Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication."

– Leonardo da Vinci

“In keeping silent about evil, and burying it so deep within us, that no sign of it appears on the surface, we are implanting it, and it will rise up a thousand fold in the future. When we neither punish nor reproach, evildoers, we are not simply protecting their trivial old age, we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.”

– Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

"Beware the fury of a patient man."

– John Dryden

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2024

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 30, 2024

3. U.S. Presses for Long Cease-Fire to Pave Way for End of Gaza War

4. Pentagon not taking Iran-backed militia pause declaration seriously

5. Chinese Hacking Against U.S. Infrastructure Threatens American Lives, Officials Say

6. With Fate of Ukraine’s Top General in Question, All Eyes Turn to Zelensky

7. How Taiwan’s New President Should Respond to Chinese Coercion

8. Transparency for Victory: How Openness Can Improve Ukraine’s Public Relations

9. Selling the War at Home (Book Review) (Russia)

10. The ICJ ruling is not a loss for Israel - Anthony Avice Du Buisson

11. CIA director: Not passing Ukraine aid would be a mistake ‘of historic proportions’

12. Ukraine’s Drone Operators Race into the Future, Mostly with Overclocked Copters

13. China Says Trump Could Abandon Taiwan If He Wins US Election

14. What Holds Japan Back

15. The Uyghurs: Kashgar Before the Catastrophe

16. Attack on US troops brings Iran confrontation closer

17. How North Korea Deterred an American Invasion in 2002

18. Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024

Key Takeaways:

The anticipated Russian 2024 winter-spring offensive effort is underway in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area.
Ukrainian officials continued to deny rumors about the purported dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
Russian forces appear to be continuing to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention to which Russia is signatory.
Russian Army General Alexander Dvornikov was reportedly appointed the new chairperson of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF).
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev made offensive and inflammatory comments about Japan while asserting Russia’s rights to the disputed Kuril Islands, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to demonstrate Russia’s support of China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.
Senior Russian officials may be intensifying their attempts to frame and justify Russia’s long term war effort in Ukraine as an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West by explicitly equating the US with the Nazis.
Russian opposition sources suggested that widespread internet outages in Russia on January 30 may be the result of Russian efforts to establish the “sovereign internet” system.
The Kremlin has been intensifying efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space in advance of the March 2024 Russian presidential election, and these efforts support the development of the “sovereign internet” system.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Horlivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 30.
The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce at least 100 main battle tanks per month and is therefore able to replace battlefield losses, allowing Russian forces to continue their current tempo of operations “for the foreseeable future.”
Russian authorities are planning to increase the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia in 2024.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 30, 2024

Jan 30, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 30, 2024, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on January 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW added a new section on Russian air, missile, and drone campaign to track Russian efforts to target Ukrainian rear and frontline areas, grow its drone and missile arsenals, and adapt its strike packages.

The anticipated Russian 2024 winter-spring offensive effort is underway in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on January 30 that the Russian offensive in Ukraine is currently ongoing and that Russian forces aim to reach the Zherebets River (in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area) and the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[1] Budanov forecasted that Russian forces would fail to achieve these objectives, however, and would likely be “completely exhausted” by the beginning of the spring.[2] Budanov’s statements are consistent with ISW’s observation that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations along this axis since the beginning of January 2024.[3] Russian forces have recently made tactical gains southeast of Kupyansk along the critical P07 Kupyansk-Svatove route near Krokhmalne and appear to be increasing assaults northwest and west of Krokhmalne towards the Oskil River.[4] Russian forces will likely be able to secure additional tactical-level gains in the Kupyansk area but are unlikely to be able to translate these tactical gains into wider mechanized maneuvers needed for operationally significant advances that could capture more territory in Kharkiv Oblast and push to the Luhansk and Donetsk oblast administrative borders.[5] ISW has observed that elements of the Western Military District’s 1st Guards Tank Army and 6th Combined Arms Army are active in the Kupyansk area and have been able to pursue infantry-led frontal assaults but have not shown the capacity to conduct large-scale mechanized maneuver since they were deployed to this axis over a year ago. ISW will soon publish a more detailed operational analysis of the situation on this Kharkiv-Luhansk axis.[6]

Ukrainian officials continued to deny rumors about the purported dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Ukrainian Presidential Press Secretary Serhii Nykyforov stated on January 29 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did not dismiss Zaluzhnyi.[7]

Russian forces appear to be continuing to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun reported on January 30 that Russian forces are using chemical weapons against Ukrainian positions in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast).[8] Shtupun noted that Russian forces conducted at least five strikes using likely K-51 grenades carrying chloropicrin on January 29 alone. Chloropicrin is primarily used as a soil fumigant that can be fatal when inhaled, and it is sometimes classified as a riot control agent (RCA) due to its harmful and irritant effects.[9] The CWC prohibits the use of RCAs in warfare.[10]

Russian Army General Alexander Dvornikov was reportedly appointed the new chairperson of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF).[11] Dvornikov had been the commander of the Southern Military District and the first overall theater commander in Ukraine from April to May 2022, and Russian President Vladimir Putin had sidelined Dvornikov without officially firing him following Dvornikov‘s failure to capture Donbas by May 2022.[12] Dvornikov was reportedly serving as an advisor to the Almaz-Antey Aerospace Concern as of October 2023.[13] Dvornikov’s newest appointment demonstrates Putin’s preference for rotating his failed generals through positions that are peripheral to combat duty as opposed to outright dismissing them.[14] DOSAAF is a Soviet-era youth movement that promotes military skills and has likely supported Russian youth education aimed at Russifying youth in occupied Ukraine.[15] Russian sources claimed that Dvornikov will need to "resuscitate" the "long-suffering" DOSAAF organization, and Dvornikov’s appointment may indicate increased Kremlin attention to military-patriotic youth education.[16]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev made offensive and inflammatory comments about Japan while asserting Russia’s rights to the disputed Kuril Islands, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to demonstrate Russia’s support of China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated on January 30 that Japanese sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine will continue but that Japan is interested in resolving its territorial issues with Russia and signing a peace treaty.[17] Japan never signed a formal peace treaty with the Soviet Union after the end of World War II. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to Kishida’s statement and claimed that the disputed Kuril Islands are Russian and that the “territorial question” between Russia and Japan about the islands is “closed“ according to Russia’s constitution – referring to amendments to Russia’s constitution in 2020 that banned territorial concessions.[18] Medvedev claimed that Russia will “actively” develop the Kuril Islands and that their “strategic role” will grow as Russia stations new weapons there.[19] Russia has been installing military infrastructure on the Kuril Islands since at least 2015.[20] Medvedev used highly offensive language to imply that Russia would not negotiate with Japan about the islands and to criticize Japan’s relations with the United States.[21] Medvedev posted these comments on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account as opposed to his Russian-language Telegram channel, suggesting that his objective was specifically to offend Japan in the English-speaking world and posture aggressively towards the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. The Russian Pacific Fleet also conducted an anti-submarine exercise in the South China Sea on January 29.[22] Medvedev’s claims and the Pacific Fleet exercises are likely aimed at demonstrating that Russia is a strong Pacific power that supports China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific, as the Kremlin has routinely stressed in the past.[23]

Senior Russian officials may be intensifying their attempts to frame and justify Russia’s long term war effort in Ukraine as an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West by explicitly equating the United States with the Nazis. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated at an international ambassadorial roundtable on “solving the situation in Ukraine” on January 30 that “Napoleon, Hitler, and now the US” have found a new way to attack Russia.[24] Lavrov quoted Nazi Reichskommissar (literally “imperial commissar”--the Nazi occupation governor) for Ukraine Erich Koch stating that “Ukraine is for [the Third Reich] only an object of exploitation... and that the population must be used as a second-class people in solving military problems” and claimed that the West today is fighting the war against Russia through Ukraine “with only the goal outlined by Reichskommissar Koch.”[25] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently started framing the war as an existential geopolitical conflict against an alleged modern Nazi movement in the West, though Lavrov’s claim that the West is pursuing the same goals and methods as a specified Nazi official is the most explicit framing yet.[26] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin may have decided that the narrative that Russia and other countries are fighting a geopolitical Western “Nazi” force is a more effective immediate narrative than Putin's attempt to appeal to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in territories formerly colonized by the Soviet Union and Russian Empire with the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) ideology.[27] The Russkiy Mir framework is purposefully based on amorphous ethnic identities that are not universally agreed upon and that are at odds with Russia’s multi-ethnic composition. Lavrov’s intensification of portrayals of the United States and West as alleged Nazi actors at an international event is also noteworthy and may suggest that the Kremlin views the Nazi narrative as potentially more successful as a posturing tool with international audiences, particularly those that are not aligned with the United States and the West.

Russian opposition sources suggested that widespread internet outages in Russia on January 30 may be the result of Russian efforts to establish the “sovereign internet” system. Russian media reported that several major Russian entities experienced outages on January 30, including but not limited to Russian telecommunications giants Yandex, Megafon, MTS, Rostelecom, and Beeline; banks VTB, Sberbank, Alfabank; consumer goods companies Avito, Wildberries, Ozon, and Lamoda; and the social media site VK.[28] The Russian Ministry of Digital Transformation reported that a technical issue with the global Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) caused the outage with .ru domains and that authorities have since restored service to users on Russia’s National Domain Name System.[29] Russian anti-censorship organization Net Freedoms Project and other opposition outlets noted that Russia has been trying to establish its “sovereign internet” system and connected the DNSSEC failure with attempts to transfer all Russian internet users to a Russian national domain name system (DNS) server separate from the global internet.[30] The Russian “sovereign internet” law, which came into force in November 2019, aims to create an independent Russian internet system protected from external actors and obliges Russian internet service providers to possess the technological means to counter these threats, and the Russian government will likely coopt this technology to increase surveillance and censorship in the Russian information space.[31]

The Kremlin has been intensifying efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space in advance of the March 2024 Russian presidential election, and these efforts support the development of the “sovereign internet” system. Russian state newswire TASS reported that social media site Telegram experienced an outage on January 18; telecom operator Beeline experienced an outage on January 19; and YouTube experienced outages in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, and Rostov-on-Don on January 23.[32] Russian state censor Roskomnadzor tested blocking all major messaging platforms in the Russian Far East on January 23, and Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported that Roskomnadzor blocked internet access in the Republic of Sakha on January 24 to stymie unrest following an ethnically motivated murder.[33] The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office reported on January 8 that it blocked over 200,000 internet resources for allegedly promoting “fakes” and for “discrediting” the Russian military and that it prepared a bill allowing Roskomnadzor to rapidly block information that fails to comply with Russian censorship laws.[34] The Kremlin is also replacing blocked sites with its own analogs; Russian Wikipedia replacement “Ruviki” left beta testing as of January 15 and internet giant Yandex took an additional step to separate its Russian entity from its international entity on January 23.[35]

Key Takeaways:

The anticipated Russian 2024 winter-spring offensive effort is underway in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area.
Ukrainian officials continued to deny rumors about the purported dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
Russian forces appear to be continuing to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention to which Russia is signatory.
Russian Army General Alexander Dvornikov was reportedly appointed the new chairperson of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF).
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev made offensive and inflammatory comments about Japan while asserting Russia’s rights to the disputed Kuril Islands, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to demonstrate Russia’s support of China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.
Senior Russian officials may be intensifying their attempts to frame and justify Russia’s long term war effort in Ukraine as an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West by explicitly equating the US with the Nazis.
Russian opposition sources suggested that widespread internet outages in Russia on January 30 may be the result of Russian efforts to establish the “sovereign internet” system.
The Kremlin has been intensifying efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space in advance of the March 2024 Russian presidential election, and these efforts support the development of the “sovereign internet” system.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Horlivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on January 30.
The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce at least 100 main battle tanks per month and is therefore able to replace battlefield losses, allowing Russian forces to continue their current tempo of operations “for the foreseeable future.”
Russian authorities are planning to increase the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia in 2024.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk direction on January 30 amid continued positional fighting. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the capture of Tabaivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after initially claiming its capture on January 29, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced further west of the settlement and are now trying to take Pishchane (east of Kupyansk).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian attacks west of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) forced Ukrainian forces to abandon their positions in part of Synkivka and that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Kotlyarivka and Kyslivka (both northeast of Kupyansk).[37] ISW has observed no visual confirmation of any of the Russian claims, however. Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured several positions during counterattacks near Tabaivka.[38] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting east of Pishchane and in the direction of Berestove (southeast of Kupyansk).[39] Elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) reportedly continue operating in the Svatove direction southeast of Kupyansk.[40]

Positional fighting continued west and south of Kreminna on January 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued positional engagements west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Dibrova.[41] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment continue to operate in the Kreminna direction.[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage posted on January 29 shows elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) capturing and clearing positions southwest of Bakhmut in the dacha area along the T0504 Bakhmut-Ivanivske road.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to gain the initiative near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut) and have moved closer to the Siversky-Donets Donbas canal west of Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut).[44] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional engagements near Bohdanivka, Ivanivske, and Klishchiivka.[45] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet), 331st and 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division), and 83rd Separate Guards VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut area.[46]

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions northwest of Horlivka. Geolocated footage posted on January 29 shows Ukrainian troops assaulting and capturing several positions about three kilometers northwest of Horlivka.[47]

Positional engagements continued near Avdiivka on January 30 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Several Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking in the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant area on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka for the past several days.[48] Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have captured positions near the water filtration plant and industrial zone in southeastern Avdiivka.[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also marginally advanced southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske.[50] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian advances southeast or southwest of Avdiivka. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Stepove; in northwestern Avdiivka in the Coke Plant area; in southern Avdiivka near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant; in southeastern Avdiivka in the industrial zone; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Opytne.[51] Elements of the 9th and 110th Motorized Rifle Brigades (both of the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) and the South Ossetian “Storm Ossetia and Alania” volunteer battalion are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka area.[52]

Russian forces recently conducted an unsuccessful assault southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled an unsuccessful Russian attack towards the Solodke-Kostyantynivka line (about 17km southwest of Donetsk City and directly southwest of Novomykhailivka) and that Russian forces lost two tanks, six MT-LB armored fighting vehicles, and one BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle.[53] Geolocated footage shows damaged and abandoned Russian armored vehicles north and south of Novomykhailivka following the attempted assault.[54] Several Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces attacked south and southwest of Novomykhailivka.[55] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional fighting west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on January 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the front in this area. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Zolota Nyva.[57] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in the southern Donetsk direction (an area that covers Novomykhailivka to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[58] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District); 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]); and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating south of Velyka Novosilka.[59]

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 30, but there were no confirmed changes to the front in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne).[60] Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Verbove.[61]

Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on January 30.[62] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[63]

Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated on January 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian air defense system radar station near occupied Rozdolne, northwestern Crimea.[64] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces shot down 11 Ukrainian drones over Crimea on the night of January 29 to 30 but did not specify how many total drones Ukrainian forces launched.[65]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 35 Shahed-136/131 drones and two S-300 missiles at Ukraine on the night of January 29 to 30 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 15 of the drones over Mykolaiv, Sumy, Cherkassy, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Kyiv oblasts.[66] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces specifically aimed Shahed drones at frontline areas and infrastructure objects near the line of contact, particularly fuel and energy facilities.[67] Ihnat stated that it is more difficult for Ukrainian forces to shoot down drones near the frontline and that the use of electronic warfare (EW) against Russian drones is a priority for Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are likely experimenting with new strike packages that are forcing Ukraine to deploy air defense systems to certain locations, forcing Ukraine to leave other areas of the theater more exposed to Russian drone and air strikes.[68] Ihnat previously acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have concentrated a considerable amount of air defense near Kyiv City to defend against regular Russian strikes and that it will be difficult for Ukrainian forces to disperse these systems throughout Ukraine as Russia’s strike campaign continues.[69] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 30 that Russian forces have launched over 330 missiles and 600 drones at Ukraine since the beginning of 2024.[70]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce at least 100 main battle tanks per month and is therefore able to replace battlefield losses, allowing Russian forces to continue their current tempo of operations “for the foreseeable future.”[71] Russia’s sole tank manufacturer UralVagonZavod reportedly produced 20 tanks per month as of March 2023.[72] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev claimed in March 2023 that Russia’s DIB could produce 1,500 main battle tanks in 2023, which suggests an average production of 125 tanks per month.[73]

The Russian MoD claimed on January 30 that Russian DIB enterprise Novator fulfilled its state defense order for Kalibr cruise missiles and Iskander ballistic missiles in 2023. Novator General Director Farid Abdrakhmanov reported to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that Novator fulfilled the state defense order for Kalibrs and Iskanders in 2023 by switching to round-the-clock production and creating a three-shift schedule at all of its factories.[74] Abdrakhmanov stated that Novator has already fulfilled 17 percent of the state defense order for 2024.[75] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 15 that Russian forces have not included Kalibr cruise missiles in strike series against Ukraine since mid-September 2023 likely as part of efforts to build up a missile reserve and that Russia likely has difficulties producing Kalibr cruise missiles because they require many foreign components blocked under international sanctions.[76]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade announced on January 30 that it created a new Department for Unmanned Aerial Systems and Robotics to oversee state and civil defense orders for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production.[77] The new Department for Unmanned Aerial Systems and Robotics will also be responsible for developing and supporting the robotics industry, except for industrial robotics, which the Department of Machine Tools and Heavy Engineering will continue to oversee.[78]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are testing a new design of the BTR-22 armored personnel carrier (APC) that is faster and more durable than the BTR-82A APC.[79] The milblogger claimed that the BTR-22 has more protective hull armor and can reach a maximum speed of 100 kilometers per hour (about 62 miles per hour) on paved roads - a 20 kilometers per hour (about 12 miles per hour) increase over the BTR-82A’s maximum speed.[80]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Dutch Defense Minister Kasja Ollongren announced that the Netherlands is allocating 122 million euros (about $132 million) for strengthening Ukrainian cyber defenses and providing Ukraine with ammunition and equipment.[81] Ollongren reported that the Netherlands is allocating 87 million euros (about $94 million) to purchasing artillery shells for Ukraine, 25 million euros (about $27 million) to the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) to purchase equipment, and 10 million euros (about $11 million) to improve Ukrainian cyber defenses.[82]

Two unnamed US officials told Politico in a January 30 article that the United States may deliver the first batch of an unspecified number of new Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs to Ukraine as soon as January 31.[83] One unnamed US official stated that new Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs have a maximum range of 90 miles (about 145 kilometers).[84]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities are planning to increase the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia in 2024. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Council Deputy Alla Barkhatnova stated on January 30 that occupation authorities in Kherson Oblast are working to increase the number of children who go on “trips” to “health and recreation” camps in Russia in 2024.[85] Barkhatnova noted that several such programs took place in 2023 and that Ukrainian children underwent ”social and psychological adaptation” in various camps, including in Litvonovo, Moscow Oblast, and in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai.[86] Ukrainian Regional Center for Human Rights (RCHR) lawyer Kateryna Rashevska noted on January 30 that the RCHR has confirmed that Russia has opened 55 such children’s camps within Russia, nine in occupied Crimea, and 13 in Belarus.[87] Rashevska observed that Ukrainian children are exposed to Russian military-patriotic programming at such camps and are always guarded by Russian military personnel.[88] ISW has long assessed that Russia is deporting Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of vacation camps or medical rehabilitation, amongst other schemes, and that Russian authorities use such camps to indoctrinate Ukrainian children into pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian ideologies.[89]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian milbloggers continued to seize on rumors of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal or resignation to further Russian information operations about domestic Ukrainian affairs and the West’s alleged control over the Ukrainian government.[90]

Kremlin officials and mouthpieces continued to promote narratives about Russia’s influence in Armenia amid deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. An Armenian citizen reportedly damaged the Children of the Siege of Leningrad monument in Yerevan on January 29, and the Russian embassy in Armenia stated that the perpetrators must be punished and that they expect Armenian authorities to conduct an investigation.[91] Kremlin newswire TASS later stated that the Armenian Investigative Committee opened a criminal case and is conducting a preliminary investigation.[92] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the Armenian government directed the damage to the monument.[93] The Russian Embassy in Armenia and the milblogger claimed that Armenian society largely agrees with Russia’s position about the incident despite claims that the Armenian government orchestrated it.[94]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin conducted an official state visit to Cuba on January 29 and 30 likely in support of Russian sanctions evasion efforts. Khrenin met with Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces Minister Corps General Alvaro Lopez Miera on January 30 to discuss prospects for Belarusian-Cuban military and security cooperation and signed unspecified agreements on military cooperation.[95] Khrenin emphasized that Cuba is a “strategic ally in the Western hemisphere.”[96]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, January 30, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2024

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters clashed in western Gaza City where Palestinian militias have likely infiltrated. The Guardian reported that Hamas is returning to the northern Gaza Strip and rebuilding a system of governance there.
Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters, including conducting an airstrike on Palestinian fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades. Palestinian fighters separately mortared Israeli forces.
Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations around Khan Younis. Palestinian fighters continued conducting a deliberate defense against Israeli forces in western Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Hamas is considering a new hostage-for-prisoner proposal. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh will soon travel to Cairo to discuss the proposal.
West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias 10 times. Israeli forces killed three Palestinian fighters affiliated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in a hospital in Jenin.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Unidentified militants launched rockets from Syria into the Golan Heights.
Iraq and Syria: Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah are conducting an information operation to distance Iran from the January 28 one-way drone attack that killed three US service members in northeastern Jordan.
Yemen: Houthi Defense Minister Mohammad Nasser al Atifi said that the Houthis are prepared for a long-term confrontation with US and UK forces in the Red Sea.
Iran: The Iranian Law Enforcement Command Border Guards commander announced that it killed a member of the Baloch militant group, Ansar al Furqan, in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 30, 2024

Jan 30, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, January 30, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters clashed in western Gaza City where Palestinian militias have likely infiltrated. The Guardian reported that Hamas is returning to the northern Gaza Strip and rebuilding a system of governance there.
Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters, including conducting an airstrike on Palestinian fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades. Palestinian fighters separately mortared Israeli forces.
Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations around Khan Younis. Palestinian fighters continued conducting a deliberate defense against Israeli forces in western Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Hamas is considering a new hostage-for-prisoner proposal. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh will soon travel to Cairo to discuss the proposal.
West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias 10 times. Israeli forces killed three Palestinian fighters affiliated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in a hospital in Jenin.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Unidentified militants launched rockets from Syria into the Golan Heights.
Iraq and Syria: Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah are conducting an information operation to distance Iran from the January 28 one-way drone attack that killed three US service members in northeastern Jordan.
Yemen: Houthi Defense Minister Mohammad Nasser al Atifi said that the Houthis are prepared for a long-term confrontation with US and UK forces in the Red Sea.
Iran: The Iranian Law Enforcement Command Border Guards commander announced that it killed a member of the Baloch militant group, Ansar al Furqan, in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters clashed on January 30 in western Gaza City where Palestinian militias have likely infiltrated. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) resumed operations in western Gaza City on January 28 and 29.[1] The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed “many” Palestinian fighters in al Shati refugee camp on January 30.[2] The IDF 5th Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) separately engaged Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.[3] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued a warning to Hamas operatives in al Shati refugee camp on January 30, calling on them to surrender.[4] The spokesperson published an infographic of Hamas commanders in the Shati and Sheikh Radwan battalions of Hamas’ Gaza Brigade whom the IDF has killed.[5] Palestinian sources reported on January 30 that Israeli forces clashed with and detained Palestinian fighters in Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City.[6]

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in northern, southern, and western Gaza City on January 30.[7] Other Palestinian militias are similarly defending against Israeli raids in the northern Gaza Strip. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the current war, fired unspecified munitions at Israeli forces advancing in Gaza City.[8]

This activity is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are likely infiltrating some of these areas.[9] CTP-ISW defines infiltration as the process by which “an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by [opposing] forces to occupy a position of advantage behind those [opposing] positions while exposing only small elements to [opposing] defensive fires.”[10]

The Guardian reported on January 30 that Hamas is returning to the northern Gaza Strip and rebuilding a system of governance there.[11] A former official from Israel’s National Security Council said that Hamas is policing in the northern Gaza Strip and governing trade. A Tel Aviv-based think tank researcher similarly reported that Hamas has re-established control in parts of the Gaza Strip where the IDF previously operated, namely al Shati refugee camp, Jabalia refugee camp, and Shujaiya. Several sources discussed the general breakdown in law and order in the Gaza Strip. Aid officials reported several incidents of unspecified personnel looting aid trucks, primarily in the central Gaza Strip.

This reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Palestinian militias are likely infiltrating into areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations.[12] Hamas’ return to providing services in areas that Israeli forces previously cleared undermines Israeli efforts to destroy Hamas.

Western media appears, however, to have exaggerated Hamas' infiltration into the northern Gaza Strip by framing it as preparation for a "new offensive" against Israel.[13] Hamas and other Palestinian fighters are likely in the early stages of the reconstitution of their governance and military capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.[14] But these efforts do not necessarily indicate that Hamas is preparing for an offensive campaign in the way that Western media has suggested.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on January 30. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) directed a drone strike targeting Palestinian fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) in the central Gaza Strip on January 30.[15] PIJ fighters mortared a concentration of IDF personnel east of Maghazi.[16]

The IDF 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 30. The 35th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) and 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) killed Palestinian fighters and located weapons in western Khan Younis.[17] The 98th Division directed the IDF Air Force to destroy the rocket launchers from which Hamas fighters fired rockets targeting Tel Aviv in Khan Younis on January 29.[18] The IDF reported that the launchers were loaded and that the Air Force also destroyed an unspecified military asset belonging to Hamas’ anti-tank unit.[19]

Palestinian militias continued to execute a deliberate defense against Israeli forces in western Khan Younis. PIJ fighters targeted four IDF tanks with RPGs west of Khan Younis on January 30.[20] Other Palestinian militias, including Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, continued to target Israeli forces in western Khan Younis with RPGs and explosive devices.[21] Palestinian militias separately contested Israeli operations in southwestern Khan Younis.[22]

Hamas is considering a new hostage-for-prisoner proposal.[23] An unspecified senior Hamas official told Reuters on January 30 that the proposal involved a three-stage truce, during which Hamas would release remaining civilians held hostage in the Gaza Strip, then soldiers, and finally the bodies of killed hostages. Reuters reported that the proposal is part of what appears to be the most “serious peace initiative for months.” The ceasefire proposal follows talks involving the US, Israeli, and Egyptian intelligence chiefs and the Qatari prime minister.[24] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh confirmed that Hamas received a ceasefire proposal and affirmed that the groups’ top priority is the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.[25] Haniyeh will travel to Cairo to discuss the proposal.[26] Hamas and other Palestinian groups in the Gaza Strip have previously insisted that they will only accept a deal that ends the war permanently.[27] The proposal, as outlined by the Hamas official, does not include the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Shin Bet director met with his Egyptian counterpart to discuss expanding Israeli operations to Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[28] Two unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on January 30 that the two officials discussed cooperating to prevent weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip that would enable Hamas to rearm itself. Egypt is concerned that an Israeli military operation in Rafah along the Philadelphi Corridor—a 14-kilometer stretch of land between Egypt and the Gaza Strip—could create a flow of Palestinian refugees into the Sinai Peninsula. Israel informed Egypt that it is planning a military operation to secure the Egypt-Gaza Strip border in early January.[29] The Wall Street Journal reported that the timing of the Israeli operation will depend on negotiations with Egypt regarding Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip and a ceasefire.[30]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 30.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias 10 times across the West Bank. Israeli forces conducted raids, detained six wanted individuals, and captured currency and weapons during operations in Tulkarm, Nour Shams, Nablus, Ein Arik, Azzun, and Tarqumiya.[31] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a militia aligned with Hamas in the current war, claimed that it detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Jenin on January 29 and 30.[32] Hamas fighters separately fired small arms targeting Israeli forces conducting raids in Jenin on January 30.[33]

Israeli forces killed three Palestinian fighters affiliated with Hamas and PIJ in a hospital in Jenin on January 30.[34] The IDF conducted a joint operation with Shin Bet and undercover Israeli police to target a founder of and spokesperson for Hamas’ Jenin Brigade.[35] The IDF said that the target was planning to execute an attack like Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack in the “immediate time frame”.[36] Israeli forces killed two other Palestinians affiliated with PIJ’s Jenin Brigade during the operation.[37] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi stated that the IDF is not seeking to fight in hospitals but that the IDF will go wherever necessary to eliminate Hamas.[38] Hamas and PIJ both condemned the operation and acknowledged the fighters’ affiliation with their respective organizations.[39]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 30.[40] This number of attacks marks a significant decrease from the 15 attacks conducted by Iranian-backed militias, including Hezbollah, into northern Israel on January 29.[41]

Unidentified militants launched rockets from Syria into the Golan Heights on January 30.[42] The IDF responded by shelling the attack’s point of origin in Syria.[43]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah are conducting an information operation to distance Iran from the January 28 one-way drone attack that killed three US service members in northeastern Jordan. Kataib Hezbollah announced the suspension of its “military and security operations” against US forces on January 30 and claimed that Iran objects to “pressure and escalation” against US forces in Iraq and Syria.[44] Western media previously reported that Kataib Hezbollah conducted the January 28 drone attack into Jordan.[45] Iranian officials previously denied Iranian involvement in the attack, claiming that the attack is part of a conflict only between “resistance groups and the US military,” adding that these “resistance groups...do not take orders” from Tehran.[46] Iran provides “extensive training, funding, logistic support, weapons, and intelligence” to Kataib Hezbollah.[47] Iran also materially supports more broadly the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that includes Kataib Hezbollah. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has attacked US forces in Iraq and Syria over 160 times since the Israel-Hamas war began.[48] This information operation sets conditions for Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi factions to frame the United States as the aggressor if the United States strikes Kataib Hezbollah in retaliation for the Iranian-backed drone strike into Jordan.

US President Joe Biden announced on January 29 that he decided on the US response to the Jordan attack, adding that the United States does not seek to expand the war in the Middle East.[49] Biden did not provide details about what course of action the United States will take. US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby added in separate comments that the United States may use a “tiered approach” involving “multiple actions” to respond to the attack.[50]

A Kataib Hezbollah official told Western media that the group decided to halt its attacks targeting US forces following separate Iraqi federal government contacts with US officials and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “to prevent escalation after the Jordan attack.”[51] Iraqi social media sources claimed that a “high-level” US delegation traveled to Baghdad on January 29 to discuss the attack, but they did not provide evidence to corroborate their claims.[52] An “informed source” told Iraqi media that the Iraqi federal government asked the United States to avoid conducting retaliatory strikes inside Iraqi territory to prevent “any escalation and security tension inside Iraq.”[53] The United States has previously conducted strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facilities in response to militia attacks that injured US personnel.[54] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors incorrectly frame these US self-defense strikes as “violations” of Iraqi sovereignty to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. The United States has the right to protect and defend its personnel in Iraq, who are deployed at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to fight ISIS.[55]

The Iraqi parliament speaker election is driving tensions between Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.[56] Iraqi parliamentarians voted for a new parliament speaker on January 13 after the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court removed the previous incumbent, Mohammad al Halbousi, in November 2023.[57] Halbousi’s candidate, Shaalan al Karim, won the most votes in the first round of voting.[58] No candidate secured the 165 votes required to become parliament speaker, however. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, particularly Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, are trying to prevent Karim from becoming parliament speaker. Khazali and Maliki hope to instead install their preferred candidate, Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[59] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy reported on January 29 that the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties—charged acting Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi with ensuring that Mashhadani becomes parliament speaker.[60] Such a demand is not legal under the Iraqi constitution. Parliamentarians aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq also claimed after the January 13 vote that members of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization and the Iraqi Shia National Wisdom Movement voted for Karim.[61] The Victory Alliance, headed by former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, recently denied that members of the Victory Alliance political party voted for Karim.[62]

Syrian Kurdish news outlet North Press Agency (NPA) claimed that Israel killed eight Lebanese Hezbollah fighters in an airstrike in Sayyida Zeynab, Damascus, on January 29.[63] NPA identified two of the Hezbollah fighters as Hussein Khalil Hashem and Hussein Fadel Awada. Hezbollah claimed both fighters but did not specify how they died.[64]

Houthi Defense Minister Mohammad Nasser al Atifi said that the Houthis are prepared for a long-term confrontation with US and UK forces in the Red Sea.[65] Atifi added that US and UK interests in the Red Sea will be considered ”legitimate targets.” Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi previously identified US and UK vessels as ”legitimate targets“ on January 18.[66]

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Border Guards commander announced that the LEC killed a member of the Baloch militant group, Ansar al Furqan, in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 30.[67] The LEC Border Guards commander said that the LEC killed the fighter in Jakigur, Rask County, near the Iran-Pakistan border. The LEC killed one other Baloch fighter in Jakigor on January 29.[68] Ansar al Furqan previously claimed to attack IRGC personnel near the border in December 2023 and conducted another attack targeting a police station in Zahedan on January 25.[69]

Salafi-jihadi groups and other insurgents have increased the rate of their attacks targeting the regime in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Salafi-jihadi and Balochi militant group Jaish al Adl has conducted at least five attacks targeting Iranian security personnel in this period.[70] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State separately detonated two suicide vests conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province on January 3, killing over 90 individuals.[71] Iran retaliated for this uptick in militancy by conducting drone and missile attacks on alleged Islamic State positions in Syria on January 15 and alleged Jaish al Adl targets in Pakistan on January 16.[72]

3. U.S. Presses for Long Cease-Fire to Pave Way for End of Gaza War

Has Israeli achieved sufficient goals towards Hamasat this point given the belief that if there is a long cease fire they will not be able to return to war? Or could they continue to achieve goals through limited operations after a "long" cease fire?

Excerpts:

U.S. negotiators, led by Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns, argue that it would be difficult for Israel to resume the war at its current intensity after a long pause, the officials said. The U.S. also has told fellow negotiators that Israel was considering the idea of moving to a phase—once all hostages are released—during which major operations would be more limited, including airstrikes on Gaza, the officials added.

...

According to a draft of the deal read to The Wall Street Journal by officials involved in the talks, during the first phase Israel would cease all military operations in Gaza including drone surveillance for six weeks while Hamas gathers hostages for release. Civilian hostages including the elderly, the sick and children would be freed. In Gaza, civilians would be free to move around the strip and aid could also reach all parts.

If that phase succeeds, a second part would kick in with Hamas letting female Israeli soldiers go, the draft says. More humanitarian aid would go into the strip and the deal also would guarantee the operation of hospitals, water services and bakeries throughout the strip.

At the meeting in Paris over the weekend, the C.I.A.’s Burns drew up the broad outlines of the deal with his counterparts from Egypt and Israel and the prime minister of Qatar. Israel described the talks in Paris as constructive, while Hamas said it was studying the plan. Both sides found flaws in the framework.

“We’re hoping in the near future to be able to get this over the finish line; we’re closer than we’ve ever been,” White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told Israel’s Channel 12 this week.

U.S. Presses for Long Cease-Fire to Pave Way for End of Gaza War

Draft agreement is designed to make it harder for Israel and Hamas to resume the conflict

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hamas-weigh-three-stage-cease-fire-e08fdfe5?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Summer SaidFollow and Jared MalsinFollow

Updated Jan. 31, 2024 1:39 pm ET

U.S. negotiators are pushing for a cease-fire deal that could stop the war in Gaza long enough to stall Israel’s military momentum and potentially set the stage for a more lasting truce, according to U.S. and Arab officials familiar with the negotiations.

Israel and Hamas are considering a three-part deal that would release hostages in Gaza beginning with a six-week cease-fire, according to a draft of the agreement hashed out this week by international intelligence chiefs in Paris. Subsequent phases also would see fighting stop and more hostages let go.

U.S. negotiators, led by Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns, argue that it would be difficult for Israel to resume the war at its current intensity after a long pause, the officials said. The U.S. also has told fellow negotiators that Israel was considering the idea of moving to a phase—once all hostages are released—during which major operations would be more limited, including airstrikes on Gaza, the officials added.

The Israeli prime minister’s office didn’t respond to a request for comment on whether it was considering such a prospect.

Families of Israeli hostages held in Gaza gather with supporters for a demonstration in Tel Aviv. PHOTO: AHMAD GHARABLI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Washington wants a longer pause in fighting than the weeklong cessation in November that saw some hostages freed, and the White House says that such a deal is now closer at hand than at any time since that cease-fire collapsed. Getting it over the line would mean surmounting internal divisions and entrenched differences between the warring sides. The Arab officials said that the obstacles make an imminent deal unlikely, but suggested that if they are overcome then an agreement could be completed within a week to 10 days.

The closed-door meeting in Paris included David Barnea, director of Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, who broadly signed off on the deal’s outline, people familiar with the negotiations said. Since the last cessation of hostilities, talks between the two sides had reached an impasse.

The willingness of both sides to even consider the outlines of a deal indicates a small but significant shift in negotiating stances. It also demonstrates the pressures on Israel and Hamas as the war in Gaza heads into its fifth month having brought the region to the brink of full-blown regional conflict.

Israel, determined to eradicate Hamas, faces strengthening calls from some Israelis to conclude the war to get more than 100 hostages back, and a growing fatigue within the Biden administration with the conflict’s toll. Washington’s allies in Arab states are pressing for a permanent end to the war that has cost tens of thousands of lives.

Hamas has said it would only be willing to release the hostages in exchange for an end to the war, something that Israel has said it wouldn’t agree to. The current proposal reflects an attempt to bridge the gap by buying time to negotiate a long-term truce and in the process effectively put a hard stop on the conflict, according to officials familiar with the talks. Hamas indicated to negotiators it would be flexible about the length of the truce so long as it had guarantees for a longer-term cease-fire, they added.

The Future of Gaza: What Happens When the Israel-Hamas War Ends?

Pentagon not taking Iran-backed militia pause declaration seriously

militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · January 30, 2024

A message from an Iran-backed militia to its fighters to suspend attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria hasn’t changed the Pentagon’s calculus for retaliatory strikes following Sunday’s deadly attack on U.S. troops in Jordan, a spokesman told reporters Tuesday.

The statement from Kataib Hezbollah, first reported by Reuters, came within hours of President Joe Biden telling reporters Tuesday that he had decided on a response to the fatal drone attack that killed three U.S. soldiers, one the Defense Department said “has the footprints” of a Kataib Hezbollah operation.

“I don’t think we could be any more clear that we have called on the Iranian proxy groups to stop the attacks,” Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters Tuesday. “They have not, and so we will respond in a time and manner of our choosing.”

Shock, grief and mourning for 3 soldiers killed in Jordan drone strike

The three citizen-soldiers from different corners of Georgia all died in a drone strike on a U.S. base in Jordan near the Syrian border.

There have been three attacks on troops in the Middle East since Sunday, Ryder added, for a total of more than 160 since October.

The U.S. targeted Kataib Hezbollah facilities during a strike within Iraq in late November.

Sunday’s fatal attack on the Tower 22 base in Jordan was the first to result in serious injuries and death. Three U.S. soldiers were killed when a drone struck a barracks building on the base, while eight were airlifted to Baghdad for treatment.

Three of those troops were transported to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany on Monday, where one is in “critical but stable condition” Ryder said, while the others are in fair condition.

Iraq’s leader wants US troops out, but there’s no timeline in place

Iraq's prime minister has said it's time for troops to go, but hasn't made any formal requests.

While it remains to be seen whether attacks in Iraq and Syria will drop, there has been a small pause in attacks from Houthi militants since Sunday.

That pause appeared to end Tuesday evening, when U.S. Central Command announced that the Navy destroyer Gravely shot down an anti-ship cruise missile fired by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

About Meghann Myers

Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.

5. Chinese Hacking Against U.S. Infrastructure Threatens American Lives, Officials Say

Two words: Unrestricted Warfare.

Excerpts:

China has consistently denied carrying out cyberattacks against the U.S. or other nations while saying American spy agencies are guilty of such conduct. The Chinese Embassy in Washington didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

FBI Director Christopher Wray and other senior security officials issued unusually stark warnings Wednesday about the threat posed by Chinese cyber intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure networks in testimony before the House China committee.

“China’s hackers are positioning on American infrastructure in preparation to wreak havoc and cause real-world harm to American citizens and communities, if or when China decides the time has come to strike,” Wray said.

Though officials didn’t specify the types of critical infrastructure targeted in the router campaign whose disruption was announced Wednesday, Wray said Chinese hackers had recently been spotted targeting “our water treatment plants, our electrical grid, our oil and natural gas pipelines, our transportation systems.”

Chinese Hacking Against U.S. Infrastructure Threatens American Lives, Officials Say

U.S. officials say Beijing is preparing to set off potentially damaging cyberattacks in any future conflict, including over Taiwan

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-disables-chinese-hacking-operation-that-targeted-critical-infrastructure-184bb407?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Dustin Volz

Updated Jan. 31, 2024 12:23 pm ET

With Fate of Ukraine’s Top General in Question, All Eyes Turn to Zelensky

Portraits of Gen. Valery Zaluzhny hang in coffee shops and bars inside Ukraine, but his strained relationship with President Volodymyr Zelensky may cost him his post.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/31/world/europe/zelensky-valery-zaluzhny-ukraine-war.html

Share full article

Valery Zaluzhny, the chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, placing flowers on the coffin of Denys Monastyrsky, the interior minister, during a farewell ceremony in Kyiv, Ukraine, last year.Credit...Efrem Lukatsky/Associated Press

By Andrew E. Kramer

Reported from Kyiv, Ukraine

Jan. 31, 2024, 12:42 p.m. ET

Want the latest stories related to Russia and Ukraine? Sign up for the newsletter Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send them to your inbox.

He deftly defended his country in Europe’s largest ground war in decades, stalling Russia’s invasion and then pushing it back with everything at hand: natural barriers like rivers, aging weapons and lethal drones, trickery and elements of surprise.

But the fate of Ukraine’s top commander, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, now appears to be hanging by a thread — not over his standing in the army, where he is well regarded, but over tensions with Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky.

The president’s frustrations have mounted since it became clear in the fall that Ukraine’s southern counteroffensive, a push that started with high hopes for Ukraine and its backers, had failed. The fighting has since bogged down in bloody, static trench warfare.

Should Mr. Zelensky dismiss the general, it could create a host of problems for him both in the war and at home. Although Mr. Zelensky embodies his country’s resistance to Russian aggression to many of his supporters abroad, the general is widely hailed as a hero in Ukraine.

His portrait hangs in coffee shops and bars. Online, he is the subject of countless patriotic memes. Public opinion polls over the fall showed his popularity exceeded Mr. Zelensky’s — a reason, analysts and opposition politicians have said, for the men’s increasingly strained relationship, though the general has never voiced political ambitions.

Military analysts have credited the general with preparing the army in the weeks and days before the invasion, even as Mr. Zelensky’s government publicly downplayed the odds of a Russian attack. General Zaluzhny oversaw not only the defense of the capital, Kyiv, but also the campaigns that thwarted the initial invasion and retook hundreds of square miles.

Their disagreements aside, Mr. Zelensky would lose military advice from an experienced commander if he were to fire the general. The United States and other allies would need to adjust to working with new military leaders, and a dismissal could fuel worries of instability in Ukraine’s wartime leadership.

And on the battlefield, Ukraine is in a precarious position, facing intensified Russian assaults in the southeast and uncertainty over whether the United States and Europe will provide more military and financial support. In the event of a shake-up, it is not clear that a new top commander could quickly win the admiration that many officers and soldiers have for General Zaluzhny. Junior officers would also probably be shuffled, too, disrupting military plans, at least temporarily.

Still, tensions over military progress have bubbled behind the scenes between the president and the general for more than a year, sometimes erupting into public. The strains reached a fever pitch on Monday, with reports in the Ukrainian news media that Mr. Zelensky had fired or intended to fire General Zaluzhny.

Mr. Zelensky’s spokesman, Serhiy Nikiforov, denied any firing at the time. “There was no dismissal,” he said.

But a member of Parliament said Mr. Zelensky had asked for the general’s resignation at a meeting Monday evening, and that the general had refused. And a senior military officer who has worked in the general staff headquarters said the president’s office was still considering a dismissal.

More broadly, speculation lingered in Ukraine over the icy relations between the two most important men overseeing Ukraine’s war effort.

“In peace and war, tensions are always present in civil-military relationships,” Mick Ryan, a retired Australian army major general who is a fellow at the Lowy Institute, a research group, wrote in an analysis of the situation.

“One thing above all others should be remembered,” Mr. Ryan wrote. “In democracies, civilian-military relationships is an unequal dialogue. The civilian leader always has primacy.”

Image

Ukrainian soldiers outside Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, where the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade counterattacked and regained control this week.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

General Zaluzhny, whom Mr. Zelensky appointed commander of the military’s general staff in 2021, won praise from Ukrainians for his leadership in the war’s first year. Before Russia invaded in February 2022, he ordered jets to reserve airfields and troops out of barracks — escaping Russian bombs once the assault began.

Commanding from a bunker in Kyiv, General Zaluzhny pursued a strategy that drew the more powerful Russian Army deep into Ukrainian territory, attenuating its supply lines, which he then attacked with sabotage groups and artillery. Ukrainian engineers blew up hundreds of bridges and dams, leaving Russians on roads that ended at muddy riverbanks or beside newly formed lakes.

And in counterattacks, General Zaluzhny focused on striking supply lines in the southern Kherson region, telegraphing for months a major effort to liberate the region. He also prepared a surprise attack in the northeast that quickly reclaimed hundreds of square miles.

Movement stalled after the Kherson campaign, which ended in November 2022. The front line barely shifted through two failed Russian pushes, and tensions between the general and president began to surface after Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive last summer.

Mr. Zelensky’s frustration burst into public view in November, after General Zaluzhny published an essay in The Economist saying the war was at a “stalemate.” The Ukrainian president suggested the comment was helpful to Russia, a striking rebuke.

Around the same time, the president’s office replaced one of General Zaluzhny’s deputies, the head of special operations forces, without explanation. It also dismissed the head of Ukraine’s medical forces.

Andrew E. Kramer is the Kyiv bureau chief for The Times, who has been covering the war in Ukraine since 2014. More about Andrew E. Kramer

7. How Taiwan’s New President Should Respond to Chinese Coercion

Excerpts:

Beyond these specific changes, the incoming Lai administration should develop a coherent plan and policy for releasing this sort of information to the public, as well as a clear policy on Taiwan’s military response to these incursions. Right now, how Taiwan’s armed forces respond to specific threats is unclear: While we know that the defense ministry stopped the policy of intercepting every single sortie, we do not know under what conditions an intercept occurs, nor do we know the Taiwanese naval response and how it differs between the People’s Liberation Army, Chinese Coast Guard, and Chinese Maritime Militia. From earlier reporting, we know that Taiwan’s coast guard was attacked by illegal Chinese fishing boats on March 16, 2020, March 22, 2020, and Sept. 29, 2023. Are these clashes that rare? Did they halt after 2023?

While Taipei should not necessarily publicly release the specific conditions and actions that would trigger a certain Taiwanese military response, the complete lack of information makes it seem as if the People’s Liberation Army, Chinese Coast Guard, and Chinese Maritime Militia have the ability to operate freely and openly on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Given Taipei’s budgetary constraints vis-à-vis Beijing’s, it is understandable that not every aerial and naval incursion should require a response. However, with Taiwan prioritizing the development of low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles to prepare for the defense of the island from a Chinese military invasion, Taiwan’s military should begin utilizing its newly acquired drones to monitor and record Chinese military, law enforcement, and militia activities in the Taiwan Strait. It also would allow Taiwan to record the incursions and increase its own presence in its air defense identification zone.

The decision to release these reports in September 2020 was a smart policy choice given the Chinese military threat. However, the longer that the reports are released, the more questions have arisen based on known People’s Liberation Army actions as well as changes to the reports. The incoming Lai administration needs to consider how to respond to these threats from Beijing and what it wants the wider public to know. We argue in favor of radical transparency, as it would clarify the nature and scale of the daily threats that Taiwan, its military, and its people face.

How Taiwan’s New President Should Respond to Chinese Coercion - War on the Rocks

THOMAS J. SHATTUCK AND BENJAMIN LEWIS

warontherocks.com · by Thomas J. Shattuck · January 31, 2024

Every time a Chinese fighter jet crosses the Taiwan Strait’s median line flying faster than the speed of sound, Taiwanese officials have mere minutes to respond. Over the course of 2023, more than 1,700 Chinese aircraft breached Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, 703 of which crossed the median line. These included fighter jets, bombers, drones, and spy balloons, not to mention the ships and aircraft carriers that have sailed around Taiwan’s waters. Each intrusion and incursion requires a difficult decision.

When he becomes president in May, William Lai Ching-te will be responsible for dealing with these serial intrusions and for deciding the future of Taiwan’s response to Chinese coercion. Indeed, Chinese incursions will likely continue to increase under Lai’s presidency, as Chinese Communist Party officials view him as a leader of “‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.” To face this threat, Lai should change the way Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense publicizes Chinese intimidation efforts.

Become a Member

Ideally this should include greater transparency to reduce confusion and stronger explanations for policy modifications, as previous reports released by the defense ministry have changed without a clear rationale. Among other improvements, the defense ministry should use international standards for categorizing Chinese aircraft, modify the timeframes of the daily reports, and provide more specific information on the aerial and naval intrusions around Taiwan.

Escalating Incursions

Since 2020, much of China’s gray zone pressure has centered around flight incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. This is a quasi-official aerial boundary within which some countries require aircraft to identify themselves while operating, and it serves as a buffer beyond a country’s territorial airspace.

In September 2020, the defense ministry began releasing public reports of People’s Liberation Army military aircraft breaching the country’s air defense identification zone. In both August and September of that year, the Chinese military carried out large-scale incursions into the air defense identification zone that included crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait. These two specific instances, which spurred the defense ministry to take public action, occurred in response to visits by Donald Trump administration officials Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar and Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Keith Krach. Before August 2020, Chinese military aircraft had only crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait two times since 1999—in 2019 and February 2020.

After the Krach-induced incursions, Taiwan’s defense ministry issued its first-ever air defense identification zone report on Sept. 16, 2020. Since then, it has released a report every day that a Chinese military aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. The reports were ostensibly meant to amplify this new type of Chinese military coercion against Taiwan. It allowed the Taiwanese and international public to understand the threat in an easily digestible format: a simple map with color-coded flight paths of various aircraft. Whoever looked at a report could see what types of aircraft China sent and how close they were flying to Taiwan. The reports sparked international coverage and the creation of an open-source database cataloging the incursions. Between September 2020 and August 2022, these incursions largely focused on the southwestern section of the zone, closer to the Taiwan-held Dongsha Island in the South China Sea than Taiwan proper.

These incursions vastly expanded after the August 2022 visit to Taiwan by then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, which resulted in the erasure of the Davis Line, a tacit division of the Taiwan Strait that both Beijing and Taipei generally respected since 1955. The move from focusing on the southwestern part of the zone to the median line of the Taiwan Strait marked a significant escalation on the part of Beijing, which used the Pelosi visit as a pretense to make the change. Since August 2022, it now is rare for a Chinese military aircraft to not cross the median line multiple times per week, whereas before, any sort of median line crossing was a major incident. The reports of 2024 look very different from the original reports from 2020; some of those changes are positive, while most of them are negative.

What’s Changed in the Reports since 2020?

As Beijing’s air defense identification zone incursions have increased in scale since 2020, so too have Taipei’s response to and public reporting of the incidents changed — which have largely been steps backward. Explaining these changes and their rationales shows how Taiwan perceives, and acts on, the evolving Chinese military threat.

In March 2021, Taiwan’s air force changed its response policy. It would no longer intercept every single sortie. It instead would track the Chinese aircraft with surface-to-air missiles and issue radio warnings. The original policy was breaking the defense ministry’s budget: It had spent almost 9 percent of its budget by October 2020 as a result of the intercepts. Taiwan also has a limited number of military aircraft to carry out these tasks, so daily intercepts significantly wear down an already small fleet.

Despite the change to the intercept policy, Taiwan’s defense ministry would still release the reports tracking the aircraft movement. Between March 2021 and January 2024, the reports continued as the number of incursions increased, with sporadic changes. In August 2022, the reports began to include the number of naval vessels sailing around Taiwan. In November 2022, the defense ministry changed the timeframe of the reports from 5 a.m. to 7 p.m. on a single day to 6 a.m. to 6 a.m. across two calendar days. In December 2023, they added Chinese surveillance balloons flying into the zone and over Taiwan. However, after the January 2024 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan, the defense ministry made additional changes to the format and structure of the reports.

Those changes, made on Jan. 16, diminished a previously transparent process by removing the types of aircraft and the approximate flight paths in favor of a zone through which the aircraft flew. The defense ministry addressed the changes without providing much of a rationale by stating, “We hope to let our country’s people understand the current situation we are facing as far as possible, without compromising the source of our intelligence.” Whereas the original reports would outline an approximate flight path of an aircraft (or group of aircraft) with its own specific color, the new structure omits that entirely in favor a large box through which all of the aircraft flew. Under the new format, it is unclear where in the box a specific aircraft flew — we only know that the aircraft flew somewhere inside the box along with others.

Some aspects of the new format are an improvement on the previous system. The defense ministry has now officially articulated the boundary of Taiwan’s de facto air defense identification zone, or the area that is actually enforced. The new reports also include the timeframes of the sorties flown both around and inside the de facto air defense identification zone and note how far the aircraft flew to the closest major city in Taiwan. While the timeframes are wide enough to be almost nonspecific, their inclusion is still an improvement. Providing more specific timeframes for each aircraft’s incursion would provide more clarity. If the defense ministry keeps the improvements from the January 2024 format while bringing back the strongest elements of the old system, understanding and transparency of the military situation around Taiwan will increase substantially.

When it comes to these reports, the defense ministry faces a growing legitimacy issue as the information included changes without warning, obvious policy change, or clear rationale. While the defense ministry reports provide the public with greater insight into the Chinese military threat that Taiwan faces, the ad hoc changes — such as the format of the reports, as well as what sort of information gets included and excluded — create confusion and reduce their usefulness. The changes diminish the veracity of the earlier reports. For example, surveillance balloons flew into relevant areas before December 2023, specifically in February 2022 and again in February 2023. Why did the defense ministry start releasing balloon information in December 2023 without a clear reason? The changes, and discrepancies, make what was previously an easily understood report harder to analyze and create a certain level of doubt regarding the entire threat situation.

Recommendations for Improving the Reports

After considering the current cross-Strait situation and the issues related to the reports, President-elect Lai and his new administration should work to build upon and improve the system that was created under President Tsai Ing-wen in 2020. Some needed changes are quite straightforward.

Currently, the report timeframe runs across two days; having a report fall across two days is a confusing metric. The timeframe should run from midnight to midnight during one calendar day. The two-day reporting style has at times resulted in double counting across two reports, so changing it to one day (12 a.m. to 12 a.m.) should reduce confusion.

As it stands, Taiwan uses different airframe designators for Chinese military aircraft than the internationally recognized ones. The defense ministry focuses on categorizing the role of the aircraft tracked instead of their specific type. For example, the Y-8Q, an antisubmarine warfare aircraft, is listed as the Y-8 ASW. As the diversity of aircraft flying into the zone has increased, this system has caused uncertainty about which airframes are involved. The defense ministry’s file photos allowed for independent assessments of aircraft types, but those photos confirmed that the same designator was being used for multiple aircraft. The defense ministry should not only return to providing specific information on aircraft types in their reports but also use internationally recognized designators to do so.

The inclusion of naval incursions in the reports was instructive, as it was unlikely that the People’s Liberation Army was only sending aircraft to intimidate Taiwan. However, the reports only provide broad, general information on the number of naval vessels detected. They do not include which types of ships are making the journeys, where the ships are found, how close to Taiwan they sail, if they cross the Taiwan Strait median line, or how long they loiter in a specific area. In this example, the inclusion of the naval incursions with no additional context diminishes any value of that information. The naval element also excludes incursions by the Chinese Coast Guard, which regularly crosses the median line and at times has sailed beyond the 24-nautical-mile boundary, and by the Chinese Maritime Militia. Delineating between formal People’s Liberation Army naval incursions, Chinese Coast Guard law enforcement incursions, and Chinese Maritime Militia activity will also provide greater clarity on the various threats that Taiwan faces from different parts of the Chinese military apparatus.

Beyond these specific changes, the incoming Lai administration should develop a coherent plan and policy for releasing this sort of information to the public, as well as a clear policy on Taiwan’s military response to these incursions. Right now, how Taiwan’s armed forces respond to specific threats is unclear: While we know that the defense ministry stopped the policy of intercepting every single sortie, we do not know under what conditions an intercept occurs, nor do we know the Taiwanese naval response and how it differs between the People’s Liberation Army, Chinese Coast Guard, and Chinese Maritime Militia. From earlier reporting, we know that Taiwan’s coast guard was attacked by illegal Chinese fishing boats on March 16, 2020, March 22, 2020, and Sept. 29, 2023. Are these clashes that rare? Did they halt after 2023?

While Taipei should not necessarily publicly release the specific conditions and actions that would trigger a certain Taiwanese military response, the complete lack of information makes it seem as if the People’s Liberation Army, Chinese Coast Guard, and Chinese Maritime Militia have the ability to operate freely and openly on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Given Taipei’s budgetary constraints vis-à-vis Beijing’s, it is understandable that not every aerial and naval incursion should require a response. However, with Taiwan prioritizing the development of low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles to prepare for the defense of the island from a Chinese military invasion, Taiwan’s military should begin utilizing its newly acquired drones to monitor and record Chinese military, law enforcement, and militia activities in the Taiwan Strait. It also would allow Taiwan to record the incursions and increase its own presence in its air defense identification zone.

The decision to release these reports in September 2020 was a smart policy choice given the Chinese military threat. However, the longer that the reports are released, the more questions have arisen based on known People’s Liberation Army actions as well as changes to the reports. The incoming Lai administration needs to consider how to respond to these threats from Beijing and what it wants the wider public to know. We argue in favor of radical transparency, as it would clarify the nature and scale of the daily threats that Taiwan, its military, and its people face.

Become a Member

Thomas J. Shattuck is a senior program manager at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House, a member of Foreign Policy for America’s NextGen Foreign Policy Initiative, the Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program, as well as a non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.

Benjamin Lewis is an independent defense analyst based in Washington, DC, focused on the People’s Liberation Army and Taiwan security issues. He is a co-founder of PLATracker, a site that monitors Chinese military activities and developments. Follow him on Twitter @OfficialBen_L.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Thomas J. Shattuck · January 31, 2024

8. Transparency for Victory: How Openness Can Improve Ukraine’s Public Relations

Excerpts:

Transparency is, of course, not a panacea that will cure all of Ukraine’s ailments. It surely will not stop Russia’s war efforts. But it has the potential to do a lot. It will signify Ukraine’s incorporation of European values and help to cut populist Western leaders’ unfounded narratives off at the knees. By working together with foreign and local journalists and observers, Ukraine can once again show the world the horrors and realities of Russia’s war and what it needs to take back its internationally recognized territory. Only then will Ukraine manage to win back the hearts and minds of the world’s democratic nations and their people. In this pivotal moment for Ukraine, with Western support faltering and Russian confidence on the rise, a full transformation toward European values, norms, and, ultimately, transparency, will be essential for the political and military boost needed to edge Ukraine closer to victory against Russia.

Transparency for Victory: How Openness Can Improve Ukraine’s Public Relations - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Joshua R. Kroeker · January 31, 2024

During my November 2023 visit to the front lines in eastern Ukraine, a commander from the 120th Territorial Defense Battalion described the country’s military as “swimming” between an outdated, secretive, and backward Soviet-era force and a modern NATO one. “Without transparency,” the commander lamented, “we cannot expect trust.” Emphasizing the crucial role of transparency in building trust, the commander underlined the consequences of withholding the truth from foreign journalists, equating it to betraying the country’s partners.

As the commander knew all too well, the war is not going very well for Ukraine right now. This much was conceded by Ukraine’s military top brass when commander-in-chief Gen. Valery Zaluzhny admitted in an interview in The Economist that his military’s long-awaited and hyped-up counteroffensive had reached a stalemate. With growing fears both internationally and inside Ukraine of a returned Russian offensive, as well as Western support of Ukraine beginning to falter, Ukraine’s military and government find themselves in a daunting predicament, prompting a reevaluation of their public relations strategy.

Much has changed since the early days of the war when President Volodymyr Zelensky’s public relations tactics garnered international support for the country’s defense. His green t-shirt, daily war updates on social media, and slogans such as “I need ammunition, not a ride” may have helped Ukraine defeat Russia in the battle of Kyiv, take back Kharkiv some months later, and surprisingly send the Russians fleeing from Kherson. But a year and a half later, Zelensky faces a barrage of concerns over corruption in his country’s army, lack of enthusiastic support from Western partners, and an uphill battle in preventing further Russian military gains.

Become a Member

The time has come for Ukraine to change its public relations strategy. For much of this year, Ukrainian and Western publics were in the dark about the status of the military’s counteroffensive. Supply and logistical issues, death counts, struggles within the military itself, troubles with recruitment and mobilization, and corruption have been concealed, locked up, labelled top secret, and thus brushed over. For international donors, governments, and partners, never mind skeptical populists looking for an excuse to prevent further funding of Ukraine’s defense, opening up about the problems that Ukraine is facing, both on the front lines and throughout the country, appears to be Ukraine’s last chance of turning the tide in its favor.

Front Line Concerns

Ukraine’s soldiers, fully aware of the challenges within the army and the looming threat of Russian advances, have no illusions about the situation facing them. Time and time again, soldiers explained to me that they were aware of the issues within the army and the growing threat presented by Russia’s advances. Yet their awareness is sobering: “Any negotiations will only result in a bigger war down the road — remember Minsk,” explained one officer in Kramatorsk fighting in the Bakhmut direction.

While the Ukrainian army does not seek NATO boots on the ground, their focus is on defending their land and preventing both a prolonged war and the grim prospect of Russian occupation. Acknowledging the need for a transformed military, the emphasis is on working together with Western partners to modernize Ukraine’s forces through the incorporation of NATO technologies and strategies, as underscored by Zaluzhny in his November interview. “A small Soviet army does not beat a big Soviet army; for us to win, we need to change the army,” the Kramatorsk-based commander declared frankly.

Logistical challenges carry existential consequences for Ukraine’s soldiers, with incorrect deliveries and shortages resulting in units trading and bartering among themselves or defending ground without proper materiel. Oftentimes, munitions arrive in incorrectly labelled boxes, packaged and sealed by foreign suppliers. Others get lost within the country. To address these issues effectively, transparency becomes the top priority, aligning with the European Union’s principles and shedding light on the struggles, losses, and realities of Ukraine’s fight against Russia and domestic issues like corruption.

A New Approach

Heroic maxims and battle cries no longer suffice. The European Union is built upon the notion of transparency. For Ukraine to fit well within the European family, fully incorporating this philosophy is long overdue. This means being frank with the world, inviting journalists to see wartime realities, and underlining the military’s struggles and needs in conversations with the general public.

Naturally, in the case of war, not everything can be said or written. Military secrets are more often than not a key to success. The element of surprise should be closely guarded. Yet confronting problems head-on, acknowledging losses, and, moreover, demonstrating a willingness to learn from those mistakes will only assist in Ukraine’s fight for democracy and victory.

Providing local and Western journalists with (nearly) unfettered access to the front will help to disseminate wartime realities. Soldiers want to speak, share their stories with the world, and most of all communicate the difficulties and realities they face. Rather than putting press officers between journalists and soldiers, allowing journalists in-depth access — where strategically and tactically possible — to write the stories of Ukrainian soldiers and share them with the world will contribute to underlining the cruelty of Russia’s invasion. The realities of the front line are far worse than most people can imagine; sharing the human aspect of the war rather than strategy and weapons types can regain some of the global attention lost over the past half year.

Giving journalists greater access will bring a number of additional benefits as well. First, it will enhance accountability within the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Second, it will reduce the payoffs of corruption both within the armed forces and society in general, as the risks will simply be too high and pressures will increase among individuals to prevent corruption. Third, it will be a trust-building exercise that over time will demonstrate through hard facts and evidence that the funds given to Ukraine are serving their intended purpose. Finally, as a result of the aforementioned processes, it will make it more difficult for populist narratives to make fabricated claims to the contrary. Additionally, this approach might also have the effect of again winning back the hearts of Western publics and demonstrate that Ukraine is exerting all efforts to prove it is worthy of European integration by following the rules-based system, as well as by showing the at times desperate conditions and needs of the armed forces in the face of Russia’s continued invasion.

Being upfront about issues, such as personnel and equipment losses and corruption, will also assuage government, donor, and investor fears. In addition to foreign aid, private investors and global civil society have donated millions of dollars to Ukraine, yet fears that that money is not being correctly placed continue to exist among potential donors and investors. Initiating a campaign of transparency to show where money and equipment are going, including eventual losses, has the potential to gain further trust among foreign societies while signaling to Western partners that all efforts are being made to incorporate European values and regulations.

Beyond this, Ukraine should make further efforts to prioritize transparency at the political level, working side-by-side with Western partners to demonstrate its commitment to combating corruption. This aligns with the principle of “trust but verify,” popularized in the 1980s during the Ronald Reagan administration in which the United States took steps of rapprochement with the Soviet Union to overcome weapons proliferation.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s current strategies are no longer as effective as they once were, resulting in a gradual loss of support for Kyiv’s war effort. Amid rising populist efforts to defund Ukraine and the potential for a second Donald Trump presidency that may see an end to the United States’ leadership role in supporting Ukraine, urgency is paramount. An immediate shift to genuine transparency can alter current trajectories, whereas maintaining the status quo is likely to worsen Ukraine’s position in the mid to long term as populist and Ukraine-skeptic politicians gain more power in European Union and U.S. elections in 2024.

Transparency is, of course, not a panacea that will cure all of Ukraine’s ailments. It surely will not stop Russia’s war efforts. But it has the potential to do a lot. It will signify Ukraine’s incorporation of European values and help to cut populist Western leaders’ unfounded narratives off at the knees. By working together with foreign and local journalists and observers, Ukraine can once again show the world the horrors and realities of Russia’s war and what it needs to take back its internationally recognized territory. Only then will Ukraine manage to win back the hearts and minds of the world’s democratic nations and their people. In this pivotal moment for Ukraine, with Western support faltering and Russian confidence on the rise, a full transformation toward European values, norms, and, ultimately, transparency, will be essential for the political and military boost needed to edge Ukraine closer to victory against Russia.

Become a Member

Joshua R. Kroeker is an independent researcher, founder of the boutique analytic and consulting firm Reaktion Group, an analyst at the political analysis project R.Politik, and an editor at RANE. He holds degrees from the University of British Columbia in Canada, Heidelberg University in Germany, and St. Petersburg State University, Russia. @jrkroeker on Twitter.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Joshua R. Kroeker · January 31, 2024

9. Selling the War at Home (Book Review) (Russia)

Selling the War at Home (Book Review) - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Paul Shields · January 30, 2024

In the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia has suffered substantial setbacks. Supplies of clothing, body armor, and food are unreliable. Open-source intelligence indicates Russia has lost over 2,000 armored vehicles and hundreds of aircraft. Estimates of personnel losses are even more extensive, with one U.S. intelligence report assessing that Russia has lost nearly 90% of the troops it had at the beginning of the war. Under these conditions, one would expect low troop morale and at least some amount of criticism or discontent from the Russian public. Yet according to a survey by the independent research center Levada, Putin manages an astonishing 80% approval rating. How is this possible?

Analysts attribute Putin’s ability to limit opposition to his management of elite competition and repression of dissent. However, these explanations accentuate Putin as the protagonist and assume the Russian people have no role. A new book by Dr. Jade McGlynn, a researcher from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, offers a different perspective by highlighting the complicity and participation of the Russian public in perpetuating the war. Russia’s War explores both Russia’s domestic information environment and, perhaps more importantly, how public opinion resonates with pro-war narratives. Rather than focus on the forms and content of Russian media, the author provides a nuanced explanation of how Russians interact with the information environment. Whereas predominant narratives center on the effects of Kremlin-generated propaganda on the Russian people, McGlynn claims that Russians are complicit in creating the narratives that justified the escalation of war. According to McGlynn, “Putin doesn’t shape Russian views on foreign policy…so much as he articulates them.” The author leverages a mixture of media analysis, survey data, and interviews to illustrate this mutually reinforcing relationship between the Russian propaganda machine and the Russian public. While the book’s technical elements might discourage a wider readership, it remains an important exploration into how a modern autocratic regime manipulates information in conventional and unconventional ways.

McGlynn situates the reader with a comprehensive description of the Russian domestic media environment and recent surge of patriotic fervor. Since February of 2021, the Kremlin has blitzed airways, workplaces, and schools with a relentless pro-war message. In turn, every level of society accommodates this new reality; pro-Kremlin news anchors are doubling their airtime, security forces crush dissident news outlets, museums now connect Ukrainian nationalism with the historical memories of Nazi Germany, and films and soap operas regularly lampoon Ukrainian characters. The Kremlin’s push to dominate the narrative has resulted in a potent mixture of spectacle, repression, and the creation of a nationalistic identity.

While the Kremlin’s propaganda tactics are well documented, Russia’s War takes its analysis a step further and asks what this information means to its audience. McGlynn rightfully acknowledges a range of attitudes among Russians, the difficulty of categorization, and the skepticism of using surveys in authoritarian countries. Nevertheless, she finds that “Russia’s war…is popular with a large number of Russians and acceptable to an even larger number.” Her findings are supported by a mixed methodology incorporating ten years of close observation of Russian state media, data analysis of some 75,000 social media posts, and 60 interviews with a mixture of elite and ordinary Russian and Ukrainian citizens. Although at times the author’s disorganized presentation of evidence can be distracting, the strength of McGlynn’s analysis is in its ability to vividly portray the perspectives of soldiers, civilians, and NGO leaders throughout the academic text. Indeed, the interview excerpts are most persuasive when she lets grandmothers, artists, and everyday workers express and explain their support for Putin.

Apathy and RepressionAlthough the book grants power to the storytelling abilities of media peddlers, the author details how the Russian population’s long-standing cynicism supports the war. Even before the conflict, feelings of powerlessness have been the hallmark of Russian political culture. The book cites surveys indicating widespread apathy, painting a grim picture of Russian civil activity. McGlynn notes that some 60% of the population can be categorized as politically passive. They have no capacity for action, preferring to sit at home rather than take to the streets. Even young people in Russia, usually the most optimistic across societies, have little hope for a better future. Russians are united in their indifference. In this regard, bottom-up anti-war resistance remains a non-existent force in Russian politics.

Those few who do take action elicit a strong response from the regime. In a two-week timespan immediately following the invasion, approximately 13,000 people were detained across 147 cities. Many also protested with their feet, fleeing abroad. Almost three quarters of a million Russians left in the first year of the war. Whether the average Russian is politically apathetic, scared to protest, or persuaded by the propaganda apparatus to genuinely support the war, the Kremlin has effectively crushed the threat of popular resistance, solidifying its hold on power.

A Complicit People

Despite the Kremlin’s heavy-handed approach, McGlynn does not absolve the Russian people of responsibility. The book’s central argument is that Russians themselves are complicit in the war. It is easy and sometimes more palatable to think that an all-powerful security state imposes its view of the world on a helpless population. But the author claims the relationship is mutually reinforcing. Her interviews with elite and ordinary Russians lead her to conclude that many Russians like the narrative they are being told, and the Kremlin is happy to provide it. Although the Kremlin propaganda apparatus has the budget, skill, and motivation to spin well-crafted yarns that play on feelings of resentment and aggression, Russians are also demanding stories that depict the West as threatening Russia’s peace, prosperity, and way of life. In the author’s words, “[Russian society and the Kremlin] co-create a more amenable version of the world around them.” Support for Putin and the war in Ukraine cannot only be attributed to the Kremlin’s propaganda or use of violence against dissidents. Instead, it appears that support from the Russian people is more widespread and deep-seated than the West might be willing to accept, entrenched in historical pathologies that will not easily fade.

As the war approaches its second anniversary, the question of popular support is instrumental for Russia as it struggles to break out of the current stalemate. The ability to train, equip, and – most importantly – recruit men to join the ranks will be essential to reinforcing Russian defensive positions and mounting future attacks. McGlynn does not address the question of recruitment, but her book helps us understand how the Kremlin intends to mold the information environment to mobilize support and restrain protests. Further research could investigate the effects of pro-Russian sentiment on enlistment and conscription in the Russian Armed Forces.

Russia’s War leads the reader to conclude that while the war may be fought in Ukraine, it can only end inside Russia. The root of the war lies in Russia’s societal imagination about who they are as a people and a country and therefore what role they should occupy on the world stage. As long as the country continues to profess and pursue grand ambitions beyond its capabilities, Russia’s relationship with the West will continue to be fraught. Unfortunately, this is an implication of her research that McGlynn neglects: she fails to provide a theoretical explanation of how this Russian identity developed and why it remains so stubborn to change. She also avoids examining the tension between the support Russians articulate for the war with their lack of voluntary action to support it. Her work is mostly descriptive in nature, and she could further explore what the ramifications of Russian public opinion portend for Russia’s future foreign policy. Although primarily intended for an academic audience or those with a background in Russian studies, Russia’s War provides valuable insight into the strategies autocratic regimes employ in shaping domestic opinion through information operations. Anyone wanting to understand how a country leverages the tools of irregular warfare on its own citizens to maintain support for a flawed foreign policy would do well to read this book.

2nd Lt. Paul Shields is a Logistics Officer in the United States Marine Corps. He currently serves with 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. A Fulbright Scholar, he graduated with an MPhil from Oxford University and completed his undergraduate studies at Stanford.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Main image: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Army Gen Martin E. Dempsey, left, and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Gen. Valery Gerasimov meet at NATO Headquarters in Brussels Jan. 16, 2013. (D. Myles Cullen via DoD)

Three Proposals to Raise the Profile of Irregular Warfare (Book Review)
Those who want to see US performance improve in execution of population influence campaigns would do well to read The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytic Memoir by retired…
Another Forgotten War: America's Experience In Afghanistan
Jeff Phaneuf and Kyle Atwell Episode 61 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast contemplates lessons learned from America’s twenty years of war in Afghanistan. Our guests begin by discussing whether, in the year following…
Al-Shabaab And The Grim Realities of Somalia's Forever War
Sam Wilkins Despite over a decade of international military interventions, the al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group known as al-Shabaab remains the most capable extremist organization on the African continent. On October 30, the group served…

0 Shares

irregularwarfare.org · by Paul Shields · January 30, 2024

10. The ICJ ruling is not a loss for Israel - Anthony Avice Du Buisson

Conclusion:

The Court will now turn to assessing the main claim of whether genocide is occurring in Gaza. As precedent from Bosnia v. Serbia show this can take years to determine. I believe that the Court will not determine that Israel is guilty of genocide. The threshold is higher to prove with specific intent especially difficult to determine. In the interim, the operation in Gaza will likely conclude and a new state of affairs will exist in the Strip.

The ICJ ruling is not a loss for Israel - Anthony Avice Du Buisson

blogs.timesofisrael.com

South Africa’s attempt to stop Israel’s military operations in Gaza has failed.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently issued an interim ruling on South Africa’s case against Israel. South Africa filed an application before the ICJ in December, where it alleges that Israel is engaged in genocidal conduct against the Palestinians in Gaza. It requested from the Court a number of provisional measures, notably a suspension of Israel’s military operations in the Strip. After hearing oral arguments from both South Africa and Israel‘s legal councils and deliberating on the matter, the Court finally issued an interim ruling. The ICJ determined that the case had merit to continue, and proceeded with issuing an Order granting some of South Africa’s provisional measures, except the suspension of military operations in Gaza.

The Order sets forth a couple provisional measures that Israel is to follow. Some of the provisions include: adherence to the convention, the prevention of incitement to genocide, unfettered access to humanitarian aid, prevention and preservation of evidence, and reporting to the Court on adherence to the measures. However, disappointingly for RSA, the provision to suspend military operations was not granted. Further, the Court condemned the taking of Israeli hostages by Hamas and called for their immediate release.

ICJ President Donoghue delivers the order at the ICJ. (26/01/2024 via ICJ Multimedia galleries.)

The interim ruling undermines South Africa’s efforts to stop Israel fighting in Gaza. South African ties with the Palestinian cause are not new. The African National Congress (ANC) since the 1980s has enjoyed strong relations with multiple Palestinian organizations, such as Fatah. Of these groups, an informal relationship is developing with Hamas in recent years. This relationship is connected to growing ties with Iran, a major sponsor of Hamas in Gaza, and is built on mutual opposition to Israel. South Africa’s developing foreign policy position on this matter is highlighted in its effort to weaponise the Court to reign in Israel’s military operations in the Strip. A failure to pass a provisional measure to this effect is therefore a significant blow in its strategy.

Another failure for South Africa is the denial of the Court to accept its framing on Israel-Palestinian history. The submission filed by South Africa aimed to connect the claim of genocide it alleges Israel is committing currently in Gaza since October 7th to the wider history of the Palestinian cause since 1948. South Africa strategically attempted to link this narrative framing of history to events outside the current war in Gaza. The purpose being to imply that the existence of Israel is built on the systematic persecution of the Palestinian people. ICJ judges rejected this framing in support of Israel’s framing that focuses exclusively on the context surrounding current Israeli operations in Gaza.

These two points are important to highlight when reviewing the interim ruling.

However, Israel and its supporters are likely to still reject the ICJ ruling. From the onset, the case represents a concerted effort of lawfare by South Africa as it accuses Israel directly of genocide. The insensitivity of claiming a state built by survivors of genocide is committing a genocide is viewed as libelous by many jews. Israeli President Isaac Herzog expressed the following in response to the ICJ ruling:

The very fact that the hearing at the court in The Hague was held on the eve of International Holocaust Memorial Day, to judge whether the democratic, moral and responsible State of Israel, which rose from the ashes of the Holocaust with the overwhelming support of the family of nations, and its institutions were guilty of committing genocide, is a blood libel that undermines the very values on which this court was established…

Consequently, the entire case is written off with little consideration or suggestion of the potential value. This is indeed one of the main reasons that Israel aimed to get the case dismissed by the Court and taken off the registry. A failure to achieve this outcome does resonate strongly and legitimises, in an already skewed international system, that there may be “something” to this case.

While I understand and respect this perspective, I do think there is still value to be gained from this interim ruling. The Court rightly rejected the main operational devices South Africa sought to use to hinder Israel. Israel was left with provisional measures that ultimately can be argued that it is already adhering to. There is nothing in the provisional measures that prevent Israel from continuing its operations and rescuing the hostages. Without any order to suspend Israeli security operations in Gaza, Israel is still left with her security strategy legally unheeded.

I view the judgement as defanging RSA’s case significantly.

The Court will now turn to assessing the main claim of whether genocide is occurring in Gaza. As precedent from Bosnia v. Serbia show this can take years to determine. I believe that the Court will not determine that Israel is guilty of genocide. The threshold is higher to prove with specific intent especially difficult to determine. In the interim, the operation in Gaza will likely conclude and a new state of affairs will exist in the Strip.

blogs.timesofisrael.com

11. CIA director: Not passing Ukraine aid would be a mistake ‘of historic proportions’

CIA director: Not passing Ukraine aid would be a mistake 'of historic proportions'

By MATT BERG

01/30/2024 11:31 AM EST

Politico

CIA director: Not passing Ukraine aid would be a mistake ‘of historic proportions’

Helping Ukraine is “a relatively modest investment with significant geopolitical returns,” the CIA director wrote.

CIA Director William Burns is the latest top U.S. official to publicly make the case for greenlighting assistance to Ukraine. | Amanda Andrade-Rhoades/AP

01/30/2024 11:31 AM EST

Western allies must continue providing assistance to Ukraine in its war with Russia this year, or risk a mistake “of historic proportions,” CIA Director William Burns wrote in a column published Tuesday.

Burns laid out his case in a Foreign Affairs column, noting that less than 5 percent of the U.S. defense budget — “a relatively modest investment with significant geopolitical returns” — is all that Washington sends to Kyiv.

If an opportunity for serious negotiations to end the war emerges, he wrote, providing arms to Ukraine will put it in a stronger bargaining position. Ukraine’s military would also be able to continue fending off Russian troops while rebuilding its infrastructure, while Moscow spends massive amounts of money to keep the war going, Burns added.

“For the United States to walk away from the conflict at this crucial moment and cut off support to Ukraine would be an own goal of historic proportions,” Burns wrote, referencing a soccer term for scoring a goal for the rival team by putting the ball into a player’s own net.

Burns is the latest top U.S. official to publicly make the case for greenlighting assistance to Ukraine, as lawmakers battle over a southern border deal that’s holding up $60 billion in aid to Ukraine. The Biden administration has been urging lawmakers to push a deal through, but there’s no clear indication when lawmakers might strike a deal.

The director’s column also comes after he secretly visited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv earlier this month, briefing him on his expectations for what Russia is planning in the near future, The Washington Post reported.

POLITICO

Politico

12. Ukraine’s Drone Operators Race into the Future, Mostly with Overclocked Copters

Ukraine’s Drone Operators Race into the Future, Mostly with Overclocked Copters

Yes, drones are flying around in the Russo-Ukraine war using artificial intelligence to attack things. But it’s more like a cheap aircraft from Target with a bomb zip-tied to it, than a Terminator.

by Stefan Korshak | January 31, 2024, 8:43 am | Comments (3)

kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · January 31, 2024

If the iconic image at the start of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine was a clunky Soviet farm tractor chugging along dragging a Russian tank into captivity, then the two years later version is probably a $500 drone crashing into a $2.5 million Russian T-90M tank and torching it.

This Russian T-90M was hit and destroyed by a cheap 500 USD drone (plus Soviet grenade). This is the most expensive Russian MBT, priced between 2.3 - 4.5 million USD.

Source of 1st video: https://t.co/LRAtiT0M1Q

Source of 2nd video: https://t.co/So17Km9QlK #Ukraine #Donetsk… pic.twitter.com/lfq39B9qRz

— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) December 26, 2023

Over the past 23 months, in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), hobby drones have gone from a nice-to-have combat tool operated mostly by geeks and usable only for short-range reconnaissance, into a weapons system so critical, that deployment of an AFU combat brigade without a dedicated drone unit would be considered military idiocy by practically all ranks.

According to most drone operators and field commanders, about one in three (if drone videos swamping the Ukrainian internet are to be believed, it’s more) of every Russian combat vehicle destroyed in Ukraine these days is blown up, burnt or broken by a budget drone.

President Volodymyr Zelensky, in an early January speech, named mini-drone production and fielding as a top war priority, and named as a national war goal – as noted by New Scientist magazine – that in 2024 Ukraine should manufacture more drones to launch into the sky to fight Russia, than it deploys soldiers on the ground.

The Ukrainian battlefield is saturated with drones flown by pilots, many of them now with months and even years of wartime flight hours under their belts. Operators reload and launch strike aircraft in less than a minute.

Kyiv Confirms Drone Attack on St. Petersburg Oil Refinery, Claims UAV Dodged Russia’s Best Air Defense

Kyiv Post sources say the Russian military, using its most powerful air defense system, the S-400, failed to eliminate the HUR drone which struck in the early hours of Wednesday morning.

Quadcopters chase Russian infantrymen through trenches and around abandoned vehicles before blowing up. Pilots drop explosives with such precision a grenade threads past protective screens installed specifically to block drone-dropped munitions, plunks into an open tank hatch, and sets a tank on fire.

Eastern Ukraine, a Ukrainian drone from the 103rd TDF Brigade drops a thermobaric grenade into the driver's hatch of a Russian T-80BVM, causing a catastrophic cookoff and turret toss. pic.twitter.com/4YwClUxVGg

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) January 26, 2024

Artists Fallen on the Battlefield

Ukraine Downs Russian Su-34 Fighter Jet Over Luhansk Region

Zaluzhny Dismissal Rumors – What We Know

Ukrainian drone pilots have long understood that aircraft range depends most on the size and power of the battery of the aircraft, and the overall weight of whatever it is the drone must tote to the target.

As the war has ground on, Ukrainian field operators have learned to extend range by packing explosives into a lighter carrying container, by hooking a more powerful battery to the drone, or both.

In the early days of the war a drone might deliver an unmodified grenade or even a mortar round to a target. The problem then was steel is heavy.

In some units, drone artificers now melt the explosives out of conventional munitions to make a drone payload that weighs less but delivers a bigger bang. And if delivered by drone the explosives and shrapnel almost always detonate much closer to a Russian soldier or vehicle than if it were sent to target as a conventional artillery shell or mortar round.

VIDEO of Ukrainian troops improvising because of shortages. These are 82mm mortar rounds with fuses removed, being heated to remove the explosive charge. This is poured into a can to create an IED (improvied explosive) for drones. #Ukraine #Ukrainewar #UkraineRussiawar pic.twitter.com/kFWNSnoFgq

— raging545 - @[email protected] (@raging545) January 26, 2024

Another approach to the problem, and one according to reports and Kyiv Post reporter observations practiced in most drone units operating across the AFU, has been to sacrifice some range in favor of a full-on anti-tank warhead, usually from an 82mm RPG grenade launcher, capable of destroying all but the very latest Russian tanks from most angles of attack.

In a Jan. 25 video, a pilot stating he is with the AFU’s 40th Separate Air Assault Brigade praised the system as easy to operate and deadly to Russian combat vehicles.

A test flight conducted by the drone group Wasp proposed a simple solution to the very toughest Russian T-90 tanks: strap not one but two RPG warheads onto the drone, along with a bigger battery.

Ukrainian drone bombers test and launch drones with two PG-7 charges from a hand-held grenade launcher at once.

So that the orcs' asses burn twice as hot... pic.twitter.com/hDfPIXmUaf

— Sharky (@Jamie04381095) January 5, 2024

By the second half of 2023, as the fighting line for the most part became static and both sides moved to dig in front line troops into deeper and safer bunkers and trenches, enterprising Ukrainian drone operators started to field drones carrying incendiary warheads.

The main component of that kind of munition is a compound called thermite, a pyrotechnic material made from metal powder and metal oxide that burns at near-sun-surface temperatures when ignited.

Popular with Ukraine drone armorers because the components are easy to find and thermite is ideal for setting a broken and abandoned armored vehicle on fire, the munition has found a new use attacking concrete pillboxes with troops inside.

VIDEO of the destruction of a Russian pillbox in the east by a Ukrainian drone carrying an incendiary warhead. These pillboxes were recently tested & installed along the Russian border in Belgorod. #Ukraine #ukrainewar #UkraineRussiawar #Russia https://t.co/JkUTwb78Hu pic.twitter.com/a2mbIMLO0c

— raging545 - @[email protected] (@raging545) January 27, 2024

Another design approach has been to deal with increasingly stronger Russian fortifications by precision-flying drones through gaps and windows of bunkers, and then detonating an anti-personnel munition inside.

Operators at an unidentified front-line location recorded manufacture and testing of one such weapon, as described by an artificer the device was a “jam tin” filled with explosives, ball bearings, and epoxy.

If purchased in a Ukrainian street bazaar or online wholesale store, most of the materials making up the bomb looked to cost, collectively, less than ten dollars.

Tests showed a man-size target with hundreds of high velocity punctures. The AFU soldier described the weapon as “a nice gift for our neighbors.”

Ukrainian homemade fragmentation ammunition for FPV drones (testing)

Essentially, it is a sewer plug filled with an explosive substance, on one side filled with epoxy resin (or a transparent compound), fragmentation submunitions in the form of steel balls (3 mm in diameter),… pic.twitter.com/laMpGXLtfv

— PS01 (@PStyle0ne1) January 28, 2024

The Ukrainian and Russian internet already is offering up reports, unconfirmed thus far, of drones carrying grenade launchers, or anti-tank missiles, or even machine guns. Drones with limited artificial intelligence, meanwhile, are a confirmed reality on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Technically, the first drones with artificial intelligence aboard were Russian attack drones called a Lancet, which were fielded in Fall 2022 and carried Cold War-era programming helping it tell the difference between a random object and the target the operator was aiming at, Andrey Maximov, a Moscow-based weapons engineering expert said in a December Linked In tech review.

By the latter half of 2023, Russia had upgraded Lancet into a version called Izdeliya 53, or Z-53, carrying a smarter automated guidance system enabling it to seek out and attack pre-programmed target profiles like tanks, trucks or a bunker.

The first confirmed Ukrainian drones with artificial intelligence enhancing targeting was, according to reports from both sides, seen around the village Krynky in mid-January, where Ukrainian Marines hold a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro River.

According to Russian sources, five Ukrainian kamikaze aircraft took to the skies to defend Marine positions by flying to Russian lines, to seek, identify and strike target autonomously. The attacks took place without input from the pilot, whose only job was to fly the drone to the target area.

“The enemy (Ukrainian forces) has started testing drones with AI,” wrote the Russian mil-blogger VDV Za Chesnost’ I Spravedlivost’ (ВДВ за Честность и Справедливость) in a Jan. 29 report.

“Together with the creation of full-time strike drone units down to individual battalions, we can state that the enemy is ahead of us in introducing new technologies on the battlefield. All this can radically change the course of conducting the SVO (Russia’s war against Ukraine) and not in our favor. In fact, the enemy is now testing new means and forms of war in the Kherson direction.”

Robert Brovi, a Ukrainian drone commander deployed to the Kherson sector, in a Jan. 5 interview with Kyiv 24 television, confirmed Ukraine is now fielding drones with artificial intelligence to assist targeting, but added that the operator still was responsible for flying the aircraft to the attack sector and cueing the drone to home in.

Mini-drones are shaping the modern battlefield and are present in numbers never before seen in war, but, as a weapons system they cannot fully replace more conventional weapons like tanks and artillery, he said. But in future there need to be more and more, Brovi said.

kyivpost.com · by Stefan Korshak · January 31, 2024

13. China Says Trump Could Abandon Taiwan If He Wins US Election

Overt election meddling?

China Says Trump Could Abandon Taiwan If He Wins US Election

Taiwan might be a ‘discarded chess piece,’ China official says
Trump earlier avoided a question on whether he’d help island

By Bloomberg News

January 31, 2024 at 12:30 PM GMT+9

Updated on January 31, 2024 at 5:45 PM GMT+9

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-31/china-says-trump-could-abandon-taiwan-if-he-wins-us-election?sref=hhjZtX76

China said a victory by Donald Trump in the presidential election later this year could lead to the US abandoning Taiwan, comments intended to sow doubt over Washington’s commitment to the island.

“The US will always pursue America first, and Taiwan can change from a chess piece to a discarded chess piece at any time,” Chen Binhua, spokesman for the office in Beijing that handles matters related to the island, said at a regular press briefing on Wednesday.

Chen was responding to a question about an interview Trump gave Fox News in July in which he avoided directly answering a query over whether as president he’d defend Taiwan if China attacked.

“If I answer that question, it’ll put me in a very bad negotiating position,” Trump said at the time. “With that being said, Taiwan did take all of our chip business.”

China frequently suggests that the US isn’t a reliable partner for Taiwan, a line that’s aimed at undermining the island’s confidence that it’ll be able to withstand an invasion. The US has traditionally adopted a policy of strategic ambiguity, acknowledging China’s historical claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, while maintaining only unofficial relations with Taipei and pledging defensive assistance.

Still, President Joe Biden has repeatedly said the US would defend Taiwan if it came under attack. Washington is Taipei’s main military supporter, and in late 2022 it authorized as much as $10 billion in weapons sales to Taiwan over five years.

Beijing has responded to the weapons sales by hitting defense firms with largely symbolic sanctions. China has vowed to bring the democratically run island of 23 million people under its control someday, by force if that’s what it takes.

When asked about Chen’s remarks, a spokesman for Trump’s campaign referred to comments he made while president that acknowledged China was a security threat.

The spokesman also pointed to a precedent-breaking conversation that Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen had with Trump when he was president-elect in 2016. The call was the closest a Taiwanese leader has come to getting formal US recognition since Washington established relations with the Communist government in Beijing some four decades ago.

The US and China fought a trade war during Trump’s term, when ties between the nations frayed over a range of issues, including the origins of the coronavirus, espionage, technology and human rights.

China has maintained its pressure on Taiwan since the island elected the US-friendly Vice President Lai Ching-te as its next leader on Jan. 13. Days afterward, Beijing peeled off one of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic allies, Nauru, and its ties with another Pacific ally, Tuvalu, are at risk after an election there.

On Tuesday, China changed a civil aviation route without consulting Taiwan, which lodged what it said was a “strong protest” with Beijing. The move essentially normalizes the flight of Chinese civilian aircraft closer to the island.

The People’s Liberation Army regularly sends sorties of warplanes into sensitive zones around Taiwan, and has held major military exercises around the island twice since August 2022 because Tsai met top US lawmakers.

Chen, the spokesman for the Taiwan office in Beijing, said the aviation change was “within regular work scope of China civil aviation regulator.” He also reiterated Beijing’s stance that “Taiwan is an integral part of China’s territory.”

— With assistance from Philip Glamann, Jing Li, and Stephanie Lai

(Updates with added context.)

14. What Holds Japan Back

Excerpts:

Under the surface, many entrepreneurs are rising and slowly gaining political clout and access to key bureaucrats and politicians, some of whom are sympathetic to new companies, given Japan’s dire economic needs. They sometimes succeed in coaxing small reforms, such as the legalization of firms spun off from university research and the legalization of online sales of over-the-counter drugs. These incremental gains help speed the emergence of new companies that in turn accrue more political influence as their numbers swell. In a snowball effect, small victories today can lead to greater victories tomorrow.

Even the big traditional companies cannot simply oppose entrepreneurship since, like Toyota, they need the newcomers as partners. Notably, Keidanren, the conservative big business federation, has called for entrepreneurial revival, backing Kishida’s target of 100,000 startups by 2027. But it has failed to push for the measures needed to make such a revival happen on the necessary scale, such as an effective tax incentive for angel investors or the shift of government financial aid for R & D to startups from established companies.

There is no guarantee that future governments will enact the necessary reforms. But without them, Japan’s economy and its global influence will continue to erode. Social and technological forces are promoting entrepreneurship to a degree not seen in the country since its postwar recovery, but the push for change must still overcome the formidable barrier of a shortsighted establishment.

What Holds Japan Back

And How Economic Reforms Could Overcome a Hidebound Old Guard

By Richard Katz

January 31, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Richard Katz · January 31, 2024

Many observers have come to believe—incorrectly—that Japan’s extended economic slump is irreversible. The country’s GDP today is no higher than it was five years ago, and per capita GDP growth has been limited on average to a measly 0.7 percent per year since 1991, down from an average of four percent during the 1980s. South Korea, a country that was only one-quarter as rich as Japan in 1980 in terms of real per capita GDP, surpassed it in 2018. China has just topped Japan as the world’s top auto exporter largely because Japan’s automakers have resisted the shift to electrical vehicles. There has been disappointment every decade since the end of the 1980s boom when assorted bursts in stock prices led brokers and politicians to proclaim falsely that “Japan is back”—only for the resurgence to falter.

That stalled growth rate has hurt much of the public, building political pressure for meaningful reform. The average real wage of a full-time worker has barely increased since 1990. Social security benefits have been cut 20 percent since 1996, with reports of some widows resorting to shoplifting. The share of nonregular workers—part-time and temporary workers whose hourly pay is half, or less, than that of full-time workers—has swelled from 15 percent of the workforce in the 1980s to nearly 40 percent today. While 72 percent of regular male workers in their late 30s have spouses, only 30 percent of nonregulars of equivalent age can afford to get married.

Japan’s economic torpor has important consequences beyond its borders. A vibrant Japan could provide a counterweight to China, for example, by helping countries in the global South resist Beijing’s economic overtures and threats. More broadly, the world would benefit if Japanese companies could regain their past innovativeness and dynamism. Firms in Japan, for instance, pioneered decades ago the commercialization of three of the technologies now critical to the fight against climate change: solar panels, electric vehicles, and lithium-ion batteries.

Revival requires relatively little political and social reform—and yet remains difficult. Japan’s travails stem from holding on to once-helpful, but now obsolete, twentieth-century policies, practices, and institutions. One such impediment is the Japanese practice of so-called lifetime employment, a policy that de facto guarantees recruits a permanent position within a company but in the process reduces labor mobility and wages. Another is the domination over the economy by once-imaginative giant corporations that now block innovative challengers. The overarching financial system also shores up weak incumbents to the detriment of startups.

The good news is that shifts in attitudes, technology, and globalization, along with the political fissures created by low growth, have facilitated the best opportunity for recovery in a generation. These trends can resurrect the kind of entrepreneurial effervescence that drove both modernization in the late nineteenth century and, after World War II, a quarter century of nearly ten percent annual growth. That South Korea has grown so well, despite sharing many of Japan’s business institutions and structural flaws, proves that fixing the Japanese economy is possible.

Unfortunately, Japan’s positive currents cannot change the system unless they are amplified by government support, which so far has been lacking. Powerful traditional companies fear that too much entrepreneurship might unleash a bout of creative destruction that would push them out of business. This old guard not only includes large corporations that remain behind the times technologically but also hundreds of thousands of moribund small and medium enterprises. A looming contest between entrepreneurs and those arrayed against them will determine Japan’s economic future.

IN WITH THE NEW

All healthy economies need a continual inflow of new high-growth companies with fresh ideas. In the United States during the 1980s and 1990s, firms less than five years old created a stunning 60 percent of the growth in factory output per worker. Today, Silicon Valley’s 2,000 high-tech ventures are just a tiny sliver of the 50,000 or so dynamic new companies in operation in the United States. These young firms supply the vitality that their older counterparts lack, sometimes by replacing incumbent firms, sometimes by forcing them to adapt, as car maker Tesla has done to legacy auto giants.

In Japan, traditional companies have been insulated from this kind of disruptive innovation. Only one of the country’s top two dozen electronics manufacturers was created after 1959. Despite a 40 percent surge in global electronics sales between 2008 and 2020, all of Japan’s top ten electronics manufacturers saw their global sales slump in that period because they could not come up with competitive versions of products ranging from smartphones to Internet networking equipment. Many economies grapple with this “old company disease,” but Japan is distinguished by the scale of the impediments that block the emergence of new firms with fresh ideas. The obstacles include difficulties with recruiting talent, reaching customers, and acquiring external finance, as well as government policies that favor incumbents. Among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, Japan’s small and medium enterprises are the oldest and have the lowest rate of growth.

But there is growing room for optimism because some of the existing hurdles are beginning to break down. Consider recruiting. In the twentieth century, Japan created the system of lifetime employment, in which leading companies hired new graduates, trained them in the firm’s mind-set, and retained them for their whole career. Workers feared leaving a big company to join a startup—many of which fail—because big companies rarely hired somebody who had switched jobs; consequently, the workers were unlikely to ever regain their previous wage level.

Today, however, talented younger workers are far more willing to take a chance on a new firm than their parents were. Four decades ago, 70 to 80 percent of people in their late 20s or early 30s who had worked for one employer for ten to 15 years stayed at that employer for at least another ten to 15 years. By the early 2000s, that rate had dropped to 50 to 65 percent, and now statistics indicate that less than half of young workers stay at the same firm for so long. The shift is also apparent in the hiring of people in the middle of their careers. Back in 1994, only 35 percent of companies hired anyone in their 30s and 40s away from another firm; now, 70 percent do so, and those that do are more profitable as a result. In the lifetime employment system, workers tended to develop company‑specific skills. Given today’s rapidly changing and uncertain conditions, firms benefit from incorporating new skill sets and perspectives through hiring midcareer workers.

Japan’s revival requires relatively little political and social reform.

A virtuous cycle has begun. Workers have greater leverage in the current tight labor market, and now, with established firms more willing to make midcareer hires, they feel emboldened to take risks. Newer companies have been able to recruit both veterans from more established firms and recent college graduates. Take the recruitment firm Visional, founded in 2009, which matches companies, new and old, with potential candidates. By 2023, it had found jobs at 20,000 companies for 2.3 million well-paid employees seeking better opportunities, and in 2021, its founder became Japan’s newest billionaire. Visional is now just one of many such recruitment agencies.

Newer firms have also been able to take advantage of a pervasive problem in employment practices among traditional firms: the lack of equal pay and promotion opportunities for women. I recently spoke to two female executives at Askul, a distributor of office supplies. They had left household-name companies to join Askul in its early days (it now has sales in the billions of dollars), lured not only by better opportunities for advancement but also by the adventure of building something from the ground up. The newer companies do not yet have sufficient weight to reduce the national gender gap in pay and promotion, but the more talented women they recruit, the more pressure traditional firms will feel to close the divide.

Technological advances are also increasing the market power of startups. In the past, new firms had difficulty reaching customers because they had to use a distribution system for products that was largely controlled by big legacy companies. E-commerce has changed that. Take Rakuten, Japan’s flagship Internet mall. In 2023, some 57,000 small and medium enterprises sold more than $40 billion worth of products to over 100 million customers through the site, which functions much like Amazon. One of Rakuten’s merchants is Tansu No Gen, a former furniture maker and now a seller whose founder was wary of e-commerce and preferred using traditional retail stores. When he retired in 2002, his children joined Rakuten’s network, and they saw sales explode from less than $1 million per year in 2002 to $175 million today.

Digitization is putting enormous pressure on Japan’s more staid companies to look in new directions. In a ranking done by IMD Business School of 64 countries in “digital agility”—how much a company increases sales and profits for every dollar it invests in digital equipment and software—Japan came in dead last. That struggle to master digitization is one of the reasons Japanese giants have had trouble competing in world markets. As a result, some traditional companies now feel compelled to work with digitally adept newcomers. In 2018, for the first time, the number of software vendors exceeded traditional parts makers among the top 5,000 suppliers to the automaker Toyota. Few of the software companies wanted to join Toyota’s corporate group and be treated as subordinates rather than partners. They cherished their independence, including the freedom to collaborate with anyone, even Toyota’s competitors. Toyota’s need for outside technological expertise for all the sophisticated electronic software and hardware in vehicles these days forced it to abandon its long-standing reluctance to allow its vendors to work with the competition. In order to innovate, it has accepted conditions that it had previously disdained.

THUMB ON THE SCALE

The biggest remaining obstacle faced by new Japanese companies is securing outside financing. Unless would-be founders are rich, creating a successful high-growth company requires seed money from “business angels” who, unlike venture capitalists, finance startups that may never get big enough to join the stock market or even desire to do so. Japan has few such angels, in part because it does not offer the tax incentives available elsewhere. Moreover, Japanese banks are loath to lend to newer firms even after they have begun growing at a healthy clip, and banks, like other traditional firms, often discriminate against female founders. Far more than in other rich countries, Japan’s banks make loans contingent not on projections of future profits but on physical collateral—such as land, factories, commercial buildings, and equipment—and, even worse, the owner’s personal guarantee to turn over their home and savings if the firm goes under. This makes it hard for new firms to secure lines of credit, since they usually rent property and their founders may not be rich enough to make a large guarantee. As a result, banks charge ten-year-old firms that have a good track record of growth a higher interest rate than they do a 50-year-old firm that may have a long record of mediocre performance because the older company has committed more collateral. Firms that lack sufficient capital from the outset start off too small and, as a result, are more likely to die prematurely or fail to reach their growth targets. Hence, many would-be entrepreneurs go overseas, to places where securing such financing is easier.

The Japanese government does not help matters by putting its thumb on the scales in favor of older and bigger companies. For example, almost 90 percent of Japan’s government support for R & D goes to firms with more than 500 workers, the worst ratio in the entire OECD. Nor does Tokyo provide new private corporations with certain pivotal tax advantages available in other rich countries, such as exemption from double taxation of income at both the level of the company and that of the individual owner.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida promised to reform this system as part of his 2022 “new form of capitalism” program, vowing that Japan would have a tenfold increase in startups, to 100,000, by 2027. But he has done almost nothing to turn this rhetoric into reality, save for one poorly designed tax break for angel investors that will not work. Reformers urged that he raise the portion of public procurement set aside for new companies from the 2018 goal of three percent to ten percent. But Japan has never even come close to the three percent goal, and Kishida has not suggested he will do anything other than try, like those before him, to meet the current low target. By contrast, the government sets aside 55 percent of its public procurement contracts for small and medium enterprises, most of which are old (and often weak), giving them an advantage over younger competitors.

A MOVABLE OBJECT?

Unless the government changes its tune, Japan will miss this opportunity for revival. Without a critical mass of successful new companies, the economy will continue to slumber, living standards will deteriorate, and voters could eventually unseat the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party, just as in 2009 when the party temporarily lost power in a landslide defeat.

Many analysts know what needs to be done. A government-convened panel of experts in technology, business, and finance prepared a superb report for Kishida pointing very concretely at the hurdles that needed to be overcome in order to promote more startups, many of the same hurdles discussed above. Kishida more or less ignored it.

That is shortsighted politically as well as economically. The LDP remains in power today only because the public is even more unconvinced by the opposition than it is by the ruling party. Disenchanted voters stay home, and turnout in national elections keeps dropping. In the absence of an economic recovery, however, the LDP has to fear that the opposition will find a way to inspire voters and triumph in a future election.

Enterpreneurs must overcome the formidable barrier of a shortsighted establishment.

Under the surface, many entrepreneurs are rising and slowly gaining political clout and access to key bureaucrats and politicians, some of whom are sympathetic to new companies, given Japan’s dire economic needs. They sometimes succeed in coaxing small reforms, such as the legalization of firms spun off from university research and the legalization of online sales of over-the-counter drugs. These incremental gains help speed the emergence of new companies that in turn accrue more political influence as their numbers swell. In a snowball effect, small victories today can lead to greater victories tomorrow.

Even the big traditional companies cannot simply oppose entrepreneurship since, like Toyota, they need the newcomers as partners. Notably, Keidanren, the conservative big business federation, has called for entrepreneurial revival, backing Kishida’s target of 100,000 startups by 2027. But it has failed to push for the measures needed to make such a revival happen on the necessary scale, such as an effective tax incentive for angel investors or the shift of government financial aid for R & D to startups from established companies.

There is no guarantee that future governments will enact the necessary reforms. But without them, Japan’s economy and its global influence will continue to erode. Social and technological forces are promoting entrepreneurship to a degree not seen in the country since its postwar recovery, but the push for change must still overcome the formidable barrier of a shortsighted establishment.

RICHARD KATZ is a Special Correspondent for Japan’s Toyo Keizai business weekly and Publisher of the Japan Economy Watch blog. He is the author of The Contest for Japan’s Economic Future: Entrepreneurs vs. Corporate Giants, from which this article is adapted.

Foreign Affairs · by Richard Katz · January 31, 2024

15. The Uyghurs: Kashgar Before the Catastrophe

Part photo essay. View the photos at the link: https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/the-uyghurs-kashgar-before-the-catastrophe/

The Uyghurs: Kashgar Before the Catastrophe

thediplomat.com

What has been erased cannot be replaced, but Kevin Bubriski’s 1998 photographs can help us remember what once was in Xinjiang.

By Robert Gerhardt

January 30, 2024

A residential neighborhood in Kashgar’s old city before demolition.

Credit: Kevin Bubriski

In 1998 photographer Kevin Bubriski spent a time among the Uyghurs in Kashgar, their ancient capital city in the Xinjiang region of China. His photographs are a glimpse into the lives of a people whose city and culture have been forever altered by repression under China’s President Xi Jinping.

The Xinjiang region of China, known officially as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in the country’s far northwest is home to about 12 million Uyghurs, a mostly Muslim ethnic group. The Uyghurs speak their own language and are ethnically and culturally closer to the people of Central Asia than they are to the Han Chinese.

Residential neighborhood in the old city before demolition. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

For decades, various Chinese leaders in Beijing have worked to undermine the Uyghurs in Xinjiang by encouraging Han Chinese to move to the province in the hopes of diluting the Uyghur population. This has resulted in the Uyghurs now making up less than half of the region’s population.

But with the rise of President Xi Jinping in 2013, and his consolidation of power, the situation of the Uyghurs has become even more dire.

At the Abaq Khoja Mosque. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

Xinjiang has become a vast surveillance state, with Uyghurs constantly under the eye of the police. Their movements are followed, cell phones are searched, and very few are allowed to leave. Having contact with people outside of China, downloading the Quran, or even going to a Mosque to pray can all get a person into serious trouble. Some Uyghurs have been subjected to forced sterilizations, forced labor, and family separations.

At the bird market. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

In 2018, it was estimated that more than 1 million Uyghurs were imprisoned in what the Chinese government referred to as reeducation camps throughout Xinjiang. The camps were established in 2017 and in the years after, despite heavy restrictions, reports began to emerge about what was happening in Xinjiang. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called China’s radical oppression of the Uyghurs “genocide and crimes against humanity” in 2021. Several countries have also levied sanctions on China because of the treatment of the Uyghur population, rankling the Chinese government, which has denied all accusations.

Uyghur police at the People’s Square. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

Before the rise of Xi, the crackdown, and the camps, American photographer Kevin Bubriski spent time in the city of Kashgar, the ancient capital of the Uyghurs, in 1998.

As Bubriski told me, “I had heard about Kashgar from nonfiction filmmaker and friend Robert Gardner, who went there to scout locations for shooting his first fiction film of J. M. Coetzee’s ‘Waiting for the Barbarians.’ He never went forward with the film but spoke enthusiastically to me about Kashgar and he encouraged me to go. I was fortunate to get a one-week assignment. I stayed on a few more weeks or so and felt excited to be there. I had my two Hasselblad cameras with me all the time and searched for interesting compositions and content.”

Residential neighborhood in the old city before demolition. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

Bubriski was first exposed to photography at the age of 14, when he began developing and printing photographs. He had been influenced by the photographs he saw in LIFE magazine, particularly David Douglas Duncan’s work documenting the Vietnam War, and the photographs in the “Family of Man” book, which was the one photography book in his home growing up.

A boy at the bird market. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

Although 1998 was an uncomfortable time of rapid transformation for the Uyghurs, their cultural heart in the high desert was still vibrant, even as the Chinese government’s brutal crackdown on religion, language, culture, and personal freedom in Xinjiang was about to commence.

“My familiarity with Tibet through numerous visit there in the 1980s and ’90s was important for my understanding of the context of the Uyghurs’ situation politically, economically, and culturally,” Bubriski said. “In 1998 I realized that Tibetans had much of the world’s attention through the voice and presence of the Dalai Lama, whereas the Uyghurs had no such resonant far-reaching voice as the venerated Tibetan Buddhist leader and teacher. I recall feeling that photographs might bring awareness to a larger community of the cultural richness of Kashgar and the threat facing the Uyghur people and their culture. I felt an urgency to be in Kashgar and make the photographs back in 1998.”

Outside the Id-Kah Mosque after Friday morning prayers. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

Bubriski’s photographs capture the Uyghurs’ cultural, economic, familial, religious, and spiritual traditions. The vibrancy, beauty, and grit of Kashgar and its people that Bubriski witnessed and photographed more 25 years ago has irrevocably changed, making his photographs even more significant.

Under Xi, China has embarked on a widespread campaign of destruction, razing mosques, cemeteries, bazaars, and other sites of cultural importance to Uyghurs. Kashgar, long the spiritual heart of the Uyghur culture, has been especially hard hit. Kashgar’s Old City was essentially demolished by 2020, stripped of its authentic cultural elements and replaced with an imagined, tourist-friendly facsimile. Authorities claim the razing was necessary for safety reasons, but in the context of the broader crackdown on Uyghur culture many find that explanation hard to swallow.

School boys and their bicycles. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

“There was palpable tension and unease among the Uyghur community all the time I was there. Two young Uyghur men guided me most of the days I was there, and they were very mindful of how to keep me and my camera out of trouble. My extensive experience in Tibet was good practice for how to be careful in Kashgar. In 1998 there was already new construction of high-rise steel and glass buildings everywhere and within a year the rail line reached Kashgar. There was a feeling among the Uyghurs of the deepening marginalization of their community.”

Residential neighborhood in the old city before demolition. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

In “The Uyghurs: Kashgar before the Catastrophe,” Bubriski’s photographs are accompanied by prose and poetry from Kashgar poet and activist Tahir Hamut Izgil and a historical essay by the late Dru Gladney, both of which add depth and understanding to the Uyghurs’ plight. The texts are presented in both English and Uyghur.

Musical instrument shop and workshop. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

“I felt it was important to have all the text elements of the book translated into the Uyghur language. While there may not be many Uyghurs who can purchase the book, in regions in the world of the Uyghur diaspora, such as Turkey, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere, English is a rarity. I felt it was important to present the Uyghur language as a small part of cultural recognition and preservation.”

At the livestock market, watching while a young man test drives a horse. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

Bubriski hopes that the photographs will give people a glimpse into what Xinjiang, and Kashgar were like, and what the world has lost through China’s policies. What has been erased cannot be replaced, but this important record stands as a testament to Uyghur culture and heritage in their homeland. Bubriski’s book is a stunning work of art and conscience that reveals a time when Kashgar, beloved city of the Uyghurs, retained much of its traditional life and charm.

At the bird market. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

“I hope that through the photographs viewers can get a feeling for the Uyghur way of life in Kashgar before the old city was demolished and before the limitations on cultural and spiritual life were so strict, severe, and dangerous. In Tahir’s and the translators’ essays there is a strong description of the nostalgia that they each feel when viewing the photographs. I would hope that that feeling of nostalgia or loss can be felt by others as well.”

A large statue of Mao overlooking the People’s Square. Kashgar, China, 1998. Photo by Kevin Bubriski.

The Uyghurs: Kashgar before the Catastrophe is published by GFT publishing and can be purchased through their website here.

Authors

Guest Author

Robert Gerhardt

Robert Gerhardt is a New York-based but internationally minded photographer and freelance writer, with a special interest in Asia. His photographs and writings have been published both nationally and internationally including in The Hong Kong Free Press, Blind Magazine, GQ Japan, and The Guardian."

thediplomat.com

16. Attack on US troops brings Iran confrontation closer

Attack on US troops brings Iran confrontation closer

gzeromedia.com · by Ian Bremmer · January 31, 2024

January 31, 2024

Collage of Joe Biden, Iran backed soldiers, and an American tank.

Jess Frampton

Just as I and my Eurasia Group colleagues predicted in our Top Risks 2024 report, the Middle East war continues to widen. We said that the conflict would inevitably expand significantly beyond Gaza – and potentially into a larger-scale regional conflict – because there are simply too many actors and variables that the United States does not have the ability to constrain. That is why it ranked #2 on our list.

We’ve seen that risk play out with the ongoing harassment of commercial shipping in the Red Sea by Yemen’s Houthis, as well as the more than 150 attacks carried out by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria against American installations in the region since Oct. 7. The US has been unable to deter these actions to date, despite issuing stern diplomatic warnings, leveling economic sanctions, creating a multinational maritime task force, and even launching limited strikes on these groups’ military capabilities.

Washington’s deterrence strategy failed, in part, because these Iranian proxies (the so-called “Axis of Resistance”) can withstand significant retaliation, enjoy continuing military and intelligence support from Tehran despite operating relatively autonomously, and see only reputational and political upsides from drawing a fight with the Americans. In part, it failed because Tehran understands that President Joe Biden really doesn’t want a direct fight with the Islamic Republic (especially in an election year), and it has accordingly felt emboldened to give its proxies a longer leash without fearing a shooting war with the US that it absolutely does not want either.

Yet we are now meaningfully closer to precisely that outcome after a Tehran-sponsored militia launched a drone strike against a US military outpost along the Syria-Jordan border (Tower 22 near the Al Tanf Garrison) that killed three American servicemembers and injured at least 40 over the weekend. The first deaths of US troops under fire since the war started, these casualties are the nightmare scenario the White House has been dreading for months: an attack in the region that kills American military personnel and puts Biden under intense political and strategic pressure to retaliate forcefully. Indeed, long before it happened, senior officials in the administration described this very scenario to me as a ‘red line.’

So make no mistake, the White House will respond in short order. The question is whether it can do that in a way that successfully deters Iran and its proxies without risking an even deadlier spiral of escalation. And on that front, Biden’s options range from the ineffective to the extremely dangerous. Moreover, the death of US servicemembers in the Middle East will be a political drag on the president no matter how he responds.

While some of Biden’s Republican opponents are advocating for direct attacks on Iranian forces – in the mold of the Trump administration’s assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020 as retaliation for a series of similar Tehran-backed attacks on US personnel – I expect the potential for significant US fatalities or further attacks on US troops to keep his response more limited and incremental. That means US actions will come in steps, each more aggressive than the last, with each additional step calibrated to dial up the pressure on Iran while minimizing escalatory risks.

At a minimum, the initial US response will include increasingly frequent and aggressive strikes against militias in Syria and Iraq, targeting larger and more sensitive assets as well as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel linked to these groups. Though direct kinetic attacks on Iranian soil are less likely, I wouldn’t be surprised if the US also strikes Iranian naval and intelligence assets located outside of Iran.

The other front to watch is US sanctions on Iranian oil exports, where Biden is under pressure to turn up the heat. But there’s little he can do without incurring major diplomatic and economic costs elsewhere. Expect marginally tightened enforcement of existing sanctions that stop short of targeting the final buyers of Iranian crude, most of whom are major Chinese refineries Biden is loath to sanction at a time when he is attempting to lower the temperature with Beijing and keep oil prices low ahead of the November election.

Will these measures be sufficient to stop Iranian proxies from hitting the United States? Maybe, just maybe, they’ll make them more cautious in their targeting. But color me skeptical. More likely, the militias in Iraq and Syria will absorb the forthcoming US strikes and intensify their attacks on US installations over the coming weeks.

When it becomes clear that his initial response has failed to deter (or provoked) further Iranian-backed strikes that will sooner or later cause additional American fatalities, Biden will have no choice but to move onto more aggressive actions such as direct targeting of IRGC leadership in Iran, overt strikes on Iranian military facilities, and – in a most severe scenario – material constraints on the purchase of Iranian crude. Any of these actions would trigger a strong Iranian response and bring the two countries much closer to direct confrontation.

To be sure, there are still good reasons why we should not expect this to become a full-fledged war between the US and Iran. Most important of which is that neither the Americans nor the Iranians want an all-out confrontation. The Iranians also don’t want to be on the wrong side of the Gulf States, with whom they now have functional relations after many years of largely cold (but occasionally hot) war. They certainly have no desire to ruin that and suddenly find themselves in a no-holds-barred fight against every major power in the region.

Still, the closer we get to tit-for-tat strikes between the US and Iran, the more likely accidents, miscalculations, and inadvertent escalations are to occur.

Implausible as it may sound, the likeliest way to de-escalate the conflict at the moment would be a breakthrough in the ceasefire and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas, which are gaining momentum. Most Iran-linked militias claim that their strikes are in solidarity with the plight of Palestinians in Gaza, so it follows that efforts to bring an end to the fighting there could help contain the expansion of the conflict elsewhere.

Talks on Jan. 27 in Paris between intelligence chiefs and leadership from the US, Qatar, Israel, and Egypt were constructive, with Israel now willing to take a deal that they wouldn’t have considered a few weeks ago and regional brokers Qatar and Egypt working hard to try to get Hamas on board. The main points of contention remain the duration of the ceasefire – Israel insists on temporary, Hamas on permanent – and the number of hostages to be released – with Israel preferring they all be let go at once and Hamas favoring a tiered approach to retain leverage. Israeli domestic politics and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s personal calculations pose hurdles, too, but the pressure to deliver a deal – from both Washington and the Israeli public – is growing.

In the context of eroding US deterrence vis-à-vis Iran and a shrinking margin for error, that pressure is emerging as the most viable pathway toward limiting further regional escalation.

us middle east iran

Walmart

17. How North Korea Deterred an American Invasion in 2002

I remember this well. I was actually sent to have a one on one sit down with COL Wlikerson on the 7th floor of State as he wanted to know how we could use Special Forces to take down the regime's nuclear program. He told me that there were policy makers who were enamored with the success of US Special Forces (and the CIA and airpower) in the fall of 2001 and believed that they could do the same in north Korea against the nuclear program. He asked me to describe the feasibility of using the Afghan model and his chances of success. He was not advocating for this course of action but wanted an informed view to use in discussions with policy makers who were proposing it.

I did not give it any thought at the time (it was October 2002) but this article notes that it could have been north Korea rather than Iraq in 2003. We should think about that.

How North Korea Deterred an American Invasion in 2002

thediplomat.com

Colin Powell’s former chief of staff revealed that an invasion was considered but deemed too risky – well before North Korea’s nuclear deterrent was in place.

By A. B. Abrams

January 31, 2024

Third Armored Brigade Combat Team “Bulldog”, 1st Armored Division (Rotational), 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-US Combined Division, Soldiers drive an M88A2 Heavy Equipment Recovery Combat Utility Lifting Extraction System (HERCULES) across an improvised ribbon bridge on the Imjin-gang River during the Bulldog Bridging Exercise at Local Training Area 320, Republic of Korea, April 22, 2019.

American discourse regarding possible military options against North Korea has changed markedly since late 2017, after U.S. intelligence confirmed that the country had gained the capability to launch nuclear strikes against the American mainland using its then newly tested Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 intercontinental range ballistic missiles. Prior to that point, calls from both civilian and military leaders for an attack on North Korea had been considerable and growing, with examples from the Trump administration’s first year in office ranging from Senator Lindsey Graham to Army Colonel Ralph Peters.

Since 2018, Washington has increasingly drawn a softer line against North Korea’s testing of ballistic missiles. Previously, any modernization of the country’s missile deterrent was harshly condemned as unacceptable and frequently responded to with sanctions (though all these efforts, including some ambitious Obama-era electronic sabotage efforts, failed to prevent North Korea from making rapid progress).

The shift was best exemplified by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton’s assertions in 2019 that Washington had an understanding with Pyongyang that only testing of missiles capable of hitting the U.S. mainland would cease. On that basis, Trump administration officials downplayed and chose not to respond to multiple ballistic missile tests from other classes that year.

This continued into the Biden administration. North Korea’s continuously modernizing missile arsenal has become an accepted fact, where it previously sparked furor and calls to action in the Western world. This process mirrors the West’s gradual coming to terms with the Soviet and Chinese nuclear and missile deterrents during the Cold War.

Before 2018, U.S. military options were widely discussed and called for, either to set back Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs or to invade and occupy the entire country. However, North Korea’s significantly superior conventional capabilities relative to other potential targets for U.S. attacks have long provided a degree of deterrence. This was an important factor ensuring North Korea did not ensure the same fates as Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and the other former Soviet security partners which the United States attacked during the height of its power. North Korean conventional capabilities were an important deterrent when the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama administrations both came close to launching attacks on its nuclear program in 1994 and 2016, respectively.

In 2002, while the George W. Bush administration was preparing for its invasion of Iraq, it was simultaneously considering an attack on North Korea. Providing important new insight into Washington’s decision not to take military action against North Korea, former U.S. Army colonel Lawrence Wilkerson specifically discussed the issue in a December interview.

Wilkerson is a veteran of the Navy’s Pacific Command based in South Korea, Japan, and Hawaii, and at the time served as chief of staff to State Secretary Colin Powell. In the interview, he recalled that during a at the Pentagon, “I was briefed we were going to war with North Korea, we were going to war with Iraq, that’d be followed by Syria, that’d be followed by Iran, although we wouldn’t have to do probably Syria and Iran because they’d quake in their boots after we did Iraq.”

Wilkerson further recalled that Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz had stated at the time: “We want to end all challenges, no matter how indistinct they might be, to American power,” with attacks on all these states considered a means of achieving this.

“These were war plans,” Wilkerson emphasized. “I went to a colonel and I said: ‘Are these concept plans or are these TPFDD – Time Phased Force Deployment Data, that means they’re probably going to be executed.” To which Wilkerson recalled the colonel replied: “Oh they’re fully TPFDD.”

Despite North Korea having been the priority target, however, the country’s significantly superior military capabilities compared to other targets led to plans for an attack being indefinitely postponed. Wilkerson stated to this effect:

Later I would come back and find out that the air force general who had briefed me on the North Korean plan had ‘seen the light,’ if you will, and said ‘100,000 casualties, 30,000 of them in the first 30 days, a lot of them Americans – a quarter of a million American non-combatants in the Seoul region – maybe we shouldn’t do this one. Maybe we should put this one on a burner and do the easy ones – he called it the ‘low hanging fruit’, in the Middle East. This is the authority in the Pentagon talking, at that time, to his State Department representative who was absolutely floored by what they were doing.

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was justified based on fabricated evidence of developing weapons of mass destruction. In that sense, North Korea was a more compelling target: Pyongyang not only already had a substantial chemical weapons arsenal, but had just two months prior, in January 2003, withdrawn from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To do so, representatives cited Article 5 which allowed withdrawal in response to “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty” which “jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”

One month before Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT, the United States had cut the oil supplies that it was obliged to provide under the 1994 Agreed Framework. The deal had limited activities at North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for U.S. support for a civilian “proliferation-proof” nuclear program and normalization of political and economic ties, including sanctions relief within three months of signing. This included removing the listing of North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act, which was a key step towards normalizing economic ties. Other than the often delayed interim energy supplies to compensate for the closure of Korean nuclear facilities, however, Washington had over the past eight years otherwise neglected to uphold the large majority of its commitments – a fact that was highlighted repeatedly in a U.S. Senate hearing in 1998 and by the agreement’s chief negotiator Robert Gallucci.

The final collapse of the Agreed Framework in December paved the way to North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, removing the sole two treaties that had prohibited Pyongyang from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Estimates at the time indicated that it could have a nuclear arsenal that decade. Thus if Washington’s primary objective were to prevent countries outside its sphere of influence from acquiring nuclear capabilities, in early 2003 North Korea would have been the priority target for an attack – if all other factors were equal.

Even without nuclear weapons, however, North Korea was considered a particularly challenging target, with U.S. intelligence reports highlighting its continued investments “to improve and train its forward deployed forces” and “maintain current conventional force capabilities and military readiness” with an emphasis on “high impact” arms, which continued even in the aftermath of the Agreed Framework’s signing. Bush’s Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had himself particularly emphasized that North Korea’s tremendous network of underground fortifications, which included “underground emplacements of enormous numbers of weapons,” would make an invasion extremely difficult.

In 1994, when the Clinton administration was considering strikes on northern military facilities, Pentagon assessments projected that U.S. and South Korean forces would suffer over 540,000 military casualties in a war with the North. These estimates had only grown by the 2000s. And these projections consistently discounted the possibility of North Korea using unconventional weapons such as VX chemical agents.

By contrast, Iraq and Libya were by far weaker targets, with both having disarmed unilaterally and allowed deep inspections of their military facilities in exchange for promises of sanctions relief. Even Syria was a far tougher target. It fielded more chemical weapons than Iraq ever did, and from the 1990s Syria had significantly modernized its ballistic missile arsenal through acquisitions from North Korea. By the early 200s, Syria was fielding missile classes far longer ranged and more precise than any Iraq had ever had – more so when considering that Iraq had disarmed.

Wilkerson’s recollections indicate that, although North Korea was by far the most urgent target, and had initially been intended as the first to be invaded, its conventional military capabilities were sufficient to force the Bush administration to reassess its plans for an attack. This indicates a strong deterrent was in place long before North Korea had either tested nuclear weapons or demonstrated the ability to strike targets farther away than Japan.

While North Korean military capabilities were not sufficient to take U.S. military options totally off the table, as demonstrated by the widespread calls in the U.S. for an attack up to 2018, they were sufficient to divert attentions toward attacking other adversary states – the “low hanging fruit in the Middle East,” as Wilkerson recalled they were referred to.

This gave Pyongyang valuable time to strengthen its deterrent capabilities, with test nuclear detonations in 2006 and 2009 followed by accelerated modernization of both strategic and conventional arsenals in the 2010s. Nuclear weapons and ICBMs, which cost relatively little to develop, would gradually reduce the burden on the country’s then much more costly conventional forces, allowing for cuts to defense spending from around 2009 while providing a surer means of deterrence.

Had North Korea’s conventional capabilities not been what they were, however, the mid-2000s may have been characterized by a new Korean War after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, rather than a second war with Iraq, with very significant implications for the geopolitical landscape across the wider world.

Authors

Guest Author

A. B. Abrams

A. B. Abrams has published widely on international security and geopolitics with a focus on East Asia, and holds related Master's degrees from the University of London. Among his publications are the books “Immovable Object: North Korea’s 70 Years at War with American Power,” and “World War in Syria: Global Conflict on Middle Eastern Battlefields.” He speaks both Korean and Arabic.

thediplomat.com

18. Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’

And on a somewhat lighter note, the trailer can be seen at the link: https://www.historynet.com/watch-first-look-at-guy-ritchies-ministry-of-ungentlemanly-warfare/?utm

Excerpt:

Judging by the trailer, the film resembles a heist movie layered with all the quirks familiar to fans of Guy Ritchie’s films. The irreverent killing of Nazis using unconventional — if not gruesome — tactics also feels somewhat similar to “Kingsman: The Secret Service,” though the choreography of action scenes may not be as elaborate.

Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’

historynet.com · by Claire Barrett · January 30, 2024

Share This Article

The first official trailer for director Guy Ritchie’s action-packed World War II film, the “Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare,” has arrived.

Based on author Damien Lewis’ book of the same name, the movie recounts the origins of British special forces — stood up at the direction of Winston Churchill — as a clandestine military banditi assembled as the Special Operations Executive, or SOE. Using “ungentlemanly” methods, the group’s mission is to turn the tide of the war.

Judging by the trailer, the film resembles a heist movie layered with all the quirks familiar to fans of Guy Ritchie’s films. The irreverent killing of Nazis using unconventional — if not gruesome — tactics also feels somewhat similar to “Kingsman: The Secret Service,” though the choreography of action scenes may not be as elaborate.

The film stars Henry Cavill (”Man of Steel”) as the band’s leader, Gus March-Phillipps. Alan Ritchson (“Reacher”) and Eiza González (“Baby Driver”) co-star, with Jerry Bruckheimer (“Top Gun”) producing.

“The “Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare” hits theaters on April 19.

Originally published by Military Times, our sister publication.

Share This Article

Sarah Sicard is a Senior Editor with Military Times. She previously served as the Digitial Editor of Military Times and the Army Times Editor. Other work can be found at National Defense Magazine, Task & Purpose, and Defense News.

more by Sarah Sicard

Dive deeper

Citation information

APAMLAHarvardVancouverChicagoIEEE

Sarah Sicard (1/31/2024) Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’. HistoryNet Retrieved from https://www.historynet.com/watch-first-look-at-guy-ritchies-ministry-of-ungentlemanly-warfare/.

"Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’."Sarah Sicard - 1/31/2024, https://www.historynet.com/watch-first-look-at-guy-ritchies-ministry-of-ungentlemanly-warfare/

Sarah Sicard 1/30/2024 Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’., viewed 1/31/2024,https://www.historynet.com/watch-first-look-at-guy-ritchies-ministry-of-ungentlemanly-warfare/>

Sarah Sicard - Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’. [Internet]. [Accessed 1/31/2024]. Available from: https://www.historynet.com/watch-first-look-at-guy-ritchies-ministry-of-ungentlemanly-warfare/

Sarah Sicard. "Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’." Sarah Sicard - Accessed 1/31/2024. https://www.historynet.com/watch-first-look-at-guy-ritchies-ministry-of-ungentlemanly-warfare/

"Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’." Sarah Sicard [Online]. Available: https://www.historynet.com/watch-first-look-at-guy-ritchies-ministry-of-ungentlemanly-warfare/. [Accessed: 1/31/2024]

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 30, 2024

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 30, 2024

U.S. Presses for Long Cease-Fire to Pave Way for End of Gaza War

Draft agreement is designed to make it harder for Israel and Hamas to resume the conflict

Pentagon not taking Iran-backed militia pause declaration seriously

Chinese Hacking Against U.S. Infrastructure Threatens American Lives, Officials Say

U.S. officials say Beijing is preparing to set off potentially damaging cyberattacks in any future conflict, including over Taiwan

With Fate of Ukraine’s Top General in Question, All Eyes Turn to Zelensky

How Taiwan’s New President Should Respond to Chinese Coercion - War on the Rocks

Transparency for Victory: How Openness Can Improve Ukraine’s Public Relations - War on the Rocks

Selling the War at Home (Book Review) - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Related Posts

The ICJ ruling is not a loss for Israel - Anthony Avice Du Buisson

CIA director: Not passing Ukraine aid would be a mistake 'of historic proportions'

CIA director: Not passing Ukraine aid would be a mistake ‘of historic proportions’

Ukraine’s Drone Operators Race into the Future, Mostly with Overclocked Copters

Kyiv Confirms Drone Attack on St. Petersburg Oil Refinery, Claims UAV Dodged Russia’s Best Air Defense

Artists Fallen on the Battlefield

Ukraine Downs Russian Su-34 Fighter Jet Over Luhansk Region

Zaluzhny Dismissal Rumors – What We Know

China Says Trump Could Abandon Taiwan If He Wins US Election

What Holds Japan Back

And How Economic Reforms Could Overcome a Hidebound Old Guard

By Richard Katz

IN WITH THE NEW

THUMB ON THE SCALE

A MOVABLE OBJECT?

The Uyghurs: Kashgar Before the Catastrophe

Attack on US troops brings Iran confrontation closer

How North Korea Deterred an American Invasion in 2002

Watch: First Look at Guy Ritchie’s ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’

Dive deeper

Citation information