Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Greetings from Camp Humphreys, Korea.

Camp Humphreys: the largest US military base outside the continental US. It cost some $7.8 billion, and some 93% of the costs were provided by Korea outside the SMA/burden sharing process. It is actually quite a gift to the US military and the ROK/US alliance.

Quotes of the Day:

"Always forgive your enemies; nothing annoys them so much."

– Oscar Wilde

"One of the lessons of history is that nothing is often a good thing to do and always a clever thing to say."

– Will Durant

"Be great in act, as you have been in thought."

–William Shakespeare

1. US: Russia ties raise risk North Korea will use nuclear weapons

2. Trump's NATO barbs spark concerns of return to 'transactional' alliance

3. N. Korea erases image of Korean Peninsula from major websites

4. Vacation in North Korea? Reclusive State Reopens to Tourism—But Only for Russians

5. A Fully Sovereign Seoul: The Debate Over South Korean Independent Nuclear Ambitions

6. N. Korea touts sole leadership system on key anniversary

7. S. Korea, U.S., Japan call for N. Korea to take 'immediate' steps to end 'all' human rights abuses

8. New DAPA chief vows to speed up weapons procurement process

9. Political parties in full-fledged election mode as April 10 voting nears

10. South Korea’s secretive tango with Cuba signals diplomatic shift in East Asia

11. China arrests N. Korean trade official for illegal currency transaction

12. The impact of Kim Jong Un’s order in late 2020 to “sound the guns” (about information)

13. China steps up crackdown on N. Korean defectors’ fake IDs

14. ＜Inside N. Korea＞S.Korea is the enemy…Trends after Kim Jong Un’s “anti-unification policy” announcement

1. US: Russia ties raise risk North Korea will use nuclear weapons

Excerpts:

North Korea’s willingness to arm Russia strikes some analysts as good reason to believe that Kim does not intend to have a full-scale war in which he would need large quantities of ammunition for his own use.

“More probable is another tactical-level military clash along the DMZ or maritime Northern Limit Line,” Heritage Foundation senior research fellow Bruce Klingner, a former CIA deputy division chief for Korea, wrote in a recent essay. “South Korean officials privately comment that they cannot rule out another deadly North Korean attack such as the 2010 sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which cumulatively killed 50 South Koreans.”

Pak, the senior State Department official, said President Joe Biden’s team is “continuing to bolster our extended deterrence” of the Kim regime.

“We continue to work with our allies and partners to make sure that we shape Kim’s calculus on that, but so I don’t see imminent or direct attack at this point,” she said.

US: Russia ties raise risk North Korea will use nuclear weapons - Washington Examiner

ByJoel Gehrke

Washington Examiner · February 18, 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin risks emboldening North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to expand and even use nuclear weapons, according to a senior State Department official.

“Kim is talking about mass-producing and using tactical nuclear weapons; Russia is looking the other way,” Dr. Jung Pak, the State Department’s lead official for North Korea in the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau, said. “What does that mean for Kim’s risk calculus if he sees Russia looking the other way on that kind of statement that would have been condemned in the past?”

Pak, while emphasizing that she is “always on the lookout for some sort of violence” from North Korea, added that her team does not “see any signs of any direct action at this time.” And yet, her wider analysis of Kim’s foreign policy and security posture raised the curtain on U.S. concerns that dovetail with outside observers, including Western analysts and even a prominent North Korean defector, who fear that Pyongyang might sense an opportunity to go on offense against his southern and democratic neighbor.

“The entire range of provocations that we have witnessed for seventy years is possible,” former senior North Korean official Ri Jong Ho, who defected to South Korea in 2014, wrote this week in The National Interest. “It is possible he could escalate to more violent provocations against the South based on his assessment that the United States will restrain any alliance response…The worst-case scenario presented by senior North Korean generals in 2013 to the author involves nuclear attacks on Seoul and Busan. South Korea would surrender unconditionally.”

In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, front left, provides direction as it conducts a test firing of what it says surface-to-sea missiles in North Korea Wednesday, Feb. 14, 2024. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)

Kim stoked those misgivings this week when he declared that the North Korean regime would “defend our maritime sovereignty by force of arms and actions, not by any rhetoric,” in reference to the Northern Limit Line, a long-standing de facto maritime boundary between the north and the south.

“It doesn’t matter how many lines exist in [North Korea’s] western sea, and what’s clear is that if the enemy violates what we consider as our maritime border lines, we will take that as a violation of our sovereignty and an armed provocation,” Kim was characterized as saying by state media.

That rhetoric raises the specter of an attack at sea, according to an American analyst who co-authored the North Korean defector’s essay.

“It is very likely that [Kim] is trying to use that and provide the justification for some kind of conflict,” said David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told the Washington Examiner. “That said, North Korea’s [officials are] masters of deception, and they may want us to focus on the West Sea while they do something on the [demilitarized zone] or something on the East Coast.”

Pak, the senior State Department official, said President Joe Biden’s team is “continuing to bolster our extended deterrence” of the Kim regime.

“We continue to work with our allies and partners to make sure that we shape Kim’s calculus on that, but so I don’t see imminent or direct attack at this point,” she said.

Washington Examiner · February 18, 2024

2. Trump's NATO barbs spark concerns of return to 'transactional' alliance

I think at least half of the press queries as well as questions from friends and colleagues in Korea seem to be about the possible outcome of the 2024 election and the impact on the ROK/US alliance.

Trump's NATO barbs spark concerns of return to 'transactional' alliance

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · February 15, 2024

Former US President and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks during a "Get Out The Vote Rally" campaign event at the Charleston Area Convention Center in North Charleston, South Carolina, Wednesday. (EPA)

Former US President Donald Trump's outspoken criticism of NATO and its collective defense resonates deeply with implications for South Korea's security, a cornerstone being the US commitment to defense, especially amid escalating North Korean threats.

After Trump, the front-runner for the Republican Party's presidential nomination, intensified his rhetoric on Saturday, the possibility of his return to power raised concerns about the revival of his transactional approach to the South Korea-US alliance.

During a campaign rally in Conway, South Carolina, Trump issued a stark warning, saying he would encourage Russia to attack NATO members labeled as "delinquent" for failing to meet the alliance's 2 percent defense spending threshold.

Even though the 2 percent target is a guideline and does not entail legal obligations or debts if unmet, Trump's public censure instills fear in South Korea. The fear stems from the country's bitter experience during the yearslong negotiations over defense cost-sharing with the Trump administration.

Observers in Seoul noted that Trump's warning extends beyond NATO members.

"So, the objective is to exert pressure on allies," said Lee Ki-tae, director of the Global Strategy Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification.

"The rhetoric employed during presidential campaigns serves as leverage to push South Korea to shoulder a greater burden in defense cost-sharing negotiations and to urge NATO to increase defense spending further."

During his term, Trump sought a substantial increase, demanding South Korea pay more than five times the prior amount, totaling around $5 billion. Negotiations for the 11th Special Measures Agreement between South Korea and the US officially began in September 2019. But it took 18 months to reach an agreement over defense costs sharing, with the five-year deal finalized in March 2021, about a month and a half after US President Joe Biden's inauguration.

"Given Trump's transactional approach, we may see a surge in demands regarding the expenses of maintaining US troops in South Korea. That contention could gain traction among the broader populace in the US," Kim Jae-chun, a professor at Sogang Graduate School of International Studies, told The Korea Herald.

"Trump will be prone to prioritize short-term political gains in his decision-making process."

A potential second Trump presidency poses another but repetitive challenging phase for South Korea, especially considering his transactional approach to allies.

Trump's long-held belief is that allies are "free riders" of US security guarantees and should therefore contribute more to defense costs sharing. As a key Asian treaty ally, South Korea is not exempt from this dynamic.

Seoul seeks to expedite negotiations over defense costs sharing with the US before the inauguration of the next US administration, given the current agreement is slated to expire in 2025.

Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corp. think tank, said, "A new US president can also insist on renegotiating SMAs, as Trump tried to do in his first presidency."

"At that time, Trump did not seem to understand that the ROK National Assembly was not going to authorize a $5 billion payment, which Trump demanded, to the US without taking most or all of that money out of the Korean defense budget," Bennett added, referring to South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

South Korea and the United States conduct a combined aerial exercise in conjunction with the deployment of US B-1B strategic bombers over South Korea on March 19, 2023. (US Air Force)

Defense costs sharing

Kim Hyun-wook, director general of the Department of North American and European Studies at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, raises a fundamental question.

"The crux of the matter lies in whether Trump possesses a genuine understanding of the alliance's function and the concept of extended deterrence," he told The Korea Herald.

"Trump approaches everything from a perspective of costs and transactions. Throughout his presidency, his position centered on the idea that because the US pays too much to its allies, they should contribute more in return for the US providing deterrence."

Extended deterrence is the US commitment to deter or respond to coercion and attacks on US allies and partners by mobilizing the full range of US defense capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

Kim said if South Korea and the United States fail to conclude the defense cost-sharing negotiations by the time of the next administration's inauguration in January 2025, and if Trump is reelected, there is a high possibility that South Korea will be asked to bear the cost of the Nuclear Consultative Group.

The NCG is a bilateral body created in accordance with the Washington Declaration signed by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and US President Biden on April 26, 2023. The NCG is tailored to enhance the viability of US extended deterrence with greater involvement and engagement from South Korea.

"Extended deterrence provided by the US to the Korean Peninsula and the wider Asian region, which currently serves as a means of containing China and upholding US hegemony, is not perceived in the same light by Trump. Instead, they are viewed through a transactional lens," Kim said.

South Korea will need to weigh whether it is worth paying such hefty sums for US extended deterrence if Trump demands exorbitant costs. Inevitably, the Korean public may contemplate the development of its own nuclear capabilities.

"Consequently, the likelihood of another crisis emerging within the Korea-US alliance increases," Kim explained.

Some experts have suggested that Seoul cannot dismiss the possibility of Trump pressing South Korea to cover the expenses related to military exercises and the deployment of US strategic assets.

The existing defense cost-sharing agreement does not directly encompass the deployment of US strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula or combined military exercises, which have increased in scale and frequency in response to escalating North Korean threats.

James DeHart, the top US negotiator in defense cost-sharing talks under the Trump administration, in 2019 referenced that the allies "have that larger set of costs that are not captured within the current SMA framework."

DeHart said, "That includes all rotations of our military personnel to the peninsula and those temporary deployments, all of those personnel that have to be trained appropriately."

Bennett also highlighted the significant ramifications of Trump's statements, which undermine the US' longstanding rock-solid commitment to Korean security.

"Because no one can tell who will win the US election in November, Trump's statement thus hurts the ROK-US alliance and forces the ROK to consider greater ability to defend itself independently," Bennett said. "And that means it puts pressure on the ROK government to consider the development of ROK nuclear weapons."

David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy in Washington, emphasized the detrimental impact of Trump's remarks on US alliances, which are forged not only in shared values but also in mutual trust.

Despite challenges, some experts have expressed the view that Trump alone will not be able to undermine the fundamental strength of the Korea-US alliance.

"That said, the alliance was maintained during the last Trump administration and if Trump is elected once again it will survive his administration because the alliance is stronger and more important than a single man," Maxwell said.

Professor Kim Jae-chun noted that navigating issues such as the cancellation of joint military exercises or the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea would pose challenges if Trump were to be president. Kim highlighted that the US Congress is fundamentally pro-alliance, especially regarding the Korea-US alliance, which boasts a robust support base.

Supporters wait for former US President and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump to speak at his 'Get Out The Vote Rally' campaign event at the Charleston Area Convention Center in North Charleston, South Carolina, Wednesday. (EPA)

What if Trump returns

Seo Jung-kun, a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, emphasized the imminent necessity for Seoul and Washington to channel efforts toward institutionalizing current agreements by establishing an organization or committee funded by the US Congress.

Seo predicted that if Trump were to be elected, he would revoke the key agreements between Yoon and Biden, including the Washington Declaration and the NCG.

"When we aim to institutionalize various aspects of the Korea-US alliance, including the Washington Declaration, the NCG and extended deterrence, ... it's imperative to establish an organization backed by a budget from Congress," Seo explained.

"Even if Trump were to return to the presidency, discussions and refinements of concepts such as trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the US and Japan, or extended deterrence, would persist within this organization over the course of Trump's potential four-year term. It remains unaffected by the presidential transition."

Lee Ki-tae proposed that South Korea should collaborate with Japan to strategize for the potential scenario of Trump's return to the White House. He emphasized that Japan could also encounter analogous pressures.

"Korea and Japan should initiate discussions encompassing diverse security challenges, such as the potential demand for an increase in defense costs sharing or the withdrawal of US forces from both countries," Lee explained.

Lee emphasized that such discussions were nonexistent during the Trump administration, as bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan were severely strained at the time.

"Given the recent improvement in relations between the two countries, I believe it is an opportune moment for both South Korea and Japan to engage in such dialogue."

Professor Kim Jae-chun underscored that South Korea should get ready for potential negotiations with Trump.

Kim emphasized the importance for Seoul to identify the domains necessitating steadfast protection of fundamental national interests, alongside delineating areas where concessions might be considered and reciprocations provided to ensure their preservation.

There are non-negotiables that South Korea cannot afford to compromise, notably the cessation of combined military exercises with the US and the withdrawal of US Forces Korea.

"There is a saying, 'Something's gotta give,'" Kim said. "But at the same time, this juncture indeed demands an astute negotiation strategy, one that allows us to safeguard what must be protected while also seizing opportunities for our gains."

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · February 15, 2024

3. N. Korea erases image of Korean Peninsula from major websites

More indications of the threat Kim feels from simply the example and existence of the ROK. Too much information has gotten into north Korea (despite my strong criticism of our lack of holistic and sophisticated information campaign) and Kim is trying to counter it by eliminating the "idea" of SOuth Korea from everything.

South Korea is not a country to be reunited with. It is a country to be dominated. Again, this is because of Kim's failed promise to the korean people in the north that the regime's nuclear weapons and missiles would bring peace and prosper to the korean people. The Korean people have prosperity and they have security due to the strength of their military and the ROK/US alliance. The north cannot compete and therefore must eliminate the "idea" of the South.

But this is confusing the Korean people in the north. Kim is taking away their hope for unification that they have longed for and have been told is their main objective for 70+ years.

N. Korea erases image of Korean Peninsula from major websites | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 19, 2024

SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has erased an image of the Korean Peninsula, viewed as a unification reference, from its major websites, as its leader Kim Jong-un has called South Korea the North's "primary foe" and vowed not to seek unification with the South.

As of Monday, the red-colored image of the Korean Peninsula had been deleted from the upper side of the website of the Foreign Trade of the DPRK, a website created to promote North Korea's trade and attract investments.

A similar image has also been dropped from the front page of the website of Publications of the DPRK, a foreign language publishing house.

The move comes as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has defined inter-Korean ties as relations between "two states hostile to each other" during a year-end party meeting.

This image (top half), captured from the website of North Korea's Foreign Trade of the DPRK on Feb. 19, 2024, shows a red-colored image of the Korean Peninsula deleted from the upper side of the website. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

In a key parliamentary meeting in January, Kim called for revising the country's constitution to define South Korea as the North's "primary foe" and "invariable principal enemy" and to codify a commitment to "suppress" South Korean territory in the event of war.

Last month, North Korea's state-run broadcasting station aired a map that highlights only the northern part of the Korean Peninsula in red, a move seen as its push to drop references to unification.

Japanese broadcaster NHK reported last week that North Korea has dropped a phrase symbolizing a unified Korea from the lyrics of its national anthem.

The lyrics, uploaded on the website of North Korea's foreign ministry, did not have the phrase "three thousand ri," which refers to the length of the whole territory of the Korean Peninsula, around 1,200 kilometers, spanning from the northern tip of North Korea to the southern resort island of Jeju.

Seoul's unification ministry on Friday voiced regret over the North's move, lamenting it as an "anti-national" act.

This image (top half), captured from the website of Publications of the DPRK on Feb. 19, 2024, shows an image of the Korean Peninsula deleted from the website. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 19, 2024

4. Vacation in North Korea? Reclusive State Reopens to Tourism—But Only for Russians

Another benefit from the Putin-Kim friendship. Is this one of the ways Putin is using to transfer funds to Kim? Is Putin forcing rich Russians to vacation in north Korea to pay his arms procurement bills from Kim? Who really wants to spend their money on a vacation in north Korea?

Vacation in North Korea? Reclusive State Reopens to Tourism—But Only for Russians

The travelers were the first international tourists allowed inside by Kim Jong Un’s regime since the pandemic

By Dasl YoonFollow

Feb. 18, 2024 10:00 am ET

SEOUL—On a recent four-day weekend, nearly 100 Russians ventured to a place no foreign travelers had entered since the start of the pandemic: North Korea.

The tourists visited Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung Square, named after the North Korean founder. They watched a youth musical performance where a girl sang in a traditional hanbok outfit. And they hit the country’s premier ski slopes.

Travelers, according to two online accounts, faced fewer restrictions than expected during the trip from Feb. 9 to Feb. 12. But some rules were nonnegotiable: They were supervised when they left their hotel and they had to pay for everything in Chinese yuan or U.S. dollars—no Russian rubles allowed.

What Kim Jong Un’s Changing Outfits Reveal About North Korea

A Fully Sovereign Seoul: The Debate Over South Korean Independent Nuclear Ambitions

JINWOO KIM

FEB 16, 2024

wrongspeakpublishing.com · by Jinwoo Kim

South Korea’s foreign and national security policy is at a crossroads. North Korea’s formidable nuclear development and Biden’s lukewarm Ukraine policy and vacillating stance toward Iran (jeopardizing the passageway for 80% of East Asia’s oil) have created the impetus for South Korea’s own nuclear ambition.

Wrong Speak Publishing is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Whichever direction is taken by political leaders and the will of the people, clarity of what is at stake is paramount. Hope and nostalgia are befitting romance, but not foreign policy. True imagination derives from the sturdy roots of seeing reality as it is.

If diplomacy and sanctions and big deal packages were about denuclearization, then they have failed. If deterrence is about preventing NK from obtaining nuclear capability, then it has failed. If extended deterrence is about assuring Seoul of anxieties about a nuclear first strike by Pyongyang, then it has failed.

Usually, it’s 3 strikes and you are out. Yet, the US, Korea, Japan, and the international community are adamant about continuing to feed the fictional narrative of not abandoning the denuclearization of NK or the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. It remains the official policy of nearly every nation.

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Stop. Full stop. They are all lying or in denial. The reality is this - North Korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons short of unconditional defeat and surrender. Addressing this reality is at the root of South Korea’s debate over nuclear weapons.

The left is delusional about NK. This delusion is the source of its opposition to nukes. If nuclear weapons were framed as a policy that leverages the U.S. for a more balanced policy, the left would unctuously support it.

The right is naive. It believes that the USA will defend SK, no matter what. Even some conservatives whisper behind closed doors that this is not credible. Some Korean conservatives want an independent nuclear capability within the US-ROK architecture. Korean progressives oppose nukes because they fear NK’s reaction due to the US-ROK architecture. If so, then, the logical corollary is that the US-ROK alliance with the ROK having nuclear weapons is the crux of the problem.

The absence of credible deterrence is the progenitor of this debate. To be more specific, the credibility of the U.S. willingness to sacrifice New York over Seoul fuels the debate. Nuclear weapons are a tool, not an objective. Nuclear weapons are not a strategy or a political goal. They are a tactic. The key issue that every pundit dances around but never addresses, is sovereignty. Nuclear submarines? They are secondary, not central.

The political issue of sovereignty and operational control is the central, primary issue. The temporary solution is to divorce nukes from the U.S.-ROK alliance. The two nations should accelerate Seoul's gaining full operational control and then discuss the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

But that is a big gulf. How do we get from here to there?

The process of regaining control AND talking about nuclear capability can be agitating and yet expedited through working on a mutual target list for striking NK. If the devil is in the details, then any bona fide military operational planning for true deterrence must tackle the art of targeting. Short of this, all other policy invocations are empty gestures.

ROK’s “Kill Chain,” “Korean Air and Missile Defense” (KAMD), and “Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation” (KMPR) are empty concepts without a specific targeting list and objectives. Port visits of US SSBNs or strategic air assets or the formation of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) are important symbolic gestures but fall short.

Identifying, formulating, vetting, culling, and sharing the target list between the U.S. and ROK is the real testimony of a political alliance. Engaging in such an activity requires some trust to begin with, instills further trust, and becomes a turning point where differences can be aired. It is the nuts and bolts of alliance policy-making.

Targeting requires both parties to identify the geographical target, ascertain the purpose of the target, determine why the target is central or peripheral, allot which weapons and platforms to deploy to strike that target, calculate the Unintended Civilian Casualty Estimate (UCCE), and conduct a timely Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) to supplement the next round of targeting.

The precedent for a real political alliance was Operation Allied Force where NATO engaged in targeting by committee. It was cumbersome and inefficient but it underscored a more important goal - fostering political unity among the allies. To be sure, this was a war campaign. We are not at war. Not yet. But we must prepare for war to avoid war. Preparing and working on a target list would advance that goal as well as provide true “assurance” for a “meaty” extended deterrence.

Absent a radical editing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the debate over South Korean independent nuclear ambitions puts the cart before the horse. The horse is a fully sovereign Seoul, with operational control of its national security policy. Only then does a debate over nuclear weapons carry true credibility. South Korea is indeed at a crossroads. The time has arrived to choose.

Wrong Speak is a free-expression platform that allows varying viewpoints. All views expressed in this article are the author's own.

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wrongspeakpublishing.com · by Jinwoo Kim

6. N. Korea touts sole leadership system on key anniversary

Another sign of regime weakness and the concerns Kim has about the threats to the regime? All these actions and statements seem so easy to exploit from a PSYOP theme and message perspective.

But I will say again, we must observe for indicators of instability just as hard as we observe for indicators of possible attack. Paradoxically, those indicators of instability may give us more warning time for a possible attack if we understand that the conditions that threaten the regime internally could lead to a decision by Kim to execute his campaign plan to dominate the peninsula as his only path to survival.

N. Korea touts sole leadership system on key anniversary | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 19, 2024

SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korea called Monday for loyalty to its leader Kim Jong-un and touted the monolithic leadership system as it marked the 50th anniversary of the announcement of the country's key guiding principle.

In an editorial piece, the Rodong Sinmun, the North's main newspaper, highlighted late leader Kim Jong-il's announcement in 1974 of the monolithic ideological principle of "Kimilsungism."

"The sole leadership system bolsters our revolution and is also the dignity and power of the nation," the newspaper said, calling on people to show their loyalty to the incumbent leader Kim Jong-un.

After being anointed as the successor to the nation's founder Kim Il-sung in 1974, Kim Jong-il announced in February that year the establishment of "Kimilsungism," a key guiding principle named after his father. It is based on the Juche ideology, the country's main guiding principle created by Kim Il-sung.

Kim Jong-un took over the communist country following the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in 2011. The late Kim inherited power from his father, the country's founder, Kim Il-sung, who died in 1994.

This file photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 18, 2014, shows the North holding a key party event in Pyongyang to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the announcement of the monolithic guiding ideology of "Kimilsungism." (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · February 19, 2024

7. S. Korea, U.S., Japan call for N. Korea to take 'immediate' steps to end 'all' human rights abuses

Keep up the fire on human rights.

(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S., Japan call for N. Korea to take 'immediate' steps to end 'all' human rights abuses | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 18, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with joint statement by S. Korea, U.S., Japan in paras 1-8; CHANGES headline; ADDS photo)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan urged North Korea on Saturday to take "immediate" steps to end "all" human rights violations as they marked the 10th anniversary of the release of a landmark U.N. report on the reclusive state's rights abuses.

The three countries' missions to the United Nations released a joint statement commemorating the anniversary of the 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI) report that accused the North Korean regime of "systematic, widespread and gross" human rights violations and made related recommendations.

"We urge the DPRK to abide by its obligations under international law, take immediate steps to end all human rights violations and abuses -- including the immediate resolution of issues involving abductees, detainees, and unrepatriated prisoners of war -- and engage with the U.N.'s human rights experts for that purpose," they said in the statement.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

South Korean Ambassador to the U.N. Hwang Joon-kook speaks during a U.N. Security Council session at the U.N. headquarters in New York on Jan. 10, 2024, in this photo captured from the U.N. Web TV. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The three countries pointed out that the report asserted the North has committed human rights violations that amount to "crimes against humanity," and indicated "the gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world."

"Unfortunately, a decade later, this is still the case. The DPRK remains one of the world's most repressive regimes, imposing severe restrictions on freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, association, religion or belief, and movement," they said.

The countries also noted the "inextricable link" between the North's rights abuses and its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.

"The DPRK's use of forced and exploited labor -- both domestically and overseas -- support its unlawful and threatening programs, as do food distribution policies that favor the military, leading to chronic malnourishment among its citizens," they said.

Separately, Matthew Miller, the spokesperson for the U.S. State Department, reiterated calls for the North to begin a reform process to improve human rights.

"We call on the DPRK to initiate a reform process to implement the recommendations of the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry and to respect human rights," Miller said. "We also urge the international community to take immediate action to address the egregious human rights situation in the DPRK and for Member States to respect the principle of non-refoulement."

Matthew Miller, the State Department spokesperson, speaks during a press briefing at the department in Washington, in this Oct. 30, 2023, file photo. (Yonhap)

The COI report included recommendations that Pyongyang undertake "profound and institutional reforms without delay" to introduce checks and balances on the powers of the nation's leader and the ruling Workers' Party, including the introduction of an independent and impartial judiciary and a multiparty political system.

The spokesperson stressed that promoting respect for human rights and human dignity in the North remains a "top priority" for the U.S. government.

"We remain committed to shining a spotlight on human rights abuses and violations, promoting accountability for those responsible for them, and increasing access to independent information inside the DPRK," he said.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · February 18, 2024

8. New DAPA chief vows to speed up weapons procurement process

More weapons, faster.

New DAPA chief vows to speed up weapons procurement process | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 19, 2024

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Feb. 19 (Yonhap) -- The new head of South Korea's state procurement agency vowed Monday to speed up the weapons acquisition process to bolster the military's capabilities against North Korea's threats in a timely and efficient manner.

Seok Jong-gun, commissioner of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), outlined a comprehensive strategy to bolster the "three-axis" deterrence system designed to track, detect and strike North Korea's missiles and prepare for future warfare by using emerging technologies.

"It is important to swiftly and efficiently acquire weapons to support the overwhelming augmentation of military capabilities," Seok said during an inauguration ceremony held at DAPA's branch in Gwacheon, south of Seoul.

Seok Jong-gun, the new chief of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), speaks during an inauguration ceremony held at DAPA's branch in Gwacheon, south of Seoul, on Feb. 19, 2024, in this photo provided by the state procurement agency. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Seok, a retired Army major general with expertise in military strategy and planning, said DAPA will overhaul the acquisition system to enable "swift and flexible" acquisition of the latest technologies, including artificial intelligence, networks, drones, space and cyber.

He also pledged active support for defense companies' efforts to export weapons systems to help the nation achieve the goal of becoming the world's fourth-largest defense exporter by 2027.

"We will diversify financial support measures for arms exports and deepen international cooperation in major markets to provide a wide range of policy support measures," he said.

South Korea aims to carve out a 5 percent share of the global arms export market by 2027 to become the world's fourth-largest defense exporter.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · February 19, 2024

9. Political parties in full-fledged election mode as April 10 voting nears

This a very consequential election. Its outcome will affect the remainder of President Yoon's time in office and influence who may succeed him in the next presidential election in three years.

(News Focus) Political parties in full-fledged election mode as April 10 voting nears | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · February 20, 2024

By Kim Han-joo and Kang Jae-eun

SEOUL, Feb. 20 (Yonhap) -- With just 50 days before the April 10 parliamentary elections, political parties have shifted into full-fledged election mode by nominating candidates for key constituencies, as observers anticipate a tightly contested race with variables in play.

The quadrennial election is set to select a new 300-member National Assembly, with this year's poll holding particular significance as it serves as a political litmus test for President Yoon Suk Yeol's administration, now entering its third year of a five-year term.

The results will also serve as a public evaluation of the main opposition Democratic Party (DP), which secured a landslide victory in the previous 2020 general elections by sweeping 180 out of the 300 seats.

The National Assembly building in western Seoul (Yonhap)

The ruling People Power Party (PPP) is rallying local residents to vote for its candidates, calling for the ouster of opposition lawmakers with backgrounds as pro-democracy student activists during past authoritarian regimes.

PPP leader Han Dong-hoon is leading the campaign against politicians belonging to what is dubbed the "86 generation" that refers to activists who went to college in the 1980s after being born in the 1960s, saying they have turned into a political cartel enjoying undue privileges for decades.

The DP, which currently holds a controlling majority with 168 seats out of a total of 298, is spearheading a campaign to pass a stern judgment on Yoon's handling of state affairs in an effort to retain its parliamentary dominance.

The DP has escalated its critique against the PPP and the Yoon government for mismanaging the economy and livelihood issues, while shedding light on scandals involving first lady Kim Keon Hee, including allegations she received a luxury bag as a gift in 2022.

Recent public surveys largely indicate a challenging path for the PPP and Yoon, especially following allegations related to the Christian Dior bag.

According to a survey jointly conducted by Yonhap News Agency and Yonhap News TV earlier this month, Yoon's approval rating slipped to 34 percent from the previous month. The survey also projected that the DP and PPP would secure 33 percent and 35 percent of the vote, respectively, if the parliamentary elections were held tomorrow. The results, however, were within the margin of error.

Han Dong-hoon (R), interim chief of the ruling People Power Party, speaks during a party meeting at the National Assembly on Feb. 19, 2024. (Yonhap)

Observers unanimously agree that it will be crucial for both parties to nominate suitable candidates in key districts, such as excluding unpopular sitting lawmakers from nominations or fielding high-profile figures for highly competitive constituencies.

Attention is also on how these candidates can garner support from swing voters in competitive constituencies and how party leadership can mitigate potential conflicts between sitting lawmakers and their rivals during the nomination process.

"In the process of candidate nomination, it is inevitable to encounter some noise. However, minimizing that noise will be the most important thing," professor Shin Yul of Myungji University told Yonhap News Agency.

The PPP has completed its candidate interviews and so far nominated 89 people, with only 34 being sitting lawmakers, an indication that the PPP is trying to replace old faces with new ones as part of reform efforts.

That commitment pales, however, in the Yeongnam region in the country's southeast, which is the main stronghold of the ruling party, because sitting lawmakers received 18 out of 21 nominations in the region.

Noteworthy among the nominees is Won Hee-ryong, a former land minister, who is forecast to vie against DP leader Lee Jae-myung in the Gyeyang district of the western port city of Incheon, a traditional liberal opposition stronghold.

The DP's candidate nominations are also under way, with Chairman Lee indicating his commitment to nominate more fresh faces over political heavyweights.

"New wine needs new bottles. We need to move towards the future," Lee said in a Facebook post last week.

However, some members have claimed the party primaries are unfair, accusing Lee of favoring those loyal to him, as the party is expected to soon announce a list of incumbent lawmakers to be excluded from nominations.

An internal rift not only heightened tensions among members but also adversely impacted public opinion.

The PPP's support rate surpassed the DP by 7.1 percentage points, exceeding the margin of error of 6.2 percentage points, according to a survey by the Korea Society Opinion Institute on Sunday.

The pollster attributed the results to a positive assessment of Han, particularly regarding the party's candidate nomination process, contrasting with the DP, where conflicts arise between those aligned with former President Moon Jae-in and those in the pro-Lee faction.

Democratic Party Chairman Lee Jae-myung speaks during a meeting of the party's Supreme Council at the National Assembly in Seoul on Feb. 19, 2024. (Yonhap)

Another variable in the April elections is the emergence of new parties striving to position themselves as the third-largest party united under the so-called big tent.

On Jan. 20, two splinter parties from the DP and one splinter party each from the PPP and the minor Justice Party, as well as independent lawmaker Yang Hyang-ja's Hope of Korea party, united under the New Reform Party (NRP).

Led by former leaders of the ruling and opposition parties, Lee Jun-seok and Lee Nak-yon, the NRP aims to secure a minimum of 30 seats. So far, five incumbent lawmakers have joined the party, but more could follow suit after the DP announces party nominations this week.

The three-way race would be the first one since the general elections in 2016, when Rep. Ahn Cheol-soo's People's Party won 38 out of the 300 seats up for grabs.

Further complicating matters are the new parties envisioned by embattled former DP leader Song Young-gil and convicted former Justice Minister Cho Kuk. Cho had hinted at the possibility of aligning with the DP's satellite party in proportional representative seats.

The developments are expected to add another layer of complexity to the upcoming parliamentary elections by diversifying voters' options and potentially reshaping the dynamics between parties.

"The NRP is forecast to take away the DP's votes, and Cho Kuk's new party could even place the DP in a more difficult position," said Lee Jong-hoon, a political analyst.

Candidate registration will take place over two days starting March 21, with official campaigning commencing on March 28. Overseas voting is scheduled from March 27 to April 1, with early voting set for two days, starting April 5.

The National Assembly will consist of 243 directly contested seats and 57 proportional representation seats allocated to parties based on the total number of votes they receive.

Lee Nak-yon (L) and Lee Jun-seok, co-leaders of the newly launched New Reform Party, shake hands during a meeting of the party's Supreme Council at the National Assembly in Seoul on Feb. 19, 2024. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · February 20, 2024

10. South Korea’s secretive tango with Cuba signals diplomatic shift in East Asia

Again,the global Baduk/Go board is visible here. I played go on my computer on the fight over here but I still cannot win against the computer.

South Korea’s secretive tango with Cuba signals diplomatic shift in East Asia

North Korea hints at diplomatic talks with Japan, suggesting a visit by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Pyongyang.

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2024/02/16/GXNK4RN5G5EBHP2F7QCG2SI37Q/

By Kim Dong-ha,

Yoon Ju-heon (New York),

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2024.02.16. 10:21

Updated 2024.02.16. 10:55

The South Korean presidential office emphasized on Feb. 15 that the significance of establishing diplomatic ties with Cuba, often referred to as ‘North Korea’s brother nation,’ citing the connection to all socialist countries associated with North Korea through this recent diplomatic initiative. An assessment within South Korea suggests that diplomatic engagement with these nations, which began with the establishment of a resident mission in Hungary under communist rule in August 1988, has now reached its culmination after over 30 years.

Speaking to reporters in Seoul, a senior South Korean presidential official remarked, “The recent establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba ultimately reflects the prevailing trend in history and who holds sway over it.” They said, “North Korea is likely to experience significant political and psychological repercussions as a result.”

Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel greets veterans during a parade commemorating the 65th anniversary of Fidel Castro's entry in Havana on Jan. 8, 2024./AFP Yonhap News

For the past two years, the South Korean government has been laying the groundwork for establishing diplomatic ties with Cuba. In the preceding year alone, the Foreign Minister held three meetings with senior Cuban officials for this purpose.

Concerned about potential interference from North Korea, the South Korean government conducted diplomatic negotiations in utmost secrecy. Sources disclosed to the Chosunilbo that these talks progressed rapidly just before the Lunar New Year holiday, spurred by Cuba’s expressed eagerness. During a Feb. 13 cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, an unexpected agenda item regarding diplomatic relations with Cuba emerged. Unlike other agenda items, this matter was not displayed on the PC monitors of cabinet members but distributed solely in paper form and collected after the meeting. Apart from Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, other cabinet members only became aware of the imminent diplomatic ties at that time.

At 8 a.m. on Feb. 14 (local time), a small group of diplomatic officials, including representatives from South Korea and Cuba, convened near the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. They exchanged formal documents for establishing diplomatic relations and shook hands. Five minutes later, the South Korean delegation issued a press release titled ‘Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between South Korea and Cuba.’ Both countries had agreed to distribute the press release at a specific time, down to the minute, considering potential interference from North Korea. Hence, no photographs related to the event were released to the public.

Regarding the recent diplomatic establishment, the U.S. State Department stated, “We respect South Korea’s sovereignty in determining its diplomatic relationships,” and emphasized, “The South Korea-U.S. alliance remains strong.” A diplomatic source clarified that the omission of the term ‘welcome’ was due to Cuba’s status as an adversary of the United States.

North Korea hinted at engaging in talks with Japan to establish diplomatic relations. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un, delivered a speech on the same day, suggesting, “If Japan sheds its bad habits, there may come a day when Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visits Pyongyang.” Reports indicate that the South Korean government is monitoring and closely observing diplomatic exchanges between North Korea and Japan.

Earlier, Prime Minister Kishida had expressed desire to “boldly change” the current state of relations between North Korea and Japan to the House of Representatives on Feb. 9. Recently, the U.K. Financial Times also reported the possibility of a summit between the two countries. It was explained that Prime Minister Kishida seeks visible achievements to improve his low approval ratings, while North Korea sees it as a potential key to avoiding international isolation.

However, experts view Prime Minister Kishida’s potential visit to North Korea or the actual establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea as facing numerous obstacles. This assessment stems from Kim Yo-jong’s speech, where she asserted, “If Japan sheds its unfair practices regarding our legitimate defense rights and refrains from using the resolved abduction issue as a barrier, there is no reason why the two countries cannot draw closer.” This declaration suggests that there is no room for compromise on key points of contention in North Korea-Japan relations, specifically the abduction issue and North Korean nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the possibility is not entirely ruled out. Last month, Kim Jong-un sent an unprecedented message of condolence regarding the earthquake in Japan’s Noto Peninsula, addressing Prime Minister Kishida with the unusual title of ‘Your Excellency.’ A diplomatic source noted, “While not necessarily leading to diplomatic relations, there could be some diplomatic progress to a certain extent.”

11. China arrests N. Korean trade official for illegal currency transaction

Oops.

China arrests N. Korean trade official for illegal currency transaction

The official had worked with a private money changer to convert USD 1 million into Chinese yuan, which is far above the limit of USD 7,000 for foreigners

By Seulkee Jang - February 19, 2024

FILE PHOTO: View into North Korea from across the Tumen River in China's Jilin Province. (Daily NK)

A North Korean trade official was recently arrested by Chinese police while attempting to illegally exchange foreign currency. The arrest prompted a flurry of activity not only from the North Korean consulate in China but also from the North Korean foreign ministry.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in China told Daily NK last Wednesday that a North Korean trade official identified as “A” was arrested by Chinese police in January while attempting to illegally exchange foreign currency through a private money changer.

“A” was an official of a major trading company under the North Korean government who had been handling import and export business in China for several years.

The official had worked with a private money changer to convert USD 1 million into Chinese yuan.

China limits the amount of foreign currency that foreigners can exchange to RMB 50,000 (around USD 7,000).

Since North Korean trade officials in China cannot expect much profit from exchanging money at official banks, they sometimes exchange money illegally by working with private money changers instead of official banks.

Assuming that USD 1 million is converted into Chinese yuan at one time, a private money changer could make RMB 10,000 – 20,000 (USD 1,390 – 2,780) more profit than an official bank, the source explained.

It was not clear whether the North Korean trading company had instructed “A” to exchange the money illegally to maximize the currency’s appreciation, or whether “A” had gone to the private money changer on his own, hoping to pocket the difference.

But given that USD 1 million is more money than a single trade official would normally have access to – and the fact that the North Korean consulate got involved as soon as “A” was arrested by Chinese police – it appears that the North Korean trade company itself was behind the illegal currency exchange.

“Trade officials working in China often work with amounts ranging from hundreds of thousands to a million dollars. [But individuals aren’t able to exchange these amounts on their own, and [“A”] was probably following orders [from his superiors],” a source in North Korea told Daily NK, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Another possibility that has been raised is that “A” resorted to illegal currency exchange not only to profit from currency spreads but also for money laundering.

Since dollars are widely used for trading purposes, there would normally be little reason to convert dollars into Chinese yuan. In addition, the fact that “A” attempted to exchange the large sum of USD 1 million in cash has led to speculation that he was attempting to launder illicit profits.

A flurry of activity

North Korean consular officials went to various Chinese police stations in an attempt to investigate the incident and take “A” into custody.

“A foreign ministry staff member was rushed from Pyongyang to China to deal with the incident,” a source in China noted, demonstrating that North Korean authorities were not only aware of the incident but were proactive in seeking an amicable resolution.

“A” was turned over to North Korean authorities, but the money he attempted to exchange was not returned.

“When someone is caught making an illegal currency exchange in China, the entire amount is confiscated. It won’t be easy [for North Korea] to get the confiscated money back, even if the government is directly involved,” the source said.

Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

12. The impact of Kim Jong Un’s order in late 2020 to “sound the guns” (about information)

We cannot emphasize enough the existential threat that information is to the regime. But like the bomber, information will always get through.

Excerpts:

A vicious crackdown was also launched in major cities such as Sinuiju, Chongjin, Kanggye, Pyongsong, Sariwon, Haeju, and Wonsan. Security and police officials took advantage of the opportunity to line their pockets with bribes and illegal transactions.

In March 2021, Hamhung security officials arrested a 19-year-old man surnamed Cho for distributing South Korean videos and deprived him of even a sip of water for five days.

The guards at the detention center committed various human rights violations to extract a confession from him, including humiliating him by placing him naked in front of bars in the detention center and not allowing him to go to the bathroom.

The young man was finally sentenced to one year of hard labor after his parents paid a bribe of USD 3,000. While being treated at home because the severity of his malnutrition prevented him from being sent to forced labor camps, he eventually took his own life. His suicide note read, “I will forever be labeled as a problematic youth corrupted by reactionary ideology, so I don’t want to live anymore. I’m sorry to my parents.”

The party committee of South Hamgyong Province used this tragic case to launch a crackdown. The authorities stepped up the intensity of cultural education for the youth, claiming that “[the young man’s case] was the inevitable fate of someone who betrayed the party and nation that raised him and allowed his ideology to be corrupted by becoming addicted to South Korean movies, the country with the highest suicide rate in the world.”

The impact of Kim Jong Un’s order in late 2020 to “sound the guns”

The order instructed officials to punish people who imported and distributed foreign video content and execute them in cases of serious violations

By Kim Jeong Yoon - February 19, 2024

https://www.dailynk.com/english/impact-kim-jong-un-order-late-2020-sound-guns/

Screenshot from what appears to be a video produced in North Korea showing a public struggle session of those caught violating the country's "anti-reactionary thought law." (Daily NK)

Before North Korea’s government passed the “Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act” in December 2020, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un issued an order to “sound the guns” as part of efforts to instill fear in the younger generation and prevent an atmosphere of distrust in the socialist system.

The Kim Jong Un regime had long been concerned about young people’s lack of faith in the socialist system as well as defections by young people who came in contact with foreign information and materials. As a result, the authorities moved to create terror among their citizens by imposing draconian punishments to strictly control what people thought and did.

On October 1, 2020, Kim received a comprehensive report from the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Social Security, and the Military Security Command on the emergence of “black markets” and organizations that sell foreign digital content. After reading the report, he issued the order to “sound the guns.”

A violation of international agreements

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establishes the signatories’ obligation to protect the right to life of every human being. According to Clause 1 of Article 6, every human being has the inherent right to life, which shall be protected by law, and no one shall arbitrarily deprive another of his life. According to Clause 2, in countries that have not abolished the death penalty, the death penalty may be imposed only for the most serious crimes, adhering to the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime, and may be carried out only after a final judgment has been rendered by a competent court.

North Korea signed the ICCPR on September 14, 1981. The right to life enshrined in Article 6 of the ICCPR is the most fundamental and sacred right that remains unchanged even in emergencies that threaten the very existence of the state.

When Kim ordered his officials to “sound the guns,” he did not simply mean that the authorities should fire their guns into the air. Instead, he was ordering them to crack down on and punish people who imported and distributed foreign video content and to shoot people in cases of serious violations.

During the Kim Il Sung regime, people who came into contact with “impure,” anti-regime materials were classified as anti-party, anti-revolutionary factionalists, and then shot or sent en masse to political prison camps.

His successor, Kim Jong Il, issued an order to “let the guns sound” to prevent the alienation of public opinion when distrust of the state and the system grew due to the great famine of the 1990s, commonly known as the Arduous March. Numerous tanks rolled through the streets of Pyongyang, and the citizens of the capital, startled by the sound of the tanks, felt a kind of terror comparable to that caused by war.

Order leads to torture, death sentences

Kim Jong Un’s order to “sound the guns,” which was similar to his father’s order, was issued to law enforcement and security agencies in October 2020.

As a result of the order, numerous people who came into contact with foreign cultural content were branded as reactionaries and executed.

In February of 2021, Pyongyang police arrested a 22-year-old male student of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology for distributing various videos such as South Korean dramas, movies, and music videos to more than 20 people. The authorities locked him up in a detention center and subjected him to cruel torture to extract a confession.

The student initially resisted, claiming that he had accidentally picked up the memory card containing the videos while riding the subway. However, after being subjected to extreme torture, he finally confessed that he had traded it in Yanggang Province. Fortunately, he avoided the death penalty and was sentenced to 15 years of reform through labor for revealing the name of the original supplier.

A vicious crackdown was also launched in major cities such as Sinuiju, Chongjin, Kanggye, Pyongsong, Sariwon, Haeju, and Wonsan. Security and police officials took advantage of the opportunity to line their pockets with bribes and illegal transactions.

In March 2021, Hamhung security officials arrested a 19-year-old man surnamed Cho for distributing South Korean videos and deprived him of even a sip of water for five days.

The guards at the detention center committed various human rights violations to extract a confession from him, including humiliating him by placing him naked in front of bars in the detention center and not allowing him to go to the bathroom.

The young man was finally sentenced to one year of hard labor after his parents paid a bribe of USD 3,000. While being treated at home because the severity of his malnutrition prevented him from being sent to forced labor camps, he eventually took his own life. His suicide note read, “I will forever be labeled as a problematic youth corrupted by reactionary ideology, so I don’t want to live anymore. I’m sorry to my parents.”

The party committee of South Hamgyong Province used this tragic case to launch a crackdown. The authorities stepped up the intensity of cultural education for the youth, claiming that “[the young man’s case] was the inevitable fate of someone who betrayed the party and nation that raised him and allowed his ideology to be corrupted by becoming addicted to South Korean movies, the country with the highest suicide rate in the world.”

The ICCPR guarantees people in signatory countries the right to a fair trial and the right not to be tortured, but North Koreans have not been guaranteed these rights. North Koreans have been enraged by their government’s brutal punishments aimed at upholding the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act. Some are wondering whether the authorities are overreaching in their crackdowns and “killing all the young and middle-aged people in the country with a view to complete the Revolution with just the judges that remain.”

Translated by Annie Eunjung Kim. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

13. China steps up crackdown on N. Korean defectors’ fake IDs

Certainly harmful to the underground railroads and escapee processes.

China steps up crackdown on N. Korean defectors’ fake IDs

Fake IDs have been very helpful in giving defectors a way to earn money and travel. But now they are being taken away

By Lee Chae Un -

February 19, 2024

https://www.dailynk.com/english/china-steps-up-crackdown-north-korean-defectors-fake-ids/

Chinese police have recently started tracking down North Korean defectors with fake IDs and confiscating their documents, Daily NK has learned.

Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a Daily NK source in China said Thursday that “A,” a defector who has been living in Jilin Province for more than 10 years with a fake ID, was called in by police earlier this month and had her ID confiscated.

The police told “A” that the Chinese government had ordered them to confiscate the fake IDs of North Korean defectors and informed her that she could no longer use the ID from that moment on.

“Since last year, the Chinese police have been identifying which defectors have been living with fake IDs, and recently they have been calling these defectors and demanding their IDs,” the source said. “Defectors who have been living in China on fake IDs for over 10 years are suddenly having their IDs confiscated.”

Eventually, “A” turned in the fake ID she had been using to the police and became undocumented, just like any ordinary defector.

When she turned in her fake ID, the police also told her to “live quietly as we won’t arrest or repatriate you as long as you don’t commit any crimes or try to go to South Korea.”

Police also recently confiscated the fake ID of “B,” a defector living in Liaoning Province. She, too, had been using the ID for more than a decade.

“You wouldn’t dream of it now, but as recently as 10 years ago, if defectors had the money, they could buy fake IDs in China,” the source said. “With the ID you bought, you could get on a plane and go anywhere you wanted, so ‘B’ became desperate when she suddenly became undocumented, even though she wasn’t even thinking of going to South Korea.”

“B” expressed her frustration: “Because I had a fake ID, I could earn money and live without major problems, but now I’m a bird that has lost its wings. I can’t sleep, and am terrified at the thought I could be arrested and repatriated to the North at any time.”

Fake IDs have been very helpful in giving defectors in China some peace of mind. But now that even these are disappearing, many defectors are growing increasingly pessimistic about their undocumented status and inability to travel freely.

“Defectors in China are feeling increasingly insecure,” the source said. “The only way for them to live safely is to go to South Korea, but since even that option is now far too difficult, the psychological strain they are suffering is growing.”

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

14. ＜Inside N. Korea＞S.Korea is the enemy…Trends after Kim Jong Un’s “anti-unification policy” announcement

I cannot be any plainer and more succinct than this:

◆ The aim of the “anti-unification policy” policy is to eliminate South Korean culture

＜Inside N. Korea＞S.Korea is the enemy…Trends after Kim Jong Un’s “anti-unification policy” announcement (2)　What is the confrontational policy aimed at doing? Asked people for their opinions and atmosphere inside

asiapress.org

A propaganda leaflet prepared by the North Koreans after relations with South Korea deteriorated. A cigarette butt was intentionally placed in the photo of President Moon Jae-in's face. The leaflets were not distributed. Published in the Rodong Sinmun in June 2020.

＜Inside N. Korea＞ S.Korea is the enemy…Trends after Kim Jong Un’s “anti-unification policy” announcement (1)　People are surprised and confused

"South Korea is now an enemy, neither a kin nor an object of reunification." Late last year, Kim Jong Un shocked South Korea and the international community with this declaration. But what do North Koreans, the people who matter most, think of it? We asked our reporting partners to share their thoughts and the mood in the country. (ISHIMARU Jiro ／ KANG Ji-won)

◆ The aim of the “anti-unification policy” policy is to eliminate South Korean culture

In the first installment of this series, ASIAPRESS reported on people’s bewilderment toward the "anti-unification policy” and the propaganda and indoctrination by the authorities based on reports from several reporting partners in Yanggang Province. In this installment, we will first introduce the views of our reporting partners in North Hamgyong Province, and their opinions on what the government intends with this policy shift. All were interviewed in late January.

A reporting partner in Musan County described the atmosphere of bewilderment that has settled over their community:

"They suddenly start calling South Korea a hostile country. People around me say various things, but I'm not sure what's what. When the government was talking about economic cooperation (when economic cooperation between North and South Korea was actively discussed in 2018-19), they claimed that (we) could live well, but now they are saying that (South Korea) is a hostile power and not a partner for reunification, so I'm confused."

A reporting partner in Hoeryong shared his thoughts on the purpose of the policy shift to the “anti-unification policy” as follows:

"This time, Kim Jong-un said, 'There will be no peaceful reunification, we will occupy (South Korea).’ In other words, we are a military power, so we are confident that we can defeat (the U.S. and South Korea). The reason why they oppose South Korea so strongly is because of crackdowns on South Korean culture. They are out to eliminate things they call ' 'non-socialism” and “anti-socialism,' and they keep conducting harsh crackdowns on the way we speak, the way we dress, (illegal) videos, defections, and using Chinese cell phones. It’s all related to South Korea, so I think they aim to eliminate everything related to South Korea.”

Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office in Kaesong being blown up. It was a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation. June 17, 2020, quoted in the Rodong Sinmun.

◆ There are people who want war because life is so hard

At the heart of the Kim Jong Un regime's argument for its “anti-unification policy” is the idea that it is on the brink of war with its arch-enemies, South Korea and the United States. Here's how ordinary North Koreans see it, as a Yanggang Province reporting partner told ASIAPRESS in late January.

-- Kim Jong Un has vowed to pacify South Korea and even use nuclear weapons.

The big concern right now is, are we really going to go to war, and can we fight the South Koreans and win? We have nukes, and if there's a nuclear war, we're all going to die, and that's something we talk about a lot when we get together. But some people want war to happen because it's so hard to live.

-- There's people who want war?

I mean, if there's a war, we might die, but it's better than the way things are now, and whether it's war or negotiations, there's a feeling that something has to change.

-- What is your opinion on nuclear war with South Korea and the United States?

Nukes are the last weapon I would use because if there is a nuclear war, the enemy will die and I will die. However, some people say nukes are actually weaker than an automatic rifle because you only have it to protect yourself. They can't say it out loud, but that's the sentiment among people who have been listening to the radio for a long time and know a little bit about the situation outside. The US, Russia, and China say they have a lot of nuclear weapons, but they can't actually use them.

Others say, 'We're just like robbers: we’re trying to get food aid by threatening the US and Japan and South Korea with nuclear weapons.' People who don't know anything (about the outside world) are saying, 'Let's become a bomb (for the country), let's be loyal,' but those who know are saying, 'How ignorant and stupid we are.'

◆ Authorities strengthen informant system…People don’t speak their mind

-- People can't speak freely in North Korea.

Now, with the crackdown on "rumors" and non-socialist phenomena, and the strengthening of the "reporting system," people are increasingly afraid to speak out against the government, even if they think policy is wrong.

The system of mutual surveillance of people's speech and behavior and reporting to the authorities is stronger than before. Information that is unfavorable to the regime is considered "rumor" or fake information, and the source of such information is intensely investigated. Food and cash are offered as rewards to people who inform on others.

-- So the informant system has been strengthened?

The reward system is so good that you can't talk freely. Companies and organizations have created petition boxes for cadres, and there is a system of mandatory criticism of individuals and organizations once a week, separate from criticism sessions.

※ Struggle sessions refer to the weekly behavioral reflection meetings held every Saturday at all workplaces, schools, and social organizations, such as women's and youth associations.

This has been in effect since March of last year, and based on the content of the petitions, there are investigations and inspections (for businesses and organizations) conducted by prosecutors or by the party committees in Hyesan and Yanggang Province. Even among cadres, it has become impossible to talk about the above (about the regime's elites and Kim Jong-un) even among people who know each other well. They don't trust each other.

※ Since around 2019, these petition boxes, which offer an anonymous way to criticize individuals and cadres, have become commonplace in companies and organizations. The system is used to accuse cadres of corruption, problematic behavior, and make other complaints. (End)

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

＜Inside N. Korea＞ S.Korea is the enemy…Trends after Kim Jong Un’s “anti-unification policy” announcement (1)　People are surprised and confused

asiapress.org

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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Company Name | Website

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＜Inside N. Korea＞S.Korea is the enemy…Trends after Kim Jong Un’s “anti-unification policy” announcement (2)　What is the confrontational policy aimed at doing? Asked people for their opinions and atmosphere inside