Quotes of the Day:

"Do not anticipate trouble, or worry about what may never happen. Keep in the sunlight." 

- Benjamin Franklin

"The greater the ignorance the greater the dogmatism." 

- Sir William Osler

"He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper." 

- Edmund Burke

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29, 2023

2. Ukrainian resistance fighters say Russian officers who hadn't been paid by Moscow sold them key intel on the Black Sea Fleet. Missiles then tore through the headquarters.

3. U.S. Constitution at Center of Military Transfer of Responsibility Ceremony

4. Gen. Mark Milley Warns of Fealty to Dictators, in Exit Speech Aimed at Trump

5. Hollyanne Milley’s Career Presses On as Her Husband’s Wraps Up

6. Gen. Mark Milley to step aside as new Joint Chiefs chair takes command

7. Gen. Milley delivers defense of democracy and swipes at Trump in farewell address

8. As Milley exits, ‘toothaches’ and challenges facing Brown’s first days as Joint Chiefs chair

9. In Poland’s ‘J-Town,’ Soldiers Move Arms to Ukraine as Russian Spies Try to Stop Them

10. The Navy will start randomly testing SEALs and special warfare troops for steroids

11. Beijing’s Increasingly Desperate Attempts to Squelch UN Criticism

12. The Sorry State of America’s Submarine Fleet

13. General Milley and the ‘Wannabe Dictator’ (WSJ OpEd)

14. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 29, 2023

15. Announcing 12th Annual SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium

16. Lessons from Ukraine: U.S. Army using conflict in Europe to prepare soldiers for the next war

17. Ukraine Situation Report: Russia Has Gained The Most Ground This Year

18. Russia’s Gray Zone Threat after Ukraine

19. Swamped with cybersecurity data, NGA hopes ChatGPT-like tools can help

20. Why Orwell Lives On (Book Review)

21. Marine Raiders complete U.S. Army Reconnaissance course

22. Army taps DRS, Intelsat for pioneering SATCOM service pilot

23. Philosophy of War: 3 Influential Theorists

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29, 2023

Maps/Graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and in the Bakhmut area on September 29.
• The Russian government announced details about the semi-annual conscription cycle set to begin on October 1 in most of Russia, reportedly including the illegally annexed territories in Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and former Wagner Group commander and current Ministry of Defense (MoD) employee Andrey Troshev on September 29 signaling that Putin will likely back the MoD in its apparent competing effort with the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to recruit current and former Wagner personnel.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is likely supporting amendments to a Russian State Duma bill that would expand its tools of digital authoritarianism to surveil users of Russian internet, banking, and telecom companies.
• The apparent self-censorship in the wider Russian information space has likely opened the door for some fringe elements to directly criticize and speculate about senior Russian military commanders without pushback.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 29.
• Russia may be continuing attempts to circumvent sanctions through military-technical cooperation with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member countries.
• Russia is relaxing passport controls on Ukrainian citizens leaving and entering Russia likely in an attempt to simplify the movement of Ukrainian citizens to Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 29, 2023

Sep 29, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29, 2023

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 29, 2023, 8:15pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on September 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and in the Bakhmut area on September 29. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked north of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and near Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) and Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv) on September 28 and 29.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed on September 29 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance east of the railway line south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut) and reported heavy fighting across the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line.[2]

The Russian government announced details about the semi-annual conscription cycle set to begin on October 1 in most of Russia, reportedly including the illegally annexed territories in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Chief of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Rear Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky stated on September 29 that the semi-annual conscription cycle will begin on October 1, except in some regions of Russia’s Far North where conscription will begin on November 1 due to poor weather.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on September 29 stating that the Russian military will conscript 130,000 personnel from October to December 2023, as compared to 147,000 personnel conscripted in the spring conscription cycle according to Tsimlyansky.[4] Tsimlyansky claimed that Russia will not send conscripts to the war in Ukraine and that conscripts will serve for 12 months.[5] Tsimlyansky stated that the fall conscription cycle will take place “in all constituent entities of the Russian Federation,” including in occupied territories in Ukraine according to multiple Russian state media outlets.[6] The Russian laws that illegally incorporated Ukrainian territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts into Russia in October 2022 stated that military conscription in these territories would begin in 2023, but Russian government officials announced the day before the beginning of the spring 2023 conscription cycle that conscription in these territories “would not occur until further notice.”[7]

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and former Wagner Group commander and current Ministry of Defense (MoD) employee Andrey Troshev on September 29 signaling that Putin will likely back the MoD in its apparent competing effort with the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to recruit current and former Wagner personnel. Putin stated that at his last meeting with Troshev (call sign “Sedoy”) the two discussed that Troshev would be involved in the formation of volunteer detachments that perform combat missions primarily in Ukraine.[8] Wagner-affiliated sources claimed that Troshev left Wagner following Wagner’s June 24 rebellion to work for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated Redut private military company (PMC), and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on September 29 that Troshev works for the MoD.[9] Russian sources widely identified the volunteer detachments that Putin tasked Troshev with forming as Redut PMC formations.[10] Putin also stated during his meeting with Troshev that Troshev maintains relationships with his former comrades, further suggesting that the MoD seeks to leverage Troshev’s connections to Wagner.[11] Yevkurov has been overseeing the MoD’s effort to subsume Wagner elements abroad and is likely heavily involved in the MoD’s campaign to recruit Wagner personnel for MoD-affiliated PMCs operating in Ukraine.[12] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 29 that several hundred former Wagner fighters have returned to Ukraine in the past weeks either with regular Russian forces or PMCs.[13]

There are increasing reports that Wagner personnel are operating alongside Rosgvardia and that the State Duma will consider a proposed bill that will allow Rosgvardia to form volunteer formations.[14] Current Wagner Commander Anton Yelizarov (call sign “Lotos”) is reportedly negotiating with Rosgvardia for current Wagner personnel to join volunteer formations under Rosgvardia on terms more favorable to Wagner.[15] A Russian insider source claimed that elements of the Wagner contingent in Belarus do not want to sign contracts with either the MoD or Rosgvardia and instead plan to join Belarusian President Lukashenko’s effort to create a Belarusian-based PMC for Wagner fighters under the command of a Wagner commander with the call sign “Brest.”[16] Putin’s backing of the MoD effort is likely significant for factional dynamics among the Russian military leadership and the wider Russian security apparatus, but it does not portend a significant redeployment of Wagner personnel to Ukraine. The piecemeal deployment of former Wagner personnel to any areas of the frontline is unlikely to generate any significant strategic or even localized effects on the battlefield in Ukraine.[17]

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is likely supporting amendments to a Russian State Duma bill that would expand its tools of digital authoritarianism to surveil users of Russian internet, banking, and telecom companies. Russian outlet Kommersant reported on September 29 that the bill would allow Russian law enforcement agencies to remotely access, edit, and delete information in Russian private businesses’ databases.[18] The Russian State Duma is reportedly proposing these amendments to protect the personal data of Russian judges, FSB employees, and police from data leaks of personal information.[19] Kommersant reported that the Russian Big Data Association – which includes Russian internet giant Yandex, Russian telecommunications companies, and banks – opposed the amendments and claimed that such access could lead to new data leaks.[20] The FSB’s efforts to gain control over large companies’ databases are likely part of an attempt to strengthen surveillance measures over the Russian populace and populations in occupied Ukraine. The FSB also intends to use potential new access to databases to mask its operations more easily. The FSB’s potential new access to private companies’ databases may affect information security in other countries that use services provided by the Russian Big Data Association. In August, the Kremlin attempted to force Yandex into supplying international user data to the FSB.[21]

The apparent self-censorship in the wider Russian information space has likely opened the door for some fringe elements to directly criticize and speculate about senior Russian military commanders without pushback. A fringe Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces recently claimed that Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov removed VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky as deputy commander in Ukraine, and no Russian sources have offered claims consistent with this one until recently.[22] ISW has no independent way of verifying the channels’ claims and speculations and is by no means ready to assess that Teplinsky’s role has changed, but the emergence and spread of such claims, though currently limited, in the Russian information space is notable amid this unusual Russian informational environment.

The response of the wider Russian information space to fringe claims about Teplinsky’s role in the war in Ukraine may portend an inflection point in discussions about the Russian military command. A Russian insider source who publishes monthly lists purportedly of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s so-called “war cabinet” notably excluded Teplinsky from their September list.[23] The fringe Russian milblogger complained that Teplinsky did not appear on this list for the first time since being added in April 2023.[24] The exclusion of Teplinsky from the “war cabinet” list is consistent with the fringe Russian milblogger’s September 22 claim that Gerasimov removed Teplinsky from his duties as deputy commander in Ukraine.[25] ISW has observed that this insider source is one of several whose information is often a harbinger of larger conversations in the wider Russian information space, specifically about changes and dynamics within the Russian leadership. ISW is not assessing at this time that the Russian military command has removed Teplinsky from some of his duties. These claims may prompt a wider discussion in the Russian information space about changes in command and factional dynamics among the Russian leadership that has been increasingly quiet since Wagner‘s June 24 rebellion. If the wider Russian information space continues to ignore these fringe conversations about Teplinsky, however, this may further suggest that Russian sources are engaging in self-censorship--or, alternatively, that the claims are so nonsensical as to require no response.

A Russian insider source speculated about Gerasimov’s intent for Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine, possibly in an attempt to renew animosity toward Gerasimov. A Russian insider source claimed on September 4 that Gerasimov wants to conserve Russian forces for the defense of Melitopol and Berdyansk, possibly at the expense of defending Tokmak.[26] Social media sources circulated this rumor on September 27 and 28 after which the Russian insider source claimed that Gerasimov is also willing to withdraw forces from Bakhmut and prefers to defend Melitopol to prevent Ukrainian forces from bringing artillery closer to Crimea.[27] The claim that Gerasimov intends to withdraw Russian forces to Melitopol to strengthen Russian defenses there is far outside of Gerasimov’s pattern of observed behavior.[28] ISW has no evidence to confirm the insider source’s claims, however. If these claims are false, it could indicate that there is a concerted effort in the Russian information space to discredit Gerasimov, possibly in tandem with protecting Teplinsky.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and in the Bakhmut area on September 29.
• The Russian government announced details about the semi-annual conscription cycle set to begin on October 1 in most of Russia, reportedly including the illegally annexed territories in Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and former Wagner Group commander and current Ministry of Defense (MoD) employee Andrey Troshev on September 29 signaling that Putin will likely back the MoD in its apparent competing effort with the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to recruit current and former Wagner personnel.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is likely supporting amendments to a Russian State Duma bill that would expand its tools of digital authoritarianism to surveil users of Russian internet, banking, and telecom companies.
• The apparent self-censorship in the wider Russian information space has likely opened the door for some fringe elements to directly criticize and speculate about senior Russian military commanders without pushback.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 29.
• Russia may be continuing attempts to circumvent sanctions through military-technical cooperation with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member countries.
• Russia is relaxing passport controls on Ukrainian citizens leaving and entering Russia likely in an attempt to simplify the movement of Ukrainian citizens to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not make confirmed gains on September 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (12km south of Kreminna), and that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive actions in the Kupyansk direction.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces expanded control over unspecified positions near Torske (12km west of Kreminna), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[30]

Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in near rear areas in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on September 28 shows Russian forces striking a bridge across the Oskil River south of Kupyansk.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have destroyed at least four bridges across the Oskil River in Kupyansk and south of the settlement in recent days.[32] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have established pontoon crossings near damaged bridges.[33]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 29 that Russian forces repelled 12 Ukrainian counterattacks near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and in the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna) between September 24 and 29.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut area on September 29 and reportedly recently advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a height near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) on an unspecified date.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting continues near Klishchiivka, Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[36] The milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Kurdyumivka and unsuccessfully tried to cross the railway line bisecting the settlement.[37] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces briefly crossed the rail line near Klishchiivka on September 28 before Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces west of the railway line.[38]

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks in the Bakhmut area on September 29 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Klishchiivka.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Andriivka, Klishchiivka, and Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut).[40] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces have regrouped near Klishchiivka and plan to recapture the settlement, but these Russian forces likely currently lack the combat capabilities necessary to do so.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian 88th Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) replaced the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR Army Corps) during a rotation in the Bakhmut area.[42] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov and other Russian sources claimed that the “Shustroy” detachment of Akhmat Spetsnaz operates with the 4th Brigade (2nd LNR Army Corps) and 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) on the outskirts of Klishchiivka.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations but did not advance on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks south of Avdiivka and Tonenke (7km northwest of Avdiivka) and near Nevelske (directly west of Donetsk City), Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[44] Russian sources claimed on September 28 that unspecified elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) continue to fight in the Marinka area.[45]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on September 29. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked north of Zavitne Bazhannya (12km south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that from September 24 to September 29 Ukrainian forces conducted four unsuccessful attacks near Pryyutne.[47]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and reportedly advanced on September 29. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces successfully counterattacked north of Pryyutne and achieved unspecified successes.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked west of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[49]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance on September 29. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 28 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked north of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[50] Russian sources claimed on September 28 and 29 that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian defenses near Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv) but did not specify an outcome.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 29 that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations towards Novoprokopivka and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[52] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted eight unsuccessful attacks near Robotyne and Verbove from September 24 to September 29.[53]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance on September 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne, Verbove, and Chervone (9km east of Hulyaipole).[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked on the western outskirts of Robotyne but did not specify an outcome.[55]

Russian air defenses reportedly shot down a Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft near Tokmak on September 29, although the situation remains unclear.[56] Ukrainian and Western media reported the Russian fratricide incident, but Russian sources have yet to acknowledge or deny the incident.[57] The reported footage of the event is unclear, but this incident, if true, would not be shocking as both Ukrainian and Russian forces use Soviet-era aircraft, making accidents through misidentification more likely in highly congested and contested airspace.[58] This possible Russian fratricide incident does not necessarily indicate a systemic problem with Russian air defenses.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia may be continuing attempts to circumvent sanctions through military-technical cooperation with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member countries. Delegations from the defense ministries of Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan arrived in Tula Oblast to discuss military and military-technical cooperation on September 29.[59] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that CIS defense ministers also established a military research organization and a joint humanitarian demining unit.[60]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russia is relaxing passport controls on Ukrainian citizens leaving and entering Russia likely in an attempt to simplify the movement of Ukrainian citizens to Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on September 29 that would allow Ukrainian citizens to enter or leave Russia without a Russian visa and with a valid or expired internal or foreign passport.[61] The new requirements retroactively came into force as of January 1, 2023, when the visa-free regime between Russian and Ukrainian citizens from 1997 expired.[62]

Russian occupation administration officials continue to forcibly deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration Ministry of Labor and Social Policy claimed on September 28 that Russian senator for occupied Kherson Oblast Konstantin Basyuk and Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo organized a “tourist trip” for 20 children and an unspecified number of adults from occupied Kherson Oblast to Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai, for an unspecified length of time.[63] Former Advisor to Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Rodion Miroshnik claimed on September 28 that 20 children and 17 mothers from front line areas of occupied Donetsk Oblast arrived at the Klyazma sanitorium in Moscow Oblast for a rehabilitation program that the “Helping Our Own” Foundation organizes.[64] Miroshnik claimed that the ”Helping Our Own” foundation has sent 150 people from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to sanitariums in Russia in the past six months.[65] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov posted footage on September 29 purportedly showing 20 children from occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts receiving Russian passports at the Victory Museum in Moscow.[66]

The Russian government may be uninterested in funding large reconstruction projects across occupied Ukraine. Russian Minister of Construction, Housing, and Communal Services Irek Fayzullin stated on September 29 that the Russian government may not rebuild all cities destroyed in fighting in occupied Ukraine, citing the lack of a population in some destroyed cities.[67] Fayzullin also claimed that there is a shortage of funds for restoring occupied territories.[68] ISW has frequently observed reports of the Kremlin shifting the financial responsibilities of infrastructure restoration in occupied Ukraine to Russian federal subjects.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko appointed Colonel Alexander Bykov as First Deputy Commander of the Internal Troops of the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) on September 28.[70] Bykov replaced Major General Igor Burmistrov in the position after Burmistrov entered reserve duty due to his age.[71]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Ukrainian resistance fighters say Russian officers who hadn't been paid by Moscow sold them key intel on the Black Sea Fleet. Missiles then tore through the headquarters.

Ukrainian resistance fighters say Russian officers who hadn't been paid by Moscow sold them key intel on the Black Sea Fleet. Missiles then tore through the headquarters.

Business Insider · by Jake Epstein

A satellite image of smoke billowing from a Russian Black Sea Navy HQ after a missile strike in Sevastopol, Crimea, on Friday.PLANET LABS PBC/Handout via REUTERS

• Russian officers leaked sensitive intel on the Black Sea Fleet to Ukrainian partisans, per Ukrainian media.
• A resistance group told the Kyiv Post the officers hadn't received salary payments from Moscow.
• Ukraine later targeted the Black Sea Fleet's headquarters in a huge missile strike last week.

After missing their anticipated salary payments, Russian officers leaked sensitive information about Moscow's Black Sea Fleet to a Ukrainian partisan movement, Ukrainian media reported, revealing the intelligence later paved the way for a devastating missile strike on the fleet's headquarters in the occupied Crimean Peninsula.

Ukrainian resistance fighters told the Kyiv Post in a recent interview that they managed to gather information about high-ranking Russian commanders from officers who were frustrated by Moscow's failure to pay their salaries on time. They said the officers were financially compensated in exchange for the information, which was then passed along to state agencies and reportedly used to plan last week's attack on the Black Sea Fleet's headquarters.

"Delays in payments alone do not force the military armed forces of the Russian Federation to go against the Russian authorities," a spokesperson for the partisan movement of Ukrainians and Tatars in Crimea, known as ATESH, told the Kyiv Post, which disclosed details of the arrangement in a Monday report. "But the financial reward only helps them to decide on cooperation with the ATESH movement, it serves as an additional incentive," the spokesperson added.

Kyiv's forces on Friday bombarded the Black Sea Fleet's headquarters in Sevastopol, on the southwestern edge of Crimea, with several Western-made cruise missiles, with visual evidence indicating they were Storm Shadow missiles. Videos and photographs of the attack showed the moment one of the missiles slammed into the building, as well as the major structural damage that the facility suffered as a result.

The Ukrainian military later said it timed the strike to coincide with a meeting of Russia's naval leadership. On Monday, Kyiv's Special Operations Forces said 34 people were killed — including Adm. Viktor Sokolov, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet — and another 105 were injured. Insider was unable to immediately and independently confirm the claims.

It's not clear how much money was offered to the Russian officers, nor are the identities of these officers known. ATESH said it had access to activities of the Black Sea Fleet's leadership, though. The group said information was passed to state agencies such as the Security Service of Ukraine, known as the SBU, and the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence, known as the HUR — the latter of which told the Kyiv Post it had worked with partisans to help target Russian positions around Crimea.

"The Russian military is well aware of the existence of the partisan movement and throw all their forces and means to suppress it and identify our agents," the ATESH spokesperson said. "The growing resistance among the Crimeans confuses them very much."

A satellite image of smoke billowing from a Russian Black Sea Navy HQ after a missile strike in Sevastopol, Crimea, on Friday.PLANET LABS PBC/Handout via REUTERS

The strike on the Black Sea Fleet's headquarters marked the latest in a string of Ukrainian attacks during the past few weeks targeting high-value Russian positions and assets around Crimea, which Kyiv has vowed to liberate from nearly a decade under Russian occupation.

These incursions include the destruction of multiple S-400 air-defense systems, attacks on an air base and a command post belonging to the Black Sea Fleet, and a massive missile strike on a shipyard in Sevastopol. Western intelligence said the assault damaged two ships while also delivering a long-term blow to Moscow's maritime logistics and operations, and Ukraine's military said dozens of Russian sailors were killed.

"Crimea will definitely be demilitarized and liberated," Mykhailo Podolyak, an advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, wrote on social media after the Friday strikes on the headquarters. "Merchant ships will return to the Black Sea. And the Russian warships will eventually take their rightful place, turning into an iconic underwater museum for divers that will attract tourists from all over the world. To a free Ukrainian Crimea."

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Business Insider · by Jake Epstein

3. U.S. Constitution at Center of Military Transfer of Responsibility Ceremony

Excerpts:

Milley ended almost 44 years in uniform, and Biden thanked the general for his service in war zones around the world. "When it comes to the Constitution, that is and always has been Mark's North Star," the president said. He noted that on the general's challenge coin are the words "We the people" — the first three words of the preamble to the Constitution.

"Those three little words mean so much to every American, but especially to those who stand in the service of our nation," Biden said.

...

The Constitution gives purpose to service. "It is that document that all of us in uniform, swear to protect and defend against all enemies — foreign and domestic," Milley said. "That has been true across generations. And we in uniform are willing to die, to pass that document on to the next generation."

The Constitution makes the American military unique. "We don't take an oath to a country. We don't take an oath to a tribe. We don't take an oath to a religion. We don't take an oath to a king, or queen, or a tyrant or a dictator. And we don't take an oath to a wannabe dictator. We don't take an oath to an individual," he said. "We take an oath to the Constitution, and we take an oath to the idea that is America, and we're willing to die to protect it."

U.S. Constitution at Center of Military Transfer of Responsibility Ceremony

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

Officials emphasized the importance of the U.S. Constitution to the military as Army Gen. Mark A. Milley transferred responsibility as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr.

President Joe Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and the rest of the U.S. national security hierarchy attended the ceremony at Fort Myer, Virginia, today. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the highest-ranking member of the U.S. military and is the principal military advisor to the present, vice president, the secretary of defense and the rest of the national security establishment.

What the Constitution means to the American military was a key point in many of the remarks at the ceremony.

Ceremony Honors

From left: Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., Vice President Kamala Harris, President Joe Biden, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Army Gen. Mark A. Milley stand during a ceremony in which Brown assumed duty from Milley to serve as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Va., Sept. 29, 2023.

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Milley ended almost 44 years in uniform, and Biden thanked the general for his service in war zones around the world. "When it comes to the Constitution, that is and always has been Mark's North Star," the president said. He noted that on the general's challenge coin are the words "We the people" — the first three words of the preamble to the Constitution.

"Those three little words mean so much to every American, but especially to those who stand in the service of our nation," Biden said.

Those words are what make the United States a strong nation, the president said. It is "who we are as a democracy, and how the United States for more than two centuries, has always managed to keep moving forward," he said. "Not fealty to any one person or to a political party. But to the idea of America. An idea unlike any other in human history. That's what we swear an oath to. And that is why generations of young women and men — Americans of every background and creed — have stepped forward to be part of the greatest fighting force in the history of the world."

Biden said he was pleased that the Senate acted to confirm Brown as chairman, but said it is "thoroughly, totally unacceptable that more than 300 other highly qualified military officers are still in limbo."

The hold on these promotions impacts everything from readiness to morale to retention. "Our troops deserve so much better," he said.

Austin said the past few years have been challenging for the military. As chairman, Milley had to take on the pacing challenge of China, confronted the COVID-19 pandemic and helped put together the coalition to help Ukraine fight back after Russia's imperial invasion, the secretary said.

"General Milley has a deep sense of history," Austin said. "And he knows that future generations will judge us harshly if we fail to defend the post-war order built by American leadership. And so, he hasn't just studied history. He has made history."

Swearing In

Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, swears in his successor, Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., during a ceremony at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Va., Sept. 29, 2023.

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Brown thanked the president and secretary for their confidence in him and gave a short preview of his priorities. "As we step out together in today's uncertain security landscape, honing our warfighting skills has primacy in all we do," he said. "We must focus on integrating our military power within our services, across the joint force and with our allies and partners to deter aggression, to fight when called upon and to decisively prevail in war,"

The U.S. military must focus on modernizing and aggressively leading with new concepts and approaches, he said. "Finally, trust is the foundation of our profession," Brown said. "As chairman, every day, I will focus on strengthening the bonds of trust across our force, ensuring the American people know their military and its service members — active, Guard, Reserve and civilian — only as the unwavering defenders of the Constitution, and servants of our nation."

Milley said he was "deeply honored" to serve as a U.S. soldier for almost 44 years and was humbled to be the 20th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The Joint Force … is the most lethal and capable military in the world, and our enemies know it," he said. "We are currently standing watch on freedom's frontier with a quarter of a million troops deployed in 150 countries."

During his four-year tenure, U.S. forces have participated in countless operations, exercises and training events around the world. "We've destroyed [the Islamic State] and served justice to [Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-] Baghdadi," he said. "We supported Ukraine in their fight for freedom against [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's war of aggression and strengthened the NATO alliance. We maintain stability in Asia. We fought terrorists in Africa and the Middle East. We defended the homeland, provided support for countless disasters and protected the American people during COVID."

Milley particularly noted that more than 800,000 U.S. service members served in Afghanistan. "To each of you, be proud that you protected this country for 20 consecutive years at great cost, with 2,326 killed in action, and 20,713 of us wounded alongside your brave colleagues from CIA and FBI and Department of State and USAID and many others from our government and our allies and partners," he said. "Hold your head high: You served. You did what your country asked. And each of you served with honor, courage, skill and dignity and never forget that."

That kind of service is about the American Republic, he said, and "the ideas and the values that make up this great experiment in liberty. Those values and ideas are contained within the Constitution of the United States of America, which is the moral North Star for all of us who have the privilege of wearing the cloth of our nation."

1:57:56

The Constitution gives purpose to service. "It is that document that all of us in uniform, swear to protect and defend against all enemies — foreign and domestic," Milley said. "That has been true across generations. And we in uniform are willing to die, to pass that document on to the next generation."

The Constitution makes the American military unique. "We don't take an oath to a country. We don't take an oath to a tribe. We don't take an oath to a religion. We don't take an oath to a king, or queen, or a tyrant or a dictator. And we don't take an oath to a wannabe dictator. We don't take an oath to an individual," he said. "We take an oath to the Constitution, and we take an oath to the idea that is America, and we're willing to die to protect it."

Austin thanked Milley for his service and spoke to the joint force. "Every day America is counting on you," he said. "We're counting on you to deter aggression wherever we can, to stand ready to fight and to win wherever we must, and to work with our partners for a more secure and peaceful world. And to defend the Republic that we love. The watch is changing, but the mission goes on."

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

4. Gen. Mark Milley Warns of Fealty to Dictators, in Exit Speech Aimed at Trump

Gen. Mark Milley Warns of Fealty to Dictators, in Exit Speech Aimed at Trump

Former president has criticized outgoing Joint Chiefs chairman, suggesting he should be executed for treason

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/gen-mark-milley-warns-of-fealty-to-dictators-in-exit-speech-aimed-at-trump-3d693f15?utm

By Gordon Lubold

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Sept. 29, 2023 2:34 pm ET

Army Gen. Mark Milley greeted his sucessor, Air Force Gen. C.Q. Brown, during a tribute for Milley on Friday in Arlington, Va. PHOTO: SAUL LOEB/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

WASHINGTON—Army Gen. Mark Milley, the Pentagon’s top officer, warned in his retirement speech on Friday that military officers must adhere to the Constitution and not bow to political pressures, in what appeared to be thinly-veiled comments about former President Donald Trump. 

“We don’t take an oath to a country, we don’t take an oath to a tribe, we don’t take an oath to a religion, we don’t take an oath to a king, or a queen, to a tyrant or dictator or wannabe dictator,” Gen. Milley bellowed across a military parade field, without mentioning his former boss by name. “We do not take an oath to an individual, we take an oath to the Constitution, to the idea that is America and we’re willing to die to protect it.” 

Friday’s speech was Milley’s last official ceremony as the Joint Chiefs chairman after years of positioning himself as a defender of democracy—and drawing the ire of critics who have accused him of overstepping the authority of the commander in chief and pursuing what they perceive as a progressive agenda.

Trump and others on the political hard right have repeatedly attacked Milley, pushing up against norms for public behavior for politicians and elected officials in the process. 

In the past week, Trump, on his Truth Social platform, accused Milley of giving the Chinese military a “heads up” about Trump’s thinking about the final days of his presidency and undermining his authority as commander in chief. Trump suggested he should face death for treason. 

Gen. Milley was honored by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, President Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris and others. PHOTO: EVELYN HOCKSTEIN/REUTERS

Milley has said his calls to his counterpart in Beijing were meant to reassure the Chinese during the political upheaval in Washington as Trump contested the 2020 election and was sanctioned by both the Pentagon leadership, Defense Secretary Mark Esper and other administration officials. 

Also earlier this week, Rep. Paul Gosar (R., Ariz.), a longtime critic, wrote in a newsletter: “In a better society, quislings like the strange sodomy-promoting General Milley would be hung.”

Milley’s critics have attempted to cast him as the face of the so-called woke military, saying he has deviated from military norms to advocate for racial justice, climate change and rights of the LGBTQ community while bungling the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Milley has vehemently defended himself on those counts.

Trump had picked Milley to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs in a surprise move at the time, admiring his gruff, no-nonsense manner and candor. But Trump later turned on Milley after he decided the general didn’t fall into line with him on a number of key issues. 

Milley, who served under both Trump and President Biden, was sometimes referred to as the “crisis Chairman” for the number of challenges presented to him while in office. He served during the unrest in Washington, D.C. following the murder of George Floyd. Milley appeared with Trump for a photo session near the White House after law enforcement and National Guardsmen forcibly cleared the area of peaceful protesters—and then later apologized for having been there.

He was also chairman during the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol by a mob of Trump supporters, a global pandemic as well as the disastrous withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan following 20 years of war.

Milley, a proud Bostonian and son of a Navy corpsman who fought in World War II, is known for his loquaciousness and penchant for invoking military history to make a point, and served a full, four-year term ending Friday. 

“This is the last time you’ll hear from me in uniform, which in itself may be cause for applause,” Milley joked. 

He is being succeeded by Air Force Gen. C.Q. Brown, only the second Black officer to serve in that role. In a nearly two-hour ceremony Friday at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall in Arlington that included a 21-gun salute, a review of troops and the typical pomp and circumstance of a senior officer’s retirement, Biden and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin both lauded Milley to an audience on an outdoor parade field. 

Biden and Austin both told stories of Milley in combat in Iraq, noting that during combat tours traveling on Route Irish, the name troops gave to one of the most dangerous roads for troops in Baghdad during the war, Milley’s convoys were blown up at least five times as he went to visit troops. 

“That’s leadership, that’s patriotism, that’s strength, that’s Mark Milley,” Biden said. 

Write to Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the September 30, 2023, print edition as 'As He Exits, Milley Says Officers Must Adhere to the Constitution'.

5. Hollyanne Milley’s Career Presses On as Her Husband’s Wraps Up

Hollyanne Milley’s Career Presses On as Her Husband’s Wraps Up

By Andrew Trunsky

Reporting from Arlington, Va., and Chevy Chase, Md.

Sept. 27, 2023

The New York Times · by Andrew Trunsky · September 27, 2023

A nurse of nearly four decades and the wife of the retiring chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mrs. Milley’s commitment to her work has paralleled that of Gen. Mark A. Milley during his dramatic tenure.

Hollyanne Milley, a nurse, plans to return to the field as a Red Cross disaster volunteer after her husband, Gen. Mark A. Milley, retires. Credit...Shuran Huang for The New York Times

Sept. 27, 2023

On an unseasonably warm night in February, dinner guests at Gen. Mark A. Milley’s Virginia home were wondering, a bit nervously, what could possibly be going on.

General Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been called away once, twice, three times, retreating upstairs to a secure room to consult with other top military brass. His wife, Hollyanne, was also missing.

A Chinese spy balloon had been detected over the Western United States. Soon, President Biden was on the line with General Milley, his highest-ranking military official, unbeknown to the guests downstairs. And Mrs. Milley, a nurse of nearly four decades, was busy making calls from another room upstairs, oblivious to the drama unfolding next door.

“I was on the phone with patients,” Mrs. Milley recalled about the evening, “so I couldn’t come down.”

That parallel commitment to their work has persisted through the chairman’s dramatic four-year term, set to end on Saturday, during which the Milleys have navigated a global pandemic, the chaotic withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and repeated attacks from former President Donald J. Trump. Without saying so, the couple, interviewed at their dining room table in Arlington, leave the impression that the term is ending not a moment too soon.

Mrs. Milley, 58, has worked almost everywhere her husband has been stationed, although she did not accompany him on deployments. A list of more than 20 stops and deployments is enshrined in their home with a stack of placards nearly as tall as the door it is next to. She is one of just a few spouses of a Joint Chiefs chairman to have maintained an accomplished career of her own. And as the chairman prepares to retire, Mrs. Milley has no intention of slowing down, with plans to return to the field as a Red Cross disaster volunteer.

A nurse of nearly four decades, Mrs. Milley has practiced nearly everywhere she has lived with her husband.Credit...Shuran Huang for The New York Times

“Her saying to me is, ‘You’ve been deploying all our life,’” General Milley said. “‘Now you’re going to be staying home and I’m deploying.’”

“I have the skills, and our children are grown, and I have the time,” Mrs. Milley added.

Mrs. Milley carries a C.P.R. mask wherever she goes, and has jumped into action at more than one official event. Her most famous impromptu rescue came on Veterans Day in 2020, at the Tomb of the Unknowns in Arlington National Cemetery.

“I saw this gentleman, he just looked weak walking up” to the memorial, Mrs. Milley said. In the seconds she took her eyes off him, he fell to the ground, unresponsive.

She quickly began chest compressions, possibly saving his life, minutes before Mr. Trump and Vice President Mike Pence arrived.

“She absolutely cringes at the mere thought of having to speak publicly,” said Rosemary Williams, a former official in the Department of Veterans Affairs and a close friend of the couple. “This changes when there’s someone in front of her who is ill or injured. Suddenly, she’s out front, she’s elbowing people aside, she’s giving orders.”

“She never came alone,” said the wife of one wounded veteran who has spent much time with Mrs. Milley. “She came with cookies.”Credit...Shuran Huang for The New York Times

Mrs. Milley is known for handing out homemade cookies to military families she meets while traveling overseas with her husband. But the reality of their past four years in Washington has often been more burdensome, and some people close to Mrs. Milley say the experience has been very hard on her at times.

June 1, 2020, may have been the lowest point of General Milley’s tenure. Wearing military fatigues, he marched behind Mr. Trump and his advisers from the White House across nearby Lafayette Square to stage a photo in front of St. John’s Church, after Park Police used tear gas to clear Black Lives Matter protesters in the park.

General Milley realized too late that he had helped create a perception that the military had endorsed Mr. Trump’s stunt, he later said.

“He talked a lot about it,” Mrs. Milley said. “It was difficult personally. It was difficult to watch the media unfold, and how it affected our children, our extended family.”

General Milley drafted a resignation letter a week later, telling Mr. Trump that he was doing “irreparable harm” and “ruining the international order,” but he was counseled to stay on at the Pentagon. He apologized in a video soon afterward, saying that “I should not have been there” and calling the incident “a mistake that I have learned from.”

Mrs. Milley knew he had drafted the letter, but she said she did not read it and would have been “behind whatever decision he made.”

General Milley being sworn in on Sept. 30, 2019. His four-year term has included a pandemic, the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and repeated attacks from former President Donald J. Trump.Credit...Anna Moneymaker/The New York Times

“I think he went through the pros and cons; I think he fell back on his beliefs,” she said.

“I’m glad he did not resign,” she added.

The tumult of that time was not unusual for the couple. Relocation has been a constant throughout Mrs. Milley’s career, but she believes living in different places has made her a stronger nurse. While at Fort Polk in Louisiana, she learned how to administer antivenin after a snakebite. At Fort Drum, a few miles south of the Canadian border in New York, she mastered cold-weather injuries, a threat she had not encountered growing up in Atlanta.

The Milleys have lived in more than 20 places around the world during their careers.Credit...Shuran Huang for The New York Times

As her husband rose in rank, she devoted more time to ensuring that families of deceased service members had the resources to recover: food, child care, a robust support network. As her influence rose, Mrs. Milley began lobbying on behalf of military families to address issues both local and systemic.

“That’s how we get through day to day sometimes,” Mrs. Milley said. “I think of these families who are so frustrated, sometimes they are thinking of getting out. If we can listen to those personal challenges, that plays into retention.”

Mrs. Milley is still active in groups that assist wounded veterans and their families. And she has close ties to many around the country.

Capt. Luis Avila, who was injured by an explosion in 2011, sang at General Milley’s swearing in, and plans to do so again at his retirement ceremony.Credit...Shuran Huang for The New York Times

“She’s the first lady of our American military, and yet you would think she’s just a friend,” said Bonnie Carroll, the founder of the nonprofit Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors.

One such case is Capt. Luis Avila, who spent 40 days in a coma and was left almost fully paralyzed after his vehicle hit an explosive device in Afghanistan in 2011. He sang “God Bless America” at General Milley’s swearing-in, and is set to sing the national anthem at his retirement ceremony. His wife, Claudia, calls Mrs. Milley a “mentor” and an “angel” for her humility in advocating on behalf of families like hers.

“She never told nobody who she was,” Ms. Avila said about Mrs. Milley’s visits to Walter Reed, the military medical center. “You always used to be by yourself. But she never came alone. She came with cookies.”

Mrs. Milley credits her mother, Margaret, who earned her own nursing degree after being treated for breast cancer in her 30s, with inspiring her to become a nurse. When Margaret was diagnosed, a 15-year-old Hollyanne Haas became her mother’s primary caregiver and helped raise her younger sister. Her mother’s cancer recurred at 49, and she died a year later.

Hollyanne met Mark in Key West, Fla., four decades ago and they married two years later, in 1985. The couple have a son and a daughter and three grandchildren. As this stage of their lives draws to a close, their regrets include not getting out enough around Washington and not staying as close as they would like with many of the friends they have met throughout their careers.

The Milleys’ parallel commitment to their work has persisted through the chairman’s four-year term, set to end on Saturday.Credit...Stefani Reynolds for The New York Times

“I do regret we didn’t have more time as a family with all those deployments,” Mrs. Milley said. “But we will make up for that in 45 days.”

Asked if she was keeping a countdown until her husband’s retirement, she laughed and turned toward him.

“He keeps the countdown,” she said.

The New York Times · by Andrew Trunsky · September 27, 2023

6. Gen. Mark Milley to step aside as new Joint Chiefs chair takes command

Gen. Mark Milley to step aside as new Joint Chiefs chair takes command

The outspoken general, who is retiring over than 40 years in the military, makes way for Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr.

By Dan Rosenzweig-Ziff

Updated September 29, 2023 at 4:00 p.m. EDT|Published September 29, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Dan Rosenzweig-Ziff · September 29, 2023

Gen. Mark Milley, the Joint Chiefs chairman who clashed with President Donald Trump but found new footing under President Biden, will step aside Friday as his successor, Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., takes over the military’s top post.

President Biden is scheduled to participate in the event at Joint Base Meyer-Henderson Hall in Virginia alongside other administration and Defense Department officials.

Milley’s sometimes tumultuous four-year tenure caps a career that spanned over 43 years. His was one of the most consequential and polarizing tenures of any senior military leader in recent memory.

He was atop the Pentagon during the Trump administration’s chaotic final months, the Biden administration’s frantic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the ongoing effort to aid Ukraine as Russia’s full-scale invasion draws closer to the two-year mark.

To his frustrated critics, Milley frequently voiced his opinion on hot-button issues, notably defending a policy, implemented after the U.S. Capitol riot, that required military personnel to study domestic extremism. In one viral moment stemming from Republican attacks, he told members of Congress, “I want to understand White rage, and I’m White.”

Supporters have lauded Milley for standing up to what they viewed as Trump’s dangerous ambitions.

Following the police killing of George Floyd in 2020, when Trump called for clearing demonstrators out of Lafayette Square near the White House, Milley initially walked alongside the president and other top administration officials as they marched to a church for a photo opportunity. The general peeled off from the procession and later issued a public apology, calling his being there a “mistake.”

“My presence in that moment, and in that environment, created the perception of the military involved in domestic politics,” Milley said at the time.

Brown’s nomination to the chairman’s job was approved by the Senate last week amid an ongoing hold on about 300 other senior officer promotions by Republican Sen. Tommy Tuberville of Alabama.

Tuberville has imposed the blockade in a bid to force the Biden administration to rescind its abortion policy, which reimburses travel expenses incurred by service members unable to obtain the procedure in the state where they are assigned.

Brown has served for the past three years as the top officer in the Air Force. He previously held positions overseeing operations in the Pacific, Europe and the Middle East.

When his nomination was announced in the spring, administration officials highlighted his experience helping to conceive and lead the air campaign against the Islamic State group, and his deep expertise on the challenges that China poses. As a member of the Joint Staff, he also has been involved in the Pentagon’s effort to arm, train and advise the Ukrainian military.

Brown will become the second African American, after Gen. Colin Powell, to lead the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dan Lamothe contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Dan Rosenzweig-Ziff · September 29, 2023

7. Gen. Milley delivers defense of democracy and swipes at Trump in farewell address

Excerpt:

“We don’t take an oath to a king or a queen or to a tyrant or a dictator. And we don’t take an oath to a wannabe dictator,” he said. “We don’t take an oath to an individual. We take an oath to the Constitution, and we take an oath to the idea that is America, and we’re willing to die to protect it.”

Gen. Milley delivers defense of democracy and swipes at Trump in farewell address

The Washington Post · by Tara Copp and Lolita C. Baldor | AP · September 29, 2023

JOINT BASE MYER-HENDERSON HALL, Va. — Army Gen. Mark Milley delivered a full-throated defense of democracy and not-so-subtle swipes at former President Donald Trump during a packed ceremony on Friday as he closed out his four, often tumultuous years as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Under cloudy skies at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Milley never mentioned the former president by name. But he practically shouted on two different occasions that the U.S. military swears to protect the Constitution “against ALL enemies, foreign AND domestic.”

“We don’t take an oath to a king or a queen or to a tyrant or a dictator. And we don’t take an oath to a wannabe dictator,” he said. “We don’t take an oath to an individual. We take an oath to the Constitution, and we take an oath to the idea that is America, and we’re willing to die to protect it.”

Milley is retiring after more than four decades of military service, including multiple combat deployments and two often turbulent years as Joint Chiefs chairman under Trump. And it was those years, and the battles he fought against Trump, that formed much of the underpinning of his farewell address and also were sprinkled throughout other speeches in the ceremony.

As chairman, Milley pushed back against a host of Trump’s plans, including demands to pull all troops out of Iraq and Syria and his desire to put active-duty troops on Washington’s streets to counter racial protests. Several books have described Milley’s deep concerns about Trump’s fitness as commander in chief and his worries that Trump would try to use the military to help block President Joe Biden’s election.

Just a week ago, Trump railed against Milley in a post on Truth Social, condemning him as a treasonous, “Woke train wreck” whose actions have been “so egregious that, in times gone by, the punishment would have been DEATH!” The post, which some interpreted as a threat, has prompted Milley to ensure his family has adequate protection.

But seemingly in response, Milley said, his voice booming, the military will protect the Constitution, no matter the personal price, and “we are not easily intimidated.”

Biden, who spoke at the ceremony, continued the democracy theme, praising Milley’s staunch defense of the Constitution, which “has always been Mark’s North Star.” And he said the general has been a steady hand guiding the military during one of the most complex national security environments.

The farewell tribute on the base just outside Washington was both rousing and somber, with marching bands, troop salutes and speeches.

Milley’s four-year term as chairman ends at midnight Saturday, and Air Force Gen. CQ Brown takes over Sunday. Milley is retiring after nearly 44 years of service.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin recalled Milley as a battle buddy, noting with a grin that he was always “eager to get into the fight. And I’ve seen that firsthand over our long history of working together, including one time when he got me blown up. Literally.”

When Austin was commanding the 10th Mountain Division during the Iraq War he visited Milley, one of his brigade commanders, who suggested they go to the hospital to see a wounded soldier.

“So we took Route Irish in Baghdad, which was known as the most dangerous road in the world. And we promptly got hit by an IED,” Austin told the crowd. “Afterwards, I asked, ‘Hey general, has this happened to you before?’ And Mark said, ‘Oh yes sir — I’ve been blown up about five times now.’”

The crowd of about 1,800 included past and current U.S. and international dignitaries and military leaders, families, friends, troops, veterans, wounded warriors and Gold Star families who lost loved ones in the wars.

Milley’s fellow hockey teammates from Princeton — where he got his military commission — were easy to spot, wearing the bright orange and black jackets they got at their 25th reunion. Many of them attended a reception Thursday night at Milley’s house, where his wife, Hollyanne, cooked lasagna for 65 people.

They all hollered out when Milley recognized them publicly from the podium, but he jokingly complained about their weak response, adding, “That’s all a result of last night.”

Also present were five female Afghan special forces whom Milley worked to get out of the country as Kabul fell to the Taliban in 2021. Capt. Mahnaz Akbari said they wanted to come to Milley’s retirement to thank him for what he did for their country and for the female troops now in the U.S.

One of the opening performances was a stirring rendition of “God Bless America” by Army Capt. Luis Avila, who was severely injured and lost a leg in a bomb blast in Afghanistan. Milley’s choice of Avila was a tribute to wounded troops but also served as a pointed jab at Trump.

Milley has said Trump made disparaging remarks about Avila, who sang from his wheelchair at a ceremony for Milley in 2019. Milley said Trump asked him at the time, “Why do you bring people like that here? No one wants to see that, the wounded.”

Milley, 65, is a native of Winchester, Massachusetts. He commanded troops at all levels, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. He became Army chief of staff in 2015 and launched several initiatives, including the creation of Security Force Assistance Brigades, which train foreign forces, and the opening of Army Futures Command in Austin, Texas, to pursue new technologies.

___

Baldor reported from Washington.

The Washington Post · by Tara Copp and Lolita C. Baldor | AP · September 29, 2023

8. As Milley exits, ‘toothaches’ and challenges facing Brown’s first days as Joint Chiefs chair

Excerpts:

“His bigger problem is first, Ukraine, because if the funding doesn’t come through…then there’s a huge problem. What do we do? How do we support Ukraine?” Cancian said. And if lawmakers do greenlight additional funding to support Ukraine’s military, Brown will need to advise Biden on ways to continue sending weapons to the Eastern European nation while US stockpiles dwindle, he added.

“Ukraine is going to be a problem really, either way,” Cancian said.

...

“He’s going to have to think about how do you make a meaningful case to Republican skeptics about why continuing aid to Ukraine could turn the battlefield around next year, even if it hasn’t this year,” O’Hanlon told Breaking Defense on Thursday. Part of that messaging, he said, will include ways to make sure Ukraine survives as a country even if it is unable to liberate more land from Russian occupation.

“In other words, what’s the fallback strategy that still keeps Ukraine strong, sovereign and safe,” O’Hanlon said.

...

“The shutdown is just an annoyance,” said Cancian, who noted that although a sizable portion of the DoD civilian workforce will be home, the first two weeks this will largely be a headache for lawyers, the comptroller, and the congressional liaison staff.

“Tuberville…. is like a toothache, you know, it’s not gonna kill you but it just never goes away,” he added in reference to the backlog of appointees awaiting votes on the Senate floor.

As Milley exits, ‘toothaches’ and challenges facing Brown’s first days as Joint Chiefs chair - Breaking Defense

"We don't take an oath to a religion. We don't take an oath to a king, or queen, or tyrant, or dictator. And we don't take an oath to a wannabe dictator," Gen. Mark Milley said today.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · September 29, 2023

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown delivers a speech during the 2021 Air Force Association Air, Space and Cyber Conference in National Harbor, Md. (USAF/Eric Dietrich)

WASHINGTON — Army Gen. Mark Milley formally slid the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairmanship job over to Air Force Gen. CQ Brown today, and with it, a series of headaches he may well be glad to be done with.

Among the challenges facing Brown as soon as he sits down at his new desk: a looming government shutdown in less than two days, a Congress that suddenly seems unable to pass Ukraine support, and a country more partisan about the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs than ever before.

“And as Commander in Chief, I relied on Mark’s counsel, because I know he always gives it to me straight no matter what,” President Joe Biden said during the formal change ceremony on Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall in Virginia.

“Like Gen. Milley, Gen. Brown is a patriot through and through, sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution… [and] I look forward to working even more closely with you, CQ,” Biden later said.

The four-star Army general is retiring after 43 years in service, including a stint as the Army Chief of Staff followed by his time as chairman. He exits with a unique place in history, having served President Donald Trump during the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol and then President Joe Biden during the military’s tumultuous Afghanistan exit and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

He may well be best remembered for his time under Trump, which led him to be reviled first by Democrats who felt he was too obsequious to Trump, and then Republicans who viewed him as undermining the president. Trump himself made it clear he has no love for Milley, saying just days ago that the general committed treason “so egregious that, in times gone by, the punishment would have been DEATH.” (Even in his way out, Milley couldn’t avoid getting dragged into politics, with Biden on Thursday slamming Trump’s comments at a political event.)

Milley seemed to nod towards those events in his remarks today at his formal exit ceremony.

“We don’t take an oath to a country. We don’t take an oath to a tribe. We don’t take an oath to a religion. We don’t take an oath to a king, or queen, or tyrant, or dictator. And, we don’t take an oath to a wannabe dictator: We don’t take an oath to an individual,” Milley said, as Biden and Brown both looked on. “We take an oath to the Constitution and we take an oath to the idea that as [Americans], we’re willing to die to protect it.

As Milley steps into civilian life, Brown is stepping forward and bringing with him almost four decades of military experience including his time as a fighter pilot, commander of the 31st Fighter Wing, Central Command’s deputy commander, head of US Air Forces in the Pacific, and service chief.

Today’s ceremony almost didn’t happen due to Alabama Republican Sen. Tommy Tuberville’s blanket hold on chamber floor votes for senior military appointees. But, last week Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-NY, announced the legislative body would hold individual floor votes on three nominees — Brown, and newly sworn in Army Chief Gen. Randy George and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Eric Smith. Brown received an 83-11 vote in favor of his nomination.

The Air Force four-star general is taking the chairmanship reins with a set of hurdles looming in front of him.

“Gen. Brown is stepping into the chairman’s post at a momentous time,” Sen. Jack Reed, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote in a short statement to Breaking Defense. “He will need to navigate a dangerous global security environment that grows more complex by the day, particularly with regard to China and Russia.”

Challenges And ‘Toothaches’

As Brown steps into the post as the 21st Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy and its decision to focus on the Indo-Pacific region has been in place for years. However, a variety of challenges and question marks still await Brown about Ukraine, a possible government shutdown, and the US Southern border, according to two analysts.

Mark Cancian, a senior advisor with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ International Security Program, spoke with Breaking Defense on Thursday and broke four challenges into two buckets. The most critical bucket, he said: securing funding for both the department and Ukraine.

“His bigger problem is first, Ukraine, because if the funding doesn’t come through…then there’s a huge problem. What do we do? How do we support Ukraine?” Cancian said. And if lawmakers do greenlight additional funding to support Ukraine’s military, Brown will need to advise Biden on ways to continue sending weapons to the Eastern European nation while US stockpiles dwindle, he added.

“Ukraine is going to be a problem really, either way,” Cancian said.

U.S. Army Gen. Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speak with Paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division during a visit to Nowa Deba, Poland, March 4, 2022. (U.S. Army Photo by Master Sgt. Alexander Burnett)

Micheal O’Hanlon, a senior fellow and director of research in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, agreed that Ukraine funding will likely emerge as a top challenge for Brown — and based on Congressional action this week, it will become an intense issue sooner than anticipated. Brown’s biggest role, O’Hanlon said, will likely be messaging why the US should continue to support Kyiv’s resistance to Russia.

“He’s going to have to think about how do you make a meaningful case to Republican skeptics about why continuing aid to Ukraine could turn the battlefield around next year, even if it hasn’t this year,” O’Hanlon told Breaking Defense on Thursday. Part of that messaging, he said, will include ways to make sure Ukraine survives as a country even if it is unable to liberate more land from Russian occupation.

“In other words, what’s the fallback strategy that still keeps Ukraine strong, sovereign and safe,” O’Hanlon said.

Ukraine aside, Cancian said he believes Brown’s second “big” challenge involves the defense budget at a time of inflation and a push by some Republicans to cut government spending. That includes coordinating among the services, who are all working to field a slew of new weapons and technologies to better position the US military to fight in the Indo-Pacific theater, in order to ensure the right balance between fielding costly new capabilities and sustaining legacy ones.

In Cancian’s bucket of less critical items facing the new chairman is the looming government shutdown that could begin on Sunday and Tuberville’s hold on hundreds of DoD nominees.

“The shutdown is just an annoyance,” said Cancian, who noted that although a sizable portion of the DoD civilian workforce will be home, the first two weeks this will largely be a headache for lawyers, the comptroller, and the congressional liaison staff.

“Tuberville…. is like a toothache, you know, it’s not gonna kill you but it just never goes away,” he added in reference to the backlog of appointees awaiting votes on the Senate floor.

From his vantage point, O’Hanlon cited two issues “bubbling and intensifying” that Brown will likely need to address during his tenure — the military’s recruiting problems and the crisis at the US southern border.

On the former, O’Hanlon said at some point senior military leaders and the White House will need to consider the recruiting shortfalls as a “crisis” of the all-volunteer force that may require more incentives or will people start talking about a draft. “There are some people in the Pentagon who are worried very acutely about it, but it hasn’t really risen to a high-level political issue, and it probably should,” he added.

O’Hanlon also cited US southern border security and the opioid problem, as a mushrooming issue for Brown and one ripe for DoD to potentially play a larger role.

“It’s not just Donald Trump, who is throwing ideas out there, that would have sounded crazy 10 or 20 years ago: It’s going to be more and more people,” O’Hanlon said, referring to reports that the former president wanted to launch attacks on drug labs inside Mexico.

“Even though [border options are] not something he should be speaking about publicly…he’s got to have thought through what roles DoD could play in a support capacity and what role DoD should not play because there’s going to be a lot more conversation around this issue.”

9.In Poland’s ‘J-Town,’ Soldiers Move Arms to Ukraine as Russian Spies Try to Stop Them

Excerpts:

The role of J-Town in Ukraine’s war hinges not only on counterespionage operations to fend off potential attacks, but also on delicate diplomacy. Ties between Ukraine and Poland, normally close, were strained last week over a dispute that began over grain shipments but snowballed into weapons deliveries. 

...

The logistics hub at Rzeszów is arguably the linchpin of that support. Though Poland doesn’t provide numbers, officials say most Western support that flows into Ukraine goes through the hub. From there, the deliveries are unloaded, and then depending on the priority, prepared for truck convoys or other ground transport traveling to the border, where Ukrainian authorities take over. 

...

In the city of Rzeszów, less than 10 miles from the airport, there is little visible sign of those espionage concerns. In the cobblestoned main square, someone was operating a small drone equipped with a video camera that swooped above the buildings, filming the city.

But local residents are on alert, according to a Polish official who described how the first Russian spy camera was found with the help of a “completely drunk” man. “In Poland, they are aware of the risks and especially in the south of Poland,” he said. “And in the area of Rzeszów-Jasionka, they are really hyperaware.”

In Poland’s ‘J-Town,’ Soldiers Move Arms to Ukraine as Russian Spies Try to Stop Them

Major logistics hub for war is humming despite espionage and a diplomatic row between Warsaw and Kyiv

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/in-polands-j-town-soldiers-move-arms-to-ukraine-as-russian-spies-try-to-stop-them-1ec71497?mod=hp_lead_pos3

By Sharon WeinbergerFollow

Updated Sept. 30, 2023 12:06 am ET

RZESZÓW, Poland—Polish authorities first got wind of a Russian-organized espionage operation targeting a crucial logistics hub for Ukraine’s war from an unexpected source: an inebriated man stumbling along spotted a suspicious camera pointed at railroad tracks not far from the local airport.

The discovery by the local resident sparked an organized search that led to the discovery of more cameras at rail stations and rail crossings. In March, the country’s security services announced that they had dismantled a spy ring that was planning to derail trains used to transport weapons destined for Ukraine. 

The spy ring, and the effort to stop it, speaks to the critical role of the logistics hub at Rzeszów—or J-Town as many in the Polish and American military now call it. The hub, located in the vicinity of Rzeszów—Jasionka Airport, around 60 miles from the Ukrainian border, is a critical link in a supply chain that moves billions of dollars in weapons through Poland that Western countries have sent to help Ukrainian forces to beat back Russian troops now dug in behind heavily-fortified lines. 

The role of J-Town in Ukraine’s war hinges not only on counterespionage operations to fend off potential attacks, but also on delicate diplomacy. Ties between Ukraine and Poland, normally close, were strained last week over a dispute that began over grain shipments but snowballed into weapons deliveries. 

Poland's Logistics Hub in Rzeszów Is the Gateway for Weapons to Ukraine

The vast majority of western aid flows through Rzeszów; Poland takes it to the border, and then Ukraine sends it to the frontlines.

Roads

Railroads

Warsaw

BELARUS

Łódź

Lublin

POLAND

Lutsk

Rivne

Kraków

Kyiv

Rzeszów

Zhytomyr

UKRAINE

Lviv

Ternopil

SLOVAKIA

Vinnytsya

Ivano-Frankivsk

HUNGARY

Chernivtsi

100 miles

100 km

Source: OpenStreetMap

Emma Brown/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The logistics hub emerged in the space of just 48 hours after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Ukrainians requested a hub that was close to the border, with good infrastructure and transportation connections. Rzeszów fit the bill. 

Soon after, Ukrainian authorities were notifying suppliers to deliver weapons to a warehouse in Rzeszów, a previously sleepy town that had a rail hub and a commercial airport.

When Rzeszów proved difficult for many U.S. military personnel to pronounce, they started calling it J-Town and the name stuck (Rzeszów is pronounced zhesh-oof, with the zh sounding roughly like a J in English). Some in the Polish military have also embraced the J-Town moniker, and use it themselves. 

“It’s fantastic,” said Col. Radosław Sułek, the facility’s commander, a logistics officer with prior experience in Afghanistan. 

 During a visit last week, aid was rolling into J-Town on a steady basis. Standing at the top of an old air-traffic control tower, Sułek pointed to an American C-17 landing at the airport. “I’m pretty happy,” he said as the plane taxied down the runway. “Another job to do.”

A few minutes later, another C-17, having finished its delivery, took off.

Residents of Rzeszów, less than 10 miles from the airport, are on alert despite few outward signs of trouble. PHOTO: JUSTYNA MIELNIKIEWICZ/MAPS FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Spat between neighbors 

The continuing deliveries at the Polish logistics hub, officially known as POLLOGHUB, are evidence that, despite last week’s diplomatic dispute, weapons deliveries from Poland to Ukraine are continuing.

The dispute began after Kyiv filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization against Poland, Slovakia and Hungary for continuing to ban the import of Ukrainian grain. It escalated amid heated comments from political leaders on both sides. Midweek, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said during a TV interview that Poland isn’t “transferring weapons to Ukraine,” which some interpreted as a potential suspension of arms supplies to the war. 

Polish officials quickly clarified that this only referred to purchases for the country’s own armed forces, and Warsaw would, as planned, transfer to Kyiv a batch of howitzers, mine-clearing vehicles, and its regular supplies of ammunition, among other equipment. But the tensions underscored a potential crack in what has been arguably Ukraine’s most reliable alliance in the war against Russia.

People who fled the war in Ukraine were recently boarding a passenger train in Rzeszów bound for the Polish capital, Warsaw. PHOTO: OMAR MARQUES/GETTY IMAGES

“There’s a disappointment that [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky’s words focus now on the financial aspect of our relationship, especially now after the massive amount of support we’ve given,” said Jacek Siewiera, chief of Poland’s National Security Bureau. “But that won’t stop Poland from supporting Ukraine to the end because we want to see Ukraine reclaiming territory, which is also in our national interest.” 

The logistics hub at Rzeszów is arguably the linchpin of that support. Though Poland doesn’t provide numbers, officials say most Western support that flows into Ukraine goes through the hub. From there, the deliveries are unloaded, and then depending on the priority, prepared for truck convoys or other ground transport traveling to the border, where Ukrainian authorities take over. 

Sułek rattles off the list of military equipment his personnel have dealt with, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and artillery. “A huge quantity of ammunition,” he said.

Supplies bound for Ukraine were recently unloaded from a U.S. Army transport plane near Rzeszów. PHOTO: DAREK DELMANOWICZ/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

Most targeted airport in Europe

The logistics hub is unusual in that it coexists in parallel with a civilian airport, while operating separately from it. The flights bringing weapons land on the same runway as commercial aircraft.

“I was there and I’m like, ‘Holy smoke, it is a civilian airport,’ ” said Lt. Gen. Piotr Błazeusz, the deputy chief of the general staff of the Polish armed forces. “

Ryanair still flies from J-Town,” he said, referring to the European discount airline.

The presence of a wartime logistics hub has brought changes—and concerns—to what had been a civilian airport. There are several layers of air defense systems, provided by the U.S., U.K. and Poland. American Patriot batteries are clearly visible from the airport.

“It’s the best protected area in Europe,” said Sułek, noting the air-defense systems, as well as physical protection around the airport.

The protection isn’t just the visible uniformed police and military, but also intelligence and special forces personnel operating quietly in the area.

The airport may be the best protected area in Europe, but it is also among the most targeted, at least for espionage.

U.S. Army Patriot missile launchers at Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport near the border with Ukraine. PHOTO: STRINGER/REUTERS

Since the spy ring was identified earlier this year, Poland has investigated other potential threats, including recent train disruptions linked to unauthorized radio traffic. An outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease in the Rzeszów area killed more than a dozen people, prompting Polish security services to launch an investigation looking at potential intentional contamination of the water, including by Russia.

The Russian Embassy didn’t respond to a request for comment about espionage allegations related to Rzeszów, but officials in Moscow have previously denounced Poland for its role in supporting Ukraine.

In the city of Rzeszów, less than 10 miles from the airport, there is little visible sign of those espionage concerns. In the cobblestoned main square, someone was operating a small drone equipped with a video camera that swooped above the buildings, filming the city.

But local residents are on alert, according to a Polish official who described how the first Russian spy camera was found with the help of a “completely drunk” man. “In Poland, they are aware of the risks and especially in the south of Poland,” he said. “And in the area of Rzeszów-Jasionka, they are really hyperaware.”

Thomas Grove, Karolina Jeznach and Drew Hinshaw contributed to this article.

Write to Sharon Weinberger at sharon.weinberger@wsj.com

10. The Navy will start randomly testing SEALs and special warfare troops for steroids

The Navy will start randomly testing SEALs and special warfare troops for steroids

AP · September 29, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Navy will begin randomly testing its special operations forces for steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs beginning in November, taking a groundbreaking step that military leaders have long resisted.

Rear Adm. Keith Davids, commander of Naval Special Warfare Command, announced the new program Friday in a message to his force, calling it necessary to protect their health and military readiness. The Navy will be the first to begin random testing, but Army Special Operations Command said it will soon follow suit, although no start date has been set.

The Army and Navy have the largest and most well known special operations forces, including the Navy SEALs and Army’s Delta Force, Green Berets and Ranger Regiment. They are often called on to do the military’s most sensitive and dangerous missions. The physical and mental challenges of getting through their selection and training programs and the pressures of the risky missions can lead to some to use performance-enhancing drugs, although officials say the numbers are small.

The use of these drugs has been a somewhat limited but persistent problem across the military, but leaders have balked at increased testing because it is highly specialized, costly and requires contracting with the few labs that do such work. The military services have done occasional tests when they perceive a problem with an individual service member, but they must get special permission from the Pentagon to do routine, random testing.

The Air Force and the Marine Corps special operations commands said they have not yet requested a similar policy change.

According to the Navy command, four units will be randomly selected each month, and 15% of each will be tested. That will amount to as many as 200 sailors monthly, and those testing positive face discipline or removal.

A driving factor in the announcement, which has been in the works for months, was the death of a Navy SEAL candidate early last year.

Kyle Mullen, 24, collapsed and died of acute pneumonia just hours after completing the SEALs’ grueling Hell Week test. A report concluded that Mullen, from Manalapan, New Jersey, died “in the line of duty, not due to his own misconduct.” Although tests found no evidence of performance-enhancing drugs in his system, a report by the Naval Education and Training Command said he was not screened for some steroids because the needed blood and urine samples were not available, and that multiple vials of drugs and syringes were later found in his car.

The NETC’s broader investigation into SEAL training flagged the use of performance-enhancing drugs as a significant problem among those seeking to become elite commandos and recommended far more robust testing.

Investigations in 2011, 2013 and 2018 into suspected steroid use by SEAL candidates led to discipline and requests for enhanced testing. The use of hair follicle testing was denied at least twice by Navy leaders over that time, and random testing for steroids wasn’t authorized by the Defense Department.

Davids requested the policy change to allow the screening, and in January, the Pentagon undersecretary for personnel approved an exemption authorizing random testing within the Naval Special Warfare force. The testing only affects the roughly 9,000 active-duty military personnel and reservists on active-duty orders in the command. Civilians are not included.

The, random force-wide testing initiative, Davids said, is a commitment to the long-term health of every member of the Naval Special Warfare community.

Lt. Col. Mike Burns, spokesman for Army Special Operations Command, said it also has been approved for random testing and is working on developing a program.

The Navy has provided $225,000 to fund the testing contract through the end of this month, and it’s expected to cost about $4.5 million per year for the next two years.

Noting that the drugs are illegal, Davids has told his force that any number above zero is unacceptable, whether during training or downrange when sailors are deployed. He has urged sailors to talk to their teammates and commanders about the drugs and their risks.

“My intent is to ensure every NSW teammate operates at their innate best while preserving the distinguished standards of excellence that define NSW,” he said in his message to the force.

According to the command, personnel will still be allowed to get prescription medication to treat legitimate medical conditions.

Command leaders also stress that there is only anecdotal evidence of performance-enhancing drug use within the ranks.

Between February 2022 and March 2023, the Naval Special Warfare Center conducted more than 2,500 screening tests and detected 74 SEAL or Special Warfare Combat Crewmen with elevated testosterone levels, the command said. It said three candidates ultimately tested positive for performance-enhancing drugs. The testosterone tests are more common but less precise, and additional screening is needed to identify steroid use.

The new random testing will require that sailors provide two urine samples. One will be sent to the Sports Medicine Research and Testing Laboratory, a cutting-edge lab used by international sports to test for doping, and one will go to the Navy Drug Screening Laboratory Great Lakes to check for standard drugs.

If the test result is positive, the sailor will be notified, there will be a preliminary inquiry and if there is no legal reason for the drugs, the sailor will be subject to discipline and removal from the force. A SEAL or SWCC candidate will be removed from training.

Under Navy procedures, all SEALs and SWCC are informed of the substance ban and sign an acknowledgement of the prohibition.

The NETC report released earlier this year suggested that SEAL candidates may have gotten conflicting messages about the use of performance-enhancing drugs. In one case, it noted that during a discussion about the policy with Mullen’s class, an instructor, who was not identified, told sailors that all types of people make it through the course, including “steroid monkeys and skinny strong guys. Don’t use PEDS, it’s cheating, and you don’t need them. And whatever you do, don’t get caught with them in your barracks room.”

The report said that after an “awkward silence” the instructor added, “that was a joke.” It said some candidates interpreted it as an implicit endorsement of using the drugs. And it noted that routine barracks inspections have found the drugs or sailors have admitted their use.

AP · September 29, 2023

11. Beijing’s Increasingly Desperate Attempts to Squelch UN Criticism

Excerpts:

But states do have a choice: to not vote for China. If China failed to secure a majority of the General Assembly’s 193 member states, it would not be elected. That’s the best possible outcome for a serial rights violator that has no business serving on a body whose members are supposed to uphold the highest international human rights standards.

Behind closed doors, officials from all manner of governments – often reluctant to criticize Beijing openly for fear of repercussions – tell us they know Chinese commit egregious and systemic human rights violations, and ask us what they can do. The answer is simple: don’t mark your ballot for a government that has shown nothing but contempt for the human rights of people across China and many abroad.

Beijing’s Increasingly Desperate Attempts to Squelch UN Criticism

UN Member Countries Should Vote Not to Return China to Human Rights Council

hrw.org · by Sophie Richardson China Director SophieHRW SophieHRW · September 29, 2023

Click to expand Image

China's then-Minister for Foreign Affairs Qin Gang delivers a remote statement during the 52nd session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, February 27, 2023. © 2023 Salvatore Di Nolfi/Keystone via AP Photo

The Chinese government appears increasingly anxious to silence critics of its appalling human rights record. At home, it arbitrarily detains or forcibly disappears them; abroad, it harasses them. At the United Nations, it’s seeking anotherterm on the UN’s top human rights body – the Human Rights Council – while telling member states to boycott public events highlighting its litany of human rights violations in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

During the UN General Assembly’s annual high-level session in New York in September, China’s UN mission wrote to each UN member state to “strongly recommend your mission NOT to participate” in a side event on Xinjiang organized by the Atlantic Council, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The plea was ignored, as an audience of hundreds attended to hear details of the Chinese government’s crimes against humanity targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, and possible UN responses.

This week, China’s UN delegation in Geneva wrote to UN members telling them “to refrain from participating … in any way” in an event on the sidelines of the Human Rights Council session focused on the authorities’ suppression of media freedom in Hong Kong. But the event had a sizeable crowd of diplomats, journalists, and others interested in learning about ongoing abuses.

Despite Beijing characterizing these events – basic to the Human Rights Council’s functions – as “blatant violations” of the UN Charter, it is among the governments running in a UN General Assembly election on October 10 for membership in the council. On the surface it seems like it’s just the kind of election Beijing likes: a slate in Asia in which there are four candidates for four seats, denying countries any real choice, with no public discussion about whether it is qualified to serve.

But states do have a choice: to not vote for China. If China failed to secure a majority of the General Assembly’s 193 member states, it would not be elected. That’s the best possible outcome for a serial rights violator that has no business serving on a body whose members are supposed to uphold the highest international human rights standards.

Behind closed doors, officials from all manner of governments – often reluctant to criticize Beijing openly for fear of repercussions – tell us they know Chinese commit egregious and systemic human rights violations, and ask us what they can do. The answer is simple: don’t mark your ballot for a government that has shown nothing but contempt for the human rights of people across China and many abroad.

12. The Sorry State of America’s Submarine Fleet

Excerpts:

One short-term solution is procuring conventionally powered submarines, a step the U.S. hasn’t taken since the middle of the Cold War. In the long run, the U.S. needs nuclear-powered submarines, which can cruise from bases to combat zones and back without refueling. They are larger, enabling a greater weapons payload and, in the future, more unmanned systems. Over a submarine’s life cycle, nuclear power is cheaper than conventional power.

Conventionally powered boats—of smaller size, inferior range and lesser payloads—are easier to build than their nuclear cousins. If made properly, they also are quieter than nuclear boats. Modern battery-powered and diesel-electric subs can be almost silent.

A small nonnuclear fleet of between 12 and 24 boats wouldn’t provide the same combat capacity as even 10 Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, since these boats play a different role. But they are far cheaper, running between $500 million and $1 billion apiece, compared with $4 billion plus for a Virginia. Nonnuclear subs can be used directly in the region as surface and transport ship hunters. Deployed from the Philippines, Japan and South Korea, and potentially sustained from Guam with a larger submarine tender fleet, conventionally powered submarines would lighten the burden of the strained nuclear fleet. By the 2040s, production expansions will have allowed the U.S. to phase out these boats and replace them with nuclear-powered ones.

The U.S. lacks the domestic infrastructure to build conventionally powered boats. But its allies are world leaders in the technology. Japan’s Soryu-class submarine, a Mitsubishi-Kawasaki co-project, has a range of more than 6,000 miles. Japanese yards take about two years to build one of these boats and can start a new one every year. Korea’s KSS-III, a Hanwha-Hyundai product, slightly larger than the Japanese Soryu, can even launch ballistic missiles, broadening its mission profile. Korean yards can produce one ship in three years and typically start a hull every year. Both ships are on the export market.

To improve South Korean-Japanese relations, the U.S. recently conducted a summit that has opened the possibility of trilateral military cooperation. The summit was the fruit of months of diplomacy, primarily by Mr. Emanuel. The Biden administration should explore either a co-production arrangement or outright purchase of batches from each power with the goal of fielding a dozen such attack submarines by 2030.

The Sorry State of America’s Submarine Fleet

To preserve its undersea advantage over China, the Navy should procure subs from Japan and South Korea.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-sorry-state-of-americas-submarine-fleet-japan-korea-alliance-taiwan-invasion-china-c29203bd?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Seth Cropsey

Sept. 29, 2023 5:55 pm ET

The guided-missile submarine USS Florida transits the Suez Canal in Egypt, April 7. PHOTO: U.S. NAVY CENTRAL COMMAND/VIA REUTERS

The U.S. submarine fleet is in a dire state. The U.S. doesn’t have the domestic infrastructure to repair and sustain its existing subs, much less expand the fleet. America needs to get creative to sustain its undersea advantage. The Navy should procure conventionally powered submarines from U.S. allies, namely Japan and South Korea. The moment is ripe, given the leadership of Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, and a potential breakthrough in Japan-South Korea relations.

The U.S. faces a parlous Indo-Pacific position amid a shifting situation in the Taiwan Strait. A decade ago, the People’s Liberation Army was growing larger and more sophisticated but remained incapable of taking Taiwan. Today China has three aircraft carriers—two made domestically, one imported—and is building a fourth, its first true supercarrier. The PLA has a surface force larger than the U.S. Navy’s battle force—that is, the total number of combat ships in the U.S. Navy. It has eight guided-missile cruisers and dozens of destroyers and frigate warships—and its many shipyards aren’t idle. The PLA’s missiles generally out-range American ones even if its sensors are less sophisticated.

Asking if China is “ready” to take Taiwan misses the mark. China no longer lacks any crucial capabilities. China could invade Taiwan tomorrow and win, although its odds of success are between 30% and 40% if the U.S. resists. If the U.S. doesn’t join the fight, Chinese victory would be nearly certain. A below-half probability of victory should counsel caution in Beijing. But these odds are far greater than they were 10 or even five years ago. Rather than whether China is ready for a war, the correct question is: What circumstances might prompt China to wage a war, rather than expand its capabilities?

In the Sino-American military balance, America’s greatest advantage is its submarine fleet. Our 50 nuclear-powered attack submarines are heavily armed with torpedoes and missiles and soon will deploy unmanned underwater vehicles and more-advanced loitering munitions, a flying drone with a warhead that can wait some time before engaging a target. Our four nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines carry 154 cruise missiles each. Critically, China’s greatest weakness is undersea warfare. The PLA is building a fleet of antisubmarine surface-combatant vessels and procuring more maritime patrol aircraft.

China is expanding and improving a seabed sensor network to detect submarines within the First Island Chain. Significant gaps, however, will remain for at least another decade. This explains why the U.S. assumes that American attack submarines will play the greatest offensive role in an Indo-Pacific War, since they could stealthily disrupt a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and destroy the warships and ground-based targets critical to China’s reconnaissance-strike network. That would let heavy but vulnerable U.S. supercarriers and strategic bombers strike targets and avoid a Chinese counterattack.

The U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet, however, is in lamentable shape. Of the total U.S. fleet, about 40% of vessels are in maintenance and repair facilities at any given time. This puts the fleet at roughly 30 deployable boats at best, rather than the 40 to 45 expected at operating level. In addition, the Navy is retiring two submarines a year on average, but building only three every two years, leading to a net annual decline. U.S. production looks unable to reverse this. The issue isn’t yards—although another short-term maintenance yard would ease the stress on larger facilities—but parts. Submarines are extraordinarily complex, requiring components in a lengthy supply chain. It takes years to procure the specific undersea sensors, fire-control systems and other crucial internal parts for each boat.

The problem requires not only more spending but also greater creativity, since the fleet will shrink until the 2030s. As America’s undersea advantage narrows, a Chinese attack becomes more probable. If China can knock out an American yard through cyber means, sabotage or even direct assault, then U.S. backlogs will mushroom, cutting the submarine force to 10 or 20 boats and tilting the balance in China’s favor.

One short-term solution is procuring conventionally powered submarines, a step the U.S. hasn’t taken since the middle of the Cold War. In the long run, the U.S. needs nuclear-powered submarines, which can cruise from bases to combat zones and back without refueling. They are larger, enabling a greater weapons payload and, in the future, more unmanned systems. Over a submarine’s life cycle, nuclear power is cheaper than conventional power.

Conventionally powered boats—of smaller size, inferior range and lesser payloads—are easier to build than their nuclear cousins. If made properly, they also are quieter than nuclear boats. Modern battery-powered and diesel-electric subs can be almost silent.

A small nonnuclear fleet of between 12 and 24 boats wouldn’t provide the same combat capacity as even 10 Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, since these boats play a different role. But they are far cheaper, running between $500 million and $1 billion apiece, compared with $4 billion plus for a Virginia. Nonnuclear subs can be used directly in the region as surface and transport ship hunters. Deployed from the Philippines, Japan and South Korea, and potentially sustained from Guam with a larger submarine tender fleet, conventionally powered submarines would lighten the burden of the strained nuclear fleet. By the 2040s, production expansions will have allowed the U.S. to phase out these boats and replace them with nuclear-powered ones.

The U.S. lacks the domestic infrastructure to build conventionally powered boats. But its allies are world leaders in the technology. Japan’s Soryu-class submarine, a Mitsubishi-Kawasaki co-project, has a range of more than 6,000 miles. Japanese yards take about two years to build one of these boats and can start a new one every year. Korea’s KSS-III, a Hanwha-Hyundai product, slightly larger than the Japanese Soryu, can even launch ballistic missiles, broadening its mission profile. Korean yards can produce one ship in three years and typically start a hull every year. Both ships are on the export market.

To improve South Korean-Japanese relations, the U.S. recently conducted a summit that has opened the possibility of trilateral military cooperation. The summit was the fruit of months of diplomacy, primarily by Mr. Emanuel. The Biden administration should explore either a co-production arrangement or outright purchase of batches from each power with the goal of fielding a dozen such attack submarines by 2030.

The Biden administration has made diplomatic strides toward improving America’s position in the Indo-Pacific but has largely neglected military questions. It has a rare opportunity to shore up the military balance with diplomatic means.

Mr. Cropsey is the president of the Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy and is author of “Mayday” and “Seablindness.”

13. General Milley and the ‘Wannabe Dictator’ (WSJ OpEd)

Conclusion:

We hope that turning down the temperature of politics in the U.S. armed forces is a priority for the new chairman—perhaps behind only the military threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party.

General Milley and the ‘Wannabe Dictator’

The departing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs takes a shot at Donald Trump on the way out.

By The Editorial Board

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Updated Sept. 29, 2023 6:45 pm ET

Outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley inspects the troops during an Armed Forces Farewell Tribute in his honor at Summerall Field at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall on Friday. PHOTO: DREW ANGERER/GETTY IMAGES

Donald Trump says many outrageous things, and among his worst was his suggestion recently that Army Gen. Mark Milley might deserve execution for his handling of the tumultuous days in January 2021. Yet on Friday arrived a sad reminder that Mr. Trump often provokes others into breaking their own institutional norms.

Gen. Milley retired this week after four years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “We are unique among the world’s militaries,” the top military officer said at a retirement ceremony on Friday, noting that service members swear an oath to the Constitution.

“We don’t take an oath to a country. We don’t take an oath to a tribe. We don’t take an oath to a religion. We don’t take an oath to a king, or a queen, or a tyrant or a dictator. And we don’t take an oath to a wannabe dictator.”

Readers will catch the parting shot at Mr. Trump. The media certainly did. And who could blame Gen. Milley for loathing Mr. Trump? Casually floating the idea of harming a U.S. military officer is conduct unworthy of a wannabe Commander in Chief.

Yet it was still dispiriting to hear Gen. Milley’s remarks about a former President, in public, while wearing the uniform of the U.S. Army. Mr. Trump is the front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination. Like it or not, he commands political support in the country. That doubtless includes a large chunk of the enlisted ranks of the United States military services. The end-of-tour catharsis of a swipe at Mr. Trump isn’t worth polarizing the force over politics.

Gen. Milley is right to highlight that U.S. service members swear an oath to the Constitution, not an individual. That fact should give him an enduring confidence that U.S. institutions are durable enough to weather disruptions like Mr. Trump. They held up under duress during his Presidency, and Mr. Trump lost to Joe Biden.

Air Force Gen. C.Q. Brown assumes the top job at one of the more volatile world moments in modern memory. He might calibrate his public remarks to the reality that, in any national security crisis, he will need all Americans to have full trust and confidence in him. Even Donald Trump supporters.

We hope that turning down the temperature of politics in the U.S. armed forces is a priority for the new chairman—perhaps behind only the military threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party.

14. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 29, 2023

Photos/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-september-29-2023

Key Takeaways

1. The Kuomintang (KMT) seeks to lead a joint presidential ballot with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and is unlikely to obtain a compromise deal with the TPP in the coming two weeks.
2. The imported egg scandal shifted the presidential electoral narrative away from cross-strait relations over the past two weeks, and the dominant narrative of the election as a choice between peace and war is likely to reemerge in the next two weeks.
3. The CCP aims to economically integrate the ROC-controlled offshore island of Kinmen with the PRC province of Fujian, which could allow the CCP to exacerbate domestic ROC internal divisions over cross-strait engagement with the PRC

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, SEPTEMBER 29, 2023

Sep 29, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 29, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: September 27 at 5pm

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

1. The Kuomintang (KMT) seeks to lead a joint presidential ballot with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and is unlikely to obtain a compromise deal with the TPP in the coming two weeks.
2. The imported egg scandal shifted the presidential electoral narrative away from cross-strait relations over the past two weeks, and the dominant narrative of the election as a choice between peace and war is likely to reemerge in the next two weeks.
3. The CCP aims to economically integrate the ROC-controlled offshore island of Kinmen with the PRC province of Fujian, which could allow the CCP to exacerbate domestic ROC internal divisions over cross-strait engagement with the PRC.

Taiwanese Presidential Election

The Kuomintang (KMT) seeks to lead a joint presidential ballot with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and is unlikely to obtain a compromise deal with the TPP in the coming two weeks. The KMT aims to overcome its third place standing in the presidential race by partnering with the TPP to create a competitive challenge to the leading Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te.[1] KMT leadership at the party and grassroots levels support cooperation between KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih and TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je. This is consistent with ISW’s September 15 assessment that hostility between KMT leadership and independent presidential candidate Terry Gou may prompt the KMT to reconsider cooperation with the TPP in the presidential election.[2] Ko has been open to cooperating with Hou since August but rejected a precondition articulated by KMT-leaning Broadcasting Corporation of China Chairman Jaw Shaw-kong in September that Hou automatically be presidential candidate.[3] The two parties have dissimilar views about the mechanisms, such as the 1992 Consensus, for engaging in dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party, which are hurdles to the two candidates running on a joint ticket.[4] Neither candidate has shown the willingness to drop out of the race to form a KMT-TPP joint ticket. Either party expressing willingness to engage in dialogue without preconditions would prompt a reevaluation of this assessment.

• Several local district level KMT leaders called for cooperation between Hou and Ko on September 20.[5] The KMT-leaning Broadcasting Corporation of China Chairman Jaw Shaw-kong met with former KMT presidential nominee Han Kuo-yu on September 26 and claimed to have “reached a consensus on promoting ‘opposition integration’” between the KMT and TPP, with negotiations alleged to begin in mid-October.[6]
• Ko stated in late September that cooperation cannot be “purely reduced to distribution of power” and that cooperation requires consensus and the combination of ideas.[7] Ko is polling ahead of Hou by 7.4 percentage points, according to a September 25 poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation.[8] Ko reportedly told an internal TPP meeting on an unspecified date in September that the KMT could “go to hell.”[9]
• The KMT interprets the 1992 Consensus to mean that there is one China, the ROC, and sees it as a means for engaging in dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[10] Ko does not align with the 1992 Consensus because it has become politically contentious in Taiwan.[11] He does support dialogue with the CCP that avoids the domestic Taiwanese political polarization around using the term 1992 Consensus.
• The trend is for media coverage surrounding controversy in the election, such as Jaw’s comments, to not last substantially into a third week. The sexual assault and barbiturate scandals that occurred in May and June that affected the DPP and KMT lasted no more than three weeks.[12]

ISW assesses that the CCP holds the following leverage points over each of the Taiwanese presidential candidates:[13]

A joint Ko-Hou presidential ticket would have the following implications for the CCP leverage points over the Taiwanese presidential candidates:

The imported egg scandal shifted the presidential electoral narrative away from cross-strait relations over the past two weeks, and the dominant narrative of the election as a choice between peace and war is likely to reemerge in the next two weeks. The Democratic Progressive Party-led government imported 145 million eggs over the summer to alleviate supply shortages. Several million of these eggs had mislabeled expiration dates, which gave rise to public concern over prior and future consumption of the imported eggs. Other scandals during this election cycle lasted no more than three weeks. The multi-year trend of cross-strait relations shaping Taiwanese presidential elections, along with the short-lived length of prior scandal coverage, suggests that the narrative of the election as a choice between peace and war will be the central issue of the 2024 presidential election.

• The DPP-led government imported the eggs between March to July to address shortages caused by the avian flu.[14] Egg processing plants mixed imported and domestic eggs to create liquid egg products and mislabeled the products as made in Taiwan.[15] The government destroyed 54 million eggs that had expired in storage facilities.[16] The agriculture minister resigned on September 17 and Premier Chen Chien-jen responded to the controversy before the Legislative Yuan on September 22.[17]
• The sexual assault and barbiturate scandals that occurred in May and June that affected the DPP and KMT lasted no more than three weeks.[18] The egg scandal is now entering its second week.[19] 
• The framing of the election as a choice between peace and war has been ongoing since at least January 2023 and remains salient in Taiwanese and Chinese media outlets.[20] The last two Taiwanese presidential elections, which occurred in 2016 and 2020, centered around the candidates’ differing views of cross-strait relations.[21] The 2024 presidential election coverage also focused on cross-strait relations with brief interludes of political scandal.

Chinese Communist Party Coercion toward Taiwan

The CCP aims to economically integrate the ROC-controlled offshore island of Kinmen with the PRC province of Fujian, which could allow the CCP to exacerbate domestic ROC internal divisions over cross-strait engagement with the PRC.[22] Economically integrating the island with China would provide an avenue for the CCP to exacerbate ROC internal divisions over cross-strait engagement with the PRC. The ROC opposition parties are willing to engage in expansive economic, cultural, and political engagement with the PRC whereas the DPP is not. Exacerbating internal ROC divisions benefits the CCP by portraying the ROC government as incompetent to the Taiwanese public. A consternated populace would be more receptive to CCP messaging promoting unification.

• The CCP put forth a plan on September 12 titled “Opinions on Supporting Fujian in Exploring a New Road for Cross-Strait Integrated Development and Building a Cross-Strait Integrated Development Demonstration Zone.”[23]
• This proposal comes amid proposals by KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih since August to build a bridge between Kinmen and Xiamen.[24] TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je also supports the construction of the bridge.[25] The Chinese Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian voiced support for constructing the bridge on September 27.[26]
• An unnamed Taiwanese official stated on September 20 that building such a bridge would “accelerate the ‘Crimeaization’ of Kinmen, and it will eventually be annexed by China.”[27]  

15. Announcing 12th Annual SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium

Announcing 12th Annual SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium

The 12th Annual SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium will convene this November 29-30 in Tampa, FL.

https://www.pr.com/press-release/897018

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Tampa, FL, September 30, 2023 --(PR.com)-- Defense Strategies Institute is proud to announce advanced registration is now open for the 12th Annual SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium, occurring this November 29-30 in Tampa, FL. The 2023 Symposium will convene senior leaders and decision makers across the SOF community, regional combatant commands, DoD, nonprofits, and industry to discuss the complexities and multifaceted nature of special operations in the 21st century.

SOF will continue to play an increasingly important role in competition with countries such as China, Russia, and Iran, particularly in irregular warfare. The Symposium will highlight the latest developments across U.S. combatant commands in the realm of special operations and irregular warfare. The integration of intelligence gathering, analysis, and technology in irregular warfare scenarios will be a focal point of discussion. Senior level speakers will delve into a diverse array of topics, addressing the growing importance of information warfare and cyber operations of emerging technologies in irregular warfare contexts.

The 2023 SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium will feature senior-level speakers including:

- Maj. Gen Michael Martin, USAF, Director, Operations, USSOCOM

- MG Patrick Roberson, USA, Deputy Commanding General, USASOC

- Todd Breasseale, SES, Office of Information Operations, SO/LIC

- William Innes, SES, Deputy Director, Acquisition, USSOCOM

- Tom Searle, PhD, Course Director, Joint Special Operations University

- Col. Rhea Pritchett, USA, PEO Digital Applications, SOF AT&L

Topics to be covered at the Symposium Include:

- Empowering Special Operations: Leading in an Era of Complex Warfare

- Transforming the SOF Enterprise to Achieve the Goals of the NDS

- Harnessing the Power of Information in Modern Warfare

- Developing the AFSOC Force of the Future by Modernizing Capabilities in Contested Environments

- Navigating the 21st Century Battlefield: Adversarial AI and Emerging Tech as a Cyber Irregular Warfare Operation

- Bolstering Deterrence Measures within NATO to Counter the Evolving Challenge of Hybrid Warfare

- And much more

DSI is now welcoming Sponsors and Exhibitors for the forum. To learn more please contact Amanda Delgado at adelgado@dsigroup.org.

Active military and government and state personnel attend complimentary. Those interested in participating in the SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium can visit Defense Strategies Institute’s website at https://sof.dsigroup.org/. Anyone interested in learning more or sending questions contact Erica Noreika at enoreika@dsigroup.org, 201-896-7802.

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Erica Noreika

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16. Lessons from Ukraine: U.S. Army using conflict in Europe to prepare soldiers for the next war

Excerpt:

“We're not going to dictate the size of a command post per se, but we're going to tell them, ‘You can be as big as you want, but you better be out of that area in 30 minutes,’” Gardner said. To be successful, units must cut down their list of tasks and learn to do without some creature comforts, he said.

“If task 27, is ‘set up your coffee pot,’ you might never get to the coffee pot,” thanks to the OPFOR simulated artillery strike, Gardner said.

Lessons from Ukraine: U.S. Army using conflict in Europe to prepare soldiers for the next war

Chief concerns are drones, electronic surveillance, and artificial intelligence.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

In the foxholes of World War II, lighting a cigarette at night could mean death by a sniper’s bullet.

In the battlefield of the future, the equivalent may be a soldier's phone connecting to a cell tower.

“The thing we struggle the most with is this business of a transparent battlefield,” said Brig. Gen. Curtis Taylor, head of National Training Center, or NTC, in California. “We've all got to learn how to operate in that context.”

This lesson is among the many the NTC and its counterpart, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), are learning from watching Ukraine and fielding their own experiments, the commanders of the two centers said.

One of the top problems is concealment, said Taylor and his counterpart at the JRTC, Brig. Gen. David Gardner. The NTC and JRTC both provide realistic training lasting around a month to troops about to deploy.

Drones, electronic surveillance, and satellites allow adversaries to easily identify U.S. formations, Taylor said—and combining that data with artillery or missiles means the enemy can strike anywhere, anytime.

At JRTC, forces playing the “opposing force,” called OPFOR, have learned to fly drones that use apps to scan for Bluetooth or WiFi signals, Gardner said.

The OPFOR can then order satellite imagery to confirm if the signal comes from a military unit, or even just look at the network name for clues. If a signal is the only one for miles, the OPFOR can quickly deduce it’s the Army unit they’re meant to be targeting.

The NTC has mulled taking it a step further, Taylor said: using commercially available software that uses the apps on a user’s phone to identify their geographical position.

The OPFOR can also use the electromagnetic signature of military communication equipment to identify the Army formation and rain down simulated artillery strikes, Taylor and Gardner said.

Both the NTC and JRTC also make frequent use of commercial satellite photos as well as drones, including the small commercial drones seen throughout Ukraine. Between 30 and 50% of all artillery strikes at NTC are launched and observed via drone, said Taylor.

In turn, Army formations are learning to adjust, including by using their communications equipment as little as possible. “In the past, it was only scouts that would go into radio silence, ” Gardner said. “Now we're seeing that across entire formations.”

Formations are also adapting by changing up their communications—using parabolic antennas to direct radio waves, using fiber-optic cables, and trying to match the pattern of other signals traffic in the area so as to not stand out, Taylor said.

“Transmitting on high power with an antenna that transmits in 350 degrees—that’s equivalent to putting a light bulb on a stand and holding it up in the dark valley,” Taylor said.

Despite the adaptations, Gardner said the training centers need new equipment to keep up.

“Our communications are very specific, they're easily detected and therefore easily targeted. They're very complex to establish, to maintain,” Gardner said. “If you need a person for each of your ten systems, you now need ten people at your command post.”

Units are also learning to hide or run. Taylor encourages soldiers to use buildings to hide themselves from the eyes of drones. Gardner has pushed units to make their command posts as easy to set up and take down as possible.

“We're not going to dictate the size of a command post per se, but we're going to tell them, ‘You can be as big as you want, but you better be out of that area in 30 minutes,’” Gardner said. To be successful, units must cut down their list of tasks and learn to do without some creature comforts, he said.

“If task 27, is ‘set up your coffee pot,’ you might never get to the coffee pot,” thanks to the OPFOR simulated artillery strike, Gardner said.

In the deserts of Fort Irwin, California, where concealment can be hard to find, Taylor said they teach another critical lesson: look unimportant. If the enemy can’t tell if a vehicle is a supply truck or part of the command team, they’re less likely to strike it.

As news from Ukraine comes in, the Army is also stepping up the use of artillery and drones. At Taylor’s NTC, the OPFOR now calls in roughly 100 artillery attacks a day, amounting to simulations of several thousands rounds being fired. The NTC uses computer simulations to model the strikes and their impact.

Both the NTC and JRTC also use commercial drones that operate in swarms. Some can even drop bombs, much like those used on both sides of the Ukraine war. Loitering munitions, or suicide drones that act like cruise missiles, are out of bounds though, Taylor said, because using them would pose a safety risk.

Amid the heavy focus on drones, the centers are even working on new ways the Army might use them. At JRTC, one unit used drones to fake an assault from one direction, before coming from another.

At NTC, Taylor has formed a whole OPFOR drone unit, which operates everything from larger, winged drones, to smaller quadcopters. The unit is unusual. The Army typically spreads out its smaller drones among units, and does not provide as much training to quadcopter operators compared to the training it gives to operators of winged drones.

Taylor said he took the step to bring a greater level of professionalism to the quadcopter operators. Russia and Ukraine similarly operate dedicated drone units.

The increased use of artillery, rockets, and surveillance at the training centers has meant higher simulated casualties, mirroring the losses faced by troops in Ukraine.

For Taylor, that means artillery now accounts for around 40 percent of casualties. Gardner, meanwhile, is looking at how to evacuate soldiers from a battlefield where evacuation routes can be cut off easily, and considering how long a unit can keep fighting after taking casualties.

“Do we really understand how many casualties makes a unit combat ineffective?” said Gardner.

He’s also considering a grim consequence of higher casualties—how to integrate new units that are replacing those decimated in combat. Right now, a platoon that suffers simulated casualties will simply return to their same company. In the future, it may return to a different company, learning how to operate under new commanders just like real replacements would.

The lessons are not only for combat soldiers, Gardner and Taylor said, but also for those who work in public affairs and psychological operations, with one eye on how Russia and Ukraine have advanced their causes through the media.

In one recent exercise, Taylor’s OPFOR troops used AI-language model ChatGPT to create enemy speakers on the artificial social media site the training ground uses. The AI enemy defense minister got into a tweet-war with the Army unit.

Gardner, meanwhile, recounted how his OPFOR unit withdrew from a town, simulated shelling it, and then spread disinformation saying the shelling was done by American troops. The Army unit public affairs officer quickly countered the claim by making public the artillery radar data that showed incoming rounds were not fired from the U.S. side.

But reflecting on the many problems Ukraine’s army has faced in trying to breach Russian defensive lines, both commanders emphasized how much combat still boils down to coordination and training.

“The things that Ukrainians are doing are very, very hard,” Taylor said. “It requires generations of practice. And so, if anything, it reaffirmed our commitment to the combined arms maneuver,” he said, referring to coordinating between different combat branches.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

17. Ukraine Situation Report: Russia Has Gained The Most Ground This Year

Excerpts:

After a months-long hiatus, the self-proclaimed anti-Putin Freedom of Russia Legion partisan group claimed it staged operations inside Russia over the past 24 hours.

As it has in the past, the group said it attacked in Belgorod Oblast.

“We can safely say: the assigned tasks were accomplished, all Legionnaires were unharmed,” the group claimed on Twitter. “The enemy suffered losses in manpower and equipment. We remind Putin's regime dogs: our raids on Russian territory are your new reality. It will happen at any moment necessary for us and unexpected for you. You can hide losses all you want, but you know very well how many funerals you write to the mothers of your subordinates. We will not stop: because Russia is our home and we will fight until we liberate it.”

Ukraine Situation Report: Russia Has Gained The Most Ground This Year

After nine months of bloody fighting this year, Russia has gained the most ground, but it amounts to less than the square area of Kyiv.

BY

HOWARD ALTMAN

|

PUBLISHED SEP 28, 2023 9:11 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · September 28, 2023

Despite all the bloodshed, destruction of towns and farmland and the loss of war materiel on both sides, little territory has been gained by either side this year, but Russia achieved the largest net increase in territory, according to The New York Times.

In a sobering graphics-based story, the publication reported that ultimately, "the front line, after months of grueling combat and heavy casualties, remains largely unchanged."

"Less territory changed hands in August than in any other month of the war," the newspaper said, based on its analysis of data from the Institute for the Study of War. While Ukraine made small gains in the south, Russia took slightly more land overall, mostly in the northeast.

Overall, Russia has gained 331 square miles while Ukraine has gained 143 square miles compared with the start of this year. The Russian net gain of 183 square miles is smaller than either New York City or Kyiv.

The bulk of Ukraine's gains in the counteroffensive have come in a salient between the towns of Robotyne and Verbove in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Russian forces have been shifting reserves there and mounting fierce counterattacks. Complicating matters for Ukraine is the fact that is has to wade through dense lines of minefields and anti-armor trenches and fortifications. Whether it can achieve further breakthroughs this year before bad weather sets in is still very much an open question.

Before we head into the latest from Ukraine, The War Zone readers can catch up on our previous rolling coverage here.

The Latest

On the battlefield, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry said that Russian forces tried an unsuccessful counterattack in Zaporizhzhia Oblast while the Russian Defense Ministry said that it launched attacks against Ukraine near Robotyne and Verbove in that region.

The status of Ukraine’s advance in the Verbove-Robotyne salient remains unclear, according to the latest assessment from the Institute for the Study of War.

Here are some key takeaways from that assessment:

• Ukrainian forces marginally advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 27.
• The situation near Verbove remains unclear as prominent Russian milbloggers have become noticeably less inclined to report in detail on Russian activity on this frontline or present bad news about Russian failures, while a discussion about reported Russian problems in this area has emerged on the fringes of the Russian information space.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 27 but did not make any confirmed gains.

As Ukraine continues to make limited progress in its ongoing counteroffensive, the defense ministers of France and the U.K., as well as the NATO secretary general, made unannounced visits to Kyiv today to show their continued support for that effort.

The visits by Grant Shapps, Sebastien Lecornu and Jens Stoltenberg came ahead of an event scheduled for tomorrow organized by the Ukrainian government, which Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs, said would bring together representatives of 165 military contractors from 26 nations. The goal is to foster the increase of weapons production inside Ukraine as its allies struggle to meet its needs for ammunition, according to The New York Times.

After a months-long hiatus, the self-proclaimed anti-Putin Freedom of Russia Legion partisan group claimed it staged operations inside Russia over the past 24 hours.

As it has in the past, the group said it attacked in Belgorod Oblast.

“We can safely say: the assigned tasks were accomplished, all Legionnaires were unharmed,” the group claimed on Twitter. “The enemy suffered losses in manpower and equipment. We remind Putin's regime dogs: our raids on Russian territory are your new reality. It will happen at any moment necessary for us and unexpected for you. You can hide losses all you want, but you know very well how many funerals you write to the mothers of your subordinates. We will not stop: because Russia is our home and we will fight until we liberate it.”

While there was no confirmation by the Ukrainian military, parliament member Yuriy Mysiagin said on his Telegram channel Thursday that the group conducted “assault operations on the territory of the Belgorod region of the Russian Federation. There are no injured or dead soldiers, the work is going according to plan.”

The Russian Defense Ministry did not address the claims and Belgorod Oblast Gov. Vyacheslav Gladkov said only that his region was attacked by Ukrainian drones, artillery and mortars. His Telegram channel did not mention an incursion by partisans.

Freedom for Russia Legion and another group, the Russia Volunteer Corps made several incursions into that area in the spring. As we noted at the time, the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) acknowledged “some form of cooperation” with those groups.

Despite increased wear and tear on its aircraft after 582 days of full-on war, Russia still maintains the ability to “surge” sortie rates for fixed-wing aircraft over occupied Ukraine, according to the U.K. MoD’s latest assessment. How long that can last, however, is in question.

“...as the war continues much longer than the Russian Ministry of Defence originally planned for, wear and tear of airframes is likely to have reduced the viability of the [Russian Aerospace Forces] VKS’s long-term tactical air power,” the assessment states.

To date, Russia has lost about 90 fixed-wing aircraft in combat since the start of the war out of about 900 tactical aircraft it had before Feb. 24, 2022.

Russia faces a continuing problem of maintaining its remaining fleet given the number of hours those aircraft have been required to fly, the U.K. MoD states.

“It is highly likely that with this extra wartime use, Russia is eating into many of its airframes’ lifespans far more quickly than the VKS planned for. The need for extra maintenance is complicated by a shortage of spare parts because of increasing demand and international sanctions.”

A joint venture between German arms maker Rheinmetall and the Ukrainian defense industry to service, maintain, assemble, produce and develop military vehicles in Ukraine has cleared another hurdle.

The German Federal Cartel Office has approved the plan Rheinmetall announced Thursday in a media release. It was first launched in May between the company and Ukraine’s state-owned Ukrainian Defense Industry Group (UDI), which replaced the former Ukroboronprom.

Authorization from other relevant agencies has already been applied for and is expected to come shortly.

“The joint venture is to be based in Kyiv and engage in service and maintenance as well as the assembly, production and development of military vehicles," the German Federal Cartel Office said Sept. 28 media release. “It will initially operate exclusively in Ukraine. There will be no competitive overlaps in Germany, nor are there any indications of competition concerns. The Bundeskartellamt cleared the transaction within one month.”

Pilots on both sides continue to do to avoid enemy air defenses by flying low — very low. This video below shows a Ukrainian Mi-8 Hip combat transport helicopter hugging the ground reportedly near the front lines in Donetsk Oblast.

Speaking of Hips, this video below shows one lifting off from a sunflower field armed with U.S. supplied Hydra-70 rockets.

The Swedish-made BvS10 tracked articulated amphibious all-terrain armored vehicle has been a handy addition to Ukraine's arsenal, able to cross the country's many rivers, stream, creeks and boggy areas.

The old saying about "it takes a village" certainly applies to a Ukrainian effort to make camouflage 'ghillie' suits for snipers, known in Ukraine as 'kikimora.' The video below shows a group effort to produce them, which are then sent to front line troops.

And finally, there are some respites to the horrors of war. Ukrainian zoological authorities say they have successfully reintroduced nearly-extinct Red Book hamsters back to the Odesa steppes.

That's it for now. We'll update this story when there's more news to report about Ukraine.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · September 28, 2023

18. Russia’s Gray Zone Threat after Ukraine

Conclusion:

Allies need to stand firm against Russian gray zone warfare—and Washington must back them. Moscow may be economically weak, and its conventional military is a far cry from the feared Red Army of the Cold War. But Russia is not down and out. The most effective way to contain Putin is to limit his ability to operate in the gray zone.

Russia’s Gray Zone Threat after Ukraine

Moscow may be economically weak, and its conventional military is a far cry from the feared Red Army of the Cold War. But Russia is far from down and out.

The National Interest · by Daniel Byman · September 29, 2023

Russia is spent. Foreign investors and some of the country’s best minds have fled, the economy is hobbled by sanctions, and its military is bogged down in Ukraine, with many of its elite soldiers dead and best equipment destroyed. The revolt of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in June 2023 seemed a final humiliation, revealing a once-feared dictator reduced to bargaining with individual commanders. This weakness is real: if Russian president Vladimir Putin could turn back the clock, it is hard to imagine he would again choose to invade Ukraine.

Russia’s massive losses will probably make Putin cautious about conventional military operations in the foreseeable future. Even if Putin were tempted, the United States has increased the number of its ground forces in Europe to their highest level in nearly two decades, and NATO’s conventional and nuclear deterrence is robust. Nor would the Russian people and elite be eager to support an invasion of a NATO country and risk escalation to nuclear war.

Yet Putin shows no sign of leaving power. He continues to harbor revisionist aims and expresses admiration for Russian conquerors like Peter the Great. Russia still seeks influence in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. As long as Putin is in power, he will undermine any future Ukrainian government and attempt to deter and punish Western countries that support Kyiv. The expansion of NATO to include Finland and eventually Sweden, the military build-up of NATO forces in Eastern Europe, and continuing military aid to Ukraine are particular affronts to Putin, even though they are justified as necessary responses to Russian aggression. Putin sees the United States, which he refers to as the “main enemy” (or glavny vrag), engaged in both hard and soft power actions to encircle and overthrow his regime.

There is a way for Russia to square this circle of maximal ambitions and weak conventional capabilities: gray zone warfare, which we define as covert operations, disinformation, subversion, sabotage, cyber-attacks, and other methods that advance a state’s security objectives but fall short of conventional warfare. Russia has numerous skilled intelligence officers, paramilitary forces, elite hackers, and other personnel who enable it to excel in this arena. Moreover, Russia’s track record in gray zone warfare is impressive, in contrast to its poor performance on the battlefield.

Russia’s future gray zone warfare will likely take many forms. European countries could suffer clandestine attacks against oil and gas pipelines and underwater fiber-optic cables. Border states like Poland, Finland, and Estonia could face a flood of illegal immigrants massing on their borders. Central Asian and African leaders who stand up to Moscow might find local insurgents awash in Russian weapons and trained by Russian special operations forces. Local critics of Moscow might suddenly suffer a series of suspicious accidents, including poisonings. Cyber attacks might take down financial systems and other critical infrastructure. Disinformation on social media platforms might be used to divide the West, while propaganda explains away Russian misdeeds, with artificial intelligence (AI) being used for even more creative mischief.

Despite Russia’s impressive gray zone capabilities, however, it has significant weaknesses. Moscow’s gray zone efforts are often uncoordinated, and the country’s technical talent is limited compared with that of the United States and Europe. Its private military companies, like Wagner, may face many additional restrictions as Putin questions their loyalty.

Bolstering U.S. and allied cyber and border defenses, sharing intelligence, and providing training and advice to local militaries can reduce the danger of gray zone warfare. But the West does not only have to play defense. Russia is also vulnerable to gray zone tactics by the United States and its European allies in Belarus, the Middle East, Africa, and even Russia itself.

Russia’s Gray Zone Toolbox

Russia’s gray zone warfare draws on a long and robust history. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union excelled at conducting covert intelligence operations and subverting its enemies, tarnishing global views of the United States and at times creating opportunities for near-bloodless communist takeovers of governments. KGB active measures included creating front organizations, backing friendly political movements, covertly funding political parties, provoking domestic unrest, and churning out forgeries and other types of disinformation.

These operations continued after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia’s support for separatists in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria; assassinations of dissidents; cyber and information campaigns in the Baltic states; and use of private military companies in Africa and the Middle East to project its influence all are experiences on which Russia will build as it pursues an aggressive foreign policy while seeking to avoid all-out war. Such organizations as the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Foreign Security Service (FSB), and Spetsnaz have a robust history of gray zone warfare.

Gray zone warfare also fits Moscow’s worldview. Russian security elites, not just Putin, see the world as full of secret threats and have an operational culture that considers the best defense as a good offense. As former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper contends, Russians “are almost genetically driven to co-opt, penetrate, gain favor, whatever.”

Consequently, Russia poses a multifaceted threat through its use of covert action, cyber operations, disinformation, and political subversion. These components of gray zone warfare are not mutually exclusive. Moscow frequently uses a combination of them to weaken its adversaries and expand its influence.

Covert Action

Moscow has long conducted covert action to deter or punish defectors and opposition leaders, subvert U.S. and NATO policies, and expand Russian influence. During the Cold War, the KGB assassinated several foreign leaders, such as Afghan president Hafizullah Amin, in pursuit of Russian foreign policy interests. The KGB’s 13th Department was particularly notorious for targeted assassinations abroad, including the killing of Russian revolutionary leader Leon Trotsky in Mexico City in 1940.

Moscow targets political opponents abroad for two major reasons. The first is to exact revenge on Russian spies, diplomats, soldiers, and even journalists and academics who flee the country, criticize the Kremlin, and aid Moscow’s enemies. A second goal is to deter future betrayals and send an unambiguous message that defectors will be hunted down. In March 2006, Russian agents poisoned Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer who defected to the United Kingdom, at a London hotel. In March 2018, Russian agents poisoned Sergei Skripal, a former GRU officer that defected to the UK, who Putin called a “scumbag” and a “traitor to the motherland.”

Russia’s war in Ukraine triggered an exodus of technocrats, soldiers, spies, oligarchs, and journalists who fled to the West, disenchanted with Putin’s authoritarianism and strategic blunders. Those who cooperate with Western governments or publicly speak out against the Kremlin could become targets of Russian intimidation and even assassination.

Russian security agencies have also conducted paramilitary activity abroad to further Russian foreign policy interests and undermine its adversaries, including the United States. Perhaps the quintessential example was in Crimea in 2014. The Kremlin effectively used masked special operations forces, or “little green men,” to seize Crimea from Ukraine without firing a shot. Russia also conducted sabotage operations in Europe, including planting bombs at two weapons depots in 2014 in the Czech Republic that were allegedly storing arms headed to the Syrian opposition, which Moscow opposed. In March 2023, Polish authorities uncovered a GRU operation to bomb rail lines that transported weapons and other aid to Ukraine. Russian actors with ties to Russian intelligence also plotted to organize protests in Moldova in 2023 as a pretext for mounting an insurrection against the Moldovan government, which Moscow viewed as too pro-Western.

U.S. and European critical infrastructure are potential targets of paramilitary activity. One example is the underwater fiber-optic cables that connect Europe with North America and link European countries with each other. There are currently sixteen cables running under the Atlantic that link the United States with mainland Europe, which are critical for global communication and account for roughly 95 percent of all transatlantic data traffic. Russia has already signaled that it could target these cables with special operations forces, intelligence units, and submarines. In January 2022, the Russian Navy allegedly mapped out the undersea cables off the coast of Ireland and carried out maneuvers, raising serious concerns in Europe and the United States about Russian sabotage.

Other potential Russian gray zone activities include weaponizing immigrants and targeting Europe’s intricate network of gas and oil pipelines, which serve as the lifeblood of European energy. Migration, especially from Africa and Muslim countries, is an emotional issue in Europe. In 2021, Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko threatened to “flood” the European Union with “drugs and migrants.” His government then sent thousands of migrants from Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, and Afghanistan to the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and especially Poland. In August 2023, leaders from Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia warned that they were seeing growing tensions on their borders with Belarus and threatened to seal their borders if Lukashenko weaponized immigration. The Italian government claimed in 2023 that the Wagner Group was behind a surge in migrants from Libya, where Wagner is active.

Despite Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin could also use private military companies in the Middle East, Africa, and other regions to increase Russian influence, undercut U.S. leadership, present itself as a security partner, and gain military access and economic opportunities. Russia could also work with partners like Iran to covertly target U.S. or other NATO forces overseas. During the war in Syria, Russia and Iran worked closely with Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militias to retake territory for the Bashar al-Assad government. These covert tools give Moscow numerous options to hit back at the West.

Cyber Operations

Russian security agencies, such as the GRU, SVR, and FSB, have increasingly conducted cyber attacks to target critical infrastructure, undermine democratic institutions, steal government and corporate secrets, and sow disorder within or between Western allies. In some cases, Russia has conducted cyber attacks in tandem with military or paramilitary operations.

One frequent tactic is to sabotage adversaries’ critical infrastructure or to plant malware in critical infrastructure for use in a future war. Russian malware is designed to do a range of malicious activities, such as overwriting data and rendering machines unbootable, deleting data, and destroying critical infrastructure, such as industrial production and processes. Russia and Russian-linked hackers use a range of common intrusion techniques, such as exploiting public-facing web-based applications, sending spear-phishing e-mails with attachments or links, and stealing credentials and using valid e-mail accounts.

In 2017, for example, the GRU deployed NotPetya, a data-destroying malware that proliferated across multiple networks before executing a disk encryption program, which destroyed all data on targeted computers. NotPetya’s global impact was massive, disabling an estimated 500,000 computers in Ukraine, decreasing Ukraine’s GDP by 0.5 percent in 2017, and affecting organizations across sixty-five countries. Global victims included U.S. multinational companies FedEx and Merck, which lost millions of dollars because of technology cleanup and disrupted business.

In 2022, Russia conducted multiple cyber operations against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. A day before the invasion, Russian attackers launched destructive wiper attacks on hundreds of systems in Ukraine’s energy, information technology, media, and financial sectors. Russia’s goal was likely to undermine Ukraine’s political will, weaken Ukraine’s ability to fight, and collect intelligence that Russia could use to gain tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. Over the next several weeks, Russian actors linked to the GRU, FSB, and SVR conducted numerous cyber attacks utilizing such malware families as WhisperGate and FoxBlade.

The West is also a target. In 2020, the SVR orchestrated a brazen attack against dozens of U.S. companies and government agencies by attaching malware to a software update from SolarWinds, a company based in Austin, Texas, that makes network monitoring software. The DarkSide, a hacking group operating in part from Russian soil, conducted a ransomware attack against the U.S. company Colonial Pipeline, which led executives to shut down a major pipeline for several days and created fuel shortages across the southeastern United States.

In 2023, Polish intelligence services claimed that Russia hacked the country’s railways in an attempt to disrupt rail traffic in the country, some of which are used to transport weapons to Ukraine. According to U.S. government assessments, Russia has targeted the computer systems of underwater cables and industrial control systems in the United States and allied countries. Compromising such infrastructure facilitates and demonstrates Russia’s ability to damage infrastructure during a crisis.

Russian agencies also use cyber attacks during elections to undermine faith in democracy by influencing public sentiment during an election campaign and raising questions about the democratic process. Moscow has targeted specific candidates by stealing or forging documents and then leaking them on public websites or social media platforms. Often referred to as “hack-and-leak operations,” the objective is to undermine faith in political candidates. Another tactic is to disrupt the voting or counting process by targeting computer systems. In addition, Russia has conducted cyber attacks during elections in an attempt to influence issues of importance to Moscow. For example, Russian security agencies have conducted cyber attacks during multiple European elections to weaken support for the European Union, NATO, and the United States.

The breadth of Russian activity is impressive. Russian cyber campaigns have attempted to disrupt elections in the United States, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, and dozens of other countries, according to the Dyadic Cyber Incident Database compiled by U.S. academics. These attacks are likely to continue, including during the 2024 U.S. presidential election campaign.

Disinformation

Russia has long used disinformation, often more effectively than its rivals, to supplement other tools and as a weapon by itself. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union successfully promoted the falsehood that the CIA was linked to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and that U.S. scientists invented the AIDS virus, a campaign referred to as Operation Denver.

Russia uses information campaigns abroad to make the Putin regime look good at home. By highlighting pro-Russian sentiment in Europe, the corruption of Russia’s enemies, and unpopular European policies on immigration, Moscow tries to make its own regime more popular as well as discredit its enemies. Similarly, Russia has tried to create an image of itself as a muscular Christian nation, contrasting its policies with LGBTQ+ and immigrant-friendly Europe and the United States.

Beyond bolstering Putin, disinformation is a way to weaken and divide Russia’s enemies. Famously, the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll farm, used disinformation in an attempt to influence the 2016 U.S. election, seeking to discredit Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and promote Donald Trump. On YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms, trolls pushed propaganda on immigration, race, and gun rights to conservative accounts while other parts of the Russian effort encouraged Black Americans to protest, inflaming tension among Americans.

In subsequent years, Russia has spread disinformation related to COVID-19 and other conspiracies, used a false news site in 2020 to get legitimate U.S. journalists to write stories on social disruption in the United States, and magnified the potential side effects of COVID-19 vaccines to decrease support for the Biden administration.

Ukraine is both a subject and a target of disinformation. In the years between Russia’s 2014 proxy war and 2022 invasion, Russian propaganda stressed that Ukraine was a failed, Nazi-led state, whose army was brutal to the local population. After Russia invaded Ukraine, the disinformation machine kicked into overdrive, both to justify the invasion at home and to undermine support for helping Ukraine abroad. To European audiences hosting large numbers of refugees like Poland, Russian propaganda claimed that the government was helping refugees over their own citizens. In Africa and other parts of the developing world, Moscow pushed the idea that the EU had banned Russian agricultural products while keeping Ukraine’s grain, causing a global food crisis.

Russia exploits overt and covert information sources, ranging from official government media to disinformation via government agencies, often in combination. Russia’s Foreign Ministry, for example, has played up false reports from Russian media of immigrants raping a thirteen-year-old Russian-German girl to stir up divisions in Germany and accusing the German government of not doing enough to protect its people, a sentiment that undermined German confidence in government and bolstered Russia’s image as tough on criminal immigrants. Even the Russian Orthodox Church, whose patriarch is staunchly pro-Putin, is involved. The church spreads propaganda while allowing its facilities to be used as safe houses for Russian priests to work with Russian intelligence agents.

Social media offers numerous, and cheap, additional ways to spread disinformation. Moscow uses fake accounts, anonymous websites, bots, and other means to spread its message, often using these sources to spread RT and Sputnik propaganda and to provide “evidence” for further lies from official media. Some of this involves troll accounts monitored by humans. Moscow also uses bots to try to amplify content and tries to exploit social media company algorithms to target particular audiences. At times, Russia will create innocuous accounts focused on health, fitness, or sports and then later, when they have a substantial following, begin to introduce political messages.

The wide array of actors each has its own audience. In addition, they amplify each other, with state voices and seemingly independent ones validating each other. Halting some are more difficult than others: it is one thing to block Russian state television or take down fake accounts, but it is another to block the Orthodox Church with millions of adherents outside Russia.

Generative AI offers a new means of disinformation. At the outset of the Ukraine war, Russia attempted to use a deepfake of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that led it to appear that he had fled the country and was urging troops to lay down their arms. Less dramatically, Russia spread deepfakes on Facebook and Reddit that showed Ukrainian teachers praising Putin. The technology has improved by leaps and bounds since then. Deepfakes will be increasingly cheap and easy to produce, and this can be done at scale, allowing Russia to flood the zone with convincing falsehoods.

There are myriad potential uses of deepfakes. Russia’s attempt to blame Ukraine for instigating the 2022 invasion could be more convincing in the future by “leaking” deepfakes of Ukrainian generals planning an attack on Russian territory. Moscow can spread scurrilous rumors about anti-Russian leaders and undermine their political support by releasing fake videos of them in compromising situations or saying offensive remarks. Moscow could try to further polarize the United States or other countries, worsening existing racial tension by releasing videos of supposedly violent Black Lives Matter rallies or of police abuses of members of minority communities. In Europe, variations of this might play out with anti-migrant videos showing migrants committing rape and murder, often mixing genuine crimes and violence with false information.

Such efforts might not sway people to Russia’s position. However, they are likely to sow discord and decrease confidence in government in general. All information, even the truth, would be suspect.

Political Subversion

In the Soviet days, Moscow aggressively subverted unfriendly governments, and these efforts helped it install Communist regimes in several Eastern European states at the end of World War II. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union infiltrated trade union movements in Africa, encouraged radical nationalist parties, and otherwise tried to shape the politics of countries it sought to influence.

Although Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and disinformation related to the Brexit vote that year correctly gathered considerable attention, Russia has also subsequently interfered in elections throughout Europe. In 2017, Russia pushed conspiracy theories and other radical ideas into the Czech Republic, played up migrant crime in the March 2018 Italian election, and used fake news, social media trolls, and other means to target Emmanuel Macron’s campaign in France. In Sweden, Russia spread disinformation about a joint military exercise with NATO. Russian disinformation also heated up during large-scale protests, such as pro-independence ones in Catalonia in 2017 and “yellow vest” demonstrations in France in 2018-2019. Russian propaganda regularly questioned the legitimacy of the European Union, blaming it for problems with migrants, and used disinformation to try to depress turnout in the May 2019 EU elections. Indeed, data from the University of Toronto suggests that almost every European country was targeted in one way or another.

At times, Russia supports political parties that share its interests. Some of these are anti-establishment parties, like the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany or Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, the latter of which also received a loan from a Russian bank. In Greece, Russia backed both far-left and far-right parties, as both were Euro-skeptical. A 2020 study by the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy found at least sixty cases of Moscow supporting political campaigns outside Russia, although the evidence on some cases is weaker than others. As of August 24, 2023, the figure was 199 cases of interference overall, with techniques including “malign finance,” information operations, and civil society disruption.

Russia also seeks to create, and then exploit, economic dependencies. Russia uses its extensive energy sector to create links to its oil and natural sectors with leaders in other countries, giving them a personal and financial interest in having a country with a strong relationship with Russia. Moscow also has developed close relationships with smuggler networks in neighboring states.

Instigating protests is another way of shaping perceptions and increasing support for Russia in preparation for more aggressive measures. In Ukraine, Russia originally sought to use its agitators to create extreme right-wing anti-Russian protests, infiltrating them with paid criminals and agent provocateurs who would then attack the police. Russia would then use these protests as proof of a “far-right coup” to justify its invasion. Indeed, Russia intended to defeat Ukraine quickly in 2022 in part by fomenting instability and chaos in Ukraine itself and, in so doing, undermining trust in government, tarnishing Ukraine as an ally for potential partners, and promoting pro-Russian voices in the country.

Russia sees such subversive operations in part as a tit-for-tat response to Western pressure. Moscow viewed the various color revolutions in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine as fomented by the West, and it also blames the United States and the West for anti-government street protests in Moscow, such as those that occurred in 2011 and 2012. U.S. efforts to promote democracy and build the rule of law are viewed as transparent attempts to undermine Moscow and its allies.

Russian Weaknesses

Gray zone warfare is a necessity for Russia in part due to its weaknesses. Russia’s military is a shell of the Red Army that posed a serious threat to Western Europe during the Cold War. Its economy is stagnant, even without the impact of Western sanctions, and is roughly the size of Canada. The threat from Russia is not a return to the Cold War when two superpowers wrestled over control of the world. Instead, Russia is a weak challenger trying to play a bad hand to its advantage.

Although numerous Russian actors are involved in gray zone activities, they are generally uncoordinated. These actors include military intelligence, domestic and foreign intelligence services, state-owned enterprises, official media, private military companies, self-proclaimed patriotic groups in Russia including biker gangs, various oligarchs, co-opted hackers, the Russian Orthodox Church, and many others. This broad set of actors allows more opportunism and creativity, but it makes unity of effort harder. Many of Russia’s front groups and local allies are also of limited loyalty, especially in a crisis. In Ukraine, Wagner Group contractors and the Russian military clashed over high casualty rates and a shortage of ammunition. Even some structures created by Russian intelligence in Ukraine, such as organizations composed of retired KGB special forces, stayed loyal to Ukraine when the invasion occurred.

Although Russian cyber attacks can be disruptive, Moscow’s capabilities are limited if countries can build a strong defense. Ukraine successfully blunted Russia’s cyber attacks during its 2022 invasion, thanks to help from the United States, the United Kingdom, and private companies such as Microsoft. Russia is at best middling in its AI capabilities and comparable to Canada, rather than to the United States or China. The exodus of much of Russia’s tech talent following the 2022 invasion and subsequent conscription only worsens Moscow’s problems.

Russia itself is also vulnerable to gray zone activity. Views of Russia across the globe are highly negative, according to a 2023 Pew Research Center poll that covered twenty-four countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A median of 82 percent of respondents had an unfavorable view of Russia, and 87 percent had little or no confidence in Vladimir Putin. These sentiments create opportunities for subverting Russian diplomatic, military, and other actions.

The same is true of Russian private military companies, which are active in Africa, the Middle East, and even Latin America. Prigozhin was instrumental in expanding Russia’s influence by using his Wagner Group to train foreign forces, conduct military operations, extract resources, and help coup-proof local regimes. But Prigozhin’s death in August 2023, almost certainly at Putin’s instruction, is likely to undermine the morale, leadership, and effectiveness of some Russian private military companies. Social media channels linked to Wagner blamed Putin and other Russian officials for orchestrating Prigozhin’s death and threatened retaliatory action against Moscow. Leaders in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Sudan, and other countries may opt to break ties with Wagner and consider alternatives to improve security.

Recommendations

Training and aid packages must focus not only on stopping Russian conventional aggression but also on fighting gray zone warfare. Russia’s efforts are most successful when a country has weak border controls, poor counterintelligence, internal divisions, is awash in firearms, and is unprepared for Russian machinations, according to a RAND study. All these conditions can be countered or at least reduced.

The specifics will vary by country and area. Efforts to combat corruption, improve border security, fight low-level insurgencies, and encourage political reform are vital for reducing Moscow’s influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. In Europe, assistance should focus on intelligence coordination, cyber defense, and border control measures. Europe must prepare for a surge of migrants facilitated by Russia, especially in such frontline states as Finland, Poland, the Baltics, and Romania. Finland is building a three-meter-high fence made of steel mesh and barbed wire in case Russia attempts to flood its 1,343-kilometer border with illegal immigrants. But it could use additional assistance in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection from drones and other systems. The Baltic states’ military leaders warned that they would shoot any “little green men” and otherwise quickly respond to covert Russian military attacks.

Moscow’s cyber and AI skills, while impressive, are far less than those of the United States and its European allies, and bolstering cyber defenses will reduce some dangers. Intelligence sharing and training of allied militaries can diminish the impact of Russian support for insurgency and terrorism. Public exposure of Russian election manipulation can, in some cases, reduce its impact, and U.S. influence operations may prove more effective given the shaken condition of the Russian regime today. Most of all, the United States and its allies should link sanctions relief and other current punishments to Moscow’s gray zone meddling as well as its invasion of Ukraine.

The United States and its allies should also prepare efforts to discredit Russian private military companies around the world and counter Russian propaganda that promotes Putin as a successful leader. This would involve highlighting increases in terrorism in areas where groups like Wagner are used in Africa, the corruption of Russian officials, and videos that highlight the challenges for ordinary Russians due to Putin’s rule. More specific information efforts may target Russian elites that help hold up the regime: this may decrease their support for Putin or at the very least increase mistrust within elite circles.

Allies need to stand firm against Russian gray zone warfare—and Washington must back them. Moscow may be economically weak, and its conventional military is a far cry from the feared Red Army of the Cold War. But Russia is not down and out. The most effective way to contain Putin is to limit his ability to operate in the gray zone.

Daniel Byman is a professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a senior fellow with the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His latest book is Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism.

Seth G. Jones is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He was a plans officer and adviser to the commanding general, U.S. Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan, as well as the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (W.W. Norton).

19. Swamped with cybersecurity data, NGA hopes ChatGPT-like tools can help

Swamped with cybersecurity data, NGA hopes ChatGPT-like tools can help

The mapping agency is trying to keep tabs on 70,000 events per second.

BY LAUREN C. WILLIAMS

SENIOR EDITOR

SEPTEMBER 29, 2023 05:35 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

Every second, some 70,000 new data points flow into the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s cybersecurity center. Agency officials hope new generative-AI tools can help cyber defenders keep better tabs on it all.

“The amount of data that we are bringing in from a cyber perspective is absolutely astounding,” said Gary Buchanan, NGA’s chief information officer. “And there isn't a workforce large enough to sift through that level of data every day, which is why we really need artificial intelligence and machine learning for our future.”

A typical day delivers 10 to 20 terabytes of data to the agency’s Cybersecurity Operations Center, Buchanan said during an Intelligence and National Security Alliance event on Thursday.

“That's an astronomical volume of data, he said. “Most people are familiar with like a gigabyte of data. A thousand gigabytes makes a terabyte.”

To put it in perspective, one terabyte equals 250,000 photos or 500 hours of high-quality video, he said. Now, multiply that by ten.

And those numbers are only going to increase as the Pentagon accelerates its digital modernization efforts. The agency’s cyber center could soon process petabytes worth of data, Buchanan said.

“We're going to reach the petabyte range, which is roughly 20 million large filing cabinets with a million of them, where the data is a petabyte. It's also equivalent to 500 billion pages of printed text. And there isn't a workforce large enough to sift through that level of data every day, which is why we really need artificial intelligence and machine learning for our future,” he said.

In addition to the sheer volume of information, NGA’s cyber center processes information from 126 data sources and four separate networks. Those data sources come with 745 custom fields and the center has to process 70,000 events per second.

The agency is working to improve its data analytics for more accurate reporting, developing new standards, and uncovering potential trends and gaps, he said.

The Pentagon is already exploring uses for generative AI tools, which output text, images, and even audio in response to user prompts, to filter and analyze satellite imagery. Now the agency is working with national laboratories to develop a cyber-focused capability. Buchanan said it’s not ready to be deployed yet, but it’s “maturing.”

“I'd love to say it's here right now. It's probably two or three years off, for us [internally], but we've been looking at it for the last two years, partnering with national labs to do so,” he said.

Buchanan’s comments come after the Pentagon announced a new generative AI task force to evaluate, “synchronize, and employ generative artificial intelligence (AI) across the Department.”

Earlier this year, Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s director, touted the technology’s potential to improve pattern analysis.

“It can do a lot of good; it can make our job easier with a lot of information put in. But it can’t determine intent,” he said. “Now, it can get you on the road to what you think might be intent, but this is where critical-thinking analysts really come in.”

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

20. Why Orwell Lives On (Book Review)

Some new insights for me on Orwell in this review.

Conclusion:

Orwell: The New Life by D. J. Taylor is undeniably the best biography of George Orwell now written. We meet the boy, then the man, who has held captive our imagination since his death because we share the same fears and worries as he did. We see him at school, working as a policeman in Burma, in the trenches of Spain, then sifting through the rubble of war-torn England. We who have the courage to stand up to the inhumane brutalism that still assaults our world and our faces gain much in having a friend in Orwell. However, Orwell ultimately points us to a deeper reality that he himself seemed unable to accept despite his genius.

Why Orwell Lives On – - Paul Krause

BOOK REVIEW SEPTEMBER 29, 2023

lawliberty.org · by Paul Krause

Eric Blair, better known to us as George Orwell, is one of those writers who is experiencing a renaissance in light of the controversies of the twenty-first century. Our own political and journalistic language take from him and invoke him: “thought-police,” “newspeak,” “Orwellian,” “1984.” Why, though, does Orwell live on and why do we still find him so important, so enduring?

D. J. Taylor gives a new account of Orwell’s life in Orwell: The New Life, one that is informed by the “vast amount of new material that has come to light” since the author’s previous biography in 2003 about one of modern Britain’s greatest writers. There is, as Taylor notes, something deeply “personal” about our attraction to Orwell. He is not a distant writer, an abstract thinker, a hidden intellectual. We feel that he is one of us, someone with whom we can instantly identify and recognize. I knew this was true of myself when I first read Orwell in high school; he happened to be one of the few “great” authors we read in class that I instantly enjoyed.

Taylor’s “new life” of Orwell is a brilliant and masterful presentation of Orwell from early childhood to his untimely death. We first learn of Orwell’s family lineage, how it dotted across the globe, itself a foreshadowing of Orwell’s own adventures across the British Empire. We then meet him at St Cyprian’s, a school of the new middle class, where he excelled on scholarship, “Within three weeks of arriving at St Cyprian’s he was top in history and joint top in French. A month later he was second in Latin and top in arithmetic.” Early on it seemed like he was destined for greatness.

After St. Cyprian’s, he attended Eton, the school where most of Britain’s next elite were educated (and still are) before attending university (usually Cambridge or Oxford). He arrived as a King’s Scholar, his expenses (minus living) paid because of his merit from St Cyprian’s. While at Eton, though, he squandered away his intellectual brilliance by doing bare minimum work. Graduation didn’t leave a young man like him—from the new middle class instead of the landed aristocracy, who had dwindled away his prospects for Oxford and Cambridge—with many options. So he set out for Burma to work as a policeman. Eric Blair would become George Orwell as a result, seeing firsthand the machinations of oppression and resentment, hope and liberation, freedom and tyranny.

It was in Burma where he witnessed power dynamics at work that left a major impression on him. Seeing colonial rule up close, how it was administered, the resentment and violence between various tribes and people, and how it was used to divide and rule, left a bad stain in Orwell’s eyes and mouth. Upon returning to England due to illness and becoming a freelance journalist, Blair changed his name to George Orwell to cope with the brutality he saw. His friends said Orwell named himself after the king and the beautiful River Orwell with its picturesque serenity. Orwell wanted a new beginning, but he never forgot what he witnessed in Burma.

The early life of Orwell recounted by Taylor is very illuminating as it brings personality and spunk to the writer we know from his novels, perhaps some of his essays, and his other writings like Burmese Days and Homage to Catalonia. The teenage Orwell, with his failed romance with Jacintha Buddicom, and his struggles witnessing imperial abuse in Burma, formed some of the pillars with which his more famous novels would deal: imperfect families, the problem of love, the jackboot of oppression, and dehumanization. It is also a deeply personal Orwell we encounter in Taylor’s pages, a man with a name, a heart, and a face like the rest of us, trying to juggle the complexities of the human condition and experience in a world that was ruined by the horror of World War I and soon to be ruined by the catastrophe of World War II. We may know Orwell’s photos, but Taylor helps bring vitality to the man many of us only know through black and white headshots on the internet. (On this note, the pictures included in this biography are wonderful as we see the young Orwell and family and friends, too.)

What makes Orwell such a compelling and fascinating writer isn’t that he lived through the seminal events of the first half of the twentieth century, which is true for many, but that he often participated in them. It is one thing for a writer, or a journalist, to sit back in their cushy office and write about what they read is going on in the world. It is another thing for a writer, or a journalist, to be present on location. Orwell saw firsthand life in the overseas territories of the British Empire. Orwell sat in the trenches of Spain during the Spanish Civil War. Orwell lived through the bombings of the Blitz. All of this made Orwell the man we know through his writings, especially his novels.

To this end, Orwell’s place in the crisis of modernity becomes apparent. Taylor notes the oddities that make him, in our now polarized age, such a common-ground figure, even if he was, and always remained, a “man of the left” and a “socialist” throughout his life. “At the heart of Orwell’s worldview, it might be said, lies modern man’s struggle to come to terms with the absence of God and the need for a secular morality that would somehow replace a value system built on the belief in an afterlife. Orwell’s own views on religion are relatively complex. … His final position was that of a man who rejects the existence of God while regretting the decay of Christianity’s cultural influence.” This, however, helps make sense of the impossibility of love in Orwell—both in his writings, like how Winston and Julia cannot truly love each other and are ultimately torn away from one another, and in his own life as he was an adulterer and terrible husband to his first wife, Eileen.

If Orwell sought to salvage “Christianity’s cultural influence” without its metaphysics, it is unsurprising that Orwell ultimately struggled with Christianity’s greatest cultural gift: Love. What really separated Christianity from the Greek philosophies and pagan religions that preceded it was how God is conceptualized as Love itself. “God is Love” (1 John 4:8) reorients the Christian understanding of Scripture, the nature of Deity, and the very nature of ourselves as images of love. The loving-kindness and compassion preached by Christianity make sense, as the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche understood, only from its acceptance of God as the alpha and omega. Orwell sought a secular agape willed by humans, but humans are now the alpha and omega rather than soulful expressions of Beauty and Love. But this outlook, Nietzsche also understood, means love cannot truly exist; all that exists is the will to power. Orwell missed the one thing Nietzsche was most prescient about.

Orwell still matters because many—especially among the intellectual class—are clinging to Orwell’s desire for a Christian moral life without the Christian God.

Thus, Orwell is left in a conundrum. He desires to “devise a secular morality that encourages men and women to behave decently and cling to the moral teachings of Christianity without threatening them with eternal hellfire or promising them a seat at the table of Paradise.” But the other side of Christianity that Orwell doesn’t want to hold onto is the corollary of a metaphysic built on love, the understanding that God is Love and Love is the source and purpose of existence. The “moral teachings of Christianity” stand with the existence of God because Christian morality, rooted in Love, finds its coherence only if Love itself exists and is the beginning and end of all things.

To an exhausted modern world that agrees with Nietzsche and Orwell, which has disavowed belief in God but still desires an ethical core of compassion and kindness, it is no surprise that Orwell drifted into a benign socialism and remained there while criticizing the excessive violence and abuses of socialism where he saw it and why so many today follow a similar path. This earned him, as Taylor explains, his few and only true enemies. “Apart from a handful of score-settling Stalinists who remembered [Orwell] from Republican Spain, thought Homage to Catalonia a travesty of what had really happened in Barcelona and feared its author’s strictures on the fellow-travellers of the post-war left, there were very few people that hated Orwell.”

This explains how Orwell, who so vigorously opposed fascism in Spain and then Nazi Germany during World War II, has ended up as a highly praised intellectual of anti-communism from the right with only faint declarations from leftwing writers that Orwell was a socialist but nothing more substantive than that bland corrective. Orwell knew that fascism, horrible as it was, was a passing fad. Despite media pretensions to the contrary in 2023, it still is. The real “enemy” was the brutal and inhumane socialism of Stalinism which Orwell saw with his own eyes in the trenches of Catalonia and the hypocrisy of the stories coming out of the Soviet Union. No surprise, then, that his most famous novels—Animal Farm and 1984—read more as a critique of the hellfire and lies of a variant of socialism than the shortcomings of capitalism or the faded danger of fascism having just been defeated by the Allies.

Yet the real allure of Orwell runs deeper than political commentary and prophetic insight into the struggle with totalitarianism. “Orwell’s writing returns to the human face with the regularity of a homing pigeon,” Taylor writes. “As well as having a merciless eye for facial peculiarities, he was fascinated by their habit of conveying characteristics—the personality, the temperament, in extreme cases the ideology—of what lay beneath the skin.” Even in animal form, Orwell’s characters are alive with personality, with uniqueness, with distinctiveness. It is as if we know them and love them.

In an age of dehumanization, which the twentieth century certainly was in most places, Orwell’s writings are not merely trying to wrestle with the opiate of the intellectuals—the death of God—they are also humanizing in ways other great English writers of the same period are not. Orwell was right to reject Graham Greene who eventually glamorized sin and evil in Brighton Rock and The End of the Affair. Orwell’s characters, by contrast, are truly tragic and captivate us because they want to be good in a world stripped of goodness, where goodness and beauty have withered away, and all that is left is the “startlingly bleak” anti-humanism of totalitarianism.

Many of us who are living in the aftermath of two world wars and now the horror of another brutal war in Ukraine are left wondering: Where is the beauty and goodness that other writers have suggested to save the world? Orwell’s writings grip us because we glimpse the goodness and beauty of the personalities and faces of his characters, the brief hopes and smiles of their tiny victories in a dark and ugly world, the very goodness and beauty we ourselves seek. However, Orwell’s endurance is also his shortcoming: without God, there can be no benign morality, no secular agape to dedicate our lives.

Orwell still matters because many—especially among the intellectual class—are clinging to Orwell’s desire for a Christian moral life without the Christian God. Thus a mystical socialism endures as its substitute despite all the atrocities its disciples have committed, atrocities that Orwell criticized and publicized to the world. But Orwell’s characters do not achieve that secular agape that the author so desired. Their faces are ripped away from us. Boxer disappeared, never to be seen again. Winston and Julia are torn apart. The inhumane face of Big Brother is what Winston sees at the end of Orwell’s most Orwellian writing. This is ultimately telling to the attentive reader. As Saint Augustine said, “There is no love without hope, no hope without love, and neither love nor hope without faith.”

Orwell: The New Life by D. J. Taylor is undeniably the best biography of George Orwell now written. We meet the boy, then the man, who has held captive our imagination since his death because we share the same fears and worries as he did. We see him at school, working as a policeman in Burma, in the trenches of Spain, then sifting through the rubble of war-torn England. We who have the courage to stand up to the inhumane brutalism that still assaults our world and our faces gain much in having a friend in Orwell. However, Orwell ultimately points us to a deeper reality that he himself seemed unable to accept despite his genius.

lawliberty.org · by Paul Krause

21. Marine Raiders complete U.S. Army Reconnaissance course

Marine Raiders complete U.S. Army Reconnaissance course

dvidshub.net

CAMP LEJEUNE, NC, UNITED STATES

09.07.2023

Story by Cpl. Henry Rodriguez II

Marine Forces, Special Operations Command

CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. – Marine Raiders from Marine Forces Special Operations Command recently completed the U.S. Army Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course.

At the end of the course, Marine Raiders graduated with distinction, earning three of the four end-of-course awards for the class, Honor Graduate, Land Navigation Award, and Gung Ho Award.

The month-long course covers a variety of reconnaissance related tasks such as target acquisition, denied environment communications, and long-range surveillance. Additionally, students were challenged with problem sets that could impact a reconnaissance mission.

“Having to use land navigation techniques without the GPS and technology we have become accustomed to was great to shake the rust off,” said a critical skills operator. “Land navigation by yourself is one thing, but utilizing tactical movements in an element while doing land navigation adds a unique challenge.”

The Marine Raiders used the course to refine their skills.

“Anytime Raiders go to a course, we are going to work to pull the most out of it,” said a special operations officer. “This training helps us refine our SOPs, especially as it pertains to working in a denied environment, with communication and surveillance limitations.”

The Marine Raiders who completed it see it as a steppingstone for MARSOC as a whole.

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22. Army taps DRS, Intelsat for pioneering SATCOM service pilot

Army taps DRS, Intelsat for pioneering SATCOM service pilot - Breaking Defense

"It will provide commercial SATCOM subscription services, which include SATCOM coverage in different locations, terminals, bandwidth, training if required by the unit and help desk services," Paul Mehney, public communications director for Army PEO C3T, told Breaking Defense.

breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · September 29, 2023

Soldiers assigned to the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School practice using a PDA-184 computer and an AN/ PRC-117G satellite radio during training at the Yarborough Training Complex at Fort Bragg, North Carolina August 29, 2019. (US Army photo by K. Kassens)

WASHINGTON — The Army has contracted DRS Global Solutions and Intelsat for its long-awaited pilot program for acquiring satellite communications services — that is, buying access in the same way that individuals subscribe to a mobile phone plan.

“This is a blanket purchase agreement with an approximate $3.6 million ceiling for each of the two vendors,” Paul Mehney, director of public communications for the Army’s Program Executive Office, Command, Control, Communications-Tactical (PEO C3T), told Breaking Defense.

“It will provide commercial SATCOM subscription services, which include SATCOM coverage in different locations, terminals, bandwidth, training if required by the unit and help desk services. The goal of this pilot is to establish a managed subscription service (marketplace) that encompasses SATCOM capabilities that are currently being used in private industry. The ‘marketplace’ in essence entails a contractual vehicle for which funding can be placed to order within the scope capabilities for a period of 12 months,” he explained.

The Satellite Communications (SATCOM) as a Managed Service (SaaMS) pilot is intended to “inform decisions on the Army’s potential use of commercially leased SATCOM network services that would be flexible and tailorable to changing mission needs, versus procuring, fielding, sustaining and modernizing the equipment in house,” the Army said in an announcement today. The actual contract was awarded on Tuesday.

“A SaaMS business model could more efficiently support Soldiers in diverse locations with diverse mission challenges during large scale combat operations,” said Col. Stuart McMillan, project manager for PEO C3T’s Tactical Network, in the announcement. “A SaaMS business model could also provide for rapid tech insertions and opportunities to mitigate surge requirements.”

Mehney said that pilot is expected to start in the first quarter of fiscal year 2024 in several regions around the globe. If successful, he added, the Army intends “to open up to a multi-vendor approach so vendors that may not be part of this pilot will have an additional opportunity to compete.”

“SaaMS would not be a one-size-fits-all model,” he added, rather one that could be tailored to a “wide variety of different missions and threats.”

Further, Mehney explained, the Army doesn’t intend to hold only one event to evaluate the pilot’s success, rather “to enable operational units to use the capability to best suit their needs and roll it into their existing training events” that each will provide feedback.

Commercial SATCOM providers have long urged DoD and the services to move from buying bandwidth in fits and starts to service contracts. Major SATCOM providers — such as Hughes (a subsidiary of SATCOM giant Echostar), Viasat, Intelsat, Inmarsat, SES and Eutelsat — have argued that this would not only ease problems with service gaps that have long plagued troops in the field, but also be cheaper and allow speedier integration of new technology.

The Space Force — led by Space Systems Command’s new(ish) Commercial Space Office (COMSO), and the Space Warfighting Analysis Center — has been working to shift its acquisition strategy toward greater reliance on commercial solutions, in particular the use of SaaMS.

COMSO’s Commercial Satellite Communications Office has long bought SATCOM services from Iridium, and has served as a middleman between other SATCOM providers and military users via the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), with funds coming the Defense Working Capital Fund. And in July, the office worked with DISA to grant its first-ever contracts for communications services from proliferated low Earth orbit satellites to 16 providers. The five-year indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts guarantee each vendor a minimum of $2,000, and puts them in the running for future task orders. The winners included DRS and Intelsat, as well as ARINC, Artel, Capella Federal, BlackSky Geospatial Solutions, Hughes Network Systems, Inmarsat Government, KGS, OneWeb Technologies, PAR Government, RiteNet Corporation, Satcom Direct Government (SDG), SpaceX, Trace Systems, and UltiSat.

Further, the Pentagon has two separate top-level strategies underway to look at how to spur commercial space integration: one spearheaded by Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman and Air Force Assistant Secretary for Space Acquisition and Integration Frank Calvelli, the other by the Defense Department’s Space Policy czar John Plumb. So far, however, the Space Force has been slow to shift significant funding to the use of commercial satellite services.

The Army effort thus is being watched keenly by commercial SATCOM firms, along with a similar pilot being run by the Marine Corps.

Interestingly, while the Marine Corps is going alone on its pilot, the Army chose to go through COMSO to arrange contracting via the the existing Commercial Satellite Communications (COMSATCOM) Subscription Services contract currently managed by DISA and the Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization. COMSO, however, is due to take over such contracting authority.

23. Philosophy of War: 3 Influential Theorists

Some light reading for a Sunday.

Philosophy of War: 3 Influential Theorists

What were St Thomas Aquinas’, Sun Tzu’s, and Carl von Clausewitz’s philosophies of warfare?

Sep 29, 2023 • By Luke Dunne, BA Philosophy & Theology

thecollector.com · by Luke Dunne · September 29, 2023

This article attempts to introduce the philosophy of war through an overview of three very important military theorists: Sun Tzu, Thomas Aquinas, and Carl Von Clausewitz. As we will see, what they shared was a concern with providing some structure to the apparent chaos of warfare. This article begins with a discussion of the philosophy of war as a whole, and poses the question of what it is to take a “philosophical” approach towards war. It then moves on to explain some of the core elements of Sun Tzu’s, St Thomas Aquinas’, and Carl Von Clausewitz’s conception of warfare.

Defining the Philosophy of War

Photograph of German Prisoners of War by William Rider-Rider, 1918, via Imperial War Museums.

The philosophy of war is concerned with bringing a range of philosophical methods to bear on the problems presented by military conflict. Sometimes, this means theorizing the conditions under which war is right, or the conditions for proper conduct in times of war. For other theorists, this means applying philosophy to the strategic and tactical problems of warfare.

Attempting to make sense of the chaos of warfare using philosophy might sound self-indulgent to some, but to others, philosophy in any form is always an attempt to offer conceptual clarity to undifferentiated, fluid, random, diffuse processes. In this view, the point of philosophical abstraction is a way of attempting to make sense of things that are otherwise difficult to grasp. Philosophy offers a simulation of reality that we can make sense of, in the same way (or in an analogous way) as how a diagram of a battlefield makes sense of an otherwise frightening, entropic event.

Yet philosophy is also concerned with addressing abstractions, discharging them, and finding particular referents for them. Whether the philosophy of war (especially the strategy-orientated parts of it) justifies its worth on the battlefield is a matter for generals and military historians to determine.

1. Sun Tzu: The First Military Theorist

A bronze statue of Sun Tzu, via NDU Press.

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Sun Tzu was a Chinese theorist of war. The major work attributed to him, the Art of War, is beloved by generations of soldiers as well as politicians, corporate executives, and others who conceive of themselves (however erroneously) as being well-placed to learn important practical lessons from ancient warfare.

Although not much is concretely known of Sun Tzu’s life, we know him to have been a general and strategist for King Helü of Wu, a ruler who made several successful conquests during the turn of the 5th century BC. Sun Tzu’s specific successes as a general are not well recorded, and the most famous story about him is probably apocryphal, but worth hearing in any case.

King Helü attempted to test Sun Tzu by having him organize the king’s concubines into a company of soldiers. When they failed to take their work seriously enough, Sun Tzu executed the two most favored concubines, whom he had appointed company commanders. The king protested, but Sun Tzu waved him off, claiming that, having been appointed, a general must do his duty even against the king’s wishes. After his practical education in warfare, Sun Tzu wrote his famous book.

Eastern Han—Three Kingdoms Battle Painting, photographed by Gary Todd, 2012, via Flickr.

Various features of the Art of War bear particular attention. For one thing, it is an extremely systematic work. It begins with a categorization of all of the various factors which contribute to the success or failure of a military campaign. Sun Tzu advocates a holistic assessment of these factors—the weather is just as important as a general’s competence or incompetence. Moreover, Sun Tzu stresses the significance of elements of warfare that seem strikingly modern—in particular, his discussion of the economics of warfare and of the role of intelligence.

Sun Tzu advocates a mixture of conservativism and competence. He believes one should advance from a position only when it has been completely secured, and advocates the near-sacred duty of command hierarchy. However, he also emphasizes the significance of flexibility both within the military apparatus and in terms of how the war is prosecuted.

The cynical view would be that Sun Tzu’s influence, especially among Westerners, comes partly from the impunity with which his work has been interpreted to fit almost any conflict situation and to justify any cause of action. Of course, this is not necessarily a mark against Sun Tzu himself—it is difficult to write a theoretical work that is both ambitious and, at the same time, idiot-proof.

2. St Thomas Aquinas

St Thomas Aquinas by Sandro Botticelli, 1482, via Providence College.

St Thomas Aquinas was a philosopher of war in quite a different way to Sun Tzu, concerned not so much with what it takes to win wars as with what it takes to justify them.

It is worth saying at the outset that what seems to be a sharp distinction of purpose between Aquinas’ work and that of Sun Tzu (and Clausewitz, who we will get onto shortly) does not translate into totally opposite methods of approaching war. Of course, Aquinas is less troubled by the practical business of how to win wars, yet is equally concerned with what it is to offer a complete description of war, to characterize the conditions of war, and to determine what is required for war to end.

Aquinas’ theory of “just war” has two elements—jus ad bellum (the right to begin war) and just in bello (right during wartime). According to Aquinas, war is justified on the basis that it is called by a sovereign authority, that it has a just cause, and that those who wage the war have morally right intentions.

It is worth pausing to observe how stringent these conditions were in a medieval context, when questions of right intention and just cause were rarely, if ever, honestly considered before war was undertaken. Yet there is a conservative strand in Aquinas’ formulation of jus ad bello—the first condition. It states that war can only be justly prosecuted by the sovereign, and is a transparent attempt to guard against war being waged by individuals, including against the sovereign.

Leviathan Frontispiece by Abraham Bosse, 1651, via Columbia University.

Equally, the idea of a just cause is sufficiently broad to justify many wars if we are to take the aggressor’s perspective. In particular, the conditions of a just cause, including righting a past wrong and restoring that which was unjustly taken in the past, can more or less accommodate any war of aggression.

This is a problem for Aquinas, given that he at no point attempts to offer a framework for making these determinations, and this lack of guidance with respect to these practical judgments substantially dilutes the constraints which Aquinas might otherwise be thought to have placed on warfare.

Yet certain elements of Aquinas’ theory of just war have proven to be extremely influential, and continue to be so today in part because they do constitute genuine constraints on the prosecution of wars. In particular, Aquinas’ discussion of self-defense as a justification for warfare has been developed extensively in the field of jurisprudence and international relations.

3. Carl Von Clausewitz

Portrait of Carl Von Clausewitz by Karl Wilhelm Wach, 19th century, via Wikimedia Commons.

Carl Von Clausewitz is arguably the most famous modern theorist of war. His practical experience of war came during the Napoleonic period, when Clausewitz fought for the Prussian military against Napoleon’s France. He was taken as a prisoner of war after the Battle of Jena, during which the Prussian-Saxon forces were authoritatively beaten. The subsequent, involuntary alliance with France led Clausewitz to leave the German army, after which he dedicated time to his major work of military theory, On War.

Part of Clausewitz’s theory of war was the view that, despite the appearance of chaos, every aspect of war could be explained with reference to deep structural factors, including the economic and social context which surrounds it. It is Clausewitz’s conception of war as an all-consuming enterprise—one which can both be explained by holistic social analysis and which can directly involve the whole of society—that has led many subsequent interpretations to focus on his work as inaugurating the modern era in military theory.

This impression of Clausewitz as the first modern military theorist was aided by the subsequent reliance of later generations of Prussian leaders on insights gleaned from him, given that by the late 19th century, Prussia had a claim to be the most modern military apparatus in the world. Yet for all of Clausewitz’s emphasis on the deep, structural forces which drive success or failure in warfare, he was nonetheless keenly aware of the uncertainty involved in warfare: he was particularly skeptical of the value of wartime intelligence and stressed the significance of irrational, emotional states in determining the course of wars. Deciding when predictive judgments can and cannot be made is one of the most difficult tasks for philosophers of war.

thecollector.com · by Luke Dunne · September 29, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com