​Quotes of the Day:

​"​The blind heart is worse than the blind eye,​ ​​​​​And the half-truth more dangerous than the lie. ​"​

​- ​Jan Struther

"The realization that we are all basically the same human beings who seek happiness and try to avoid suffering is very helpful in developing a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood; a warm feeling of love and compassion for others." 

- Tenzin Gyatso, 14th Dalai Lama

​"​It’s possible to fight intolerance, stupidity, and fanaticism when they come separately. When you get all three together it’s probably wiser to get out, if only to preserve your sanity.​"

- ​P. D. James, the protagonist Adam Dalgliesh speaking, in Devices and Desires (1989)

​1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 7 (Putin's War)

2.  Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (07.10.22) CDS comments on key events 

3. Massive blast cripples parts of Crimea-Russia bridge, in blow to Putin's war effort

4.  Himars Transform the Battle for Ukraine—and Modern Warfare

5. America’s Military Faces a ‘Window of Maximum Danger’

6. Educating Maritime Geostrategists for the Naval Services

7. U.S. Maritime Industry’s Expanded Reach is Not Without its Risks

8. A Marine who hated Muslims went to a mosque to plant a bomb. His intended victims ended up saving his life

9. The personal is political: Iran protests for a normal life

10. Putin confronted by insider over Ukraine war, U.S. intelligence finds

11. Experts: Russia finding new ways to spread propaganda videos

12. Russia must return Kuril Islands to Japan - Ukraine’s Parliament

13. The CIA Thought Putin Would Quickly Conquer Ukraine. Why Did They Get It So Wrong?

14. White House Tightens Rules on Counterterrorism Drone Strikes

15.  How much do Russians really support Putin and the war in Ukraine?

16. Special Operations Forces: Better Data Necessary to Improve Oversight and Address Command and Control Challenges

17. FBI and CISA Publish a PSA on Information Manipulation Tactics for 2022 Midterm Elections

18. Analysis | Washington’s Asia strategy leading up to the midterms: Keep calm and carry on

19. The U.S Army's Security Force Assistance Triad: Security Force Assistance Brigades, Special Forces and the State Partnership Program

20, 25 NC counties, including Wake, become ‘unconventional warfare exercise' site as Fort Bragg launches annual Special Forces test

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 7 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7

Key Takeaways

• Western and Russian reports of fractures within the Kremlin are gaining traction within the Russian information space, undermining the appearance of stability of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may have waited to announce that he had replaced Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Aleksandr Chaiko until he needed to use Chaiko as a scapegoat for Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman, Donetsk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces likely continued counteroffensive operations along the Kreminna-Svatove road in western Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued to establish defensive positions in northern Kherson Oblast, and Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing battles north and northwest of Kherson City.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast.
• Anecdotal reports of poor conditions for mobilized personnel in the Russian information space are continuing to fuel the accurate narrative of Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) incompetence.
• Russian officials offered basic concessions for mobilized men and their families on October 7 but continue to rely on local governments and other non-federal institutions to provide support, including food and training, to newly mobilized men.
• Russian occupation authorities in Donetsk Oblast are continuing to forcibly mobilize Ukrainian civilians, belying Russian claims that residents of newly-annexed territories will not be mobilized.
• Ukrainian officials in newly liberated Kharkiv Oblast continue to uncover Russian torture chambers and other human rights abuses.
• Russian occupation officials have likely failed to repair necessary civilian infrastructure in occupied and illegally-annexed parts of Ukraine in time for winter as temperatures drop.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 7

Oct 7, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 7, 9:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Western and Russian reports of fractures within the Kremlin are gaining traction within the Russian information space, undermining the appearance of stability of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime. The Washington Post reported that US intelligence obtained information that a member of Putin’s inner circle directly criticized Putin’s “extensive military shortcomings” during the war in Ukraine, and other Western and Kremlin-affiliated officials noted rising criticism of Putin’s mishandling of the war and mobilization.[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that there have been debates in the Kremlin regarding mobilization in a statement to The Washington Post but denied all allegations of a member of the Kremlin confronting Putin. ISW cannot verify any of these reports are real or assess the likelihood that these arguments or fractures will change Putin’s mind about continuing the war, let alone if they will destabilize his regime. Word of fractures within Putin’s inner circle have reached the hyper-patriotic and nationalist milblogger crowd, however, undermining the impression of strength and control that Putin has sought to portray throughout his reign.

Some Russian milbloggers have begun speculating that there are two factions within the Kremlin following Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Private Military Company financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s harsh criticism of the Russian higher military command.[2] A milblogger told his nearly one million readers that Kadyrov and Prigozhin are part of the faction that seeks to continue the war and accomplish its ideological goals regardless of cost. The milblogger noted that the faction opposed to them consisted of government officials who wish to negotiate with the West to save their assets and residences in the West but are too afraid to confront Putin directly. The milblogger expressed hope that the pro-war faction will defeat the faction that fails to see that Russia cannot afford to end the war.

The presentation of fundamental disagreements within Putin’s inner circle and challenges to his decisions, even if quiet, within the Russian nationalist space risks depicting Putin as weak and not fully in control of his government. The truth or falseness of that presentation is less important than its injection into the audiences on which Putin most relies for continued support in his war. Putin himself may have externalized his own concerns about this break in the façade of his power and of the unanimity of his trusted senior officials in an odd exchange with a teacher on October 5.[3] Putin asked the teacher how he taught his students about the causes of the Pugachev Rebellion that challenged Catherine the Great in the mid-1770s.[4] The teacher, from Izhevsk, one of the towns that Pugachev captured during his revolt, offered answers that did not satisfy Putin, including the observation that the rebellion had occurred because of the appearance of “a leader who could capitalize on a wave of dissatisfaction,” and that the lesson to be drawn from that episode of history was “that it is necessary to respect the views of other members of society.” Putin offered his own answer: “The leader [Pugachev] claimed to be tsar. And how did that arise? Why was that possible?...Because of the element of weakening of the central power.”[5] The exchange was bizarre and fascinating since there is no reason Pugachev’s Rebellion should have been on Putin’s mind at this time, nor any reason for him to worry about someone else “claiming to be tsar.”—unless, of course, Putin himself perceives a weakening of the central power, i.e., himself.[6]

Kadyrov and Prigozhin will likely attempt to make minor ground advances in Donetsk Oblast to maintain their prominence and reputation in the nationalist and proxy information spaces. Russian forces have been making incremental advances around Bakhmut and Avdiivka between October 6 and October 7, likely with the support of Wagner and Kadyrov’s elements in the area. Some milbloggers and Ukrainian officials reported that Prigozhin committed 1,000 of his troops to strengthen positions in Lysychansk to secure Russian frontlines following the collapse of the Lyman frontline.[7] Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin even awarded Kadyrov the title of hero of the DNR.[8] The claims about Kadyrov and Prigozhin making gains and preparing to save the day coincides with Kremlin efforts to improve the reputation of the Commander of the Central Military District, Colonel-General Alexander Lapin whom they both attacked earlier.[9] Milbloggers even reported meeting Lapin, who is now reportedly commanding the Svatove-Kreminna frontline in Luhansk Oblast.[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin may have waited to announce that he had replaced Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Aleksandr Chaiko until Putin could use Chaiko as a scapegoat for Russian military failures in Kharkiv and Lyman. Russian media reported on October 7 that Putin replaced Chaiko with Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov. Chaiko is the second military district commander to be replaced since the Russian lines in Kharkiv collapsed—Putin replaced the Western Military District commander on October 3, as ISW previously reported.[11] Oddly, Russian milbloggers first reported that Muradov had replaced Chaiko on September 4, but the Kremlin has yet to formally confirm the appointment.[12] State-run and independent media outlets quoted the governor of Dagestan congratulating Muradov on his appointment and cited an entry in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities to confirm the replacement.[13] Muradov had previously commanded the eastern grouping of Russian forces in Ukraine, which is likely comprised of elements of the EMD, as of July.[14]

Key Takeaways

• Western and Russian reports of fractures within the Kremlin are gaining traction within the Russian information space, undermining the appearance of stability of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may have waited to announce that he had replaced Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Aleksandr Chaiko until he needed to use Chaiko as a scapegoat for Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman, Donetsk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces likely continued counteroffensive operations along the Kreminna-Svatove road in western Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued to establish defensive positions in northern Kherson Oblast, and Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing battles north and northwest of Kherson City.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast.
• Anecdotal reports of poor conditions for mobilized personnel in the Russian information space are continuing to fuel the accurate narrative of Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) incompetence.
• Russian officials offered basic concessions for mobilized men and their families on October 7 but continue to rely on local governments and other non-federal institutions to provide support, including food and training, to newly mobilized men.
• Russian occupation authorities in Donetsk Oblast are continuing to forcibly mobilize Ukrainian civilians, belying Russian claims that residents of newly-annexed territories will not be mobilized.
• Ukrainian officials in newly liberated Kharkiv Oblast continue to uncover Russian torture chambers and other human rights abuses.
• Russian occupation officials have likely failed to repair necessary civilian infrastructure in occupied and illegally-annexed parts of Ukraine in time for winter as temperatures drop.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to counterattack from Kharkiv Oblast in the direction of Svatove on October 7. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian advances on settlements east and southeast of Kupyansk.[15] Russian forces continued to shell Kupyansk and settlements in its vicinity.[16]

Ukrainian forces likely continued counteroffensive operations along the Kreminna-Svatove road in western Luhansk Oblast on October 7. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attempt at crossing the Zherebets River in an unspecified area in the Lyman direction.[17] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that heavy fighting is ongoing in unnamed settlements in Luhansk Oblast and noted that Russian forces are realizing the vulnerability of their defensive positions in Svatove.[18] Haidai added that Russian forces are mining infrastructure in Svatove and are stealing medical equipment from the settlement while calling on residents to evacuate.[19] Haidai added that Russian officers abandoned mobilized servicemembers in Kreminna.[20] Russian milbloggers reported that Central Military District Commander Colonel-General Alexandr Lapin is overseeing the situation on the Kreminna-Svatove stretch, especially Russian preparation of defensive positions in the area.[21]Russian sources claimed that Russian volunteer units BARS-16 and BARS-13 and elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division are entrenching their positions and uploaded footage of a military convoy reportedly moving in the direction of Svatove.[22] Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed that 1,000 Wagner soldiers redeployed to Lysychansk to prevent Ukrainian breakthroughs in the area following the fall of Lyman.[23]

Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful assaults north of Kharkiv City on October 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on Krasne, approximately 30km northeast of Kharkiv City.[24]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Russian forces continued to establish defensive positions in northern Kherson Oblast on October 7. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces continued to shell settlements in northern Kherson Oblast in an effort to prevent Ukrainian advances in the southern direction and fired S-300 air-defense missiles at ground targets in liberated settlements.[25] Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian forces have urgently redeployed troops from Nova Kakhovka to Beryslav and emphasized that Russian forces still have the ability to cross the Dnipro River.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance into Russian positions in Pyatokhatki, Sadok, Ishchenka, and Bezimenne.[27] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are forming defensive lines along the Sukhyi Stavok-Borozenske-Sukhanove-Mylove line, running from the Inhulets River to Dnipro River.[28] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are still operating in Sukhy Stavok, however.[29]

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing battles north and northwest of Kherson City on October 7. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the direction of Zeleny Hai-Ternovi Pody (approximately 30km northwest of Kherson City) three times.[30] The Russian MoD and milbloggers, in turn, claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions in Ternovi Pody.[31] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces are consistently firing at Ukrainian forces in Pravdyne and Soldatske, and along the E58 (M14) highway.[32] Russian forces are also fortifying positions northwest of Kherson City by having the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 127th Regiment dig trenches in Kyselivka.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Maksymivka, about 33km due north of Kherson City.[34] Mykolaiv Oblast Administration Head Vitaliy Kim also stated that Russian command may have left Snihurivka (approximately 60km east of Mykolaiv City) but noted that he cannot confirm this information at this time.[35]

Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast to support their southern counteroffensive. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an area of Russian force concentration in Borozenske (approximately 45km northeast of Nova Kakhovka), killing 10 servicemen and wounding 20.[36] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian ammunition depots in northern Kherson and southeastern Mykolaiv Oblasts and shot down a Russian Ka-52 helicopter.[37] Social media users reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian positions in Chornobaivka (northwest of Kherson City) and noted a gas pipe explosion in Kalanchak in southern Kherson Oblast.[38] Social media footage also showed the aftermath of a reported strike on a civilian mini-bus crossing the Inhulets River in Dariivka; Russian-appointed occupation officials blamed Ukrainian forces for the attack.[39]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued conducting ground attacks throughout Donetsk Oblast on October 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Bakhmut, to the northeast near Vyimka, Bakhmutske, and Krasna Hora and to the south near Andriivka and Mayorsk.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults around Avdiivka near Kamianka and Vesele to the north, Pervomaiske to the west, and Nevelske to the southwest.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults in western Donetsk Oblast near Pobieda and Novomykhaililvka.[42] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) claimed that Russian and allied forces seized Otradivka, Vesela Dolyna, and Zaitseve, all south of Bakhmut, and geolocated footage showed that Russian forces entered Zaitseve on October 7.[43] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance on Soledar and Bakhmutske.[44]A Russian source claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances toward Pervomaiske.[45] Russian sources claimed that the Russian 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), which is subordinate to the 58th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District, stormed Ukrainian positions in Mariinka, and that unspecified Russian forces are advancing towards Novomykhailivka and Pobieda, south of Marinka in western Donetsk Oblast.[46] The 42nd MRD is based in Chechnya.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 7. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City, Mykolaiv City, and unspecified areas of Odesa Oblast with drones.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also struck Slavhorod, Zaporizhia Oblast, 95km north of the front line.[48] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued routine shelling of Nikopol and Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the northern bank of the Dnipro River.[49]

A Russian source expressed continued concern that Ukrainian forces are preparing to imminently launch a counteroffensive on the Zaporizhia Oblast front line.[50] The source claimed that Ukrainian officials and forces are conducting an information operation to mislead Russian forces about the probability of an offensive so Russian forces will transfer manpower away from other parts of the front line.[51] Ukrainian officials have made no concrete statements about a Ukrainian counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast and have certainly not been conducting an information operation to that effect that ISW has been able to observe. It is more likely that Russian milbloggers have run an information operation on themselves by constantly repeating warnings of an imminent attack.

Russian and Ukrainian sources traded accusations of shelling the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant in Enerhodar, temporarily cutting power to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on October 7.[52] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that shelling damaged a power line, forcing the ZNPP to temporarily rely on its emergency diesel generators.[53] IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi announced that the IAEA successfully rotated out its observers at the ZNPP, indicating that Russian occupation authorities are still allowing IAEA access to the plant despite ongoing tensions.[54]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

ISW cannot confirm how representative ongoing anecdotal reports of poor conditions for mobilized personnel are of the experience of the 300,000 or more mobilized Russian men. However, the prevalence of those anecdotes in the Russian information space is damaging the Kremlin by continuing to fuel the accurate narrative of Kremlin and MoD incompetence. Poor conditions could also be a driving force behind reported defections, surrenders, and strikes by mobilized personnel. Ukrainian intelligence officials told reporters that over 2,000 Russians contacted Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” surrender hotline since partial mobilization was announced on September 21.[55] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 7 that it intercepted a call wherein a Russian soldier told his wife that 60 of the 65 mobilized men in his unit disappeared without a trace on their second day at the frontlines.[56] Independent Russian media outlet Sota reported on October 6 that 100 mobilized men from Bryansk Oblast who were deployed to Belgorod Oblast refused to fight in Lyman because they had not received the training or duty assignments they were promised.[57] Around 500 Russian servicemembers in Livenka, Belgorod Oblast had called for a strike on October 5 due to unbearable living conditions.[58] Belgorod Oblast Governor Ivan Budlov announced that he sent 299 servicemembers to a different training ground on October 6 with better weapons, food, and medics, demonstrating that public pressure surrounding the conditions of the mobilized is forcing Russian government officials to make at least sporadic concessions.[59]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to defend itself from popular criticism of its training of mobilized personnel by sharing the announcement of a new “Russian Center for Mobilization Training” on October 7.[60] The new center will provide “educational activities for additional professional programs in the field of mobilization training and mobilization,” per the government decree, but is capped at 69 employees—an absurdly small number of trainers for the 300,000 men that the MoD claims it will mobilize under “partial mobilization.” The announcement is primarily a public relations stunt that will not alter Russian force generation capabilities in the coming months. The center is not subordinated to the MoD but rather to the Main Directorate for Special Programs of the President of the Russian Federation, which is technically in charge of mobilization. The center’s existence may or may not affect the Kremlin’s long-term ability to mobilize more capable personnel but is extraordinarily unlikely to improve those capabilities in the short term due to the ongoing bureaucratic incompetence of the MoD and its demonstrated shortages of training personnel.

Russian officials offered basic concessions for mobilized men and their families on October 7 but continue to rely on local governments and other non-federal institutions to provide support, including food and training, to newly mobilized men. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two laws on October 7 exempting mobilized personnel and other participants in his “special military operation” from accruing penalties for late payments for housing, communal services, loans, and credit card debts.[61] Such payment holidays may cost the Russian federal government little in the short term, but the Kremlin likely hopes that such “concessions” will limit criticism of mobilization. The governors of Leningrad and Nizhny Novgorod Oblasts canceled planned celebrations of mass holidays, including New Year celebrations.[62] Russian outlets reported that holiday funds would be used to support the invasion of Ukraine and mobilized men and their families. The Union of Veterans of Belgorod announced on October 7 that it is working with a public organization for the promotion of patriotism, “Patria,” to ask the Belgorod Oblast government to allow both organizations to assist in organizing basic military training courses for mobilized residents of Belgorod Oblast.[63] The Union reported that veterans and specialists are currently developing a curriculum and that they are receiving support from other veterans’ groups. The Union claimed that it hopes to spread the initiative to Kursk Oblast.

Some Russian citizens continued to express their dissatisfaction with Russia’s “partial mobilization” on October 6-7. Social media users circulated a video of a man who lit two cars on fire in Moscow on October 6 using Molotov cocktails while shouting anti-war slogans.[64] Russian authorities quickly detained him. An unidentified person threw a Molotov cocktail at a military enlistment office in Simferopol in Russian-occupied Crimea on October 7.[65] And RT reported that Russian officials detained two university students for distributing anti-mobilization and anti-war leaflets in Russia’s Ryazan Oblast on October 7.[66]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Russian occupation authorities in Donetsk Oblast are continuing to forcibly mobilize civilians, belying Russian claims that residents of newly-annexed territories will not be mobilized.[67] The General Staff said that in Horlivka, occupation authorities are targeting residents who did not support Russia’s illegal annexation and are detaining men who try to avoid mobilization to forcibly mobilize them into the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) 1st Army Corps. Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on October 7 that Russian officials issued mobilization summons to Mariupol men who work at a metallurgical plant in Russia’s Lipetsk Oblast.[68] The men had previously obtained Russian passports through an accelerated citizenship process for residents of Russian-occupied areas.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian officials in newly-liberated Kharkiv Oblast continue to report Russian torture chambers and other human rights abuses, further confirming ISW’s previous assessments that the atrocities uncovered in Bucha, Izyum, and elsewhere were not isolated war crimes but rather a microcosm of Russian atrocities throughout Russian-occupied areas.[69] The head of the Investigative Department of the State Police in the Kharkiv Oblast, Serhiy Bolvinov, reported that Ukrainian forces have so far discovered 22 Russian torture chambers in Kharkiv Oblast as of October 6.[70] He reported that Russian forces used electric shocks, severe beatings, suffocation, and tearing out fingernails as common methods of torture against local civilians.

ISW Non-Resident Fellow Nataliya Bugayova warned in April 2022 that “Bucha is an observable microcosm of a deliberate Russian terror campaign against Ukrainians. Similar intentional atrocities are happening throughout Russian-occupied areas in Ukraine.”[71] Ukrainian officials will likely continue to find evidence of Russian war crimes and atrocities as Ukrainian forces liberate occupied areas.

Russian occupation officials have likely failed to repair necessary civilian infrastructure in occupied and illegally annexed parts of Ukraine as winter approaches and temperatures drop, risking a humanitarian catastrophe. Ukraine’s Resistance Center reported on October 7 that occupation authorities have left half of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast without heating after failing to repair or build new natural gas pipelines.[72] The Center assessed that Russian authorities may not begin work on restoring natural gas supplies to parts of Zaporizhia oblast until the spring.

Ukrainian officials continued to encourage partisan activity in Russia’s illegally-annexed and occupied Ukrainian regions. GUR Representative Vadym Skibitsky stated on October 7 that Ukrainian partisan activity will only intensify in Russian-occupied parts of the country and emphasized that Ukrainian law allows for partisan activity.[73] Skibitsky emphasized that the GUR sees a strong partisan movement in Crimea, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, where partisans are not only eliminating collaborators and sharing intelligence, but also forcing Russian officials to use Rosgvardia and FSB forces to control populations in occupied territories.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[3] http://en dot kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69519

[13] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/10/07/v-vostochnom-voennom-okruge-smenili-komanduyuschego-chetyre-dnya-nazad-stalo-izvestno-o-naznachenii-novogo-komanduyuschego-zapadnym-voennym-okrugom; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/866793; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/10/2022/633fd1469a794733591700b5

[56] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/60-chelovek-propalo-bez-vesty-65-yz-mobylyzovannykh-tolko-pryekhaly-y-na-vtoroi-den-propaly.html

[58] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-oct-5-6 ; https:// t.me/rybar/39798; https:// t.me/mobilizationnews/1107; https://vk.dotcom/video747383270_456239080; https://vk dot .com/wall-172002569_279422

[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/20618; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202210070001; https://t.me/mod_russia/20621; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/Document/View/0001202210070003

[72] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/10/07/okupanty-zalyshyly-okupovanu-chastynu-zaporizhchyny-bez-opalennya/

[73] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/na-tymchasovo-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-ukrainy-rukh-oporu-bude-tilky-posyliuvatysia.html

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (07.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (07.10.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

As of the morning of October 7, 2022, more than 1,207 Ukrainian children are victims of full- scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation, Prosecutor General's Office reports. The official number of children who died and were wounded during the Russian aggression is 418, and more than 789 children, respectively. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories.

The Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine is working to return 32 children deported to Russia whose parents remain in Ukraine. Deputy Prime Minister - Minister for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories Iryna Vereshchuk also said that there are recorded facts of Ukrainian children deported to Russia being illegally adopted. She added that such [adoption] parents would be prosecuted for illegal adoption. As of September 20, Vereshchuk reported that the Russian invaders took at least 2,100 Ukrainian children deprived of parental care to the Russian Federation.

Overall, 2,608 educational institutions were damaged due to bombing and shelling by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Of them, 313 were completely destroyed.

Deputy Minister of Culture and Information Policy Kateryna Chuyeva said at the briefing that As of October 6, the Ministry had verified damage to 161 objects of cultural heritage, 23 monuments of national importance, 129 monuments of local importance, 143 objects of valuable historical buildings and 9 newly discovered objects. Chuyeva emphasized that in total, the Ministry established 540 episodes of the destruction of cultural infrastructure, including heritage sites, institutions and religious buildings.

During the last day, the Russian military shelled seven regions of Ukraine, as reported in the October 7 morning round-up of Oblasts Military Administrations.

In Kharkiv Oblast, during the past day, the Russian military shelled the districts of Kupyansk (2 wounded), Chuguyiv (2 wounded), and Izyum (4 wounded). In Kupyansk, there was a fire on the territory of a furniture workshop. A 47-year-old woman was wounded in the Izyum district. She stepped on a mine while picking mushrooms in the forest.

Early in the morning, the enemy attacked two districts of Zaporizhzhia, using kamikaze drones for the first time [on Zaporizhzhia]. 1 wounded civilian and damaged infrastructure facilities were reported. In the afternoon, the Russian military shelled the residential sector of Zaporizhzhia again, the secretary of the city council, Anatoliy Kurtev, said. One of the enemy projectiles fell into the courtyard of a high-rise apartment building, damaging the building and utility networks.

The number of victims of yesterday's rocket attacks on residential buildings in Zaporizhzhia increased to 11 people killed. More than two dozen people were rescued from under the rubble, reported State Emergency Service.

In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, the Russian military again shelled the Nikopol district all night. In Nikopol, several high-rise buildings, more than ten private houses, commercial buildings, a transport infrastructure enterprise, gas pipelines and electricity networks were damaged.

As the result of the evening shelling of Nikopol district - 1 dead civilian and 1 wounded were reported.

In Sumy Oblast, the enemy shelled Bilopolska, Novoslobidska, Shalyginska, and Velikopysarivska communities. A cultural center and a residential building were damaged in the Novoslobidska community.

At night, the enemy attacked Mykolaiv, according to the preliminary information, with kamikaze drones. The roof of a two-story building was on fire. The Mykolaiv and Bashtan districts of the region were also under fire. A civilian infrastructure facility, residential buildings, and an agricultural enterprise were damaged.

According to the mayor Oleksandr Sienkovych, in Mykolaiv, since the beginning of the war, 138 civilians have died, including one child, and another 688 people have been seriously injured. Out of 225 days of full-scale war, Russian terrorists did not shell Mykolaiv for only 35 days.

As the mayor reported, the Russian occupiers damaged 77 educational institutions, 22 cultural institutions, 17 medical institutions and 15 sports facilities in Mykolaiv. In addition, about 1,500 residential buildings were damaged, including more than 600 multi-apartment buildings.

In Donetsk Oblast, on October 6, 2 civilians were killed by enemy shelling: in Bakhmut and Kurdyumivka.

More than 22,000 people, including 3,500 children, have left Donetsk Oblast since the beginning of the mandatory evacuation. Deputy Head of the Office of the President Kyrylo Tymoshenko announced this at a briefing.

In the recently liberated Lyman in Donetsk Oblast, residents reported to the police about 39 burial sites, among them might be both single and group burials; law enforcement officers are investigating the details of the crimes, Donetsk Oblast military administration reports.

The Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Denys Monastyrskyi, announced that in Lyman law enforcement officers found 60 bodies, of which 31 people have been identified so far. According to Monastyrskyi, almost every tenth house in Lyman was utterly destroyed, and half of the houses were seriously damaged.

In the Kherson Oblast, the area liberated by the Ukrainian defenders increased from 400 sq. km to 500 sq. km. There are 29 newly liberated towns and villages, the head of the joint press center

of the operational command "South" Nataliya Humenyuk announced. Currently, the most critical task in the de-occupied villages is to help people prepare for the winter period, they need food and construction materials, and the electricity supply must be restored, the Deputy of the Kherson Regional Council, Serhiy Khlan, said at a briefing.

In the temporarily occupied Crimea, the total number of issued mobilization summonses is about 3,000, of which at least half were given to Crimean Tatars, said the permanent representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic Crimea, Tamila Tasheva, in a comment to the newspaper El País, Ukrinform reports. According to Tasheva, mobilization is a tragedy for the indigenous people of Crimea. "They are either sent to die or forced to leave," she emphasized.

Operational situation

It is the 226th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas").

The enemy is trying to maintain control over the captured territories and concentrates its efforts on disrupting the intensive actions of the Ukrainian Defence Forces in some directions. The enemy continues offensive actions in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions and regroups its troops in the Pivdennyi Buh direction.

The enemy fired at the Ukrainian troops' positions along the contact line. The Russian troops carry out engineering equipment of defensive positions and frontiers in some directions and conduct aerial reconnaissance. The enemy strike at civilian infrastructure and the homes of civilians, violating the norms of International Humanitarian Law, laws and customs of war. The threat of Russian air and missile strikes persists throughout the entire territory of Ukraine. Thus, during the past day, the Russian forces launched 8 missile and 15 air strikes, and carried out more than 70 rounds of anti-aircraft fire. Three enemy Kh-22 cruise missiles did not reach their targets.

The enemy fire affected the civil infrastructure and population of more than 25 Ukrainian towns and villages, including Novomykhailivka, Zaliznychne, Spirne, Davidiv Brid, Blahodativka and Myrne. The Russian military shelled Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv and Nikopol solely with the purpose of destroying the critical infrastructure of the cities and the residential districts. Near the state border, Boyaro-Lezhachi, Mezenivka and Ryzhivka of the Sumy Oblast, and Dvorichne, Zarubivka, Vovchansk, and Gatyshche of the Kharkiv Oblast were shelled from barrel artillery.

Aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out 23 strikes during the past 24 hours. It has been confirmed that an enemy stronghold, 15 areas of concentration of weapons and military equipment, and 7 anti-aircraft missile systems have been hit. In addition, Ukraine's Air defense units shot down more than 20 enemy UAVs, including five Orlan-10, fifteen Shahed-136 and one Mohajer-6.

Overall, Russian troops used a total of 86 Iranian Shahed-136 drones against Ukraine, 60% of which Ukrainian forces have already destroyed.

Over the past day, Ukraine's missile forces and artillery hit 5 areas of concentration of enemy manpower, weapons and military equipment, 5 air defense positions, 2 artillery guns, an ammunition warehouse and a crossing.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RF prepared for the Russian highest military and political leadership a classified report on the situation with ammunition of the main calibers. By the end of this month, the Russian command forecasts the emergence of "a difficult situation with artillery ammunition of the main calibers ... interruptions with mortar ammunition are expected." In particular, this concerns 122-mm and 152-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mines. It is also noted that the nature of possible hostilities directly depends on their pace and the amount of ammunition.

Russian troops began the forced mobilization of Ukrainian citizens in the Russian-occupied Kreminna and Starobilsk regions of Luhansk Oblast. They send Ukrainians of various ages and health conditions to the front lines without proper training and ammunition because Russian forces "benefit from the deaths of Ukrainians, regardless of whose sides we fight because it breaks the mental ties between the regions."

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation demonstratively does not provide the mobilized with even basic military equipment.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the

RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

Ukrainian forces completely liberated the Boriv district of Kharkiv Oblast. The enemy stopped the advance of the Defense Forces in the areas of Dvorichne and Tavilzhanka.

The enemy concentrated in this area grouping consisting of 6-7 BTGs and at least three 3rd artillery divisions, in particular:

- two BTGs of the 55th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 41st Army (they suffered significant losses after a series of counterattacks in the Petropavlivka area),

-   BTG of the 15th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division (MRD) of the 1st Tank Army,

-consolidated BTG of the 59th tank regiment of the 144th MRD of the 20th Army (no more than 14-15 combat-capable tanks),

-BTG of the 252nd motorized rifle regiment of the 3rd MRD of the 20th Army, BTG of the 200th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps of Northern Fleet (the total number is close to a reinforced company).

Their actions are supported by the 2c19 self-propelled artillery battery and the BM-21 "Grad" anti-aircraft missile battery, the "Uragan" anti-aircraft platoon from the Nova Tarasivka area.

A combined battalion from the 18th MRD (11th Army Corps) is preparing a battalion defense area near Verkhnya Duvanka, intending to cover the Troitske - Svatove route.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The enemy fired artillery of various types at the areas of Spirne, Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamianske, Serebryanka and Rozdolivka.

The command of the enemy forces concentrates the troops of the 2nd Army in the area of Kreminna and Svatove. Two BTGs from the 21st separate motorized rifle brigade are fighting with the vanguards of the Ukrainian Defense Forces on the approaches to Kreminnaya. To the north, two BTGs of the 30th separate motorized rifle brigade, which have not yet taken part in hostilities, move to the defense.

The Ukrainian Defense Forces halted their advance 20-30 km from approaching Svatove, reaching the organized defensive positions of the Russian troops. Units of the 30th separate motorized rifle brigade (a BTG) move to the defense at the Raigorodka-Karmazynivka frontier, with the task of stopping the advance of the Defense Forces in the Borova-Svatove direction. A platoon of self- propelled guns 2c3 "Akatsiya" and a platoon of anti-aircraft guns BM-21 "Grad" were deployed south of Svatove.

Ukrainian sabotage reconnaissance groups are active along the P66 route.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy fired at the areas of Soledar, Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar, Kurdyumivka, Opytne, Zaitseve, New York, Maryinka, Shakhtarske, Vodyane and Novomykhailivka. Mercenaries of PMC "Wagner" continue their assault on Zaytseve and have partially captured Vesela Dolyna.

Russian troops continued their attacks to the northeast of Bakhmut in the area of Yakovlivka, Soledar and Bakhmutsky, and to the south of Bakhmut in the area of Odradivka, Mayorsk and Zaitseve. They led battles on the western outskirts of Donetsk - Avdiyivka and conducted ground assaults near Krasnohorivka and Vodyane and near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.

Over the past day, units of the Defense Forces repelled attacks by Russian troops in the areas of Vyimka, Krasne, Bakhmut, Mayorsk, Vesele, Pobieda, Nevelske, and Kamianka.

Five hundred mobilized criminals have arrived to reinforce the Russian army fighting in the temporarily occupied territory of the Donetsk Oblast. Officers from among former Russian law enforcement officers have been appointed commanders of the newly arrived units. In addition, the command of the Russian troops issued an order to confiscate mobile phones from all arriving mobilized personnel.

Zaporizhzhia direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The infrastructure in the areas of Novoukrainka, Novodanylivka, Chervone, Novosilka, Poltavka and Mali Shcherbaky was damaged by enemy shelling.

Ukrainian troops destroyed Russian ammunition depots in Melitopol.

Tavriysk direction

-   Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;

-  Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.

Over twenty-five towns and villages along the contact line suffered from enemy fire damage.

Over the past day, units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine repelled the attacks of the Russian invaders in the area of Ternovi Pody.

Ukrainian troops focused mainly on regrouping in the north of the Kherson Oblast and did not conduct ground attacks on October 6. In addition, on this day, Ukrainian forces attacked with HIMARS anti-aircraft missiles a building in the city of Kherson, where Russian military personnel lived, and the Antonivskyi bridge.

The enemy is equipping defensive positions along the Beryslav-Nova Kakhovka line.

Near Mykolaiv, Ukrainian forces captured a Russian tank unit, including three soldiers: a mechanic-driver who was mobilized with experience of military service in the Russian Airborne Forces, a tank commander from the "Wagner" PMC and a gunner-operator Ukrainian mobilized from Luhansk.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

On October 7, twelve enemy warships and boats were on a mission in the Black Sea, conducting reconnaissance and controlling navigation in the Black Sea waters. Up to 24 Kalibr missiles are

ready for a volley on four carriers: two surface and two underwater (one frigate 1135.6, one "Buyan-M" missile corvette and two submarines of project 636.3). In general, the current activity of the Russian Federation maritime groups is characterized by low intensity. The rocket threat to [the territory of] Ukraine remains high.

In the waters of the Sea of Azov, there are patrol ships and boats on the approaches to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports in order to block the Azov coast.

The enemy continues shelling Ukrainian ports and coastal areas. A Su-35 multi-purpose fighter jet was deployed from the "Gvardiyskyi" military airfield, which carried out two air strikes with Kh-31 missiles on the Mykolaiv Oblast.

The intensity of the movement of military equipment by road and rail transport in Crimea in the direction of the Kherson Oblast remains stably active. From Crimea, railway freight trains arrive on the territory of the Kherson Oblast, unloading military equipment and ammunition at the "Kalanchak", "Brylivka", and "Novooleksiiivka" stations.

"Grain Initiative": On October 7, the bulk carrier NEW ISLAND, chartered by the UN World Food Program (WFP), left the port of Chornomorsk. It has 30,000 tons of wheat for the people of Ethiopia on board. Bulker joined the caravan with two other vessels that left the ports of Odesa and Pivdenny. Together, these vessels will deliver 56,600 tons of wheat and corn to countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. Since the departure of the first ship with Ukrainian food, 6.4 million tons of agricultural products have been exported. A total of 285 ships with food for the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa left Ukrainian ports. In particular, 5 ships that the UN WFP chartered exported more than 150,000 tons of Ukrainian wheat to Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Yemen.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 07.10

Personnel - almost 61,680 people (+350);

Tanks - 2,466 (+17);

Armored combat vehicles – 5,093 (+29);

Artillery systems – 1,455 (+31);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 344 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 177 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,862 (+8); Aircraft - 266 (0);

Helicopters – 233 (+1);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,067 (+20); Intercepted cruise missiles - 246 (0);

Boats / ships - 15 (0).

Ukraine, general news

As of October 1, 2022, Ukraine's international reserves, according to preliminary data, amounted As of October 1, 2022, Ukraine's international reserves, according to preliminary data, amounted

to 23,929.6 million US dollars. In September, they decreased by 5.9% due to the sale of currency by the National Bank on the interbank market, as well as for the country's defense needs and payments to Ukrainians abroad. This was reported by the National Bank of Ukraine.

The number of vacancies is steadily increasing, and the competition is decreasing, reports the Ukrainian job search portal Work.ua. The labor market in Ukraine is gradually shifting from employers to job seekers. The number of current vacancies on Work.ua increased to 56,554 in September (+16% compared to August). In August, the monthly increase was 20%. The top five regions with the highest number of vacancies did not change during the month: Kyiv (16,857 vacancies), Lviv (6,530), Dnipropetrovsk (4,873), Odesa (3,256), and Ivano-Frankivsk (1,974) Oblasts made it to the top 5.

International diplomatic aspect

"We have not faced the prospect of Armageddon since Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Joseph Biden said at a Democratic fundraiser. Putin is "not joking when he talks about the use of tactical nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons," the POTUS warned the audience. However, according to US officials, nothing has changed in the intelligence assessments, for there is no evidence the Russian tyrant has plans to deploy a nuclear weapon imminently. One official explained that the POTUS words should be viewed in the broader sense and growing concerns of the Administration about Putin's threats.

In his annexation speech, Putin blamed the US for deploying nuclear arms against Japan twice, thus setting a precedent. In the meantime, Putin omitted to mention his own country's use of the ultimate weapon in September 1954. A 40 kt nuclear bomb exploded in the air, exposing some 45,000 Soviet troops to the radiation. "Snowball," a typically inhumane Moscow operation, was meant to see the survivability of troops and equipment and their ability to set off to offense shortly after the explosion. The party leaders and top military brass were satisfied with the results, ignoring the "collateral" damage to many of their citizens. The current Moscow leadership is not that different about disregarding human life either of their people or of Ukrainians.

Meanwhile, it's an overstretch to draw parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis, for at that time, there was a possibility of a direct clash between the two superpowers. Under the current circumstances, a nuclear exchange between Moscow and Washington DC might be triggered only in case of a retaliatory strike on Russian territory and escalations spiraling out of control. Therefore, along with warning the Kremlin of catastrophic consequences, the US should engage China and India in amplifying the message.

"The way out of conflict is for Russia to leave Ukraine," Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin explained a possible off-ramp for Vladimir Putin. In sharp contrast to the Finnish formula, Angela Merkel, a former Chancellor of Germany, promotes her failed policies of Russia's privileged role and de facto Moscow's veto over policies towards Ukraine and others. "European security architecture can be developed within the framework of international law, which ultimately

requires the inclusion of . Because as long as we haven't really managed to do this, the Cold War won't really be over either," she said.

So, Angela Merkel sides with Vladimir Putin in his blame game for the alleged guilt of the West for not giving Russia a proper place in Europe. It also means blaming the West (for poking a bear) that Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. She presumes that it is possible to expect either Putin's regime or a successor to obey international law. However, Putin clearly stated that Russia isn't going to honor the rules-based order. The chances of moderates replacing Putin in the Kremlin are slim, while hawks are arguing for a more rigid stance on Ukraine and against the West. The idea of ending the Cold War by integrating Russia as a part of the European security architecture is not feasible because the revisionist power wants precisely the opposite: restoring the Cold War's rules. Angela Merkel might have forgotten that just before launching its full-scale offensive in Ukraine, the Kremlin issued the ultimatum, demanding to disband the European part of NATO and drive the US out of the continent. The former Chancellor fails to admit that her appeasement strategy is part of the problem. Berlin's policies led Germany and Europe to addiction to Russian energy and money. Promoted by Angela Merkel's government, the Partnership for Modernization project helped Putin's regime to enrich itself and gain economic and military strength for wars and aggressive policies. Berlin de facto has been exerting Russia's veto power, denying Georgia and Ukraine's right to collective defense (NATO) and self- defense (Merkel's government weapons ban and Scholz's government self-limitation on types of weapons allowed to send).

The Ukrainian Parliament has adopted a resolution on the necessity to return to Japan its Northern Territories. The document aims at restoring Japan's territorial integrity and historical justice. The Soviet Union attacked Japan in 1945, violating the Neutrality Pact of 1941, which had allowed Moscow not to worry about fighting on two fronts, thus relocating Red Army units and armaments from the far East. After the surrender of Japan, the Soviet Union illegally annexed four Japanese islands (Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu). For years Japan has been trying to negotiate the return of the illegally annexed territories, but Moscow has never been serious about the negotiations. The resolution of the Ukrainian Parliament won't solve the issue, but Ukraine's victory will provide an opportunity for Japan. Restoration of Japan's sovereignty over its Northern territories will result in a peace treaty, thus symbolically putting an end to the Second World War.

The 2022 Nobel Peace Prize was shared by jailed Belarus rights activist Ales Bialiatski, the Russian civil rights group Memorial, and the Ukrainian Centre for Civil Liberties. The laureates "have made an outstanding effort to document war crimes, human rights abuses, and the abuse of power. Together they demonstrate the significance of civil society for peace and democracy." Undoubtedly, all candidates are well-respected personalities and organizations and deserve the Prize. It's a good sign of support for three nations suffering from brutal Russian tyranny and carrying on their unequal fight for freedom; however, they deal with different scopes, threats, and challenges. In the meantime, the country's grouping interplays with the ideological cliche of three Slavic peoples that the Kremlin and the Russian Church consider "one people". As the Baltic states are not happy with being referred to as former Soviet Republics, so are Ukrainians for

putting them in the "trinity basket." It's as if the United States would have been referred to as a former British colony.Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020 and are involved in security studies, defence policy research and advocacy. Currently all our activity is focused on stopping the ongoing war.

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3. Massive blast cripples parts of Crimea-Russia bridge, in blow to Putin's war effort

So who is responsible?

The exact cause of the blast at Europe’s longest bridge is yet to be confirmed. Russian officials said a truck exploded, causing Crimea-bound sections of the road part of the bridge to collapse. A subsequent fire engulfed a train of fuel tanks on a separate, adjacent rail portion of the bridge.

Putin ordered a “government commission” to examine the Kerch bridge “emergency” in Crimea, Russian state media TASS reported.

An official in Crimea blamed “Ukrainian vandals” for the explosion. Some Ukrainian officials gloated over the incident without directly claiming responsibility. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that “the reaction of the Kyiv regime to the destruction of civilian infrastructure testifies to its terrorist nature.”

Massive blast cripples parts of Crimea-Russia bridge, in blow to Putin's war effort | CNN

CNN · by Hannah Ritchie,Tim Lister,Josh Pennington · October 8, 2022

CNN —

In a major blow for Russian President Vladimir Putin, a huge explosion has severely damaged the only bridge connecting the annexed Crimean peninsula with the Russian mainland, paralyzing a key supply route for Moscow’s faltering war in Ukraine.

The blast early Saturday caused parts of the Kerch Strait road and rail bridge – opened by Putin himself in 2018 – to collapse, images and video from the scene showed. At least three people were killed in the explosion, Russian officials said, citing preliminary information.

The exact cause of the blast at Europe’s longest bridge is yet to be confirmed. Russian officials said a truck exploded, causing Crimea-bound sections of the road part of the bridge to collapse. A subsequent fire engulfed a train of fuel tanks on a separate, adjacent rail portion of the bridge.

Putin ordered a “government commission” to examine the Kerch bridge “emergency” in Crimea, Russian state media TASS reported.

An official in Crimea blamed “Ukrainian vandals” for the explosion. Some Ukrainian officials gloated over the incident without directly claiming responsibility. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that “the reaction of the Kyiv regime to the destruction of civilian infrastructure testifies to its terrorist nature.”

Smoke billows from fire on the Kerch bridge at sunrise on Saturday.

Stringer/Reuters

The damage to the road bridge appears to be severe, with the part of the bridge that carries westbound road traffic crippled in at least two places. The damage to the rail link where fuel tanks caught fire is unclear.

The bridge is strategically important because it links Russia’s Krasnodar region with the Crimean peninsula, which was annexed by Russia from Ukraine in 2014 in a move condemned by the international community.

It is a critical artery for supplying Crimea with both its daily needs and supplies for the military. Over the last few months, dozens of Russian military convoys have used the bridge, carrying vehicles, armor and fuel.

If the Russian military can’t use the bridge, its supply lines to forces in southern Ukraine would become more tenuous, especially when combined with Ukrainian advances southwards into Kherson region, north of Crimea.

Russia has used the Crimean railroads to ferry supplies to forces in Kherson, and several rail hubs in both Crimea and Kherson have been attacked by long-range Ukrainian rockets.

Sergey Aksenov, the Russian-appointed Head of Crimea, said “two spans of the roadbed of the part [of the bridge] from Krasnodar to Kerch, collapsed” after the explosion, and that a train’s fuel tanks caught fire.

Video and images from the 19-kilometer (11-mile) bridge appear to show a portion of the roadway had fallen into the water below, with several charred rail fuel tanks remaining on the adjacent track.

“As soon as the fire is extinguished, it will be possible to assess the extent of damage to the bridge and pillars, and it will be possible to talk about the timing of the restoration of traffic,” Aksenov said.

Russia’s Investigative Committee said on Telegram that preliminary information indicates three people were killed in the incident, “presumably the passengers of a car that was next to the blown-up truck.”

At least two bodies, that of a man and a woman, were recovered from the water, and their identities were being established, the investigative panel said.

Records indicate the truck that exploded belonged to someone in Russia’s Krasnodar region; investigators are checking the owner’s home and trying to determine the truck’s route, the investigative committee said.

The bridge spans the Kerch Strait, which connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, on which sit key Ukrainian ports, including Mariupol. For Russia, the bridge symbolizes the physical “reunification” of Crimea with the Russian mainland.

No further details on the timing or scope of the commission have been announced.

Russian state media RIA Novosti said that there are “no projections for the timing of the restoration of the Crimean bridge yet,” citing Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov.

A view shows fuel tanks ablaze and damaged sections of the Kerch bridge on October 8, 2022.

Stringer/Reuters

An official in Crimea placed blame on “Ukrainian vandals.”

“Ukrainian vandals somehow managed to get their bloody paws on the Crimean bridge. And now they have something to be proud of, in 23 years of their economic activity, they did not manage to build anything deserving of interest in Crimea. But they did succeed in damaging the roadbed of the Russian bridge,” Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea Vladimir Konstantinov said.

“Such is the whole essence of the Kiev regime and the Ukrainian state … Of course, the causes of the accident will be investigated, and the damage will be repaired swiftly,” he added.

CNN cannot independently verify Konstantinov’s claim.

Ukraine reacts to explosion

Ukrainian officials taunted Russia over the explosion without directly acknowledging that Ukraine was responsible for the attack.

“Air defense of the Russian Federation, are you sleeping?” the Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said on Facebook, alongside a video showing a section of the bridge’s road that had been completely destroyed.

“Russian illegal construction is starting to collapse and catch fire. The reason is simple: if you build something explosive, sooner or later, it will explode. And this is just the beginning,” David Arakhamia, the head of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s party in parliament and a member of Kyiv’s negotiating team with Russia, said in a Telegram statement about the incident.

A senior Ukrainian official, Oleksiy Danilov, posted video of the damaged Kerch bridge alongside a clip of Marilyn Monroe singing “Happy Birthday, Mr President,” which Monroe performed for President John F. Kennedy in 1962. Putin turned 70 on Friday.

On Thursday, Oleksii Hromov, a senior official with the General Staff, said that since September 21, Ukrainian troops had managed to advance 55 kilometers in the north-east, “establish control over 93 settlements, [and] take control over more than 2,400 square kilometers.”

Hromov appeared to be referencing gains in Kharkiv region that were made before September 21 but only confirmed later.

“In the Kherson direction, the enemy is trying to counter-attack at the expense of reserves in order to restrain the advance of our troops and regain lost positions. Since October 1, 29 settlements have been taken under [our] control,” he said.

In an interview in August, a senior Ukrainian military commander said the Kerch bridge was a legitimate target.

“This is a necessary measure in order to deprive them (Russia) of the opportunity to provide reserves and reinforce their troops from Russian territory,” Maj. Gen. Dmytro Marchenko said in an interview with RBC-Ukraine.

Russia’s bridge to Crimea

The Kerch bridge is able to handle 40,000 cars a day and to move 14 million passengers and 13 million tons of cargo per year, state news agency RIA Novosti reported when Putin opened the bridge in 2018.

Russian special forces masked in camouflage without unit insignia seized Crimea in a lightning operation in February 2014. Initially, Russia denied that its troops had carried out the mission. Later, it acknowledged that the so-called “little green men” were indeed Russian units. The West responded swiftly with crippling economic sanctions.

After the bridge opened, the United States condemned its construction as illegal.

“Russia’s construction of the bridge serves as a reminder of Russia’s ongoing willingness to flout international law,” according to a US State Department statement at the time.

Putin drives a Kamaz truck during a ceremony opening the bridge on May 15, 2018.

Alexander Nemenov/Pool/Reuters

President Vladimir Putin opens the road-rail bridge linking Crimea to mainland Russia in March 2018.

Yury Kochetkov/AP

“The bridge represents not only an attempt by Russia to solidify its unlawful seizure and its occupation of Crimea, but also impedes navigation by limiting the size of ships that can transit the Kerch Strait, the only path to reach Ukraine’s territorial waters in the Sea of Azov.”

Ukrainian officials echoed those sentiments following the explosion.

“Crimea, the bridge, the beginning. Everything illegal must be destroyed, everything stolen must be returned to Ukraine, everything occupied by Russia must be expelled,” Mykhailo Podoliak, who is an adviser to Ukraine’s leader.

Train hit in eastern Ukraine

Meanwhile, a cargo train in Ilovaisk in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region was hit by a “powerful explosion” Saturday morning, according to the adviser to Mariupol Mayor Petro Andrushenko.

“Not only Crimea. Not only fuel tanks. There is also a cargo train in Ilovaisk. Locals report a rather powerful explosion and subsequent detonation at night. The occupiers now have big problems with supplies from both sides,” Andrushenko said.

A cargo train in Ilovaisk in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region was hit by a "powerful explosion" Saturday morning.

Press Service of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the DPR

Pro-Russian authorities in the self-declared republic of Donetsk confirmed the cargo train incident, releasing video Saturday showing the fire’s aftermath at a local railway station.

Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations said on Telegram that shelling “by Ukrainian militants” caused the fire. CNN cannot independently verify the claim.

On Thursday, US President Joe Biden expressed caution about the dangers stemming from Putin’s nuclear threats as his military continued to experience military setbacks in Ukraine.

“First time since the Cuban missile crisis, we have a direct threat of the use (of a) nuclear weapon if in fact things continue down the path they are going,” Biden warned Thursday evening during remarks at a Democratic fundraiser in New York.

He added: “I don’t think there’s any such thing as the ability to easily (use) a tactical nuclear weapon and not end up with Armageddon.”

CNN’s Kostan Nechyporenko, Olga Voitovych, Eyad Turki, Daria Tarasova, Zayn Nabbi, Teele Rebane, Oleksandra Ochman, Josh Pennington, Brad Lendon and Jason Hanna contributed to this report.

CNN · by Hannah Ritchie,Tim Lister,Josh Pennington · October 8, 2022

4. Himars Transform the Battle for Ukraine—and Modern Warfare

The King of Battle ... remains ... Artillery

Photos and graphics at the link.

Himars Transform the Battle for Ukraine—and Modern Warfare

The mobile, high-precision U.S. rocket system is thwarting Russia’s invasion as it revolutionizes military strategy

https://www.wsj.com/articles/himars-transform-battle-for-ukraine-modern-warfare-11665169716?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Stephen Kalin​

 and Daniel Michaels

 | Photographs by Adrienne Surprenant /MYOP for The Wall Street Journal

Oct. 8, 2022 12:00 am ET

MYKOLAIV REGION, Ukraine—A global revolution in warfare is dramatically tipping the scales of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, putting in the hands of front-line troops the kind of lethality that until recently required aircraft, ships or lumbering tracked vehicles. It also has the capacity to change battlefields far from Eastern Europe.

The centerpiece of the new battle order is the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or Himars. Provided by the U.S. and operated by Ukrainian soldiers since June, they are augmenting lightweight and precise weaponry that includes drones, Javelin antitank rockets and Stinger antiaircraft missiles, enabled by GPS guidance and advanced microelectronics.

Able to pick off Russian military bases, ammunition depots and infrastructure far behind front lines, Ukraine’s 16 Himars helped its troops this summer halt a bloody Russian advance. Since last month, Ukrainians have seized back swaths of territory in their country’s east and ground down Russian troops in the south. Washington recently pledged to deliver another 18 Himars.

Within Kyiv’s arsenal, Himars offer a unique combination of range, precision and mobility that allows them to do the job traditionally handled by dozens of launchers firing thousands of shells.

By shrinking launchers and nearly guaranteeing hits on targets, Himars and the other equipment are upending century-old assumptions about how wars must be fought—and particularly about military supplies. Himars’s vastly improved accuracy also collapses the massive logistical trail that modern infantry has demanded.

“Himars is one part of a precision revolution that turns heavily equipped armies into something light and mobile,” said Robert Scales, a retired U.S. Army major general who was among the first to envision Himars in the 1970s.

Last month The Wall Street Journal gained rare access to a front-line Himars unit.

Lt. Valentyn Koval said the four Himars vehicles in his unit have destroyed about 20 Russian antiaircraft batteries.

Before a rocket hits its target the men can be on their way back to camp.

One evening at dusk the men in this unit were making dinner when orders for their fifth mission of the day arrived: to target Russian barracks and a river barge ferrying munitions and tanks 40 miles away.

Six men piled into their two Himars: a driver, targeter and commander in each, accompanied by the battery commander and a security detail in an armored personnel carrier. The commander plugged coordinate data into a tablet computer to determine the safest location for firing.

Within minutes, the two Himars rumbled out from cover under an apricot grove toward the launch spot in a nearby sunflower field. Thirty seconds after arriving, they fired seven missiles in quick succession. Before the projectiles hit their targets, the trucks were returning to base camp.

Ten minutes later came another pair of targets: Soviet-era rocket launchers some 44 miles away. Off rolled the Himars again and fired another barrage of missiles.

Soon after, the soldiers were back at camp and finishing their dinner. Some pulled up videos on Telegram showing the fruit of their labor: burning Russian barracks.

Ukraine’s Himars rockets, which can fly 50 miles, have hit hundreds of Russian targets, including command centers, ammunition depots, refueling stations and bridges, choking off supplies to front-line units. Since stopping Russia’s spring advance across Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, they are now targeting retreating Russian forces.

Ukrainian commanders estimate that Himars are responsible for 70% of military advances on the Kherson front, the unit’s commander, Lt. Valentyn Koval, said. The four vehicles in his unit have killed hundreds of Russians and destroyed about 20 antiaircraft batteries, he said.

Lt. Koval poses next to a Himars.

Russian artillery—like most such systems since World War I—lacks precision. To destroy a target, troops generally level everything around it. Gunners following maps rain shells in a grid pattern that aims to leave no terrain in a quadrant untouched. Russian forces in Ukraine are lobbing dozens of shells per acre to hit one objective, analysts say.

Himars can do the job with one rocket carrying a 200-pound explosive warhead. Each Ukrainian Himars carries one six-rocket pod that can effectively land the punch of more than 100,000 lbs. of traditional artillery.

Artillery is cumbersome. During Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991, it accounted for more than 60% of a U.S. division’s weight. Moving it demands soldiers, trucks, fuel and time, plus additional soldiers and vehicles to protect those supply operations.

All that support sucks resources and makes a juicy target, as the world saw in the opening days of the Ukraine war, when a Russian supply convoy halted by Ukrainian attacks outside Kyiv became a 40-mile-long sitting duck.

“It’s not just the precision of Himars that’s revolutionary,” said Gen. Scales. “It’s the ability to reduce the tonnage requirements by an order of magnitude or better.”

A sergeant dismounts from the Himars vehicle he commands.

Ukrainian soldiers prepare to load Himars munitions.

The supply chain for Himars units consists of factory-packaged rocket pods stashed at pickup points in the nearby countryside and usually hidden by foliage. A cargo truck deposits the camouflage-green pods—each a little bigger than a single bed—at a string of designated locations, not unlike a commercial delivery route.

Himars teams drive to the ammo drop spots, where a waiting three-man loading team removes spent pods and swaps in full ones within five minutes, using a crane integrated into the vehicle.

“Himars is one of, if not the most, efficient type of weapons on the battlefield,” said Lt. Koval, a jocular 22-year-old with a Pokémon ringtone on his cellphone. “This gives us an opportunity to react quickly, hit in one place, move to another, and destroy effectively.”

Russia’s best truck-based rocket launchers, by contrast, can require around 20 minutes to set up in the launch spot and 40 minutes to reload—critical time when the enemy tries to return fire. The Himars can drive faster and has an armored crew cabin.

Ukrainian Himars teams stay lean by spending weeks in the field without returning to a larger base. Lt. Koval’s unit, which received the first Himars in June, has spent the past three months sleeping in tents beside the launchers or inside nearby support vehicles.

Soldiers prepare food and coffee while waiting for the call to file more rockets.

The men, trained by U.S. instructors outside Ukraine, remain on standby for new targets, switching into action and just as casually returning to mundane activities like making coffee or playing cards.

On the front armor of one Himars, the soldiers painted a white grin below the Ukrainian word for “workhorse.” On the other, whose odometer shows it has traveled over 13,000 miles, they stenciled 69 black skulls, commemorating significant confirmed hits.

Mission details arrive as geographic coordinates, with a target description and instructions on whether to use explosive missiles for armored targets or fragment charges for hitting personnel. Targeting tips come from sources including U.S. intelligence and partisans in occupied territories.

The Himars commanders then pick a suitable launch location and guide the vehicles into place. Inside the cab, the vehicle commander sits between the driver and the targeter, who feeds the mission data into a computer. When the vehicle reaches the launch site, the targeter presses one button to angle the missiles skyward and another button to fire.

The missiles roar into the night sky with a burst of flame, leaving a cloud of smoke over the field. The launcher is lowered and the vehicle speeds back to its tree cover.

“We are the juiciest target in the region,” said Lt. Koval. “So we need to maneuver to survive.”

A Himars on the road to an operating position in a field.

Smoke lingers in a sunflower field after a Himars fired a rocket.

Maneuverability is exactly why Himars was created as a downsized version of a tank-like weapon, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, which has also been provided to Ukraine by the U.K. and Germany. First used in Desert Storm, before the advent of precision artillery, massed batteries of the 12-rocket vehicles unleashed so much explosive force and shrapnel that Iraqi troops dubbed it “steel rain.”

MLRS’s heft means that only the largest military cargo jets can airlift it and they land far from the fighting. To move distances on land requires a flatbed truck. Himars was envisioned as a lighter, more agile version.

The push for nimble units equipped with lightweight gear became part of a broader effort to streamline the U.S. military after the Cold War that reached its peak under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld starting in 2001, but was sidetracked by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

HIMARS

Max speed:

Firing range:

Weight:

In service:

Origin:

52.8 mph

19.9 to 186.4 miles

10.88 tons

2005

U.S.

6 MLRS series rockets

or 1 ATACMS missile

Crew number

10.5 ft.

7.9 ft.

23 ft.

Source: Army Recognition

Jemal R. Brinson/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Himars, on wheels and with only six rockets, was a project that stayed on track. One initial shortcoming, the Pentagon discovered, was that six cluster bombs didn’t pack enough punch to destroy many targets. GPS-guided artillery, rolled out in the mid-1990s, gave Himars new life. Precision meant the rockets didn’t need to explode together for a giant blast. They could each pick off a different geolocated target.

“The precision revolution changes everything,” said Gen. Scales, who considers the transformation to be the kind of epoch-making military shift that redefines warfare and will now tip battlefield advantage from massed armies to small infantry units.

Such shifts were rare in the past, including the eclipse of infantry by horse-mounted warriors around the fourth century and the introduction of gunpowder to Europe a millennium later, said Gen. Scales, a military historian who served as commandant of the U.S. Army War College.

Others came around the U.S. Civil War with the introduction of precise rifles and artillery and machine guns, which proved so deadly in World War I, and at the start of World War II, when the German blitzkrieg merged motorized transportation with radio coordination of troops.

Now, inexpensive microprocessors are putting what Gen. Scales dubs “cheap precision” in the hands of Ukrainian soldiers.

“If I enter the coordinates of this hole,” said Lt. Koval, standing by a molehill the size of a shoebox, “it will hit this hole.”

One Himars has 69 skulls stenciled on it, one for every verified hit.

On one particularly busy day in late August, the two Himars under Lt. Koval’s command worked in tandem with two others. When his pair ran out of ammunition, they dropped back to reload while the other duo advanced to fire. Lt. Koval said they tag-teamed for 37 hours without stopping to sleep and hit roughly 120 targets, enabling Ukrainian infantry to break Russian lines around the southern city of Kherson.

Washington was initially reluctant to provide Ukraine with Himars, fearing such a move could cause Moscow to retaliate against the U.S. or its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It has declined to supply more powerful rockets which can be fired up to 185 miles and would enable Ukraine to destroy sturdier targets, like concrete bridges that they have so far only been able to blow holes through.

In a sign that Ukraine’s additional firepower is taking a toll on Moscow’s forces, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has told Russian troops to make Ukraine’s long-range weaponry a priority target.

Himars operators say the biggest threat comes from Russia’s kamikaze drones, buttressed recently by more effective Iranian systems, but they feel well protected by Ukrainian anti-air systems and special forces. Lt. Koval’s crew abandoned two firing missions this summer out of caution when a drone was spotted nearby, but he said no Himars have been hit.

“We’re always on the move,” said Lt. Koval.

So far no Himars have been hit by enemy fire, Lt. Koval said.

Write to Stephen Kalin at stephen.kalin@wsj.com and Daniel Michaels at daniel.michaels@wsj.com

5.  America’s Military Faces a ‘Window of Maximum Danger’

Interesting criticism of integrated deterrence. I interpreted it not as a smokescreen to cut the conventional military but as an attempt by DOD to try to force a whole of government focus on deterrence and not make the military the "easy button" for every national security issue. Unfortunately for integrated deterrence to be effective it requires more than DOD leadership. It requires national leadership.

Excerpts:

The disconnect between rhetoric and reality is most pronounced in the U.S. Navy. Congress wrote the goal of a 355-ship Navy into law in 2017, while China “actually went out and built one.” The U.S. fleet is on track to number fewer than 280 ships by 2027, and Beijing has also “built an anti-navy,” the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, “which is specifically designed to destroy our ships and keep us out of the First Island Chain”—the archipelagos closest to the Chinese mainland, including Japan and Taiwan.

Meanwhile, Republicans in Congress call for budget increases, but “generic warnings of risk” aren’t persuading the public. Because an aversion to standing armies is part of the “American DNA,” Mr. Gallagher observes, defense spending historically follows “a sine wave,” increasing in wartime and trailing off after combat ends.

One problem is that the Pentagon isn’t articulating its needs to lawmakers. He describes a scene he’d like to see—a “simple conversation” that “has never happened”: “We’re sitting there in front of the map”—the Navy secretary, the chief of naval operations and members of the House Armed Services Committee. The Pentagon officials say: “ ‘OK, here’s what we think the PLA is going to do. Here’s what we’re capable of doing. Here’s what we don’t have, and what we’re asking you for.”

Mr. Gallagher has made a cause of beating up the Biden administration’s buzz phrase “integrated deterrence,” which, charitably defined, means combining diplomatic and military power to dissuade America’s enemies from misbehaving. Mr. Gallagher calls it a “smoke screen to justify cuts to conventional hard power.” The administration has proposed retiring dozens of ships and hundreds of aircraft in the coming years, a strategy to “divest to invest” in new technology, which won’t arrive until the 2030s. “Behind integrated deterrence,” Mr. Gallagher says, is “a series of remarkable assumptions about the ability of technology to make things super easy for us in warfare, which I find to be really naive.”

Mr. Gallagher has been calling for a new “public diplomacy” campaign to make clear why, more than ever, the U.S. needs “a Navy capable of decisive fleet action near our enemy’s home waters.” An example from the past is how the Navy sold the public on the need to build ballistic-missile submarines that could lurk undetected in the oceans and ensure the U.S. could respond to any nuclear attack. Each submarine commissioned from 1959 through 1967 was named after an essential American, from George Washington to Theodore Roosevelt, and the subs became known as the “41 for Freedom.” The campaign captured “the popular imagination in a very visceral way,” Mr. Gallagher said in 2018.

America’s Military Faces a ‘Window of Maximum Danger’

Marine turned lawmaker Mike Gallagher warns that the U.S. is far more vulnerable to losing a war than the public recognizes.

By Kate Bachelder OdellFollow

Oct. 7, 2022 2:24 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-military-faces-a-window-of-maximum-danger-mike-gallagher-marine-war-conflict-china-russia-ukraine-weapons-combat-11665161728

Green Bay, Wis.

Russia has invaded Ukraine and threatens nuclear war, China is eyeing Taiwan, Iran holds regular military exercises with China and Russia, and North Korea just launched a missile over Japan. If that doesn’t sound ominous enough, Mike Gallagher has worse news: The U.S. is increasingly vulnerable to losing a war, “either by sitting the conflict out or through defeat in combat.”

This is “a window of maximum danger,” says the military veteran and third-term congressman, and most Americans aren’t aware of its gravity as they understandably focus on domestic matters. He’s making it his political mission to change that.

Americans “want to think of ourselves as the force for good in the world, but we’re reluctant to pay the cost for that,” says Mr. Gallagher, 38, a Republican representing northeastern Wisconsin. He has been pressing the case for more military spending since before he first ran for Congress in 2016. “Global engagement is a sound investment for the taxpayer,” Mr. Gallagher said in his first political speech, delivered in 2014, the year after he completed a seven-year stint in the Marines. “Are we prepared to let China and Russia enforce shipping lanes, to let them dominate airspace, space and cyberspace instead of us? Would that make any financial sense for Wisconsin?”

I spent two days with him in September, touring shipyards and businesses in the Badger State and talking about the threats from China and Russia—and from America’s own distraction and complacency—as well as his ideas about how to prevent war and reunite the Republican Party.

Taiwan is a particular preoccupation. What interest do Americans have in protecting this distant island? If the Chinese subdued it, it would heighten their threat to Japan and the Philippines, which the U.S. is bound by treaty to defend. America’s friends would hedge their bets by cozying up to Beijing. More important, by seizing Taiwan’s semiconductor-manufacturing capability, Xi Jinping would “hold the rest of the world economically hostage,” Mr. Gallagher says. “All this stuff that drives people in the Midwest crazy, when Hollywood or Wall Street bows down” to the Chinese Communist Party, “you can 10-X that if Xi takes Taiwan.”

President Biden has more than once said the U.S. military would intervene to defend Taiwan. But these assertions have the feel of verbal stumbles, not clear statements of intent. “To avoid war, you have to convince the other guy you’re willing to go to war,” Mr. Gallagher says, “and I’m not sure we are.” Over time—from Barack Obama’s unenforced “red line” in Syria to Donald Trump’s impulse to withdraw from the world—America has too often taken a dubious approach to world affairs, which Mr. Gallagher summed up in 2014 by inverting Theodore Roosevelt’s dictum: “Speak loudly and carry a small stick.”

The disconnect between rhetoric and reality is most pronounced in the U.S. Navy. Congress wrote the goal of a 355-ship Navy into law in 2017, while China “actually went out and built one.” The U.S. fleet is on track to number fewer than 280 ships by 2027, and Beijing has also “built an anti-navy,” the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, “which is specifically designed to destroy our ships and keep us out of the First Island Chain”—the archipelagos closest to the Chinese mainland, including Japan and Taiwan.

Meanwhile, Republicans in Congress call for budget increases, but “generic warnings of risk” aren’t persuading the public. Because an aversion to standing armies is part of the “American DNA,” Mr. Gallagher observes, defense spending historically follows “a sine wave,” increasing in wartime and trailing off after combat ends.

One problem is that the Pentagon isn’t articulating its needs to lawmakers. He describes a scene he’d like to see—a “simple conversation” that “has never happened”: “We’re sitting there in front of the map”—the Navy secretary, the chief of naval operations and members of the House Armed Services Committee. The Pentagon officials say: “ ‘OK, here’s what we think the PLA is going to do. Here’s what we’re capable of doing. Here’s what we don’t have, and what we’re asking you for.”

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Mr. Gallagher has made a cause of beating up the Biden administration’s buzz phrase “integrated deterrence,” which, charitably defined, means combining diplomatic and military power to dissuade America’s enemies from misbehaving. Mr. Gallagher calls it a “smoke screen to justify cuts to conventional hard power.” The administration has proposed retiring dozens of ships and hundreds of aircraft in the coming years, a strategy to “divest to invest” in new technology, which won’t arrive until the 2030s. “Behind integrated deterrence,” Mr. Gallagher says, is “a series of remarkable assumptions about the ability of technology to make things super easy for us in warfare, which I find to be really naive.”

Mr. Gallagher has been calling for a new “public diplomacy” campaign to make clear why, more than ever, the U.S. needs “a Navy capable of decisive fleet action near our enemy’s home waters.” An example from the past is how the Navy sold the public on the need to build ballistic-missile submarines that could lurk undetected in the oceans and ensure the U.S. could respond to any nuclear attack. Each submarine commissioned from 1959 through 1967 was named after an essential American, from George Washington to Theodore Roosevelt, and the subs became known as the “41 for Freedom.” The campaign captured “the popular imagination in a very visceral way,” Mr. Gallagher said in 2018.

Mr. Gallagher also calls for “an aggressive reform effort” that goes beyond bromides about waste, fraud and abuse. One example is increasing the Pentagon’s “tooth-to-tail” ratio, the proportion of combat troops to support personnel. The Office of the Secretary of Defense alone employs 4,000 people by one estimate—almost the size an aircraft-carrier crew (around 5,000). A Marine intelligence officer who deployed twice to Iraq, Mr. Gallagher says months spent looking for a terrorist who was eventually discovered hiding inside a trap compartment “in this ugly green couch” taught him “how things that seemed pretty simple in D.C. get pretty difficult at the point of the spear.”

Maybe, he adds, the military branches don’t “need golf courses”—there are by one estimate more than 140 on U.S. bases world-wide—or, for that matter, to run commissaries: “If there’s one thing the modern free-market economy has figured out, it’s grocery stores.” Congress could trim “all sorts of jobs being done by one-stars that could be done by lieutenant colonels or colonels.” All of this could produce enough money “to really start testing the limits of the shipbuilding industrial base.”

Another problem is that leftist ideology has “escaped from the lab of higher education and is now infecting other institutions, the military among them.” Only 45% of the public has a “great deal” of confidence in the military, according to an annual poll by the Reagan Institute. That’s down 25 points in three years, and Mr. Gallagher thinks woke ideology is a major reason. Mr. Gallagher thinks the military’s emphasis on “inclusion” at the expense of “war-fighting excellence” may deprive the military of the recruits it most needs. Young people are attracted to the Marines precisely because it’s an exclusive organization with exacting standards not everyone can meet.

At Fincantieri Marinette Marine, north of Green Bay, I touch a piece of what will eventually become the U.S. Navy’s new Constellation-class frigate. The hope is that the Navy has learned from procurement disasters such as the littoral combat ship, and that the frigate will be a cornerstone of a larger fleet. But the frigate isn’t set to arrive in the fleet until the latter half of the 2020s.

If a crisis in Taiwan or elsewhere comes sooner the U.S. would have to fight with the equipment it has, much of it from Ronald Reagan’s defense buildup in the 1980s. America, Mr. Gallagher says, therefore needs a “hedging strategy” to defend Taiwan “within the decade” and prevent an invasion in the first place:

Convert tired old ships into missile barges. Strap antiship missiles onto aircraft that hunt submarines. Buy two years worth of munitions parts in every budget to fill up bomb stocks. If “armed with a sense of urgency, there’s all sorts of things we can do” to “make the PLA think twice about taking over Taiwan,” Mr. Gallagher says. “The only short war for Taiwan is one that China wins.”

One lesson of Ukraine “is that you need to be in the business of arming yourselves and your allies prior to deterrence failing. Because by the time it does, it’s too late.” The savings from failing to arm earlier are “dwarfed by the cost of having to ramp up or get involved in war on someone else’s terms.”

Mr. Gallagher can seem like an intellectual directed-energy weapon, firing off at length about today’s parallels to the early Cold War, a period he studied while earning a doctorate at Georgetown in international relations. Why a doctorate? He invokes the old saying from the Office of Strategic Services, precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency: The ideal recruit is “a Ph.D. that can win a bar fight.”

Yet bar fighting isn’t Mr. Gallagher’s style, and he may be worth studying for those who want to repair the Republican Party and find a constructive way to manage Donald Trump. Mr. Gallagher called the Jan. 6 riots “banana-republic crap” in a video he taped while trapped in his office, but he didn’t vote to impeach Mr. Trump because it “accomplishes nothing.” He supports more money for tightening the border but opposed Mr. Trump’s diverting military-construction money on the principle that a president was usurping Congress’s appropriation power. Mr. Gallagher has no Democratic opponent for re-election.

“The military crisis,” he adds, is “a microcosm of the broader societal crisis.” The U.S. is “increasingly becoming a healthcare and retirement organization that has guns.” The next president will have to “sail the ship of state through the Scylla of a confrontation with China and the Charybdis of an entitlement crisis.”

And that’s if the confrontation takes that long to materialize. Mr. Gallagher notes that China faces both a “structural economic slowdown” and a “demographic buzzsaw” as its population ages rapidly. So why wait to make a play for Taiwan? “Xi’s gotten away with Hong Kong.” He’s getting away “with genocide in Xinjiang. Oh, and unleashing—not deliberately—but unleashing a virus on the world that has killed six million people. And there’s been no accountability for that. So what would lead you to conclude that Xi is going to be restrained?”

Mr. Gallagher offers this scenario: Taiwan’s next president takes office in May 2024. Suppose the country elects someone “more friendly to independence than anyone in history,” and Mr. Xi concludes that he can’t take Taiwan through “political warfare.” Meanwhile, Americans begin “tearing each other apart” in another nasty presidential campaign.

According to “Navy nerds” who study the region, conditions are especially favorable in October for an amphibious assault. “You could be headed for the mother of all October surprises in 2024,” Mr. Gallagher says. “So with apologies to the Rolling Stones, time is not on our side.”

Mrs. Odell is a member of the Journal’s editorial board and a 2022 Robert Novak Fellow.

WSJ Opinion: Putin’s Best Weapon: Bidenomics

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Appeared in the October 8, 2022, print edition as 'America’s ‘Window of Maximum Danger’'.

6. Educating Maritime Geostrategists for the Naval Services

I am surprised Julian Corbett is not mentioned. He was an important geostrategist.

I also would say that the "intersection" below should include land and landpower. I think "maritime" geostrategist must have sufficient understanding of land and landpower just as "land" geostrategists must have a sufficient understanding of the martimtime domain.

Conclusion:

Geostrategists must be capable of understanding the intersections of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard power in peacetime and in conflict. They must understand the new maritime geography the U.S. must take national interest in and conceptualize new operations to shape these areas and how American influence is projected. But members of the naval services are instructed to uphold the ‘rules-based international order’ without adequately understanding what came before it, who created it, and what could come next. Equipped with these understandings, they would better recognize the motivations driving great power competitors and revisionist states today – and therefore understand how to better influence geostrategy. That would be the first step to becoming a geostrategist and seizing the opportunities posed by the evolving geostrategic environment at sea.

Educating Maritime Geostrategists for the Naval Services

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

Human Factors Week

By Drake Long

Introduction

In 1567, a Spanish navigator named Álvaro de Mendaña y Neira set sail for an ill-fated voyage to Oceania. His mission was to find a stopover for the famed Manila Galleons, ships carrying supplies and looted resources between the Spanish colonies in the Philippines and Peru. Where he landed was an undiscovered island in the South Pacific christened Santa Isabel, but his crew ultimately encamped for three months in an area further north dubbed Guadalacanal. Both locations are better known in the modern day as part of the Solomon Islands.

The expedition did not go smoothly. Neira intended to set up a permanent Spanish colony, but his party’s hostility toward the native Solomon Islanders and unfamiliarity with the local terrain led to constant, bloody clashes, starvation, and death. The Spanish mission fled Guadalcanal in failure in 1568. Spain attempted a similar mission some 30 years later with the same outcome.

Plans to establish a base in the Solomon Islands for the benefit of the Manila Galleons were ultimately shelved. The resistance of the Solomon Islanders and dearth of resources on the archipelago itself led Spain to think the Solomons were more burden than blessing. Spain decided the islands offered no strategic economic benefit whatsoever, and moved on.

Over 300 years later, a very different empire with different goals looked at the Solomon Islands and came to a separate conclusion. Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s 4th Fleet, saw in the Solomons an ideal position for land-based aviation and advocated that the Empire of Japan seize it in an amphibious campaign. From the Solomon Islands, aircraft could place the encroaching Allies and their navies under a threatening bomber and torpedo umbrella. This assumption proved correct, and the Solomon Islands preoccupied Allied attention in the opening phases of the Pacific war.

Now the Solomon Islands has found itself at the center of attention yet again. It switched recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China in 2019 and has shocked its neighbors by courting something akin to a security guarantee from Beijing. Yet anyone with a stake in the South Pacific should have known the domestic political environment in the Solomons would lead to this point.

Map of the Solomon Islands. Click to expand. (Graphic via Wikimedia Commons)

There is a specific criticism leveled at the United States from its partner-nations in the Pacific and Oceania – that . There is some validity to this statement. The Solomon Islands, despite having featured prominently in the annals of history for virtually every previous major maritime power in the Pacific, has only just now become a major point of consternation for the United States (and Australia), after its downward spiral into another bout of domestic political upheaval is too far along to stop.

To other nations in the Pacific, the United States does not seem to proactively adjust its foreign policy to counter new threats, so much as it reacts to events. The opening of new embassies in the Pacific Islands well after the PRC already did so epitomizes this late-to-the-party approach.

This is not the approach the combined U.S. naval services want to take, according to the priorities laid out in the Triservice Maritime Strategy. The U.S. naval services are redesigning themselves to better compete day-to-day with other maritime powers, including by inculcating a mission command mindset into all components of U.S. maritime power and integrating the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard into unified instruments of naval diplomacy and engagement with partner nations.

But to really serve as an effective steady-state influencer deeply involved in great power competition, the U.S. naval services need to invoke the roadmap laid out in the Triservice Maritime Strategy to create more than mission commanders. The services need to create a cohort of geostrategists.

Building Geostrategy

Both Spain and Imperial Japan, when looking at the physical characteristics of the Solomon Islands, were practicing a form of geostrategy. Geostrategy calls on states to rank and prioritize the criticality of physical features according to the national interest. Chokepoints, straits, and sea lines of communication are all terms for things geostrategists define, value, and then consider how to defend or exploit.

One of the core tenets of geostrategy is that physical geography does not appreciably change. However, political and economic geography do, and the above (simplified) story offers a case study in how geostrategy can adjust accordingly. For the Spanish Empire, the motivating factor to explore the Solomons was in service to a trade route between two other colonies. Ultimately though, the ill-fated expedition to the Solomons proved it was not as relevant to the economic geography of the Spanish Pacific as some navigators thought.

Imperial Japan saw in the Solomons a method of protecting vulnerable sea lines of communication, and a way to further project its airpower to threaten the Allies. Most historians of the subsequent Guadalcanal campaign would probably argue the Solomons’ geography did end up being an important factor in the Empire of Japan’s favor at the outset of the war.

Navalists – which in this context does not just mean members of the U.S. naval services, but also shipping industry executives, oceanographers, marine scientists, and maritime law experts – are inherently geostrategists. Be it their profession, hobby, or subject of academic inquiry, seapower hinges on the relationship between different physical geographies – the oceans and landmasses. Maritime shipping ultimately connects inland economic resources to littoral economic hubs. Marines require a Navy to trek across bodies of water to their next crisis. Environmentalists focused on healthy seas have to contend with toxic shipbreaking practices and other forms of environmentally disastrous work close to the shore.

It is impossible to be a navalist assigned to think about and work with seapower without considering the physical geography of the world and the maritime domain. Alfred Thayer Mahan, perhaps the most famous maritime geostrategist of all, implicitly explained this on a deeper level in his famed book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History.

The problem all maritime states have in the modern day, including the United States, is that they are not cultivating navalists as geostrategists, or in other words, a cohort well-suited to the changing, global security environment. This is not to say the U.S. naval services do not create servicemembers steeped in global events or geography. The U.S. Navy in many ways epitomizes the navalist-as-diplomat mentality. But the Triservice Strategy itself places special emphasis on the phrase ‘rules-based’ order, a nebulous term that does not always resonate with the countries the U.S. needs to partner with for effective competition. There are multiple new facets – new geographies – in the geostrategic environment that the current rules-based order is not equipped to deal with. Rather than adapting, the U.S. risks hanging on to the status quo past its expiration date.

New Economic Geography

Geostrategy must appreciate how much of a sea change global commerce is currently experiencing. There was a brief period, roughly bookended between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, where trade networks worked on an assumption of globalized supply chains and unfettered, just-in-time shipping. This would reduce costs and insulate commerce from many geopolitical frictions.

That era is almost certainly over. Trading nations are increasingly adopting policies of weaponized interdependence that use supply chains’ overreliance on them for strategic advantage. China, the United States, and the European Union, all titans of trade, are increasingly exploring on-shoring for manufactured goods and expanding their definitions of critical sectors to guard against dependence on rival actors to provide products necessary to national security. The reliability of trade is shifting as well. The cascade of effects from the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed how incredibly fragile the global shipping industry actually is, and nations crucial to trade are increasingly securitizing key waterways like the South China Sea.

The sources of marine wealth are changing as well. The traditional understanding of maritime trade operates on a system not unlike what guided the Manila Galleons long ago. Trade flows from point A to point B, and geostrategy is set up around ensuring that trade is not vulnerable to disruption. However, centers of gravity in the maritime economy are moving further and further away from the coast and out into the open ocean. Seabed mining, marine genetic resource harvesting, and deep-sea fishing are all entering new phases of commercial activity within the next 10 years, where previously inaccessible resources are now within reach. This is significant because traditional geostrategy is focused on ensuring trade between ports is uninterrupted – usually by identifying key waterways and sea lanes. But increasingly, key maritime concentrations of geostrategic value could be on the high seas where there are major deposits of resources, such as the Clarion Clipperton Zone in the central Pacific.

A map of the Clarion Clipperton Zone in the central Pacific Ocean (adapted from the International Seabed Authority, 2018). Colored areas are those licensed for mining and shaded squares are areas currently protected from mining. Click to expand. (Graphic via NOAA)

The existing rules-based order does not have clear answers for these emerging developments. In search of a different solution, new treaties and rules are being actively sought out by countries with the most to gain from this new economic geography.

Educating Geostrategists

For a geostrategist looking at the changing economic geography and thinking of how the U.S. naval services fit into it, they would probably rely on precedent. Historical precedent is the most important skill to impart on the navalist-as-geostrategist. Yet to adequately find and draw on precedents, the U.S. naval services would need to make significant changes to professional military education and training. A rising cohort would need to embrace a more global curriculum that truly emphasizes maritime geostrategy from the perspective of revisionist states, allies, and partners. For example, most navalists can name Alfred Thayer Mahan – but can they name K.M. Panikkar, the post-colonial Indian seapower theorist that penned a sequel to Mahan’s work, going so far as to title it An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History? They probably can cite it unwittingly – after all, within that circa 1945 essay Panikkar penned the modern-day understanding of ‘the Indo-Pacific.’1

The international relations field is already somewhat ahead of the curve on this with the development of Global International Relations, a specific subfield championed by the likes of Amitav Acharya. Global IR is predicated on the belief that other theories of interstate relations and regional systems outside of the U.S. and Europe are just as valid as the prevailing western-centric theories. This might seem intuitive, but these alternative views of seeing the world have only become more prominent after the long, lengthy process of decolonization, where the knowledge of non-European empires and seapowers were no longer discarded, ignored, or suppressed.

Geostrategy can embrace some of these same principles. As already pointed out, the understanding of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ changes when speaking to modern-day navalists in India, Japan, or the United States. Reconciling these differences can only occur when the U.S. raises a cohort of navalists that actually understand, on a deep level, why their allies and partners view the world the way they do.

In order to create these geostrategists, the U.S. naval services should invest in professional military education that stresses alternative ways of viewing the world. One method to do this is to significantly increase International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs and bring in navalists from other nations currently theorizing and codifying their own seapower strategies. They can interact and impart knowledge with U.S. counterparts – be they members of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard.

Another method is to set up incentive funds that promote wargames that emphasize playing and understanding ‘Green’ or ‘Orange’ states. These countries are not necessarily the primary combatants in an operational wargame, but may be allied to the Blue or Red Teams, or neutral, and are capable of tipping the balance of competition. Far too often wargames tied to professional military education stress the ‘great powers’ of a competition without understanding the relative strength of middle powers and even small states. If navalists empathized more with these resident powers of the Pacific, they would better appreciate their stakes in great power competition as well.

Finally, the U.S. naval services need to integrate outside of the military and facilitate professional development opportunities that expose its navalists to other maritime professions. The new geography of the world is not being charted by the military so much as marine scientists, economists, and environmentalists. As Arctic ice melts, the first person to explore the viability of a Northern Sea Route will likely be a shipping magnate. The bodies setting the rules for the ‘blue economy’ are currently centralized in the United Nations – many of which the U.S. naval services would be keen to keep an awareness of, if not sponsor an observer in. This would serve to better understand the concerns of Pacific Island states who see the orderly expansion of economic rights in their vast Exclusive Economic Zones as key to their economic development.

This civil-military integration could take the form of bringing more outside experts into the PME institutions that serve the naval services. The Naval War College, Marine Corps University, and Coast Guard Academy all have the flexibility to provide nuanced and intriguing discussions of the changing maritime world for their students. But this integration could just as well be served through sending servicemembers and navalists as short-term observers to international rules-making bodies and industry groups.

Conclusion

Geostrategists must be capable of understanding the intersections of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard power in peacetime and in conflict. They must understand the new maritime geography the U.S. must take national interest in and conceptualize new operations to shape these areas and how American influence is projected. But members of the naval services are instructed to uphold the ‘rules-based international order’ without adequately understanding what came before it, who created it, and what could come next. Equipped with these understandings, they would better recognize the motivations driving great power competitors and revisionist states today – and therefore understand how to better influence geostrategy. That would be the first step to becoming a geostrategist and seizing the opportunities posed by the evolving geostrategic environment at sea.

Drake Long (Twitter: @DRM_Long) is a Pacific Forum Young Leader and a member of CIMSEC.

References

1. In Panikkar’s words, he called the Indo-Pacific ‘a strategic arc’ encompassing the east coast of Africa all the way to the easternmost islands of Southeast Asia.

Featured Image: ISS040-E-006780 (3 June 2014) — Clouds over the southern Pacific Ocean are featured in this image photographed by an Expedition 40 crew member on the International Space Station. (Photo via Nasa)

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

7. U.S. Maritime Industry’s Expanded Reach is Not Without its Risks

Excerpts:

Admiral James Foggo USN (Ret.) emphasized the critical role that the US merchant marine plays when providing vital sealift capacity to support American armed forces deployed worldwide.

“Logistics is the sixth domain of warfare,” he said. This requires the efforts of “civilian mariners who experience their tradecraft at sea.”

U.S. Maritime Industry’s Expanded Reach is Not Without its Risks

gcaptain.com · by Ira Breskin · October 7, 2022

A tunnel inside the Red Hill Underground Fuel Storage Facility at Pearl Harbor, Jan. 26, 2018. U.S. Navy Photo

Ira Breskin

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October 7, 2022

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By Ira Breskin

NEW YORK— Recognizing potential risks attached to the US maritime industry’s expanded reach was the theme of the Navy League’s inaugural Maritime Security Conference held here Thursday.

Wider geographic presence, for example, translates into increased US Coast Guard operations far beyond heavily-traveled domestic waters, said Admiral Linda Fagan, USCG Commandant

“We are an Arctic national. We are a Pacific nation.”

The goal is to ensure “free and open access and lawful pursuit of natural resources,” Fagan said. “We are a global coast guard,” she added at the event, hosted by the Navy League’s New York Council.

For example, Coast Guard Cutter Healy earlier this month reached the North Pole, after traversing the frozen Arctic Ocean. This is the second time that a US ship has visited the pole unaccompanied; Healy first did so in 2015.

Moreover, USCG is more actively policing IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing in the east Pacific and Caribbean, Fagan said.

Admiral James Foggo USN (Ret.) emphasized the critical role that the US merchant marine plays when providing vital sealift capacity to support American armed forces deployed worldwide.

“Logistics is the sixth domain of warfare,” he said. This requires the efforts of “civilian mariners who experience their tradecraft at sea.”

Several speakers suggested initiatives that the Pentagon should consider to ensure that Navy vessels operating in the Pacific continue receiving requisite bunker fuel. The review is more imperative given the planned shutdown by next spring of the Navy’s Red Hill Bunker Fuel Storage Facility in Hawaii.

Despite challenges that closing Red Hill may create, it provides at least one benefit. It forces the Navy to use a more distributed, less vulnerable fuel supply network and “eliminates a single point of failure” Admiral Foggo said.

The Defense Department is closing the Red Hill, which has 250 million gallon storage capacity, to address environmental issues attached to leaking tanks.

To mitigate any potential fuel supply shortfall, Congress could increase the number of vessels enrolled in the recently established Tanker Security Program (TSP), Tim Walton said. He is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology in Washington D.C.

Through TSP, the government will pay $6 million a year for the option to charter each of the 10 US-flagged TSP tankers enlisted to provide supplemental sealift capacity. Under TSP, the government can charter these vessels, at market rates, to supplement the tonnage delivered by about 10 government-owned tankers.

Moreover, Washington could require that additional government-purchased fuel, or “preference cargo,” be carried by TSP ships, in order provide them increased, guaranteed revenue, Walton said.

On the domestic security front, US Customs and Border Protection is more “intel driven,” rather than transaction-based, when providing security at nation’s marine terminals, said Edward Fox, the agency’s assistant director for the Port of New York and New Jersey.

To do so, it is tapping into intelligence shared by sister federal agencies when addressing major areas of concern: importation of illegal narcotics, terrorist threats and financial fraud, Fox said.

Ira Breskin is a senior lecturer at State University of New York Maritime College in the Bronx, NY and author of The Business of Shipping (9th edition, 2018), a primer that explains shipping economics, operations and regulations.

8. A Marine who hated Muslims went to a mosque to plant a bomb. His intended victims ended up saving his life

A Marine who hated Muslims went to a mosque to plant a bomb. His intended victims ended up saving his life | CNN

CNN · by John Blake · October 8, 2022

Editor’s Note: This article is part of CNN’s Undivided series, which chronicles how Americans of very different backgrounds have found common ground. In this series, which runs through the midterm elections, we profile unlikely friendships between people of differing ages, races, religions and cultures.

CNN —

As soon as some members of the Islamic Center of Muncie saw the man coming toward them, they knew he was trouble.

He was a big guy with broad shoulders, marching toward their mosque with his head down and his face flushed red from what looked like anger. It was Friday at Muncie Islamic Center in Muncie, Indiana, and the mosque was filling with people who had come for afternoon prayers. As an outsider with a USMC tattoo on his right forearm and a skull tattoo on his left hand, he stood out.

His name was Richard “Mac” McKinney, and he was there not to worship but to destroy. He was a former US Marine who had developed a hatred toward Islam during combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. His fury deepened when he returned home to Muncie to see how Muslims had settled into what he called his city, and even sent their children to sit next to his daughter at her elementary school.

Unable to contain his anger, he went to the Islamic center that day in 2009 on what he saw as his final mission. He was going to plant a bomb at the mosque in hopes of killing or wounding hundreds of Muslims. He was on a scouting mission to pick a location to hide his bomb and to gather intelligence that would validate his assumption that Islam was a murderous ideology.

“I told people that Islam was a cancer; and I was the surgeon to cure it,” he says.

But when McKinney entered the mosque, he encountered a form of resistance that he had not planned for. Something happened that day that would change him in a way he never expected.

The people whose lives he intended to take would end up saving his life.

McKinney and the mosque’s members built ‘an impossible bridge’ to one another

What happened to McKinney at the mosque is so dramatic that it sounds like something from a movie. And in fact, it is.

McKinney’s transformation is the subject of a riveting documentary short called “Stranger at the Gate.” The film, which won a special jury prize at the 2022 Tribeca Film Festival, recounts how McKinney abandoned his plot and ended up converting to Islam and embracing a surprising role at the mosque.

McKinney recently spoke to CNN via video about his unlikely conversion. Wearing a blue “Say No Hate to Hate,” T-shirt over his muscular frame and a long white beard that made him look like a buffed Santa Claus, McKinney told his story in a blunt, no-frills manner that underscored his 25 years in the military.

McKinney says he thought his Friday afternoon visit might end with his death.

“By the end of the night, I figured they would have me in the basement with a sword to my throat,” he says.

Richard "Mac" McKinney says he developed a hatred of Islam during combat as a Marine in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Karl Schroder

Instead, several mosque members stepped forward and disarmed McKinney with some shrewd choices that may have saved their lives.

The film cites one staggering act of kindness: Mohammad S. Bahrami, a native of Afghanistan and co-founder of the center, ended up hugging McKinney and erupting in tears.

“To this day, it still doesn’t make sense to me,” McKinney says about the gesture.

Joshua Seftel, the film’s director, says he was drawn to McKinney’s story in part because of his own experiences facing antisemitism growing up in Schenectady, New York, in the late 1970s and early ’80s. Classmates lobbed antisemitic slurs while throwing pennies at him.

Seftel made his film as part of “The Secret Life of Muslims,” an online video series. He says McKinney’s story gave him hope that even some of the deepest divisions in the US can be transcended.

“They were able to build an impossible bridge to one another,” Seftel says of McKinney and members of the Muncie Islamic center. “If that could happen, anything is possible. They gave us a blueprint for how we could all do this.”

McKinney was looking for a way to forgive himself for what he did in war

To reveal too many details about how McKinney converted would rob the film of its impact. But there are some scenes and characters that beg to be described.

One was the story of how McKinney was changed by combat. McKinney’s struggles after he returned to Muncie in 2006 are a prime example of the adage, “In war there are no unwounded soldiers.”

McKinney says he was trained to see the Iraqi and Taliban soldiers he fought not as human beings but as paper targets on a shooting range. He also says he struggled to find a new community after he left what he calls the “band of brothers” he fought alongside during his service. Once he returned home, he drifted into drinking and womanizing to numb his wartime experiences.

Seeing Muslims only caused his pain to resurface. He resented the presence of Muslims in Muncie because it seemed to make a mockery of the sacrifice he and his comrades made in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“I wasn’t willing to share,” he says. “I saw America as mine. I bled for this. It was a ‘You don’t belong here’ kind of thing.”

Layered in his grief was also guilt over the lives he had taken during combat. He wasn’t just at war with Muslims; he was at war with himself.

“He can’t completely forgive himself for what he did,” says Dana, one of his ex-wives, in the film.

Then he met the ‘Mother Teresa’ of Muncie’s Muslim community

There were plenty of people who helped diffuse McKinney’s anger and guilt.

One was Jomo Williams, an African American member at the Islamic center who knew something about anger. His great-great-grandfather was lynched and castrated by a White mob. He carried a hostility toward White people until he converted to Islam.

In a scene from the film, Jomo Williams prays at the Islamic Center in Muncie.

Karl Schroder

Williams was one of the first to spot McKinney striding toward the mosque, looking agitated and angry.

“When I saw him, he was walking kind of fast, his head was kind of down, and he was kind of red in the face a little bit,” Williams says in the film. “I knew something was wrong.”

As viewers can see in the film, Williams later asked McKinney a question that set him on his path to conversion.

But if there is a heroine in “Stranger at the Gate,” it’s a magnetic woman everyone calls “Sister Bibi.”

Bibi Bahrami is a co-founder of the Islamic Center of Muncie and played a pivotal role in McKinney’s conversion. Bahrami and her husband, Mohammad, are pillars in the Muncie community. They have six children, several who have gone on to graduate from Ivy League schools and pursue assorted careers. She is a whirlwind, volunteering at a local women’s shelter, the YWCA, Muncie Rotary Club and the Interfaith Fellowship while serving on local boards and hosting fundraisers for local politicians.

She embodies the Quranic verse on the Islamic center’s website: “The reward for goodness is nothing but goodness.”

She, too, knew the damage done by war. Her family in Afghanistan was displaced when the Soviet Union invaded in 1979. She fled her country in tears and lived six years in a refugee camp in Pakistan before marrying and making her way to the US.

Seftel calls her the “Mother Teresa of the Muslim community” in Muncie. She’s someone who takes in strangers in need in the community to clean and iron their clothes and feed them meals. Her reputation is such that refugees from other countries somehow find her number and address to track her down for help.

Bibi Bahrami, a co-founder of the Islamic Center of Muncie.

Karl Schroder

She says she experienced an awakening when she came to the US and became a citizen.

“The freedom of choice is the biggest thing for me,” she says about what she likes about the US. “I’m still able to practice my religion, to continue covering (wearing her hijab) and get an education. I was inspired by these opportunities. I truly love this country.”

Her service is also part of her worldview. Showing kindness to a stranger is central to the Muslim faith.

“God created all of us to get to know each other and take care of each other – not to despise,” she says.

She reached out to McKinney with a bold invitation

Bahrami’s hospitality is remarkable considering many Muslim Americans are still treated like strangers in their own country. Hate crimes against Muslims in the US surged 500% from 2000 to 2009, according to a Brown University study, reflecting an increase in anti-Muslim sentiment after the 9/11 attacks.

Many still face hostility, surveillance and questions over their patriotism.

Joshua Seftel, director of "Stranger at the Gate."

Gabi Porter

Some members of the Muncie Islamic center stopped attending the mosque because they were afraid of the burly Marine with the tattoos.

But Bahrami extended her circle of compassion to include McKinney. She invited him to her home and prepared a hearty Afghan dinner of chicken, rice, an eggplant dish and a green yogurt dip seasoned with cilantro and lime juice.

McKinney devoured the meal.

“He tried everything,” she says, chuckling. “He was not picky.”

The meal became another bridge to McKinney. He kept visiting Bahrami and others at the center. He read the Quran, Islam’s holy book. He formed friendships. He told mosque members about his time in combat and they accepted him.

Eight months after McKinney’s initial visit to the mosque, he converted to Islam. After the ceremony he was greeted with what he called “a mosh pit of hugs” from the people he once intended to harm. Eventually he even served two years as president of the Islamic Center in Muncie.

When asked how he felt when he was showered with hugs following his conversion ceremony, McKinney broke into a wide, boyish grin:

“I was good with that.”

McKinney now has a new mission

Ask him why he converted, and he becomes more talkative. He says the more time he spent with mosque members, the more he discovered how much he had in common with them. He once thought of becoming a preacher when he was a boy, and he discovered that Islam shares some similarities with Christianity.

Islam, Christianity and Judaism, for example, are connected in many ways. Each is a monotheistic religion that traces its origins back to Abraham. Many Muslims, for example, consider Jesus a great prophet born to a virgin mother.

Bibi Bahrami, Richard "Mac" McKinney and filmmaker Joshua Seftel, from left, discuss Seftel's film, "Stranger at the Gate," at a recent screening.

courtesy Gabi Porter

But it was the kindness of the people at the center, and the community they shared with him, that proved most decisive in his conversion, he says.

“They were just happy. They were just plain pleasant,” he says. “And I really needed that in my life.”

He says that if the people at the center had reacted with hostility that first day, the result probably would have been bloodshed.

Would it be fair to say their kindness saved his life?

“No, no,” he says. “It’s too little to say.”

McKinney says he probably would have attacked the mosque and eventually received the death penalty if not for how he was treated.

Today, McKinney is trying to return the kindness that was extended to him. He earned a bachelor’s degree in social work with a minor in peace and conflict resolution and now travels the country to speak about his experiences.

Has he been able to forgive himself now that he’s converted? He pauses before answering.

“It’s a work in progress,” he says in his gravelly baritone. “How about that?”

Yet as a beautiful scene in the film illustrates, others have forgiven him.

It shows McKinney standing beside Williams, the African American man who lost his great-great-grandfather to hate, silently raising their palms together in prayer as a ribbon of golden sunlight streams into the mosque.

That image conveys more than words could say. McKinney is no longer the stranger at the gate.

He’s found a new band of brothers and sisters — not in the heat of battle, but in faith.

CNN · by John Blake · October 8, 2022

9. The personal is political: Iran protests for a normal life

Resistance is the natural response by oppressed people. Where there is oppression eventually there will be resistance. 

The personal is political: Iran protests for a normal life | Lowy Institute

lowyinstitute.org · by Shadi Rouhshahbaz

Chants of “Women, Life, Freedom” and “Down with the Dictator” have filled the streets of over 80 cities in Iran and more than 200 cities around the world in the past two weeks. The death of a 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian women Mahsa Zhina Amini while in custody of the morality police has sparked an intergenerational multi-ethnic movement that calls for a revolution and a democracy.

Iran, a country that has often been isolated in the years since the 1979 revolution, is suddenly the centre of attention with numerous debates about how the recent uprisings are the different from previous ones.

The chants themselves as well as the mobilisation of the protesters suggests this movement is different from what Iran has experienced before. Demonstrators from different ethnoreligious groups, genders, locations, and generations have called for gender equality and regime change. This feminist movement has succeeded and has continuously expanded for two weeks with much more damage, casualties and detentions than ever.

It’s important not to reduce this movement to anti-hijab protests, an Islamophobic uprising, or economic grievances.

Yet, these protests are not spearheaded by any single leader from inside Iran or the diaspora. After the uprisings of the Green Movement in 2009, the government enforced house arrest on Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and Zahra Rahnavard, the leaders. But this time every person participating in the protests, regardless of geography or mode of participation, is a leader demanding change. This very characteristic has made it difficult for security forces to suppress the movement. The driver behind this individual yet collective leadership is the well-known feminist principle of “the personal is political”, framed by Carol Hanisch in Notes from the Second Year: Women’s Liberation and emphasising that the oppression of women is partially rooted in political and systemic patriarchy, but also partially due to the difficulties that women face when bringing their personal challenges of gender inequality to the political arena. Hanisch saw the solution to combine the personal and the political as consciousness-raising.

A still from a video of demonstrations at Allameh Tabataba’i University (ATU) in Iran’s capital Tehran on 19 September (UGC/AFP via Getty Images)

Iranian women have much personal experience of oppression to convey. On 7 March 1979, hijab became mandatory for women in Iran regardless of ethnoreligious background. The next day – International Women’s Day – women took to the streets hoping to overturn this regulation. These protests were suppressed with violence, and the demands of women were reduced to sound like wearing a piece of fabric on their head is a trivial issue in comparison with the political shift that the country was taking. Needless to say, the “trivial issue” quickly expanded to different dimensions of women’s rights in Iran.

The lesson was well-learned. In the years since women have used different ways to demonstrate their dissatisfaction, from reducing the amount of hair and skin that they cover, to removing the hijab in public and tying it to a stick and holding it in a form of non-violent protest. While none of the efforts have been individually effective, they have changed the perception and societal reactions to a point that the policing of Mahsa Jina Amini’s body united people against the system.

However, it is not only women who are facing oppression in Iran. Systemic oppression has influenced the rights and livelihoods of many different groups with different backgrounds. Looking at the ongoing protests, most protestors are younger Iranians who comprise more than half of the population. Born after the Islamic Revolution, they feel strongly about their rights and personal freedoms. And much like other young people elsewhere in the world, they do not trust a political system that fails to prioritise their ambitions and futures.

Resistance has emerged in various art forms that are shared across social media platforms and news outlets.

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A post shared by Nafas [they/them] نفس (@lovenrageillustrations)

Listening to the social media-inspired single “” released by 25-year-old Shervin Hajipour, one can make a list of transnational’s grievances that Iranian Twitter users have declared as reasons for participating in protests: “Because of …” poverty, the climate crisis, pollution, shooting down the PS752 flight, the extinction of animals, forced immigration, student rights, mental health, discrimination against Afghan refugee children, the imprisonment of activists and scholars, and many other reasons. When sung in demonstrations, every Iranian finds at least one verse closer to their personal experience of living under a religious dictatorship with poor governance. This is why it’s important not to reduce this movement to anti-hijab protests, an Islamophobic uprising, or economic grievances.

Sarah, a 22-year-old student from Iran says, “Throughout my life, I’ve learned that my country is different, and its rules are difficult. I’ve also learned, while growing up, that I must not speak out about my rights; otherwise, I could be imprisoned, exiled, or even worse”. But in the past two weeks, many women like Sarah have decided to speak up and act against oppression. They have been joined by men who experienced their own forms of oppression by the system. Iranians take to the streets every day for a normal life and a better future where the political becomes concerned with the personal.

lowyinstitute.org · by Shadi Rouhshahbaz

10. Putin confronted by insider over Ukraine war, U.S. intelligence finds

Are we revealing possible HUMINT or SIGINT sources and capabilities?

Putin confronted by insider over Ukraine war, U.S. intelligence finds

The disagreement by a member of Putin’s inner circle was deemed significant enough that it was included in President Biden’s daily intelligence briefing

By Greg Miller, Shane Harris, Paul Sonne and Catherine Belton 

October 7, 2022 at 2:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Greg Miller · October 7, 2022

A member of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle has voiced disagreement directly to the Russian president in recent weeks over his handling of the war in Ukraine, according to information obtained by U.S. intelligence.

The criticism marks the clearest indication yet of turmoil within Russia’s leadership over the stewardship of a war that has gone disastrously wrong for Moscow, forcing Putin last month to order the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of troops in a desperate bid to reverse recent battlefield losses.

The information was deemed significant enough that it was included in President Biden’s daily intelligence briefing and shared with other U.S. officials, according to people familiar with the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence.

The discontent that the member of Putin’s inner circle expressed related to what the insider considered mismanagement of the war effort and mistakes being made by those executing the military campaign, according to one of the people.

The insider’s identity could not be confirmed, although the name has been included in U.S. intelligence reporting.

The new intelligence, coupled with comments from Russian officials, underscores divisions within Putin’s upper echelon, where officials have long been loath to bring bad news to an autocratic Russian leader who is seen as more isolated that at any time in his 22-year rule.

A spokesperson for the National Security Council declined to comment on the intelligence.

The number of people Putin counts as close or trusted aides and advisers is small and composed primarily of colleagues from his days serving as a KGB officer and those he met while a deputy to the mayor of St. Petersburg in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The mobilization has sparked domestic unrest, prompted hundreds of thousands of Russian fighting-age men to flee the country and been beset by bureaucratic incompetence, with individuals being called up who are supposed to be excluded from service.

As the war enters its eighth month, and Russian victory remains elusive and ill-defined, the unquestioning loyalty Putin has enjoyed may be slipping, intelligence officials said, but they cautioned there was no indication the Russian leader was on the brink of being swept aside.

“Since the start of the occupation we have witnessed growing alarm from a number of Putin’s inner circle,” a Western intelligence official said. “Our assessments suggest they are particularly exercised by recent Russian losses, misguided direction and extensive military shortcomings.”

A second senior Western official said the internal tensions are “consistent with the way in which the campaign has gone for the Russians, and the atmospherics in the Kremlin. There are a lot of people who are convinced this isn’t going well or the right course of action.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged there have been disagreements and debates among Russian leaders as Putin has faced crucial decisions such as the mobilization.

“There is disagreement over such moments. Some think we should act differently,” Peskov told The Washington Post. “But this is all part of the usual working process.”

Asked about disagreements within Putin’s inner circle, Peskov said, “There are working arguments: about the economy, about the conduct of the military operation. There are arguments about the education system. This is part of the normal working process, and it is not a sign of any split.”

But Peskov said U.S. intelligence reporting about an individual in Putin’s inner circle directly challenging the Russian leader was “absolutely not true.”

Armed with American and European weapons, Ukrainian forces have recaptured thousands of square miles of territory in recent weeks from a Russian military reeling from personnel shortages.

The losses prompted a scramble by the Kremlin to organize hasty staged referendums and announce formal annexations of occupied land, widely condemned as illegal, all while beginning to draft hundreds of thousands of military reservists despite the risk of domestic opposition and protest.

Putin has also threatened to take extreme measures to protect Russia’s territory, including the use of nuclear weapons, hoping the threat will make Ukraine’s backers think twice about how far Kyiv should be enabled to advance.

The situation has led to public criticism of Putin’s defense minister and top generals in a rare outpouring of discontent.

Ramzan Kadyrov, head of Russia’s Chechen Republic, who has sent Chechen militias to fight against Ukraine, lashed out at a top general in recent days and said he should be demoted to private. After the comments, Kadyrov announced that Putin had promoted the Chechen to the rank of colonel general.

Yevgeniy Prigozhin, a longtime Putin ally whose Wagner mercenaries have also been fighting for Moscow in Ukraine, agreed with Kadyrov, describing Russian military leaders as “pieces of garbage” in a statement.

One Moscow-installed official in occupied Kherson described a retreat in recent days by Russian forces northeast of the city as a “regrouping” and claimed the region was “locked down,” but also called top Russian military leaders traitors and incompetents.

“Indeed, many people say that if they were the minister of defense, who brought things to this state of affairs, they would shoot themselves, if they were real officers,” Kirill Stremousov, deputy head of the Russia-installed Kherson administration, said Thursday in a video on Telegram.

Putin’s problems on the battlefield are compounded by a haphazard mobilization at home.

“It seems to me his position is fragile,” one Russian official said of Putin in an interview on the day the mobilization was announced.

“In all these months we have heard that half the world is on our side. But neither Modi nor Xi are now supporting this,” the Russian official said, referring to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who were seen to be distancing themselves from Putin’s war effort during a summit last month in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

In another conversation this week, the official said he had not heard about any direct challenges to Putin from within the inner circle. But “there are protests” by the heads of parliamentary committees about how the president and the military are conducting the war — “about why the army is not being supplied properly, about why the campaign is not going as it should,” the official said.

Senior security officials in Europe said they were not aware that anyone had dared to challenge Putin directly over the course of events in Ukraine and added that they hadn’t seen the U.S. intelligence reporting on the criticism directed at Putin.

Even so, some of those officials said that cracks were increasingly evident across multiple layers of the Russian system, citing outbreaks of criticism and finger-pointing across the Russian military, security services and regional governments now forcing military-age men into service.

One senior European security official described growing “criticism of Putin — behind his back,” including from within the Kremlin ranks. “They think he’s stubborn,” the official said, and “obsessed with Ukraine” — an “obsession they do not necessarily share.”

A second security official in Europe said: “There is scapegoating. Finger-pointing. All of this is happening.”

Two Russian business executives who maintain contacts with political officials echoed those sentiments and said the coming weeks could be crucial for determining Putin’s future and what decisions he makes about the war.

If the Russian military doesn’t stem its losses, then infighting will break out, said one of these people, a member of the Russian business elite. “This is a breaking point.”

The mobilization of forces has proved widely unpopular in Russia and may signal that Putin feels pressured to take desperate measures.

For months, Putin had resisted calling up additional forces, even as battlefield losses suggested he had not deployed sufficient forces at the outset of the war. As early as the spring of this year, when Putin’s plan for a quick invasion and occupation of Ukraine had clearly fizzled, U.S. intelligence analysts assessed that he would have to announce a broad mobilization — amounting to hundreds of thousands of additional troops — if he hoped to achieve his objectives, which at the time Putin believed he still could, according to a senior U.S. official familiar with the matter.

Putin’s decision to call up what Russian officials say will be 300,000 additional troops ranks as among the most destabilizing and politically risky moves of his career and “may lead to regime instability,” a third European security official said.

Others, however, said that despite a mass exodus of military-age men from Russia, Putin has crossed an important threshold without triggering any meaningful internal challenge to his rule. Even regional officials angered by the mobilization are overwhelmingly complying, supplying tens of thousands of recruits.

“Everybody is keen on searching for signs of Russia folding, and you do see internal tensions,” a senior Baltic official said. “But Russia is now on a war footing, and they are still going. We haven’t seen anything to suggest otherwise.”

Belton reported from London.

The Washington Post · by Greg Miller · October 7, 2022

11. Experts: Russia finding new ways to spread propaganda videos

​If you circulate these videos, are you a useful idiot?

​

Experts: Russia finding new ways to spread propaganda videos

English-language versions of Russian propaganda videos are circulating on Twitter and platforms popular with American conservatives, including Gab and Truth Social, created by former President Trump.

by David Klepper, Associated PressPublished Oct 5, 2022

Philadelphia Inquirer · by David Klepper

Russia has devised yet another way to spread disinformation about its invasion of Ukraine, using digital tricks that allow its war propaganda videos to evade restrictions imposed by governments and tech companies.

Accounts linked to Russian state-controlled media have used the new method to spread dozens of videos in 18 different languages, all without leaving telltale signs that would give away the source, researchers at Nisos, a U.S.-based intelligence firm that tracks disinformation and other cyber threats, said in a report released Wednesday.

The videos push Kremlin conspiracy theories blaming Ukraine for civilian casualties as well as claims that residents of areas forcibly annexed by Russia have welcomed their occupiers.

English-language versions of the Russian propaganda videos are now circulating on Twitter and lesser-known platforms popular with American conservatives, including Gab and Truth Social, created by former President Donald Trump, giving Russia a direct conduit to millions of people.

In an indication of the Kremlin's ambitions and the sprawling reach of its disinformation operations, versions of the videos were also created in Spanish, Italian, German and more than a dozen other languages.

“The genius of this approach is that the videos can be downloaded directly from Telegram and it erases the trail that researchers try to follow," Nisos' senior intelligence analyst Patricia Bailey told The Associated Press. “They are creative and adaptable. And they are analyzing their audience.”

The European Union moved to ban RT and Sputnik, two of Russia's leading state-run media outlets, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in late February. Tech companies such as Google's YouTube and Meta's Facebook and Instagram also announced they would ban content from the outlets within the 27-nation EU, undermining Russia's ability to spread its propaganda.

Russian attempts to get around the new rules began almost immediately. New websites were created to host videos that make debunked claims about the war. Russian diplomats took on some of the work.

The latest effort revealed by analysts at Nisos involved uploading propaganda videos to Telegram, a loosely moderated platform that is broadly popular in Eastern Europe and used by many conservatives in the United States. In some cases, watermarks identifying the video as RT's were removed in a further attempt to disguise their source.

Once on Telegram, the videos were downloaded and reposted on platforms including Twitter without any labels or other indications that the video was produced by Russian state media. Hundreds of accounts that later posted or reposted the videos were linked by Nisos researchers to the Russian military, embassies or state media.

Some of the accounts appeared to use fake profile photos or posted content in strange ways that suggested they were inauthentic.

One example: a Twitter account supposedly run by a woman living in Japan that had a singular interest in Russian propaganda. Instead of posting about a variety of topics such as entertainment, food, travel or family, the account user only posted Russian propaganda videos — and not just in Japanese, but also in Farsi, Polish, Spanish and Russian.

The account also cited or reposted content from Russian embassies hundreds of times, researchers found, showing again the close relationship between Russian diplomats and the country's propaganda work.

When it comes to Russia's overall disinformation capabilities, Bailey said, the network is “just one piece of a puzzle that is quite large."

Twitter labels content that it can identify as coming from Russian state media. Since late February, the company says it's added labels to more than 900,000 different Tweets that contained links to Russian state outlets like RT. In addition, the platform does not artificially promote content from state media accounts.

“We use labels to make it clear on Twitter when an account is operated by a state actor, such as a state-backed media outlet, and we will not recommend or amplify Tweets from these types of accounts,” a company spokesperson told The AP.

More examples of Russian disinformation campaigns have emerged as the war has dragged on.

Last week, Russia sought to spread a baseless conspiracy theory blaming the U.S. for sabotage to the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea.

The same week, Meta announced the discovery of a sprawling Russian disinformation network that created websites designed to look like major European news outlets. Instead of news, the websites carried propaganda intended to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its western allies.

That operation was the largest of its kind to originate in Russia since the war began, researchers concluded.

“The network exhibited an overarching pattern of targeting Europe with anti-Ukraine narratives and expressions of support for Russian interests,” according to a report from the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab, which helped identify the network disabled by Meta.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

Philadelphia Inquirer · by David Klepper

12. Russia must return Kuril Islands to Japan - Ukraine’s Parliament

Ukraine's parliament appears to be expanding and globalizing the national security problem.

Russia must return Kuril Islands to Japan - Ukraine’s Parliament

ukrinform.net

That’s according to Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk, who made the statement in a Facebook posting, Ukrinform reports.

"Today, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine appealed to the international community regarding the Northern Territories of Japan.

From August to September 1945, the USSR illegally occupied the northern territories of Japan before deporting the Japanese population. Russia, as the "successor of the USSR", was obliged to return them. But they haven’t done it yet.

Therefore, the Parliament of Ukraine appeals to the UN, European Parliament, PACE, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and international community, urging them to continue taking all possible measures for the contractual and legal registration of the status of Japan's northern territories," Stefanchuk wrote.

Earlier it was reported that the Verkhovna Rada at its latest meeting supported the draft resolution on the parliamentary appeal to the international community regarding the northern territories of Japan.

ukrinform.net

13. The CIA Thought Putin Would Quickly Conquer Ukraine. Why Did They Get It So Wrong?

I admit that I thought Russia would rapidly overwhelm and occupy Ukraine. I thought the Russian air force would establish air superiority and provide the ground forces freedom of maneuver. I had no idea the Russian military forces would be so incompetent. 

The CIA Thought Putin Would Quickly Conquer Ukraine. Why Did They Get It So Wrong?

High-tech surveillance may have blinded the U.S. to how corruption has weakened the Russian military.

James Risen, Ken Klippenstein

The Intercept · by James Risen · October 5, 2022

Ever since Ukraine launched a successful counteroffensive against Russian forces in late August, American officials have tried to claim credit, insisting that U.S. intelligence has been key to Ukraine’s battlefield victories.

Yet U.S. officials have simultaneously downplayed their intelligence failures in Ukraine — especially their glaring mistakes at the outset of the war. When Putin invaded in February, U.S. intelligence officials told the White House that Russia would win in a matter of days by quickly overwhelming the Ukrainian army, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials, who asked not to be named to discuss sensitive information.

The Central Intelligence Agency was so pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances that officials told President Joe Biden and other policymakers that the best they could expect was that the remnants of Ukraine’s defeated forces would mount an insurgency, a guerrilla war against the Russian occupiers. By the time of the February invasion, the CIA was already planning how to provide covert support for a Ukrainian insurgency following a Russian military victory, the officials said.

U.S. intelligence reports at the time predicted that Kyiv would fall quickly, perhaps in a week or two at the most. The predictions spurred the Biden administration to secretly withdraw some key U.S. intelligence assets from Ukraine, including covert former special operations personnel on contract with the CIA, the current and former officials said. Their account was backed up by a Naval officer and a former Navy SEAL, who were aware of the movements and who also asked not to be named because they were not authorized to speak publicly.

The CIA “got it completely wrong,” said one former senior U.S. intelligence official, who is knowledgeable about what the CIA was reporting when the Russian invasion began. “They thought Russia would win right away.”

When it became clear that the agency’s predictions of a rapid Russian victory had been wrong, the Biden administration sent the clandestine assets that had been pulled out of Ukraine back into the country, the military and intelligence officials said. One U.S. official insisted that the CIA only conducted a partial withdrawal of its assets when the war began, and that the agency “never completely left.”

Secret U.S. operations inside Ukraine are being conducted under a presidential covert action finding.

Yet clandestine American operations inside Ukraine are now far more extensive than they were early in the war, when U.S. intelligence officials were fearful that Russia would steamroll over the Ukrainian army. There is a much larger presence of both CIA and U.S. special operations personnel and resources in Ukraine than there were at the time of the Russian invasion in February, several current and former intelligence officials told The Intercept.

Secret U.S. operations inside Ukraine are being conducted under a presidential covert action finding, current and former officials said. The finding indicates that the president has quietly notified certain congressional leaders about the administration’s decision to conduct a broad program of clandestine operations inside the country. One former special forces officer said that Biden amended a preexisting finding, originally approved during the Obama administration, that was designed to counter malign foreign influence activities. A former CIA officer told The Intercept that Biden’s use of the preexisting finding has frustrated some intelligence officials, who believe that U.S. involvement in the Ukraine conflict differs so much from the spirit of the finding that it should merit a new one. A CIA spokesperson declined to comment about whether there is a presidential covert action finding for operations in Ukraine.

The U.S. intelligence community’s stunning failure at the beginning of the war to recognize the fundamental weaknesses in the Russian system mirrors its blindness to the military and economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, when Washington failed to predict the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. While not all U.S. intelligence analysts underestimated the Ukrainian will to fight, the community’s missteps in Ukraine came just months after American intelligence gravely underestimated how fast the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan would collapse in 2021, leading to a rapid takeover by the Taliban.

Some senior U.S. intelligence officials have since admitted they were wrong in projecting a quick Russian victory. In March, Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, acknowledged during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing that the CIA didn’t do well “in terms of predicting the military challenges that [Putin] has encountered with his own military.”

The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, said at the same March hearing that “my view was that, based on a variety of factors, that the Ukrainians were not as ready as I thought they should be, therefore I questioned their will to fight, [and] that was a bad assessment on my part.”

“I think assessing … morale, and a will to fight is a very difficult analytical task,” he added. “We had different inputs from different organizations. And at least from my perspective as director, I did not do as well as I could have.”

I’m in

Yet these admissions mask a more fundamental failure that officials have not fully acknowledged: U.S. intelligence did not recognize the significance of rampant corruption and incompetence in the Putin regime, particularly in both the Russian army and Moscow’s defense industries, the current and former intelligence officials said. U.S. intelligence missed the impact of corrupt insider dealing and deceit among Putin loyalists in Moscow’s defense establishment, which has left the Russian army a brittle and hollow shell.

“There was no reporting on the corruption in the Russian system,” said the former senior intelligence official. “They missed it, and ignored any evidence of it.”

“There was no reporting on the corruption in the Russian system.”

Following a string of Russian defeats, even prominent Russian analysts have begun to openly blame the corruption and deceit that plagues the Russian system. On Russian television last weekend, Andrey Gurulyov, the former deputy commander of Russia’s southern military district and now a member of the Russian Duma, blamed his country’s losses on a system of lies, “top to bottom.”

Additionally, Putin imposed an invasion plan on the Russian military that was impossible to achieve, one current U.S. official argued. “You can’t really separate out the issue of Russian military competency from the fact that they were shackled to an impossible plan, which led to poor military preparation,” the official said.

Remains of Russian uniforms in the destroyed village of Shandryholove near Lyman, Ukraine, on Oct. 3, 2022.

Photo: Wojciech Grzedzinski/Getty Images

After Russia’s defeat in Lyman, in eastern Ukraine, last weekend, retired Army Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, who commanded U.S. Army forces in Europe from 2014 until 2018, also admitted that he had “overestimated Russia’s capabilities” before it invaded Ukraine because he “failed to realize the depth of corruption” in the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The inability of the U.S. intelligence community to recognize the significance of Russian corruption appears to be the result of an over-reliance on technical intelligence. Before the war, high-tech satellites and surveillance systems allowed the U.S. to track the deployment of Russian troops, tanks, and planes, and to eavesdrop on Russian military officials, enabling U.S. intelligence to accurately predict the timing of the invasion. But it would have needed more human spies inside Russia to see that the Russian army and defense industries were deeply corrupt.

Since the war began, a long list of weaknesses in the Russian military and its defense industries have been exposed, symbolized by the so-called jack-in-the-box flaw in Russian tanks. Ukrainian forces quickly learned that one well-placed shot could blow off a Russian tank turret, sending it sky high and killing the entire crew. It became clear that Russian tanks had been designed and built cheaply — with ammunition stored openly in a ring inside the turret that can explode when the turret is hit — and that crew safety had not been prioritized. In July, Adm. Tony Radakin, Britain’s military chief, said that Russia had lost almost 1,700 tanks in Ukraine.

Weak leadership, poor training, and low morale have led to huge casualties among Russian rank and file soldiers. In August, the Pentagon estimated that 70,000 to 80,000 Russian troops had been killed or wounded in Ukraine. Ukraine has also suffered huge casualties, but Russian front-line strength has been badly weakened.

Meanwhile, one of the biggest mysteries for U.S. analysts has been Russia’s failure to gain control of Ukraine’s skies, despite having a far larger air force. Aircraft design flaws, poor pilot training, and gaps in aircraft maintenance have left Russian aircraft vulnerable to Ukraine’s air defenses, which have been bolstered with Stinger missiles and other Western air defense systems.

The failure of U.S. intelligence to see the dysfunction in the Russian army and defense industries means that it also didn’t foresee Russia’s ongoing battlefield defeats, which are now having a profound political and social impact on both Putin and Russia. Putin has ordered a partial mobilization to replace heavy battlefield losses, sparking large-scale protests. At least 200,000 people have already fled Russia, including thousands of young men seeking to avoid conscription.

The Intercept · by James Risen · October 5, 2022

14. White House Tightens Rules on Counterterrorism Drone Strikes

More restrictive rule of engagement

Excerpts:

A description of the policy, along with a classified new counterterrorism strategy memo Mr. Biden has also signed, suggests that amid competing priorities in a turbulent world, the United States intends to launch fewer drone strikes and commando raids away from recognized war zones than it has in the recent past.

The policy requires Mr. Biden’s approval before a suspected terrorist is added to a list of those who can be targeted for “direct action,” in a return to a more centralized control of decisions about targeted killing operations that was a hallmark of President Barack Obama’s second term. Mr. Trump had given commanders in the field greater latitude to decide whom to target.

The New York Times has not seen a copy of the classified document, which officials call the P.P.M., for presidential policy memorandum. But it was described by a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to explain its key aspects.

White House Tightens Rules on Counterterrorism Drone Strikes

nytimes.com · by Charlie Savage · October 7, 2022

A classified new policy requires President Biden’s approval to add suspected terrorists to a kill list. The Trump administration had decentralized control over targeting decisions.

An Air Force Predator drone, right, returning from a mission in the Persian Gulf region in 2016. The new policy suggests that the United States intends to launch fewer drone strikes away from recognized war zones.Credit...John Moore/Getty Images

WASHINGTON — President Biden has signed a classified policy limiting counterterrorism drone strikes outside conventional war zones, tightening rules that President Donald J. Trump had loosened for a 21st-century method of warfare, according to officials.

The policy, which the White House sent to the Pentagon and the C.I.A. on Friday, institutionalizes a version of temporary limits that Mr. Biden’s team quietly put in place on the day of his inauguration as a stopgap for reducing risks to civilians while the new administration reviewed the counterterrorism policies it had inherited from Mr. Trump.

A description of the policy, along with a classified new counterterrorism strategy memo Mr. Biden has also signed, suggests that amid competing priorities in a turbulent world, the United States intends to launch fewer drone strikes and commando raids away from recognized war zones than it has in the recent past.

The policy requires Mr. Biden’s approval before a suspected terrorist is added to a list of those who can be targeted for “direct action,” in a return to a more centralized control of decisions about targeted killing operations that was a hallmark of President Barack Obama’s second term. Mr. Trump had given commanders in the field greater latitude to decide whom to target.

The New York Times has not seen a copy of the classified document, which officials call the P.P.M., for presidential policy memorandum. But it was described by a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to explain its key aspects.

In a statement, Liz Sherwood-Randall, Mr. Biden’s homeland security adviser who oversaw a 20-month review that led to the changes, acknowledged that the policy had been completed and characterized it as directing the government to be “discerning and agile in protecting Americans against evolving global terrorist challenges.”

She added: “The president’s guidance on the use of lethal action and capture operations outside areas of active hostilities requires that U.S. counterterrorism operations meet the highest standards of precision and rigor, including for identifying appropriate targets and minimizing civilian casualties.”

The Biden administration’s rules apply to strikes in poorly governed places where Islamist militants are active but that the United States does not consider to be “areas of active hostilities.”

Only Iraq and Syria — where U.S. troops and partners are fighting the remnants of the Islamic State — are currently deemed to be conventional war zones where the new rules will not apply and commanders in the field will retain greater latitude to order counterterrorism airstrikes or raids without seeking White House approval, the official said.

Reporting From Afghanistan

• A Year Under the Taliban: ​A single year of extremist rule has turned life upside down for Afghans, especially women. A photographer captured the jarring changes.
• Inside the Fall of Kabul: ​In the summer of 2021, the Taliban took the Afghan capital with a speed that shocked the world. Our reporter and photographer witnessed it.
• On Patrol: A group of Times journalists spent 12 days with a Taliban police unit in Kabul. Here is what they saw.
• Face to Face: ​​A Times reporter who served as a Marine in Afghanistan returned to interview a Taliban commander he once fought.

That means the rules will limit any such operations in several other countries where the United States has carried out drone strikes in recent years, including Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen, as well as the tribal region of Pakistan.

The number of counterterrorism raids and drone strikes in several of the affected countries had been decreasing in recent years. The last U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen were in 2018 and 2019, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal. This summer, a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan killed Al Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahri.

The policy requires “near certainty” that a target is a member of a terrorist group approved for so-called “direct action” and “near certainty” that no civilians will be killed or injured before pulling the trigger, the official said.

The policy is said to declare that capturing is preferable to killing, requiring the military and the C.I.A. to evaluate the feasibility of a capture operation. It also requires them to obtain the consent of the State Department’s chief of mission in a country before carrying out an operation there, the official said.

By limiting targeting approval to specific, named people, the policy does not authorize a tactic that may increase the risk of mistakes that kill civilians: so-called signature strikes, attacking people without knowing their identities based on patterns that raised suspicions.

Still, the rules permit seeking Mr. Biden’s permission for other types of strikes in extraordinary circumstances, and do not require White House approval for strikes carried out in self-defense, such as the so-called collective self-defense of partner forces.

Many strikes in Somalia, where U.S. forces are helping to build up government troops battling the militant group Al Shabab, have been justified as collective self-defense of partners — including one on Sept. 18 that the military said killed 27 Shabab fighters who had attacked Somali forces.

Counterterrorism drone strikes targeting militants in remote and poorly governed regions — where there are no police to arrest people plotting terrorist attacks — have become a new style of warfare, raising legal and policy dilemmas. Four presidents have now grappled with how to use and constrain the technology.

The C.I.A. used a novel armed drone to kill a militant in 2002, after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In the 2002 attack, the strike destroyed a car carrying a suspected member of Al Qaeda in Yemen.

What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What’s their motivation for telling us? Have they proved reliable in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with these questions satisfied, The Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The reporter and at least one editor know the identity of the source.

By the end of the George W. Bush administration, the government had acquired many more armed drones, and airstrikes in tribal regions of Pakistan were soaring.

Drone strikes increased still further early in the Obama administration, including in Yemen with the emergence of a dangerous Qaeda affiliate. And as the frequency of airstrikes increased, so did botched ones in which the military or the C.I.A. mistakenly killed civilians.

In 2013, Mr. Obama sought to impose greater control over drone warfare by issuing new limits on “direct action” operations away from war zones. In 2017, Mr. Trump replaced those guidelines with a looser set of rules, which Mr. Biden set aside in January 2021.

Mr. Biden’s rules are said to declare that the United States will carry out such strikes in other countries consistent with domestic and international law — both areas where the government’s interpretations have been the subject of some dispute.

As a matter of domestic law, the government has generally claimed that it has legal authority to attack terrorism suspects under the Authorization for Use of Military Force that Congress enacted after the Sept. 11 attacks. Presidents in both parties have stretched that law beyond the original version of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan to cover many other groups and places.

As a matter of international law, the policy is said not to delve into the circumstances in which the United States believes it can carry out strikes in another country without the consent of its government under a disputed theory that local authorities are unwilling or unable to suppress a threat emanating from their territory.

The policy also says that to be put on the kill-or-capture list, a target must be deemed a “continuing and imminent threat to U.S. persons,” the official said.

For now, the Biden administration is not making public the text of its drone strike rules. Nor is it releasing a classified national security memo encapsulating a new international counterterrorism strategy, the development of which Ms. Sherwood-Randall oversaw in parallel.

The strategy is said to respond to how the terrorist threat has evolved over time — it is more diffuse, ideologically diverse and geographically dispersed — and the need for the United States to prioritize threats amid competing problems and resource constraints, including those involving Russia, China, cybersecurity, climate change and the coronavirus pandemic.

The strategy is also said to emphasize other means of reducing the risk of terrorism, including working with partner forces and supporting overseas civilian law enforcement abilities, while reserving U.S. kinetic action as a tool where merited.

Under Mr. Trump’s system, the White House approved “country plans” that set broad standards for particular areas, in which operators had greater latitude to select targets.

The Biden system still envisions country plans that will include things like local logistics and identifying which militant groups operating there are eligible for targeting.

The new counterterrorism rules are distinct from Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III’s efforts to strengthen the Pentagon procedures aimed at preventing civilian deaths in military operations generally. That includes conventional battlefield zones, which Afghanistan was still considered to be in August 2021, when a botched military drone strike in Kabul killed 10 innocent people amid the chaotic U.S. withdrawal.

The review also weighed whether to restore an Obama directive, rescinded by Mr. Trump, that had required the government to annually disclose its best understanding of how many militants and civilians it had killed in counterterrorism airstrikes. Congress has separately required the military to make public some of that information.

But for now, the White House has not restored the Obama-era directive as applied to the C.I.A. The official said whether and how to build on the disclosure law was still under consideration.

The Biden-era standard of “near certainty” that no civilians will be killed applies equally to adult men in a potential strike zone as to women and children, the official said. The Trump-era rules also had a standard of “near certainty” that no civilians would be harmed in a strike but are said to have allowed systematic exceptions so long as bureaucratic procedures were followed.

Officials familiar with the matter have described some country plans in the Trump era, which remain classified, as permitting a lower standard — “reasonable certainty” no civilians would be hurt — in assessing the status of adult men in a potential strike zone.

But it remains unclear what the “near certainty” standard means in practice. The military announced this month that it had carried out a strike in Somalia that apparently killed Abdullahi Nadir, a longtime Shabab leader.

The military initially said he was the only person killed in the strike — but later realized that a second person, also believed to be a Shabab militant, was also killed, according to officials familiar with the matter. The two were apparently in a car at the time of the attack.

Senior officials at the Pentagon and the White House have questioned how operators could have met the “near certainty” standard if they did not realize a second person was present. An Africa Command spokesperson acknowledged that the strike was under review.

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting from Stuttgart, Germany.

nytimes.com · by Charlie Savage · October 7, 2022

15. How much do Russians really support Putin and the war in Ukraine?

Excerpts:

JK: So, I think the biggest question many people are wondering about is to what extent are we really seeing vulnerability in the Kremlin? There are more reports coming now of dissent from within Putin’s inner circle and criticism from what used to be his supporters in the pro-war camp. How much does this really matter in terms of his hold on power? Today is his 70th birthday. Is there any reason to think he won’t be in the Kremlin on his 71st?

SG: There’s always vulnerability in the Kremlin. The reality is that when you don’t have what you would think of as a normal political system, one that creates and endows a government with legitimacy every five or six years, then you’re not giving them any incentive to wait until the next election. They know that [Putin] could be in power forever, which means they don’t have to wait for the next election. It means that if there is a threat to their livelihoods and their prospects, and if that threat is acute, if you’re Putin, if you’re that dictator, you have to worry about that threat 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

We do see Putin respond to threats, take them very, very seriously and organize politics around how serious these threats are. That is something Putin has been doing for a long time. At the same time, there is also a tremendous amount of strength and resiliency. He does control a very powerful coercive apparatus, he controls all there is to politics and all there is to the economy.

I think his core asset in all of this is the fact that it’s not enough just for people who are dissatisfied with Putin — whether that’s people in government around him or ordinary citizens — to be dissatisfied. In fact, it’s probably really hard to look around the Russian landscape right now and find people who are very happy with the way things are going, but they have to be able to believe that they A) could pull off a change in government, and B) that the change in government would actually make something better.

It’s still easier for everybody in this game, whether you are in the elite, in the top of the system, or much further down the food chain, to find an individual solution to this, to keep your head down and sort of isolate yourself. That’s the strategy that seems to be much more available and much more sensible to people than trying to take the very big risk of trying to create political change.

GR: Maybe some people listening are familiar with the movie “The Death of Stalin.” This situation has a lot of similarities to that. People who were sitting around the table with Putin, being humiliated by him on television on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, they probably hate him as much as anybody does. But their problem is, “If we were able to take the old guy out, and that’s a big if, who do we get next? And what’s usually happened in the past is that whoever comes next then eliminates the rest of us as his potential competitors and people who know where the bodies are buried.”

So, you not only have to be able to coordinate, you have to be confident that whoever replaces Putin will treat you better and not immediately turn on you. That’s the classic dynamic of these kinds of political systems. I think this situation is actually really acute. If Putin had wanted to die peacefully in his bed, he would have not invaded Ukraine. I think he’s more vulnerable now than he’s been, really, since he took office.

How much do Russians really support Putin and the war in Ukraine?

Why the Russian president may be more vulnerable now than he’s ever been.

Joshua Keating

Global Security Reporter

October 7, 2022

grid.news · by Joshua Keating

How much trouble is Russian President Vladimir Putin really in? Every day seems to bring new battlefield setbacks for his military in Ukraine, images of Russian citizens fleeing en masse from a shambolic mass mobilization and — more recently — surprisingly direct criticism of the conduct of the war from insiders who have traditionally been his staunchest supporters.

Hear more from this conversation between Joshua Keating, Samuel Greene and Graeme Robertson:

But in an autocratic political system, particularly one with as much power vested in a single leader as Russia’s, public controversy only matters so much. In his more than two decades in power, Putin — who celebrated his 70th birthday on Friday — has weathered a host of military, political and economic crises, more often than not finding ways to turn them to his advantage.

On this week’s Global Grid, Grid Global Security Reporter Joshua Keating spoke with Samuel Greene and Graeme Robertson, the authors of “Putin vs. The People: The Story of a Popular Dictator and the Struggle for the Future of Russia.” This study of Putin’s relationship with his citizens and the often misunderstood role of public opinion in autocratic political systems was first published in 2019 but reissued this year with new material on the war in Ukraine.

Greene is director of the Russia Institute and professor of Russian politics at King’s College London. Robertson is a professor of political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and director of the Center for Slavic, Eurasian and East European Studies. They discussed the evolution of Putin’s nationalist message, why the annexation of Crimea in 2014 led him into a disastrous miscalculation this year, and why he may have as much trouble understanding Russians’ real views as we do.

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The conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Joshua Keating: I’ll start with a question that I’m guessing is pretty difficult to answer: How much do we really know right now about the level of support in Russia for this war and the extent to which the Russian people are really behind their president right now?

Graeme Robertson: We actually know quite a lot about public opinion in Russia, and we know that about 60 percent of people say in polls that they support the war. We know from research that those numbers are, in one sense, pretty firm. There is some degree of preference falsification, but we know that people respond to polls pretty much the way they did before, that people answer questions just about as freely as they did in Russia before the war. So those numbers are a pretty decent guide to public opinion.

We see a very clear age gradient in the polls. Younger people are much more likely to oppose the war. Older people are much more likely to support it. This is, in part, a result of younger people being more affected by the war. It’s also a result of the fact that younger people have a much broader information diet. I saw a really interesting poll the other day that showed that one of the best predictors of being opposed to the war was being able to define what a VPN was. So, if you know what a VPN is, that means you’re probably able to access one, and if you want to access one, you have a different set of information.

That’s sort of the landscape of public opinion, but what’s harder is to know how to interpret that landscape. We typically think of public opinion as being something that’s formed after people have been exposed to different kinds of information and reflect some kind of deeper understanding of the situation. That’s clearly not the situation that we have in Russia. So instead, what we have is a war that’s based mostly on people’s trust in the authorities to do the right thing.

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And to the extent that that’s true, it means we have very broad but very thin and very fragile support for the war. As soon as it becomes more and more obvious that the state is not effective, that the state is not telling the truth, that support could collapse pretty quickly.

JK: In the book, you really emphasize the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as a kind of turning point in the government’s relationship with the people and the rhetoric that Putin uses. Could you tell us a little more about what changed in 2014, and what lessons Putin might have taken from that experience into the current conflict?

GR: What we saw after the Crimean annexation was really a transformation in Russia. Popular support for Putin went up dramatically. His poll numbers have been sliding from when the financial crisis hit Russia in 2009, through the elections of 2012, which resulted in mass protests on the streets. When Putin was reelected in 2012, his strategy shifted to a much more nationalist and much more anti-Western agenda.

Before Crimea, people had been supportive of the president, but not particularly engaged. When we asked people how proud they felt of their president, very few people did feel pride. But after Crimea, lots of people felt pride. So you had lots of people who felt joy and emotional attachment to Russia. And this was a big transformation. So it’s possible that Putin drew from this experience the idea that if he could launch a successful war, he could once again capture the hearts and minds of the Russian people.

There are other, incorrect lessons that he drew from the Crimean experience that led him to this disaster in Ukraine. The military operation in Crimea went off very easily without a hitch. There was little to no resistance. They also were able to support and sponsor uprisings in eastern Ukraine that ultimately ran into resistance from Ukrainian militias and then the Ukrainian army, but that had been relatively successful. I think Putin took that experience where he was able to turn local actors to the Russian side as being something that would happen again in 2022. He missed the enormous transformations in Ukrainian society that occurred between 2014 and 2022.

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He missed the consolidation of national identity, especially in eastern parts of Ukraine.

So, Putin completely misjudged the extent to which people would flip and start supporting the Russian invasion. I think his wrong assumption about the war was less about Russian and domestic opinion than about public opinion and behavior in Ukraine.

JK: There’s been a sort of interesting dichotomy in Putin’s rhetoric where, on the one hand, he frames this as a sort of civilizational struggle or a matter of Russia’s historical destiny. But until a few weeks ago, he avoided mobilization or even calling this a “war.” So how do you square that? Why was there this reluctance by Putin to fully engage Russian society until recently, considering how he seems to believe the stakes are?

Samuel Greene: I think we have to recognize that as much as we don’t understand about Russian public opinion, Putin doesn’t understand a whole lot more than we do. In some ways, he may understand less simply because he’s beholden to some ideas and maybe he’s not quite as rigorous about the research. But the reality is that he had no way of knowing how the public was going to respond to the war. He had no way of knowing, ahead of time, how it was going to respond to this partial mobilization. And so when he’s in that position of not really knowing, it means that Putin has to do two things.

He tends to be experimental. So he will try things out and leave himself with the flexibility to pivot. So that instead of going for the 1.2 million [troop] mobilization that some people have been talking about, he starts off with 300,000 to see what kind of response he gets, and then he can push forward if it if it works, and he can turn around in the other direction if it doesn’t.

But the other thing is that Putin has really, going back to the very beginning of his time in office in 1999, tried to be all things to all people. So if you go back to the early 2000s, if you wanted a kind of a backward-looking and nostalgic view of politics, you could find reasons to identify with Putin. And if you wanted a forward-looking and sort of progressive view of politics, you could also find ways to convince yourself that that was the direction that he was taking. He does, I think, still try to give people various reasons to get on board. So, if what really motivates you is nationalism, then he’s giving you a bunch of rhetoric that puts him in your camp. But if what really motivates you is the idea that the United States might be threatening us, or you really don’t like NATO, or that kind of thing, he’s giving you rhetoric in that direction. And you can kind of ignore the other parts that you might not like.

JK: One thing you talk about in the book is the strong “rally round the flag” effect that Russians, in particular, tend to display during international crises and insulates the Kremlin from the economic impact of things like sanctions. But are there limits to that, to how much economic pain Russians will tolerate for geopolitical gains?

GR: First of all, the kind of rally around the flag effect that we see in Russia is common in most countries in the world. You see rallies around the flag when the country citizens perceive the country be under some kind of threat and the government responding militarily. Look at the American invasion of Iraq or the Falklands War in Great Britain in the 1980s, and you see the same kind of phenomenon. So Russia isn’t unique in this context. But what’s interesting is that what you saw in these other cases of rallies, that were mostly in democracies, is that the rally holds until such time as the opposition starts to feel able to criticize the government again; criticizes mistakes that are made in the invasion of Iraq, for example.

In democracies, that happens pretty quickly. In somewhere like Russia, where you don’t have a free press, and there’s not the same access to opposition voices, the process is much more slow. And so we saw after the Crimea annexation, the rally lasted about four years before economic problems started to chip away again at Putin’s popularity.

So, what’s really interesting about what we’re seeing in Russia right now: On the one hand, you had this economic squeeze that’s taking place more slowly than anticipated. It’s not really biting yet with a ferocity that some people were expecting at the beginning of the sanctions. I think that’s a slow burner. But the faster way of chipping away at his authority is the criticism of the handling of no more than we see from two sides. We see it very much from the nationalist side who don’t think the wars been done hard enough, fast enough, well enough. This is [Chechen President Ramzan] Kadyrov’s criticism.

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But then on the other hand, there’s also more criticism from society as the inequities and inefficiencies of the mobilization start to become more obvious. So I think this is actually a really interesting moment where the wartime rally effect is really under a lot of pressure from two sides at the one time.

JK: There’s been extensive reporting that even before the draft and more so after it, that a disproportionate share of those fighting and dying in this war are from more remote regions of Russia and ethnic minority communities: places like Dagestan, Tuva, Yakutia. I’m curious how these communities fit into the nationalist rhetoric Putin has been espousing in recent years. Does he address his message about Russian greatness to them as well?

SG: It’s interesting: As much as we talk about Putin as a nationalist, he’s a great power nationalist, but he hasn’t really been an ethnic nationalist, at least until pretty recently. And he’s been very careful in the ways that he’s used nationalism in his rhetoric. You’re not going to find me saying nice things about Putin on a regular basis, but he does seem to recognize the fact that Russia is a multiethnic country and that trying to exploit ethnic divisions within Russia would be catastrophic, including for Putin’s own power. And so he’s tried very hard to talk in a way that allows everybody within the state the right to feel to feel patriotic.

But there are there are dangers within that. One is the degree to which he has mobilized the sort of hard-right Slavic ethno-nationalist communities in Russia in support of this war. It does drag him more and more into the kinds of rhetoric that they espouse, and that can begin to create problems, particularly when we see something like this mobilization and the extent to which it draws on marginalized communities.

When the rhetoric in these communities doesn’t match up with what’s actually being done to them, when poverty drives people into the military as an avenue of social mobility, when people in these communities begin to feel that they’re being exploited or somehow bearing an uneven, inequitable burden that other communities, particularly the dominant ethnic Slavic community in Russia, is not being asked to bear, then they may come calling for some recognition, and for some autonomy, and for some justice.

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JK: Since the mobilization, we’ve also seen hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the country, both to neighboring countries and farther afield. One would assume these are the sorts of people who might be more inclined to oppose the government or at least be critical of it. So what impact could this exodus have on Russian politics going forward?

GR: Yes, we’re seeing a historically large emigration of Russia’s intellectuals, lots of educated people, and frankly, people with the resources to get up and go, so better-off people. I haven’t seen any decent polling around émigrés, but anecdotally, it’s pretty clear that most of the people who are leaving are critical of the war and did not want to be involved in the war. Although obviously, there are some people amongst those that have fled who supported the war until it came down to the point where they didn’t want support it with their with their lives and their bodies.

The real tragedy of this is not even just politically, it’s the enormous human capital. For Russia to prosper and develop and flourish in the future, these are the people, the young people, that it needs. And that’s yet another tragedy that Putin is visiting upon his own country.

JK: So, I think the biggest question many people are wondering about is to what extent are we really seeing vulnerability in the Kremlin? There are more reports coming now of dissent from within Putin’s inner circle and criticism from what used to be his supporters in the pro-war camp. How much does this really matter in terms of his hold on power? Today is his 70th birthday. Is there any reason to think he won’t be in the Kremlin on his 71st?

SG: There’s always vulnerability in the Kremlin. The reality is that when you don’t have what you would think of as a normal political system, one that creates and endows a government with legitimacy every five or six years, then you’re not giving them any incentive to wait until the next election. They know that [Putin] could be in power forever, which means they don’t have to wait for the next election. It means that if there is a threat to their livelihoods and their prospects, and if that threat is acute, if you’re Putin, if you’re that dictator, you have to worry about that threat 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

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We do see Putin respond to threats, take them very, very seriously and organize politics around how serious these threats are. That is something Putin has been doing for a long time. At the same time, there is also a tremendous amount of strength and resiliency. He does control a very powerful coercive apparatus, he controls all there is to politics and all there is to the economy.

I think his core asset in all of this is the fact that it’s not enough just for people who are dissatisfied with Putin — whether that’s people in government around him or ordinary citizens — to be dissatisfied. In fact, it’s probably really hard to look around the Russian landscape right now and find people who are very happy with the way things are going, but they have to be able to believe that they A) could pull off a change in government, and B) that the change in government would actually make something better.

It’s still easier for everybody in this game, whether you are in the elite, in the top of the system, or much further down the food chain, to find an individual solution to this, to keep your head down and sort of isolate yourself. That’s the strategy that seems to be much more available and much more sensible to people than trying to take the very big risk of trying to create political change.

GR: Maybe some people listening are familiar with the movie “The Death of Stalin.” This situation has a lot of similarities to that. People who were sitting around the table with Putin, being humiliated by him on television on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, they probably hate him as much as anybody does. But their problem is, “If we were able to take the old guy out, and that’s a big if, who do we get next? And what’s usually happened in the past is that whoever comes next then eliminates the rest of us as his potential competitors and people who know where the bodies are buried.”

So, you not only have to be able to coordinate, you have to be confident that whoever replaces Putin will treat you better and not immediately turn on you. That’s the classic dynamic of these kinds of political systems. I think this situation is actually really acute. If Putin had wanted to die peacefully in his bed, he would have not invaded Ukraine. I think he’s more vulnerable now than he’s been, really, since he took office.

Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.

grid.news · by Joshua Keating

16.  Special Operations Forces: Better Data Necessary to Improve Oversight and Address Command and Control Challenges

Is it a data problem, a process problem, or a leadership problem? Or a combination?

The 56 page report can be downloaded here:  https://www.gao.gov/assets/730/723204.pdf

Special Operations Forces: Better Data Necessary to Improve Oversight and Address Command and Control Challenges

gao.gov

Fast Facts

Over the last 20 years, DOD has increasingly deployed its Special Operations Forces around the world to address the nation's most complex and sensitive security challenges. The number of personnel that perform this work has increased—from 45,700 in FY 2001 to 73,900 in FY 2021.

DOD collects and uses data to oversee these forces while they are deployed. But the data itself has problems. For example, the data doesn't use standard terminology and doesn't offer complete, readily available information on these deployed personnel.

Our recommendations address these issues.

Special Operations Forces in the Levant region, which includes Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon

Highlights

What GAO Found

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has established a variety of command and control (C2) structures to manage its Special Operations Forces (SOF). In calendar year 2021, USSOCOM reported that it had 28 active SOF C2 structures, primarily in the Middle East (Central Command) and Africa (Africa Command). (See figure). From calendar years 2018 through 2021, USSOCOM reported that it terminated or transitioned 57 SOF C2 structures.

Status of Special Operations Command and Control Structures, by Geographic Combatant Commands from Calendar Years 2018 through 2021

Note: Terminated refers to C2 structures no longer in operation, while transitioned reflects a change in the level of command or in specific missions.

USSOCOM has identified three challenges with its oversight of SOF C2 structures, including: (1) appropriately sizing or terminating; (2) maintaining SOF training and preparedness; and (3) staffing. USSOCOM has taken actions to address these challenges, including mission and organizational changes; reviews of SOF requirements; and improving management of deployments. While these are positive steps, it is too soon for GAO to determine whether these changes, and USSOCOM's commitment to further improvements, are sufficient to address the challenges it faces with oversight of SOF C2 structures.

USSOCOM's oversight of its C2 structures is hindered by limited data such as a lack of a standard terminology to define C2 structures and no requirement to have a centralized data collection mechanism for readily available and complete information. As such, there is not a consistent way to determine the composition of SOF C2 structures across the enterprise and maintain accountability of personnel assigned to SOF C2 structures. Additionally, the decentralized data collected by the SOF C2 structures themselves may not be maintained. By using a standard terminology and establishing a centralized data collection mechanism, DOD could improve transparency of its SOF C2 structures, which would further enhance oversight conducted by DOD and other entities, such as the Congress.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense has increased its reliance on SOF over the past 2 decades to advance and protect U.S. national security interests. The centerpiece of how SOF employs its forces is through the use of SOF mission command, and involves a variety of command and control structures. These are scalable organizations that allow USSOCOM to provide SOF to geographic combatant commanders based on an operational need.

House Report 116-442, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, included a provision for GAO to conduct a review of USSOCOM's structure and organization. This report (1) describes the type and number of SOF C2 structures DOD used from calendar years 2018 through 2021 and evaluates the data used to oversee them, and (2) describes any challenges USSOCOM has identified with its oversight of SOF C2 structures and any actions taken to address them.

GAO analyzed data on SOF C2 structures for calendar years 2018 through 2021. GAO also reviewed studies and interviewed DOD officials on challenges in overseeing SOF C2 structures.

Recommendations

GAO is making two recommendations, including that DOD require the use of standard terminology and establish a centralized data collection mechanism to retain data on, for example, personnel assigned to SOF command and control structures. DOD concurred with the recommendations.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Geographic Combatant Commands, together with the Joint Staff and in consultation with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, develop and employ a standard and consistent terminology on SOF command and control structures, whether through updated doctrine, guidance, or other means. (Recommendation 1)

Open <label class="status-code-label">Open</label><p class="status-code-description"><p> Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.</p></p>

Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, in consultation with the USSOCOM service component commands, as well as the Joint Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, establish a centralized data collection mechanism or process to collect and to retain data on a regular basis about the composition of all of its SOF command and control structures—regardless of the command level—such as the number of personnel and duration of the C2 structures. (Recommendation 2)

Open <label class="status-code-label">Open</label><p class="status-code-description"><p> Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.</p></p>

gao.gov

17. FBI and CISA Publish a PSA on Information Manipulation Tactics for 2022 Midterm Elections

So I tried to find the actual PSA but the link gives me a "404 - File Not Found" message. I searched the web site and found two links but both gave me "404 - File Not Found"

So have they been hacked to prevent exposure of the tactics? (weak attempt at humor). Or has it been removed because it is "politically sensitive" and controversial? 

They are probably updating or replacing the file. If I find it I will forward it.

FBI and CISA Publish a PSA on Information Manipulation Tactics for 2022 Midterm Elections

https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/10/07/fbi-and-cisa-publish-psa-information-manipulation-tactics-2022?utm_source=pocket_mylist

Original release date: October 07, 2022

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and CISA have published a joint public service announcement that:

• Describes methods that foreign actors use to spread and amplify false information—including reports of alleged malicious cyber activity—in attempts to undermine trust in election infrastructure.
• Confirms “the FBI and CISA have no information suggesting any cyber activity against U.S. election infrastructure has impacted the accuracy of voter registration information, prevented a registered voter from casting a ballot, or compromised the integrity of any ballots cast.”

The PSA also describes the extensive safeguards in place to protect election infrastructure and includes recommendations to assist the public in understanding how to find trustworthy sources of election-related information.

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

18. Analysis | Washington’s Asia strategy leading up to the midterms: Keep calm and carry on

Excerpts;

Admittedly, clouds are continuing to form on the horizon, and the Indo-Pacific is undergoing geopolitical shifts that have not yet produced discernible consequences. Some trendlines, such as North Korea’s accelerating nuclear missile program and the PRC’s continued efforts to project greater influence through illiberal means, will bring more disquiet than a stable equilibrium to many stakeholders in Asia, including the United States. Moreover, the outcomes of the U.S. midterm elections will either enable — or hinder — the Biden administration’s ability to further project its foreign policy agenda toward Asia.

In looking at the big picture, there is a bipartisan consensus that China is the defining foreign policy challenge for the United States in the long term and that the United States needs to support Taiwan’s democratic progress. On a more granular level, Democrats and Republicans disagree on how the United States can execute a durable China strategy. Irrespective of the results, the elections will not singlehandedly alleviate the effects of preexisting quandaries that have traditionally stymied American efforts to shape the landscape in Asia. Looking ahead, despite the U.S. government’s competing priorities in multiple theaters, Washington will need to continue using its various instruments of national power and coordinate closely with fellow Quad members, Australia, India, and Japan, to uphold and protect a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Analysis | Washington’s Asia strategy leading up to the midterms: Keep calm and carry on

Medium · by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy · October 7, 2022

Analysis | Washington’s Asia strategy leading up to the midterms: Keep calm and carry on

Eleanor Shiori Hughes

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris addresses service members aboard USS Howard (DDG 83) during her visit to Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka. (Image: U.S. Pacific Fleet via Flickr)

Last week, Vice President Kamala Harris and over 50 foreign dignitaries flew to Tokyo to attend the state funeral of the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. Harris led the U.S. presidential delegation, and shortly thereafter, made her way to Yokosuka naval base, where she spoke to U.S. navy personnel and denounced China for its aggression in the region, including on the Taiwan Strait.

Due to rapid geopolitical shifts in East Asia and the Pacific, U.S.-China relations have increasingly taken on a zero-sum logic, narrowing the space for cooperation. China is carrying out an ambitious long-term agenda to cement itself as a regional hegemon and achieve global acceptance of its foreign and domestic objectives. In response, Vice President Harris recently traveled to Japan and South Korea to underscore longstanding U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific and reaffirm the Biden administration’s “allies-first” approach as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. While many stakeholders in both Washington and Indo-Pacific capitals have welcomed this agenda, the Biden administration has not yet fully realized its vision to engage in a free and open architecture in Asia. Due to the long-term nature of China’s strategic objectives, the U.S. government ought to maintain a steady presence in the region by continuing to preserve its alliances. And with the upcoming U.S. midterm elections on November 8th, it would be prudent to take stock of the state of U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific, how other countries are also vehicles for delivering a positive vision of the region, and why there is still reason to keep calm and carry on.

The strategic choice between the Atlantic and the Pacific

Over the past several months, the war in Ukraine has led the United States to refocus its strategic priorities on the European continent. Through the “Pivot to Asia” strategy, former President Barack Obama and his administration sought to reorient America’s foreign policy priorities to meet some of the most pressing twenty-first-century challenges in Asia. But once Donald Trump took over the Oval Office, his administration made it an article of faith that the United States is once again living in an era of great power rivalry — in this case, namely with China. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War — and even after the Soviet Union’s collapse — the United States may have had the luxury of choosing to focus on strategic challenges in either Europe or Asia. But gone are those days. Washington lacks the necessary stamina to sensibly respond to China as the defining foreign policy challenge of this century on its own. But if the past is prologue, the Biden administration must figure out how to maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe while entrenching its presence in Asia.

The Biden administration has rightfully emphasized cooperation with like-minded allies and partners, but this pledge is just a starting point. The administration published an Indo-Pacific Strategy this past February and released a first-ever U.S. strategy for the Pacific Islands region this past week. However, Beijing is closely watching whether the United States and Western Europe will remain united in response to Russia’s aggression on Ukraine. The PRC has high ambitions to fundamentally change the Indo-Pacific chessboard in its geopolitical favor, and they are in it for the long haul. Washington ought to continue to support its allies and friends in keeping pace with this challenge.

America is not the only country shaping the Indo-Pacific

U.S. regional allies offer a steady counterweight to Chinese power. Countries such as Australia and Japan have employed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework to address the China challenge through democratic norms and institution-building. For one, Australian decision-makers are oftentimes present in U.S. intelligence networks, including the Pentagon and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii. While its military is only as large as the U.S. Marine Corps, Australia is also a member of Five Eyes, along with the newly-established AUKUS grouping with the United Kingdom. Washington has no qualms over incorporating Canberra into its intelligence-sharing mechanisms.

Meanwhile, over the past several years, Japan underwent a major grand strategy transformation under the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. He revolutionized Japanese foreign policy by publishing Japan’s first National Security Council in 2013 and reinterpreting Article 9 of Japan’s constitution to allow collective self-defense in 2015. As evidenced by the U.S. withdrawal from what is now known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), former President Trump was not as oriented towards multilateral institution-building. Biden may have largely eschewed prioritization of economic engagement in Asia in his first year of office, but with the formal launching of the long-awaited Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) earlier this summer, Tokyo recognizes that America’s renewed emphasis on regional economic integration is still a work in progress.

Just a few months ago, South Korea underwent a new transition of power favorable to the U.S. government. President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol took office on May 10th. While his predecessor Moon Jae-in eyed delivering a formal peace declaration with North Korea and taking a more cautious approach in dealing with China, President Yoon demonstrated that he is more in sync with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and other players in acknowledging strategic interest and priorities vis-à-vis the PRC’s aggressive posture across multiple fronts. The recent joint statement that came out of his first summit with President Biden suggests that South Korea plans to up its cooperation with the U.S. and its diplomatic standing globally. But going forward, Seoul will need to take a concrete look at what tradeoffs and risks it is willing to take with allies and partners. The hope is that Seoul will create a comprehensive blueprint, outlining how it plans to marshal resources to shape the rules-based liberal order in Asia and begin to iron out differences with Japan.

Lastly, India has been walking on a tightrope, particularly because it has not fully condemned the Ukraine war. It relies heavily on military parts from Russia, yet it was only a few years ago that it confronted a bloody skirmish with China along the disputed Himalayan border, where twenty Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers were killed. New Delhi may not be fully aligned with the West in regard to Putin’s authoritarian measures, but while in Uzbekistan last month, Prime Minister Narenda Modi told Putin that “today’s era is not the era for war.” As a member of the Quad, India is a critical player in America’s ongoing saga of institutionalizing its Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, one should not rule out the possibility that New Delhi’s relations with Moscow will experience a gradual cleavage.

Despite uncertainties, the time is right to keep calm and carry on

Admittedly, clouds are continuing to form on the horizon, and the Indo-Pacific is undergoing geopolitical shifts that have not yet produced discernible consequences. Some trendlines, such as North Korea’s accelerating nuclear missile program and the PRC’s continued efforts to project greater influence through illiberal means, will bring more disquiet than a stable equilibrium to many stakeholders in Asia, including the United States. Moreover, the outcomes of the U.S. midterm elections will either enable — or hinder — the Biden administration’s ability to further project its foreign policy agenda toward Asia.

In looking at the big picture, there is a bipartisan consensus that China is the defining foreign policy challenge for the United States in the long term and that the United States needs to support Taiwan’s democratic progress. On a more granular level, Democrats and Republicans disagree on how the United States can execute a durable China strategy. Irrespective of the results, the elections will not singlehandedly alleviate the effects of preexisting quandaries that have traditionally stymied American efforts to shape the landscape in Asia. Looking ahead, despite the U.S. government’s competing priorities in multiple theaters, Washington will need to continue using its various instruments of national power and coordinate closely with fellow Quad members, Australia, India, and Japan, to uphold and protect a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Medium · by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy · October 7, 2022

19.  The U.S Army's Security Force Assistance Triad: Security Force Assistance Brigades, Special Forces and the State Partnership Program

I like trinites (or triads). I will have to add this one to my list. But what is the strategy and campaign plans integrating these capabilities?

As an aside, when I was the USASOC G3 in 2007-2010 SFA was in the process of being developed. Here are some excerpts from one of my briefings from 2008 I dug out of my files, 14 years ago.

The key point for me is how I interpreted the USSOCOM Commander and CSO intent for SFA. The process, in my opinion, should be a strategy and campaign plans.

•SFA is a process that integrates the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission (which is inherently and by definition Joint and Whole of Government) with Security Assistance (SA) programs to be able to train, advise, assist, and equip a friend, partner and ally (e.g., build partner capacity) in order to defend itself against internal and external threats, (USASOC G3 understanding of CDR USSOCOM and CSO intent)

Again this is from 2008:

SFA Key Points

1.SOCOM is the Joint Proponent

2.No consensus on definition

3.Close doctrinal relationship between FID and SFA

•Establish SFA within current FID doctrine (USASOC recommendation)

4.Sourcing SFA requirements will be a shared SOF-GPF responsibility

•Requires a process ensuring “the right force is at the right place”

•Current global sourcing process

Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo

•Military Departments and DoD long engaged in activities to enhance capabilities of partner nations, SFA will remain an enduring mission.

•United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) designated as the joint SFA proponent.

–Lead collaborative development of and integration of SFA

•USSOCOM will

–Lead the development of Joint SFA doctrine and training/education

–Lead the identification of required joint SFA capabilities

–Lead the development of joint SFA mission essential task lists

–Develop joint sourcing solutions in collaboration with the Joint Staff and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), in coordination with the Services and Global Combatant Commands (GCC)

–Serve as a source of SFA expertise to Joint Task Forces or GCCs

–Consult with other U.S. Government agencies on future SFA related initiatives, strategies, concepts and plans

–Assist Under Secretary of Defense in identifying critical SFA skills, training, and experience

•USSOCOM “SFA Fundamentals Document”

Definition of SFA

•From the SFA DoDI

–“Actions or sets of activities to generate, employ, or sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces, or institutions, in support of a U.S. national policy.”

•From the SFA Fundamentals Document (SOCOM Draft Document)

•The intent to enable foreign security forces to respond effectively defend against to internal, external, and trans-national threats either unilaterally, or as part of an alliance or international coalition. SFA encompasses a broad range of US efforts to organize, train, equip, and advise foreign security organizations FSF and relevant sustaining institutions. SFA is designed to:

–Span the range of military operations from steady-state oriented security cooperation conditions, to surge oriented combat and post-combat conditions.

–Address both current and future force requirements.

–Develop the capabilities of foreign security forces and institutions.

SFA Definitions

•There is not a consensus concerning the definition of SFA.

•The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority (FM 3-07 and USSOCOM SFA Fundamentals Document). The intent to enable foreign security forces to respond effectively to internal, external, and trans-national threats either unilaterally, or as part of an alliance or international coalition, (USSOCOM SFA Fundamentals Document Draft).

•SFA is unified military action to generate, employ, or sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. (from the USSOCOM GSC Executive Session 31 Oct 08)

• 

–Train, Advise, Assist and Equip for internal and external threats

–Equip underpinned by Security Assistance and Security Cooperation in Steady State

–With combat advisor role when required

–SFA operates in context of a Whole of Government (similar to Foreign Internal Defense doctrine)

•SFA is a process that integrates the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission (which is inherently and by definition Joint and Whole of Government) with Security Assistance (SA) programs to be able to train, advise, assist, and equip a friend, partner and ally (e.g., build partner capacity) in order to defend itself against internal and external threats, (USASOC G3 understanding of CDR USSOCOM and CSO intent)

Summary

•Close doctrinal relationship between FID and SFA

•As SFA doctrine continues to evolve it may be possible to merge them into a single, overarching construct (OR GO BACK TO FID!!)

•Sourcing SFA requirements will be a shared SOF-GPF responsibility – GFM Process

•“SFA Fundamentals” establishes a process ensuring “the right force is at the right place”

–Current global sourcing process

–SFA methodology to determine appropriate force

•SOCOM is the Joint SFA Proponent

I would also add this from then CSA, General Casey writing in JFQ in 2009:

•Now, there are some folks who say we need an advisor corps. I’d say we have an advisor corps; it’s called Special Forces. The question is how large of an effort do we need for training foreign armies. I got together with Jim Mattis [General James N. Mattis, USMC, commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command], Jim Conway [General James T. Conway, commandant, U.S. Marine Corps] and Eric Olson [Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command]. We all sat down and said, “Okay, what do we really need here?” First, we all thought we needed to set ourselves up in Iraq and Afghanistan for the long haul because we’re going to be training the militaries and the police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan for a while. Then we thought that we could probably do the rest of the engagement with other militaries with Special Forces, and we’re growing a battalion each year over the next 5 years. There may be times when we need to have Special Forces teams augmented with conventional forces. For example, we can send a 10-man team out of a brigade headquarters, lash them up with an A-team, and they can assist in training with foreign brigades. But more and more, the people who need our help are not going to be in a position where they can be openly seen with American Soldiers running around the country. So we’re looking more toward the majority of this work being done by Special Forces, augmented, when they need to be, by regionally oriented conventional forces, which is something else the ARFORGEN model allows us to do.

•We also asked ourselves if we really think we’re going to build another country’s army and police forces and ministries from the ground up any time soon. And the answer was, probably not. We’ve got several challenges: we’ve got to set ourselves up to do Iraq and Afghanistan for the long haul, and then figure out how we augment Special Forces to do the other engagement that we need. That’s kind of the direction we’re going. In the interim, we have a training center for transition teams that we’re going to continue to run, it’s going to move down to Fort Polk, out of Fort Riley, and we’re going to have a brigade dedicated to doing nothing but training transition teams. So we’ll continue to do that for a while.

One of the things missing from above and the article below is the importance of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs forces.

The U.S Army's Security Force Assistance Triad: Security Force Assistance Brigades, Special Forces and the State Partnership Program

by Charles McEnany

ausa.org · September 30, 2022

As the Army modernizes for MDO—competing with or defeating adversaries who threaten the United States in the land, sea, air, space and cyberspace—observers might be perplexed by the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). Given the future battlefield, it appears counterintuitive that the Army would make security force assistance (SFA)—“activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions”1—central to its modernization.

The Army’s SFA is integral to strategic competition. With global threats and aggressive attempts by China and Russia to rebalance the international order, the Army has calculated that building partner capability is critical for competing.

Though the SFABs are the first purpose-built formation for SFA, the Army has conducted these missions for decades, often utilizing Army Special Forces (SF) Green Berets and the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). Through the three complementary legs of the SFA triad—SFABs, SF and SPP—the Army maintains a cost-effective and regionally tailored capability to train foreign forces while fostering broader governmental and societal engagement.

The Strategic Environment

The United States and its allies face a volatile security landscape. Though China poses the most comprehensive challenge, Russia’s war in Ukraine is a reminder that the United States cannot dictate the demands on its foreign policy. The same principle applies to other security flashpoints, namely North Korea, Iran, international terrorism, climate change and pandemics.

Persistent and aggressive strategic competition is already occurring as China and Russia attempt to shape the international order. Competition is neither peace nor conflict, as competitors leverage all instruments of national power—including political, military, economic, diplomatic, technological and informational—to achieve their aims. Though Beijing and Moscow hope to achieve their aims without military confrontation with the United States, they intend to prevail, should it occur. As a result, they have pursued military modernization while acting below the threshold of armed conflict to weaken the United States and its allies.

Despite the severity of the international security environment, it is unlikely that the U.S. defense budget will consistently receive the 3–5 percent annual growth estimated by the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission as necessary to keep pace with these threats.2 Prioritizing finite resources against increasingly severe and numerous global threats is a daunting challenge for the Pentagon.

These factors require that the U.S. military bolster its network of allies and partners to maximize the value of its defense resources while advancing its influence.

U.S. Army Soldiers with 5th Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) and members of the Maldives National Defense Forces pose for a group photo at Central Area Command, Kahdhoo, Maldives, 26 May 2022. SFABs train and advise foreign security forces to improve partner capabilities and facilitate achievement of U.S. strategic objectives (U.S. Army photo by Specialist Jacob Núñez).

The Value of Security Force Assistance

SFA (not to be confused with SFABs, which are one formation that conducts SFA) is a broad concept, including organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising foreign security forces.3 This Spotlight considers U.S. Army SFA and not the contributions of the Navy, Air Force and Marines. While Army SFA is recently associated with advising forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, strategic competition presents opportunities to assist partners with robust governments that face military shortfalls relative to a regional hegemon.

Land force SFA has unique benefits, with both tactical and strategic effects. Nearly every country maintains a land force,4 giving the Army an in-roads through its global landpower network. Even in regions thought to be naval-dominated, relationships forged by the Army can set the foundation for broader U.S. engagement. For example, two-thirds of countries in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command have chiefs of defense who are army generals.5

SFA provides the joint force with global access, influence and presence, allowing the Pentagon to set favorable conditions for conflict. Presence gives Washington a pulse on local and regional developments that often can only be fully appreciated through human relationships. This access also generates favorable positional advantages for U.S. forces that can enable joint force operations or complicate adversary attempts for horizontal escalation.

U.S. presence directly contributes to conventional deterrence. U.S. forces on the ground with foreign partners demonstrate commitment and can serve as a “tripwire.” Even a small U.S. force may deter an adversary from initiating conflict against a local country through the implication that such an initiation would draw the United States into a conflict. Additionally, U.S.-trained partner forces able to resist military coercion can deter adversaries from conflict initiation.

Defining SFA

Due to its broad nature, security force assistance (SFA) can be challenging to define. SFA is a subset of security cooperation, but it is not identical to security assistance, which refers to a group of programs authorized under Title 22 of the U.S. Code. This Spotlight applies the definition used by DoD and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA): “activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.” The Army defines SFA similarly: “unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority”6 Further, SFA is often conveyed through various terms, like foreign internal defense or train, advise and assist. SFA, as discussed in this Spotlight, most closely resembles train, advise and assist.

SFA also builds integrated deterrence, summarized by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin as “using every military and non-military tool in lock-step with allies and partners.”7 Besides military-to-military engagements, SFA includes training between the U.S. military and partner domestic security services, such as law enforcement or border protection.8 This assistance builds partner resilience against vulnerabilities that adversaries exploit. As integrated deterrence incorporates non-military tools, such as economics and diplomacy, the potential for SFA to advance U.S. influence outside the military is vital. Positive engagement with the U.S. military reinforces Washington as the global partner of choice. These relationships can develop into whole-of-government and whole-of-society connections—expanding the network of nations necessary to uphold the international order.

Additionally, by empowering local forces to contribute more to their security, SFA can allow the Pentagon to execute its regional prioritization. Since U.S.-trained forces are better prepared to prevail against adversaries, the United States may be able to avoid conflict altogether. For example, U.S. training of Ukrainian forces, which has primarily been conducted by Army SF since 20149 and through Ukraine’s SPP partnership with California (and other U.S. states),10 has helped the United States to remain out of direct conflict. This training is a small investment compared to the potential costs of open war with Russia that would, among other impacts, divert U.S. resources from the Indo-Pacific. If the United States does become involved in a conflict, SFA encourages burden-sharing by integrating allies and partners into multinational operations.

SFA is also mutually beneficial for U.S. capability. Soldiers learn tactical and operational skills from their partners, who often have niche capabilities and an intimate understanding of the local culture, operational environment and regional adversaries. The Army can integrate these lessons into training and doctrine through after-action reviews, thus broadly improving U.S. forces.

The Importance of Allies and Partners

Allies and partners feature prominently in recent defense strategies. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) makes “Strengthen[ing] Alliances and Attract[ing] New Partners” one of three lines of effort, stating that “allies and partners provide complementary capabilities and forces along with unique perspectives, regional relationships and information that improve our understanding of the environment and expand our options.”11 Likewise, the 2022 NDS calls for incorporating “ally and partner perspectives, competencies and advantages at every stage of defense planning.”12

The Army has made SFA central to modernization. Army Chief of Staff General James McConville noted, “A strong military comes from strong relationships. . . . Together with allies and partners, we have many more options collectively than we do as individual nations to maintain our strength and readiness.”13 The Army underscored this commitment in 2017 by creating the first SFAB—one of two signature modernization formations (the Multi-Domain Task Force—MDTF—being the other).

Figure 1: The Army's SFA Triad (Enlarge)

In combination, SFABs, SF and SPP form a “triad” of Army SFA (see Figure 1). Though the three legs of the triad are not necessarily the only organizations in the Army that conduct SFA, it is a central doctrinal component of each. The three formations are best perceived as different tools in the same SFA toolkit. They are complementary, un-redundant SFA capabilities for combatant commanders to utilize based on their respective strengths.

Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)

The Army has established six SFABs—five in the active component regionally aligned to geographic combatant commands (GCCs) and one in the National Guard with a global focus. Under the Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC), which recruits, assesses, selects and prepares SFABs for global employment, these formations are key to Army MDO through their support of GCC security cooperation requirements.

SFAB Organization

Each SFAB, commanded by a colonel or brigadier general, consists of approximately 800 Soldiers, each serving a three-year assignment. The officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) must volunteer and are the SFABs’ core. Major General Scott Jackson, founding Commander of the 1st SFAB, observed, “Every good advisor is a good Soldier, but not every Soldier is a good advisor.”14

SFABs recruit experienced Soldiers (the average SFAB officer has 13 years of service, and the average NCO has ten years of service)15 who are experts in their military occupational specialty (MOS) and have previously served at the level for which SFAC recruits them.16 Candidates undergo an extensive selection process. Once accepted to the SFAB, each Soldier receives six weeks of training in advisory skills at the Military Advisor Training Academy in Fort Benning, Georgia.17 Advisors also receive regionally relevant cultural, language and foreign weapons training.18

SFABs are comprised of the capabilities needed to train a foreign conventional force. These capabilities include:

• three maneuver battalions, advising across all warfighting functions;
• a field artillery battalion, providing fire support and targeting expertise;
• an engineer battalion, providing engineering, intelligence and communications expertise; and
• a logistics battalion, providing logistics and medical expertise.

SFABs are divided into 60 multifunctional teams—Maneuver Advising Teams, Field Artillery Advising Teams, Engineer Advising Teams and Logistics Advising Teams—each of which boast four to twelve Soldiers and is headed by a captain.19

In 2021, SFAC regionally aligned the SFABs to each GCC (see Table 1) except for U.S. Northern Command. Regional alignment allows SFABs to build expertise in the operational environment, culture and languages of their respective area of responsibility (AoR) and, therefore, deeper engagement with partners. The 54th SFAB (National Guard) is not regionally aligned but it is employed globally as an enabler to support active component SFABs and GCC requirements.

Table 1: Security Force Assistance Brigades (Enlarge)

The SFAB deployment model prioritizes persistent presence and geographical reach within each GCC. SFABs divide into three task forces, each of which takes turns rotating into the AoR for six months, maintaining the SFAB’s persistent presence.20 Unlike the first SFAB deployment in 2018, where all advisors concentrated in Afghanistan, small advisor teams now spread out to various partner nations within the region.21 Often, advisors deploy to remote locations with minimal oversight, underscoring the importance of selecting advisors whom SFAC can trust with this autonomy. SFAC has about 800–1,000 advisors deployed daily and, as of 2022, has had engagements with 54 countries.22

Because of the geographical diversity of the SFABs, there is no “typical” deployment. SFABs tailor their missions to host nation and GCC requirements and thus vary between and within regions. In South America, for example, 1st SFAB has trained counternarcotics forces.23 In Africa, 2nd SFAB trained Senegalese forces for their United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali, while an engineering team trained forces in Ghana to plan and design a base camp.24 Missions can also be more traditional, such as 3rd SFAB’s focus on training counterterrorism forces,25 4th SFAB training Georgian forces on new weapon systems,26 or 5th SFAB participating in multinational exercises throughout the Indo-Pacific.27

Figure 2: SFAB Functions Across the Conflict Spectrum28 (Enlarge)

SFAB Value

SFABs operate across the conflict spectrum (see Figure 2). In competition, SFABs contribute to deterrence through a persistent presence in the contact layer of strategic competitors while building partner interoperability and situational awareness for joint and coalition forces. Competing enables prevailing in conflict by providing the joint force positional advantages and interoperability for multinational operations. SFAB regional alignment tailors these contributions to each AoR’s specific operational environment, security challenges and partner capability.

Compared to previous SFA, SFABs preserve the Army’s warfighting readiness. With enormous demands for training Afghan and Iraqi forces, the Army utilized portions of conventional brigade combat teams (BCTs). Because SFA benefits from more experienced Soldiers serving as advisors, the Army typically assigned BCT leadership (senior NCOs and mid-level officers) to these roles, breaking them away from the BCT’s junior officers and enlisted ranks. With senior leaders gone, remaining Soldiers were limited to training at the individual and squad level, degrading unit readiness.29 While this system was tolerable in low-intensity conflicts, potential large-scale combat operations require training at higher echelons. Hence, the Army created the SFAB as a dedicated advisory formation to preserve BCT readiness.

Ironically, SFABs may even improve the Army’s tactical warfighting capability. SFAB advisors must not only be experts at skills vital to squad-level effectiveness, including marksmanship, communications and the military decisionmaking process, but must also be effective at imparting these skills to others. SFAB advisors gain unique experiences in complex environments that Soldiers in other conventional units may not have. Once advisors finish with an SFAB, nearly all return to conventional Army formations in leadership roles, where they can impart their skills and experiences to their new formations.30

Guyana Defense Force (GDF) personnel and Florida Army National Guard Soldiers with B/2-54th Security Force Assistance Brigade assess security tactics during a knowledge exchange at Base Camp Stephenson, Guyana, 22 March 2022. Guardsmen and GDF members collaborated on best practices regarding security and recovery scenarios, which gave servicemembers the opportunity to share their knowledge and experiences while building both individual and team skills (U.S. Army photo by Sergeant N.W. Huertas).

SFABs are also critical to the Army’s modernization at the operational and strategic levels. At first glance, SFABs may appear unrelated to the MDTFs—multi-domain maneuver elements that synchronize long-range precision effects—such as electronic warfare, space, cyber and information—with long-range precision fires. In fact, SFABs and MDTFs, with their overlapping regional alignments, are synergistic.

SFABs are crucial to achieving the positional advantages within adversary antiaccess/area-denial networks that MDTFs rely on to create and exploit advantages.31 Some local partners may be apprehensive about basing more provocative MDTF capabilities, such as long-range fires, in their nations.32 Because SFABs contain fewer high-end capabilities than MDTFs, they may be a more attractive initial option for partnership with the U.S. military. SFABs can form trust between the United States and partner militaries and so set the foundation for future MDTF presence. SFABs also enhance MDTFs’ non-lethal effects. For example, a Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (MDEB) seeks to exploit cyber and information advantages during competition.33 The SFABs’ understanding of local politics, culture and security concerns can enhance the MDEB’s ability to identify and counter adversary disinformation campaigns with locally relevant messaging aimed at critical populations.

SFABs and SF: Conventional versus Unconventional SFA

This paper does not fully examine Army SF’s extensive contributions to the SFA mission, but an overview of SF’s role clarifies distinctions with SFABs.

There are seven Special Forces Groups (SFGs)—five in the active component and two in the National Guard (see Table 2). SF’s foundation is the 12-man Operational Detachment–Alpha (ODA). A captain leads each ODA alongside a subordinate warrant officer and a senior enlisted advisor. The rest of the ODA comprises an intelligence sergeant and two Soldiers of each occupational specialty—weapons, communications, engineering and medical.34 It takes between 53 to 95 weeks for a Soldier to become an SF operator (depending on MOS).35 Candidates undergo extensive training, including in languages and cultural familiarization, allowing ODAs to operate covertly in denied environments, independently or alongside local partners, in a wide range of mission sets.

The primary distinction is that SFABs train foreign conventional forces while SF focuses primarily on foreign SOF and unconventional forces. SF evolved during the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Due to the premium placed on SOF to conduct counterterrorism, Army SF primarily trained Afghan and Iraqi SOF and accompanied them on raids. This development created the perception that Army SF exclusively trains foreign SOF and unconventional forces,36 which, although not doctrinally true, is often practical.

Table 2: Army Special Forces Groups (SFGs) (Enlarge)

SFABs are better optimized to build conventional armies compared to SF. According to General McConville, “Special Forces is very good at training tactical-type units. . . . But SFABs build a professional military force, which is different. How do you do logistics? How do you maintain vehicles? How do you build a professional military that will provide security?”37 The disintegration of Afghan forces in 2021, largely due to ineffective logistics,38 captured this point.

Additionally, because a captain leads an ODA, they may not have the command experience to build conventional armies at the right echelon. As General McConville put it, “That captain has never been a battalion commander, never a brigade commander and maybe never even a company commander. . . . The SFAB is going to have a forward battalion commander that has run a battalion. . . . That’s how you professionalize these armies.”39

The second significant distinction is the purpose of SF and SFAB employment. According to an officer with command experience in both SF and SFABs, SF advising prioritizes “direct adversary-based outcomes” while SFABs focus on “partner-based outcomes with a more indirect effect on adversaries.”40 This is sensible, given SF’s doctrinal roles outside advising, including direct action, unconventional warfare and special reconnaissance, prioritizing effects on an adversary utilizing local forces. SF also maintains much more flexibility, conducting a wide range of operations as the mission dictates, supported by organic sustainment and mission command elements. Contrarily, SFABs have a singular, partner-oriented mission and rely on the Theater Army Service Component Command.41

In reality, SFABs complement SF by relieving SFA demands. Given the nature of operations, Army SF faced unprecedented deployment pressures during the GWOT.42 With growing global requirements for U.S. SFA, these demands are likely to remain high, despite the end of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. SFABs can fill a gap by reducing pressures on Green Berets, particularly in cases where well-trained and experienced conventional Army NCOs can produce similar training outcomes, thereby freeing up SF for the missions that only they can conduct.

State Partnership Program (SPP)

While the contributions of SF and SFABs have received significant attention, SPP is more inconspicuous. According to the National Guard, SPP is a “Joint Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation program managed by the National Guard Bureau, executed by the GCCs and sourced by the National Guards (NG) of the U.S. States and territories.”43 The purpose of SPP is to partner state NG units (both Army and Air Force) with foreign militaries, security forces and disaster response organizations.

A member of the 169th Cyber Protection Team (CPT) and members of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina conduct cyber adversarial exercises at the Private Henry Costin Readiness Center in Laurel, Maryland, on 29 June 2022. Beginning in August 2018, the 169th CPT has supported the military-to-military knowledge transfer and team-building efforts to the Armed Forces Bosnia and Herzegovina under the State Partnership Program (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sergeant Tom Lamb).

SPP Organization

SPP began in 1993, first partnering with the three Baltic Republics. In less than 30 years, SPP has grown to 85 partnerships with 93 different nations (approximately 45 percent of all countries) across every region (see Figure 3). All 54 U.S. states and territories participate, allowing SPP to conduct over 1,000 events yearly, and the program grows by an average of two partnerships per year.44 Due to the number of partnerships, differences between U.S. state NGs and the variety of partner requirements, there is no standardized SPP deployment structure like that of an SFAB or SF. SPP tailors programs to GCC and partner requirements, including senior leader engagements, familiarization visits, training and exercises, subject matter exchanges and co-deployments. Focus areas include infantry tactics, counterterrorism, engineering, medicine, cyber, disaster response and leader development.

Figure 3: State Partnership Program Map45 (Enlarge)

SPP Value

SPP’s most important quality is its potential to cultivate long-term interpersonal relationships with partner forces. While SF and SFABs benefit from a more persistent presence than SPP, they have a frequent officer and enlisted turnover rate.46 Contrarily, because many Guardsmen remain in one state for their entire service, they can cultivate years- or even decades-long relationships with partner Soldiers as they rise through the ranks.47 These long-term interactions facilitate a deep understanding of security concerns, capability gaps and opportunities for engagement.

As an NG program, SPP is highly cost-effective. Though SPP partners with nearly 45 percent of the countries in the world, its annual budget is only $40 million.48 Army Guardsmen attend the same Basic Combat Training as active-duty Soldiers, but they cost the Army less annually because they are part-time, train less frequently and do not require other living expenses. Similarly, SPP deployments are typically shorter-term; consequently, they do not require the same investment as SF or SFABs. Though there may be a tradeoff in capability associated with this lower cost, the outcomes of these partnerships are highly beneficial.

Despite this cost-effectiveness, SPP can provide unique skill sets. Given the National Guard’s predominant domestic role compared to the active component—for example, natural disaster response—SPP is particularly valuable for building partners’ domestic resilience. Likewise, Guardsmen can work in the private sector, often at the forefront of innovation with relevant military applications. Guardsmen may have civilian expertise in cyber, logistics, information technology, or healthcare that they can contribute to their partner force. The 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups are also within the Army National Guard and, therefore, can contribute their skills to SPP partners.

Additionally, SPP’s scale is conducive to partnering with a national military. Compared to regionally aligned SFABs and SFGs, a better ratio exists between the number of troops in a partner’s army and the number of Guardsmen a state provides. The Army National Guard’s (ARNG) endstrength as of March 2022 was 325,393 Soldiers.49 Texas, the state with the largest ARNG, has over 19,000 Soldiers;50 an SFAB has only 800. U.S. geographical diversity offers opportunities to partner states and nations with similar operational environments,51 enhancing the value of training. Moreover, if a country requires a capability that its NG partner does not possess, it can link with an alternative state NG that does possess the required capability.

Finally, SPP has significant potential to achieve soft power outcomes outside the military. Because Guardsmen are “citizen Soldiers” with extensive roots in the civilian world, there is a greater likelihood that these partnerships transcend into whole-of-society relationships. Partner states and nations conduct civilian leader engagements, which can include industry and create commercial opportunities.52 Likewise, SPP partnerships may set the foundation for academic collaboration, such as the university exchange program between Iowa and Kosovo.53 SPP military outcomes may be secondary to the broader networks formed, particularly in strategic competition.

SFABs, SF and SPP, with their complementary roles, provide combatant commanders a suite of SFA capabilities across the spectrum of competition, crisis and conflict. With this triad, the Army possesses a regionally tailorable capacity to train conventional and unconventional forces while promoting governmental and societal engagement. Still, the Army, Pentagon and Congress can take steps to improve the impact of advisory missions.

Recommendations

Army

Recommendation 1: Ensure close coordination and alignment between SFABs and MDTFs. Successful maneuvering in competition is the foundation for MDTF operations in crisis and conflict; SFABs are integral to the necessary access and influence that MDTFs exploit.

Recommendation 2: Prioritize fully manning SFABs because of their importance in competition. Senior NCOs and mid-level officers are critical to ensuring that unit culture remains conducive to representing the U.S. military in remote locations with little oversight.

Recommendation 3: Pursue opportunities to incorporate the synthetic training environment (STE) into SFA. Though there is no replacement for interpersonal advising missions, and not all partners will have the necessary technological capacity, the STE can supplement existing relationships to promote persistent presence. If necessary, it can serve as an alternative where the deployment of U.S. advisors is politically sensitive.

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

Recommendation 1: Synchronize integration of partner force capability assessments across the tactical and strategic levels of analysis. For example, a disconnect was evident between tactical assessments of the Afghan National Army and the feasibility of these units resisting the Taliban. Learning from this misalignment may ensure that political leaders understand partner force capability in future SFA missions.

Recommendation 2: Leverage the Army’s landpower network to expand joint force exercises with coalition partners.

Recommendation 3: Analyze the impact of Army SFA in Ukraine to generate lessons learned that may apply to the defense of Taiwan.

Congress

Recommendation 1: Adequately fund SFABs and SFGs to enable a globally expansive, persistent SFA network. Should the Army see the need and have the necessary endstrength, consider funding a second SFAB for the Indo-Pacific, as this region’s importance and size would benefit from a more prominent advisor presence.

Recommendation 2: Ensure consistent, stable funding for SPP. This program’s outsized influence for the United States is significantly disproportionate to its dollar investment.

Recommendation 3: Sustain congressional support for U.S. training and advising of the Ukrainian military and apply these lessons to Taiwan. Robust U.S. training and support for Ukraine sends a strong signal to adversaries of the efficacy of U.S. commitments to its partners. China has taken notice and will likely consider these factors in operational planning against Taiwan.

Conclusion

The Army’s SFA triad is critical to its modernization for strategic competition and MDO. SFABs, SF and SPP maximize the economy of force by strengthening deterrence, lowering the burden on American forces and promoting U.S. global influence. With the international order under strain, Washington must proactively grow its unmatched network of partners. This coalition of like-minded nations, united by shared values, is invaluable in the era of strategic competition.

★ ★ ★ ★

Charles McEnany is a National Security Analyst at the Association of the United States Army. He holds an MA in Security Policy Studies from George Washington University.

1. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 2021), 192.
2. Aaron Mehta, “DoD needs 3-5 percent annual growth through 2023, top officials say,” Defense News, 13 June 2017.
3. Congressional Research Service, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” 1 June 2022, 1.
4. Sophia Ankel, “These are the 31 countries that don’t have a military,” Business Insider, 11 October 2019.
5. Center for Security Policy, Stopping A Taiwan Invasion: Findings & Recommendations from The Center for Security Policy Panel of Experts (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy, 25 April 2022), 68.
6. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2009, 1-1).
7. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, “Secretary of Defense Remarks at the 40th International Institute for Strategic Studies Fullerton Lecture,” DoD News, 27 July 2021.
8. Congressional Research Service, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” 1.
9. Michael Lee, “The U.S. Army’s Green Berets quietly helped tilt the battlefield a little bit more toward Ukraine,” Fox News, 24 March 2022.
10. Jim Garamone, “Ukraine-California ties show worth of National Guard program,” DoD News, 21 March 2022.
11. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, January 2018, 8.
12. DoD, Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy, 28 March 2022, 2.
13. Thomas Brading, “Strength in Indo-Pacific relies on partnerships, says Army chief of staff,” Army News Service, 21 May 2021.
14. Todd South, “Advising everywhere: Army SFABs go smaller, farther,” Army Times, 14 February 2022.
15. U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC), Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, 2022, 26–27.
16. Congressional Research Service, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” 1.
17. Congressional Research Service, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” 2.
18. Congressional Research Service, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” 2.
19. Congressional Research Service, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” 1.
20. John Amble and Colonel Curt Taylor, “Security Force Assistance in an Era of Great Power Competition,” Modern War Institute, podcast, 8 July 2020.
21. South, “Advising everywhere: Army SFABs go smaller, farther.”
22. South, “Advising everywhere: Army SFABs go smaller, farther.”
23. SFAC, Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, 26–27.
24. SFAC, Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, 14–15.
25. SFAC, Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, 16–17.
26. SFAC, Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, 18–19.
27. SFAC, Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, 20–21.
28. Thomas Shandy, “SFAC: What Does Winning Look Like in the Continuum of Conflict?” Security Force Assistance Command, 29 September 2020.
29. Congressional Research Service, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” 1.
30. SFAC, Security Force Assistance Command Factbook, 9.
31. Charles McEnany, Multi-Domain Task Forces: A Glimpse at the Army of 2035, Association of the United States Army, Spotlight 22-2, March 2022.
32. Lieutenant General Stephen Lanza, USA, Ret., and Colonel Daniel S. Roper, USA, Ret., Fires for Effects: 10 Questions about Army Long-Range Precision Fires in the Joint Fight, Association of the United States Army, Spotlight 21-1, August 2021.
33. McEnany, Multi-Domain Task Forces: A Glimpse at the Army of 2035, 4.
34. “Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFOD A)," American Special Ops.
35. “US Army Special Forces ‘Green Berets’| The Complete Guide,” SOFREP, 19 June 2021.
36. Tim Ball, “Replaced? Security Force Assistance Brigades vs. Special Forces,” War on the Rocks, 23 February 2017.
37. South, “Advising everywhere: Army SFABs go smaller, farther.”
38. The reasons for the disintegration of the Afghan National Army are myriad and not the purpose of this paper. For a detailed explanation, see Jonathan Schroden, “Who is to Blame for the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces?” War on the Rocks, 24 May 2022.
39. Kyle Rempfer, “Army advisers in Africa following spike in combat,” Army Times, 24 March 2020.
40. Major Christopher R. Thielenhaus, “Special Forces vs SFAB: It’s Not a Competition,” Infantry 110, no. 2 (Summer 2021): 21.
41. Thielenhaus, “Special Forces vs SFAB: It’s Not a Competition,” 21.
42. Stavros Atlamazoglou, “20 years of fighting terrorism took a heavy toll but has helped prepare for a bigger fight, US special operators say,” Business Insider, 14 October 2021.
43. U.S. Department of Defense National Guard Bureau, The State Partnership Program, January 2022, 2.
44. U.S. Department of Defense National Guard Bureau, The State Partnership Program, 3.
45. U.S. Department of Defense National Guard Bureau, The State Partnership Program, 4.
46. General Daniel R. Hokanson, “The National Guard’s State Partnership Program and Its Role in the National Defense Strategy,” The Heritage Foundation, 9 May 2022, video, 13:20.
47. Hokanson, “The National Guard’s State Partnership Program,” 12:45.
48. U.S. Department of Defense National Guard Bureau, National Guard State Partnership Program Fact Sheet.
49. Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/Country, March 2022.
50. Defense Manpower Data Center, Military and Civilian Personnel.
51. Hokanson, “The National Guard’s State Partnership Program,” 14:04.
52. U.S. Department of Defense National Guard Bureau, The State Partnership Program, 7.
53. Claire Quigle, “Transforming Education in Kosovo,” University of Iowa College of Education, 1 December 2020.

ausa.org · September 30, 2022

20. 25 NC counties, including Wake, become ‘unconventional warfare exercise' site as Fort Bragg launches annual Special Forces test

Fond memories. Everything I experienced (all the dilemmas thrown at us) in Robin Sage, I experienced in various forms for the rest of my career dealing with indigenous forces. All of the cadre bring back a wealth of experience that continually updates the course to ensure the relevance to the real world.

SFC Bobby Ware had an outsize impact on my thinking and understanding of how to deal with indigenous forces. I will never forget him and will be forever grateful for his mentorship.

25 NC counties, including Wake, become ‘unconventional warfare exercise' site as Fort Bragg launches annual Special Forces test

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/25-nc-counties-including-wake-become-unconventional-warfare-exercise-site-as-fort-bragg-launches-annual-special-forces-test/ar-AA12IRWK?ocid=weather-verthp-feeds

Rodney Overton - Yesterday 9:21 PM

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ORT BRAGG, N.C. (WNCN) — A unique test for the intense U.S. Army course of Special Forces candidates is now underway across dozens of counties in North Carolina.

25 NC counties, including Wake, become ‘unconventional warfare exercise' site as Fort Bragg launches annual Special Forces test

© Provided by WNCN Raleigh

The test — called Robin Sage — is an “unconventional warfare exercise” that pits the Fort Bragg candidates for Special Forces against opposing forces in a fictional country called “Pineland.”

Robin Sage will last until Nov. 7 and takes place in 25 counties in North Carolina — including several in central North Carolina including Wake, Chatham, Cumberland, Harnett, Hoke, Lee, Moore and Sampson.

US Army's annual ‘unconventional warfare exercise' to span 25 NC counties

“Throughout the exercise military and civilian personnel, as well as community volunteers who serve as auxiliary actors will participate in and provide support as role-playing elements,” a news release from Fort Bragg said.

Robin Sage lasts for two weeks and is the final test for students who seek to graduate from the Special Forces Qualification Course at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.

“All Robin Sage movements and events, have been coordinated with public safety

officials throughout the various towns and counties hosting the training,” the Fort Bragg news release said. “Residents are advised to steer clear of the student elements and role-players, and may be expected to hear non-lethal ammunition sounds and see occasional non-lethal flares.”

Special Forces candidates assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School take part in the final phase of field training known as Robin Sage in central North Carolina, September 28, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by K. Kassens)

© Provided by WNCN Raleigh

The other North Carolina counties for Robin Sage include Alamance, Anson, Bladen, Brunswick, Cabarrus, Columbus, Davidson, Guilford, Montgomery, New Hanover, Randolph, Richmond, Robeson, Rowan, Scotland, Stanly and Union.

Three counties in South Carolina are also included in Robin Sage: Chesterfield, Dillon, and Marlboro.

“Residents with concerns should contact local law enforcement officials, who will immediately contact exercise control officials,” according to the Fort Bragg news release.

The test has been taken by Special Forces candidates for more than 50 years.

Copyright 2022 Nexstar Media Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

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David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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