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Quotes of the Day:
“Dare to begin! He who postpones living rightly is like the rustic who waits for the river to run out before he crosses.”
- Horace
“The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge more than society gathers wisdom.”
- Isaac Asimov
Much like the quote “democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others” is that democracy promotes the “triumph of mediocrity,” since its progress toward thought rarely moves faster than its slowest members. Yet, the alternative, despotism, might move faster around progress, typically leads to the “triumph of stupidity.” Weighing the two, mediocrity wins out. Those of us in a democracy, in wanting all its freedoms, must accept that it comes fully equipped with the inefficient pace of progress.
- B. H. Liddell Hart
1. U.S. reiterates commitment to 'complete denuclearization' of Korean Peninsula
2. 6 Chinese, Russian military aircraft enter S. Korea's air defense zone: JCS
3. S. Korean official notes possibility of N. Korea launching ICBM this month
4. From Boycotts to Selfies: Asia’s Myriad Perceptions of Japan
5. Canadian 3-star general takes office as new deputy UNC chief
6. Trump considers overhauling his approach to North Korea if he wins in 2024
7. Trump says reports of plans to accommodate North Korea are ‘fake news’
8. Trump denies media article on N. Korea negotiation plan as 'fake news'
9. South Korea to increase defense spending over five years
10. Missile warning data sharing between S. Korea, US, Japan to be operational in 'next few days': US official
11. 'Noryang: Deadly Sea': Requiem for legendary admiral who becomes myth
12. North Korea’s De-risking Strategy and Its Implications
13. N. Korea’s latest spy satellite equipped Japanese camera – again
14. High-ranking N. Korean officials question whether Kim Ju Ae could succeed her father
15. Korean population expected to plunge to 36 million in 2072
1. U.S. reiterates commitment to 'complete denuclearization' of Korean Peninsula
I too am fully committed to the denuclearization of north Korea. But the solution to denuclearization lies in the Biden-Yoon April Summit and the Camp David Principles and the Spirit of Camp David.
As I have written many times:
Although denuclearization of the north remains a worthy goal, it must be viewed as aspirational as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. The conventional wisdom has always been that denuclearization must come first and then unification will follow and that there should be no discussion of human rights out of fear that it would prevent Kim Jong Un from making a denuclearization agreement. Today even a blind man can read the tea leaves and know that Kim Jong Un will not denuclearize despite the fact that his policies have been an abject failure. His political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies completely failed in 2022 and 2023 because Presidents Yoon and Biden, like their predecessors, refused to make the political and economic concessions he demanded just to come to the negotiating table: namely to remove sanctions. It is time for the U.S and the ROK/U.S. alliance to execute a political warfare strategy that flips the conventional wisdom and seeks unification first and then denuclearization. Everyone must come to the understanding that the only way to end the nuclear program and the human rights abuses is through unification of the Korean peninsula. The ROK and U.S. must continue to maintain the highest state of military readiness to deter war and then adopt a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive and sophisticated information and influence activities campaign, and focus all efforts on the pursuit of a free and unified Korea- ultimately a new nation called the United Republic of Korea (UROK).
The Yoon and Biden administrations have an opportunity for a new approach to the Korean security challenge. The Alliance way ahead is an integrated deterrence strategy as part of the broader strategic competition that is taking place in the region. There is a need for a Korean “Plan B” strategy that rests on the foundation of combined ROK/U.S. defensive capabilities and includes political warfare, aggressive diplomacy, sanctions, cyber operations, and information and influence activities, with a goal of denuclearization but ultimately the objective must be to solve the “Korea question” (e.g., the unnatural division of the peninsula) with the understanding that denuclearization of the north and an end to human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will only happen when the Korea question is resolved that leads to a free and unified Korea, otherwise known as a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
I am going to beat this horse: Deterrence, defense, denuclearization, the Korea question (unification), using a superior form of political warfare based on a rock-solid ROK/US alliance and realistic assumptions of the nature of the Kim family regime and its strategy and objectives.
U.S. reiterates commitment to 'complete denuclearization' of Korean Peninsula | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 15, 2023
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Dec. 14 (Yonhap) -- The United States remains committed to the "complete denuclearization" of the Korean Peninsula, the State Department said Thursday, highlighting diplomacy is its "first option" to address the North Korean nuclear quandary.
Matthew Miller, the department's spokesperson, made the remarks after Politico, a U.S. media outlet, reported that former President Donald Trump is considering a negotiation plan under which North Korea freezes its nuclear program and stops building new bombs in return for sanctions relief and other incentives.
Trump later rejected as "fake news" the Politico report that suggested he could, if reelected, consider letting Pyongyang keep its existing nuclear arms rather than dismantling them.
"We are committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and we will continue to work to try to achieve that goal," he told a press briefing.
Matthew Miller, State Department spokesperson, speaks during a press briefing at the department in Washington on Oct. 30, 2023. (Yonhap)
Miller's remarks were in response to a question of if it is possible to lift economic sanctions against the North should the North freeze its nuclear program rather than abandoning it.
"I don't want to comment about very hypothetical scenarios when they have shown no willingness to move in that direction at all," he said.
Miller stressed that Washington's first option is diplomacy when it comes to the North Korean conundrum.
"We want to pursue diplomacy with North Korea. As I've said before, we have seen those offers rejected by the North Korean government," he said.
"But we will continue to make clear that diplomacy is our first option, but also that we stand strongly with our allies, South Korea and Japan," he added.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 15, 2023
2. 6 Chinese, Russian military aircraft enter S. Korea's air defense zone: JCS
Probing, testing, creating dilemmas?
(LEAD) 6 Chinese, Russian military aircraft enter S. Korea's air defense zone: JCS | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · December 14, 2023
(ATTN: RECASTS throughout with details; ADDS byline)
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Dec. 14 (Yonhap) -- Two Chinese and four Russian military aircraft entered South Korea's air defense identification zone (KADIZ) in the East Sea without notice Thursday, Seoul's military said, prompting the South to send its fighter jets to the scene.
Between 11:53 a.m. and 12:10 p.m., the Chinese and Russian aircraft entered the KADIZ from north of the eastern island of Ulleung and exited it from east of the easternmost islets of Dokdo, according to an official at Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
The aircraft did not violate South Korea's air space, the official added.
The JCS said it had detected the Chinese and Russian aircraft before their entry into the KADIZ and mobilized the Air Force's fighter jets to take tactical measures against a contingency.
The air defense zone is not territorial airspace but is delineated to call on foreign planes to identify themselves so as to prevent accidental clashes.
The JCS official said South Korea protested about the incursion to China through a direct military line, while it could not make such a protest to the Russian side as the two sides do not operate such a communication line.
In June, four Chinese and four Russian military planes entered the southern and eastern parts of the KADIZ, according to the JCS.
This file graphic shows Russian and Chinese aircraft entering South Korea's air defense identification zone. (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · December 14, 2023
3. S. Korean official notes possibility of N. Korea launching ICBM this month
My previous thoughts:
How To Respond To North Korea’s ICBM Test
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/03/north-koreas-icbm-test/
North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Test: A 6 Step Strategy To Respond
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-test-a-6-step-strategy-to-respond/
The ROK and U.S. should make sure the press, pundits, and public understand that this is a fundamental part of North Korean strategy and that it conducts provocations for specific objectives. It does not represent a policy failure; it represents a deliberate policy decision by Kim Jong-un to continue to execute his political warfare strategy. The following is a response framework for consideration:
First, do not overreact. But do not succumb to the criticism of those who recommend ending exercises. Always call out Kim Jong-un’s strategy As Sun Tzu would advise- “ …what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; … next best is to disrupt his alliances.” Make sure the international community, the press, and the public in the ROK and the U.S. and the elite and the Korean people living in the north know what Kim is doing.
Second, never ever back down in the face of North Korean increased tension, threats, and provocations.
Third, coordinate an alliance response. There may be times when a good cop-bad cop approach is appropriate. Try to mitigate the internal domestic political criticisms that will inevitably occur in Seoul and DC. Do not let those criticisms negatively influence policy and actions.
Fourth, exploit weakness in North Korea – create internal pressure on Kim and the regime from his elite and military. Always work to drive a wedge among the party, elite, and military (which is a challenge since they are all intertwined and inextricably linked).
Fifth, demonstrate strength and resolve. Do not be afraid to show military strength. Never misunderstand the north’s propaganda – do not give in to demands to reduce exercises or take other measures based on North Korean demands that would in any way reduce the readiness of the combined military forces. The north does not want an end to the exercises because they are a threat, they want to weaken the alliance and force U.S. troops from the peninsula which will be the logical result if they are unable to effectively train.
Sixth, depending on the nature of the provocation, be prepared to initiate a decisive response using the most appropriate tools, e.g., diplomatic, military, economic, information and influence activities, cyber, etc., or a combination.
There is no silver bullet to the North Korea problem. Therefore, the focus must be on the long-term solution to the security and prosperity challenges on the Korean peninsula. This requires the execution of a superior ROK/U.S. alliance political warfare strategy. It must focus on resolving the Korean question, e.g., “the unnatural division of the peninsula” (per paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement). Solve that question and the nuclear issues and the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity will be ended. The question to ask is not what worked and what did not, but whether the ROK/U.S. alliance actions move the region closer to the acceptable, durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance interests.
(3rd LD) S. Korean official notes possibility of N. Korea launching ICBM this month | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 15, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS more details in paras 9-14)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Dec. 14 (Yonhap) -- A South Korean presidential security official on Thursday raised the possibility of North Korea launching an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) this month as he arrived in Washington for a high-profile security meeting.
Principal Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo made the remarks upon arrival here on the eve of the second meeting of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a South Korea-U.S. security meeting designed to discuss nuclear and strategic planning issues.
"I think there is a possibility of North Korea launching an ICBM this December," he told reporters at Dulles International Airport near Washington.
He did not elaborate on what intelligence led him to believe so.
Principal Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo speaks to the press upon arrival at Dulles International Airport near Washington on Dec. 14, 2023. (Yonhap)
Asked whether the North's spy satellite launch last month will be part of discussions at the NCG session, Kim said that a ballistic missile using ICBM technology is a subject of "extended deterrence" discussions between Seoul and Washington.
South Korea and the U.S. view the North's satellite launch as having utilized ICBM technology in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. Extended deterrence refers to the U.S.' commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend its ally.
"Whether that ballistic missile is long or short, if a nuclear (weapon) is loaded onto it, it becomes a nuclear threat and a nuclear attack against us," he said.
"That said, it is extended deterrence that we explore (ways) to forestall a North Korean nuclear attack in advance, and firmly face down a nuclear attack immediately at an early stage in the event of a North Korean miscalculation," he added.
Touching on the agenda for this week's NCG session, Kim said that a core issue will be to establish extended deterrence in a "unitary" way -- an apparent reference to South Korea leveraging its conventional military assets in pursuit of an integrated deterrence formula with the U.S.
"There have been concrete outcomes when it comes to intelligence sharing, joint planning and joint execution," Kim said, referring to the allies' nuclear deterrence efforts. "I came here to confirm them and explore the next procedures ahead."
He also said that following this week's NCG gathering, the two countries' defense authorities may take charge of working-level NCG affairs.
Asked to comment on Washington's assessment that the North is not interested in diplomacy with the U.S., Kim stressed, "It is North Korea that has rejected diplomacy."
"We have never let up on diplomacy," he said.
He added that at the moment, "deterrence" is an area that South Korea can focus on strengthening.
The NCG was established under the Washington Declaration that President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden adopted during their summit in Washington in April as part of efforts to enhance the credibility of extended deterrence.
The inaugural session was held in Seoul in July, led by Kim and U.S. National Security Council (NSC) Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell and NSC Coordinator for Defense Policy and Arms Control Cara Abercrombie.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 15, 2023
4. From Boycotts to Selfies: Asia’s Myriad Perceptions of Japan
Excerpts;
Washington should appreciate that South Korea’s negative views, though critical to understanding regional dynamics, are not representative of the entirety of Asia. South Korea’s historical grievances with Japan are deeply rooted and complex, but they contrast with the generally positive or positive-trending perception of Japan in other areas, such as Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Policies and strategies involving Japan should not be established on a baseline of Seoul’s perspective. Currently, Washington appears to be prioritizing reconciliation between Tokyo and Seoul for this reason, with far less focus on supporting Japanese security initiatives in the rest of the region. This is likely the result of a decades-long relationship of trust between Washington and Seoul and vocal activism by Koreans and Korean-Americans dissatisfied with Japan’s attitude towards reconciliation. These views are real and important, but a one-size-fits-all approach will forgo the opportunity to forge more effective and nuanced regional partnerships.
Indeed, Washington’s understandable desire for Japan and South Korea to cooperate more on regional security may paradoxically benefit from a de-prioritization of that strained bilateral relationship. Promoting the common goods that Japan can provide to the region as a whole may ultimately prove a more effective focus. This approach would give space for Tokyo and Seoul to continue their slow and uneven process of mutual trust-building, while allowing the United States to emphasize more positive examples of Japanese regional leadership.
Finally, Japan’s experience shows that the United States should approach its role in the Indo-Pacific with a sense of humility. American policymakers should recognize that in many Asian countries the United States is seen not just as an external actor but as a participant in historical memory. This perception calls for a diplomatic strategy that is sensitive to the historical experiences and current sentiments of each nation. Humility in this context means acknowledging past negative American actions across the region, such as U.S. conduct during the Vietnam War or involvement in backing authoritarian regimes in the Philippines and Indonesia. Japan’s rebounding popularity in Southeast Asia suggests that respectful and empathetic long-term dialogue can yield results. Such an approach would enhance U.S. credibility and effectiveness in fostering cooperative security arrangements in a critical region.
From Boycotts to Selfies: Asia’s Myriad Perceptions of Japan - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Ryan Ashley · December 14, 2023
As an instructor on Indo-Pacific security, the most common question I receive from students, ranging from undergraduates to senior military officers, is: Why do some countries in Asia still deeply resent Japan, while others display a warm fondness towards Tokyo?
Layers of nationalism, politics, and historical memory make sweeping generalizations about “Asian” perceptions of Japan meaningless. In South Korea, vigorous youth-led campaigns to boycott Japanese goods underscore this enduring legacy of animosity and mistrust. In Taiwan, President Tsai Ing-wen faced mixed reactions for tweeting in Japanese during her 2020 reelection campaign, but is credited with gaining support from the island’s “pro-Japan” progressives by doing so. Meanwhile, in Thailand and the Philippines, I have observed young students casually snapping selfies with the Japanese “rising sun” flag while enjoying a cone of matcha ice cream or eating sushi.
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This dynamic is not just of interest to scholars of Asian foreign relations — perceptions towards Japan have a direct impact on regional security. With the United States championing Japan’s growing security capacity as part of its larger Indo-Pacific strategy, Washington should clearly understand the diversity of regional views towards Japan. Tokyo’s bolstered security posture has been met with profound skepticism in Seoul, complicating security cooperation in critical areas like the East and South China Sea. This strain in relations stands in contrast with Taiwan and Southeast Asia, which both welcome Japan’s new security presence with fewer reservations. Indeed, even countries in Southeast Asia that favor close economic and political ties with China, like Cambodia, are not communicating much skepticism towards an increased Japanese security presence in their region. Exploring these divergent and somewhat paradoxical views of Japan’s security policies today — as well as the history behind them — can help Washington to craft more nuanced and effective security policies for the Indo-Pacific.
Historical Memory
To understand the nuanced views of Japan in Asia, it is essential to delve into some of the region’s complex disagreements over “historical memory.” Indeed, in the United States, most perceptions of Japan’s history in Asia are shaped by Japanese actions in Northeast Asia, mainly the Korean Peninsula, Manchuria, and China. From its annexation of the island of Taiwan (then Formosa) in 1895 to the end of the war in Asia in 1945, the Empire of Japan left a legacy of imperialist domination, cruelty, and blood-soaked atrocities. Japan’s brutal practices included forced labor, the establishment of the “comfort women” system of sexual slavery, the suppression of local languages and cultures, and the gruesome medical experiments conducted by Unit 731 on Korean and Chinese subjects. These events still play an emotional and active role in Korean and Chinese politics today, especially due to some perceptions that Japanese political, educational, and social institutions seek to deny or understate these events.
An often-ignored aspect of this history is the ignoble role of the West. Powers like the United States and the United Kingdom mostly tolerated Japan’s expansion into Korea, only beginning a belated campaign of political and economic pressure against Japan following its invasion of the Republic of China. Western acquiescence, epitomized by the 1905 Taft-Katsura Memorandum, which essentially sanctioned Japan’s control over Korea in exchange for non-interference with American rule in the Philippines, still fuels resentment in South Korea. Further still, America’s post-war policies towards the region, which included promoting a rehabilitation of Japan as a newly democratic and free society, met particular skepticism in South Korea.
Taiwan’s history with Japan, starting with its annexation following the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, makes it the former territory with the longest memory of occupation. Japan subjugated the peoples of Taiwan in a similar, albeit perhaps less brutal, manner to that seen in Korea and China. But circumstances changed following Japan’s defeat in 1945. After a brief period of relative peace and stability, Taiwan found itself hosting the defeated Nationalist forces of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and under the authoritarian direct rule of the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-Shek. That rule was punctuated by the “white terror,” a period of brutal suppression of perceived communist or disloyal forces on the island. The echoes of this period are still felt in Taiwanese politics today and, in most cases, represent a more powerful and emotional scar of historical memory than those left by Japan.
In Southeast Asia, the experience of Japanese occupation during the 1940s was often just as brutal as in Korea and China, but briefer. Imperial Japan governed territories like the Philippines and Singapore through a lens of harsh ethnic grievance, with any opposition to Japanese rule perceived as a racial betrayal of Tokyo’s “Pan-Asian” vision. However, Japan’s role in displacing Western colonial powers led to mixed reactions in the wider region, with some leaders in countries like Thailand and Indonesia viewing Japan as a perhaps unwelcome but convenient liberator from European hegemony. Post-war, as Japan’s influence in the region evolved from military occupation to economic engagement, views of Japan actually worsened due to perceptions of commercial neocolonialism. Indeed, some of the largest anti-Japanese protests in Asia’s history, such as the 1974 “Malari” anti-Japanese riots in Indonesia, were more motivated by frustrations over post-war Japan’s economic policies rather than any wartime conduct. Yet, following a period of economic reform and the foreign policy shifts of the 1977, specifically the “Fukuda Doctrine” of outreach to Southeast Asia, views of Japan improved dramatically in the region.
Japan’s Expanding Regional Security Role
While these perceptions have long impacted Asia’s international relations, their relevance to regional security is particularly distinct today. Japan, once devoted to a foreign policy that eschewed hard security as a tool of national power, has steadily reasserted its security presence in Asia in recent years. Motivated by an increasingly unstable and insecure strategic environment, Tokyo is once again a central player in regional security developments.
Indeed, security leaders in Tokyo speak of Japan as a “front line” state, surrounded by aggressive Chinese territorial claims on its lands, a newly revanchist Russia to its north, and frequent provocative North Korean missile tests. As an island country, dependent on imports for most of its raw materials and energy needs, Japanese national security documents are today publicly stating what had long been taken for granted in private: The country needs to maintain secure access to sea lanes to safeguard its supplies of critical resources. This has sparked a series of ambitious Japanese security initiatives, largely through an unprecedented bolstering of the Japanese Self-Defense Force’s combat capabilities and an increased network of capacity building and training support missions in Southeast Asia.
Many countries in the region share Japan’s concern about China’s rise and share Japan’s strategic alignment with the United States. Yet their responses to Tokyo’s new security policies nonetheless vary based on their historical memory and unique domestic politics. As such, they deserve consideration on a more specific basis.
South Korea: Unsolved Historical Questions and Domestic Political Incentives
In the case of South Korea, skepticism towards Japan remains first and foremost about historical memory and the perception that Japan has not properly atoned for its past actions. Yet the existence of such grievances also creates a domestic political incentive for “Japan-bashing” in South Korea. This phenomenon has been well documented by scholars such as Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider, who argue that the manipulation of historical narratives is often used as a tool by political elites to consolidate domestic support, define national identity, and rally populist public opinion. These tactics are typically associated with the Korean political left, who prioritize rapprochement with North Korea over security coalition building with neighbors aimed at deterring Pyongyang.
Thus, under the current conservative President Yoon Suk-Yeol, there are mostly positive headlines about the Japanese-South Korean relationship, motivated by Seoul’s outreach to Tokyo over shared security priorities. These headlines have been accompanied by a series of positive gains now locked in by political agreements. But it is worth remembering that Seoul-Tokyo ties typically fluctuate between highs and lows, and the lack of a lasting agreement on perennial memory issues like comfort women and forced labor imply that, sooner or later, relations will return to a low point.
Against this backdrop, the historical role of the West, which today largely backs an increased Japanese security presence in the Indo-Pacific, could also prove multi-faceted. Support in European and North American capitals for expanding Japanese role as a security provider in Asia may soothe some anxieties in Seoul. However, it may also bring up echoes of the West’s historical ambivalence toward Korea’s subjugation by others.
Taiwan: Changing Views with a Changing Identity
Yet Taiwan, which also suffered decades of occupation, lacks South Korea’s domestic political incentives for criticizing Japan. As Taiwanese politics increasingly represents an independent (i.e., non-Chinese) political identity, views of Japan are decoupling from those on the mainland and in South Korea. This process of identity formation has led to a reevaluation of historical narratives, including those concerning the Japanese occupation. Indeed, Japan-bashing is perceived in Taiwan as a particularly mainlander perspective, not a native or “Taiwanese” one. Native Taiwanese, referring to those who lived on Taiwan prior to the retreat of Chinese Nationalist forces to the island in 1949, even factored Japanese aspects into their identity, as evidenced by the use of the Japanese language by protestors to determine Chinese versus Taiwanese identity during the anti-Nationalist “228” protests in 1947. As described by Taiwanese anthropologist Huang Chih-Huei, the experience of Nationalist rule led many native Taiwanese to feel that “the earlier colonizers turned out to be the better set,” leading to an embrace of the Japanese aspects of their identity.
These mixed attitudes towards Japan extends to the current generation. A 2022 survey found that a significant majority of the younger population held favorable views of Japan, and most named Japan as their “favorite” country. Scholars like Huang-Chih Chiang and Yeh-Chung Lu have noted that the younger generation in Taiwan tends to associate Japan with positive aspects like advanced technology, cultural richness, and even democratic values, rather than with the colonial past. This shift is also reflected in the island’s foreign policy toward Japan and bilateral economic ties, which are increasingly influenced by Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to forge a distinct identity separate from China. In this way, the younger generation’s inclination towards a Taiwanese identity, as opposed to a Chinese one, has inadvertently facilitated a more positive reassessment of the historical Japanese influence on the island.
Certainly, pragmatism also underlies Taiwan’s favorable view of Japan, particularly regarding defense. A 2021 poll by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation revealed that over 70 percent of Taiwanese would welcome Japanese support in the event of a military conflict with China. This statistic highlights a strategic dimension to Taiwan’s positive perception of Japan, acknowledging Japan’s potential role as a critical ally in ensuring the island’s security.
Southeast Asia: Pragmatism and Economic Focus
Unique geopolitical and historical factors in Southeast Asia have led to a more positive attitude towards Japan than in much of Northeast Asia. To be sure, even this claim risks straying into the realm of generalization. However, reliable polling, such as ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s survey of Association of Southeast Asian Nations elites, demonstrates a substantial majority of Southeast Asian leaders viewing Japan favorably, with around two-thirds regularly expressing confidence in Japan’s role in providing regional security and promoting stability. This positive perception is deeply rooted in economic ties and strategic partnerships that have evolved significantly since the mid-20th century.
The Fukuda Doctrine, as mentioned above, marked a symbolic turning point in Japan’s approach towards Southeast Asia and helped to overcome regional perceptions of economic neocolonialism. Motivated by flagging relations with the region and concern over Washington’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China, Japan’s new doctrine emphasized “heart-to-heart” relations, including mutual understanding, trust, and equal economic partnership. This policy paved the rhetorical road to more mutually beneficial economic relations between Japan and the region, by sparking by a dramatic increase in Japanese investment following the 1985 Plaza Accords and Tokyo’s substantial financial support to countries affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. As a result, views of Japan’s economic presence evolved to focus less on neocolonial extraction and more on value added, rebuilding trust among Southeast Asia’s elites and citizenry alike. This trust was pivotal in overcoming the deep-seated skepticism that stemmed not just from wartime conduct but, perhaps even more so, from post-war predatory economic practices.
Thus, in the realm of security, Southeast Asia’s stance towards Japan has been pragmatic but largely positive. During my fieldwork in the region, security leaders from Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia have told me there is a prevailing regional belief that the historical context of World War II has lost its relevance in the modern era. Japan’s consistent focus on development assistance, economic partnership, and respect for the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations has solidified its standing as a trusted and valued partner in the region. Beyond positive poll numbers and personal conversations, this trust is evident in Japan’s growing security relationships across Southeast Asia. These include the recent agreement to negotiate a Reciprocal Access Agreement with the Philippines, signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam, and a potential $3.6 billion sale of stealth frigates to Indonesia.
Conclusion
When shaping policies in the Indo-Pacific region, Washington should be attuned to the nuances of historical memory. By appreciating the historical context of Japan’s relationships with countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations, external actors can more effectively navigate the region’s complex web of affinities and enmities.
Washington should appreciate that South Korea’s negative views, though critical to understanding regional dynamics, are not representative of the entirety of Asia. South Korea’s historical grievances with Japan are deeply rooted and complex, but they contrast with the generally positive or positive-trending perception of Japan in other areas, such as Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Policies and strategies involving Japan should not be established on a baseline of Seoul’s perspective. Currently, Washington appears to be prioritizing reconciliation between Tokyo and Seoul for this reason, with far less focus on supporting Japanese security initiatives in the rest of the region. This is likely the result of a decades-long relationship of trust between Washington and Seoul and vocal activism by Koreans and Korean-Americans dissatisfied with Japan’s attitude towards reconciliation. These views are real and important, but a one-size-fits-all approach will forgo the opportunity to forge more effective and nuanced regional partnerships.
Indeed, Washington’s understandable desire for Japan and South Korea to cooperate more on regional security may paradoxically benefit from a de-prioritization of that strained bilateral relationship. Promoting the common goods that Japan can provide to the region as a whole may ultimately prove a more effective focus. This approach would give space for Tokyo and Seoul to continue their slow and uneven process of mutual trust-building, while allowing the United States to emphasize more positive examples of Japanese regional leadership.
Finally, Japan’s experience shows that the United States should approach its role in the Indo-Pacific with a sense of humility. American policymakers should recognize that in many Asian countries the United States is seen not just as an external actor but as a participant in historical memory. This perception calls for a diplomatic strategy that is sensitive to the historical experiences and current sentiments of each nation. Humility in this context means acknowledging past negative American actions across the region, such as U.S. conduct during the Vietnam War or involvement in backing authoritarian regimes in the Philippines and Indonesia. Japan’s rebounding popularity in Southeast Asia suggests that respectful and empathetic long-term dialogue can yield results. Such an approach would enhance U.S. credibility and effectiveness in fostering cooperative security arrangements in a critical region.
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Ryan Ashley is an intelligence officer in the U.S. Air Force with extensive operational experience in East Asia and Japan and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Texas Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. He is also a lecturer with the Air Force Special Operations School. He has previously published on East Asian security and international relations with War on the Rocks, Nikkei Asia, and The Diplomat.
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
Image: The White House
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Ryan Ashley · December 14, 2023
5. Canadian 3-star general takes office as new deputy UNC chief
The revitalization of the UN Command continues.
Canadian 3-star general takes office as new deputy UNC chief
The Korea Times · December 14, 2023
Lt. Gen. Derek Macaulay, the new deputy commander of the United Nations Command (UNC), speaks during a change-of-responsibility ceremony held at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul, Dec. 14, in this photo posted on the UNC's Facebook. Yonhap
A Canadian three-star Army general took office as the new deputy commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) on Thursday, underscoring the multinational command's role in promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Lt. Gen. Derek Macaulay succeeded British Lt. Gen. Andrew Harrison during a change of responsibility ceremony at the UNC headquarters in Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, some 60 kilometers south of Seoul.
The UNC is led by a four-star U.S. general, currently Gen. Paul LaCamera, who also heads the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea.
"It is clear we must continue to work together in unity to support our Commander, Gen. LaCamera, in order to foster collaboration, resilience and understanding among member states in upholding peace and harmony on the Korean Peninsula," Macaulay said during the ceremony.
"We can contribute together to a legacy of peace and cooperation that reflects the enduring values of South Korea and the UNC Member states," he added.
It marks the second time a Canadian general has been appointed to the position since 2018.
Canada's current chief of the defense staff, Gen. Wayne Eyre, served as the UNC deputy chief from 2018 to 2019. He was the first non-American to serve in the position at the U.S.-led command.
Established in July 1950 under a U.N. mandate to support South Korea against North Korea's aggression, the UNC currently oversees the armistice agreement that ended the 1950-53 Korean War.
The UNC member states are the U.S., Britain, Canada, Turkey, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, the Netherlands, Colombia, Greece, New Zealand, Belgium, France, South Africa, Norway, Denmark and Italy. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · December 14, 2023
6. Trump considers overhauling his approach to North Korea if he wins in 2024
Sigh.....
ROK to go nuclear?
Trump considers overhauling his approach to North Korea if he wins in 2024
By ALEXANDER WARD
12/13/2023 05:00 AM EST
Politico
The idea, which has been considered in other forms during years of U.S.-led negotiations with North Korea, would be a shift in Washington’s overall approach to Pyongyang.
Former President Donald Trump (right) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un remain on good terms. | Evan Vucci/AP
12/13/2023 05:00 AM EST
Donald Trump is considering a plan to let North Korea keep its nuclear weapons and offer its regime financial incentives to stop making new bombs, according to three people briefed on his thinking.
The move would mark a sharp departure from his past stance on the issue and a shift toward accommodating the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, with whom Trump developed an unusually friendly relationship during his time in office.
While American presidents of both parties have largely despaired of persuading North Korea to relinquish its atomic arsenal, U.S. policy has continued to call for denuclearization of the Communist fortress state.
Trump, however, may be prepared to give up on even attempting to convince Kim to dismantle his country’s nuclear weapons if he wins another term in 2024. At least part of his motivation, the people said, would be to avoid wasting time on what he sees as futile arms talks — and focus instead on the larger task of competing with China.
Trump, one of the people said, is highly motivated to get an agreement with North Korea. “He knows he wants a deal,” this person said of Trump. “What type of deal? I don’t think he has thought that through.”
One of the ideas Trump is weighing, according to the people briefed on it, would involve enticing North Korea to freeze its nuclear program and stop developing new weapons, in exchange for relief from economic sanctions and some other form of aid. It would also require the creation of a verification to ensure North Korea keeps its word, the people said.
All three individuals, like others in this story, were granted anonymity to speak freely about the president’s thinking.
In a Truth Social post hours after this story published, Trump said “This is a made up story, DISINFORMATION, put out by Democrat Operatives in order to mislead and confuse. The only thing accurate in the story is that I do get along well with Kim Jong Un!” Trump did not specifically deny he was mulling the freeze-for-relief idea.
It is possible that Trump could still pursue denuclearization as a long-term goal, but it would be a departure from standard U.S. policy to strike even a near-term deal with North Korea that doesn’t state that explicitly.
Prior administrations, from both American political parties, have sought to pause Pyongyang’s weapons development with the goal of eventually convincing North Korea to shed its pariah status by abandoning nuclear arms. They have offered incentives to North Korea aimed at achieving such a pause, from food aid to sanctions relief to fuel oil.
But in all previous cases, American administrations have emphasized that stopping the creation of new weapons was merely an interim step in the direction of full denuclearization.
Trump’s first-term policy on North Korea was “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.” And his initial approach was very hardline — he once considered dropping a nuclear weapon on North Korea and blaming its use on another country.
After multiple personal engagements, Trump said he and Kim “fell in love,” sending letters to one another and remaining on good terms. But that goodwill did not translate into an agreement — save for a temporary missile-testing pause — and North Korea’s program has only advanced since.
If Trump softens his approach, it could rattle allies like South Korea and Japan and unnerve members of his own party who prefer a tougher approach toward Pyongyang. It would also open the former president to criticisms of hypocrisy, as he consistently bashed the Obama administration for relieving Iran’s economic woes in exchange for reversing its advance toward a first nuclear weapon. Trump, as president, withdrew the U.S. from the Barack Obama-era Iran nuclear deal.
Trump’s conversations on a North Korea strategy also signal that the former president is confident in his frontrunner status for the Republican nomination and has set his sights on issues that excited him as president.
North Korea has not been a hot-button campaign issue — China, Israel-Hamas and Ukraine suck up all the oxygen — but Trump’s coziness with Kim has served as the occasional punchline for his 2024 rivals.
“Neither Joe Biden’s weakness nor Donald Trump’s friendliness to Kim have changed North Korea’s direction for the better. These dictators only understand strength,” Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Trump administration, said in September.
Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, responding in September to reports of Russia potentially giving North Korea high-tech nuclear technologies in exchange for conventional weapons, said the U.S. had “to keep Kim Jong Un in a box … and to keep the pressure on.”
Trump often calls or summons people in his orbit to muse on his legal woes, the state of the economy, foreign policy or whatever he’s thinking about, said two other people who know how the president operates. Sometimes he’s prompted by coverage of an issue on cable news either to know more about it or simply offer his thoughts on the subject, they added.
Trump became obsessed with North Korea after Pyongyang launched its first-ever intercontinental ballistic missile in 2017. He threatened to go to nuclear war to stop Kim from developing his program, and Kim threatened his own attacks unless the U.S. backed off.
Those tensions — highlighted by Trump calling Kim “Little Rocket Man” — turned into a historic personal diplomacy endeavor over the prospect of North Korea dismantling its arsenal, with Kim during a summit in Hanoi offering only a small concession while Trump wanted a bigger deal. The former president remained interested in the North Korea problem for the rest of his presidency and is still talking and thinking about it at Mar-a-Lago.
The reduction in tensions between the U.S. and North Korea during the Trump years changed how Americans perceived the so-called “Hermit Kingdom.” In 2018, 51 percent said North Korea was the greatest U.S. enemy. The following year, that number plummeted to 14 percent, according to Gallup.
Trump’s latest thinking on Pyongyang is far from novel in the history of U.S.-North Korea relations.
“This sounds remarkably similar to other things we’ve tried since the early 1990s,” said retired Marine Lt. Gen. Chip Gregson, formerly the Pentagon’s top Asia official from 2009 to 2011. “It sounds good, it’s a great talking point. Been there, done that, and it hasn’t worked.”
North Korea has shown remarkable skill at keeping its nuclear development away from prying eyes. In 2010, for example, scientists in the country showed American analysts they had a uranium enrichment program, including two halls filled with 2,000 centrifuges.
“I was stunned by the sight,” Siegfried Hecker, a prominent American scientist on the 2010 visit to North Korea, said after his return.
Trump’s leaning that Pyongyang might not part with its nuclear weapons tracks with the long-held intelligence community assessment that no North Korean leader would abandon such weapons that they feel help keep the regime in place. Trump may decide down the line to push for North Korea’s denuclearization, but at the start that won’t be his explicit goal, and will instead seek more modest aims.
The next administration doesn’t start for more than a year and a lot can change in U.S.-North Korea relations — and the world — before then. Trump’s thinking could also evolve, based on discussions he has with confidants and advisers.
Kim, like his father and grandfather before him, sees his nuclear weapons as the guarantor of his rule, deterring countries like South Korea or the United States from launching an invasion to dethrone him. After a year of threatening nuclear war against one another, Trump and Kim engaged in historic leader-to-leader diplomacy that ultimately didn’t result in North Korea’s denuclearization.
Ever since, Kim has embarked on an advancement of his weapons program, earlier this year displaying the largest-ever number of nuclear missiles during a nighttime parade. North Korea would “exponentially increase” its arsenal, he said in January.
Biden administration officials have repeatedly offered to negotiate with North Korea without preconditions, but Pyongyang has offered nothing but silence. President Joe Biden, then, has moved closer to allies Japan and South Korea, ensuring they’re more coordinated and aligned on the North Korea issue as well as China and broader Indo-Pacific concerns.
Some analysts suggest that Trump’s current thinking might be a way to break the stalemate. “A proposal that freezes North Korea’s program while not denuclearizing completely in the near or medium term might be a more realistic approach given the current situation,” said Frank Aum, a Northeast Asia expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace. “That might be the only way forward.”
But Aum and others noted there were clear risks to Trump’s current inclination, the biggest one being that South Korea seeks nuclear weapons of its own. The country’s conservative president, Yoon Suk Yeol, earlier this year suggested that Seoul might pursue the bomb if the North Korea threat grew further. That would raise the prospect of a nuclear arms race in Asia just as the U.S. is hoping to limit China’s own development.
Pressure against the Trump policy would almost certainly mount in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. Lawmakers, including Republicans friendly to Trump, would likely advise him to reverse course, in part because North Korea is aiding Russia in its war against Ukraine. There would also be overarching questions about America’s commitment to non-proliferation if the U.S., at least for a time, effectively approved of North Korea’s nuclear attainment.
There are also many unknowns, namely how Kim would react to such a proposal, the specific details of how to ensure North Korea’s program remains untouched or how Beijing, Pyongyang’s closest partner, would react to all of this. But one thing many are sure of is that the prospect of North Korea dismantling its arsenal shrinks with each passing day.
“North Korea has made it clear it’s not accepting any limitation on its program,” said Sydney Seiler, a former national intelligence officer for North Korea. “They say they’ll denuclearize only when the world denuclearizes.”
POLITICO
Politico
7. Trump says reports of plans to accommodate North Korea are ‘fake news’
Damage control.
Trump says reports of plans to accommodate North Korea are ‘fake news’
The article, citing anonymous sources allegedly close to the former president, said Trump would pivot to requesting a 'freeze' on North Korean nuclear development
By Timothy H.J. Nerozzi Fox News
Published December 14, 2023 2:08pm EST
foxnews.com · by Timothy H.J. Nerozzi Fox News
Video
Fox News Flash top headlines for December 14
Fox News Flash top headlines are here. Check out what's clicking on Foxnews.com.
Former President Donald Trump is pushing back on a report that he would provide generous political accommodations to North Korea if he is re-elected in 2024.
Trump dismissed a report from Politico citing three anonymous sources close to Trump that claimed he intended to rollback demands for denuclearization of the Kim regime and instead pursue a "freeze" in exchange for loosened sanctions.
"A Fake News article in Politico, through anonymous sources (as usual!), states that my views on Nuclear Weapons in North Korea have softened," the former commander-in-chief said in a short statement posted to his social media site Truth Social on Wednesday
KIM JONG UN PRAISES MOTHERS' ROLES IN RAISING COMMUNISTS, REVOLUTIONARIES
Former President Donald Trump speaks at the New York Young Republican Club Gala at Cipriani Wall Street in New York City. (Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images)
Trump continued, "This is a made up story, DISINFORMATION, put out by Democrat Operatives in order to mislead and confuse. The only thing accurate in the story is that I do get along well with Kim Jong Un!"
An anonymous source that Politico claimed was "briefed on [Trump's] thinking" on North Korea said that his biggest priority was a "deal."
"He knows he wants a deal," the alleged inside source told Politico. "What type of deal? I don’t think he has thought that through."
NORTH KOREA WARNS US THAT HARM TO SPY SATELLITE WOULD BE DECLARATION OF WAR
A handout photo provided by Dong-A Ilbo of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump inside the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the South and North Korea in Panmunjom, South Korea. (Dong-A Ilbo via Getty Images/Getty Images)
Trump claimed in April that he averted a "nuclear holocaust" via his diplomacy with North Korea.
Trump made the comments in a deposition for his New York civil fraud case, which was not made public until August.
"I was very busy. I was — I considered this the most important job in the world, saving millions of lives. I think you would have nuclear holocaust, if I didn't deal with North Korea," Trump told lawyers with the New York attorney general’s office in April.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attends the 7th enlarged plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in Pyongyang, North Korea. (KCNA via REUTERS)
CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP
Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to meet with a dictator of North Korea when he shook hands with Kim Jong Un in 2019.
"It started off rough, remember that? I was saying ‘little rocket man’ and he was saying ‘I've got a red button on my desk, and I’m willing to use it,'" Trump recalled in an April 2023 interview.
"And then all of a sudden we get a call — they want to meet," he added. "We would have had that whole situation straightened out shortly after the beginning of my second term."
Timothy Nerozzi is a writer for Fox News Digital. You can follow him on Twitter @timothynerozzi and can email him at timothy.nerozzi@fox.com
foxnews.com · by Timothy H.J. Nerozzi Fox News
8. Trump denies media article on N. Korea negotiation plan as 'fake news'
Damage control two. Doth they protest too much? I wonder who these advisors are? Who among the Trump camp has any real Korea experience?
I would be happy to help but I could never pass the loyalty test as all I can be loyal to is to support and defend the Constitution.
(2nd LD) Trump denies media article on N. Korea negotiation plan as 'fake news' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 14, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout; CHANGES headline, lead)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 (Yonhap) -- Former President Donald Trump on Wednesday dismissed as "fake news" a media report that he is considering a negotiation plan under which North Korea freezes its nuclear program and stops building new weapons in return for sanctions relief and other incentives.
Citing three people briefed on his thinking, Politico, a U.S. media outlet, reported that Trump is weighing the idea as he is seeking a second White House term in next year's election expected to be a rematch between him and incumbent President Joe Biden.
The outlet noted that the plan would mark a "sharp" departure from his past stance in pursuit of the North's denuclearization and a shift toward "accommodating" North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, with whom Trump developed an "unusually friendly" relationship.
"A fake news article in Politico through anonymous sources (as usual!) states that my views on nuclear weapons in North Korea have softened," Trump wrote in a social media post.
He went on to call the article a "made up story, disinformation, put out by Democrat operatives in order to mislead and confuse."
"The only thing accurate in the story is that I do get along well with Kim Jong-un!" he said.
In its article, Politico cited the sources as saying Trump is weighing the idea that would "involve enticing North Korea to freeze its nuclear program and stop developing new weapons, in exchange for relief from economic sanctions and some other form of aid."
Politico raised the possibility that Trump could seek the North's denuclearization as a long-term goal.
Part of Trump's motivation for the idea would be to focus on the "larger task of competing with China" while avoiding "wasting time on what he sees as futile arms talks," the outlet said.
The idea, if pushed for, could cause friction with Seoul as South Korea has long been pursuing North Korea's complete denuclearization while seeking a credible nuclear deterrent provided by the United States.
Talk of a nuclear freeze surfaced in the past as part of a potential interim deal aimed at achieving North Korea's complete denuclearization. But a deal that does not specify the end goal of denuclearization could unnerve Seoul and Tokyo.
With a long-running impasse in denuclearization efforts, calls have emerged for a new approach to persuade the North to renounce its nuclear ambitions -- particularly when Pyongyang has enshrined its nuclear armament in its constitution and adopted an aggressive nuclear policy.
During his presidential term from 2017-2021, Trump sought leader-to-leader diplomacy with the North, which led to three face-to-face meetings between him and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shake hands at the inter-Korean border truce village of Panmunjom on June 30, 2019. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · December 14, 2023
9. South Korea to increase defense spending over five years
South Korea to increase defense spending over five years
Defense News · by Leilani Chavez · December 13, 2023
MANILA, Philippines — South Korea plans to spend 346.7 trillion Korean won (U.S. $262.8 billion) in the next five years to bolster its defense capabilities amid, according to the country’s Defense Ministry.
The ministry announced its 2024-2028 midterm defense plan Tuesday, noting an increase of 17.3 trillion Korean won from last year’s version. The budgetary adjustment, which follows North Korea’s Nov. 21 launch of a reconnaissance satellite, calls for improved military capabilities, efforts to maintain troop levels and the modernization of defense facilities.
Specifically, funding to improve defense capabilities increased by 6%, from 107.4 trillion Korean won to 113.9 trillion Korean won; that is now expected to grow by 11.3% annually. This effort involves deterrence measures, growing a preemptive strike capability, and countering North Korean missiles and drones.
The country added 10.8 trillion Korean won to the initial figure of 224 trillion Korean won. That money will support troops and modernization programs to prepare a “strong and combat-ready military,” according to the ministry’s news release. Funding will also help the military reorganize itself to create “strategic units and advanced forces.”
Following North Korea’s satellite launch last month, South Korea suspended a no-fly provision in the 2018 inter-Korean treaty, enabling the South to monitor the North’s activities along their shared border. North Korea reacted by withdrawing from the pact entirely.
Tension escalated after the North reportedly stationed troops at 11 guard posts, established temporary bases and deployed military assets along the 4-kilometer-wide (2.5-mile-wide) Demilitarized Zone. South Korean officials released images to back these claims.
North Korea has also opened more than 10 coastal artillery embattlements along the West Sea, and its guards were seen carrying handguns at the Joint Security Area in breach of a previous agreement. In turn, South Korea announced plans to restore 11 previously dismantled guard posts at the DMZ.
North Korea has committed approximately 17 violations of previous agreements, according to Ju Hyung Kim, a defense analyst at the Seoul-based Security Management Institute think tank. These include the five UAVs North Korea flew in South Korean airspace in December 2022.
And North Korea’s nuclear development program has rendered a 1992 denuclearization agreement between the two countries “practically null,” Kim told Defense News.
South Korea has steadily developed countermeasures against its neighbor, but President Yoon Suk Yeol has called for the development of “overwhelming” wartime capabilities, including what the government refers to as Defense Innovation 4.0, which incorporates advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, to the three-axis system — a strategy that informs how the military should respond to an attack from the North.
In March, the government unveiled its so-called Kill Web strategy meant as an improvement to the Kill Chain approach, which would neutralize nuclear and missile strikes as well as directly launch attacks against Pyongyang should the two Koreas enter into armed conflict.
“When given a mission, we must always maintain a readiness to immediately operate the world’s best long-range, ultra-precise and high-power missiles, and resolutely punish enemy provocations,” Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said Friday during a visit to the country’s strategic missile command. “The enemy’s provocation may vary, but your role is to strike the enemy’s heart and head fatally.”
Amid tension on the Korean Peninsula, Kim warned of a possible scenario in which China tries to take Taiwan by force — an island nation Beijing considers a rogue province.
“In such a scenario, it is conceivable that key U.S. assets currently stationed in South Korea could be redirected toward the Taiwan Strait,” Kim said. “This redirection may create a security vacuum that North Korea might exploit, leading to miscalculations regarding the United States’ ability to fully commit its capabilities in a two-front war situation.”
“Therefore, it is crucial for the trilateral partners [South Korea, the U.S. and Japan] to devise a feasible plan to address this potentially drastic scenario and consistently signal to North Korea that a full-fledged military attack against South Korea would not be successful,” Kim added.
About Leilani Chavez
Leilani Chavez is an Asia correspondent for Defense News. Her reporting expertise is in East Asian politics, development projects, environmental issues and security.
10. Missile warning data sharing between S. Korea, US, Japan to be operational in 'next few days': US official
Excellent. A step toward integrated missile defense.
Missile warning data sharing between S. Korea, US, Japan to be operational in 'next few days': US official
The Korea Times · by 2023-12-14 13:13 | North Korea · December 14, 2023
South Korea's National Security Adviser Cho Tae-yong, center, poses with his U.S. and Japanese counterparts Jake Sullivan, left, and Takeo Akiba in Seoul, Dec. 9. Courtesy of Office of the President of the Republic of Korea
A system for the real-time sharing of North Korean ballistic missile warning data between South Korea, the United States and Japan is expected to become operational "within the next few days," a White House official said Wednesday.
Mira Rapp-Hooper, the National Security Council senior director for East Asia and Oceania, made the remarks, touching on progress in trilateral cooperation since the landmark Camp David summit between President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in August.
"We are on track to make good on our promise to be sharing real-time missile warning data by the end of this year and in fact, expect that to be operational within the next few days," she said during a keynote speech at the forum hosted by the Brookings Institution.
At the August summit, Yoon, Biden and Kishida agreed to operationalize the trilateral real-time system by the end of this year as their countries have been stepping up security coordination in the face of evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats.
NK condemns missile warning data sharing between S. Korea, US, Japan
As the U.S. has bilateral alliance treaties with South Korea and Japan, it has had a data sharing system with each ally, but there has not been a direct data linkage between the two Asian neighbors that have long been in historical feuds stemming from Japan's 1910-45 colonization of the Korean Peninsula.
Information collected through this method is expected to enhance the countries' overall capabilities to detect and track incoming North Korean missiles, observers said.
Highlighting deepening trilateral cooperation, Rapp-Hooper also noted a "full agenda plan for 2024," which includes trilateral meetings between the three countries' commerce ministers and between their financial ministers in the first half of next year.
During the forum, the official cast the three countries' "commitment to consult" each other in case of a common crisis as "one of the most important things" from the Camp David summit.
She said that the commitment does not place the three countries in a "formal trilateral security guarantee relationship" but acknowledges that they increasingly share a common security environment.
"It has, as the basic premise of trilateral cooperation, also encouraged us to go on to have much deeper ... better informed conversations about mounting challenges in the region, such as DPRK-Russia cooperation or the PRC's recent aggression in the South China Sea," she said.
DPRK and PRC stand for the official names of North Korea and China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, respectively. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · by 2023-12-14 13:13 | North Korea · December 14, 2023
11. 'Noryang: Deadly Sea': Requiem for legendary admiral who becomes myth
I look forward to this film.
Yi Sun-sin: 'Those who seek death shall live. Those who seek life shall die.'
'Noryang: Deadly Sea': Requiem for legendary admiral who becomes myth
The Korea Times · December 14, 2023
A sea battle scene from "Noryang: Deadly Sea" is shown in this undated file photo. Courtesy of Lotte Entertainment
"Noryang: Deadly Sea," director Kim Han-min's final installment of his trilogy about Korea's legendary naval admiral, Yi Sun-sin, opens and closes with the deaths of two historical figures who forever shaped the geopolitical landscape of East Asia.
The movie opens with a scene in which Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the mastermind behind the Japanese invasions of Korea, dies soon after ordering the Japanese forces to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula.
The 2.5-hour epic film recounts the last naval battle between a retreating Japan and the allied forces of Joseon and the Ming dynasties who pursued them.
Ironically, the conflict that was meant to conclude the seven-year war flared up in the most dramatic — and deadly — way. More soldiers died in the Battle of Noryang, which took place on Dec. 16, 1598, and lasted until dawn the next day, than in any other battle of the war.
With their diminished military strength, which naturally reduced their willingness to risk their lives, the Japanese soldiers' primary aim was not victory, but simply survival and a safe return home.
For Yi Sun-sin, his mission was clear: annihilate the enemy. As much as it was his responsibility to win the war as an admiral, it was also his personal revenge against the Japanese forces who took the lives of his own son and those of countless others. Yi believes ending the war "in the right way" would set the path for the nation and teach the enemy a lesson that reckless invasions cost it dearly.
Actor Kim Yoon-seok, who played Yi, found it challenging to deliver the admiral's resolute conviction through minimal dialogue.
The actor pulled off a stellar performance, embodying Yi's unwavering resolve and indomitable spirit to fight till the very end of the war that eventually claimed his own life. As the director has said, Kim decisively portrayed Yi's double-sidedness of having "strong passion, as seen in 'Roaring Currents,' and realistic and level-headed attitude seen in 'Hansan' at the same time."
At the height of the battle, Yi falls to his knees, struck by a bullet on his left shoulder. He is hurriedly carried to his cabin while his son continues to beat the war drums to keep up the fighting spirit.
Kim matter-of-factly utters Yi's famous last words, "Do not announce my death," in the admiral's characteristic low and calm voice to keep moral high, making his death all the more tragic.
Admiral Yi Sun-sin is shown in this undated still image from "Noryang: Deadly Sea." Courtesy of Lotte Entertainment
The film embodies the director's decadelong dedication to one subject — Admiral Yi's life, his love for the nation and the people, and his great war strategies and tactics.
Some may find the lengthy — yet necessary — explanations about the power dynamics and history of East Asia in the beginning of the film perplexing. It was all the more confusing with three different languages, some of them in old dialects, being spoken and even allied forces failing to see eye to eye on what extent a war should be launched.
Clocking in at 1 hour and 40 minutes, the night battle scenes take the audience to Asia's deadliest naval warfare that finally ended the Imjin War, or the Japanese invasion of Korea (1592-98). The ferocious war at sea takes place in pitch black. It is only occasionally lightened up with cannons shooting fire and the arrows of flying fire. The dramatic, blood-pumping action sequences in a long take vividly reconstruct the deadly confrontations on war vessels.
All these elaborate, engaging cinematic elements are enough to tie some loose ends. For some, watching the war hero's final moments on the big screen, although a well-known fact, might be enough.
The movie is set to hit local theaters Wednesday. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · December 14, 2023
12. North Korea’s De-risking Strategy and Its Implications
Excerpts:
Developing an appropriate concept for dealing with the North Korean shift towards de-risking would begin by acknowledging such a shift is taking place, and that it is of a long-term strategic nature.
This will impact mainly two fields of North Korea policy: the stick of pressure through economic sanctions, and the carrot of political dialogue.
Sanctions have had limited effects even during the past decades when Pyongyang was not part of a new Cold War alliance. Now that votes at the United Nations Security Council reflect growing camp antagonism again, sanctions are unlikely to become more effective, or to pass the hurdle of a veto. However, some existing sanctions can probably be used as negotiating mass.
Talks, including summits, have in the past taken place due to North Korea’s interest in buying time, reducing the risk of further sanctions or military attacks, or in the hope of extracting resources from their negotiating partners. Under its new strategy, North Korea will still be interested in talks but for different reasons. The key goals of meetings with the West will be to drive a wedge through the Western alliances and keep its own allies sufficiently nervous to ensure and maximize their continued support.
Not least, caution is recommended concerning offering the North Korean leadership excuses to further reduce external interaction. Pyongyang has been quick to take advantage of such opportunities in the past, and it might be even more willing to do so under its new de-risking strategy.
North Korea’s De-risking Strategy and Its Implications
https://www.38north.org/2023/12/north-koreas-de-risking-strategy-and-its-implications/
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has been closing several of its embassies in 2023, reducing the total number of its diplomatic missions to 46.[1] One frequently cited reason is the country’s “dire economy.” However, economic problems have persisted for a long time and are therefore not sufficient to explain the recent series of embassy closures. Instead, they are an indicator of Pyongyang’s long-term strategy of de-risking: a shift from managing risk to avoiding it.[2]
The geopolitical return to a “new Cold War,” catalyzed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, forms the backdrop for this strategy. The North Korean leadership seems to have adjusted its risk-benefit analysis to the new geopolitical environment. Changes in economic and foreign policy, which had been actively made or passively permitted since the mid-1990s, have been re-evaluated, with the COVID-19 pandemic being a unique, low-key opportunity to undo many of these changes. The membership in a new and firm alliance with Moscow and Beijing helps to offset the economic and political costs of the return to a conservative state-centered economic policy and international isolationism.
This article will discuss the following issues:
- What are these risks from the perspective of the North Korean leadership?
- Why has Pyongyang ever taken these risks?
- Why is it now reconsidering these risks?
- What are the implications of this new strategy?
De-risking What?
The North Korean leadership has taken many risks in the past decades. Even though it has done so half-heartedly and reluctantly, it permitted a marketization of the domestic economy, an expansion of foreign trade, and more active external relations.
The role of markets and of quasi-private economic activity has been substantially strengthened, special economic zones have been established, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been allowed to operate in North Korea, and diplomatic relations have been intensified or newly established.
Admittedly, none of this went as far as similar developments in other state socialist countries, such as China or Vietnam. Neither the US nor Japan ever established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Some risk reduction happened because of external action, for example, when NGOs left North Korea because of unacceptable restrictions on their operations.[3] The economy remained under tight state control, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) did not give up its power monopoly, collective leadership was not introduced, religious freedom could still only be found in the constitution, and heavy domestic travel restrictions remained in place.
Nevertheless, a new middle class emerged, entrepreneurship developed, individualism became more pronounced, and companies like Air Koryo and Korea Kumgang Group (KKG) started looking like North Korean versions of South Korean conglomerates (chaebol). Ideologically, a weakening of the isolation of North Korea and its citizens from the rest of the world could be observed. In general terms, a limited transfer of power from the state to individuals occurred.
Internationally, North Korea exposed itself to the risks of intensified interaction with its adversaries. This includes economic dependency through trade, with the annual volume growing to over 7 billion USD in 2013. In line with the tightening of sanctions due to the developing nuclear weapons program, this dependency has changed from being multilateral to being unilaterally focused on China, with over 96 percent of North Korea’s trade in 2022 being with the big neighbor.[4] To illustrate the huge transition that has taken place in the last two decades, it is noteworthy that in 2001, the main recipient of North Korean exports had been Japan.
Last but not least, North Korea has a regime that prefers to be enigmatic and closely guards against information leaking to the outside world. From that perspective, high-level defections pose a substantial risk. Prominent cases in the past decade include Thae Yong Ho, former DPRK deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom, who left in 2016, and Jo Song Gil, former acting ambassador to Italy, who reportedly defected in 2018. Apart from the reputational damage, such high-ranking insiders are a rare and valuable source of information about the status of the North Korean regime, which has otherwise been very successful in defending against the collection of human intelligence.[5] A growing number of citizens traveling or staying abroad increased the risk of exposing North Koreans to external information and subsequent defections, to potential attempts by hostile intelligence services to recruit them as sources, or to other forms of intelligence leaks.[6]
Why Take These Risks?
The North Korean leadership can be assumed to act rationally, at least from their own perspective. Risks will, therefore, only be taken if there is no other option or if the expected benefits are higher than the perceived costs. In that sense, there are at least two narratives concerning the causes of these risky measures. Spontaneous grassroots changes might have happened as a result of individual survival strategies due to the disastrous economic conditions since the mid-1990s, leading Pyongyang to passively accept them ex-post. A different narrative would assign more agency especially to the new North Korean leadership under Kim Jong Il since 1994, who had experimented with economic reforms since the early 1980s.[7] Both narratives imply an alignment of policy with reality—which, to use North Korean terms, closely reminds us of the “creative principle” of the state ideology of self-reliance (juche). As Kim Jong Il put it in January 2001, if the environment changes, policies must change, too.[8]
The environment for North Korea had indeed changed dramatically since the 1980s, reaching a major final accord in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since its foundation, the DPRK had been part of a larger camp, usually called the socialist or Eastern bloc. Bilateral relations within this group were often less than harmonious, but the alliance as such existed and worked despite sharp ideological differences and nationalist egoisms. China did intervene to support North Korea during the Korean War, the Soviet Union and its allies did rebuild North Korea in the 1950s, and trade with socialist countries did take place under very favorable conditions, including barter trade, long-term loans and low, so-called friendship prices.
The end of the socialist bloc meant the end of North Korea’s place in that alliance and of the benefits it had been able to reap. Almost overnight, North Korea lost its key military ally, nuclear umbrella and main economic partner. Russia and the former socialist satellite states were only ready to keep trading with North Korea at world market prices and in hard currency. The leadership in Pyongyang was either not willing or not able to adjust its foreign trade regime to the new conditions. One of the consequences was a sudden drop in the imports of oil, and thus also in the availability of fuel, fertilizer and other crucial inputs for North Korea’s agriculture.[9] The result was a major economic crisis, including a famine called the “Arduous March” in North Korea.
At this point, whether by acknowledging grassroots changes or pursuing a more top-down reform policy, North Korea started taking the risks mentioned above. Specific examples include inter-Korean economic projects such as Mt. Kumgang tourism or the Kaesong Industrial Complex, special economic zones such as Rason, marketization policies like the July 2002 measures, various attempts to give farming collectives and enterprises more autonomy, and ideological adjustments such as the military first policy (songun or sŏn’gun) or the policy of a parallel development of the military and the economy (byungjin or pyŏngjin).
Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle
We know embarrassingly little about the internal dynamics of decision making in the North Korean leadership. But facts suggest that its willingness to risk true reforms of the economic system was relatively short-lived—if such an intention ever existed at all. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that external support of North Korean reforms was limited as well.
In hindsight, it seems that the summit meeting between Kim Jong Il and Koizumi Junichiro in September 2002 was the peak of North Korea’s risk affinity. After the beginning of the second nuclear crisis in October 2002 and the subsequent gradual withdrawal of the West from economic cooperation with the DPRK, a few projects were continued, but Pyongyang was increasingly reluctant to take new and greater risks. Witnessing how the “Axis of Evil” turned from mere rhetoric into an actual list of targets for an invasion by the world’s strongest military certainly contributed to a growing risk aversion.
In 2005, the North Korean state decided that the era of post-Arduous March humanitarian aid was over and insisted on a shift to developmental assistance. This collided with Western sanctions and either ended or limited international partnerships. Depending on perspective, the timing of the measures against Banco Delta Asia in 2005 undermined, or offered a convenient excuse not to proceed with, North Korean denuclearization. But at that time, this process had not been a realistic option anyway, considering North Korea’s perception of being surrounded by hostile and powerful forces without any reliable nuclear-armed ally by its side.
The regime’s occasional attempts to crack down on the consequences of its earlier risk-taking, such as the 2009 currency reform, were further testament to a decision against reforms that had already been made. In this context, it is useful to note the absence, at any time, of a strong and paradigmatic official endorsement of a reform policy by the leadership.
But in the real world, it can be difficult to abruptly stop a process once it has been set in motion. Therefore, the outcomes of post-Arduous March risk-taking could still be observed for many years. Markets, restaurants, cafés, gas stations, car wash services, small logistics companies, etc., continued to rival and outperform the once only available option for such services—the state. The new middle class was still visible in the capital and in major provincial cities, and even socialist capitalists, often dubbed donju (masters of money), emerged in the grey area between private and state ownership.
External relations had been in decline, especially since North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, followed by five more such tests until 2017. A brief but short-lived reversal happened in 2018, with a series of high-level summits between Kim Jong Un and the leaders of China, South Korea, Russia and, most surprisingly, the United States. This unseen diplomatic activity by the North Korean leader fueled hopes that the stalled reform process would be lifted to a higher level. But the failed Hanoi Summit in 2019 and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 put a sudden end to these expectations.
It is difficult to say at what point the North Korean leader realized that the combination of sanctions and COVID-19 presented a “golden opportunity,” as he called it, during the Eighth Party Congress of the WPK in January 2021. In any case, what had started as another drastic reaction to a pandemic turned into a prolonged and extreme state of self-isolation. The borders were de facto closed. To illustrate this: while in 2018, 1,137 North Koreans managed to reach South Korea; in 2022, that number went down to 67.
Opportunities for entering the country were severely limited as well. As of December 2023, no tourist entries have taken place since the beginning of the pandemic. DPRK citizens have only been allowed to return to their home country since late August 2023. The travel ban on foreign nationals was lifted in late September 2023, although quarantine requirements remain in place. And while the embassies of China and Russia have been able to send new staff to Pyongyang since March 2023, most other representations remain closed. One effect of this drastic reduction of “eyes on the ground” is that North Korea has become more enigmatic again, which is very much in the regime’s interest.
The Future of Pyongyang’s De-risking
If we indeed witness the unfolding of a long-term de-risking strategy by the North Korean leadership, then a return to pre-pandemic levels of interaction with the outside world and, particularly with the West, is not to be expected.
We can only expect the bare minimum of regular Western diplomatic presence in North Korea to be restored. Apart from a possible lack of enthusiasm by the sending countries, doing so will often require the renovation of facilities that have not been in use for years, which offers Pyongyang many opportunities for delaying the process.
The presence of non-diplomatic missions in the DPRK is likely to be reduced or not to be restored. Many of these post-Arduous March efforts of humanitarian aid and assistance had become necessary due to a lack of such support by North Korea’s former allies. China and Russia are now more likely to provide support again, making the risk of hosting organizations like the Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Development Programme, World Food Programme, and World Health Organization, harder to justify.
Some of the DPRK diplomatic missions abroad are beneficial from Pyongyang’s perspective and will be maintained. Opening new missions in line with new geopolitical dynamics can be expected. At the same time, it is possible that future reevaluations of the risk-benefit balance of diplomatic missions will take place, resulting in more closures.
The DPRK can be expected to maintain and even enlarge its presence in international organizations that experience an internal shift of power in favor of China and Russia.
It can be expected that in due course, tourism from China will resume, and tourism from Russia will be expanded compared to pre-pandemic levels. Apart from the standard tours to the capital, the DMZ, and scenic mountains, large-scale projects such as the Wonsan-Kalma coastal tourist area on the east coast will be made operational for these tourists.
Considering the comparatively low number of Western tourists, the relatively small income from this group, and the high risk of granting access to journalists and intelligence collectors, it is unlikely that Western tourism to North Korea will reach its peak levels of about 5,000 annually anytime soon. It is even possible that a resumption of regular Western tourism will not take place at all.
Turning to domestic affairs, the pressure for economic reforms has substantially decreased. This leaves more room for implementation of the announcements by Kim Jong Un at the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, namely a more inward-oriented economic development strategy with a strengthened role of the state.
In terms of regional security, there is a possibility that the leadership in Pyongyang will be less inclined to take the risk of aggressively developing its nuclear arsenal. We do not know how Kim Jong Un assesses his related capabilities. He might conclude that the current level of his own WMD program, in combination with the increased likelihood of military support from Russia and China, will suffice as a deterrent. The absence of a nuclear test since 2017 points in that direction.
Implications for North Korea Policy
Developing an appropriate concept for dealing with the North Korean shift towards de-risking would begin by acknowledging such a shift is taking place, and that it is of a long-term strategic nature.
This will impact mainly two fields of North Korea policy: the stick of pressure through economic sanctions, and the carrot of political dialogue.
Sanctions have had limited effects even during the past decades when Pyongyang was not part of a new Cold War alliance. Now that votes at the United Nations Security Council reflect growing camp antagonism again, sanctions are unlikely to become more effective, or to pass the hurdle of a veto. However, some existing sanctions can probably be used as negotiating mass.
Talks, including summits, have in the past taken place due to North Korea’s interest in buying time, reducing the risk of further sanctions or military attacks, or in the hope of extracting resources from their negotiating partners. Under its new strategy, North Korea will still be interested in talks but for different reasons. The key goals of meetings with the West will be to drive a wedge through the Western alliances and keep its own allies sufficiently nervous to ensure and maximize their continued support.
Not least, caution is recommended concerning offering the North Korean leadership excuses to further reduce external interaction. Pyongyang has been quick to take advantage of such opportunities in the past, and it might be even more willing to do so under its new de-risking strategy.
- [1]
- As of December 2023, DPRK embassies in Angola, Bangladesh, Congo, Guinea, Hong Kong, Nepal, Senegal, Spain and Uganda have been closed.
- [2]
-
The term “de-risking” is often used in an economic or financial context, but the concept can also be applied to other areas including international relations, economic liberalization, or market reforms. In that sense, according to the U.S. Department of State, “de-risking refers to the phenomenon of… terminating or restricting… relationships with clients or categories of clients to avoid, rather than manage, risk.”
- [3]
-
The closure of the Goethe-Institute’s library in Pyongyang in 2009 by the German side is one example (https://www.dw.com/en/goethe-institut-to-close-center-in-north-korea-on-censorship-claim/a-4928516).
- [4]
-
KOTRA (2023). 2022년 북한의 대외무역 동향 (Trends in North Korean Trade 2022). KOTRA 자료 23-052, https://dream.kotra.or.kr/.
- [5]
-
Donald Gregg, former CIA Chief of Station and later US Ambassador in South Korea, called North Korea the “longest-running intelligence failure in the history of US espionage.” See: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/gregg.html.
- [6]
-
An extreme case has been the raid on the DPRK’s embassy in Madrid in February 2019 during which mobile phones and computers containing potentially sensitive data had been stolen by the attackers. See: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47553804.
- [7]
-
Cautious innovations such as the introduction of “August 3rd goods” (a focus on consumer goods production) in 1983 and the Joint Venture Law of 1984 came after Kim Jong Il’s visit to China in 1983. See Kihl, Y. W. (1984). North Korea in 1983: Transforming “The Hermit Kingdom”? Asian Survey, 24(1), 100–111. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644170.
- [8]
- Kim, Jong-il, “The 21st Century is a Century of Great Change and Creation.” January 4, 2001.
- [9]
- Smith, Hazel (2005). Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
13. N. Korea’s latest spy satellite equipped Japanese camera – again
No surprise.
N. Korea’s latest spy satellite equipped Japanese camera – again
The new camera is still not capable of providing meaningful surveillance for military purposes
By Seulkee Jang - 2023.12.15 9:17am
dailynk.com
N. Korea’s latest spy satellite equipped Japanese camera – again | Daily NK English
A photo of the Pyongyang General Control Tower published in state media on November 23, 2023. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
The spy satellite recently placed into orbit by North Korea carried a camera imported from Japan, Daily NK has learned.
A source in North Korea who is familiar with the arms industry told Daily NK on Dec. 7 that the Malligyong-1, which was launched on Nov. 21, was equipped with an optical camera manufactured in Japan. This camera was of better quality than the one used in a failed satellite launch on May 1, the source said.
After the failure of North Korea’s first spy satellite launch, the South Korean military recovered wreckage of the launch vehicle in open waters off the west coast of the Korean Peninsula. A commercial digital camera manufactured in Japan was reportedly found in the wreckage.
Analysis found that the camera had a zoom function but a resolution of just one to three megapixels, making it useless as a military surveillance satellite. A resolution of three megapixels would allow photographs of major areas and bases but would not have enough detail to identify weapon systems inside those bases.
After the South Korean military released its assessment of North Korea’s surveillance capabilities and the satellite’s performance based on its analysis of the recovered wreckage, the North Korean authorities reportedly gave special orders to the responsible department to find a better camera for the next satellite.
While those orders were carried out, the camera is reportedly still not capable of providing meaningful surveillance for military purposes.
North Korean media reported that the Malligyong-1 had taken photographs of Anderson Air Force Base, on the island of Guam, at 9:17 AM on Nov. 27. By mentioning the specific time and location of the satellite images, North Korea seems to have been trying to dispel doubts about the satellite’s effectiveness.
Daily NK’s source said that North Korea did not load the satellite with a Russian optical camera despite consulting with Russia on technical issues. The North Korean authorities were too focused on putting the satellite into stable orbit and achieving two-way communication with ground control to improve camera function, the source explained.
Daily NK reported in late November that North Korea’s National Aerospace Technology Administration was more focused on putting the satellite into orbit than on enhancing surveillance capabilities for the latest launch.
“The images taken by Malligyong-1 are currently being kept under close guard,” the source said.
North Korea appears to be taking strict precautions to ensure the satellite’s photographic capabilities are not made public. For example, North Korean media outlets have not published any of the actual images they claim the satellite has taken of US military facilities.
However, according to an individual who has seen the satellite images, they have a lower resolution than the Google satellite images that officials at the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Ministry of State Security are allowed to view, the source said.
“Before the next launch, North Korea will focus on improving camera quality in its technical consultation with Russia.”
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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Seulkee Jang
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynk@uni-media.net.
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14. High-ranking N. Korean officials question whether Kim Ju Ae could succeed her father
I question it too.
High-ranking N. Korean officials question whether Kim Ju Ae could succeed her father
Some analysts warn that too much attention is focused on whether Kim Ju Ae will succeed her father at the expense of better understanding and criticizing North Korea's nuclear program
By Seulkee Jang - 2023.12.14 5:03pm
dailynk.com
High-ranking N. Korean officials question whether Kim Ju Ae could succeed her father | Daily NK English
Kim Jong Un was accompanied by his wife and daughter at a banquet celebrating the founding of the DPRK’s military on Feb. 7, 2023, according to state-run media. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, has recently been making repeated appearances at major military events, which has led to rumors that the young girl will succeed her father as leader of the country in the future. However, high-ranking officials in North Korea say that it is “impossible” for Kim Ju Ae to become her father’s successor.
Upon being told that some analysts in South Korea believe that Kim Ju Ae will be the successor to her father, a high-ranking source in North Korea told Daily NK on Nov. 11 that “I don’t understand why they say that. If you let a woman take power in the fourth generation, the last name of the fifth-generation leader will be different. That doesn’t make sense. When you name a successor, you think of the future. Succession is establishing the fourth generation to serve as a basis for the fifth generation.”
In short, the source argued that Kim Ju Ae’s descendants would have a family name other than Kim, a family name associated with the country’s so-called Paekdu Bloodline, and that this would make a fifth generation succession impossible to achieve. The source’s argument puts on display the power of patriarchal beliefs in North Korean society; namely, that children must take their father’s last name and only sons may become successors to keep familial lines going.
N. Korea intensifies idolization of Kim Jong Un by presenting him as a “wise father figure”
In fact, some analysts say that North Korea’s leadership is not putting Kim Ju Ae on display at major events to establish her as successor but rather as part of a strategy to intensify idolization of her father.
“The North Korean leadership hasn’t finished bolstering Kim Jong Un’s unitary leadership system,” an expert at a South Korean policy think tank told Daily NK, speaking on condition of anonymity. “North Korea’s leadership is focusing on intensifying efforts to idolize Kim Jong Un, not establishing a succession. Even during the recent Fifth National Conference of Mothers, the propaganda focused on highlighting [Kim Jong Un’s] image as a loving father of the Socialist Grand Family.”
In fact, after that conference ended, Rodong Sinmun focused on promoting Kim’s image as a wise, warm father, writing, “Everyone cried and cried again, saying there were no other hardworking fathers of the people like our Supreme Leader [Kim Jong Un].”
The expert’s argument suggests that the goal of the National Conference of Mothers was two-pronged: idolizing Kim Jong Un as the father of a great socialist family and using mothers to intensify ideological indoctrination at home to prevent young people from ideologically defecting from the regime. The expert essentially argues that the conference had nothing to do with the succession process.
However, ever since Kim Ju Ae began appearing in public, North Korea began idolizing the Kim family under the slogan “protecting the Paekdu Bloodline to the death,” likely as part of efforts to prevent people from being concerned about her social status, which to many North Koreans would be lower than a son.
“Workers’ Party officials recognize Comrade Kim Yo Jong [Kim Jong Un’s sister] as part of the Paekdu Bloodline, but they don’t see her as noble,” the high-ranking source in North Korea told Daily NK. “To resolve this issue, it makes sense for [the daughter] to participate in revolutionary history with the Supreme Leader from the time she’s young.”
Kim Jong Un takes his daughter to military events to “justify development of nuclear weapons”
Broadly speaking, a major reason Kim Jong Un has been taking his daughter to major military events is to justify his government’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons.
Kim Ju Ae first appeared in North Korean media at the launch of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile in November of last year. At the time, state-run media outlets ran several photos of the father and daughter walking hand-in-hand with the missile in the background, commenting that the elder Kim would continue to strengthen the country’s nuclear arsenal – the “powerful sword to protect peace” – in terms of quantity and quality to bring about the “bright smiles and beautiful dreams of future generations.”
Basically, state media aimed to present Kim Jong Un as the leader who developed nuclear weapons for the future generation, while his daughter was to be seen as a symbol of that future generation.
In lectures conducted for officials within the Workers’ Party of Korea, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Social Security, and other major agencies after North Korea’s successful launch of a military spy satellite on Nov. 21, speakers focused on praising the greatness of Kim Jong Un for “making North Korea a space power through his excellent leadership.” Notably, no mention was made of Kim Ju Ae during these lectures.
Kim Jong Un with his wife and daughter in a photo published by state media on November 19, 2022. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
“The content of recent political workshops for officials continues to focus on how nuclear weapons have eliminated the clouds of war and opened the path for the untouchable Juche Revolution to last 100 years, and that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are aimed at creating a future without war,” the high-ranking source told Daily NK.
In short, North Korea’s leadership continues to stress the legitimacy of developing nuclear weapons by calling for continued weapons development to bequeath to future generations a secure nation without war.
As such, North Korea will likely use Kim Ju Ae’s appearances at major military events as a tool to justify its development of nuclear weapons. However, her appearances are likely to focus attention on the country’s succession rather than on criticism of North Korea’s advancement of its nuclear program.
“With more than 85% of Kim Ju Ae’s activities focused on the military, our fundamental perception of North Korea’s advancement of its nuclear weapons and missiles is growing a bit blurred as we see it through the frame of succession,” Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) told Daily NK.
In short, Hong argues that some analysts are focusing on whether Kim Ju Ae will succeed her father rather than analyzing the fundamental reasons why the North Korean leadership is having her appear at test launches related to the country’s nuclear program.
“The North Korean government wants to dilute the provocative threat posed by the advancement of its nuclear weapons by shifting attention to Kim Ju Ae,” KINU’s Hong said. “As the debate over the succession continues, North Korea is likely to use the debate to sow confusion as part of its psychological warfare against South Korea and the United States.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
Seulkee Jang
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynk@uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
15. Korean population expected to plunge to 36 million in 2072
No more Korea?
Korean population expected to plunge to 36 million in 2072
donga.com
Posted December. 15, 2023 08:10,
Updated December. 15, 2023 08:10
Korean population expected to plunge to 36 million in 2072. December. 15, 2023 08:10. by Do-Hyong Kim dodo@donga.com.
As Korea's total population experiences a significant decline, current estimates suggest that it will plummet to 36 million in the next 50 years. Concurrently, the nation grapples with a rapid aging demographic, exacerbated by a persistent low fertility trend. Projections indicate that individuals aged 65 or older will approach nearly half of the population in five decades.
According to the 'Future Population Estimates for 2022-2072' released by Statistics Korea on Thursday, Korea's total population, which was estimated at 51.67 million last year, is anticipated to decrease to 47.11 million in 2050 and further decline to 36.22 million in 2072. The total population in this survey encompasses Koreans and foreigners residing in Korea for more than three months.
The total fertility rate, representing the average number of children a woman is expected to give birth to in her lifetime, declined from 0.78 last year to 0.65 in 2025. It gradually increased but is projected to reach only 1.08 in 2072. Consequently, the country's population structure is rapidly aging, with the proportion of individuals aged 65 or older anticipated to rise from 17.4% last year to 25.3% in 2030, 40.1% in 2050, and 47.7% in 2072. The analysis considered scenarios involving high, low, and medium levels of the population's birth, death, and international movement, with predictions based on the intermediate level. In the pessimistic scenario, characterized by a low-level estimate, the total population is expected to decrease further to 30.17 million in 2072.
한국어
donga.com
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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