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Quotes of the Day:
“When men differ in opinion, both sides ought equally to have the advantage of being heard by the public; when Truth and Error have fair play, the former is always an overmatch for the latter.”
- Benjamin Franklin
"If we mean to have heroes, statesmen and philosophers, we should have learned women"
- Abigail Adams
“Character, in the long run, is the decisive factor in the life of an individual and of nations alike.”
- Theodore Roosevelt
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 18 (Putin's War)
2. Amid flow of weapons to Ukraine, DefMin says black market smuggling is 'artificial' concern
3. Sabotage and War in Cyberspace
4. The West Worries Too Much About Escalation in Ukraine
5. The Quad needs a futures focus
6. Russia’s War Has Created Opportunities for Biden to Go Big
7. Senate Armed Services releases full $847 billion defense bill
8. What If the War in Ukraine Spins Out of Control?
9. How the System Was Rigged: The Global Economic Order and the Myth of Sovereignty
10. Russia Following 2014 ‘Annexation Playbook’ In Eastern Ukraine, White House Says
11. Opinion | How media coverage drove Biden’s political plunge
12. Top US general orders comprehensive review of US-China military interactions
13. Special Forces Soldiers participate in the US Department of State ATLAS program’s culminating exercise CAPSTONE
14. Ukraine destroys two military ammo depots, hurting Russian morale: Official
15. FDD | The UN Has Now Spent $81.6 Million at the Four Seasons Damascus
16. The rodeo that was the Pacific Islands Forum meeting
17. Sen. Marco Rubio: Expose Secret Chinese Communist Party Cells
18. Knocking anti-Israel bias to the mat
19. U.S. military biological activities warrant closest attention: Lavrov
20. China demands U.S. cancel potential arms sale to Taiwan
21. Nancy Pelosi’s plan to visit Taiwan prompts outrage from China
22. U.S. touts progress in hypersonic arms race with China, Russia
23. Ukraine Faces Difficulties Getting Western Weapons to Front Lines
24. U.S. Himars Help to Hold Off Russian Advance, Ukraine Says
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 18 (Putin's War)
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 18
understandingwar.org
Karolina Hird, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 18, 5:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s July 18 meeting with the commander of the Eastern group of forces Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov supports ISW’s assessment that Moscow will not prioritize an attack to seize Slovyansk in this stage of the operation but will instead focus on seizing Siversk and Bakhmut.[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 18 that Shoigu inspected the Eastern group and directed Muradov to prioritize the destruction of Ukrainian long-range missiles and artillery systems. This is the first time ISW has observed explicit mention of the Eastern force grouping operating in Ukraine in this phase of the war. The Russian MoD previously reported that the Central and Southern force groups took part in the capture of Luhansk Oblast under the leadership of Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin and Army General Sergey Surovikin.[2] The Eastern group of forces is likely comprised of elements of the Russian Eastern Military District (EMD), which have been active along the Izyum axis in Kharkiv Oblast.[3] It is still unclear whether Muradov also directly controls operations around Kharkiv City. Muradov’s forces are operating in the Izyum-Slovyansk direction ostensibly with the objective of eventually seizing Slovyansk itself, and it is noteworthy that Shoigu did not direct Muradov to prioritize taking ground along this axis at this time. Muradov holds a lower rank than both Lapin and Surovikin, suggesting that the Kremlin considers the Izyum-Slovyansk area to be a lower priority than capturing territory in Donetsk Oblast as part of the wider Donbas campaign. The Kremlin likely is focusing military resources and high-rank leadership on localized and discrete gains around Siversk and Bakhmut, despite Shoigu’s earlier calls for the intensification of operations along all axes of advance.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s likely effort to shield ethnic Russians from high levels of mobilization may trigger resistance in some of the ethnic enclaves that seem to be disproportionately bearing the burden of war. Russian Telegram channel Rybar released a report on July 18 about the Novaya Tuva movement- an anti-war organization comprised of activists from the Tuvan ethnic minority enclave.[5] Rybar accused the Novaya Tuva movement of disseminating anti-war propaganda and inciting ethnic discord within the Russian Federation. This report is noteworthy in the context of the recent increase in the formation of regionally-based volunteer battalions through Russia, many of which fall along distinct ethnic lines.[6] ISW and others have previously noted the prevalence of non-ethnic Russian battalions fighting in Ukraine, which include troops from Chechnya, South Ossetia, Tuva, Tartarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, and others.[7] These indicators suggest that Putin may be unwilling to conduct general mobilization in part due to a reluctance to mobilize large numbers of ethnic Russians. Rybar’s post as well as previous reporting on a "Free Buryatia” anti-war group bring to the fore the risk that Putin’s apparent desire to have non-Russians bear the brunt of the war at this stage could create domestic tension in these regions.
Key Takeaways
- The Russian Ministry of Defense’s meeting with the leadership of the Eastern grouping of forces in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin will not focus on seizing Slovyansk at this stage of the campaign but will instead prioritize attempting to seize Siversk and Bakhmut.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin’s likely effort to put the burden of supporting operations in Ukraine on ethnic minorities to avoid conducting a general mobilization of ethnic Russians may be sparking resistance in ethnic enclaves in Russia.
- Russian forces conducted a series of ground attacks east of Siversk and south of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces intensified efforts to advance on Avdiivka and conducted limited ground assaults along the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline.
- Russian authorities are continuing to integrate occupied areas into the Russian trade economy.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
- Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to conduct air and artillery strikes to the northwest of Slovyansk and may be preparing to resume offensive operations southwest of Izyum towards Barvinkove on July 18.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces tried and failed to advance around Brazhivka and Dmytrivka-both 20km northeast of Barvinkove along the T2122 highway.[9] Russian forces additionally conducted artillery strikes around Barvinkove in the areas of Karnaukhivka and Virnopillya.[10] As ISW has previously assessed, Russian forces may be attempting to set conditions for advances southwest of Izyum to complement advances towards Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum or to open a new advance towards Kramatorsk, although Russian troops are unlikely to successfully advance on Kramatorsk from Barvinkove due to the complicated cross-country terrain in this area. Russian forces also continued strikes directly on Slovyansk and on settlements to the east of Slovyansk, including Tetyanivka, Donetske, and Starodubivka.[11]
Russian forces conducted a series of unsuccessful ground attacks to the east of Siversk on July 18. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attempts to improve their tactical positions in the directions of Bilohorivka-Hryhorivka, Zolotarivka-Verkhnokamyanske, Zolotarivka-Serebryanka, and Verkhnokamyanka-Verkhnokamyanske.[12] Russian forces also conducted limited ground attacks near Spirne, about 10km southeast of Siversk and continued to strike Ukrainian positions around Siversk.[13]
Russian forces continued localized ground assaults south of Bakhmut on July 18. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to advance along the Myronivka-Vuhledar Power Plant line, about 20km southeast of Bakhmut.[14] Russian forces conducted additional limited assaults in Novoluhanske and Semihirya, also south of Bakhmut, but did not make any confirmed advances.[15] Russian forces continued artillery, missile, and airstrikes around Bakhmut and struck Pokrovske, Vesela Dolyna, Kurdyumivka, Travneve, Shumy, and Soledar.[16]
Russian forces intensified ground attacks towards Avdiivka on July 18.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to improve their tactical position around Verkhnotoretske and Kamyanka, both to the northeast of Avdiivka. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) representative Eduard Basurin claimed that DNR forces have completely blocked the road from Avdiivka to Konstyantynivka (north of Avdiivka) and have surrounded Avdiivka in a semicircle.[18] Former Russian militant commander and Russian nationalist miblogger Igor Girkin noted that despite recent claims of success around Avdiivka, DNR units in this area are severely degraded and unlikely to make substantial gains under the threat of heavy Ukrainian artillery fire.[19]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces focused on preventing Ukrainian forces from advancing to the Russian border in Kharkiv Oblast on July 18.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued to carry out air, artillery, and missile strikes on civilian and military infrastructure in Kharkiv City and settlements to the north, northeast, east, and southeast.[21] Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Russian forces concentrated on striking Ukrainian positions in Chuhuiv on July 17-18.[22]The Ukrainian Main Military Directorate (GUR) reported that the “Cedar” (“Кедр”) Ukrainian GUR Reconnaissance unit conducted a special operation in Dementiivka, north of Kharkiv City on July 18.[23] The GUR stated that Ukrainian forces conducted a limited, localized counteroffensive that pushed “a large unit” of Russian forces out of Dementiivka.[24]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces focused on maintaining occupied lines and preventing a Ukrainian offensive along the Southern Axis on July 18.[25] Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Ukrainian positions along the Kherson-Mykolaiv and Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast borders and settlements on the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted mutual shelling strikes along the contact line along the Southern Axis.[27] Kherson Oblast officials reported that Russian forces continued changing their concentration areas to densely populated areas in Kherson Oblast in an effort to deter Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions.[28]
Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed on July 18 that Ukrainian forces are increasing groupings of forces and equipment near the contact line in the Mykolaiv-Kryvyi Rih direction in preparation for an offensive on Kherson Oblast.[29] Rybar also claimed that Ukrainian forces set up a pontoon bridge in preparation for a possible offensive across the Inhulets River near Arhanhelske, Kherson Oblast.[30]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Nothing significant to report.
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian occupation authorities continued efforts to facilitate the economic integration of occupied areas into the Russian trade economy. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities are “nationalizing” grain stores in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast under a unified Russian-owned “State Grain Company.”[31] The report notes that Russian authorities are exporting up to 100,000 tons of stolen Ukrainian grain from Zaporizhia Oblast to Egypt, Turkey, and unspecified Middle Eastern countries. Leveraging grain exports will allow Russian authorities to tie Ukrainian products directly into their global trade networks.
[18] https://www.kp dot ru/online/news/4835786/; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/38477; https://t.me/readovkanews/38860
[23] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rozviduvalna-hrupa-hur-mo-na-kharkivshchyni-znyshchyla-drh-morskoyi-pikhoty-pivnichnoho-flotu-vmf-rf-i-polonyla-ofitsera-spetspryznachentsya.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=185&v=4ekZzZpIaFI&feature=em...
[24] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rozviduvalna-hrupa-hur-mo-na-kharkivshchyni-znyshchyla-drh-morskoyi-pikhoty-pivnichnoho-flotu-vmf-rf-i-polonyla-ofitsera-spetspryznachentsya.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=185&v=4ekZzZpIaFI&feature=em...
[31] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/07/18/rosiyany-zahoplyuyut-elevatory-na-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-cherez-vidmovu-misczevyh-spivpraczyuvaty-z-nymy/
understandingwar.org
2. Amid flow of weapons to Ukraine, DefMin says black market smuggling is 'artificial' concern
Excerpts:
If NATO and European Union countries do implement more stringent controls to monitor the weapons flow, they’ll be facing an uphill climb.
“It’s just impossible to keep track of not only where they’re all going and who is using them, but how they are being used,” Rachel Stohl, an arms-control expert and vice president at the Stimson Center, told the Washington Post in May.
During today’s event, Reznikov said that Ukraine has ample reason to be transparent: the country’s survival depends on it.
“Ukraine is invested in ensuring control and transparency. This is in our best interest because we need to survive,” he said.
Amid flow of weapons to Ukraine, DefMin says black market smuggling is 'artificial' concern - Breaking Defense
Ukraine's defense minister says his country has been receptive to NATO, EU initiatives to monitor the influx of weapons.
breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · July 19, 2022
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III meets with Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Nov. 18, 2021. (Photo courtesy of the Defense Department/Lisa Ferdinando)
WASHINGTON: Ukraine’s defense minister today dismissed concerns that weaponry sent to Ukraine by the United States and other nations could be diverted into the dark world of illegal arms trafficking, calling the worry “artificially engineered.”
“Since day one, we have worked in close cooperation with our partners to ensure full transparency. Additionally, approximately three months ago I addressed [the] states providing us with the weapons… and offered they send their monitoring missions to Ukraine,” Oleksii Reznikov said during a virtual event hosted by the Atlantic Council. “And several countries have done so.”
The defense minister’s comments come as both NATO and European Union nations reportedly have begun pressing Kyiv for stricter controls and tight management of the billions of dollars in ammunition and weapons flowing from Western countries meant to fend off Russian invaders.
Back in the US, despite overwhelming support for Ukraine on Capitol Hill, concerns about oversight have cropped up among at least one firebrand Republican, Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., who made headlines in May by holding up new spending on the grounds that a special inspector general should be established. The US to date has committed approximately $7.6 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the Biden administration took office, according to the Pentagon.
Reznikov said to date Ukraine has been receptive to other countries’ suggestions on ways to maintain transparency. The defense minister also said he has discussed the issue with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
A senior US military official recently told reporters that the Pentagon has not seen any signs of smuggling or that any of the weapons the US has sent are being used by anyone other than the Ukrainian military, though the official admitted the US wasn’t meticulously following the arms.
“We are not tracking weapons,” the official said late last week. “And quite honestly, I mean, we feel pretty good that the Ukrainians are using the weapons that we’ve provided to them and have not seen any indications that those weapons have gone anywhere else other than to fight against the Russians.”
If NATO and European Union countries do implement more stringent controls to monitor the weapons flow, they’ll be facing an uphill climb.
“It’s just impossible to keep track of not only where they’re all going and who is using them, but how they are being used,” Rachel Stohl, an arms-control expert and vice president at the Stimson Center, told the Washington Post in May.
During today’s event, Reznikov said that Ukraine has ample reason to be transparent: the country’s survival depends on it.
“Ukraine is invested in ensuring control and transparency. This is in our best interest because we need to survive,” he said.
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The bill, which boosts defense spending by $45 billion over the president’s request, now heads to the Senate floor.
breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · July 19, 2022
3. Sabotage and War in Cyberspace
Excerpts:
Cyberspace was supposed to elevate the role of sabotage in war. Indeed, the existence of interlinked communications networks suggested opportunities for crippling information attacks, an irresistible prospect for leaders seeking quick and decisive victory. Sabotage, long a sideshow in conventional wars, might under these conditions take center stage. This has not occurred in Ukraine, however, where the war has descended into a contest of attrition and will. But this doesn’t mean that Russia has been inactive in cyberspace during the war. Quite the opposite: It has been quite aggressive in terms of espionage and propaganda, both in Ukraine and abroad.
These activities have a long history. Military forces have employed spies for millennia, seeking information on the size and disposition of their enemies, along with foreknowledge of enemy intentions. Access to secrets can enable battlefield victories, at least in theory, because they allow commanders to array their defenses against likely attacks and because they reveal opportunities to go on the offensive. Scholars have long debated the value of intelligence in war relative to material capabilities. This debate is somewhat misleading, however, because information improves the efficiency of military force rather than replacing it. The question is not whether intelligence is decisive but how it aids the use of force.
Cyberspace espionage for military purposes is particularly appealing. Highly interconnected communications networks provide more entry points for collection, and concentrated data depositories mean that successful intrusions can release extraordinary amounts of information. The scale in cyberspace is much larger, as Michael Warner notes. Successful espionage offers more than dribs and drabs about the enemy — it has the potential to offer a fine-grained view of enemy capabilities and intentions. All of this increases the risk of overloading military bureaucracies with more data than they can bear. Defense officials can reduce collection to alleviate the burden, or they can search for better information-processing technologies. If they choose the former, what kinds of collection are they willing to abandon? If they choose the latter, what sort of technologies do they have in mind? And how does their decision improve the use of secret intelligence for conventional military operations?
These questions are not terribly exciting, at least not compared to spectacular acts of sabotage. But we might learn something about the practical use of cyberspace operations by asking them. Russia’s experience in Ukraine offers a cautionary tale about expecting too much from cyber attacks, but it may yet reveal lessons about intelligence and war.
Sabotage and War in Cyberspace - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Joshua Rovner · July 19, 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a terrible throwback to attrition warfare. Having failed in their opening salvo against Kyiv, Russian forces have settled into a grinding campaign in other parts of the country, using artillery bombardments in advance of slowly moving infantry. There is nothing elegant about their approach. After years of speculation about hybrid warfare and grey-zone tactics, Russia has reverted to form. Its offensive cyberspace operations have been particularly marginal to its conventional military effort. Open sources suggest that Russia has rarely used destructive malware since the February invasion. Over the same period it fired millions of bullets, artillery shells, and rockets, with devastating effect. As Michael Kofman put it, “This is a heavy metal war.”
This has surprised many observers, who thought the war would follow a different path. I was one of them. I suspected that Russia would open the war with a burst of cyberspace operations designed to hobble Ukrainian communications and make it impossible for Kyiv to organize a coherent defense. It’s easy to see the allure of such a concept, though I doubted it would succeed because the technical demands are quite high. Nonetheless, Russian military doctrine stresses the importance of information dominance, and analysts have spent years sounding the alarm about the potential for large-scale digital disruption in the event of war. Instead, most Russian efforts appear to be related to espionage and propaganda, with only a smattering of sabotage.
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Microsoft has issued two reports on Russian operations. Its data suggests that most Russian activities are about stealing information and influencing the public debate, not incapacitating information systems or causing physical harm. Russia may unleash such operations later, the authors warn, but so far, they have been largely absent. Indeed, it is telling that Microsoft devotes the lion’s share of its June report to Russian propaganda, detailing the ways in which Russian agencies pre-positioned fake stories before the war to make them seem more credible later. Such public methods are easier to track, to be sure, which explains part of why they receive so much attention. But if disruptive operations were so important to Russian cyberspace activities, we should at least see their residue.
The June report also suggests a correlation between cyberspace operations and conventional campaigns, highlighting a half-dozen instances in which malware moved on a target in advance of military forces. Yet the link is tenuous in some cases, and in others it appears that Russian cyberspace efforts were simply aimed at gathering information. Efforts to use malware to disable Ukrainian communications, or to cause harm to Ukraine’s foreign supporters, have been infrequent and largely inconsequential. There is little evidence in open sources that Russian cyberspace operations have had a meaningful effect on Ukraine’s combat performance. Nor have they had much effect on the international response. Cyberspace operations, in short, have not played a key role in this war.
Why not? Observers have offered a host of plausible explanations. Aid from the United States and the private sector may have provided a critical bulwark against digital aggression, as Microsoft suggests. Or perhaps Ukraine’s defenders were better than expected. Maybe Russia restrained its activities because it feared destroying the networks it would need after occupying the country. Maybe Russia withheld damaging operations against the West because it wants to use the threat of cyberspace attacks to coerce Ukraine’s supporters. Russian cyber activities might have been ineffective because they are too reliant on hackers whose activities the Russian state cannot fully control. Going on the offensive in cyberspace is harder than we thought for these reasons. Defenders have key advantages in a conflict, not least their ability to move information into the cloud and otherwise make their communications redundant.
There may be truth in these claims — it is too soon to tell. But there is a simpler explanation. Because cyberspace is an information domain, cyberspace operations are about gaining information advantages. Intelligence agencies scour the domain in search of details that may be useful to strategists, diplomats, and military leaders. They want to know about the strength and disposition of enemy forces, as well as the capabilities and intentions of third parties. In this sense, Russian cyberspace activities are no different from intelligence gathering in past conflicts. Espionage — collecting and interpreting secret information to give political and military leaders decision advantage — is key. Sabotage remains secondary.
The Logic of Wartime Sabotage
“Everything in war is very simple,” Clausewitz tells us, “but the simplest thing is difficult.” The reason is friction: the routine bureaucratic hiccups that affect organizational performance. Armies are large, armed bureaucracies, subject to the same day-to-day annoyances as any other: broken machines, sick soldiers, paperwork errors, flat tires, and so on. Military leaders strive to coordinate the efforts of many individual warfighters, but normal friction gets in the way. In peacetime this is frustrating but tolerable. During a conflict it becomes much worse, as everyday glitches are amplified under the confusion and stress of organized violence.
Wartime saboteurs seek to weaponize friction. Their actions are often covert, meaning that the victim does not realize that “normal” malfunctions are actually by design. In some cases, this can include introducing faults during the design and production process of wartime materials. Sabotage may also include quietly disabling communication technologies, making it difficult for enemies to follow events and organize their response. The heart of sabotage is forcing dysfunction into adversary capabilities and organizations. Sabotage is not about winning a fair fight. It is about making the fight unfair.
In some cases, sabotage can include more subtle methods of eroding adversary efficiency and morale. The World War II Office of Strategic Services, for example, encouraged civilians behind enemy lines to engage in a kind of inconspicuous sabotage. They did not ask civilians to take extraordinary risks to demolish factories. Instead, they called for an accumulation of inconveniences that would increase friction within them. Laborers could do this by “starting arguments” and “acting stupidly.” Administrators could go further. The office offered memorable guidance on how to do so:
Make “speeches.” Talk as frequently as possible and at great length. Illustrate your “points” by long anecdotes and accounts of personal experiences. … When possible, refer all matters to committees, for “further study and consideration.” Attempt to make the committees as large as possible — never less than five … Bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible. Haggle over precise wordings of communications, minutes, resolutions. … Refer back to matters decided upon at the last meeting and attempt to re-open the question of the advisability of that decision.
Whether this activity had measurable effects on the war’s outcome is difficult to answer, given the enormous scope and complexity of the conflict. Some sabotage operations clearly succeeded on their own terms, though their impact on the war itself was marginal. Because the strategic logic of sabotage is based on the cumulative effect of many small actions over time, it is inherently hard to assess its impact. Recent work on sabotage makes the similar argument that it is tactically useful but strategically indecisive. Technological changes, however, have raised the prospect of more dramatic results.
Sabotage in Cyberspace
Cyberspace, we are told, is a playground for saboteurs. The domain is gigantically complex, making it easy for attackers to lie in wait. It is also interconnected, making it possible for attackers to operate from afar at little risk. Saboteurs have a lot of options when they choose to go on the offensive, ranging from simple tactics like website defacement and denial-of-service attacks, to more ambitious operations to disable physical systems. Their choices have increased over the last two decades, as modern militaries have increased their use of information networks to coordinate their actions. Digital dependence allows them to work more efficiently, knitting together disparate forces and providing a mechanism for sharing intelligence in real time, but it also makes them more vulnerable to cyberspace sabotage.
Defense against cyberspace sabotage is difficult for many reasons, not least the sheer number of networks and machines needing protection. Overlapping links between military organizations, defense firms, and other contractors also create possible security risks. The huge amount of software code that underwrites military hardware inevitably contains flaws, some of which are unknown to defenders until they are exploited. Human error compounds these problems. Lapses in operational security and cyber hygiene make it difficult for military and defense organizations to guard against opportunistic saboteurs.
Observers have long believed that cyberspace is ripe for offensive action, implying that sabotage will have outsize effects in future wars. The main advantages seem to lie with the attacker, and recent books have stressed the new dangers of cyber attacks. David Sanger of the New York Times calls cyberspace operations “the perfect weapon,” cheap and easy tools for debilitating the infrastructure on which we all depend. Publishing before the war in Ukraine, Sanger echoed the common belief that future wars would star with a cyber barrage. Nicole Perloth, also of the Times, warns that such attacks are potentially cataclysmic. Her recent book, which pays close attention to the Russian threat, is called This is How They Tell Me The World Ends.
Yet cyber security researchers have repeatedly taken aim at this assumption. Low-impact sabotage (e.g., denial-of-service attacks) may be relatively easy to achieve, but more ambitious operations are not. These depend on exquisite intelligence, along with specially tailored malware that takes advantage of specific vulnerabilities. Access to target networks is often tenuous, meaning that even well-planned operations may never get off the ground. Saboteurs risk exposure as their objectives grow, meaning that defenders are more likely to spot planning for substantial attacks and take actions to defend themselves. Successful operations thus require a combination of time, money, skill, organization, and luck.
States in conflict are likely to take extra steps to defend themselves against cyberspace operations, making wartime sabotage especially difficult. They can build redundant communications to ensure their reliability and harden existing networks. They can move data onto the cloud and away from domestic servers, which are vulnerable to physical destruction. And they can call on foreign allies and private firms for technical support. (Microsoft stresses this point in its latest report on the war in Ukraine.) The normal barriers to public-private cooperation prove less daunting when civilians are in real danger. For all these reasons, wartime cyberspace operations may prove to be relatively inconsequential, just as sabotage was of marginal effect in past conflicts. Perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised that most Russian cyberspace activities have served other purposes.
Back to Basics
Cyberspace was supposed to elevate the role of sabotage in war. Indeed, the existence of interlinked communications networks suggested opportunities for crippling information attacks, an irresistible prospect for leaders seeking quick and decisive victory. Sabotage, long a sideshow in conventional wars, might under these conditions take center stage. This has not occurred in Ukraine, however, where the war has descended into a contest of attrition and will. But this doesn’t mean that Russia has been inactive in cyberspace during the war. Quite the opposite: It has been quite aggressive in terms of espionage and propaganda, both in Ukraine and abroad.
These activities have a long history. Military forces have employed spies for millennia, seeking information on the size and disposition of their enemies, along with foreknowledge of enemy intentions. Access to secrets can enable battlefield victories, at least in theory, because they allow commanders to array their defenses against likely attacks and because they reveal opportunities to go on the offensive. Scholars have long debated the value of intelligence in war relative to material capabilities. This debate is somewhat misleading, however, because information improves the efficiency of military force rather than replacing it. The question is not whether intelligence is decisive but how it aids the use of force.
Cyberspace espionage for military purposes is particularly appealing. Highly interconnected communications networks provide more entry points for collection, and concentrated data depositories mean that successful intrusions can release extraordinary amounts of information. The scale in cyberspace is much larger, as Michael Warner notes. Successful espionage offers more than dribs and drabs about the enemy — it has the potential to offer a fine-grained view of enemy capabilities and intentions. All of this increases the risk of overloading military bureaucracies with more data than they can bear. Defense officials can reduce collection to alleviate the burden, or they can search for better information-processing technologies. If they choose the former, what kinds of collection are they willing to abandon? If they choose the latter, what sort of technologies do they have in mind? And how does their decision improve the use of secret intelligence for conventional military operations?
These questions are not terribly exciting, at least not compared to spectacular acts of sabotage. But we might learn something about the practical use of cyberspace operations by asking them. Russia’s experience in Ukraine offers a cautionary tale about expecting too much from cyber attacks, but it may yet reveal lessons about intelligence and war.
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Joshua Rovner is an associate professor in the School of International Service at American University.
Special Series, The Brush Pass
warontherocks.com · by Joshua Rovner · July 19, 2022
4. The West Worries Too Much About Escalation in Ukraine
Yes we do. We should not be self deterring. We should be doing what is necessary to ensure Ukraine can successfully defend itself and defeat Putin in Putin's War.
Excerpts:
Certainly, this policy comes with costs and challenges. Serious obstacles to interoperability could emerge involving languages, communications equipment, ammunition, and spare parts. Yet Ukraine faces some of those difficulties already as it exhausts the old Soviet equipment it is using and transitions to NATO-provided weapons. Because Ukraine needs trained soldiers more than brand new recruits, NATO states must make it easier for soldiers to temporarily resign to fight for Ukraine. They must ensure that medical care and other benefits will be ready for these soldiers—and that volunteers can smoothly rejoin when they return. Their prospects for promotion should reflect their hard-won combat experience. The hardest part of this policy will be accepting casualties among the volunteers without retaliating. This is why they must truly be volunteers, unlike the soldiers Russia ordered into Crimea and the Donbas as “green men” in 2014. Not all NATO members will embrace these obligations, but with U.S. participation, some would be enough.
To mitigate risks, NATO should start small by focusing on expertise more than numbers. Russia will be loath to start an unwinnable war with NATO over a few hundred more volunteers fighting for Ukraine—even if organized more purposefully by NATO governments. Tacitly tolerating their deployment will make it harder for Russia to deter the next hundreds, which gradually become the next thousands.
Ever since proposals for a no-fly zone failed, the desire to do more for Ukraine has struggled to crystallize around a prudent and realistic plan. Foreign volunteers is the right policy to explore. Coupled with abandoning unnecessary limits on which arms NATO members send to Ukraine, this is how NATO can more effectively support Ukraine without starting World War III.
The West Worries Too Much About Escalation in Ukraine
NATO Can Do More Without Provoking Moscow
July 12, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Dan Altman · July 18, 2022
As the world looks on while Ukrainians fight for their lives and their freedom, many feel a burning desire to do more to support them. The problem is not a lack of forces or resources—it is fear of provoking a wider, perhaps nuclear, war with Russia. That fear is why U.S. President Joe Biden and other NATO leaders have consistently made clear that they will not intervene directly in the conflict, instead limiting their help to weapons, money, intelligence, and sanctions. As devastating as events in Ukraine are today, a nuclear war with Russia could kill more people than Ukraine’s entire population of roughly 44 million.
NATO leaders understand that they must walk this fine line between aiding Ukraine and risking war with Russia, but they have no theory of how to do it. The German and French governments hem and haw about whether to provide Ukraine with tanks. When Poland proposed a plan to transfer MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Ukraine, the United States refused. U.S. Defense Department spokesperson John Kirby warned that it “raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance” and therefore was not “tenable.” Yet the United States was already shipping Javelin antitank missiles and Stinger surface-to-air missiles. Soon after, it began sending other weapons, including M777 howitzers and now HIMARS multiple-rocket launchers. What is the difference? Those weapons do more to strengthen Ukraine’s combat power than MiG-29s, so the theory cannot be that Russia reacts more strongly to policies that do more harm to its interests. Why, then, missiles and artillery but not planes? The answer is that there is no answer. It is simply arbitrary.
NATO needs a strategy predicated on a theory of what it can do to aid Ukraine without widening the war to a direct conflict between it and Russia. Lessons from past crises point to the principles that should guide such a strategy. History shows that NATO would recklessly risk war only by crossing two Russian redlines: openly firing on Russian forces or deploying organized combat units under NATO-member flags into Ukraine. As long as NATO stops short of unmistakably crossing those lines, it can do more to help Ukraine at an acceptable risk of war.
Arms transfers and sanctions are both wholly consistent with this approach, so it is tempting to conclude that NATO members are doing all they can. They are not. They should build on current policies by dispensing with arbitrary limits on the types of conventional weapons they are providing Ukraine and expanding sanctions. Moreover, there is a third way to support Ukraine besides arms and sanctions—one that NATO is neglecting. It is time for NATO to encourage, organize, and equip its soldiers to volunteer to fight for Ukraine.
WALKING THE LINE
NATO should pursue a strategy of going as far as possible in Ukraine without plainly crossing Russia’s redlines—meaning refusing to openly attack Russian forces or send combat units into the country. The United States prevailed in the gravest crises of the Cold War by using this approach.
The Cold War’s first major showdown—the Berlin blockade of 1948–49—evinced this strategy. Although easily able to overwhelm U.S., British, and French troops in what would become West Berlin—an enclave deep inside Soviet-occupied East Germany—Soviet leader Josef Stalin did not seize the territory. To do so would have meant attacking those troops and thus provoking war. Instead, he imposed a blockade that choked off food and coal for two million Berliners. When Soviet troops blocked the roads and railways, Western leaders declined to attack them to reopen supply corridors. They resorted to an airlift instead, betting that Stalin would not attack defenseless transport aircraft. In the end, the vaunted Berlin airlift succeeded.
More than a decade later, American leaders decided to impose a blockade in lieu of launching an open attack—this time, during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Angered by the Soviet Union’s attempt to sneak nuclear missiles into Cuba and Moscow’s lies about it, U.S. President John F. Kennedy was initially inclined to destroy the missiles with airstrikes. He and others around him, however, decided the risks were too great. Director of Central Intelligence John McCone deemed airstrikes too risky, writing in a memo that the “consequences of action by the United States will be the inevitable ‘spilling of blood’ of Soviet military personnel.” He went on: “This will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation against U.S. foreign military installations.” Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev recognized this, too. According to a transcript of his remarks at a Soviet Presidium meeting, he feared that a U.S. attack would spark a war: “The tragic thing—they can attack, and we will respond. This could escalate into a large-scale war.” Kennedy chose neither to attack nor to accept the missiles as a fait accompli. He instead blockaded Cuba. In history’s gravest nuclear crisis, neither leader ordered an attack.
It is time for NATO to encourage, organize, and equip its soldiers to volunteer to fight for Ukraine.
One attack did occur, however, when Soviet generals on the ground in Cuba decided to launch surface-to-air missiles to shoot down an American U-2 spy plane that had entered Cuban airspace. The attack killed U.S. Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., the pilot. Khrushchev’s fears of war peaked at that moment, and Moscow chastised the generals who carried out the attack. Before retaliating, Kennedy gave diplomacy one last chance. Shared fears about the implications of that shootdown led both sides to make concessions that helped resolve the crisis. In the end, the United States prevailed by taking risks without attacking.
The United States and the Soviet Union also engaged in proxy wars to avoid attacking each other directly and starting World War III. Both countries used large-scale arms shipments and sometimes soldiers fighting as volunteers to support local forces. Designed to avoid escalation, such covert wars are a common tactic in international politics. During the Korean War, Soviet pilots secretly fought in the Chinese air force. Soviet arms equipped North Vietnam, and Soviet soldiers even operated surface-to-air missile batteries against U.S. aircraft. Despite its losses, the United States decided to tolerate this Soviet participation rather than widen either war. The Soviets also allowed similar behavior from the United States on other battlefields. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, for example, the United States armed and financed the mujahideen resistance. The Soviet Union eventually withdrew. As recently as 2018, Russian Wagner Group mercenaries in Syria unsuccessfully attacked U.S. forces operating alongside Kurdish forces. The United States did not treat it as an attack by the Russian government.
HOW FAR CAN NATO GO?
These examples underscore that pushing as far as possible without openly attacking is often the best way to compete while managing escalation risks. Creative policymaking can engineer options that achieve objectives without crossing redlines, thus preventing a wider war. Providing intelligence that Ukrainian forces use to kill Russian soldiers is not the same as NATO openly attacking Russia, nor is support in cyberspace. Lithuania’s restrictions on Russia’s use of its territory to ship goods to Kaliningrad meet this standard. Even enlarging NATO to include Finland and Sweden and deploying forces eastward to defend NATO members bordering Russia entail acceptable risks; such actions do not constitute an attack on Russia. In fact, there is good reason to think that NATO can do even more in Ukraine without provoking a wider war.
Some believe that Russia’s nuclear weapons and greater interests in Ukraine give it the advantage over NATO. This is mistaken. It is true that NATO leaders prioritize avoiding war with Russia over aiding Ukraine, but it is just as true that war with NATO would cost Russia far more than would abiding most forms of aid to Ukraine. After all, Russia is already struggling mightily against Ukraine. It cannot simultaneously win a conventional war with NATO. And no one would win a nuclear war.
Interests alone do not determine who has the advantage when both sides wish to avoid war. Instead, the advantage goes to the side that puts the other in the difficult position of choosing whether to escalate or accept a limited defeat. The side that must start the war is in the more difficult position. Russia has tolerated NATO’s sanctions and arming Ukraine for precisely that reason.
To be sure, it would be wrong to conclude that NATO can get away with anything. Most important, Russia will not accept NATO openly attacking Russian forces. If NATO can shoot down a Russian aircraft with impunity—for instance, to enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine—where would it end for Russia? Why would NATO not keep attacking? How could Russia credibly threaten to retaliate for the second plane after not doing so for the first? What about the third? The tenth? What, then, would stop NATO from bombing Russian forces in Ukraine? Russia cannot allow the precedent of consequence-free attacks on Russian forces.
Borders are Russia’s other vital redline. NATO forces openly operating in Russia are plainly unacceptable, and NATO should also rule out deploying organized combat units in Ukraine. Sending units to Ukraine to fight Russian forces risks war. NATO troops in Ukraine for purposes other than combat—such as deterring Russia from advancing into certain areas—would do less to strengthen Ukraine on the frontlines. And their presence would risk Russian attacks against them, intentional or unintentional.
CALL TO ARMS
Within these limits, there are three primary ways to aid Ukraine. The first is arms, and on that, NATO can do more. The current limits on NATO arms to Ukraine are not grounded in any theory or strategy. NATO can provide Ukraine with modern tanks, fighter aircraft, advanced surface-to-air missiles, and more at acceptable risk. The second is sanctions, and NATO can do more there, too—starting with further curtailing European imports of Russian natural gas.
The third way is by supplying foreign volunteers—a strategy NATO has largely neglected. Although some volunteers are already there fighting as individuals or in Ukraine’s International Legion, NATO members should encourage, equip, and fund their soldiers and veterans who are willing to fight for Ukraine. To limit the risk of war with Russia, these soldiers would fight wearing Ukrainian uniforms under the Ukrainian chain of command.
States recruit foreign soldiers to gain expertise and to forestall military defeat. In Ukraine’s case, if used adeptly, foreign volunteers could help Ukraine bolster its proficiency with combat skills that take years of training and expertise to master, and use advanced weapons more quickly and effectively. This is essential as Ukraine exhausts its Soviet-era stocks and transitions to more advanced NATO weapons. In the longer run, numbers also matter. If Ukraine turns the tide against Russia, Moscow may react by fully mobilizing for war, banking on its larger population to ultimately overwhelm Ukraine in a war of attrition. A growing stream of foreign volunteers would upend Russia’s calculation that it could win a long war. NATO has already removed the upper limits on the quantities of weapons Ukraine can bring to bear. It is time to do the same for the troops on the ground.
The benefits of organizing volunteers exceed the risks. Data on more than 230 cases of states recruiting foreign soldiers—often amid ongoing war—supports this conclusion. According to Elizabeth Grasmeder, who collected and analyzed this data, not once did recruiting foreign volunteers provoke the state fighting against those soldiers to go to war with the state supplying them. Only a few cases led to limited attacks to discourage the recruitment.
Russia cannot allow the precedent of consequence-free attacks on Russian forces.
Certainly, this policy comes with costs and challenges. Serious obstacles to interoperability could emerge involving languages, communications equipment, ammunition, and spare parts. Yet Ukraine faces some of those difficulties already as it exhausts the old Soviet equipment it is using and transitions to NATO-provided weapons. Because Ukraine needs trained soldiers more than brand new recruits, NATO states must make it easier for soldiers to temporarily resign to fight for Ukraine. They must ensure that medical care and other benefits will be ready for these soldiers—and that volunteers can smoothly rejoin when they return. Their prospects for promotion should reflect their hard-won combat experience. The hardest part of this policy will be accepting casualties among the volunteers without retaliating. This is why they must truly be volunteers, unlike the soldiers Russia ordered into Crimea and the Donbas as “green men” in 2014. Not all NATO members will embrace these obligations, but with U.S. participation, some would be enough.
To mitigate risks, NATO should start small by focusing on expertise more than numbers. Russia will be loath to start an unwinnable war with NATO over a few hundred more volunteers fighting for Ukraine—even if organized more purposefully by NATO governments. Tacitly tolerating their deployment will make it harder for Russia to deter the next hundreds, which gradually become the next thousands.
Ever since proposals for a no-fly zone failed, the desire to do more for Ukraine has struggled to crystallize around a prudent and realistic plan. Foreign volunteers is the right policy to explore. Coupled with abandoning unnecessary limits on which arms NATO members send to Ukraine, this is how NATO can more effectively support Ukraine without starting World War III.
- DAN ALTMAN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University.
Foreign Affairs · by Dan Altman · July 18, 2022
5. The Quad needs a futures focus
There is one primary question that all four conturneis need to ask and answer for their citizens: How does (and how will) the Quad support my nation's national security and national prosperity?
The Quad needs a futures focus
A better – and public – understanding is needed
of the cascading effects of regional challenges.
lowyinstitute.org · by Abhijnan Rej
If there is a cumulative lesson from the past few years, it’s that the era of “polycrises” is firmly upon us. A polycrisis is defined as the net effect from the non-linear interaction of many systemic risks spanning several natural and human-designed systems. One is playing out right in front of our eyes, whereby the economic effects of Covid-19 have amplified – and in turn, have been amplified by – those flowing from Vladimir Putin’s naked aggression, seriously rattling global commodities markets. Coupled with the worsening effects of climate change, the two shocks, cutting across systems, could lead to a dramatic upsurge in global hunger, United Nations agencies warned last month. That, in turn, could potentially trigger serious social unrest across the world, analysts fear.
The salient point here is that public health experts have long warned of the growing risk of pandemics, international affairs analysts about Putin’s geostrategic ambitions, and climate experts about the worrying links between climate change and food insecurity. None of the events that have so far transpired individually should therefore come as a total surprise. What has been surprising is the inability of experts to see how all of the above could interact in the future to produce the effects we are witnessing.
The present polycrisis makes it an imperative for governments to focus on scenarios that could play out in the near and not-so-near future, arising out of the interacting effects of current trends and how and if those trends are likely to hold in the future. Such exercises are aids not only to governmental and non-governmental planning but could also help shape inter-governmental cooperation agendas, the latter especially so given that polycrises often tend to have transnational impact and system-wide spill-over effects.
Transparency from the Quad futures group, in conjunction with actively soliciting inputs from non-Quad countries, will reassure the Indo-Pacific region at large that its activities contribute to broader regional public good.
This is where the Quad – with its committed goal of providing public goods in the Indo-Pacific – is a natural hub for long-term futures exploration. The region stands to be particularly affected by interacting stresses and wildcards because of its emergence as the global economic and technological centre of gravity, economic, social, and political diversity, not to mention vulnerability to climate change and geopolitical pressures. Witness, as an example, the ongoing crisis in Sri Lanka where corruption, poor governance and fiscal imprudence coupled with external shocks from the pandemic as well as the war in Ukraine have led to economic implosion with potentially serious ramifications for regional security.
A joint working group dedicated towards exploring possible futures can also inform the many Quad lines of effort announced since last year, from emerging tech, cyber, and space to global health, climate, and maritime domain awareness. To be clear, the goal would not be prediction of the future but critical and rigorous projection of the past and present. As experts claim, this is best done through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods.
Exploring the future: Sanaxai district, Attapeu province, Laos (Mongkon Duangkhiew/ILO Asia Pacific)
While it is true that governments routinely carry out classified exercises around how the future could play out – and in the case of the United States, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) periodically releases public Global Trends reports – a multilateral futures analysis will be more representative of regional perceptions of future transnational challenges.
Ideally, a Quad futures working group is best comprised of senior officials across government departments, aided by a broader multidisciplinary specialist pool. However, if such a group was to have an explicit focus on security issues, it could consist of officials from Australia’s Office of National Intelligence, India’s National Security Council Secretariat, Japan’s National Security Secretariat, and the US NIC, aided by non-governmental security experts. Given that the four mentioned government institutions are mandated with taking a broad all-source, and often long-term, view of national security, drawing on them for a Quad security futures working group is a logical fit.
That said, such a group should take a leaf out of the American playbook and publicly release its findings. Transparency from the Quad futures group, in conjunction with actively soliciting inputs from non-Quad countries, will reassure the Indo-Pacific region at large that its activities contribute to broader regional public good. (As part of the research for the NIC Global Trends Report, for instance, US officials travel across the world and solicit input from major non-governmental organisations.)
If an official Quad futures group is seen as excessive, a “Track 2” approach could be a good starting point. After all, much of the ambitious recent intra-Quad cooperation agenda has been driven by non-governmental organisations.
In terms of the initial focal target of such a working group, exploring the humanitarian fallout of future polycrises involving climate change and extreme weather events is an obvious benefit and could even inform planning of joint military exercises, such as the Malabar. Another focus area could be the future intersection of tech and security trends, including how spatial computing technologies could aid in meeting challenges that may emerge from the aggregate effect of rapid urbanisation and climate risks in the Indo-Pacific.
It is regularly said that the Indo-Pacific (and not Europe, for example) is where battles will play out in the years ahead. If so, the time for a Quad futures initiative that looks at the contours of those battles to come has indeed arrived.
lowyinstitute.org · by Abhijnan Rej
6. Russia’s War Has Created Opportunities for Biden to Go Big
Conclusion:
Times of heightened geostrategic risk help clarify political imperatives. China and Russia, powerful, aggressive, and expansionist dictatorships, are on the march. And terrorists also remain undaunted in seeking to kill Americans. As nations around the world make big changes to their security and economic posture to respond to geostrategic threats, the Biden administration should consider its own bold policy changes.
Russia’s War Has Created Opportunities for Biden to Go Big
As nations around the world make big changes to their security and economic posture to respond to geostrategic threats, the Biden administration should consider its own bold policy changes.
The National Interest · by Dan Negrea · July 18, 2022
Europe’s largest country, Russia, has invaded its smaller neighbor Ukraine in what has become the biggest war in Europe in seventy-five years. Asia’s largest country, China, is tacitly supporting Russian president Vladimir Putin’s war and is increasingly aggressive itself: China has increased its military pressure on Taiwan, absorbed Hong Kong in violation of the 1984 Sino-British treaty, militarized the South China Sea, provoked several confrontations with the navies of neighboring countries, and killed twenty Indian soldiers in a 2019 land border clash.
In response to this much more dangerous geopolitical reality of a world beset by two powerful and aggressive dictatorships, countries around the world are making political U-turns to increase their security. The Biden administration should consider its own bold political moves to strengthen America’s security.
Germany
During Angela Merkel’s sixteen years as chancellor and before, Germany’s Russia policy was dominated by the concept of Wandel durch Handel—change through trade. This idea held that economic interdependence would cause dictatorial Russia to soften its oppression at home and aggressive actions abroad. This doctrine—which also applied to Germany’s China policy—had the added benefit of being good for German business. Simultaneously, perceiving a diminished Russian threat after the end of the Cold War, Germany reduced its defense spending to close to 1 percent of GDP. The number of Bundeswehr tanks, for example, dropped from 5,000 at the end of the Cold War to 266 in 2022.
But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked a Zeitenwende—a major turning point in history. Putin’s war forced Germans to confront the reality that just two hours by plane from Berlin a European country is fighting desperately for its sovereign existence against an invading army that murders civilians and flattens cities.
With broad support from the German people, the governing coalition of Social-Democrats, Greens, and Free-Democrats reacted quickly and with dramatic changes. Key German politicians now concede that Germany must assume a leadership role in Europe, including in military affairs. Germany announced plans to almost double military spending and to send weapons to Ukraine—a massive change from Merkel’s fruitless attempts at dialogue to end the 2014 Russia-instigated crisis in Ukraine.
On the energy front, with the support of the environmentalist Green party, Germany has taken steps to significantly reduce its dependence on Russian energy—an estimated 50 percent at the end of 2021. Germany is postponing its clean energy plans and will use fossil fuels like liquefied natural gas and coal from non-Russian sources. Even nuclear energy is being proposed in “no taboos deliberations“ on German energy policy.
NATO
Just three years after President Emmanuel Macron declared NATO “brain dead,” Putin’s war energized an alliance many thought was drifting into irrelevance. American presidents from Dwight Eisenhower to Donald Trump have complained that NATO countries have not spent enough for their own defense. In 2014, just three of the twenty-eight NATO countries met the target of spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Today, that number is nine, and the others have clear plans to reach that threshold by 2024. At the recent NATO summit in Madrid, several member countries even talked about increasing their spending to 2.5 percent and 3 percent of GDP.
The number of members in the alliance is growing, too. Citizens in neutral Sweden and Finland are newly in favor of joining NATO and their leaders have applied for membership. These countries will only strengthen NATO: Finland is already above the 2 percent defense spending threshold and Sweden plans to get there by 2028. And in another major change welcomed by America, NATO’s new Strategic Concept reflected a new consensus that China is a strategic threat that the alliance must also address.
Japan
Japan’s American-drafted constitution after World War II committed the country to pacifism and only allowed its armed forces to act in self-defense. But rising military threats in recent decades from China, Russia, and North Korea have moved its public opinion and political class toward greater military preparedness and flexibility. Legislation passed by the Diet in 2015 reinterpreted the constitution to allow Japan’s military to act overseas in “collective self-defense” with allies.
Putin’s war, Xi Jinping’s tacit support for it, and growing Chinese pressure on Taiwan have pushed Japan to move even further. At the end of April, with broad public support, Japan’s government announced its decision to double Japan’s defense budget to 2 percent of its GDP, or $106 billion, making it the third-largest military budget in the world.
The United States
The Biden administration got several things right after the Russian invasion. It has provided critically important military, economic, and diplomatic support to Ukraine. It has led NATO’s strong support of Ukraine and coordinated a global economic sanctions campaign against Russia. And it has been firm in warning China not to break international sanctions against Russia or offer it military support.
These policies are in the bipartisan tradition of American foreign policy and consistent with positions that President Joe Biden espoused during his campaign and since.
But the Biden administration can go further. Like other governments around the world, it could use this profound crisis to consider bold changes in direction to increase America’s security.
The Biden Doctrine
The administration may want to revisit the Biden Doctrine which holds that the defining issue of our time is the struggle between democracy and autocracy. The doctrine was unpersuasive before the Ukraine crisis and even more so after it. America’s gravest foreign policy threats do not come from autocracy in general but from China and Russia in particular. The problem with China and Russia is not that they are dictatorships but that they are powerful, aggressive, and expansionist dictatorships that threaten U.S. interests through their use of military and economic coercion, unfair business practices, and disturbance of the peace throughout the world.
The Biden administration has criticized several friends and allies for flaws in their democracy: Poland, Turkey, India, Thailand, and the Philippines among them. And several non-democracies for their human rights record: Vietnam and Saudi Arabia, for example.
But these countries and others like them are important strategically to the United States in its confrontation with China and Russia.
Instead of lobbing public criticism at strategically important partners, the United States could revive the Cold War concept of the Free World—defined in our time as all countries seeking to remain independent of Chinese and Russian control, whether democracies or not. This concept was embraced during the Cold War by presidents of both parties and should be used anew. America could continue to promote democracy but through quiet diplomacy.
Energy Security
The president was clear during his campaign that he plans to “transition” away from the fossil fuel industry and lead America into a clean energy future. His administration has been implementing this promise by canceling the Keystone XL Pipeline, restricting leasing on federal lands and off-shore drilling, imposing tougher regulations on methane emissions, eliminating some fossil fuel subsidies, proposing policies that make energy production more expensive, and introducing U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission-mandated climate-related financial disclosures.
These policies have contributed to the perception that the Biden administration discourages the growth of U.S. oil and gas production. This in turn contributed to gasoline prices climbing to their highest level ever and U.S. inflation to its highest level in forty years. American consumers are hurting, and the U.S. economy may fall into recession.
But there are also important national security and foreign policy considerations here. The Biden administration has tried to mitigate the problem with imports from Saudi Arabia and even from Venezuela. And it has approached Qatar to help supply LNG to a Europe anxious to reduce Russian gas imports.
These policies raise several puzzling questions. Since climate change is a global phenomenon, why is it better if oil and gas are produced in Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, or Qatar instead of America? Why increase business dealings with autocracies (in contradiction to the Biden Doctrine) when the United States could produce more hydrocarbons at home? Why not create opportunities for American energy workers instead of foreign workers?
The Biden administration may be inspired by the Greens in Germany, who since Putin’s invasion have undertaken an extraordinary short-term energy policy pivot without abandoning their long-term renewable energy aspirations. Closer to home, Larry Summers, who served as treasury secretary under former President Bill Clinton and director of the National Economic Council under former President Barack Obama, suggests an “all-in, more energy supply approach that emphasizes freeing up fossil fuels in various ways in the short run and making, with government support, the ultimate pivot to renewables.”
On how to get more oil and gas production, we could listen to fracking pioneer Harold Hamm. He recommends opening federal lands for energy development and supporting energy infrastructure, including pipelines, to increase our energy supply and ability to export to allies.
Importantly, any “all-of-the-above” U.S. energy plan should include increased nuclear capacity. America derives today about 20 percent of its total energy from nuclear. But several countries are at around 30 percent, including Sweden, Finland, and South Korea, while Belgium is at 50 percent and France at 70 percent.
Border Security
In a recent tweet, Biden said that we are in a “time of war and global peril.” It is then only prudent to ensure that adversaries cannot harm Americans at home—the 9/11 Commission was clear that border security is national security
As outlined recently by the Heritage Foundation, over the past eighteen months, the Department of Homeland Security has caught 756,000 aliens from 156 countries at the southern border and released them in the United States. Over the same period, 620,000 others “got away” into the United States.
Furthermore, Customs and Border Patrol reports that over the past eighteen months it has arrested forty-two subjects who were on the terror watchlist and attempted to enter the United States illegally. Based on the catch-and-release and got-away numbers above, it is reasonable to conclude that many others on the terror watchlist avoided arrest and succeeded in entering the United States.
The southwestern border is an obvious national security vulnerability that could be exploited by our adversaries, and it requires decisive policies to address it.
Times of heightened geostrategic risk help clarify political imperatives. China and Russia, powerful, aggressive, and expansionist dictatorships, are on the march. And terrorists also remain undaunted in seeking to kill Americans. As nations around the world make big changes to their security and economic posture to respond to geostrategic threats, the Biden administration should consider its own bold policy changes.
Dan Negrea is the Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. He served between 2018 and 2021 as the State Department’s Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs, and as a member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Office.
Image: Reuters.
The National Interest · by Dan Negrea · July 18, 2022
7. Senate Armed Services releases full $847 billion defense bill
Senate Armed Services releases full $847 billion defense bill - Breaking Defense
The bill, which boosts defense spending by $45 billion over the president's request, now heads to the Senate floor.
breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · July 18, 2022
The early morning sun strikes the U.S. Capitol November 6, 2006 in Washington, DC. Midterm elections take place November 7, potentially changing the balance of power in the nation’s capital. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images)
WASHINGTON: The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) today released the text of its annual defense policy bill, boosting the department’s procurement and research funds by billions over its budget request.
The SASC version of the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act would authorize a $45 billion increase in defense spending over the budget request, to a total of $847 billion, at a time when high inflation is eating into the Pentagon’s coffers, the US is contending with an increasingly aggressive China and the Pentagon is shipping weapons to Ukraine amid Russia’s invasion of the country.
In a statement, SASC chairman Sen. Jack Reed called the bill an “important step forward.”
“From China’s emergence as our most consequential strategic competitor to Russia’s assault on Ukraine, the challenges before us are momentous,” he said. “With broad, bipartisan support this year’s NDAA increases funding for our national defense, invests in the platforms and infrastructure our military needs, and delivers critical resources for our allies and partners around the globe.”
SASC’s version of the NDAA appears to closely follow a summary of the legislation released last month, and gives the Pentagon about $158 billion in procurement, up from $144.2 billion in the Pentagon’s ask. Congress increased funds for combat aircraft, Navy and Marine Corps vessels, armored vehicles, munitions, and short- and long-range fires, according to last month’s bill summary.
The bill authorizes $137.7 billion in research, development, test and evaluation funds, more than $7.5 billion over the budget request. That spending “supports” the Army’s modernization efforts on long-range fires, future vertical lift, next-generation combat vehicle, and air and missile defense.
The RDT&E account also authorizes spending increases for microelectronics and hypersonics. That includes approximately $300 million for the Pentagon’s glide-phase interceptor initiative, which the head of the Missile Defense Agency has said is still in the early stages of R&D. It also provides an additional $25 million for research into sea-launched cruise missiles — a potentially controversial provision considering the Biden administration’s opposition to the program.
The legislation also provides $800 million in funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Fund. On Friday, the US sent another $400 million of weapons to the embattled country, bringing total US security aid for the Ukrainians to $8 billion since the start of the Biden administration. In the committee’s bill report, it underscored the importance of boosting funding for the Ukrainians.
“The committee recognizes the dynamic nature of the security situation in Ukraine requires that the Department have a variety of authorities at its disposal to support Ukraine’s Armed Forces,” the committee wrote. “The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) is essential, both in the immediate fight against Russia aggression and as part of the longer-term effort to support the Ukrainian government’s efforts to rebuild and enhance the military capabilities needed to maintain their sovereignty and defend their territory.”
In the Pacific, the NDAA boosts authorized funding for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative by $1.1 billion “for unfunded requirements identified by the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.” Additionally, it authorizes $245 million for Joint All-Domain Command and Control, including a joint force headquarters in the Indo-Pacific, according to last month’s summary.
Sen. Jim Inhofe, who is retiring early next year and for whom the bill is named, said in a statement that he hopes “the Senate acts with a sense of urgency on the NDAA.”
“With the Chinese Communist Party accelerating the already historic modernization of its military, Russia continuing to destabilize security in Europe, and record-high inflation jeopardizing our buying power, Congress must do everything we can to give our military every advantage on the battlefield,” the ranking member said.
Late last week, the House of Representatives passed its version of the NDAA with a topline number of $839 billion. Once the Senate votes on its version, legislators will hash out their differences in conference committee.
breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · July 18, 2022
8. What If the War in Ukraine Spins Out of Control?
Excerpts:
There is no silver bullet for avoiding a wider war. Talks, negotiations, and diplomacy will not do the trick. Putin can be restrained only by the application of force, and the application of force is never without risks. The first step toward a good long-term policy is to recognize the novelty of this moment: a major war likely to last for years, festering at the heart of an international system drawing closer to anarchy. Educated to follow the rules of a liberal international order, allied policymakers and diplomats must now learn to navigate the absence of order.
The less apocalyptic the perspective of Washington and its allies, the better. The United States and Russia are not on the verge of World War III. Not every move is existential. The Russian military suffers under countless and increasing constraints, whereas the war in Ukraine will constantly turn up new, uncertain, disturbing, and frightening contingencies. The world will have to learn to live with it. The Cuban missile crisis lasted for 13 days. The crisis generated by the war in Ukraine will last for a long time to come.
What If the War in Ukraine Spins Out of Control?
How to Prepare for Unintended Escalation
July 19, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · July 19, 2022
The war in Ukraine will soon enter its sixth month. For all the talk of Russia crossing the West’s red lines with its conduct in the war and of the West crossing Russia’s red lines with its military assistance to Ukraine, the true red lines have not yet been breached. At the outset of the war, both sides hashed out a set of invisible rules—unspoken but nonetheless real. They include Russia’s acceptance of allied heavy-weapons deliveries and intelligence support for Ukraine, but not the use of Western troops. And they include Western states’ grudging acceptance of Russian conventional warfare within Ukraine’s borders (eager as these countries are to see Moscow defeated), as long as the conflict does not lead to the use of weapons of mass destruction. So far, these invisible rules have continued to function, proof that neither U.S. President Joe Biden nor Russian President Vladimir Putin wants a wider war.
Yet a wider war is certainly possible. After all, no international mechanism controls the conflict. The United Nations has been peripheral, and the European Union stands on one side. The United States is not in a position to end the war on its terms, and neither is Russia nor Ukraine. Talks between Kyiv and Moscow have broken down, and despite ongoing efforts at deconfliction, there has been no U.S.-Russian diplomacy to speak of since February 24, when the war began. Add to this the size and complexity of the conflict, the number of countries involved, and the new technologies in use, and the mixture becomes potentially toxic.
The shared desire of Putin and Biden to avoid a wider war is, therefore, no guarantee that the war will contain itself. A conflict can spin out of control even if neither side makes a deliberate decision to escalate or use nuclear weapons. And although unlikely, a nuclear attack is still in the realm of possibility, given Russian capacity and the opacity of Moscow’s actual nuclear doctrine. Accidental escalation may, in fact, be even more frightening than deliberate escalation, since the latter holds within it the possibility of deliberate deescalation. After all, a willed trajectory is easier to reverse than one that moves ahead of its own volition.
The Cold War may be a useful guide for what lies over the horizon. Given the length of that conflict and the fallibility of political and military leaders on both sides, it was remarkable that the U.S.-Soviet confrontation ended peacefully. But behind the bright miracle of humanity’s survival in a nuclear age are the dark corners of near-confrontation and episodic escalation that characterized the second half of the twentieth century. The war in Ukraine will likely follow this pattern—including phases in which the overall confrontation is well managed, followed by phases in which the conflict abruptly and anarchically intensifies. Policymakers and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic must prepare for this scenario even more diligently than they prepare for the prospect of intended escalation. The fog of war, made thicker by the speed and unreliability of social media, is real. It can obscure even the best-laid strategies.
RED LINES
Biden has been explicit about where he will not go in Ukraine. He will not intervene directly. He will not sanction NATO involvement in the conflict. He will not dictate to Ukraine war aims more maximalist (or minimalist) than those set in Kyiv. And although the United States is supplying immense amounts of equipment to Ukraine, Biden has emphasized the distinction between Ukraine’s self-defense, to which Washington is unequivocally committed, and Ukrainian strikes on Russia itself. Military support to Ukraine is calibrated along these lines. Biden wants Ukraine to win on its terms and on its territory. He clearly does not want this to become a regional war and has even used a New York Times op-ed to communicate these aims to Moscow.
A conflict can spin out of control even if neither side makes a deliberate decision to escalate.
Putin has been more ambiguous—promising “consequences” for allied military aid. Russian propaganda regularly advocates advances on Berlin or nuclear attacks on London. However overblown, such messaging creates a permissive consensus within the Kremlin and Russian society. In June, amid a dispute over the delivery of goods to Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave separate from mainland Russia, Putin threatened Lithuania with unspecified punitive measures. Lithuania is a NATO member, and a Russian attack would trigger a direct military conflict. Elsewhere, Putin could engineer or exploit crises in the Balkans to enhance Russia’s position—staging coups, engaging in paramilitary activity, or launching an outright invasion. Major cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in Europe and the United States constitute another risk. Should they occur, the United States and others would likely retaliate, beginning a new chapter in the war.
Some of Putin’s rhetorical ambiguity is bluster. He cannot afford a wider war. Although Russia probably has the money to continue its policy of regime change in Ukraine, the Russian army has huge manpower deficiencies—a function of Putin’s ruinous initial war plan. Any additional conflict, especially against well-equipped NATO forces, would worsen these problems. In theory, then, Putin and Biden can meet halfway. Of the same mind about not wanting a bigger conflagration, they have incentives to abide by the war’s invisible rules.
COLD WAR REDUX?
In their adherence to invisible rules, Putin and Biden have recaptured an important Cold War dynamic. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States and the Soviet Union never formally agreed on how to fight proxy wars. Neither side, for instance, established ground rules for the Korean War—the first hot conflict of the Cold War era. Instead, over nearly four decades, both sides improvised their way to a sustainable way of doing business. There was the permissible: mutual denunciation, cultural and ideological competition, espionage, active measures such as propaganda and disinformation campaigns, the pursuit of spheres of influence, interference in the domestic politics of other countries, and support for the other’s adversaries in peace and war (usually sweetened by degrees of plausible deniability). And there was the impermissible: direct military clashes and the use of nuclear weapons.
One can only guess at today’s invisible rules. For Western countries, the most important appears to be keeping their uniformed soldiers out of war. Departing from the etiquette of the Cold War, the United States has abandoned the plausible deniability it cultivated while supporting Afghanistan’s mujahideen in their fight against Soviet forces in the 1980s. In Ukraine, Washington and its allies have openly provided the Ukrainian military with heavy weapons, military training outside Ukraine, and intelligence sharing to identify targets. Russia, for its part, has not targeted weapons convoys headed into Ukraine while they are still on NATO territory. Nor has Russia disrupted the steady flow of U.S. and allied political leaders into Kyiv, all of whom must travel through a country at war. This kind of restraint would have been unthinkable in World War II but was typical of the Cold War.
WALK THE LINE
What could threaten the invisible rules that the United States and Russia have established? One possibility is sheer accident. The other is a cycle of events that “demands” escalation. To be sure, these possibilities can converge, and a single accident could be the pretext for an escalatory spiral—as occasionally occurred during the Cold War.
Consider the Cuban missile crisis. Too often celebrated as an instance of U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s cool, the 1962 showdown between Moscow and Washington over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba almost culminated in disaster. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev overreached; Cuban President Fidel Castro was overzealous; Kennedy lucked into a workable solution—trading the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey for the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The only mechanism that deescalated the crisis was Khrushchev and Kennedy’s ability to communicate and to find common ground, a modest mechanism indeed. Later, in 1983, in an atmosphere of high Cold War tension, the Soviet Union misread NATO’s “Able Archer” exercise—simulating a conflict escalation—as a real-life nuclear attack and came close to launching a disastrous retaliatory strike. Once again, the invisible rules of the Cold War came close to malfunctioning. Perhaps two such cataclysms averted is not bad for a 40-year conflict. Perhaps it is two too many.
The war in Ukraine is similarly prone to accident. Today, the concerns fall mostly on the Russian side. The war’s invisible rules may be fully apparent to Putin but less so to his commanding officers, many of whom are dealing with the frustration of battlefield setbacks, equipment problems, inadequate manpower, and a Ukrainian military that has fought with skill and resolve. Their adventurism could encourage an air or missile strike outside of Ukraine—for example, to halt the passage of weapons into Ukraine. That, of course, would be a Russian attack on a NATO member state, and not because the Kremlin directly made a risky choice. The risk, of course, is that Washington would interpret such an attack as Kremlin-directed escalation. Having based his entire war on prevarication, Putin might have no credible means of changing this interpretation and no ability or willingness to communicate a mistake. A Russian-NATO war would be imminent.
Studied patience and calm can keep the conflict in Ukraine from exploding out of control.
An instructive case study in interpretation and reaction comes from 2014. In July of that year, Russian-controlled separatists in eastern Ukraine downed a civilian aircraft, Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, with a Buk surface-to-air missile, resulting in 298 deaths—primarily Dutch citizens. Instead of communicating the mistake via its proxies or staying silent, Moscow engaged in absurd allegations and disinformation—putting forward dozens of contradictory explanations. This incident did not escalate beyond a war of words, as the conflict in Ukraine was still localized and limited in scale. The outraged Netherlands never contemplated military action. A comparable set of circumstances might have a different outcome today, however. Unlike in 2014, there would be immense pressure on NATO to do something, and many already-nervous countries would interpret the attack as a sign that Russia was expanding its war.
As this example underscores, Moscow’s propaganda adds to the confusion of war. Under the Kremlin’s influence, Russian media consistently characterizes the 2022 war as a conflict between Russia and the West, rhetorically walking up to the precipice of a wider war. When Lithuania threatened to block goods going to Kaliningrad, for instance, Russia’s official rhetoric was bellicose, almost as if Putin were issuing an ultimatum. Most likely, he was merely posturing for a Russian audience. Although both sides eventually defused the crisis, Russia’s attempt to keep the conflict on a slow boil through domestic propaganda is a trap in which the Kremlin may eventually catch itself.
Another kind of accident could take place on the Ukrainian side. While striking military targets in Russia, Ukraine’s military could miscalculate and hit a major civilian target inside Russia. This is obviously something that Moscow does without any qualms in Ukraine itself, where Russian missile attacks are killing civilians—including children and the elderly—every day. Still, the Kremlin could use a Ukrainian attack, especially with externally supplied weapons, as a pretext to retaliate against allied military supplies very close to or even on NATO territory. Putin would likely assume that Western states supported the Ukrainian attack, much as he assumed that the 2014 Maidan uprising that led to the ouster of Russian-backed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was a CIA plot. Deconfliction alone, absent high-level communication between Moscow and Washington, might not be enough to unwind a crisis.
Finally, an unintended escalatory cycle resembling the Cuban missile crisis could expand into a regional or world war. Despite its peaceful resolution, the 1962 crisis is a cautionary tale. Khrushchev failed to anticipate Kennedy’s strong reaction, in part because he did not expect Washington to discover the missiles before they were fully in place. He mistakenly thought that he could outflank Kennedy through secrecy, luck, and bluster. Putin may be less erratic than Khrushchev, but he has already demonstrated his inability to read Ukrainian politics, military capabilities, and morale. He could, out of hubris or out of rage, conclude that his only way forward is to up the ante, dramatically escalating the war as a way of pushing Western countries back on their heels and scaring them off once and for all. He might fail to anticipate the reaction this would provoke within the United States and its allies. If so, like Khrushchev, Putin would face an excruciating decision. Up the ante further or back down.
NO EASY ANSWERS
Despite these risks, studied patience and calm can keep the conflict in Ukraine from exploding out of control. Success in war validates decisive action and speed, but the complexity of war can also validate going slowly. In the event of an accident—a Russian act of war against a country outside of Ukraine, say, though not one ordered by Putin—it will be crucial for Washington and its allies to review the situation meticulously. Evidence may be hard to come by, but the U.S. response should be calibrated with level-headed logic, not necessarily the logic of tit for tat. Otherwise, it might prove impossible for either side to reverse an unnecessary escalatory cycle.
Western countries cannot deliver Putin from his temptations to enlarge the conflict. Only he can do that, and so far, the United States has acted with circumspection. Washington has established channels for military deconfliction that have served both sides well in Syria. Hopefully, they will continue to do so in Ukraine. The United States should remind itself and its allies again and again about the stakes of undesired escalation and the necessity of seeing Russian rhetorical provocations for what they are. The best response to trolling, something Putin loves to do, is ignore it. The same should be true for Putin’s nuclear threats. Verbal ugliness need not always be countered. It, too, can be strategically ignored.
There is no silver bullet for avoiding a wider war. Talks, negotiations, and diplomacy will not do the trick. Putin can be restrained only by the application of force, and the application of force is never without risks. The first step toward a good long-term policy is to recognize the novelty of this moment: a major war likely to last for years, festering at the heart of an international system drawing closer to anarchy. Educated to follow the rules of a liberal international order, allied policymakers and diplomats must now learn to navigate the absence of order.
The less apocalyptic the perspective of Washington and its allies, the better. The United States and Russia are not on the verge of World War III. Not every move is existential. The Russian military suffers under countless and increasing constraints, whereas the war in Ukraine will constantly turn up new, uncertain, disturbing, and frightening contingencies. The world will have to learn to live with it. The Cuban missile crisis lasted for 13 days. The crisis generated by the war in Ukraine will last for a long time to come.
- LIANA FIX is Program Director in the International Affairs Department of the Körber Foundation and was previously a Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
- MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2014 to 2016, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio.
Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · July 19, 2022
9. How the System Was Rigged: The Global Economic Order and the Myth of Sovereignty
Excerpts:
Martin’s prose is dense, and his blow-by-blow recounting of the events that took place over almost half a century is at times tedious, although impressive in its detail. Future economic historians will no doubt find the book useful for its list of sources: the endnotes consist of 66 pages of references in small type, which, at first guess, may include more than 1,000 books and articles. The problem with Martin’s detail, however, is that it often obscures the big picture. The major issues emerge periodically, but one wishes that the book were structured more around the key questions of ideology—for instance, the belief in the unconstrained free market and its counterpart, the insistence on the meaningful role of the state—and international law that shape the interactions of states.
The idea that all countries are sovereign underpins the international system. But that fundamental basis appears increasingly mythical given the ways countries surrender elements of their sovereignty. For one, weaker countries are not nearly as sovereign as more powerful ones; inequality in international relations places limits on the independence of less powerful countries. And second, countries voluntarily surrender sovereignty, however surreptitiously, because doing so benefits particular political or class factions in those societies. In other words, international organizations should not be judged against an unrealistic standard of upholding the national sovereignty of all their members, both because power is distributed unequally worldwide and because national sovereignty is divided locally among different groups with different interests. Any international economic order must rest on the precarious foundation of a world of unequal and split sovereignty.
How the System Was Rigged
The Global Economic Order and the Myth of Sovereignty
July/August 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Branko Milanovic · July 19, 2022
In 2010, Greece was mired in a major debt crisis. It had been hit hard by the global collapse of financial markets and had just seen its government bonds downgraded to junk status. Facing the distinct possibility of default, the country turned for help to international organizations: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission, and the European Central Bank. These organizations provided Greece with three enormous loans in 2010, 2012, and 2015. But the bailouts came with stiff conditions, forcing domestic political and economic reforms and imposing austerity measures that plunged an already reeling country into further turmoil. Successive Greek governments acquiesced to the terms of these bailouts but then tried to claw back control of the country’s domestic economic policy under pressure from both the left and the right.
Greece’s travails with the IMF and other international creditors point to how national sovereignty is conditional, not absolute, in the modern world. Sovereign nation-states are supposed to be the constituent units of the international system. International organizations such as the Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF and the World Bank—and the United Nations exist, in part, to maintain stable political and economic relations between independent states and prevent some from riding roughshod over others. But belonging to these organizations invariably curbs the freedom of many member countries, especially weaker ones. An international order that claims to rest on the sovereignty of states often forces some countries to reckon with how partial their sovereignty truly is.
In The Meddlers, the historian Jamie Martin traces the evolution of the modern international economic order in the decades before the rise of the IMF and the World Bank. In 1920, in the wake of World War I, the governments of the victorious countries created the League of Nations, a body meant to peacefully resolve political disputes and prevent future wars. The league also sought to help distressed countries by delivering economic advice and giving lenders implicit guarantees that they would recoup their loans to countries in need. The league’s role laid the groundwork for the present economic order.
With a critical eye, Martin explores this history of the relationship between international organizations and their nominally sovereign member states. He finds that the international economic order rests on deep inequality, on powerful states dictating terms to the less powerful, and thus on the infringement of the sovereignty of weaker states. The league and its future incarnations, specifically the IMF and the World Bank, may have formally accepted the equal sovereignty of their members, but in practice, they have habitually violated this sovereignty. That truth, however, is not surprising. It is not altogether realistic to expect, as Martin seems to, that the international economic order will uphold the respect of sovereignty. That implausible demand gets in the way of a finer understanding of how countries actually retain and lose sovereignty in the modern age, how sovereignty is often willingly, although sometimes not openly, traded off by some groups within states for economic gain. Big external forces may eat away at the full independence of countries, but so, too, do the forces within.
A SUBTLER KIND OF MEDDLING
Before the nineteenth century, countries didn’t really have to grapple with these sorts of questions pertaining to sovereignty. Countries fought one another, plundered treasures, took slaves, imposed monopolies, and did not worry much about rules—because there were very few. But questions of sovereignty became more relevant with the advent in the nineteenth century of the system of nation-states, which at first covered only Europe and European settler societies (such as Australia and the United States). De jure and de facto European protectorates, such as China, Egypt, Tunisia, and the Ottoman Empire, belonged to the gray zone of states that were nominally independent but in reality were under the thumb of European powers. When such protectorates were unable to repay their debts, European states would enforce payment by taking control of national treasuries; when protectorates were unwilling to trade, European states would compel them to open their ports. The United Kingdom assailed China in this way during the two Opium Wars of the nineteenth century. British, French, and Spanish troops jointly landed in Mexico in 1861 to extract debt repayments from the fledgling Mexican republic. Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom imposed a naval blockade on Venezuela between 1902 and 1903 after that country’s president refused to pay its foreign debts. Gunboat diplomacy met gunpoint debt collection.
These relationships changed with World War I. The Meddlers opens with a retelling of that conflict, when the Allies worked together to coordinate access to raw materials necessary for the war effort, such as wheat from Argentina, nitrate from Chile, and tin from Malaya. They also coordinated the shipping of food, making sure that civilian populations in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom did not go hungry. Such planning required each participant to surrender bits of its economic sovereignty for the collective good, for instance, by organizing collective bidding processes for foreign-produced raw materials and food so as to limit price increases. It also complicated the relationship between governments and their countries’ private sectors, leading to the first attempts at state-directed economic planning in Germany and among the Allies.
This kind of coordination expanded markedly with the founding of the League of Nations. At its inception, the league had 42 members, including countries in Latin America, Asia (notably China and Japan), and even a few from Africa. The league got involved in a variety of thorny issues that bedeviled many countries in the wake of the war. It sent economic advisers to control government spending and stabilize the hyperinflation that ravaged parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. It provided a forum for the negotiation of the intractable issue of German reparations. And it tried to boost economic development in southern Europe by issuing small loans to those ethnically Greek refugees who, in one of the population exchanges common after the war, had left Turkey and moved to Greece. The multilateral power of the league far outstripped the scope of earlier economic treaties agreed to by two or a handful of countries. Members of the league had joined a voluntary international organization that could at some point limit their economic sovereignty if they could not service their debts or adequately run their economies.
The league, Martin argues, ended up creating the kinds of rules and procedures that are today taken for granted and enshrined in the policies of the IMF and the World Bank (both founded in 1944). Many countries accept the IMF’s regular annual oversight through the so-called Article IV consultations, and should they borrow funds from the IMF, the international body places various conditions on their domestic economic and social policies that limit their sovereignty. The league inaugurated a different kind of external interference in domestic affairs, one far subtler than what had transpired before, which Martin describes as the “unwanted meddling that empires long visited on semi-sovereign countries.”
A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN
In exchange for help from the league in obtaining loans, a country had to accept the league’s superintendence of its economic affairs. Martin recounts how such tradeoffs worked in the cases of Albania and Austria between 1922 and 1924, Greece in 1925, and, more fleetingly and unsuccessfully, China in the 1930s. To Albania and Austria, the league provided foreign advisers who controlled each country’s fiscal policies to assure foreign lenders that the funds were not being squandered. In Greece, the league provided housing and business loans to refugees. It sent Jean Monnet, a French diplomat (who would eventually help found the European Economic Coal and Steel Community), to China to advise the country’s new National Economic Council, a body created in 1931 to help speed economic reform in the country. But Monnet’s mission made little impression in the midst of China’s other problems, including civil conflict, competing centers of power, and Japanese interference.
The league’s first forays into imposing austerity policies (and thus into limiting the sovereignty of member states) took place in European countries, which bristled at being treated no better than the populations of Africa and Asia. People in Christian European states imagined themselves at the top of a global hierarchy; they could venture out and limit the sovereignty of people elsewhere, but they struggled to accept the surrender of their own sovereignty. The league’s work could not help but carry colonial overtones. J. G. Moojen, a longtime Dutch colonial official, thought that his experience in suppressing uprisings in South Sumatra uniquely qualified him for the position of the overseer of the league’s activities in Albania. In his application for the job, as Martin recounts, he drew a parallel between his former experience and the work in Albania: the people in South Sumatra were “independent and fond of liberty,” much like “the Albanian mountain inhabitants.” Moojen did not get the job—it went to another Dutch East India official—but a league bureaucrat agreed with his assessment of the situation, noting that Albania was a country where “a certain amount of financial wisdom may have to be instilled by means of a revolver.”
Outside the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., January 2022
Olivier Douliery / AFP
Perhaps one of the more fundamental features of this system became clear only in hindsight. The league was formally composed of equal member states, but in fact, the victorious great powers—France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and, lurking on the outside, the United States—did not think that they were beholden to the same rules as weaker member states. The defeated European powers, Austria and Germany, were aggrieved that they were not afforded seats at the high table. Japan held less sway simply by being an Asian country. And African countries and colonies found themselves at the bottom of this hierarchy. A similar pecking order persists to this day. Countless authors have told the story of the United Kingdom’s sterling devaluations in 1967 and 1976, which were imposed by the IMF. This episode has won so much scholarly attention precisely because the IMF’s intrusion into the economic policies of a major Western power remains hard to imagine today. Nowadays, when the IMF imposes identical or much greater limits on economic decision-making in Argentina or Nigeria, for instance, the action hardly arouses any interest beyond the predictable statements of concern about the profligacy of countries in the so-called global South and the usual worries in Western capitals about whether the debtors will repay their creditors.
Martin shows that the country most reluctant to give up any morsel of economic sovereignty was then, as it is now, the United States. The United States, despite the efforts of President Woodrow Wilson, never joined the League of Nations. It was unwilling to bear the costs of multilateralism, to curb the power of its private companies, to risk being dragged into future wars, or, most of all, to share sovereignty. The British and the French felt more urgently the necessity of international coordination, perhaps because they were less powerful than the ascendant United States.
The international economic order rests on deep inequality and on the infringement of the sovereignty of the weak.
The American position, of course, changed after World War II, in part because the United States could then fully dictate the rules of the game, which it was not yet strong enough to do after World War I. The last part of The Meddlers discusses the forensically studied negotiations among the soon-to-be-victorious Allies in 1944 and 1945 in Bretton Woods and at Dumbarton Oaks that led to the founding of the IMF and the World Bank and the entire postwar global economic order. Martin explores the differences between the two main protagonists: the United States, as embodied by the Treasury Department official Harry Dexter White, and the United Kingdom, represented by the economist John Maynard Keynes. The main point of contention between the two was how countries would access IMF funds, which would largely be provided by the United States. The United States insisted that the provision of funds above a certain sum had to be followed by increasingly tight conditions placed on domestic policy. The United Kingdom, knowing that it would need to borrow soon, argued that members of the IMF should treat access to funds as a right, not a privilege. Unsurprisingly, given the relative imbalance of power, American preferences won the day.
This is well-trodden ground. But in several tantalizing sentences, Martin challenges, without naming it, the economist Dani Rodrik’s influential argument about the “golden age” between 1945 and 1971 of international economic coordination and limited globalization, during which the Bretton Woods system functioned without too much friction and allowed member states significant policy autonomy. Martin’s underlying argument that the international system never treated all countries the same undermines Rodrik’s thesis. Martin writes, “The challenges of global governance . . . are more significant than what is implied by stylized histories of embedded liberalism and its collapse into neoliberalism. There was no stable era of mid-twentieth-century autonomy that can be easily recaptured.” And also, “There was no golden age of national autonomy and sovereign equality after 1945.”
Without fully developing his argument, Martin seems to dispute the view that the neoliberal era, ushered in by figures such as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, represented a true departure from the so-called golden age that preceded it. For Martin, hierarchy has always existed in international economic relations. The notion that relations between powerful economies and less powerful ones in the decades after World War II were not shaped by inequality and discrepancies in power was an illusion, an ideological façade made necessary by the Cold War, in which the Western camp needed to present itself as a team of equals.
THE FANTASY OF SOVEREIGNTY
Martin underlines how this parity was always chimerical. No iteration of international order in history has allowed member countries to fully preserve their sovereignty. As it is, countries are rarely hermetically sealed. Even if one thinks in purely economic terms, the borders between what is domestic and what is foreign are thoroughly permeable in a world of interdependence. For instance, the anti-inflationary policies of Paul Volcker, who was chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve in the 1980s, cannot be understood as only a domestic issue: higher interest rates in the United States had enormous repercussions for indebted countries as varied as Brazil, Mexico, Poland, and Romania. (The anti-inflationary measures being imposed now by the U.S. Federal Reserve will likely have similarly deleterious consequences for many emerging economies.) Today, China applies all sorts of conditions, such as requiring the transfer of technology, on access to its market; that can hardly be construed as domestic policy. Continuous trade deficits or surpluses are not simply the concerns of the countries involved; if China and Germany run large trade surpluses, for instance, other countries have to run trade deficits, which they can reduce significantly only by depreciating their currencies.
It is often impossible to convincingly distinguish between the domestic and the international sphere. By criticizing how stronger countries exercise power, as Martin does, one is simply writing a chronicle of the inevitable and the obvious. An international organization, such as the IMF, should not try to contrive equality among its members; it should set itself the more realistic goal of minimizing inequity. It could do this by taking the social concerns of borrowing countries more seriously and allowing them much longer periods of adjustment. For instance, it could ask borrowers to phase out subsidies over ten years rather than three; it could resist the impulse to excessively financialize economies through encouraging the private provision of pensions and education, which often helps only the rich and does little for the poor and the middle class; and it should not penalize government investments in infrastructure and health.
An ideological infrastructure that presumes equality will only invite the strong to come up with ever more clever narratives to justify their hegemony. Then, in addition to de facto inequality, countries will have to deal with hypocrisy, too, as happens today when rich countries clamor for more attention to climate change while remaining among the greatest per capita emitters of carbon dioxide: the United States’ per capita emissions are nine times as great as India’s; Finland’s are ten times as great as Zimbabwe’s.
Volcker at the World Bank, Washington, D.C., May 2014
Jonathan Ernst / Reuters
An additional problem hinted at in the chapters discussing austerity policies in post–World War I Austria and development loans in Greece is unfortunately not developed further. The desire for equal sovereignty implicitly frames every country as a homogeneous entity with discrete interests. In this view, the League of Nations and other international organizations are imagined as powerful external entities clamping down on the independence of weaker states. But countries are not homogeneous; every country contains many class, social, and political groups, and some of them use international organizations to impose policies that they are not strong enough to see through the domestic political process. The Austrian government in the 1920s, as Martin notes, did precisely that when seeking to advance fiscal reforms and circumvent opposition in Parliament. Innumerable other governments have followed suit, shifting blame to foreigners (and willingly surrendering domestic sovereignty) as a way to further a particular domestic interest. They cry, “Foreigners made us do it!” even when the tail is wagging the dog.
This is how powerful groups with specific agendas collaborate in the neoliberal era. Countries yield domestic sovereignty not under the implacable pressure of international organizations but through international agreements that powerful social groups use to lock in their preferred policies. In Globalists (one of the books Martin cites), the historian Quinn Slobodian shows that such an approach was pioneered by libertarians and the Mont Pelerin Society they founded in Switzerland in 1947. They realized that there was no real possibility of a single world government that would advance the interests of businesses. Instead, they argued for a “double government”: “the imperium,” which would deal with political, cultural, and symbolic matters and would be fully autonomous, and “the dominium,” which would be internationally controlled and deal with economics. Within the latter, cross-country business interests would hold sway and ensure secure property rights, low taxation, and the independence of central banks (among other business-friendly measures) across borders. Should one country defect and try to pursue, say, an independent exchange-rate policy or abandon independent central banking, markets would rapidly punish the renegade. The society’s vision of the dominium is indeed at work today: powerful social and class groups within countries willingly trade portions of national sovereignty to further their own interests.
Martin’s prose is dense, and his blow-by-blow recounting of the events that took place over almost half a century is at times tedious, although impressive in its detail. Future economic historians will no doubt find the book useful for its list of sources: the endnotes consist of 66 pages of references in small type, which, at first guess, may include more than 1,000 books and articles. The problem with Martin’s detail, however, is that it often obscures the big picture. The major issues emerge periodically, but one wishes that the book were structured more around the key questions of ideology—for instance, the belief in the unconstrained free market and its counterpart, the insistence on the meaningful role of the state—and international law that shape the interactions of states.
The idea that all countries are sovereign underpins the international system. But that fundamental basis appears increasingly mythical given the ways countries surrender elements of their sovereignty. For one, weaker countries are not nearly as sovereign as more powerful ones; inequality in international relations places limits on the independence of less powerful countries. And second, countries voluntarily surrender sovereignty, however surreptitiously, because doing so benefits particular political or class factions in those societies. In other words, international organizations should not be judged against an unrealistic standard of upholding the national sovereignty of all their members, both because power is distributed unequally worldwide and because national sovereignty is divided locally among different groups with different interests. Any international economic order must rest on the precarious foundation of a world of unequal and split sovereignty.
- BRANKO MILANOVIC is a Senior Scholar at the Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality at the CUNY Graduate Center.
Foreign Affairs · by Branko Milanovic · July 19, 2022
10. Russia Following 2014 ‘Annexation Playbook’ In Eastern Ukraine, White House Says
Russia Following 2014 ‘Annexation Playbook’ In Eastern Ukraine, White House Says
The White House is expected to announce another weapons shipment to Ukraine this week.
defenseone.com · by Jacqueline Feldscher
Russia is preparing to annex parts of eastern Ukraine following the same “playbook” it used to illegally seize Crimea in 2014, a White House official said Tuesday.
There is “ample evidence” from intelligence sources and the public domain that Russian leader Vladimir Putin is seeking to make Ukrainian territory part of Russia, said John Kirby, the National Security Council’s coordinator for strategic communications.
“The Russian government is reviewing detailed plans to purportedly annex a number of regions in Ukraine, including Kherson, Zaporizhia, all of Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts,” Kirby said at a White House briefing.
Over the past several weeks, fighting in Ukraine has been focused in the Donbas in eastern Ukraine. Russian troops are making gains and now control all of Luhansk, though they have also suffered some losses, including the retreat from Snake Island earlier this month.
Kirby said Russia is now taking steps similar to those it took before annexing Crimea in 2014, including installing illegitimate proxy officials in the areas it controls in eastern Europe. Next, those officials are expected to arrange sham referendums that support joining Russia, which Putin will use to claim ownership of Ukraine’s sovereign territory.
These referendums are expected to happen later this year—possibly in September to coincide with Russia’s regional elections, Kirby said.
Russia is already seeking to secure its toehold in the East. Kirby said Russian banks are opening in Ukrainian territory that is controlled by Russia. In addition, Russian officials are forcing Ukrainian residents to apply for Russian citizenship and issuing Russian passports.
In response, the United States is sending more military aid to Ukraine. The administration is expected to announce another tranche of weapons shipments to Ukraine this week, Kirby said. The upcoming package will include more High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, and more rounds for the multiple launch rocket systems that the Pentagon has already sent to Ukraine, as well as additional artillery and ammunition.
“Annexation by force would be a gross violation of the UN charter and we will not allow it to go unchallenged or unpunished,” Kirby said.
Even before Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the administration publicly shared more intelligence than has been released during previous conflicts, while being careful to protect sources and methods. Kirby said today’s announcement is an example of that continuing so the world can be prepared for Russia’s next moves, and Putin’s attempts to obfuscate his intentions.
“We’re also going to continue to expose Russian plans so the world knows that any purported annexation is premeditated, illegal, and illegitimate,” Kirby said.
defenseone.com · by Jacqueline Feldscher
11. Opinion | How media coverage drove Biden’s political plunge
But I thought the biased mainstream media was supposed to always support Biden and democrats?
Opinion | How media coverage drove Biden’s political plunge
The Washington Post · by Perry Bacon Jr. · July 18, 2022
By
Columnist |
July 18, 2022 at 7:00 a.m. EDT
The mainstream media has played a huge, underappreciated role in President Biden’s declining support over the past year. Its flawed coverage model of politics and government is bad for more than just Biden — it results in a distorted national discourse that weakens our democracy. The media needs to find a different way to cover Washington.
One of the sharpest dips in Biden’s approval rating — which has dropped from 55 percent in January 2021 to less than 39 percent today — happened last August, when it declined almost five points in a single month. There wasn’t a huge surge in gas prices, nor some big legislative failure. What caused Biden’s dip was the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan — or, rather, the media’s 24/7, highly negative coverage of it.
To be clear, Biden deserved criticism. The early stages of the U.S. exit were tumultuous, with desperate Afghans clinging to U.S. military planes and massing outside the Kabul airport. The Taliban took control far more quickly than the administration anticipated. But for much of August, the homepages of major newspapers and cable news programs were dominated by Afghanistan coverage, as if the chaotic withdrawal was the only thing happening in the world. Journalists and outlets tore into the president, with Axios calling the withdrawal “Biden’s stain,” NBC News correspondent Richard Engel declaring that “history will judge this moment as a very dark period for the United States,” and CNN’s Jake Tapper asking an administration official on his show, “Does President Biden not bear the blame for this disastrous exit from Afghanistan?”
Biden’s poll numbers plunged, closely tracking the media hysteria. As The Post’s Dana Milbank wrote in December, data analysis showed a marked increase in negativity in media coverage of Biden that started last August. After the withdrawal, the media lumped other events into its “Biden is struggling” narrative: infighting among Democrats over the party’s agenda, Democrats’ weak performances in the New Jersey and Virginia gubernatorial races, rising inflation, and the surge of the delta and omicron variants. Biden’s role in these issues was often exaggerated — there are many causes of inflation besides Biden’s policies; presidents can’t stop the emergence of coronavirus variants. This anti-Biden coverage pattern remains in place.
Afghanistan was an important turning point in media coverage for two reasons. One, it provided journalists the big anti-Biden story that I think many of them were desperate to find. And it drove down Biden’s popularity with the public, giving the media justification for even more coverage that cast the president as struggling.
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Biden coverage shifted in this direction because of the media’s long-standing biases toward bothsidesism and strong criticism of those in power. (When I say “mainstream media,” I’m referring to the news coverage in national newspapers such as The Post and the New York Times, major broadcasters such as CNN, wire services like the Associated Press, local newspapers and TV stations, and publications with elite audiences such as Axios and Politico. These outlets do not coordinate their reports, but they take cues from each other and have similar coverage approaches. I’m not referring to opinion pieces in these outlets or the work of news organizations that have a clear ideological bent.)
Reporters tend to view their role as a check on politicians. This means presidents are always covered skeptically — but when one party dominates Washington, the political media often scrutinizes that party’s president even more. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump got very negative coverage at times when their parties also controlled Congress.
Also, the media’s “equally positive and negative to both sides” approach has been challenged by the increasingly radical and antidemocratic Republican Party. Honest coverage of political news often seems anti-GOP. The mainstream media covered Trump very harshly, particularly in the final months of his presidency as he worked to overturn election results. Some journalists, consciously or unconsciously, were poised to “balance” that negative Trump coverage with criticism of Biden, even if his actions weren’t nearly as deserving of condemnation. In the post-Trump era, leaders at CNN, the New York Times and other major outlets have emphasized that they don’t want to be perceived as more aligned with the Democrats.
In the first few months of 2021, many in the media focused on narratives that seemed like they could turn into big anti-Biden stories but didn’t pan out. Before most public schools were open, journalists focused on closures because Biden had pledged to get kids back in the classroom. Biden’s first news conference as president, in March 2021, featured numerous questions about a surge in migrants across the southern border and some about his 2024 plans, but not one on covid-19, which the administration seemed to be handling well.
In August, the hunt found its mark: the Afghanistan withdrawal. And as high inflation became entrenched, the media had a perpetual issue to ding the president on.
Relentless negative coverage is toxic for politicians. As University of Minnesota policy analyst Will Stancil has argued, U.S. news coverage often has a collective tenor, what he calls a “main signal.” This signal seeps from traditional news sources into social media, with stories shared on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.
Biden’s arc shows what happens if this broad tenor turns against a politician. There seems to be a generalized frustration with him, as opposed to unhappiness over a single issue or two, even among people who don’t closely follow traditional news outlets or are generally supportive of his views.
The political strategy Team Biden took, focusing on showing the president competently managing the pandemic and the economy and reducing partisanship in Washington, was particularly harmed by the media’s coverage approach. It is difficult for a president to demonstrate competence with a media perpetually looking for something negative. For one thing, when Biden got an issue under control, such as coronavirus vaccine distribution, many journalists simply moved on to a new problem without crediting him much for fixing the old one. By making reduced political gridlock a metric of his success, Biden positioned himself to look bad when congressional Republicans and Sens. Joe Manchin III (D-W.Va.) and Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) blocked his proposals.
Now, Biden is polling worse than Trump was in July 2020, when thousands of people were dying each week of covid, a situation much worse than the real and serious problem of high inflation in the Biden era. You can’t credibly argue that Trump, with his constant inflammatory statements and incompetent management, was a better president than Biden. These poll numbers reflect something gone wrong.
And in my view, media coverage is a big factor in those warped polling results. Media commitment to “equal” coverage of both parties has resulted in a year and a half of coverage since Biden entered office that implies both parties are similarly bad, as if the surge of inflation and some of Biden’s policy mistakes rival a Republican Party that is actively undermining democracy in numerous ways, such as continuing to voice baseless claims of voter fraud in the 2020 presidential election, passing measures making it harder to vote, and gerrymandering so aggressively in states such as Wisconsin that elections are effectively meaningless.
Yes, I am calling for the media to cover Biden more positively. Not in the sense of declaring Biden a better man than Trump (though that is obviously true). Instead, political coverage should be grounded in highlighting the wide range of our problems and assessing whether politicians and parties are working toward credible solutions. Such a model would still produce a lot of stories about surging inflation, Afghanistan and other issues where Biden’s policies haven’t worked. But there would also be more stories about other issues important to Americans, even if they were going well under Biden (like the huge job growth during his tenure). Ideally, on every issue, the media would compare the Republican and Democratic solutions. You can see how this model might help Biden — but the bigger benefit would be to readers.
It’s too early to say whether Biden is a great or even good president. But most Americans aren’t getting a fair look at that question. Instead of telling us whether Biden is effective, the media has focused on showing that it is not too biased toward Democrats. Better that journalists actually cover America’s problems and whether Biden is solving them — or at least has better policies than the Republicans. That’s the kind of journalism we need.
The Washington Post · by Perry Bacon Jr. · July 18, 2022
12. Top US general orders comprehensive review of US-China military interactions
I would certainly hope that DIA already has this data and has been making assessments about these interactions and does not need to be directed to do this.
Top US general orders comprehensive review of US-China military interactions
CNN · by Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent
(CNN)The most senior US general has ordered a comprehensive review of US military interactions with Chinese forces over the last five years as concerns about Beijing's assertive behavior in the Indo-Pacific region increases, according to three defense officials.
By launching the review, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley is seeking to gain a detailed understanding of all interactions between the two militaries, especially any that could be deemed "unsafe" or "unprofessional" due to Chinese aircraft or ships operating too close to US military assets. Officials tell CNN the aim is to have a solid look at any changes in patterns of Chinese military activity.
"China has been on the rise, economically and militarily, for more than a decade. They've become more bold in the Pacific," Milley said in a written statement to CNN. "Maintaining open lines of communication and managing competition will reduce strategic risk. The US military's focus is on modernization and readiness. Our network of partners and allies is a source of strength."
Interactions between the two militaries are so sensitive that incidents are often not made public. For example, in June, a US C-130 transport plane being operated by US special forces had some type of encounter with Chinese aircraft, but the Pentagon has not publicly acknowledged the incident.
US Navy challenges Chinese claims in South China Sea for second time in a week
Milley asked for an initial internal staff review before his July 7 video teleconference call with his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Li Zuocheng. "Gen. Milley discussed the need to responsibly manage competition and maintain open lines of communication. Gen. Milley underscored the importance of the People's Liberation Army engaging in substantive dialogue on improving crisis communications and reducing strategic risk," according to a statement issued by Milley's office shortly after the call.
The review is expected to continue reflecting Milley's intense focus on ensuring the US has a full understanding of China's military capabilities and intentions.
NBC News first reported the review.
Countering China is a key US strategic priority and last month US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin called out Beijing for a series of coercive, aggressive and dangerous actions that threaten stability around Asia and vowed the United States would stand by partners to resist any pressure.
"Indo-Pacific countries shouldn't face political intimidation, economic coercion, or harassment by maritime militias," Austin said in a keynote speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's premier defense conference.
"The PRC's moves threaten to undermine security, and stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific," Austin said, using the acronym to refer to the country by its official name, the People's Republic of China.
US defense chief says China muscling neighbors, plundering resources in Pacific
He listed a series of areas where he said China is muscling its neighbors, including sending large numbers of warplanes into the skies near Taiwan, dangerously intercepting the patrol planes of US allies and illegal fishing operations that "plunder the region's provisions."
In March, Adm. Philip Davidson, the then-head of US Indo-Pacific Command, described China as "the greatest long-term strategic threat to security in the 21st century."
"I'm worried that they're accelerating their ambitions ... to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order, which they've long said that they want to do that by 2050. I'm worried about them moving that target closer," Davidson said in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
China is adamant its military is defensive.
"The development of China's national defense aims to meet its rightful security needs and contribute to the growth of the world's peaceful forces," the country's 2019 defense white paper said. "China will never threaten any other country or seek any sphere of influence."
The US, for its part, appears to be stepping up its operations in the South China Sea. On Saturday, a US Navy warship, the USS Benfold, challenged Chinese claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea, the US 7th Fleet said in a statement -- the second operation of in just days.
The guided-missile destroyer sailed near the Spratly Islands -- known as the Nansha Islands in China -- in the southeastern South China Sea in a so-called "freedom of navigation operation," the 7th Fleet statement said.
The US Navy operation in the island chain where China has built military fortifications on man-made islands challenged "restrictions on innocent passage imposed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, and Taiwan," the statement said.
CNN's Brad Lendon and Oren Liebermann contributed reporting.
CNN · by Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon Correspondent
13. Special Forces Soldiers participate in the US Department of State ATLAS program’s culminating exercise CAPSTONE
In many countries "the State Department is the lead?" How about in nearly, almost every country the Chief of Mission is always in charge.
Excerpts:
"What we try to gain from this is a better understanding of how these organizations work, how they're structured and how they plan and conduct operations; we think we can better support them by doing that," said Lt. Col. Samuel Oliver, commander, 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group. “In many countries that we work in, the State Department is the lead in those countries. We have to work under their umbrella and meet mutual goals, both with the Departments of Defense and State.”
The shared experiences gained from joint exercises like ATLAS: CAPSTONE enables greater understanding and enhanced communication between organizations. Real-world exercises also build upon the units’ existing experience and familiarization with certain skills. These events provide an invaluable and integrated training opportunity with federal and Ohio National Guard Special Forces to ensure interoperability, lethality and adaptability in any environment.
Special Forces Soldiers participate in the US Department of State ATLAS program’s culminating exercise CAPSTONE
dvidshub.net
Photo By Spc. Carleeann Smiddy | Soldiers with Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Ohio...... read more
Photo By Spc. Carleeann Smiddy | Soldiers with Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Ohio National Guard, throw smoke grenades to provide cover while reacting to contact during training exercise CAPSTONE at Fort Pickett, Virginia, May 8, 2022. CAPSTONE is a training exercise that allows the interoperability of tactics and procedures between SFOD-A and the Department of State Diplomatic Security to secure U.S. Embassy personnel and assets during times of duress. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Carleeann Smiddy/RELEASED) | View Image Page
FT. PICKETT, VA, UNITED STATES
05.10.2022
FORT PICKETT, Va. – A mob of angry citizens flooded the streets, smoke filled the air, and what was once a peaceful protest erupted into a riot, threatening the lives of the diplomatic personnel inside a simulated U.S. Embassy abroad. When threatened, the embassy relies on its Marine Security Detachment and its Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) as its first line of defense. When those agencies are pushed to their limits, the Green Berets are called upon. Green Berets are U.S. Army Special Forces who excel in unconventional warfare and increase the combat potential of forces around the globe.
For almost a week, Soldiers with the Ohio National Guard’s Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (Bravo Company), 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne), participated in a joint exercise with the U.S. Department of State to help train students in its Agent Training Program. The program's advanced tactics, leadership and skills course (ATLAS) culminated in a high-intensity immersion exercise known as CAPSTONE.
Bravo Company's participation was vital, as the elite Soldiers provided a wealth of knowledge and experience to the students. This hands-on training is invaluable in preparing agents to protect U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel abroad upon graduation from the Agent Training Program.
"Bravo Company participated in the ATLAS capstone to build and establish relationships and interagency cooperation," said the Bravo Company detachment commander. “Similar to Special Operations Forces, Diplomatic Security Services personnel are assigned to austere and remote parts of the world.”
Bravo Company filled the roles of both instructors and participants during the Capstone training exercise. As instructors, they advised high-ranking diplomatic personnel and embassy security forces before the simulated conflict to help increase security and adaptability using existing forces on location. As participants, Bravo Company acted as a quick reaction force (QRF). The DSS agents-in-training were able to call the QRF as the simulated embassy was on the brink of being overrun. Bravo Company also served as a QRF to rescue an attacked convoy of U.S. personnel and conducted a helicopter insertion during a simulated hostage rescue mission.
Adaptability and critical thinking were essential in facing the growing and ever-shifting threats DSS personnel have to meet.
Bravo Company employed its practical and hard-won wisdom to deliver guidance in the joint, interagency and high-tempo CAPSTONE environment. The students of the Agent Training Program worked with Bravo Company to receive hands-on advice and lessons in the field during a challenging and realistic series of training scenarios.
This personal level of engagement with Special Forces leveraged the training provided by the ATLAS program, enhancing the student's pre-existing essential skills with weapons, tactics and critical thinking which allows them to dominate in high-intensity conflict across the globe.
"Many Diplomatic Security Service agents have never worked with Special Operation Forces elements, so just talking through our capabilities and the things we bring to the environment is value-added for them," said the Bravo Company detachment commander.
Embassy defense and evacuation, hostage recovery and exfiltration are among countless missions Bravo Company executes. As the end of the CAPSTONE exercise was announced, both Bravo Company and DSS agents had integrated entirely as one unit. Together they had established an understanding of how they would react with one another in any given scenario.
"What we try to gain from this is a better understanding of how these organizations work, how they're structured and how they plan and conduct operations; we think we can better support them by doing that," said Lt. Col. Samuel Oliver, commander, 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group. “In many countries that we work in, the State Department is the lead in those countries. We have to work under their umbrella and meet mutual goals, both with the Departments of Defense and State.”
The shared experiences gained from joint exercises like ATLAS: CAPSTONE enables greater understanding and enhanced communication between organizations. Real-world exercises also build upon the units’ existing experience and familiarization with certain skills. These events provide an invaluable and integrated training opportunity with federal and Ohio National Guard Special Forces to ensure interoperability, lethality and adaptability in any environment.
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14. Ukraine destroys two military ammo depots, hurting Russian morale: Official
Hard to keep up morale when you no longer have ammunition to fire.
Ukraine destroys two military ammo depots, hurting Russian morale: Official
Newsweek · by Zoe Strozewski · July 18, 2022
Ukraine has recently destroyed two of Russia's military ammo depots in Ukraine's southern Kherson region, according to a Ukrainian military spokesperson.
Natalia Humeniuk, the head of the United Coordinating Press Center of Security and Defense Forces of the South of Ukraine, was asked during an interview with the Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform on Monday about the reported destruction of an ammo depot in the city of Nova Kakhovka in the Kherson region. Humeniuk responded that in addition to one in Nova Kakhovka, an ammo depot in another district of the Kherson region was also destroyed.
Humeniuk stated that these strikes resulted in the "enemy" lacking ammo to attack Ukraine's positions, saying that they saw "very good results." Such strikes "not only interrupt the logistic chains of the area, but it also affects the morale of the occupants," Humeniuk said, according to an English translation.
Humeniuk did not specify exactly when each ammo depot was destroyed, or where the second destroyed depot was located. Newsweek was not able to independently verify that the two Russian ammo depots had been destroyed. The defense ministries of Russia and Ukraine were contacted for confirmation and comment.
Much of the Kherson region has been under Russian control since early in the Russia-Ukraine War, which began on February 24 this year. This has reportedly not stopped Ukrainian forces from continuing their fight to retake the oblast nearly five months into the conflict.
Ukraine has recently destroyed two of Russia's military ammo depots in Ukraine's southern Kherson region, according to a Ukrainian military spokesperson. Above, fighters of the territorial defense unit, a support force to the regular Ukrainian army, take part in an exercise as part of the regular combat tactics classes, not far from the Ukrainian town of Bucha in the Kyiv region on July 13. Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images
In late June, Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksei Arestovich said in an interview with internet blogger Mark Feigin that Ukrainian forces had moved within 18 kilometers, a little more than 11 miles, of Kherson city.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a U.S. think tank that provides frequent updates on the Russia-Ukraine War, provides maps on assessed territorial control and fighting in Ukraine. The ISW's most recent map for Sunday, July 17, pinpoints "claimed Ukrainian counteroffensives" taking place along the edge of the Russian-held territory in the Kherson region.
The map circled a point about midway between the cities of Kherson and Mykolaiv, which is about 36 miles from Kherson and is not currently shown to be under Russian control. The ISW assessed that the circled point had seen "significant fighting in the past 24 hours."
Last week, Ukraine announced that it had destroyed two different ammo depots using U.S.-supplied HIMARS missiles within Nova Kakhovka.
It was not immediately clear if either of the two strikes on Russian ammo depots in Nova Kakhovka that Ukraine announced last week were the same that Humeniuk was referring to in the interview with Ukrinform. Newsweek asked Ukraine's defense ministry for more information on when both of the strikes Humeniuk mentioned took place.
Newsweek · by Zoe Strozewski · July 18, 2022
15. FDD | The UN Has Now Spent $81.6 Million at the Four Seasons Damascus
Excerpt:
The U.S. president, secretary of state, and ambassador to the United Nations should ask the UN secretary-general to immediately appoint an independent ombudsman to review all humanitarian operations in Syria. The ombudsman should be able to block further procurement from problematic suppliers and take other appropriate measures to prevent diversion. Congress may want to strengthen the president’s hand by making some appropriations for the United Nations contingent on the appointment of an ombudsman. Until then, assistance for the war’s victims will continue to enrich their oppressor.
FDD | The UN Has Now Spent $81.6 Million at the Four Seasons Damascus
fdd.org · by David Adesnik Senior Fellow and Director of Research · July 18, 2022
The United Nations released new procurement data last week showing that its agencies spent an additional $11.5 million last year at the Four Seasons Damascus, for a total of $81.6 million since 2014. The persistence of wasteful spending at the Four Seasons, whose owner finances the Bashar al-Assad regime, demonstrates the need for a complete overhaul of UN procurement processes in Syria.
UN agencies procured $199.8 million worth of goods and services in Syria in 2021, a decrease of nearly 20 percent compared to purchases of $244.5 million the previous year. The UN dataset includes information about 319 major purchase orders and contracts from 2021, which account for $173 million worth of procurement, or 86 percent of the total.
Samer Foz, a confidant of Assad, has a majority stake in the Four Seasons Damascus, with the Syrian Ministry of Tourism holding a minority share. The European Union sanctioned Foz in early 2019; later that year, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned both Foz and the hotel itself.
In 2016, when news first broke about the size of UN bills at the Four Seasons, a spokesman for the UN secretary-general justified the expenditure on the grounds that there were few safe places for UN personnel to reside in Damascus. Yet even after Assad crushed the last rebel strongholds in and around the capital, the United Nations did not relocate its staff.
The new procurement data also underscore the extent to which the United Nations procures goods and services directly from the Syrian government and from other suppliers with ties to the regime. For example, the General Organization for Seed Multiplication (GOSM), one of the government’s agricultural arms, received $1.5 million last year and $17.6 million since 2015. Even if GOSM has an innocuous mission, the regime has demonstrated its ability to divert aid from its intended recipients to security forces or senior officials.
The United Nations also hires security companies with ties to the Assad regime, such as ProGuard, whose co-founder Hashim Anwar al-Aqqad is under EU sanctions for supporting the regime. ProGuard did $600,000 worth of business with UN agencies last year and $4.1 million since 2015. Meanwhile, Shorouk for Security Services had contracts worth $1.5 million last year and $6.3 million since 2015. Shorouk has former generals on its board, and a Syrian émigré scholar has traced the company’s links to Maher al-Assad, the brother of the dictator.
Greater transparency in procurement is also needed. UN agencies withheld the names of the suppliers associated with 55 orders or contracts, whose total value is $33.6 million, or one sixth of all UN procurement in Syria last year. The stated purpose for withholding these names is to protect the privacy or security of the suppliers, yet these anonymous vendors often provided goods such as office equipment, furniture, and food, which are not of a sensitive nature. Some agencies designated the names of only a few partners as sensitive, but UNICEF withheld the names of suppliers for all $15.7 million in goods and services it purchased last year.
Since the first years of the war, independent analysts have reported how the Assad regime diverts extensive amounts of humanitarian aid. The United Nations has apparently resigned itself to the status quo. Even donor states hesitate to raise the subject.
The U.S. president, secretary of state, and ambassador to the United Nations should ask the UN secretary-general to immediately appoint an independent ombudsman to review all humanitarian operations in Syria. The ombudsman should be able to block further procurement from problematic suppliers and take other appropriate measures to prevent diversion. Congress may want to strengthen the president’s hand by making some appropriations for the United Nations contingent on the appointment of an ombudsman. Until then, assistance for the war’s victims will continue to enrich their oppressor.
David Adesnik is research director and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he also contributes to FDD’s Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). For more analysis from David and CEFP, please subscribe HERE. Follow David on Twitter @adesnik. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CEFP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by David Adesnik Senior Fellow and Director of Research · July 18, 2022
16. The rodeo that was the Pacific Islands Forum meeting
The rodeo that was the Pacific Islands Forum meeting - The Sunday Guardian Live
Cleo Paskal
-
Published : July 16, 2022, 11:41 pm | Updated : July 16, 2022, 11:41 PM
sundayguardianlive.com · July 16, 2022
Fiji’s capital Suva is turning into Vienna in the 1930s, when ‘diplomats’ from around the world spied on each other and sent cables home about who was sleeping with whom. Meanwhile, across the border, the war machine was roaring into life.
It was quite a rodeo at the first in-person meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) since the start of the Covid lockdowns. Held last week in Fiji, the annual gathering was anything but boring.
Just before it started, two countries (Kiribati and Marshall Islands) formally announced they were no longer members.
Then USVice-President Kamala Harris gave a virtual address announcing, among other things, two new embassies for the region (conditions apply) and, yes, a heavy US policy emphasis on the PIF.
A couple of Chinese defence attachés, who snuck into the media section to watch Harris’ address, were booted out at the behest of a Fijian journalist applying reciprocity after Fijian journalists were stifled during Wang Yi’s recent trip.
I’ll get back to the meeting soon but, first, it’s long past time to make something really, really clear.
In spite of all the emphasis placed on the PIF from Washington, Canberra and Wellington as the “pillar” of Pacific regionalism, the PIF is neither the most inclusive nor effective regional organization. Far from it.
WHO ACTUALLY GETS WORK DONE IN THE PACIFIC?
Let me introduce you to some others. First up, the Pacific Community.
Now that the PIF has lost two Pacific Island Country (PIC) members, it consists of 14 PICs, plus Australia and New Zealand.
The Pacific Community consists of 22 PICs plus Australia, New Zealand, France, United Kingdom and United States. Some of the PICs that are in the Pacific Community but not in the PIF are part of the United States, including American Samoa, Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).
Let that sink in. Washington is talking about major backing for the PIF, when it isn’t even a member. Meanwhile, nearby, there is another regional organization where it is a member—as are Guam and CNMI, which are US territories with US citizens. And American Samoa. America is even in the name.
I can hear you saying, “yes, but does the Pacific Community do anything useful?” Good question.
I could, of course, counter with “does the PIF do anything useful?” And I’ll get to that. But first, more about the Pacific Community.
It was founded after World War II, in 1947, by the then major powers in the region: United States, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, France, and Netherlands. It moved to its first permanent headquarters in 1949. Those headquarters were in Noumea, New Caledonia, in the former US Headquarters South Pacific Base Command—the base built and used by US forces during WWII.
The Netherlands withdrew from the Pacific Community in 1962 and, as the countries of the Pacific gained independence or autonomy, they joined as individual members.
What does it do? It does the nitty gritty practical work essential for human security. As they say it is “the principal scientific and technical organisation in the Pacific region”. Explaining that, “We are renowned for knowledge and innovation… We have some 200 staff at our headquarters… It is the base for several divisions and programmes, namely: Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability Programme; Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Ecosystems Division; Public Health Division; and Statistics for Development Division.”
An example of their work: “Our facilities include a laboratory where our scientists examine specimens of tuna and other fish species, and store them for reference by scientists around the world.”
Not as sexy as the PIF’s grand press releases about the Blue Pacific, but much more practical for the governments of the region looking to develop their fisheries based on sound science.
And the Pacific Community is not the only regional organization quietly getting on with the work needed by the region. If you care about environmental security, as the US says it does, the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) has 21 PICs members (seven more than the PIF) and around 150 staff, including some of the region’s best scientists.
If you want to reach all the Pacific Islands, and work on scientific and practical research and solutions for some of the region’s critical challenges, these are the organizations where you’ll find the experts who can get the job done.
WHAT DOES THE PIF ACTUALLY DO?
Which brings us back to the Pacific Island Forum. It says it is “the region’s premier political and economic policy organisation”. Ok. So, what does it do, other than policy papers?
There have been at least four major crises with political and economic implications in the region in the last 2-3 years. Let’s see how the PIF helped.
*Covid: There were webinars, a taskforce, some press releases, and so forth but, if you look at the situation on the ground in each country, it is hard to discern a major role played by the PIF.
Countries like Palau and the Marshall Islands got vaccines from the United States. Solomon Islands languished until a major outbreak coincided with geopolitical upheaval moving it to the top of the priority list. And then it was primarily Australia and India that stepped in.
* Volcanic eruption in Tonga: Largely “thoughts and prayers” from the PIF, with most of the rescue and recovery done by Tongans themselves, with support from individual nations.
*University of the South Pacific: This one is a bit complicated, but there have been severe disruptions in the governance of the University of the South Pacific, a key regional tertiary institution. Leadership from Samoa did much more than the PIF.
* China-Solomon Islands Security Deal: There was “concern” from the PIF but not much more. And this was an area where the PIF could have really made a difference in safeguarding democracy and economic integrity in the region.
Solomons Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare is deeply unpopular at home, in part because of PRC-linked corruption, and has said he wants to postpone the scheduled 2023 elections. He has recently taken delivery of substantial Chinese police equipment (backed by Chinese “police trainers”), including drones. It seems likely he is preparing to do a “Hong Kong” on his own people.
The excuse he’s giving to postpone elections is Solomons is hosting the Pacific Games in 2023 and the country doesn’t have enough money for both the Games and an election.
The PIF could have either helped find funding for the elections or made a recommendation that the Games be postponed (or boycotted) so that they couldn’t be used as an excuse to deprive the people of the Solomons of their democratic rights.
Instead, at the PIF meeting, the Australian Prime Minister hugged Sogavare. Imagine the message that sends to the people of Solomons concerned about democracy.
* Fifth one: Oh, and there has been a fifth regional crisis, the PIF itself. Australia and New Zealand-linked shenanigans over the election of the Secretary General exacerbated decades of marginalization of the five countries of the Micronesian region, fracturing the PIF.
Of those five countries, two countries are officially no longer members of the PIF, and the leader of a third didn’t attend the meeting. The leaders of the two others (Palau and FSM) came to the PIF meeting, but likely more because they’ve both taken very courageous stands against Chinese expansionism and got the message that, if they wanted backing, they better show up. This is not a viable way forward.
At the same time, when stands are taken by PIF leadership, they may not be what they seem. A major one is a “nuclear-free Pacific”. This is something Beijing has also been pushing—perhaps because it knows it is a political weapon to use against the US that is unlikely to affect the real expansionist military power in the region, China.
Speaking of which, China seems fine with the PIF. In its “Five Year Plan” for the Pacific Islands, Beijing pledges: “China will provide 1.08 million USD grants to the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) in 2022, and will continue to provide aid according to PIF’s actual needs in the future.”
China is a “Dialogue Partner” of the PIF, along with the United States. However, unlike the United States, it’s not a member of the Pacific Community. Just saying.
WASHINGTON (HEART) PIF
This is why it is a bit confusing that the US is throwing so many eggs into the PIF’s weak and leaky basket.
For example, the White House’s announcements that it was to “Appoint the First-Ever US Envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum.” Not sure why this couldn’t be done by someone (or a team) who could also liaise with Pacific Community, SPREP and other important regional/multilateral organizations, aiding coordination.
The region urgently needs practical solutions to real world problems so countries aren’t destabilized and become easier prey for Beijing. That means understanding the operating environments of every country individually, and then working together to get things (not policy papers) done. And the US already has unique bilateral relationships in the region (especially with the Freely Associated States) and is a member of organisations that work, structurally and literally. Seems that should be a focus.
The stronger a country is, the less likely it is to turn to Beijing. The PIF seems to want to siphon off sovereignty, rather than reinforce it. The Pacific Community and SPREP (and others) want to give the countries the tools they need to strengthen themselves.
The PIF meeting last week was a real rodeo but the region doesn’t have time to indulge in theatrics. Sure, it’s nice for diplomats to hang out at the resorts in Fiji and write reports from the comfort of their air-conditioned rooms. But out there, in the rest of the Pacific, democracy is being stolen, economies are being destroyed and people are getting desperate.
Fiji’s capital Suva is turning into Vienna in the 1930s, when “diplomats” from around the world spied on each other at gilded cafes and sent cables home about who was sleeping with whom. Meanwhile, across the border, the war machine was roaring into life.
Cleo Paskal is The Sunday Guardian Special Correspondent as well as Non-Resident Senior Fellow for the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.
sundayguardianlive.com · July 16, 2022
17. Sen. Marco Rubio: Expose Secret Chinese Communist Party Cells
Sen. Marco Rubio: Expose Secret Chinese Communist Party Cells
WSJ · by July 17, 2022 3:57 pm ET
The CCP is operating inside many of America’s most well-known and respected financial firms.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, addresses party officials in Beijing, March 1.
Photo: Liu Bin/Zuma Press
More than 150 million Americans invest in the stock market. Most assume these highly regulated investments are safe. Unfortunately, Dennis Kwok and Sam Goodman’s op-ed “Communist Cells in Western Firms?” (July 12) reveals a startling risk: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is operating inside many of America’s most well-known and respected financial firms.
CCP members brag about it openly in Chinese state media. Several years ago, McKinsey & Co. employees touted their leadership of CCP branches in the company’s Chinese offices. McKinsey is one of the largest consulting companies in the world. It works closely with the U.S. government and intelligence community.
The risk of Communist infiltration is widespread because the number of publicly traded companies operating in China—from tech giants and advanced manufacturers to shoemakers and drug companies—is staggering. Financial companies such as BlackRock, Citigroup and Goldman Sachs are among the most vulnerable.
Such infiltration poses a real threat. According to the bipartisan, bicameral U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Beijing uses its corporate cells to “co-opt and neutralize sources of potential opposition to the policies and authority” of the CCP.
There is a good argument that our companies should not be operating at all in China, where a Marxist regime co-opts them to undermine American strength. But at the very least, our nation’s retirees and pensioners deserve more transparency. My No Chinese Communist Surprise Parties Act (S.3598) would require companies to disclose the presence of CCP cells and whether they influence corporate decisions. If companies have to disclose their risk from carbon emissions, they certainly should do the same for communism.
Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.)
Miami
Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the July 18, 2022, print edition as 'Expose Secret Chinese Communist Party Cells.'
WSJ · by July 17, 2022 3:57 pm ET
18. Knocking anti-Israel bias to the mat
Conclusion:
However, if the Court of Arbitration for Sport annuls the IJF’s four-year ban of Iran, it will provide cover for a return to greater discrimination. As the journey of Saeid Mollaei shows, Iranian judokas should be throwing opponents, not matches.
Knocking anti-Israel bias to the mat
NY Daily News · by David MayNew York Daily NewsJul 16, 2022 at 5:00 am
Three years, two nationalities and one pandemic later, Iranian judoka Saeid Mollaei finally faced his Israeli opponent — and now best friend — Sagi Muki, on the mat. Their unlikely friendship, the topic of an upcoming television series, began in 2019 when the Iranian regime threatened Mollaei for planning to fight Muki at the world championships — a violation of Tehran’s sports boycott of Israel.
Fortunately, Mollaei’s story did not have a tragic ending like that of wrestling champion Navid Afkari — tortured and executed by the regime for engaging in peaceful protest. The International Judo Federation (IJF) protected Mollaei and suspended Iran for violating the Olympic Charter and its principle of non-discrimination — a demonstration of how global sporting bodies have a pivotal role to play in opposing prejudice and protecting human rights.
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Israel's Sagi Muki celebrates after defeating Belgium's Sami Chouchi in the men's under 81 kg weight category during the European Judo Championship in the Israeli coastal city of Tel Aviv on April 27, 2018. (JACK GUEZ/AFP via Getty Images)
Sporting bodies’ increased adherence to the principle of fair play, along with growing acceptance of Israel, have hampered persistent boycotts like Iran’s. As a result, Tehran now pretends to follow the rules, while having its athletes suffer mysterious injuries, fail their weigh-ins and throw matches. Iran forced Mollaei to do just that in 2019.
In February that year, Mollaei intentionally lost at the Paris Grand Slam. Had he won, his next opponent would have been Muki. Mollaei went on to win the bronze medal, but feigned an injury to avoid standing on the podium with Muki.
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Saeid Mollaei reacts after defeating Austria's Shamil Borchashvili in the judo men's -81kg semifinal B bout during the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games at the Nippon Budokan in Tokyo on July 27, 2021. (JACK GUEZ/AFP via Getty Images)
In May 2019, following pressure from the IJF, including threats to have Iran banned from the 2020 Olympics, the heads of Iran’s Olympic committee and judo federation, Reza Salehi Amiri and Arash Miresmaeili, declared they would “fully respect the Olympic Charter and its non-discrimination principle.” The matter appeared to have been settled.
But in August 2019, Mollaei again found himself on a collision course with Muki at the World Judo Championships in Tokyo. Iranian officials warned Mollaei to lose early in the tournament to avoid the Israeli. But Mollaei refused, breezing by his opponents. With Mollaei edging closer to a faceoff with Muki, an Iranian embassy official trespassed into the coaches’ and athletes’ section to warn Mollaei in person. Amiri, the Iranian Olympic committee chair who committed his government to non-discrimination, called Mollaei’s coach to hammer home the regime’s message. On video chat, Amiri warned Mollaei that security forces were at his parents’ house and that there would be consequences for disobeying the regime. Mollaei lost his matches, ensuring he would not face Muki or share a podium with him.
But Mollaei had had enough of the regime’s intimidation. Behind the scenes, IJF staff escorted Mollaei and secured his passport and belongings. IJF President Marius Vizer personally reassured Mollaei that the judo federation understood his predicament and would support him. Vizer helped Mollaei seek asylum in Germany, and secure the right to compete on behalf of Mongolia and later Azerbaijan. Mollaei has not returned to Iran since.
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Weeks after the fateful tournament in Tokyo, the IJF issued Iran a preliminary suspension, followed by a continuing suspension that would remain in place until Iran issued strong commitments to fair play and non-discrimination. However, Iran would not miss much as the pandemic canceled most tournaments.
In March 2021, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) agreed that Iran violated IJF rules but annulled Iran’s suspension, finding that IJF bylaws did not allow for an indefinite suspension. The IJF responded by converting the suspension to a four-year ban, which Iran appealed. The CAS is reportedly expected to issue its follow-up ruling this month.
In the meantime, Muki congratulated Mollaei on Instagram for his return to competition in November 2019. Mollaei responded, “This is true friendship and a win for sports and judo over politics.” Mollaei then competed in a tournament in Tel Aviv in February 2021, receiving a warm welcome from Israel’s judo federation, and defeated an Israeli opponent — not Muki — in June 2021. Mollaei even dedicated his July 2021 Olympics silver medal to Israel, offering a “Thank You” in Hebrew.
Mollaei’s long-anticipated bout with Muki finally occurred this past week. The result, a Mollaei victory, was not as important as the process. After pinning his opponent, Mollaei helped Muki to his feet. The two shook hands, embraced and smiled. An Iranian and an Israeli athlete at the pinnacle of their sport demonstrated how things should be.
The year ahead will be a major test for anti-discrimination and Israel’s inclusion in the sporting world. Qatar has already agreed to allow Israelis to attend the World Cup this November. And Israel qualified for the under-20 World Cup hosted in Indonesia next May through June. The Muslim-majority Pacific nation, which has no formal ties with Israel, will allow Israel to participate unhindered.
However, if the Court of Arbitration for Sport annuls the IJF’s four-year ban of Iran, it will provide cover for a return to greater discrimination. As the journey of Saeid Mollaei shows, Iranian judokas should be throwing opponents, not matches.
May is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
NY Daily News · by David MayNew York Daily NewsJul 16, 2022 at 5:00 am
19. U.S. military biological activities warrant closest attention: Lavrov
Admit nothing, deny everything, and make counter accusations.
Russian and CHinese propaganda team up.
U.S. military biological activities warrant closest attention: Lavrov
english.news.cn
Source: Xinhua
Editor: huaxia
2022-07-19 13:08:15
Photo taken on Feb. 27, 2022 shows the empty street in the early morning in Kiev, capital of Ukraine. (Xinhua/Li Dongxu)
There is "multiplying evidence of (the Pentagon's) criminal experiments with the most dangerous pathogens in order to create biological weapons conducted under the guise of peaceful research," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov wrote in an article.
MOSCOW, July 19 (Xinhua) -- In an article published on Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for closest attention to the Pentagon's military biological activities around the world.
There is "multiplying evidence of (the Pentagon's) criminal experiments with the most dangerous pathogens in order to create biological weapons conducted under the guise of peaceful research," read the article carried by the Izvestia newspaper.
Lavrov criticized "the Pentagon's covert activities in Ukraine carried out through its Defense Threat Reduction Agency."
According to him, the traces that the Russian military has discovered in the military-biological labs in Donbass and adjacent areas clearly indicate that the Pentagon has directly violated the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons (BTWC).
"We have presented the documents to Washington and to the UN Security Council. The procedure has been initiated under BTWC to demand explanations," Lavrov wrote.
The U.S. administration is trying to justify its actions by saying that all biological research in Ukraine was exclusively peaceful and civilian in nature, but there is no evidence of any of this, he said. ■
english.news.cn
20. China demands U.S. cancel potential arms sale to Taiwan
Not going to happen. We cannot give into Chinese political warfare.
China demands U.S. cancel potential arms sale to Taiwan
Reuters · by Reuters
1/2
Chinese and Taiwanese printed flags are seen in this illustration taken, April 28, 2022. Picture taken April 28, 2022. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration
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HONG KONG, July 18 (Reuters) - China has demanded that the United States immediately cancel its latest arms sale to Taiwan, the Chinese state broadcaster reported on Monday, citing the country's Ministry of National Defence.
The Pentagon said on Friday that the U.S. State Department had approved the potential sale of military technical assistance to Taiwan worth an estimated $108 million. read more
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Reporting by Meg Shen; Editing by Hugh Lawson
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Reuters
21. Nancy Pelosi’s plan to visit Taiwan prompts outrage from China
We do not need this kind of division about these issues.
Excerpts:
Two people familiar with the situation said there were divisions in the US administration over whether Pelosi should visit Taiwan. Some officials believed it was easier to justify a visit in April because that was just after the start of the invasion of Ukraine. Biden in February sent a high-level delegation of former officials, including retired chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff Michael Mullen, in a message of support to Taiwan.
Pelosi and her delegation will visit Japan, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. The lawmakers will also spend time in Hawaii at the headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific command. A seventh person familiar with the situation said it was still possible the trip would fall through.
Pelosi’s office would not confirm if the Speaker was planning a visit to Taiwan or any other countries in Asia. The White House declined to comment on congressional travel plans.
Nancy Pelosi’s plan to visit Taiwan prompts outrage from China
Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · July 19, 2022
Nancy Pelosi plans to visit Taiwan next month to show support for Taipei as it comes under mounting pressure from China, in what would be the first trip by a Speaker of the US House of Representatives to the country in 25 years.
Six people familiar with the situation said Pelosi would take a delegation to Taiwan in August. The 82-year-old California lawmaker cancelled a visit in April after she caught Covid-19.
Pelosi would be the most senior US lawmaker to visit the island since one of her predecessors as Speaker, Republican Newt Gingrich, travelled there in 1997.
Her visit will come as US-China relations remain mired in their worst state since the countries normalised diplomatic relations in 1979 and Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.
In April, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi said a Pelosi visit would be a “malicious provocation”. News of the trip comes as US president Joe Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping prepare to hold an online meeting in the coming weeks.
Three people familiar with the situation said the White House had expressed concern about the trip. The timing is sensitive for China because it will come in the same month as the August 1 anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army.
The issue is also delicate for Beijing because the Chinese Communist party will hold its 20th congress later this year — a meeting at which Xi is expected to secure an unprecedented third term as leader.
China reacted angrily, warning the US against the trip and demanding that Washington “adhere to the One China principle”.
Foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said China “will have to take determined and forceful measures to firmly safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity” if the visit went ahead.
Bonnie Glaser, a Taiwan expert at the German Marshall Fund, said Beijing had become “hypersensitive” about Congress, which has introduced an “unprecedented” number of anti-China bills in recent years.
“China has become convinced that Congress and the executive branch are colluding to contain its rise,” said Glaser. “Since Speaker Pelosi is a Democrat and from the same party as President Biden, her trip is interpreted as part of a strategy of using Taiwan as a card against China and providing official support for Taiwan independence.”
While the US and China are at loggerheads over many issues, Taiwan has become one of the most serious areas of contention since Biden took office. The Chinese military has flown increasingly large numbers of fighter jets and bombers into Taiwan’s “air defence identification zone”, raising tensions across the Taiwan Strait.
Speaking at the Shangri-La defence forum in Singapore in June, Chinese defence minister Wei Fenghe said his military would “crush” any attempt by Taiwan to become independent, and warned the US to stop trying to contain China. “If someone forced a war on China, the People’s Liberation Army will not flinch,” Wei added.
Two people familiar with the situation said there were divisions in the US administration over whether Pelosi should visit Taiwan. Some officials believed it was easier to justify a visit in April because that was just after the start of the invasion of Ukraine. Biden in February sent a high-level delegation of former officials, including retired chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff Michael Mullen, in a message of support to Taiwan.
Pelosi and her delegation will visit Japan, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. The lawmakers will also spend time in Hawaii at the headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific command. A seventh person familiar with the situation said it was still possible the trip would fall through.
Pelosi’s office would not confirm if the Speaker was planning a visit to Taiwan or any other countries in Asia. The White House declined to comment on congressional travel plans.
Follow Demetri Sevastopulo on Twitter
Additional reporting by Maiqi Ding in Beijing
Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · July 19, 2022
22. U.S. touts progress in hypersonic arms race with China, Russia
I recently heard a former defense official ask in a private meeting why the US needs a hypersonic missile? What concept will it support? What problem or gap is it designed to solve and fill? He intimated this is a vanity project and does not have significant military utility.
U.S. touts progress in hypersonic arms race with China, Russia
The Washington Post · by Karoun Demirjian · July 19, 2022
The Pentagon this week said it reached important new milestones as it scrambles to catch China and Russia in what has become a fraught arms race between the world’s most advanced militaries, conducting a successful hypersonic missile test and securing a $1.3 billion deal to help defend against such threats.
Monday’s test of the air-breathing hypersonic missile, a partner venture of defense-tech manufacturers Raytheon and Northrop Grumman, follows separate successful tests announced last week using hardware built by Lockheed Martin. Together, they hint at a potential breakthrough for the Defense Department, which has faced growing scrutiny from lawmakers who fear the United States is losing ground to its adversaries and just last month conceded a full-system test fail.
Yet with China testing advanced-engine hypersonic missiles and Russia promising to use hypersonic cruise missiles in battle by the end of this year, U.S. officials say there is perhaps greater urgency to develop adequate defenses against such weapons. Central to that, they say, is the deal to have L3Harris Technologies and Northrop Grumman design and launch 28 satellites as part of the Pentagon’s new missile defense network.
“People talk about space as a war-fighting domain,” Derek Tournear, director of the Space Development Agency, told reporters in announcing the contracts. “These satellites are specifically designed to go after that next generation of threats out there.”
Since China successfully tested a hypersonic glide missile a year ago, Beijing’s and Moscow’s recent strides have put Washington on high alert. While these recent successful tests are seen as encouraging, they have not yet evened the playing field: Russian government news service Tass reported this week that Moscow completed testing its hypersonic cruise missile and intends to put it into use.
The Pentagon has laid out a five-year plan for developing resilient defenses — a timeline that has disquieted the lawmakers tasked with funding and overseeing such research and development.
“I get really nervous when I hear dates like 2028 for something, and we’re pleased that it’s 2027,” Sen. Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) said to Vice Adm. Jon Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, during a discussion about hypersonics at a Senate Armed Services subcommittee hearing in May. “So how are we going to condense the time period?”
Hypersonic missiles can fly at speeds at or above Mach 5, five times the speed of sound, and travel at low atmospheric altitudes. Unlike ballistic missiles, they can also change course during flight, enabling them to dodge traditional defense systems.
To date, U.S. missile defense has been focused primarily on identifying ballistic missiles, by detecting the initial heat trail registered by their blastoffs and then calculating trajectory. The maneuvering capabilities of hypersonic missiles, however, make their courses — and ultimately, their targets — far less predictable.
“Historically, we have not flown satellites that were designed to go after and detect hypersonic maneuvering vehicles,” Tournear said.
The Pentagon expects that by positioning a large number of heat-detecting satellites in the atmosphere, orbiting on different planes at low and medium altitudes, the U.S. military will be able to see when and how such missiles change direction. By compiling tracking data from multiple satellites in real time, the military believes it will be able to create an accurate picture of the hypersonic missile’s activity and warn those in its path to anticipate incoming strikes, either so they can attempt an intercept or take cover.
“Right now today, we have limited capability to do that tracking aspect,” Tournear said. “The satellites we’re going to launch … can do that complete missile warning and missile tracking.”
Two years ago, the Space Development Agency awarded contracts to L3Harris and SpaceX to produce four satellites each. The first two of those satellites are expected to be launched in September, Tournear said, while the other six are set for next March.
The 28 satellites covered by the contracts announced this week are scheduled to begin launching in April 2025, in four sets of seven, each of which will orbit on a different plane.
The tranche that follows is likely to have 54 satellites, officials say.
“We get resilience by proliferation,” Tournear said.
Bidding for the next round of satellite contracts has not yet opened, and it is unclear how many firms will compete. In the initial round, 10 companies sought to build eight satellites; in the current round, seven firms put in bids. Tournear would not identify which companies were excluded but said that, overall, the quality of submissions improved markedly between rounds.
Still, at a current cost of about $50 million per satellite, which is about half the full budget for launching and operating them, the cost to American taxpayers will only grow as the program becomes a permanent fixture of the federal budget. The projected life span of each satellite tops out at five years, Tournear said, meaning the entire fleet will have to be replaced at regular intervals.
The Washington Post · by Karoun Demirjian · July 19, 2022
23. Ukraine Faces Difficulties Getting Western Weapons to Front Lines
Photos at the link.
Ukraine Faces Difficulties Getting Western Weapons to Front Lines
The country has been given multiple complex systems with not much in common
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-faces-difficulties-getting-western-weapons-to-front-lines-11658223001
By Stephen FidlerFollow
July 19, 2022 5:30 am ET
Western weapons are now in action in the battle for Ukraine. But getting them into operation on the front lines is creating serious headaches for Ukraine’s military.
Ukrainian officials have depicted Western arms as essential in their efforts to turn the tide of the war against Russia, which has in recent months been making grinding territorial gains—and they want more. Until recently, Ukraine has been dependent on heavy weapons built or derived from Soviet-era systems, of which Russia has better equipment in much greater numbers.
More modern and effective Western weapons, particularly long-range artillery pieces, are now in the fight. They are already making a difference, allowing precision Ukrainian strikes on important ammunition dumps, air-defense infrastructure and command centers deep behind the lines that are disrupting the Russian offensive.
Ukrainian troops load a French Caesar howitzer. NATO is attempting to standardize nations’ equipment so it becomes interchangeable.
PHOTO: STRINGER/REUTERS
But absorbing this new equipment, coming in dribs and drabs from different Western countries, into the Ukrainian army is proving a serious challenge.
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“The current approach by which each country donates a battery of guns in a piecemeal way is rapidly turning into a logistical nightmare for Ukrainian forces with each battery requiring a separate training, maintenance and logistics pipeline,” said the Royal United Services Institute, a London defense and security think tank, earlier this month.
The Western artillery being absorbed by the Ukrainian military include M777 towed howitzers from the U.S., Australia and Canada, and self-propelled howitzers such as the Caesar from France and the Panzerhaubitze 2000, or PzH 2000, from Germany—as well as the U.S. M109 and the AHS Krab from Poland.
“None of these systems have that much commonality…Ammunition should be interchangeable, etc. But that’s not the case,” said Jack Watling, a co-author of the report, based in part on interviews with Ukrainian military and intelligence officials.
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U.S.-supplied M777s require specialized training to operate and maintain and different supply chains for parts.
PHOTO: CPL. AUSTIN FRALEY/U.S. MARINE CORPS/REUTERS
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has attempted to standardize equipment such as ammunition—under standardization agreements known as Stanags—so that it becomes interchangeable between nations and benefits from economies of scale. But these efforts at standardization have had limited effect.
NATO has more than 1,000 Stanags that set common military standards for processes and materials but it is up to each ally to decide which to implement. A NATO official pointed out that NATO leaders agreed at last month’s summit in Madrid to help Ukraine in its transition from Soviet-era weapons to modern NATO weapons.
It isn’t just different types of weapons that Ukraine has been given. Its military must also learn to handle and maintain Western weapons, which are more complicated to operate and maintain than those they have been using up to now. “When you transition to non-Soviet-origin platforms you begin to have to deal with a lot of things that were not in play before,” said Scott Boston, a senior defense analyst at Rand Corp.
“A lot of the Ukrainian stuff is legacy—40-year-old vehicles that you fix with a hammer and a wrench, brute force, lubricants and prayer. If you think about how a mechanic fixes a modern consumer automobile—with a hand-held computer that you hook up to read the sensors inside the vehicle—it is going to be different,” he said.
NATO Military Spending Amid the Ukraine War, Explained
NATO Military Spending Amid the Ukraine War, Explained
Play video: NATO Military Spending Amid the Ukraine War, Explained
Some NATO members are upgrading their military capabilities and increasing defense budgets as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues. Analysts say jet fighters and air defense systems are in demand, but some weapons could take years to be delivered. Illustration: Ryan Trefes
The complexity is a trade-off for better performance, said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe who is now with the Center for European Policy Analysis. “To achieve the higher level of capability that Western systems have, there is a level of complexity that’s needed involving hydraulics, electronics, of the weapons systems as well as the ammunition that’s needed to get to extra precision and range,” he said.
According to Mr. Watling, this is a nonexhaustive list of the issues Ukraine faces in handling different artillery systems.
Some are 39-calibre systems and some are 52-calibre, giving them different ranges. They have different spare parts and maintenance requirements, different loading mechanisms and require different charges. They may use their own proprietary computers, leading to questions about data transfer, and some have proprietary shells. There are different training requirements to operate and maintain the systems, and different supply chains for parts.
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A tank with German Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers. The weapons are heavy and some bridges in Ukraine may not be strong enough to bear their weight.
PHOTO: GREGOR FISCHER/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Because some of these systems are provided in such small numbers, there aren’t enough pieces to rotate in and out of the front line for maintenance and therefore they have to be withdrawn when they break down. Multiple artillery pieces with different capabilities also create challenges for command-and-control systems and battlefield commanders.
Another issue is spares, said Mr. Boston. With its Soviet-era weapons, the Ukrainians can cannibalize old or disused equipment for repairs. “There are no spares other than what they have received” for the Western equipment, he said.
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Some artillery systems now being operated by Ukraine are particularly challenging, in particular the powerful and capable German PzH 2000, which has—among other things—very specific requirements for loading charges. Ukrainian troops needed some 40 days of training to operate and maintain the system. At 57 metric tons, it is also heavier than most Soviet-derived equipment, meaning that some bridges aren’t strong enough to bear its weight, potentially complicating its journey into the battlefield.
With only 12 such platforms being sent by Germany and the Netherlands, the transport problem is limited for now. But weight would be a factor if Western nations began to send in their battle tanks, which weigh upward of 60 metric tons—though that seems unlikely for now.
No Western analyst argues that Ukraine would be better without these new systems. But Mr. Watling believes Ukraine’s Western supporters should draw a lesson with future supplies, for example of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and try to limit the numbers of different systems being supplied.
Ukrainian troops on American self-propelled howitzers in the Donetsk region, Ukraine.
PHOTO: GLEB GARANICH/REUTERS
Write to Stephen Fidler at stephen.fidler@wsj.com
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
News and insights on Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the West’s response, selected by the editors
24. U.S. Himars Help to Hold Off Russian Advance, Ukraine Says
U.S. Himars Help to Hold Off Russian Advance, Ukraine Says
Long-range artillery is stabilizing the front line, Ukraine’s military chief says, ahead of a planned counteroffensive in southern Ukraine
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-long-range-weapons-are-helping-hold-back-russian-advance-ukraine-says-11658229644
By Isabel ColesFollow
and Evan GershkovichFollow
Updated July 19, 2022 5:07 pm ET
U.S.-supplied long-range artillery has helped stabilize the front line with Russia in the east of the country, the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces said, as his troops geared up for a counteroffensive to retake territory in the south.
After weeks of grueling combat in eastern Ukraine that culminated in Russian forces claiming control over the Luhansk region, the arrival of U.S. mobile rocket launchers, known as Himars, last month has strengthened Kyiv’s hand.
“It is difficult, tense, but completely under control,” said Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valeriy Zaluzhny, who said he discussed the situation on the battlefield with Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a post on his Telegram channel Tuesday, Mr. Zaluzhny cited Himars as an “important factor contributing to our retention of defensive lines and positions.”
Along with other heavy weapons systems from North Atlantic Treaty Organization members in recent weeks, Himars have enabled Ukraine to strike Russian bases far behind the front lines, including ammunition and fuel depots.
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Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on Monday told a group of Russian troops to make Ukraine’s long-range weaponry a priority target, in a sign that Ukraine’s additional firepower is taking a toll on Moscow’s forces. While the new weapons systems are raising costs for Russia, Western officials say it is unclear whether they will enable Kyiv to alter the course of the conflict completely.
In his overnight address, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the country’s forces had inflicted “significant logistical losses” on Russia, making it increasingly difficult for them to hold positions in captured territory.
A towed howitzer near a front line in eastern Ukraine.
PHOTO: GLEB GARANICH/REUTERS
But absorbing this new equipment, coming in dribs and drabs from different Western countries, into the Ukrainian army is proving a serious challenge.
Ukrainian forces have been chipping away at Russian lines in the south while mobilizing troops for a broader counteroffensive to regain a strategically vital area along the Black Sea.
Kyiv’s southern push seeks to draw Russian forces away from the east, free up the country’s southern ports that once exported billions of dollars of wheat, and disrupt the land bridge Moscow has sought to establish between Russia, Crimea and onward to the European Union’s doorstep.
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The U.K.’s Ministry of Defense said Russian planners now faced a dilemma between deploying reserves to the Donbas area or shoring up positions around Kherson in southwestern Ukraine.
Cute Dogs, Bono and Ads: Ukraine’s PR Strategy to Rally Global Support
Cute Dogs, Bono and Ads: Ukraine’s PR Strategy to Rally Global Support
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Ukraine’s government has ushered in a new era of public relations since the start of the war, using tactics including filming dogs on the battlefield and teaming up with celebrities to help secure funds and weapons to take on Russia. WSJ explains. Photo Composite: Emily Siu
On Tuesday, Ukraine struck the only bridge linking the occupied southern city of Kherson to the rest of Russian-held territory south of the Dnipro river. A Moscow-installed official in Kherson told Russian state news agency TASS that the bridge had been damaged in four places but wasn’t destroyed. Kherson was the first major city to fall in the invasion and it remains a linchpin of Russia’s occupation of southern Ukraine.
Since the start of the invasion, Ukraine has recaptured more than 1,000 villages and towns, Mr. Zelensky said, mainly in the north of the country, following Russia’s withdrawal from around the capital, Kyiv, in March.
More than 2,621 towns and villages remain under Russian control, he said, urging Ukrainians to maintain contact with people there. “Russia keeps most of them in an information vacuum,” Mr. Zelensky said.
Ukraine also on Tuesday named Oleksandr Klymenko, a detective at the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, as a new specialized anticorruption prosecutor, a role required by the EU in Ukraine’s push for membership of the bloc. Demonstrating progress in fighting corruption is one of Kyiv’s long-term commitments to its Western partners. Mr. Klymenko’s appointment must be ratified by Ukraine’s prosecutor general. The holder of that role was removed by Mr. Zelensky over the weekend.
As the West ferries long-range weapons into Ukraine, Russia’s military has stepped up missile strikes on positions deep inside the country, far from the front lines. Some of these strikes have led to mass casualties.
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A Ukrainian soldier shows video from his phone of his first night operating Himars.
PHOTO: EMANUELE SATOLLI FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The death toll in a Russian rocket attack on a city in central Ukraine last week rose to 25, including three children. A neurologist who was wounded in the strike on Vinnytsia while receiving patients at a clinic later died in the hospital, said Serhiy Borzov, head of the regional military administration.
Russia has repeatedly said its forces don’t target civilians. However, British intelligence says a shortage of more modern precision strike weapons is likely to result in further civilian casualties.
White House national security adviser John Kirby said Tuesday that the U.S. was planning to provide another aid package to Ukraine later in the week that would include more Himars and ammunition.
Mr. Kirby also accused Russia of using an “annexation playbook, very similar to the one we saw in 2014” in Crimea, to siphon off additional Ukrainian territory. “We know their next moves,” he said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin in February recognized the independence of Moscow-created proxy states in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region and began issuing Russian passports and introduced the ruble in occupied parts of Ukraine’s south, where Russian-appointed authorities say they are working on referendums to annex those territories.
Mr. Putin traveled to Tehran on Tuesday to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, in only his second trip abroad since the invasion of Ukraine.
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Mr. Putin’s trip came just days after President Biden’s own tour of the Middle East and was intended to signal that the protracted and costly war in Ukraine hasn’t diminished Moscow’s place on the world stage.
A grave digger covers the coffin of a woman who was killed in a Russian rocket attack on the outskirts of Pokrovsk, eastern Ukraine.
PHOTO: NARIMAN EL-MOFTY/ASSOCIATED PRESS
In Washington, Ukraine’s first lady, Olena Zelenska, met with first lady Jill Biden at the White House on Tuesday and was also greeted by Mr. Biden upon her arrival. Ms. Zelenska has held meetings with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other high-level U.S. officials in Washington this week and is scheduled to deliver remarks to lawmakers at the Capitol on Wednesday.
People wait on an evacuation bus in Kramatorsk, eastern Ukraine.
PHOTO: NARIMAN EL-MOFTY/ASSOCIATED PRESS
A crater left by a Russian missile strike in Dnipro, Ukraine.
PHOTO: VINCENZO CIRCOSTA/ZUMA PRESS
Mr. Blinken is expected to point to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an urgent reason for governments to cooperate more closely on the international supply chain, according to State Department officials.
At a virtual meeting on Wednesday with representatives from more than a dozen countries, Mr. Blinken is also set to emphasize the need to reduce dependence on petroleum and natural gas from countries deemed unreliable, instead focusing on trade in clean-energy products, those officials said.
In Russia, authorities have sought to control the information space and shield the population from the scale of the conflict, referring to the invasion as a “special military operation” and blocking foreign social-media networks like Facebook and Instagram since the first weeks of the war.
On Monday, a Moscow court fined Google 21.77 billion rubles, equivalent to $392 million, saying the company systematically failed to remove information banned in Russia, the country’s state news agencies reported. The court cited a statement from Russia’s state communications regulator, Roskomnadzor, last month, according to the news agencies, which said that Google-owned YouTube has purposefully disseminated false information.
Alphabet Inc.-owned Google didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
Ken Thomas contributed to this article.
Write to Isabel Coles at isabel.coles@wsj.com and Evan Gershkovich at evan.gershkovich@wsj.com
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