Quotes of the Day:

“Do you begin to see, then, what kind of world we are creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid hedonistic Utopias that the old reformers imagined. A world of fear and treachery and torment, a world which will grow not less but more merciless as it refines itself. Progress in our world will be progress toward more pain.” 

- George Orwell

“The happiness in your life depends upon the quality of your thoughts.”

- Marcus Aurelius

“Fear is the main source of superstition, and one of the main sources of cruelty. To conquer fear is the beginning of wisdom.” 

- Bertrand Russell

1. FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy | The White House

2. New National Security Strategy Returns Focus to Rules, Partnerships, and American Leadership

3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 12 (Putin's War)

4. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (12.10.22) CDS comments on key events

5. Elon Musk blocked Ukraine from using Starlink in Crimea over concern that Putin could use nuclear weapons, political analyst says

6. How Likely Is Nuclear War? Expert Explains Threat of Russia, North Korea

7. Biden security plan calls for diverse military, more nuclear spending

8. Freedom Caucus wants defense bill delayed if vaccine mandate not repealed

9. Russia pounds dozens of Ukraine towns, warns of escalation

10. United Nations condemns Russia's move to annex parts of Ukraine

11. Multi-domain task forces are growing, and shaping exercises overseas

12. Tracking China's preparations for war

13. US State Department says Iran nuclear deal 'not our focus right now'

14. The Logic of the Nuclear Triad

15. America’s arsenal is in need of life support

16.  Opinion | Our Generals Are Bad at Strategy. They Should Study the Civil Rights Movement.

17. Why U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers Are Irreplaceable

18. Kremlin Talking Points Are Back in the U.S. Debate

19. Biden warns US faces ‘decisive decade’ in rivalry with China

20. Army Harnessing Non-Kinetic Effects for Multi-Domain Ops in Indo-Pacific

21. Change is in the Mission for U.S. Special Operations Command

22. Ukraine’s Path to Victory

23. How to Avoid a War Over Taiwan

1. FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy | The White House

Access the new 48 page NSS here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

Some initial comments.

The emphasis on alliances is good.

I will receive criticism for this but "outmaneuvering geopolitical competitors" is a directive to conduct effective and superior political warfare. This excerpt from the first paragraph provides sufficient guidance for me.

Page 2. The 2022 National Security Strategy outlines how my Administration will seize this decisive decade to advance America’s vital interests, position the United States to outmaneuver our geopolitical competitors, tackle shared challenges, and set our world firmly on a path toward a brighter and more hopeful tomorrow. 

I would also add that effective integrated deterrence requires a political warfare strategy.

Spoiler alert for Korea watchers;

Page 12. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to expand its illicit nuclear weapons and missile programs. 

Page 38. We will seek sustained diplomacy with North Korea to make tangible progress toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while strengthening extended deterrence in the face of North Korean weapons of mass destruction and missile threats.

While the criticism has begun on social media I really do not think much more is necessary. In fact sometimes less is more. Yes it would have been better to specifically state a human rights up front approach north Korea but if you look at the 20 times human rights is addressed in the NSS there is sufficient guidance and justification for a human rights upfront approach. Some excerpts:

Page 6. This means that the foundational principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, and political independence must be respected, international institutions must be strengthened, countries must be free to determine their own foreign policy choices, information must be allowed to flow freely, universal human rights must be upheld, and the global economy must operate on a level playing field and provide opportunity for all. 

Page. 8.  Americans will support universal human rights and stand in solidarity with those beyond our shores who seek freedom and dignity, just as we continue the critical work of ensuring equity and equal treatment under law at home. We will work to strengthen democracy around the world because democratic governance consistently outperforms authoritarianism in protecting human dignity, leads to more prosperous and resilient societies, creates stronger and more reliable economic and security partners for the United States, and encourages a peaceful world order. In particular, we will take steps to show that democracies deliver—not only by ensuring the United States and its democratic partners lead on the hardest challenges of our time, but by working with other democratic governments and the private sector to help emerging democracies show tangible benefits to their own populations. We do not, however, believe that governments and societies everywhere must be remade in America’s image for us to be secure.

Note the above excerpt provides the foundation for a superior political warfare campaign against north Korea.

Page 16. To make our coalitions as inclusive as possible, we will also work with any country that supports a rules-based order while we continue to press all partners to respect and advance democracy and human rights.

Page 17. These democratic allies and partners are also essential to supporting democracy and human rights around the world. Actions to bolster democracy and defend human rights are critical to the United States not only because doing so is consistent with our values, but also because respect for democracy and support for human rights promotes global peace, security, and prosperity. 

Page 18. Together with our allies and partners, we are also holding states accountable for violations and abuses of human rights, including against ethnic and religious minorities, treating the fight against corruption as the core national security interest it is, countering transnational repression, and standing with people around the world on the front lines of the fight for dignity, equality and justice.

Why the document does not include north Korea here I cannot say:

Page 41. Together, we will support effective democratic governance responsive to citizen needs, defend human rights and combat gender-based violence, tackle corruption, and protect against external interference or coercion, including from the PRC, Russia, or Iran.

All one needs to do is read the reports at the Committee for Human Rights in North KOrea to understand the crimes being committed against women, among the many other crimes against humanity. https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php 

Despite the criticism above and the critiques we will hear in coming days, as a former planner I find a lot of substance I could use to generate supporting campaign plans to conduct effective political warfare at the national level in the gray zone of strategic competition that is taking place around the world and especially in the Asia Pacific (INDOPACIFIC). There is no perfect "strategy" and the purists will ask why there is no clear articulation of the traditional ends, ways, and means, assumptions, constraints, etc, (but no NSS has really ever laid out a strategy IAW the generally accepted "doctrine" even though there is no official such doctrine. The question is whether it provides sufficient guidance and objectives (aspirational and spectific) to develop supporting campaign plans and whatever we are calling mission strategic plans at the country teams at our embassies around the world. I find it sufficient.

FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · October 12, 2022

Read the full strategy here

President Biden’s National Security Strategy outlines how the United States will advance our vital interests and pursue a free, open, prosperous, and secure world. We will leverage all elements of our national power to outcompete our strategic competitors; tackle shared challenges; and shape the rules of the road.

The Strategy is rooted in our national interests: to protect the security of the American people, to expand economic opportunity, and to realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life. In pursuit of these objectives, we will:

• Invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence;
• Build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and
• Modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition.

COOPERATION IN THE AGE OF COMPETITION

In the early years of this decisive decade, the terms of geopolitical competition will be set while the window of opportunity to deal with shared challenges will narrow. We cannot compete successfully to shape the international order unless we have an affirmative plan to tackle shared challenges, and we cannot do that unless we recognize how heightened competition affects cooperation and act accordingly.

Strategic Competition. The most pressing strategic challenge we face as we pursue a free, open, prosperous, and secure world are from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy.

• We will effectively compete with the People’s Republic of China, which is the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order, while constraining a dangerous Russia.
• Strategic competition is global, but we will avoid the temptation to view the world solely through a competitive lens, and engage countries on their own terms.

Shared Challenges. While this competition is underway, people all over the world are struggling to cope with the effects of shared challenges that cross borders—whether it is climate change, food insecurity, communicable diseases, or inflation. These shared challenges are not marginal issues that are secondary to geopolitics. They are at the very core of national and international security and must be treated as such.

• We are building the strongest and broadest coalition of nations to enhance our collective capacity to solve these challenges and deliver for the American people and those around the world.
• To preserve and increase international cooperation in an age of competition, we will pursue a dual-track approach. On one track, we will work with any country, including our competitors, willing to constructively address shared challenges within the rules-based international order and while working to strengthen international institutions. On the other track, we will deepen cooperation with democracies at the core of our coalition, creating a latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships that prove democracies can deliver for their people and the world.

INVESTING AT HOME

The Biden-Harris Administration has broken down the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy because our strength at home and abroad are inextricably linked. The challenges of our age, from strategic competition to climate change, require us to make investments that sharpen our competitive edge and bolster our resilience.

• Our democracy is at the core of who we are and is a continuous work in progress. Our system of government enshrines the rule of law and strives to protect the equality and dignity of all individuals. As we strive to live up to our ideals, to reckon with and remedy our shortcomings, we will inspire others around the world to do the same.
• We are complementing the innovative power of the private sector with a modern industrial strategy that makes strategic public investments in our workforce, strategic sectors, and supply chains, especially in critical and emerging technologies.
• A powerful U.S. military helps advance and safeguard vital U.S. national interests by backstopping diplomacy, confronting aggression, deterring conflict, projecting strength, and protecting the American people and their economic interests. We are modernizing our military, pursuing advanced technologies, and investing in our defense workforce to best position America to defend our homeland, our allies, partners, and interests overseas, and our values across the globe.

OUR ENDURING LEADERSHIP

The United States will continue to lead with strength and purpose, leveraging our national advantages and the power of our alliances and partnerships. We have a tradition of transforming both domestic and foreign challenges into opportunities to spur reform and rejuvenation at home. The idea that we should compete with major autocratic powers to shape the international order enjoys broad support that is bipartisan at home and deepening abroad.

• Our alliances and partnerships around the world are our most important strategic asset that we will deepen and modernize for the benefit of our national security.
• We place a premium on growing the connective tissue on technology, trade and security between our democratic allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe because we recognize that they are mutually reinforcing and the fates of the two regions are intertwined.
• We are charting new economic arrangements to deepen economic engagements with our partners and shaping the rules of the road to level the playing field and enable American workers and businesses—and those of partners and allies around the world—to thrive.
• As we deepen our partnerships around the world, we will look for more democracy, not less, to shape the future. We recognize that while autocracy is at its core brittle, democracy’s inherent capacity to transparently course-correct enables resilience and progress.

AFFIRMATIVE ENGAGEMENT

The United States is a global power with global interests; we are stronger in each region because of our engagement in the others. We are pursuing an affirmative agenda to advance peace and security and to promote prosperity in every region.

• As an Indo-Pacific power, the United States has a vital interest in realizing a region that is open, interconnected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. We are ambitious because we know that we and our allies and partners hold a common vision for the region’s future.
• With a relationship rooted in shared democratic values, common interests, and historic ties, the transatlantic relationship is a vital platform on which many other elements of our foreign policy are built. To effectively pursue a common global agenda, we are broadening and deepening the transatlantic bond.
• The Western Hemisphere directly impacts the United States more than any other region so we will continue to revive and deepen those partnerships to advance economic resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security.
• A more integrated Middle East that empowers our allies and partners will advance regional peace and prosperity, while reducing the resource demands the region makes on the United States over the long term.
• In Africa, the dynamism, innovation, and demographic growth of the region render it central to addressing complex global problems.

###

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · October 12, 2022

2. New National Security Strategy Returns Focus to Rules, Partnerships, and American Leadership

The new NSS will be thoroughly parsed in the coming days.  

My question is how the NSS was developed? Was it done by a small team with direct access to the president to develop a focused strategy. Was it written by a broader committee from across the government? Was it staffed throughout the interagency with input solicited and accepted to ensure "agency equities" are represented? 

If done by a small team the strategy can be very focused but without sufficient "buy-in" from the interagency. If done by a committee with "too much input" it can be a watered down strategy consensus document.  

We should read and assess the strategy to determine which process might have been used.

New National Security Strategy Returns Focus to Rules, Partnerships, and American Leadership

China is a “pacing” threat, Russia just an “acute” one—but international partnerships, the old global order are key to beating both.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

The new National Security Strategy is a pitch of sorts, both to reassure U.S. allies that Washington still wants to lead on international rules, norms, ideals, and partnerships; and to convince the American people that such leadership will improve their own lives.

On Wednesday, the Biden administration released an unclassified version of the long-awaited document—it arrives seven months after the Defense Department submitted its classified National Defense Strategy—echoes its predecessor’s 2017 version in its focus on great power competition and China in particular. But the new strategy’s emphasis on America’s place in the international rules-based order marks a return from the Trump administration’s departure, and it also downgrades the Russian threat to “acute,” a step below China’s “pacing challenge.”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine delayed the strategy’s release but also vindicates the administration’s approach, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told reporters on Wednesday.

“Frankly, in February, there were a whole lot of people who thought the war would be over rapidly and Russia would be in a much better position than it is in today. And so we think what has actually unfolded over the last six months, which has defied many of the expectations…is a vindication of, of taking our time and being methodical in putting forward the strategy,” Sullivan said.

He said the Biden administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine “presents in living color the key elements of our approach, the emphasis on allies, the importance of strengthening the hand of the democratic world and standing up for our fellow democracies and for democratic values”

Sullivan said the strategy has three main elements:

• Invest in the “underlying sources and tools of American power and influence, especially our strength here at home” That means efforts to strengthen U.S. technology sector, restore U.S. manufacturing, and bolster governmental regulatory and research bodies.
• Build and maintain international coalitions. “both to shape the global strategic environment and to address these transnational threats.”
• Set international norms around things like democracy, trade, technology standards, etc., in a way that reflects not only US interests but also those of democratic allies.

On China, the strategy reaffirms that the United States does “not support Taiwan independence,” and “opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side.” The document pays considerably more attention to “maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical to regional and global security and prosperity and a matter of international concern and attention.” That language seems aimed at deterring a Chinese military attack on Taiwan in the near future without antagonizing Beijing over its ultimate plans to integrate the self-governing island.

On Russia, the strategy expects Putin to grow increasingly dangerous and erratic as his Ukraine war fails.

“Russia’s conventional military will have been weakened, which will likely increase Moscow’s reliance on nuclear weapons in its military planning. The United States will not allow Russia, or any power, to achieve its objectives through using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons,” it reads. The strategy reaffirms the U.S. commitment to “a more expansive, transparent, and verifiable arms control infrastructure,” without providing guidance on how to bring Russia along.

The strategy continues the “integrated deterrence” approach to conflict already outlined by the Biden administration, which essentially emphasizes interoperability across domains, with partners, and across the whole government.

But perhaps the strategy’s most important aspect is its recognition that U.S. military strength is only as secure as its core technological strength. The same is true for U.S. economic security.

“Since 1945, the United States has led the creation of institutions, norms, and standards to govern international trade and investment, economic policy, and technology. These mechanisms advanced America’s economic and geopolitical aims and benefited people around the world by shaping how governments and economies interacted—and did so in ways that aligned with U.S interests and values,” it says.

One of the most important things that the United States can do in the next ten years to preserve U.S. economic power and influence is build an international consensus on trade and intellectual property rules around technology. Both the economic and the military might that come from U.S. technological leadership are essential to the Biden administration’s vision for future security.

“Nowhere is this need more acute than in updating the rules of the road for technology, cyberspace, trade, and economics,” it reads.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

3. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 12 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12

Key Takeaways

• Russia is intensifying efforts to set information conditions to falsely portray Ukraine as a terrorist state to deflect recent calls to designate Russia as a terrorist state.
• Russian forces may have imported Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated personnel to occupied areas in Ukraine to train Russian troops in the use of Shahed-136 drones.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops continued counteroffensive operations toward Svatove and Kreminna. Russian forces are continuing defensive operations in this area.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting ground attacks in northwestern and western Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
• Russian forces are likely reinforcing the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian military continues to face problems equipping individual Russian soldiers with basic personal equipment.
• Russian and occupation administration officials continue to employ coercive measures against residents in Russian-occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 12

Oct 12, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 12, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russia has seemingly intensified its information operation to falsely portray Ukraine as a terrorist state, likely to set information conditions to counter efforts to designate Russia as a terrorist state. Several Russian sources made unverified claims that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers detained Ukrainian citizens for allegedly planning “terrorist attacks” in Sverdlovsk, Moscow, and Bryansk oblasts on October 12.[1] Russian milbloggers relatedly amplified rhetoric accusing Ukraine of being a terrorist state and calling for Russian authorities to enhance “counterintelligence” procedures and formally designate Ukraine as a terrorist state.[2] Claims of preparations for alleged and subversive Ukrainian activity in Russia align with a wider attempt to set information conditions to respond to Ukrainian attempts to formally designate Russia a terrorist state, especially in the wake of recent massive attacks on critical Ukrainian infrastructure and residential areas. The Russian information space may also be setting conditions to justify further massive strikes on Ukrainian rear areas; although, as ISW has previously assessed, these tactics are part of the Russian way of war and will likely be utilized regardless of informational conditions.[3] Russian authorities may also be setting conditions for false-flag attacks against Russia framed as Ukrainian-perpetrated acts of terrorism.

Russian forces may have brought Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated personnel to occupied areas in Ukraine to train Russian troops in the use of Shahed-136 drones. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 12 that Russian forces brought an unspecified number of Iranian instructors to Dzankoi in Crimea and Zalizniy Port and Hladivtsi in Kherson Oblast to teach Russian forces how to use Shahed-136 attack drones.[4] The Resistance Center stated that the Iranian instructors directly control the launch of drones on civilian targets in Ukraine, including in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[5] The IRGC is notably the primary operator of Iran‘s drone inventory, so these Iranian instructors are likely IRGC or IRGC-affiliated personnel.[6]

Key Takeaways

• Russia is intensifying efforts to set information conditions to falsely portray Ukraine as a terrorist state to deflect recent calls to designate Russia as a terrorist state.
• Russian forces may have imported Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated personnel to occupied areas in Ukraine to train Russian troops in the use of Shahed-136 drones.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops continued counteroffensive operations toward Svatove and Kreminna. Russian forces are continuing defensive operations in this area.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting ground attacks in northwestern and western Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
• Russian forces are likely reinforcing the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian military continues to face problems equipping individual Russian soldiers with basic personal equipment.
• Russian and occupation administration officials continue to employ coercive measures against residents in Russian-occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna on October 12. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces in the vicinity of Kyslivka, Kharkiv Oblast (25km northwest of Svatove).[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian assaults in the direction of Tabaivka (24km northwest of Svatove) and Orlianka (29km northwest of Svatove) in Kharkiv Oblast and in the direction of Kuzemivka, Luhansk Oblast (13km northwest of Svatove).[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced to the outskirts of Vilshana (44km northwest of Svatove) and reinforced positions in Dvorchina (54km northwest of Svatove) with air defense systems on October 12.[9] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Zherebets River northwest of Kreminna near Raihorodka, Karmazinovka, Andriivka, Makiivka, and Novoliubivka in Luhansk Oblast.[10] ISW makes no effort to evaluate these Russian claims and does not forecast Ukrainian ground movements. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire in the Kupyansk direction.[11]

Russian forces continued to conduct counterattacks west of Kreminna while strengthening defensive positions in the Svatove-Kreminna area on October 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack on Novosadove (16km west of Kreminna), despite recent Russian claims that Russian forces captured the settlement.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are still operating in Terny and Yampolivka (both 17km west of Kremina), despite similar claims that Russian forces recently occupied those settlements.[13] The Russian milblogger added that Russian forces regained control of the left bank of the Zherebets River and that the area around Torske is currently a grey zone, although ISW cannot independently verify these claims.[14] Ukrainian and social media sources reported that Russian forces continue efforts to establish trenches and fortified defensive positions along the Kreminna-Svatove line.[15] Ukrainian sources also reported that Russian forces continue to mine bridges and territory around Kreminna-Svatove.[16] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces completely control the Kreminna-Savtove highway despite previous reports of Ukrainian forces shelling the road and conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations in the area.[17] Russian forces may be conducting counterattacks west of Kreminna to delay Ukrainian advances and buy Russian forces time to reinforce and resupply units and strengthen defensive positions in the Kreminna-Svatove area. However, the Russian elements in this area are likely substantially understrength. Odesa Oblast administration spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk, citing unspecified partner sources, reported on October 12 that elements of the Russian 488th Motor Rifle Regiment of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division stationed near Kreminna are experiencing critical supply issues after Ukrainian forces struck Russian supply columns in the area on October 10 and 11.[18]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops conducted counteroffensive operations in northwestern and western Kherson Oblast on October 12. Several milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing efforts to push south of the current frontline in northwestern Kherson Oblast and attacking toward Mylove (30km northeast of Beryslav along the western bank of the Dnipro River).[19] Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian troops are attempting to advance past the Davydiv Brid pocket in western Kherson Oblast, with several milbloggers indicating that Ukrainians attacked toward Ishchenka and Kostromka (both within 10km south of Davyid Brid) from positions near Davydiv Brid.[20] ISW makes no effort to evaluate these claims or make forecasts regarding Ukrainian ground attacks in Kherson Oblast.

Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian troops liberated five settlements in northern Kherson Oblast and otherwise maintained operational silence regarding specific Ukrainian ground maneuvers in this area on October 12. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian troops successfully retook control of Novovasylivka, Novohryhorivka, Nova Kamianka, Trifonivka, and Chervone—all settlements in northern Kherson Oblast within 25km south of the Dnipropetrosk Oblast border that Ukrainian forces liberated around October 4.[21] Ukrainian military officials also noted that Ukrainian troops are continuing their interdiction campaign to target Russian concentration areas and military assets in Kherson Oblast to support ongoing ground maneuvers.[22] Residents of Kherson Oblast posted imagery reportedly of the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes near Kherson City in the Chornobaivka and Komyshany areas, in the Nova Kakhovka-Beryslav area, and southwest of Kherson City in Nova Zburivka.[23]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults near Bakhmut; to the northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar, Spirne, and Bakhmutske; and to the south of Bakhmut near Mayorsk, Ivanhrad, and Mykolaivka.[24] A Russian source reiterated claims that Wagner Group forces entrenched themselves in Ivanhrad and advanced within a few kilometers of the center of Bakhmut.[25] A Russian source also claimed that Russian forces seized an unspecified “important” road junction northeast of Bakhmut, likely referring to the E40 and T1302 intersection.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks west of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka.[27] Russian sources claimed that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 100th Brigade made unspecified advances toward Nevelske, just northwest of Donetsk City.[28] The RussianMoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian ground attack near Novodarivka in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[29]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces are likely reinforcing the Zaporizhia Oblast front line as of October 12. Pro-Kremlin Russian news outlet RIA Novosti reported a Russian soldier’s claims that Russian forces have equipped defensive lines along the Orikhiv-Polohy front and are prepared to advance.[30] Russian forces are likely unable to conduct offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast; the RIA Novosti report is likely a response to the sustained milblogger concern over a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south. Russian milbloggers continue expressing concern that Ukrainian forces are preparing to launch a counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast but are divided about whether the attack is imminent or postponed.[31] The Russian military may have reinforced the Zaporizhia front with elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA). Russian sources posted footage of a Russian T-90M tank of an unspecified element of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) firing at a target in an unspecified area along the Zaporizhia Oblast front line.[32] Ukrainian and Western sources previously reported the 58th CAA is severely degraded, and Russian sources reported on September 9 that Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod delivered a batch of T-90M tanks to the Russian Ministry of Defense and directed factories to work around the clock to increase production.[33]

Russian forces continued routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts on October 12.[34] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City, Mykolaiv City, and Ochakiv.[35] Ukrainian sources also reported that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to strike Nikopol and Marhanets on the northern bank of the Dnipro River.[36] The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications reported that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in Tokmak, destroying six S-300 air-defense systems on October 11.[37]

Russian forces have likely increased their usage of logistics lines through southern Zaporizhia and western Donetsk oblasts after the Kerch Bridge attack. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Adviser Petro Andryushchenko posted footage on October 12 of Russian military equipment, including transport trucks, fuel trucks, and engineering equipment, headed both east and west from Mariupol.[38] Andryushchenko also stated that Russian forces have established temporary military storage and housing facilities in Mariupol.[39] The Russian reaction may also indicate increased fear at the possibility of further degradation of Russian logistics lines through Crimea apart from fears about the Kerch Strait Bridge.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) released its findings on the cause of the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge in Crimea on October 11. The FSB claimed that the Ukrainian government transported the explosives used in the attack from Ukraine through the port of Odesa. Russian milbloggers amplified the FSB report and highlighted this detail as part of their calls for the Russian government to either not renew or pull out of the current agreement that allows Ukraine to export grain through the Black Sea.[40]

Russian and Ukrainian sources exchanged accusations of shelling the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on October 12; the shelling disconnected the ZNPP from external power lines for the second time in five days.[41] Ukrainian state nuclear agency Energoatom reported on October 12 that Ukrainian engineers restored the ZNPP to the Ukrainian power grid.[42] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a 30-person Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group from advancing on the ZNPP from the Dnipro River.[43]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military continued facing problems equipping individual Russian soldiers with basic personal equipment—including winter gear. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhayev announced that a Sevastopol entrepreneurial clothing brand organized a group of local seamstresses and sewed almost 400 pairs of thermal underwear for Russian forces for free when the brand learned that Russian forces need winter clothing.[44] Razvozhayev stated that he would buy an additional 1000 pairs of thermal underwear to help supply Russian forces.[45] One Russian milblogger stated that Russian soldiers complain too much and that running out of basic provisions like underwear, toilet paper, and soap is just a harsh reality of war.[46] The Russian MoD continued downplaying of these problems may further decrease effectiveness of Russia’s mobilization efforts. The Russian MoD emphasized that all mobilized servicemen receive modern equipment, protective equipment, medical, tactical gear, appropriate field uniforms, and first-aid kits.[47] Russian forces are likely experiencing shortages of more advanced equipment as well. A Russian milblogger promoted a Russian crowdfunding initiative to provide Russian soldiers with other supplies like transport vehicles, thermal imagers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and battalion and brigade-level communication equipment.[48]

The Russian government continues to send poorly disciplined mobilized Russians to Ukraine with little to no training. An anonymous Ukrainian military officer reportedly stated that hundreds of Russian convicts offered pardons for combat have already showed up on the battlefield in Ukraine and that some have gone absent without leave.[49] More than 100 Russian conscripts from Bryansk reportedly refused to deploy to Ukraine from their base in Soloti, Belgorod Oblast.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that 500 mobilized replacements equipped with Soviet-era gear already joined the Russian 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 49th Combined Arms Army in combat in Ukraine.[51]

Russian occupation forces continue forming ad hoc units in occupied Ukraine comprised of Ukrainian citizens. Kherson Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo stated on October 12 that Russian occupation forces are forming a volunteer reconnaissance battalion named after Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Margelov in occupied Kherson Oblast.[52] Saldo claimed that Russian occupation authorities are not mobilizing Kherson residents but calling on interested individuals to volunteer.[53]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation administration officials continue to employ coercive measures against residents of Russian-occupied territories to generate forced support for Russian military operations in Ukraine. Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on October 11 that Russian and occupation administration officials have detained and tortured more than 700 Melitopol residents in pursuit of coerced confessions and to compel cooperation with the Zaporizhia occupation administration.[54] Fedorov also reported on October 12 that Russian and occupation administration officials forced Melitopol residents to donate blood for wounded Russian soldiers.[55] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 12 that Russian forces have placed military personnel and equipment in schools in Yasynuvata, Donetsk Oblast, Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Kadiivka, Luhansk Oblast, and in Myrolyubivka and Hladivka in Kherson Oblast.[56] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian forces quartering in Ukrainian schools during the Ukrainian school year means that these measures amount to Russian forces using schoolchildren as “human shields,” although ISW has no independent confirmation that the schools are in use by troops or students at this time.[57]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[4] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/12/na-tymchasovo-okupovani-terytoriyi-rosiyany-zvezly-iranskyh-instruktoriv/ ; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/20571

[5] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/12/na-tymchasovo-okupovani-terytoriyi-rosiyany-zvezly-iranskyh-instruktoriv/; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/20571

[33] https://ura dot news/news/1052585521; https://ura dot news/news/1052582816; https://rossaprimavera dot ru/news/981b15c5; https://rossaprimavera dot ru/news/783b4f65; https://og47 dot ru/2022/09/11/laquoUralvagonzavodraquo-postavil-Minoborony-RF-partiyu-novykh-tankov-T-90M-laquoProryvraquo-32097; https://t.me/kommunist/9232; https://sports.yahoo.com/russias-leading-58th-army-destroyed-184646857.h... https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=external&v=1536190163441448

[39] Andryushchenko

[43] https://t.me/vrogov/5542; https://ria dot ru/20221012/zaes-1823336410.html; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/66931; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/41556

[46] https://vk dot com/@kuban24_tv-pochemu-na-peredovoi-net-chistogo-belya-i-stoit-li-eto-obsch; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/6468

[56] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/12/popry-start-navchalnogo-roku-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-rozmishhuvaty-vijskovyh-v-shkolah-na-tot/

[57] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/12/popry-start-navchalnogo-roku-rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-rozmishhuvaty-vijskovyh-v-shkolah-na-tot/

understandingwar.org

4. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (12.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (12.10.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

The Ukrainian energy system is functioning normally, and there was no need to ask for emergency help from European neighbors. There is no capacity deficit. The repair work is ongoing. In total, electricity supply has been restored for almost 4,000 towns and villages and millions of consumers, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said. He stressed that Ukraine was ready for the fact that Russia would try to destroy critical infrastructure facilities, and various response scenarios had been developed.

Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Karim Khan said that the court would investigate the Russian massive missile attack on Ukraine on October 10. He stressed that international law would ensure that the perpetrators are punished. "We have to be there to get to the truth," he said.

A special tribunal is being created in the Hague to try Putin and the political leadership of Russia, Current Time TV reported. The tribunal is being formed at the request of Ukraine and will involve the best international lawyers. They [political leadership] will be tried for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The court will be able to start work in about a year.

Russian forces continue targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure. In particular, the head of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration, Valentyn Reznichenko, said that this morning, the Russian military hit the energy infrastructure in the Kamianka district. There was a large fire and significant damage. The head of the Sumy Administration, Dmytro Zhyvytsky, reported two hits on energy infrastructure in Sumy and Shostka districts, leading to power outages.

Russia continues to terrorize peaceful residents in Ukraine. The authorities of seven central Ukraine regions, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovograd, Poltava, Chernihiv and Cherkasy, reported on Wednesday about air raids, missile strikes and the operation of air defense systems. The Russian forces shelled the Nikopol district of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with Grad MLRS and heavy artillery all night long. Three people were injured in Nikopol, including a 6-year-old girl who had to have both her legs amputated. Doctors assess the condition of the wounded as serious. At least 7 civilians were killed and 8 wounded as a result of the morning shelling of Avdiyivka, Donetsk Oblast, where the Russians struck the busy central market.

More than 70 people have died in Zaporizhzhia since September 30 due to Russian attacks, and hundreds of the city residents have been injured, the head of the Zaporizhia Regional Military Administration, Oleksandr Starukh, said. "All the missiles that hit the city are precision-guided missiles. They fly where they were directed", Starukh stressed.

Ukraine will need $17 billion to restore critical infrastructure, destroyed homes and schools, President Volodymyr Zelensky said.

During an additional inspection, prosecutors of the Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office discovered the body of the 25th victim, who died as a result of a Russian shooting into the civilian caravan on September 25. A 75-year-old woman crawled about 200 meters away from the place and died in the nearby forest strip.

Occupied territories

The Russian Federal Security Service reported that a total of 8 people were detained in connection with the Kerch Strait Bridge exposition. There are five citizens of Russia, three citizens of Ukraine and Armenia. The organizer, the Russians believe, was Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence and its head, Kyrylo Budanov. Russian propagandist Volodymyr Solovyov has already called Kyrylo Budanov "target No. 1" in his Telegram channel.

Russian special service personnel received evacuation plans in all temporarily occupied territories, particularly in Crimea, where many officers are stationed. According to Ukraine's Center of National Resistance, the families of the Ukrainian nationals who agreed to cooperate with the occupying authorities, "leaders" of the districts, and the top military leaders have already begun to leave the temporarily occupied territories.

The Russian occupiers almost completely blocked the departure of Ukrainians from the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast after Russia signed the "document" on the accession of this region. Over the past day, about 60 people left. In addition, it is known that the Russians abducted at least 529 people in the region, reported the head of Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration, Oleksandr Starukh.

The head of Rosatom, Alexei Likhachev, said that several units of the Zaporizhzhia NPP stolen from Ukraine are planned to be converted to Russian fuel. They currently run on fuel from the American electrical company Westinghouse. However, the timing of the move was not announced.

Operational situation

(please note that this part of the report is on the previous day's (Oct 11) developments)

It is the 231st day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories. It concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops, and continues the offensive in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions.

The Russian military shells the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the entire contact line, fortifies defensive positions and frontiers in certain directions, and conducts aerial reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and customs of war, it strikes critical infrastructure and residential quarters. Thus, during the past day, the occupiers launched one ballistic and twenty-eight cruise missiles. Twenty of them were shot down by Ukrainian air defense units. In addition, the Russian military launched thirteen airstrikes and fired more than forty rounds of anti-aircraft fire. Objects and civilians in more than

forty towns and villages, including Lviv, Popivka, Chuhunivka, Ladyzhyn, Kryvyi Rih, Zaporizhzhia, Pavlohrad, and Nikopol, were affected by these criminal actions. The Russian forces also used fourteen kamikaze drones to attack critical infrastructure in Odesa and Mykolaiv Oblasts, twelve of these UAVs were destroyed. In the border areas, Senkivka of Chernihiv Oblast, Seredyna-Buda, Novovasylivka and Sorokyne of Sumy Oblast, Strelecha, Krasne, Ohirtseve, Vovchanski Khutory, Staritsa, Dvorichna and Dvorichne of Kharkiv Oblast were shelled.

The threat of Russian air and missile strikes persists throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.

As a result of the successful actions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and a large number of wounded [Russian personnel], there is a shortage of medical workers in the temporarily occupied territories of Luhansk Oblast. Therefore, to replenish the hospital staff, the self-proclaimed leaders of the region sent a request for the secondment of medical personnel from the central and eastern regions of the Russian Federation.

The aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 15 strikes over the past day. Hits on 13 areas of enemy weapons and military equipment concentration and on 2 Russian anti-aircraft missile systems are confirmed.

Over the past day, Ukraine's missile forces and artillery hit 12 enemy command posts, 17 areas of manpower, weapons and military equipment concentration, 4 ammunition depots, and more than 20 other important objects.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus declares that the Republic of Belarus is ready to provide assistance to the Russian Federation in the war against Ukraine. The defense and industrial complex of the Republic of Belarus is already involved in repairing Russian equipment damaged in action. In addition, the first batch of twenty T-72 tanks was removed from storage and sent to the Russian Belgorod Oblast.

During the last week, the transfer of T-72A tanks, 2s3 self-propelled guns, D-30 and D-20 howitzers, engineering equipment, cargo vehicles, and specialized vehicles from the Republic of Belarus to the Russian Belgorod and Rostov oblasts was recorded. This weaponry is removed from long-term storage and shipped from the 969th tank reserve base (Uryechye village, Lubansk district, Minsk Oblast), the 1868th artillery armament base (Gomel), the 288th reserve base of automobile equipment (Stari Dorogy, Minsk Oblast), 25th rocket and artillery weapons arsenal (Novokolosovo village, Stolbtsovsk district, Minsk Oblast), 1371st engineering base for the storage of engineering weapons (Krasne village, Molodechnensk district, Minsk Oblast).

The first formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, formed out of the persons drafted as a part of the partial mobilization, began to arrive on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. At the moment, up to 1,000 Russian military personnel have arrived.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low.

Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The Russian troops' command continues to make significant efforts to push units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces south of Svatove away from the R-66 Svatove - Kreminna rocade road, which is important for Russian troops. In particular, it employs up to three BTGs from the 254th motorized rifle regiment of the 144th motorized rifle division, the 55th separate motorized rifle brigade, detachments of the "Wagner" PMC, 13th and 16th BARS detachments to counterattack the positions of the advanced units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the area of Raihorodok, Karmazynivka. The Russian forces conduct persistent and stubborn attacks in the direction of Krasnorichenske - Ploschanka - Makiivka.

In addition, the Russian military continues its attempts to counterattack from the Chervonpopivka-Zhytlivka frontier in the direction of Terny, using for the assault squads individuals recruited among those convicted in the Russian Federation and serving sentences in correctional institutions. It conducts active deterrent actions in the Kolomiychikha area with forces of up to two BTGs of the 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army.

The enemy has so far failed to complete this task and ensure the stability of its defense system northwest of Kreminna and northwest and southwest of Svatove. The R-66 road remains under the fire control of the advance units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and they are able to reach close approaches to Svatove.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

●  252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The Russian forces fired mortars, tanks, barrel and jet artillery in the areas around Pershotravneve, Kovalivka, Terny, Yampolivka, Torske, Serebryanka, Bilohorivka and Siversk.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military inflicted fire damage in the areas of Bilohorivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Klishchiivka, Odradivka, Opytne, Mayorsk, Spirne, Yakovlivka, Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka and Novomykhailivka.

Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled the Russian attacks in the areas of Mykolaivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Mayorsk, Pervomaiske and Krasnohorivka.

Zaporizhzhia direction

●  Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian forces did not conduct offensive actions. Velyka Novosilka, Neskuchne, Mali Shcherbaky, Orihiv, and Chervone were shelled by tanks, mortars, and barrel and jet artillery.

Tavriysk direction

-    Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;

-   Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.

The Russian military continues shelling the positions of Ukrainian units to deter the counteroffensive along the entire contact line. Areas of more than twenty towns and villages were affected by artillery fire. In particular, Velyke Artakove, Davydiv Brid, Blahodativka, Sukhy Stavok, Shyroke, Ternovi Pody, Soldatske, Pravdyne and Myrne.

In Kherson Oblast, the occupiers continue to raid agricultural enterprises, conduct an inventory of assets there and re-register them under Russian legislation.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

In the open sea, the Russian naval group numbers 14 units located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Among them are 2 carriers of cruise missiles - two corvettes of project 21631 with a total of 16 missiles. According to updated data, during October 10-11, the Russian military used 14 "Kalibr" cruise missiles.

There are also three large amphibious ships of project 775 in the sea (perhaps being tested after the completion of maintenance in Sevastopol). The remaining eight amphibious ships are based in Novorossiysk and Sevastopol. The combat coordination of about 2,000 mobilized personnel, including 600 from Sevastopol, continues at the base of the 810th marines brigade. Their training is to be completed end of October. Some of them may form a marines grouping. The local occupation "authority" is trying to raise their morale by introducing family benefits and purchasing additional personal equipment (standard equipment of the 1960s) for the mobilized, among other things.

In the Sea of Azov waters, patrol ships and boats are located on the approaches to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports to block the Azov coast.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 14 Su-27, Su-30, and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved. Passenger planes Tu-154B (registration number RA- 85586) and Tu-154M (registration number RA-85041) from the 224th special flight detachment of the Russian Air Force arrived from the central part of Russia to the Crimean peninsula, delivering another batch of mobilized personnel.

The Russian military continues shelling Ukrainian ports and coastal areas. On the morning of October 12, the Russian forces attacked Odesa and Mykolayiv with "Shahid 136" kamikaze drones. Most of them were shot down by air defense.

The internal political situation in Crimea remains difficult in connection with the explosion and fire on the Kerch Strait Bridge on October 8. According to Russian estimates, the bridge's restoration will take at least 1.5-2 months. Currently, road and rail traffic is limited only to the transportation of passengers in passenger cars and trains.

Freight transportation to mainland Russia is carried out by "Lavrentiy", "Kerchensky-2", and "Yeysk" ferries (previously used to deliver cargo to Mariupol). A kilometer-long traffic jam has formed on both sides of the crossing; the traffic jam on the Crimean side reaches up to 4 km, with 800 trucks in line.

"Grain Initiative": 9 ships with more than 150,000 tons of agricultural products left the ports of Great Odesa for the countries of Africa, Asia and Europe. Among them are the bulk carrier KLC ERCIYES, which will deliver 11,500 tons of soybeans to Egypt, the bulk carrier SIMAS – 13,400 tons of corn to Lebanon, and the tanker AGNES VICTORY – 42,000 tons of oil for India. Bulk carriers LUCKY, KLC ERCIYES, ELIF S, GREAT ARSENAL departed from the berths of Odesa port. SIMAS, JASMIN QUEEN, LUGANO left the port of Chornomorsk. Ships AGNES VICTORY, EGE BEY left the port of Pivdenny.

Since August 1, when the first ship with Ukrainian food left, 325 ships have exported 7.2 million tons of agricultural products from Ukrainian ports to countries in Asia, Europe and Africa.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 12.10

Personnel - almost 63,380 people (+270);

Tanks 2,505 (+1);

Armored combat vehicles – 5,181 (+19);

Artillery systems – 1,507 (+11);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 355 (+2); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 182 (+1); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,927 (+11); Aircraft - 268 (+1);

Helicopters – 235 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,129 (+15); Intercepted cruise missiles - 315 (+20);

Boats / ships - 15 (0).

Ukraine, general news

Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said it is possible to stop scheduled blackouts if electricity consumption is reduced by 25% between 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. throughout Ukraine. "We are grateful to all Ukrainians who deliberately reduced their electricity consumption yesterday and the night before yesterday. The total savings amounted to 10%.

International diplomatic aspect

"We express our daily regret that Western heads of state, in the United States and Europe, engage in nuclear rhetoric every day," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov referred to the growing number of warnings from the Western leaders that consider initial Vladimir Putin's nuclear blackmail reckless and dangerous.

The head of the UK GCHQ has said there are no current indications that Russia is considering using nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war. "I'm sure Putin's worried about the dangers of escalation. He thinks about those in different terms. But I think it is a sign that he has not reached for these other forms of waging war," said Sir Jeremy Fleming during a lecture at the RUSI.

A Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine would likely change the course of the conflict and trigger a kinetic response from the West, a senior NATO official said. He added that so far, nuclear threats have been used by Moscow mainly to deter NATO from siding with Ukraine on the battleground.

In the meantime, the following week, NATO will hold "Steadfast Noon," an annual nuclear deterrence exercise. "I think it would send a very wrong signal if we suddenly now canceled a routine, long-time planned exercise because of the war in Ukraine. So, if we now created the grounds for any misunderstanding, a miscalculation in Moscow about our willingness to protect and defend all Allies, we would increase the risk of escalation, and that's the last thing we will do," NATO Secretary-General explained the reasons why the Alliance isn't going to put off the drill.

NATO Secretary-General couldn't be more right, especially given that Russia wasn't deterred from a range of escalatory steps last year and this year because of the US decision to postpone the scheduled ICBM tests several times. The Kremlin should see no gap between the rhetoric that the Alliance is firm and ready to defend every inch of its territory and the actions on the ground. The West should dismiss the manipulative and misleading wording of the Russian officials while conveying a strong message to the Kremlin, the international community, and respective societies that only firmness in the face of escalation could avert it, and consolatory rhetoric is just inviting Russia to push further.

"We could move the lost volumes from the Nord Streams along the bottom of the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea region and thus make the main routes for the supply of our fuel, our natural gas to

Europe through Turkey, creating the largest gas hub for Europe in Turkey," Vladimir Putin said at an energy conference in Moscow. "That is, of course, if our partners are interested in this. And economic feasibility, of course," he added. The Russian President again pushed the conspiracy theory that the US was likely behind the explosions on Nord Stream pipelines. Whoever did this, "economic feasibility" was hardly behind both Nord Stream projects from the beginning, as well as the idea of exporting gas via the Black Sea route. Russia started the energy war against Western Europe this spring, and the Europeans have shifted to alternative markets.

"Our prosperity has been based on cheap energy coming from Russia. Russian gas – cheap and supposedly affordable, secure, and stable. It has been proved not [to be] the case… We have to find new ways for energy from inside the European Union, as much as we can, because we should not change one dependency for another," High Representative Josep Borrell addressed the EU Ambassadors Annual Conference.

It's highly likely that, facing difficulties in redirecting natural gas flows from the attractive European market and blaming European policies for triggering the energy crisis, Putin is trying to drive a wedge between Europeans. Hungary is helping Moscow to avoid certain sanctions and pretend that Russia is not diplomatically isolated. The Hungarian Foreign Minister is in Moscow talking to Gazprom for the second time since Russia launched its full-scale aggression. At the same time, Putin aims for Turkey, a would-be European hub, to side with him. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been trying to expand his diplomatic success and serve as a mediator of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.

Elon Musk might have talked to Vladimir Putin before twitting his infamous "peace plan." His plan is seen in Kyiv and by Ukrainian partners as Putin's whims list. It envisaged Russia's sovereignty over Crimea and guaranteed water supply to the illegally annexed peninsula, new "referenda" in the occupied territories, and Ukraine's neutrality. However, the business genius didn't offer anything to Ukraine and feasible explanations of why Ukraine should agree to such a plan, given its resolve to free all of its territory and successful UAF counteroffensive. Furthermore, the "plan" contained no reaction to Russia's recent illegal annexations and its numerous war crimes.

Had Elon Musk talked to Putin before publishing the plan, which he denies, this action might violate the Logan Act, prohibiting unauthorized negotiations that might undermine the US government's position. It is something that Michael Flynn, the first Donald Trump national security advisor, did, asking the Russian Ambassador not to escalate and get sanctions relief in return. Flynn pleaded guilty to "wilfully and knowingly" making "false, fictitious and fraudulent statements" to the FBI about his conversations with the Russian diplomat.

"We will address how to ramp up support for Ukraine, and the top priority will be more air defense for Ukraine," NATO Secretary-General said. Germany has already delivered IRIS-T, and the US promised to provide air defense systems. "These victories belong to Ukraine's brave soldiers. But the Contact Group's security assistance, training, and sustainment efforts have been vital," US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said at the beginning of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group's meeting in Brussels.

Canada will donate $47 million in artillery ammunition, drone cameras, satellite services, and winter clothing to help meet Ukraine's defense needs. Germany will deliver several PzH2000 howitzers in the next few weeks and MARS II MLRS. France has reportedly promised the delivery of three LRU MLRS (upgraded M270s).

The EU ambassadors agreed on a mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament aimed at the non-acceptance of Russian travel documents issued in the occupied territories of Ukraine and Georgia. It's going to fill the gap in the non-recognition policy.

Russia, relevant news

Over the past seven days, 25,000 Russian nationals have entered the European Union, 50% less than a week earlier. Most of the entrants have crossed the Estonian and Finnish border, according to the data of the Frontex EU border control agency.

On Wednesday, the government of the Czech Republic decided to increase visa restrictions for Russian citizens. Russian citizens entering the Czech territory through the external Schengen border, particularly the Czech international airport, for tourism, sports, or culture will now be refused entry, the Czech government website states.

The Bulgarian government has suspended an agreement on visa-free entry into the country for Russian citizens with diplomatic and service passports, “Kommersant” reports.

The Lefortovo Court of Moscow arrested a citizen of Ukraine, Viktor Yakushin, for two months. The Russian FSB accused him of delivering two Igla man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems from Kyiv to Moscow Oblast. FSB investigators calmed that the MANPADs were intended to commit terrorist acts.

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5. Elon Musk blocked Ukraine from using Starlink in Crimea over concern that Putin could use nuclear weapons, political analyst says

Thanks Mr. Musk. You certainly cannot be trusted to do the right thing.

Elon Musk blocked Ukraine from using Starlink in Crimea over concern that Putin could use nuclear weapons, political analyst says

Business Insider · by Charles R. Davis

At left, a Starlink terminal. At right, Elon Musk.

Getty Images

• Elon Musk denied a Ukrainian request to enable the use of Starlink in Russian-occupied Crimea.
• The analyst Ian Bremmer said Musk told him he feared a Ukrainian offensive could start a nuclear war.
• Musk denied that he'd recently spoken with Russian President Vladimir Putin, as Bremmer had claimed.

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Elon Musk personally rejected a Ukrainian request to extend his satellite internet service to Crimea, fearing that an effort to retake the peninsula from Russian forces could lead to a nuclear war, the influential political analyst Ian Bremmer said in a newsletter published on Monday.

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February, Musk — and the US government — provided Kyiv with thousands of Starlink systems, enabling Ukrainian forces to communicate in what had previously been dead zones. The low energy requirements of the service's satellite receivers have enabled connection to reconnaissance drones, providing valuable real-time intelligence on Russian movements and the ability to target them, Yahoo News reported in August.

But recently there have been problems. Last week, a senior Ukrainian government official told the Financial Times reported that the service was suffering "catastrophic" outages on the front lines, prompting speculation that it had been shut off in areas controlled by Russia — perhaps to prevent the Kremlin from exploiting the network.

On Twitter, Musk said he could not comment on battlefield conditions, saying, "That's classified." But Bremmer, the founder and president of the political-risk research firm Eurasia Group, said on Monday that in a conversation with Musk in late September, Musk appeared to confirm that the satellite service was being intentionally disabled.

Neither SpaceX nor Ukraine's ministry of defense immediately responded to requests for comment.

Bremmer said Musk told him he'd been asked by Ukraine's defense ministry to activate Starlink in Crimea, which Russia invaded and illegally annexed in 2014. Bremmer said Musk "refused given the potential for escalation."

According to Bremmer, Musk claimed to have recently spoken with Russian President Vladimir Putin, asserting that he was "prepared to negotiate." (Musk this month proposed a Ukraine peace plan seen as aligning with Russian interests.) Bremmer said Musk told him that in that conversation, Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons if Ukraine tried to retake the Crimean peninsula, which serves as the base for Russia's naval forces on the Black Sea.

On Twitter, however, Musk flatly denied having any recent conversation with the Russian leader, writing on Tuesday that he had "spoken to Putin only once and that was about 18 months ago." The subject, he said, "was space." Bremmer was likewise adamant, tweeting that Musk "told me he had spoken with putin and the kremlin directly about ukraine."

Russian forces have been losing ground in Ukraine's south and have lost huge swaths in Ukraine's east as they've pressed into regions Russia declared it had annexed, sparking concern among arms-control experts about whether Putin and his top advisers may contemplate an attack with a nuke from their vast arsenal in an attempt to stanch their losses.

Have a news tip? Email this reporter: cdavis@insider.com

Business Insider · by Charles R. Davis

6. How Likely Is Nuclear War? Expert Explains Threat of Russia, North Korea

Excerpts:

Being totally realistic and honest, if America was hit with a nuclear weapon, is there anything people can do or we pretty much at that point, you say your prayers and that’s the end of it?

Geller: Yeah. I mean, I make the joke that I’ll be running to the church if there’s any nuclear weapon underway. But yeah, I mean, there’s two parts that we have to worry about on nuclear attack. There’s the initial blast, which could be huge. Russia I know has nuclear bombs on the order of mega tons, that’s at least a million tons of nuclear explosive material that, I hate to say this, but so many people will just die from the blast. And then there’s the radiation, the fallout after that, that can cause long-term impacts, cancer, things like that.

So, my advice to all the people is, if there’s a weapon coming toward you, go to the church. If you’re far enough away, start driving as much as you can. But we hope not to think about those things because we’re focused on deterring nuclear attacks. So that should never happen.

How Likely Is Nuclear War? Expert Explains Threat of Russia, North Korea

dailysignal.com · by Virginia Allen · October 13, 2022

Russia has threatened to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. How serious are those threats? Is the United States prepared to respond in the face of a nuclear attack? And what role do China and North Korea play in the discussion of nuclear war?

“We’ve been hearing threat after threat, nuclear threat after nuclear threat against Ukraine,” Patty-Jane Geller, a Heritage Foundation senior policy analyst in nuclear deterrence and missile defense, says.

“Is the threat likely? Probably not. I don’t see how using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine would really help [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and help his war aims. The Ukrainians aren’t going to surrender. But that doesn’t mean that the chances that he’ll use a nuclear weapon are zero, either,” she says.

Geller joins “The Daily Signal Podcast” to explain the true threat of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, and why North Korea is testing its missile capabilities.

Listen to the podcast below or read the lightly edited transcript:

Virginia Allen: Patty-Jane Geller is a senior policy analyst in nuclear deterrence and missile defense in the Center for National Defense at The Heritage Foundation, and she joins us now to talk about the threat of nuclear war that might be facing, might not be facing our world. So Patty-Jane, thank you so much for being here.

Patty-Jane Geller: Thanks so much for having me on the show.

Allen: This is a big conversation and one that’s getting a lot of press and a lot of attention right now in large part because of some of the comments that we’re seeing made by world leaders, including our own President [Joe] Biden. I know [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is threatening to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

Last week President Biden, he gave remarks at a fundraising dinner saying that he believed that Putin wasn’t joking around, that he was serious and would maybe use nuclear weapons. He even used the term of Armageddon, that we’re at that level of threat at this moment.

And then on Tuesday he was on [“CNN Tonight” with] Jake Tapper. And Biden kind of walked that back and he said, “No, I don’t think that Putin would use nuclear weapons.”

What can we draw from this? Is there a real threat? And do you think that the White House is being really intentional in their messaging? Is there confusion coming from the White House? What can we make of Biden’s comments here?

Geller: That’s a great question. I think the biggest takeaway is that Biden’s comments on nuclear Armageddon is probably the latest example of his irresponsible rhetoric to the American public.

And we’ve seen Biden do this several times, where he makes a comment and his staff need to walk it back. He said multiple times that we would come to defend Taiwan in a conflict and his staff had to go walk that back.

Biden has been right in other cases when he assures the American people that the nuclear threat is low, we do have to take it seriously. But talking about Armageddon, the president’s job should be to assure the American people that the United States is strong and will be able to deter or counter nuclear threats. So I don’t think that comment was very helpful.

When we look at the nuclear threat from Russia, the nuclear threat, surely it’s real. Russia has the largest nuclear stockpile in the world. We’ve been hearing threat after threat, nuclear threat after nuclear threat against Ukraine. Is the threat likely? Probably not.

I don’t see how using a nuclear weapon against Ukraine would really help Putin and help his war aims. The Ukrainians aren’t going to surrender. But that doesn’t mean that the chances that he’ll use a nuclear weapon are zero, either. I’m sure I’ll get to talking a little bit about Russia’s nuclear arsenal and their doctrine and their strategy.

And one thing that’s really different about how Russia views nuclear weapons and how the U.S. views nuclear weapons is that Russia has a much lower threshold for actually using them. They kind of see them as another weapon to use on the battlefield to try to compel its enemies to back down. Whereas I’m sure we all here in the U.S. think of nuclear weapons as something that we should not use, they’re very dangerous.

Allen: So what would it take for Putin to get to that point where he says, “This is worth it?” What’s the kind of cost-benefit analysis that he would be doing to say, “Yeah, I’m going to push this button and we’re going to use nuclear weapons”?

Geller: Yes. So, we’ve been seeing, or talking about throughout the war, the concern that if Putin is losing the conventional fight, he’s not making any progress on the war in Ukraine, then that’s when he’ll resort to nuclear weapons out of desperation to get the Ukrainians to back down. But we haven’t seen that happen yet.

Putin has been losing in Ukraine, Ukrainians have been making progress, and we haven’t seen any sign of resorting to use nuclear weapons. The government has reported that they haven’t seen any sort of movement of Russia’s nuclear weapons.

So he would have to decide that the response from the West to using a nuclear weapon would be weak and he would have to decide that it would be helpful for his war effort.

Allen: OK. Now, how many nuclear weapons does Russia have? Do we have that information?

Geller: We have a sense of it. There are a couple ways to look at it. The first thing I’ll tell you is that Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, bigger than ours.

And so there are two kinds of categories of nuclear weapons that we think about. First, there are strategic nuclear weapons. Those are kind of what we think about when we think of nuclear Armageddon, weapons that can reach each other’s homelands, long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers that can strike U.S. soil or that we can use to strike Russia and soil.

The U.S. and Russia have about parity when it comes to strategic nuclear weapons because we both abide by the New START arms control agreement. Both Russia and the U.S. are limited to about 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons when we’re talking about strategic nuclear weapons.

But where there’s the disparity is in nonstrategic nuclear weapons, those that aren’t covered by that arms control treaty. And when we talk about nonstrategic nuclear weapons, we’re thinking weapons that can be used on a battlefield in Europe. So maybe artillery armed with nuclear weapons, much shorter-range missiles that can reach Ukraine from Russia, for example, or reach native states.

And Russia actually outnumbers the U.S. by about 20-to-1 on those kinds of weapons. They’re at least 2,000 nonstrategic weapons. They’re modernizing that arsenal. And the U.S. deploys about 100 of these nonstrategic nuclear weapons in NATO states in Europe.

So, that’s another reason why we’re worried Russia has this many more and this many types of nuclear weapons than we do. Will they perceive that the U.S. doesn’t have a proportional response to that kind of nuclear attack? That’s what I’ve been worried about.

Allen: And why doesn’t the U.S. have more? Are we trying to actively match Russia’s nuclear arsenal?

Geller: Not necessarily. So the reason we don’t have more dates just kind of back to the end of the Cold War when the United States was pursuing nuclear reduction, so was Russia. We found greater peace after the Cold War. But then over the last 20 years, the U.S. has been kind of on holiday. We’ve been dealing with the Middle East and meanwhile, Russia was building back up.

And actually, the Obama administration in 2010 said that Russia and the U.S. were no longer adversaries. While we were in kind of this la-la land, focused on the Middle East, not worrying about great power competition, Russia was building back up its nuclear arsenal, and not to mention China as well.

So there certainly have been efforts that started in the Trump administration to build back up our nuclear forces to kind of rectify that numeric imbalance with Russia. But we haven’t seen a lot of progress on that yet.

Allen: You mentioned China. What does China’s approach to nuclear weapons look like right now and how does it compare to the way that Russia’s approaching nukes or the U.S.?

Geller: Yes. China is actually undergoing a rapid expansion of its nuclear forces. Our senior military commanders have labeled it breathtaking. They call it a strategic breakout, actually, it’s one of the most rapid nuclear buildups we’ve ever seen.

And this is far different from China’s historic view on nuclear weapons, is that it only needed the minimum number to try and deter major nuclear attack, maybe 50 or 100 or so nuclear weapons. But that’s changed. And China seems to be racing to achieve parity, if not superiority, to both the U.S. and Russia in terms of its nuclear weapons.

So we’re starting to see a lot more attention on China because now we still have a lot more nuclear forces than they do, but they’re quickly catching up. And the U.S. and Russia have a long history of dialogue and arms control and talking about nuclear weapons. But China won’t talk to us at all. So this is a big reason why China is the pacing challenge to the U.S. and we have a big challenge ahead of us when it comes to China nukes.

Allen: And where does North Korea fall in that? Are they also having conversations with China and Russia? Do we know? Are they developing their nukes totally on their own? Are they getting help?

Geller: Good question. They’re are certainly improving their nuclear capability. North Korea has a complicated relationship with the Chinese. I’m not sure exactly how they’ve managed to succeed so much.

But what we’re seeing from North Korea, despite decades of efforts … to denuclearize, is what we say, to get North Korea to give up its nuclear program, they’ve been testing missiles, both short-range in the region and also ones that can strike U.S. soil. And they’ve conducted several nuclear tests to be able to explode a nuclear weapon. And we see them preparing for another nuclear test, which might help them bolster their capabilities.

So, that’s a third nuclear threat that we have to worry about.

Allen: In recent weeks, North Korea, they’ve launched multiple sets of missiles, like you mentioned, including one that flew over Japan. North Korea, their state media says that Kim Jong Un has overseen the test launches of several nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles. And this includes one that can be fired from an underwater silo.

Is North Korea, I mean, are they kind of just blowing smoke on this issue? Are they trying to appear tough and show the world, “Look, we can compete with the big dogs, we have nuclear capabilities, too”? Or are they a legitimate loose cannon that we need to be concerned about the fact that they are really becoming another nuclear power?

Geller: We absolutely need to be concerned about the North Korean nuclear threat, and I think the way you assess that is just by looking at their capabilities. It’s not all set in stone yet, but the more nuclear tests they do, they’re not just showing that they’re another power to be reckoned with, it’s not just signaling with those tests, they’re working on improving their missiles, improving their ability to carry nuclear warheads and to strike their targets.

So this is a concern, and one reason I want to talk about is U.S. extended deterrent commitments. So we have agreed with many of our allies, including South Korea and Japan, that they will not get their own nuclear weapons. And in exchange, the U.S. will, we say, extend our nuclear umbrella over those allies. We’ll protect them if the time comes.

And you mentioned the missile that North Korea flew over Japan. So it’s our allies who are most under threat, I would say, and they’re going to be more and more anxious about the U.S. ability to protect them with our own nuclear forces. So I think that’s kind of the biggest impact to the US.

Allen: So, for you, your wheelhouse is really studying nuclear weapons and the nations that are developing them. What are the signs that you look for or pay attention to from countries like China or Russia or North Korea that might indicate that they are legitimately preparing to use a nuclear weapon?

Geller: Great question. Fortunately, there’s a lot that our intelligence community should be able to pick up. For instance, in Russia, we know that not all of their nuclear missiles currently have nuclear weapons on them. They would have to go take out the nuclear weapons from their depots and put them on.

So I know our intelligence community has been searching for just the movement of the forces in charge of their nuclear weapons and the weapons in storage themselves. And fortunately, the U.S. government has reported they haven’t seen any of that.

Allen: Hopefully we won’t.

Geller: Right. Similarly in China, China has a lot of mobile nuclear missiles. So we might see some sort of movement of their missiles around, again, movement of warheads. And we’re not really expecting just kind of a bolt out-of-the-blue nuclear attack, either. There’ll be a context in which this occurs.

In China, for instance, we might be fighting a conventional fight and seeing the conflict escalate, that’s a sign we need to start worrying. But the takeaway is, as that happens or even before that happens, the U.S. needs to be messaging its strong deterrents capabilities, reminding our adversaries that we are nuclear power, too.

I haven’t heard enough of this from the Biden administration and that any attack on the U.S. or its allies will be met with a nuclear response. And that’s the essence of deterrence, really why we have nuclear weapons.

Allen: It was interesting in July, New York City issued a PSA to its citizens to say, “Hey, if we were to be hit by a nuclear weapon, this is what you should do,” and it gave steps. A lot of people were interested by that.

Of course, it kind of makes everyone raise that question of, why are we talking about this now? Is there a real nuclear threat? It’s sort of flying in an airplane and halfway through the flight, the pilot announces, “Don’t worry, the plane’s not on fire,” and everyone’s looking around, like, “OK.” It’s a little eerie, the fact that if there are governments that are saying, “Hey, just FYI, this is what you should do,” but, granted, we should be prepared, we should know if there is anything we can do.

Being totally realistic and honest, if America was hit with a nuclear weapon, is there anything people can do or we pretty much at that point, you say your prayers and that’s the end of it?

Geller: Yeah. I mean, I make the joke that I’ll be running to the church if there’s any nuclear weapon underway. But yeah, I mean, there’s two parts that we have to worry about on nuclear attack. There’s the initial blast, which could be huge. Russia I know has nuclear bombs on the order of mega tons, that’s at least a million tons of nuclear explosive material that, I hate to say this, but so many people will just die from the blast. And then there’s the radiation, the fallout after that, that can cause long-term impacts, cancer, things like that.

So, my advice to all the people is, if there’s a weapon coming toward you, go to the church. If you’re far enough away, start driving as much as you can. But we hope not to think about those things because we’re focused on deterring nuclear attacks. So that should never happen.

Allen: We hope and pray not. Well, Patty-Jane Geller, thank you so much for your time. And for all of our listeners, if you want to learn more on this issue, and if you want to read Patty-Jane’s work, you can just go to The Heritage Foundation and look at Patty-Jane Geller and find all of her research there. We so appreciate your time. Thank you.

Geller: Yeah. Awesome. Thank you so much.

Have an opinion about this article? To sound off, please email letters@DailySignal.com and we’ll consider publishing your edited remarks in our regular “We Hear You” feature. Remember to include the url or headline of the article plus your name and town and/or state.

dailysignal.com · by Virginia Allen · October 13, 2022

7. Biden security plan calls for diverse military, more nuclear spending

Excerpts:

The document devotes a page to the Pentagon’s signature policy under Biden: “integrated deterrence,” which means coordinating military, diplomatic and economic levers from across the U.S. government to deter an adversary from taking aggressive action.

“Integrated deterrence requires us to more effectively coordinate, network, and innovate so that any competitor thinking about pressing for advantage in one domain understands that we can respond in many others as well,” the strategy reads.

Biden security plan calls for diverse military, more nuclear spending

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · October 12, 2022

The White House released its long-awaited National Security Strategy on Wednesday, outlining plans for strengthening alliances worldwide while maintaining a strong American military “by promoting diversity and inclusion.”

The strategy also includes a commitment to strengthening the U.S. nuclear arsenal at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened to use nukes in Ukraine and as the Pentagon warns of China’s growing arsenal of the destructive bombs.

The document was originally expected to be publicly released last spring but was delayed in part because of the fighting in Ukraine. National security adviser Jake Sullivan said Russia’s aggression in the region did not fundamentally change the administration’s plans, but did result in some parts of the document receiving revisions and updates.

“[The Ukraine war] presents in living color the key elements of our approach: the emphasis on allies, the importance of strengthening the hand of the democratic world and standing up for our fellow democracies, and for democratic values,” he told reporters in a call unveiling the strategy.

“To watch how Ukraine unfolded, how the terms of geopolitical competition have sharpened up over the course of the past few months, and also being able to put on display how our strategy works in practice, I think all of those serve a purpose in terms of giving life to the document that we’re releasing.”

The strategy names Russia and China as major powers that threaten U.S. security, but it also notes an evolving terrorist threat from foreign militants and domestic extremists. Combating that will require both military intervention and “addressing the root causes of radicalization” with help from foreign partners.

That will also mean ensuring a well-trained, well-equipped American military force, the strategy argues.

“We will maintain our foundational principle of civilian control of the military, recognizing that healthy civil-military relations rooted in mutual respect are essential to military effectiveness,” the plan states. “We will strengthen the effectiveness of the force by promoting diversity and inclusion; intensifying our suicide prevention efforts; eliminating the scourges of sexual assault, harassment, and other forms of violence, abuse, and discrimination; and rooting out violent extremism.”

Strengthening alliances

In an effort to “amplify our capacity to respond to shared challenges,” the White House strategy calls for deepening and modernizing defense and intelligence alliances like NATO, Five Eyes (with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.K.), and the Quad (with Australia, India and Japan).

For the Indo-Pacific, the strategy calls for building the collective capacity of U.S. partners in the region and stronger ties between likeminded countries. AUKUS, the year-old alliance based on sharing U.S. and U.K. nuclear submarine technology and other defense-related know-how with Australia, will be “critical to addressing regional challenges.”

Ukrainian gunmen ready to fire an American-made M777 howitzer on the front line in the Kharkiv region on Aug. 1, 2022, amid Russia's military invasion. (Sergey Bobok/AFP via Getty Images)

It also seeks to build on the Pentagon’s recent, massive effort to lead Western military aid for Ukraine and strengthen defense industry ties between allies. A strong partnership means allies need to be incorporated at every stage of defense planning, the strategy states.

“The war in Ukraine highlights the criticality of a vibrant Defense Industrial Base for the United States and its allies and partners,” the document says. “It must not only be capable of rapidly manufacturing proven capabilities needed to defend against adversary aggression, but also empowered to innovate and creatively design solutions as battlefield conditions evolve.”

Amid concerns from industry that efforts to work with allies are mired in red tape, President Joe Biden is seeking to “remove barriers to deeper collaboration,” the strategy says, “to include issues related to joint capability development and production to safeguard our shared military-technological edge.”

Nuclear plans

The strategy also pledges the U.S. will rely less on the threat of nuclear weapons as a strategic centerpiece, but also emphasizes the need to invest in modernizing the nuclear triad and the country’s commitments to protect allies.

“Nuclear deterrence remains a top priority for the nation and foundational to integrated deterrence,” it states.

It alludes to China’s growing nuclear arsenal as a motivator for U.S. investment in its own weapons.

“By the 2030s, the United States for the first time will need to deter two major nuclear powers, each of whom will field modern and diverse global and regional nuclear forces,” the strategy says.

Sullivan, speaking with reporters, said the forthcoming Pentagon nuclear posture and missile defense strategies would “depart from some of the Trump-era formulas and [take a] step forward towards reduction.”

Congress is poised to block the Biden administration’s plan to cancel the submarine-launched cruise missile, known as the SLCM-N, and it has yet to decide on how it will approach the administration’s plan to retire the B83 gravity bomb. The administration stopped short of setting a “no first use” policy that arms control advocates have sought.

Next steps

The document devotes a page to the Pentagon’s signature policy under Biden: “integrated deterrence,” which means coordinating military, diplomatic and economic levers from across the U.S. government to deter an adversary from taking aggressive action.

“Integrated deterrence requires us to more effectively coordinate, network, and innovate so that any competitor thinking about pressing for advantage in one domain understands that we can respond in many others as well,” the strategy reads.

The document devotes a page to the Pentagon’s signature policy under Biden: “integrated deterrence.” (Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images)

“This augments the traditional backstop of combat-credible conventional and strategic capabilities, allowing us to better shape adversary perceptions of risks and costs of action against core U.S. interests, at any time and across any domain,” it adds.

It also highlights investments in emerging technologies and their ability to “transform warfare and pose novel threats.”

Speaking with reporters, Sullivan said the administration’s budget and forthcoming defense strategy documents have all emphasized modernizing “the fighting force” and “the systems, platforms and technologies that they rely upon in every domain.”

With the National Security Strategy finally publicly released, focus now shifts to the overdue National Defense Strategy. Lawmakers have been pressing for its release after Biden released only a two-page summary in March.

Mandated by Congress, the National Defense Strategy helps lawmakers weigh the president’s national security priorities for budgeting, shows allies and adversaries those priorities, and helps government officials speak with a single voice on national security matters.

But neither the Pentagon nor the White House on Wednesday made a public announcement on a timeline for that second document.

About Leo Shane III and Joe Gould

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.

8. Freedom Caucus wants defense bill delayed if vaccine mandate not repealed

Sigh...we are good at cutting off our nose to spite our face.

Freedom Caucus wants defense bill delayed if vaccine mandate not repealed

The Hill · by Mike Lillis · October 11, 2022

Members of the hard-line conservative House Freedom Caucus are calling on Republican leaders to delay passage of the annual defense authorization bill until after the new year if its demands, like repealing the military’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, are not met.

In January, a new Congress may include GOP majorities in either the House or Senate that can “rework” the legislation, the group said.

“Congressional Republicans still have the opportunity to stand in defense of our Nation’s military – if we stand united,” the group wrote in a letter to House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) on Tuesday.

“Just as they did in July, Democrats will need Republican votes to pass the NDAA, and the House Freedom Caucus urges all Republicans to hold the line to force Democrats to reverse the policies of President Biden undermining our Nation’s military and its combat readiness, starting with the vaccine mandate,” the letter said.

The Senate started debate on its National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on Tuesday, and a final vote is expected after the midterm elections. It would then be reconciled in conference with the House version of the NDAA, which passed in June in a 329-101 vote, with 39 Democrats and 62 Republicans voting against the legislation.

The Freedom Caucus opposed that bill over similar concerns about the vaccine mandate and what it called the “prioritization of ‘diversity’ and ‘inclusion’ over combat readiness.”

Now, the group is also calling for the establishment of a special inspector general to scrutinize U.S. involvement in Ukraine as part of a list of four core demands for the NDAA.

The Hill’s Morning Report — Trump will be front and center at today’s Jan. 6 hearing Ryan, Vance locked in dead heat in Ohio Senate race: poll

“Republicans must demand that the NDAA: (1) fully repeals the vaccine mandate and allows service members involuntarily discharged to be reinstated without penalty; (2) ends the contamination of our military by radical Leftist ‘woke’ ideologies and the prioritization of politics over combat readiness; (3) halts wasteful spending on ‘Green New Deal’ pet climate projects; and (4) establishes a Special Inspector General on U.S. involvement in Ukraine,” the letter said.

If those are not met, the Freedom Caucus said, Republicans should delay passage until after the start of the next Congress, when the group hopes to have “a new Republican Majority to comprehensively rework the NDAA to serve America’s service members instead of Leftist political agendas.”

Election analysts widely believe that Republicans are favored to win back the House and that control of the Senate is a toss-up.

The Hill · by Mike Lillis · October 11, 2022

9. Russia pounds dozens of Ukraine towns, warns of escalation

Russia pounds dozens of Ukraine towns, warns of escalation

Reuters · by Max Hunder

• Summary
• Russian official warns of World War Three if Ukraine joins NATO
• Mykolaiv town "massively shelled", says mayor
• Iran-made drones used in attacks near Kyiv - governor
• Biden says Putin "rational actor who has miscalculated"

KYIV/BRUSSELS, Oct 13 (Reuters) - Russian missiles pounded more than 40 Ukrainian cities and towns, officials said on Thursday, as NATO allies meeting in Brussels unveiled plans to beef up Europe's air defences after committing more military aid to Kyiv.

The new pledges prompted Moscow to renew warnings that Western states' help made them "a direct party to the conflict" and that admitting Ukraine to Western military alliance NATO could trigger World War Three.

"Kyiv is well aware that such a step would mean a guaranteed escalation to a World War Three," deputy secretary of Russia's Security Council, Alexander Venediktov, told the state TASS news agency on Thursday as the United States vowed to defend "every inch" of allied territory.

Moscow has repeatedly justified the Feb. 24 invasion that has killed tens of thousands of people, in what it calls a "special operation", by saying Ukraine's ambitions to join the alliance posed a threat to Russia's security.

NATO is not likely to quickly allow Ukraine to join, not least because its membership during an ongoing war would put the United States and allies into direct conflict with Russia.

Even before the war, NATO had dragged its feet on Ukrainian membership. Shortly after Russia's invasion in February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy signalled he was willing to consider neutrality.

But hours after Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed partially occupied regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as Russian land on Sept. 30, Zelenskiy made a fast-track bid to join. read more

In the past 24 hours Russian missiles hit more than 40 settlements, while Ukrainian air force carried out 32 strikes on 25 Russian targets, Ukraine's Armed Forces General Staff said.

The southern port city of Mykolaiv came under massive bombardment, local officials said.

“It is known that a number of civilian objects were hit," regional governor Vitaly Kim said in a social media post.

He said the top two floors of a five-story residential building were completely destroyed and the rest were under rubble.

KAMIKAZE DRONES

Russia also targeted a settlement in the region of Ukraine's capital Kyiv, where three drone strikes hit critical infrastructure early on Thursday, the region's administration said on Telegram.

Governor of the Kyiv region, Oleksiy Kuleba, said that based on preliminary information the strikes were caused by Iranian-made loitering munitions, often known as "kamikaze drones". read more

Ukraine has reported a spate of Russian attacks with the Shahed-136 drones in recent weeks. Iran denies supplying the drones to Russia, while the Kremlin has not commented.

1/12

A view shows an apartment building damaged by a Russian military strike, as Russia's attack on Ukraine continues in Mykolaiv October 13, 2022. REUTERS/Viktoriia Lakezina

Missiles struck about 30 multi-storey buildings and houses, gas pipelines and power lines in the city of Nikopol in the Dnipropetrovsk region, leaving more than 2,000 families without electricity, regional governor Dnipropetrovsk Governor Valentyn Reznichenko wrote on Telegram.

Reuters was not able to immediately verify the reports.

As his forces suffered several setbacks since September, Putin has ordered the call-up of hundreds of thousands of reservists, proclaimed the annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory and repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons to protect Russia, including regions annexed last month.

A senior NATO official said on Wednesday a Russian nuclear strike would almost certainly trigger a "physical response" from Ukraine's allies and potentially NATO and on Thursday the United States reaffirmed its commitment to its allies' defence.

"We are committed to defending every inch of NATO's territory - if and when it comes to that," U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in Brussels ahead of a meeting of defence ministers from the alliance, including close-door talks by its nuclear planning group.

Separately, 15 European NATO members announced plans for joint procurement of air defence systems, dubbed "European Sky Shield" to better protect their territory. read more

UN CONDEMNATION

In New York, three-quarters of the 193-member General Assembly - 143 countries - backed on Wednesday a resolution condemning Russia's "attempted illegal annexation" of the four partially occupied regions in Ukraine.

Only Syria, Nicaragua, North Korea and Belarus joined Russia in voting against the resolution, while 35, including Moscow's strategic partner China, abstained, and the rest did not vote.

In Brussels, more than 50 Western countries met on Wednesday to pledge more military aid to Ukraine, especially air defence weapons, after heavy retaliatory strikes this week ordered by Putin in response to an explosion on a bridge in Crimea.

Among the pledges were promises of air defence system deliveries from France and Britain, and Canada's commitment to provide artillery rounds among other supplies.

At the meeting, Austin said Russia's latest attacks laid bare its "malice and cruelty." At least 26 people have been killed since Monday in Russian missile attacks across Ukraine.

Ukraine had shifted momentum since September with extraordinary gains, but would need more help, he said.

Since Monday's attacks, Germany has sent the first of four IRIS-T SLM air defence systems, while Washington said it would speed up delivery of a promised NASAMS air defence system.

"The more assistance Ukraine gets now, the sooner we'll come to an end to the Russian war," Zelenskiy said by video to a forum during International Monetary Fund and World Bank annual meetings in Washington.

Reporting by Reuters bureaux; Writing by Cynthia Osterman,Simon Cameron-Moore and Tomasz Janowski; Editing by Michael Perry, Stephen Coates and Frank Jack Daniel

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Max Hunder

10. United Nations condemns Russia's move to annex parts of Ukraine

A pretty decisive vote. I understand India also abstained.

Excerpt:

Only four countries joined Russia in voting against the resolution - Syria, Nicaragua, North Korea and Belarus. Thirty-five countries abstained from the vote, including Russia's strategic partner China, while the rest did not vote.

United Nations condemns Russia's move to annex parts of Ukraine

Reuters · by Michelle Nichols

UNITED NATIONS, Oct 12 (Reuters) - The United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday overwhelmingly condemned Russia's "attempted illegal annexation" of four partially occupied regions in Ukraine and called on all countries not to recognize the move, strengthening a diplomatic international isolation of Moscow since it invaded its neighbor.

Three-quarters of the 193-member General Assembly - 143 countries - voted in favor of a resolution that also reaffirmed the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

"It's amazing," Ukraine's U.N. Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya told reporters after the vote as he stood next to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, who said the result showed Russia could not intimidate the world.

Only four countries joined Russia in voting against the resolution - Syria, Nicaragua, North Korea and Belarus. Thirty-five countries abstained from the vote, including Russia's strategic partner China, while the rest did not vote.

"Today it is Russia invading Ukraine. But tomorrow it could be another nation whose territory is violated. It could be you. You could be next. What would you expect from this chamber?" Thomas-Greenfield told the General Assembly before the vote.

Moscow in September proclaimed its annexation of four partially occupied regions in Ukraine - Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia - after staging what it called referendums. Ukraine and allies have denounced the votes as illegal and coercive.

The General Assembly vote followed a veto by Russia last month of a similar resolution in the 15-member Security Council.

Russia's U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia told the General Assembly ahead of the vote that the resolution was "politicized and openly provocative," adding that it "could destroy any and all efforts in favor of a diplomatic solution to the crisis."

'DOUBLE STANDARDS'

The moves at the United Nations mirror what happened in 2014 after Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimea. The General Assembly then adopted a resolution declaring the referendum invalid with 100 votes in favor, 11 against and 58 formal abstentions.

China abstained on Wednesday because it did not believe the resolution will be helpful, China's Deputy U.N. Ambassador Geng Shuang said.

"Any action taken by the General Assembly should be conducive to the de-escalation of the situation, to be conducive to the early resumption of dialogue and should be conducive to the promotion of a political solution to this crisis," he said.

The United States and other Western countries lobbied ahead of Wednesday's vote. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken convened a virtual meeting on Tuesday with diplomats from more than 100 countries.

They won dozens more votes than compared with the 2014 result, and improved on the 141 countries who voted to denounce Russia and demand it withdraw its troops from Ukraine within a week of its Feb. 24 invasion.

Moscow has then been trying to chip away at its international isolation. As Russia and the West have vied for diplomatic influence, some states - particularly in the global South - have grown concerned about paying the price for being squeezed in the middle of an intense geopolitical rivalry.

"We deplore the politics of the double standards of the powerful of this world when it comes to Africa," Democratic Republic of Congo U.N. Ambassador Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja told the General Assembly on Wednesday.

"We support Ukraine. We want to see the war ended," he said. "But we would like to see the international community take similar action against other situations in the world where countries are being invaded and occupied."

Reporting by Michelle Nichols; editing by Costas Pitas and Grant McCool

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Michelle Nichols

11. Multi-domain task forces are growing, and shaping exercises overseas

Multi-domain task forces are growing, and shaping exercises overseas

armytimes.com · by Todd South · October 13, 2022

WASHINGTON — The two multi-domain task forces the Army has in the Indo-Pacific region now shape major joint military exercises as the Army applies its multi-domain operations doctrine to the real world.

Over the past six months, the 1st MDTF deployed 16 cells across 10 time zones to support five named joint or bilateral exercises, said Brig. Gen. Bernard Harrington, 1st MDTF commander. The cells are task-organized and can be as small as a three-soldier team and as large as a company or battery.

The 1st MDTF saw its first major use during the naval exercise Rim of the Pacific in 2018. Since then, they’ve added capabilities, personnel and equipment to play a role in Orient Shield and Talisman Saber in 2019.

Early exercises put into practice what had previously been merely concepts, Harrington told an audience on Wednesday at the annual Association of the U.S. Army conference.

What that work has accomplished already is a way for the Army to establish its own “interior lines,” or forward presence, near China to push back against their protective anti-access/area denial bubble.

But they’re not doing that by massing tanks on warships along the coasts. Instead, they’re using a variety of measures — radios, radar, cyber and old-fashioned missiles — to highlight the reach of the Army and its partner forces.

Harrington noted that China has its advantages on its own turf. It has all its forces available and a deep magazine to fire offensively or in defense.

“It’s very hard to close that gap with mass and magazine depth,” he said.

In the old days, Harrington added, a unit would work up to a partner exercise, conduct the exercise and go home and wait for the next exercise. But new practices make a persistent forward presence the norm.

That presence helps build those interior lines and extend them over time.

Newly appointed commander of the 3rd MDTF, formed in September, Col. David Zinn, made a clear distinction between the MDTFs now versus the early years of their inception.

“We are not an experimental formation, we are an operational formation,” Zinn said.

Experimentation will still continue, as it did in Forager 2021, also a Pacific military exercise. That exercise saw the first synchronization of all assets — land, air, maritime, cyber, space and electronic warfare.

Then, at RIMPAC 2022 the task force fused the four things it must do to be successful — sink ships, shoot down missiles, neutralize satellites and jam an enemy’s command and control.

The force set its sights on a vessel off the coast of Hawaii during a joint ship sinking event.

Soldiers coordinated near simultaneous effects, using space assets, to shut down satellites. They used live electronic warfare attacks to jam communications. A cyber team isolated the vessel’s connection to headquarters. And then a long-range strike was launched, Harrington said.

And while they conducted that attack, a Mississippi Army National Guard unit ran air defense for the task force.

The Army has slated 1st and 3rd MDTFs for more than 15 exercises in eight countries with plans to add more than 1,400 personnel from 39 Army branches over the next year, Harrington added.

Those exercises include Project Convergence-Pacific, Northern Edge, Orient Shield, Yudh Abhyas, Tiger Balm, Balikatan and Talisman Sabre.

Also, next year, 3rd MDTF is expected to reach initial operational capability and the Army expects to field both its mid-range, 1,000 kilometer strike capability and a long-range hypersonic weapon in the region, Harrington said.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

12. Tracking China's preparations for war

Conclusion:

“We have an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical to regional and global security and prosperity and a matter of international concern and attention,” The White House says in its new National Security Strategy released on Wednesday. “We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and do not support Taiwan independence…And we will uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.”

Tracking China's preparations for war

https://www.theruck.news/p/china-taiwan-war?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=95203&post_id=78020183&isFreemail=false&utm_medium=email

Beijing "would not be subtle," says a long-time CIA analyst.

Paul Szoldra

4 min ago

IF YOU’RE A CASUAL OBSERVER of headlines, “Xi’s looming third term in China raises threat of war over Taiwan” or “No Need to Blow Up TSMC in China War, Taiwan Security Chief Says” may give you the sense that as one deadly and destructive war rages in Ukraine, the world is about to have another in the Taiwan Strait.

It’s not. Defending the island democracy of 23 million in Taiwan is certainly on the mind of national security leaders today, but if another war truly were on the horizon, various economic and military factors would indicate Beijing planned to attack across the roughly 100-mile-wide strait. Yet we’re not currently seeing those signs—good news, obviously—despite worrying stories on how “Taiwan’s citizen warriors prepare to confront looming threat from China” and “The persistent threat of China invading Taiwan.”

So, what are the indicators and how do we know what they are? Thank retired CIA analyst John Culver for answering both questions in this sober and insightful analysis. The 35-year intel veteran notes the warning signs of a full-scale invasion or naval blockade to cut off western support and concludes that if “China decides to fight a war of choice over Taiwan, strategic surprise would be a casualty of the sheer scale of the undertaking.”

The war in Ukraine has shown how modern war requires vast stocks of bombs, missiles, and bullets—which in turn require raw materials, manufacturing capacity, and long production timelines. So China “would have already started surging production” of rockets, ballistic and cruise missiles, and other items “at least a year before D-Day,” according to Culver. Such a surge would be difficult to hide from both western intelligence and civilian analysts armed with excellent commercial satellite imagery.

Beijing’s preparations for war “almost certainly would not be subtle, at least to the U.S. intelligence community,” says Culver, “and probably not to Taiwan and other Western observers.” So here are other things to watch for before any shots are fired in anger…

1 to 2 years out:

• China “would take visible steps to insulate its economy, military, and key industries from disruptions and sanctions.”
• Internally and externally, Beijing would ramp up propaganda against the west and would prepare its citizens “psychologically for the costs of war”—tens of thousands of deaths in combat, financial pain, and civilian deaths from a U.S.-Taiwan response.
• “Six or twelve months before a prospective invasion, China probably would implement a [People’s Liberation Army]-wide stop loss, halting demobilizations of enlisted personnel and officers, just as it did in 2007 when it ratcheted up pressure as Taiwan prepared to hold elections.”
• There are also several economic indicators, per this CSIS analysis:
• A freeze on foreign financial assets in China
• Travel restrictions placed on high-priority workers and Chinese elites
• Sales of U.S. bonds and rapid repatriation of Chinese assets from abroad
• Stockpiling of emergency supplies and medicine

3 to 6 months out:

• At this point, the PLA “would also halt most regular training and perform maintenance on virtually all major equipment,” Culver writes. “It would expand the capacity of the Navy and Air Force to rearm, resupply, and repair ships, submarines, and aircraft away from military facilities that the United States or Taiwan would likely bomb, including naval bases and military airfields near the Taiwan Strait. The PLA Navy would replace electric batteries on its non-nuclear submarines and intensify training in loading missiles, torpedoes, and ammunition on all vessels.”
• In the areas opposite Taiwan's coast in China’s Eastern and Southern Theater Command, the PLA would set up field hospitals near embarkation points and airfields and take other “steps rarely seen in mere exercises.”
• “There likely would be public blood drives. Mobile command posts would depart garrisons and move to hidden locations. Units responsible for managing petroleum, oil, and lubricants would deploy with field pipeline convoys to support vehicle preparation at civilian ports being used to load transport ships embarking on an invasion.”
• Additionally, “provincial military-civilization mobilization committees would commandeer commercial ships, roll-on/roll-off vehicle transport ships, large car ferries, aircraft, trains, trucks—everything relevant to a war effort, for preparation prior to conflict, and then throughout.”
• Military forces would be placed on alert. Across the PLA, leave would be canceled, and many would be recalled or restricted to their bases and ships. Civilian flights around the country would be disrupted. Even with Chinese censorship and its great firewall, it’s hard to imagine these activities not leaking out or being spotted by western observers.
• And an “enormous” number of China’s 1.4 billion-strong population would be mobilized, “including reservists to guard key civilian infrastructure, be prepared to repair U.S. bomb damage, and prevent riots and sabotage.”

SO THERE IS TIME, and war is, fortunately, not inevitable. Even top U.S. military officials differ on whether Beijing ever makes good on threats to take Taiwan by force. In the end, Chinese President Xi Jinping weighs a strategic calculus—is trying to seize Taiwan worth the cost? The western response, then, is to deter war by making that potential cost so unbearable that Xi always answers a resounding “no.”

That deterrent begins to take shape in several recent news reports. From The New York Times on Oct. 5, U.S. Aims to Turn Taiwan Into Giant Weapons Depot:

WASHINGTON — American officials are intensifying efforts to build a giant stockpile of weapons in Taiwan after studying recent naval and air force exercises by the Chinese military around the island, according to current and former officials.

The exercises showed that China would probably blockade the island as a prelude to any attempted invasion, and Taiwan would have to hold out on its own until the United States or other nations intervened, if they decided to do that, the current and former officials say.

Report two: Taiwanese microchip mogul Robert Tsao is bankrolling a training program for a civilian militia to defend against a Chinese invasion. The program right now is small yet backed by a $30 million pledge. “We need to train three million people in three years,” Tsao said. Years of training and arms stockpiling helped Ukraine defend against Russia during the war’s opening. And western weapons shipments have helped Kyiv shift the balance in its favor.

Three: Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen said Monday that China’s threat of armed confrontation “is absolutely not an option for our two sides.” She added: “Only by respecting the commitment of the Taiwanese people to our sovereignty, democracy, and freedom can there be a foundation for resuming constructive interaction across the Taiwan Strait.” China predictably responded by saying Taiwan was not independent and didn’t have a president. But Tsai comes out ahead by bringing the rhetoric down—while suggesting that Beijing’s continued saber-rattling and military incursions near Taiwan’s shores will only result in even more western support rather than capitulation.

“We have an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical to regional and global security and prosperity and a matter of international concern and attention,” The White House says in its new National Security Strategy released on Wednesday. “We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and do not support Taiwan independence…And we will uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.”

The Ruck is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

13.  US State Department says Iran nuclear deal 'not our focus right now'

US State Department says Iran nuclear deal 'not our focus right now' | CNN Politics

CNN · by Jennifer Hansler · October 12, 2022

A picture obtained by AFP outside Iran, shows people gathering next to a burning motorcycle in the capital Tehran on October 8, 2022.

Stringer/AFP/Getty Images

Washington CNN —

The Iran nuclear deal is “not our focus right now,” US State Department spokesperson Ned Price said Wednesday, noting the administration was instead focusing on supporting the protesters in Iran as efforts to restore the nuclear deal have hit yet another impasse.

“The Iranians have made very clear that this is not a deal that they have been prepared to make, a deal certainly does not appear imminent,” Price said at a department briefing.

“Iran’s demands are unrealistic. They go well beyond the scope of the JCPOA,” he said, using the acronym for the formal name of the deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

“Nothing we’ve heard in recent weeks suggests they have changed their position,” Price added.

Courtesy Namazi family

American Siamak Namazi forced to return to prison in Iran after short furlough

The spokesperson said the administration’s current focus “is on the remarkable bravery and courage that the Iranian people are exhibiting through their peaceful demonstrations, through their exercise of their universal right to freedom of assembly and to freedom of expression.”

“And our focus right now is on shining a spotlight on what they’re doing and supporting them in the ways we can,” Price said.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in late September that he did not “see any prospects in the very near term” to bring about a return to the Iran nuclear deal.

In an interview with CBS’ “60 Minutes,” Blinken said that “Iran has continued to try to add extraneous issues to the negotiation that we’re simply not going to say yes to.”

“We will not accept a bad deal, the response that they’ve given to the last proposals put forward by our European partners have been a very significant step backwards,” he said.

A senior State Department official said at that time that “we’ve hit a wall” because of Tehran’s “unreasonable” demands.

Speaking to reporters during the UN General Assembly, the official said the UN nuclear watchdog’s probe into unexplained traces of uranium found at undisclosed Iranian sites remained the key sticking point.

“At the same time as Iran is standing against its people on the street, it’s standing in the way of the kind of economic relief that a nuclear deal would provide. So I think they have to explain that to their own people why, on the verge of the deal, they would choose this issue and jeopardize at this point the possibility of the deal,” the official said in late September.

Amid the standstill on the JCPOA, the Biden administration has unveiled a series of measures aimed at punishing the regime for its repression of the Iranian people and to try to support the protesters.

A protester holds a portrait of Mahsa Amini during a protest against her killing. (OZAN KOSE/AFP via Getty Images)

Iranian official admits that student protesters are being taken to psychiatric institutions

In late September, the US announced sanctions on Iran’s Morality Police following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in their custody.

In a statement, the US Treasury Department said it was sanctioning the morality police “for abuse and violence against Iranian women and the violation of the rights of peaceful Iranian protestors.”

Shortly thereafter, amid internet shutdowns by the Iranian government in the face of widespread protests over Amini’s death, the US government took a step meant to allow technology firms to help the people of Iran access information online.

Last week, the US issued additional sanctions on seven senior Iranian officials for the government shutdown of internet access and the violence against protesters, targeting Iran’s Minister of the Interior, Ahmad Vahidi, who oversees all Law Enforcement Forces that have been used to suppress protests, as well as its Minister of Communications.

CNN · by Jennifer Hansler · October 12, 2022

14. The Logic of the Nuclear Triad

Conclusion:

The nuclear triad is the foundation of American national security. All too often it is forgotten that the nation’s nuclear deterrent has served as the foundation of American security for more than seven decades. They have allowed the United States to engage in conflict abroad without the intervention of adversaries. Even today, it is because of the nuclear triad that both Russia and China exercise restraint when contemplating a change to the international order.

The peace dividend gained from the end of the Cold War allowed the United States to neglect the regular nuclear modernization that kept the American arsenal ahead of the Soviet Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent threats to use nuclear weapons and China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal are clear signs that the world has changed. As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis said during a February 7, 2018 press conference, “America can afford survival.” He added, “Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a war that we were unable to deter.”

The Logic of the Nuclear Triad

19fortyfive.com · by Derek Williams and Adam Lowther · October 12, 2022

Why the Nuclear Triad Matters: With the United States actively aiding Ukraine in its war against Russia, while also aiding Taiwan in its effort to deter an invasion from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Americans are living in one of the most dangerous periods in history. No longer can Americans bask in the glow of the post-Cold War “Unipolar Moment.” Instead, the world is proving even more dangerous than during the bipolar period in which a democratic West faced off against the communist bloc. The new tri-polar period, although in its infancy, is starting out as unstable as many political scientists projected.

Admittedly, Russia is not an economic peer to the United States and the PRC is not yet a nuclear peer, but both states are attempting to use their nuclear arsenals to coerce the United States into abandoning democratically elected governments Kyiv and Taipei. Given the current international security environment, it is worth reflecting on the role deterrence and the nuclear triad play in ensuring strategic stability.

The Nuclear Triad and Deterrence

According to the Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military Terms, deterrence is defined as “The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.” Using all instruments of national power, the U.S. alters the adversary’s decision-making process, encouraging restraint. The most effective strategy tailors messages to an adversary’s culture, beliefs, and interests. Deterrence requires capability, credibility, and communication.

Deterrence by the threat of punishment is a concept that relies on the threat of imposing costs on an adversary to alter their decision calculus. This is accomplished by holding at risk what an adversary values. Targets can include industry, infrastructure, military forces, and the adversary’s population. It was the clear threat of nuclear war that ensured the Cold War remained cold.

Deterrence by denial occurs when the desired benefits of an adversary’s potential actions are reduced or eliminated by defensive measures. Denial can be achieved through passive defense, active defense, or offensive operations. The adversary must understand the risk to success posed by denial efforts, which means it is important to effectively communicate those efforts.

Deterrence by dissuasion is the least assertive form of deterrence and seeks to change an adversary’s perception of interests by convincing them that there are effective ways to achieve national interests without challenging the international status quo. These more passive approaches to deterrence can include the use of international norms to shape behavior and the use of carrots instead of sticks. The effort to bring Russia into NATO in the years immediately following the Soviet Union’s collapse is an example of deterrence by dissuasion.

What is important to remember about maintaining effective deterrence is that it takes capability (the ability to impose costs), credibility (the adversary’s belief you will do what you say), and the ability to effectively communicate with an adversary. Without all three, it is challenging to maintain stable deterrence.

Assurance

Assurance is the art of convincing an ally that the United States will defend its vital interests in the face of a threat from a nuclear-armed adversary. If successful, the U.S. gains nonproliferation benefits by discouraging allies from developing independent nuclear capabilities. Assurance is more than just extending a rhetorical “nuclear umbrella” over allies. Denis Healey, a former British Secretary of State for Defence, once noted, “It only takes 5 percent credibility of American retaliation to deter an attack [from the Soviets], but it takes 95 percent credibility to reassure the allies.” Simply put, achieving assurance is harder than achieving deterrence.

Visible actions like maintaining a sufficient force posture and military exercises with allies reassure allies that the United States is reliable. These and related activities are the reason that no American ally has developed an independent nuclear weapons capability in more than sixty years.

Nuclear Triad

There are three legs of the nuclear triad that each possess unique attributes. Together, they produce a mutually supportive and flexible strategic deterrent for the country. These unique and overlapping capabilities allow the triad to become more than just the sum of its parts.

The triad’s overlapping attributes help ensure the enduring survivability of American deterrence capabilities. They allow the president to hold adversary targets at risk of attack throughout any crisis or conflict. Because each leg of the triad has distinct strengths and weaknesses, the president can hold a range of static, hardened, relocatable, hardened and deeply buried, time-sensitive, geographically complex, and area targets at risk. These target sets present a diverse set of challenges for American nuclear capabilities.

Bombers

Bombers are the most flexible and visible leg of the triad. Flexibility comes in two forms. First, they can attack an adversary from any direction, which makes them ideal for difficult targets. Bombers can strike any target regardless of terrain, borders, or location. This flexibility is only enhanced by the fact that the B-52H carries the variable-yield air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the B-2 can carry either the ALCM or the variable-yield B-61 gravity bomb. Thus, bombers are able to strike targets with a low-yield option and limit damage.

Second, bombers are the only leg of the triad that, once launched, are recallable. This attribute pairs with the visibility of bombers. Because bombers are “generated” in a way that is visible to space-based surveillance satellites, they provide the United States the ability to signal an adversary and escalate in discreet steps that then offer the opportunity to deescalate—the ultimate objective. Loading bombers with nuclear weapons, moving them to forward bases, and conducting flights in a geographic region are visible ways to signal an adversary of American resolve and intent. Only bombers have the ability to engage in such overt displays of power.

Image of B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

The ALCM and its eventual replacement, the Long-range Stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile, extend the effective range of bombers and deny sanctuary to the enemy. By extending the range of bombers, cruise missiles reduce risk to aircrew, increase aircraft survivability, and reduce support requirements for stand-off strikes, such as tankers and strike-support aircraft. Cruise missiles increase the survivability of each bomber since each cruise missile’s survivability is independent of other cruise missiles. The survivability provided by cruise missiles lends to the credibility of the bomber leg and the stability of nuclear deterrence.

Bombers are, however, vulnerable to conventional attack while on the ground. While in the air, the B-52H is vulnerable to advanced anti-aircraft systems, which is why the venerable aircraft only engages in stand-off attack with cruise missiles. It is this susceptibility to attack that makes the second leg of the triad so important.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)

ICBMs are the nation’s “on alert” nuclear force that provides a 24/7/365 option that can strike targets 5,000-10,000 miles away in less than half an hour. Because the ICBM force is always on alert, the president can strike time-sensitive targets if necessary. Their ability to penetrate existing defenses provides an assured strike capability. With only a small number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) on alert at any given time and with the bomber force off alert, the alert status of the ICBM is particularly vital.

In order to destroy the American ICBM force, an adversary must strike more than 450 hardened targets. This is a daunting task that demands an adversary maintain a large and accurate fleet of ICBMs. Even with such a capability, the risk of failing to destroy the entire ICBM force is significant and a reason for pause when contemplating an attack on the United States.

Diagram depicting the different stages of a Minuteman III missile path from launch to detonation, as well as the different basic stages of the missile themselves. Based on information in TRW Systems. (2001) Minuteman Weapon System History and Description.

This is an important point worth reiterating. Unlike the bomber and submarine force, destroying the ICBM force requires a large-scale nuclear attack on the American homeland. Thus, the stakes are much higher. Sinking a ballistic missile submarine with a torpedo or shooting down a bomber may not lead to a nuclear response, but a nuclear attack on the ICBM fields certainly would.

The weakness of the ICBM force is its stationary position. Both Russia and China know exactly where every American Launch Facility and Launch Control Center is located. While they are all hardened and buried, an accurate strike would destroy them. Thus, the sea leg of the triad provides the most survivable nuclear forces.

SLBM

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles provide the most secure leg of the nuclear triad. Submarines combine mobility, accuracy, and high yield to hold hardened targets at risk. Unlike ICBMs submarines can move, which allows them to modify their launch point to minimize third-country overflight and change the angle of attack—striking challenging targets. Submarines also have a more diverse re-entry angle than ICBMs—making it harder to defend against them. While not prompt, like ICBMs, submarines provide an on-alert option to the president that is able to shape its trajectory and therefore alter warning time for the adversary.

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Wash. (Aug. 14, 2003) — USS Ohio (SSGN 726) is in dry dock undergoing a conversion from a Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) to a Guided Missile Submarine (SSGN) designation. Ohio has been out of service since Oct. 29, 2002 for conversion to SSGN at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Four Ohio-class strategic missile submarines, USS Ohio (SSBN 726), USS Michigan (SSBN 727) USS Florida (SSBN 728), and USS Georgia (SSBN 729) have been selected for transformation into a new platform, designated SSGN. The SSGNs will have the capability to support and launch up to 154 Tomahawk missiles, a significant increase in capacity compared to other platforms. The 22 missile tubes also will provide the capability to carry other payloads, such as unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Special Forces equipment. This new platform will also have the capability to carry and support more than 66 Navy SEALs (Sea, Air and Land) and insert them clandestinely into potential conflict areas. U.S. Navy file photo. (RELEASED)

The great weakness of submarines lies in the potential of an adversary to engage in effective anti-submarine warfare. With the advent of small and stealthy unmanned underwater vehicles, it is becoming more likely that ballistic missile submarines will be tracked from port. High-performance computing and the eventual development of usable quantum computing will, at a point in the not-too-distant future, make the world’s oceans far less opaque to space-based intelligence capabilities.

Decision-making

Eliminating any leg of the triad would ease adversary attack planning and allow them to concentrate resources and attention on defeating the remaining leg(s). Thus, a triad of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs not only provides the president with a range of options for striking adversary targets, but the triad makes an adversary’s decision to strike the United States difficult and dangerous. The United States employs a deterrence-by-denial strategy against nuclear-armed adversaries, presenting three unique problems for pre- and post-launch survivability. Let us explain further.

Under pre-launch conditions, an adversary must counter a large dispersed and hardened target set (ICBMs), a mobile undersea stealth-like target set (submarines), and a globally deployed target set (bombers). These capabilities require adversary investments into intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance in order to find, fix, track, and target dispersed bombers, deployed submarines, and counter-force capabilities to engage fixed and mobile forces. Counter-force capabilities require a large number of prompt, accurate, and high-yield weapons; anti-submarine warfare capabilities; and air/missile capabilities—to identify and strike bomber bases.

US President Joe Biden. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Although the bomber force is vulnerable when not on alert, bombers become survivable once generated to an alert status because of their ability to launch on limited warning and disperse to a larger number of bases. ICBMs also deny an adversary the ability to preemptively destroy the American arsenal with a small-scale strike requiring the destruction of no more than 20 targets. The size of the ICBM force requires an adversary to target a large number of their weapons against counterforce (ICBM) targets instead of counter-value (cities) targets. The large and dispersed nature of the ICBM force discourages the adversary from targeting more weapons against American population centers due to the enormous retaliatory capacity of surviving ICBMs.

Under post-launch and retaliatory-strike conditions, the adversary must counter ballistic missiles originating from both known (ICBM) and unknown (SLBM) locations, penetrating bombers (B-2) and cruise missiles (B-52H). This forces an adversary to invest in anti-ballistic missiles, air defenses, and counter-cruise missile technologies. An adversary must make these investments and take these actions in an environment where there is a great deal of uncertainty, and the risk of failure means the destruction of society.

Is it any wonder that nuclear deterrence has held for more than seven decades?

Signaling

The triad communicates resolve to adversaries and allies alike. Bombers can forward deploy, allowing the United States to conduct overflights and presence missions. Such action complicates the risk calculation for an adversary, and it signals to our allies an American commitment—linking American interests with those of its allies. The bomber force is stabilizing because of its visibility and longer flight times to targets. A bomber’s ability to launch and be recalled allows for more presidential decision time, allows the adversary to reconsider actions, demonstrates resolve, and increases risk for the adversary.

An artist rendering of the future U.S. Navy Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines. The 12 submarines of the Columbia-class will replace the Ohio-class submarines which are reaching their maximum extended service life. It is planned that the construction of USS Columbia (SSBN-826) will begin in in fiscal year 2021, with delivery in fiscal year 2028, and being on patrol in 2031.

While bombers are the best option for signaling, the other legs possess attributes that improve deterrence and assurance messaging. ICBMs are on constant alert, signaling American resolve and commitment. Their sustained posture is also a strong constraining force during a crisis.

Submarines can also signal allies and adversaries by increasing their alert rate, deploying additional submarines, and directing deployed vessels to conduct port calls at American or allied overseas ports. These measures demonstrate resolve and commitment. However, increased submarine deployments may increase adversary fear of a first strike, adding uncertainty.

Deterrence Failure

American nuclear forces must achieve military objectives if deterrence fails. This requires an ability to tailor strike options for reestablishing deterrence. In the event of deterrence failure, conducting counter-force strikes, coupled with active and passive defenses, can reduce American casualties. This is only possible because the triad offers the diverse set of capabilities—described above—needed to provide the president with a range of options for retaliation and the restoration of deterrence.

Hedging and the Nuclear Triad

The last role nuclear weapons play is in hedging against an uncertain future. The triad’s variety of deployment methods (air, sea, and land); the multitude of delivery profiles (ICBM, SLBM, gravity bomb, cruise missile); and diversity of designs (W78, W87, W76, W88, W80 warheads, and B61 gravity bomb) protect the nation.

Hedging is important because of the possibility of technical failure within one leg of the triad, adversary breakout from existing force levels, and adversary technological breakout. By hedging with a triad, instead of a dyad (bombers and submarines) or a monad (submarines), the nation can protect against the risks just mentioned and return to a larger number of nuclear weapons if needed. The fact that the nuclear force can also return to alert status also signals U.S. resolve to its adversary, increases the credibility of its nuclear force, and if deterrence fails, provides the president options to restore deterrence and achieve US strategic objectives. This hedge force is critical to our ability to adapt to changes over time.

Conclusion

The nuclear triad is the foundation of American national security. All too often it is forgotten that the nation’s nuclear deterrent has served as the foundation of American security for more than seven decades. They have allowed the United States to engage in conflict abroad without the intervention of adversaries. Even today, it is because of the nuclear triad that both Russia and China exercise restraint when contemplating a change to the international order.

The peace dividend gained from the end of the Cold War allowed the United States to neglect the regular nuclear modernization that kept the American arsenal ahead of the Soviet Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent threats to use nuclear weapons and China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal are clear signs that the world has changed. As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis said during a February 7, 2018 press conference, “America can afford survival.” He added, “Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a war that we were unable to deter.”

Lt. Col Derek Williams, USAF, is a B52 Electronic Warfare Officer and graduate of Sandia National Laboratories’ Weapons Intern program. Dr. Adam Lowther is the Director of Strategic Deterrence Programs at the National Strategic Research Institute. The views expressed are those of the authors alone.

19fortyfive.com · by Derek Williams and Adam Lowther · October 12, 2022

15. America’s arsenal is in need of life support

Excerpts:

Thankfully, the solutions are simple if there is sufficient political will to pursue them. Congress should push to authorize and appropriate funding levels for key munitions that match the current maximum production rate. In the next breath, members would be wise to ask what more can be done to increase maximum production rates next year. Notably, the initial version of the Senate appropriations bill has $1 billion for industrial capacity expansion.

Congress should also establish multiyear purchasing agreements for vital munitions where possible; help defense manufacturers address weak points in their munition production workforces; and bolster smaller, secondary and tertiary subcontractors that may be slowing overall production rates.

The Senate just added more than a dozen authorizations for multiyear contracts during the chamber’s consideration of the annual defense authorization bill. In fact, the Senate’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act advances all of these priorities and hopefully will be supported by House leadership and included in the final conference report.

In addition to actions Washington can take, the United States can look to its allies for help. As the United States expands production capacity, it will be able to sell key munitions to capable allies, thus reducing the operational burden on U.S. forces and the financial burden on the American taxpayer. Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom should all be reviewing the LRASM and SM-6 for future procurement.

Washington should also explore co-production agreements with reliable allies and partners. That would build larger, combined production capacity over time and result in a more potent, combined, deterrent force.

The good news for Americans is that there is still time to act, but the window of opportunity may be closing.

America’s arsenal is in need of life support

By Bradley Bowman and Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery (ret.)

 Oct 12, 03:08 PM

Defense News · by Bradley Bowman · October 12, 2022

The United States is set to face a raft of consequences if urgent measures are not taken to expand its production capacity for military munitions.

For many years, the Defense Department and Congress together all but ignored the issue. Year after year, budgets were proposed and approved that saw crucial munitions purchased at the lowest possible rate companies could sustain, hollowing out the industrial base.

Now, with an extraordinary array of threats emerging, Washington can no longer disregard a munitions production shortfall that endangers U.S. military readiness and undercuts Washington’s ability to provide beleaguered democracies, such as Ukraine and Taiwan, with the combat capabilities they need.

The good news is that there are several steps Congress can take to begin to address the munitions crisis. Those include authorizing and funding major production increases of key munitions, supporting targeted measures to expand industrial capacity, and the provision of multiyear procurement authorities that incentivize private sector investment.

To begin to understand the challenge, consider the U.S. assistance provided to Ukraine. On Oct. 4, the Pentagon announced $625 million in additional security assistance for Ukraine, bringing the total to $17.5 billion since January 2021. Among other things, according the Pentagon, assistance provided to Ukraine by the U.S. has included roughly 8,500 Javelin anti-armor systems, 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems, 880,0000 155mm artillery rounds, 2,500 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds and an unknown quantity of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rounds used by the 38 U.S. High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems in or on their way to Ukraine.

While the Biden administration’s support for Ukraine represents a necessary step to secure core American interests, the laudable provision of these weapons to Kyiv has highlighted shortcomings when it comes to the Pentagon’s munitions arsenals and the capacity of the U.S. industrial base to produce them.

The Javelin anti-tank weapon that gained increased notoriety in the early days of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s latest invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the wider problem. According to Pentagon budget documents, the average rate of Pentagon procurement of the Javelin during fiscal 2020 to fiscal 2022 was about 675 annually. At that rate, it would take more than 12 years to replace the 8,500 Javelin systems sent to Ukraine.

In April, when the United States had sent only 5,000 Javelin missiles to Ukraine, lawmakers expressed concerns that this quantity amounted to one-third of U.S. stockpiles.

The Defense Department and Congress are taking belated steps to address the Javelin shortfall, and industry is looking to double production capacity — but that could take a couple years. There are also production capacity concerns related to the Stinger missiles, 155mm artillery rounds and GMLRS rounds.

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Some might respond by arguing the United States should halt the provision of weapons to Kyiv. But that would be a penny-wise, pound-foolish move that both neglects the core American interests at stake on the battlefield in Ukraine and invites more aggression from autocrats.

These munitions challenges are not only relegated to ground warfare munitions or the situation in Ukraine. China now boasts the largest naval force in the world, and deterring or defeating an attack by Beijing on Taiwan would require the U.S. military to maintain the capability and capacity to sink an extraordinary number of Chinese vessels. Yet, once again, the U.S. military lacks the requisite number of munitions.

Chinese J-15 fighter jets are launched from the deck of the Liaoning aircraft carrier during military drills in the South China Sea in 2017. (STR/AFP via Getty Images)

The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile is a consummate example. The LRASM has a 500-mile-plus range that can launch from U.S. Air Force (B-1 and soon B-52) and Navy (F-18 and soon P-8) aircraft, placing China’s naval fleet at risk. Unfortunately, the Pentagon only has about 200 of these missiles today; recent war games consistently indicate the United States needs about 800-1,200 to deter or defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Despite that fact, the average annual LRASM procurement rate across FY20-FY22 was only 38 missiles (including both the U.S. Navy and Air Force). For FY23, the Pentagon requested a total of 88 missiles. At that rate, it would take until around 2032 to accumulate around 1,000 missiles in the U.S. inventory. Such a lethargic procurement plan is perilously disconnected from warnings that Beijing could conduct an attack long before that.

A Long Range Anti-Ship Missile launches from a U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer during flight testing in 2013. (U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)

To begin to address this dangerous shortfall, Washington should work with industry to get the LRASM production up to 200-250 a year as soon as possible. For FY23, production capacity could ideally be increased to at least 110-130 as an interim step.

Other high-end munitions with similar capacity shortfalls in war games include the Standard Missile-6, a multipurpose missile that can be used for countering cruise and ballistic missiles, sinking ships, land-attack operations, and potentially even hypersonic missile defense. The Navy is buying approximately 125 of these a year, but even double that rate would still not fulfill warfighter needs.

Across many of these munitions, the key problem has been the failure of Washington to procure the munitions in sufficient quantities in the form of signed contracts with industry. When the contracts and large quantity procurements weren’t forthcoming, industry predictably responded by permitting some industrial capacity to wither.

Thankfully, the solutions are simple if there is sufficient political will to pursue them. Congress should push to authorize and appropriate funding levels for key munitions that match the current maximum production rate. In the next breath, members would be wise to ask what more can be done to increase maximum production rates next year. Notably, the initial version of the Senate appropriations bill has $1 billion for industrial capacity expansion.

Congress should also establish multiyear purchasing agreements for vital munitions where possible; help defense manufacturers address weak points in their munition production workforces; and bolster smaller, secondary and tertiary subcontractors that may be slowing overall production rates.

The Senate just added more than a dozen authorizations for multiyear contracts during the chamber’s consideration of the annual defense authorization bill. In fact, the Senate’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act advances all of these priorities and hopefully will be supported by House leadership and included in the final conference report.

In addition to actions Washington can take, the United States can look to its allies for help. As the United States expands production capacity, it will be able to sell key munitions to capable allies, thus reducing the operational burden on U.S. forces and the financial burden on the American taxpayer. Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom should all be reviewing the LRASM and SM-6 for future procurement.

Washington should also explore co-production agreements with reliable allies and partners. That would build larger, combined production capacity over time and result in a more potent, combined, deterrent force.

The good news for Americans is that there is still time to act, but the window of opportunity may be closing.

Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is the senior director of FDD’s Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation.

16.  Opinion | Our Generals Are Bad at Strategy. They Should Study the Civil Rights Movement.

There is a lot we could learn from the civil rights movement for contouring political warfare and resistance.

This is quite a critique.

Excerpts:

The U.S. military also has done poorly at the end game of wars. General Tommy R. Franks, who presided over the beginnings of both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, believed that what happened after the enemy’s capital was taken was someone else’s concern — when in fact that was when the real wars began.

The civil rights movement, on the other hand, began every campaign with the ending in mind. As one of their songs put it, they kept their eyes on the prize. The goal always was “reconciliation” — not expecting to embrace the enemy, but simply to find a peaceable way forward. After an agreement was reached in Birmingham, Ala., to desegregate downtown lunch counters, they worked with the owners of those establishments to make the change easier, calling ahead to inquire about what would be a good time to send in Black customers. The movement was effectively training its former opponents in how to live with integration.

Finally, the members of the civil rights movement were in it for the long term. Yes, some people burned out, or had to go home to earn a living. But the movement as a whole understood that changing a society is a long and difficult struggle, with setbacks and unexpected turns. Martin Luther King Jr. and those around him did not do one-year tours and then “rotate” home. He was engaged more or less continuously from 1955 until he was assassinated in Memphis, Tenn., in 1968. One can only wish that the leaders of the U.S. military had taken Iraq and Afghanistan as seriously.

Opinion | Our Generals Are Bad at Strategy. They Should Study the Civil Rights Movement.

Politico

Magazine

Opinion | Our Generals Are Bad at Strategy. They Should Study the Civil Rights Movement.

Martin Luther King Jr. knew that tactics without strategy is a recipe for failure.

Martin Luther King Jr. appears at a news conference in Selma, Ala., in February 1965. | Horace Cort/AP Photo

Opinion by Thomas E. Ricks

10/12/2022 04:30 AM EDT

Thomas E. Ricks is the author of several works about the U.S. military as well as the new book “Waging a Good War: A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968.”

The U.S. military has struggled mightily in recent decades. American armed forces excel at tactics, but our generals have not been good at strategy, and it’s made our military like a Ferrari without a steering wheel — powerful but unable to get you to where you want to go.

The armed forces could learn a lot from a surprising source: the civil rights movement of the 1950s and ‘60s.

At first glance, the notion may seem preposterous. The military, after all, is a huge, hierarchical organization devoted to using force to defend American interests, while the movement was a relatively small, disruptive group of people that primarily used non-violent methods to challenge white supremacy in the American South. But despite the obvious difference between fighting a war in Iraq and agitating for civil rights domestically, the civil rights movement offers important lessons about strategy that could benefit our military leaders.

In fact, the two organizations are far more similar than is generally recognized. Inspired by the example of the great Indian activist Mohandas Gandhi, the civil rights movement borrowed many of the characteristics of a military organization. It paid close attention to recruiting, organization, training and discipline, all hallmarks of an effective army.

The problem with U.S. military strategy has been complicated by the fact that both our military and civilian leaders have not been honest with themselves or the public about our wars. We invaded Iraq on the false premise that it possessed biological or nuclear weapons. We went into Afghanistan without a clear idea of what we intended to do after ridding it of al Qaeda members, or how we were going to do it. The results have been devastatingly clear.

By contrast, the civil rights movement’s leaders were especially adept at strategy. Indeed, it is here that the Pentagon could learn some important lessons. Martin Luther King Jr. and his closest advisers — Andrew Young, James Bevel, Diane Nash and James Lawson, among others — devoted vast amounts of time and energy to formulating their strategy. Their understanding of it was somewhat different, and I think, deeper, than the way the American military thinks about it. U.S. war colleges teach that strategy is a relatively straightforward matter of figuring out what you want to do, then deciding how to do it, and what resources to devote to the effort.

The key figures of the civil rights movement treated strategy as a harder, more fundamental question. For them, it began with the most basic and difficult of questions: Who are we? In Nashville in 1960, the answer that Nash, then a young college student, formulated was: First, we are people who are no longer willing to live under segregation. Thus, strategy began with how one thought about one’s self. Actions — that is, tactics — then flowed from that conception. In other words, we are people who would rather die than live under subjugation. This insight led to a series of extraordinary actions — the Nashville sit-ins of 1960, the formation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee a year later, and soon thereafter, the Freedom Rides that put the civil rights movement on the front pages of newspapers across the country and indeed around the world. Kennedy administration officials warned Nash and others that they could get killed; she responded that they fully understood that fact, an answer that astounded the officials. They already had decided that they would rather die than submit to segregation any longer.

Most of all, the movement’s leaders excelled at holding to their strategic goals, of not being distracted by lesser issues or half-hearted compromises, a perennial issue for the military. They wanted to be treated as American citizens equal before the law, and especially to have the right to vote. They wanted to live in peace and justice — and their non-violent tactics would reflect that.

They also were rigorously honest, believing that only by determining the facts of the matter could one discern the way forward. After the funeral for some of the four girls killed in the Birmingham church bombing in September 1963, civil rights movement leaders went to the cemetery for the burial, leaving behind a restless crowd bristling with energy that wanted to march or do something. Nash wrote a scathing memo to King and others, chiding them for leaving and for blowing an opportunity to turn negative energy into something positive. “You can tell people not to fight only if you offer them a way by which justice can be served without violence. … This energy could have been channeled, into a constructive, disciplined soul force aimed at creatively using this energy to achieve a concrete gain.” From such internal truth-telling, great organizations learn, adapt and change.

The U.S. military used to understand the need for such candor and to demand it of its leaders. But in Iraq and Afghanistan, its commanders too often failed to discern the facts on the ground or to convey them to their civilian overseers. Instead, they served for a yearlong rotation without truly grappling with the scope of the challenge, then came home and went on to other things.

In addition, the movement excelled at using operations to send a message. It generally did not stage demonstrations for the sake of marching. Rather, it used actions in the streets to convey a thought or emphasize a point. In Selma, Ala., Black people who tried to register to vote were turned away as unqualified as illiterate. Thus, the town’s Black teachers, who clearly were educated, marched. By contrast, the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq tended to launch a mission and then later try to decide what to say about it.

The U.S. military also has done poorly at the end game of wars. General Tommy R. Franks, who presided over the beginnings of both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, believed that what happened after the enemy’s capital was taken was someone else’s concern — when in fact that was when the real wars began.

The civil rights movement, on the other hand, began every campaign with the ending in mind. As one of their songs put it, they kept their eyes on the prize. The goal always was “reconciliation” — not expecting to embrace the enemy, but simply to find a peaceable way forward. After an agreement was reached in Birmingham, Ala., to desegregate downtown lunch counters, they worked with the owners of those establishments to make the change easier, calling ahead to inquire about what would be a good time to send in Black customers. The movement was effectively training its former opponents in how to live with integration.

Finally, the members of the civil rights movement were in it for the long term. Yes, some people burned out, or had to go home to earn a living. But the movement as a whole understood that changing a society is a long and difficult struggle, with setbacks and unexpected turns. Martin Luther King Jr. and those around him did not do one-year tours and then “rotate” home. He was engaged more or less continuously from 1955 until he was assassinated in Memphis, Tenn., in 1968. One can only wish that the leaders of the U.S. military had taken Iraq and Afghanistan as seriously.

POLITICO

Politico

17. Why U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers Are Irreplaceable

I personally love the 4.7acres of sovereign US territory.

Why U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers Are Irreplaceable

19fortyfive.com · by Sarah White · October 12, 2022

Why America Has No Viable Alternative To Aircraft Carriers: There is a school of thought in academic circles that aircraft carriers may soon become obsolete due to the nature of the threat posed by China. The long-range reconnaissance systems and missiles being developed by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are believed to be accurate and destructive enough to disable an aircraft carrier, and taking out even one of them would have a devastating effect on the U.S. defense posture in the Pacific theater. Thus, continuing to develop new aircraft carriers has been seen by some as a situation of “too many eggs in one basket.”

U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier Ronald Reagan.

Aircraft Carriers Have a Future

But where this argument breaks down is when the available alternatives are considered. What other option does the Navy have than what an aircraft carrier essentially is, a floating, mobile air base? Where are the better options?

Because the Navy is not dependent on land bases, it is not vulnerable to attack the same way the Air Force would be. Along with allowing the Navy not to be tied to land bases, aircraft carriers play a role that a fleet of smaller ships could never fulfill, at least for the foreseeable future. Here are a few reasons that their role is so indispensable.

Lethality

Large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers go a long way in making an adversary think twice before launching an attack. They sustain the Navy’s deterrent strategy, sending the message to potential aggressors that the U.S. is equipped to defeat them in an actual war.

The lethality of aircraft carriers derives from the type of weapons they carry. The Nimitz- and Ford-class carriers are armed with dozens of strike fighters, mostly F/A-18E and F/A-18F Super Hornets, and are further equipped with anti-aircraft and missile defenses. The other part of carriers’ lethality is their stamina in sustaining attacks. Aircraft carriers’ weapons systems have the capacity to pummel hundreds of targets on land or at sea every day during a conflict.

Versatility

A large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is inherently versatile. It can accomplish power projection, sea control, air defense, and various other missions simultaneously. Aircraft carriers also have an unlimited range with nuclear power, so they never need to be refueled at sea. This allows them to move about 700 miles in a single day. Without carriers, sustaining operations against distant adversaries would be extremely difficult.

Aircraft carriers’ versatility is also a matter of convenience: nothing else can provide a similarly capable floating mobile sea base. When the Navy has everything it needs to prepare for conflict in one place, it makes much less sense to consider switching to dependence on a series of smaller, scattered vessels in combination with bases in allied countries. That situation would create an immediate logistical tangle that would be to the Navy’s disadvantage if and when conflict in the Pacific, especially with China, breaks out.

Cost

Aircraft carriers are expensive: a carrier strike group probably costs a billion dollars per year to own and operate. That is less than ten percent of what the federal government spends every day. One day’s worth of federal government spending comes out at about $16 billion, which is the same amount that it costs to build and equip one new Ford-class carrier. The yearly sustainment costs are probably less than one day’s worth of federal spending for all ten U.S. carriers. Operating costs after construction is about $800 million per year for the 50-year lifespan of a carrier. If destroyer escorts are added to the bill, that adds an additional $200 million.

Ultimately, the expense of carriers is a long-term investment that exists to make sure the Navy can accomplish its objectives at sustained levels when war breaks out. It is not likely that smaller warships could operate week after week at the intensity that carriers are capable of. How long is it plausible to sustain an alternative option, given the pace at which surface combatants might expend their missiles in major conflicts?

Survivability

Compared to any alternatives, large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are much more resilient in withstanding potential attacks. Their size, flexibility in movement, and level of protection makes them formidable targets for adversaries. Sinking or disabling just one is thought to be nearly impossible—except through the use of a nuclear weapon. That is why there is debate over whether the PLAN’s latest weapons are actually able to take a carrier out.

The aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) steams through the Atlantic Ocean July 16, 2014. The Harry S. Truman was underway conducting an ammunition transfer. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Karl Anderson, U.S. Navy/Released)

Growth

There is no reason to believe that aircraft carriers are entering obsolescence when the carrier air wing is entering a new stage of evolution.

In the next 40 years, the Navy will complete the transition from the Nimitz to the Ford classes of aircraft carriers. For the first time, the U.S. will have carriers equipped with the stealthy F-35C (the carrier-based version of the cutting-edge F-35 fighter jet) plus the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, a radar plane that can track scores of targets from many miles away, and the CMV-22, a flexible tilt-rotor for resupplying carriers.

In the future, the Navy will also be able to add unmanned aircraft to the carrier airwing. The most critical hardware at this stage will be the MQ-25 drone, essentially an unmanned tanker.

These advancements all but guarantee that U.S. aircraft carriers will remain the preeminent geopolitical weapon of war for decades to come, both as an instrument of deterrence and as a tool for defeating aggression.

130105-N-ZZ999-001

U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Jan. 5, 2012) The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) operates in the Arabian Sea during sunset. John C. Stennis is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations, theater security cooperation efforts and support missions for Operation Enduring Freedom. (U.S. Navy photo by Yeoman 3rd Class James Stahl/Released)

Author Biography: Sarah White is a Senior Research Analyst at the Lexington Institute: Prior to joining Lexington, Sarah held internships at the Albright Stonebridge Group and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She earned an M.A. in Latin American Studies in 2019 from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, and a B.A. in political science and Spanish from Wake Forest University in 2017. Sarah is fluent in Spanish, proficient in Portuguese, and conversational in French. She is a native of McLean, Virginia.

19fortyfive.com · by Sarah White · October 12, 2022

18. Kremlin Talking Points Are Back in the U.S. Debate

​This is not provided to endorse a partisan position but to understand Russian political and information warfare.

It might worth reading this letter to the editor from 2021 as a companion to this piece:

The ‘useful idiots’ are back

https://thecitizen.com/2021/05/27/the-useful-idiots-are-back/

And although the new NSS has been published, this excerpt from President Trump's 2017 NSS should remain important guidance:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Kremlin Talking Points Are Back in the U.S. Debate

Foreign Policy · by Laura Thornton · October 13, 2022

Argument

An expert's point of view on a current event.

Elon Musk, Tucker Carlson, and midterm candidates are peddling Russian propaganda on Ukraine.

By Laura Thornton, the director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund.

Tesla CEO Elon Musk attends a gala event at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York on May 2.

Tesla CEO Elon Musk attends a gala event at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York on May 2. Dimitrios Kambouris/Getty Images for The Met Museum/Vogue

When Tesla chief executive Elon Musk tweeted his support for Russia’s dismemberment of Ukraine, he used some highly revealing language. Crimea should be Russian, he tweeted, because of “Krushchev’s mistake”—a reference to Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev’s redrawing of internal Soviet borders. That particular wording has never been part of the U.S. debate about Ukraine, but it is the standard language used by the Kremlin for its claims on Ukrainian land. It’s not the only talking point Musk has embraced that will be familiar to anyone following Kremlin propaganda.

Musk’s tweets are a prominent example of a worrisome trend: Kremlin talking points are creeping back into the U.S. debate. Few issues have united Democrats and Republicans again after years of intense polarization as much as supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s brutal and unprovoked invasion. In the U.S. Congress, there has been strong bipartisan backing for weapons deliveries and other aid to Kyiv, as well as for fortifying NATO’s eastern frontier. Until recently, voices supporting the Kremlin were few and far between, most prominently, Fox News host Tucker Carlson and former President Donald Trump. Carlson openly declared he was on Russia’s side, and Trump praised Russian President Vladimir Putin for his cleverness for invading Ukraine. As noisy as they were, these voices were overpowered by a consensus about the war and how the United States should respond.

Now, there are cracks in this consensus, with Musk the latest example of Russian propaganda slipping back into the public conversation. With campaigning for next month’s U.S. midterm elections heating up, Putin’s talking points are increasingly being spread by candidates running for office, as we document with the Midterms Monitor, a joint social-media tracking project of the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshal Fund and the Brennan Center for Justice. The monitor has captured more than 2,300 tweets by U.S. candidates for Congress or high state office dealing with Ukraine since Aug. 1. Many of these posts are critical of Russia and back U.S. policy on the war. Some criticize the high cost of aid. But a noisy minority—most, but not all, Republicans—are also parroting the most egregious Kremlin propaganda. Should these candidates be elected, especially to Congress, they could push for a shift in U.S. policy on Ukraine.

Some of these candidates have taken their cues from Fox News, the most influential source of pro-Russian disinformation in the United States. As catalogued by The Bulwark, the network’s hosts have labeled Ukraine as parasitic, called Ukrainians’ defense of their country an attack on Russia, and called the war “another Russia hoax” as part of a plot led by Democrats. In a bizarre twist of reality that directly repeats Russian propaganda, the Conservative Political Action Conference called Ukraine’s own territories claimed by Russia “Ukrainian-occupied” in a tweet last month. Showing a Russian flag waving in the background, the tweet also demanded an end to U.S. “gift-giving” to Ukraine. (The tweet was later deleted but can be read here in full.)

There is little doubt that some of these positions are the result of Russian influence operations, not least because some candidates are retweeting Russian propaganda sources.

Republican candidates—and some Democrats—are joining in. Many anti-Ukraine messages center on keeping money at home. J.D. Vance, a Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate in Ohio, is campaigning on an end to aid for Ukraine and just called for “negotiations” with Putin, who of course continues to insist on Ukraine’s dismemberment. Mayra Flores, a Republican candidate for the House of Representatives from Texas, tweeted: “Congress just voted to send another $12,300,000,000 to Ukraine! … Why aren’t we putting America’s best interests first?” Allen Waters, a Republican House candidate from Rhode Island, shared, “#AmericaFirst not #Ukraine. Keep Rhode Island safe from nuclear conflict.”

But candidates are also repeating Kremlin narratives almost verbatim. This includes calling Ukrainians “Nazis,” accusing Kyiv of war crimes, saying the United States started the war, and blaming Washington for the Nord Stream pipeline explosions. Donnie Palmer, a Republican House candidate from Massachusetts, praised Trump by saying: “did he get us into a war … did he blow up 2 pipelines, is he backing Nazis in Ukraine?” Eric Brewer, Republican House candidate from Ohio, attacked the U.S. ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Michael Carpenter: “@USAmbOSCE Carpenter is omitting the context for Putin’s military operation … He’s ignoring Ukraine’s 8 years of war crimes & Russia’s 8 years of restraint. Putin acted late.”

Derision for the Ukrainian government is being spread as well. “What classy people the government of Ukraine employs,” tweeted Irene Armendariz Jackson, a Republican House candidate from Texas, at a Ukrainian diplomat who used an expletive in response to Musk’s suggestion to surrender Crimea. Some candidates have blamed Ukraine’s NATO aspirations for the war instead of Putin’s clearly stated view that Ukraine has no right to exist as a country.

Among the Democrats who have joined in, by far the most prolific is Geoffrey Young, a House candidate from Kentucky. He has tweeted some 680 times about Russia or Ukraine since Aug. 1, including retweeting the Russian state-owned propaganda network RT, Redfish, and some of Russia’s most infamous propagandists, such as Dmitry Polyanskiy, Moscow’s ambassador to the United Nations. When he’s not celebrating Russian military advances, Young parrots the Kremlin’s attacks on NATO and launders Putin’s narrative that Ukrainians are “Nazis.” “Since 2014, the war criminals, aggressors, and mass-murderers in and near Ukraine have been Washington first & foremost, NATO, the Ukrainian government (which has been a US puppet), and groups of Ukrainian Nazis,” he tweeted. Of the Biden administration, he wrote: “My country is being run by genocidal war criminals.” In part due to these positions, Young has not received support from the Democratic Party.

There is little doubt that some of these positions are the result of Russian influence operations, not least because some candidates are retweeting Russian propaganda sources. The ideas, too, aren’t all homegrown. Framing Ukraine as a Nazi state did not originate in U.S. domestic debate, but was imported from mainstream Russian discourse, just like Musk’s phrasing of the supposed “mistake” that made Crimea a part of Ukraine.

American anti-Ukraine voices are also often rebroadcast on Russian state media for a Russian audience, which also serves the Kremlin’s propaganda operations. Naturally, Musk’s proposal to dismember Ukraine was all over Russian state media, while Sputnik highlighted former presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard’s announcement on Monday that she is leaving the Democratic Party because it is supposedly run by a “cabal of warmongers.” Similarly, RT has amplified Republican Congressman Paul Gosar’s statement that the United States “doesn’t owe Zelensky a damn thing.”

A compounding problem is that much of our tracked social media content with the highest user engagement—counting likes and retweets—is critical of Ukraine. This may be a result of the social media algorithms or just human behavior, where negativity attracts more attention. The most-tweeted mentions of “NATO,” for example, do not favor the alliance’s effort to help Ukraine defend itself, which is the majority consensus among Americans. Instead, Twitter is flooded with content calling NATO a “war machine.”

Not every anti-Ukrainian candidate will win office next month. But if enough of them do, they could shift critical foreign policy decisions in Washington. Congress could reduce the aid Ukraine desperately needs. The return of U.S. political divisions over Russia would also send troubling signals to the United States’ already skittish European allies, who are understandably anxious about U.S. foreign policy shifts if a Republican president is elected in 2024.

Like all efforts to defend against information operations, the spread of Kremlin talking points in the U.S. political debate can only be countered by proactively debunking, counter-messaging, and flooding the zone. Ukraine’s defenders need to go on the offensive by stating why the outcome of the war matters to the United States. Supporters of Ukraine, not least the Biden administration, have plenty to learn from Ukraine itself, which has effectively shaped the narrative and out-operated the Kremlin in the information space.

If the bipartisan and popular consensus in support of Ukraine is to be maintained, Democrats and Republicans need to put forward an unambiguous defense of Ukraine and not let a noisy minority of candidates and celebrities like Musk grab the public stage. Come November, we will know if they succeeded.

Laura Thornton is a senior fellow and the director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshall Fund. Twitter: @LauraLThornton​

19. Biden warns US faces ‘decisive decade’ in rivalry with China

Excerpts;

Biden recently said the US would defend Taiwan if it came under attack from China, in his fourth such statement, which has reinforced concerns about a possible war breaking out in the Indo-Pacific region.

The release of the strategy comes days before President Xi Jinping is expected to secure a third term as China’s leader at the Communist party’s 20th congress. US and Chinese officials are also negotiating a possible first in-person meeting between Biden and Xi when they attend the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, next month.

The document had been expected earlier this year but was delayed because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Its publication paves the way for the Pentagon to release its “national defence strategy” and for the administration to release a highly anticipated “nuclear posture review”.

Biden warns US faces ‘decisive decade’ in rivalry with China

Washington’s new national security strategy singles out Beijing for capability to reshape international order

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · October 12, 2022

Joe Biden has warned that the US faces a “decisive decade” in its rivalry with China, as he unveiled a national security strategy that singled out Beijing as having the intent and capability to reshape the international order.

In the first such document of his presidency, Biden on Wednesday wrote that his administration was “clear-eyed about the scope and seriousness” of the challenge posed to the international order from China and Russia.

“China harbours the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favour of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit,” Biden wrote in the 48-page text.

He added that Russia had “shattered peace in Europe” with the invasion of Ukraine and was endangering the global non-proliferation regime with its “reckless nuclear threats”.

In terms of competition with China, which the Pentagon calls the “pacing challenge” for the US, Biden said the next decade would be decisive.

“We stand now at the inflection point, where the choices we make and the priorities we pursue today will set us on a course that determines our competitive position long into the future,” the national security strategy laid out.

Biden’s strategy, which comes fives years since the US released its previous iteration, outlines his view of the strategic challenges facing the country and the crucial priorities for American national security officials.

It said the US’s goal is to have a “free, open, prosperous, and secure international order”. It would try achieve this by investing in US power and influence, building strong coalitions to “shape the global strategic environment”, and strengthening the military to ensure it was “equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers” while also having the capability to counter terrors threats to the country.

The focus on China comes as relations between Washington and Beijing are mired in their worst state since the countries established diplomatic relations in 1979. The US is concerned about everything from the rapid modernisation of the Chinese military to its aggressive activity around Taiwan.

Two months ago China conducted large-scale military exercises, including firing missiles over Taiwan, in response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei.

Beijing accuses Washington of interfering in its domestic affairs and creating anti-China coalitions with US allies. In recent days, Beijing has criticised Washington for introducing export controls designed to slow Chinese progress in artificial intelligence, super computers and advanced chips.

The national security strategy presented Beijing as posing the most serious challenge to the US, but also said Washington would take steps to make sure it was “outcompeting the People’s Republic of China in the technological, economic, political, military, intelligence and global governance domains”.

It also recognised that China was central to the global economy and was an important player in terms of efforts to deals with climate change and global public health issues. It said the two countries would still “coexist peacefully” despite the challenges.

Biden recently said the US would defend Taiwan if it came under attack from China, in his fourth such statement, which has reinforced concerns about a possible war breaking out in the Indo-Pacific region.

The release of the strategy comes days before President Xi Jinping is expected to secure a third term as China’s leader at the Communist party’s 20th congress. US and Chinese officials are also negotiating a possible first in-person meeting between Biden and Xi when they attend the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, next month.

The document had been expected earlier this year but was delayed because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Its publication paves the way for the Pentagon to release its “national defence strategy” and for the administration to release a highly anticipated “nuclear posture review”.

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · October 12, 2022

20. Army Harnessing Non-Kinetic Effects for Multi-Domain Ops in Indo-Pacific

What about other non-kinetic effects such as psychological operations?

Excerpts:

The MDTF will then use non-kinetic effects to “electromagnetically isolate” threats, giving Joint Force commanders the option conduct a kinetic attack against the vulnerable threat, he said.

The task forces may also use kinetic capabilities itself, including the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, as well as the Mid-Range Capability Battery and Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon in the future, Harringon said.

“We are able to layer kinetic effects on top of a potentially electromagnetically isolated adversary,” he said. “What we ultimately then [give] that Joint Force Commander is options as to how to potentially neutralize that target.”

Army Harnessing Non-Kinetic Effects for Multi-Domain Ops in Indo-Pacific

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Mikayla Easley

10/12/2022

Army photo

WASHINGTON, D.C. —With Defense Department efforts concentrated on deterring and eliminating threats in the Indo-Pacific, the Army is assisting the Joint Force by operationalizing long-range non-kinetic effects in the region, a senior official said Oct. 12.

The Multi-Domain Task Forces, or MDTF, are in-theater, specialized Army units designed to employ an array of long-range precision effects against an adversary’s anti-access/area denial networks, said Brig. Gen. Bernard Harrington, commander of the service’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force.

The task forces’ goal is to use non-kinetic capabilities — such as cyber, electronic warfare, intelligence and long-range fires — to augment the Joint Force’s existing lethal capabilities, he said during a panel discussion at the annual Association of the United States Army conference in Washington, D.C.

Operating in small units, each MDTF is assigned to a specific theater and uses capabilities tailored to threats in that region, he said.

Each task force supports the Army’s new commitment to conducting operations from all domains — including air, land, sea, space and cyber — as outlined in the service’s new operational doctrine, Field Manual 3.0, Harrington said.

“Although we are an Army unit … we support that Joint Force Commander as he or she is trying to execute neutralization of that network and gain access into that region,” he said.

In order to neutralize threats, the task forces use intelligence information to determine the best ways to disconnect an adversary from its anti-access/area denial networks and prevent it from completing any mission, Harrington explained.

The MDTF will then use non-kinetic effects to “electromagnetically isolate” threats, giving Joint Force commanders the option conduct a kinetic attack against the vulnerable threat, he said.

The task forces may also use kinetic capabilities itself, including the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, as well as the Mid-Range Capability Battery and Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon in the future, Harringon said.

“We are able to layer kinetic effects on top of a potentially electromagnetically isolated adversary,” he said. “What we ultimately then [give] that Joint Force Commander is options as to how to potentially neutralize that target.”

The Army currently has three Multi-Domain Task Forces operational, with the most recent unit opening its doors in September at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Along with the first MDTF created in 2017 at Joint Base Lewis McChord in Washington, the newest task force will focus on threats posed in the Indo-Pacific, said Col. David Zinn, commander of the third MDTF.

The second Multi-Domain Task Force was stationed in 2021 in Germany in support of U.S. Army Europe and Africa.

Zinn likened the Multi-Domain Task Forces’ relationship with the Joint Force as “a collection of archers and a quiver of arrows.”

“The Navy archers have some Navy arrows, and they can choose those arrows. And then the Air Force archers will have some Air Force arrows in that quiver,” he said. “So while we bring our additional arrows to the quiver, that's the additional capacity. And then our arrows have different capabilities, and that’s the complementary capability that we bring.”

Topics: Army News

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Mikayla Easley

21. Change is in the Mission for U.S. Special Operations Command

Excerpts:

Special Operations Command Korea, according to its own website, is a SOJTF-in-waiting. Its role is primarily to form a SOJTF on the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. “If the armistice fails, SOCKOR and ROK SWC will combine to establish the Combined Special Operations Component Command Korea under the Combined Forces Command,” according to its website. Meanwhile it carries on training exercises.

Gen. Clarke and Assistant Secretary Maier announced closed their April Vision and Strategy statement saying: “Just as our adversaries adapt to and shape the strategic environment, SOF will continue to evolve in order to fulfill the vision of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation in integrated deterrence, crisis, and conflict.”

SOCOM is still carrying on the war on terrorism with only slight public notice. Its work with allies in training Ukraine’s fighting forces may result in shaping conventional warfare in coming years. With that kind of record the American public should look forward to seeing what Special Forces leadership and personnel come up with in the future.

Change is in the Mission for U.S. Special Operations Command

thecipherbrief.com

Fine Print

October 12th, 2022 by Walter Pincus, |

Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010.

View all articles by Walter Pincus

OPINION — U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which has grown to become the world’s top counterterrorism force over the past 20 years, is now facing some change in mission and reductions in personnel under the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy.

During that period, SOCOM grew from about 45,700 military and civilian personnel in 2001 to about 73,900 in fiscal year 2021.

SOCOM Commander General Richard Clarke and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Christopher Maier announced last April in their Vision and Strategy statement, Special Operations Forces (SOF) must evolve “from the world’s premier Counter Terrorism (CT) force into one optimally suited to support the Joint Force and the Nation as part of integrated deterrence.”

With China and Russia as major power competitors, “Over the next 10 years, we will modernize SOF, pioneer dynamic and unorthodox approaches (including the full toolkit associated with irregular warfare), leverage emerging technologies to mitigate adversarial activities by China, and create asymmetric advantages for current and future conflict,” they wrote.

They also forecast that “Given anticipated budget reductions, our budget proposals will reflect deliberate efforts to find efficiencies in our processes and procedures.”

Ironically, SOF work in line with the new strategy had already begun eight years ago in Ukraine, while CT was still the main focus of SOCOM.

“Our special-operations forces helped develop and work with other allies to come into Ukraine and build up the Ukrainian special operations forces,” Gen. Clarke, told members of the House Armed Services Committee at a hearing in April.

Since that training began in 2014, Ukrainian forces “doubled in size,” Clarke said, and “created a solid military force with a robust, non-commissioned corps. It also created a cadre of potential recruits for Ukrainian special operations units, helping those units not only get better but bigger.”

However, as a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released last Wednesday showed, SOCOM’s new strategy focus has had an impact on its current operations.

During calendar year 2021, the GAO found, SOCOM had 28 action units or task forces operating around the world, primarily in the Middle East (12) and Africa (6). And between 2018 and 2021, it had terminated 27 SOF task forces and transitioned another 30 to other missions.

But the GAO report is a sharp reminder that SOCOM, and thus the U.S., continue to have American military units in active combat in several places around the world.

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For example, last Thursday, U.S. Combined Special Ops Joint Task Force-Levant (SOJTF-Levant) carried out two major assaults in Northern Syria that killed three Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist leaders, according to a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) press release.

Last week’s GAO report notes that back in 2020, CENTCOM had transitioned SOJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve, which had been directed at the ISIS terrorist group, into SOJTF-Levant, which has been carrying out military operations in Iraq and Syria.

Headquartered in Kuwait, SOJTF-Levant also exercises command of SOF units in Jordan and Lebanon. Recently, SOJTF-Levant reduced its personnel from about 270 to 230, according to the GAO.

In Afghanistan, according to the GAO, SOJTF-Afghanistan ended its mission in August 2021, with its personnel then becoming the nucleus of Over-The-Horizon/Counterterrorism Task Force established in January 2022, with responsibility for Afghanistan as well as Central and South Asia nations.

The July 31, 2022, U.S. drone attack that killed Al-Qaeda Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was the work of the Over-The-Horizon/Counterterrorism Task Force. It proved the U.S. continues to have intelligence and military power in the area.

In Africa, the GAO lists six task forces but only mentions one, the Special Operations Task Force – North/West Africa which it describes as “conducting counterterrorism operations in North and West Africa.”

However, beyond that one group there also are Special Operations Task Force East Africa, Joint Special Operations Air Component Africa, Naval Special Warfare Unit Ten, SOCAFRICA Signal Detachment and Joint Special Operations Task Force-Somalia.

Last May, President Biden authorized an increase of some 400 SOF personnel for Somalia which has been fighting against Al Shabab terrorists for years. By doing so, Biden reversed a withdrawal of some 700 American military during the Trump Administration. Then Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said, “It is not a deployment. This is a change in posture. It’s about putting troops back into Somalia on a persistent basis. It’s not a deployment with an end date.”

This past August 14, the SOJTF-Somalia in coordination with the Somalian government, conducted an air strike against al-Shabaab terrorists who were attacking Somali Army units near Teedaan, Somalia. Some 13 terrorists were either killed or wounded.

Just over a week ago, U.S. Africa Command said it carried out another air strike on October 1, near Jilib, southwest of the Somali capital of Mogadishu. The strike, the Command said, killed Abdullahi Nadir, al-Shabaab’s chief prosecutor, who it said had been in line to replace the group’s ailing leader, Ahmed Diriye.

In the Indo-Pacific Command there are four Special Operations Task Forces according to the GAO report. One is SOJTF-511, headquartered in Okinawa with a mission to counter ISIS expansion and deny terrorists safe haven in the Philippines.

SOJTF-511.2, is a team of U.S. servicemen based at Camp Don Basilio Navarro, headquarters of the Philippine Army’s Western Mindanao Command. The small team is what remains of what used to be a 600-personnel contingent of military advisers and trainers deployed from 2002 to 2015 under Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines to go after the then Al-Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf group.

U.S. Special Operations Command created a task force in the Pacific region to work with allies there to thwart China’s information operations, the commander told lawmakers Thursday.

Another Indo-Pacific SOJTF team will be focused on information and influence operations in the Pacific theater because of China’s growing capabilities. SOCOM’s Gen. Clarke told Congress last summer that with the new task force “we actually are able to tamp down some of the disinformation that they [China] continuously sow.”

Special Operations Command Korea, according to its own website, is a SOJTF-in-waiting. Its role is primarily to form a SOJTF on the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. “If the armistice fails, SOCKOR and ROK SWC will combine to establish the Combined Special Operations Component Command Korea under the Combined Forces Command,” according to its website. Meanwhile it carries on training exercises.

Gen. Clarke and Assistant Secretary Maier announced closed their April Vision and Strategy statement saying: “Just as our adversaries adapt to and shape the strategic environment, SOF will continue to evolve in order to fulfill the vision of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation in integrated deterrence, crisis, and conflict.”

SOCOM is still carrying on the war on terrorism with only slight public notice. Its work with allies in training Ukraine’s fighting forces may result in shaping conventional warfare in coming years. With that kind of record the American public should look forward to seeing what Special Forces leadership and personnel come up with in the future.

Read more expert-driven national security insight, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

22. Ukraine’s Path to Victory

Note the author's bio.

Excerpts:

Once Putin is gone, the world must focus on making Russia pay restitution. Moscow should be held fully responsible for the damage it has done to Ukraine, providing reparations to the country and to the Ukrainian people. Ideally, after regime change, Russia will do this of its own volition. But if it doesn’t, the West can redirect hundreds of billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as collateral. Russia must release all prisoners of war and all Ukrainian civilians it has detained or forcibly moved to Russia. It especially needs to return the thousands of children it kidnapped during the invasion and occupation. Finally, Ukraine and its partners must demand that Moscow hand Putin, other senior Russian leaders, and any figures involved in wartime atrocities over to a globally recognized criminal tribunal. The West should refuse to lift any sanctions on Moscow until these demands are met. They must demonstrate that extreme aggression, genocide, and terror are not acceptable.

This program of penance and justice may seem frightening to international leaders, who believe it could cause instability in Russia. Some analysts even say that the Russian Federation could disintegrate, leading to catastrophic consequences for the rest of the world. Many international leaders had similar fears when the Soviet Union collapsed, including former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, who traveled to Ukraine in 1991 to try to stop the country from seceding from Russia. But these leaders were wrong. Despite the war, Ukraine has become a symbol of democracy around the world. Many other post-Soviet states have grown far wealthier and freer since 1991. If Russia were weakened today, the net outcome would be similarly positive. Its reduced capabilities would make it harder for Moscow to threaten as many people as it does now. And it is simply unjust to try to keep the country’s residents under the foot of a paranoid, genocidal dictator.

Indeed, Ukraine may well need a weaker Russia to protect its wins. At a minimum, it will need substantive regime change to feel safe. Putin’s commitment to eliminating Ukraine and forcing it back into his empire is so extreme that a Ukrainian victory cannot be secure as long as he is in power. And Russia is full of ruthless leaders with a similarly distorted moral compass and a similarly imperialistic worldview. Until Ukraine is allowed to join NATO, it will have to build a powerful military, becoming—as Zelensky put it—a “big Israel.” This is not ideal, and it will be costly. But at least in the near term, it will be the only way that a victorious Ukraine can ensure a long-lasting peace.

Ukraine’s Path to Victory​

How the Country Can Take Back All Its Territory

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

October 12, 2022​

Foreign Affairs · by Andriy Zagorodnyuk · October 12, 2022

For too long, the global democratic coalition supporting Kyiv has focused on what it should not do in the invasion of Ukraine. Its main aims include not letting Ukraine lose and not letting Russian President Vladimir Putin win—but also not allowing the war to escalate to a point where Russia attacks a NATO country or conducts a nuclear strike. These, however, are less goals than vague intentions, and they reflect the West’s deep confusion about how the conflict should end. More than seven months into the war, the United States and Europe still lack a positive vision for Ukraine’s future.

The West clearly believes that Kyiv’s fight is just, and it wants Ukraine to succeed. But it is not sure yet whether Ukraine is strong enough to retake all its territory. Many Western leaders still believe that the Russian military is too large to be defeated. This thinking has led the members of the pro-Ukrainian coalition to define only their interim strategic military goals. They have not plotted out the political consequences that would come from a complete Russian military collapse.

It is time to start: Ukraine can win big. The country has proved again and again that it is capable of routing Russia. It first did so by preventing Russia from seizing Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and the Black Sea coastline. It succeeded again by halting Russia’s concentrated offensive in the Donbas, the eastern Ukrainian region comprising Donetsk and Luhansk Provinces, part of which Russia has occupied since 2014. Most recently, Ukraine retook Kharkiv Province in less than a week, broke through Russia’s defensive lines in the south, and began liberating parts of the east.

The West must join Kyiv in aiming for an unequivocal Ukrainian victory. It should recognize that Ukraine’s military is not just more motivated than Russia’s but also better led and better trained. To win, Ukraine doesn’t need a miracle; it just needs the West to increase its supply of sophisticated weaponry. Ukrainian forces can then move deeper and faster into enemy lines and overrun more of Russia’s disorganized troops. Putin may respond by calling up additional soldiers, but poorly motivated forces can only delay a well-equipped Ukraine’s eventual triumph. Putin will then be out of conventional tools to forestall losing.

Outside analysts worry that before facing defeat, Putin would try to inflict massive civilian casualties on Ukraine, seeking to coerce the Ukrainian government into making concessions or even into surrendering. He might do so, Western analysts fear, by continuously targeting densely populated areas in Ukrainian cities with long-range missiles—as he has done this week—or through carpet-bombing raids. But Putin lacks the resources to truly level Ukrainian cities. Russia’s remaining inventory of conventional missiles and bombs is large enough to cause substantial damage, but it is not big enough to destroy swaths of Ukraine. And Ukraine has already proved that it will fight on even when Russia reduces cities to rubble. Putin destroyed Mariupol, ruined large parts of Kharkiv, and launched thousands of strikes on other cities and regions. The damage just made Ukrainians more committed to victory and closed off chances for negotiated settlements.

Many Westerners also fear that Putin might act on his threats to use nuclear weapons. But the West can intimidate Putin in ways that will deter him from seriously contemplating such an attack, and a nuclear strike might turn all global powers, not just the United States and Europe, against him. It is ultimately unlikely that Putin will go nuclear. But if he does, the West must make sure that his plan backfires.

As Ukraine’s counteroffensive advances against an increasingly cornered Putin, it should mainly focus on liberating territory that Russia has seized since February 24. But a full Ukrainian victory also entails freeing the parts of the country that Russia has occupied since 2014, which includes Crimea. It means that Ukraine must reclaim its territorial waters and exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, without any compromises or conditions.

Russia’s president has increasingly staked his regime on conquering Ukraine, sacrificing his country’s economic growth and international reputation in the process. Such a broad defeat could well push Russian elites to remove him from power. Indeed, as the mass of Putin’s failures and Ukraine’s achievements grows, Putin’s fall may become inevitable. This scares certain leaders, who worry that a power struggle in Russia will breed dangerous instability. But it’s hard to imagine a Russia more dangerous than the one led by Putin, given all the havoc he has wreaked—in Ukraine and throughout the world. The international community should welcome his departure.

ADVANTAGE, UKRAINE

Many Western observers believe that Ukraine will have to cede territory to Russia if it wants peace. They are wrong; territorial gains will only embolden the Kremlin. Putin decided to attack eastern Ukraine in 2014 because he succeeded in occupying Crimea. He invaded the entire country because he managed to establish proxy puppet regimes in the Donbas. Partial success simply motivates Putin to continue his campaigns and seize more territory. The only way to stop the war and to deter future aggression is for the invasion to end with an unequivocal Russian failure.

Winning everywhere might seem overly ambitious, and it certainly won’t be easy. But it is far more possible than most outside observers realize. Ukraine, after all, has repeatedly outperformed international expectations. In the opening weeks of the war, the country stopped Russia’s blitzkrieg against the capital and then forced Moscow to retreat. Putin responded to this defeat by declaring that he would regroup and focus on conquering the Donbas, which is filled with the kind of open fields that favor Russia and its heavy artillery. And yet Ukraine steadily wore Russia down, making it pay for every tract of land with massive casualties. Eventually, Russia was forced to halt.

Ukrainians have also proved that they can make Russia not just retreat, but run. Ukraine’s lightning offense across Kharkiv in late September prevented Russia from even trying to annex the province. Its early October victory in Lyman has made Russia’s position in the Donbas deeply uncertain. Ukraine is now even liberating villages in adjoining Luhansk, the only Ukrainian province that Russia entirely seized after February 24. And Ukrainian soldiers are moving closer to Kherson, the first major city that Russia seized in its 2022 offensive.

Ukraine has repeatedly outperformed international expectations.

Ukraine’s repeat successes are not coincidences. The country’s military has structural advantages over its Russian adversary. The Russian military is extremely hierarchical and overly centralized; its officers are unable to make critical decisions without getting permission from senior leaders. It is very bad at multidirectional planning, incapable of focusing on one segment of the frontline without distracting from its operations in another. Ukraine, by contrast, is quick to adapt, with a NATO-style “mission command” system that encourages lower-ranking officers and sergeants to make decisions. Ukraine has also carried out many successful multidirectional attacks. The country’s counteroffensive in the south, for example, diverted critical Russian resources away from Kharkiv, allowing Ukrainian units to advance there with ease.

Ukraine’s advantages are unlikely to dissipate. The Russian military continues to make unsound decisions. A critical number of junior Russian officers were killed in the first months of the war, and without them, Russia will find it harder to organize and train its troops. Unlike Ukraine, Russia does not have a strong core of noncommissioned officers who can help with the war. Although Russia’s mass mobilization will likely have an impact—the influx of new soldiers will complicate Ukraine’s efforts to advance—it will mostly yield inexperienced and poorly trained men who neither want to fight nor know how to fight. As they experience the shock of battle, coming under loud and devastating artillery attacks, many will run. Many will die.

Ukraine has also suffered serious casualties, and its soldiers will continue to fall in combat. But unlike the Russians, who are fighting a “special military operation” fueled by Putin’s imperial delusions, the Ukrainians are fighting a total war to save their country. Ukraine continues to see a steady stream of motivated fighters; Russia continues to see long lines of men fleeing the country. Ukrainians value and respect their military commanders and President Volodymyr Zelensky, and the military protects its soldiers and promotes its brightest. The Russian military, however, mistreats its troops, showing little regard for their lives. This helps explain why Russian soldiers fled from Kharkiv and are now running in parts of the Donbas and Kherson. Armies that run once tend to run again.

QUALITY AND QUANTITY

It is true that Russia has more weapons than does Ukraine. Despite months of losses, Moscow still possesses sizable stockpiles of missiles, guns, and ammunition that it can use to attack Ukrainian forces. But this is not the advantage that it may seem. When it comes to using weapons, Russia and Ukraine follow different philosophies: Ukraine’s focuses on high-tech and precision-driven equipment, whereas Russia’s relies on high quantity but lower-precision systems. Because precision substantially affects accuracy, Ukraine can do more with less. If Ukraine continues to receive a steady supply of Western weapons, it will be able to negate Russia’s numerical superiority.

Long-range firepower is one critical capability where Ukraine will need more support. The country must have enough weapons and ammunition to outfit its brigades with artillery systems and multiple rocket launchers that can reach behind enemy lines, hitting ammunition depots and making it extremely hard for Russia to send in reinforcements. Ukrainian forces have already successfully used such Western systems, especially U.S.-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). But they will need even more equipment, including new, powerful weapons that can hit deeper targets. If supplied, U.S.-made Army Tactical Missiles Systems (ATCAMS) would prove particularly useful by allowing Ukraine to destroy Russian battlefield positions up to 190 miles away. Ukraine must also have enough weapons to simultaneously meet its operational requirements in at least two or three regions, such as the east and south, while holding off the Russians in others. If Ukraine maintains an initiative and equally strong presence along the war’s long lines of contact, it can be assured of hitting Russia in the areas where the Russian military is weakest.

The United States and Europe can learn invaluable lessons from the way their weapons perform in Ukraine.

But firepower is not the only thing that Ukraine needs. To defeat Russia, Ukraine must be equipped with more tanks and armored personnel carriers, both of which it used to great effect in retaking Kharkiv Province. Ukrainian artillery units will also need enough counterbattery radars, such as AN/TPQ radar systems, so they can swiftly detect incoming fire. Ukraine needs more midrange air-defense units, such as the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), to protect its troops and cities as they come under Russian bombardment. It will need to sustain all these capabilities, so Ukraine’s military must set up ammunition and spare-parts facilities around its western borders. It must also build comprehensive support facilities closer to the frontlines, where it can quickly repair damaged weapons and equipment.

Ukraine has already proved itself capable of downing Russian aircraft and defying predictions that Russia would gain air superiority. Ukraine has also been able to damage the Russian navy. The country’s successful strike against Russian navy installations and vessels, including the Moskva cruiser—the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship—helped push Russia’s ships farther away from the Ukrainian coast. But sea access denial is an ongoing process, not a one-time achievement, and Ukraine will need help if it wants to fully break Russia’s blockade. The West must supply the country with more coastal missiles, unmanned systems, and detailed intelligence so Ukraine can eventually regain full access to its seas.

The West has reasons to supply Ukraine that go beyond just this conflict. The war has given NATO a rare chance to test its equipment in a real-time, high-intensity operational environment. The United States and Europe can learn invaluable lessons from the way their weapons perform, and the more gear they provide, the more knowledge they will acquire. Together, the West and Ukraine can figure out which weapons systems need tweaking and which ones work best, and Kyiv can use the most effective ones to keep pushing Russian forces back.

SAVING THE WORLD

Putin is aware that Russia is losing on the battlefield, and his not-so-veiled threats to use nuclear weapons are a transparent attempt to halt Western assistance. He likely knows that these threats will not stop Ukraine. But if Putin follows through on them, it would be both to deter the West from helping Ukraine and to shock Kyiv into surrendering.

Breaking the nuclear taboo, however, would devastate the Kremlin in ways that simply losing the war wouldn’t. Tactical nuclear weapons are difficult to target, and the fallout can extend in unpredictable directions, meaning a strike could seriously damage Russian troops and territories. Ukrainians would also fight on even if hit by a nuclear attack—for Ukrainians, there is no scenario worse than Russian occupation—so such a strike would not lead to Kyiv’s surrender. And if Russia goes nuclear, it will face a variety of severe retaliatory measures, some of which may have consequences that go beyond just the battlefield. China and India have so far avoided backing Ukraine or sanctioning Russia, but if the Kremlin launches a nuclear attack, Beijing and Delhi may join the West’s anti-Russian coalition, including by implementing severe sanctions and banning relations with Russia. They may even provide military assistance to Ukraine. For Russia, then, the result of nuclear use would be not just defeat but even more international isolation.

Putin speaking with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, September 2022

Sergey Bobylev / Sputnik / Reuters

Putin, of course, is capable of making terrible choices, and he is desperate. Neither Ukraine nor the West can discount the possibility that he will order a nuclear attack. But the West can deter him by making it clear that, should Russia launch such a strike, it will directly, and conventionally, enter the conflict. Avoiding NATO involvement is one of the main reasons Putin continues to threaten a nuclear attack—Putin knows that if Russia cannot prevail against Ukraine, it has no chance against NATO—and he is therefore unlikely to do something that would bring the bloc in. That’s especially true given the speed with which NATO would win. Ukraine’s counteroffensive is moving comparatively slowly, giving Putin space to use his propaganda apparatus to manage public perception of the events. Once NATO joined, he would have no time to shield his reputation from the Russian military’s stunning collapse.

NATO has no shortage of ways to seriously threaten Russia without using nuclear weapons. It might not even need a land operation. The Western coalition could credibly tell the Kremlin that it would hit Russian capabilities with direct missile strikes and airstrikes, destroying its military facilities and disabling its Black Sea Fleet. It could threaten to cut all its communications with electronic warfare and arrange a cyber-blackout against the entire Russian military. The West could also threaten to impose sanctions that are totalizing and complete (no exceptions for energy buys), which would quickly bankrupt Russia. Especially if taken together, these measures would cause irreparable, critical damage to the Russian armed forces.

What the West should not and cannot do is be cowed by Russia’s nuclear blackmail. If the West stops aiding Ukraine because it fears the consequences, nuclear states will find it much easier to impose their will on nonnuclear ones in the future. If Russia orders a nuclear strike and gets away with it, nuclear states will have almost automatic permission to invade lesser powers. In either scenario, the result will be widespread proliferation. Even poorer countries will plow their resources into nuclear programs, and for an understandable reason: It will be the only sure way to guarantee their sovereignty.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

With enough Western weapons, Ukraine will continue breaking through Russian defenses. It will use long-range rockets to destroy command posts, depots, and supply lines, making it impossible for Russia to properly reinforce its battered troops. It will shoot down Russian aircraft, preventing the Russian air force from defending positions. It will keep sinking Russian naval craft. And it will be helped along the way by the Russian military’s many deficiencies: its intense centralization, its emphasis on punishing its forces for mistakes rather than learning from them, and its highly inefficient style of combat. In the face of mounting setbacks, Russian morale will eventually collapse. The country’s soldiers will be forced back home.

Ukraine’s liberation of Crimea and the parts of the Donbas that Russian proxies seized in 2014 will come next. And after Ukraine’s victories elsewhere, these operations are unlikely to be all that taxing. By the time Ukrainian forces get to those regions, the Russian military will most likely be too exhausted to seriously defend them. Many of the male residents of the Russian-controlled Donbas will already have been killed on the frontlines. The survivors (which will likely include most of the region’s remaining male population) are unlikely to be loyal to the Kremlin, given what Putin has put them through. Some Western observers may consider Crimea to be a special case and encourage Ukraine to not press forward there, but although it has been under Russian control longer, its annexation remains every bit as illegal today as it was in 2014. International law should know no compromises or double standards.

The liberation of Crimea and the Donbas should, however, include a reintegration campaign. Because the periods of Russian occupation, with their attendant aggressive propaganda, have lasted so long, residents will need to receive social, legal, and economic assistance from Ukraine as part of reconciliation efforts. These efforts will make for a more delicate operation. As the Ukrainian government restores its governance, it will need to show residents that, unlike Moscow, Kyiv can provide stability and the rule of law.

A Ukrainian victory cannot be secure as long as Putin is in power.

Meanwhile, the world must prepare for what Ukrainian wins in these long-occupied regions will mean for Putin. Annexing Crimea and creating puppet states in the Donbas were two of his signature achievements, and his regime may not survive losing them. The world may want to prepare even before Ukraine moves into Crimea; Putin’s regime will be endangered if Ukraine retakes just the areas Russia seized after February 24. Losing almost all the land it just annexed would be a humiliating failure for Moscow, one that may get Russia’s elites to finally realize that their president’s obsession with war is deeply unproductive and to rise up against him. It would not be the first time in Russian history that a leader has been pushed out of power.

Once Putin is gone, the world must focus on making Russia pay restitution. Moscow should be held fully responsible for the damage it has done to Ukraine, providing reparations to the country and to the Ukrainian people. Ideally, after regime change, Russia will do this of its own volition. But if it doesn’t, the West can redirect hundreds of billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as collateral. Russia must release all prisoners of war and all Ukrainian civilians it has detained or forcibly moved to Russia. It especially needs to return the thousands of children it kidnapped during the invasion and occupation. Finally, Ukraine and its partners must demand that Moscow hand Putin, other senior Russian leaders, and any figures involved in wartime atrocities over to a globally recognized criminal tribunal. The West should refuse to lift any sanctions on Moscow until these demands are met. They must demonstrate that extreme aggression, genocide, and terror are not acceptable.

This program of penance and justice may seem frightening to international leaders, who believe it could cause instability in Russia. Some analysts even say that the Russian Federation could disintegrate, leading to catastrophic consequences for the rest of the world. Many international leaders had similar fears when the Soviet Union collapsed, including former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, who traveled to Ukraine in 1991 to try to stop the country from seceding from Russia. But these leaders were wrong. Despite the war, Ukraine has become a symbol of democracy around the world. Many other post-Soviet states have grown far wealthier and freer since 1991. If Russia were weakened today, the net outcome would be similarly positive. Its reduced capabilities would make it harder for Moscow to threaten as many people as it does now. And it is simply unjust to try to keep the country’s residents under the foot of a paranoid, genocidal dictator.

Indeed, Ukraine may well need a weaker Russia to protect its wins. At a minimum, it will need substantive regime change to feel safe. Putin’s commitment to eliminating Ukraine and forcing it back into his empire is so extreme that a Ukrainian victory cannot be secure as long as he is in power. And Russia is full of ruthless leaders with a similarly distorted moral compass and a similarly imperialistic worldview. Until Ukraine is allowed to join NATO, it will have to build a powerful military, becoming—as Zelensky put it—a “big Israel.” This is not ideal, and it will be costly. But at least in the near term, it will be the only way that a victorious Ukraine can ensure a long-lasting peace.

• ANDRIY ZAGORODNYUK is Chair of the Centre for Defence Strategies. From 2019 to 2020, he was Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

Foreign Affairs · by Andriy Zagorodnyuk · October 12, 2022

23. How to Avoid a War Over Taiwan

Excerpts:

But credible threat is not enough to prevent a war. The United States must also restore credible assurance, making sure both Taipei and Beijing understand that its objective is not an independent Taiwan but rather peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Washington needs to make clear that it does not support independence for Taiwan, that it opposes any unilateral change to the status quo by either side, and that it will accept any outcome that is peacefully agreed to by mainland China and Taiwan. This has long been the official U.S. position, but a series of statements and omissions by political leaders in Washington have cast the U.S. approach into doubt, and at times U.S. actions have contravened these statements. The Biden administration should therefore speak and act with greater discipline and consistency on Taiwan than it has so far. Senior officials should not refer to Taiwan as a country and should not say that Taiwan can decide unilaterally that it wants to be independent, as if the United States has no stake in such a decision. The United States should make clear that it is not pursuing sovereign status for Taiwan even as it presses for the island’s inclusion in international organizations that do not require members to be independent states, or for Taiwan’s meaningful participation short of membership in intergovernmental organizations such as the World Health Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization that require statehood for membership, or for the negotiation of bilateral trade and investment agreements that strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship. The Biden administration should continue to press Beijing to engage in direct discussions with Taipei’s democratically elected leadership and to seek a long-term resolution of cross-strait differences that meets the approval of the people of Taiwan.

The United States should also avoid symbolic political gestures that needlessly aggravate Beijing, focusing instead on substantive measures that make Taiwan and forward-deployed U.S. forces in Asia stronger and more resilient. That means that U.S. officials and politicians, including members of the U.S. Congress and those campaigning for office, should refrain from making politically advantageous but strategically damaging statements about Taiwan. Recent calls for clarity in the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan do nothing to enhance the credibility of the U.S. deterrent threat because Beijing already anticipates that Washington would intervene in a cross-strait conflict, although Beijing does not know how intensely or effectively Washington would do so. An unconditional U.S. defense commitment, however, would likely undercut the essential deterrent component of assurance by appearing to restore a de facto alliance relationship between the United States and Taiwan, thus providing a blank check to future politicians on the island advocating for de jure independence. Similarly, calling for formal recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, as former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has done; or calling for the stationing of significant U.S. forces on the island in peacetime, as former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton has done; or designating Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally,” as the original language of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 proposed, may all sound like ways to bolster deterrence of a cross-strait conflict. But if these policies were adopted, they would undercut the assurances to Beijing that are an essential element of deterrence, increasing rather than decreasing the likelihood of conflict across the Taiwan Strait.

How to Avoid a War Over Taiwan

Threats, Assurances, and Effective Deterrence

By Thomas J. Christensen, M. Taylor Fravel, Bonnie S. Glaser, Andrew J. Nathan, and Jessica Chen Weiss

Foreign Affairs · October 13, 2022

As tension rises between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan, strategists on all sides seem to have forgotten what the American game theorist Thomas Schelling taught years ago: deterring an adversary from taking a proscribed action requires a combination of credible threats and credible assurances. Instead of heeding that lesson, a growing number of U.S. analysts and officials have called for the United States to treat Taiwan as if it were an independent state and to abandon the long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” in favor of “strategic clarity,” defined as an unconditional commitment to use military force to defend the island in the event of a mainland Chinese attack. These calls have intensified since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with some commentators even advocating for formal recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign country. Still others have called for a permanent (and significant) deployment of U.S. forces to Taiwan to lend credibility to the U.S. threat of a military response to a mainland attack. In testimony before the U.S. Senate last year, Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, implied that the United States could never allow Beijing to control Taiwan because such an outcome would make it impossible to defend other U.S. allies in Asia.

But shifting U.S. policy toward support for Taiwan’s permanent separation from the mainland is more likely to provoke than to deter an attack on Taiwan. Deterrence requires credibility in both of its elements: threat and assurance. The threat requires signaling both the costs of a proscribed action and sufficient political will to impose those costs. The assurance requires conveying to the target, in a way that it can trust, that it will not be taken advantage of if it refrains from taking the proscribed action.

Avoiding war in the Taiwan Strait requires all sides to be deterred. At a minimum, Taiwan must be deterred from declaring formal independence, Washington must be deterred from recognizing Taiwan as an independent state or restoring a formal alliance with the island, and Beijing must be deterred from using military force against Taiwan to compel unification. All sides must not only be threatened with harm for crossing these redlines but also be assured that they will not suffer catastrophic losses to their interests if they refrain from these actions. Triangular deterrence has succeeded for over 40 years in keeping the peace across the Taiwan Strait. But rising tensions have made this delicate arrangement more fragile.

CRUMBLING DETERRENCE

Since the beginning of the Trump administration, deterrence has begun to break down on all sides. Taiwan’s threat—its ability to exact a military cost from mainland China in case of an attack—has never been strong, and it is only now acquiring mobile weapons that might enable it to hold off an attack for a matter of weeks. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s assurance—that it will not eventually declare independence if it is not attacked—has weakened over time. Public opinion polls suggest that a growing number of Taiwan’s citizens see themselves as Taiwanese rather than as Chinese or some mix of both. Most citizens of Taiwan still support policies that maintain the status quo in cross-strait relations and oppose explicitly pro-independence policies that risk war. But the percentage of the population that supports eventual independence from mainland China is at an all-time high. Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen has avoided taking actions that would provoke an attack. Her ruling Democratic Progressive Party no longer advocates formal independence for the island, instead asserting that Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China, is already a sovereign and independent country and that any change in the status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan through a plebiscite. But Tsai has not assured Beijing that Taiwan will refrain from pursuing de jure independence. For its part, the opposition Kuomintang also maintains that the Republic of China has always been independent and sovereign. And it has shifted from a position of advocating eventual unification with mainland China, albeit only under certain conditions, to a position of seeking to lower tensions across the strait in order to preserve Taiwan’s de facto autonomy as long as possible.

Beijing’s balance of credible threat and credible assurance has also grown unstable. Mainland China has long been able to threaten to impose severe military and economic consequences on Taiwan if it were to declare independence. And now that Beijing has built up its military capabilities, it can also credibly threaten to impose such costs on the United States if it were to intervene in a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. But Beijing has failed to assure Taiwan that refraining from moving toward permanent separation or independence will be rewarded with restraint rather than answered by increased efforts to compel unification on mainland China’s terms. To the contrary, Beijing has greatly increased military pressure on Taiwan and warned that it will attack if it is unable to achieve unification peacefully. Beijing has not articulated a firm deadline by which unification must be achieved, but Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated that progress on unification with Taiwan is a prerequisite to fulfilling his dream of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” for which he set 2049 as the target date.

New vulnerabilities call into question whether the United States can mount an effective defense of Taiwan.

On the U.S. side, both aspects of deterrence have also weakened. In the past, the United States was able to credibly threaten an effective military response in the event of a mainland attack on Taiwan. Even if leaders in Beijing believed they would ultimately prevail, the cost of doing so appeared very high. In addition, Washington wielded the threat of painful economic sanctions. Meanwhile, through its consistent adherence across multiple presidential administrations to its “one China” policy—which, in the words of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, has meant that the United States “does not challenge” the position that Taiwan is a part of mainland China—Washington was able to credibly assure Beijing that if it did not use force against Taiwan, the United States would not support independence for the island and would not restore something akin to the 1954 mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, which was terminated as part of the agreement between Beijing and Washington to normalize relations in 1979.

The credibility of both U.S. threat and U.S. assurance in the Taiwan Strait has been weakened. Mainland China’s military modernization, especially since the late 1990s, places at risk in new ways not only Taiwan but also forward-deployed U.S. forces that might assist in Taiwan’s defense. For instance, mainland Chinese missiles, submarines, and cyber-capabilities now hold at risk U.S. Navy ships, including aircraft carriers, as well as U.S. aircraft, U.S. space assets, and large U.S. military bases in the Western Pacific such as those in Japan and Guam. These new vulnerabilities call into question whether the United States can mount an effective intervention in defense of the island. On the assurance side, the growing rhetoric in Washington to support Taiwan’s permanent separation from mainland China or restore something akin to an alliance relationship with the island increases fears in Beijing that waiting for a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences will only result in the permanent loss of Taiwan.

SUBSTANCE OVER SYMBOLISM

To maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, the United States must restore both the credibility of its threat to impose costs on Beijing if it attacks Taiwan and the credibility of its assurance not to damage Beijing’s interests there if the mainland refrains from such an attack. To present a credible threat, the United States must reconfigure its military posture in East Asia. Instead of relying on vulnerable aircraft carriers and a few large, concentrated air and naval bases, Washington should adopt a more mobile, dispersed, and resilient posture that will be much harder for Beijing to attack and destroy. Often described as “active denial,” such a strategy would deny mainland China the prospect of a quick and cheap military victory over Taiwan.

The United States is already moving in this direction, including by adopting new army, navy, Marine Corps, and air force doctrines and by procuring large numbers of long-range antisurface and antiship missiles, many of which can outgun mainland Chinese systems. But the U.S. military must also gain access to additional locations in the region from which to operate, harden its existing facilities to reduce their vulnerability to preemptive strikes, pre-position munitions and other supplies in the region, and make its military supply lines from the United States less vulnerable.

To that end, the United States should continue to emphasize to regional allies that they have a stake in peaceful, stable cross-strait relations and that they should therefore contribute to a moderate, responsible U.S. strategy to deter mainland belligerence. At a minimum, the United States military will need greater access to a more diverse set of locations in Japan to make its posture more resilient and harder to target, but it may also need such access in other countries, including the Philippines. To the extent possible, the United States should also try to enhance cooperation with allies to prepare for joint or coordinated military responses to a conflict over Taiwan. At the same time, Washington should continue to mount a global diplomatic effort to emphasize to Beijing the economic and diplomatic costs it would incur in the event of a conflict.

The United States cannot help defend Taiwan if the island will not defend itself.

Taiwan also has an important role to play in deterring a mainland Chinese attack. It must demonstrate its ability to remain resilient during a blockade and impose high costs on an invading mainland force. Taiwan should create deeper reserves of strategic resources such as fuel and food in case Beijing elects to blockade the island instead of invading it. The United States should continue to press Taiwan to create more robust, mobile coastal defenses and air defenses, turning itself into a “porcupine” capable of inflicting real pain on an invading mainland Chinese military. Unlike Ukraine, which enjoys land borders with U.S. allies, Taiwan would be extremely difficult for the United States to resupply in the event of a conflict. For that reason, Taiwan must stockpile and train in advance with the weapons it needs. It must also expand its civil defense capabilities, both to pose the threat of in-depth defense to an invading military and to distribute essential resources to the public during a blockade. The United States cannot help defend Taiwan if the island will not defend itself.

But credible threat is not enough to prevent a war. The United States must also restore credible assurance, making sure both Taipei and Beijing understand that its objective is not an independent Taiwan but rather peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Washington needs to make clear that it does not support independence for Taiwan, that it opposes any unilateral change to the status quo by either side, and that it will accept any outcome that is peacefully agreed to by mainland China and Taiwan. This has long been the official U.S. position, but a series of statements and omissions by political leaders in Washington have cast the U.S. approach into doubt, and at times U.S. actions have contravened these statements. The Biden administration should therefore speak and act with greater discipline and consistency on Taiwan than it has so far. Senior officials should not refer to Taiwan as a country and should not say that Taiwan can decide unilaterally that it wants to be independent, as if the United States has no stake in such a decision. The United States should make clear that it is not pursuing sovereign status for Taiwan even as it presses for the island’s inclusion in international organizations that do not require members to be independent states, or for Taiwan’s meaningful participation short of membership in intergovernmental organizations such as the World Health Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization that require statehood for membership, or for the negotiation of bilateral trade and investment agreements that strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship. The Biden administration should continue to press Beijing to engage in direct discussions with Taipei’s democratically elected leadership and to seek a long-term resolution of cross-strait differences that meets the approval of the people of Taiwan.

The United States should also avoid symbolic political gestures that needlessly aggravate Beijing, focusing instead on substantive measures that make Taiwan and forward-deployed U.S. forces in Asia stronger and more resilient. That means that U.S. officials and politicians, including members of the U.S. Congress and those campaigning for office, should refrain from making politically advantageous but strategically damaging statements about Taiwan. Recent calls for clarity in the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan do nothing to enhance the credibility of the U.S. deterrent threat because Beijing already anticipates that Washington would intervene in a cross-strait conflict, although Beijing does not know how intensely or effectively Washington would do so. An unconditional U.S. defense commitment, however, would likely undercut the essential deterrent component of assurance by appearing to restore a de facto alliance relationship between the United States and Taiwan, thus providing a blank check to future politicians on the island advocating for de jure independence. Similarly, calling for formal recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, as former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has done; or calling for the stationing of significant U.S. forces on the island in peacetime, as former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton has done; or designating Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally,” as the original language of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 proposed, may all sound like ways to bolster deterrence of a cross-strait conflict. But if these policies were adopted, they would undercut the assurances to Beijing that are an essential element of deterrence, increasing rather than decreasing the likelihood of conflict across the Taiwan Strait.

• THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN is Director of the China and the World Program at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
• M. TAYLOR FRAVEL is the Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
• BONNIE S. GLASER is Director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
• ANDREW J. NATHAN is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.
• JESSICA CHEN WEISS is the Michael J. Zak Professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University and a former Council on Foreign Relations Fellow on the U.S. Department of State Policy Planning Staff.
• They are among the contributors to Avoiding War Over Taiwan, a report by the Task Force on U.S.-China Policy convened by the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations and the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego, School of Global Policy and Strategy, from which this article is adapted.

Foreign Affairs · October 13, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com