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Quotes of the Day:
“The deepest sin against the human mind is to believe things without evidence.”
- Aldous Huxley
“It never ceases to amaze me: we all love ourselves more than other people, but care more about their opinion than out own.”
- Marcus Aurelius
From the Locke Society: On this day in 1632 (August 29): John Locke, who this organization is named after, was born. Commonly referred to as the “Father of Liberalism” many falsely claim that modern liberal ideals have roots in Locke’s philosophy. John Locke was not only a philosopher who influenced the Founding Fathers on the ideals of limited government and individual rights, but an advocate for the importance of an educated citizenry. In order for a free society to survive, citizens must be educated on the importance of freedom and the responsibilities of having freedom. In Locke’s Treatises of Government, he discussed the idea of a government that is formed by the people, but in order to have a competent and successful government, the citizenry must be educated, and educated well. Locke warned against allowing education to fall into corrupt hands as it will “not only deceive their Expectations and hinder their Knowledge, but corrupt their Innocence, and teach them the worst of vices.” The Locke Society has been born in his name to ensure that the freedom of our posterity is protected through a strong education that maintains the morals and principles of our virtuous nation.
1. US, South Korea kick off ‘counterattack’ phase of Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise
2. N. Korea to buy 10,000 tons of rice from India
3. Satellite imagery shows flood damage at N. Korea's nuclear test site: Beyond Parallel
4. Budget raised for defense system against N.Korean threats
5. Human Rights Violations of the South Korean Government: Interview with Director Hyunseung Lee
6. North Korea imports Chinese meteorological equipment
7. North Korean family settles in ‘heaven on earth’: Salt Lake City, Utah
8. Heavy rain, salt scarcity in North Korea may complicate kimchi season
9. Korea, U.S. agree to launch formal talks on U.S. Inflation Reduction Act: Amb. Cho
10. Korea can't ignore human rights in China, says U.S. envoy
11. THAAD a purely defensive system designed to counter N. Korean threat: State Dept.
12. What Might be Yoon Suk-yeol's Productive Approach in Economic Cooperation with North Korea?
13. S. Korea calls for 'consultative mechanism' with U.S. on inflation law
14. S. Korean Navy joins U.S.-led maritime exercise in waters off Guam
15. Arming to Disarm: North Korea’s Nuclear Paradox
16. South Korea’s embattled Yoon spurned by young antifeminists over failed pledges, scandals
1. US, South Korea kick off ‘counterattack’ phase of Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise
I hope people can appreciate the complexity of such training.
Excerpts:
Information about the counterattack training is unavailable, but in previous exercises the two allies have focused on a central theme, said Yang Uk, an associate research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.
“It could be a limited attack or a full-scale attack” from an adversary, he told Stars and Stripes by phone Monday. “There’s many aspects to war that you cannot train for all at once; each year, you have to specify and have a theme.”
By focusing on a central theme, the military can train for several versions of that scenario, he said.
Yang said this year’s exercise is “really important” and its theme is likely related to South Korea’s overall defense capabilities.
US, South Korea kick off ‘counterattack’ phase of Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · August 29, 2022
Service members from U.N. Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea work during the 11-day Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise in South Korea, Aug. 22, 2022. (South Korea Ministry of National Defense)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — American and South Korean forces on Monday commenced the second phase of their largest joint exercise in five years, marking another milestone in Seoul’s attempts to take wartime control of its military.
Ulchi Freedom Shield, the 11-day military drill ending Thursday, has entered the “counterattack operations” phase, a South Korean Ministry of National Defense official told Stars and Stripes by phone Monday.
The second phase aims “to ensure [South Korea’s] safety in response to enemy attacks,” the ministry official said.
North Korea condemns the exercises as rehearsals for invasions of its territory; U.S. and South Korean military chiefs say they are preparations for defense against a North Korean attack.
The communist regime has made preparations for its first nuclear weapons test since 2017, U.S. and South Korean defense officials warned since July.
The training sites, troop numbers and other details have not been publicly disclosed by the United States and South Korean military. U.S. Forces Korea, the military command responsible for the roughly 28,500 troops on the peninsula, has said it does not comment on ongoing training as a matter of policy.
Military units are taking part in field exercises and in computer simulations “all over the country,” the ministry official said.
South Korean officials customarily speak to the media under the condition of anonymity.
Media access to Ulchi Freedom Shield has been scant. Publicly released information has been limited to a few news releases and photographs of USFK commander Gen. Paul LaCamera and Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup discussing the operations at a command bunker near Seoul.
Information about the counterattack training is unavailable, but in previous exercises the two allies have focused on a central theme, said Yang Uk, an associate research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.
“It could be a limited attack or a full-scale attack” from an adversary, he told Stars and Stripes by phone Monday. “There’s many aspects to war that you cannot train for all at once; each year, you have to specify and have a theme.”
By focusing on a central theme, the military can train for several versions of that scenario, he said.
Yang said this year’s exercise is “really important” and its theme is likely related to South Korea’s overall defense capabilities.
Exercises like Ulchi Freedom Shield are one of many requirements South Korea’s military must satisfy for the U.S. to relinquish its wartime authority, according to the numerous, evolving bilateral agreements spanning several presidential administrations, including most recently between Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and his South Korean counterpart, Suh Wook, in 2021.
Seoul retains control of its military in peacetime; however, that authority will be superseded by Washington in the event of war.
South Korea’s military has been undergoing a decades-long evaluation by its U.S. counterpart for more autonomy. USFK announced in a news release Aug. 23 that a South Korean army general would lead the large-scale exercise alongside the command’s chief for the first time, one of the requirements set out by the defense leaders from both countries.
The exercise was suspended after 2017, when then-President Donald Trump and then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in negotiated with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un for denuclearization.
That suspension was lifted when South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol took office in May after campaigning for stronger military ties with the U.S.
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · August 29, 2022
2. N. Korea to buy 10,000 tons of rice from India
What we should keep in mind is that Kim Jong Un has the funds from his global illicit activities to buy food for the Korean people in the north. He has enough money to prevent starvation and suffering.
N. Korea to buy 10,000 tons of rice from India
donga.com
Posted August. 30, 2022 07:47,
Updated August. 30, 2022 07:47
N. Korea to buy 10,000 tons of rice from India. August. 30, 2022 07:47. weappon@donga.com.
North Korea is allegedly planning to import 10,000 tons of rice from India. While publicly criticizing the Yoon Suk-yeol administration for its ‘audacious plan’ containing a measure to provide massive food aid to the North, North Korea is now moving to buy rice from India after China last month. Some analyze that COVID-19 and floods in North Korea may have deepened the economic difficulties, causing a severe food shortage in the country.
Voice of America (VOA) reported on Monday that it recently attained the ‘ship arrangement guide’ released to the delivery industry, according to which North Korea is now moving to ship 10,000 tons of rice from Visakhapatnam Port, the Eastern side of India to its Nampo Port. The guide introduced the desired departure date to be between Sept. 25 and 30. The guide is sort of a notice that contains the type of freight, departure and arrival locations, offered by a freight owner to find a vessel to ship its freight. An insider of the shipping industry told VOA, “It seems that North Korea wants to import ‘long grain’ produced in India, Pakistan and Thailand rather than ‘short grain’ that it commonly consumes.”
VOA pointed out that the guide didn’t include the supporting organization’s name, which is commonly presented in the case of humanitarian food aid from international organizations. It shows the possibility of North Korea coming out itself to import rice from India apart from humanitarian aid. Rice was out of the list of items sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council’s resolution against North Korea, as it is categorized as a humanitarian one.
During his remarks to commemorate National Liberation Day, South Korean President Yoon revealed his plan of providing food support to North Korea in exchange for the North’s mineral resources in case North Korea comes to the negotiating table for denuclearization. Against this, Kim Yo Jong, vice director of the North Korean Workers’ Party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department, criticized Yoon’s offer saying it is nothing but a ‘hollow dream.’
In the report ‘International Food Security Assessment,’ the Economic Research Service under the U.S. Department of Agriculture noted that some 16.3 million people in North Korea, or 63.1 percent of the nation’s total population, are identified to be suffering from food shortage. Some voiced concerns that the food crisis may even worsen due to the pandemic that went widespread around June, the rice-planting season, and a series of flood damages. North Korea imported about 10,000 tons of rice from China last month.
한국어
donga.com
3. Satellite imagery shows flood damage at N. Korea's nuclear test site: Beyond Parallel
See the imagery and analysis at CSIS' Beyond Parallel: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/punggye-ri-update-flood-mitigation/
Satellite imagery shows flood damage at N. Korea's nuclear test site: Beyond Parallel | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · August 30, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- Recent satellite imagery suggest that work to repair North Korea's main nuclear test site in Punggye-ri may have been suspended due to flood damage, a U.S. monitor said Monday.
The satellite imagery, taken on Wednesday, showed no significant activities at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, according to Beyond Parallel, a project of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank.
"No significant activity is observed at Tunnel No. 3 of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility. This is not unexpected as both the United States and South Korea assess that North Korea has finished all preparations for conducting a nuclear test at this tunnel," it said.
"Road construction to Tunnel No. 4 remains suspended, and flood damage to the facility's sole access road is observable, both likely a result of the heavy rains during the past two months," it added.
North Korea voluntarily dismantled the Punggye-ri site in 2018 to show its willingness to denuclearize to the international community.
It, however, is believed to have begun repairing the Punggye-ri facility, the site of its all six nuclear tests so far, earlier this year.
Officials in Seoul and Washington have said the North may have completed all preparations for a nuclear test and that the recalcitrant country may conduct its seventh nuclear test "at any time."
Pyongyang conducted its sixth and last nuclear test in September 2017.
"Satellite imagery from August 24, 2022, shows no significant developments or changes to the area outside the portal for Tunnel No. 3, within which the United States and South Korea have assessed that North Korea has completed all preparations for conducting a nuclear test," Beyond Parallel said on its website.
"These sources have also assessed that the decision to conduct a seventh nuclear test remains solely within the hands of Kim Jong-un, who announced that the country's "nuclear war deterrent is also fully ready to demonstrate its absolute power" in late July," it added, referring to North Korean leader by his name.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · August 30, 2022
4. Budget raised for defense system against N.Korean threats
What about the nuclear powered submarine? Not mentioned. I would rather they build about 6 light aircraft carriers (to keep two deployed but I know that is a fantasy) than build any nuclear powered submarines.
Note the budget discussion for the Ministry of Unification.
Budget raised for defense system against N.Korean threats
Controversial project to develop light aircraft carrier is left out in defense spending bill
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · August 30, 2022
South Korea’s Defense Ministry has proposed to raise expenditures on establishing an indigenous three-axis defense system by 9.4 percent amid North Korea’s mounting missile and nuclear threats, but has left a controversial project of locally building a light aircraft carrier out of the spending bill.
The overall defense budget for 2023 approved by the Cabinet on Tuesday morning set a 4.6 percent year-on-year increase to around 57.1 trillion won ($42.3 billion), the Defense Ministry said.
Approximately 40.1 trillion won is allocated to expenses on force operations and maintenance, up 5.8 percent compared to last year’s budget.
The operation and maintenance appropriations cover the cost of operating and maintaining military equipment and facilities and other expenses such as salaries and benefits for military personnel and training and education.
The budget for the "force improvement" program is proposed to rise by 2 percent to around 17 trillion won compared to the previous year.
“We’ve heavily invested in boosting soldiers’ morale by raising their salaries, significantly improving the quality of meals, clothing and living conditions to make them suitable for soldiers of the future generation and improving conditions for military officers to command and for soldiers to serve,” the ministry said.
“We also focusing on allocating our funds to establish the three-axis system to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and reinforce indigenous technological capabilities and strengthen the foundation of the defense industry,” it added.
Three-axis defense system
The next year’s force improvement program mainly seeks to develop “core military capabilities to counter nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea” including advancing South Korea’s “three-axis system,” according to the Defense Ministry.
The three-pronged defense system consists of the Kill Chain preemptive strike mechanism, Korea Air and Missile Defense, which aims to build complex and multi-layered missile defense shields, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation.
Around 5.2 trillion won is earmarked for developing and producing weapons, including reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles for mid-to-high altitude operations, long-range artillery interceptors and 230-millimeter multiple rocket launchers, in order to further develop the three-axis system.
The South Korean military also plans to upgrade the existing Patriot Advanced Capability-2 missiles to more advanced PAC-3 systems to enhance its missile defense and intercept capabilities.
The budget for the three-axis system would increase by 9.4 percent compared to this year to implement the Yoon Suk-yeol government’s defense policy, a senior official at South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration, who requested to remain anonymous, told a closed-door briefing Friday before lifting the press embargo.
The Defense Ministry has sought to expedite the establishment of the three-axis defense system to counter and incapacitate North Korea’s escalating missile and nuclear threats.
In addition, the ministry set aside around 6.6 trillion won to strengthen the military’s operational responsiveness. The specific projects include locally manufacturing more K2 tanks, securing ammunition reserves and building Ulsan-class Batch III frigates.
Light aircraft carrier project left out
But the proposed defense spending notably excludes expenditure on a contentious project to indigenously develop a light aircraft carrier, senior officials at the DAPA confirmed during the closed-door briefing. The defense project was one of former President Moon Jae-in’s key campaign promises.
DAPA officials elucidated that the exclusion does not indicate the termination of the defense project for the foreseeable future. But South Korea's arms procurement agency now views that it should evaluate the suitability of locally developing carrier-capable aircraft before continuing the project.
“We are preparing to commence a basic design of a light aircraft carrier. But the outcome of the ongoing assessment of the domestic development of carrier-based aircraft would affect the decision on whether to begin a bidding process,” one DAPA official told reporters.
The bidding process was originally set to start later in the year under the Moon government so as to choose a defense contractor for a basic design of a light aircraft carrier. But a military source who is familiar with the issue confirmed to The Korea Herald that the defense project is likely to be scrapped in light of the Yoon Suk-yeol government’s critical view of the project.
The DAPA’s recent decision to purchase additional 20 F-35A stealth fighter jets has been widely seen as a prelude to aborting the navy’s plan to procure and deploy F-35B stealth fighter jets -- with short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) systems -- to a light aircraft carrier.
‘Audacious initiative’
Meanwhile, South Korea’s Unification Ministry has requested a 22 percent increase in its budget for humanitarian aid to North Korea and inter-Korean cooperation projects despite strained inter-Korean relations.
The Unification Ministry has proposed around 1.4 trillion won in overall spending for the next year, a 3.35 percent on-year decrease. The bill was also approved during the Cabinet meeting Tuesday morning and will be submitted to the National Assembly on Friday.
Among them, the ministry allocates approximately 1.23 trillion won for the inter-Korean cooperation fund, a 3 percent decrease from around 1.27 trillion won this year. The rest is earmarked for other general projects, including expenditures for supporting the resettlement of North Korean defectors.
In the inter-Korean cooperation fund, the ministry sets aside around 625.9 billion won to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea, implement inter-Korean cooperation projects in the fields of health care, agriculture, stockbreeding, forestation, environment and enhancing North Korean human rights.
The expenditures for the next year rise by 22 percent compared to this year despite worsening inter-Korean ties.
Around 1.5 billion won has been newly allocated to “substantially improve the human rights situation of the North Korean people” in coordination with UN agencies and international nongovernmental organizations.
The Unification Ministry also underlined that the inter-Korean cooperation fund has been formulated with the focus on providing financial support to North Korea. The Yoon Suk-yeol government proposed to provide economic compensations in return for North Korea’s substantive process toward denuclearization in its recently unveiled “audacious initiative.”
“We have established financial foundations to support the implementation of the audacious initiative … by securing the budget for large-scale food and fertilizer aid, modernization of North Korea’s infrastructure and among others,” the ministry said in a press statement.
To that end, the ministry sets aside funds for inter-Korean economic cooperation, food assistance and fertilizer aid although the funds have long existed.
But questions remain on whether the Yoon government can implement inter-Korean cooperation projects. The rate of spending this year’s inter-Korean cooperation fund is merely 5.2 percent as of this July as North Korea has ratcheted up bellicose rhetoric against South Korea.
The former Moon administration’s project to monitor fake news on North Korea will be scrapped, as it was cut out of the defense budget for next year. The Moon administration began monitoring news on North Korea this year as it saw the spread of false and fabricated information would lead to negative consequences, including the distortion of the policy environment.
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · August 30, 2022
5. Human Rights Violations of the South Korean Government: Interview with Director Hyunseung Lee
This 30 minute interview is in Korea but with English subtitles. Note: Hynseung Lee is an escapee from north Korea,also educated in China so he has tremendous insights to share.
The title does not provide all the content covered. There are very important insights on the regime and especially on information and influence in addition to the discussion about some of the critical events in the South (e..g, forced repatriation of the fisherman)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFN-30iwlxc
Human Rights Violations of the South Korean Government: Interview with Director Hyunseung Lee
109 views Aug 29, 2022 North Korean Fishermen, Human Rights Violations of the South Korea Government, and K-pop in North Korea: Interview with Director Hyunseung Lee
We express our deep thanks to Director Hyunseung Lee for accepting our interview request. You can learn more about his work through his organization One Korea Network’s YouTube channel https://www.youtube.com/channel/UClbo...
To learn more about North Korean human rights, here are some good starter resources, written by HRNK researchers. You can subscribe to HRNK’s newsletter through our website: https://www.hrnk.org
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https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Col...
6. North Korea imports Chinese meteorological equipment
Forecasting the weather is important but it does not fix the poor policy decision made by the regime, namely to prioritize the development of nuclear weapons and missiles over the welfare of the people.
Excerpts:
The imported equipment reportedly includes hundreds of kinds of computer monitors, desktops, solar panels, sensors, and server programs.
Meanwhile, the State Hydro-Meteorological Administration plans to bolster meteorological cooperation with China, and is reportedly devising the measures needed to make this happen.
The source said the Cabinet and State Hydro-Meteorological Administration plans to expand the number of meteorological observatories nationwide, along with installing more automated meteorological equipment.
“They are underscoring that only by analyzing the weather more minutely through the latest equipment can we minimize damage to the people’s economy and create a foundation to live through our own strength,” he said.
North Korea imports Chinese meteorological equipment
Chinhwa Joint Venture Company imported the observation equipment and general equipment through the port of Nampo last month
By Jeong Tae Joo - 2022.08.30 8:57am
dailynk.com
North Korea's meteorological office. (Sogwang)
North Korea is actively pushing the modernization of its meteorological equipment, Daily NK has learned. Multiple sources say that as part of this effort, the authorities recently imported from China the latest automated meteorological equipment, which they are currently installing in major cities nationwide.
A Daily NK source in Pyongyang said Friday that “the latest observation equipment is currently being installed” at major meteorological observatories nationwide “in accordance with the Five Year Plan’s policy to modernize the State Hydro-Meteorological Administration to realize the scientification and digitalization of weather predictions and observations, as well as to bolster their accuracy.”
Prior to this, Chinhwa Joint Venture Company, an affiliate of the State Hydro-Meteorological Administration, imported the observation equipment and general equipment from China through the port of Nampo last month, the source said. The authorities have been installing the equipment at major meteorological observatories in major cities throughout the country, including Pyongyang, since Aug. 22, following the equipment’s release from quarantine.
A source in South Hamgyong Province said the city of Hamhung has also received the latest automated meteorological equipment in accordance with orders from the State Hydro-Meteorological Administration.
“The State Hydro-Meteorological’s order is aimed at making observations and datification using the new equipment routine by this autumn,” he said.
The effort follows a policy judgment by North Korea that the nation needs better weather analysis and weather predictions for the authorities to quickly respond to natural disasters and implement scientific agricultural production.
According to the sources, North Korea is currently installing the equipment – imported from China through the Chinhwa Joint Venture Company – in Pyongyang, Ganggye in Chagang Province, Hyesan in Yanggang Province, Hamhung in South Hamgyong Province, and Wonsan in Kangwon Province.
The imported equipment reportedly includes hundreds of kinds of computer monitors, desktops, solar panels, sensors, and server programs.
Meanwhile, the State Hydro-Meteorological Administration plans to bolster meteorological cooperation with China, and is reportedly devising the measures needed to make this happen.
The source said the Cabinet and State Hydro-Meteorological Administration plans to expand the number of meteorological observatories nationwide, along with installing more automated meteorological equipment.
“They are underscoring that only by analyzing the weather more minutely through the latest equipment can we minimize damage to the people’s economy and create a foundation to live through our own strength,” he said.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
7. North Korean family settles in ‘heaven on earth’: Salt Lake City, Utah
Excerpts:
Kang, a pseudonym, and her two children, and one other unrelated North Korean refugee arrived in Utah in November 2021. The four were the first North Korean refugees to settle in a foreign country other than South Korea since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, according to the U.S. State Department.
In an interview with RFA’s Korean Service, Kang recounted her family’s harrowing escape from North Korea, which included two unsuccessful attempts, a stint in a labor camp, and confrontations with brokers who sought to take advantage of her family’s vulnerability.
North Korean family settles in ‘heaven on earth’: Salt Lake City, Utah
A mother tells RFA how she and her 2 children escaped to China, then made their way to the U.S.
By Soyoung Kim for RFA Korean
2022.08.29
rfa.org
She spends six days per week juggling three separate jobs and only has time to return home to see her children once a week, but Kang Mi Young says her life in Salt Lake City, Utah, is “heaven” compared to the “hell” in North Korea she escaped from in 2019.
Kang, a pseudonym, and her two children, and one other unrelated North Korean refugee arrived in Utah in November 2021. The four were the first North Korean refugees to settle in a foreign country other than South Korea since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, according to the U.S. State Department.
In an interview with RFA’s Korean Service, Kang recounted her family’s harrowing escape from North Korea, which included two unsuccessful attempts, a stint in a labor camp, and confrontations with brokers who sought to take advantage of her family’s vulnerability.
Kang Mi Young says her work schedule in Salt Lake City is rough. Her primary job is at a Korean-owned dental laboratory. After that she works an overnight shift helping disabled people, where she can get a few hours of sleep when her duties are complete. She also works at a Korean grocery store on weekends.
“I really don’t have time to go home. My daytime and nighttime workplaces and my house are triangularly located. I commute back and forth between two workplaces, and I go home once a week.”
Even so, Kang said her life in the United States, where she can depend on getting paid for the work she does, is much more comfortable than the one she and her family left behind in North Korea.
“Even with a little effort, there is no worry about eating and living, and there is no hindrance to the lives of children,” she said. “In North Korea, you still have no food to eat even though you work all day long. No matter how much I pay in taxes, the income here is high. Should I call it heaven on earth? I feel like I went to heaven after living in the hell that is North Korea.”
Failed attempts
Most North Koreans who escape the hardships of their authoritarian and isolated country want to settle in the South, where they face no language barrier and are already considered citizens. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, more than 33,000 North Koreans have settled in the South over the years. Kang’s case, making a home somewhere other than South Korea, is far more rare.
Only 220 North Koreans have settled in the U.S. since Washington started accepting North Korean refugees in 2006, according to a 2021 report by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, a non-governmental organization.
Kang’s journey may have an atypical ending, but much of her story mirrors that of other escapees. Prior to their successful escape, Kang’s family made two previous attempts, only to be caught by Chinese police and sent to a detention facility before being forcibly repatriated.
The second time they were repatriated, Kang was sent to a prison camp where she was starved and tortured. She was freed after relatives sold the family home and used the money to bribe camp officials, she said.
Escaping again
Despite the two unsuccessful attempts, the family remained determined to escape. The third time they set out, they were able to make their way to a safehouse in the Chinese city of Shenyang. The safehouse owner introduced them to a broker, who promised to help them get to South Korea via Southeast Asia.
Helping runaway North Koreans is big business in China, but many brokers take advantage of escapees, who are reluctant to report abuse to the authorities because it could mean that they get sent back to North Korea.
The broker Kang dealt with was a South Korean man, who earned a living collecting refugees from Shenyang and sending them to another broker who would help them get to Thailand.
According to Kang, she and other female refugees were forced to have sex with the broker while they were staying at the safehouse.
The broker delivered her to another safehouse in Qingdao, where she was ordered to write out a contract that would bind her to another broker, and told she would be killed if she refused.
Fearing for her life and the lives of her children, she finally signed the contract, which stated that after her arrival in South Korea that she would have one year to pay off her 7 million won (U.S. $5,200) debt.
The broker promised her that he would assign her to a job that would pay 5 million won ($3,725) per month, which is considerably higher than the average South Korean salary, and much higher than what typical entry-level employees receive.
Kang was skeptical and escaped with her family to Thailand with the help of an organization that requested not to be identified, for security reasons and because it continues to operate in the region. Once in Thailand, Kang and her daughters were placed in a refugee center.
While Kang initially planned to resettle in South Korea, she feared that she could be subject to the terms of the contract she had signed under duress. Another North Korean refugee told her that he was applying for asylum in the U.S., so she decided that she would too.
After two years in a Thai refugee center, her application was accepted and her family boarded a plane to Utah, with a stopover in South Korea.
When the plane landed at Incheon International Airport, Kang said she cried with joy.
Toiling in “Heaven”
Now in Salt Lake City, Kang said she hopes to start her own business. When she was in North Korea, she supported her family by selling Chinese goods in the marketplace.
“I graduated college in North Korea, but I don’t have a college diploma here, and I’m past the age to go to college. I dream of doing business in the future,” she said.
“Right now is the period where I will work hard for several years to establish a foothold. Compared to my career in North Korea, I’m going to go into the field where I can do my best. I studied well. I was interested in beauty and massage. I can also branch out into things like vegetable farming, where I can do well without making mistakes.”
The time away from her children is difficult, but Kang believes the sacrifices have been worth it.
“I feel sorry. But right now, my tasks and my children’s tasks are different. My children have to concentrate on learning and studying, even when I don’t come home,” she said.
“I need to lay a foundation for them to study. Now, my children are aware of the situation and they study when I’m not home. I believe they will study well so that they can go to college here.”
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
rfa.org
8. Heavy rain, salt scarcity in North Korea may complicate kimchi season
While the people in north Korea are suffering, my wife and I recently received a gift of fresh Kimchi from a family who escaped from north Korea. My wife says it is some of the best Kimchi we have ever had. Every time we eat it we have to think of those who are suffering in the north. They just cannot get a break. It seems like all the conditions and the regime are against them.
Heavy rain, salt scarcity in North Korea may complicate kimchi season
Stores of a favored salt variety used to make the popular dish have been washed away in the past month.
By Chang Gyu Ahn for RFA Korean
2022.08.24
rfa.org
A salt shortage in North Korea made worse by heavy rains this summer could disrupt the country’s kimchi-making season this autumn, sources in the country told RFA.
North Korea is in the thick of its July-August rainy season, and sources have reported that heavy rains and flooding have destroyed crops, businesses and homes.
The rains have also dissolved mountains of salt piled up outdoors, especially on the country’s west coast, which produces the variety of salt preferred for cooking.
Now merchants are desperately scouring the countryside to find as much salt as they can, as prices will likely skyrocket when demand spikes higher during the approaching kimchi season.
Kimchi is traditionally made in the fall on the Korean peninsula. Arguably Korea’s most well-known food, kimchi arose out of the necessity of preserving vegetables so they could last through the long Siberian winter.
“These days, merchants from all over the country are flocking to each salt field on the West Coast, including here in South Pyongan province,” a resident of Onchon county in the province, north of the capital Pyongyang, told RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“This is because of a rampant shortage of salt. The salt fields on the West Coast failed to produce sufficient salt this year to cover for last year,” the source said.
Even before the rains came in mid-July, the country was low on salt.
“Last year, the authorities banned the production of salt, warning of a high risk of [coronavirus] infection through the sea,” the source said. International health experts have not identified contact with saltwater as a risk for contracting COVID-19.
North Korea in May declared a national “maximum emergency” after a major outbreak of coronavirus in the previous month. The resulting lockdown prevented salt production in Onchon county, according to the source.
“From mid-July, inclement weather and pouring rain have again disrupted salt production,” said the source. “There is no storage for salt in the salt fields, so the salt produced is piled up outdoors to remove the brine.
“All of the salt that had been stored has dissolved. This was ruinous to all the salt mills in the county,” the source said.
According to the source, salt has been in short supply in North Korea since the “Arduous March,” what Koreans call the 1994-1998 North Korean famine which killed millions, up to 10 percent of the population by some estimates.
“The authorities assigned many young people to each salt mill from last year to solve the salt shortage, but they have yet to see any effect,” said the source.
“Residents who work in the salt mills steal a little bit of salt every time they come home from work and store it in their house, then they sell it during the kimchi season, when the salt prices go up,” said the source. “This pays for their food and coal. This year, very few houses have enough salt to sell in the fall. The residents are worrying about how they will survive this upcoming winter.”
The disruption to salt production this year is expected to decrease output nationwide by more than half compared to last year, but there is a possibility that production could increase slightly if there is good weather at the end of this month, the source said.
The rains and the coronavirus also disrupted production in the northeastern province of North Hamgyong, a source from the city of Chongjin told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
Even with the nationwide shortage, people still want the salt from the West Coast, according to the second source.
“It is because there is a tidal flat in the West Sea, so the salt produced there is rich in minerals,” the second source said, referring to the body of water west of the peninsula, known internationally as the Yellow Sea.
“Cooking with [West Sea] salt tastes better. The salt from the West Sea is considered the best quality,” said the second source.
“Currently, the price of 1 kg of salt in the market exceeds 2,200 won per kilogram (U.S. $0.12 per lb.), but it is certain that it will rise even more when kimchi season comes,” the second source said. “I used to worry about food. Now I even worry about salt. This world is cruel.”
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
rfa.org
9. Korea, U.S. agree to launch formal talks on U.S. Inflation Reduction Act: Amb. Cho
A new friction point in the alliance. Did anyone foresee the second and third order effects of the IRA legislation?
Tuesday
August 30, 2022
dictionary + A - A
Korea, U.S. agree to launch formal talks on U.S. Inflation Reduction Act: Amb. Cho
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/30/business/industry/korea-ira-inflation-reduction-act/20220830103953900.html
Cho Tae-yong, Korea's ambassador to the United States, speaks during a press conference in Washington on Aug. 29. [YONHAP]
The U.S. government has agreed to launch formal talks with Korea on ways to minimize the adverse effects of the recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) on Korean electric vehicles, Seoul's ambassador to the U.S. said Monday.
Amb. Cho Tae-yong also said the U.S. understands the reasons behind Korea's concerns and that they are justified.
"We have especially stressed that the discriminative measures against electric vehicles from Korea, an ally and partner in a free trade agreement, are unfair, and the U.S. side is not presenting any differing views," the Korean diplomat said in a meeting with reporters in Washington.
"Based on such discussions, the Korean and U.S. governments have agreed to hold talks between the governments to come up with a solution to this issue," added Cho.
U.S. President Joe Biden signed the IRA into law earlier this month.
The law allows a government tax credit of up to $7,500 for each new electric vehicle (EV) purchase, but only for cars with batteries produced in North America.
The U.S. law has been considered a heavy blow to Korean carmakers, especially Hyundai Motor Group, which had announced plans to invest more than $5 billion in the U.S. for EVs and EV batteries during Biden's visit to Seoul in May.
"Completely addressing this issue requires tremendous efforts. [We] will work to minimize damage [to Korean firms] through active discussions with key actors from the U.S. Congress and administration," Cho said.
A Korean government delegation arrived in Washington earlier in the day to deliver the country's concerns over the Inflation Reduction Act.
Yonhap
10. Korea can't ignore human rights in China, says U.S. envoy
And we should also remember that China is complicit in north Korean human rights abuses by its policy of forced repatriation of escapees (refugees) from the north.
Tuesday
August 30, 2022
dictionary + A - A
Korea can't ignore human rights in China, says U.S. envoy
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/30/national/diplomacy/Korea-US-ambassador-Philip-Goldberg/20220830151628274.html
U.S. Ambassador to Korea Philip Goldberg gives a lecture in Seoul National University’s Wooseok Economics Hall in Gwanak District, southern Seoul, Monday afternoon. [NEWS1]
South Korea and the United States should hold countries like China responsible for human rights, the new U.S. ambassador to Seoul said in a lecture Monday.
Philip Goldberg gave his first lecture since arriving in the country at Seoul National University's (SNU) Institute for Future Strategy Monday afternoon. He discussed South Korea-U.S. relations, Pyongyang' denuclearization and other regional and international issues.
"The Republic of Korea and the United States have the responsibility to promote democracy and defend against destabilizing authoritarian regimes," said Goldberg. "Our collective effort will build a credible voice for promoting human rights and freedoms abroad like diversity, equality and tolerance."
This includes criticizing countries like China, which "continues to carry out genocide and crimes against humanity against predominantly Muslim Uighurs and religious minority groups in Xinjiang," he said, "and undermine Hong Kong's autonomy and protected rights."
Describing Seoul and Washington as "like-minded partners," Goldberg stressed that "Korea's rapidly expanding influence gives Koreans a say in what happens in the world."
He called for Seoul and Washington to "work together with our allies and partners to support peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" and on disputes in the South China Sea. He described Korea as "an essential, equal and capable partner with the United States" in such efforts.
"Together, we face unprecedented threats from authoritarian states like the People's Republic of China, Russia and North Korea, and we are redefining and re-enforcing the future of our shared security," said Goldberg. "The United States and the Republic of Korea are working together to oppose all activities that undermine or threaten the rules-based international order and a free and open Indo-Pacific."
He added that if Korea, the United States and Japan "work together to promote democratic values and principles, regional security and prosperity can be even stronger," saying it's "our fundamental interest to support closer cooperation with each other."
Goldberg referred to U.S. President Joe Biden's trip to Seoul for a summit with Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on May 21.
"Both of our leaders share our commitment to advancing freedom, peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as to promoting democracy and the rules-based international order, fighting corruption and advancing human rights," he said. "Our alliance truly is the linchpin for peace and prosperity in the region."
Goldberg said that the two sides reaffirmed their mutual commitment to the defense of South Korea and stressed the importance of military readiness "to ensure that our combined forces have the highest capability to deter a North Korean attack."
He said this included measures such as resuming full-scale military exercises and deployment of U.S. strategic assets to pre-2018 levels "as a demonstration of our seriousness in extended deterrence."
On North Korea, Goldberg said the long-held goal is to establish "a sustainable and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula," in cooperation with the international community.
He added that Seoul and Washington "put great effort into encouraging the DPRK to denuclearize, including through UN Security resolutions, while offering dialogue without preconditions." DPRK is the acronym for the North's full name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Regarding Russia, he said, "We applaud Korea for joining international efforts to support Ukraine, and hold Moscow accountable for its unprovoked invasion, including supporting international sanctions."
As Russia's aggression continues, he said, "It's vital that democratic nations do all within their power to prove to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and to the world that his unprovoked, premeditated war will not succeed."
He pointed to other areas of cooperation between South Korea and the United States, such as climate change and economic security, including joint ventures and investments in areas like semiconductors, high-capacity batteries, biopharmaceuticals and other critical parts of supply chains.
Goldberg noted that Korea has "evolved into a diplomatic, economic, military and cultural powerhouse" and that Korea's "growing economic and soft power have translated into a natural progression towards a greater role in world affairs and evolution that will only serve as a positive influence in our global community."
Goldberg also discussed Seoul-Washington matters with former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, honorary director of the Institute of Future Strategy, and Kim Byung-yeon, an SNU economics professor and head of the institute, during the event.
Regarding the recently enacted U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, Goldberg said that he believed Korea recognized "its chief purpose was really part of the movement towards the green economy and trying to deal with issues of climate change while at the same time promoting the manufacture of electric vehicles and batteries for those vehicles."
Goldberg became U.S. ambassador to Korea last month, 16 months after predecessor Harry Harris left the country. A career diplomat, Goldberg served as U.S. coordinator for the implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea from 2009 to 2010 during the Barack Obama administration and was ambassador to the Philippines, Bolivia and Colombia.
As one of his first activities after his arrival in Korea, Goldberg gave a speech at the Seoul Queer Culture Festival on July 16, along with other foreign diplomats, to promote LGBT rights in Korea, an event that sparked protest rallies from conservative groups.
When asked by a student his views on conservative Koreans' stance on LGBT rights, Goldberg replied, "I support this policy, because I am a representative of the U.S. and we believe very strongly in human rights. As for gay marriage, or any of the legislative issues, those are Korean issues; you have to settle those here."
He stressed in his SNU lecture, "Gender, race, national origin, disability status or sexual orientation cannot be an excuse to leave anyone on the sidelines."
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
11. THAAD a purely defensive system designed to counter N. Korean threat: State Dept.
As long as China keeps focusing on THAAD we have to keep explaining how defensive THAAD is.
THAAD a purely defensive system designed to counter N. Korean threat: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · August 30, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. missile defense system deployed in South Korea, THAAD, is a purely defensive system that is only designed to protect South Korea and its people against threats from North Korea, a state department spokesperson said Monday.
Vedant Patel, principal deputy spokesperson for the department, also insisted any call or demand from other countries to withdraw THAAD would be "inappropriate."
"THAAD is a prudent and limited self defense capability designed to counter a DPRK weapons program," Patel said in a telephonic press briefing.
"Criticism or pressure on the ROK to abandon its self-defense is inappropriate," he added, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
His remarks come after South Korea announced that the country has formed a consultative body to assess the environmental impact of the U.S. THAAD system deployed in Seongju, located some 300 kilometers south of Seoul, a move that Seoul officials said will help "normalize" the operation of the THAAD system.
South Korea decided to host the U.S. missile defense system in 2016 at the height of North Korean nuclear and missile provocations, but the system has been operating in a status of "temporary installation" pending an environmental impact assessment.
The Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which came into office in May, has also hinted at the possibility of deploying additional THAAD units in South Korea following a series of North Korean missile launches this year.
Pyongyang has already launched more than 30 ballistic missiles this year, which mark the largest number of ballistic missiles it fired in a year, according to the U.S.
"The U.S. and the ROK made an alliance decision to deploy THAAD to the ROK as a purely defensive measure to protect the ROK and its people from armed attack and to protect alliance military forces from the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threat," said Patel.
The department spokesperson also called on Pyongyang to return to dialogue.
"We are prepared to meet with the DPRK without preconditions and we hope the DPRK will respond positively to our outreach," he said.
DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · August 30, 2022
12. What Might be Yoon Suk-yeol's Productive Approach in Economic Cooperation with North Korea?
From my friend, colleague, and escapee from north Korea, Hyun Seung Lee.
Excerpts:
The long-term goal of any inter-Korean economic cooperation should be a free unified Korea, and economic cooperation that does not share the principle of reciprocity and free market values should be firmly excluded.
Moreover, when designing a better model for inter-Korean economic cooperation, the government needs to keep in mind that the North Korean regime’s authority should be minimized, the benefits of the North Korean people should be maximized, and the South Korean government should be able to control it as much as possible.
As President Yoon Suk-yeol said in his inauguration speech, “We should pursue a sustainable peace that blooms freedom and prosperity, not a fragile peace that temporarily avoids war.”
Likewise, the reunification policy is truly meaningful only when it develops into sustainable cooperation for freedom and prosperity, not cooperation for temporary dialogue.
What Might be Yoon Suk-yeol's Productive Approach in Economic Cooperation with North Korea? - OKN
By
Hyun-Seung Lee
August 27, 2022
onekoreanetwork.com · August 28, 2022
This article is adapted from remarks presented by the author at International Forum on One Korea 2022 in Seoul, Korea on August 13, 2022.
Today, the issue of reunification on the Korean Peninsula seems to be left out of Korea’s national interest and is increasingly being forgotten in our memories.
It is true that implementing the reunification policy amid various challenges such as the denuclearization of North Korea and an improvement in human rights is incredibly tough. However, it is unfortunate that the current Yoon administration has yet to craft a clear vision for reunification.
Also, we should be very cautious about the new administration’s attempts of following the failed policies of the former administrations that have achieved nothing new in breakthroughs for inter-Korean dialogue and exchange.
In particular, the way of solving the North Korean nuclear problem and finding a solution to the reunification issue by pursuing an inter-Korean summit by sending humanitarian aid to North Korea as a bait seems no different from previous failed attempts by the progressive South Korean governments.
In addition, the Green Detent policy aims to promote co-existence and co-prosperity of the two Koreas and build a foundation for peaceful unification by easing tensions and creating trust in non-political, non-military ecology, and environmental fields. But this is highly unrealistic.
This is because North Korea is a country where politics and ideology dominate the people and their everyday lives. It is an environment in which no policy can be formulated and implemented apart from politics, ideology, and military concepts.
Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to highlight the limitations and failures of past South Korean governments’ policies toward North Korea and also discuss the policies and direction that the new administration can take in achieving the goal of a free and unified Korea.
Without a doubt, the human rights issue in North Korea should be top priority unification policy. However, today, I would like to propose both a realistic and efficient economic-cooperation policy besides the human rights and denuclearization issue that is prevalent in most policies.
When we talk about inter-Korean economic cooperation, there are two models that cannot be left out: (1) the Kaesong Industrial Complex and (2) Mt. Kumgang tourism. There was nothing wrong behind the idea of the two economic cooperation models, but the implementation of these two policies have completely failed.
The facts that the profit from these two economic cooperation models were used only for the North Korean regime’s nuclear development and military maintenance – and none that contributed to the lives of the North Korean people – and the failure to achieve constructive people-to-people exchanges between the North and South Koreans all indicate a complete failure of such policy.
Therefore, I would suggest several policies that can be implemented to focus more on the North Korean people and get the North Korean regime interested while avoiding a repeat of past policy failures.
First, the dispatch of North Korean workers abroad is one of the top priorities of the North Korean regime to the extent that it would send labor workers to the Donbas region of Ukraine, which is currently at war.
I believe that the South Korean government can take advantage of the North’s prioritized policy and boldly propose to Kim Jong Un that South Korean companies will hire North Korean workers in South Korea rather than in North Korea’s side of the area such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex.
Inviting and hiring North Korean workers to South Korea allows South Korean companies to directly pay the North Korean workers, and the North Koreans can witness the stark contrast between South Korea and their own country with their own eyes while interacting South Koreans in a more free-flowing environment.
In addition, by paying workers directly to their bank accounts, we can reduce the amount of money flowing into the regime as much as possible and improve the quality of the workers’ lives, as well as create a more suitable environment for them to learn about liberal democracy and the market economy.
Second, another type of inter-Korean cooperation in the energy sector to resolve North Korea’s power shortage has notably sufficient conditions to attract the attention of the North Korean regime.
North Korea’s actual electricity production is 23 billion kWh (kilowatt hour), which is only 4% of South Korea’s power generation. The power shortages, more chronically severe than food shortages, have a greater impact on the overall North Korean economy and the lives of its residents.
Without electricity, which is the basic means of developing the economy, the factories will be stalled, and the production of food and other means will be halted entirely.
Economic cooperation with North Korea’s electrical supply is an area that needs to be cooperated in for the purpose of improving the quality of life of the North Korean people and achieving a free and unified Korea in the future.
However, North Korea’s nuclear power plant construction plan and electricity infrastructure plan promoted by the Moon Jae-in administration were dangerous measures that could give Kim Jong-un most of the advantage.
Instead of building small modular nuclear power plants in North Korea, the South Korean government can propose building them in South Korea. This method can limit the North Korean power supply to factories that produce daily necessities, food production, and raw materials and can exclude the munition factories, military facilities, and party and government agencies in the process.
We need to let the South Korean government, not the North Korean regime, conduct the planning and control the power supply chain.
Also, electricity should not be provided for free, but must be paid for through an exchange in natural resources or other various means.
Furthermore, there may be various ways to minimize the influence of the North Korean regime in policymaking by utilizing cooperation in the tourism industry and IT sector, which are Kim Jong-un’s main interests.
Undoubtedly, these proposals have the disadvantage of not being able to proceed unless the Kim Jong-un regime accepts them. However, cooperation that only benefits the Kim Jong-un regime will further delay the achievement of the freedom of the North Korean people and the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.
The long-term goal of any inter-Korean economic cooperation should be a free unified Korea, and economic cooperation that does not share the principle of reciprocity and free market values should be firmly excluded.
Moreover, when designing a better model for inter-Korean economic cooperation, the government needs to keep in mind that the North Korean regime’s authority should be minimized, the benefits of the North Korean people should be maximized, and the South Korean government should be able to control it as much as possible.
As President Yoon Suk-yeol said in his inauguration speech, “We should pursue a sustainable peace that blooms freedom and prosperity, not a fragile peace that temporarily avoids war.”
Likewise, the reunification policy is truly meaningful only when it develops into sustainable cooperation for freedom and prosperity, not cooperation for temporary dialogue.
Author
onekoreanetwork.com · August 28, 2022
13. S. Korea calls for 'consultative mechanism' with U.S. on inflation law
Again, this is a new alliance friction point.
S. Korea calls for 'consultative mechanism' with U.S. on inflation law | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · August 30, 2022
SEOUL, Aug. 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's trade minister called Tuesday for the United States to launch a bilateral consultative mechanism to address the adverse effects of a U.S. law that will exclude South Korean electric vehicles from tax credits.
U.S. President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law earlier this month, which will provide up to US$7,500 in tax credits for consumers to buy new electric vehicles assembled in North America.
South Korean Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun said the IRA includes discriminatory clauses against non-U.S. firms, and the South Korean government and the related industries cannot help but voice concerns.
"We will strategically push for bilateral consultations with the United States in consideration of its political, economic and other various circumstances," he said in an emergency trade promotion committee meeting.
Cho Tae-yong, South Korea's ambassador to the U.S., said Monday the U.S. government has agreed to launch formal talks with South Korea on the issue, noting that the U.S. understands the reasons behind South Korea's concerns.
The new law could deal a blow to Hyundai Motor Co. and Kia Corp. as the two South Korean carmakers, key affiliates of Hyundai Motor Group, manufacture all of their EVs in South Korea for export, meaning that buyers of the Hyundai IONIQ 5 and Kia EV6 cars will not be eligible for tax credits.
Ahn said he will visit Washington next week for meetings with U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai and other government and Congress officials.
Also Tuesday, Vice Foreign Minister Lee Do-hoon said in a parliamentary session that South Korea has proposed that the U.S. delay discriminatory measures on South Korean EVs by 2025, when Hyundai is set to join a list of qualifying EVs for the tax credits.
In May, Hyundai Motor announced its plan to invest $5.54 billion to start construction on a 300,000-unit-a-year EV plant in Georgia in January 2023 and begin production in the first half of 2025.
Hyundai Motor said it is considering speeding up the construction of its dedicated electric vehicle (EV) plant in the U.S.
Hyundai said it could start producing the all-electric version of the Genesis GV70 SUV at its Alabama plant late this year.
On Monday, South Korea sent a delegation to the U.S. to explain its stance and to have talks for possible supplementary measures.
In addition to efforts for bilateral consultations, Ahn vowed to review dispute resolution procedures in accordance with trade norms. Seoul officials have said the new law violates the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles.
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · August 30, 2022
14. S. Korean Navy joins U.S.-led maritime exercise in waters off Guam
Operationalizes the recent Korean Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) where the U.S. and ROK reaffirmed their commitment to enhanced military cooperation throughout INDOPACOM.
S. Korean Navy joins U.S.-led maritime exercise in waters off Guam | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · August 30, 2022
SEOUL, Aug. 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Navy participated in a U.S.-led multinational maritime exercise in waters off Guam earlier this month to enhance combined operational capabilities, the armed service said Tuesday.
The Pacific Vanguard exercise took place from Aug. 21 through Monday, involving the naval forces from the South, the United States, Australia, Canada and Japan. The Korean Navy sent the 4,400-ton Munmu the Great destroyer and the 7.600-ton Sejong the Great destroyer to the exercise.
During the exercise, the five Navies engaged in various maritime operations, like anti-submarine warfare operations, air warfare operations, live-fire missile events and replenishment at sea, according to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
The South Korean Navy has taken part in the exercise since 2019.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · August 30, 2022
15. Arming to Disarm: North Korea’s Nuclear Paradox
I am still scratching my head over this one. Actions do speak louder than words. I still do not tihnk that the regime will ever give up its nuclear weapons.
Conclusion:
Growing strategic uncertainty, alongside the regime’s hereditary domestic politics and juche-inspired autonomy, suggests that even if the gap between its denuclearization principles and nuclear practice continues to widen, Pyongyang’s anti-nuclear advocacy will endure as the basis of its strategy. This means that if North Korea wishes to continue to assert denuclearization, it must retain its nuclear capacity as a way of hedging its security inferiority. This paradox continues to offer geopolitical, semantic, and psychological safeguards: Pyongyang seeks to delegitimize U.S. nuclear strategy in the region while seeking to restrain South Korean nuclear ambitions, and, of necessity, justifies its minimum nuclear capacity as an interim measure toward a phased nuclear disarmament – “arming to disarm.”
Arming to Disarm: North Korea’s Nuclear Paradox
Even as its nuclear capacity continues to advance, Pyongyang will keep its anti-nuclear doctrine in place – despite the growing contradiction.
thediplomat.com · by Soon-ok Shin · August 29, 2022
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North Korea has conducted a number of long-range ballistic missile tests in 2022, breaking a self-imposed moratorium in place since 2018, amid a period of détente during the Moon Jae-in and Trump administrations. North Korea began a carefully choreographed stratagem in January 2022 with an announcement at the eighth Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee that it would resume “all temporarily-suspended activities.” Initially, Pyongyang test-fired medium-range and cruise missiles. After a pause in February, coinciding with the Beijing Winter Olympics, matters were escalated with a series of ICBM launches over the following months. The firing of upgraded missiles using diversified launching methods demonstrated significant technological and tactical advancement. Meanwhile, reports that the nuclear test site in Punggyeri has been restored have led to speculation that a next step may be a seventh nuclear test.
The obvious question is whether, in gearing up its deterrence capability, Pyongyang has now discarded its “Korean Peninsular denuclearization” doctrine, the so-called “denuclearization instruction” enshrined in the legacies of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il? My response is that North Korea will maintain a tenacious commitment to denuclearization.
Since the early 1990s, Pyongyang’s position has remained consistent: It has unwaveringly stressed the inevitability of nuclear development in response to a hostile U.S., while continuing to pledge a commitment to denuclearization. This nuclear paradox – arming to disarm – is likely to persist, even as its nuclear capacity continues to advance and the gap between its anti-nuclear doctrine and nuclear-deterrence practice continues to widen.
Understanding North Korea’s ever-fluid nuclear rhetoric is more important than ever. This article looks at the deep roots of Pyongyang’s anti-nuclear practice to discuss how this served its geopolitical, domestic, and psychological interests during the Cold War.
Securing the commitment of its powerful allies to provide extended security underpinned Pyongyang’s anti-nuclear strategy in the 1950s and ‘60s. Fashioned in a Cold War antagonism, it adopted a form of realpolitik, externally associating with the USSR and China to counterbalance the U.S. extended deterrence provided to the South. Internally, North Korea focused on strengthening its conventional capability, as set out in the 1962 Byungjin policy. A security-inferior Pyongyang felt the necessity to engage in normative nuclear politics and embrace the international anti-nuclear movement as a means of condemning and seeking to deter nuclear-shield Cold War enemies.
Its anti-nuclear posture was, however, complicated by Sino-USSR rivalry and a fear of abandonment. Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated once Khrushchev took office, and regional geopolitics became even more intricate with the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. By the early 1970s, it was not evident to Kim Il Sung that Moscow and Beijing would necessarily stand firm in protecting Pyongyang. Indeed, Sino-U.S. détente heightened security uncertainty surrounding the peninsula and intensified both Koreas’ nuclear aspirations. Given the nature of the asymmetric alliances, it was inevitable that the two client states would question the depth of their patrons’ commitment. Nixon’s decision to pull the U.S. Seventh Division out of South Korea in 1971 was a watershed moment for Park Chung-hee, who resolved to develop his own nuclear capability, embarking on a clandestine nuclear program. Likewise, exploration of nuclear technology cooperation was top of Kim Il Sung’s agenda.
The difference was that while Washington’s maneuvers pulled Seoul back into the non-proliferation orbit, Moscow failed in its attempts to reassure Pyongyang. Under pressure from Washington, Seoul proceeded not only to complete its long-overdue ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in April 1975, but also cancelled a reprocessing deal with France in January 1976. Its reward was greater nuclear energy cooperation with Washington. In contrast, despite Moscow’s efforts, North Korea resisted signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It regarded the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the South as a constant provocation. Throughout the 1960s and ‘70s, Pyongyang sought support from its allies to build nuclear reactors, to no avail. The result was to aggravate its fear of abandonment. At the same time, juche ideas fueled Kim’s fears that the regime’s survival was threatened, increasing the urgency to secure a self-reliant deterrent.
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Given these concerns, Pyongyang’s balancing act – not fully embracing either patron, in order to extract strategic advantage from both – foreshadowed what would become an aspect of its apparently counter-intuitive “arm to disarm” doctrine.
Semantics of “Inevitability”
In the late 1940s, echoing the Kremlin’s strategy of delegitimizing U.S. nuclear weapons, the North had enthusiastically embraced global peace and anti-nuclear campaigns. In addition, its anti-nuclear discourse conveyed a strong message to a domestic audience: While affirming the universal values of the cause, the discourse was expanded to reflect local reality, i.e. the division of Korea. By the turn of the 1950s, therefore, the anti-nuclear agenda had become conflated with the national unification imperative, focusing on the “inevitability” of civil war.
For example, Han Sol Ya, chair of the Korean National Peace Committee, delivered a speech on his return from the 1949 Paris World Peace Congress, only a year before the outbreak of the Korean War, counter-intuitively justifying war as an option in achieving unification, “to complete peace in the world.” In similar vein, the 1950 Stockholm Peace Appeal was appropriated to include a national unity message calling for “peace and national reunification,” with the emphasis on the latter. Millions of signatures were arranged in a petition to support the appeal, even as war raged on the peninsula.
In due course, another “inevitability” was embraced, this time nuclear acquisition to counter the nuclear establishment (evidenced by China’s 1964 test). Meanwhile, a newly emergent non-proliferation regime, culminating in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, was bound to trouble a juche-inspired Pyongyang. Juche demanded a “rightful” place for North Korea at the international table, from which it could contest a nuclear order dominated by the existing powers, especially the United States. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, therefore, was condemned as protecting the position of Washington through an “unfair” nuclear protocol. Pyongyang’s resistance was a rerun of the struggle for independence and a restatement of its anti-imperialist imperative during the Japanese colonial period. Thus the combination of an anti-U.S. imperialist narrative and juche-based sovereignty underpinned Pyongyang’s ambition to acquire “righteous” nuclear weapons. The pursuit of “justice” in the nuclear order led it to rationalize “inevitable” nuclear-arming as an interim response to “injustice.”
Psychology of Anti-Nuclearism
The dynamics of Cold War rivalries continued to evolve at international, regional, and subregional levels, leading the focus of Pyongyang’s anti-nuclearism to shift from, first, engagement in the world peace movement, to second, the creation of regional nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs)/zones of peace (ZOPs), to third, advocacy of peninsular denuclearization.
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Early Cold War geopolitical rivalry had seen Washington and Moscow reach out to their respective allies, leading to the strengthening of opposing blocs. The Kremlin agreed on joint nuclear research activity with Beijing in 1953, while Eisenhower launched an ambitious “Atoms for Peace” initiative that same year. In the later part of the decade the United States began to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe to counterbalance the Warsaw Pact’s superior conventional forces. In the Asia-Pacific, it extended its nuclear umbrella to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Moscow’s response, constrained by inferior nuclear capability, was to play the anti-nuclear card, condemning U.S. deployment in both the European and Asian theaters and proposing NWFZs in Central Europe and the Asia-Pacific in 1959. As Washington continued to increase its tactical weapons disposition in Asia throughout the 1960s, the focus of Pyongyang’s strategy shifted from the world peace movement toward the creation of an Asia-Pacific NWFZ and ZOP.
The early 1970s marked a strategic turning point in East Asia, with a series of security developments that included, notably, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s pragmatic engagement with Beijing. The effect was to increase Pyongyang’s uncertainty about its allies’ commitment, motivating it to look beyond its traditional “socialist” diplomacy to reach out to the Third World and embrace the anti-nuclear thrust of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
In the 1980s, the balance of power shifted toward the South, causing Pyongyang’s anti-nuclearism to focus more narrowly on the Korean Peninsula. Its advocacy of a peninsular NWFZ/ZOP demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Meanwhile, it was being further confronted by the U.S. threat through the enlarged Team Spirit military exercises. The urgency Pyongyang had come to attach to an anti-nuclear posture exposed its fears that survival of the regime was at risk. At the turn of the 1990s, responding to a new geopolitical reality at the end of the Cold War, it adopted a more tightly focused anti-nuclear project, moving beyond peninsular NWFZ demands to advocate peninsular denuclearization.
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Given its inferior security capacity, Pyongyang anticipated two benefits from its anti-nuclear stance: The NWFZ was likely to deliver the same result as an extended deterrence, with Pyongyang obtaining negative security assurances from nuclear-armed enemies. At the same time, NAM-related postcolonial anti-nuclear solidarity would serve to challenge and undermine the legitimacy of Washington’s nuclear strategy, providing a psychological boost in the face of U.S. domination.
Conclusion
Pyongyang’s Cold War anti-nuclearism served important geopolitical, semantic, and psychological purposes. First, in reacting to a chronic existential threat, North Korea actively engaged in peace/anti-nuclear campaigning with the aim of delegitimizing and deterring the adversary. Second, its anti-nuclearism reflected a capacity to adapt to Cold War security challenges while promulgating its juche-inspired autonomy. Lastly, it provided both a psychological safeguard and psychological warfare tools against its nuclear-armed enemies.
Looking ahead, and contrary to critics who regard North Korea’s anti-nuclear posture since the early 1990s as camouflaged realist behavior, I argue that Pyongyang’s ostensible commitment to denuclearization will continue to be integral to its nuclear doctrine. This may appear puzzling, considering the proclaimed imperative of “inevitable” nuclear arming. But it is evident that the emergent Sino-U.S. rivalry of the early 21st century has revived some of the Cold War security dynamics in East Asia and exacerbated Pyongyang’s threat perception.
Growing strategic uncertainty, alongside the regime’s hereditary domestic politics and juche-inspired autonomy, suggests that even if the gap between its denuclearization principles and nuclear practice continues to widen, Pyongyang’s anti-nuclear advocacy will endure as the basis of its strategy. This means that if North Korea wishes to continue to assert denuclearization, it must retain its nuclear capacity as a way of hedging its security inferiority. This paradox continues to offer geopolitical, semantic, and psychological safeguards: Pyongyang seeks to delegitimize U.S. nuclear strategy in the region while seeking to restrain South Korean nuclear ambitions, and, of necessity, justifies its minimum nuclear capacity as an interim measure toward a phased nuclear disarmament – “arming to disarm.”
GUEST AUTHOR
Soon-ok Shin
Soon-ok Shin is assistant professor in International Relations at the Université de Tunis El Manar. Her research focuses on the international relations of East Asia with specific reference to the U.S.-ROK alliance, Sino-U.S. relations, inter-Korean relations, middle power studies, and DPRK nuclear discourse.
This article is based on the findings of a research paper published in The Pacific Review; an international relations journal covering the interactions of the countries of the Asia-Pacific.
thediplomat.com · by Soon-ok Shin · August 29, 2022
16. South Korea’s embattled Yoon spurned by young antifeminists over failed pledges, scandals
This must surely be one reason for President Yoon's low approval rating. The feminists and anti-feminsits are unhappy with him. Who is left?
South Korea’s embattled Yoon spurned by young antifeminists over failed pledges, scandals
- Support for President Yoon among young, male voters that propelled him to the top job has started to wane as he struggled to deliver on campaign promises
- Yoon, a political newbie, has also come under fire for his inexperience and multiple political, personal controversies
David D. Lee in Seoul
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Published: 8:30am, 30 Aug, 2022
By David D. Lee South China Morning Post5 min
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Yoon, a former prosecutor general with no political experience, has come under fire for his lack of experience. Photo: AP
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol marked his 100th day in office on August 17 amid waning public support by his base of disillusioned young men as he struggles to deliver on his election promises and navigate personal and political controversies.
Yoon, a former prosecutor general with no political experience, has come under fire for his lack of experience, with many young men calling him a “newbie who collected money but didn’t do any work”, “amateur” and “salary thief”, according to a survey by the Weekly Chosun across college campuses.
The support of young male voters who sought a change from liberal former president Moon Jae-in has been key in propelling Yoon to the top job. In March, exit polls from the country’s three major broadcast stations – KBS, MBC and SBS – showed that nearly six in 10 male voters in their 20s had voted for Yoon.
“I confidently voted for Yoon in March, but I’m regretting it a little bit now,” said Charles Shin, 28-year-old PhD student in the southwestern city of Gwangju.
Yoon rose to power on pledges to stabilise South Korea’s housing market, raise monthly wages for soldiers to 2 million won (US$1,500) and to abolish the Gender Equality Ministry, but has struggled to deliver on these.
Many young male supporters of Yoon disapprove of gender quotas under the Gender Equality Ministry and the “framing for the vulnerable that the liberal party usually capitalises on”, said Shin.
Some of these supporters have reminded the president of his promise, in a July rally led by antifeminism group Man on Solidarity.. So far, Yoon has only asked the minister to propose a road map to abolish the Gender Equality Ministry.
A Gallup Korea survey released earlier in August revealed that just 22 per cent of Koreans aged 18-29 approved of Yoon as president, while 64 per cent disapproved.
A tracking poll by Realmeter also showed that Yoon’s support from people in their 20s in May stood at 55.6 per cent and declined to 26.9 per cent in August.
South Korean presidents typically see approval ratings of 70-80 per cent during their early months in office, driven by high expectations for their new governments.
Support for Yoon began to wane in June when the president and his wife brought along a non-governmental acquaintance on his visit to Spain for the Nato summit. Some children of the presidential couple’s relatives and associates also landed jobs at the presidential office, prompting accusations of nepotism.
Yoon’s approval ratings took a further hit this month after he failed to meet US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in Seoul, who arrived after a high-profile visit to Taiwan that ignited Beijing’s fury.
He tried to navigate that by saying he had been on summer holiday at the time, but critics have accused him of avoiding Nancy Pelosi to avoid China’s wrath.
The same Gallup survey also revealed that 24 per cent of respondents disapproved of the president over his choice of Cabinet ministers, while 14 per cent pointed to Yoon’s lack of experience and incompetence.
Six per cent of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with how his administration handled floods in Seoul earlier this month after historic rainfall swamped the city and killed 13 people.
There are also hints of a political struggle in Yoon’s conservative People Power Party, which came under fire in July after the party’s former chairman Lee Jun-seok was suspended for six months over sexual misconduct allegations.
Young and charismatic Lee had been crucial in rallying young voters for the party during the presidential election. Yoon and other party leaders appeared to turn their backs on Lee when the allegations surfaced, prompting whispers of intraparty unrest.
“One thing I’ve realised from Yoon’s poor start is that those who gain power do whatever they want. People on the right and left side of the political sphere are all the same,” Shin said.
Polling agency Media Tomato earlier this month published a poll with 42.5 per cent of respondents willing to support a new conservative party formed by Lee and former lawmaker Yoo Seong-min, while just 29.8 per cent supported the PPP.
“Yoon doesn’t seem to have a concrete vision while at his presidency,” said Chung Joo-shin, director of the Korea Institute of Politics and Society. “The question of his leadership and his inability to solve problems addressed by his supporters seems to have exacerbated his decline in support.”
Chung believes that the continued absence of change will make it harder for the presidency to gain respect, and that a new young leader in the liberal camp would soon gain political momentum.
“If a turnaround is to happen, the president needs to start becoming closer with the public instead of trapping himself in his presidential office,” he said.
There have been signs of a small uptick in Yoon’s popularity ratings over the past three weeks, as he seeks to reshuffle his team to replace as much as 25 per cent of members, or around 70 personnel. Yoon last week appointed Kim Eun-hye as the new senior secretary for press affairs.
While it hasn’t moved his detractors, some supporters remain steadfast despite Yoon’s numerous missteps.
“There is a reason that every president is given five years to be in office,” said Park Jeong-hyun, a 31-year-old businessman from Incheon. “His mishaps don’t seem to be that big, and it’s the president who has the final say in who he hires for the president’s office.”
Park attributes his support of Yoon to his political inexperience, unlike many of Yoon’s critics and predecessors. “I like that he never stepped foot in the national assembly ever in his life. I don’t trust those people.”
David D. Lee
David D. Lee attended the E.W. Scripps School of Journalism at Ohio University. He has covered social issues, popular culture and the political arena as a reporter in the US, Israel and South Korea. David currently works as a freelance reporter in Seoul, where he enjoys runs at the Han River and frequently goes searching for trendy cafes in the alleyways of the city.
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