Quotes of the Day:

“Mayor Orden stood behind a chair and gripped its back with his hands. “Do the people want order, Molly?” “I don’t know,” she said. “They want to be free.” “Well, do they know how to go about it? Do they know what method to use against an armed enemy?” “No,” Molly said, “I don’t think so.” “You are a bright girl, Molly; do you know?” “No, sir, but I think the people feel that they are beaten if they are docile. They want to show these soldiers they’re unbeaten.” “They’ve had no chance to fight. It’s no fight to go against machine guns,” Doctor Winter said. Orden said, “When you know what they want to do, will you tell me, Molly?” She looked at him suspiciously. “Yes—” she said. “You mean ‘no.’ You don’t trust me.” “But how about Alex?” she questioned. “I’ll not sentence him. He has committed no crime against our people,” said the Mayor. Molly was hesitant now. She said, “Will they—will they kill Alex?” Orden stared at her and he said, “Dear chile. My dear child."

— The Moon Is Down (Twentieth-century Classics) by John Steinbeck

"It is dangerous to be right in matters on which the established authorities are wrong."

– Voltaire

"Dear optimist, pessimist, and realist – while you guys were busy arguing about the glass of wine, I drank it! 

Sincerely, the opportunist."

–Lori Greiner

1. Special Operations Force Structure: Strategic Calculus or Organizational Power?

2. Americans Need Domestic Unity for Effective Foreign Policy

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 5, 2024

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2024

5. How Primed for War Is China?

6. How cheap drones are transforming warfare in Ukraine

7. Disinformation Aimed at Policymakers

8. Today’s disinformation economy was built on the lying techniques of Big Tobacco

9. Fear and Ambition Propel Xi’s Nuclear Acceleration

10. Failure at the Wall Street Journal

11. Amid growing criticism of Biden foreign policy, experts credit wins while leaving room for improvement

12. History Has No Lessons for You: A Warning for Policymakers

13. Israel Admits It Targeted Own Citizens With Graphic Misinformation Channel

14. The Marines are retaining women at significantly higher rates than men

15. Waking A Weary Superpower

16. Here’s how to help solve Ukraine’s drone shortage problem

17. War Books: A Reading List for Strategic Competition with China

18. A Conversation with Gen. Randy George, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army

19. The Key to Ukrainian Victory is Partnering (not Ukrainifying)

20. Three Years After Coup, Myanmar Military Junta Falling Apart – OpEd

21. ‘A race against time’: Taiwan strives to root out China’s spies

22. Transfer of Army special operators to Baumholder on track for 2026

23. Biden response strikes only a distraction unless they target, destroy top Iranian military leaders, capabilities

24. Take a look at the tanker-like warship the US has used as a floating Navy SEAL base

25. Civil War 2.0: Scenario 1--Insurrection Redux?

1. Special Operations Force Structure: Strategic Calculus or Organizational Power?

An important contribution to the debate and some important views and historical perspectives on PSYOP and criticism of our military and SOCOM concerning influence operations. I also agree that cuts can provide an opportunity and we should always be seeking opportunities.

They did omit one historical footnote (or anecdote) and that is how the term MISO came about. It is relevant to discussion of the establishment of the Military Information Support Operations Command. In 2009 the CSA and the Cdr of USSOCOM made a deal to change PSYOP to MISO. The CSA did not like the term PSYOP. The CDR USSOCOM agreed in return for the Army providing a G.O. billet for PSYOP. The rest of the story is below. No G.O. billet was established and PSYOP became known as a Japanese soup or MISO (to the horror of PSYOP personnel and professionals who are concerned with our nation's ability to influence).

Special Operations Force Structure: Strategic Calculus or Organizational Power? - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Cole Livieratos · February 6, 2024

On May 1, 1952, the U.S. Army opened the special operations training center and school that still trains most of its special operations forces today. The school was then known as the Psychological Warfare Center, and it emphasized the importance of psychological operations in all military activities, including the newly conceived special forces.

Despite its pivotal role in creating Army special operations as it is known today, psychological operations has since been pushed to the bottom of the special operations hierarchy. In our decades of combined experience working in and researching special operations, irregular warfare, and military strategy, we have witnessed psychological operations and civil affairs’ continued relegation in the special operations hierarchy. In a time when U.S. competitors are investing heavily in information and influence operations, Army Special Operations Command plans to reduce these branches and further subordinate them to other parts of special operations. This would be a mistake.

The evolving character of modern warfare and strategic competition makes the need for these capabilities clear. Countries like China and Russia have recently poured unprecedented resources into disinformation and influence campaigns and capabilities. Information technologies and artificial intelligence are increasingly effective at causing confusion on the battlefield and shaping global opinion about conflicts. And the Russo-Ukrainian and Israel-Hamas conflicts have demonstrated the substantial impact of information influence operations on war today.

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Despite these trends, the U.S. Army is reducing the size of its few units whose purpose is to understand and influence the modern information environment. The proposed cuts to these units, part of Army Special Operations Command, will increase risk to the joint force in modern competition and conflict and is a topic one of us has written about for this site. The increased risk reflects force structure decisions that are not driven primarily by strategic calculus, but instead by organizational power and interests.

For Army special operations, the power increasingly resides with leaders from special mission units and special forces. Branches with fewer resources, senior officers, and access to organizational leadership, like civil affairs and psychological operations, are especially vulnerable in times of austerity. No matter their operational utility or importance to combatant commanders, branches without senior representation and direct access to senior leaders will consistently lose resource competitions. These organizationally weaker forces, along with special operations support personnel, will bear the brunt of cuts to Army special operations.

Army and special operations leaders could consider eliminating psychological operations and civil affairs altogether and making them specialties within the special forces branch. If slots still need to be reduced from Army Special Operations Command, the command should consider eliminating the redundant 1st Special Forces Command. Alternatively, psychological operations and civil affairs could be removed from Army special operations and placed directly under U.S. Special Operations Command. A fourth option would be to remove psychological operations and civil affairs from special operations altogether. Although this move would sever these branches’ long lineage as part of Army special operations, it would place them in a better position to develop long-term capabilities that benefit the joint force.

Despite their importance on the modern battlefield, the history and capabilities of psychological operations are not well understood. We believe that understanding the past, present, and potential future of psychological operations and their relationship to other special operations organizations helps explain why they are in line for major cuts and damaging restructuring.

Hostile Takeover? The Historical Relationship Between Psychological Operations and Special Operations

The Office of Strategic Services, which was created in 1942 and served as a precursor to the CIA and special forces, grew out of the Coordinator of Information, an office responsible for both intelligence operations and psychological warfare. When the Office of Strategic Services was disbanded at the end of World War II, the Army maintained a small psychological operations staff and established a full psychological warfare department and training center in 1951 at Fort Riley. The following year, the center moved to Fort Bragg (now Fort Liberty) and the Psychological Warfare Center was activated. After the activation of 10th Special Forces group a few weeks later, special forces were vocal about their fearsof being “relegated to a subordinate role” beneath psychological operations. By 1956, the school changed its name to the Special Warfare Center, beginning a shift away from psychological operations and towards special forces that accelerated under President John F. Kennedy and during the Vietnam War.

No set of special operations forces were spared from cuts after Vietnam. The much larger special forces maintained three groups, but by the early 1980s psychological operations only had one poorly resourced group. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan, a staunch believer in the power of information, issued National Security Decision Directive 130, “U.S. International Information Policy,” calling “revitalization and full integration of Psychological Operations … a high priority of the Department of Defense.” The department’s subsequent 1985 Psychological Operations Master Plan contained over 200 specific Defense Department actions needed to revive the Army’s psychological operations forces, but the two centerpieces of the plan were the creation of a Joint Psychological Operations Center within the department and separating psychological operations from special operations.

When U.S. Special Operations Command was established in 1987, one of the most hotly debated issues was whether psychological operations would be assigned to it. The most important figure who opposed doing so was retired Gen. Richard Stilwell, the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. An examination of letters in U.S. Special Operations Command’s archive between the unit’s new commander, Gen. James Lindsay, and Department of Defense leaders like Stilwell reveals that Lindsay was only able to win support for gaining control of psychological operations by “eliminating some of the layering in the chain of command” between psychological operations and the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. Lindsay promised Stilwell that the command would establish a two-star psychological operations and civil affairs directorate to “provide necessary visibility” for those forces and that they would have direct access to U.S. and Army special operations leaders.

But after Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger agreed to move psychological operations under U.S. Special Operations Command, the command convinced Defense Department leadership that the Joint Psychological Operations Center was unnecessary because it duplicated efforts of the psychological operations directorate. After plans for the center were shuttered, U.S. Special Operations Command also eliminated its psychological operations and civil affairs directorate. None of the robust psychological operations representation that was promised for the command to gain control of psychological operations forces, pictured below from a June 1987 memorandum, lasted more than a few years after its creation.

Source: Leon W. Babcock, “Memorandum for Commander in Chief, USREDCOM, from J5,” June 10, 1987, p.5. Proposed Psychological Operations chain of command. Organizations in red (several of which were outside of U.S. Special Operations Command’s control) were either never created or no longer exist. Other psychological operations organizations have changed or been created since 1987.

The elimination of or failure to create the Defense Department and national-level psychological operations organizations pictured above were far beyond U.S. Special Operations Command’s purview. But by successfully arguing to bring psychological operations under the new special operations organization, blocking the creation of the Joint Psychological Operations Center, and then eliminating the psychological operations directorate, the new command did more to limit military information influence operations than most people realize. By the time al-Qaeda terrorists carried out the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, a Defense Science Board report noted how psychological operations’ weak organizational structure, lack of high-ranking officers, and lack of representation at higher echelons within and outside U.S. Special Operations Command resulted in ineffective military messaging capabilities, especially at the strategic level. The lack of a strategic messaging capability would plague defense officials in the years following 9/11, and every attempt to upgrade psychological operations organizations would prove to be short-lived.

Psychological Operations’ Declining Organizational Power

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the creation of a Joint Psychological Operations Support Element under U.S. Special Operations Command in 2003 because he recognized the need for coordinated combatant command messaging to support the post-9/11 wars. The unit was operational in 2006 and became a formalized command called the Joint Military Information Support Command in 2009. The command was dissolved in 2011 in favor of a psychological operations command that would fall under Army special operations. The move was meant to centralize control of psychological operations forces, but the new command would quickly be eliminated to create a new special forces command to oversee special forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations.

Part of the rationale for shuttering the Joint Military Information Support Command was that its functions and resources would be transitioned to a new Military Information Support Operations Command that would oversee all psychological operations forces in the Army, including the two reserve groups booted from Army Special Operations Command in 2006. The Military Information Support Operations Command, provisionally established in August 2011, would be headed by a brigadier general, creating an opportunity for the first active-duty general officer from psychological operations in decades. While the authorization for a psychological operations general officer languished, Army Special Operations Command placed a special forces officer in command of the Military Information Support Operations Command. The first commander was Col. Chris Sorenson, a self-described “commando” whose career ambition was to join the “most lethal-thinking commando force on the planet.” Sorenson was succeeded by another special forces officer, Col. Robert Warburg. A psychological operations officer only commanded the unit for less than a year in 2014 after Army special operations leadership planned to dissolve the command so they could use the personnel slots to create 1st Special Forces Command that would oversee most special forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations units.

1st Special Forces Command was created during another period of austerity measures as sequestration forced Army special operations leaders to curb planned growth to special forces, ranger, and aviation units. Under the guise of “unity of command,” 1st Special Forces Command (which was originally supposed to be called 1st Special Warfare Command to not privilege special forces) further subordinated civil affairs and psychological operations by placing an additional layer of leadership between those forces and Army special operations leadership. Unsurprisingly, key leader billets in the command have been held almost exclusively by special forces personnel. According to an interview with an officer involved in the deliberations, 1st Special Forces Command decided to use the special forces symbol as the unit crest and made all civil affairs and psychological operations forces begin wearing the special forces patch because the special forces leadership wanted civil affairs and psychological operations “to know who’s in charge.” 1st Special Forces Command took over the headquarters building built for the Military Information Support Operations Command, and interviews with officers working for proponent offices of the three branches revealed that special forces personnel frequently took billets designated for the other two branches.

The Current Plan to Cut Army Special Operations Forces: Organizational Power or Strategic Calculus?

Army Special Operations Command’s plan to absorb the loss of nearly 3,000 billets is to first reduce the number of unfilled billets in several of its units, focusing on special operations support, civil affairs, and psychological operations. Along with these reductions is a significant restructuring of special forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations organizations. This will reportedly result in one of two psychological operations group headquarters being eliminated. The remaining psychological operations group headquarters and the civil affairs brigade would lose control of their assigned battalions, which would each be assigned to the special forces group with which they are regionally aligned. The 1st Special Forces Command roundtables and discussions that led to this decision were comprised almost entirely of special forces officers with little or no input from civil affairs and psychological operations personnel.

There is some benefit to this arrangement. Special forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations could be more integrated in their training and preparation for deployments. Each of the three branches might gain more of an appreciation and understanding of one another, potentially creating opportunities to align operations that have not existed in the past.

But the costs to the long-term capabilities of civil affairs and psychological operations units far outweigh the benefits. Without moving the battalions from Fort Liberty to the location of each Special Forces Group, integration between the three branches will be minimal. If Army special operations leaders eventually decides to relocate civil affairs and psychological operations battalions, the remaining psychological operations group and civil affairs brigade headquarters would likely be eliminated because they would serve little purpose. These moves would place a career ceiling of lieutenant colonel on civil affairs and psychological operations officers, which would have the dual effect of damaging future recruiting into the branches and stripping them of the little remaining institutional influence they have. Operationally, the realignment would make civil affairs and psychological operations missions fully subordinate to those of special forces. The missions of each branch often overlap, but they are not entirely the same. It could become even more difficult for psychological operations to support regional and global efforts to counter disinformation from competitors like China and Russia because those missions could sap attention and resources from more narrowly focused special forces units.

Army Special Operations Command’s plan to move civil affairs and psychological operations battalions under special forces groups is but the latest in the historical trend of subordinating these branches to special forces. Without a major shift, there is no reason to think this trend will reverse: The next steps might be to assign all civil affairs and psychological operations companies to special forces battalions, or all civil affairs and psychological operations detachments to special forces companies. The logical conclusion is an option worth considering: eliminating civil affairs and psychological operations altogether and making those functions specialties within the special forces branch.

But this move would fail to address the need for joint and strategic messaging capabilities. Civil affairs and psychological operations functions could risk falling further by the wayside during irregular or conventional conflict as special forces focused more on combat operations.

Another possibility would be to eliminate 1st Special Forces Command. The young organization has not invested in the long-term vitality of civil affairs and psychological operations, and it is a clear example of the “overstructure” that Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth hopes to target with the force structure reductions. Any warfighting responsibilities envisioned for this command could be performed by theater Special Operations Commands that already have regional expertise, relationships, and context for special operations missions. Rather than enhance Army special operations’ operational capabilities, 1st Special Forces Command is a headquarters that has enhanced special forces’ ability “to fight and win … [its] scramble for funding and authorities.”

But these options each fail to address the growing disconnect between the increasing importance of information influence operations in competition and conflict and an Army force structure that does not prioritize capabilities to conduct these operations. Military leaders and civilian policymakers should instead view the cuts as an opportunity to reform the way the special operations and the joint force are structured to prevail in an era of strategic competition.

Cutting Army Special Operations: An Opportunity for Reform

A different approach would be to keep active-duty psychological operations and civil affairs units part of special operations by removing them from Army special operations and assigning them directly to a command under U.S. Special Operations Command. This command could incorporate the Joint MISO WebOps Center already under U.S. Special Operations Command and become the center to integrate all information influence operations across the various services. Like Air Force joint terminal attack controllers or Navy explosive ordnance disposal units, Army psychological operations and civil affairs forces would still deploy as special operations teams that work for theater Special Operations Commands. In addition to this operational role, the command could also house an institutional center to develop doctrine, training, career progression, and the long-term institutional health of all assigned branches.

But the past two decades of growing special operations resources have given little indication that U.S. Special Operations Command values information influence operations more than Army Special Operations Command and special forces. A final option policymakers should consider would therefore be to remove civil affairs and psychological operations out of special operations entirely by assigning them to a new joint center. Operationally, such a center would primarily coordinate information influence operations conducted by the combatant commands rather than conduct its own operations. Forces assigned to the center could still be allocated to support global special operations missions. But the center’s real benefit would be the long-term institutional support of all forces that conduct influence operations across the joint force. Not only would the joint center oversee the development of doctrine and training, but it would also directly represent the equities of assigned branches in each service’s resourcing processes without filtering interests through Army and U.S. Special Operations Commands.

Unquestionably, these moves would require significant changes across the services and could not be taken quickly or easily. These proposals would also not solve the Army’s shrinking force structure and would therefore require reconsidering where to absorb losses. But the potential of changing the military’s institutional structure to better support the operational capabilities that combatant commanders demand the most would better position the United States for long-term strategic success. A sensible first step would be for Congress to require a study on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of these two options. This effort would have to be led by an objective party outside the Department of Defense and could build on previous work that organizations like the Center for Naval Analyses and the RAND Corporation have conducted to examine special operations force structure. The study should make every effort to equally consider everyone with expertise and all those who would be affected by the moves without privileging leaders from any single branch or organization.

Bureaucratic competition has and always will be central to institutional strategy, but the Army’s shrinking force has catalyzed the pressures of parochial interests and created an especially large obstacle to modernization efforts. Civil affairs and psychological operations are the latest victims of this competition. Without major organizational reforms, the military’s ability to understand and influence the modern battlefield will continue to erode.

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Cole Livieratos is an Army strategist and former psychological operations officer. He holds a Ph.D. in international relations and is authoring a book manuscript about the development of U.S. special operations forces and strategy in irregular warfare. He is currently a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow examining the intersection of emerging technology and national security.

Ken Gleiman is a professor of practice at Arizona State University’s Future Security Initiative, a retired special forces officer, and Army strategist. He is also the president of the Army Strategist Association. He is the co-author of a forthcoming book on irregular warfare and competitive statecraft.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any other branch or agency of the U.S. government.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Cole Livieratos · February 6, 2024

2. Americans Need Domestic Unity for Effective Foreign Policy

We really do need to wake up. Our political polarization is playing right into the hands of our adversaries. It is truly depressing to see that Americans "hate" Americans on the other political side more than they fear what our adversaries are trying to do to us.

I cannot emphasize the words in the 2017 NSS enough:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Americans Need Domestic Unity for Effective Foreign Policy

U.S. opponents are working to worsen polarization.

By Stephen J. Hadley and Richard Fontaine, the chief executive officer of the Center for a New American Security.

Foreign Policy · by Stephen J. Hadley, Richard Fontaine

• Politics
• United States

February 5, 2024, 3:05 PM

The United States thrives in a stable international environment and amid substantial domestic unity. In 2024, it seems folly to wish for either. Multiple foreign crises persist, ranging from wars in Europe and the Middle East to the China challenge. A looming presidential election promises to further divide Americans.

Yet dealing with difficult international challenges requires broad unity. When it comes to that, it’s performance, not pleas or promises, that will make the difference.

The global threats are daunting. Russia is ready to exploit Western exhaustion toward supporting Ukraine. Hamas’s assault on Israel, the brutal war in the Gaza Strip, and terrorist attacks by Iranian proxies threaten to spark widespread violence across the Middle East. China seeks to absorb Taiwan and contest U.S. influence everywhere. Kim Jong Un’s whim could throw the Korean Peninsula into crisis, Iran is closing in on a nuclear weapon, and Venezuela’s leaders talk openly about annexing neighboring territory.

Yet as difficult as they are, the United States, with its power, wealth, geography, and values—and with its friends and allies—can manage these challenges. Washington possesses everything necessary to succeed, even in a tumultuous world, so long as it remains politically united enough to marshal these advantages in common purpose.

A recent poll showed that about twice as many Americans believe that foreign policy should be a top priority in 2024 than was the case a year ago. Other surveys, however, show deep skepticism about the United States’ global leadership, the basic competence of government, and the value of international engagement. A Pew Center study found that just 4 percent of American adults express real confidence in the U.S. political system, and a mere 16 percent say that “they trust the federal government always or most of the time.” In the 2023 Chicago Council Survey, 57 percent of Americans support an active role for the United States in world affairs, a decline from 70 percent in 2018—with the drop most evident among Republicans. A divided, inward-looking nation will make navigating global challenges even more difficult.

That is why foreign adversaries work to increase our domestic polarization and to undermine Americans’ trust in their own institutions. From 2021 through 2022, a Chinese state-led cybercampaign targeted the systems of U.S. state governments. China also attempted to influence U.S. political processes during the 2022 midterm elections to a greater extent than ever before. The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence suggested in a December 2022 report that Beijing has grown bolder in its interference attempts in part because it saw a greater chance to exploit divisive issues such as abortion and gun control. Russia has infamously tried to shake public confidence in democratic elections worldwide—including by interfering in U.S. presidential elections. Iran sought to influence the 2020 elections by sending fake, threatening emails to voters. As our adversaries well know, a fractured United States is a weaker United States.

The impact of political deadlock on U.S. foreign policy is vivid in the holdup of aid to Ukraine. A majority of Democrats and Republicans in Congress support providing assistance, but the aid has stalled because of deep differences over border security. The fourth five-year reauthorization of PEPFAR, or the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, has become embroiled in broader debates over abortion. Our divisive domestic politics can endanger even lifesaving programs, such as PEPFAR, that enjoy broad bipartisan support.

Most proposed remedies call on political leaders to forge common cause through a combination of pleas and promises. They should explain to the public, it has been said, the disproportionate benefits generated by U.S. global leadership and the potentially dire consequences that would attend its abandonment. They should pledge to unify the country, promise to work across the political aisle, and emphasize that, whatever our differences are at home, they pale in comparison to those with our foreign adversaries.

Repeated explanations help, but such rhetorical exhortations make up just part of the answer. Forging the national unity necessary for an effective foreign policy requires focusing on the home front as well as showing—not simply claiming—that our political system works for the American people.

In recent years, many Americans have felt victimized by globalization, threatened by illegal immigration, disrespected by privileged elites, and abandoned by their politicians. Americans worry about the affordability of health care and the education of their children, suffer the effects of inflation, and wonder about job security amid technological change. They see unsustainable debt levels, rising international competition, and economic policies that seem to place disproportionate burdens on unprivileged segments of the population. Americans who doubt whether the nation’s democratic system works for them have grounds for concern.

Such domestic problems—illegal immigration, chaos on the southern border, the unsustainability of entitlement spending, debt levels that threaten fiscal stability, and more—have been with us for decades. In many cases, the solutions have also been clear. Yet our political system remains unable to enact sustainable, bipartisan solutions.

What the United States needs is an economic system that provides inclusive growth and does not leave people behind. It needs border security, combined with legal immigration that can be an economically revitalizing force. It needs political leaders to make the hard decisions necessary to bring long-term government expenditures—including on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—in line with revenues. It needs a plan for overall fiscal stability. And it needs to rebuild a strong national defense.

None of these are impossible tasks. If our leaders take such steps, they can begin to restore Americans’ faith in their institutions and pull the country back together.

Today’s international challenges threaten the security, prosperity, and freedom of the American people. But Americans will naturally shy from a focus on overseas problems until their leaders address real needs at home. Progress on these issues can instill greater confidence that policymakers can act effectively abroad. The path to a more globally engaged United States runs through better domestic governance.

This country’s founders believed that a system based on democratic principles better provides for domestic security and prosperity than any other. By showing progress on the long-standing issues that concern Americans at home, our leaders can restore people’s confidence that this is so.

That, in turn, would help to renew public support for U.S. engagement abroad. It’s possible. Even in 2024.

Foreign Policy · by Stephen J. Hadley, Richard Fontaine

3. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, February 5, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-5-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq and Syria: Iranian-backed Iraqi officials are using recent US airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to retroactively justify their political pressure on the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq.
• The United States has the right to respond and defend itself against these attacks from Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are themselves violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching attacks from Iraqi territory targeting US forces, who are in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government, and American assets elsewhere in the region.
• Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on February 5.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Force 162nd Division launched a new, division-size clearing operation in central and northern Gaza City in the past week. CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Palestinian fighters infiltrated southwestern Gaza City
• The IDF is conducting operations in the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt Hamas' attempts to reconstitute its governing authority.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that the IDF plans to clear Hamas fighters and military infrastructure from Rafah and the central Gaza Strip on February 5.
• Yemen: US Central Command conducted preemptive strikes targeting four Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and a land-attack cruise missile on February 4.

IRAN UPDATE, FEBRUARY 5, 2024

Feb 5, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, February 5, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Iranian-backed Iraqi officials are using recent US airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to retroactively justify their political pressure on the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq. The United States has the right to respond and defend itself against these attacks from Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are themselves violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching attacks from Iraqi territory targeting US forces, who are in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government, and American assets elsewhere in the region. Acting parliament speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi called on the Iraqi federal government to implement the January 2020 parliamentary resolution to expel “all foreign forces” from Iraq while touring the sites of the US strikes in al Qaim and Akashat in western Anbar Province on February 5.[1] Popular Mobilization Forces Chief of Staff and Kataib Hezbollah official Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi and Iranian-backed Badr Organization member and Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee Chairman Abbas Zamili accompanied Mandalawi to al Qaim and Akashat.[2] The Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee announced in December 2023 a draft resolution in December 2023 that would expel US forces from Iraq.[3]

Mandalawi is a Shia politician who is close to the Shia Coordination Framework, a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties. Mandalawi became acting parliament speaker in November 2023, when the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court unconstitutionally dismissed former speaker Mohammad al Halbousi.[4] The Shia Coordination Framework has sought to postpone the election of a new parliament speaker to replace Mandalawi by invalidating the candidacies of parliament speaker hopefuls.[5] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors filed a lawsuit on January 23 that includes a clause preventing Parliament from resuming the vote for a parliament speaker until the Federal Supreme Court issues a ruling on the eligibility of Halbousi-backed candidate Shaalan al Karim.[6]

Other Iranian-backed politicians in Iraq also issued statements to increase pressure on Iraqi officials. Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh said that the US airstrikes went “too far” because they targeted a Popular Mobilization Forces facility, adding that the Iraqi people, government, and political forces must end the foreign presence in Iraq.[7] Fayyadh said that targeting the Popular Mobilization Forces was a “red line” and that US strikes will not go “unnoticed.”[8] Key Iranian proxy Hadi Ameri and the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Shia parties—called for the expulsion of US forces immediately.[9] Iran backs some Shia Coordination Framework parties.

Iran’s surrogates in Iraq co-opted and lead the Popular Mobilization Forces. Fayyadh, who leads the PMF, has closely cooperated with Quds Forces operatives to implement Iranian directives in Iraq, including by killing Iraqi citizens during peaceful protests in 2019.[10] The PMF contains many Iranian proxy groups. The US strikes targeted two such groups on February 2.[11]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on February 5.[12] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson stated on January 29 that Ahmadian would discuss border security and terrorism with Iraqi officials.[13] Ahmadian emphasized Iran’s willingness to cooperate with Iraq during a meeting with the Iraqi prime minister, citing the March 2023 security agreement between the two countries.[14] The March 2023 agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from Iran’s borders.[15] Ahmadian’s visit to Iraq follows the IRGC’s drone and missile strikes targeting alleged Mossad-affiliated facilities and individuals in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan on January 15.[16] Iran claims frequently that anti-regime Kurdish groups and Israel use Iraqi Kurdistan to conduct operations in Iran.[17]

Ahmadian also likely discussed the recent US strikes targeting IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq during his meetings with Iraqi officials. Sudani stated that Iraq opposes “any unilateral actions” that violate the principle of “respect for sovereignty” during his meeting with Ahmadian.[18] Sudani was likely referring to both the IRGC’s January 15 strikes in Erbil and the February 2 US strikes, which the Sudani administration described as a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty on February 3.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq and Syria: Iranian-backed Iraqi officials are using recent US airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to retroactively justify their political pressure on the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq.
• The United States has the right to respond and defend itself against these attacks from Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are themselves violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching attacks from Iraqi territory targeting US forces, who are in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government, and American assets elsewhere in the region.
• Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on February 5.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Force 162nd Division launched a new, division-size clearing operation in central and northern Gaza City in the past week. CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Palestinian fighters infiltrated southwestern Gaza City
• The IDF is conducting operations in the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt Hamas' attempts to reconstitute its governing authority.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that the IDF plans to clear Hamas fighters and military infrastructure from Rafah and the central Gaza Strip on February 5.
• Yemen: US Central Command conducted preemptive strikes targeting four Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and a land-attack cruise missile on February 4.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) 162nd Division launched a new, division-size clearing operation in central and northern Gaza City in the past week.[20] The IDF withdrew a large number of forces from the northern Gaza Strip on December 31 after months of fighting there.[21] CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Palestinian fighters infiltrated southwestern Gaza City.[22] The IDF 162nd Division commander said on February 5 that the Nahal Brigade and 401st Brigade began conducting new clearing operations to reduce Hamas fighters and infrastructure in al Shati camp and Rimal neighborhood in western Gaza City. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said on February 4 that the 162nd Division’s operation aims to target Hamas underground infrastructure over two weeks.[23] Palestinian militias continued attacks targeting IDF forces during these operations in western Gaza City.[24]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that Palestinian fighters are hiding among civilians in humanitarian shelters to evade capture and facilitate infiltration in the northern Gaza Strip.[25] The IDF is evacuating the entire population from the shelters in the northern Strip to find and detain the fighters.[26] The correspondent said that the IDF captured over 70 ”high-level” Hamas and PIJ fighters over the last week using this method.[27] The IDF estimates there are 200,000 Gazans in the northern strip, mostly concentrated within humanitarian shelters.[28] The IDF is continuing to search for Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Hadad, who has evaded capture and is responsible for Hamas’ reconstitution efforts in the Gaza Strip, according to the IDF.[29] Hadad’s capture would slow but not stop Hamas’ reconstitution and infiltration in the Gaza City area.

The IDF is conducting operations in the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt Hamas' attempts to reconstitute its governing authority.[30] Israeli operations are targeting Hamas’ police and internal security apparatus.[31] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry‘s Internal Security Forces in Gaza both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[32] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent estimated that half of Hamas’ police officers are also fighters in the group’s military wing, the al Qassem Brigades.[33]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stressed on February 5 that establishing a political alternative to Hamas is crucial to the success of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.[34] Gallant’s statement about establishing a civil alternative echoes the four-pronged security and governance plan he articulated for the Gaza Strip on January 4.[35] The lack of a suitable political alternative has enabled Hamas to begin rebuilding its governance system in the northern Gaza Strip as it infiltrates into areas where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations.[36]

Israeli forces and Palestinian militias clashed three times in the central Gaza Strip. The al Quds Brigades claimed mortar attacks on Israeli infantry and armor east of Maghazi and east of Deir al Balah.[37] Israeli forces struck a five-man Hamas cell operating near Israeli forces in the Central Gaza Strip.[38]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 5. The 646th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) cleared militia sites, captured weapons, killed at least 10 Palestinian fighters, and directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis.[39] The Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) cleared Hamas infrastructure and killed dozens of Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.[40]

Palestinian militias continued to attempt to defend against Israeli operations in the Khan Younis. Militia groups claimed 11 attacks on Israeli forces in Khan Younis on February 5.[41] Hamas’ militant wing conducted a complex attack on Israeli armor using improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades in the al Amal area in Khan Younis.[42] Hamas and PIJ’s militant wings conducted a combined attack on an Israeli tank in the same area of western Khan Younis.[43]

The IDF is increasing its focus on degrading Hamas and PIJ rocket capabilities. The IDF concentrated on other tactical objectives during earlier phases of the ground operation. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the IDF estimates Hamas has about 1,000 rockets left in its arsenal.[44] These rockets are mostly in small, relatively simple underground launch silos, which enable Hamas and its allies to disguise and protect their rocket infrastructure. Hamas fighters launched a rocket salvo targeting Tel Aviv from disguised, buried launch silos only 20 to 30 meters from Israeli troops, which illustrates the challenges involved in detecting and destroying similar sites.[45] Unspecified senior IDF officials told the correspondent that it will take up to two years to completely wipe out Hamas’ rocket launch capability in the Gaza Strip.[46] The IDF also added that a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) cell operating in Zaytoun, southern Gaza City, is responsible for most rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip in recent weeks.[47]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on February 5.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that the IDF plans to clear Hamas fighters and military infrastructure from Rafah and the central Gaza Strip on February 5.[48] The IDF said on February 2 that the 99th Division’s operations in the central Gaza Strip aim to prevent Hamas fighters from infiltrating Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip.[49] Gallant did not specify a timeline for the operation, nor did he address where the Gazan civilians sheltering in Rafah would be moved during an operation in Rafah. An unspecified senior Israeli official said on February 4 that Israel would work with Egypt to evacuate Gazans northward before any ground offensive begins in Rafah.[50]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blamed Hamas for impeding hostage negotiations by making demands Israel “will not agree to.”[51] Netanyahu said that defeating Hamas will take “months, not years” in a Likud party meeting on February 5.[52] Netanyahu reiterated that Israel seeks to completely defeat Hamas and that the IDF will need to operate in all areas of the Gaza Strip to defeat Hamas. Israel’s public broadcaster reported on January 31 that Hamas was demanding the release of all elite Nukhba unit fighters currently held in Israeli jails.[53] The Nukhba unit is an elite Hamas unit that participated in the October 7 attack on Israel. Egyptian officials reported that Hamas political leadership demanded the release of 3,000 Palestinian prisoners, including two top Palestinian leaders.[54]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades battalions in Nablus, Tulkarm, and Tubas attacked Israeli forces during Israeli raids in the West Bank on February 5.[55] The IDF said that it conducted raids in Nablus, Hebron, and Tulkarm arresting 33 “wanted persons.”[56] Unspecified Palestinian militia fighters fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Hebron on February 5.[57]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 5.[58] Hezbollah claimed four attacks.[59]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada announced on February 4 that it will continue conducting attacks targeting US forces.[60] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah announced on January 30 that it suspended its “military and security operations” targeting US forces.[61] Kataib Hezbollah’s announcement followed a visit by IRGC-QF commander Esmail Qaani in the wake of the January 28 attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan.[62] Western media reported that Kataib Hezbollah, which is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, launched the one-way drone attack from western Iraq.[63] The Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada spokesperson stated on February 4 that the February 2 US airstrikes on IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed militia targets in Iraq and Syria will not deter Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada’s “resistance operations” targeting US forces.[64] The United States conducted the airstrikes on February 2 in response to the January 28 attack. Several other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, also announced between January 31 and February 2 that they will continue attacking US forces.[65]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack that killed six US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) members at the al Omar oil field in eastern Syria on February 4.[66] The SDF said that “Iran-backed militias” targeted a training ground at al Omar, killing the SDF members.[67] US forces are stationed at al Omar but the attack did not injure any.[68] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attack on a backup Telegram channel that it created in October 2023. The group started using the backup on February 2.[69]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed separate drone attacks targeting US forces at Harir Airbase in Erbil Province, Iraq, and Rumaylan Landing Zone in Syria on February 3.[70] CTP-ISW previously reported that IRGC-controlled and local Syrian media claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted these attacks.[71] Three ”security sources” told Reuters on February 3 that there was no attack targeting the al Harir airbase.[72] US Department of Defense Press Secretary Major General Patrick Ryder confirmed on February 5 that there have been two attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East since February 2. Ryder did not specify where the attacks occurred and stated that no US forces were injured in the attacks.[73]

Unspecified gunmen shot and killed senior Asaib Ahl al Haq official Naji al Kaabi (Abu Ali) in Maysan Province on February 4.[74] Kaabi was responsible for Asaib Ahl al Haq relations in Maysan Province.[75] The deputy commander of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces 43rd Brigade blamed Kaabi’s death on “unruly militias.”[76] The 43rd Brigade is part of Asaib Ahl al Haq, an Iranian-backed militia.

Followers of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr may have assassinated Kaabi. Sadr’s followers, known as Sadrists, have significant influence in Maysan, which is a Sadrist stronghold. Sadrist militiamen have previously assassinated local Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated officials.[77] Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali issued a de-escalatory statement calling on Asaib Ahl al Haq members to avoid actions “contrary to Sharia, the law, or tribal customs” following Kaabi’s death.[78] This suggests that Khazali is attempting to avoid an outright confrontation with other groups in the province.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev on February 5, likely to discuss the recent US strikes targeting IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq.[79] The United States conducted strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Anbar Province and Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on February 2 in response to the January 28 drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan.[80] Iraqi state media reported that Sudani and Kutrashev discussed “efforts to prevent further escalation” in the region.[81] Kutrashev emphasized Russia’s support for “stability and security” in Iraq.[82] Russian state media has not published an official readout of the meeting at the time of writing. Kutrashev has held a series of meetings with senior Iraqi officials, including Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid, and Iraqi Shia cleric and politician Ammar al Hakim, since January 23.[83] Kutrashev told Russian media on January 25 that Russia seeks to expand its “presence” in Iraq and “invest additional resources in areas related to security.”[84]

Sudani also met with Chinese Ambassador to Iraq Cui Wei on February 5.[85] Sudani and Cui Wei discussed Sino-Iraqi economic cooperation, including Chinese companies’ participation in the Development Road project. Iraq launched the Development Road project in March 2023 to connect the Grand Faw Port in southern Iraq to Turkey by road and rail.[86] Sudani said that major powers should help end the Israel-Hamas War.

A pro-Syrian Arab Army source reported that the Jordanian Army fired anti-aircraft guns across the Syria-Jordan border targeting an agricultural area near Daraa City.[87] The source did not specify what the Jordanian Army targeted. The Jordanian military has conducted three airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed drug-smuggling networks in southwestern Syria since December 2023.[88] Jordanian forces have also clashed with Iranian-backed drug smugglers along the border twice since December 2023.[89]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted preemptive strikes targeting four Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and a land-attack cruise missile on February 4.[90] CENTCOM said that the missiles were “an imminent threat to US Navy ships” and commercial shipping in the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden region.[91]

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani and Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh attended the funeral of an IRGC Quds Force officer on February 4.[92] Anti-Iranian regime media reported that an Israeli airstrike in Syria killed IRGC Quds Force officer Saeid Alidadi on February 2.[93] Alidadi served as an IRGC Quds Force military “advisor” in Syria.[94] Iran uses the title of ”advisor” to describe IRGC Quds Force operatives deployed to Syria in support of the Bashar al Assad regime since 2011.[95] Iran did not announce his rank.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticized unspecified Islamic countries for continuing economic relations with Israel during a gathering with Artesh Air Force and Air Defense Force commanders and servicemembers on February 5.[96] Khamenei stated that Muslim nations must deliver a ”decisive blow” to Israel by cutting off economic relations. Khamenei criticized unspecified Islamic countries for providing economic aid and “weapons” to Israel. Khamenei also called on Islamic states to cut economic and political ties with Israel prior to the Israel-Hamas war.[97]

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024

Key Takeaways:

• US Senate negotiators unveiled their proposed supplemental appropriations bill on February 4 that — if passed — would provide roughly $60 billion of security assistance for Ukraine, the overwhelming majority of which would go to American companies and US and allied militaries.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Ukraine needs to replace a “series of state leaders” across the Ukrainian government who are “not just in a single sector” such as the Ukrainian military.
• The Kremlin is intensifying rhetoric pushing for the hypothetical partition of Ukraine by seizing on innocuous and unrelated topics, likely in an attempt to normalize the partition narrative in Western discussions about Ukraine.
• Delays in Western security assistance continue to exacerbate Ukraine’s shell shortage and undermine Ukraine’s ability to use high-value Western counterbattery systems.
• The Kremlin may not allow Boris Nadezhdin, the only anti-war Russian presidential candidate, to run in the March 2024 presidential election due to Nadezhdin’s larger-than-anticipated popularity.
• The Kremlin is reportedly nationalizing private enterprises in Russia quietly.
• Russian forces made confirmed gains near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Avdiivka, and northeast of Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting along the entire frontline.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) may expand the list of courses available to women at the FSB Academy.
• Russian occupation administrations continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children into Russian culture and nationalism through patronage networks with Russian federal subjects (regions).

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 5, 2024

Feb 5, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2024

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Fredrick W. Kagan

February 5, 2024, 8:40pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on February 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Senate negotiators unveiled their proposed supplemental appropriations bill on February 4 that — if passed — would provide roughly $60 billion of security assistance for Ukraine, the overwhelming majority of which would go to American companies and US and allied militaries. The bill provides three main packages of assistance to Ukraine totaling $48.83 billion: $19.85 billion for replenishing weapons and equipment from the US Department of Defense (DoD) inventory; $13.8 billion for the purchase of weapons and munitions for Ukraine from US manufacturers; and $14.8 billion for continued US support to Ukraine through military training, intelligence sharing, and other support activities.[1] The appropriations bill provides that funds can go to foreign countries that have provided support to Ukraine at the request of the US, but the vast majority of the aid — if approved — would go to US companies and US or allied government entities supporting Ukraine.[2] Roughly 16 percent of the Ukraine-related appropriations in the bill would go directly to Ukraine, including $7.85 billion of direct budget support for the Ukrainian government and $1.58 billion for efforts to build a self-reliant Ukrainian economy amid the ongoing Russian invasion.[3] The appropriations bill also provides $1.6 billion in foreign military financing, which must be used to purchase goods and services from the US, to address Ukraine’s and other US partners’ air defense, artillery, maritime security, and maintenance requirements.[4] The appropriations bill provides smaller packages of $300 million to help Ukraine promote the rule of law and protect its borders and $100 million to support demining, counterterrorism, and nonproliferation programs.[5] The bill provides $8 million for the DoD Inspector General to exercise oversight over US security assistance to Ukraine.[6]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Ukraine needs to replace a “series of state leaders” across the Ukrainian government who are “not just in a single sector” such as the Ukrainian military.[7] Zelensky responded to a question from Italian outlet Rai News about reports that he may intend to replace Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi by stating that he is considering changing multiple “state leaders” and emphasized that this effort involves replacing multiple unspecified individuals, not just “a single person.”[8] Zelensky emphasized the importance of Ukrainian morale, as the Ukrainian leadership “cannot be discouraged” and must maintain the “right positive energy” in order to win the war.

The Kremlin is intensifying rhetoric pushing for the hypothetical partition of Ukraine by seizing on innocuous and unrelated topics, likely in an attempt to normalize the partition narrative in Western discussions about Ukraine. Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev claimed on February 5 that purported European plans to construct a railway line from Spain to Lviv City are evidence of the West’s acknowledgement that Lviv City would be “the new capital of Ukraine within the borders of [Lviv Oblast],” presumably following the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[9] The plan, notably, has nothing to do with Ukrainian borders or an end state to the war in Ukraine and is an independent European infrastructure project. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently reignited the narrative framing the invasion of Ukraine as an historically justified imperial conquest and proposed to a largely Russian-speaking audience in December 2023 that Russia and European powers could partition Ukraine and leave it as “sovereign” rump state within the borders of Lviv Oblast, comments that subsequently gained some attention from a few right-wing nationalist Central European politicians.[10] Medvedev notably posted his February 5 claims on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account and not on his Russian-language Telegram account, suggesting that his statement was intended for an international audience as opposed to a Russian domestic audience. Medvedev’s statement furthers the Russian information operation that erroneously portrays Ukraine as an artificially constructed state, likely in an effort to reduce Western military support for Ukraine and normalize Western discussions that push Ukraine to cede much of its territory and people to Russia as a legitimate way to end the war. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains his maximalist objectives in Ukraine, which are tantamount to complete Ukrainian and Western capitulation.[11]

Russian ultranationalists continue to support the Kremlin’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine and reject the notion that negotiations would lead to a lasting end to the war. Deputy Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Main Directorate of Rosgvardia, Commander of its special rapid response and riot police (OMON and SOBR), and prominent Russian milblogger Alexander Khodakovsky claimed that a “truce” would not result in peace and that “achieving lasting peace is only possible through war and the victory” of either Russia or Ukraine.[12] Khodakovsky also claimed that the current period of positional warfare hinders Russian forces from exhausting Ukrainian forces along the entire frontline and argued that Russian forces need to pressure Ukrainian forces and compel Ukraine to commit more resources to battle along the entire frontline. Khodakovsky’s zero-sum framing of the war is indicative of the wider Russian ultranationalist support for the Kremlin’s maximalist objectives of a complete Ukrainian and Western defeat. This zero-sum framing is also incompatible with any serious negotiations for an armistice or lasting peace.

Delays in Western security assistance continue to exacerbate Ukraine’s shell shortage and undermine Ukraine’s ability to use high-value Western counterbattery systems. Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated on February 5 that Russian forces intensified their rate of artillery strikes by nearly 25 percent over the last week and shelled Ukraine over 1,500 times, targeting over 570 settlements.[13] The New York Times reported on February 4 that, by contrast, Ukrainian forces in critical areas of the front, such as Avdiivka, are increasingly rationing shells and can therefore only target masses of advancing Russian soldiers, noting that Russian forces have apparently adapted and are now advancing in smaller groups that are harder for Ukrainian artillery to strike.[14] Ukrainian military analyst and retired Colonel Petro Chernyk noted that Ukrainian forces possess relatively better counterbattery capabilities writ large than Russian forces, particularly because they have American AN/TPQ-36, -48, and -50 radars and the German COBRA radar system.[15] Counterbattery radars are effective in that they detect incoming fire and calculate its point of origin so that artillery forces can conduct return fire — for which artillery forces require sufficient artillery ammunition, however. A lack of artillery ammunition thus severely degrades counterbattery systems: AN/TPQ, COBRA, and other Western counterbattery systems are only as effective as the number of shells that Ukrainian forces have at their disposal to pursue the targets that counterbattery radars identify. ISW previously reported that Russian forces are benefitting from the combined dynamic of Ukraine’s ammunition shortage and its subsequent inability to conduct sufficient counterbattery warfare, and this dynamic is likely to become more acute as Ukraine’s period of shell shortages protracts.[16]

The Kremlin may not allow Boris Nadezhdin, the only anti-war Russian presidential candidate, to run in the March 2024 presidential election due to Nadezhdin’s larger-than-anticipated popularity. A Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) working group claimed on February 5 that 15 percent of the signatures that Nadezhdin collected to register as an election candidate were fraudulent and that the CEC recommends not registering him as a candidate.[17] Nadezhdin stated in response to the CEC’s announcement that his campaign plans to collect the 4,500 valid signatures he needs to run and that he will appeal to the Russian Supreme Court if the CEC refuses to register him as a presidential candidate.[18] Nadezhdin previously claimed to have submitted 200,000 signatures to the Russian CEC on January 31.[19] Russian presidential candidates sponsored by political parties need to submit 100,000 signatures with additional regional requirements in order to run in the presidential election, and no more than five percent of the total submitted signatures can be fraudulent.[20] The CEC stated that it will announce its final decision on February 7, but the CEC is unlikely to allow Nadezhdin to run.[21]

Nadezhdin previously stated that he believes the CEC will have to allow him to run in the March 2024 presidential election due to his widespread popularity and that he wanted as many uncontestable signatures as possible so the CEC could not disqualify him. ISW assessed on January 23 that the Kremlin may intend to use the March 2024 election as an unofficial referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine by allowing Nadezhdin to run in an election that portrays Russian President Vladimir Putin (and by extension his war in Ukraine) as overwhelmingly popular, but the CEC’s February 5 announcement suggests that the Kremlin may have backtracked from this plan out of concern that Nadezhdin might gain too many votes and reduce Putin’s margin of victory below levels the Kremlin is willing to accept.[22] The CEC’s valid signature requirement is the logical mechanism for ending Nadezhdin’s presidential campaign whether or not the Kremlin was initially willing to tolerate the campaign.

Russian officials and sources have increasingly censored and sought to discredit Nadezhdin after Nadezhdin’s campaign gained significant notoriety while collecting signatures.[23] Russian CEC Deputy Chairperson Nikolai Bulaev claimed on February 2 that Nadezhdin’s campaign collected dozens of signatures of deceased Russians and questioned the integrity of the Nadezhdin campaign.[24] Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta recently reported that Nadezhdin’s campaign struggled to find a printing house to print copies of Nadezhdin’s campaign newsletter, citing a source within the campaign.[25] Nadezhdin previously claimed that Russian state television attempted to censor him and his campaign.[26] A Russian ultranationalist milblogger cryptically suggested on January 30 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) would “meet” with Nadezhdin prior to the election, implying that the FSB would interrogate or imprison him.[27]

The Kremlin is reportedly nationalizing private enterprises in Russia quietly. Russian opposition outlet Meduza published an investigation on February 5 detailing how the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office uses three main schemes to seize and nationalize assets from Russians despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assurances that there will not be nationalization in Russia.[28] Meduza found that Russian courts pursue one scheme through challenging cases regarding the privatization of certain companies that were subject to the widespread privatization efforts of the 1990s. The Prosecutor General’s Office reportedly utilizes this scheme to claim that regional authorities exceeded their powers by privatizing a given company and to demand that it be returned to the state. Meduza reported that the second scheme is to deem owners of private enterprises “foreign investors,” which allows Russian authorities to seize the assets of the private enterprise owners more easily under Russian foreign investment laws.[29] The final avenue for nationalization, according to Meduza, is when the Prosecutor General’s Office seizes assets from defendants accused of corruption or fraud, charges that courts reportedly used more frequently in 2023.[30] ISW has previously observed Russian courts expanding the prosecution of certain cases to broadly suppress dissent, and the Russian Prosecutor General may be employing a similar prosecution strategy as it pertains to property law in order to nationalize private assets using corruption, fraud, and foreign investment laws.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• US Senate negotiators unveiled their proposed supplemental appropriations bill on February 4 that — if passed — would provide roughly $60 billion of security assistance for Ukraine, the overwhelming majority of which would go to American companies and US and allied militaries.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Ukraine needs to replace a “series of state leaders” across the Ukrainian government who are “not just in a single sector” such as the Ukrainian military.
• The Kremlin is intensifying rhetoric pushing for the hypothetical partition of Ukraine by seizing on innocuous and unrelated topics, likely in an attempt to normalize the partition narrative in Western discussions about Ukraine.
• Delays in Western security assistance continue to exacerbate Ukraine’s shell shortage and undermine Ukraine’s ability to use high-value Western counterbattery systems.
• The Kremlin may not allow Boris Nadezhdin, the only anti-war Russian presidential candidate, to run in the March 2024 presidential election due to Nadezhdin’s larger-than-anticipated popularity.
• The Kremlin is reportedly nationalizing private enterprises in Russia quietly.
• Russian forces made confirmed gains near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Avdiivka, and northeast of Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting along the entire frontline.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) may expand the list of courses available to women at the FSB Academy.
• Russian occupation administrations continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children into Russian culture and nationalism through patronage networks with Russian federal subjects (regions).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Kupyansk and west of Kreminna amid continued fighting on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 5. Geolocated footage published on February 4 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced in northern Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and east of Yampolivka (east of Kreminna).[32] Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Hryhorivka on February 5.[33]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Western Military District [WMD]) failed an initial attempt to encircle a tactical Ukrainian force grouping defending a section of the P07 (Svatove-Kreminna) highway northwest of Svatove but that Russian forces are likely preparing for another attack.[34] Mashovets reported that elements of the 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA, WMD) and 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) attempted to break through Ukrainian defenses along the Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka line (northwest of Svatove and immediately southeast of Stepova Novoselivka) from the north and south, respectively, to enable elements of the Russian 1st Tank Regiment and 15th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) to tactically encircle the Ukrainian force grouping near Stepova Novoselivka (northwest of Svatove) at a later time and eventually push Ukrainian forces in the area east of the P07 highway.[35] Mashovets reported that the 12th Tank Regiment, however, failed to break through the Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka line from the south while the 26th Tank Regiment lost momentum before it could complete the tactical encirclement from the north.[36] Mashovets reported that the 1st GTA’s command has not given up on trying to encircle the Ukrainian force grouping near Stepova Novoselivka and has reinforced the 12th Tank Regiment with elements of the 4th Tank Division for another attempt to break through the Ukrainian lines from the south.[37]

A recent Ukrainian HIMARS strike on occupied Lysychansk, Luhansk Oblast, killed at least one significant Russian occupation official. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated on February 5 that a February 3 Ukrainian HIMARS strike killed LNR Emergency Situations Minister Colonel Alexei Poteleshchenko, and other occupation officials claimed that the strike killed 28 people.[38] Some Russian sources claimed that many of the 28 killed were occupation officials, public prosecutors, and law enforcement officers who had gathered for a celebration.[39] ISW is unable to verify this claim, however.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance in the Siversk area northeast of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on February 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Vesele (15km southeast of Siversk).[40]

Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on February 5, but there were no confirmed changes to this area of the frontline. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut), and in the direction of Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[41] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet) and 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC], Western Military District) reportedly continue to operate near Bakhmut and Klishchiivka, respectively.[42]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 5. Geolocated footage published on February 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka).[43] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka) and up to one kilometer deep in northern Avdiivka, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of either of these claims.[44] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Stepove; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke and Sieverne; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[45] Elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade and 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) reportedly continue operating near Avdiivka and Nevelske, respectively.[46]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 5, but there were no confirmed changes to this area of the frontline. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Heorhiivka.[47] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military is preparing to shift its main effort north of Novomykhailivka in the directions of Oleksandrivka-Novomykhailivka and Marinka-Pobieda (west of Donetsk City) and will use elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reinforced with elements of the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry (both of the Pacific Fleet) as the main attacking force.[48] Mashovets also stated that Russian forces have replenished the troops, weapons, and equipment of elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division).[49] Mashovets stated that Russian Territorial Troops (TRV) conducted a tactical rotation with assault units of the 1219th and 1465th Motorized Rifle Regiments, which are now operating alongside the elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and elements of the 1442nd Motorized Infantry Regiment of TRV continue to operate on the Syhnalne-Novomykhailivka and Stepne-Novomykhailivka lines. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) conducted the recent unsuccessful mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, which generated widespread criticism in the Russian information space.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 5. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting occurred near Zolota Nyva (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[51] Elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Troops [TRV]) are reportedly operating near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) and elements of the 26th Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Regiment (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodonetske (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[52] Combat footage posted on February 3 reportedly shows Ka-52 helicopters of the Russian 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (EMD) reportedly conducting strikes in the direction of Malynivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53]

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Robotyne but added that it is unclear if Russian forces have consolidated those gains.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled four Russian assaults near Robotyne.[55] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[56]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional engagements in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including in Krynky, on February 5.[57] A prominent Kremlin milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces use mobile electronic warfare (EW) systems while trying to cross the Dnipro River but that Russian drones are still effective at striking Ukrainian crossing groups.[58] The milblogger noted that Russian EW systems are not effective against Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones in the area.[59] Another milblogger, who has routinely stressed that Ukrainian FPV drones on east bank Kherson Oblast are a major threat, claimed that Russian forces in the area have improved their ability to counter Ukrainian FPV drones.[60]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) may expand the list of courses available to women at the FSB Academy. Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov on February 5 to consider expanding the specialties and training areas that the FSB will allow women to study at the FSB Academy.[61] The FSB Academy currently only permits women to study in the Foreign Language Department.[62] Putin did not specify which specialties he recommends that the FSB open to women, but this may be part of an effort to build out FSB recruitment in the long term but opening the academy to a new pool of recruits.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov announced on February 5 that Russia will allocate 100 billion rubles (about $1.1 billion) to drone production through 2027.[63] Manturov stated that Russia will allocate the money to the production of various types of drones, including “hundreds of thousands” of first-person view (FPV) drones and tens of thousands of “heavy” drones (unmanned combat aerial vehicles).

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine continues efforts to disperse defense industrial base (DIB) assets to protect them from targeted Russian strikes. Ukrainian drone manufacturer TAF Drones Head Oleksandr Yakovenko stated on February 5 that TAF Drones has dispersed drone production over six unspecified cities and that all 12 of TAF Drones’ production plants move every three months.[64] Yakovenko also noted that TFP Drones produced 18,000 first-person view (FPV) drones in January and is on track to produce 25,000 in February and 30,000 in March, with an intended output of 350,000 FPV drones in 2024. Ukrainian military officials announced that Ukraine intends to produce over 1 million drones in 2024. Dispersing drone production factories will likely aid in safeguarding this production goal from Russian strikes on DIB facilities.

The Netherlands announced on February 5 that it will provide an additional six F-16 aircraft to Ukraine.[65] The Dutch Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that it decided to send the six F-16s to Ukraine in addition to the 18 F-16s that it initially promised after negotiations on the sale of the aircraft to American aviation company Draken International fell through.[66] Ukrainian pilots will likely train on the F-16 aircraft at the F-16 training center in Romania.[67]

Poland reportedly allocated a new loan for joint Ukrainian-Polish weapons production.[68] Ukrainian President’s Office Deputy Head Ihor Zhovkva announced the loan on February 5 but did not offer specifics about the joint projects that the loan will finance or the amount of the loan.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation administrations continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children into Russian culture and nationalism through patronage networks with Russian federal subjects (regions). The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on February 5 that it sent 25 Ukrainian children from occupied Kalanchak, Kherson Oblast to a cultural program in the Republic of Mordovia for the New Year holiday.[69] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration also reported that it is jointly implementing youth programs with Pskov Oblast, which will host Ukrainian children to train them as “young activists.”[70]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Kremlin appears to be expanding narratives surrounding Soviet-era monuments to former Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe. Russian Ambassador to Bulgaria Elenora Mitrofanova stated on February 5 that Russian-Bulgarian relations have significantly declined since the start of the invasion of Ukraine and stressed that the dismantling of a monument to the Soviet Red Army in Sofia is a “slap in the face” to the relatives of Bulgarian resistance movement fighters.[71] Bulgarian officials began demolishing the Soviet-era monument in Sofia in December 2023 as part of wider Bulgarian efforts to remove Soviet-era monuments.[72] Russian officials have recently seized on the removal of Soviet-era monuments in post-Soviet countries, particularly in Estonia, to accuse these countries of pursuing escalatory anti-Russian policies.[73] The Kremlin likely aims to use these narratives to set conditions to justify Russian escalations against Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors, and Russia has previously used this narrative to justify hybrid war tactics against these countries.[74] The expansion of this recently intensified narrative to a former Warsaw Pact country suggests that the Kremlin may attempt to use ongoing conversations about Soviet-era monuments to intensify escalatory rhetoric against Central and Eastern European states, including NATO members.

Russian sources seized on reporting about a confiscated shipment of explosive material in Georgia to portray Ukraine as a transnational security threat. The Georgian State Security Service reported on February 5 that Ukrainian, Georgian, and Armenian citizens were involved in the shipment of several IEDs from Odesa through Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Georgia en route to Voronezh Oblast in Russia.[75] Russian sources claimed that the shipment of explosive material was associated with planned Ukrainian terrorist attacks within Russia and asserted that Ukrainian special services routinely organize terrorist activity in countries that are a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[76] Russian sources will likely continue to frame any illicit transnational activity involving Ukrainian citizens or Ukrainian-born individuals as being official Ukrainian state activities in an effort to falsely portray the Ukrainian government as a destabilizing force in the region.

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

5. How Primed for War Is China?

Excerpts:

Washington and its friends are not moving with the speed, resources, or urgency needed to outpace a rapidly maturing Chinese military threat.

The requirements of denying China optimism about the outcome of war are fairly straightforward—even if they are not easily satisfied. They include a Taiwan bristling with anti-ship missiles, sea mines, mobile air defenses, and other cheap but lethal capabilities; a U.S. military that can use drones, submarines, stealthy aircraft, and prodigious quantities of long-range strike capabilities to bring decisive firepower to bear in the Western Pacific; agreements with allies and partners that give U.S. forces access to more bases in the region and threaten to bring additional countries into the fight against Beijing; a global coalition of countries that can batter China’s economy with sanctions and choke off its oceangoing trade; and a revitalized industrial base that can keep the democratic countries fighting until their economic and financial superiority proves decisive in the end. Washington and its friends are already pursuing every one of these initiatives. But they’re not moving with the speed, resources, or urgency needed to outpace a rapidly maturing Chinese military threat.

The second task involves pairing deterrence with reassurance—to limit the degree to which inaction might, in Xi’s eyes, condemn China to dismemberment and humiliation. Chinese officials genuinely fear that U.S. policy and Taiwanese politics are putting the island on a path toward independence or some other form of permanent separation, even as they fail to recognize that their own actions are largely responsible for that trend. So the United States must tread carefully regarding Taiwan.

Washington should avoid showy spectacles—such as then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in August 2022—that do nothing to strengthen the island’s defenses and much to stoke China’s anxiety and ire. The United States should reject the idea—proposed by former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, among others—of ditching the “One China” policy and formally recognizing Taiwan. It should push back against pro-independence declarations or actions by Taiwanese leaders. In short, the United States must wield a credible ability to defend Taiwan and, at the same time, offer a credible pledge that it aims to prevent either side from unilaterally changing the status quo.

This approach is so challenging because of its many contradictions. Beefing up U.S. alliances may decrease China’s military optimism but also increase its sense of foreboding. The urgency needed to bolster deterrence may be hard to square with the prudence that cross-strait diplomacy requires—especially as China policy gets drawn into the U.S. presidential election campaign. A powerful but troubled China is heading in a bad direction. It will take all the strength and sobriety the United States and its friends can muster to prevent a slide into war.

How Primed for War Is China?

Risk signals for a conflict are flashing red.

FEBRUARY 4, 2024, 7:00 AM

By Michael Beckley, an associate professor of political science at Tufts University, and Hal Brands, a professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Foreign Policy · by Michael Beckley, Hal Brands

• U.S. Foreign Policy
• Geopolitics
• United States
• China

How likely is China to start a war? This may be the single-most important question in international affairs today. If China uses military force against Taiwan or another target in the Western Pacific, the result could be war with the United States—a fight between two nuclear-armed giants brawling for hegemony in that region and the wider world. If China attacked amid ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the world would be consumed by interlocking conflicts across Eurasia’s key regions, a global conflagration unlike anything since World War II.

How worried should we be?

Notwithstanding the recent flurry of high-level diplomacy between Washington and Beijing, the warning signs are certainly there. Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing is amassing ships, planes, and missiles as part of the largest military buildup by any country in decades. Notwithstanding some recent efforts to lure back skittish foreign investment, China is stockpiling fuel and food and trying to reduce the vulnerability of its economy to sanctions—steps one might take as conflict nears. Xi has said China must prepare for “worst-case and extreme scenarios” and be ready to withstand “high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms.” All of this comes as Beijing has become increasingly coercive (and occasionally violent) in dealings with its neighbors, including the Philippines, Japan, and India—and as it periodically advertises its ability to batter, blockade, and perhaps invade Taiwan.

Many U.S. officials believe the risk of war is rising. CIA Director William Burns has said Xi seeks the capability to take Taiwan by 2027. And as China’s economy struggles, some observers—including, reportedly, U.S. intelligence analysts—are looking for signs that a peaking China might turn aggressive in order to distract attention from internal problems or to lock in gains while it still can.

Other analysts think the risk of Chinese aggression is overblown. Some scholars say the danger likely can be managed provided Washington doesn’t provoke Beijing—an echo of a longer-standing argument that China won’t upend a status quo that has served it well. Others point out that China has not started a war since its invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Still others dismiss the prospect that China might fight in response to a slowing economy and other domestic problems, claiming that the country has no history of diversionary war. What links these arguments is a belief in the basic continuity of Chinese conduct: the idea that a country that hasn’t launched a disastrous war in more than four decades is unlikely to do so now.

We believe this confidence is dangerously misplaced. A country’s behavior is profoundly shaped by its circumstances, no less than its strategic tradition, and China’s circumstances are changing in explosive ways. Political scientists and historians have identified a range of factors that make great powers more or less inclined to fight. When one considers four such factors, it becomes clear that many of the conditions that once enabled a peaceful rise may now be encouraging a violent descent.

First, the territorial disputes and other issues China is contesting are becoming less susceptible to compromise or peaceful resolution than they once were, making foreign policy a zero-sum game. Second, the military balance in Asia is shifting in ways that could make Beijing perilously optimistic about the outcome of war. Third, as China’s short-term military prospects improve, its long-term strategic and economic outlook is darkening—a combination that has often made revisionist powers more violent in the past. Fourth, Xi has turned China into a personalist dictatorship of the sort especially prone to disastrous miscalculations and costly wars.

This isn’t to say China will invade Taiwan in a particular week, month, or year. It is impossible to predict when, exactly, a conflict might occur because the trigger is often an unforeseen crisis. We now know that Europe was primed for war in 1914, but World War I would likely not have happened then had the driver of the car carrying Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand not taken one of history’s most fateful wrong turns. Wars are more like earthquakes: We can’t know precisely when they will happen, but we can recognize factors that lead to higher or lower degrees of risk. Today, China’s risk indicators are blinking red.

The possibility of a U.S.-China war might seem remote at first glance. Beijing has not fought a major war in 44 years, and its military hasn’t killed large numbers of foreigners since 1988, when Chinese frigates machine-gunned 64 Vietnamese sailors in a skirmish over the Spratly Islands. The so-called Asian peace—the lack of interstate wars in East Asia since 1979—has rested on a Chinese peace.

The absence of war has hardly meant the absence of aggression: Beijing has used military and paramilitary capabilities to enlarge its writ in the South and East China seas. In recent years, China has also engaged in bloody scraps with India. Nonetheless, the fact that Beijing has abstained from major wars—while the United States has fought several of them—has allowed Chinese officials to claim that their country is following a uniquely peaceful path to global power. And it compels those who worry about war to explain why China, which has experienced record-breaking growth enabled by two generations of peace, would change course so dramatically.

It wouldn’t be the first time a seemingly peaceful rising power broke bad. Prior to 1914, Germany hadn’t fought a major war for more than 40 years. In the 1920s, Japan looked to many foreign observers like a responsible stakeholder as it signed treaties pledging to limit its navy, share power in Asia, and respect China’s territorial integrity. In the early 2000s, Russian President Vladimir Putin mused about joining NATO and linking Russia closer to the West. That each of these nations nonetheless launched barbaric wars of conquest underscores a basic truth: Things change. The same country can behave differently, perhaps radically so, depending on the circumstances.

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A scene from the TV show The Long Season shows three men sitting on a cushioned bench. And older man wearing a vest sits in the middle, and two younger men flank him, one smoking a cigarette and the other appearing to yawn.A scene from the TV show The Long Season shows three men sitting on a cushioned bench. And older man wearing a vest sits in the middle, and two younger men flank him, one smoking a cigarette and the other appearing to yawn.

How Did This Brilliant Chinese Rust Belt Noir Get Made Under Xi?

“The Long Season” is the funniest, saddest show to come out of China.

Two Indian army soldiers stand guard during a patrol of the Indo-Bhutan border at Darranga, some 100kms north of the capital of the Indian state of Assam, Guwahati, 19 December 2003.Two Indian army soldiers stand guard during a patrol of the Indo-Bhutan border at Darranga, some 100kms north of the capital of the Indian state of Assam, Guwahati, 19 December 2003.

China Is Quietly Expanding Its Land Grabs in the Himalayas

As the world worries about an invasion of Taiwan, Beijing is methodically continuing its seizure of territory in Bhutan.

Technicians wearing white protective suits conduct tests in a research laboratory in Ningbo, China.Technicians wearing white protective suits conduct tests in a research laboratory in Ningbo, China.

The West Did Not Invent Decoupling—China Did

Beijing has long sought to gain a free hand by untangling its economy from the West.

One such circumstance involves territorial disputes. Most wars are fights about who owns what strip of the Earth; roughly 85 percent of international conflicts waged since 1945 have revolved around territorial claims. Territory is hard to share because it often has symbolic or strategic significance. Even when nations agree to divide an area, they often end up fighting over the most valuable parts, such as cities, oil reserves, holy sites, waterways, or strategic high ground. In addition, securing territory requires physical presence in the form of fences, soldiers, or settlers. Thus, when nations claim the same turf, they come into frequent and unwelcome contact. Territorial disputes are especially likely to escalate when one side fears its claims are eroding precipitously. The belief that hallowed ground is slipping away or that the nation could be dismembered by its enemies can trigger aggression that a country more secure in its borders would avoid.

A second cause of war is a shifting military balance. Wars are waged over various issues but all share a fundamental cause: false optimism. They happen when both sides believe they can use force to achieve objectives—in other words, when both sides think they can win. Of course, few wars are truly win-win affairs, meaning at least one side—and very often both sides—disastrously underestimated the enemy’s strength. In short, competitive or ambiguous military balances cause wars; therefore, anything that makes a given balance more competitive or ambiguous, such as the introduction of new technologies or a massive military buildup by the weaker side, increases the risk of war.

Even the mightiest countries can spiral into violent insecurity when beset by economic stagnation, strategic encirclement, or other protracted trends that threaten their international position.

Third, great powers become belligerent when they fear future decline. Geopolitical competition is fierce and unforgiving, so nations nervously guard their relative wealth and power. Even the mightiest countries can spiral into violent insecurity when beset by economic stagnation, strategic encirclement, or other protracted trends that threaten their international position and expose them to predation by their foes. Heavily armed but increasingly anxious, a great power on the precipice of decline will be eager, even desperate, to beat back unfavorable trends by any means necessary. For imperial Germany, imperial Japan, and Putin’s Russia, that ultimately meant war.

Finally, a country’s conduct is shaped by its regime. Personalist dictatorships are more than twice as likely to start wars as democracies or autocracies in which power is held in many hands. Dictators initiate more wars because they are less exposed to the costs of conflict: Over the past 100 years, dictators who lost wars fell from power only 30 percent of the time, whereas other types of leaders who lost wars were voted out or otherwise removed from office nearly 100 percent of the time. Dictators veer into extremism because they are surrounded by sycophants who go all out to meet the dear leader’s demands. Dictators also cultivate real and imagined enemies abroad because blood-and-soil nationalism helps them justify oppressive rule at home. So whereas leaders of limited governments typically rule modestly and fade into obscurity, dictators—including Germany’s Adolf Hitler, Italy’s Benito Mussolini, the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin, China’s Mao Zedong, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and Russia’s Putin—often butcher their way into the history books.

These four factors—insecure borders, a competitive military balance, negative expectations, and dictatorship—help explain China’s historical use of force, and they have ominous implications today.

A Chinese propaganda poster shows soldiers holding guns with Chinese characters on a red panel underneath.

A Chinese propaganda poster titled “Long Live the Victory of People’s War!” circa 1966. Fine Art Images/Heritage Images/Getty Images

The People’s Republic of China was born fighting. After enduring a century of foreign imperialism, China bore the brunt of World War II in Asia after Japan invaded in 1937. At least 14 million Chinese died. Then, from 1945 to 1949, the Chinese Civil War reached its bloody climax, killing at least 2 million more as the Communists fought their way to power.

Forged amid these conflicts, China emerged as a hyper-belligerent state. For several decades, it was one of the world’s most embattled countries, fighting five wars and becoming a chief enemy of both Cold War superpowers. This violent record is unsurprising because China displayed all the risk factors for war.

For starters, China was led by Mao, the apotheosis of one-man rule. He routinely purged his colleagues and made decisions unilaterally, often half-asleep in the middle of night, based on inscrutable and shifting rationales. He also displayed a shocking disregard for human life. Roughly 45 million people were starved, beaten, or shot to death during the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s ill-conceived plan to transform China into a superpower within his lifetime. Partly to rally the nation behind this disastrous campaign, Mao instigated an international crisis in 1958 by shelling islands held by the Nationalist government on Taiwan.

Mao may have been sadistic, but even a less ruthless leader would have struggled to keep such a shattered nation at peace. After winning the civil war, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had to reimpose central government authority village by village and painstakingly eradicate resistance by ethnic minorities, warlords, and Nationalist sympathizers. To make matters worse, the fall of the Japanese and European empires left China partly surrounded by new countries that were hostile, unstable, or both. Most of China’s borders were contested to some degree; by the 1960s, the boundary with the Soviet Union was the most militarized in the world. Taiwan was the base of a rival Chinese government, backed by the United States, with overt plans to reconquer the mainland. India hosted a Tibetan government in exile and claimed swaths of Chinese territory; and China’s heartland was wedged between two Cold War hot spots, Indochina and the Korean Peninsula.

China considered itself constantly at risk of being torn apart, a historical trauma exacerbated by the economic catastrophes and political upheaval Mao wrought. Yet Beijing always had a viable strategy against each of its land neighbors because China’s huge population enabled it to swallow opponents through what Beijing called “people’s war,” a combination of human wave attacks and guerrilla raids. All told, it was a combustible combination: a brutal dictatorship embroiled in territorial disputes and armed with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of manpower.

China thus went from conflict to conflict, getting violent when it felt especially vulnerable or feared an impending decline in its position.

China thus went from conflict to conflict, getting violent when it felt especially vulnerable or feared an impending decline in its position. In 1950, China mauled U.S. forces that had advanced deep into North Korea, risking nuclear retaliation. Later that decade, China nearly started two additional wars by shelling Nationalist garrisons on offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait. In 1962, Beijing attacked Indian forces after they had built outposts in Chinese-claimed territory in the Himalayas. During the Vietnam War, China sent tens of thousands of troops to fight U.S. forces. In 1969, Beijing again risked nuclear war by ambushing Moscow’s forces along the Ussuri River, following a significant Soviet buildup there. Ten years later, China attacked Vietnam after the latter started hosting Soviet forces and invaded Cambodia, one of Beijing’s only close partners.

After that, China’s guns largely fell silent. There would be exceptions, most notably in 1995 and 1996, when China lobbed missiles near Taiwan. But generally speaking, Beijing became less prickly and aggressive from 1980 to the mid-2000s as its circumstances dramatically changed.

First, the regime mellowed. In 1976, Mao died and was eventually replaced by Deng Xiaoping, who had been purged by Mao and understood the dangers of one-man rule. Under Deng’s guidance, term limits for senior leaders were established. The National People’s Congress and the CCP’s Central Committee began meeting regularly. A professionalized bureaucracy began to take shape. These institutions were far from perfect, but they created checks on power that had been utterly lacking under Mao.

Second, China’s geopolitical position improved, and threats to its territorial integrity diminished. After the U.S. opening to China during the 1970s, the rival government on Taiwan lost most of its diplomatic recognition and its military alliance with the United States. To corner the Soviet Union, the United States formed a quasi-alliance with China and transferred advanced technology to Chinese firms. Taiwan, the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam could no longer encroach on Chinese territory without potentially triggering a U.S. response. And when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the major threats to China’s land borders disappeared almost entirely. Without Russia’s support, India, Vietnam, and the newly formed states of Central Asia were in no position to contest China’s borders. Instead, they moved to normalize relations with Beijing.

Third, China’s view of the future brightened. After rapprochement with the United States and other democracies, China gained easy access to the global economy and a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. From the late 1970s to the early 2000s, its economy grew at a breakneck pace. Country after country curried favor with Beijing to access its booming market. Britain handed back Hong Kong. Portugal gave up Macau. The United States fast-tracked China into the World Trade Organization. With China’s economy going gangbusters and the world’s most powerful nations welcoming its rise, Beijing had little incentive to upset a status quo that seemed to be getting better by the day.

Finally, China had little opportunity for conquest. Whereas its economic and diplomatic clout was surging, China’s military was clearly incapable of taking territories still under dispute, most of which were at sea. With a pathetic air force and navy prior to the 2000s, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would have amounted to a “million-man swim,” and a naval clash with Japan’s advanced forces might have been over in a matter of hours. Most importantly, the United States could be expected to crush Chinese aggression in maritime Asia. Having watched U.S. forces decimate the Iraqi military in the Gulf War, Chinese leaders were inclined to embrace Deng’s maxim to hide their light and bide their time.

Today’s China is done hiding and biding. Instead, it is churning out warships and missiles faster than any country since World War II. Chinese planes and warships simulate attacks on Taiwanese and U.S. targets. Asian sea lanes are dotted with Chinese military outposts and brimming with Chinese coast guard and fishing vessels that brazenly shove neighbors out of areas claimed by Beijing. Meanwhile, China is abetting Russia’s brutalization of Ukraine and massing forces on the Sino-Indian border.

One reason China has become more combative is because it can. China’s inflation-adjusted military budget expanded tenfold between 1990 and 2020. Beijing now outspends every other country in Asia combined. It wields the world’s largest ballistic missile force and navy. By the end of this decade, its nuclear arsenal could rival Washington’s. With conventional missiles capable of pulverizing U.S. bases on Okinawa—the only ones within 500 miles of Taiwan—it is no longer clear that the Pentagon could immediately respond to, let alone defeat, a Chinese assault on Taiwan. Historically, the United States has fallen back on its manufacturing prowess to outproduce adversaries in protracted wars. But now that China is the workshop of the world, Beijing might believe—correctly or not—that the military balance would shift further in its favor the longer a war continues.

China also has growing motives for war as territorial disputes intensify. For starters, peaceful means of reunifying Taiwan are disappearing fast. In 1995, more Taiwanese citizens considered themselves exclusively Chinese than Taiwanese, and more favored moving toward unification with China than toward independence. Today, nearly two-thirds of the population considers itself exclusively Taiwanese, versus only 4 percent that identifies as exclusively Chinese. While most Taiwanese support maintaining the status quo for now, 49 percent of the population prefers eventual independence over an indefinite continuation of the status quo (27 percent) or unification (12 percent). Meanwhile, the United States has tightened its relationship with Taiwan, with U.S. President Joe Biden declaring at least four times that the United States would defend the island from a Chinese attack. As Washington and Taipei overhaul their militaries for a potential conflict with China, Beijing is growing more alarmed about the fate of the territory it covets most.

In the South China Sea, China’s military presence has greatly expanded, but its diplomatic position is eroding. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that China’s expansive claims to the South China Sea were null and void. Since 2022, the Philippines—the country that brought the case—has been reasserting its maritime rights and allowing U.S. access to additional military bases on its territory to help defend them. Japan is forming a quasi-alliance with Manila, and a growing cast of nations, including Britain, France, and Germany, are sending warships through the South China Sea in defiance of Beijing’s claims. In response, China has gotten physically aggressive. Last year, for example, Chinese coast guard ships blasted Philippine supply boats with water cannons, preventing them from delivering food to military personnel stationed on the Second Thomas Shoal.

As China’s military power has grown, its larger geopolitical outlook has darkened. China’s economy has lately been stagnating and shrinking relative to that of the United States. Productivity is down, and debt has exploded. Upwards of 20 percent of young adults were unemployed as of mid-2023—when Beijing temporarily stopped releasing statistics on the problem—and that number almost certainly understates the severity of the problem. Droves of wealthy and well-educated Chinese are trying to get their money and children out of the country. Those problems will worsen as China suffers the worst aging crisis in world history: Over the next 10 years, China will lose 70 million working-age adults while gaining 130 million senior citizens.

Finally, China faces an increasingly hostile strategic environment. The world’s wealthiest countries are choking off its access to high-end semiconductors—the lifeblood of economic and military innovation—and slapping new trade and investment restrictions on Beijing every year. Anti-China pacts, such as AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral agreement, are proliferating. China’s only great-power ally, Russia, has thrown its military into a meat grinder in Ukraine and turned public opinion in many European countries against Beijing.

China is ruled by a dictator, who has already shown he’s willing to sacrifice the well-being of the Chinese people to achieve his grandiose objectives.

If China were ruled by a committee of technocrats, it might respond to these pressures with diplomatic compromise and economic reform. But China is ruled by a dictator, who has already shown he’s willing to sacrifice the well-being of the Chinese people to achieve his grandiose objectives.

Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has appointed himself chairman for life, inserted his governing philosophy into the constitution, and purged thousands of potential rivals. He has taken uncompromising positions on China’s vast territorial claims. “We cannot lose even one inch of the territory left behind by our ancestors,” he warned U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis in 2018. Xi has attached his legitimacy to making China a superpower: State media now declares that under Mao, China stood up; under Deng, China grew rich; and under Xi, China will become mighty. In recent years, Xi has given internal speeches instructing the Chinese military to be ready for war and the Chinese people to prepare for “extreme scenarios.”

Perhaps this rhetoric is just bluster. But many of Xi’s actions—the brutal zero-COVID lockdowns, the concentration camps in Xinjiang, the crushing of Hong Kong’s freedoms—betray ruthlessness. Combined with the other changes China is undergoing, these forms of internal aggression should make us very nervous about the external aggression that may lie ahead.

An illustration shows Chinese President Xi Jinping inside a globe projection with a gathering storm spinning over one eye.

Doug Chayka illustration for Foreign Policy

Of course, countries don’t choose war or peace in a vacuum; they also take cues from the larger state of the world. In the 1930s, cascading international chaos demoralized defenders of the existing order and emboldened those tempted to attack it. So how might the current disorder—punctuated by Europe’s largest war since World War II and a spreading conflict in the Middle East—shape China’s choices?

One view is that Russia’s war in Ukraine makes other wars of aggression less likely by showing how badly they can backfire. In this telling—favored by Biden administration officials and some academic experts—China is learning sobering lessons from Putin’s misbegotten land grab. Beijing is learning how difficult conquest can be against a committed defender, how badly autocratic militaries can underperform in combat, how adept U.S. intelligence is at detecting plans for predation, and how harshly the democratic world can penalize countries that defy the liberal order’s norms. It is closely scrutinizing the Chinese military for the sort of corruption that has undermined the Russian military and has discovered that the rot is much deeper than it seemed. U.S. officials are surely hoping China is interpreting recent events in a similar light.

But we should scrutinize this interpretation carefully. For one thing, it’s incredibly hard to know what China’s view of the Ukraine war is. After all, the lessons that matter aren’t those published by senior colonels in the People’s Liberation Army or think tankers in Beijing. The lessons that matter are drawn by a cosseted dictator whose perception of the world may be colored by all the normal pathologies of personalist regimes. From what Xi has said publicly, there is little evidence the conflict has tempered his ambitions or fundamentally moderated Chinese statecraft. When Xi visited Moscow in March 2023, he told Putin, “Right now, there are changes—the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years—and we are the ones driving those changes together.”

It’s dangerous to assume that Xi is learning precisely those lessons Americans would like him to learn—rather than another, less reassuring set of lessons that could be reinforcing China’s incentives to fight.

Moreover, Xi may not see Ukraine and Taiwan as remotely comparable. Putin’s forces struggled in Ukraine in part because this wasn’t the war for which they had been prepared and indoctrinated. That wouldn’t be a problem for China, given that it has been preparing for a war over Taiwan for decades—and relentlessly instructs its soldiers that unification is central to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Moreover, if Xi considers Taiwan less capable than Ukraine of mounting an all-of-society resistance, he wouldn’t be alone. Many U.S. officials and independent analysts have voiced the same concern.

Or perhaps Xi has concluded that the United States won’t fight any war against a nuclear-armed great power—because Biden said as much in explaining why Washington wouldn’t confront Moscow head-on. Perhaps he thinks Western sanctions aren’t really so punishing: Two years into the war, Russia controls 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory, its oil and other exports have found new markets, its factories are churning out armaments, and its economy is not in danger of imminent collapse. And perhaps he sees the recent trajectory of the war—in which Russia has weathered Ukrainian counterattacks while U.S. politicians bicker about sending Kyiv more money and weapons—as evidence that autocracies can summon more strength and resilience than their democratic foes.

To be clear, we do not know what Xi really thinks. But it’s dangerous to assume that he is learning precisely those lessons Americans would like him to learn—rather than another, less reassuring set of lessons that could be reinforcing China’s incentives to fight.

China may ultimately attack Taiwan—or India, Japan, the Philippines, or another country—in 2025, 2027, 2029, or never. We can’t predict with any certainty when, or even whether, Beijing will use force because that decision will hinge on many contingent factors. But we can assess whether countries are more or less prone to war and whether their internal features and external conditions put them at higher or lower risk of lashing out. Today, much of what historians and political scientists know about the causes of war suggests China is primed for violence.

Unfortunately, Washington can’t affect some of the factors pushing Beijing down this perilous path. The United States can’t fix China’s demographic crisis, solve its structural economic problems, or stop Xi’s consolidation of one-man rule. It could, perhaps, change China’s negative expectations about the future—by easing Beijing’s access to high-end technology or abandoning efforts to build stronger coalitions in the Indo-Pacific, for instance, although doing so might fatally weaken Washington’s position. The United States must try to prevail in competition and, at the same time, avoid an awful conflict. Within that context, it should aim to temper China’s optimism about how a war in Asia might turn out and prevent Beijing from concluding that it must fight to avoid a humiliating defeat.

Washington and its friends are not moving with the speed, resources, or urgency needed to outpace a rapidly maturing Chinese military threat.

The requirements of denying China optimism about the outcome of war are fairly straightforward—even if they are not easily satisfied. They include a Taiwan bristling with anti-ship missiles, sea mines, mobile air defenses, and other cheap but lethal capabilities; a U.S. military that can use drones, submarines, stealthy aircraft, and prodigious quantities of long-range strike capabilities to bring decisive firepower to bear in the Western Pacific; agreements with allies and partners that give U.S. forces access to more bases in the region and threaten to bring additional countries into the fight against Beijing; a global coalition of countries that can batter China’s economy with sanctions and choke off its oceangoing trade; and a revitalized industrial base that can keep the democratic countries fighting until their economic and financial superiority proves decisive in the end. Washington and its friends are already pursuing every one of these initiatives. But they’re not moving with the speed, resources, or urgency needed to outpace a rapidly maturing Chinese military threat.

The second task involves pairing deterrence with reassurance—to limit the degree to which inaction might, in Xi’s eyes, condemn China to dismemberment and humiliation. Chinese officials genuinely fear that U.S. policy and Taiwanese politics are putting the island on a path toward independence or some other form of permanent separation, even as they fail to recognize that their own actions are largely responsible for that trend. So the United States must tread carefully regarding Taiwan.

Washington should avoid showy spectacles—such as then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in August 2022—that do nothing to strengthen the island’s defenses and much to stoke China’s anxiety and ire. The United States should reject the idea—proposed by former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, among others—of ditching the “One China” policy and formally recognizing Taiwan. It should push back against pro-independence declarations or actions by Taiwanese leaders. In short, the United States must wield a credible ability to defend Taiwan and, at the same time, offer a credible pledge that it aims to prevent either side from unilaterally changing the status quo.

This approach is so challenging because of its many contradictions. Beefing up U.S. alliances may decrease China’s military optimism but also increase its sense of foreboding. The urgency needed to bolster deterrence may be hard to square with the prudence that cross-strait diplomacy requires—especially as China policy gets drawn into the U.S. presidential election campaign. A powerful but troubled China is heading in a bad direction. It will take all the strength and sobriety the United States and its friends can muster to prevent a slide into war.

Foreign Policy · by Michael Beckley, Hal Brands

6. How cheap drones are transforming warfare in Ukraine

How cheap drones are transforming warfare in Ukraine

The Economist

Science & technology | Ukraine’s drone war

First Person View drones have achieved near mythical status on the front lines

Drone attack

Video: Ukraine's Bozha Sprava/Ukraine’s Adam Tactical Group via Telegram

Feb 5th 2024

It is human v machine at its simplest. The soldier is crouched under the hull of his battered and immobilised tank. A drone languidly drifts towards him, as if taking stock of the duel. The soldier runs for it. He clambers over the front of his tank to escape. The ensuing chase has a hint of farce, with the drone in pursuit as the soldier circles the tank desperately. Within 15 seconds it is all over. The drone explodes. As the smoke clears, the soldier lies crumpled on the ground.

The internet is awash with snuff movies from the war in Ukraine. Many depict the lethal feats of a type of weapon that did not exist at the outset of the war, but which has come to assume near mythical status on the front lines: the First Person View (FPV) drone. Derived from racing quadcopters, these are guided to their target by a pilot on the ground who watches a video feed through goggles.

The development of such drones began in garages by unpaid enthusiasts, and sometimes in the teeth of official resistance. Now both Russia and Ukraine churn out hundreds of thousands per year, and are keen to imbue them with artificial-intelligence (AI) capabilities that represent the cutting edge of lethal autonomy at scale.

Don’t try running away

The appeal of FPV drones is that they offer cheap, accurate firepower. Unguided artillery shells cost anywhere between $800 and $9,000. A GPS-guided shell is closer to $100,000, and a Javelin anti-tank missile around twice as much again. A simple FPV drone costs perhaps $400. A typical Ukrainian assault group of 12 to 16 soldiers is now accompanied by almost the same number of drone operators, of whom half a dozen are FPV pilots, notes Franz-Stefan Gady, a military analyst who frequently visits the front lines. (The rest fly other sorts of drones, for tasks such as reconnaissance.)

With Ukraine facing a major shortage of conventional artillery—it fires 2,000-3,000 shells a day, about a quarter of what Russia manages—FPV drones can help close the firepower gap. Drones are agile and relay pictures back to their operators in real-time. That lets them perform tricks that artillery cannot, such as chasing vehicles or soldiers and flying into buildings or trenches.

Ukrainian and Russian drone strikes

Jul 2023

Oct 2023

Jan 2024

• Sources: Tochnyi; Daniele Barbera; Andrew Perpetua

They offer psychological advantages too. Artillery barrages typically come in waves. Soldiers in trenches can hide in relative safety underground until a bombardment is finished. But drones can loiter near their targets, making them a persistent, insidious threat that can strike at any time. In a one-week period in the autumn of 2023, Ukrainian drones took out 428 pieces of Russian equipment, including 75 tanks and 101 artillery pieces. Samuel Bendett of the Centre for Naval Analysis, an American think-tank, points to Russian front-line accounts that say the threat of drone attacks forces troops to disperse and move in small groups under the cover of darkness.

For most fervent drone advocates, all this is a glimpse of a future in which disposable aircraft replace big guns entirely. “This is a new type of…high-precision aerial artillery,” argued Dmitry Rogozin on January 23rd. Mr Rogozin oversaw parts of Russia’s arms industry from 2011 to 2018 and now serves in the puppet regime running the occupied Ukrainian province of Zaporizhia. “It will gradually replace conventional…artillery, since it is much more accurate and cheaper, and the recording of target hits is visible to the operators.”

The more common view is that drones will indeed revolutionise warfare, but alongside artillery rather than instead of it. A trio of artillery pieces might fire two or three rounds per minute for an entire hour, with each round delivering 10kg of high explosive with a blast that is lethal within a radius of 50 metres. Delivering that much firepower by an average FPV would require dozens of drones, each with their own pilot. Drones require a line of sight back to their operators. That is less of a problem in the flatter parts of Ukraine, such as Kherson and Zaporizhia, but a bigger issue in hillier regions such as Donetsk. And artillery can still fire in high winds or heavy rain—or in the cold, which can sap a drone’s battery, and therefore its range.

“Achilles”, a Ukrainian drone commander based near Bakhmut in the east of the country, says that his FPV drones, which cost between $300 and $500 each, have destroyed millions of dollars worth of Russian equipment. But he emphasises their role in an orchestra of violence: “It is the combined firepower of artillery and drones that is powerful.” FPVs—as well as more conventional mines or fire from armoured vehicles—can be used to paralyse a vehicle and force its crew out, he says. Artillery then hits the position and either kills them outright or forces them into shelter.

If the soldiers make it into cover, the drones go back to work. Skilled pilots can guide them into underground shelters that artillery cannot reach. “Even if the enemy survives the explosion, there won’t be enough air to breathe,” says Achilles. “So they start coming out. And as soon as they do, we hit them with mortar [fire] or artillery or a fragmentation shell.” Such synergies are why Achilles thinks FPV drones will not replace conventional artillery for the foreseeable future. “Our [allies] need to banish any thought they can send us millions of drones in place of shells, and that we’ll cope. It’s just not true. Artillery is a different thing altogether.”

There is no escape

Whatever the future holds, for now the two sides seem to be employing different tactics. Ukrainian drone units are asked to upload videos of their exploits to “Delta”, a piece of battlefield management software that can help managers in Kyiv to understand what works and what doesn’t. Ukraine typically uses drones against high-value targets, such as armoured vehicles, artillery or supply trucks. Less is known about Russian doctrine. But its forces seem to focus their attacks on lower-value targets. Of 3,804 Russian FPV videos analysed by Lostarmour, a Russian military blog, 40% record attacks on dugouts, trenches and other front-line positions, and another 28% on soldiers in the open or sheltering in pre-existing buildings. Only a fraction show attacks on vehicles and artillery (see chart).

The rise of FPV drones has also meant a rise in countermeasures that aim to stop them. Electronic warfare is a big one, with powerful jammers that block radio signals between a drone and its operator. But there are, of course, countermeasures to the countermeasures. Drones can have their electronics hardened to resist jamming, though that increases the price. Some newer FPV drones are being delivered with swappable radio chips, making it easy to change the frequencies on which they operate. “If the FPV drone is set up properly with the right software, and with the antenna at the right angle…you can’t stop the drone,” insists Pavlo Litovkin, an instructor at KazhanFLY, a drone training school near Kyiv. And precisely because the jammers emit so much electromagnetic radiation, they are easy-to-spot targets in their own right.

The number of Ukrainian drone attacks that get through varies greatly along the front lines. They are used everywhere (see map) but in newly formed units, whose commanders, troops grumble, have been appointed through political connections, a hit rate of 10% to 15% is common. But in specialised units, such as special forces or those from Ukraine’s intelligence services, it can be 70% or 80%.

Skilled pilots are one of the best ways to improve a drone’s effectiveness. Videos from the front line suggest their proficiency has risen dramatically over the past year. In the past, operators would be happy just to hit a tank. Now they circle around and strike at the base of the rear of the turret, which can cause the tank’s ammunition to detonate, destroying it. In one video a column of six Russian armoured vehicles are struck one after the other in exactly this way.

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine war

KazhanFLY is regarded as one of the best schools. Its main FPV drone course takes ten days. Reconnaissance flying and engineering courses take another five days. Trainees begin with lectures on aeronautics and electronic warfare, before switching to a hangar with a special course of hoops and obstacles. In one exercise on a large outdoor range, pilots must hit buggies by flying through jamming.

One question is whether drones will be able to stay cheap as armies become more accustomed to defending against them. Forthcoming research by Jack Watling and his colleagues at the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London, which draws on Ukrainian military data, suggests they may not. An FPV drone that has a good chance of getting through and achieving a kill against an armoured vehicle, they argue, requires fancy features such as infrared sensors for night missions, a high-quality radio which is resistant to interference from nearby drones, a biggish antenna and enough thrust to carry 5kg of high explosive.

Mr Watling and his colleagues estimate a price of about $30,000—two orders of magnitude higher than the cheap and cheerful munitions in use today. Many Ukrainian drone builders and operators vehemently contest these assumptions, arguing that much cheaper drones will remain effective, and that—as the garage-built drones have already proved—standard military procurement is bloated and inefficient.

Seek and destroy

One capability that drone pilots are keen on is autonomous object recognition, which would allow a drone cut off by jamming to complete the last phase of its attack autonomously. Object recognition is already available on expensive drones, like America’s Switchblade 300, which costs $53,000. Russia’s Ovod (Gadfly) FPV has supposedly used a similar AI-based “terminal guidance” system since last summer. But drone advocates argue that this too can be done on the cheap. The Ukrainian Scalpel drone, for instance, costs $1,000 and can lock onto a target designated by its pilot. So does the AirUnit, a prototype drone whose final version aims to be cheaper still. A recent FPV video claims to show two Russian Pantsir air-defence systems being destroyed using autonomous guidance.

Drones attack Russian tanks in Ukraine

Video: Ukraine's Bozha Sprava/Ukraine’s Adam Tactical Group via Telegram

These systems are not yet reliable and autonomous terminal guidance is not commonplace on the low-end systems. Some Ukrainian insiders suggest that a turning point could come in April or May, though Eric Schmidt, a former CEO of Google and frequent visitor to Ukraine, is investing heavily in Ukrainian drone production. People familiar with those efforts say that the aim is not only to mass produce units (which should help drive costs down even further), but to give them clever capabilities as cheaply as possible.

Software-defined radios, for instance, replace dedicated electronic components with programmable computer chips. They make it easier to implement techniques such as frequency hopping, which should make communications harder to jam. Another idea is to replace GPS tracking, which can also be jammed, with optical navigation, which tracks the terrain a drone flies over. Commercial components will be used wherever possible. That should keep costs down, and help ensure that the final product is compliant with ITAR, a set of infamously restrictive American arms-export regulations to which Mr Schmidt, being an American citizen, is subject. Both Russia and Ukraine hope for a technological breakthrough. But they plan for a drone war of attrition.

Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, wants to produce 1m FPV drones over the course of 2024. December 2023 was an inflection point, says Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s tech-savvy deputy prime minister, with “tens of thousands” of drones rolling off production lines—twice the level of the entire previous year. Despite recent attacks on drone factories and a shortage of explosives, state-procured FPV drones now outnumber volunteer-made ones for the first time. “The number one priority,” wrote Valery Zaluzhhny, Ukraine’s top general, in an essay published on February 1st, “is mastery of an entire arsenal of…cheap, modern and highly effective, unmanned vehicles”.■

The Economist

7. Disinformation Aimed at Policymakers

A long but fascinating and informative read.

I have sent the below comment out before (a number of years ago) but I think it is worth reprising since the article below discusses narcissism. 

Last evening in our class on “Unconventional Warfare for Policy Makers and Strategists we were discussing leadership in underground resistance movements and insurgencies. In our reading from “Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies” was this passage on evaluating one type of leader found in underground resistance movements (i.e., narcissism). The entire publication can be accessed at this link. http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf 

I thought it would be interesting to compare this passage with the current political climate. And if you would like to read about the personality trait after narcissism please go to the link above (spoiler alert: it is paranoia)

P. 98-99 …. Egocentricity is a normal component in infantile development; however, as a child develops into adolescence he or she is supposed to become less self-absorbed and more cognizant of others. Narcissism is a psychoanalytic theory that holds that primary narcissism (or self-love) in the form of grandiose self does not diminish as the individual develops and expands his or her social network. If this fails to occur, regardless of reason, the grandiose self-image can result in individuals who are sociopathic, arrogant, and devoid of compassion for others. Some leaders demonstrate a marked desire for admiration and attention, a hallmark of narcissism. Their chosen methods of violence are often spectacular and attention grabbing, suggesting a more narcissistic clinical presentation. There are also those who exhibit a narcissistic leadership style although they probably do not meet the clinical criteria for an Axis II disorder. In fact, this leadership style is heavily represented in the military, industry, and academia. Characteristics of the narcissistic leadership style include a vulnerability to biased information processing that results in an overestimation of their own strength and an underestimation of their adversary’s, a grandiose and self-serving disposition, a lack of tolerance for competition, difficulty relying on experts, and a desire for sycophantic subordinates. Often displaying superficial arrogance over profound personal insecurity, they actively seek admiration, are vulnerable to insults, slights, and attacks, and are prone to rage. Key observables that indicate this style are the leader’s sensitivity to criticism, surrounding themselves with sycophants, and overvaluation of his chances of success and an underestimation of the strength of an opponent.

Disinformation Aimed at Policymakers

https://counteringdisinformation.substack.com/p/disinformation-aimed-at-policymakers?r=7i07&utm

TODD LEVENTHAL

FEB 5, 2024

Most disinformation is aimed at mass audiences, such as the extensive themes aimed at various audiences in Lithuania described in my previous post.

But the most important, sensitive, and potentially most damaging disinformation and influence operations are aimed at policymakers in other countries, for the purpose of inducing them adopt a course of action that is to Russia’s advantage. Ladislav Bittman, the former deputy head of the disinformation department of communist Czechoslovakia’s Security Service (StB) from 1964 to 1966, wrote:

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The overall purpose is not only to deceive but to cause damage to the target. The victim of disinformation must be led to inflict harm upon himself, directly or indirectly — either by acting against his own interests on the basis of spurious information or by remaining passive when action is needed. (The KGB and Soviet Disinformation, p. 56)

The best examples of documented Soviet disinformation aimed at foreign government leaders of which I am aware are found in the paper “KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82,” written by Vasili Mitrokhin, who was an archivist in the KGB’s foreign intelligence branch, the First Chief Directorate (FCD), for 28 years, from 1956 to 1984. He based this paper and his other writings on notes he made on the top-secret KGB documents he handled. His notes were smuggled out of the USSR after Mitrokhin defected to the United Kingdom in 1992.  The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation described this unparalleled treasure trove of top secret information, the “Mitrokhin Archive,” as “the most complete and extensive intelligence ever received from any source.” 

Mitrokhin’s paper was documents KGB covert influence operations taken in southwest Asia in the years immediately following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. It was originally published in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin No. 14/15, Winter 2003/Spring 2004. 

Inventing “Nightmare Scenarios”

One common manipulative technique the KGB used was to try to convince foreign leaders that nightmare scenarios they feared would supposedly occur if they pursued policies the Soviets opposed. In directing these false messages to foreign leaders, the KGB used agents working under their control whom the foreign leaders trusted as the conduits for their manipulative messages. (I examined this issue in “GEC Counter-Disinformation Dispatch #9: Clandestine Disinformation and Agents of Influence,” which contains the same examples and much of the same introductory language used below.) 

In the early 1980s, Pakistan was a key conduit for U.S. and other military aid to Afghans fighting the Soviet occupation. Mitrokhin says that KGB disinformation specialists sought to convince then-Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1980 that the United States was secretly seeking to oust him:

In Bangkok, information is to be conveyed to the Pakistan Mission to the effect that within the Carter Administration there are doubts about the utility of further increases in military assistance to Pakistan, given the Zia-ul-Haq regime's unpopularity in the country. [US] Secretary of State [Cyrus] Vance and his assistants consider that, in order to avert another major failure of US foreign policy [like the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979], it is imperative to seek to replace the dictatorship with another regime which would guarantee stability in Pakistan.

Another way to pressure Pakistan was by stirring up concerns about Pakistan in its rival, neighboring India, with whom it had fought several wars. The message the KGB communicated through its agents to then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi played on some of India’s deepest fears at the time about Pakistan acquiring a nuclear weapon:

In India, information is to be conveyed to Prime Minister Gandhi to the effect that Pakistan is not satisfied with the insignificant scope of American military assistance and the condition imposed on it to abstain from exploding a nuclear device while the American assistance program is in force. The leaders of Pakistan intend to continue to whip up hysteria over the events in Afghanistan in order to obtain a significant increase in military assistance from the US and the lifting of restrictions on the development of the nuclear program.

The KGB directed false, alarmist messages to Iranian leaders, who were deeply distrustful of the United States, about U.S. military bases that were supposedly going to be built close to Iran:

Through the UN leadership, information is to be conveyed to representatives of Iran to the effect that, in return for growing military assistance to Pakistan, the US is seeking to be granted military bases on Pakistani territory, including in Baluchistan, in close proximity to the Iranian frontier. The leaders of Pakistan are inclined to make concessions to the Americans on this issue.

There were also direct threats to Pakistani leaders:

Through KGB SCD [Second Chief Directorate] assets, a warning is to be conveyed to the Pakistan Mission in Moscow to the effect that if a sensible line does not prevail in [then-Pakistani leader] Zia-ul Haq's political course, and Pakistan agrees under pressure from the US and China to turn its territory into a base for permanent armed struggle against Afghanistan, the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences will be instructed to study ways of exploiting the Baluchi and Pushtun movements in Pakistan, as well as internal opposition to the country's military regime, in the interests of the security of the frontiers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

In messages aimed at U.S. leaders, KGB disinformation specialists sought to play on U.S. fears that the United States would be demonized in Pakistan if President Zia was overthrown, as had happened in Iran after Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi fell from power in 1979:

Through the possibilities of India and of the UN Secretary [General], convey information to the US to the effect that the Reagan administration's plans to expand military and other assistance to Pakistan will provoke an extremely negative reaction within the democratic opposition to the Zia-ul Haq regime. If the precarious Zia-ul Haq dictatorship is overthrown, the US would be faced with rising anti-American feelings in that country on the same scale as in Iran.

The messages constructed by KGB disinformation specialists were based on their deep knowledge of the political, cultural, and military issues and sensitivities in the region. They knew the “nightmare scenarios” that leaders in the region feared and deliberately sought to inflame them, with the goal of having leaders of Pakistan, India, Iran, and the United States take or refrain from actions that the Soviets calculated would work to their benefit. It is worth reading the entire document, which is roughly 20 pages long, to see the sophistication and malevolence involved in KGB covert influence operations. The goals of the KGB active measures in Southwest Asia from 1980 to 1982 were wide-ranging and comprehensive. They included, as Mitrokhin recorded them:

• compromise the Zia-ul Haq regime [in Pakistan]
• weaken the positions of the US and China in Pakistan
• exacerbate relations with Iran
• intensify and deepen disagreements between India and Pakistan on existing disputed issues
• inspire new irritants in Indo-Pakistan relations
• reinforce the antipathy and suspicion felt by Indira Gandhi and other Indian leaders towards Zia-ul-Haq personally
• compromise [Zia] in the eyes of the Muslims of India and other countries in the world
• induce the government of India to seek to secure the end of Pakistan's support for the Afghan rebels
• step up the activities of Pakistani émigrés and of the nationalist movement, particularly in Baluchistan
• disrupt Afghan émigré organizations
• intensify the local population's hostility towards Afghan refugees.

[End of section drawn from “GEC Counter-Disinformation Dispatches #9: Clandestine Disinformation and Agents of Influence.”]

The general logic the KGB utilized in constructing many of the manipulative clandestine messages aimed at foreign leaders was:

• What does the target of influence fear most?
• Construct a message designed to induce them to believe that their nightmare scenario will occur if they take steps that we do not wish them to take.
• Convey this message to the foreign policymakers via a source they trust but whom we clandestinely control.

The current rulers in the Kremlin are likely using the same logic and methods today in trying to influence foreign policymakers not to supply weapons to Ukraine that would enable them to expel the Russian invaders. We can prudently assume, although we cannot know for certain, that the Russian intelligence services are using agents at their control to transmit secret messages about “nightmare scenarios” to Western policymakers. But we do know that Kremlin leaders have made blood-curdling threats quite openly, including Putin and former president and current deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev.

When ordering what he called a “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Putin made what was likely intended to be viewed as a veiled threat to possibly use nuclear weapons, stating:

Whoever tries to interfere with us, and even more so, to create threats for our country, for our people, should know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead you to such consequences that you have never experienced in your history.

In September 2022, when announcing a partial military mobilization in Russia, Putin made a similar threat, warning, “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.”

A 2023 study by the Henry Jackson Society stated:

Russian rhetoric threatens the use of nuclear weapons daily, whether on state-controlled television and social media or through the ramblings of Russian politicians, such as former President and Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev, now deputy head of the Russian Security Council. Medvedev’s threats against the West have become so extreme and out of touch with reality they have lost any ability to scaremonger Western policymakers and observers of the war in Ukraine.

Russian media and bombastic rhetoric by ruling elites threatening the use of nuclear weapons are directed at a dovish audience in the West.

The study also noted:

Western fears of escalation and Russian ‘red lines’ have been raised extensively since Russia launched its invasion. Each time Ukraine has asked for weapons, Russian leaders have warned about escalation which has then been echoed by some dovish Western policymakers. But on each occasion when the West crossed Russia’s imaginary ‘red lines’ there was no Russian response.

We cannot know how effective Russian threats have been in influencing the actions of the United States, Germany, and other Western leaders, but we know that these government are very concerned about the dangers of escalation, as they have alluded to repeatedly.

In his paper on “KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82,” Mitrokhin adds, with regard to messages aimed at influencing foreign policymakers:

Conveying information in this manner is termed ‘the method of special positive influence.’ It involves passing slanted information of various kinds and content, and disinformation, in conversations designed to influence governments, parties, individual political, public and state personalities, through agents, foreign confidential contacts, intelligence officers, and agents or co-optees of Soviet nationality. ‘Special positive influence’ presupposes continuous work for the purpose, constant study of its results and of the reaction to the measures which are taken.

This passage testifies to the professionalism of KGB covert influence operations, which are carefully planned initiatives with a great deal of attention paid to their impact. Mitrokhin’s reference in this passage to the Soviet/Russian intelligence term “confidential contact” is worth expanding upon.

Confidential Contacts

Soviet KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky in his 1991 book with British historian Christopher Andrew, Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 has a chapter on “Agent Recruitment.” In it, he writes:

In order to qualify as a full KGB agent, the ‘subject of deep study’ has to fulfill two main conditions. First, he (or she) has to agree to secret, ‘conspiratorial’ collaboration. Second, he (or she) must be willing to accept instructions from the KGB. Targets who fail to meet with either of these conditions are classed only as ‘confidential contacts’ (doveritelnaya svyaz); their chances of subsequent promotion to full agent are slim. (p.40)

KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s Handbook, a dictionary of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence terms defines “confidential contacts” as:

Individuals of foreign nationality who, without being agents, communicate to intelligence officers information of interest to them and carry out confidential requests, which in substance are of an intelligence nature, on the basis of ideological and political affinity, material interest, friendly or other relations which they have established with the intelligence officers. 

Confidential contacts do not have any obligation toward the intelligence officer (or the intelligence service). (p. 34)

The Handbook also has an additional entry on “confidential contacts of influence,” which are described as:

Confidential contracts of intelligence officers (and intelligence agents) in government and political circles, who are used clandestinely by Intelligence to carry out active measures designed to exert the required influence on government agencies and on the public and political life of a target country. (p. 34)

Gordievsky also included in his book a 1978 “psychological personality profile” that KGB headquarters instructed its field officers to use in assessing possible recruited agents. It listed, inter alia:

1. “Personal qualities which illustrate attitude to operational work:

a) Positive qualities – industrious, conscientious, disciplined, carries out instructions, prepared to take initiative, active punctilious, adheres to principles, adopts a responsible attitude to the task in hand, vigilant, security-minded.

b) Negative qualities – lazy, not conscientious, ill disciplined, does not heed instructions, slovenly, unwilling to take the initiative, passive, slipshod, unprincipled, adopts an irresponsible and uncommitted attitude to the task in hand, does not possess the necessary vigilance, disinterested in security, indiscreet. (pp. 25, 27)

This was the first of 10 areas in which potential recruits were to be evaluated. Other criteria were equally detailed, for example, #4, “Attitude to other people:”

a)   Positive – well disposed, sociable, sympathetic, polite, tactful, fair, thoughtful, sincere, exacting.

b)   Negative – ill disposed, reserved, mistrustful, indifferent, rude, abrupt, unfair, thoughtless, insincere, unexacting, argumentative.” (p. 27)

As a thought exercise, based on these criteria, how do you think the pre-presidential Donald Trump would have been judged by Soviet and Russian intelligence as a potential agent – positively or negatively? I think the answer is clear. He is much more likely to have been viewed by the Chekists in the Kremlin as a useful “confidential contact” than as someone who could be a recruited agent. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine a more ill-tempered, undisciplined man.

I should hasten to add that in focusing on “confidential contacts,” I am following the lead and the insights and analysis of a genuine expert in Soviet and Russian intelligence operations, former NSA counterintelligence analyst John Schindler, who opined on this issue in September 2023 when he was interviewed by Niccolo Soldo, for his Substack, “Fisted by Foucault.” Schindler said:

If you know Chekist modus operandi, Trump was what Russian spies call a “confidential contact,” which falls well short of the Western definition of an intelligence agent (I’ve explained this all in detail here). Some people don’t even know they are one. Seriously, can you image Trump as any kind of spy? He’d crack under pressure in ten seconds. You’d have to search a while to find someone less temperamentally suited to clandestine work than Donald J. Trump.

Thus, Don never got his Trump Tower in Moscow, which is what he wanted all along. That’s a pretty good tell that the secret relationship between Trump and the KGB (and its post-Soviet successor in foreign intelligence, the SVR) was never consummated. But the Kremlin never forgets. This is the “kompromat” on Trump that liberals became obsessed with. It’s not about “pee-pee tapes” and such – the Russians probably do have videos of Trump’s sexual antics, but let’s be honest, Don would brag about them and might post them online himself – rather the secret relationship between Trump and the KGB in the 1980s, the details of which would be embarrassing for Trump, even though that clandestine partnership never really panned out.

For years after the Soviet collapse, Trump had business dealings with various shady Russians, i.e. mob types with KGB connections. Don never gave up his dream of Trump Tower Moscow. He kept certain doors open, and he tried to exploit them in 2016, when he miraculously turned out to have a real shot at the White House. Hence Don’s hiring of third-tier guys like ostrich-jacketed Paul Manafort, who really did have some shady links to Russian intelligence, and oddball Michael Flynn, the former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) director who got cozy with Moscow after he retired from the Army (being fired from DIA by President Obama).

Trump’s error was that he misread Kremlin intentions. Vladimir Putin hated Hillary Clinton more than he liked Donald Trump. Putin blamed Hillary for the 2011 Moscow protests, believing she tried to pull off a “color revolution” in Russia as Secretary of State. Russian machinations in 2016 were about punishing Hillary more than boosting Trump. The concept was to damage Hillary, who was expected by Moscow to win the 2016 election. Trump didn’t expect to win either. Remember, Don had no victory speech ready on election night. Trump’s presidential run started as a grand publicity stunt, an effort by Don to shake loose more money from NBC for future seasons of The Apprentice, but it managed to put Trump in the White House, an outcome that neither he nor Moscow had in their plans.

The dirty little secret of the 2016 Trump-Russia story is that Trump wanted a closer relationship with Moscow than he actually had, and the resistance there was in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage viewed candidate Trump as a publicity-hungry buffoon who was pro-Russian but not terribly useful for Moscow. U.S. and Allied SIGINT agencies intercepted senior Kremlin officials talking about Trump, and all I will say is that their commentary was not flattering to Don.

The absence of Trump’s close relationship with Russian intelligence is proved by that strange July 2016 meeting in Manhattan’s Trump Tower between Team Trump, led by Don Jr., and Kremlin representatives, ostensibly to discuss “adoptions.” The real agenda was that Trump wanted dirt on Hillary from Moscow, which wasn’t supplied. The point is you don’t need to fumble around with such meetings if you’re a bona fide Russian agent. Trump then would have the top SVR officer in New York on speed-dial.

Moreover, the Kremlin was messing around with Trump, and not just Hillary, in 2016. Russian intelligence had a hand in the notorious Steele Dossier, which was denounced by real experts (such as me) on Russian spy games as obvious disinformation, designed to remind Trump that Moscow possessed kompromat on him. It worked too well and instead became the focus of anti-Trump mania on the Left.

Once Trump entered the White House, he was his usual transgressive self and did stupid things like invite the Russian Ambassador to the Oval Office, which only “proved” to liberals that he was a Kremlin pawn. Trump became so hobbled by that controversy, which, when coupled with Don’s lazy inability to ever figure out how the Executive Branch which he controlled actually worked, meant that Moscow wound up disappointed in Trump, who over four years never managed to shift U.S. policy in any pro-Kremlin direction worth mentioning. Indeed, in policy terms, Trump’s administration was harsher towards Moscow than Obama was.

To sum up: both sides have it wrong. The Left’s insistence that Trump “was installed to destroy us” sounds plausible to “Resistance” wine moms but is complete fantasy. Russian intelligence ran disinformation and propaganda operations against the U.S. 2016 election, but more to smear Hillary than boost Trump. Their impact on the election was slight in any event. However, the Right’s insistence that the “Russia hoax” as Trump calls it was a figment of the liberal imagination isn’t true either. Trump’s conduct in 2016 can’t be called espionage, but Don would have colluded more closely with Moscow if he’d been allowed to. The Kremlin didn’t want that. 

Those are the nuanced, deeply informed views of a genuine expert on Soviet/Russian intelligence operations, of which there are very few commenting in public. I highly recommend John’s Substack, Top Secret Umbra, which he describes as “A Counterintelligence Perspective on Espionage, Terrorism, Deception and Propaganda.” 

KGB Manual on Confidential Contacts

Schinder references a 1977 manual on “Confidential Contacts in the KGB’s Foreign Intelligence and Work with Them,” published in a limited run of 220 offset copies by Institute of the KGB, which he says is still in use Russian foreign intelligence today, and which was published in 2021 by the Free Russia Foundation. It makes for fascinating reading. Some excerpts are (read while thinking of Trump as the confidential contact or “foreigner”):

Some intelligence assignments for political or operational reasons are not always prudent to perform with the use only of agents.

Confidential contacts by comparison to agents are a less developed, less effective and less manageable means of foreign intelligence. However, [their use] … enables the use for intelligence purposes of persons who occupy high professional or public positions in their countries but with whom relations are impossible or inadvisable to be taken to the level of agent.

… confidential relations involve collaboration by such a foreigner with an intelligence officer, which, unlike collaboration with an agent, is outwardly carried out largely within the law of his country in practice. The foreigner places his obligations to his government or to his party higher than his duties to the Soviet representative (or agency).

But unlike lawful relations, the foreigner who maintains confidential relations with the intelligence officer, influenced by certain incentives, to some extent consciously “gets around” or partly violates the requirements of certain legal and especially administrative regulations. He does this, however, within such limits and in such a form which are permissible from his perspective and do not involve criminal liability.

… The intelligence officer who maintains confidential relations with a foreigner regards with understanding the foreigner’s effort to mainly observe the relevant legal norms, and himself outwardly shows respect to these norms, legending his actions and the motives for his behavior convincingly.

… Thus, confidential relations include, or combine within them some characteristics specific to agent relations, and several characteristics pertaining to lawful relations. They contain certain elements; the foreigner’s deviation from legal and administrative regulations in effect in his country, not to mention the deviations of both the intelligence officer and the foreigner from the official line of behavior, and thus qualitatively differ from lawful relations. But these deviations are not systematic and persistent and do not create a threat of criminal prosecution of the foreigner, which substantially distinguishes confidential relations from agent relations.

… Confidential contacts are among the most important and effective means of performing intelligence tasks. To a significant degree, they complement and extend the agent opportunities of foreign intelligence and sometimes serve as the chief means of obtaining intelligence information and conducting active measures [covert influence operations].

… the value of the information obtained from confidential contacts, especially from those who occupy a high professional or civic post may be no less than the value of information obtained by an agents’ network, and active measures carried out with the help of confidential contacts may be no less important and effective than the active measures conducted through the agents’ network.

… In order to maintain confidential relations, it is vital to have the official position of the foreigner correspond to the official position of the intelligence officer in the cover agency.

… The grounds for establishing confidential relations with foreigners essentially are not distinguishable from those for recruitment of foreigners as agents. …

The ideological-political basis is the most reliable. In establishing confidential relations, it is used very often by itself, as well as in combination with material or mental psychological grounds.

… the intelligence assignments for confidential contacts, especially from the state, political and other prominent figures, cannot be given as commands or ultimatums or without appeal. They must be given to the foreigner in the form of a request, wish, or polite recommendation. The form of giving the assignments must not hurt the foreigner’s pride, lower him to the level of a “petty agent,” or place in doubt his self-reliance and independence. Even so, the assignments cannot be given casually, as if by the way. In that case, the foreigner may not pay attention to the assignment, and not ascribe it the necessary meaning, which inevitably reflects on the quality of its fulfillment.

… one must make sure the number and frequency of meetings corresponds to the legend, and to the foreigner’s and intelligence officer’s official positions.

…the place of the meetings must ensure security for holding confidential, substantive conversations, and on the other, be natural and justified for the intelligence agent and the foreigner and not lead to a thought that they are trying to conceal their contact as some sort of unlawful action.

… candidates for enlistment in confidential collaboration are selected, as a rule, from among foreigners who have a more or less high professional and social position in their countries, who are in many cases political or government figures, prominent media workers; and major specialists in the fields of sciences of interest to intelligence. These persons are usually relatively independent, enjoy significant authority, popularity and respect in their milieu, are able to dispose people well toward them, have influence on them, and guide them.

… the intelligence officer, for successful management of a confidential contact and the most effective use of him in the interests of intelligence may rely above all on his art of persuasion. For this, it is necessary to analyze deeply the psychology of the personality; to be able to create the necessary psychological situations; to detect in time various nuances in the behavior of the target of operational development and remove or neutralize undesirable elements of his behavior. The intelligence officer must know the structure and patterns of interpersonal relations; to be able to create a psychological climate favorable for himself; to ensure, through sophisticated use of his “role” the necessary psychological compatibility and interest by the target of operative development in communication with him.

Trump

Trump is now likely, barring extraordinary circumstances, to be the Republican candidate for president this year and, if he is elected, his second term would not be a carbon copy of the first. 

With regard to the question of Russian influence on a potential second Trump administration, the signs are very worrisome. 

First, Trump would not be surrounded by responsible policymakers from the Republican and Washington foreign policy establishment, who restrained him in his first term, persuading him, for example, not to withdraw from NATO, as he wished to do. Despite this, in 2020 Trump made it very clear to top European policymakers that he considered NATO to be “dead,” as Politico reported in January 2024:

"You need to understand that if Europe is under attack we will never come to help you and to support you," Trump told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2020, according to French European Commissioner Thierry Breton, who was also present at a meeting at the World Economic Forum in Davos.

"By the way, NATO is dead, and we will leave, we will quit NATO," Trump also said ….

The U.S. Congress has passed legislation forbidding any president from withdrawing from NATO without Senate approval, but if Trump is elected, he will be president and in a position to renege on any treaty obligations he wishes.

This makes the topic of what motivates Trump and how he can be manipulated more relevant than ever. 

Gordievsky notes in his 1991 book Instructions from the Centre, “if [a KGB officer] finds it difficult to exert an ideological or financial hold over the target, the recruiter will seek to establish a bond of personal friendship.  Frequently, flattery is his most important tool.” (p. 24; emphasis added)

Donald Trump’s Hero Worship of Dictators

Does anyone doubt that Trump is susceptible to flattery or that he is “wowed” by ruthless leaders like Putin and China’s Xi, whom he likely sees as his ego ideal, defined as “the inner image of oneself as one wants to become.”  Thus, he has described Chinese leader Xi in worshipful terms, saying that Xi “runs 1.4 billion people with an iron fist. Smart, brilliant, everything perfect. There’s nobody in Hollywood like this guy,” as if the make-believe world of Hollywood is the standard against which all things should be judged.

In 2016,  Dan P. McAdams, a psychology professor at Northwestern University and the author of the book The Strange Case of Donald J. Trump: A Psychological Reckoning, commented on Trump’s psychological state.

For psychologists, it is almost impossible to talk about Donald Trump without using the word narcissism. Asked to sum up Trump’s personality for an article in Vanity Fair, Howard Gardner, a psychologist at Harvard, responded, “Remarkably narcissistic.” George Simon, a clinical psychologist who conducts seminars on manipulative behavior, says Trump is “so classic that I’m archiving video clips of him to use in workshops because there’s no better example” of narcissism ….

… People with strong narcissistic needs want to love themselves, and they desperately want others to love them too—or at least admire them, see them as brilliant and powerful and beautiful, even just see them, period. The fundamental life goal is to promote the greatness of the self, for all to see.

A 2018 Psychology Today article “Understanding the Mind of a Narcissist” describes narcissists in these terms:

Despite having a seemingly strong personality, narcissists lack a core self. Their self-image and thinking and behavior are other-oriented in order to stabilize and validate their self-esteem and fragile, fragmented self.

… narcissists only "love" themselves as reflected in the eyes of others. It’s a common misconception that they love themselves. They may actually dislike themselves immensely. Their inflated self-flattery, perfectionism, and arrogance are merely covers for the self-loathing they don’t admit — usually even to themselves. Instead, it’s projected outward in their disdain for and criticism of others. They’re too afraid to look at themselves because they believe the truth would be devastating. Emotionally, they may be dead inside, and hungering to be filled and validated by others.

Flattery from a world leader whom he admired could be the most valuable thing for Trump’s wounded psyche. He would likely be willing to sacrifice large parts of the country’s security for ephemeral praise.

Donald Trump's former AG Bill Barr said of Trump:

He’s a consummate narcissist. … He will always put his personal interest and gratifying his own ego above everything else, including the country’s interests. There’s no question about it. … He’s a very petty individual who will always put his interests ahead of the country's, his personal gratification of his ego. Our country can't be a therapy session for a troubled man like this.

It should not be difficult for Putin, Xi or other canny world leaders use flattery and other calculating techniques to manipulate anyone with such gargantuan ego needs. Trump would likely do almost anything to win the approval and praise of people he idealizes. 

Trump’s former National Security Adviser John Bolton outlined these concerns in recent article, “Trump Is a Danger to U.S. Security” in The Wall Street Journal on January 31, 2024. Mr. Bolton wrote:

Mr. Putin’s flattery pleases Mr. Trump. When Mr. Putin welcomed Mr. Trump’s talk last year of ending the Ukraine war, Mr. Trump gushed: “I like that he said that. Because that means what I’m saying is right.” Mr. Putin knows his mark and would relish a second Trump term.

An even greater danger is that Mr. Trump will act on his desire to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He came precariously close in 2018. …

… In a second term, Mr. Trump would likely continue seeking “the deal of the century” with China, while his protectionism, in addition to being bad economic policy, would make it harder to stand up to Beijing. The trade fights he picked with Japan, Europe and others impaired our ability to increase pressure against China’s broader transgressions.

… And imagine Mr. Trump’s euphoria at resuming contact with North Korea’s Kim Jung Un, about whom he famously boasted that “we fell in love.” Mr. Trump almost gave away the store to Pyongyang, and he could try again. A reckless nuclear deal would alienate Japan and South Korea, extend China’s influence, and strengthen the Beijing-Moscow axis.

… A second Trump term would bring erratic policy and uncertain leadership, which the China-Russia axis would be only too eager to exploit.

The Chekist leaders in the Kremlin are professionally schooled in ways to manipulate others, and Trump’s need for approval and publicity are so acute that he would essentially be putty in the hands of tough, hostile, well-briefed, brainy foreign leaders.

8.  Today’s disinformation economy was built on the lying techniques of Big Tobacco

Another long read on disinformation with an interesting thesis. You can also listen to this at the link below (46 minutes)

Today’s disinformation economy was built on the lying techniques of Big Tobacco

Salon columnist Matthew Rozsa discusses the history of disinformation

https://plus.flux.community/p/todays-disinformation-economy-was?utm

plus.flux.community · by Matthew Sheffield

The term disinformation is most commonly associated with the internet and social media posters spreading conspiracy theories, but when you really think about it, disinformation is actually just lying at an industrial scale.

While various authoritarian governments have used lying and propaganda forever, the history is crystal-clear: In the United States, the modern-day tactics of lying to the masses were invented in the mid-20th century by huge tobacco companies desperate to stave off federal regulation of their disease-causing products.

This is a history worth exploring because all of the disinformation techniques that Big Tobacco used have been subsequently adopted by fossil fuel companies to fight public accountability and then further adopted by Donald Trump into a political marketing program that is essentially a personality cult.

Joining me in this episode to talk about the history of disinformation and the tobacco industry is Matthew Rozsa, he is a climate change journalist at Salon.com who’s written about Big Tobacco and propaganda and how its deceptive techniques were later adopted to oppose climate change mitigation policies.

The video of this discussion is available. The transcript of the audio follows. The conversation took place January 25, 2024.

Related Content

• Philosopher Richard Bett on the history of skepticism and why today’s online know-nothings are practicing a zombie Socratic method
• Disinformation researcher Renée DiResta on epistemology and internet content moderation
• Former libertarian activist Will Wilkinson on the many commonalities of atheist libertarianism and Christian fundamentalism
• The American right is at war with modernity itself and the struggle did not begin with Donald Trump
• How reactionaries invented canceling people while also pretending to believe in free speech

Audio Chapters

0:00 — Introduction

03:00 — The History of Disinformation in the Tobacco Industry

06:23 — Manufacturing doubt and building anti-epistemology

08:33 — Big Oil and American reactionaries adopted Big Tobacco's disinformation techniques

16:50 — How mainstream journalism's "both sides" paradigm facilitates disinformation

21:43 — False dilemmas can protect false beliefs

24:36 — Both tobacco and oil companies hid their private research on the harms of their products

29:34 — Donald Trump's nonstop cascade of lies is the continuation of this dishonest tradition

32:36 — Disinformation addicts mostly cannot be persuaded, so they must be opposed

Cover image: An advertisement for Camel cigarettes featuring the cartoon character Joe Camel

Audio Transcript

This is a rush transcript that likely contains errors. It is provided for convenience purposes only.

MATTHEW SHEFFIELD: Thanks for being here today, Matt.

MATTHEW ROZSA: Thank you for having me, Matthew.

SHEFFIELD: All right. Well, the history of the history that we're going to be talking about here today, I think, is a bit unfamiliar to a lot of people because advertising is kind of boring to everybody.

I think, to the extent people know about advertising in the 20th century, they think of Andy Warhol and that's about it. But there's a lot more there, and Mad Men only scratched the surface, I'm afraid. [00:03:00]

ROZSA: I would say if you're talking about Big Tobacco, you have to start in the early 1960s, when president John F. Kennedy was elected on what he described as a New Frontier platform, and he appointed people to positions of power that were idealistic and believed in an activist version of government. One of those people was the Surgeon General Luther Terry, and he became concerned about tobacco products in 1964 and in 1965. Because of his efforts and because of other investigations that validated his concerns, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 was passed and it mandated that warning labels had to be attached to cigarette boxes.

That should have been the end of it in terms of any pushback to the scientific consensus that cigarettes are linked to lung cancer and other deadly diseases. But tobacco companies [00:04:00] wanted to maximize their profits, so in the 1970s, they launched a campaign called Operation Berkshire. Operation Berkshire manufactured doubt, and that is a term that anyone who wants to study disinformation should familiarize themselves with—manufactured doubt.

They made it seem as if there were legitimate scientific disagreements about the risks posed by tobacco products, even though that was objectively not the case. They created organizations like the International Committee on Smoking Issues, which later changed its name to the International Tobacco Information Center.

They were very, very effective until 1994, when a Democratic congressman from California named Henry Waxman began an investigation of his own. He exposed Big Tobacco and there was a famous hearing on April [00:05:00] 16th of that year in which the executives lied under oath when asked if they knew that nicotine was addictive.

This is extremely important because all of these executives were in various ways later forced out of their industry. They suffered legal consequences. And in 1998, 46 states and the four major tobacco companies signed the Master Settlement Agreement, which stipulated that tobacco companies had to pay states 206 billion over 25 years, as well as take steps to reduce youth smoking.

That in terms of the story of big tobacco is still not the end of it, but that is where this becomes relevant when discussing other political issues, because other interest groups that want to do things which harm the public follow big tobacco's playbook. They use the same [00:06:00] tactics. They manufacture doubt rather than pat rather than even though they seem like they're presenting legitimate arguments.

These are synthetic positions that exist for the sole purpose of advancing the economic. interests of the fossil fuel industry and those who otherwise are financially connected to it.

Manufacturing doubt and building anti-epistemology

SHEFFIELD: Well, and so the term manufacturing doubt, let's talk about that a little bit more. What does that mean? And, and how does it work and how did it work for big tobacco in terms of what they were doing with big tobacco?

ROZSA: They. People, they paid scientists, they paid doctors, they paid activists to claim that the consensus about the dangers posed by nicotine products were either overstated or somehow questionable. And the reality is these arguments did [00:07:00] not come about through independent scientific research. These arguments, all of them were promulgated by Organizations that had an agenda that agenda was to make money for, in this case, tobacco companies and the public, which is not necessarily scientifically literate, doesn't know that when they read studies, they have to look for things like conflicts of interest that they have to not just accept that the byline is who that person says they are.

They have to do a little digging. They don't necessarily understand. It. Even what a lot of this jargon filled language really means that makes it easy for bad faith actors to pollute the public dialogue. Yeah.

SHEFFIELD: Well, and, and also to do it and to use, people who have actual real scientific credentials to deliver disingenuous arguments that some of which may even be [00:08:00] true in a limited sense.

In other words, that. They may address one specific peripheral point. In regards to a scientific consensus but it's not in any way essential to it. So in other words, you might say, well, somebody, they might expose someone having fudged on some research, something, or, committed some plagiarism or something like that and claim, well, see, then this invalidates everything that the entire scientific community has saying about whether it's, tobacco and cancer or climate change or whatever.

Big Oil and American reactionaries adopted Big Tobacco's disinformation techniques

SHEFFIELD: That that's it's and the idea is basically to make it so that you can believe what you want and to destroy the idea of objective truth. Like, that's that's what's so ironic about this right wing. And I guess in their case, they weren't deliberately. It wasn't right wing originally in their case. But it ended up being that way.

But you know, originally what they're trying to [00:09:00] do is sort of. Create an anti epistemology, if you will, a framework in which knowledge is impossible.

ROZSA: I agree. I would also add to use to go back to something you said earlier. They will say something that has an element of truth in it, but presented in a way that intentionally confuses the issue to use 1 example when you're discussing climate change, the most important thing to know is that The primary cause of greenhouse gas emissions is humanity's use of fossil fuels for purposes like electricity generation and transportation.

That is the primary cause of the problem. That doesn't mean that there aren't other factors that contribute to climate change. 1 factor that deniers like to bring up is volcanic eruptions. I wrote an article for salon where I talked to experts about volcanic eruptions. They do, in fact. Play a [00:10:00] role in climate change, but to quote one of my articles, this one is called how much are volcanoes to blame for climate change?

And I wrote it last year. Flavio Lennar, an assistant professor of earth and atmospheric sciences at Cornell University told me volcanoes only emit small amounts of CO2 relative to how much humans emit today. Another possible factor of natural climate change are changes in solar radiation, but its fluctuations are too small to explain current climate change, plus it has been trending down since 1950, not up.

He then proceeds to list other naturally occurring climate change variables, and indeed, deniers will say, what about solar radiation? What about all of these things that arguably could play a role? And. In many cases, do all of that can be used to confuse people who aren't familiar with the science and convince them [00:11:00] that, well, reducing fossil fuels.

Is it necessary? Eventually eliminating fossil fuels? Is it necessary? Because we'll still have climate change. That is subjectively untrue. If humanity follows the path established in the Paris climate accords, we will you. Eventually see a improvement in this area. And that's what that's the point that I was making.

Yeah.

SHEFFIELD: Yeah. And, but to that, speaking of, sort of remedies that are proposed to, mitigate crises discovered by science. Part of the. You, you mentioned the, the plan that they had set up called Operation Berkshire. One of the things that they did later well, I guess let's let's go back to that.

And actually, maybe secondhand smoking is how we can do it. Because, because I mean, essentially, there were. There were kind of three phases, if you will, in terms of regulation of Big Tobacco.

One was [00:12:00] first, the first one was with children. And then the second one was with just establishing the link of cancer and publicly disclosing that. And then the third one was secondhand smoke. That was kind of the last domino that fell. So I'm just the reason why I want to focus on this a bit more and unpack it is that, I, I, I want to get into the relationship between the commercialized anti epistemology that we're talking about here, and then how. How that was then exported into other issues. That's, that's basically the intent of, of,

ROZSA: of the episode.

I, I see, I think I see, I mean, my answer to that question would be that the EPIs epistemologically, as you put it earlier, it's nihilistic. It's the idea that we can't have definitive answers to these questions, and therefore you may as well just accept the status quo. That in the case of Big Tobacco caused [00:13:00] people to doubt for it because if in the case of Big Tobacco, the psychological component of it is if people doubt whether we really know for sure that cigarettes can cause lung cancer, well, then I guess I might as well continue smoking and that same type of logic is applied in other areas.

Big Tobacco is not the area that I've studied in depth. My area in depth has been climate change. I know that the strategies that were applied back in the 1970s after the original implementation of these tobacco regulations have been used by other private companies. This includes fossil fuel companies that do not want climate change regulations to be implemented or in some cases even passed.

SHEFFIELD: Yeah, well and and there is a direct link here because These techniques were, they were pioneered by commercial nonpolitical actors, but the people who came up with them and the companies, the [00:14:00] marketing agencies and ad agencies that created them, they were also had clients in the, in the right wing activists fear.

And, and then as the Republican party, especially under Reagan became overtly obsessed with. Dismantling regulations and things like that. This became a natural fit for them and they and they did in fact. Get together and there were a number of, of organizations that were, being funded by big tobacco, such as heritage foundation and a number of other right wing groups that helped the launder of some of these messages especially as we got, into the into the nineties and, and eighties and, when, when the focus became on curbing secondhand smoking and things like that and so.

Yeah. I guess what, what, and then, of course, as you mentioned, that they, they took those same ideas into the climate change discussion as well. And so it's, it's an [00:15:00] interesting act, though, in a sense, though, because everyone wants to think that they are open minded. That they do their own research like that's it.

That is basically the paradigm that they were trying to tell you that big tobacco was using was that do your own research. You can believe what you want. You have the credibility and expertise. To dispute, a biologist who has been published in, 10 different medical journals more than they do because you have common sense

ROZSA: or and I find because I interact with more climate change deniers than I can shake a.

And the reality is they often will say, well, you have this scientist. What about this scientist? They don't. And then when you claim, well, my scientist is objectively correct. And your scientist is objectively incorrect. They make you seem like the unreasonable one. How can you claim that the matter is settled?

Why are you afraid of new ideas? [00:16:00] Why am I not allowed to just ask questions? This is the type of. Reasoning and on a superficial level, that reasoning makes sense on a superficial level. Yes, we should be open to hearing new ideas to being challenged to questioning even our most sacred precepts, but there is a burden on the people asking those questions.

And that burden is to have evidence based arguments. When you have scientists asking questions, not based on evidence, but because they're paid. By special interest groups to manufacture doubt, those arguments are not legitimate and should not be taken seriously. And when they are taken seriously, it makes it harder for the public to have intelligent conversations about these literal life and death issues.

How mainstream journalism's "both sides" paradigm facilitates disinformation

SHEFFIELD: Yeah, no, absolutely. And, and I think it's, it's something that, that point that you just made. [00:17:00] It's something that I think people who have who are politically progressive and well informed about issues understand that innately and, have a generalized and daily appreciation of that fact.

But I think it's a point that a lot of people who are not really political or don't pay attention to the news whatever their political orientation is. It's seems difficult to grasp and it's something that, it's related to the idea of this paradigm that, that they're seizing on and manipulating, it also exists in the news media as well.

This, this, the infamous both sides epistemology of journalism where no matter what the Republicans do or what they say, you have to just portray them as, a routine regular. political party and well, we got to cover what they're saying and put it on there. And not really fact check it or say anything contrary to it because that's not our job.

When in fact [00:18:00] it is their job and they are attacking you as a journalist every single day. I would argue. You hold your fire. Sorry,

ROZSA: I know I shouldn't I was interrupting, but I very enthusiastic because the point that I make about this in terms of climate change specifically is they they further manipulate people by pointing to the scientific method and arguing that those of us who acknowledge the evidence are somehow being unscientific by insisting that those who deny the Climate change and deny humanity's role in climate change provide evidence of their own.

That is the underline the bottom line that everyone needs to know in terms of climate change is that if humanity significantly reduces its greenhouse gas emissions, particularly climate Those that are linked to fossil fuels like carbon dioxide, we will be able to prevent a future [00:19:00] of intense weather disruptions, heat waves, droughts, food shortages, and other calamities.

This is what we're trying to accomplish. It is at its core. A pollution reduction problem, and we're not able to have an intelligent conversation about how to solve that problem because people who are profiting from the status quo are manufacturing doubt, creating doubt, not based on evidence, but based on evidence.

Flooding the zone with shit, to use an expression that was coined by someone, and I have heard before, it refers to the strategy of the It was Steve Bannon, actually. Steve Bannon? You knew who coined that? Yes, it's a good expression. I'm actually also thinking, because, one of the pivotal points in the history of manufacturing doubt for climate change was in 2003.

That was when President George W. Bush, at Vice President Dick Cheney's urging, fired [00:20:00] his Environmental Protection Agency head, Christine Todd Whitman. Whitman acknowledged that climate change was real, and although she preferred free market approaches to addressing environmental problems, she was not a science denier.

Cheney and the fossil fuel industry of which he was a part through his connection to Halliburton Wanted her gone and in 2003 when she was removed from power That was the tipping point at which the mainstream within the republican party Stopped acknowledging that human activity is causing climate change.

Before 2003, Republican presidents were not explicitly anti science. They preferred more conservative policy approaches to addressing environmental problems, but they didn't challenge the notion that scientific inquiry was in itself. Important. Now, there are millions of [00:21:00] people who distrust climatologists as a group, who distrust geologists as a group, who distrust whole branches of well established science that is based on centuries of research because philosophically it's incompatible with what they've been told to believe about climate change.

That is a form of mass insanity, is it not?

SHEFFIELD: It is, and one of the ways that they do that, and you, and you do talk about this, so, And just for reference we're, this discussion is built around two articles that you wrote for a salon, which will definitely be in the show notes. I encourage everybody to check those out after we're done here, but yeah, the

False dilemmas can protect false beliefs

SHEFFIELD: one of the, the techniques of, of creating this, thoughtless response in the to, to susceptible people is to create a false sense of urgency and to lie about mitigation efforts. And, and they did that [00:22:00] in the 90s when, when, when people were trying to say, look, secondhand smoking is, is killing people and giving them cancer they, they promulgated the idea that, well, you just want to ban cigarettes entirely and make them illegal.

And you're going to create this giant, massive black market and you're going to, create all these crimes and you're going to subsidize the mafia with this and et cetera, et cetera. And, and then they recycled the same thing today with regard to climate change policies to reduce carbon, claiming that it would create communism, that it would destroy the market.

And it's, they're, they're trying to create panic with people who don't really know anything about policy or or what would entail. And the reality is that, as the various renew deal proposals have demonstrated, these are not. Anti capitalist proposals that are being advanced.

And in fact, people would be given lots of money rather than having their [00:23:00] livelihoods taken away because people, because climate change activists understand that you have to make it possible for people to do this. So, yeah,

ROZSA: if I may, it reminds me of a quote from Dr. Michael E. Mann, a climatologist at the University of Pennsylvania, who I interview frequently and in my article, the one that we're discussing about vice president Cheney and his role in. Creating this movement of misinformation, so to speak man said it was a harbinger of things to come because, of course, after this, the bad faith attack by Republicans on climate science has now metastasized to our entire body politic and to the very notion of fact based discourse.

That sums it up perfectly. Dick Cheney did not want Christine Todd Whitman as Bush's EPA head because her policies would cost fossil fuel companies money. And I do believe that fossil fuel companies are correct about one thing. [00:24:00] Eventually, we will need to transition entirely away. From use of fossil fuels, if you, if they do indeed acknowledge that the scientists are right, then they also have to acknowledge that their industry will need to be phased out.

But the question, the obvious question is what matters more their desire to make as much money as possible doing what they've been doing for decades, or the species of the planet needing to survive without the climate being changed by greenhouse gas emissions.

Both tobacco and oil companies hid their private research on the harms of their products

SHEFFIELD: Yeah, well, and and there and there is another parallel between climate change denial and tobacco and big tobacco tactics earlier is that both of these industries had privately developed research, which showed that they were creating a problem for humanity through their products and they suppressed it and did not release it to the public. And can you talk about [00:25:00] that parallel? If you will.

ROZSA: Absolutely. And in 1994, as I mentioned before, there was a famous congressional hearing where seven members, the seven dwarfs, so to speak, of big tobacco were brought to Washington to discuss whether their products were addictive and they weren't.

Okay. Lied under oath, they perjured themselves. It was later proven through investigation that they had commissioned these inquiries, their own private studies into their products and knew through that independently financed research that their products were addictive. So when they told Congressman Henry Waxman that they did not think that their product was addictive, they were lying.

This was not a legitimate difference of opinion. They were saying something that they knew to be false. And today, with climate change denial, it's the same thing. When I wrote that article about Big Tobacco, I was inspired because because fossil fuel [00:26:00] executives were appearing in Washington. They were much better prepped than the tobacco executives were in 1994.

The purpose, though, was the same. Did they accept? The scientific facts, the fact that oceanographers and biologists and scientists from dozens of disciplines have, through their research, proved that the planet is getting warmer and that the primary cause is greenhouse gas emissions caught due to fossil fuels.

And it's very, very difficult, obviously, because that hearing was not watched. By most people, most people weren't paying attention, having done all of the research and so that they could call out the lies that were being spoken, but that's, I guess, where, as a journalist, it can be frustrating because I know people personally who are climate change deniers who will talk to me [00:27:00] about misinformation they read and act as if that misinformation is as valid as falsehoods.

The information that I received from scientists who spend years in the field, conducting research, having it peer reviewed, which means that, and that's what I think a lot of the public doesn't understand is that the peer review process, as long as it's done with integrity is very rigorous. It is you, there is no ideological agenda causing people to say that the earth is getting warmer.

These are scientists who just engage, go out. Do the research, bring it back, and then have to have it tested by other scientists to prove that it is worthy of being published.

SHEFFIELD: Well, and they also explicitly are testing alternative methods or alternative explanations for why phenomenon are happening. So it is the case, that not every single whether it's, insect population or erosion in an area or [00:28:00] whatever, like it's not always necessarily going to be because of climate change, whatever these things may be and but they are testing all of these alternative explanations when they're looking at something to say, well, why are there more of this particular species of grasshopper right now in this area?

What's happening? Where did this come from? And so they'll go and propose. Well, it's maybe this 1. Maybe it's this 1. Okay. And, but the research in many of these cases keeps coming to, well, the climate is changing for these, organisms or for whatever the natural phenomenon was, and that's just the reality of it.

Like you can, to your, I'm just underscoring your point there. You're, you're a hundred percent right with that and people it's it, but if you don't understand how science works and how it's made. It can seem like it's a conspiracy if you don't understand it.

ROZSA: I would also like to quote something. I actually had the privilege of interviewing christine Todd Whitman for salon for an article.

I wrote about centrism. I'll share the link with you [00:29:00] It was called where have all the centrists gone? And she said those who are yelling the loudest have gotten the microphone And those are the ones that get the attention of the press that Also succinctly encapsulates part of the problem when it comes to fighting misinformation is that they are the loudest voices and they are the voices which have the microphone.

In this case, the funding of special interest groups that want their agenda to prevail.

SHEFFIELD: Yeah. Okay, great. Let me click that.

ROZSA: So I love that. Okay, great.

Donald Trump's nonstop cascade of lies is the continuation of this dishonest tradition

SHEFFIELD: The techniques of disinformation, the, the methods of propagating it, the of spreading the idea of anti epistemology it's of course inherent in Donald Trump's entire shtick and his, especially in regards to his false claims about the 2020 election.

And, there are millions of, of, of right leaning people in the United States now that they want to desperately believe that [00:30:00] they themselves and their belief system are not linked to Donald Trump. And what he's done inside the Republican party, that they think that he did this uniquely and just sort of came out of nowhere and made everyone in the Republican party insane. But as we're, we've been talking about today, like all of this has just built upon each other that once you've established that nothing can be true, that expertise is not real, that academics and scientists are lying to you.

Then anything is possible. Anything can be true. Any belief can be you can believe whatever you want. And so that's why to this day, a majority of Republicans now believe that Donald Trump. Did not lose the 2020 election, and now we've reached the point where they believe that the January 6th Capitol invasion, the only invasion and refusal to concede peaceful transfer of power in American history was somehow Not inappropriate.

That is the Republican belief. [00:31:00]

ROZSA: I'm glad that you drew that connection because I think it's not, it's not only not a coincidence in one in ways you can understand one better through comprehending the other to understand how people can see footage of. These rioters pouring into the Capitol footage of Ashley Babbitt trying violently to murder the vice president of the United States, footage of, of police officers being abused.

And somehow they'll just buy what a right wing media outlet tries to sell them through manipulated edits as an alternative reality. It speaks to an almost cravenness, a craven disregard for the truth. And once you understand that they want to not accept reality, it suddenly is a lot easier to comprehend how they can deny [00:32:00] Thousands of scientists and their research and deny what thousands of politicians, their own elected officials experienced because they want to believe that Donald Trump isn't a would be despot and they want to believe that they can continue using fossil fuels in the ways that they find pleasurable without it harming the planet and damn anyone who will tell me not to drive to the polls in an SUV on November, 2024 and vote for Trump. Yeah.

Disinformation addicts mostly cannot be persuaded, so they must be opposed

SHEFFIELD: Well, so what are you thinking that are for people who are aware of what's going on in this regard?

Have you given any thought about, what can be done to sort of counteract this anti epistemology? And

ROZSA: I have spent a great deal of time pondering that question because I. Like I said, I know a lot of people who are right wing. I care about them. [00:33:00] I don't think that they are bad people. I just think that they have been misinformed.

But pride is a very difficult barrier for most to overcome. And at this point, my I'd say that the goal of most journalists in the climate change field is to just present the scientific reports as they come in as accurately as possible in a way that is accessible so that people who understand the problem are up to date with their information and people who are on the fence or just uninformed can receive accurate information. For the people who already swallowed the misinformation and only crave more, there is no hope. So we just have to create a political coalition large enough that their bad ideas don't lead to bad policies.

SHEFFIELD: Yeah, I think that that is That's [00:34:00] probably right. Especially because a lot of, the, the population just from a, from a age standpoint, I mean, the, the only age group that Donald Trump won in 2020 was people who were who were 55 and older, if I remember right, and or 65 plus and so, when you get to that age.

It's really hard to change your ways. Most people have gotten to that point and feel like they have figured everything out, that they know everything about the world. I mean, there's, there's, it is an irony, an unfortunate irony of society that people mock, correctly mock teenagers for thinking they know everything, but They also do not recognize that the elderly don't know everything either.

And are just as prone to being as arrogant and in that regard.

ROZSA: I would also add that there are many young people who are aspiring to leadership on the right. People like Vivek Ramaswamy, who is a climate change denier. He is from our generation. He was born in [00:35:00] the 1980s, like you and me, but. His ideas sound like something that a crotchety old grandpa who watches Fox News 12 hours a day would spout.

He is, he is, he is an octogenarian climate change denier in the package of a slick young millennial. Yeah.

SHEFFIELD: Yeah. And so, and and there is some, some there's, there is hope to be derived from the fact though, that generation Z in having been faced with the horrible circumstances that, the, the Trump voting elders have created for them, that they are now.

voting in self defense in percentages much higher than any other generation before them.

ROZSA: My concern though is when will it be too late? Because, and I, I, I often joke that I feel [00:36:00] like I live in. A sci fi movie, but it's an apocalyptic disaster film, which is never the genre you would want to live in.

And 1 of the themes of those films is that there is a countdown. And in this case, although we don't know exactly where we are in that countdown, there is a countdown. Once temperatures go beyond 1. 5 degrees Celsius above industrial levels, it is going to be much harder. To prevent a lot of the climate change related damage that will then occur, or at least mitigate its effects.

There is a threshold that we are close to hitting, and I'm not sure Generation Z is going to have enough time to turn things around and fix the mistakes that their Trump voting elders made. I feel horrible for them. All of their anger toward us, very justified.

SHEFFIELD: Yeah. Well, no, that's true. And, [00:37:00] and I guess, and we were talking before we were recording that, I think the other, that re that reality with both climate change, but also other issues like gun safety and things like that or police reform, these are all issues that are directly, directly impacting younger people much more than people who are older than them and the, the, the right wing basically in, in a lot of ways, humans, we have kind of been stuck in sort of the controversies, the philosophical controversies of the, the early 20th century and never gotten past them. Whether it is, people refusing to, believe that human beings evolved.

I mean, that to this day. remains in the United States, unfortunately, a controversial assertion in the views of many people. And like, even now, like in states like Oklahoma and others, they They mandate that textbooks have things in them that say [00:38:00] something like, well, evolution is just a theory it is, it needs, it needs more research to determine where did life originate and and I'm trying to remember what the exact verbiage is, but I'll, I'll find it later, but yeah, like it's, it, it just, they, they, there's this sort of continuing cycle where the right is sort of, it, Advancing Nietzschean nihilism and the American left and population at large never discovered existentialism, which is the antidote to it.

ROZSA: I think that is an excellent point. In our prerecorded conversation, I also discussed the politics of aesthetics that is used by fascists, where they convince the working class to. Engage in artistic displays and performances and met modes of self expression that are indeed satisfying, but that don't in any way, substantively address the underlying social and [00:39:00] economic problems that have caused their suffering in the first place.

That is the essence of fascist politics is to use this and then weaponize it. to help right wing dictators rise to power. That's the formula that they use. I would say what concerns me about the climate change issue specifically is this is one where denying the truth could radically alter the planet itself.

To return to what you said about evolution versus creationism, obviously the creationists are just as anti science as the climate change deniers. But the stakes are lower because the species does not risk being significant is suffering billions of deaths and a radical civilization altering series of intense weather occurrences because people don't want to admit that humans evolved from monkeys.

The stakes are lower. That doesn't mean that science is any less poor, but the stakes of the misinformation being promulgated are much lower.

SHEFFIELD: Yeah, [00:40:00] that's true. Yeah. And I think that is unfortunately one. Problem with the, the, the moment that we live in where, in the past, the, the false beliefs, you, there, there, there weren't, there, there was, I think early, in the earliest stages of human history, if you believe, that diseases were caused, by being unholy or, whatever, whatever random thing that could be harmful to you but then as we sort of, you Achieve some sort of rudimentary medical science.

Most people seem to get on board with that, right? They, they understood, you don't see almost anybody challenging germ theory, for instance, or, or things like that. And so the stakes for false. Scientific beliefs went down drastically because, Bigfoot or Loch Ness Monster or, aliens or Area 51, that didn't affect you in any way, whether you believe that was true.

If you believe that, the CIA shot [00:41:00] JFK, even like that didn't really. Impact your life or the rest of the society.

ROZSA: But then you have the anti science rhetoric that emerged during the worst days of the COVID 19 pandemic. People would refuse to get vaccinated. People would refuse to wear masks.

I always focused on the anti masker ideology because the anti vaccine ideology again. anti scientific, I under, vaccines are complicated enough that I can comprehend how someone might struggle to understand how vaccine platforms actually work. Especially mRNA as well. Yes, but by contrast, wearing a mask, it's obvious.

That's why when you sneeze, you cover your hand, your nose and mouth because you don't want your snot. Spraying germs everywhere. It shouldn't require a PhD in biology or infectious diseases to understand why you should wear a mask to prevent the spread of respiratory illnesses. Yet a lot of people [00:42:00] began arguing that I don't need to wear a mask.

A mask, the scientific literature says masks don't even really help. And you shouldn't require scientific literature to tell you that masks help. What does it say about people's Ability to comprehend reality. And the answer is most of these anti maskers are right wingers. They're part of what one friend of mine refers to as the right wing griftosphere.

And they don't accept that they can be duped into ignoring the evidence before their very eyes about something like wearing a mask to prevent the spreading of respiratory illnesses, because their ideological masters tell them to believe. And that extends to climate change, to the 2020 presidential election, to any, to cigarettes and lung cancer, any number of subjects.

SHEFFIELD: Yeah, and just on that point it is interesting that Republicans in the let's say 90s or in 2000s [00:43:00] were just as likely as Democrats to support vaccines. Actually and so they, but they became more radicalized on this point because. Their media told them to do it. They, they tell them what to believe.

And while also telling them that they're independent thinkers. I mean, that is the horrible irony of this.

ROZSA: They define an independent thinker as someone. It becomes a brand. It becomes a brand that is disconnected from the objective meaning of the phrase independent thinker.

SHEFFIELD: Yeah, they became a herd of independent thinkers with all the same ideas.

ROZSA: They did indeed. They did indeed.

SHEFFIELD: All right. Well, so, it's been a good discussion here today. Matt, Matt let's well, we already got up on the screen. So let me say that again. All right. So it's been a great discussion today, and I hope the audience has enjoyed it as well. And for people who want to keep up with you, [00:44:00] you are on social media at Matthew Rocha.

And if you're listening, that's M-R-O-Z-S-A. And and I guess they can get you on salon. com as well. Right?

ROZSA: They can indeed.

SHEFFIELD: Okay. Awesome. All right.

ROZSA: Thank you, Matt. I appreciate this. This was a lot of fun. I appreciate you having me on. I'm looking forward to seeing this go up.

SHEFFIELD: All right, so that is the program today. I appreciate everybody for joining us for the conversation. And you can always get more of this program if you go to theoryofchange.show. You can get the full video, audio, and transcripts of all the episodes. And I also do encourage everybody to visit flux.community.

Theory of Change is part of the Flux media network. So go to flux.community for more podcasts and articles about politics, religion, media, and society and how they all interact and affect each other.

plus.flux.community · by Matthew Sheffield

9. Fear and Ambition Propel Xi’s Nuclear Acceleration

Fear and Ambition Propel Xi’s Nuclear Acceleration

China’s leader built up a nuclear arsenal, steeling for a growing rivalry with the United States. Now China is exploring how to wield its newfound strength.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/04/world/asia/china-nuclear-missiles.html?

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A military parade in Beijing in 2019. As China’s nuclear options have grown, its military strategists are looking to nuclear weapons as not just a defensive shield, but as a potential sword.Credit...Kyodo News, via Getty Images

By Chris Buckley

Reporting from Taipei, Taiwan

Feb. 4, 2024

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Nineteen days after taking power as China’s leader, Xi Jinping convened the generals overseeing the country’s nuclear missiles and issued a blunt demand. China had to be ready for possible confrontation with a formidable adversary, he said, signaling that he wanted a more potent nuclear capability to counter the threat.

Their force, he told the generals, was a “pillar of our status as a great power.” They must, Mr. Xi said, advance “strategic plans for responding under the most complicated and difficult conditions to military intervention by a powerful enemy,” according to an official internal summary of his speech in December 2012 to China’s nuclear and conventional missile arm, then called the Second Artillery Corps, which was verified by The New York Times.

Publicly, Mr. Xi’s remarks on nuclear matters have been sparse and formulaic. But his comments behind closed doors, revealed in the speech, show that anxiety and ambition have driven his transformative buildup of China’s nuclear weapons arsenal in the past decade.

From those early days, Mr. Xi signaled that a robust nuclear force was needed to mark China’s ascent as a great power. He also reflected fears that China’s relatively modest nuclear weaponry could be vulnerable against the United States — the “powerful enemy” — with its ring of Asian allies.

Now, as China’s nuclear options have grown, its military strategists are looking to nuclear weapons as not only a defensive shield, but as a potential sword — to intimidate and subjugate adversaries. Even without firing a nuclear weapon, China could mobilize or brandish its missiles, bombers and submarines to warn other countries against the risks of escalating into brinkmanship.

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Since his first days as China’s top leader, Xi Jinping has signaled that a robust nuclear force was needed to mark China’s ascent as a great power.Credit...Li Gang/Xinhua, via Getty Images

“A powerful strategic deterrent capability can force the enemy to pull back from rash action, subduing them without going to war,” Chen Jiaqi, a researcher at China’s National Defense University, wrote in a paper in 2021. “Whoever masters more advanced technologies, and develops strategic deterrent weapons that can leave others behind it in the dust, will have a powerful voice in times of peace and hold the initiative in times of war.”

This article draws on Mr. Xi’s internal speeches and dozens of People’s Liberation Army reports and studies, many in technical journals, to trace the motivations of China’s nuclear buildup. Some have been cited in recent studies of China’s nuclear posture; many others have not been brought up before.

Mr. Xi has expanded the country’s atomic arsenal faster than any other Chinese leader, bringing his country closer to the big league of the United States and Russia. He has doubled the size of China’s arsenal to roughly 500 warheads, and at this rate, by 2035, it could have around 1,500 warheads — roughly as many as Washington and Moscow each now deploy, U.S. officials have said. (The United States and Russia each have thousands more warheads mothballed.)

China is also developing an increasingly sophisticated array of missiles, submarines, bombers and hypersonic vehicles that can deliver nuclear strikes. It has upgraded its nuclear test site in its far western Xinjiang region, clearing the way for possible new underground tests, perhaps if a superpower arms race breaks out.

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China is developing an increasingly sophisticated array of missiles, submarines, bombers and hypersonic vehicles that can deliver nuclear strikes.Credit...Jason Lee/Reuters

A major shift in China’s nuclear power and doctrine could deeply complicate its competition with the United States. China’s expansion has already set off intense debate in Washington about how to respond, and it has cast greater doubt on the future of major arms control treaties. All while U.S.-Russian antagonism is also raising the prospect of a new era of nuclear rivalry.

Mr. Xi and President Biden have calmed rancor since last year, but finding nuclear stability may be elusive if Beijing stays outside of major arms control treaties while Washington squares off against both Beijing and Moscow.

Relations Between China and the U.S.

• Nuclear Acceleration: Xi Jinping, China’s leader, built up a nuclear arsenal, steeling for a growing rivalry with the United States. Now China is exploring how to wield its newfound strength.
• The Limits to a Détente: China and the United States are back at the negotiating table. Whether they can agree on much is another matter.
• Economy: As factories in the United States spin up to produce electric vehicles, semiconductors and solar panels, China is flooding the market with similar goods, often at lower prices. That is spurring new calls for higher tariffs on Chinese imports.
• Espionage: The ambitious Ministry of State Security is deploying A.I. and other advanced technology to go toe-to-toe with the United States, even as the two nations try to pilfer each other’s scientific secrets.

Crucially, China’s growing nuclear options could shape the future of Taiwan — the island democracy that Beijing claims as its own territory and that relies on the United States for security backing. In the coming years, Beijing may gain confidence that it can limit the intervention of Washington and its allies in any conflict.

In deciding Taiwan’s fate, China’s “trump card” could be a “powerful strategic deterrence force” to warn that “any external intervention will not succeed and cannot possibly succeed,” Ge Tengfei, a professor at China’s National University of Defense Technology, wrote in a Communist Party journal in 2022.

Xi’s Nuclear Revolution

Since China first tested an atomic bomb in 1964, its leaders have said that they would never be “the first to use nuclear weapons” in a war. China, they reasoned, needed only a relatively modest set of nuclear weapons to credibly threaten potential adversaries that if their country was ever attacked with nuclear arms, it could wipe out enemy cities.

“In the long run, China’s nuclear weapons are just symbolic,” said Deng Xiaoping, China’s leader, in 1983, explaining Beijing’s stance to the visiting Canadian prime minister, Pierre Trudeau. “If China spent too much energy on them, we’d weaken ourselves.”

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A display of one of China’s nuclear tests, at a Beijing museum in 1992.Credit...Forrest Anderson/Getty Images

Even as China upgraded its conventional forces starting in the 1990s, its nuclear arsenal grew incrementally. When Mr. Xi took over as leader in 2012, China had about 60 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States.

China was already increasingly challenging its neighbors in territorial disputes and saw danger in the Obama administration’s efforts to shore up U.S. power across the Asia-Pacific. In a speech in late 2012, Mr. Xi warned his commanders that the United States was “stepping up strategic containment and encirclement around us.”

Beijing worried, too, that its nuclear deterrent was weakening. Chinese military analysts warned that the People’s Liberation Army’s missiles were growing vulnerable to detection and destruction as the United States made advances in military technology and built alliances in Asia.

Official Chinese accounts of history reinforced that fear. People’s Liberation Army studies often dwell on the Korean War and crises over Taiwan in the 1950s, when American leaders hinted that they could drop atomic bombs on China. Such memories have entrenched views in Beijing that the United States is inclined to use “nuclear blackmail.”

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People’s Liberation Army studies often dwell on the Korean War, above, and crises over Taiwan in the 1950s, when American leaders hinted that they could drop atomic bombs on China.Credit...Universal Images Group, via Getty Images

“We must have sharp weapons to protect ourselves and killer maces that others will fear,” Mr. Xi told People’s Liberation Army armaments officers in late 2014.

Late in 2015, he took a big step in upgrading China’s nuclear force. In his green suit as chairman of China’s military, he presided over a ceremony in which the Second Artillery Corps, the custodian of China’s nuclear missiles, was reborn as the Rocket Force, elevated to a service alongside the army, navy and air force.

The Rocket Force’s mission, Mr. Xi told its commanders, included “enhancing a credible and reliable nuclear deterrent and nuclear counterstrike capability” — that is, an ability to survive an initial attack and hit back with devastating force.

From Tunnels to Silo Fields

China is not only on a quest for more warheads. It is also focused on concealing and shielding the warheads, and on being able to launch them more quickly and from land, sea or air. The newly elevated Rocket Force has added a powerful voice to that effort.

Researchers from the Rocket Force wrote in a study in 2017 that China should emulate the United States and seek “nuclear forces sufficient to balance the new global situation, and ensure that our country can win the initiative in future wars.”

China’s nuclear deterrent long relied heavily on units dug into tunnels deep in remote mountains. Soldiers are trained to go into hiding in tunnels for weeks or months, deprived of sunlight, regular sleep and fresh air while they try to stay undetected by enemies, according to medical studies of their grueling routine.

“If war comes,” said a Chinese state television report in 2018, “this nuclear arsenal that shuttles underground will break cover where the enemy least expects and fire off its missiles.”

The Rocket Force expanded quickly, adding at least 10 new brigades, an increase of about one-third, within a few years, according to a study published by the U.S. Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute. China has also added more road- and rail-mobile missile launchers to try to outfox American satellites and other detection technology.

Chinese fears of American abilities have nonetheless remained. Even as China was rolling out road-mobile missiles, some experts from the People’s Liberation Army argued that they could be tracked by ever more sophisticated satellites.

A solution, some analysts from the Rocket Force argued in 2021, was to also build clusters of launch silos for missiles, forcing U.S. forces to try to detect which ones housed real missiles and which ones had dummies, making it “even harder to wipe them out in one blow.”

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A satellite image provided by Planet Labs Inc. shows what analysts believed was a field of intercontinental ballistic missile silos near Hami, in western China, in 2021.Credit...Planet Labs Inc., via Associated Press

Other Chinese studies made similar arguments for silos, and Mr. Xi and his commanders seemed to heed them. The boldest move so far in his nuclear expansion has been three vast fields of 320 or so missile silos built in northern China. The silos, safely distant from U.S. conventional missiles, can hold missiles capable of hitting the United States.

The expansion, though, has hit turbulence. Last year, Mr. Xi abruptly replaced the Rocket Force’s two top commanders, an unexplained shake-up that suggests its growth has been troubled by corruption. This year, nine senior Chinese military officers were expelled from the legislature, indicating a widening investigation.

The upheaval could slow China’s nuclear weapons plans in the short term, but Mr. Xi’s long-term ambitions appear set. At a Communist Party congress in 2022, he declared that China must keep building its “strategic deterrence forces.”

And even with hundreds of new silos, Chinese military analysts find new sources of worry. Last year, Chinese rocket engineers proposed reinforcing silos to better shield missiles from precision attacks. “Only that can make sure that the our side is able to deliver a lethal counterstrike in the event of a nuclear attack,” they wrote.

Tough Decisions

Chinese leaders have said that they want peaceful unification with Taiwan, but may use force if they deem that other options are spent. If Beijing moved to seize Taiwan, the United States could intervene to defend the island, and China may calculate that its expanded nuclear arsenal could present a potent warning.

Chinese military officers have issued blustery warnings of nuclear retaliation over Taiwan before. Now, China’s threats could carry more weight.

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A photograph released by Chinese state media in 2023 said to show a rocket test. The country’s Rocket Force has been elevated to a service alongside the army, navy and air force.Credit...Liu Mingsong/Xinhua, via Associated Press

Its expanding array of missiles, submarines and bombers could convey credible threats to not just cities in the continental United States, but to American military bases on, say, Japan or Guam. The risk of a conventional clash spiraling into nuclear confrontation could hang over decisions. Chinese military analysts have argued that Russian nuclear warnings constrained NATO countries in their response to the invasion of Ukraine.

“The ladder of escalation that they can apply now is much more nuanced,” said Bates Gill, the executive director of Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. “The implicit message is not just: ‘We could nuke Los Angeles.’ Now it’s also: ‘We could wipe out Guam, and you don’t want to risk escalation if we do.’”

Beijing’s options include 200 or so DF-26 missile launchers, which can swap between conventional and nuclear warheads and hit targets across Asia. Chinese official media have described Rocket Force units practicing such swaps, and boasted during a military parade about the missile’s dual convention-nuclear role — the kind of disclosure meant to spook rivals.

In a real confrontation, Washington could face difficult decisions over whether potential targets for strikes in China may include nuclear-armed missile units, and in an extreme whether an incoming DF-26 missile may be nuclear.

“That’s going to be a really tough decision for any U.S. president — to trust that whatever advice he’s getting is not risking nuclear escalation for the sake of Taiwan,” said John K. Culver, a former C.I.A. senior analyst who studies the Chinese military. “As soon as the U.S. starts bombing mainland China, no one is going to be able to tell the U.S. president with conviction exactly where China’s line is.”

Chris Buckley, the chief China correspondent for The Times, reports on China and Taiwan from Taipei, focused on politics, social change and security and military issues. More about Chris Buckley

A version of this article appears in print on Feb. 4, 2024, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: China Builds Up Nuclear Arsenal. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

10. Failure at the Wall Street Journal

Wow. This is really an unusual story. I would not have expected this. But I guess writing about the malign activities of China is not good for the bottom line especially if you want to sell the paper. I surely hope they are not courting a China aligned buyer.

I found only one mainstream media report about the firings in my quick Google search. This is is a link to a February 1st Washington Post article: https://www.washingtonpost.com/style/media/2024/02/01/wall-street-journal-shakes-up-dc-bureau-with-big-layoffs/

Failure at the Wall Street Journal

https://chinaarticles.substack.com/p/failure-at-the-wall-street-journal?r=7i07&utm

MATT TURPIN

FEB 4, 2024

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Friends,

For those of us who depend on high-quality investigative journalism, this was a sad week as the Wall Street Journal axed its entire U.S.-PRC team in Washington. More on that below under article #1.

In recognition of the hard work of these journalists over the years, I asked DALL-E for a painting of journalists who investigate China and here is what I got:

I clearly have not yet mastered how to prompt Generative AI for compelling output.

Thanks for reading!

Matt

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1.     Missing Boxes, an Email from China: How a Chip Shipment Sparked a U.S. Probe

Kate O’Keeffe, Heather Somerville, Yang Jie, and Aruna Viswanatha, Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2024

Autonomous-trucking company, facing several federal investigations, was preparing to exit the American market for China when the CEO directed his staff to ship advanced semiconductors out of the U.S.

After weeks of waiting, TuSimple executives learned in early January that the Commerce Department had stopped the shipment while the agency investigates whether the company planned ultimately to send the chips to China in violation of export controls, according to people familiar with the matter.

The probe adds a new dimension to federal authorities’ suspicions about San Diego-based TuSimple’s dealings in China, after the U.S. government previously ordered the company to segregate its American and Chinese businesses.

The A100 chips, which TuSimple planned to use to improve its self-driving technology for semi trucks, are among most powerful processors for high-performance computing and artificial intelligence. While the chips are permitted to be sent to Australia, Biden administration restrictions prohibit their transfer to China as part of an effort to keep American technology from aiding China’s military buildup.

COMMENT – This week, two days after this article was published, the Wall Street Journal fired 20 journalists and staff in Washington. This includes shuttering the team covering U.S.-PRC news, investigative reporters who have published dozens of articles like the one above. 

For the last few years, I’ve noticed a qualitative improvement in the reporting on U.S.-PRC issues, particularly around export controls, Intellectual Property theft, investment security risks, and the PRC’s malign influence in the United States. This requires years of research and experience in a variety of fields (technology, finance, government regulatory frameworks), which can only be done by a well-resourced media outlet like the Journal. 

The team at the Wall Street Journal, who was just unceremoniously fired on Thursday, led the way in this transformation. Their exclusive reports routinely landed on the paper’s front page and forced officials in the U.S. Government, as well as corporate leaders, to pay far more attention to what Beijing was trying to accomplish and the methods they were using.

Apparently, the Murdoch family wants to sell its flagship newspaper and the Journal’s Editor in Chief, Emma Tucker, has been tasked with improving the paper’s bottom line, so that Lachlan Murdoch, Rupert’s heir apparent, can maximize the profit he earns off selling the paper.

But I’m scratching my head on why they would get rid of the U.S.-PRC investigative reporting team that has done so much to raise the Journal’s profile as a serious newspaper beyond the narrow confines of cheerleading the financial services industry. Reports like the one above (or the ones below), that this team has produced over the past 2-3 years are likely to become even more important as the rivalry between Beijing and Washington heats up.

Here’s just a few exclusive, investigative reports that this team is responsible for that I think are incredibly significant and would likely not have come about had there not been a team working on them:

• The Billionaire Keeping TikTok on Phones in the U.S. – September 20, 2023
• Trump’s Businesses Got Millions from Foreign Governments While He Was President – January 4, 2024
• China Is Stealing AI Secrets to Turbocharge Spying, U.S. Says – December 25, 2023
• Blacklisted Chinese Chip Maker Does a Thriving Business with U.S. – October 5, 2023
• Chinese Gate-Crashers at U.S. Bases Spark Espionage Concerns – September 4, 2023
• DuPont China Deal Reveals Cracks in U.S. National-Security Screening – August 12, 2023
• U.S. Tracked ZTE, Huawei Workers at Suspected Chinese Spy Sites in Cuba – June 21, 2023
• Congress Seeks Details on Spying Risks from Chinese Cargo Cranes – April 3, 2023
• Leaders of Self-Driving-Truck Company Face Espionage Concerns Over China Ties – February 1, 2023
• U.S. Approves Nearly All Tech Exports to China, Data Shows – August 16, 2022
• U.S. Companies Aid China’s Bid for Chip Dominance Despite Security Concerns – November 12, 2021
• China Stymies Once-United U.N. Panel on North Korea Sanctions – September 15, 2021
• How China Targets Scientists via Global Network of Recruiting Stations – August 20, 2020
• Qualcomm Lobbies U.S. to Sell Chips for Huawei 5G Phones – August 8, 2020

Each of these, and dozens more, helped the public and Government officials gain a much more detailed understanding of Beijing’s malign activities.

I don’t have any evidence to support this thesis (aside from a hunch), but it wouldn’t surprise me if pressure of some kind had been applied to stop the Journal’s hard-hitting investigative journalism on these topics. I suspect that there are two groups who are extremely happy that Tucker (Murdoch) axed this team: certain corporate executives and investors, who want to conceal their backroom dealings with Beijing, and the Chinese Communist Party, who hate having their activities exposed to the public.

As the Washington Post is fond of saying: Democracy Dies in Darkness.

2.     A new diplomatic struggle is unfolding over Taiwan

The Economist, January 25, 2024

The new year has brought no respite from tensions over Taiwan. On January 13th its people elected an independence-minded candidate, William Lai Ching-te, as their next president, infuriating China. Two days later it was China’s turn, with its officials announcing that little Nauru was cutting ties with Taiwan in favour of China. On January 24th the us navy sent a warship through the Taiwan Strait, which China described as a “provocative act”. Amid this drama a new diplomatic battle is intensifying that risks setting the stage for war.

For over 70 years the government in Beijing led by the Communist Party has fought for official recognition from the world. Lately it has opened up a novel front in this campaign. The party wants not only to be the sole representative of China, it also wants countries to adopt its view that Taiwan is an inalienable part of it. Victory in this struggle would give China’s leaders a big diplomatic cudgel—as well as a legal basis for invading the island.

COMMENT – Continued failure by United Nations officials and organizations to resist the Chinese Communist Party and speak truth to power.

3.     DOD Releases List of People's Republic of China (PRC) Military Companies in Accordance with Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021

U.S. Department of Defense, January 31, 2024

Today, the Department of Defense released an update to the names of "Chinese military companies" operating directly or indirectly in the United States in accordance with the statutory requirement of Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.

Updating the Section 1260H list of "Chinese military companies" is an important continuing effort in highlighting and countering the PRC's Military-Civil Fusion strategy. The PRC's Military-Civil Fusion strategy supports the modernization goals of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by ensuring it can acquire advanced technologies and expertise developed by PRC companies, universities, and research programs that appear to be civilian entities. Section 1260H directs the Department to begin identifying, among other things, Military-Civil Fusion contributors operating directly or indirectly in the United States.

The Department will continue to update the list with additional entities as appropriate. The United States Government reserves the right to take additional actions on these entities under authorities other than section 1260H. The list is available here.

COMMENT – I’m proud to have played a small role in ensuring that the Department of Defense routinely publish this legislatively mandated report on the companies that support the Chinese Defense Industrial Base.

The initial requirement to publish a public list of “Chinese Communist Military Companies” was included in the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1237). But the Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations willfully ignored this legislative mandate and refused to publish the list (which would have opened up authorities to sanction these companies).

It was not until June of 2020 that the Trump Administration (Defense Secretary Esper in particular) finally pushed through the bureaucratic resistance and published the first list (more than two decades after Congress required the executive branch to publish it). The publication of the list by the Department of Defense activated the use of IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act) sanctions, which the Trump Administration imposed on the first three tranches of these companies in November 2020 with Executive Order 13959 (Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies).

The Biden Administration continued the practice (by issuing Executive Order 14032, Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments That Finance Certain Companies of the People's Republic of China) and last week’s issuance of the latest list suggests that the Chinese Defense Industrial Base, and its network of civil suppliers through Military-Civil fusion, will face continued costs and restrictions.

However, it does not appear that there is much appetite for expanding the imposition of costs and restrictions on the PRC Defense Industrial Base. One of the changes that the Biden Administration made in implementing its Executive Order was to pass implementation of sanctions and restrictions to the Department of the Treasury. IMO Treasury has been dragging its feet on imposing any serious costs or restrictions on the PRC Defense Industrial Base. 

Secretary Yellen and her team seem far more interested in pursuing mutually advantageous economic and financial agreements with Beijing, than in degrading the military capacity of what the Administration and Department of Defense identify as the pacing threat for the nation. 

To me, this is yet another example of the gap between the rhetoric of “integrated deterrence” and reality. 

If the Administration took its own policy of “integrated deterrence” seriously, then the Treasury Department would be aggressively implementing sanctions and restrictions on the various Chinese Communist Military Companies identified by the Department of Defense.

The refusal by Treasury to use its authorities aggressively creates a perverse outcome: by failing to kneecap the PRC Defense Industrial Base, the Administration simply makes it far more costly from the Department of Defense to maintain a military advantage over the PRC. If the PLA is unhindered in its military modernization, the demands on DoD and allied military expansion only grow. We are being penny-wise and pound-foolish.

What makes this situation even worse is that (as I showed last week) we are shrinking our own defense procurement.

I think the Administration is absolutely right to adopt a strategy based on “integrated deterrence”… now they need to actually execute it!

4.     Negative Takes on China’s Economy Are Disappearing from the Internet

Jonathan Cheng, Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2024

Chinese authorities warn against denigrating the economy and urge officials to highlight its ‘bright prospects.’

Several prominent commentaries by economists and journalists in China have vanished from the internet in recent weeks, raising concerns that Beijing is stepping up its censorship efforts as it tries to put a positive spin on a struggling economy.

This month, top lieutenants of Chinese leader Xi Jinping urged officials to “promote the bright prospects of China’s economy.” Those calls came after an unusual warning from China’s top spy agency in December, which cautioned the public to be wary of those who denigrate the economy. “Economic security is a key component of national security,” the Ministry of State Security said.

One recent commentary that disappeared was an editorial published last month by Caixin Media, a Beijing-based business news outlet known for backing pro-market reforms. The editorial called for officials to confront economic challenges directly, harking back to when China’s economy was on the brink of collapse during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. The editorial said that, at the time, officials insisted that “the situation is excellent,” but in reality people were destitute.

The article urged officials to “seek truth from facts,” quoting an ancient Chinese aphorism that was frequently invoked by Mao Zedong and especially by his successor Deng Xiaoping, who ushered in four decades of reform and opening.

“One can only correct inappropriate policies in a timely manner if one sticks to seeking truth from facts,” read the unsigned article, which was published on Dec. 25, a day before the 130th anniversary of Mao’s birth.

Within hours, the editorial disappeared from Caixin’s website. A representative for Caixin declined to comment.

COMMENT – There is no way in hell the PRC economy grew by 5.2% last year.

I recommend everyone read Rhodium Group’s excellent analysis at the end of last year.

Through the Looking Glass: China’s 2023 GDP and the Year Ahead – December 29, 2023

Here’s the opening paragraph:

• Despite clear evidence that it was slowed down by unexpected economic headwinds this year, China will almost certainly claim to have hit its “around 5%” GDP growth target for 2023. The realities of a still-shrinking property sector, limited consumer spending, falling trade surplus, and battered local government finances mean that actual growth in 2023 was more like 1.5%. Looking ahead, China may see a cyclical recovery to perhaps 3.0-3.5% growth in 2024 as property bottoms out, although structural slowdown will naturally remain the dominant story for years to come.

5.     US disabled Chinese hacking network targeting critical infrastructure

Christopher Bing and Karen Freifeld, Reuters, January 31, 2024

The U.S. government in recent months launched an operation to fight a pervasive Chinese hacking operation that compromised thousands of internet-connected devices, two Western security officials and a person familiar with the matter said.

The Justice Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation sought and received legal authorization to remotely disable aspects of the Chinese hacking campaign, the sources told Reuters.

The Biden administration has increasingly focused on hacking, not only for fear nation states may try to disrupt the U.S. election in November, but because ransomware wreaked havoc on Corporate America in 2023.

The hacking group at the center of recent activity, Volt Typhoon, has especially alarmed intelligence officials who say it is part of a larger effort to compromise Western critical infrastructure, including naval ports, internet service providers and utilities.

While the Volt Typhoon campaign initially came to light in May 2023, the hackers expanded the scope of their operations late last year and changed some of their techniques, according to three people familiar with the matter.

The widespread nature of the hacks led to a series of meetings between the White House and private technology industry, including several telecommunications and cloud computing companies, where the U.S. government asked for assistance in tracking the activity.

COMMENT – Hey Biden Administration, you know Executive Order 13694 is still on the books…

Signed by President Obama in April 2015, this executive order (titled Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), allows you to impose financial sanctions (using IEEPA, International Emergency Economic Powers Act) on those entities waging these harmful cyber campaigns against us. Instead of just disrupting them, you could impose significant costs on the PRC Government, its commercial entities, and persons responsible for these attacks.

Back in late 2015, the Obama Administration used the threat of EO 13694 to compel Beijing to promise that it wouldn’t conducted cyber-enabled economic espionage (a promise Beijing violated almost immediately with no consequences). Given that we have ample evidence that Beijing continues to wage a harmful cyber campaign against is we should be responding.

Now the problem is that the Treasury Department owns these authorities and as I argued above, the Treasury Department appears out of step with the seriousness of national security challenges facing the nation. So, it would likely require White House leadership and direct intervention to force Secretary Yellen and her staff to actually use these authorities to impose costs and re-establish some level of integrated deterrence.

6.     Chinese Nationals Charged with Illegally Exporting U.S.-Origin Electronic Components to Iran and Iranian Military Affiliates

U.S. Department of Justice, January 31, 2024

Four Chinese nationals are charged in an indictment in the District of Columbia with various federal crimes related to a years-long conspiracy to unlawfully export and smuggle U.S.-origin electronic components from the United States to Iran.

According to court documents, Baoxia Liu, aka Emily Liu; Yiu Wa Yung, aka Stephen Yung; Yongxin Li, aka Emma Lee; and Yanlai Zhong, aka Sydney Chung, unlawfully exported and smuggled U.S. export controlled items through China and Hong Kong ultimately for the benefit of entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which supervises Iran’s development and production of missiles, weapons, and military aerial equipment to include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

“For more than a decade, the defendants allegedly orchestrated a scheme to smuggle U.S. manufactured parts to the IRGC and the Iranian agency charged with developing ballistic missiles and UAVs,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department's National Security Division. “Such efforts to unlawfully obtain U.S. technology directly threaten our national security, and we will use every tool at our disposal to sever the illicit supply chains that fuel the Iranian regime’s malign activity.”

“Aggressively combating illicit procurement networks that support Iranian military systems like radars and UAVs is essential to U.S. national security,” said Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod of the Department of Commerce. “Today’s indictment, tied to the work of the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, reaffirms that proliferators cannot hide behind front companies in third countries to funnel technology to our adversaries.”

“Our indictment alleges a years-long, complex conspiracy to violate U.S. laws by procuring U.S. technology with military uses for entities in Iran who would do us harm – a serious offense that endangers our national security,” said U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves for the District of Columbia. “Our office, along with our federal law enforcement partners, will continue to turn over every stone to find those who break our laws and put us at risk. We are committed to making sure that U.S. technology is kept out of the hands of those taking aim at the United States and its citizens through robust enforcement of U.S. sanctions.”

“Our foreign adversaries use many tactics to gain access to critical U.S. technologies and innovation,” said Executive Assistant Director Larissa L. Knapp of the FBI’s National Security Branch. “In this instance, it is alleged that U.S.-origin equipment was smuggled by front companies to the benefit of end users in Iran. Any circumvention of U.S. export control law is simply unacceptable – the FBI will work diligently with its partners across the globe to hold all accountable who jeopardize our national security.”

According to the indictment, beginning as early as May 2007 and continuing until at least July 2020, the defendants utilized an array of front companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to funnel dual-use U.S.-origin items, including electronics and components that could be utilized in the production of UAVs, ballistic missile systems, and other military end uses, to sanctioned Iranian entities with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) such as Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI), Rayan Roshd Afzar, and their affiliates.

Throughout the course of the conspiracy, the defendants concealed the fact that the goods were destined for Iran and Iranian entities and made material misrepresentations to U.S. companies regarding the end destination and end users. These deceptive practices caused the U.S. companies to export goods to the defendants’ PRC-based front companies under false pretenses and under the guise that the ultimate destination of these products was China as opposed to Iran. As a result, a vast amount of dual-use U.S.-origin commodities with military capabilities were exported from the United States to Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions and export control laws and regulations.

The defendants are charged with conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), violating IEEPA, smuggling goods from the United States, and one count of submitting false or misleading export information. If convicted, the defendants face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for violating the IEEPA; up to 10 years in prison for smuggling goods from the United States; and up to five years in prison for each count of conspiracy and submitting false or misleading export information. Arrest warrants have been issued for Liu, Yung, Li and Zhong who all remain fugitives.

COMMENT – Shocking that PRC nationals would be involved in a multi-year conspiracy to aid the Iranians in building out military capabilities.

7.     Would a Trump presidency change China's calculations on Taiwan?

Ken Moriyasu, Ryohtaroh Satoh, and Thompson Chau, Nikkei Asia, January 30, 2024

Republican candidate's indifference on island is among 'worst kept secrets in Washington'.

As former President Donald Trump gains momentum in his bid for a return to the White House, observers are examining how a potential Trump presidency affects Taiwan policy and whether it changes Beijing's calculations, including the time line for China's publicly stated desire for unification.

"During the majority of the Trump administration, one of the worst kept secrets in Washington was that Trump didn't care about Taiwan," Evan Medeiros, former National Security Council senior director for Asia under President Barack Obama, told Nikkei Asia. "There were some rumors that, in fact, he even said that during meetings with Chinese officials."

Trump's former national security adviser John Bolton wrote in his 2020 memoir, "The Room Where It Happened," that one of Trump's favorite comparisons was to point to the tip of one of his Sharpies and say, "This is Taiwan," then point to the historic Resolute desk in the Oval Office and say, "This is China."

Robert Sutter, a former U.S. government official and professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, recently wrote a commentary for the National Bureau of Asian Research noting that President Joe Biden's commitment to defending Taiwan using American forces if it were attacked by China -- he has done so publicly four times -- has served as a strong deterrent to Beijing.

"Biden's extraordinary posture on coming to Taiwan's assistance if it is attacked shows that this administration is more likely than any since the depths of the Cold War to become directly involved in countering an attack by China with military force," he wrote.

Sutter told Nikkei in an interview that Biden's firm stance on Taiwan has affected other American allies and partners, especially Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

"Why does Marcos risk what he's risking vis-a-vis China?" Sutter asked, regarding Manila's shift away from Beijing and tilt toward Washington. "If you're looking at your self-interest, it doesn't make a lot of sense. But if you feel confident [about the U.S. position], then it makes sense."

If there is less clarity under Trump, views toward the U.S. may change.

Medeiros agreed. "Four times Biden has said that he will come to the defense of Taiwan," he said. "One time you can explain away. Maybe two. Not four."

COMMENT – Former President Trump is undermining U.S. deterrence and jeopardizing peace and security in the Western Pacific.

Just as the Biden Administration adopted a more realist view of the PRC espoused by former President Trump during his term in office, candidate Trump would be well served to maintain that continuity.

I fear that in his desire to differentiate himself from Biden, he will sacrifice his own best foreign policy initiatives simply because Biden adopted them.

Authoritarianism

8.     China warns citizens against 'exotic beauty' traps of foreign spies

Kelly Ng, BBC, January 25, 2024

9.     Spycraft and Statecraft

William J. Burns, Foreign Affairs, January 30, 2024

10.  The Story of the Decade

Nicholas Wade, City Journal, January 25, 2024

New documents strengthen—perhaps conclusively—the lab-leak hypothesis of Covid-19’s origins.

The day is growing ever closer when Washington may have to add to its agenda with Beijing a nettlesome item it has long sought to avoid: the increasingly likely fact that China let the SARS2 virus escape from the Wuhan lab where it was concocted, setting off the Covid-19 pandemic that killed some 7 million people globally and wrought untold economic havoc.

New documents may explain why no one has been able to find the SARS2 virus (aka SARS-CoV-2) infesting a colony of bats, from which it might have jumped to people. The reason would be that the virus has never existed in the natural world. Documents obtained by U.S. Right to Know, a health advocacy group, provide a recipe for assembling SARS-type viruses from six synthetic pieces of DNA designed to be a consensus sequence—the genetically most infectious form—of viruses related to SARS1, the bat virus that caused the minor epidemic of 2002. The probative weight of the recipe is that prior independent evidence already pointed to SARS2 having just such a six-section structure.

The documents unearthed by U.S. Right to Know, and analyzed by its reporter Emily Kopp, include drafts and planning materials for the already-known DEFUSE proposal, an application to DARPA, a Pentagon research agency, for a $14 million grant to enhance SARS-like bat viruses.

The new recipe is in striking accord with a theoretical paper published in 2022 that predicted the SARS2 virus had been generated in exactly this way. Three researchers—Valentin Bruttel, Alex Washburne, and Antonius VanDongen—noted that the virus could be cut into six sections if treated with a pair of agents known as restriction enzymes and so had probably been synthesized and assembled in this way.

Restriction enzymes, made naturally by bacteria as a defense against viruses, are an invaluable tool for biologists because they cut DNA at specific points known as recognition sites. These sites occur randomly across the genome, so a natural virus treated with a restriction enzyme will be cut into pieces of different sizes. However, researchers who want to synthesize a virus from scratch in order to manipulate its parts more effectively will often rearrange the recognition sites so that they are evenly spaced. This allows short chunks of DNA, all of roughly equal length, to be synthesized chemically and then strung together in a complete viral genome. Bottom line: if your virus has evenly spaced recognition sites, it’s a pretty good bet that it was made in a laboratory.

Bruttel and his colleagues guessed that a commonly used pair of restriction enzymes, known as BsaI and BsmBI, might have been used to assemble the SARS2 virus’s genome. When they examined the structure of SARS2, they found that the recognition sites used by these enzymes were indeed evenly spaced across the genome, marking it into six sections. “Our findings strongly suggest a synthetic origin of SARS-CoV2,” they wrote.

Their paper did not receive the attention it deserved, in part because of the difficulty of ruling out a natural explanation for the even spacing. The small group of virologists who adamantly oppose the lab-leak hypothesis attacked the paper as “confected nonsense” (Edward Holmes) and “kindergarten molecular biology” (Kristian Andersen).

11.  Hong Kong begins work on its own National Security Law, years after a similar law crushed dissent

Kanis Leung and Zen Soo, Associated Press, January 30, 2024

12.  China suspends visa issuance to Lithuanian citizens

Augustas Stankevičius, LRT, January 26, 2024

The Chinese mission in Vilnius has suspended the issuance of visas to Lithuanian citizens as of Wednesday, Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis has confirmed.

“We have been informed about this. No further information has been provided,” he told Lithuanian journalists in Kyiv on Thursday.

Landsbergis said he was unaware of the reasons for and the duration of the suspension.

The Chinese mission had last temporarily suspended the issuance of visas to Lithuanian citizens in late November 2021.

Beijing then said the move was due to technical reasons, but it came after China had officially downgraded diplomatic ties with Lithuania to the level of chargé d’affaires in response to the opening of the Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius.

COMMENT – Of note, as Beijing was imposing this punishment on Lithuania, Beijing granted visa-free travel to citizens of various European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Switzerland and the Netherlands) who they believe have “behaved themselves.”

Will other EU member states do anything to demonstrate solidarity with one of their own or will they stand by as Beijing continues its practice of divide-and-conquer?

I suspect the latter, which only reinforces the Chinese Communist Party’s belief that these tactics work.

For all their talk about European values and European unity, EU member states continue to demonstrate that they cannot defend themselves from outside threats and that individual European states are more than happy to sacrifice their neighbors for slight economic advantages.

13.  Taiwan Builds Own AI Language Model, Taide, to Counter China’s Tech Influence

Jennifer Creery, Bloomberg, January 25, 2024

14.  Top China Political Advisory Body Ousts Senior Rocket Researcher Wang Xiaojun

Bloomberg, January 29, 2024

15.  China’s Censorship Dragnet Targets Critics of the Economy

Daisuke Wakabayashi and Claire Fu, New York Times, January 31, 2024

16.  China Says Trump Could Abandon Taiwan If He Wins US Election

Bloomberg, January 30, 2024

17.  How the US is preparing for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, Reuters, January 31, 2024

18.  Taiwan angered at 'unilateral' China change to Taiwan Strait flight path

Ben Blanchard, Reuters, January 31, 2024

19.  Is the world economy deglobalizing?

Joe Seydl, JP Morgan, January 24, 2024

Environmental Harms

20.  Peru’s ports allow entry of Chinese ships tied to illegal fishing & forced labor

Michelle Carrere, Mongabay, December 22, 2023

21.  Global coal exports and power generation hit new highs in 2023

Gavin Maguire, Reuters, January 18, 2024

Foreign Interference and Coercion

22.  US and China launch talks on fentanyl trafficking in a sign of cooperation amid differences

Ken Moritsugu, Associated Press, January 30, 2024

23.  China orders a Japanese fishing boat to leave waters near Japan-held islands claimed by Beijing

Associated Press, January 27, 2024

24.  Iran's oil exports reach 5-year high, with China as top buyer

Ryosuke Hanafusa, Shuntaro Fukutomi, and Yuta Koga, Nikkei Asia, January 31, 2024

25.  China denies providing weapons to Hamas in Israel-Gaza war

Seong Hyeon Choi, South China Morning Post, January 25, 2024

26.  China, Papua New Guinea in talks on policing, security cooperation - minister

Kirsty Needham, Reuters, January 29, 2024

27.  Ex-MI6 boss warns UK not equipped to deal with Chinese spies

ITV, January 27, 2024

Human Rights and Religious Persecution

28.  Top Hong Kong court overturns Tiananmen activist Chow Hang-tung’s acquittal over 2021 remembrance vigil

James Lee, Hong Kong Free Press, January 25, 2024

29.  China says it jailed British national for 5 years in 2022 for spying

AFP, Hong Kong Free Press, January 26, 2024

30.  Bishop approved by pope ordained in China in apparent thaw in relations

Philip Pullella, Reuters, January 25, 2024

Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage

31.  U.S. and China worked to lower Taiwan election risks, Sullivan says

Ken Moriyasu, Nikkei Asia, January 31, 2024

32.  US firms in Taiwan adapt by picking local partners as investments grow: AmCham

Ralph Jennings, South China Morning Post, January 31, 2024

33.  Shipbuilders ask for EU help on Chinese subsidies

Varg Folkman, Politico, January 23, 2024

34.  China EVs: lithium producers Ganfeng, Tianqi issue profit warnings, blame price plunge for battery material as stocks sink

Eric Ng, South China Morning Post, January 31, 2024

35.  ASML China Sales Surged Despite Secret Dutch Deal with US

Cagan Koc, Ian King, and Diederik Baazil, Reuters, January 25, 2024

36.  Economics IMF Lifts World GDP Outlook on US Strength, China Fiscal Support

Eric Martin, Bloomberg, January 30, 2024

37.  What China’s E.V. City Says About the State of the Economy

Keith Bradsher and Joy Dong, New York Times, January 27, 2024

38.  China’s Economic Pain Worsens as Real-Estate Sales Plummet

Stella Yifan Xie and Cao Li, Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2024

39.  China’s big airlines set for fourth straight lossmaking year

Chan Ho-him, Financial Times, January 30, 2024

40.  Chinese Lithium Producers’ Shares Drop in Wake of Profit Warnings

Jiahui Huang, Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2024

41.  China’s manufacturing activity contracts for fourth month as economic recovery lags

Joe Leahy and Hudson Lockett, Financial Times, January 30, 2024

42.  China's factory activity shrinks again, weak demand hobbles economy

Reuters, January 30, 2024

43.  China's vice premier urges more support for listed firms amid market rout

Reuters, January 29, 2024

44.  WuXi Bio Denies Military Ties After Shares Slumped on US Bill

Bloomberg, January 28, 2024

45.  Evergrande Was Once China’s Biggest Property Developer. Now, It Has Been Ordered to Liquidate.

Alexander Saeedy and Rebecca Feng, Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2024

Cyber & Information Technology

46.  G42’s China Ties Reveal a Broader AI Debate

Katrina Northrop, The Wire China, January 28, 2024

47.  What to Do When the Chips Are Down

William Alan Reinsch, CSIS, January 29, 2024

48.  Tesla CEO Musk: Chinese EV firms will 'demolish' rivals without trade barriers

Abhirup Roy, Reuters, January 25, 2024

49.  White House science chief signals US-China co-operation on AI safety

Madhumita Murgia, Financial Times, January 24, 2024

50.  Dell, Micron Backed a Group Raising Alarms on Rivals' China Ties

Brody Ford, Bloomberg, January 25, 2024

51.  TikTok Struggles to Protect U.S. Data from Its China Parent

Georgia Wells, Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2024

52.  Chinese automakers hit by production issues with Huawei computing unit

Reuters, January 31, 2024

Military and Security Threats

53.  US says it disrupted a China cyber threat, but warns hackers could still wreak havoc for Americans

Didi Tang, Eric Tucker, and Frank Bajak, Associated Press, January 31, 2024

54.  Taiwan begins extended one-year conscription in response to China threat

Nikkei Asia, January 25, 2024

55.  Tracking Tensions at Second Thomas Shoal

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, January 30, 2024

56.  Security recall: The risk of Chinese electric vehicles in Europe

Janka Oertel, European Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024

57.  Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Meeting with Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi

The White House, January 27, 2024

58.  The Geopolitics of World War III

Michael Hochberg and Leonard Hochberg, RealClear Defense, January 27, 2024

59.  Raimondo Warns Chinese EVs Pose National, Data Security Risks

Mackenzie Hawkins, Bloomberg, January 30, 2024

60.  Chinese Hacking Against U.S. Infrastructure Threatens American Lives, Officials Say

Dustin Volz, Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2024

One Belt, One Road Strategy

61.  China’s Belt and Road and Its Alternatives: Competing or Complementary?

Zenel Garcia, The Diplomat, January 20, 2024

62.  To challenge China’s influence in Africa, US borrows from belt and road playbook

Jevans Nyabiage, South China Morning Post, January 29, 2024

63.  China's Belt and Road in limbo

Nikkei Asia, December 29, 2023

China's Belt and Road Initiative is facing new snags, with Italy announcing its withdrawal from the program while security concerns in Pakistan and elsewhere cloud the prospects for ongoing infrastructure projects.

While China continues to face criticism that it is creating debt traps for financially distressed countries, President Xi Jinping's government is making moves that could potentially benefit the huge infrastructure building drive, such as drawing closer to Afghanistan's Taliban government.

Opinion Pieces

64.  The US is failing to quickly field hypersonic missile defense

Mark Montgomery and Bradley Bowman, Defense News, January 19, 2024

The Pentagon warned in its annual report to Congress last year that China already possesses “the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal” and is sprinting to field even more advanced offensive capabilities. These weapons would give Beijing a capability to conduct a prompt strike that paralyzes America’s command-and-control and missile-defense capabilities.

The good news is that the United States is making progress on its own offensive hypersonic weapons. The bad news is that American efforts to develop systems that can defend against Chinese hypersonic capabilities are not keeping pace. If Washington does not act quickly to expedite the Pentagon’s fielding of hypersonic missile defense capabilities, deterrence may fail in the Pacific.

A hypersonic weapon is a missile that travels at speeds above Mach 5, or greater than 1 mile per second. There are many existing ballistic missile systems that travel at hypersonic speeds, but Chinese hypersonic missiles present an additional challenge. In addition to their high speeds, these systems include hypersonic glide vehicles, which maneuver through the atmosphere after an initial ballistic launch phase. To make matters worse, Beijing is also developing hypersonic cruise missiles that use air-breathing engines such as scramjets to reach high speeds and maneuver.

That combination of speed and maneuverability presents a daunting challenge for existing U.S. ballistic and cruise missile defense radars and interceptors, making it difficult to track and destroy the adversary’s incoming glide vehicle or cruise missile. The fact that hypersonic glide vehicles can also operate at unusual altitudes — well above cruise missiles but below ballistic missiles — adds an additional layer of complexity.

China has several hypersonic variants that leverage their extensive work in both intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. That includes, for example, the deployed DF-17, a medium-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle that has a reported range of 1,600 kilometers. Beijing could use that system to target American and allied military bases and fleets in the Pacific.

To match China’s effort, the United States has spent more than $8 billion on offensive hypersonic missile development over the past two years alone. Despite delays and challenges, some of these efforts are making headway. The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, the Air Force’s Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile, and the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike and Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare programs could all field weapons this decade.

Unfortunately, America’s hypersonic defense efforts are not nearly as impressive.

The Missile Defense Agency has invested in developing a glide-phase interceptor to destroy adversarial missiles in their vulnerable glide phase, before they start complex maneuvering in the terminal phase. But the Biden administration only asked for $209 million for hypersonic defense programs in its fiscal 2024 budget request, and the Pentagon requested less than $515 million in funding in fiscal 2022 and fiscal 2023 combined.

These requests are a fraction of the funding dedicated to offensive capabilities and well short of what is required. This failure to prioritize hypersonic defense has consequences: The Department of Defense said in April that it did not expect to field a hypersonic defense system until fiscal 2034.

65.  Western nations need a plan for when China floods the chip market

Chris Miller, Financial Times, January 28, 2024

66.  What Worries Me About War with China After My Visit to Taiwan

Nicholas Kristof, New York Times, January 27, 2024

67.  U.S. Technologies and the Emboldening of China

Steve Coonen, Wire China, January 28, 2024

68.  Beijing’s Passive-Aggressive Middle East Policy

Michael Singh, Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2024

69.  Elizabeth Warren’s iRobot Gift to China

Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2024

One might say Elizabeth Warren got her robot. The Massachusetts Senator has prodded antitrust regulators to block Amazon’s acquisition of Roomba manufacturer iRobot. On Monday the two companies called off their deal amid opposition from competition regulators. What a coup—for the Chinese.

Progressives opposed Amazon’s $1.7 billion bid for iRobot the moment it was announced in August 2022. They claimed without evidence that Amazon would undermine Roomba rivals selling in the company’s online marketplace and use the smart vacuum to spy on American homes. But they mostly worried that the acquisition would make Amazon more powerful.

It wasn’t a secret that Amazon wanted to hoover up iRobot’s engineering talent. Expanding its use of robotics could make Amazon’s retail operations more efficient and help expand in new markets. But progressives want to stop big tech companies from growing.

“Amazon has fully leveraged its monopoly power and is ‘almost universally recognized’ as the leader in warehouse and fulfillment robotics space,” Ms. Warren and other progressives wrote to Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan in September 2022. The deal “would open up a new market to Amazon’s abuses.”

The FTC around that time began reviewing the deal. In July 2023 the European Commission opened its own investigation, focusing on dubious concerns that Amazon would favor iRobot over rivals. Yet the U.K.’s competition regulators cleared the deal last year and said Amazon wouldn’t have an incentive to undercut Roomba competitors.

European law prohibits tech platforms like Amazon from favoring their own products. Yet European regulators refused to consider possible concessions from Amazon to allay their concerns about “self-preferencing.” So Amazon and iRobot scrapped the deal.

COMMENT – Anti-trust regulators in Europe, the United States, and the PRC have one thing in common: each are focused on hindering U.S. technology companies.

70.  China Is Trying to Have It Both Ways in the Middle East

Isaac Kardon and Jennifer Kavanagh, New York Times, January 26, 2024

11. Amid growing criticism of Biden foreign policy, experts credit wins while leaving room for improvement

Fair and balanced from Fox News. We report, you decide.  I am pleasantly surprised to see some praise from Fox News for the Biden Administration foreign policy. The praise makes the criticism more legitimate. 

I concur with the experts that the Administration's work on alliances is one of the most important foreign policy and national security "wins."

Amid growing criticism of Biden foreign policy, experts credit wins while leaving room for improvement

Experts agree on Biden's ability to stabilize traditional alliances

By Michael Lee Fox News

Published February 6, 2024 4:00am EST

foxnews.com · by Michael Lee Fox News

Video

Keith Kellogg details how Biden has 'dumbed deterrence down' as US strikes continue in Middle East

Retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg joined 'America's Newsroom' to discuss how the Biden administration is actually 'widening the war' in the Middle East as retaliatory strikes continue.

President Biden's first three years in office have forced him to confront numerous foreign policy challenges, leading to mixed reviews from experts on how well the president has responded on the world stage.

"One of the most important accomplishments of the Biden administration has been re-invigorating NATO, which is the most successful military alliance in U.S. history," David Tafuri, a foreign policy analyst who served as a foreign policy adviser to the Obama campaign, told Fox News Digital. "The future of NATO was in question during Trump's administration."

Tafuri's comments come as Biden faces multiple international crises ahead of his reelection bid in November, including Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine, a war in Gaza, and continued tense relations with adversaries such as Iran and China.

To date, Tafuri said the president has demonstrated an improved foreign policy over that of former President Trump's administration, a comparison that could weigh heavily again as the former president seeks to solidify his grasp on the Republican nomination for president and set up a rematch with Biden.

BIDEN'S FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES IN 2023: CHINA, RUSSIA, WAR IN MIDDLE EAST

President Biden (Joe Raedle/Getty Images)

When it comes to rebuilding the alliance with NATO, Tafuri said Trump "openly discussed withdrawing from NATO" and "openly feuded with other NATO members and flirted with [Russian President] Vladimir Putin," something that only worked to embolden Russia.

"Trump's encouragements to Putin and attempt to blackmail [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy by withholding weapons from Ukraine (for which he was impeached by the House of Representatives), more than anything Biden did, led to the Russian invasion of Ukraine," Tafuri said. "Now, the front line for protecting democracy and rule of law runs through eastern and southern Ukraine."

Tafuri also lauded Biden's handling of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, noting that the president was well ahead of Putin's plans and began readying Ukraine and allies to respond to the invasion months in advance.

"This gave Ukraine and its allies time to prepare for the invasion, which proved crucial in Ukraine's early success in defending Kyiv as well as most of the territory that Russia thought it would be able to occupy," Tafuri said. "Biden led NATO to work more collaboratively than it has in decades to provide billions of dollars in aid and sophisticated weapons systems to Ukraine, again flustering Russia's intentions."

But Ian Bremmer, the president of Eurasia Group, said that as the war in Ukraine drags on it is getting harder for Biden to claim it as a win.

"A year ago, maybe even six months ago, you would have said Russia/Ukraine" was a foreign policy win for Biden, Bremmer told Fox News Digital, noting that the U.S. was "leading a multilateral coalition of all the NATO allies to put 11 rounds of sanctions on Russia" but also provided "unprecedented amounts of support for Ukraine" that helped the country in its early battlefield successes.

US ‘NOT LOOKING FOR A WAR WITH IRAN,’ WHITE HOUSE SAYS, STRIKES DESIGNED TO ‘PUT AN END’ TO ATTACKS ON TRUMP

"Unfortunately, the last few months have made it much harder to say that's a win, in part because Zelenskyy is looking weaker and more desperate and his counteroffensive didn't go well," Bremmer said.

Bremmer also pointed to the fact that Biden has been unable to maintain unity among European allies as the conflict drags on, while at home the president has also faced division and questions from Republicans about the continued heavy spending on Ukraine.

President Biden meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office on Sept. 21, 2023. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci/File)

"That makes it harder for him to maintain his commitment to do as much as necessary, whatever it takes as long as it takes," Bremmer said.

Despite the setback, Bremmer said Biden has contributed to multiple foreign policy accomplishments in his three years in office. Aside from the improvement in relations with NATO allies, Bremmer pointed to Biden's work strengthening ties between two critical allies in Japan and South Korea.

"They were basically at each other's throats and not engaging diplomatically … hurting their economic and security relationship," Bremmer said. "The U.S. facilitated a breakthrough, hosted a trilateral meeting at Camp David, and since then, you've had dozens of high-level trilateral engagements on the economic side, diplomatic side and security side."

Bremmer likened the breakthrough to the Abraham Accords that were negotiated under Trump, an agreement that normalized relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

PENTAGON SAYS ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR ISN'T SPREADING DESPITE US SOLDIERS KILLED IN JORDAN, RED SEA ATTACKS

"It's that scale of a win," Bremmer said.

Another accomplishment Bremmer pointed to was Biden's handling of China, arguing that the president has facilitated a "more functional and more stable" relationship with one of America's largest adversaries.

Bremmer said the U.S. has "not given up anything that matters" when dealing with China under Biden, noting that those tariffs remain where they were under the Trump administration, yet the U.S. has been able to secure export controls on "semiconductors, cloud computing, the CHIPS Act and the chips agreement with the Netherlands, South Korea and Japan."

"That is coordinating U.S. industrial policy and probably the most strategically important part of the advanced economy," Bremmer said.

Bremmer noted that coordinating with the advanced economy also "underpins artificial intelligence," a technology that the Chinese are "way back" on.

While Bremmer cautioned that there should be no "false sense" that the U.S. and China suddenly have a "relationship of trust," he said Biden's moves have forced China to negotiate in some areas from a "position of weakness," making them more willing to meet U.S. demands. This has resulted in other wins such as an agreement for the Chinese to shut down exports of ingredients used to make fentanyl in the U.S. and the stopping of Chinese harassment of American aircraft.

President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping (Reuters/Kevin Lamarque/File)

BIDEN ATTENDS DIGNIFIED TRANSFER OF FALLEN TROOPS KILLED IN JORDAN DRONE ATTACK

While complex issues remain when it comes to China, Bremmer said Biden has positioned the U.S. well to deal with those challenges.

The same might not be able to be said about the Middle East, Bremmer said, noting that the region has been an obvious place of "struggle" for the administration.

"The big breakthrough in the Middle East in the last three years was facilitated by China, not the U.S.," Bremmer said. "It was the Saudi, Iran breakthrough … the Americans were completely on the sidelines and kind of surprised by that."

Bremmer also pointed to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which he said was "mishandled" by Biden despite being given a tough situation by previous administrations.

"Still, Biden mismanaged the withdrawal and did it unilaterally without engaging properly with allies," Bremmer said. "Of course, the visuals in particular were incredibly embarrassing as the U.S.-supported government folded, collapsed almost immediately."

Meanwhile, Bremmer noted the lack of progress made between Israel and the Palestinians during Biden's time in office, which has now resulted in a "massive war" that Biden will be hard-pressed to contain in his current position.

US LAUNCHES MIDDLE EAST AIRSTRIKES AFTER SOLDIERS' DEATHS: 'THIS IS THE START OF OUR RESPONSE'

"As you've heard from the head of the CIA and the secretary of state, this is the most dangerous time in the Middle East in at least four years, and it comes at a time when the president of the U.S. does [not] have a lot of leverage over Israeli actions," Bremmer said.

That war has come during a period when American forces in the region have continued to be the target of attacks from Iran-backed proxy militias in Iraq and Syria, the most recent of which killed three American service members and injured dozens more.

Biden responded by authorizing a series of more than 100 airstrikes throughout the region on Friday, with Biden warning, "If you harm an American, we will respond."

President Biden and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (Probst/ullstein bild via Getty Images | Nicholas Kamm/AFP via Getty Images)

"This past Sunday, three American soldiers were killed in Jordan by a drone launched by militant groups backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Earlier today, I attended the dignified return of these brave Americans at Dover Airforce Base, and I have spoken with each of their families," the president said in a statement shortly after the strikes last Friday.

Yet Biden has faced calls to do more, including hit Iranian targets directly, with some arguing that the president's unwillingness to do so has led to Iran being emboldened.

While Tafuri believes Iran remains one of the most challenging foreign policy issues for Biden moving forward, he argued that critics shouldn't "tie Iran's support for the proxy forces and militias that are attacking Americans to any action by President Biden."

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"These forces have been active for decades and have been targeting Americans since they were founded," Tafuri told Fox News Digital. "After the Iraq invasion by the Bush administration in 2003, these groups killed hundreds of Americans. In 2016, the Iranian-backed militias were incorporated by law into Iraq's armed forces, which gave them a big boost in power and influence."

Instead, Tafuri expressed confidence that Biden will be able to deter such attacks in the future while also tackling the more pressing matter of ensuring the country does not obtain nuclear weapons.

"A bigger challenge is ensuring Iran does not get nuclear weapons," Tafuri said. "I expect that over the next year that the Biden administration will focus on disincentivizing attacks on our soldiers by Iranian proxy forces, while keeping the more important goal of restraining Iran's nuclear ambitions at the forefront of our policy."

foxnews.com · by Michael Lee Fox News

12. History Has No Lessons for You: A Warning for Policymakers

Conclusion:

Lesson-learning is a shortcut for critical thinking. It appeals to positive impulses, but it loses value once you sink into specific historical contexts and appreciate their contingencies. It also poses its own risks: misapplication, distortion, selectivity, reinforcing biases, and so on. History should remain central to the education of national security professionals not for lesson-learning but for enriching their understanding of the world and themselves while cultivating the wisdom to inform sound decisions.

History Has No Lessons for You: A Warning for Policymakers - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Joseph Stieb · February 6, 2024

As a historian working in professional military education, I find myself in the awkward position of warning strategists and students alike against drawing too many lessons from history. As quick keyword searches of major foreign policy publications show, the quest for historical lessons appeals to both policymakers seeking guidance and academics seeking to make their work relevant.

But while a sophisticated grasp of the past has tremendous value for anyone in government, reducing it to a search for lessons detracts from sound historical understanding and misleads today’s strategic thinkers. And while I am as guilty as other historians of pitching my work in terms of readily applicable lessons, I fear this reduces our discipline to simplistic aphorisms.

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Instead, history education is relevant to national security practitioners because it fosters a better understanding of how the current world came to be, why other societies think differently from the United States, the dangers of analogical reasoning, and the difficulties of real-time decision-making. Equally importantly, it cultivates an ability to think outside of the parameters of the present. This contributes to a more critical comprehension of oneself and one’s nation and a stronger ability to unpack assumptions and avoid errors.

The Problems with “Lessons”

Sara Maza defines historical lessons as “neatly packaged axioms applicable to present and future circumstances.” In strategy, this would mean a principle or course of action derived from historical cases that should guide contemporary decision-making. Lesson-learning involves reasoning by analogy: present situation X is like past situation Y, so we should pursue one course or another based on that lesson.

But isn’t lesson-learning just an attempt to learn from the past to avoid similar mistakes in the future? What is so wrong about applying historical lessons to today’s challenges?

To understand the pitfalls of lesson-learning, consider the concepts of context and contingency. Context refers to the complex swirl of social, political, economic, intellectual, environmental, and other factors that shape the environment in which people live and act at any given time. All historical contexts are different; the world in 2050 will not be like today’s world, which is unlike the world of 1989, much less that of 1648, and so on. These differences make generalizing across contexts innately difficult. Nevertheless, understanding any decision or policy requires looking at context. To explain the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example, one must understand the post–Cold War international system, ideas about U.S. power at the time, and the recent trauma of Sept. 11.

In John Lewis Gaddis’ definition, contingencies are “phenomena that do not form patterns.” They are the branching points of history at which things could have easily been different because of unpredictable, unusual, and often small occurrences whose importance is sometimes clear only in hindsight. Contingency accounts for the importance of human agency and the fact that people may react differently to similar circumstances. Through this concept, historians challenge the idea that any given event was inevitably determined by large structural forces.

To return to the Iraq War example: The war was contingent on the shock of Sept. 11, which depended on the success of 19 hijackers executing their operation, which hinged on U.S. intelligence shortcomings and significant luck by the terrorists themselves. Al Qaeda’s rise was contingent on schisms within the international jihadist movement, the crushing of jihadist groups in Egypt and Algeria in the 1990s, the personal development of its leaders, and the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. So while the Iraq War had many grand contextual causes like unipolarity, it also had more specific and contingent roots in factors determined by chance and human agency.

Context and contingency pose a number of problems for lesson-learning. First, the failure to pay attention to these forces often leads to a misapplication of history to present scenarios. After the 2007 Iraq troop surge, for example, counter-insurgency advocates such as David Petraeus used the momentum of the surge’s partial successes to advocate for counter-insurgency in Afghanistan.

The contexts of these two countries, however, differed dramatically. Iraq faced an urban insurgency in a modernized society. Afghanistan featured a dispersed rural insurgency, a poorly governed border that offered safe haven for the Taliban, and an even weaker central government and sense of national identity. By overlooking the different contexts of these societies, many strategists constructed the questionable “lesson” that Iraq demonstrated counter-insurgency’s applicability to other cases. Moreover, the surge’s advances were contingent on a number of factors that were hard to replicate across cases. Without the simultaneous “Sunni awakening” against al-Qaeda in Iraq, U.S. troops may have achieved limited security gains but would have failed to consolidate those gains or root al-Qaeda in Iraq out of Sunni communities.

The case of counter-insurgency speaks to another limitation of lesson-learning: policy-makers and analysts often read history selectively to get the lessons they want. Counter-insurgency advocates like John Nagl highlighted early Cold War cases like Malaya or the Philippines to promulgate this strategy for the war on terror. But not only did these arguments downplay counter-insurgency’s imperial connections, they also overlooked contextual differences that made it hard to apply “lessons” from these cases to the present. For example, the British during the Malayan Emergency succeeded in part because most of the insurgents came from the minority Chinese population, which could be easily isolated from the Malay majority.

Anti–counter-insurgency theorists committed similar distortions in their quest to purge it from U.S. doctrine. Some reduced the surge’s gains to paying off insurgents, oversimplifying the actual history. Historian Douglas Porch argues that counter-insurgency theorists ignored the political nature of insurgency and that the surge failed to create space for political compromise in Iraq. In contrast, counter-insurgency advocates talk endlessly of the political nature of insurgency, and the surge did contribute to a major decline in violence that created opportunities for Iraqi reconciliation. A focus on lessons too often turns history into “an enormous grab bag” for policy analysts to use to support preexisting conclusions.

In addition, lesson-learning faces a major paradox. Highly specific lessons provide little value for applying to new cases. Nevertheless, general lessons that might be applicable across cases are usually so banal that they offer no insight.

For example, are the lessons of the Iraq War to avoid invading countries that never attacked the United States, failing to plan for those conflicts, and then attempting long-term nation-building? If so, one needs little history to reach these conclusions. History is hardly necessary to reach President Barack Obama’s dictum: “Don’t do stupid shit.” In fact, focusing on such trite lessons might mislead students into thinking that historical actors were simply stupid and that they would never make such blunders.

Additionally, history often offers contradictory lessons, each with some semblance of truth. The bromide that “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme” is misleading. History is more like meterless free verse poetry, nonlinear and paradoxical.

Consider the contradictory lessons of World War II and Vietnam. The lesson that U.S. leaders took from World War II was that dictators always exploit weakness and that striking them early was better than appeasement, as the British and French did to Adolf Hitler at the 1938 Munich Conference. This “no more Munichs” mentality informed U.S. decisions to intervene in Korea and Vietnam. As U.S. ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge argued to President Lyndon Johnson in 1965, “I feel there is a greater threat to start World War III if we don’t go in. Can’t we see the similarity to our own indolence at Munich?” The Vietnam disaster, however, engendered competing lessons: Don’t send half a million troops to a peripheral theater to prop up a sclerotic dictatorship on the faulty logic of the domino theory.

So, when Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which lesson should have informed policy? Always nip aggressors in the bud, or be wary of creating unnecessary wars by striking in haste? Both lessons had some credence, which made them mostly useless. As Hal Brands argues, these contradictory lessons distorted strategic thought in this crisis. The war’s skeptics could see only a new Vietnam in the desert, despite massive contextual differences. In contrast, the war’s boosters, including the George H.W. Bush administration, believed Saddam was a new Hitler. Bushqueried in January 1991: “My mind goes back to history: How many lives might have been saved if appeasement had given way to force earlier?”

Bush’s war to reverse Iraqi aggression was justifiable without this shaky analogy. However, this “lesson” prompted him to inflate the threat and use overheated rhetoric that raised Americans’ expectations about what Bush envisioned as a limited war. This fed a sense of disappointment at Saddam’s survival that cast a pall over U.S. policy toward Iraq for the next decade.

Finally, lesson-learning makes policy-makers more vulnerable to cognitive biases. In the recency bias, people draw on examples that are freshest in their memory or experience to reason through a current problem. In the availability heuristic, people draw on more vivid and salient instances for the same purposes.

Searching for lessons encourages decision-makers to overrate the importance of recent and dramatic events and ignore other evidence that might challenge their views. For example, the George W. Bush administration, like most Americans, overestimated the likelihood of catastrophic weapons of mass destruction terrorism because of the shadow of Sept. 11, which itself depended on numerous contingencies. This contributed to the disastrous invasion of Iraq.

Lesson-learning combined with these biases also creates risks of overlearning from recent events. Restraint advocates may be right that the war on terror’s failures should prompt a humbler grand strategy. But they also frequently misrepresent the complex history of the war on terror, downplaying positives such as the lack of major attacks on the U.S. homeland and the defeat of core al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. By explaining U.S. mistakes like Iraq simply as a product of the pursuit of hegemony, they overlook the many contingencies that made the war possible, including Sept. 11 and the mutual misperceptions of U.S. and Iraqi leaders.

Moreover, restrainers’ recommendations for a significant reduction of U.S. power and presence in the world risk overcorrection. Would weapons of mass destruction proliferation, geopolitical competition, and revanchist nationalism surge if the United States withdrew from Europe or northeast Asia? Would global commerce endure without the U.S. Navy? What would happen to nations like Ukraine and Taiwan? That the war on terror was largely an overreaction does not offer clear lessons for dealing with these challenges. Recent history should inform but not dominate our thinking about them.

Why Even Study History?

At this point, my employer may be wondering why they hired me at all. If lesson-learning is not the reason to study history, then why should a strategist with limited time study history at all?

One major benefit for a strategist is to understand how the present came to be. History shows how we got to the present day in any domain: society, economics, politics, military affairs, ideas, and so on. It gives the strategic thinker a stronger sense of the landscape in which he or she will operate and a better understanding of the people, institutions, and nations that surround them. How did we arrive at the point where the United States became the fulcrum of the liberal international order? How did our political system become so polarized? How did the United States arrive at such a tense relationship with the United Nations, a body it was largely responsible for creating? Great historical works on these kinds of questions show students that current realities have not always been so and that they formed out of a mix of contextual and contingent factors that are unlikely to occur again.

Furthermore, these questions are all open to multiple interpretations, and they all resist simple lesson-learning. Indeed, a focus on lessons skips the vital task of interpreting history, as any lesson must build on arguments about what happened, how, and why. My students are often surprised that history is an interpretive process with no final answers. But realizing this helps them consider that what they may have learned about the past from various sources may be dubious, which cultivates greater curiosity and humility.

Furthermore, global history helps national security practitioners understand how other societies see things and why they often diverge from U.S. perceptions. Understanding Russia or China’s history, and the way modern Russians and Chinese interpret it, is essential for understanding their strategies, identities, and politics. Grasping China’s narrative of a “century of humiliation” or Russia’s crises since the Soviet Union’s collapse is crucial for understanding how they approach global politics. A stronger sense of Arab resentment of Western power, including colonialism, support for Israel, and crippling sanctions, may have induced more caution prior to the Iraq War.

The best moments at my job at the Naval War College come when one of our international students interrupts to say “No, that’s not how we see things.” When teachers can connect those moments to history, U.S. students get outside of their biases and assumptions and comprehend the world in a more critical way.

History also gives students an empathetic ability to see events from the past forward rather than in hindsight, which historian Gordon Wood calls a “historical sense.” Rather than condescending to the past, future national security professionals should be asking why mostly reasonable and intelligent people made such mistakes and why errors persist over time.

A historical sense also strengthens students’ ability to consider each situation in its own terms rather than picking the analogies that bolster our assumptions or goals. James Fallows, for instance, recalls seeing U.S. officials reading books about the U.S. reconstruction of Germany and Japan on a plane to Iraq in 2003. These cases of success offered the flattering “lesson” that the United States could turn former foes into democratic allies. But there were vast differences between these contexts as well as many counter-examples of the United States failing to transform foreign societies. U.S. officials should have engaged more systematically with Iraq’s particular historical development before plunging in.

History, which Gaddis calls a “vicarious enlargement of experience,” can immerse students in the emotions and ideas that shaded past decisions, helping them appreciate the pressures and confusion of the moment. It may seem obvious now that the United States should not have fought the Vietnam War. But it is less clear what President Johnson should have done with a deteriorating situation in Vietnam that he inherited from his predecessors, a bipartisan consensus on stopping communist advances, and the fear that “losing Vietnam” would jeopardize his crucial domestic reforms. Students can thereby better understand the imperfect information, political factors, organizational constraints, emotional strains, and lack of good options that will affect them when they must make decisions.

Finally, historical education fosters humility and self-understanding for budding strategists. The further we move away from a given event, the easier it is to identify and critique the assumptions that policy-makers held at the time. Looking back on the 1990s, it is easy to criticize U.S. leaders’ assumptions that liberal democracy was sweeping the world and that neoliberalism offered the best courses of economic development. But applying this type of scrutiny to one’s own time is intensely difficult. History does not provide answers to contemporary strategic questions, but it nurtures the ability to think outside of the parameters of the present while challenging assumptions.

If there are any lessons from history, they are largely cautionary ones about irony, tragedy, and the limits of human reason. Wood put this well: “History does not teach lots of little lessons. Insofar as it teaches any lessons, it teaches only one big one: that nothing ever works out quite the way its managers intended or expected.”

Conclusion

To be fair, policy-makers do not have the luxury of chewing on historical complexities. They have to make decisions within numerous constraints, and history provides a body of knowledge that they should draw on to inform those decisions.

Historians should pitch their relevance in the terms described above rather than in terms of lessons. But if policy-makers insist on some form of lessons, historians should respond in two ways. First, they should encourage policy-makers to view lessons in cautious, probabilistic terms that always account for contextual differences. As Senator J. William Fulbright said in 1966, “The value of history is not what it seems to prohibit or prescribe, but its general indications as to the kinds of policies that are likely to succeed and the kinds that are likely to fail.” Second, historians should pick away at models, theories, and lessons and stress how context and contingency make generalization so difficult.

Lesson-learning is a shortcut for critical thinking. It appeals to positive impulses, but it loses value once you sink into specific historical contexts and appreciate their contingencies. It also poses its own risks: misapplication, distortion, selectivity, reinforcing biases, and so on. History should remain central to the education of national security professionals not for lesson-learning but for enriching their understanding of the world and themselves while cultivating the wisdom to inform sound decisions.

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Joseph Stieb is an assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. He is the author of The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990–2003. He has published articles in the Texas National Security Review, Diplomatic History, Modern American History, Journal of Strategic Studies, International History Review, War on the Rocks, Washington Post, Foreign Policy, and elsewhere.

The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense or its components, to include the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Joseph Stieb · February 6, 2024

13. Israel Admits It Targeted Own Citizens With Graphic Misinformation Channel

Unfortunately the Haaretz article is behind the paywall (I cannot subscribe to every publication).  

This is what gives PSYOP a bad reputation.

Is this an "own goal?" Was the anticipated effect/benefit worth the potential blowback? PSYOP against your population is usually not a good idea. But if the enemy is employing the North Vietnamese strategy of Dau Tranh (which I think we can see elements of in Hamas' strategy) you do have to counter the enemy's propaganda against your own population. But you do not do it with propaganda but with accurate and superior information.

Israel Admits It Targeted Own Citizens With Graphic Misinformation Channel

https://www.thedailybeast.com/israel-admits-it-ran-a-graphic-misinformation-op-on-own-citizens

‘UNAUTHORIZED’

Amanda Yen

Breaking News Intern

Published Feb. 04, 2024 11:29AM EST 

Jack Guez/Getty Images

The Israeli Defense Forces admitted it is behind a Telegram channel for Israeli audiences where users posted graphic images of dead Palestinians they claimed were Hamas fighters to influence opinion on the Gaza war. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the IDF’s Influencing Department, which is in charge of “psychological warfare” against foreigners, created the channel 72 Virgins – Uncensored “without authorization and without authority.” The IDF walked back its claim that it had nothing to do with the channel, previously telling Haaretz, “There is no reason for the IDF to conduct influence campaigns on Israeli citizens of Israel.” In the channel, users post bloodied corpses of Hamas fighters with vulgar language and captions that resembled click-bait headlines. “You won't believe the video we got! You can hear their bones crunch,” one user commented on Oct. 11. “You have to watch it with sound, you’ll die laughing!” A video from Oct. 14 featured an Israeli vehicle repeatedly crushing a dead body beneath its tire treads. “Exclusive video of a good night, don't forget to share and repost,” the caption read.

Read it at Haaretz

14. The Marines are retaining women at significantly higher rates than men

Not only the Marines:

The Army, which did not provide officer data, showed an overall retention rate of 80.4% for women, slightly higher than the 77.1% rate for men.

The Marines are retaining women at significantly higher rates than men

marinecorpstimes.com · by Hope Hodge Seck · February 6, 2024

The military service with the smallest proportion of women in the ranks may also be disproportionately good at retaining them, newly obtained information shows.

According to reenlistment and retention data presented by the Marine Corps to the Pentagon’s Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services in December 2023, the service retains women at higher rates than men in almost every demographic and category ― and in some cases, by a wide margin.

While the Corps’ enlisted retention rates are relatively low compared to some of its service counterparts, a function of the service’s operational requirements and young, high-turnover workforce, women are dramatically more likely to reenlist.

In fiscal 2023, 28% of first-term male Marines opted for reenlistment, while 35% of women did ― a spread of seven percentage points. The year before, 24% of first-term men reenlisted, while 32% of women did. For second-term enlisted Marines, the gap was narrower, but still pronounced.

In 2023, 43% of second-term males reenlisted, compared with 47% of second-term females. Fiscal year 2022 saw a similar 41% to 46% second-term reenlistment gap.

Service data shows this trend has been observable since at least fiscal year 2019, the last year for which data was presented. And the margin shows no signs of narrowing: While in fiscal 2022 the Marines retained 30% of enlisted women and 27% of enlisted men, the gap widened in fiscal 2023, with a 33% female enlisted retention rate compared with 28% for enlisted males.

RELATED

Here are some of the ways the Marines are trying to improve retention

"Treat people like human beings," for one.

By Philip Athey

Overall, the female reenlistment rate for women was 33% for women, compared to 28% for men.

Among Marine officers, continuation rates are closer, but still show a gap. In fiscal 2023, 90% of female officers opted for continuation, compared to 88% of men. The year before, 92% of officer women and 90% of officer men stayed in. The gap holds true across the past five years.

These trends are especially remarkable because they have no parallel among the other services, which also presented retention data to the committee.

The Air Force, which has similarly high enlisted and officer retention rates, had exactly the same enlisted retention rate for men and women in 2023, 88.68%, and a negligible .14% difference in officer retention. At 90.71%, male officers had the higher rate.

In the Navy, which also has similar enlisted and officer retention rates, enlisted men stay in at higher rates than women. In 2023, 86.5% of enlisted men opted for continuation compared with 84.8% of women. And female officers barely edged out their male counterparts, with a continuation rate of 91% compared to 90.6% for men.

The Army, which did not provide officer data, showed an overall retention rate of 80.4% for women, slightly higher than the 77.1% rate for men.

Why does the Marine Corp retain women at such a markedly higher margin than women? It’s not exactly clear, although job distribution may play a role.

In the Marine Corps infantry, where women still constitute a small minority, the service typically opts not to retain all the Marines who want to reenlist. Last year, only 16% of first-term male riflemen were selected for continuation, according to Marine Corps data.

Marine officials themselves aren’t proposing any theories. A spokeswoman for Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Maj. Danielle Phillips, said internal polling from fiscal 2018–2022 doesn’t show any differences in reasons Marines give to leave the service or continue that would account for a five-percentage-point gender difference.

Top reasons for choosing to continue, she said, include retirement benefits; pay compensation; medical/dental care; and opportunity for promotion. The No. 5 most popular reason to continue did show a divergence between the genders: for men, it was deployment opportunities, while for women, it was the military tuition assistance benefit.

“There have been studies on retention ― not specific to higher female retention ― in the past,” Phillips said in a statement provided to Marine Corps Times. “One of our manpower modernization initiatives will allow us to catalogue and analyze historical manpower-related studies in the near future.”

Kyleanne Hunter, a senior political scientist at Rand who served in the Marine Corps as an AH-1W Super Cobra attack pilot, deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, had additional insights about what may be driving the retention gender gap.

Past Air Force and Army studies have shown, she said, that troops of color, regardless of gender, tend to stay in uniform longer than their white counterparts, at least until a certain career seniority point. That’s relevant, she said, because women still make up a small minority of Marines, at roughly 10% of the total force. Because of that, she said, women can face a higher “barrier to entry” in selecting Marine Corps service.

“There’s very likely a self-selection bias that’s occurring,” Hunter said. “Are the women who join women who would be more likely to stay in, because they’ve already had to go through higher barriers to entry?”

Hunter applauded steps the Marine Corps and the other branches have taken to lower those perceived barriers to service, including expanded parental leave benefits, more inclusive health care and public messaging that features women. In the past several years, the proportion of female Marines has gradually increased, and top leaders have discussed their desire to see more women in the field of combat arms, which was largely closed to them until 2016.

The retention picture may also tie back to the Marines’ continued success in meeting recruiting targets, even as the other services have struggled or fallen short. The challenge of the Corps’ recruiting message, and the invitation to try to meet the service’s exacting standard, creates a self-selection effect ― a phenomenon that may be especially true for women electing to join the most male-dominated service.

“Tapping into a cultural narrative and cultural zeitgeist, it’s something that Marines have always done really well,” Hunter said. “People are joining the Marines not because they just want to join the military, but because they want to be a Marine.”

About Hope Hodge Seck

Hope Hodge Seck is an award-winning investigative and enterprise reporter covering the U.S. military and national defense. The former managing editor of Military.com, her work has also appeared in the Washington Post, Politico Magazine, USA Today and Popular Mechanics.

15. Waking A Weary Superpower

Excerpts:

We need to draft a new National Security Strategy that speaks in concrete terms of geostrategy, identifying the key global choke points critical to American security and the requisite alliances and military capabilities needed to achieve those goals. This means refocusing NATO on deterring Russian aggression (matching our resources to our rhetoric), repositioning American bases on NATO’s eastern flank, especially in Poland, and, in the Pacific region, building a wider alliance of Asian powers to augment the framework of AUKUS—the partnership between Australia, the U.K., and the U.S.—to deter China. In the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. needs to reaffirm its alliance with Israel, while also taking a clear-eyed look at which Arab countries can be counted on to support American interests against China, Russia, and, most of all, Iran.

Admitting what went wrong after the Cold War should not be cause for despair, but rather a spur to act, especially in this critical election year. The United States is a country with still-untapped human and material resources, blessed with a uniquely secure geopolitical environment. It remains the most desirable destination for immigrants from around the world and a vibrant land of opportunity for innovation and capital formation. Our natural resources and R&D base give us unparalleled advantages relative to our competitors and our enemies. While our political institutions have been tarnished of late, the country’s democratic culture remains strong and will reassert itself once the principles of citizenship and merit return to center stage. In foreign and security policy, a strategy that prioritizes national interests and matches those with national power—both our own and our allies’—will deter and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries.

Waking A Weary Superpower

How America can overcome its crisis of self-confidence

City Journal · by Andrew A. Michta · February 1, 2024

How America can overcome its crisis of self-confidence

/ Eye on the News

Feb 01 2024

The United States is arguably more politically polarized and wearier of maintaining the global security system than at any time since the end of the Cold War. National debt stands at a whopping $34 trillion, inflation lingers, the southern border is uncontrolled, and a poll last fall showed that 78 percent of Americans thought the country was moving in the wrong direction. In foreign affairs, seemingly “never-ending wars,” the possible failure of U.S. policy in Ukraine, and the potentially widening Israel–Hamas war have cast into doubt the course the country has been on for the past three decades. As the next presidential election moves into high gear, the country’s leadership urgently needs to articulate a path to recovery, at home and abroad.

As with any such effort, the first step is to admit that one has a problem—or more than one. First, American elites remain in thrall to economic and political assumptions that no longer reflect reality. This is in part because, with the fall of the Berlin Wall more than three decades ago, pragmatism and careful risk assessment gave way to faith that the “end of history” had validated our assumptions about economics and politics. On economic policy, both government and business disregarded fundamental tenets of national security, facilitating an unprecedented transfer of American technology, know-how, and research base to Communist China on the flawed premise that trade and development would make it become more pluralist and democratic.

After the Cold War, American foreign policy also lost much of its commonsense restraint and orientation toward the national interest. With the implosion of the Soviet Union, the U.S. could act unilaterally with relative impunity, but it failed to develop a proper sense of restraint about whether, when, and how it should act. The successful Cold War strategy gave way to projects of breathtaking scope, aimed at transforming entire cultures through state-building. These imprecise goals, framed in concepts like the Global War on Terror (though after 9/11 America was obviously justified in seeking to respond), committed the country to two decades of warfare that drained our resources and sapped our political will.

The U.S. needs to focus in three key areas if it is to achieve national renewal. First, our political leaders must weigh all policy choices in terms of how they serve American citizens. In an empire, elites govern the citizens; in a republic, they govern on the citizens’ behalf. This means that we must put the welfare of Americans and our national security priorities at the center of our economic decision making. Consequently, when it comes to national security, we must on-shore our critical manufacturing and arrange it so that other supply chains are located in friendly countries. The United States urgently needs to rebuild its manufacturing base, for without it, the country will lack the wherewithal to support its military in the event of war. This should be the leading project for Congress and the next administration.

Second and equally important will be ending the toxic ideological polarization that has paralyzed our ability to seek compromise in the name of the public good. We need a thorough reform of the educational system at every level, from elementary through colleges and universities, so that we can once again pass on our national DNA to the next generation. After decades of divisive curricula in which racial transgressions overshadow what we share as a people, American education needs to start healing. In a country as racially and ethnically diverse as ours, this can only be done through the restoration of the centrality of individual citizenship.

The rekindling of national cohesion means relearning the principle of genuine tolerance, not its ideologically deformed imitation. This requires that Americans patiently endure the expression of beliefs with which they may disagree—sometimes vehemently—and recognize that, as long as their fellow citizens abide by the law, they have no right to seek to censor them. Our culture of free speech unfortunately has reached a low point; as a New York Times/Sienna College poll conducted in 2022 showed, 84 percent of Americans saw being afraid to exercise free speech as a serious problem.

Finally, our foreign and national security policy needs fundamental rethinking, but not in terms of “pivots to Asia” or other similar recipes. Thus far the conversation has been about defending the rules-based international order and a new era of “strategic competition” in a multipolar world. This discussion remains fundamentally normative and reactive, buried in old assumptions. We need an approach that shapes the key areas of the world where America must remain engaged to ensure our continued security and prosperity, especially the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. We need to transform our alliances so that they support America’s and our allies’ geostrategic priorities at a manageable cost. We should work with those who share our threat perceptions and are willing to put their money and national resources on the line to counter them.

We need to draft a new National Security Strategy that speaks in concrete terms of geostrategy, identifying the key global choke points critical to American security and the requisite alliances and military capabilities needed to achieve those goals. This means refocusing NATO on deterring Russian aggression (matching our resources to our rhetoric), repositioning American bases on NATO’s eastern flank, especially in Poland, and, in the Pacific region, building a wider alliance of Asian powers to augment the framework of AUKUS—the partnership between Australia, the U.K., and the U.S.—to deter China. In the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. needs to reaffirm its alliance with Israel, while also taking a clear-eyed look at which Arab countries can be counted on to support American interests against China, Russia, and, most of all, Iran.

Admitting what went wrong after the Cold War should not be cause for despair, but rather a spur to act, especially in this critical election year. The United States is a country with still-untapped human and material resources, blessed with a uniquely secure geopolitical environment. It remains the most desirable destination for immigrants from around the world and a vibrant land of opportunity for innovation and capital formation. Our natural resources and R&D base give us unparalleled advantages relative to our competitors and our enemies. While our political institutions have been tarnished of late, the country’s democratic culture remains strong and will reassert itself once the principles of citizenship and merit return to center stage. In foreign and security policy, a strategy that prioritizes national interests and matches those with national power—both our own and our allies’—will deter and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries.

Andrew A. Michta is senior fellow and director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Views expressed here are his own.

Photo: McKinneMike/iStock/Getty Images Plus

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​16. Here’s how to help solve Ukraine’s drone shortage problem

Excerpts:

As a general rule, there are good reasons for requiring partners to spend FMF money in the United States. Foreign demand for American-made weapons spurs the U.S. economy, employs Americans, builds valuable defense-industrial capacity, and strengthens political support for arming key partners to deter and defeat common adversaries.

Sometimes, however, U.S. interests are best served by making an exception to the rule. Ukraine’s urgent need for large quantities of cheap drones is just such instance. If and when Congress finally passes the supplemental, it should take that opportunity to revisit this issue.

With this additional funding, Kyiv not only could buy more UAVs but could also swap out Chinese-made drones and components for Ukrainian-made alternatives. In addition, Ukraine could scale up its integration of more expensive features, such as thermal imaging cameras, jamming resistance, home-on-jam capability, and machine vision. This would give Kyiv a boost in the ever-evolving race between Russian and Ukrainian drone technology and provide an offset for Russia’s superiority in electronic warfare and proliferation of small counter-drone jammers.

Vladimir Putin wants to weaken and control Ukraine. If he succeeds, Europeans and Americans will regret it for years to come. Washington and its allies can avoid that outcome by providing Kyiv with additional security assistance, which should include ensuring Ukrainian forces have the drones they need to fight Putin’s unprovoked invasion.

Here’s how to help solve Ukraine’s drone shortage problem

Defense News · by John Hardie and Bradley Bowman · February 5, 2024

Drones and other unmanned systems are a “central driver” of the Russia-Ukraine war, Kyiv’s top general observed in an op-ed published this month. In terms of battlefield innovation, Ukraine’s “number one priority” is the “mastery of an entire arsenal of (relatively) cheap, modern and highly effective, unmanned vehicles and other technological means,” he wrote.

By leveraging their resources, technologies and production capacity, the U.S. and its allies can help Ukraine meet this challenge.

In addition to artillery shells, one of Ukraine’s most urgent battlefield needs is an enormous number of one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as “kamikaze drones.” First and foremost, this means first-person view — or “FPV” — drones, combining cheap commercially available quadcopters rigged with munitions. Both Russia and Ukraine widely employ FPVs as improvised loitering munitions used to attack vehicles and personnel at or near the front line. But while the Ukrainians adopted FPV drones first, Russia now has the edge thanks to its advantage in production capacity.

With Western-provided shells currently in short supply, Ukraine will need to lean even more heavily on FPVs as a partial replacement for artillery. The Ukrainians are making many thousands of FPV drones every month, but they’re still well short of Kyiv’s goal of 1 million per year. Although Ukraine has received some loitering munitions from the United States and other Western countries, they’re far more expensive and aren’t produced at anywhere near the sufficient scale.

Ukraine also needs more long-range attack drones designed to strike targets far behind the frontlines. Here, too, Moscow currently has an advantage thanks to its Iranian-provided Shahed UAVs, which Russia began producing itself last year. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia can now make as many as 350 Shaheds per month.

Although U.S. companies don’t yet mass-produce anything like the Shahed, Ukrainian industry has begun making a variety of long-range attack drones and continues to develop new designs. Kyiv’s forces have repeatedly employed such UAVs to strike airbases and other deep targets both in occupied territory and inside Russia.

If Ukraine can sufficiently scale production, it could beat Russia at its own game. In 2024, Kyiv aims to make 11,000 one-way attack UAVs with a range of at least 300 kilometers. These drones can supplement Ukraine’s limited stocks of Western-supplied missiles.

Ukraine has an innovative and rapidly developing UAV industry, but a lack of resources is slowing progress. Western assistance can help Ukraine scale production and obtain access to advanced technologies and components. Europe intends to do its part. Latvia is leading a UAV coalition for Ukraine, while Lithuania has expressed interest in helping Ukraine produce drones. But the United States has an important role to play, too.

So, what’s to be done?

First, the Biden administration and Congress should incentivize U.S. defense companies to partner with Ukrainian firms. One option is the transfer of Ukrainian intellectual property to American companies for production at scale in the United States. U.S. firms could also invest in localization of production in Ukraine. This sort of cooperation is already beginning to happen, but U.S. government support could help it blossom.

In concert, the United States and Ukraine should consider establishing a working group that brings together government, military, and industry officials focused on unmanned systems. This forum would help institutionalize key relationships and promote defense-industrial cooperation. It would also benefit the U.S. military and American companies by helping them absorb lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Kyiv, for its part, is eager to engage in such a forum.

In the meantime, Congress should consider permitting Kyiv to spend a portion of its U.S. security assistance funding inside Ukraine to procure UAVs that American industry currently struggles to supply in sufficient quantities. This approach, after all, would not be some dramatic departure from current U.S. practice with other democratic partners.

Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, provides partner nations with grants or loans with which to procure U.S. defense articles, services, or training. Washington pledged over $1.6 billion in FMF for Ukraine during the 2022 and 2023 fiscal years. In its supplemental request for fiscal year 2024, the Biden administration asked Congress for $7.2 billion in FMF funding, including $1.7 billion for Kyiv and other European countries affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine. The rest would go to Israel and Indo-Pacific countries, including Taiwan.

Unlike Israel and Taiwan, however, Congress has not authorized Ukraine to use FMF funding for “offshore procurement.” Kyiv must spend all its FMF money in the United States, whereas Jerusalem and Taipei can use some of their U.S.-provided funds for purchases from their own defense industries.

As a general rule, there are good reasons for requiring partners to spend FMF money in the United States. Foreign demand for American-made weapons spurs the U.S. economy, employs Americans, builds valuable defense-industrial capacity, and strengthens political support for arming key partners to deter and defeat common adversaries.

Sometimes, however, U.S. interests are best served by making an exception to the rule. Ukraine’s urgent need for large quantities of cheap drones is just such instance. If and when Congress finally passes the supplemental, it should take that opportunity to revisit this issue.

With this additional funding, Kyiv not only could buy more UAVs but could also swap out Chinese-made drones and components for Ukrainian-made alternatives. In addition, Ukraine could scale up its integration of more expensive features, such as thermal imaging cameras, jamming resistance, home-on-jam capability, and machine vision. This would give Kyiv a boost in the ever-evolving race between Russian and Ukrainian drone technology and provide an offset for Russia’s superiority in electronic warfare and proliferation of small counter-drone jammers.

Vladimir Putin wants to weaken and control Ukraine. If he succeeds, Europeans and Americans will regret it for years to come. Washington and its allies can avoid that outcome by providing Kyiv with additional security assistance, which should include ensuring Ukrainian forces have the drones they need to fight Putin’s unprovoked invasion.

John Hardie is deputy director of the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Bradley Bowman serves as senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power.

17. War Books: A Reading List for Strategic Competition with China

War Books: A Reading List for Strategic Competition with China - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by T.S. Allen · February 2, 2024

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Editor’s note: Welcome to another installment of our weekly War Books series! The premise is simple and straightforward. We invite a participant to recommend five books and tell us what sets each one apart. War Books is a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.

This week’s installment of War Books, originally published three years ago, features a list of books compiled by long-time War Books contributor and former US Army intelligence officer T.S. Allen. Together, the books provide a foundational understanding of the strategic competition taking place between the United States and China—and how the United States can best position itself to be successful.

Haunted by Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, by Sulmaan Wasif Khan

Khan defines grand strategy as “the way in which [a state] marshals different forms of power to pursue national objectives.” In this fascinating book, he argues that China has basically had a consistent grand strategy since 1949, which has been defined by the fragility of the Chinese state and the fear of foreign powers. Xi Jinping’s regime embodies this paradox: on one hand, when Xi took power China was arguably more secure than at any other time since 1949; on the other hand, events since this book was published have shown that China is clearly frantically striving to increase its security, with everything from massive protectionist industrial policies to genocide of Muslim populations it worries could turn to terrorism. Only China’s fears can explain this behavior, and this is by far the best account of them. For analysts, Khan’s book has immense explanatory power. For strategists, it will suggest Chinese paranoias that could be exploited.

Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping, François Bougon

In place of a Big Brother, the people of China have Xi Dada—literally “Big Xi”—their seemingly endearing nickname for CCP Chairman Xi Jinping. Xi apparently plans to lead China for the rest of his life, so understanding his worldview is essential to understanding the direction of China. In this remarkable intellectual biography, French journalist François Bougon explains the fundamental motivations of Xi who, Bougon argues, hopes to be the most powerful man in the world. Xi grew up amid the chaotic madness of China’s Cultural Revolution, and when he took office in 2012, many foreign commentators expected him to be a great reformer who would increase economic and personal freedom. Within a year, however, Xi was clearly on the path to become China’s greatest dictator since Mao, and in 2018, he removed the presidential term limits from China’s constitution, clearing the path for him to rule with an iron fist indefinitely. The tea leaves should have been easier to read, Bougon suggests: Xi has always been a dedicated Maoist and nationalist and despised Western powers, who he sees as conspiratorial and bent on disrupting China’s inevitable rise to great-power status with ideas he rejects, such as “human rights.” It would be wrong, however, to see Xi Jinping Thought as a direct continuation of Mao’s revolutionary ideology. Xi’s concept of China’s rise is rooted in a long, imagined history, much of which Mao rejected. While Mao despised the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius, Xi has elevated Confucius to join Mao as one of China’s foundational sages. Xi also claims to have a remarkable command of Chinese classic literature and Daoism, which deeply shape his thought. They all feed a notion of a “China Dream,” a play on the term “American Dream,” which Xi is firmly dedicated to achieving.

We are competing in an era where bite-sized territorial conquest is an increasingly common strategy, and the Sino-Vietnamese War is an example of China taking just that approach. In 1979, China sent its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) south to “teach Vietnam a lesson” in response to simmering Sino-Vietnamese territorial disputes and concerns over the Soviet Union’s influence in southeast Asia (China had recently aligned with the United States against the Soviets). Within a month, the PLA’s “self-defense counterattack” had defeated Vietnamese ground forces, reduced the provincial capital city of Lang Son to rubble, declared the road to Hanoi open, and then withdrawn, having made China’s point. However, as Xiaoming Zhang notes in this unique and richly sourced history, China continued to fight a war of attrition against Vietnam until the early 1990s, regularly shelling targets in the Vietnamese border region and fighting major border battles as part of a policy of “bleeding” Vietnam to punish it for its ongoing occupation of Cambodia. Until 1983, China continued to seize small territorial strongholds along the border. Then, in 1984, it launched a major operation to seize the Laoshan Heights. From 1985 to 1989 the PLA systematically rotated a total of 180,000 combat troops through deployments to the Laoshan Heights so they could gain combat experience, inflicting 33,500 Vietnamese casualties, and suffering 4,300. The PLA continued to execute combat missions on the border until 1993. China does its best to censor accounts of this aggression, but we certainly should not forget them. Keep this in mind when analysts argue that China has not fought a war since 1979.

China’s Vision of Victory, by Jonathan D.T. Ward

Chinese propaganda is not exciting reading material, but its tedious slogans are as meaningful, so you have to make sense of them if you want to understand the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dr. Jonathan D.T. Ward has done so better than most, and has found that the CCP’s leaders are dedicated to achieving the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” by 2049, the centenary of the party taking power. In China’s Vision of Victory, he outlines the political, economic, and military objectives China aims to achieve along the way. This book is particularly useful for defense analysts as it clearly outlines China’s vast military ambitions. While Ward argues that our competition with China is fundamentally economic, he is clear-eyed about the fact that China seeks a military that is “second to none,” which will have far-reaching ramifications for world order.

Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia, by Clive Hamilton

In this essential book, ethicist Clive Hamilton explains China’s entire playbook for influence operations, with a focus on his native Australia. He argues that the CCP is “engaged in a systematic campaign to infiltrate, influence and control the most important institutions in Australia.” Through coordinated media influence, investments, and outright espionage, the CCP hopes to rob Australia of its sovereignty—and end Australia’s longstanding alliance with the United States. This book is notable for its particularly thoughtful treatment of Chines diaspora issues. The CCP thinks of the Chinese diaspora as its stooges, and even absurdly claims the legal right to detain ethnic Chinese people who do not have Chinese nationality. However, as Hamilton notes, many Chinese-Australians firmly oppose creeping CCP influence, which they understand better than their fellow Australians.

While this book was an instant bestseller when it hit Australians shelves, before that two publishers dropped the book over fears of Chinese retaliation and harassment. Free speech has triumphed for now, and Hamilton has another book on the global reach of the CCP coming out later this year.

China Dream, by Ma Jian

The essential moral bankruptcy of modern China, which fuses debased Marxist ideas, gross consumerism, and militant nationalism, is a topic so dark it can only be illuminated by literature. In China Dream, exiled Chinese novelist Ma Jian imagines the hectic life of a mid-level CCP functionary named Ma Daode (literally “virtue”) who is placed in charge of a “China Dream Bureau” in the fictional Ziyang City. To escape haunting memories of the violent Cultural Revolution that consumed his youth and finally clear his head, Ma hopes to merge all of China’s dreams with the internet using a new China Dream Device, which will allow him to incept the China Dream into the people’s heads, and then control their hopes, as well as his own fears. Anyone who seeks to understand CCP officialdom ought to read this book. It is also a handy reminder that Xi is trying to build the China Dream on rotten foundations, as his own anti-corruption drives demonstrate.

T.S. Allen is a former intelligence officer in the US Army. Follow him on Twitter @TS_Allen.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Amber I. Smith, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by T.S. Allen · February 2, 2024

18. A Conversation with Gen. Randy George, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army

30 minutes to listen to the CSA at this link: https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/a-conversation-with-gen-randy-george-chief-of-staff-of-the-u-s-army/

A CONVERSATION WITH GEN. RANDY GEORGE, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY

GEN. RANDY GEORGE AND RYAN EVANS

FEBRUARY 5, 2024

PODCASTS - WAR ON THE ROCKS

As the largest war in Europe since World War II rages and as China rises, the U.S. Army is preparing for an evermore dangerous world with an ambitious vision. To learn more about this vision, Ryan paid a visit to Gen. Randy George, who has been serving as the Army’s chief of staff since last September. They tackled a range of topics, from warfighting and professionalism in the Army, to modernizing training and acquisitions, and to lessons learned versus lessons identified. Gen. George reveals his thoughts on how the Army is learning from the war in Ukraine. And they also discussed a new Army initiative called “transforming in contact.”

PS: We are hiring a membership editor. If you want to play a critical role in driving conversations and debates about national security, you should consider applying.

19. The Key to Ukrainian Victory is Partnering (not Ukrainifying)

Excerpts:

As a result, those who argue for “Ukrainifying” the relationship are only considering one aspect – Ukraine’s trench warfare experience – and even this view is incomplete. These observers fail to account for the role of Special Operations thus far and in the coming fights. Even worse, to accept the inevitability of attritional war would doom Ukraine to a frozen conflict that Russia can more easily win. Moscow has a long history of pinioning weaker neighbors, even as increasing international partnerships can compensate for its critical losses in Ukraine.

In the meantime, Russian defenses will remain formidable even as the escalating scale of Russian casualties increases their motivation to strengthen fortifications over time. Simply falling back on defensive trench warfare will not lead Ukraine to victory in the long-term. Instead of “Ukrainifying” their approach, the Ukrainian military needs to focus on leveraging partner expertise, specifically to identify, defeat, and exploit Russian vulnerabilities to break through the current lines. Special Operations help enable those options through a network of partnerships that multiply combat power and innovate options to use it. Ukraine would be wise to apply those lessons now, before they are forced into a war of attrition they may not win.

The Key to Ukrainian Victory is Partnering (not Ukrainifying) - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Spencer Meredith · February 6, 2024

Speaking recently at the National Defense University, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasized the basis for Ukraine’s continued fight against Russian aggression: domestic resilience and international perseverance. Despite significant improvements in Ukraine’s strategic position, these central themes have remained consistent since early 2022. Largely due to the combined impact of Ukrainian resistance and NATO military assistance, Ukrainian forces have made incredible progress, surpassing nearly all expectations held before the war. However, Ukraine is at an inflection point. Without sustained international support, its emerging internal strengths risk being overwhelmed and defeated by Russian innovation and potentially outmaneuvered by Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian-backed counteroffensives.

Some have argued that the solution is to “Ukrainify” NATO’s approach and let the partner call the shots. While it is certainly true that Ukrainian forces have vast experience in trench warfare along the front lines, it is not true that continuing such an approach is in the country’s best interest. Indeed, preserving the battle lines for an extended period risks catastrophic failure. It is naïve to assume Ukraine has the right strategy simply because they have matured in operational experience. Even a cursory glance at US strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq shows how easily grand goals and detailed plans can be disconnected from operational reality. Equally important, Ukraine lacks the domestic means to sustain and win in Russia’s preferred war of attrition; the current battles over US funding mask sustainment challenges across the entire defense enterprise. Neither is there evidence to justify a radical rejection of ongoing training models.

Instead, a closer examination of Special Operations Forces (SOF) training for Ukraine reveals a successful model worth emulating. This article examines the history of this training, highlighting three key skills developed through a SOF-enabled, partnered approach and advocates for leveraging these partnerships to transition away from trench warfare.

Special Operations Training in Ukraine: Adaptation and Partnership

US SOF began training the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (UKRSOF) in 2015. Much of that initial instruction emphasized switching from a Spetsnaz approach focused on site seizure and targeted assassination to a more comprehensive irregular warfare (IW) skillset. Partly due to the small-unit instruction inherent in SOF training and partly due to their comparatively small footprint in the Ukrainian military, UKRSOF made this transition quickly. Four years after initiating the training program, UKRSOF received NATO interoperability certification. Three years after that, they helped stop the Russian takeover of Hostomel Airfield and prevented Russian reinforcements from the northeast. Both actions effectively saved Kyiv and Ukraine in the early days of the war.

Building on these early successes, Task Group-Ukraine (TG-U) is currently responsible for training, equipping, and advising UKRSOF. This group is part of a bigger joint special operations team, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 10 (CJSOTF-10), which collaborates with conventional military, interagency, and NATO partners through the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U). Through long-term collaborative training with Ukrainian and NATO partners, TG-U harnesses a wealth of diverse expertise. As the war shifts towards entrenched and defensive strategies, the adaptable skills developed by TG-U will likely prove essential in achieving tactical advances on the front lines.

Three skills in particular have made an outsized impact on UKRSOF. The first and perhaps most important is mission command at the tactical level. As a hallmark of Special Operations across the Joint Force, TG-U teaches UKRSOF the fundamentals of small-unit tactics. It also provides instruction on the value of localized decision-making to higher headquarters. Employing a “spider web” approach across human and technical networks, UKRSOF has become more deeply integrated within the Ukrainian military writ large, and through CJSOTF-10, the international partner forces supporting them. Effective mission command was clearly evident in the early days of the war and in advance of the first Ukrainian counteroffensive. This dynamic has continued, with UKRSOF effectively serving as force multipliers alongside other units and demonstrating their capabilities as force generators in their own right.

The second critical skill set taught by TG-U is the ability to develop, plan, execute, and assess SOF-specific missions that provide discrete options, and integrate with the broader Ukrainian Armed Forces. Previous training in special reconnaissance and sabotage bolstered Ukraine’s early defenses in 2022. Additional skill sets include direct action against high-value targets, terminal guidance for precision munitions, and support for information operations. Each has been highlighted through activities in and around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Kherson, and over-the-horizon strikes in Crimea. Together, these have added operational depth to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and expanded the operational challenges facing Moscow’s strategy in Ukraine.

Third, Special Operations training prioritizes flexibility, adaptability, and innovation. Two examples are noteworthy: drone adaptation and battlefield medicine. Ukrainian domestic innovation has accelerated the pace of drone warfare. Building on earlier lessons from the Syrian Civil War, Ukraine has expanded the sources of innovation to include civilian start-up companies and individual “irregular” partners alongside government efforts across the research-development-procurement process. The combined effort has increased the lethality of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) through greater carrying capacity, longer range and flying time, and low visibility “first person view” spotter drones. Ukrainian drones are effectively demoralizing as much as destroying Russian warfighting capabilities. The successes seen on the battlefield – destroyed armored personnel carriers, next-generation T-90 tanks, electronic warfare platforms, and command posts – have degraded Russia’s ability to conduct effective operations across the front lines. These achievements, however, are not solely the result of the emerging skills of the Ukrainian forces, as impressive as their determination has been in the last two years. Crucially, they also stem from the enduring partnerships and collaborative efforts developed with US and NATO SOF over the past decade.

Drone warfare and Russian defections rightly receive attention, as have the higher profile HIMARS and guided munition strikes by Ukrainian conventional forces. What has not been as widely known is how SOF training enables those strikes by broadening Ukrainian skills and resources. US and NATO SOF trainers provide more than field manuals for urban assault and resistance training. TG-U has also linked elements across the SOF enterprise, including Civil Affairs partnerships with US private sector companies at the leading edge of drone technology and Psychological Operational Detachments (PSYDET), expanding Ukrainian messaging capabilities.

Ukrainian drone strikes have increased the scope of vulnerable targets, and Ukrainian PSYOP teams have exploited that vulnerability with traditional loudspeaker vehicles and social media targeting. They have also used drones as methods of surrender, dropping leaflets and signaling to Russian defectors fleeing the battlefield. The nexus of training, equipping, and advising can be seen in the thousands of Russian defections.

SOF medical training has also prioritized adaptability and innovation, which itself contributes to battlefield survivability in frontline Ukrainian units. Conducted by US Special Forces Medics and Navy Corpsmen, training includes coordination with US companies providing 3D printers to produce cricothyrotomy kits. Modeled on the SOF depth-in-breadth approach, UKRSOF teams practice with the kits as part of basic combat medicine training and keep practicing when they return to the front lines. Support continues through telemedicine advising during and after operations.

The enhanced effectiveness of drones and improved “golden hour” treatment demonstrate more than immediate benefits. These advancements highlight the success of US training with Ukrainian forces, facilitated by a network of collaboration that extends beyond military and government agencies to include international and non-governmental partners.

Remote Partnership and Reverse Burden Sharing in Action

The SOF-enabled approach does not require a large in-country presence. In fact, some aspects can be done remotely. CJSOTF-10 developed a Remote Advise and Assist Cell (RAAC) to coordinate live streaming battlefield awareness for UKRSOF and their supported conventional units. The RAAC uses various commercially available software to facilitate connections between civilian experts and military personnel, enhancing tactical mission command and innovation away from the front lines. Lessons learned are then quickly developed for TG-U modules and influence equipment procurement through SAG-U, such as the refurbishing of artillery tubes to extend their use during equipment shortages. This process exemplifies the comprehensive SOF support cycle.

The effectiveness of that cycle became evident in January 2023, when, after nearly a decade of IW training, the Ukrainian Special Operations Command requested a modification in the training curriculum. Previously, students completed a condensed version of the US Special Forces Qualification Course in about five months. However, due to Russian defenses impeding Ukrainian progress and expected high casualty rates in a planned spring counteroffensive, there was an urgent need to enhance UKRSOF capabilities, particularly in specialized breaching techniques.

Drawing on decades of collaboration during the Global War on Terror, NATO SOF partners have specialized in different aspects of irregular warfare while ensuring they can work seamlessly with one another and with conventional forces. This shared experience allowed TG-U to develop an innovative “reverse burden sharing” training approach, leveraging the specialized strengths of various partners instead of depending solely on US SOF. Under this model, each member contributes what it can with training facilities, tactics, and equipment for breaching fortified defenses. TG-U coordinates these efforts with US SOF, handling administrative and logistical roles and freeing others to focus on their areas of expertise. The revamped curriculum emphasizes light infantry skills like those of the US Army Rangers, reducing the time needed away from the front lines to just six weeks. This training incorporates Ukrainian combat experiences and NATO standards, symbolizing a new step in the evolution of Ukrainian and partner SOF.

Real Challenges Remain

Despite the effectiveness of SOF training and employment, Ukraine still faces significant challenges in achieving victory. Issues such as the uncertainty of continued Western support and the increasing sophistication of Russian drone attacks are growing concerns. Additionally, entrenched Soviet-era mindsets within the Ukrainian military limit its operational adaptability. Perhaps most concerning is Ukraine’s limited ability to employ brigade-sized elements at any single point, let alone at multiple points along the front lines.

Yet, UKRSOF can help address this problem. For example, the Ukrainian Rangers were specifically trained to create, hold, and exploit gaps for conventional units to advance through breaches. Further developments in drone capabilities and employment can also add air elements to surge at those breakout points. Special Operations Forces can and should be employed in that role, even as they continue to adapt to changing battlefield conditions. The real challenge remains convincing a partner to go against years of Soviet doctrine that includes almost a decade of defensive trench warfare. Persistent partnerships through SAG-U and CJSOTF-10 can help in that regard.

The Way Ahead: Partnered, SOF-Enabled Strategy

As a result, those who argue for “Ukrainifying” the relationship are only considering one aspect – Ukraine’s trench warfare experience – and even this view is incomplete. These observers fail to account for the role of Special Operations thus far and in the coming fights. Even worse, to accept the inevitability of attritional war would doom Ukraine to a frozen conflict that Russia can more easily win. Moscow has a long history of pinioning weaker neighbors, even as increasing international partnerships can compensate for its critical losses in Ukraine.

In the meantime, Russian defenses will remain formidable even as the escalating scale of Russian casualties increases their motivation to strengthen fortifications over time. Simply falling back on defensive trench warfare will not lead Ukraine to victory in the long-term. Instead of “Ukrainifying” their approach, the Ukrainian military needs to focus on leveraging partner expertise, specifically to identify, defeat, and exploit Russian vulnerabilities to break through the current lines. Special Operations help enable those options through a network of partnerships that multiply combat power and innovate options to use it. Ukraine would be wise to apply those lessons now, before they are forced into a war of attrition they may not win.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or National Defense University positions.

Dr. Spencer Meredith is a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National Defense University. With over twenty-five years of research and work on Russia and Ukraine, he specializes in governance and irregular warfare. For more than a decade, he has advised the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and for the past four years, served as a Strategic Advisor for the Joint Special Operations Command. He also supports CJSOTF-10 as Special Advisor for Lessons Learned.

Main image: Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) move across an objective during exercise Combined Resolve XI at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, December 10, 2018. During Combined Resolve XI, an exercise with over 5,500 participants from 16 nations, SOF conducted operations in enemy-occupied territory to support and interoperate with conventional forces. (1st Lt. Benjamin Haulenbeek via U.S. Army)

20. Three Years After Coup, Myanmar Military Junta Falling Apart – OpEd

Excerpts:

Scot Marciel, a former U.S. ambassador to Myanmar, said the military was, “being pressured on multiple fronts, has lost substantial territory and control of a number of towns, and appears to be suffering from low morale and poor leadership”.

...

Former US ambassador Marciel said the resistance “now has a very real chance to defeat the military, at least in terms of forcing the military to surrender substantial political power”.

“But it is difficult to predict how long this might take.”

That depends largely on how the internal dynamics within the army plays out — if the anger within the army turns into a mutiny of sorts, Min Aung Hlaing’s day at the top of the hierarchy is numbered.

Three Years After Coup, Myanmar Military Junta Falling Apart – OpEd

By Subir Bhaumik

eurasiareview.com · February 5, 2024

Exactly three years after the coup that blocked an elected government from taking power, Myanmar’s oppressive military junta seems to be falling apart, with pressures mounting on its supremo Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to step down to pave the way for comprehensive national reconciliation and a return to democracy.

On 14th January, at a small gathering in a cantonment town in Myanmar, hard line pro-military Buddhist monk Pauk Kotaw shouted at the top of his voice that Min Aung Hlaing should step down as chairman of the State Administration Council and his deputy Senior General Soe Win take over. The crowd cheered in agreement, as seen in gleaned videos of the event posted on social media.

Online, pro-military journalists and bloggers have launched similar tirades against General Hlaing in the past two weeks as the Burmese military Tatmadaw lost control of nearly 40 towms to ethnic rebel armies.

“He should resign as commander-in-chief,” Ko Maung Maung, a pro-military YouTuber said.

“Such public utterances against Myanmar’s powerful junta leader and the chief of its armed forces would have been unthinkable just a few months ago,” says Myanmar watcher Gautam Mukhopadhyay, India’s most active ambassdor so far but now retired from foreign service.

Burmese military insiders say relative moderate senior officers looking to stop the string of military defeats are pitching for Soe Win to take over. Former Burmese military intelligence chief General Myat Tun Oo and former Home Minister Soe Htut are leading the anti-Hlaing faction which has the backing of most mid-ranking officers who feel Hlaing resorted to the Feb 1, 2021 coup when his presidential ambition was blocked by the victorious National League for Democracy led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi .

“That ill-conceived coup set off a chain reaction that has destroyed the country and will now end up destroying the Tatmadaw,” said a brigadier who has recently surrendered to the 3-group Brotherhood Alliance. “Some senior officers are trying to salvage an exit route for the army,” he told this writer over a messaging App on condition of strict anonymity.

No wonder, for the first time since seizing power in a dawn coup d’etat on Feb. 1, 2021, Min Aung Hlaing finds himself in his weakest position with anger mounting over his leadership after a series of battlefield defeats for the military in a sweeping offensive by rebel groups that started in October, dubbed Operation 1027.

So far, the junta has lost control of at least 35 towns, according to the media collective Myanmar Peace Monitor, although a Beijing-mediated ceasefire has halted clashes near the Chinese border. In other parts, fighting continues.

The junta, which has not addressed specifics about battlefield defeats, has previously acknowledged some loss of control of territory. On Wednesday, on the eve of the coup anniversary, Min Aung Hlaing extended a state of emergency for another six months to allow the military to carry out tasks to “bring the nation to a normal state of stability and peace”.

“There is deep frustration within the military, which extends to Min Aung Hlaing personally,” a diplomat in Southeast Asia told Reuters, asking not to be named. “Some would certainly love to see him go.”

The military is also struggling to recruit soldiers and forcing non-combat personnel to the frontline – all causing blowback for Min Aung Hlaing, the diplomat said.

Junta spokespersons are avoiding media queries to elicit a formal response .

To be sure, the army’s losses on the battlefield may not lead to a collapse and it is unclear if or how Min Aung Hlaing could be pushed out or who may replace him, including his current deputy Soe Win.

However, the events have damaged both Min Aung Hlaing’s standing and that of the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, which the U.N. has accused of conducting systematic human rights violations in the country.

Many senior officers are upset with Hlaing’s recent choices for key positions– specially the choice of Maj Gen Toe Yi, who ran the country’s notorious interrogation centres as deputy home minister. Yi, who headed the Sa Pa Ya unit, is said to have pressured a lot of field commanders to fight to death or face executions when all seemed lost during battles with motivated rebel formations in the last 3 months.

“Its poor showing on the battlefield is seen as shameful by nationalists and other military supporters who have launched unprecedented public criticism of Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership,” said Richard Horsey, the Crisis Group’s senior Myanmar adviser.

Those asking hard questions of the regime and its leader include pro-junta journalists, according to a Reuters review of multiple social media posts in recent weeks.

Moe Hein, who runs the pro-junta news platform Thuriya Nay Wun and often appears on state television, raised doubts about the military’s senior leadership after the fall of Laukkai town during Operation 1027 in early January.

“A win or loss in a battle depends on everyone from the commander in chief to the troop commanders,” he said on Facebook.

Scot Marciel, a former U.S. ambassador to Myanmar, said the military was, “being pressured on multiple fronts, has lost substantial territory and control of a number of towns, and appears to be suffering from low morale and poor leadership”.

In a roadmap announced after the coup, the junta pledged to hold elections by August 2023.

But popular unrest spiralled out of control soon after, which the military attempted to violently put down, triggering nationwide armed uprisings that have now combined with decades-old rebel groups to fight the junta.

Alongside, Myanmar’s economy – already weakened following decades of military-dominated rule – has taken a battering, with foreign investment drying up since the coup and Western sanctions taking hold.

Power outages, frequent supply shocks of key commodities including fuel and sky-rocketing prices are hitting ordinary families, thereby further eroding support for the junta, said a financial analyst.

“People from all walks of life have started feeling the sting,” said the analyst, asking not to be named citing safety concerns.

In a statement issued on Wednesday, the National Unity Government (NUG), which comprises of people from Suu Kyi’s party, along with three rebel groups allied with it said they were open to negotiations with the military if it met six conditions.

NUG foreign minister Zin Mar Aung said the army has to return to barracks and accept civilian control to end military involvement in politics and agree to pave the way for a comprehensive dialogue with all stakeholders to restore democracy and work towards making Myanmar an authentic federation with only few powers like defence, foreign affairs, currency, home, border affairs and heavy industry under the central government.

There was no immediate junta response to the NUG statement.

The opposition has limited time before fighting grinds to a halt in many parts when the monsoon rains arrive around June.

Former US ambassador Marciel said the resistance “now has a very real chance to defeat the military, at least in terms of forcing the military to surrender substantial political power”.

“But it is difficult to predict how long this might take.”

That depends largely on how the internal dynamics within the army plays out — if the anger within the army turns into a mutiny of sorts, Min Aung Hlaing’s day at the top of the hierarchy is numbered.

eurasiareview.com · February 5, 2024

21.  ‘A race against time’: Taiwan strives to root out China’s spies

​I will never forget being at the Taiwan Army HQ at a conference with about 100 Taiwan officers and about 20 Americans and the Chief of Staff of the Taiwan Army saying that there are PLA/Chinese spies in this very room right now. I did not think he was talking about any of the 20 Americans.

‘A race against time’: Taiwan strives to root out China’s spies

As Beijing has increased its efforts to recruit Taiwanese people, the number of spying cases has risen

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · February 2, 2024

In November, a Taiwan court heard accusations that two serving soldiers had accepted bribes from Chinese agents to record a video declaring their loyalty to China and their intention to defect in the event of a war. The video reportedly made its way into Chinese propaganda materials.

Weeks later, a conviction over a similar accusation was upheld against a retired army colonel. The colonel was found guilty of having accepted monthly payments totalling more than half a million Taiwan dollars (£12,500) to delay his retirement for years and serve as a spy. Local media reports said the colonel also posed for a photo holding a handwritten note, pledging his loyalty to Beijing’s cause of annexing Taiwan to the Chinese state.

“I, Hsiang Te-en, hereby pledge to support cross-strait peaceful unification,” the note read. “I will do my best at my current post to fulfil the glorious task of pushing for peaceful unification for the motherland.”

Taiwan revels in its young democracy as president-elect charts fresh course

Read more

The cases are among dozens of espionage allegations tried in recent years that involve serving or retired soldiers in Taiwan accused of spying for China.

Tensions between China (formally the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) and Taiwan (formally the Republic of China, or ROC), are at their highest in decades. The ruling Chinese Communist party (CCP) claims Taiwan is a province of China, and its leader, Xi Jinping, appears to have made “reunification” a crucial component of his future legacy. The CCP has never ruled Taiwan. The party took control of the mainland after the civil war in 1949, ousting the nationalist government led by the Kuomintang (KMT), which fled to Taiwan and established a government in exile. But the CCP bases its claim on historical ties between the two regions, including during the Qing dynasty. Taiwan’s leaders say it is a sovereign state and its future is for the people to decide.

Under Xi’s rule the PRC has ramped up intimidatory and coercive actions against Taiwan, with the aim of eventual annexation. It runs extensive grey-zone military activities, cyber, economic and cognitive warfare. Beneath all that is an apparently extensive and well-resourced network of spies and agents of influence seeking to steal secrets, gather intelligence, sow discord and undermine Taiwan’s democracy from within.

In 2017 Taiwan’s government estimated there were more than 5,000 spies working for China in Taiwan.

Taiwan’s defence minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, said the Beijing intelligence service’s attempts to recruit Taiwanese people had been “considerable”.

“China does a lot of things to win our people over,” he said in December. “They’ve had a significant impact.”

Some cases involve a Chinese national posing as a businessman, but who has connections to CCP organisations known to conduct foreign espionage and influence work. Lavish dinner invitations and small gifts escalate to overseas trips, financial payments and sexual incentives that are then sometimes used as blackmail against targets.

In another high-profile case retired senior Taiwan military officials were convicted of charges related to the recruitment of others for a Chinese national, Xie Xizhang, who allegedly cultivated a network of agents and assets for Chinese intelligence services for decades while undercover as a Hong Kong businessman. Xie is wanted by authorities but is believed to be overseas.

Targeted nationals in Taiwan are not all military personnel – other cases have involved politicians and community leaders being offered free trips to China and other inducements before elections, or members of the Mongolian and Tibetan communities in Taiwan being recruited to give information on individuals to the CCP. Spies have even been found working in the president’s protection detail. But the sheer number of current and former soldiers being prosecuted has raised serious concerns about a cohort of people who arguably should be the most loyal to Taiwan.

Dr Shen Ming Shih, a research fellow at the Taiwan government-linked thinktank the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, says there are several factors driving recruitment. Some are ideological and linked to the complicated history of Taiwan and China.

“Because of Chinese sentiment, they do not think China is an enemy country, and their concept of hostility is weak,” Shen says. Others, he adds, are simply lured by money and sex, or driven by revenge over their treatment or lack of promotion during service. He says there has not always been enough understanding about the seriousness of what they are being recruited to do, along with lenient punishments in the past.

In about two-thirds of the cases involving military personnel, the accused are retired. But this trend appears to be changing, says Shen.

“The focus used to be on retired generals, but now it is gradually moving towards active-duty, middle-ranking officers, or junior noncommissioned officers and soldiers. The main purpose of this is to learn the combat capability and morale of the army, and to assess the grassroots officers’ and soldiers’ support for the ruling party.”

The temptation of high pay across the strait

Chen Xi is a 32-year-old Taiwanese who joined foreign fighters in Ukraine this year. Now back in Taiwan, he is lobbying for improved conditions and training in the ROC military. He told the Guardian morale was being affected by relentless cognitive warfare from China, and “outdated” leadership in the ROC military, which is historically rooted in the Kuomintang party (KMT). The KMT’s former leader, Chiang Kai-shek, who oversaw decades of brutal martial law in Taiwan, always intended to one day retake the mainland.

“A military that has lost its spiritual beliefs and honour will not have the concept of loyalty to the country and the people, and will naturally not be able to withstand the temptation of high pay across the strait,” Chen tells the Guardian.

He also suggested the complicated questions around Taiwanese identity had a specific impact on the military.

“For whom are they fighting? For what? For Taiwan? Or is it for the morality of the Republic of China? Why fight against China, a country of the same language and race?”

The Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong being monitored by a Taiwanese Keelung class warship. Photograph: Taiwan defense ministry/AFP/Getty Images

There is some sense among observers that the espionage cases were being promoted by government figures more than usual, in the run-up to Taiwan’s presidential election in January. The ruling Democratic Progressive party campaigned on its stance against Beijing’s aggression. But analysts also believe the high number of cases shows that authorities are catching up on the problem.

Defence journalist Tingting Liu says it is significant that the traditionally closed-off ROC military is cooperating with prosecutors and the government in rooting out spies.

“Usually it’s not easy for prosecutors or national security bureaus to go and directly investigate the military, but the three parties are now working very closely,” she says. “Yes there’s an increased number of people being caught, but that’s also because they’re upping their game.”

A spokesperson for the defence ministry said it was comprehensively strengthening defensive measures against the CCP’s “diverse means and methods of infiltration and intelligence gathering”. She said recent arrests stemmed mostly from internal reporting by other active service members. This highlighted “the effectiveness of persistent defence education and strengthening security vigilance”, she said.

The government has also hardened national security laws, increased regular questioning of crucial personnel, and toughened restrictions on retired officers visiting China. Observers said there had been a marked improvement in operational security and counterintelligence in recent years.

“There is no doubt that China is always trying various ways to damage Taiwan and look for any kind of intel that would benefit them,” says Liu. “But also Taiwan is trying very hard to arrest these people. It’s a race against time, and these cases being reported show that the threat is still real.”

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · February 2, 2024

22. Transfer of Army special operators to Baumholder on track for 2026

Excerpts:

The timeline for the relocation is likely to be a welcome development for both the Stuttgart area and Baumholder.

For years, Stuttgart residents have complained about gunfire at the Army’s shooting range in Boeblingen, a suburb where Green Berets and Navy SEALs train.

...

Over the next couple of years, 400 family housing units will be built, he said.

For special operations forces, the shift to Baumholder will offer access to larger ranges for shooting and maneuvers than what is available in the Stuttgart area, a major metropolitan location that hosts U.S. European and Africa Command headquarters.

While the Baumholder move will affect special operators, the two-star-led U.S. Special Operations Command Europe headquarters will stay put in Stuttgart.

Transfer of Army special operators to Baumholder on track for 2026

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · February 6, 2024

The U.S. Army's Smith Barracks in Baumholder, Germany, dominates the otherwise rural setting. U.S. Special Operations Command Europe's Green Berets and Navy SEALs are slated to move from Stuttgart to a new home in Baumholder in 2026. (Stars and Stripes)

STUTTGART, Germany — U.S. special operations troops based in Stuttgart are expected to take up residence at a rural base in southwestern Germany in 2026, adding 1,000 people to a garrison once on the Pentagon’s chopping block, Army officials said Tuesday.

About $500 million in construction projects are underway at the Army garrison in Baumholder for relocation of troops assigned to Special Operations Command Europe, Col. Reid Furman, commander of the service’s installations in the German state of Rheinland-Pfalz, said in a statement.

Once the move is complete, the Baumholder military community will tally around 11,000 people, he said.

The timeline for the relocation is likely to be a welcome development for both the Stuttgart area and Baumholder.

For years, Stuttgart residents have complained about gunfire at the Army’s shooting range in Boeblingen, a suburb where Green Berets and Navy SEALs train.

The situation has been a sore spot in community relations over the years. Meanwhile, the community of Baumholder, which relies heavily on the economic ripple effect of the Army presence there, has long sought more troops.

In the early 2000s, the Army designated Baumholder for closure as part of a post-Cold War drawdown, creating local worry over how the community of 4,500 Germans would adapt to life without the Army.

Baumholder American High School and part of current and former Wetzel base housing are visible from downtown Baumholder, Germany, July 12, 2022. U.S. special operations troops based in Stuttgart are expected to take up residence at this rural base in 2026, Army officials said Feb. 6, 2024. (Alexander Riedel/Stars and Stripes)

Special operations forces take part in an international exercise hosted by the U.S. military at Baumholder, Germany, in 2014. U.S. special operations troops based in Stuttgart are expected to take up residence at Baumholder in 2026, Army officials said Feb. 6, 2024. (Michael Abrams/Stars and Stripes)

Over the years, troop numbers steadily declined, with an infantry brigade departing in 2012. But by 2015, the Army was working on plans for revitalizing the base, and money has flowed back into Baumholder.

In late January, Furman escorted Michael Ebling, Rheinland-Pfalz’s interior minister, around the Baumholder garrison to show off the latest upgrades. Furman said that investment in the Baumholder garrison will exceed $1 billion over the next 10 years.

“This substantial funding will cover various initiatives, including the construction of the special operations forces complex, the relocation of additional forces to Baumholder, investments in Army family housing, as well as the creation of a new Army Lodge,” Furman said.

Over the next couple of years, 400 family housing units will be built, he said.

For special operations forces, the shift to Baumholder will offer access to larger ranges for shooting and maneuvers than what is available in the Stuttgart area, a major metropolitan location that hosts U.S. European and Africa Command headquarters.

While the Baumholder move will affect special operators, the two-star-led U.S. Special Operations Command Europe headquarters will stay put in Stuttgart.

In a statement Tuesday, SOCEUR didn’t specify which units under its command will be making the move. The estimated 1,000 people involved are a mix of troops, families and support staff, the command said.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · February 6, 2024

23. Biden response strikes only a distraction unless they target, destroy top Iranian military leaders, capabilities

Biden response strikes only a distraction unless they target, destroy top Iranian military leaders, capabilities

New York Post · by Social Links for Mark Dubowitz View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · February 5, 2024

More On: iran

US destroys Houthi missile in third straight day of offensive, while terror group warns of retaliation

Graham pans retaliatory strikes on Iranian proxies: ‘National security is in freefall’

Iran issues warning about suspected spy ships in the Mideast after new US strikes hit Yemen

Jake Sullivan warns ‘additional strikes’ coming against Iranian proxies who attacked US forces

Iran-backed terrorist proxies recently killed three American soldiers and wounded more than 40.

After a week of publicly telegraphing their plans to strike back, the Biden administration over the weekend hit 85 targets in Iraq and Syria and 36 targets in Yemen.

It is too early to assess how effective these US strikes have been and whether we will see multiple strikes over the coming days and weeks.

We will hear about how many targets were struck, how many militia members were killed, and which military capabilities were destroyed.

Strike at Iran

But this is a distraction: We should assess the effectiveness of these strikes by how many senior officers of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are killed and how many of the military capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are destroyed.

We should not be impressed by the administration’s assessment of how American bombs took out ammunition dumps, intelligence facilities, radars and command and control centers controlled by militias, and Iraqis, Syrians and Yemenis fighting for Tehran.

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After all, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, is happy to replenish his terror proxies with more weapons to fight the US and our allies to the last militia member.

see also

Iran ‘directly involved’ in Houthis’ Red Sea attacks in support of Hamas, US Navy chief says

What he really fears is direct American power against his regime.

We should learn from the Israelis. Israel has quietly killed 17 senior officers of the Revolutionary Guards since Dec. 25. The IRGC has now pulled their senior commanders out of Syria.

The Israelis don’t telegraph their punches, they don’t leak to reporters their plans, they don’t let their targets get out of Dodge. They strike the regime directly. They keep quiet.

Restore sanctions

The Biden administration also has to stop providing the mullahs who are killing Americans with billions of dollars in sanctions relief.

For three years, President Biden has stopped enforcing the oil sanctions that drove Iranian oil sales to 100,000 barrels per day during the Trump administration. Now they are more than 1.3 million barrels per day.

Iran’s foreign exchange reserves have spiked from $4 billion to more than $20 billion under Biden.

Is it any surprise that Iran’s economy grew faster under Biden than did the American economy?

Biden also gave Iran access to $16 billion in frozen oil funds for what he says will be humanitarian purchases.

But the regime knows that money is fungible and, as in the past, it will be using those billions to finance its war machine.

If Biden doesn’t want the violence to escalate into a major regional war, he needs to make Khamenei understand the direct costs for his regime from continued violence against ­Americans.

New York Post · by Social Links for Mark Dubowitz View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · February 5, 2024

24. Take a look at the tanker-like warship the US has used as a floating Navy SEAL base

Take a look at the tanker-like warship the US has used as a floating Navy SEAL base

Business Insider · by Lauren Frias

Military & Defense

Lauren Frias

2024-02-05T22:31:01Z

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Cmdr. John Hamilton, the commanding officer of the USS Jason Dunham, speaking with Capt. Scott Hattaway, the commanding officer of the USS Lewis B. Puller.

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialists 3rd Class Jonathan Clay/Released

• The USS Lewis B. Puller is an expeditionary sea base stationed in the Arabian Sea.
• Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed they hit the Puller on January 29, but US officials denied it.
• Last month, two Navy SEALs died during a boarding operation that originated from the Puller.

The USS Lewis B. Puller is an expeditionary sea base designed to support a wide variety of military operations, including those involving Navy SEALs.

The floating base is deployed to the Arabian Sea in response to ongoing attacks on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea by Houthi rebels, an Iranian-backed militant group in Yemen.

The 760-foot-long ESB has a unique silhouette, with an open-sided hangar space underneath the ship's sprawling flight deck that makes it resemble a floating parking lot. It was the launchpad for a Navy SEAL mission in January that seized missile parts bound for the Houthi rebels.

Photos show the massive warship and the operations conducted aboard.

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Named after a legend

US Marines preparing to take off from the Puller in the Red Sea.

US Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Aaron Irvin

The Puller is named after Lt. Gen. Lewis "Chesty" B. Puller, the most decorated Marine in history and the only one to receive five Navy Crosses.

The Marine leader served for 37 years and is best known for fighting in campaigns in World War II and the Korean War. He was awarded his fifth Navy Cross in the Battle of Chosin Reservoir in 1950.

His award citation from the battle said Puller "served to inspire his men to heroic efforts in defense of their positions and assured the safety of much valuable equipment which would otherwise have been lost to the enemy."

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The US Navy's first expeditionary sea base

An MV22 Osprey helicopter preparing to land aboard the Puller.

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Dawson Roth

The Puller is the lead ship in the Navy's ESB ship class and the service's first purpose-built mobile base vessel.

It's one of six in its class, including the USS Hershel "Woody" Williams, USS Miguel Keith, USS John L. Canley, USS Robert E. Simanek, and USS Hector A. Cafferata Jr. The Canley deployed in August 2023; the latter two are under construction.

Its deck is large enough to land transport aircraft such as the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53 Super Stallion, and it can launch small boats for amphibious missions or boarding teams.

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The first US ship commissioned outside America

Capt. David Skarosi saluting the flight-deck officer after landing on the Puller.

US Army Photo by Spc. Frederick Poirier

In 2017, the Puller was converted to a naval warship in a ceremony in Bahrain, making it the first US ship to be commissioned outside America.

It differs from the Navy's two previous expeditionary transfer docks, the USNS Montford Point and USNS John Glenn, in that ESBs can operate in more demanding and low-intensity missions by comparison, Navy officials have said.

The Puller, for example, can operate within a few dozen miles of adversaries and may regularly encounter combat aircraft, drones, and surface vessels.

"As the security environment becomes faster paced, more complex and increasingly competitive, with the ever-growing and evolving challenge of asymmetric threats from state and non-state actors alike, the Navy has a growing need to station more diverse and capable warships around the globe," Vice Adm. Kevin M. Donegan, the commander of Naval Forces Central Command, said in a statement in 2017. "Commissioning this expeditionary sea base, the USS Lewis B. Puller, will allow the Navy and Marine Corps team to meet the threats in the region head on."

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Missing Navy SEALs

The dhow was brought alongside the USS Lewis B. Puller, and the advanced conventional weapons materials were offloaded.

US Central Command Public Affairs Courtesy Photo

On January 11, the Puller was involved in an operation to seize Iranian missile parts from a dhow off the coast of Somalia in international waters in the Arabian Sea.

Navy SEALs launched in a small boat from the Puller for a mission known as a visit, board, search, and seizure. The SEALs approached the dhow in a fast boat and clambered up a ship ladder to detain its crew and search its holds for weapons bound for Yemen.

In a rare occurrence, two Navy SEALs involved in the operation were reported missing at sea after one SEAL slipped off the ladder and his teammate jumped in to save him. They were later presumed dead on Sunday following an "exhaustive" 10-day search.

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Disputed Houthi attack

The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit's Maritime Raid Force fast-ropes onto the Puller.

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kristina Young/Released

Last week, Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree, the Houthi spokesman, claimed with no evidence to have fired a missile at the Puller while the vessel was sailing through the Gulf of Aden as "part of military measures aimed at defending Yemen and supporting the oppressed Palestinian people."

Defense officials denied that the ship was attacked.

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$650 million floating parking garage

An electrician's mate assigned to the Puller participates in search-and-rescue training during an exercise in the Arabian Gulf.

US Army Photo by SPC Frederick Poirier

The $650 million mobile sea platform was built by General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company. Almost resembling a floating parking garage with a flight deck, it was designed to include aviation facilities, equipment staging support, and command-and-control assets.

The Puller can travel 15 knots and has an operational range of 9,500 nautical miles.

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ESB features

An aviation boatswain's mate signals to an MH-60S Seahawk helicopter aboard the Puller.

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elliot Schaudt

The Puller has a spacious flight deck with four rotary-wing landing spots, a mission deck, and a hangar, though the space is smaller than an aircraft carrier. Its design allows the ship to serve as a transfer point for small landing aircraft for equipment and cargo.

The ship's aft houses the accommodation and functional workspaces for its hybrid crew of civilian and military members.

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Blue and Gold crews

US Marines participate in vessel-boarding training aboard the Puller.

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elliot Schaudt

A typical ESB crew includes 44 military sealift command personnel and 101 military, with accommodations for up to 250.

The Puller's military crew operates on a rotational model, and Blue and Gold Crews alternate on and off hull every five months. This allows the vessel to stay deployed and operate in hazardous areas for longer periods.

The Puller has been a part of numerous operations around the Arabian Sea.

In December 2022, naval forces aboard the Puller seized ammunition rounds, fuses, and propellants for rockets after it intercepted a fishing trawler in the Gulf of Oman.

The trawler, which was on a maritime route from Iran to Yemen, was illegally smuggling more than 50 tons of weapons to the Houthis, including more than 1 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, nearly 7,000 proximity fuses for rockets, and more than 2,100 kilograms of propellant used to launch rocket-propelled grenades.

The Puller was also involved in a counter-narcotics mission in January 2022, recovering $14.7 million in illicit drugs and saving injured mariners in the Gulf of Oman.

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Live-fire exercises

Sailors deployed aboard the Puller firing a .50-caliber machine gun.

US Marine Corps Photo by Cpl. Jessica Y. Lucio/released

Military crew aboard the Puller also conduct a number of training and exercises during deployments. The photo above shows a live-fire exercise with a .50-caliber Browning machine gun.

Honing warfighting skills

A US Marine firing an M4A1 carbine rifle during combat marksmanship training on the flight deck of the Puller.

US Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Sarah Stegall

Marines also participate in combat-marksmanship training through an intensive shooting course and in other drills. Some of the other types of training can be seen in the following photos.

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Vessel-boarding training

A US Marine participates in vessel-boarding training aboard the Puller.

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elliot Schaudt

Maritime exercises

Sailors lower a rigid-hull inflatable boat aboard the Puller prior to small-boat operations.

US Army Photo by Spc. Frederick Poirier

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'A revolutionary concept'

US Marines assigned to the All-Domain Reconnaissance Detachment, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, board the Puller from an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat.

US Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Sarah Stegall

"The Puller isn't just another ship, but a revolutionary concept; a ship that provides us a key platform that will provide continuity to a variety of operations," Donegan said when the Puller was commissioned.

"Named after the most decorated Marine in American history, the USS Lewis B. Puller will provide greater operational flexibility to 5th Fleet, forward-deployed as the first ship built specifically for the purpose of serving as an expeditionary sea base," he added. "As such, it will augment our amphibious forces, not replace them, mine countermeasure forces, and provide an expeditionary sea base for maritime security operations throughout the region."

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Business Insider · by Lauren Frias

​25. Civil War 2.0: Scenario 1--Insurrection Redux?

Civil War 2.0: Scenario 1--Insurrection Redux?

A critical looming federal court decision could be the excuse Trump uses to ignite another insurrection

https://patrickeddington.substack.com/p/civil-war-20-scenario-1-insurrection

PATRICK EDDINGTON

JAN 29, 2024

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They weren’t tourists, they’re not “hostages” (Photo source: FBI)

As NPR's Ron Elving recently pointed out, it's not impossible that President Biden could overcome historically dismal poll numbers, rally his coalition, and win a second term in office. His more immediate and dangerous problem is whether he'll first be facing a fresh insurrectionist challenge from Trump should certain legal and political developments go against the former president.

In this next-to-last installment of The Republic Sentinel's "Civil War 2.0" series, I look at how two pending federal court cases, a conviction in his January 6, 2021, related cases, or an outright election loss to Biden could each become triggers for Trump to summon his followers to rise up again against the federal government.

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Political Triggers for Trumpist Violence

Trigger 1: Adverse decision on Trump's presidential immunity claims

On January 9, Trump's legal team argued before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (DCCCA) that Trump or any president could order the assassination of a political opponent and not be prosecuted unless first impeached and convicted by Congress. Justice Department attorney James Pearce made the obvious point to the three judge panel.

“What kind of world are we living in," Peace asked the court, "… if a president orders his SEAL team to murder a political rival and then resigns or is not impeached — that is not a crime? I think that is an extraordinarily frightening future that should weigh heavily on the court’s decision.”

Trump's January 19 claim that "A president of the United States must have full immunity, without which it would be impossible for him/her to properly function" was likewise generally greeted with derision by a vast range of legal scholars.

This scenario assumes that the DCCCA (which may rule as early as this week in the case) will declare that Trump's post-November 2020 election activities do not constitute "official acts" of the president, and that he is thus not immune from prosecution for attempting to remain in power illegally. 

If that happens, will Trump call upon his followers to rise up to try to overthrow the federal government? Based on his behavior to date in the existing civil and criminal cases against him, my assessment is no.

As he has with all of the other legal proceedings against him, Trump will 1) rail on Truth Social and other friendly media about the "corrupt" or "unfair" court decision, 2) fund raise off of it, and 3) direct his legal team to continue to raise every possible objection or employ every conceivable dilatory motion to try to drag out the pre-trial phase of his pending January 6-related criminal trial for as long as possible. He will also appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, which may or may not agree to take the case.

All of this means that the original March 4 trial date for his January 6 case will almost certainly slip by at least a month and possibly much more, meaning that the ultimate trial, his appeal of the verdict to the federal appeals court and to the Supreme Court may drag out into early 2025. And if Trump, despite one or more federal convictions, still wins the election, he could attempt a self-pardon--and it's unclear whether anyone or any entity would necessarily have legal standing to challenge such an act. Alternatively, a hung jury in the January 6-related trial would likely allow Trump to escape prison and, if victorious in the November 2024 election, take office once again. Simply stated, a loss the immunity appeal would not foreclose Trump from still prevailing politically and returning to office.

Trigger 2: Conviction in J6 case which costs Trump the election

Assuming the Supreme Court rules in Trump's favor later this winter or early spring that he cannot, in fact, be disqualified from the 2024 ballot absent action by both chambers of Congress to find him guilty of sedition or insurrection under the 14th Amendment, Trump could still lose the general election to Biden if he's convicted in one or more of the federal criminal trials he faces.

There's credible evidence that among non-hard core MAGA voters or those otherwise not committed to either candidate that a successful federal prosecution and conviction of Trump for fomenting the January 6 insurrection would almost certainly lead to his electoral defeat. Federal courts may not be viewed as legitimate by Trump's hardened supporters, but most Americans still do believe that evidence and the rule of law mean something and thus are paramount to the maintenance of domestic order. If Trump is convicted at the federal level, enough of those voters appear prepared to reject him at the polls.

That outcome could still become a trigger for a level of domestic unrest and increased "lone wolf" or small group terrorism incidents, particularly if Trump once again falsely alleges mass voter fraud in addition to being the victim of a "political" prosecution. Even so, it would likely not lead to the kind of domestic tumult that threatens the survival of the Republic. During the final year of Biden's current term in office, however, there is one scenario that could produce a domestic conflagration of unpredictable scale and duration.

Trigger 3: Adverse decision in Trump v Colorado (14th Amendment, Sec. 3 ballot disqualification)

Within perhaps a matter of weeks, the Supreme Court will rule on whether the Colorado Supreme Court's invocation of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to disqualify Trump from the federal ballot is constitutional. If America's highest court affirms Colorado's decision, it would likely mean Maine's disqualification of Trump from their state's ballot would also stand, spurring others to bring 14th Amendment ballot disqualification lawsuits in multiple additional states. If enough of those succeed, it could make it mathematically impossible for Trump to win enough electoral college votes to become president.

It is this outcome that represents the greatest danger for political sectarian domestic violence at scale because it represents Trump's "nothing left to lose" scenario. I believe the likelihood he would call for a general uprising against established political institutions and leaders is very high.

The question, then, is this: if he does so, would the tens of millions of his voters join him?

My scenario assumes that they would do so, and on a historic scale.

Fueled by a belief that their chosen candidate had been wrongly barred from office by "corrupt" unelected Supreme Court judges, mass street demonstrations, particularly in DC, would seem inevitable within the first week after such a ruling and invariably create a new, dangerous flashpoint for immediate violence at a scale that could dwarf the events of January 6, 2021. 

GOP leaders in the House and Senate would immediately face calls to impeach and remove all Supreme Court justices who voted to uphold the Colorado Supreme Court's exclusion of Trump from the ballot, with ominous threats about what a failure to act might mean for them and their families should they fail to try....this against the backdrop of a trend that has already been high since the January 6, 2021 insurrection.

In the weeks following a Supreme Court ballot disqualification decision, anti-Trump elements across the country will file ballot disqualification suits in their states seeking to replicate the Colorado model. Pro-Trump elements in those same states would seem likely to violently target such activists in an attempt to prevent further ballot disqualification efforts.

GOP controlled legislatures across the country would face immediate pressure from pro-Trump elements to pass legislation mandating that Donald Trump's name be on the federal ballot, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision. Alternatively, or perhaps in tandem, calls for secession from the federal government might also ensue.

So if the Supreme Court does uphold the Colorado Supreme Court's ballot disqualification ruling against Trump, does it mean that something approximately Civil War 2.0 could actually happen?

It's fair to ask whether Trump's key demographic (white, over 55, probably most of whom are not in great health) could remotely be ready for sustained conventional combat against organized federal forces that remain loyal to the existing, lawfully constituted government. Guerilla action and/or increased terrorist acts against federal facilities, law enforcement personnel, judges and court personnel, and House and Senate Democratic members, family members, and staff would seem to be the far more likely outcome.

I certainly believe the latter option is a near certainty, but to understand why the scenario I've outlined would likely go far beyond that, we need another short trip down memory lane to understand just how quickly political, and thus military, loyalties can change in a time of maximum domestic political crisis.

From Blue to Gray…

Many Americans probably don't realize who led Union troops against anti-slavery zealot John Brown during his October 1859 raid on the federal armory at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, but to Civil War aficionados the names are legendary: then-Colonel Robert E. Lee and Lieutenant J.E.B. ("Jeb") Stuart. Less than 18 months later, both men would betray the Union and become among the most important and successful officers to serve in the Confederate Army.

Indeed, as a 2001 U.S. Army Center for Military History study of the period notes:

"The roster of the Regular Army was altered considerably by [Jefferson] Davis' action in creating a Confederate Army. Of the active officer corps numbering 1,080, 286 resigned or were dismissed and entered the Confederate service. (At least 26 enlisted men are known to have violated their oaths.) West Point graduates on the active list numbered 824; of these, 184 were among the officers who offered their swords to the Confederacy. Of the approximately 900 graduates then in civil life, 114 returned to the Union Army and 99 others sought southern commissions. General in Chief Scott and Col. George H. Thomas of Virginia were southerners who fought for the Union. More serious than their numbers, however, was the high caliber of the officers who joined the Confederacy; many were regimental commanders and three had commanded at departmental level."

Thus, one in five current or former military officers elected to betray the Republic and join the Confederate Army--a manpower and experience infusion that helped the South start and sustain for four years what remains the bloodiest war in American history.

In 1861, those men believed they were defending a particular way of life, something that transcended any allegiance to an individual politician or group of politicians. The emotions that motivated them were deep and powerful, overriding any capacity for rational thought. Today, most of us understand that their cause was not simply unjust and immoral, it was utterly treasonous.

Should the Supreme Court disqualify Trump from the ballot under the 14th Amendment, his followers will no doubt believe that the existing system is rigged against their leader, and thus against them, and they will no doubt act out of a deep and powerful rage, overriding any capacity for rational thought. Should the Republic survive, future generations will also likely view that their cause was also not simply unjust and immoral, it was just as treasonous as the betrayal of Lee, Stuart, and hundreds of thousands of others.

…to Red versus Blue

In calling for a general uprising, Trump would no doubt appeal for assistance and support to GOP governors who have already endorsed him. As I've noted previously, Trump's recent call for "all willing governors" to send their NG troops to the Texas-Mexico border has met with at least initial, albeit limited/small scale success. Alarmingly, those governors who've answered Trump's call have done so in violation of the Supreme Court's ruling that immigration enforcement has always been and remains the province of the federal government, not the states. And are allowing Trump, as a civilian political figure not in government, to exercise a de facto level of control over state NG forces.

However, it's one thing to send a relatively small number of law enforcement or NG personnel to another state at Trump's behest as part of the state v. federal political war over immigration enforcement. It's another matter entirely to try to send whole combat formations from Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and other southern/southeastern states to try to forcibly install Trump in power in defiance of the Constitution.

In that event, the Biden administration would no doubt order NG troops federalized for call up under what is known as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) in order to quell any insurrectionist activity. As I've previously assessed, I believe existing active duty military units would remain both largely (i.e., 95%+) intact and loyal to the current lawfully constituted federal government.

NG division, brigade combat team, and joint forces headquarters locations [National Guard Bureau]

ANG Special Operations Forces locations by state (Source: National Guard)

If one or more GOP governors rejected such a federalization order and told their state Adjutant General (the commanding general of a state's NG forces) to either keep NG units under state control, or worse put them at Trump's disposal, a constitutional crisis that could devolve into combat between federal and NG forces might ensue.

As for other sources of armed, non-NG foot soldiers for his rebellion, Trump could try to avail himself of the services of the kinds of elements that participated in his first attempted coup.

Pro-Trump ex-military and law enforcement personnel, with perhaps a small percentage of deserters from military units and state or local police departments, could coalesce into organized, paramilitary pro-Trump militias.

The right-wing Oath Keeper militia and white supremacist Proud Boy elements played critical, if not decisive, roles in the January 6, 2021, breach of the Capitol. Subsequent federal prosecutions of key leaders and members of those organizations has led to the de facto destruction of the Oath Keepers and a shift to a more local and decentralized structure for remaining Proud Boy elements. Some recent press and civil society group reports even claim that Proud Boy activity is on the decline.

Even if true, the toxic political milieu that gave rise to the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers persists, which means the possibility of new, militant, pro-Trump elements emerging remains a real and dangerous threat. And the extremely large pool of former military and law enforcement personnel in the population at large--easily numbering in the hundreds of thousands--is well acquainted with the latest small arms weaponry and tactics needed to build, organize, train, and field an armed, paramilitary, pro-Trump force.

In terms of access to military style semiautomatic rifles, ammunition, and accessories, the heavy concentration of manufacturers of such weapons and equipment in politically "Red" states would certainly seem to favor pro-Trump forces.

AR-15 manufactures by location:

• Sig Sauer: NH
• Ruger: AZ/NC/NH
• LWRC: MD
• Daniel Defense: GA
• Adams Arms: FL
• Smith & Wesson: TN
• Aero Precision: WA
• Anderson Manufacturing: KY
• Rock River Arms: IL
• Barrett: TN
• Bushmaster: NV
• Seekins Precision: ID
• KE Arms: AZ
• Patriot Ordnance Factory: AZ
• Wilson Combat: AR
• Springfield Armory: IL
• Radical Firearms: TX
• FN: SC
• Palmetto State Armory: SC
• Bravo Company: WI

However, many of these companies have existing contracts with the U.S. government or other governments allied with the U.S.--making it far less likely that these firms would want to risk existing or potential future business opportunities with the federal government by becoming regular suppliers of arms, spare parts, etc. to any insurrectionist forces.

The problem is that many of these former military or law enforcement members will, at the outbreak of any new pro-Trump insurrection, already own at least one and likely many more modern, military grade rifles, with at least nominal quantities of ammunition and spare parts stocks on hand. Accordingly, they would be capable of causing enormous death, injury, and destruction if they were successfully motivated to act and properly organized and led militarily.

In that event, it could take many months or more for forces loyal to the Republic to eradicate armed and organized pro-Trump resistance. The political, social, and economic scars from such a conflict would take decades to heal, if they could be fully healed at all. But a functioning Republic could still emerge from such a conflict, just as it did from the Civil War.

However, there is another, even darker outcome that could well lead to the end of the existing Republic and a full civil war: a Trump electoral victory and its aftermath, which will be the subject of the final installment in this series next week.

Thanks for reading The Republic Sentinel! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com