between its inception in 1998 and 2010, scientists tracked more than 90 percent of extinction-threatening asteroids, in the process increasing the accuracy of their predictions and reducing the best estimate of the risk that one will strike the earth by a factor of ten. Consider also that during the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. government spent $18 billion on Operation Warp Speed to accelerate vaccine development. The program resulted in safe and effective vaccines that the United States and other countries were able to buy at a price constituting a small fraction of the vaccines’ social benefits, which have been estimated to amount to tens of trillions of dollars. The economist Robert Barro has estimated that between September 2021 and February 2022, these vaccines saved American lives at a cost of between $55,000 and $200,000 each, more than 20 times above the cost-effectiveness threshold that lifesaving policies usually need to meet.

A climate change demonstration in London, September 2019

Hannah McKay / Reuters

If the world’s best and brightest step up and governments or the private sector provide funding, we can achieve even more impressive successes. For instance, although it still must overcome major technical hurdles, widespread metagenomic sequencing of wastewater would help detect novel diseases at a stage when they can still be contained and eradicated. The Nucleic Acid Observatory, based at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is pursuing just this vision. The public and private sectors should also develop better personal protective equipment and do further research on sterilization technology such as Far UVC—an ionizing radiation process that, if successful, could offer a near-universal defense against pathogens and be installed in any building. Regarding artificial intelligence, research aimed at making systems safe and reliable must be scaled up tenfold. The common thread running through measures such as these is an emphasis on defensive strategies that do not themselves create or enhance other risks.

Progress is also possible in other domains. Intelligence collection and analysis aimed at the known sources of large-scale risks will be critical. And although achieving complete certainty is impossible (as the astronomer Carl Sagan once quipped, “Theories that involve the end of the world are not amenable to experimental verification—or at least, not more than once”), scanning and forecasting what is on the horizon can help identify new concerns. In this vein, it is encouraging that the most recent Global Trends report by the National Intelligence Council included a discussion of the concept of existential risk, calling for “the development of resilient strategies to survive.”

More governments, institutions, and firms need to take such ideas seriously. Regulatory reform will also be important. In Averting Catastrophe, Cass Sunstein, a former head of the regulatory office at the White House, showed how the government’s current approach to cost-benefit analysis can’t sufficiently account for potential catastrophic risks. Sunstein argued for what he called the “maximin principle”: in the face of sufficiently extreme risks—and human extinction certainly qualifies as such—governments must focus on eliminating the very worst outcomes. As it happens, the White House is currently modernizing its framework for reviewing regulation. It should use this opportunity to make its approach to dealing with low-probability risks of extreme damage fit for the twenty-first century, whether by adopting Sunstein’s maximin principle or something similar that takes global catastrophic risks seriously.

We are one of history’s first generations.

Fukuyama prophesied “centuries of boredom at the end of history.” Nothing could be further from the case. Powerful and destructive technologies will present an unprecedented challenge to the current political system. Advanced AI could undermine the balance of power that exists between individuals and states: an entirely automated workforce would give the government little reason to treat its citizens well; a dictatorship that possessed an AI army and police force could prevent the possibility of an uprising or a coup. Government could use the prospect of a third world war as a reason to expand the state and crack down on individual liberties such as free speech on the grounds of protecting national security. The possibility of easily accessible bioweapons could be used to justify universal surveillance.

With humanity’s future in mind, we should resist such pressures. We must fight to ensure both that we have a future and that it is a future worth having. The cultural shift toward liberalism over the past three centuries created an engine of moral progress that led to the spread of democracy, the abolition of slavery, and expanded rights for women and people of color. That engine can’t be turned off now. If anything, we need to go much further in promoting moral and political diversity and experimentation. Looking back millennia, moderns see the Romans’ practices of slaveholding, torture for entertainment, and ultra-patriarchy as barbaric. Perhaps future generations will see many of our current practices as little better.

So we must walk a tightrope. We must ensure that global cooperation reduces the risks of global catastrophe to near zero while maintaining the freedom and diversity of thought and social structures that would enable us to build a future that our grandchildren’s grandchildren would thank us for. Contemplating large-scale political change is daunting, but past innovations in governance, such as the UN system and the EU, provide reasons for hope.

We are not used to seeing ourselves as one of history’s first generations; we tend to focus on what we have inherited from the past, not what we could bequeath to the future. This is a mistake. To tackle the task before us, we must reflect on where we stand in humanity’s full lineage. We in the present day recklessly gamble, not just with our lives and our children’s lives but with the very existence of all who are yet to come. Let us be the last generation to do so.

Foreign Affairs · by What We Owe the Future · August 11, 2022

William MacAskill is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Priorities Institute. He is the author of the forthcoming book What We Owe the Future.

10. The Realist Underpinnings of China’s Taiwan Strategy

Also lessons from Putin's War in Ukraine.

Excerpts:

In the wake of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, it is thus important that the architects and communicators of Western and, in particular, U.S. foreign policy understand and are willing to engage with such concerns. It has generally been the case that the West overstates the prospects of China launching an aspirational war based on the relationship between Taiwan and China in history. It will be far more dangerous if we understate the potential that China would launch what it deems to be a defensive war based on the proximity of the two states’ geography.

Buffer theory may not be common fare in the diplomatic language of Western nations, but policymakers grasp the basic concept well enough when it impact their own interests. When Solomon Islands inked a security pact with China earlier this year, raising the prospect that a Chinese military base could be built within 2,000 kilometers of Australia’s coast, it was described as a “red line“ by Australia’s then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison. The distance between Taiwan and China is less that one-tenth of this.

The Realist Underpinnings of China’s Taiwan Strategy

Yes, “reunification” is a matter of national pride and prestige for China. But isolating Taiwan also serves a critical strategic function – and that helps explain Beijing’s response to Pelosi’s visit.

thediplomat.com · by Corey Lee Bell · August 13, 2022

China’s aggressive response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei has prompted criticism, and no small measure of alarm, both within and beyond the region.

It included dispatching People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) jets across the median line separating Taiwan from China, and China’s military engaging in a concurrent series of drills in six separating locations on each side of the island – the closest less than 12 nautical miles from Taiwan’s shore. The high-risk exercises involved firing munitions around and over the island, some of which allegedly landed in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone, and temporarily cutting off flights and maritime routes, representing a hostile demonstration of China’s capacity to rapidly effect an embargo on the island.

China has now concluded the drills, but its military warned that it would continue to conduct “regular patrols” in the Taiwan Strait.

Notably, China’s actions outstripped any seen during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96, which also saw exercises and missiles fired near the island and resulted in the disruption of commercial shipping and flights. The upscaled response reflects the severity of current tensions – not to mention the extent to which China has been emboldened by decades of enormous advancements in the capacity of its military.

But there is perhaps another more instructional point of comparison. And that is the vast gulf between the level of bellicose rhetoric seen on this occasion, and the far milder rhetoric emanating from Beijing just four months ago, when Pelosi was first scheduled to travel to Taiwan.

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Immediately prior to the August visit, loud and stern warnings were directed at the United States, with six issued over the space of a few days – the most strident being Xi Jinping telling U.S. President Joe Biden that “those who play with fire will perish by it.”

In contrast, statements were far fewer and tamer in the leadup to the originally scheduled trip in April. For example, a statement from the Chinese embassy in the U.S. in April merely stated that Beijing had lodged “stern representations” and “urged” the U.S. to “abide by the one-China principle… and to cancel Speaker Pelosi’s plan to visit Taiwan.”

This prompts us to consider an important question: What has brought about such a dramatic change in such a short period of time?

While there is likely more than one answer, one probable reason is what has unfolded in the Russia-Ukraine War – in particular, China’s reading of the U.S. and its allies’ response to the conflict.

Communication Gaps

One issue that might be of concern to China is the extent to which the West has been largely dismissive of Russia’s geostrategic concerns.

Russia has often justified its actions in neorealist terms. This is a tradition of international relations that is generally more predominant in parts of the developing world less profoundly impacted by the constructivist revolution of the 1990s, and made skeptical of neoliberalism by their own relatively marginal role in shaping the international norms and institutions that constrain them. Neorealism includes, in particular, buffer state theory.

Russia has often stated fears that neighboring Ukraine – which ousted pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014 – might join NATO, thus depriving Russia of a buffer against this more powerful rival alliance, and empowering the latter, now closer to the gates of Moscow, to isolate Russia and threaten its security. Emboldened by NATO’s backing, Putin has claimed, Ukraine or Ukrainian factions might also try to redress long-standing ethnic and territorial grievances in a way that would bring them into conflict with Russia, triggering a mandatory intervention from NATO partners, which could incite a nuclear war.

Unfortunately, these concerns have largely been addressed with extreme skepticism by Western leaders and Western media. Russia’s aggression has instead been mainly viewed through the prism of psychology, national identity, and history, manifest in claims that Putin is delusional and paranoid, and wants to restore the territorial boundaries – and, by extension, prestige – Moscow achieved at the height of the former USSR.

This returns us to the situation in the Taiwan Strait. China’s ambition to “reclaim” Taiwan is also often understood through the lens of national history and identity, and the psychology of another autocratic leader. What China often describes as its “sacred task” of “reunifying” ancestral lands, or, at the least, closing off the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War, is often interpreted in the West as an aspiration to restore China’s “greatness” or create an immortal legacy for China’s aspiring “president-for-life” Xi Jinping. Beijing’s One China policy, through which China demands that other nations recognize that it is the sole sovereign power of both sides of the Taiwan Strait, is on this basis viewed as face-saving, and a measure of isolating Taiwan so that it can eventually be absorbed at minimal cost.

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Looking at the issue through a realist lens, however, tells us another story. Similar to Ukraine’s geographical relationship with Russia, Taiwan’s proximity and pivotal strategic location in relation to China’s maritime trade routes means that as far as Beijing is concerned, if the island is not an ally or a buffer – if Taiwan is able to effectively prosecute an independent foreign policy – it could be a threat. In this sense, the One China policy doesn’t only deprive Taiwan of protectors; it helps ensure that an island merely 180 kilometers from China’s shores, which overlooks one of the most important maritime trade passages in the world and guards the two direct maritime roots from China to the Pacific – namely, the Bashi Channel and the Miyako Strait – can’t effectively form alliances with China’s strategic rivals.

Put another way, China’s Taiwan policy functions to prevent other powers, principally the United States, from “using Taiwan to constrain China” – an accusation that has a broader set of meanings, but that nonetheless situates the Taiwan issue in the context of great power competition.

Beijing’s calculations on what may trigger war across the Taiwan Strait are predicated not on degrees of provocation but rather upon a hierarchy of concerns. China has indeed shown substantial strategic patience on the matter of the so-called “reunification” of Taiwan with China. It is much less obvious that it will have strategic patience if it views the United States’ alleged salami-slicing of the One China pledge as a leadup to making Taiwan a stand-in or proxy component of the forward presence of a U.S.-led alliance intent on “containing” China.

It is interesting on this front – though likely coincidental – that prior to the lead up to Pelosi’s Taiwan trip, the phrase translated as “those who play with fire will perish by it” was used in late May by Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for China’s State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, to condemn those that “plan to play the Taiwan card and use Taiwan to constrain China.” The comment was made in response to Biden’s later walked-back assertion that the U.S. was committed to defending Taiwan militarily. This was followed shortly after by a virtual meeting between China and the United States’ joint chiefs of staff in July, in which China’s General Li Zuocheng passed on to U.S. General Mark Milley China’s demand that Washington “cease U.S.-Taiwan military collusion.”

More recently, such fears have been communicated more explicitly, albeit it not from the top brass in Beijing. For instance, a recent opinion article in the state mouthpiece China Daily said that the U.S. has tried to “incorporate the island into its grand strategy to contain, isolate and weaken China,” and that in contrast to Beijing’s hitherto strategic patience on the issue of unification, “once Taiwan mutates into a national security threat… due to US machinations, Beijing’s strategic calculus will drastically change.”

The Lessons From the Russia-Ukraine War

If such concerns have heightened in China since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, it is arguably for good reason. First, if the war is to be regarded as instructional, it might be noted that Russia’s aggression has only encouraged neighboring states to rush to the embrace of NATO, and prompted the West to be more committed to Russia’s isolation – effectively transforming an aspirational war into something the Russian leadership may see as an existential one.

Second, this response to the Ukraine crises appears to be having some contagion, with Taiwan more aggressively reaching out to allies, and members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) openly drawing parallels between Russia’s aggression and threats to “sovereignty” in the Indo-Pacific. This comes after June’s NATO summit which – at the behest of Australia and other players in the region – expressed concern at “the deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order.”

On the Taiwan side, as with the case with Ukraine, it certainly appears that growing Chinese aggression has pushed Taiwan to seek closer integration with U.S.-led security alliances, symbolized by a call from Taiwan’s Vice President William Lai for the U.S. to consider allowing Taiwan to join the Quad on March 3. Since then, Taiwanese political figures have exploited various international and other platforms to draw attention to parallels between the Ukraine conflict and the existential threats facing Taiwan and emphasize the value Taiwan has to the democratic sphere, including Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen’s early June speech at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit and Legislative Yuan President You Si-kun’s calls for Quad countries to end their strategic ambiguity on Taiwan.

Yet it is important to note that this has been happening in the backdrop of a longer trend, which has gained momentum since late 2020, wherein Washington’s alleged salami-slicing of the One China policy became complemented with the “slice-adding” of Taiwan-U.S. military cooperation. Since October 2020, it has become publicly known that the U.S. military trains Taiwanese forces in Taiwan and Guam, that the number of U.S. military personnel deployed in Taiwan had nearly doubled, that the U.S. had set up a “training ground” on the island, and that there had been cooperation between Taiwan forces and the U.S. National Guard. In October 2021 Tsai noted, “We have a wide range of cooperation with the U.S. aiming at increasing our defense capability.”

Yet what Beijing is likely to view to be the biggest threat – in terms of the prospect of Taiwan serving as a proxy forward presence of the U.S. alliance – is advancements in interoperability, or the capacity for Taiwanese and U.S. forces to cooperate and conduct joint operations. A tragedy for Russia is that its aggression has helped realize the very thing it feared – Ukraine’s greater integration in NATO, seen in Ukraine forces switching from Russian to NATO weapon systems and calibers, receiving training in NATO countries, and (almost certainly) learning to process and use information provided by U.S. surveillance and intelligence agencies. While U.S. and Taiwanese forces are currently very far from achieving integration at the level of full spectrum interoperability, enhancing interoperability is increasingly something that both Taiwan and the U.S. are willing to discuss openly.

A congressional bill forwarded in late September 2021 from the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, for instance, asked for an assessment of “the interoperability of current and future defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners,” while a recent bill amendment propossal advanced the “Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for joint operations.” In mid-March this year, a press release from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense stated that the island will “continue to negotiate with the US to prepare purchasing the latest weapons and equipment… in order to improve military interoperability between Taiwan and the United States.” The Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency in mid-July explicitly stated that newly announced weapons sales to Taiwan would enhance Taiwan’s military interoperability with the U.S. and its allies. At the same time, Taiwanese forces have begun training in English, and the island aims to become an English-speaking bilingual nation by 2030.

How to Avoid Catastrophe

In the wake of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, it is thus important that the architects and communicators of Western and, in particular, U.S. foreign policy understand and are willing to engage with such concerns. It has generally been the case that the West overstates the prospects of China launching an aspirational war based on the relationship between Taiwan and China in history. It will be far more dangerous if we understate the potential that China would launch what it deems to be a defensive war based on the proximity of the two states’ geography.

Buffer theory may not be common fare in the diplomatic language of Western nations, but policymakers grasp the basic concept well enough when it impact their own interests. When Solomon Islands inked a security pact with China earlier this year, raising the prospect that a Chinese military base could be built within 2,000 kilometers of Australia’s coast, it was described as a “red line“ by Australia’s then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison. The distance between Taiwan and China is less that one-tenth of this.

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Taiwan, in my view, should be protected from Chinese aggression. Much is at stake – not just for Taiwanese, but for the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific more generally. But if an unnecessary catastrophe is to be avoided, a fine line needs to be drawn to ensure that active deterrence does not give undue substance to the fear that the West is “using Taiwan to constrain China.” For that to happen, there needs to be a balancing act that negotiates the unabashed application of power politics – or at least the maintenance of the balance of power in the western Pacific – with a recognition of, and attempt to allay, what Beijing might sincerely deem to be “legitimate” security concerns.

If Russia’s enduring Ukraine quagmire has taught us anything, it is that when strategic aspiration gives way to existential fear, grave costs – both economic and more importantly human – may no longer serve as constraining factors.

GUEST AUTHOR

Corey Lee Bell

Corey Lee Bell is a researcher at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Sydney. He was awarded a doctorate from the University of Melbourne’s Asia Institute, and has worked in universities and with think tanks in Australia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea.

thediplomat.com · by Corey Lee Bell · August 13, 2022

11. Will an Attack on Crimea Change the Course of the Ukraine War?

Will an Attack on Crimea Change the Course of the Ukraine War?

Kyiv has shown that it can hit far behind enemy lines, but putting Crimea in play may deal a psychological blow without altering the territorial endgame.

By Emma Ashford, an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University and the author of Oil, the State, and War., and Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Foreign Policy · by Emma Ashford, Matthew Kroenig · August 12, 2022

Emma Ashford: Good morning, Matt! Are you enjoying the dog days of summer?

Matthew Kroenig: Like many Washingtonians, I am doing my best to avoid the swamp this month. I am currently in La Jolla, California—technically for work, but I hope to make it to the beach at some point.

Although you and I generally take a different approach to foreign policy, I suspect you were also savvy enough to escape the city this month?

Emma Ashford: Good morning, Matt! Are you enjoying the dog days of summer?

Although you and I generally take a different approach to foreign policy, I suspect you were also savvy enough to escape the city this month?

EA: I tried, but it’s heating up everywhere: including in Crimea, once a favorite summer vacation spot for Soviet elites and now a conquered territory and a springboard that helps Russia sustain its intervention in Ukraine.

In fact, it is so hot that things are going boom. Reports are saying that Ukrainian special forces are responsible for the massive explosion in Crimea that took out a Russian airfield. It marks a significant escalation in the war: Thus far, the Ukrainians haven’t really been able to stage attacks that far behind Russian lines.

MK: It is a notable development indeed. And I think a positive one for the Western war effort. The Russians reportedly lost at least eight aircraft. It won’t be easy for Russia to replace that much military hardware anytime soon.

I think it is also good for the Ukrainians to strike into territory that Moscow considers to be part of Russia. It never made sense for the Ukrainians to refrain from striking Russian military power in Russia while Russia was actively attacking Ukraine. It was like fighting with one hand tied behind their backs. It’s partly America’s fault of course; the Biden administration was reluctant to provide the Ukrainians with longer-range weapons from the start of the war.

Don’t underestimate the psychological impact of this attack, with wealthy Russian vacationers fleeing clogged roads in a panic with explosions in the background.

I also hope this attack brings the war home in the minds of the Russian people. They may pay more attention to foreign policy with billowing clouds of smoke getting in the way of their sunbathing. Don’t underestimate the psychological impact of this attack, with wealthy Russian vacationers fleeing clogged roads in a panic with explosions in the background. Maybe the Russian people can finally put pressure on the Kremlin to end his invasion.

EA: In all fairness, despite some folks talking about the escalation risk of hitting Russian territory, until this point, it has largely been a question of capability: For the most part, the Ukrainians haven’t been capable of striking back into Russian territory proper. Certainly, there have been some fires at Russian ammunition dumps and fuel depots in recent months, perhaps as a result of sabotage, but this incident is the first the Ukrainians have claimed openly, marking what I suspect will now be a trend.

I’m less sure that this strike will have a significant military impact. You are probably right about the psychological impact—disturbing Russians’ vacations in Crimea and making them feel unsafe—but in military terms, it’s not as important. Air assets have been relatively less useful in this war, and the Russians have massive stockpiles of old Soviet equipment and ammunition to draw from. Some of the other strikes that have taken place, like using the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System to attack Russian supply lines, are probably more militarily significant.

That said, it does all raise the question of where the war in Ukraine goes from here. We are now six months in, and an endpoint looks further away than ever.

MK: Well, speaking of endpoints, this week’s attacks provide more evidence of what the combatants might want. In debates over a final political settlement, some argue that Kyiv should trade land for peace. They say the pre-Feb. 24 borders would be an acceptable outcome—with Russia essentially keeping the territory it took since 2014 in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Maximalists like me think the goal should be to push Russia out of all the territory it took by force since 2014, including Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea.

Of course, it will be up to the Ukrainians to decide how much they want to fight and for what objectives, but on Tuesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky seemed to come down on the side of the maximalists, saying, “This Russian war … began with Crimea and must end with Crimea—with its liberation.

I think this is the right goal, but I suspect you see it differently.

A member of the Russian forces guards in front of surface-to-air S300 missiles in a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile unit on the Cape of Fiolent in Sevastopol on March 5, 2014.

Ukraine Tries to Blow Up Russia’s Grip on Crimea

Ukraine isn’t taking credit for the strikes, but officials see them as an effort to cut Russian supply lines.

A general view shows the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Russia’s Gone Nuclear in Ukraine—With Power Plants, not Missiles

The United States and United Nations have told Moscow to stop holding Europe’s biggest nuclear reactor hostage.

EA: My concern is practicality. Sure, it would be great if the Ukrainians could push the Russians back to the Feb. 24 lines—or even all the way back to pre-2014 lines. But I have serious doubts that it is possible.

In just the last few weeks, we’ve learned that the death toll in this war is already extremely high, perhaps as many as 15,000 Russians and a roughly similar number of Ukrainians. Both sides are now operating with fresh recruits; Ukraine has likely lost many of its best troops. And while the Ukrainians seem to be making a little progress around the Ukrainian city of Kherson, it’s notable that that’s the only city on the western bank of the Dnipro River held by Russia. It’s uniquely vulnerable. For example, Ukraine took out all the bridges to the city, making it harder for Russia to resupply its forces there. Elsewhere, advances will be harder.

We will learn a lot over the next few months as the Ukrainians start to conduct the long-awaited offensive against Russian forces in the south. The destruction of the air base itself is likely to only have minimal military impact, but it signals that the Ukrainians can now attack supply lines and logistical targets in Crimea, which may have more of an impact on the Russian effort in the south. If Ukraine is able to make significant progress there, then it may be more feasible to talk about rolling back at least some Russian gains since February. But if they cannot make progress, it suggests that a stalemate is probably the best that can be hoped for in the conflict, and some kind of settlement is necessary.

Regardless, I think it’s pure fantasy to suggest that the Russians can be pushed out of Crimea.

MK: You are right that the battle lines have barely moved in recent weeks. Both sides are exhausted, and a continued stalemate is possible—if not likely.

But it is August, and everyone is looking for some good beach reading, so let me indulge in a little fantasy.

I think there is a case for cautious optimism. Ukraine has just recently received more advanced Western weapons, such as the U.S. High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). With the free world behind it, I think Kyiv also has the advantage in terms of the resupply of material. The Ukrainians have a morale edge. They are fighting for their very existence while Russians are fighting a made-up “special military operation.” While Russia has a theoretical manpower advantage, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been reluctant to fully mobilize the Russian military because he doesn’t want to provoke a backlash when large numbers of grieving Russian mothers see their sons coming back in body bags. And, as you point out, Ukraine is just now launching this new offensive in the south, so we have yet to see what might be possible there.

I think it is too early to declare victory, defeat, or stalemate.

If the Ukrainians cannot make advances in the coming months, Western leaders should be seriously looking at ways to wind this conflict down rather than prolong a stalemate at such enormous costs.

EA: The next few months are likely to be decisive—not in battlefield terms, necessarily, but in telling us whether anything other than a stalemate is possible.

And that’s where it gets trickier because there are costs to continuing the war and the risks of escalation to a broader conflict remain so long as the war continues. The winter in Europe will be tough given Russia’s decreases in gas shipments to European states, and public support for Ukraine is waning in the United States. American taxpayers are likely to start to wonder what they’re getting for that funding. After all, Washington has already spent $54 billion on Ukraine. It’s a lot of money. I seriously doubt that Congress will approve another large funding bill for Ukraine—at least this year—while the domestic economy is in such turmoil.

If the Ukrainians cannot make advances in the coming months, Western leaders should be seriously looking at ways to wind this conflict down rather than prolong a stalemate at such enormous costs.

MK: Funding for Ukraine has become controversial in the United States, with people asking: Why are we defending Ukraine’s borders if we can’t even protect America’s own southern border? But I think helping Ukraine defeat Russia does make the American people safer, richer, and freer. In fact, while people think of the Trumpist wing of the Republican Party as increasingly isolationist, the best case I have seen for why average Americans should support Ukraine was made by former U.S. President Donald Trump’s own secretary of state, Mike Pompeo.

EA: That’s going to be a tough sell among voters, and I’m not sure Pompeo is going to be the one to persuade them!

Look, here’s another long-term cost to the war. The Russians have announced that they are suspending U.S. access for inspections under the New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty, which governs both sides’ stockpiles of intercontinental ballistic missiles. It’s not really in anyone’s interest to lose that last vestige of arms control between the two sides.

MK: Putin can be clever, and I think he is trying to hit the Biden administration where it hurts. The Democrats have always prized arms control—almost as an end in itself. By suggesting that New START—the last remaining arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow—may be at risk, he is trying to find other ways to increase pressure on the White House for its support of Ukraine.

I do suspect, however, that this is mostly a bluff. Putin also values arms control because it is the last remaining issue for which Russia still gets a seat as a real great power. Also, the terms of the treaty are one sided in Russia’s favor at this point because Russia is building all kinds of exotic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons not limited by the treaty.

EA: You’ve never found an arms control treaty you wouldn’t like to kill, have you?

It’s probably a bluff from the Russians, particularly following the White House’s recent statement that they were open to talking with Russia about strategic arms control even during the war in Ukraine. But losing the inspections does reduce confidence and makes the treaty shakier. As you, yourself, pointed out, the Russians like to cheat on arms control; we can’t spot that easily without the inspections. It’s not a reason to dial down on America’s commitment to Ukraine. But it’s a reminder that it carries concrete costs that could actually impact the security of those here in the United States.

Add that to the other costs we’re starting to see: inflation, food shortages, and a looming energy crisis in Europe that could be catastrophic when winter arrives. Policymakers should be looking for ways to try and get out of this situation before it becomes a multiyear war. The recent deal to extract some grain shipments from Ukrainian ports suggests there are openings for diplomacy that benefit all sides; we should be thinking about how to exploit that.

Before we wrap up though, how about some lighter summer fare? It’s the summer of post-COVID-19 “revenge travel” but also the summer of wild inflation. Where should folks head for their inflation vacation?

MK: Hmm. Where does our money go furthest? I know it is not my current location of La Jolla—where U.S. Sen. Mitt Romney famously has a house with an elevator in the garage. In fact, San Diego is so expensive, American families are now crossing America’s southern border in search of a better life in Tijuana, Mexico. For one salient point of comparison, a plate of tacos in Tijuana costs about 20 pesos (or under $3) compared to up to $60 in San Diego.

I will have to come up with a more frugal option for next summer. Maybe there will be good deals on dachas in liberated Crimea next year after Ukraine pushes the Russians out!

EA: Well, if U.S. sanctions stay in place, your dollar should go pretty far. I was thinking about Latin America, but with inflation at 90 percent in Argentina, that doesn’t seem like the best idea. How about a trip to Europe? The dollar is at parity with the euro for the first time in 20 years. And everyone knows that Europeans love nothing more than American tourists in terrible Hawaiian shirts stomping around their historic cities en masse!

But equally important: What should folks read on vacation? Let’s throw out some great new books for our readers to enjoy at the beach. I’ll even refrain from plugging my own book. (Oil, the State, and War: The Foreign Policies of Petrostates, available now!)

MK: Well, it is too late since everybody who is anybody has obviously already memorized your book by heart.

I am hoping to get to the new Michael Beckley and Hal Brands book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict With China. I know it is not exactly a light read, but this is how I like to spend my free time. What about you?

EA: I’m currently rereading Odd Arne Westad’s magisterial history of The Cold War: A World History. And I just finished Before and After the Fall, which is an edited volume on the end of the Cold War and its impacts. Both are hugely helpful for understanding how we got to where we are today. Next up is looking toward the future with Elizabeth Economy’s The World According to China.

But I should let you get back to your vacation, sorry, work in California. Will Romney be letting you borrow his car elevator?

MK: I don’t think I’ll need it. I am walking distance from the ocean. Now I just have a day of meetings and lectures to get through until I can enjoy it. Until next time?

EA: See you then.

Foreign Policy · by Emma Ashford, Matthew Kroenig · August 12, 2022

12. How to prevent a war between America and China over Taiwan

Excerpts:

Fortunately, China’s actions in this crisis have been muscular but calibrated—designed to show its anger and might, while avoiding escalation. Its forces have been deployed so as not to start a war. America has sent similar signals. It postponed a routine test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. And Ms Pelosi’s plane took a circuitous route to Taiwan, to avoid flying over Chinese bases in the South China Sea.

...

Sometimes a public stand-off with China makes sense. More often it causes a lot of trouble for very little gain. The g7 condemned China’s missile-lobbing, as did Japan and Australia. But South Korea did not and South-East Asian countries have been loth to take sides. Even as it condemns China’s aggression, the Biden administration should stress that it does not support formal independence for Taiwan. Congress should avoid symbolic moves that will bring few real benefits to the island, such as renaming Taiwan’s representative office in Washington, currently in the tpa. Why not pass a trade deal instead?

War is not inevitable. For all Mr Xi’s ambition, his priority is to keep a grip on power. If the invasion of Ukraine teaches one lesson, it is that even a supposedly easy victory can turn into a drawn-out struggle, with ruinous consequences at home. America and Taiwan do not have to prove that a Chinese invasion would fail, just cast enough doubt to persuade Mr Xi to wait.

How to prevent a war between America and China over Taiwan

It is becoming ever harder

The Economist

Aug 11th 2022

America and China agree on very little these days. Yet on the subject of Taiwan, at least in one regard, they are in total harmony. The status quo surrounding the self-governing island, which China claims and whose thriving democracy America supports, is changing in dangerous ways, say officials on both sides. War does not look imminent, but the uneasy peace that has held for more than six decades is fragile. Ask them who is at fault, however, and the harmony shatters.

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That much is clear from the crisis triggered this month by a visit to Taiwan by the speaker of America’s House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi. She was well within her rights, but her trip was provocative. It infuriated the Chinese Communist Party. One of Ms Pelosi’s predecessors had visited the island in 1997, but China’s top diplomat claimed that American “saboteurs” had wrecked the status quo. After Ms Pelosi left, China fired missiles over the island and carried out live-fire drills that encircled it, as if it were rehearsing for a blockade.

Since the previous stand-off in 1995-96, America, China and Taiwan have all grown uneasy with the ambiguities and contradictions—the status quo, if you will—on which peace precariously rests. China, especially, has bared its teeth. If the world is to avoid war, it urgently needs to strike a new balance.

In part this reflects the breathtaking change of the past half-century. Taiwan has blossomed from a military dictatorship into a prosperous, liberal democracy of 24m people, nearly all of them Han Chinese. Its citizens are more than twice as rich as mainlanders. Their success is an implicit rebuke to China’s autocratic regime, and an obvious reason for them to resist being governed from Beijing. Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, has made no formal moves towards independence, but the island is drifting away from the mainland. China’s offer of “one country, two systems” has looked empty since the mainland crushed civil liberties in Hong Kong, which was given the same deal. Today very few Taiwanese say they want formal independence immediately, if only because that would surely provoke an invasion. But even fewer favour prompt unification.

America has changed, too. After intervening to protect Taiwan twice in the 1950s, it began to doubt that it was worth defending, but the island’s democratic success and its importance as a source of semiconductors have upped the ante. Today allies such as Japan see resolute support for Taiwan as a test of America’s standing as a dominant and dependable power in the western Pacific. America has made no formal commitment to defend Taiwan directly, adopting instead a policy of “strategic ambiguity”. But amid growing Sino-American rivalry, and with politicians in Washington vying to sound tough on China, there is little doubt that America would join a fight over Taiwan today. Indeed, President Joe Biden has repeatedly said as much—though each time his staff have walked back his remarks.

But no country has done more to wreck the status quo than China. Whether peace lasts is largely up to President Xi Jinping, its strongman. He gives ample grounds for pessimism. As China has grown rich, he has nurtured an ugly, paranoid nationalism, stressing every humiliation it has suffered at the hands of perfidious foreign powers. He has linked unification with Taiwan to his goal of “national rejuvenation” by 2049. China’s armed forces have been building the capacity to take the island by force; its navy now has more ships than America’s. Some generals in Washington think an invasion could occur in the next decade.

Fortunately, China’s actions in this crisis have been muscular but calibrated—designed to show its anger and might, while avoiding escalation. Its forces have been deployed so as not to start a war. America has sent similar signals. It postponed a routine test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. And Ms Pelosi’s plane took a circuitous route to Taiwan, to avoid flying over Chinese bases in the South China Sea.

The danger is that China uses the crisis to set new boundaries for its encroachments into what Taiwan considers its airspace and territorial waters. It could also attempt to impose even stricter limits on the island’s dealings with the rest of the world.

That must not happen. The task for America and its allies is to resist these efforts without getting into a fight. America could start by re-establishing norms that held before the crisis. It should promptly resume military activities around Taiwan, for instance, including transits through the Taiwan Strait and operations in international waters that China claims as its own. It could continue to expand military exercises with allies, involving them more in contingency planning over Taiwan. Japan was irked when China fired missiles into its vicinity and has indicated that it could intervene in a war, which would greatly complicate a Chinese invasion.

The aim is to persuade China that such an invasion is not worth the risk. It makes sense to use the Taiwan Policy Act (tpa), now before Congress, to provide more training and weapons to Taiwan. But Taiwan needs a better strategy based on small, mobile arms like those Ukraine has used so well, not the costly kit favoured by its generals. The island should become a “porcupine” that would be hard for China to digest. Like Ukraine, Taiwan must also show more willingness to defend itself. Its armed forces have long been plagued by corruption, waste and scandal.

Sometimes a public stand-off with China makes sense. More often it causes a lot of trouble for very little gain. The g7 condemned China’s missile-lobbing, as did Japan and Australia. But South Korea did not and South-East Asian countries have been loth to take sides. Even as it condemns China’s aggression, the Biden administration should stress that it does not support formal independence for Taiwan. Congress should avoid symbolic moves that will bring few real benefits to the island, such as renaming Taiwan’s representative office in Washington, currently in the tpa. Why not pass a trade deal instead?

War is not inevitable. For all Mr Xi’s ambition, his priority is to keep a grip on power. If the invasion of Ukraine teaches one lesson, it is that even a supposedly easy victory can turn into a drawn-out struggle, with ruinous consequences at home. America and Taiwan do not have to prove that a Chinese invasion would fail, just cast enough doubt to persuade Mr Xi to wait. ■

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The Economist

13. Long-Range Missiles? Special Op? Regardless, Crimean Air Base Blasts Are A 'Real Quandary' For Russia

We want all of the above to create dilemmas for the Russians.

Long-Range Missiles? Special Op? Regardless, Crimean Air Base Blasts Are A 'Real Quandary' For Russia

rferl.org · by Todd Prince

New or modified Ukrainian-designed missiles? Shipborne, U.S.-made HIMARS? Armed drones? Ukrainian special forces? Sabotage?

While the preponderance of evidence points to a Ukrainian operation, there is still no clarity on exactly what caused a series of blasts that sent plumes of black smoke rising from a Russian naval air base on the occupied Crimean Peninsula.

The explosions at the Saky Air Base on August 9 destroyed at least nine military aircraft, including Su-30SM fighters and Su-24M bombers, as well as a few buildings that may have contained ammunition and fuel, an analysis of satellite imagery by Schemes, an investigative unit of RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service, indicated.

Officially, Ukraine has been silent about the cause of the blasts, but anonymous Ukrainian military sources told media outlets, including The New York Times, that Kyiv was behind it. And whatever sparked the conflagration, Ukraine is making the most of it with gloating, trolling social media posts -- such as one from a Defense Ministry account mocking Russian vacationers in Crimea to the tune of the 1980s pop hit Cruel Summer.

As it did when the flagship of its Black Sea Fleet was sunk by what are widely believed to have been Ukrainian missiles, Russia has denied an attack even occurred, saying fire-safety violations caused ammunition to explode -- a version that has been rejected abroad.

At least one thing is clear, however: It’s a blow to Russia in its war against Ukraine, particularly as both sides gear up for what may be a major counteroffensive by Kyiv in areas north of Crimea, aimed in part to retake the city of Kherson from Russian forces.

“It’s bad news for Russia regardless of who struck and how they did it. It expands a dangerous front in the war,” said Robert Person, a professor of international relations at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

Saky Military Base Near Novofedorivka, Crimea

“The fact that Ukraine can and will destroy key targets in Crimea will make it more difficult for Russia to use the peninsula to support its occupation forces in southern Ukraine,” Person, who does not speak for the U.S. military, told RFE/RL in an e-mail.

“This could make a significant difference in Ukraine’s efforts to retake Kherson if Ukraine can wreak logistical havoc for Russia in Crimea,” he said.

'Tough Choices'

In 2014, Russia seized control of Crimea, which belongs to Ukraine but is the home of the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and quickly moved to militarize the peninsula, known for its beach resorts. It has been using air bases there, including Saky, to strike Ukrainian positions in the south ever since President Vladimir Putin launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.

In the run-up to the invasion, Russia deployed tens of thousands of more combat-ready troops to Crimea, along with heavy equipment. Those troops poured north from the peninsula as the invasion began and quickly captured parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions.

Photo Gallery:

Satellite Images Of Russian Base In Occupied Crimea Before And After Massive Explosions

Satellite images taken before and after explosions rocked a Russian air base in occupied Crimea reveal extensive damage inflicted by the blasts. Unidentified Ukrainian officials have told U.S. media that their armed forces were responsible for the explosions but did not give further details. Russian officials say an accidental munitions explosion caused the explosions.

The importance of the blasts at the Saky base goes beyond the destruction of a handful of planes, analysts said.

“The Russians are rushing everybody into Kherson to defend it against a possible Ukrainian offensive, so opening up another front in Crimea makes perfect military sense, and it’s long, long overdue,” Glen Howard, a military analyst and president of the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington-based think tank, told RFE/RL.

Since the invasion, the Ukrainian military has been able to slow the advance of Russian forces in the south and east by bogging them down along front lines that run hundreds of kilometers, pressuring their supply routes. If the blasts at Saky were a Ukrainian attack, it amplifies those problems and vulnerabilities, analysts said.

“This places the Russians in a real quandary,” Mick Ryan, a retired major general in the Australian Army and a fellow at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote on Twitter.

“The Ukrainians clearly can now hold large parts of Crimea at risk. And not just airbases. The Black Sea Fleet, its fuel, munitions, repair yards and infrastructure are now vulnerable,” he wrote.

“It will force the Russians to make tough choices about the deployment of their focus across the south and east of Ukraine,” Ryan remarked, adding that the loss of ammunition and fuel at Saky is much more serious for the Russians than the loss of the planes.

“It will have a longer-term impact on aviation operations,” he wrote.

Special Op?

Saki is located on Crimea’s western shore, more than 225 kilometers from the current front line in Kherson, a distance believed to be beyond the range of missiles in Ukraine’s possession.

The United States and its NATO allies have declined to give Ukraine weapons that can travel such a distance because Kyiv could potentially use them to strike targets inside Russia, possibly leading to an escalation of the war.

WATCH: Massive explosions hit a military airfield in Russian-occupied Crimea.

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The United States, NATO, and the vast majority of the world’s nations reject Russia’s claim to Crimea.

In its daily update on the conflict on August 10, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said it could not determine what caused the explosions at the base.

The craters and scorch marks visible in satellite images taken the day after the blasts “could have been caused by many things – special forces, partisans, or missiles, on-site or from a distance,” ISW said.

While Ukraine claims to have been behind a recent strike in a part of Kherson that is about 170 kilometers from the front, its armed forces have not demonstrated they have the capability necessary to reach Saky, ISW said.

Ukraine Territorial Control

Person said he is leaning toward the theory that the blasts were the result of a special operation, in part because of the limited range of its weapons.

“I’m quite confident that if [Ukraine] did have those weapons, the world would know about it already,” he said. “Ukraine’s information strategy all along has been to give the appearance of strength in their David versus Goliath struggle against Russia.”

Howard said that if it was a special operation, this would imply that Ukrainian forces had infiltrated the air base, likely at night, placed explosives at key locations, and then detonated them remotely.

'Morale Disaster'

He said the Ukrainian special forces may have chosen to detonate the explosives during the middle of the day, when thousands of Russian vacationers were relaxing on Crimean beaches, to maximize the propaganda effect.

Opinion | It’s time the free world commits to the defense of Taiwan

The Washington Post · by Lin Fei-fan · August 12, 2022

Lin Fei-fan is the deputy secretary general of the governing Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan.

China’s bellicose response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s (D-Calif.) historic visit to Taiwan proves the paramount necessity for the international community to be vocal about its support for Taiwan — now more than ever.

Since Pelosi’s visit, China has escalated tensions through unprecedented and disproportionate military actions, economic coercion and diplomatic sanctions. The shift is severe enough that some analysts have called it the most dangerous development in the Taiwan Strait since the 1996 missile crisis.

In Taiwan, threats from China have been a part of daily life for decades. But at this moment, we face a deeper, existential question: Can the world really afford to lose Taiwan, an integral member of the world’s liberal democratic order?

After Xi Jinping took power in 2012, China made a major national shift from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide your strength, bide your time” approach to a new strategy that actively and aggressively pursues the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” International policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative and debt diplomacy have extended China’s influence in developing countries. Internally, the Chinese Communist Party has cracked down on domestic rights protection and democratic movements, including those in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

Cross-strait policy under Xi is no exception to the emboldened changes in China’s national strategy. China has worked incessantly to curb Taiwan’s development as a sovereign nation and undermine its democratic system, relentlessly promoting unification and beginning to set an internal timetable for doing so — a move made obvious in 2019 when Xi officially proposed the “one country, two systems” model for Taiwan following its annexation.

This clear strategic shift is exactly why the United States and its allies must begin to rethink their approach toward China. For Taiwan, the eventuality of Chinese aggression is no longer a “what-if” scenario — the more important question is whether the international community will stand with Taiwan as we fight to defend our way of life.

China’s military capacity and its potential expansionist timeline are indubitably major threats to the world order, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But there is a lot that Taiwan and the global community can do to harness international support and make Beijing aware of the heavy price it would pay in choosing to take Taiwan by force.

The world is generally aware of Taiwan’s critical geopolitical role due to its prevalence in the semiconductor supply chain and its strategic location. But even more important, Taiwan is a beacon of democratic achievement and a regional pillar of peace.

The recent history of Taiwan, one of the few emerging democracies in Asia, is a testament to the social capacity for the region to engage in democratic transitions without military coups or violent revolutions. Taiwan is the first country in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage, boasts one of the most comprehensive universal health-care systems in the world, and is among one of the few nations to commit to global climate governance despite being excluded from international organizations that are designed to foster global cooperation on these key sociopolitical issues.

Taiwan is by no means enthusiastic about the prospect of a war, but we’re also unwilling to back down in the face of threats. Recent polls show that more than 70 percent of the Taiwanese people — across varying socioeconomic backgrounds — are willing to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack. Diplomatic support bolsters our existing commitment to national defense by giving our people a greater assurance that they are not isolated from the international system, and their choice to defend democracy will not be in vain.

This is why the Taiwanese people welcomed Pelosi’s choice to visit Taiwan. As she expressed, the world is facing a choice between autocracy and democracy. The United States, Taiwan and our democratic allies must not give in.

I was born in Taiwan after martial law had already ended; I’m part of a generation lucky to have grown up in a society undergoing democratic transformation, rather than the authoritarian rule experienced by our parents. My generation is bound together by a collective identity forged on the basis of freedom of expression and the ability to shape our own future. When China tried to intimidate Taiwan with a restrictive economic deal eight years ago, we organized the Sunflower Movement— and changed the trajectory of our nation. We made Taiwan prioritize the voices of young people concerned about the future of democracy rather than the might of corporations backed by autocratic powers.

Taiwan has a demonstrated and tenacious democratic spirit that is magnified in the face of threats to our way of life. We call on the international community to see us as a trusted ally and country worthy of the world’s collective defense.

The Washington Post · by Lin Fei-fan · August 12, 2022

15. The Biggest Challenge in Building Missile Defense Presence in Guam? Finding the Right Site

The location is important to keep Gaum from tipping over. (Note sarcasm but a Congressmen really did wonder about the possibility of Guam tipping over and capsizing when the Marines complete their move there. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c7m6aewquco)

The Biggest Challenge in Building Missile Defense Presence in Guam? Finding the Right Site

There are candidate locations, but nothing is final, said Missile Defense Agency Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill.

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

The Missile Defense Agency is taking first steps for a facility—which will include a command and control center—in Guam as part of a long-term missile defense plan in the Indo-Pacific region. But choosing the right site has been one of the nascent program’s biggest challenges.

“So we learned a lot from Hawaii, that that radar was designed to really protect the islands from the rogue threat, which we know will continue to evolve and become more complex over time. Our issue became siting, and siting is tough,” particularly for long-range discrimination radar, Vice Adm. Jon Hill, the agency’s director, said during a Defense News webcast Aug. 12.

“That's a very constrained space. So we know that to be a fact. We know the sizing and the requirements on the sensors that we will need, we know where you can and cannot put live ordnance...that's always a constraining factor.”

The plan for Guam’s missile defense program, which has an increased carve out in the 2023 budget request, is to “lay down the basic architecture of the systems.”

So far, the agency has started environmental impact surveys and recently completed a visit focused on determining sites. Nothing is final, but, “we have a very good feel for at least technically and operationally where things should go in order for it to function as a system.”

Hill said he had a team on the island “for a couple of weeks,” and they met with leaders from Hawaii and Guam.

Guam is expected to be critical in future U.S. military efforts to deter China from attacking Taiwan, and would be within range of a long-range missile from the country. The Pentagon released plans earlier this year to bolster Guam’s defenses by 2028, though analysts have argued that the timeline should be accelerated. The U.S. has gradually added missile defense capabilities to the region, including land-based defenses such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, alongside ship-based interceptors and a myriad of sensors.

The ballistic missile defense and hypersonic missile defense capabilities from the MDA, combined with the Army’s cruise missile defense systems, will be integrated “into a command suite with command and control battle management on top of it,” Hill said.

“So you can think of a number of radars and ensure we meet the requirement, which is persistent, 360-degree coverage, right, because of the evolved threat, and it's an island in a very interesting geographical location. So that's what we're doing now, working very hard across the Army, Navy as the executive agent, on Guam.”

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

16. Taiwan can't be allowed to become another Ukraine | Opinion

Excerpts:

Lastly, democratic countries should make clear to China the consequences that would follow an attack on Taiwan. The free world has shown impressive unity in response to the war in Ukraine, with crippling sanctions agreed in record time. China should understand that they would face an equally unified response. This would have an even greater effect considering Chinese reliance on exports to fuel its growth. Making the economic consequences clear now can be an important deterrent against any attack.

Xi Jinping's vision of re-unification with China is not shared by the vast majority of Taiwanese citizens, who cherish their democratic freedoms and firmly oppose Chinese threats of force. The free world must not abandon them. Politicians in the U.S. and Europe failed to deter an attack on Ukraine's democracy, they must not make the same mistake with Taiwan.

Taiwan can't be allowed to become another Ukraine | Opinion

Newsweek · · August 12, 2022

ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN , FORMER NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

ON 8/12/22 AT 12:03 PM EDT

Last week, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. In reaction, China launched its biggest military exercises ever in the region and fired multiple missiles over the island. This belligerent response shows why Pelosi was right to visit. The tragedy unfolding in Ukraine reminds us that free world cannot stand by when an authoritarian bully threatens a neighboring country.

The visit by the speaker of the House was the highest profile by a U.S. politician in two decades. During the intervening years Taiwan has become a beacon of liberty in the region. According to the Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties, Taiwan ranks second in Asia and joint 16thin the world—alongside Germany and Iceland. It was one of the only countries to improve its score during the pandemic. Democracy has become core to Taiwan's identity.

The opposite is true of China. Over the last 25 years, hopes that greater economic cooperation with the West would lead to liberalization have been crushed. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China has become increasingly repressive at home and aggressive abroad. His attitude to democracy was clear in the violent crackdown and arrest of protesters in Hong Kong.

The rusted out wreckage of an old tank is seen at Ou Cuo Sandy Beach on Taiwan's Kinmen islands, which lie two miles from the mainland Chinese coast, on Aug. 11, 2022. SAM YEH/AFP via Getty Images

Xi's aims for Taiwan echo Russian President Vladimir Putin's for Ukraine. He views it as an essential part of the motherland. This week the Chinese ambassador to France said that Taiwanese citizens would need to be 're-educated' if the island was 're-unified' with China. This was not a slip of the tongue. Meanwhile, China's first white paper on Taiwan in 22 years dropped the promise not to deploy soldiers in Taiwan in case of 're-unification.'

We can have no doubts about China's ambitions for Taiwan. For years, politicians, particularly those in Europe, willfully ignored Putin's words on Ukraine. We cannot now block our ears when Chinese officials speak on Taiwan.

Some commentators have criticized the timing of Pelosi's visit, saying it could destabilize the region. This is completely wrong. What is destabilizing the region are China's actions in the South China Sea. Allowing the Chinese Communist Party to dictate to senior U.S. politicians when and where they can visit in the region would be a huge mistake. Other leaders from the United States, Europe, and the democratic world should follow Pelosi's lead and visit Taiwan.

Visits are an important symbol of support. However, as Ukrainians tragically learned, nice words and gestures are not enough when you live in the neighborhood of an autocratic bully. Action is needed now to protect Taiwan's democratic future.

First, countries should step up military aid and cooperation with Taiwan. With a war ongoing in Europe, this task will fall mainly on the U.S. and its allies in the region. President Biden's clear remarks that the United States would defend Taiwan in case of an attack are important. The U.S. should already step up the supply of defensive weapons and military training for Taiwan, to deter China from any attempt to take the island by force. This would send a strong message that China's provocations against Taiwan are counterproductive.

Second, all democratic nations should strengthen their economic ties with Taiwan. This is already happening. The European Union has increased trade with Taiwan eightfold over the past two decades. This partnership should be deepened, as European companies look to diversify away from suppliers in autocratic states. An EU—Taiwan bilateral investment agreement would be an important step in this regard.

Stronger economic ties should go hand-in-hand with closer political ones. Democratic nations should be united when China threatens countries for enhancing ties with Taiwan, as it did with Lithuania.

Lastly, democratic countries should make clear to China the consequences that would follow an attack on Taiwan. The free world has shown impressive unity in response to the war in Ukraine, with crippling sanctions agreed in record time. China should understand that they would face an equally unified response. This would have an even greater effect considering Chinese reliance on exports to fuel its growth. Making the economic consequences clear now can be an important deterrent against any attack.

Xi Jinping's vision of re-unification with China is not shared by the vast majority of Taiwanese citizens, who cherish their democratic freedoms and firmly oppose Chinese threats of force. The free world must not abandon them. Politicians in the U.S. and Europe failed to deter an attack on Ukraine's democracy, they must not make the same mistake with Taiwan.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen was NATO Secretary General (2009-2014) and Danish Prime Minister (2001-2009). Today he is CEO at consultancy Rasmussen Global, and Founder of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

Newsweek · by Eileen Falkenberg-Hull · August 12, 2022

17. Russia’s Brutal Honesty Has Destroyed the West’s Appeasers

I wish north Korea's brutal honesty would do the same for its appeasers!

Russia’s Brutal Honesty Has Destroyed the West’s Appeasers

Foreign Policy · by Alexey Kovalev · August 12, 2022

Argument

An expert's point of view on a current event.

Yet plenty of Western intellectuals and politicians still ignore what Moscow is saying loud and clear.

By Alexey Kovalev, an investigative editor at Meduza.

Crosses, flowers, and photographs mark the graves of victims of the battles for Irpin and Bucha at the cemetery of Irpin, Ukraine, on May 16.

Crosses, flowers, and photographs mark the graves of victims of the battles for Irpin and Bucha at the cemetery of Irpin, Ukraine, on May 16. Christopher Furlong/Getty Images

One of my most revealing interviews covering Russia’s war on Ukraine was with Polina Kovalevskaya. Along with her husband and three daughters, she was a refugee from Mariupol, the Ukrainian city with a prewar population of almost 450,000 that was besieged by Russian forces for almost three months. After three horrific weeks of hiding in basements during incessant Russian shelling, the family managed to escape the city, which was already a mass grave and charred ruin by then. When I asked them for a photo of their former home, they sent me a video instead. In the clip, amid a vast expanse of smoldering rubble, a Russian tank fires point-blank at an apartment building that was somehow still standing. Part of the building implodes, adding to the total devastation for miles and miles around. “This was our home,” Kovalevskaya told me when describing the video.

What makes the video so chilling wasn’t just the fact that targeting civilians is a war crime. It’s that the clip bears the unmistakable logo of RT, the Russian channel that started off in 2005 as a mostly benign attempt to improve Russia’s international image and ended up as a domestic disinformation bullhorn. The video’s unequivocal message: This is what we’re doing in Ukraine, and we’re not even going to pretend anything else.

Yet six months into this brutal war, there are still plenty of Western intellectuals, politicians, journalists, and activists willfully ignoring what Russia itself is telling them again and again, loud and clear. As a Russian journalist now in exile, I find this willful ignorance of my country deeply disturbing. Some of these pundits insist that there is a “peaceful” solution—which usually translates to stopping weapons deliveries to Ukraine and leaving the country to Russian leader Vladimir Putin to pick apart—or that the conflict is about the Kremlin’s “interests” or “security concerns.” All the while, the evidence of Russia’s actual goals and war crimes in Ukraine has become ever more overwhelming.

A considerable part of this evidence comes from Russia’s own propaganda sources, including TASS news agency photographers in occupied areas where foreigners and Russian independent media are not allowed. A host of Russian state media outlets have been meticulously documenting their military’s atrocities, with the footage presented to Russians and the world as an achievement and underlined with an incessant stream of genocidal rhetoric. One has to be actively and systematically avoiding reality to claim that the invasion is anything other than a horrific crime bordering on genocide—and all of it committed by choice. The war will end when Putin chooses to end it—or is forced to do so. The alternative is the destruction of Ukraine, which Putin and countless Russian public figures have unequivocally said is not a real country and doesn’t deserve to exist.

If, like John Mearsheimer, your arguments are being used by Russian state television to prop up the regime’s ridiculous claims, you should probably reconsider the intellectual journey that led you to this point.

Still, some Western advocates of appeasement will offer perfunctory condemnations before then spending many times more column inches on diverting the blame from Putin to the United States, the West, NATO, or all of the above. With that kind of argument, they would have enthusiastic allies in the Kremlin. On Russian airwaves, the story goes that it was the Ukrainians who forced the invasion on Russia by supposedly preparing to annihilate Ukraine’s Russian-speaking minority. In psychology, this is called projection.

If, like the political scientist John Mearsheimer, your arguments are being used by Russian state television to prop up the regime’s ridiculous claims that Kyiv and Washington are to blame for this war, you should probably reconsider the intellectual journey that led you to this point. If, like many of the Western leftists obsessed with the NATO war cause theory, you reject imperialism and colonialism as a matter of principle (rather than only its U.S. or British versions), you couldn’t have missed the Kremlin’s detailed public plans for dismantling Ukraine’s sovereignty, Russia’s plundering of faraway lands like Sudan to fund a war of conquest and annihilation, and the Kremlin’s use of ethnic minorities as cannon fodder for the war.

If you think Ukraine has a problem with a nationalist far right, then you might have noticed the unapologetic Hitler worshippers in the ranks of the Russian forces. If, like the British Labour Party’s Jeremy Corbyn, you promote peace through diplomacy—appeasement-speak for stopping military aid to Ukraine and giving Putin what he wants—you should be aware by now of the realities in the Russian-occupied areas and ask yourself if this is really the fate you are willing to condemn millions of Ukrainians to. You might take it as a sign that you’re on the wrong side of history—and just about anyone’s understanding of ethics, including the right to self-defense—when you have to say out loud that you’re not a Putin puppet.

Scholars can debate the exact definitions of what Russia is doing in Ukraine, but one thing is clear from the most immediate goal of its forces in the area they occupy: The aim is to erase not just Ukraine’s sovereignty as a state (including by annexing the occupied areas) but its very nationhood. Ukrainian place names are erased from maps and street signs, local media are replaced with Russian-language propaganda broadcasts, and students are reeducated under a Russian curriculum by teachers shipped in from Russia. The plan is not secret: It was announced on April 3 in an article in the state-owned RIA Novosti news agency—two days after the Kremlin’s forces retreated from the Kyiv region, leaving behind hundreds of dead civilians who had been raped, tortured, and executed during the monthlong occupation.

Everything in Yale University historian Timothy Snyder’s “genocide handbook” has already been perpetrated in one form or another, including forced Russification and the abduction of thousands of Ukrainian children to be raised as Russians in the motherland. Kremlin-loyalist media are not only cheering all of this on but demanding even more cruelty: A Komsomolskaya Pravda radio host demanded a gulag to be built for Ukrainian teachers who have been refusing to follow the Russia-supplied syllabus. In case anyone has forgotten, gulags were hard labor camps where an estimated 1.6 million political and other prisoners perished during Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin’s brutal rule.

The footage my interviewee sent me of her destroyed house closely resembles that in RT’s war documentary Mariupol. The Russian City. If the film’s title is not transparent enough concerning the regime’s ambitions, members of the camera crew also filmed themselves planting the Russian tricolor on the roof of Mariupol’s city council building. Lost to most Russians is the irony that Mariupol, like similarly obliterated Severodonetsk, lies in that part of Ukraine that is supposedly dominated by Russian speakers yearning to be free from Kyiv—yet it has been subjected to the most systematic destruction and cruelty.

For Russians, the consequences of refusing to accept the Kremlin’s line on Ukraine are clear: Harsh censorship laws passed in the immediate aftermath of the Feb. 24 start of the invasion guarantee criminal prosecution for spreading “fake news,” “disparaging” the Russian military, and using the word “war” when describing Putin’s war. (I crossed the border out of Russia on foot with my wife the night before the law went into effect.) Criticizing the war has severe consequences: In July, Moscow City Councilor Alexei Gorinov was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for speaking out against the war. Ilya Yashin, another opposition politician, is currently on trial for anti-war campaigning. The judge demanded a closed hearing to prevent the defendant from gaining “a platform for promoting his anti-war ideas.”

Foreigners are under no such pressure when they align with the Kremlin’s goals in Ukraine. At the very heart of many Western progressives and old-style leftists’ worldview is a reflexive anti-American and anti-Western ideology, which operates from the core premise that no historical crime could ever be graver than those committed by the United States and the European powers. Hence, any anti-American leader has their natural sympathies, and any country supported by the United States—such as Ukraine—becomes deeply suspicious. Since the advent of populist parties in the West, there is also a conservative version of these anti-Western, pro-Russian sentiments—just ask former U.S. President Donald Trump.

But if you find yourself agreeing with Putin solely on the basis of agreeing with his anti-Western stance, it’s probably time to consider other factors, too. When calling for peace, an end to Western support for Ukraine, and meeting Russia’s demands for another country’s land, have you fleshed out what half a genocide might look like? It’s not as if Russia has been especially coy about its intentions in Ukraine. It has been advertising them practically 24/7 on national television. Have you asked actual Ukrainians if what you call a peace would be acceptable to them? In recent polls, more than 80 percent of Ukrainians have consistently rejected any territorial concessions to Russia. If you are a left-wing politician or activist, are you aware of your Ukrainian comrades’ opinions? When calling for peace with Putin, do you realize that displaying symbols of peace is now a prosecutable offense in Russia? Do you know what the occupied areas you’d like to trade for “peace” look like? Russia has made sure that you do.

Alexey Kovalev is an investigative editor at Meduza. Twitter: @Alexey__Kovalev

18. Air Force will shut down program that trains foreign pilots

I am at a loss for the rationale. I think this is a huge mistake.

So is this a HQ USAF issue and action or an AFSOC-USSOCOM issue and action? I am specifically talking about the 6th and the 711th squadrons since they are SOF units.I believe we need this capability in SOF. I have seen first hand some of the outstanding work they have done with no standard aircraft and indigenous capabilities to develop the right kind of air capabilities among host nation aviation units. Every friend, partner, and ally cannot have F35s and 5th generation aircraft (e.g, my experience in the Philippines).

Air Force will shut down program that trains foreign pilots

The Air Force is slated to shut down three units that specialize in Train, Advise and Assist

BY ETHAN BROWN | PUBLISHED AUG 12, 2022 12:15 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Ethan Brown · August 12, 2022

By the end of this year, Task & Purpose has learned, the Air Force is slated to shut down three units that specialize in Train, Advise and Assist (TAA) and Combat Air Advisor (CAA) missions: the 81st Fighter Squadron out of Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, and the 6th Special Operations Squadron and 711th Special Operations Squadron, both at Duke Airfield, Florida. These units provide formal training to friendly foreign states’ militaries through hands-on assistance, total immersion, and institutional expertise in the use of unique and tailored airpower, including light attack, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISR), and air mobility, particularly for austere operational locales.

Multiple sources from different Air Force Major Commands (MAJCOMs) reached out to me to discuss the termination of these units’ operational missions after analysis on Ukraine’s air power needs. The significance of losing these programs is relevant to the current strategic environment. As policy shapers and strategists are struggling to craft a coherent strategy for crises in Ukraine, a proven tool for building security partnerships is critical now more than ever. The air advisor program is one such proven tool — one of the few in the entire Afghanistan mission that worked, something noted in the damning Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report on Operation Enduring Freedom.

Unit leaders and operational specialists from the air advisor community have yet to brief Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles ‘CQ’ Brown on the capability gap arising from the loss of these units; they have been stonewalled for two years now, as greater strategic issues like the Afghanistan withdrawal and Ukraine crisis pushed air advising lower and lower on the Headquarters Air Force’s (HAF) list of priorities. A senior Air Force official whom I spoke with, having direct engagement with the air advising program, told me “we are at an inflection point in the air advisor enterprise, and the Air Force needs to decide whether it wants to take its version of security force assistance — air advising — seriously or just assume that someone else does it.”

Brown has made it a clear priority for the Air Force that working with allies and partner nations is paramount to developing capabilities necessary to cover Air Force security gaps. There are simply too many vulnerable locales around the globe for a single air force to secure on its own. Brown’s guidance hinges on these partnerships being “integrated by design” with those other nations. If these partnerships are truly a priority, the divestment of the Air Force’s security force assistance capability will reduce the number of engagements possible with the full spectrum of allies and partners — including those smaller states who are not capable of purchasing U.S. equipment via foreign military sales (FMS).

Two A-10C Thunderbolt IIs fly in formation over southern Arizona, April 29, 2019. The A-10 is built around the GAU-8 Avenger 30MM Gatling gun and is capable of carrying an additional 16,000 pounds of munitions under the wings and belly of the aircraft. (Staff Sgt. Betty R. Chevalier/U.S. Air Force)

But the die may already be cast as far as these units being stood down, meaning the value of this brief to the chief of staff may not be enough to keep Combat Air Advising operational. The move to stand down the units has been staffed through Headquarters Air Force, per an Air Force official with knowledge of the unit’s pending status, and the 14th Fighter Wing Public Affairs office confirmed that the mission for the 81st Fighter Squadron has been terminated following the conclusion of the Afghanistan mission.

The mission statement for each unit — “develop sustainable, effective Combat Air Forces” isn’t merely a catchy slogan either. These units truly enable partner nations to conduct the integration of air power, beginning-to-end — from training pilots, maintenance and logistics personnel, weapons sustainment, and loading — through to ground force coordination (forward control of air delivered munitions). Perhaps most significantly, these units are specially trained in cultural skills unique to the “customer,” enabling a more effective carryover of American institutional knowledge to the tactical abilities of the host-nation forces receiving the Train, Advise and Assist benefits. Air Advising (AA) should not be confused with similar mission sets by other services, like Security Force Assistance which falls under the purview of the Army Special Forces and Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB). But in this context, it is similar in application and specific to air power integration with partner nations.

The Air Force TAA program was one of the few success stories in Afghanistan, headlined by the A-29 program (charter mission of the 81FS over the last decade) which brought a near-precision strike capability to the Afghan Air Force. I was there and part of this program as a U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Control Party specialist (TACP) in 2016 when the Super Tucanos first arrived in Kabul, flown by American and Afghan pilots. I was among the augmentee advisors who validated Afghan Air Controllers in training and was part of the Train, Advise and Assist command and control element that supervised the Afghans’ first unilateral air interdiction mission using the A-29s on Taliban targets. The 6th and 711th had advisors training Afghans at this time as well and were pivotal in improving the capabilities of the Afghan Air Force.

It was a titanic effort to get there, but the program worked. Of course, the entire mission would fall to pieces once it had been handed over to contractors for long-term sustainment and ultimately left to wither and die by a retracting coalition presence. That, as well as the myriad political issues that would doom the whole endeavor, but that is another topic entirely. Yet the Train, Advise and Assist mission produced results via the efforts of the 81FS and SOS units, proving the efficacy of this capability with a partner nation.

What then is the reason for this emerging capability gap? Funding and prioritization. During a recent interview with a senior ranking Air Force member who has experience in the AA community, they informed me that the issue lies largely with the fact that TAA and CAA mean different things to each MAJCOM. While air advising exists as a function within various MAJCOMs, there is no HAF presiding authority, nor does air advising receive operational Air Force funding; those funds are dispersed through each individual MAJCOM.

Thus, each MAJCOM can prioritize air advising differently, with the capability varying dramatically between commands. The 81FS, for example, belongs to the Air Education and Training Command (AETC), yet is flagged as a Fighter Squadron; it is not understood to be an advisory unit by the MAJCOM. Thus, AETC has not prioritized the advise and assist mission of the 81st, especially with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and instead (understandably) is concerned with the pilot shortage and manning requirements across the force elsewhere. Because AETC has the authority to divest, the 81st will cease to exist operationally by the end of this year; ditto with AFSOC and the 6th, and 711th. Three of those 81FS A-29s were transferred from AETC into AFSOC custody a mere two years ago, per a former member of one of these units I spoke to, as Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was soliciting Armed-Overwatch candidates. Yet those three tails — which are currently parked at Hurlburt Field — are not known to have been flown by a U.S. Military member post delivery.

In AFSOC, the present chain of command has similarly not prioritized training with partner nations, and the withdrawal from Afghanistan all but slayed this sick horse. There is no fixed plan on what to do with the CAA-qualified, tab-wearing airmen who will be divested from the 6th and 711th SOS, but rather, they will return to their original AFSCs within AFSOC and carry their CAA-tabs with them as an additional duty. All this to say, any advising by those personnel in the future is all but certain to occur on the ground, and not in the cockpit with a partner pilot; this arrangement will nullify entirely the ability to achieve proficiency in training by partner forces.

A limited version of air advising remains on hand, but dramatically different from the capabilities provided by the three units to be stood down this year. Those alternatives are the Mobility Support Advise Squadrons (MSAS). These units possess a nascent air advisor capability, but by design are focused on mobility, sustainment, and logistics for operations, not operations themselves. This reflects the presiding MAJCOM — Air Mobility Command — who owns these units.

Why does the closure of these units matter at a strategic and policy planning level? The Air Force does not have a replacement plan for ensuring the availability of this institutional knowledge, or the persons who possess it with tactical relevance. The administrative plan is to return those maintenance personnel and pilots back to their “Big Air Force” career fields — every member of these units were selected from other Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs), maintenance, life support systems, pilots etc, and specially trained to fill TAA manning slots — leading to a wide pool of airmen to retire, rather than “go back to flying my old platform after spending so much time and effort to make TAA a success,” a senior member of one of these units would recall.

The only ad hoc plan of retaining this institutional knowledge for this capability is to create a repository of knowledge on a digital database at the Ft. Leavenworth Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, an intellectual institution owned by the Army.

A MiG-29 Fulcrum takes off from Starokostiantyniv Air Base, Ukraine, Oct. 9 as part of the Clear Sky 2018 exercise. (Tech. Sgt. Charles Vaughn/U.S. Air National Guard)

All of this is occurring when a discussion remains in flux about sending 4th-generation fighter jets to Ukraine, when a capability to provide Security Force Assistance in the form of air power has already been established as a valuable and proven resource. The West can’t send F-16s, A-10s, or the Eurofighter to Ukraine for a litany of reasons. For one, how easy would it be for Russia to claim the United States was attacking, seeing as how the F-16 and renowned A-10 are among the most recognizable aircraft on the planet? This is where units and capabilities like the 81FS and the Special Operations Squadron — its institutional knowledge and people, its inventory of globally sourced aircraft from a variety of international vendors — come into play as a critical resource, one which the Air Force is either ignoring, or unaware of the impact of its loss.

The issue on training foreign personnel on Western systems is a rather simple one, as explained to me by a former Air Advisor pilot with knowledge of the TAA pilot programs. This member told me that TAA units are uniquely qualified to address training differences between American and partner forces. In the case of potential F-16s being shipped to Ukraine, in order to train the Ukrainian pilots, it is not as simple as learning the new positions of switches and buttons in cockpits. These are pilots with Russian-influenced tactical thinking who were trained on Russian-developed systems. Comparatively, these units tout the ability to take a Ukrainian civilian off the street with basic eye-hand coordination who can be trained to fly an A-29 in less time than it would take to train a Ukrainian Air Force pilot to unlearn a MiG-29, and relearn everything about flying in order to operate a Western-built F-16.

It is likely too late to ‘save’ the 81FS or the 6th and 711th SOS, unfortunately. And perhaps someday someone will write a story about their exploits in Afghanistan, the Levant, and Africa. But the real issue, for now and for the immediate future, is losing wholesale the capability to advise and assist friendly states on airpower needs from beginning to the critical ‘finish’ phase — pilot training on U.S.-supplied platforms through on-station assets and kinetic engagement; the very thing being discussed on how to support partner nations long-term.

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Ethan Brown is a senior fellow for defense studies at the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence and Global Affairs (Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress). He is a U.S. Air Force special warfare veteran, having spent 11 years as a special operations Joint Terminal Attack Controller. He is on Twitter @LibertyStoic.

taskandpurpose.com · by Ethan Brown · August 12, 2022

19. Carl Sagan's 1995 prediction of America's future is worryingly accurate

Prescient. Now let's change and prove him wrong.

Excerpts:

“The dumbing down of America is most evident in the slow decay of substantive content in the enormously influential media, the 30-second sound bites (now down to 10 seconds or less), lowest common denominator programming, credulous presentations on pseudoscience and superstition, but especially a kind of celebration of ignorance.”

Dr Sagan, who sadly died in December 1996, was an American astronomer, planetary scientist, cosmologist, astrophysicist and astrobiologist. He regularly wrote and spoke on these topics to help educate the masses.

Carl Sagan's 1995 prediction of America's future is worryingly accurate

unilad.com

Anna Verdon

Published 12:38, 13 August 2022 BST

| Last updated 12:38, 13 August 2022 BST

Astrophysicist, Dr Carl Sagan, made a scarily accurate prediction of what America looks like today, making us wonder if he had access to a time machine.

Sagan, who is best known for passionately sharing complex scientific views, also enjoyed sharing his insights into humanity.

And in his book from 1995 it seems as if he were already aware of what the world would be like today, foretelling the rise of big tech, misinformation and news snippets.

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Credit: Shutterstock

In a passage from The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark, that is frequently shared on social media, Sagan highlighted that the search for truth would constantly be undermined by superstition and pseudoscience – or what we now deem ‘fake news’.

It sets out his pessimistic view of where the US might go if it loses the appreciation of rational thinking, reason and open-mindedness.

And it looks like we might already be there.

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In the text he wrote: “Science is more than a body of knowledge; it is a way of thinking. I have a foreboding of an America in my children’s or grandchildren’s time—when the United States is a service and information economy; when nearly all the key manufacturing industries have slipped away to other countries; when awesome technological powers are in the hands of a very few, and no one representing the public interest can even grasp the issues; when the people have lost the ability to set their own agendas or knowledgeably question those in authority; when, clutching our crystals and nervously consulting our horoscopes, our critical faculties in decline, unable to distinguish between what feels good and what’s true, we slide, almost without noticing, back into superstition and darkness.

Carl Sagan’s prediction about America, from 1995.

From The Demon-Haunted World pic.twitter.com/ZY6FNvMDKd

— Ali A. Rizvi (@aliamjadrizvi) August 8, 2022

“The dumbing down of America is most evident in the slow decay of substantive content in the enormously influential media, the 30-second sound bites (now down to 10 seconds or less), lowest common denominator programming, credulous presentations on pseudoscience and superstition, but especially a kind of celebration of ignorance.”

Dr Sagan, who sadly died in December 1996, was an American astronomer, planetary scientist, cosmologist, astrophysicist and astrobiologist. He regularly wrote and spoke on these topics to help educate the masses.

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Sagan helped assemble to first physical messages sent into space and he’s best known for his scientific contributions in his research into extra-terrestrial life as well as the discovery into the high temperatures on the surface of the planet Venus.

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Topics: News, Space, World News

Anna Verdon