Quotes of the Day:
“It is difficult to free fools from the chains they revere.”
- Voltaire
“I was in darkness, but I took three steps and found myself in paradise. The first step was a good thought, the second, a good word; and the third, a good deed.”
- Friedrich Nietzsche
"The art of war does not require complicated maneuvers; the simpler ones are to be preferred. Above all, what is needed is common sense. In those terms, it is hard to see how generals make mistakes; it is because they want to be clever. The most difficult thing is to divine the enemy's plans, to see what is true in all the reports one receives. The rest only requires common sense."
- Bonaparte
1. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (04.09.22) CDS comments on key events
2. As Russian Oil Exports Rise, Governments and Shipping Companies Play Cat-and-Mouse
3. Next Wave of Nuclear-Power Plants Sees New Life in Climate Bill
4. Cambodia’s Ream naval base attracts competing patrons
5. Army general declares Americans too fat or criminal to fight in rebuke of service leaders
6. Japan doubles down in defense of post-war order
7. 50 years ago, the Munich Olympics massacre changed how we think about terrorism
8. Military reserves, civil defense worry Taiwan as China looms
9. A Slowing China Helps Rein In Inflation Around the World
10. Read H. P. Lovecraft to Understand War
11. Atreides of Harkonnen? A Literary Corollary for Self-Awareness and Host Nation Perception in Small Wars
12. OPEC+ cuts oil supplies to the world as prices fall
13. Gorbachev Did Save One Communist Party — China’s
14. Ukrainian Forces Recapture Two Towns in the South
15. Liz Truss: The UK’s New Prime Minister and the Indo-Pacific
16. Time to Rethink America’s Nuclear Strategy
17. China seeks 'naval outpost' in Nicaragua to threaten US, Taiwan warns
18. Opposite Sides of the COIN: Understanding Unlikely Insurgent Successes and Failures
19. Why China is fuming over NASA’s Artemis program
20. From China to Mexico to NYC: How fentanyl became ‘a weapon of mass destruction’ in the US
21. How the West is racing to stop Ukraine's guns falling silent
22. New “gang of four” in Taiwan challenges China
23. Wife leaked intel about her husband's military unit to Russia, who then bombed it, says Ukraine's secret service
24. ‘A white nationalist pyramid scheme’: how Patriot Front recruits young members
1. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (04.09.22) CDS comments on key events
Note: "Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainiansecurity think tank. We operate since 2020 and are involved in security studies, defence policy research and advocacy. Currently all our activity is focused on stopping the ongoing war."
CDS Daily brief (04.09.22) CDS comments on key events
Humanitarian aspect:
As of the morning of September 4, 2022, more than 1,122 Ukrainian children are victims of full- scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation, Prosecutor General's Office reports. The official number of children who have died and been wounded in the course of the Russian aggression has increased to 380 and more than 737, respectively. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories.
More than seven thousand Ukrainian children have been illegally taken to Russia since the beginning of the war, Ombudsman Dmytro Lubenets said. Only 51 children were returned. Russia is preventing the return of Ukrainian children as much as possible as it plans to assimilate them.
In Donetsk Oblast, on September 3, 4 civilians were killed by enemy shelling; 2 more were wounded.
In Zaporizhzhya Oblast, on September 3, the enemy attacked the Vasylivskyi and Pologivskyi districts of the region. As a result, eighteen objects of civil infrastructure were damaged.
On the night of September 4, Mykolaiv was subjected to a massive rocket attack. Three medical facilities, two educational institutions, a hotel, a museum, and residential buildings were damaged. In addition, the power grid and water supply were damaged, utility services are working at the site.
The Russian occupiers also shelled the Mykolaiv, Voznesensk and Bashtan districts of Mykolayiv Oblast (1 child died, 3 others were injured).
In the morning, the Russian aggressors destroyed an elevator with several thousand tons of grain in Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast. In addition to the elevator, dozens of houses were damaged. The scale of the damage is being established, according to the deputy mayor of Ochakiv, Oleksiy Vaskov.
At night, the Russians shelled the restaurant complex "Dubrovsky" in Kharkiv. The restaurant burned down.
On the afternoon of September 4, Russian occupiers shelled districts of Kharkiv again; there were victims among civilians. According to Oleh Synegubov, the head of the Oblast Military Administration, 2 people have been hospitalized.
On September 3, the Russian military shelled the Kharkiv, Izyum (1 wounded), Bogodukhiv and Chuhuiv districts (1 killed, 1 wounded) of Kharkiv Oblast. Private houses and commercial
buildings were damaged. A 50-year-old woman was killed in the Zolochiv community of Kharkiv Oblast due to today's shelling by Russians. In addition, three people were injured in the village of Andriyivka near Izyum, according to the Oblast Military Administration.
At night, the enemy shelled the Nikopol district of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast three times. As a result of the shelling, dozens of residential buildings, outbuildings, and the plant's territory were damaged, said the head of the Oblast Military Administration, Valentyn Reznichenko.
On September 3, the Russian occupiers shelled Bilopilska and Krasnopilska communities in Sumy Oblast. In total, almost 70 enemy shellings from self-propelled guns and mortars were recorded.
Volunteers of World Central Kitchen came under Russian shelling in eastern Ukraine. Three trucks are damaged, and some of the food is destroyed. Chef and WCK founder José Andrés tweeted about it. According to him, none of the volunteer team was injured. World Central Kitchen has been feeding people in hot spots worldwide for over a decade. During the six months of the war in Ukraine, WCK volunteers prepared more than 130 million meals.
Germany will allocate €200 million to Ukraine for internally displaced persons. German Economic Development Minister Svenja Schulze said that a corresponding agreement would be signed today during the visit of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal to Berlin, Reuters reports. According to the UN, 7 million Ukrainian citizens became internally displaced due to Russian aggression.
Occupied territories
In the Kherson Oblast, the occupiers have been carrying out "filtration measures" among local residents since the morning. Serhiy Bratchuk, speaker of the Odesa Military Administration, citing information from local residents, reports that the invaders are trying to intimidate people and force them to hand over their relatives and friends, who are members of the resistance movement.
The occupation authorities of Melitopol report a massive power outage in the city.
Operational situation
It is the 193rd day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy continues to concentrate on establishing full control over the territory of Donetsk Oblast, maintaining the captured parts of Kherson, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhya, and Mykolaiv Oblasts.
The enemy continues offensive actions in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas. They continue to actively use air defense means to cover their troops. The enemy conducts UAV aerial reconnaissance with high intensity and is trying to improve the logistical support of its troops.
Over the past 24 hours, the enemy has launched more than 10 missile and more than 24 airstrikes at military and civilian objects on the territory of Ukraine. In particular, civilian infrastructure was damaged in the areas of Peremoga, Husarivka, Novomykhailivka, and Biloghirya.
The threat of systematic massive air and missile strikes on military and critical infrastructure facilities throughout Ukraine continues to persist.
Due to the lack of high-precision weapons, the enemy began to use outdated S-300 anti-aircraft guided missiles more often. More than 500 such missiles have already been used, some of which did not reach the target. The Russian military has about 7,000 5n55 rockets in their arsenal, but a large part of them are not suitable for use due to their poor technical condition.
The enemy shelled the military and civilian infrastructure using tanks, combat vehicles, barrel and rocket artillery at Mikhalchyna Sloboda in Chernihiv and Stukalivka in Sumy Oblasts.
During the past day, to support the actions of the ground groupings, the aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out 11 strikes aimed at destroying the enemy manpower, combat and special equipment, EW, air defense and logistic support facilities in the Donetsk and Pivdenny Buh directions.
Missile troops and artillery of the Ukrainian ground groupings continue to perform counter- battery combat tasks and breach the enemy's control system and logistical support. During the past day, Ukrainian Defence Forces inflicted fire damage on four enemy control points, the areas of concentration of combat equipment and personnel of the tank battalion, and the object of accommodation of the enemy's personnel. In addition, the "Zoopark" counter-battery radar, the "Zhitel" electronic warfare station, an ammunition depot, and a large number of the enemy's manpower were destroyed.
In anticipation of danger, the Russian occupiers strengthened the administrative and policing regime in the towns and villages located on the banks of the Dnipro River and the coastline protection in the temporarily captured areas of Zaporizhzhya and Kherson Oblasts. In addition, the Russian state companies have been given new targets for selecting "volunteers" for the war. Thus, the Russian Railways company received an order to search for up to 10,000 new candidates for a short-term contract among civilian employees.
The Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus are conducting the readiness review of field communication systems as part of preparations for the command and staff exercises.
The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction
• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;
• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs
The enemy shelled the areas of Kozacha Lopan, Kharkiv, Slatyne, Sosnivka, Udy, Petrivka, Velyki Prohody, Stary Saltiv, Andriyivka, Krasnopillya, Prudyanka, Ruski Tyshki, Cherkaski Tyshki, Ruska Lozova, Pryshyb, Husarivka, and Nortsivka.
Kramatorsk direction
● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;
● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs
Bohorodychne, Dolyna, Krasnopillya, Sloviansk, Siversk, Raihorodok, Donetske, Ivano-Daryivka, Vesele, Karnaukhivka, Nova Dmytrivka, Velyka Komyshuvaha were shelled by enemy artillery.
Ukrainian Defense Forces managed to successfully repulse enemy attacks in the areas of Bohorodychne, Pasika, Soledar, and Dolyna.
Donetsk direction
● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet", 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs
Enemy shelled from mortars, tanks, barrel and jet artillery the areas of Zaytseve, Bakhmutske, Soledar, Bakhmut, Bilohorivka, Vyimka, Rozdolivka, Avdiivka, Novokalynove, Berdychi, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Kodema, and Vesela Dolyna.
The Ukrainian Defense Forces successfully repelled enemy attacks in the areas of Bakhmut, Pokrovske, Bakhmutske, Pisky, Pervomaiske, Novobakhmutivka, Kodema, Zaitseve, Avdiivka, and Maryinka.
Zaporizhzhya direction
● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs
The enemy shelled the areas of Krasnohorivka, Orlivka, Biloghirya, Olgivske, Zelene Pole, Novopil, Novosilka, Vremivka, Maryinka, Novomykhailivka, Velyka Novosilka, Paraskoviivka, Zolota Nyva, Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka, Orihiv, Hulyaipole, Dorozhnyanka, and Uspenivka.
Kherson direction
● Vasylivka–Nova Zburyivka and Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line - 252 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 27, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.3 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiments of the 106th parachute airborne division, 7th military base of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 16th and 346th separate SOF brigades
There is no change in the operational situation.
Kherson-Berislav bridgehead
● Velyka Lepetikha – Oleksandrivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 250 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces – 22, the average width of the combat area of one BTG –
11.8 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 108th Air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault brigade of the 7th Air assault division, 4th military base of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 239th Air assault regiments of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331 Air assault regiments of the 98th Air assault division, 126th separate coastal defense brigade, 127th separate ranger brigade, 11th separate airborne assault brigade, 10th separate SOF brigade, PMC
The Ukrainian Defense Forces with units of the Foreign Legion, the battalion of Chechen volunteers, the 17th separate tank brigade, 45th separate artillery brigade, 128th separate mountain assault brigade, 60th separate infantry brigade, and units of the 73rd SOF Center (Marine) attacked the positions of the enemy 10th separate SOF brigade, 34th separate motorized rifle brigade, 126th separate coastal defense brigade, 205th separate motorized rifle brigade, supported by the 227th artillery brigade and 140th artillery regiment.
The AFU 60th separate infantry brigade surrounded Russian forces from two directions (from Ivanivka and from Potemkyne) and liberated Vysokopillia, destroyed BMD-2, captured T-72B3M, BMP-2 and BMD-2 of the enemy's 11th separate airborne assault brigade (the brigade had already suffered losses near Hostomel and was restored); the fighting continues. Near Myrolyubivka, units of the 60th separate infantry brigade entered the village and captured two enemy BMP-2s.
In Petrivtsi area, the AFU 128th separate mountain assault brigade lost four T-72M1 tanks, several trucks and BRM-1K, coming under artillery fire with one of its advancing columns. In the battles, the units of the brigade, having broken through the battle formations of the Russians, moved deep and captured the Silok-M1 UAV countermeasures station.
The AFU 45th separate artillery brigade destroyed with artillery fire enemy's armored personnel carrier and self-propelled guns 2c5 in the areas of Lyubimivka and Khreshchenivka.
The units of the 73rd SOF Center (m), taking advantage of the results of the strike, hit three enemy BMDs and damaged three more units of enemy combat equipment in Khreshchenivka and opened the way for the development of the offensive of the 60th separate infantry brigade and the 128th separate mountain assault brigade further to the east. The brigades' units attacked the enemy positions of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade BTG in Zolota Balka and liberated this village.
Ukrainian units broke into Lyubimivka from the north and northwest and took positions on its northern outskirts, capturing enemy BMP.
Units of the Foreign Legion broke into Arkhangelsk and continue fighting.
Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:
The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the sea and connect unrecognized Transnistria with the Russian Federation by land through the coast of the Black and Azov seas.
The number of enemy ships stationed in the Black Sea is 11 warships and boats. Two Kalibr cruise missile carriers, namely a frigate of project 1135.6 and one "Buyan-M" type corvette, are in the southern part of Crimea, ready for a missile attack. Up to 16 Kalibr missiles may be ready for a salvo.
Most large amphibious ships are in the ports of Novorossiysk and Sevastopol for replenishment and scheduled maintenance. There are no signs of preparation for an amphibious assault on the southern coast of Ukraine.
The 810th Marine Brigade restaffs and restores combat readiness at Crimea's combat training grounds.
One submarine of project 636.3 is located in Sevastopol, and three are in Novorossiysk. A Russian corvette, minesweeper and boats are on patrol in the Sea of Azov.
Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 10 Su-27, Su-30 and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.
The enemy continues to attack the seaports of Ukraine. For this purpose, the enemy uses mainly MLRS and S-300 air defense systems, sometimes cruise missiles. Russian occupiers launched a massive rocket attack on Mykolaiv on September 4 at 2:30 am. Three medical institutions, two educational institutions, a hotel, a museum, and residential buildings came under fire. Air defense forces in the Mykolaiv region shot down a Russian Kh-59 missile fired by an enemy Su- 35 fighter jet around 6 am on September 4. Also, at 6 am on September 4, the occupiers launched a rocket attack on the town of Ochakiv. As a result of the explosions, the object of civil infrastructure with thousands of tons of grain and residential buildings was damaged.
The largest caravan of ships since the opening of the "grain corridor" departed today from the Odesa coast. Nine dry cargoes and four tankers with Ukrainian agro-industrial products left the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdenny. The cargo vessel BS CALLISTO led the caravan, followed by the tankers MUBARIZ IBRAHIMOV, CANOPUS, GEN. POLAD HASHIMOV and MRC LINA. The bulk carriers LADY EVA, SARA, SEA DOLPHIN C, LADY PERLA and MAINA are also in the wake formation. The largest vessel of the caravan is the bulk carrier NORD VIRGO, 229 meters
long, and the smallest is the 80-meter SEALOCK. Finally, the dry cargo AFANASIY MATYUSHENKO under the Ukrainian flag with the home port of Kherson, heading to the Turkish port of Tekirdag, closes the caravan.
In total, 282.5 thousand tons of Ukrainian agricultural products are on board 13 ships headed to eight countries of the world. Thus, the total volume of grain transported since August 1 has exceeded 2 million tons. The first million tons took 4 weeks of work, while the second million tons were transported in just one week. Thus, reaching the planned transportation volume of 4 million tons of grain per month is realistic.
Operational losses of the enemy from 24.02 to 04.09
Personnel - almost 49,500 people (+450);
Tanks – 2,049 (+15);
Armored combat vehicles – 4,430 (+27);
Artillery systems – 1,147 (+13);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 294 (+1); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 156 (+3); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,276 (+8);
Aircraft - 236 (+1);
Helicopters – 206 (+1);
UAV operational and tactical level - 864 (0); Intercepted cruise missiles - 203 (0);
Boats / ships - 15 (0).
Ukraine, general news
Ukrainian exports increased by 25% in August, said the Ministry of Economy. In August, Ukraine exported 7.29 million tons of products worth $3.36 billion.
The leading export goods are:
— sunflower oil ($443 million);
— corn ($347 million);
— rapeseed ($305 million).
The labor market in Ukraine is an employer's market. According to the robota.ua employment portal, the number of job seekers in the Ukrainian labor market is three times greater than the number of open vacancies. The leader among available vacancies is Kyiv, and the worst situation is next to the temporarily occupied territories. For example, there are only 300 vacancies in Mykolaiv, while there are 13,000 in Kyiv.
International diplomatic aspect
Russia’s war of aggression caused a profound change in the European security architecture. It revitalized NATO and drew two more members - Finland and Sweden. Other neutral countries
are on the way to deepening their ties with the Alliance. Though unwilling to abandon their neutrality at the moment, more than half of Swiss (56%) – support increased ties with NATO, which is well above the 37% average in recent years.
Irish people are divided by half on a hypothetical membership issue. Fifty-two per cent would love to see their nation in NATO, while 48% oppose it, according to BehaviourWise. However, two-thirds think that it’s better to remain neutral. Forty percent of the Irish support the idea of giving military aid to Ukraine, while as many as thirty-nine percent believe it shouldn’t. Two- thirds believe the EU should ban Russian energy imports even if it means higher energy prices in Ireland. Most Irish worry about the rising cost of food (89%) and that the war in Ukraine will lead to food shortages and hunger in many countries (83%).
Ukraine’s prime minister has thanked Germany for its support while in Berlin. It’s the first high- level bilateral visit after President Frank-Walter Steinmeier didn’t make it to Kyiv in April. “Germany has made huge progress in its support of Ukraine with weapons,” Denys Shmyhal praised Olaf Scholz before going on with the hope that Berlin would do way more, including sending “modern combat tanks” such as the Leopard 2.
There is a long list of light arms, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and various equipment and ammunition Germany has already provided Ukraine. However, Kyiv asks for more heavy armament and artillery systems like MLRS MARS II and Panzerhaubitzen 2000 howitzers, a handful of which has already been delivered. Germany pledged to produce state-of-the-art IRIS- T SLM air defence systems for Ukraine, but it takes time while the war rages on.
Germany has been under criticism from its allies in Central and Eastern Europe for not doing enough in support of Ukraine. The missile ground it still tries to hold with regard to Russia doesn’t reflect the situation and sows distrust among the Eastern allies. There was one more collective call of German public intellectuals on their government to play diplomacy. “A modus vivendi must be found with the Russian government based on the acknowledgement of realities that one does not like, which rules out a further escalation of the war. In the end, there will have to be an agreement between Ukraine and Russia,” stated the appeal. Being aware that there’s no room for diplomacy with Russia yet, Berlin is not in a hurry to create such a space with significant defense aid.
Ukraine’s prime minister expressed his hope that €5 billion in macro-financial assistance from the EU would be secured this week. Meanwhile, Germany announced a €200 million aid package to assist internally displaced people in Ukraine.
Russia, relevant news
Having invested 17% of its gold and currency reserves in yuan, the Russian Federation found it impossible to return funds from Chinese assets. The sale of yuan, in which more than $100 billions of Russian reserves were invested on January 1, requires a separate agreement with
China. This requires permission from the Chinese authorities, and "it will be very difficult to get it in a crisis," as the Russian central bank says.
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2. As Russian Oil Exports Rise, Governments and Shipping Companies Play Cat-and-Mouse
Excerpts:
Toward the end of the year, Maxar plans to launch the first two WorldView Legion satellites, another pair two months after that, and another two a couple months later. The new satellites will allow Maxar to triple its revisit of certain spots to up to 15 times per day.
Smith said that the number of calls they’ve received from intelligence entities looking to track Russian oil has gone up considerably and it's not just in the Black Sea. Russian smugglers are resorting to strange, but ultimately futile, tactics to avoid being seen.
One time, he said, Maxar satellites found a Russian oil vessel that was properly broadcasting its identity via the AIS tracking system—and offloading oil to a ship that was not. “You can see vessels next to each other. You can see the pipe where the oil was being actually, you know, offloaded onto a dark vessel. And then, interestingly enough, there was another dark vessel that was kind of approaching. And it looks like it's almost, like, lining up, like it was a gas station.”
As Russian Oil Exports Rise, Governments and Shipping Companies Play Cat-and-Mouse
High-tech tracking tools haven’t deterred Black Sea smugglers from lining tankers up like cars at a gas station.
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
Russia is exporting “more oil than ever” despite Western attempts to cut off one of Moscow’s economic lifelines and despite new tools and technologies that make it harder to hide energy shipments, according to analysts and observers. Some governments, it seems, are determined to buy Russia’s oil even if they don’t support its war on Ukraine.
Robin Brooks and his colleagues at the Institute of International Finance, or IFF, built a database to track the movement of oil tankers out of Russian ports. That’s not as easy as it sounds because those tankers “are registered and flagged all over the place,” to hide their actual ownership, according to an August 25 briefing note from the association obtained by Defense One. “We trace the ultimate owner through shell companies as needed, which provides some perspective on who has been helping to ship Russian oil around the world,” the note says. “The conclusion from this work is that tanker capacity out of Russia has been robust overall.”
Brooks, the IIF’s chief economist, put it more directly on Twitter: “Russia is exporting more crude than ever.”
That may come as a surprise. Many Western oil companies ditched Russian crude after the Kremlin launched its illegal offensive on Ukraine in February. Energy prices soared past $120 a barrel; many speculated that the price could hit $150 by year’s end.
But the global benchmark price for crude oil has fallen back to $90 a barrel—and Russia is selling it for about 20 percent less. China, India, and even NATO member Turkey are buying more Russian oil than ever. Now U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is pushing G7 nations, which together comprise about 30 percent of the global economy, to place a price cap on Russian oil, which she says would squeeze Moscow and keep global energy prices in check.
But just as Russia has found willing buyers, they’ve also found willing shippers. “Attracted by higher tanker rates, Greek-owned tankers have stepped in to increase Russia's capacity to sell oil to the global market,” Jonathan Pingle, associate research analyst with the IIF, said in an email. “For each crude tanker we track out of Russian ports, we scrape for the location of the beneficial owner's headquarters. From this, we've found that Western-owned tankers have accounted for an increasingly large portion of Russia's shipping capacity. Greek-owned vessels have provided 55 percent of capacity since the start of the war, compared to 35 percent in years prior.”
New Tools to Spot Russian Oil Movers At Sea
Russia may still have buyers for its crude but those transactions won’t be as invisible as the participants may want. In addition to new tools like the IIS database, satellite imagery and pieces of other open-source information are making it easier for Western observers to track Russian oil movers.
Satellite image provider Maxar has a tool called Crows Nest that can track ships that are trying to avoid detection. That’s been very useful in the effort to stop Russia from smuggling Ukrainian grain.
Bryan Smith, Maxar’s director of maritime products, said the technique uses radar to scout wide areas for potential targets. Maxar then uses its numerous high-resolution satellites to survey the ships, even those that are trying to “go dark” by turning off their automatic identification system, or AIS. They use AI to predict things like speed and momentum so that they know where to point the satellite during the next revisit, “which will allow for us to maintain chain of custody,” he said.
Toward the end of the year, Maxar plans to launch the first two WorldView Legion satellites, another pair two months after that, and another two a couple months later. The new satellites will allow Maxar to triple its revisit of certain spots to up to 15 times per day.
Smith said that the number of calls they’ve received from intelligence entities looking to track Russian oil has gone up considerably and it's not just in the Black Sea. Russian smugglers are resorting to strange, but ultimately futile, tactics to avoid being seen.
One time, he said, Maxar satellites found a Russian oil vessel that was properly broadcasting its identity via the AIS tracking system—and offloading oil to a ship that was not. “You can see vessels next to each other. You can see the pipe where the oil was being actually, you know, offloaded onto a dark vessel. And then, interestingly enough, there was another dark vessel that was kind of approaching. And it looks like it's almost, like, lining up, like it was a gas station.”
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
3. Next Wave of Nuclear-Power Plants Sees New Life in Climate Bill
We need more nuclear power. Except in conflict areas. The lesson from Ukraine is something we should have always known: every nuclear power facility is a potential target.
But climate change activists, environmental advocates and business and industry advocates should all be aligned on the importance of nuclear energy for the future.
Next Wave of Nuclear-Power Plants Sees New Life in Climate Bill
Federal support, investor interest boost idea of building small reactors at closing coal plants or industrial sites, but economics remain unproven
https://www.wsj.com/articles/next-wave-of-nuclear-power-plants-sees-new-life-in-climate-bill-11662370381?mod=hp_lead_pos9
By Jennifer HillerFollow
Sept. 5, 2022 5:33 am ET
Smaller-scale nuclear-power proposals are getting a boost of federal support under the recently passed climate, healthcare and tax bill. Now their backers must prove the projects can be delivered on time and on budget.
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Investor interest in what are known as advanced reactors—pitched as the next generation of nuclear power—has grown in recent years because the reactors are potentially cheaper and faster to build than their predecessors. But their economics are unproven and none are currently under construction in the U.S.
Subsidies for advanced reactors under the legislative package which President Biden signed into law in August could spur some projects forward, say analysts and executives.
The projects would qualify for production or investment-tax credits also available to wind and solar power under the new law. They could receive an enhanced credit if they are placed near former coal-fired power plants, an idea that has taken hold among utility companies in search of new, stable forms of power generation. Projects eventually could receive billions of dollars through the credits, say analysts.
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New reactors could face the same challenges that energy infrastructure of all kinds has faced because of issues such as slow permitting. Sen. Joe Manchin (D., W.Va.) has proposed legislation as a companion to the climate bill to speed approvals, though it faces political headwinds.
Nuclear-power generation has steadily declined in recent years, with 13 units shut since 2013, as it faces concerns over spent fuel and other environmental issues, as well as competition from cheaper energy sources, including wind, solar and natural gas.
The law also offers tax credits to help existing nuclear reactors stay open. But some utility executives and project developers say new nuclear plants ought to be built to simultaneously meet growing energy demand, corporate climate targets and Mr. Biden’s climate goals.
“Even preserving the nuclear fleet is not enough,” said Jeff Lyash, chief executive of the Tennessee Valley Authority, which oversees power generation for a large part of the mid-South.
Nuclear-power plants including the Calvert Cliffs facility in Lusby, Md., face competition from cheaper energy sources.
PHOTO: ALYSSA SCHUKAR FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The TVA holds an early federal permit that approves a site near Oak Ridge, Tenn., about 15 miles west of Knoxville, for small reactor deployment. Mr. Lyash said it would be a few years before the company decides whether to construct the reactor.
The nuclear industry has a history of delays and cost overruns. Just one large nuclear plant is under construction in the U.S.—Southern Co.’s expansion of its Vogtle facility in Georgia—and it is more than five years delayed and billions of dollars over its initial projected cost. Other countries including China and Russia are building smaller reactors, but skeptics say the effort is a gamble on a technology with unproven economics.
“I think we’re in some sort of a nuclear bubble here,” said Edwin Lyman, director of nuclear-power safety at the nonprofit Union of Concerned Scientists, a nuclear-safety watchdog. “There are multiple federal vehicles for subsidizing these projects. The question is: ‘Is there really a demand?’ Or ‘Is this supply-driven?’”
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The climate-and-tax bill offers tax credits to help nuclear reactors such as Braidwood Generating Station in Illinois stay open.
PHOTO: TAYLOR GLASCOCK FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Advanced nuclear reactors could deliver carbon-free power but first must overcome the industry’s poor record on project execution, said Chris Levesque, CEO of TerraPower LLC, which plans a reactor project near the site of a closing coal plant in Kemmerer, Wyo.
“There is a show-me aspect to this,” Mr. Levesque said.
Clay Sell, CEO at advanced nuclear company X-Energy LLC, said tax credits could help the industry follow the same path as wind and solar, which have seen widespread development and plummeting project costs. “This provision carries with it the same level of promise for the nuclear industry,” Mr. Sell said.
In August, Dow Inc. said it would consider placing an X-Energy high-temperature gas reactor at one of Dow’s Gulf Coast sites to provide power and heat for industrial processes. Advanced nuclear technology will be critical to helping energy-intensive industries decarbonize, said Edward Stones, Dow business vice president for energy and climate.
TerraPower plans a reactor project near the site of a coal plant that is closing in Kemmerer, Wyo.
PHOTO: NATALIE BEHRING/ASSOCIATED PRESS
TerraPower, which is backed by Bill Gates, said in August that it had raised $750 million, including $250 million from Korean conglomerate SK Group. Moohwan Kim, an executive vice president at holding company SK Inc., said the company has invested in TerraPower “under the judgment that nuclear will be a vital part of the energy transition in the future.”
TerraPower and X-Energy were chosen by the Energy Department to test, license and build what are called demonstration reactors to prove the technology. Last year’s bipartisan infrastructure law included $3.2 billion for such projects.
The idea of building smaller reactors isn’t new, but 10 years ago potential customers were unsure how to evaluate costs and regulatory risks, said Carlos Leipner, director of global nuclear-energy strategy at the pronuclear environmental-policy group Clean Air Task Force.
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“It’s easier to quantify and manage this risk, and hence, we’re seeing stakeholders that before would never consider nuclear talking about nuclear today,” Mr. Leipner said.
The latest legislation included $700 million to help research, develop and produce more highly enriched uranium fuel that would be needed for some proposed advanced-reactor projects. Russia was considered the chief fuel supplier for those projects before its invasion of Ukraine exposed the fragility of global nuclear-fuel supplies. Domestic fuel would be critical for the commercialization of certain reactor designs, say analysts.
Write to Jennifer Hiller at jennifer.hiller@wsj.com
4. Cambodia’s Ream naval base attracts competing patrons
Strategic competition.
Excerpts:
There are legitimate operational reasons for Cambodia to develop its naval facilities and, by allowing China to fund the base’s development, Cambodia is taking advantage of Beijing’s efforts to win influence in Southeast Asia. Yet Phnom Penh is aware of the sensitivity surrounding the base and the need to ensure that it is not used by foreign powers to harm the interests of ASEAN member states.
This sentiment was demonstrated by the joint Cambodian–Vietnamese declaration in December 2021 — that no hostile forces would be allowed to use their respective territories to harm each other’s security. The Cambodian officials interviewed say that their position does not allow the Ream Naval Base to be used by one major power against another.
As US–China competition intensifies, the window during which Cambodia can extract benefits from competing patrons while resisting major power pressure to take sides is narrowing. Cambodian policymakers should consider this when charting the Kingdom’s course through the choppy waters of great power rivalry.
Cambodia’s Ream naval base attracts competing patrons | East Asia Forum
5 September 2022
Author: Abdul Rahman Yaacob, ANU
eastasiaforum.org · by Abdul Rahman Yaacob · September 5, 2022
Author: Abdul Rahman Yaacob, ANU
Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base — a facility in the Gulf of Thailand — has in recent years been the subject of interest from major powers competing for influence in Southeast Asia. China’s efforts to access the base first surfaced in July 2019 after the Wall Street Journal reported an alleged agreement allowing the Chinese military to use the base. The Cambodian government facilitated a visit to the naval base for 70 local and foreign journalists to counter the findings of the report.
Despite Cambodia’s efforts to dispel allegations of a Chinese military presence at the Ream Naval Base, suspicions continued to mount. Following US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman’s visit to Phnom Penh in 2021, the Cambodian government agreed to a visit by the Cambodia-based US Defence Attaché. But the visit marked a downward trend in US–Cambodia relations as the US Embassy in Phnom Penh claimed that Cambodian military officials refused full access to the base.
A Cambodian defence official, interviewed under Chatham House Rules, provided a counter-narrative on the US visit. In response to Sherman’s request, the Cambodian government formed a Coordination Working Group to meet the US Defence Attaché’s requirements. The visit included a one-hour meeting, visits to newly constructed buildings, an Australian-supported naval workshop and the construction of the new Tactical Command Headquarters at Koh Preab.
While the visit initially went according to plan, the US delegation demanded access to areas outside the visitation agreement’s scope. From Cambodia’s perspective, the sudden demand to access areas beyond what was agreed challenged its sovereignty and national security — so they rejected the delegation’s demands. The Cambodian defence official noted that the United States would react the same way if a foreign official demanded unrestricted access to the Pentagon.
Cambodian officials involved in recently-concluded research consistently highlighted the Cambodian navy’s weakness in enforcing the kingdom’s maritime security. Shore-to-ship communication capabilities are lacking and the Royal Cambodian Navy is unable to track the movement and location of Cambodian navy vessels further out at sea. The Ream Naval Base does not have the facilities to host large visiting warships and the surrounding waters are too shallow to host large foreign naval vessels. Visiting foreign naval vessels are regularly based at the nearby commercially-run Sihanoukville Port.
The recently announced Chinese-funded development project at the Ream Naval Base aims to provide the Cambodian Navy with the facilities and technology to address these shortcomings. The development project will improve medical and training facilities and repair eight Cambodian naval vessels. Other new facilities will cover communication and surveillance systems, including communication and radar facilities critical for long-range shore-to-ship communication and to track the location of Cambodian naval vessels out at sea. The waters around the base will be deepened, and wharves will be built to enable larger foreign warships to dock. These developments will allow Cambodia to receive larger foreign naval vessels on goodwill or training visits at the base.
The Cambodian official added that China is funding the developmental project without any conditions attached. During the negotiations, the Chinese understood that Cambodia would not share control of the Ream Naval Base and that Phnom Penh would not take sides in the US–China rivalry.
The same official also noted that the United States had a keen interest in the naval base. When Cambodia demolished a US-funded building attached to the base in 2020, the United States reportedly offered to build two new buildings in return for shared authority over parts of the base, a proposal that Cambodia rejected.
There are legitimate operational reasons for Cambodia to develop its naval facilities and, by allowing China to fund the base’s development, Cambodia is taking advantage of Beijing’s efforts to win influence in Southeast Asia. Yet Phnom Penh is aware of the sensitivity surrounding the base and the need to ensure that it is not used by foreign powers to harm the interests of ASEAN member states.
This sentiment was demonstrated by the joint Cambodian–Vietnamese declaration in December 2021 — that no hostile forces would be allowed to use their respective territories to harm each other’s security. The Cambodian officials interviewed say that their position does not allow the Ream Naval Base to be used by one major power against another.
As US–China competition intensifies, the window during which Cambodia can extract benefits from competing patrons while resisting major power pressure to take sides is narrowing. Cambodian policymakers should consider this when charting the Kingdom’s course through the choppy waters of great power rivalry.
Abdul Rahman Yaacob is a PhD candidate at the National Security College (NSC), The Australian National University (ANU). He was one of the four Chief Investigators in a recently concluded project on Australia–ASEAN defence relations which was hosted by NSC and funded by the Australian Army Research Centre. Some information for this article is derived from interviews with senior Cambodian defence officials.
eastasiaforum.org · by Abdul Rahman Yaacob · September 5, 2022
5. Army general declares Americans too fat or criminal to fight in rebuke of service leaders
Ouch. I doubt the general intense this as a rebuke of service leaders and was simply sharing a common observation - or perhaps observable facts.
Excerpts:
Although that memo pointed to some of the same challenges — declining interest, poor messaging on career and benefits from service, and potential recruits not quite physically or intellectually qualified for the Army — Wormuth and McConville said the responsibility is first and foremost with the Army.
“This is not a recruiter problem. This is an Army problem,” the memo said.
However, Brunson said the issues are wider than with the Army.
“Some of the challenges we have are obesity, we have pre-existing medical conditions, we have behavioral health problems, we have criminality, people with felonies, and we have drug use,” he said. “This is not an Army problem, this is an American problem.”
Army general declares Americans too fat or criminal to fight in rebuke of service leaders
"This is not an Army problem, this is an American problem."
BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED SEP 4, 2022 3:01 PM
taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · September 4, 2022
The Army’s recruiting troubles stem from Americans not being fit to serve or simply not interested in service, the head of the Army’s I Corps said this week. Lt. Gen. Xavier Brunson’s comments run contrary to what the secretary of the Army and the service’s chief of staff stated earlier this year when outlining efforts to combat this year’s poor recruitment numbers.
Brunson made the comments in an interview with The Spokesman Review in Washington State, where Brunson is also head of Joint Base Lewis-McChord.
In the interview, Brunson was primarily discussing how to reach younger Americans — his strategy involves “influencers” such as teachers and better messaging about Army benefits — but as part of outlining what needs to change, Brunson also was blunt in his criticisms about military-age Americans.
“Only 23% of the people that are of age to serve are actually qualified,” Brunson told the Spokesman Review. “This is now a condition. This is not an Army problem, so nationally what we have to look at is what’s going on with our youth.”
Brunson’s comments run counter to what Army Secretary Christine Wormuth and Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville wrote in a July memo, which stated the service has been unable to win the “war for talent” and find ways to make the Army more attractive to young Americans.
Although that memo pointed to some of the same challenges — declining interest, poor messaging on career and benefits from service, and potential recruits not quite physically or intellectually qualified for the Army — Wormuth and McConville said the responsibility is first and foremost with the Army.
“This is not a recruiter problem. This is an Army problem,” the memo said.
However, Brunson said the issues are wider than with the Army.
“Some of the challenges we have are obesity, we have pre-existing medical conditions, we have behavioral health problems, we have criminality, people with felonies, and we have drug use,” he said. “This is not an Army problem, this is an American problem.”
The criticism of younger Americans’ fitness isn’t unique. The Defense Department has made it clear that it worries Generation Z might not be physically capable of service, with their “brittle” bones not prepared for the strain of boot camp.
The Army, while not alone in its recruiting troubles, has been trying several strategies to try and make military service more appealing to potential soldiers. McConville has said the Army will not lower its recruiting standards, as it has done in the past, so instead it is launching a program to get potential soldiers trained and educated enough to meet those goals. The Future Soldiers Preparatory Course launched last month as a pilot program, and those in it will go through a 90-day training period.
Beyond the messaging Brunson advocates for, and the training the Army is hoping will help bolster numbers, the service branch is trying a classic tactic: money. The Army has set up multiple types of enlistment bonuses, including one as high as $50,000, for soldiers who will both join the military and deploy to basic training as soon as possible.
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taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton · September 4, 2022
6. Japan doubles down in defense of post-war order
Excerpts:
Tokyo is investing in diplomacy to secure European support in the case of a similar act of aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Speaking at the NATO Summit meeting in Madrid on 29 June, Kishida said that “Russian aggression against Ukraine is not a problem for Europe alone, but instead an outrageous act that undermines the very foundation of the international order.”
As the war in Ukraine has unfolded, the focus on the collective defense provisions enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has opened new avenues for consultation between Japan and other Asia Pacific allies.
The Kishida administration will complete a comprehensive strategic review by the end of 2022 and a new National Security Strategy will be announced. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will feature prominently in Japan’s assessment of the geopolitics it must be prepared to navigate. But so will China.
For Japan, accepting aggression akin to the kind Russia has perpetrated would raise the risk that China might also see an opportunity to use force. Putin’s claim of an alternative Russian history to justify his invasion also draws parallels to President Xi Jinping’s narrative of China’s regional claims.
Japan doubles down in defense of post-war order
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has expedited a debate about pacifist Japan’s military preparedness and strategy
asiatimes.com · by Sheila A Smith · September 5, 2022
Japan has gone all-in with the Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The strategic consequences for Tokyo are considerable. Japan’s long-running efforts to conclude a formal peace agreement with its northern neighbor have come to an end.
Putin’s aggression has also accelerated debate in Japan about its own strategy and future military preparedness. Most important of all, the Japanese people have also defined this crisis as a challenge to the norms of the post-war order that they have relied upon for their own security.
When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 22, 2022, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was quick to take a stand. The Kishida cabinet announced that, along with G7 nations, it would impose sanctions on Russia and it began to mobilize financial support for the Ukrainian government.
In the weeks following, Japan provided humanitarian assistance for evacuees and even material support for Ukrainian defense forces.
This represents a significant strategic shift. Former prime minister Shinzo Abe was unable to negotiate a post-war peace treaty with Putin, and Japan’s efforts to improve bilateral ties failed. Japan’s diplomatic efforts targeting Russia focused on the possibility of a compromise on the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands and improved bilateral ties. But the aim was broader. Abe wanted to try to coax Russia away from strategic partnership with China.
Diplomacy with Russia intensified after Japan and China clashed in the East China Sea over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, resulting in increased Chinese Coast Guard and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activities in and around Japanese territorial waters. Abe hoped that in engaging with Putin, he could offer an alternative to Russian cooperation with China.
By 2018, Putin publicly questioned the idea that the Kuril Islands were up for negotiation at all. Russia then went so far as to enhance its defenses on the island chain. Japanese foreign direct investment in Russia declined from US$757 million in 2012 — when Abe came into power — to $429 million in 2020 after it became clear that Putin had no intention of concluding a peace treaty.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) and then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe shake hands at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. Photo: Sputnik / Alexander Vilf
Tokyo has had little reason to worry about the direct threat posed by Moscow but deepening Russian–Chinese military cooperation makes it harder for Japan to discount the possibility of the two states working together in a future conflict.
Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force has also scrambled its fighter jets to intercept Russian aircraft more than 200 times per year since 2008 as it contended with an even greater number of intrusions by Chinese aircraft in the southwest.
Then, Chinese and Russian forces began to exercise together. Russian ships transited the waters around the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in 2016. In 2019, Russian aircraft peeled off from a joint Chinese–Russian exercise to enter the airspace of the Takeshima Islands — territory that is disputed between South Korea and Japan — in a deliberate attempt to exacerbate tensions between the two US allies.
Russia and China also began annual joint nuclear bomber exercises over the Sea of Japan. These exercises were most recently carried out during the Quad Summit in Tokyo during US President Joe Biden’s visit.
The Japanese people have supported Kishida’s emphasis on defending the post-war status quo. Media editorials and public opinion polls overwhelmingly supported this normative framing of Japanese interests. In March 2022, 85% of Japanese people polled approved of Kishida’s response to the invasion of Ukraine.
Tokyo’s position on the Russian invasion also reflects the growing strategic ties between Japan and Europe. Japan has deepened its engagement with the European Union and developed its partnership with NATO.
European nations now also see the connections between the challenge posed in the Indo-Pacific and their own security and economic goals. Diplomatically, European nations have a stake in nuclear non-proliferation efforts vis-a-vis North Korea, as well as in ensuring freedom of navigation across international waters.
Tokyo is investing in diplomacy to secure European support in the case of a similar act of aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Speaking at the NATO Summit meeting in Madrid on 29 June, Kishida said that “Russian aggression against Ukraine is not a problem for Europe alone, but instead an outrageous act that undermines the very foundation of the international order.”
As the war in Ukraine has unfolded, the focus on the collective defense provisions enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has opened new avenues for consultation between Japan and other Asia Pacific allies.
The Kishida administration will complete a comprehensive strategic review by the end of 2022 and a new National Security Strategy will be announced. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will feature prominently in Japan’s assessment of the geopolitics it must be prepared to navigate. But so will China.
For Japan, accepting aggression akin to the kind Russia has perpetrated would raise the risk that China might also see an opportunity to use force. Putin’s claim of an alternative Russian history to justify his invasion also draws parallels to President Xi Jinping’s narrative of China’s regional claims.
The Russian invasion has also affected the new 10-year defense plan that will set the course for Japan’s own military planning. Japan must now worry more than ever that Moscow and Beijing will join forces against it. The growing PLA provocations against the United States and other countries deepen concern over stability in the Taiwan Strait in the months and years ahead.
Chinese soldiers assigned to a brigade under the PLA 73rd Group Army perform preventive maintenance on their armored vehicles on June 15, 2021. Photo: eng.chinamil.com.cn / Liu Zhiyong
The live-fire exercises conducted by the People’s Republic of China after US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan demonstrate a jump in the PLA’s capabilities to act jointly and across domains to control the waters and airspace in and around Taiwan.
Japan will invest much more in its military capabilities and will examine how to retaliate against an increasingly hostile set of neighbors.
This was a risk Kishida was willing to reckon with as he doubled down on Japan’s strategy of defending the post-war “rules-based order”, and it is a risk that Japan cannot avoid as tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue to rise.
Sheila A Smith is John E Merow Senior Fellow for Asia Pacific Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. An extended version of this article appears in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, Japan’s strategic choices, Vol 14, No 3.
This article was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. It is republished under a Creative Commons license.
asiatimes.com · by Sheila A Smith · September 5, 2022
7. 50 years ago, the Munich Olympics massacre changed how we think about terrorism
I remember this vividly. I now wonder how this would have been covered had we had the internet, social media, and 24 hour news cable coverage.
50 years ago, the Munich Olympics massacre changed how we think about terrorism
NPR · by James Doubek · September 4, 2022
A member of Black September appears on the balcony of the apartment where gunmen held members of the Israeli Olympic team hostage on Sept. 5, 1972. It was the first time a terrorist attack had been broadcast live to a global audience. Kurt Strumpf/AP
It was just after 4 a.m. when an attack that would shock the world began — quietly.
Eight men in tracksuits hopped the fence at Munich's Olympic Village, carrying with them Kalashnikov rifles and grenades in duffel bags.
They were members of the group Black September — an affiliate of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Their mission was to hold Israeli athletes hostage and demand the release of 236 prisoners: 234 in Israel and the two leaders of the West German Baader-Meinhof terrorist group.
Their mission failed. About 20 hours after it began, five of the hostage-takers would be dead, along with 11 members of Israel's Olympic team and a West German policeman.
But the Munich massacre of Sept. 5 to 6, 1972, would have lasting repercussions on an international scale, waking up Western governments to the threat of terrorism, showing the power of live broadcast and setting the stage for future violence.
"The cheerful Games"
The Israeli Olympic delegation parades during the opening of the Munich Olympic Games on Aug. 26, 1972. West German organizers wanted to give the Games a light atmosphere, trying to break from Germany's prior Olympics under the Nazis in 1936. AFP via Getty Images
Munich 1972 was supposed to be the opposite of Berlin 1936. Nearly three decades after the Holocaust, West German authorities went to pains to try to erase symbolism of the country's Nazi past. The light blue Olympic emblem, "Radiant Munich," as the International Olympic Committee notes, symbolized "light, freshness, generosity." The event's motto was "the cheerful Games."
"They wanted to come across as playful, as laid back, congenial. Not a police state," says David Clay Large, a senior fellow at the Institute of European Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and the author of Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror, and Triumph at the Olympic Games.
Authorities were aware of security threats, but they were coming from different directions. There was the Red Army Faction, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof's leftist group, which had carried out bombings in West Germany that year. The far-right National Democratic Party of Germany was a concern, as were other groups, Large says.
Despite warnings, the idea of a Palestinian group carrying out an attack was not "at the top of their list for possible dangers," Large says.
The Games had already gone on for 10 days without a serious incident, and security officials had let down their guard. The gunmen, having already scouted the location, easily slipped into the building that housed the Israelis. They knew which apartment to go to.
Black September ended up with nine hostages, after killing wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg and weightlifter Yossef Romano, who had both fought back against the attackers.
The group demanded the release of 236 prisoners, most of them Palestinians in Israeli custody, and threatened to kill hostages otherwise.
As West German authorities scrambled to figure out how to respond that morning, the Games resumed as normal. It was at least seven hours into the hostage situation by the time events were halted.
The hostage crisis was viewed globally as it unfolded
Photographers gather after the Munich massacre near the building where the Israeli team had been held hostage in September 1972. About 900 million people watched the terrorist attack on television. Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images
When television networks finally switched to covering the hostage crisis, it created the aspect of the attack most notable today: It was the first time a terrorist incident had reached a global audience during a live broadcast.
At the Olympic press center, 11 monitors showed the ongoing athletic events while another three were trained on the building where the Israelis were being held hostage. Dave Marash was a CBS Radio reporter at the time. "Those simultaneous images flickering on those monitors struck me as the most incongruous, most inappropriate, most flat surreal visual memory of my life," he told NPR in 2002.
The hours dragged on as West German authorities worked to buy time. Their response was uncoordinated. Security was in the hands of state authorities, not federal ones. They had no expertise in dealing with hostage situations. Calling in the army wasn't an option — West Germany's postwar constitution limited the domestic use of the army during peacetime.
"What they tried to do was negotiate their way out. That was their only recourse," Large says. But the West Germans had no way to give Black September the main thing it wanted: the release of the prisoners. Israel's prime minister, Golda Meir, said no. She told the West Germans they were responsible for getting the hostages out.
The West Germans came up with a plan. Black September was told it would be able to take a plane with its hostages to Cairo. On the plane would be West German police disguised as members of the plane's crew, who would overpower the terrorists.
Late that evening, the gunmen and their hostages were flown by helicopters to the Fürstenfeldbruck air base outside Munich, where the plane was waiting.
Significant problems immediately became apparent. The police officers who were supposed to be on the plane backed out, saying it was too dangerous. Plan B was to use snipers to kill the hostage-takers as they emerged from the helicopters and tried to board the plane. But the police had no expert snipers and no proper equipment. And they didn't know how many Black September members were in the group.
A member of Black September used a grenade to destroy one of the two helicopters that had Israeli hostages inside. The burned-out army helicopter is pictured here at Fürstenfeldbruck air base on Sept. 7, 1972. AP
"The attempt to pick off these commandos turned out to be an absolute fiasco," Large says. "They ended up shooting five of them, five of the eight commandos, but not before the commandos then killed in cold blood all of the remaining nine hostages."
A West German policeman was also killed in the exchange of gunfire. Three of the Black September members escaped but were soon captured.
Eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team were killed. Top row, from left to right: Amitzur Shapira, David Berger, Eliezer Halfin, Yossef Romano, Kehat Shorr. Bottom row: Moshe Weinberg, Mark Slavin, Yakov Springer, Yossef Gutfreund, and Andre Spitzer. Not pictured is Ze'ev Friedman. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images; AP Photo
Initial reports coming out of the air base said the rescue was a success. It wasn't until early on Sept. 6 that officials confirmed that all the Israelis had been killed.
ABC sportscaster Jim McKay, who had anchored coverage throughout the day, made the announcement to world audiences at 3:24 a.m.: "They're all gone."
New exposure for acts of terrorism and the Palestinian cause
A man with binoculars surveys the Olympic Village in Munich during the hostage-taking of members of Israel's Olympic team in 1972. AFP via Getty Images
About 900 million people are believed to have watched the hostage crisis on television.
"From start to finish, it was the first time terrorists had hijacked a televised event and turned it into their own drama," says Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who has studied terrorism for decades.
In 1968, about 11 international terrorist groups were operating. A few years after the Munich massacre, that number was more than 50, Hoffman says. A large reason for that was the global attention the attack received.
"I think other aggrieved persons saw terrorism as a vehicle to attract attention to themselves and their cause and also coerce governments. I mean, you had these small nonstate actors ... with limited weaponry and constrained capacity for violence, forcing governments to deal with them," Hoffman says.
The impetus for the attack, of course, did not come out of nowhere, having its origins in the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a conflict between Jordan and the PLO.
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat speaks at a plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly in November 1974, the month the United Nations granted the PLO observer status. Hulton Archive/Getty Images
The incident, though horrific, gave new attention to the Palestinian cause. More than a million Palestinians had been refugees since Israel's creation in 1948 and the wars that followed, but global powers had been largely ignoring their plight.
Khaled Elgindy, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and the director of its Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs, notes that the U.S. and the Soviets were preoccupied with the Cold War.
The Munich attack, as well as other terrorism connected to the PLO, "was really a double-edged sword," he says. "It brought attention to the Palestinian issue, but it's mostly negative attention."
He says it was likely part of a two-pronged approach by the PLO: active diplomacy combined with militant attacks that were carried out with plausible deniability.
"And these kinds of violent attacks actually succeed in putting the issue on the international agenda," Elgindy says. From there, the PLO notched two diplomatic wins: 20 Arab League countries recognized the organization as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" in October 1974. A month later, the United Nations gave the PLO observer status.
Israel begins a sweeping retaliation
Golda Meir, Israel's prime minister, authorized assassination squads to kill those involved in the 1972 Munich attack. Evening Standard/Getty Images
Palestinian militants had previously hijacked several planes in incidents starting in 1968, and Japanese terrorists recruited by a Palestinian group massacred 26 people at Israel's Lod Airport in May 1972.
But Israel considered the brazenness of an attack against its athletes to be a new extreme.
In the days after the Munich massacre, Israel launched airstrikes and raids on PLO bases in Syria and Lebanon, destroying bridges and houses. Over 200 people may have been killed, including women and children, according to Large.
Relations between West Germany and Israel had been improving since the mid-1960s but were now at another low point after the attack during the Olympics. Tensions were further inflamed less than two months later when Black September sympathizers hijacked a Lufthansa flight on Oct. 29, 1972, demanding that the three Black September members in West German detention be freed.
The West Germans quickly complied. The three surviving perpetrators of the Munich massacre arrived in Libya to a hero's welcome, given refuge by Moammar Gadhafi.
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was enraged. She authorized Israeli assassination squads to take out those involved in planning the Munich attack. Operation Wrath of God lasted some 20 years.
Accounts vary on how many people directly connected to the attack were killed by Israel. In one infamous case, agents killed a waiter in Norway whom they mistook for a PLO official.
"They didn't get all the culpable figures involved," though they did kill some innocent people, Large says. "This was not a delicate operation on the part of Israel. And it further inflamed the extreme tensions in the Middle East."
The attack spurred the development of counterterrorism forces
Members of Germany's GSG 9 federal-police special-forces unit are pictured in August 2022 at their training center. The counterterrorism unit came about as a direct result of the 1972 Munich attack. Andreas Rentz/Getty Images
It's impossible to capture every ripple effect of the attack, but terrorism scholars note that one distinct change was in how Western governments thought about international terrorism as a threat, long before the 9/11 attacks.
"If Germany suffered such a gruesome, huge attack and failed so colossally, then we could be next. So we better prep," says Ronit Berger Hobson, outlining what governments were thinking at the time.
Hobson, a lecturer in politics and international relations at Queen's University Belfast, recently outlined the international security response to the Munich massacre in an article in the journal Israel Affairs, co-authored with professor Ami Pedahzur of the University of Texas at Austin.
Multiple governments created new special forces to respond to hostage situations and terrorism — they never had them before. West Germany promptly organized the GSG 9 police unit. France, Britain and the U.S. followed with similar forces, as part of the police or the military.
Israel already had its Sayeret Matkal unit, which had origins in intelligence-gathering. (During the hostage crisis, Israel offered to send this force in, but West Germany rejected the help.) But the Munich attack and others led to a proliferation of special forces units within Israel's security services with a renewed focus on counterterrorism, Hobson says.
Those special forces were able to demonstrate successes in the years that followed. In 1976, Israeli forces successfully rescued hostages in Entebbe, Uganda. The GSG 9 succeeded in freeing hostages from a hijacked plane in Somalia in 1977. As Hobson and Pedahzur note, France's Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale freed hostages aboard an Air France flight in 1994.
Some missions failed as well, including when terrorists killed or injured most hostages in Ma'alot, Israel, in 1974 and the U.S. attempt to rescue hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1980.
The Olympics were forever changed
The Olympic flag flies at half-staff in the Olympic Stadium in Munich on Sept. 6, 1972, during the memorial service for the members of the Israeli Olympic team who were killed. International Olympic Committee President Avery Brundage declared that the "Games must go on." Keystone/Getty Images
The Olympic Games were suspended for a total of 34 hours, with a memorial for the Israelis held in the main competition stadium the morning of Sept. 6. But International Olympic Committee President Avery Brundage declared that the "Games must go on."
The remaining members of the Israeli team quickly flew home, under orders from Meir.
Shaul Ladany, now 86, a racewalker who survived the attack by escaping early on, said he would have liked to have stayed for the remainder of the Games.
Countries hostile to Israel had tried unsuccessfully to keep Israel from competing in various sports forums, he told NPR. "After we lost 11 of our people, with our own hand we gave them that satisfaction that they kicked us out of the Olympic Games."
From a security standpoint, the Olympics would never be the same.
Organizers of subsequent Games were forced to devote more to prevent future attacks. "The security budgets just dramatically shot up," says Large, with the 1976 Montreal Olympics spending 50 times more on security than Munich had spent. China spent $6.5 billion on security alone for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
The trend toward ballooning security budgets — for personnel, surveillance, equipment, infrastructure and more — continues to the present, one of the factors that make any government think hard about costs before offering a bid.
Chinese police officers stand at the Olympic Green ahead of the Beijing Olympics on Aug. 6, 2008. China spent $6.5 billion on security for the 2008 Games, part of a trend toward enormous Olympic security budgets. Mike Hewitt/Getty Images
Perhaps the security budgets have kept the events of Munich from being repeated — though terrorism would strike the Olympics again in Atlanta in 1996, when a bomb exploded, killing one person directly and another person indirectly and injuring more than 100.
It was a half-century ago that Munich presaged for the world the era of international terrorism — only fully crystallized to Americans on 9/11.
"It was basically sending the message, because the theme of the Olympics is peace and cooperation. And if the Olympics weren't safe, nothing would be," says Hoffman, the terrorism researcher. "It ushered in, I think, the modern era of terrorism that we're still enmeshed in today and can't escape."
The book One Day in September by Simon Reeve served as an additional resource for this story.
NPR · by James Doubek · September 4, 2022
8. Military reserves, civil defense worry Taiwan as China looms
Taiwan needs to turn its reserved forces and civil defense (and civil resistance) into a strength. They need to shift from defense and hiding to active resistance to invading forces.
Excerpts:
“The civil sector has this idea and they’re using their energy, but I think the government needs to come out and coordinate this, so the energy doesn’t get wasted,” he said.
Yang is critical of the government's civil defense drills, citing annual exercises in which civilians practice taking shelter.
“When you do this exercise, you want to consider that people will hide in the subway, they need water and food, and may have medical needs. You will possibly have hundreds or thousands of people hiding there,” Yang said. “But were does the water and food come from?”
In July, the New Taipei city government organized a large-scale drill with its disaster services and the Defense Ministry. Included for the first time was urban warfare, such as how first responders would react to an attack on a train station or a port.
Military reserves, civil defense worry Taiwan as China looms
Yahoo · by HUIZHONG WU
TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — Chris Chen, a former captain in Taiwan's military, spent a lot of time waiting during his weeklong training for reservists in June. Waiting for assembly, waiting for lunch, waiting for training, he said.
The course, part of Taiwan's efforts to deter a Chinese invasion, was jam-packed with 200 reservists to one instructor.
“It just became all listening, there was very little time to actually carry out the instructions,” Chen said.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has underscored the importance of mobilizing civilians when under attack, as Ukraine's reserve forces helped fend off the invaders. Nearly halfway around the world, it has highlighted Taiwan's weaknesses on that front, chiefly in two areas: its reserves and civilian defense force.
While an invasion doesn’t appear imminent, China's recent large-scale military exercises in response to a visit by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan have made the government in Taipei more aware than ever of the hard power behind Beijing’s rhetoric about bringing the self-ruled island under its control.
Experts said that civilian defense and reserve forces have an important deterrent effect, showing a potential aggressor that the risks of invasion are high. Even before the invasion of Ukraine in March, Taiwan was working on reforming both. The question is whether it will be enough.
Taiwan’s reserves are meant to back up its 188,000-person military, which is 90% volunteers and 10% men doing their four months of compulsory military service. On paper, the 2.3 million reservists enable Taiwan to match China's 2 million-strong military.
Yet, the reserve system has long been criticized. Many, like Chen, felt the seven days of training for the mostly former soldiers was a waste of time that did not prepare them well enough.
The number of combat-ready reservists — those who could immediately join front-line battles — is only about 300,000, said Wang Ting-yu, a lawmaker from the governing Democratic Progressive Party who serves on the defense committee in the legislature.
“In Ukraine, if in the first three days of the war it had fallen apart, no matter how strong your military is, you wouldn’t have been able to fight the war,” Wang said. “A resilient society can meet this challenge. So that when you are met with disasters and war, you will not fall apart.”
Taiwan reorganized its reserve system in January, now coordinated by a new body called the All Out Defense Mobilization Agency, which will also take over the civil defense system in an emergency.
One major change was the pilot launch of a more intensive, two-week training instead of the standard one week, which will eventually be expanded to the 300,000 combat-ready reservists. The remaining reservists can play a more defensive role, such as defending bridges, Wang said.
Dennis Shi joined the revamped training for two weeks in May at an abandoned building site on Taiwan’s northern coast. Half the time it was raining, he said. The rest, it was baking hot. The training coincided with the peak of a COVID-19 outbreak. Wearing raincoats and face masks, the reservists dug trenches and practiced firing mortars and marching.
“Your whole body was covered in mud, and even in your boots there was mud,” Shi said.
Still, he said he got more firing time than during his mandatory four months of service three years ago and felt motivated because senior officers carried out the drills with them.
“The main thing is when it’s time to serve your country, then you have to do it,” he said.
There are plans to reform the civil defense force too, said Wang, though much of the discussion has not been widely publicized yet.
The Civil Defense Force, which falls under the National Police Agency, is a leftover from an era of authoritarian rule before Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. Its members are mostly people who are too old to qualify as reservists but still want to serve.
“It hasn’t followed the passage of the times and hasn’t kept pace with our fighting ability,” Wang said.
Planned changes include a requirement to include security guards employed by some of Taiwan’s largest companies in the force, and the incorporation of women, who are not required to serve in the military.
About 73% of Taiwanese say they would be willing to fight for Taiwan if China were to invade, according to surveys by Kuan-chen Lee at the Defense Ministry-affiliated Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a number that has remained consistent.
The Ukraine war, at least initially, shook some people's confidence in the willingness of America to come to Taiwan's assistance in the event of an attack. Whereas 57% said last September they believed the U.S. would “definitely or probably” send troops if China invaded, that dropped to 40% in March.
The U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity leaves it murky as to whether the U.S. would intervene militarily. Pelosi said during her visit that she wants to help the island defend itself.
Outside of government efforts, some civilians have been inspired to do more on their own.
Last week, the founder of Taiwanese chipmaker United Microelectronics, Robert Tsao, announced he would donate 1 billion New Taiwan Dollars ($32.8 million) to fund the training of a 3 million-person defense force made up of civilians.
More than 1,000 people have attended lectures on civil defense with Open Knowledge Taiwan, according to T.H. Schee, a tech entrepreneur who gives lectures and organizes civil defense courses with the volunteer group, which aims to make specialized knowledge accessible to the public.
Others have signed up for first aid training, and some for firearms courses, though with air guns as Taiwan’s laws do not allow widespread gun ownership.
These efforts need government coordination, said Martin Yang, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Military and Police Tactical Research and Development Association, a group of former police officers and soldiers interested in Taiwan’s defense.
“The civil sector has this idea and they’re using their energy, but I think the government needs to come out and coordinate this, so the energy doesn’t get wasted,” he said.
Yang is critical of the government's civil defense drills, citing annual exercises in which civilians practice taking shelter.
“When you do this exercise, you want to consider that people will hide in the subway, they need water and food, and may have medical needs. You will possibly have hundreds or thousands of people hiding there,” Yang said. “But were does the water and food come from?”
In July, the New Taipei city government organized a large-scale drill with its disaster services and the Defense Ministry. Included for the first time was urban warfare, such as how first responders would react to an attack on a train station or a port.
The drills had the feeling of a carnival rather than serious preparation for an invasion. An MC excitedly welcomed guests as Korean pop music blared. Recruiters for the military, the coast guard and the military police set up booths to entice visitors, offering tchotchkes such as toy grenade keychains.
Chang Chia-rong guided VIP guests to their seats. The 20-year-old expressed a willingness to defend Taiwan, though she hadn’t felt very worried about a Chinese invasion.
“If there’s a volunteer squad, I hope that I can join and defend my country,” she said. “If there’s a need, I would be very willing to join.”
Yahoo · by HUIZHONG WU
9. A Slowing China Helps Rein In Inflation Around the World
A Slowing China Helps Rein In Inflation Around the World
China is a key factor in falling costs for energy and commodities, but domestic factors are still keeping U.S. inflation high
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-slowing-china-helps-rein-in-inflation-around-the-world-11662296400
By Gwynn GuilfordFollow
Sept. 4, 2022 9:00 am ET
A global slowdown, in particular in China, is taking the edge off inflation pressures, especially for key imports and commodities.
Global inflation eased in July, to 0.3% on a monthly basis, down from an average of 0.7% a month in the first half of the year, according to analysis by Nora Szentivanyi, a global economist at JP Morgan, and colleagues. The figures omit Turkey, where inflation is unusually high.
“Weaker global demand in the face of diminished purchasing power through the past year is now driving disinflation through two main channels,” said Ms. Szentivanyi—first, by weighing on some commodity prices, and, second, by easing global supply-chain constraints.
She and her colleagues estimate falling commodity prices and easing goods price pressures will lower global inflation to a 5% annualized rate in the second half of 2022, from 9.7% in the second quarter.
The global slowdown is being felt most acutely in commodity prices.
Brent crude oil fell to around $93 a barrel Friday from more than $120 in early June. Copper is down around 28% from mid-April. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s food price index fell 1.9% in August from July, the fifth straight monthly decline. Prices of U.S. imports, excluding autos, rose 1.9% in July, down from 3.2% in March.
Foreign-made manufactured goods like furniture, recreational equipment and home entertainment increased just 2.8% in July, compared with 4.8% in April. That relief on import prices should flow through to consumer prices in the coming quarters, said Omair Sharif, who leads forecasting firm Inflation Insights.
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What is your outlook for China’s economy? Join the conversation below.
To be sure, many other forces are still pushing the other way on U.S. inflation: service prices are rising, in particular for housing, and tight labor markets have pushed wage growth to its highest in at least 20 years. Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell recently said July’s slightly slower pace of inflation was far too little for the central bank to ease its campaign of raising interest rates.
Recent research by New York Fed economists found that price increases from imported inputs have passed through to U.S. domestic producer prices at a much higher rate recently than pre-Covid. But whether the reverse will also be true depends on how the U.S. economy is doing.
Import prices for consumer goods, excluding autos, fell 0.5% in July from April, while consumer prices for those same goods rose at a steady clip. If that divergence persists, the likely reason is domestic factors “such as unstable inflation expectations, higher wage inflation, strong pricing power of domestic distributors and higher transportation costs,” said Aichi Amemiya, senior U.S. economist at Nomura Securities.
Earlier
China Wrestles With Protests, Discontent Amid a Slowing Economy
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China Wrestles With Protests, Discontent Amid a Slowing Economy
Play video: China Wrestles With Protests, Discontent Amid a Slowing Economy
As China’s economy stalls, protests have broken out over frozen bank accounts and mortgage payments for unfinished homes. WSJ explains the reasons behind the simmering discontent and how Beijing authorities are trying to keep a lid on it. Photo Composite: WSJ
China is a key driver of easing external price pressures. The world’s second-largest economy after the U.S. grew just 0.4% from a year earlier in the second quarter, its weakest in two years. While wide-scale Covid-19 lockdowns drove much of spring’s decline, China’s property collapse is now dragging heavily on growth.
Slumping investment by developers, in particular, has quashed demand for industrial and energy commodities. The volume of gasoline imports fell 36% in July from a year earlier, while that of steel dropped 25%, according to Chinese government data.
China in 2021 consumed 72% of the world’s iron-ore imports, 55% of refined copper and more than 15% of oil globally. Any slowing of its resource-hungry economy tends to put downward pressure on commodity prices everywhere, said Edward Gardner, commodities economist at Capital Economics.
A prime example is iron-ore prices, which are down around 40% from their peak earlier in the year, said Warren Patterson, head of commodities strategy at ING.
10. Read H. P. Lovecraft to Understand War
I guess I have some new reading to do. I have never read Lovercraft.
Conclusion:
Such insights alert us to tenets of operations and strategy.
Or look at China. Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea is weird, especially considering that it’s party to a charter that specifically rules out such claims, and has been smacked down by an international tribunal charged with interpreting that charter. How do you explain and respond to something so bizarre? Photos out of Chinese cities locked down under Xi Jinping’s “zero covid” policy are eerie, as are photos Hong Kong following the Chinese Communist Party’s crackdown on democracy. Chinese citizens should be thronging the streets, but they aren’t. Why?
And on and on. So pick up some Lovecraft—and discover the weird and eerie around you.
Read H. P. Lovecraft to Understand War
19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · September 4, 2022
You take your wisdom where you find it. In 2020, on impulse, I incorporated the “weird fiction” of H. P. Lovecraft, the grandmaster of the genre, into my recreational reading. I can’t remember exactly why. After all, that year was creepy enough without marinating in tales of monsters, demons, and ghoulish folk plaguing New England cities and towns. Maybe it was a form of escapism, substituting wild stories of dread for the real stories of dread that dominated headlines that year.
Or maybe it was my oddball form of virtual travel amid the lockdowns. Lovecraft was a Providence native and a resident for much of his short life, dwelling in a house just off the Brown University campus. In fact, his gravestone bears the inscription “I Am Providence.” Much of his work is set there. In 2020 the family and I went many months without venturing into that fair and nearby city, among our favorite places on the planet. Maybe fiction furnished a partial substitute.
Anyway. So it was.
That August, perchance, Naval Postgraduate School professor Leo Blanken ran an article over at Strategy Bridge inspired in part by Lovecraft’s writings. Titled “The Weird and Eerie Battlefields of Tomorrow: Where Horror Fiction Meets Military Planning,” the article draws on a literary critic of whom I had never heard, the late Mark Fisher. After reading it I downloaded and devoured a copy of Fisher’s monograph The Weird and the Eerie through the wonders of Kindle. Together these works make a useful addition to your armory of implements for thinking about martial affairs, not to mention politics and life in general.
Fisher postulates that Lovecraft and other purveyors of uncanny literature and film—sci-fi author H. G. Wells and moviemaker Stanley Kubrick also make his roster of artists—rivet readers’ attention less by making their works horrific than by making them strange. Both the weird and the eerie have to do with things outside the ordinary. The weird, says Fisher, “is that which does not belong.” It “brings to the familiar something which ordinarily lies beyond it, and which cannot be reconciled with the ‘homely.’”
Weirdness, then, is about presence—the presence of something freaky and possibly otherworldly in normal surroundings. Fisher, in fact, deems “the irruption into this world of something from outside” to be “the marker of the weird.” He maintains that “the weird is a particular kind of perturbation. It involves a sensation of wrongness: a weird entity or object is so strange that it makes us feel that it should not exist, or at least it should not exist here. Yet if the entity or object is here, then the categories which we have up until now used to make sense of the world cannot be valid. The weird thing is not wrong, after all: it is our conceptions that must be inadequate.”
So weird fiction is as much about how human beings react to the presence of an anomaly as it is about the anomaly itself.
Nowadays, Lovecraft is probably best known for his tales of Cthulhu. According to one compilation of these stories, “the Cthulhu Mythos was H. P. Lovecraft’s greatest contribution to supernatural literature: a series of stories that evoked cosmic awe and terror through their accounts of incomprehensibly alien monsters and their horrifying incursions into our world.” These supernatural forays take place in such familiar settings as Providence or Boston, or in New England small towns like the make-believe Innsmouth, on the North Shore of Massachusetts.
So weirdness injects phenomena that are radically foreign to daily life into daily life, while weird stories are about how ordinary folk respond to these phenomena. (Typically with dismay—at least at first.) Zombie literature and films—The Walking Dead, World War Z, and Pride and Prejudice and Zombies, to name three recent entries—probably comprise the most popular genre of weird fiction these days. Think about it. Reanimated, mindless, murderous corpses by definition do not belong in regular life and cannot be reconciled with it. Their existence defies all natural laws. Yet their menace compels the living to come to terms to something utterly beyond everyday experience in order to combat it, and try to restore some semblance of normalcy.
Weird!
If the weird is about presence, the eerie is more about absence. In particular, it’s the absence of something familiar and expected—people in particular. Writes Fisher, “a sense of the eerie seldom clings to enclosed and inhabited domestic spaces; we find the eerie more readily in landscapes partially emptied of the human. What happened to produce these ruins, this disappearance? What kind of entity was involved? What kind of thing was it that emitted such an eerie cry?” An empty or ruined house, church, or fortress is eerie. So is a desolate cityscape in post-apocalyptic fiction. Think the Statue of Liberty jutting out of an isolated beach in the old Planet of the Apes, or the ruins of Washington DC in the 1976 sci-fi flick Logan’s Run.
H.P. Lovecraft excels at weird fiction because he expertly weaves the eerie with the weird. His stories tend to start off eerie and build to a weird climax. My favorite among the Cthulhu stories—and apparently the last of his writings—is “The Haunter of the Dark.” The story follows the typical pattern. Horror author Robert Blake lives just off the Brown campus. From his study window he can gaze across Providence at Federal Hill, these days a mecca for Italian dining. For Blake it was a “spectral, unreachable world,” abounding in “bizarre and curious mysteries.”
An abandoned, decrepit church transfixes him. “A vague, singular aura of desolation hovered over the place,” writes Lovecraft, “so that even the pigeons and swallows shunned its smoky eaves.” Foliage on the church grounds remains stunted even amid the lush Rhode Island spring. That’s a quintessential eerie atmosphere. Blake makes his way across the city to Federal Hill to investigate the edifice, only to unearth evidence of past demonic practices. Worse, his presence seems to reawaken a sleeping malice of old, the haunter of the dark. Ghastly events ensue. From there the story progresses toward its weird and terrifying crescendo.
What does this all have to do with warlike endeavors? Blanken posits—and I agree—that consuming weird fiction primes military practitioners and analysts to notice weird or eerie anomalies in the profession of arms. Detecting a phenomenon is the first step toward adapting to it or turning it to advantage. Weird fiction can help us make sense of the past, survey the world around us, and potentially glimpse the future. Fisher credits World War I with ushering in a “traumatic break from the past” that allowed Lovecraft’s brand of weird fiction to flourish. Blanken examines the Great War through the weird/eerie prism, finding anomalies—things missing that should have been there, or things egregiously out of step with prewar reality—that should have been apparent to military folk at the time.
Let’s peer through that prism at the present. Doing so helps us ask good questions. Uncrewed, autonomous aircraft and ships? Eerie; no people. Artificial intelligence that learns faster than human beings, and could outwit and outfight them? Weird; machines are supposed to be our servants. Cyberspace that exists everywhere and nowhere? That’s both weird and eerie.
Or look at the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine. Imagery of Ukrainian towns or cities emptied of people following Russian air or missile bombardment is eerie. Inhabitants are supposed to be there but aren’t thanks to Russian aggression. That’s disturbing and affronts the conscience. Such images rally sympathy among Ukraine’s outside supporters, prompting them to make major outlays of funding and military implements of all types. The eerie can have political ramifications.
The Ukrainian armed forces’ ability to stand against Russia is frankly weird considering the lopsided disparity between the two combatants by any measure, whether it’s GDP, numbers of platforms and weapons, or manpower. Acknowledging the conflict’s weird character directs our attention to the importance of training, to the excellence of Western-supplied armaments, and above all, to the advantages that go to the combatant bestriding its home ground. The weak could even win. Life imitates weird fiction.
Such insights alert us to tenets of operations and strategy.
Or look at China. Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea is weird, especially considering that it’s party to a charter that specifically rules out such claims, and has been smacked down by an international tribunal charged with interpreting that charter. How do you explain and respond to something so bizarre? Photos out of Chinese cities locked down under Xi Jinping’s “zero covid” policy are eerie, as are photos Hong Kong following the Chinese Communist Party’s crackdown on democracy. Chinese citizens should be thronging the streets, but they aren’t. Why?
And on and on. So pick up some Lovecraft—and discover the weird and eerie around you.
Expert Biography: A 1945 Contributing Editor writing in his own capacity, Dr. James Holmes holds the J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, he was the last gunnery officer in history to fire a battleship’s big guns in anger, during the first Gulf War in 1991. He earned the Naval War College Foundation Award in 1994, signifying the top graduate in his class. His books include Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best Book of 2010, and a fixture on the Navy Professional Reading List. General James Mattis deems him “troublesome.” The views voiced here are his alone. Holmes also blogs at the Naval Diplomat.
19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · September 4, 2022
11. Atreides of Harkonnen? A Literary Corollary for Self-Awareness and Host Nation Perception in Small Wars
To complement Professor Holmes ' article on reading Lovecraft, I coincidentally published this on the Small Wars Journal yesterday. Tom Ordeman argues we should read (and watch) Herbert's Dune.
Atreides of Harkonnen? A Literary Corollary for Self-Awareness and Host Nation Perception in Small Wars
By Tom Ordeman, Jr.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/atreides-harkonnen-literary-corollary-self-awareness-and-host-nation-perception-small-wars
Science Fiction as Military Corollary
Two key elements serve as hallmarks of the American military mindset. First: since at least 1945, American troops have considered themselves the undisputed "good guys," the guys in white hats, heirs to the fights against the clear evils of fascism and communism. Second: American troops love science fiction, often for its visions of revolutionary, war-winning technology, rather than for its use in the illustration of social or moral lessons.
The former element manifests itself in the attitudes displayed not only by American service personnel, but also in their demeanor. American troops whose great-grandfathers may have served during the Second World War, and who may or may not have seen combat, nonetheless carry themselves as if they personally liberated Paris from the Third Reich's occupying troops. The latter element manifests itself primarily in the adoration of Star Wars, the juggernaut franchise based upon George Lucas' 1977 science fantasy remake of Akira Kurosawa's The Hidden Fortress. Meanwhile, other media franchises also receive various levels of military attention.
Examples are manifold. In 2004, pseudonymous author "Dr. Rusty Shackleford" of The Jawa Report co-opted elements from Star Wars to explain the international dynamics of the Global War on Terror. Then, in a 2015 Small Wars Journal essay, Army veteran Justin Baumann highlighted hybrid warfare using Star Wars examples. One lecturer at the U.S. Naval Academy Museum's NavyCon 2017 used his time to discuss naval acquisition by Star Wars' Galactic Empire; by 2020, another lecturer had prepared similar remarks to discuss fleet acquisition as illustrated in the first season of Star Trek: Picard. U.S. Air Force personnel have long referred to the F-16 aircraft as "Vipers", after the fighter craft featured in the 1978 Battlestar Galactica television series. Between 2015 and 2019, Amazon Prime aired The Man in the High Castle, a re-imagining of the postwar sociopolitical landscape aided by science fantasy elements. The Commandant of the Marine Corps' reading list includes such classics as Ender's Game and Starship Troopers. One might argue that this phenomenon culminated with the 2018 publication of Strategy Strikes Back: How Star Wars Explains Modern Military Conflict, in which notable authors such as Max Brooks, John Amble, Matt Cavanaugh, Steve "Doctrine Man" Leonard, James Stavridis, and Stanley McChrystal once again endeavored - for the sake of entertainment, more so than serious analysis - to illustrate military concepts through examples from Lucas' world famous film franchise.
Of course, this cognitive ligature results in a sort of projection of fictional concepts onto historical events. As a result, American troops perpetually identify themselves with the protagonists: the Rebel Alliance, the United Federation of Planets, the Colonial Fleet, and such. Thus, American troops equate the fight against fascist oppression with the epic fight against the repressive forces of the Galactic Empire. They defend the Federation against incursions from Klingons or Romulans, analogues for hostile foreign powers who pay mere lip service to international norms. They defend humanity against the Cylon menace, a collective of conformist drones whose national ideology is inconsistent with the tenets of personal freedom.
A modest proposition: what if this perception is admirable, but misguided? What if the best science fiction franchise to describe America's role in the world is the ornate, intricate, borderline incomprehensible universe described by the late Frank Herbert in his seminal classic, Dune? And what if, cloaked in confidence in their own righteousness, American troops have ceased to be the admirable agents of House Atreides, and have instead become the Harkonnens?
The Gold Standard of Science Fiction
Published in 1965, Frank Herbert's iconic novel won the inaugural Nebula Award for Best (Science Fiction) Novel and tied for the 1966 Hugo Award. French-Chilean filmmaker Alejandro Jodorowsky spent much of the 1970's developing a bizarre film interpretation of the novel that - perhaps thankfully - never came to fruition, though it went on to influence such classics as Ridley Scott's Alien. After several more failed attempts, 1984 saw the release of David Lynch's controversial interpretation, featuring an ensemble cast. The film lost money, and no sequels were produced. Having been denied a great deal of creative control, Lynch distanced himself from many of the film's extended versions. The Sci-Fi Channel commissioned a 2000 television adaptation, as well as a 2003 adaptation of two of Herbert’s sequels. The first of two episodes of a new interpretation by Denis Villeneuve, director of Arrival and Blade Runner 2049, was released in late 2021.
Set approximately ten thousand years in the future, Dune tells the story of Paul, son of Duke Leto and his consort, Lady Jessica. As the reigning heir of House Atreides, Leto leads the current stage of a generations-long struggle with the rival House Harkonnen. These and other houses - notably House Corrino, led by Padishah Emperor Shaddam IV - make up the Landsraad, a sort of feudal imperial confederation. The Landsraad operates in concert with a galactic mercantile, the CHOAM Corporation, which ostensibly dictates the conditions of the interstellar economy.
That economy revolves entirely upon the most precious commodity in the universe: Melange, colloquially known as "the Spice." Spice consumption expands consciousness and extends life. "Thinking machines" having been outlawed, Spice allows the Mentats to perform complex calculations in their heads, and the Spacing Guild to provide interstellar travel to the Empire’s citizens. For these reasons, Spice is extremely precious. Melange occurs at only one location: the brutal desert planet of Arrakis. Spice mining is difficult and dangerous, and every outing of the spice harvesters will eventually summon one of Arrakis' legendary sand worms, necessitating a hasty airborne departure.
House Atreides has gained favor amongst the other noble houses. Because his methods are just and fair, Duke Leto Atreides now rivals the Padishah Emperor himself for influence in the Landsraad. For this reason, Shaddam IV conspires with Baron Vladimir Harkonnen, Leto's enemy and rival in the Landsraad, to reassign control of Arrakis - and responsibility for harvesting the Spice - to House Atreides. Sensing treachery and intrigue, Duke Leto sends his agents to scout out Arrakis, and concludes that the only way to survive is to form an alliance with the Fremen, Arrakis' indigenous population. The Fremen sustain ancient beliefs, speak an ancient language, and have adapted over millennia to survive in the harsh conditions of Arrakis' open deserts. The Atreides and their entourage begin to embrace Fremen ways, and to leverage their resources - particularly imported or reclaimed moisture - to improve the lives of Fremen who live and work in the capital city of Arrakeen. Initial meetings between the Fremen and House Atreides appear promising: Lady Jessica secures the trust of the Fremen housekeeper, the Shadout Mapes, while Duke Leto secures the tentative respect of a Fremen chieftain named Stilgar.
By contrast, for eighty years, House Harkonnen acted as the Emperor's designated procurators on Arrakis, squeezing every possible grain of Melange from the planet. Their occupation was repressive: partly for the sake of control, and partly for pure sport, Harkonnen troops harassed and subjugated the Fremen. Some Fremen secured menial jobs working for the Harkonnens in Arrakeen: maids, servants, and such. However, no question existed as to which population was superior, and which was inferior. At the behest of his cunning uncle, Baron Vladimir, Glossu Rabban Harkonnen's unapologetic brutality earned the nicknames of "The Beast" and "Mudir Nahya" (Demon Ruler). Throughout the Landsraad, the Harkonnens are reviled for their depravity, but feared for the sake of the power that their long tenure as Arrakis' overseers afforded them.
Every faction nurtures its own agenda. The Padishah Emperor seeks political stability, while the Harkonnens seek to consolidate their wealth and power. The Spacing Guild seeks to safeguard the flow of Spice, while the Bene Gesserit - a powerful sisterhood of operatives to which Lady Jessica belongs - leverage their positions throughout the Landsraad in pursuit of a secretive, intergenerational breeding program. Under the secret leadership of the Padishah Emperor's own planetologist, the Fremen seek to transform Arrakis, both physically and politically. Meanwhile, the Atreides seek to offset the Padishah Emperor's power by establishing "Desert Power": an alliance with the Fremen, combining the Atreides' technology and training with the Fremen command of the desert.
Duke Leto's strategy fails in its infancy: the Padishah Emperor's personal shock troops, the Sardaukar, augment Harkonnen troops in a surprise attack that obliterates the Atreides’ foothold on Arrakis. With Duke Leto dead, Glossu Rabban retakes his former post as Baron Vladimir's oppressive viceroy, reimposing their brutal regime upon the Fremen. However, before his untimely death, Duke Leto manages to establish enough trust with the Fremen to secure sanctuary for a tiny cadre of Atreides survivors, notably Paul and Jessica.
Paul Atreides becomes a sort of messiah to the Fremen, and eventually reunites with House Atreides' chief strategist, Gurney Halleck. Their fragile "Desert Power" begins as an insurgency, eventually growing so powerful as to bring Spice production to a standstill. Although the Padishah Emperor and the Harkonnens attempt to intervene, even seeking the outright annihilation of the Fremen, "Desert Power" proves too powerful: the Atreides-Fremen alliance and its threat to the Spice brings the universe to its knees. Paul deposes the Padishah Emperor, and the Fremen assume a dangerous measure of interstellar power under his fragile leadership.
Herbert’s classic novel followed from extensive research on coastal and desert ecology, inspired by a 1959 trip to the iconic dunes outside Florence, Oregon. His research also focused upon the Middle East and the Arabic language, which influenced the linguistic intricacies interwoven into Herbert’s narrative. The story showcases a variety of competing and complementary agendas, none of which manage to play out as their perpetrators intend. Even the central protagonist, Paul, eventually loses control of the very force he manages to recruit to his cause, originating the quote that summarizes the entire story: “No more terrible disaster could befall your people than for them to fall into the hands of a Hero.”
Role Reversal
On the fictional planet Arrakis, the members of House Atreides send advance teams to make contact with the Fremen, ascertain their culture, learn to speak their languages, and seek to establish alliances with key Fremen tribes. By contrast, the Harkonnens make no such effort. Instead, they dismiss the Fremen as barbarians to be managed, exploited, or simply exterminated.
For the sake of neither the Afghan nor Iraq campaigns could Western troops be bothered to develop more than a passing understanding of either culture. The number of Western troops who learned critical languages - Arabic, Kurdish, Farsi, Dari, Pashtu, Urdu - with any degree of competence numbered in the dozens, perhaps the hundreds. Few of these dealt directly with the local populace in their respective theaters. Instead, they were employed in rear echelon units, such as intelligence cells or embassies. Rank-and-file troops charged with interacting with locals dealt mostly through interpreters, possibly going so far as to enjoy “three cups of tea” under the naive assumption that sharing in this basic aspect of local hospitality built common cause with their local interlocutors. Other coalition troops openly flaunted cultural proscriptions against alcohol consumption, or inter-gender fraternization, or a variety of other such proscriptions.
On Arrakis, the Atreides recognize their wealth - particularly in water - and seek to leverage that wealth for the sake of improving Fremen lives. Atreides forces engage in ambitious water preservation measures and seek opportunities to increase water rations for the Fremen in their employ. By contrast, the Harkonnen periods before and after the Atreides initial occupation become symbolic of excess, perversion, and flaunted wealth. The Harkonnens make no effort to improve Fremen lives, treating them instead as a resource to be squeezed to a breaking point in pursuit of an ever-growing spice production quota.
Despite the Counterinsurgency field manual's admonitions against ostentatious displays of wealth, Western troops enjoyed luxuries that their local counterparts - particularly the Afghans - could scarcely have dreamed of. While some frontline troops at forward patrol bases suffered the same sort of deprivations that the local populace endures on a lifetime basis, most support troops - the vast majority of deployed forces - enjoyed fast food concessions, recreation facilities, and other amenities beyond anything that Afghans or many Iraqis could ever hope to experience. For the sake of comfort, these conspicuous displays of wealth created cultural distance between Western troops and their host nation counterparts, while simultaneously encouraging unrealistic expectations with regard to what Western coalitions could accomplish. In Afghanistan in particular, unbridled expenditures - coupled with a prevailing lack of oversight or accountability - contributed directly to the coalition's failure.
On Arrakis, the Atreides recognize the importance of protecting Fremen life. In one key passage, Lady Jessica spares the life of the Shadout Mapes for the sake of building rapport with the Fremen - a reflection of her moral values, but also of her recognition of the importance of influencing Fremen hearts and minds. (Notably, Jessica exploits a longtime Bene Gesserit initiative, the Missionaria Protectiva, which seeded a belief system among the Fremen in a manner eerily similar to the longtime Saudi sponsorship of an international network of madrassas.) In another, Duke Leto himself orders that a substantial amount of raw spice - the most valuable commodity in the known universe - be abandoned in order to save the lives of a Fremen harvesting crew. By contrast, the Harkonnens place no value on the lives of Arrakis' indigenous populace. To Baron Vladimir, his underlings, and their troops, the Fremen amount to little more than an obstacle in their pursuit of wealth and power.
Certainly, few Western troops harbored the sort of cynicism and disregard for human life demonstrated by the Harkonnens. Still, despite the proliferation of noble and productive concepts like "courageous restraint" and "winning the hearts and minds," the coalition repeatedly alienated host nation communities through their overall lack of restraint in the application of deadly force applied toward one objective or another. For a period lasting beyond the initial months and years of the Afghan campaign, wedding parties were bombed almost repeatedly, fueling a consistent erosion of host nation faith in the coalition's integrity and motives. Even after coalition commanders recognized the need for restraint, troops quickly determined that they could secure the desired level of fire support with three words: "troops in contact." While coalition troops' goal was never the indiscriminate killing of civilians, the perception by host nation civilians was undoubtedly the same as it would have been if troops' intent had been deliberately hostile.
In a final example, the Atreides establish immediate plans to reconstitute Arrakis’ spice harvesting work force and infrastructure, both of which have been deliberately compromised by the Harkonnens during their withdrawal. These Harkonnen efforts to repatriate the best of their equipment mirrors efforts by coalition troops to leave minimal equipment with their Afghan and Iraqi counterparts. While a variety of considerations governed coalition calculations with regard to which assets stayed or went, this situation exceeded weapon systems and tactical vehicles, extending to base infrastructure such as access control and surveillance systems. In one documentary depicting the British withdrawal from Camp Bastion, an Afghan officer eventually comments to one of his colleagues, “They’re taking all the important things.”
A Disruptive Endgame
Eventually, operating under the Fremen nom de guerre "Muad'Dib", Paul Atreides leads an invasion force of Fremen warriors, augmented by a cadre of Atreides survivors that coincidentally resemble Army Special Forces A-Teams, against Arrakeen. Muad'Dib's forces quickly overwhelm their Harkonnen opponents, taking control of Arrakis, and of the Spice trade by extension. Baron Vladimir dies at the hands of Paul's captive sister, while Glossu Rabban is assassinated by the Fremen, and his brother Feyd-Rautha perishes in single combat with Paul. Muad'Dib becomes de facto Emperor of the known universe, while the Fremen - having seemingly found their messiah and fulfilled the prophecy seeded by the Missionaria Protectiva - launch a jihad across the universe, which even Muad'Dib himself is largely powerless to rein in.
Herbert's description of the Fremen conquest of Arrakeen reads like a fantastic version of the August 2021, fall of Kabul, after Taliban forces overran Western-aligned Afghan troop positions in a matter of days. The Taliban advance was, apparently, tolerated by a rural populace exhausted by nearly twenty years of failed NATO campaigns. Eventually, in a manner reminiscent of the fall of Saigon - and also of the uneasy Arrakeen settlement imposed at Muad'Dib's convenience - American and international troops evacuated military, civilian, and contracted personnel, in addition to thousands upon thousands of refugees, at the convenience of a Taliban force that had effectively surrounded Kabul's central airfield. The Taliban even disseminated images of their officials occupying government buildings, and of their most elite combatants brandishing appropriated Western equipment. Critics observed that the United States had spent twenty years, nearly 2,500 fatalities, and more than $2 trillion to replace the Taliban with the Taliban.
Elsewhere, in Iraq, the international coalition withdrew just before the close of 2011, leaving a Western-aligned Shiite strongman, Nuri al Maliki, as Prime Minister. This followed American interference in Iraqi politics to secure Maliki's position, despite his party's failure to secure an electoral majority against the rival Iraqiyah unity party in the nation's 2010 parliamentary election. With no residual coalition forces to act as a stabilizing force in Iraqi politics, Maliki launched an immediate, Iranian-backed pogrom against sectarian political rivals, attempting to consolidate his power by targeting Iraq's minority Sunni committee. In a matter of months, the same Sunni tribesmen who had partnered with coalition troops to eliminate Iraq's al Qaeda affiliate, the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), welcomed ISI's successor organization back into Iraq's Sunni provinces as liberators, preferring their former enemies to the America-backed government. The social, cultural, and political damage inflicted by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS/"DAESH") took years to halt and defies efforts at quantification.
In neither Afghanistan nor Iraq, nor in a multitude of other foreign locales, have recent generations of Americans arrived with the intention of making life miserable for the local populace, stealing precious resources, or exploiting host nation counterparts for one-sided game. Of course, intentions count for little if they result in botched execution. Unfortunately, America's national track record - admittedly complicated by the conflicting objectives, methods, and conduct of coalition partners - left a great deal to be desired in recent campaigns. American troops' perception of themselves as benevolent liberators counts for little if their operations, well-intentioned though they may be, result in a host nation perception of malevolence or indifference by those they were sent to assist.
This challenge of "perception is reality" goes beyond bombing wedding parties, or the unintended deaths of innocent bystanders. For example, the DoD's own Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that "logistic postures that project an image of unduly luxurious living by foreign forces while host nation civilians suffer in poverty should be avoided." As noted previously, coalition troops undermined their own credibility and alienated themselves from the local nationals whose support they desperately needed, for the sake of minimizing the deprivations normally associated with military life.
For all the talk of political failures in Western capitals, or local forces abandoning their posts, perception among local nationals played a role in the Afghan and Iraqi debacles that could not be overcome by logistics, marksmanship, or air supremacy. For all the talk of "a return to great power competition" and "near-peer competitors," the Cold War's historical precedent suggests that a return to such a state of affairs would actually play out in a series of small proxy wars, rather than a direct confrontation. In the twentieth century's Cold War, as with any number of similar states of strategic unease throughout recorded history, as well as isolated small wars, the victor's success depended upon being perceived - at least by its allies, often by its opponents, and certainly by its own populace and troops - as the Atreides, rather than the Harkonnens. This perception depends at least as much upon competent execution as it does upon legitimate objectives. If American and coalition troops intend to serve the strategic purposes for which they exist, there is no time like the present - at the conclusion of two tumultuous decades of operations, and during a recruiting shortfall - to take a sober look at the force's shortfalls, and to both resolve and prepare to do better.
After all, the Spice must flow.
About the Author(s)
Tom Ordeman, Jr.
Tom Ordeman, Jr. is an Oregon-based information security professional, freelance military historian, and former federal contractor. A graduate with Distinction from the University of Aberdeen’s MSc program in Strategic Studies, he holds multiple DoD and industry security certifications. Between 2006 and 2017, he supported training and enterprise risk management requirements for multiple DoD and federal civilian agencies. His research interests include the modern history of the Sultanate of Oman, and the exploits of the Gordon Highlanders during the First World War. His opinions are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of any entity with which he is associated.
12. OPEC+ cuts oil supplies to the world as prices fall
Perhaps OPEC+ is the enemy. It is certainly no friend to the US and the global economy,
OPEC+ cuts oil supplies to the world as prices fall
BY DAVID MCHUGH AP BUSINESS WRITER UPDATED SEPTEMBER 05, 2022 8:53 AM
Read more at: https://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article265346171.html#storylink=cpy
OPEC and allied oil-producing countries, including Russia, cut their supplies to the global economy by 100,000 barrels per day, underlining their unhappiness with crude prices that have sagged because of recession fears.
The decision Monday by energy ministers means the cut for October rolls back the mostly symbolic increase of the same amount in September. The move follows a statement last month from Saudi Arabia’s energy minister that the group could reduce output at any time. Oil producers such as Saudi Arabia have resisted calls from U.S. President Joe Biden to pump more oil to lower gasoline prices and the burden on consumers.
But worries about slumping future demand have helped send prices down from June peaks of over $120 per barrel, cutting into the windfall for the government budgets of OPEC+ countries but proving a blessing for drivers in the U.S. as pump prices have eased.
The energy ministers said in a statement that the September increase was only for that month, and that the group could meet again at any time to address market developments.
Other factors are lurking that could influence the price of oil. For one, the Group of Seven major democracies plan to impose a price cap on imports of Russian oil and what effect that might have on the market. The price level for the cap has not yet been set.
Meanwhile, a deal between Western countries and Iran to limit Tehran’s nuclear program could ease sanctions and see more than 1 million barrels of Iranian oil return to the market in coming months. However, tensions between the U.S. and Iran appear to have risen in recent days: Iran seized two U.S. naval drones in the Red Sea, and U.S., Kuwaiti and Saudi warplanes flew over the Middle East on Sunday in a show of force.
Oil prices have gyrated in recent months: Recession fears have pushed them down, while worries of a loss of Russian oil because of sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine pushed them up.
Recently, recession fears have taken the upper hand. Economists in Europe are penciling in a recession at the end of this year due to skyrocketing inflation fed by energy costs, while China's severe restrictions aimed at halting the spread of the coronavirus have sapped growth in that major world economy.
Those falling oil prices have been a boon to U.S. drivers, sending gasoline prices down to $3.82 per gallon from record highs of over $5 in June.
That month, fears that U.S. and European sanctions would take Russian oil off the market helped push Brent to over $123. Those concerns are still out there because European sanctions aimed at Russian oil shipments won't take effect until the end of the year.
Read more at: https://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article265346171.html#storylink=cpy
13. Gorbachev Did Save One Communist Party — China’s
Excerpts:
Recent developments do not augur well for the CCP. Its survival strategy inspired by the Soviet collapse has run its course. As China’s economic growth has slowed to a crawl because of deteriorating demographics and market-unfriendly policies, the central pillar of the party’s legitimacy looks increasingly shaky.
Chinese leaders also have forgotten one of the most important lessons their predecessors drew from the Soviet collapse: The Cold War bankrupted the Soviet empire and ultimately led to its breakup. Instead of maintaining a low international profile as dictated by Deng, China’s leaders have adopted an assertive foreign policy that’s contributed to a breakdown of China’s relations with the West.
If stagnant growth and escalating geopolitical tensions continue for a decade or two, the CCP may find itself in the same dire straits that greeted Gorbachev when he assumed power in 1985. The only unknown is whether future Chinese leaders can do better than Gorbachev in salvaging a crisis-ridden regime.
If anything, the CCP likely will fare worse. By precluding a peaceful transition to democracy, the party may be inadvertently creating conditions for the kind of cataclysmic upheaval Gorbachev tried so hard to avert. In struggling to avoid the Soviet leader’s mistakes, China may yet commit even worse ones.
Gorbachev Did Save One Communist Party — China’s
If the Chinese regime hadn’t learned from the former Soviet leader’s example, it might not be as resilient and repressive as it is today. But it may yet share his fate.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-09-04/mikhail-gorbachev-s-legacy-includes-more-repressive-china?srnd=premium&sref=hhjZtX76
ByMinxin Pei
September 4, 2022 at 6:00 PM EDT
The death of the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev naturally elicited an outpouring of praise from Western leaders for his role in ending the Cold War. If Gorbachev helped bring freedom to most of the former Soviet bloc, however, the revolution he led arguably led to the opposite outcome in China. Without Gorbachev’s example, the Chinese regime might not be as resilient, repressive and resistant to political reform as it is today.
China’s official reaction to the news of Gorbachev’s passing has been muted. That’s little surprise; one wouldn’t expect the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to have anything positive to say about a leader who tried to democratize a communist regime peacefully. At the same time, Chinese leaders can hardly deny Gorbachev’s influence: Many of the strategies they’ve followed since 1991 have been consciously adopted in response to his policies.
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It was in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, for instance, that China accelerated pro-market reforms and widely opened its economy to the outside world. At the time, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping delivered a stark warning to his comrades: The Soviet Union had collapsed because its communist leaders had failed miserably to deliver a better standard of living. The CCP would be doomed if it repeated the same mistake.
Over the previous decade, Deng had fought bitter battles with hardliners who objected to economic integration with the capitalist West. Such opposition melted away after 1991. Although Deng himself always had a clear understanding of the need for economic modernization, he still required a powerful shock such as the Soviet collapse to persuade others of the wisdom of his strategy.
In the early 1990s, the party at last rallied behind Deng’s mantra, “Development is the cardinal truth.” The reforms implemented then led to years of sustained double-digit growth.
Where Deng thought Gorbachev had gone wrong, of course, was in relaxing control over society through his glasnost (openness) policy. Following so soon after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, the fall of the Soviet Union only gave Chinese leaders an even more powerful impetus to suppress any and all potential threats.
Consequently, the party began to allocate massive resources to domestic security. Spending on law enforcement rose five-and-a-half times in real terms from 1991 to 2002. Generous investments in the coercive apparatus enabled the party to modernize the surveillance state and snuff out potential opposition forces, including political dissidents, religious groups, organized labor and cults.
Here we may find the answer to the puzzle of how rapid economic development consolidated China’s one-party state instead of destroying it, as in South Korea and Taiwan. Contrary to expectations that rising wealth would inevitably lead to democratization, the Chinese “economic miracle” has given the CCP a new lease of life by helping it gain popular support and build a more capable system of repression.
However, even the combination of strong performance legitimacy and high-tech coercion has not entirely freed the CCP from its fear of Gorbachev-style glasnost. The CCP seems especially haunted by the evaporation of the political legitimacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union soon after Gorbachev permitted the media and the intelligentsia to expose the party’s crimes against its own people.
So, in recent years, the CCP has launched a new campaign against “historical nihilism,” a term applied to any form of truth-telling that challenges the party’s official narrative about its past, in particular the catastrophic rule of Mao Zedong (1949-1976). To ensure that none dares to air the party’s dirty laundry or expose its falsehoods, the Chinese government has tightened censorship in the media and on college campuses, and levied severe penalties, including imprisonment, on those found guilty of “historical nihilism.”
The question now is whether China has successfully averted Gorbachev’s fate or only postponed it.
Recent developments do not augur well for the CCP. Its survival strategy inspired by the Soviet collapse has run its course. As China’s economic growth has slowed to a crawl because of deteriorating demographics and market-unfriendly policies, the central pillar of the party’s legitimacy looks increasingly shaky.
Chinese leaders also have forgotten one of the most important lessons their predecessors drew from the Soviet collapse: The Cold War bankrupted the Soviet empire and ultimately led to its breakup. Instead of maintaining a low international profile as dictated by Deng, China’s leaders have adopted an assertive foreign policy that’s contributed to a breakdown of China’s relations with the West.
If stagnant growth and escalating geopolitical tensions continue for a decade or two, the CCP may find itself in the same dire straits that greeted Gorbachev when he assumed power in 1985. The only unknown is whether future Chinese leaders can do better than Gorbachev in salvaging a crisis-ridden regime.
If anything, the CCP likely will fare worse. By precluding a peaceful transition to democracy, the party may be inadvertently creating conditions for the kind of cataclysmic upheaval Gorbachev tried so hard to avert. In struggling to avoid the Soviet leader’s mistakes, China may yet commit even worse ones.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story:
Minxin Pei at mpei6@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Nisid Hajari at nhajari@bloomberg.net
14. Ukrainian Forces Recapture Two Towns in the South
Ukrainian Forces Recapture Two Towns in the South
nytimes.com · September 5, 2022
Here’s what we know:
President Volodymyr Zelensky offered the first public hints of progress in what is expected to be a slow and grueling campaign to push Russian forces out of Ukraine’s south.
Zelensky says two towns in the south have been liberated.
Four of the six U.N. inspectors complete their work at Ukraine’s Russian-occupied nuclear power plant.
With Boris Johnson’s departure, Ukraine loses a friend.
Deadly shelling in the east offers a grim reminder of a continuing battle.
Other European nations try to fight rising prices, as fears of social unrest grow.
KYIV, Ukraine — As Ukrainian forces mount a counteroffensive against well-entrenched Russian soldiers across southern Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky offered the first public hints of progress in what is expected to be a slow and grueling campaign.
Ukrainian forces have recaptured two villages, he said Sunday night, offering few details even as he sought to bolster the resolve of the nation as summer fades and he tries to brace the public for a grueling winter.
“We will liberate all our lands, all our people,” Mr. Zelensky said.
While Russian officials and pro-Kremlin analysts have dismissed the idea that the offensive is having an impact, the occupation authorities in the Kherson region said on Monday that they had put a planned referendum on whether to join Russia on hold because of “the events that happened.”
“This will be a practical decision, because we don’t jump the wagon,” said Kirill Stremousov, the deputy head of the Russian-appointed administration in Kherson.
Speaking in an interview on Rossiya-1, Russia’s state-run television network, he said that the occupation authorities had to make the population “understand that we are not enemies — we are the ones liberating them.”
More than half the local population is estimated to have already fled Russian occupation, and intensified fighting threatens to create new humanitarian crises.
Ukraine’s military high command said on Monday that Russian occupation forces in Kherson have imposed a ban on the movement of all local residents.
“In particular, people are prohibited from crossing the Dnipro River both by bridges and by watercraft,” the military said. “In case of violation of the ban, the occupiers threaten to open fire.”
The river bisects the Kherson region, which is about the size of Maryland.
After weeks of trying to weaken Russian positions in Kherson, last week Ukraine began its most complex and ambitious counteroffensive since it drove the Russians from around the capital, Kyiv, and other cities in the north in the first months of the war.
The Ukrainian offensive is focused on isolating and attacking Russian forces on the western side of the Dnipro. By pounding Russian ammunition depots and repeatedly attacking the four main crossings across the river, the Ukrainians are hoping to starve Russian forces of munitions and supplies and force them to either retreat or surrender.
Ukraine’s military has imposed sweeping restrictions on journalists and urged people not to publicize details of the operations. Moscow tried to cast the offensive as a failure even before it began. But in recent days, some Russian military bloggers have noted Ukrainian advances.
With details around the offensive scarce, both militaries are waging an information battle to control the narrative of what military analysts say could be one of the war’s most significant confrontations to date.
On Monday, the Ukrainian military southern command claimed that the 127th Regiment of Russia’s 1st Army Corp had refused to fight. It was the second time they highlighted what they said was the refusal of a Russian unit to fight.
“One of the reasons is unsatisfactory all-round support: Personnel in advanced positions were left even without water,” the Ukrainian military said in a statement. “The special services of the occupying forces took measures against the rebels — they were taken out of their positions.”
Soldiers fighting along the front have characterized the battles as slow and costly, with heavy losses on both sides.
In a sign of the hunger for good news, Ukrainian social media accounts lit up Sunday night with videos and images of a soldier hoisting a Ukrainian flag on a rooftop.
Kyrylo Tymoshenko, an official in Mr. Zelensky’s office, shared the image and said in a post on Facebook that it had been taken that day in the village of Vysokopillia in the southern Kherson region. Vysokopillia — which Russian forces seized in March — is about 90 miles from the provincial capital.
Mr. Zelensky appeared to nod to that development in a statement after a meeting with military leaders on Sunday, saying, “Ukrainian flags are returning to the places where they should be.”
KYIV, Ukraine — Ukraine’s state nuclear energy provider said on Monday that four of the six members of an International Atomic Energy Agency inspection team had completed their work and left the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant a day before the agency issues a report on the conditions there.
The international agency, which is the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, said two monitors remained at the plant, which is held by Russian forces but is still run by Ukrainian engineers.
And it has expressed hope that an enduring international presence would ease the turmoil at the site, Europe’s largest nuclear facility, which has come under repeated shelling, raising the specter of a nuclear disaster.
As the world awaits the inspectors’ report, Ukrainian officials sought to keep up pressure on the agency to offer a robust assessment of both the conditions at the plant and the challenges facing Ukrainian engineers charged with its safe operation.
“We do not understand whether everything is normal there in terms of safety, cooling of the reactors, with the personnel, whether they understand the algorithms by which they work,” Mykhailo Podolyak, adviser to the head of the Ukrainian president’s office, told Ukrainian television on Monday. Anything short of a comprehensive assessment, he said, would show the ineffectiveness of the international agency.
President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine accused Moscow of turning the plant itself into a “nuclear weapon” and repeated his calls for the Russian military to leave the plant.
“They occupied our nuclear station, six blocks. The biggest in Europe. It means six Chernobyls; it means the biggest danger in Europe,” he said in extracts of an interview with ABC News that is scheduled to air on Monday.
“There shouldn’t be any military personnel. There shouldn’t be any military equipment on the territory. And there shouldn’t be the workers of nuclear power plant who are surrounded by people with firearms.”
Repeated shelling of the plant over the past month has damaged all of the connections to four high-voltage external power lines, forcing it to use a lower-voltage reserve line to power the cooling equipment needed to prevent meltdowns.
“In the U.S., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would not allow a reactor to operate under those conditions for more than 24 hours,” said Edwin Lyman, a nuclear power expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists.
When the main power lines and the reserve line were damaged by shelling and fires on Aug. 25, there was a blackout at the plant, and it had to rely on diesel generators to prevent a disaster.
Rafael Mariano Grossi, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told a news conference on Friday that his biggest concern regarding the physical safety of the facility itself was related to a reliable connection to external power.
LONDON — Prime Minister Boris Johnson may be a polarizing figure in Britain, where his long association with scandal forced his resignation.
His replacement — announced on Monday to be Liz Truss, the hawkish foreign secretary — will have to heal a Conservative Party divided after Mr. Johnson’s turbulent three years in office.
But if there is one place where appreciation for Mr. Johnson is undimmed, it is Ukraine, where the prime minister is seen as a genuine friend of the embattled nation since Russia’s invasion in February.
Pastries have been named after him in Kyiv, and countless memes have been created in his honor. Yulia Maleks, 36, who owns a small farm in a village near Lviv, recounted with laughter how she named a prized sheep “Johnsonuk,” using the moniker that has been adopted for Mr. Johnson across Ukraine, a play on his official Instagram handle.
Ukraine’s national railway service, a vital lifeline for evacuating civilians from the country’s east — and which also transported Mr. Johnson during one of two visits to the country since the invasion — topped their logo with a floppy blonde hairdo on social media after Mr. Johnson’s announcement in July that he would resign.
For Mr. Johnson, an admirer of Churchill, stolid support for Ukraine helped buck up his leadership as the costs of Brexit and the pandemic took their toll, in addition to the numerous scandals that ultimately eroded the prime minister’s support and forced his departure.
One of the few things that British lawmakers can seem to agree on is backing Ukrainian forces in their battle against Russia, and the British public in opinion polls has overwhelmingly supported these efforts.
The conflict gave Mr. Johnson an opportunity to remind his country, and the world, of the legacy of British resolve on the continent and the latitude for a more independent foreign policy that Britain’s departure from the European Union has provided. British support of Ukraine allowed Mr. Johnson to juxtapose Britain’s position with the more cautious approach of Berlin and Paris.
No major Western leader, perhaps, was as outspoken in supporting the country, with multiple visits to Ukraine since the start of the war, countless phone calls to President Volodymyr Zelensky, and the commitment of military and financial aid that forged a bond between the two leaders. They have repeatedly traded praise for one another.
Before Mr. Johnson’s successor was announced on Monday, the Ukrainian leader again praised the outgoing prime minister and said he was a personal friend.
“I sincerely hope that Boris’s legacy in this fight against Russian barbarism will be preserved,” Mr. Zelensky wrote in an essay for Britain’s Mail on Sunday newspaper.
Britain is expected to continue Mr. Johnson’s policy of robust support for Ukraine under Ms. Truss.
But for ordinary Ukrainians, Mr. Johnson’s departure may feel like a more personal loss.
“Thank you for your support of Ukraine and Ukrainians. We will never forget it,” one social media user wrote late Sunday. “I even named ma cat after you: Mr. Boris Johnsonuk.”
Russian shelling killed four Ukrainian civilians in Donetsk Province over the weekend, offering a grim reminder of the continuous battle in the country’s east even as the war’s focus has shifted to the south.
The governor for Donetsk, Pavlo Kyrylenko, said on Sunday that two people had been killed a day earlier in the village of Velyka Novosilka, which is about 60 miles west of the regional capital. Shelling also killed one person in the city of Siversk, which is north of Donetsk, and another in the village of Vodiane, Mr. Kyrylenko said. Two people were wounded.
Mr. Kyrylenko added in a post on the Telegram messaging app that 797 civilians have died and more than 20,000 have been wounded in the Donetsk region since Russia invaded Ukraine in late February.
But Ukraine’s new attempt to regain ground in the southern province of Kherson, which was lost to Moscow at the start of the war, has shifted the dynamics in the east.
After failing to capture Ukraine’s capital early in the war, Russian forces switched focus to try to seize control of the eastern Donbas region, which is made up of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. They had captured nearly all of Luhansk by early July of this year, but their efforts since to take control of neighboring Donetsk have stalled.
That is in part because of a weekslong pause by Moscow in its offensive to rotate and refresh troops, but also because Ukraine has been preparing defensive positions in Donetsk since 2014 — when rebels loyal to Russia seized government buildings there and in Luhansk, beginning a long trench war with Ukrainian forces — that are difficult to dislodge. Ukrainian attacks on Russian ammunition depots and other supply points behind the front lines, using longer-range artillery supplied by Western countries, have also slowed Russia’s advances in Donetsk.
Now, an uptick in fighting in Kherson has changed the calculus for both sides in Donetsk.
“As Ukraine tries to make advances in Kherson and the Russian military fights and tries to defend that territory, the rest of the Russian forces attempt to make incremental advances on Donbas,” Michael Kofman, director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for a New American Security, said on the War on the Rocks podcast.
There are signs that Moscow might reinforce its troops in the east to renew its stalled campaign. Ukrainian military intelligence has said in recent days that the Russian army’s newest grouping — the 3rd Army Corps — will likely be deployed to Donbas.
It would be the first major new formation of troops to be dispatched by the Kremlin since it launched a campaign in July to bring in new recruits — though military analysts have questioned the grouping’s combat readiness.
“Images of the 3rd Army Corps elements have shown the volunteers to be physically unfit and old,” a recent analysis by the Institute for the Study of War said.
Analysts say that fighting in eastern Ukraine will almost certainly stretch into next year. A likely hiatus in offensive operations in the winter will give both sides an opportunity to train new forces, and so it will be critical for Ukraine to force Russia to commit new troops just to hold its current positions, the Royal United Services Institute, a London think tank that specializes in security issues, said in a report.
The United States government estimated in July that 15,000 Russians had been killed since February and said that Ukraine had also suffered significant losses. On Sunday, Britain’s ministry of defense said in an intelligence update that Russian troops were continuing to suffer from low morale.
“With the prospect of a bitter winter spent outdoors, there is ample opportunity to ensure that Russia’s forces remain cold, wet, hungry, miserable and therefore vulnerable to shock and a collapse in morale,” the report said.
On the world stage, Britain’s incoming prime minister, Liz Truss, is best known for taking a hard line against President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.
“Putin must lose in Ukraine,” she said last March in Lithuania, using language that went beyond that of the United States and other Western allies. She has announced sanctions against hundreds of Russian companies and individuals, including relatives of Mr. Putin.
Ms. Truss, whom Britain’s Conservative Party selected on Monday as its leader, making her the country’s next leader, is expected to double down on Britain’s support for President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, with further sanctions and more weapons for the Ukrainian army. She has promised to increase Britain’s spending on defense to 3 percent of its gross domestic product by the end of the decade.
Britain’s relations with the European Union, scratchy ever since Brexit, could become even more turbulent under Ms. Truss. She has promised to push through legislation that would upend the trading arrangements in Northern Ireland, which remains part of the European single market. Officials in Brussels have reacted angrily, stoking fears of a trade war between Britain and the European Union.
The dispute could spill over into trans-Atlantic relations. The Biden administration is worried that a clash over trade in Northern Ireland could threaten 25 years of peace since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.
On Monday, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, offered a conciliatory message of congratulations to Ms. Truss, describing the European Union and Britain as “partners.”
“We face many challenges together, from climate change to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” Ms. von der Leyen tweeted. “I look forward to a constructive relationship, in full respect of our agreements.”
BERLIN — Governments across Europe moved this weekend to introduce measures aimed at tackling soaring energy costs and inflation, amid growing concerns that rising prices fueled by the war in Ukraine could stoke social unrest.
Germany, Sweden and the Czech Republic were among the countries that on Sunday announced plans to ease the burdens of an energy crisis that has been triggered largely by Russia’s invasion and Western governments’ decision to punish Moscow in response.
The German government unveiled a $65 billion reliefpackage, while Sweden’s government said it would offer around $23 billion in liquidity guarantees to help energy companies purchase supplies until March. Without that support, Finance Minister Mikael Damberg said on Sunday, some electricity providers risked going into “technical bankruptcy.”
The Czech government announced plans to create a government-run entity to purchase energy supplies for schools, hospitals and other public sector institutions, although it did not say when such purchases would begin. The announcement came just two days after the Czech government survived a no-confidence vote instigated by the opposition over its failure to curb soaring energy prices.
A day earlier, on Saturday, protesters took to the streets in Prague, the Czech capital, to call for stronger government action to curb spiraling energy prices. Tens of thousands of demonstrators, led by far-right and fringe political factions, also criticized the government’s membership in NATO and the European Union.
The protests underlined growing concerns among European leaders that the energy crisis and soaring inflation could trigger broader political instability.
In Germany, Europe’s largest democracy, left-wing and far-right groups have announced plans to begin weekly demonstrations. Unions have also threatened to stage protests, but it was unclear whether those plans would continue after the government unveiled a $65 billion economic relief package on Sunday.
France also is embarking on its biggest energy conservation effort since the 1970s oil crisis. President Emmanuel Macron’s government is calling on its citizens to prepare for a new era of energy “sobriety” in case of a cold winter, but also has insisted the government would help cushion the blow. France has so far spent $26 billion to keep power bills affordable.
BERLIN — The German government announced a $65 billion reliefpackage on Sunday to help ease the burden on citizens facing soaring inflation and surging energy costs that have worsened with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and have sent European leaders scrambling to prepare the continent for winter.
The package is the third and largest announced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s coalition as part of its response to the energy crisis resulting from the war in Ukraine, which prompted Western countries to impose harsh sanctions against Moscow and pledge to reduce purchases of Russian oil and gas.
With energy prices soaring as Europe tries to wean itself off Russian fossil fuels, and an emergency meeting of European Union energy ministers planned for this week, leaders are racing to implement stopgap measures as fall and winter loom. France is embarking on its biggest conservation effort since the 1970s oil crisis. On Sunday, Liz Truss, the front-runner to become Britain’s new prime minister, said that she would “act immediately” to deal with soaring energy costs if elected.
Berlin announced its package two days after Gazprom, the Kremlin-controlled Russian energy giant, announced an indefinite halt to the Nord Stream 1 pipeline that terminates in Germany and provides gas to much of Europe. Gazprom said that problems had been found during inspections, and that the pipeline would be closed until they were eliminated, giving no timeline for the resumption of the gas flow.
German officials have said the move is politically motivated, and it came on the same day that finance ministers for the Group of 7 countries agreed to impose a price cap on Russian oil in an effort to cut off some of the energy revenue Moscow continues to earn from Europe.
With the latest German relief package — once approved by Parliament, which is all but guaranteed — the government will have spent about $95 billion on economic aid measures since Russia’s invasion in February, one of the largest such programs among industrialized nations. Berlin plans to fund the latest measures with a windfall tax targeting companies whose profits are rising as a result of the energy crisis.
“Our country is facing a difficult time,” Mr. Scholz told a news conference in Berlin, promising that “no one will be left behind.”
As Europe’s largest economy, Germany is among the worst affected by the energy crisis rippling across Europe, where natural gas costs about 10 times what it did a year ago.
Among the measures Germany unveiled include one-time payments to households, tax breaks for energy-intensive industries and cheaper public transportation options. It also announced plans for an electricity “price brake,” subsidized by the windfall tax, that would guarantee citizens a certain amount of electricity at a lower cost. Consumption beyond that would be priced higher.
The windfall tax would be levied on energy companies that benefit from the rising energy prices during the gas crisis — mainly producers of coal, nuclear and renewable energy.
German officials have worried for months that soaring costs could trigger social upheaval. Left-wing and far-right groups have promised to begin weekly demonstrations against Mr. Scholz’s center-left coalition. Some unions have threatened to take to the streets, with one labor group calling the measures announced on Sunday only a “half step.”
Mr. Scholz said on Sunday that his government understood people’s worries over living costs. “We take these concerns very seriously,” he said.
Last week, Germany’s energy minister said the country was in a relatively good position despite energy concerns, having managed to fill its gas storage facilities to over 80 percent capacity, thanks to preparations that started shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine. Germany has also slashed its reliance on energy from Russia, which provided more than half its gas imports before the war, a figure that dropped to less than 10 percent in August.
John J. Sullivan, the U.S. ambassador to Russia, left Moscow on Sunday and is retiring from public service after serving under five American presidents, the State Department said.
Mr. Sullivan oversaw the operations of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Russia during its most difficult period in decades — after President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, prompting the United States and partner nations to impose economic sanctions on Russia and give Ukraine weapons and humanitarian aid.
Mr. Sullivan, a Republican, served as deputy secretary of state under both the secretaries of state in the Trump administration, Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo, before being appointed ambassador to Russia in December 2019. He served as acting secretary of state in April 2018, before Mr. Pompeo began his tenure leading the State Department.
And before the Ukraine war, Russia and the United States had for five years engaged in retaliatory actions over diplomatic staffing. Mr. Sullivan told Politico in a written exchange in February that the number of employees in the U.S. embassy in Moscow had dropped to about 150 from about 1,200 during that period. Mr. Sullivan said there were entire floors of the embassy that were unoccupied, and row after row of empty cubicles and dark offices.
Mr. Sullivan agreed to stay on as ambassador when asked by President Biden after he took office in January 2021.
“It may be passé now, but I was taught that when a president asks an American to serve, only the most compelling excuse can justify a refusal with great remorse,” Mr. Sullivan said in the written interview. “And I had no excuse, because I love my job, and I love working with my colleagues at Embassy Moscow.”
The State Department said that Elizabeth Rood, a foreign service officer who became deputy chief of mission in Moscow in June, will serve as the chief of mission until a new ambassador is named and takes up the post.
nytimes.com · September 5, 2022
15. Liz Truss: The UK’s New Prime Minister and the Indo-Pacific
That was fast.
Excerpts:
Truss’ time in office may well be short. Her election has not reset the U.K.’s electoral clock, and the next general election will take place no later than January 2025. Truss inherits the leadership of a Conservative Party that is currently polling poorly with the wider British public, wracked by sleaze scandals and a skyrocketing cost of living in the U.K. An increasing focus on domestic issues should be expected as Truss tries to broaden her appeal beyond her own party, as well as resuscitate the Conservative Party’s moribund popularity.
These factors will likely divert the Truss ministry’s attention away from considered and productive foreign policymaking, instead leading to a preference for quick wins in the region that can be held up as easy, vote-winning successes. Truss may continue to highlight existing gains in the Indo-Pacific – such as the U.K.’s impending membership in the CPTPP – for quick political capital back home. Issues where nuance of statecraft is needed, as with China and Myanmar, for example, may fall victim to rash hawkishness in the case of the former and neglect with the latter.
With a tight time limit on office, an increasingly challenging environment in the Indo-Pacific, and myriad domestic troubles, it will be a difficult time for Truss to develop substance over style.
Liz Truss: The UK’s New Prime Minister and the Indo-Pacific
Bold promises made during her election campaign, combined with serious domestic challenges, may hamper Truss’ ability to build the U.K.’s footprint in the region.
thediplomat.com · by James Jennion · September 5, 2022
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Liz Truss, the United Kingdom’s new prime minister, loves the Indo-Pacific. That’s what her many visits, photo-ops, and speeches within the region would suggest. Having served as the U.K.’s foreign secretary from September 2021 until last week, and previously international trade secretary, Truss arrives at Downing Street with an international resumé. Now that she is in the driver’s seat, Truss will need to show she can provide more than visits and slogans to make the U.K. a worthy partner in the Indo-Pacific.
However, bold promises made during her election campaign, combined with serious domestic challenges, may hamper Truss’ ability to build the U.K.’s footprint in the region.
Who Is Liz Truss?
It is essential to note that Liz Truss was not elected in a country-wide election. Truss was elected as leader of the governing Conservative Party after the resignation of her predecessor, Boris Johnson. She is therefore prime minister by virtue of her leadership of the governing party, not from a public mandate brought by a national election. She was elected by more than 160,000 Conservative Party members – or 0.3 percent of the U.K.’s voting public – so her recent rhetoric has been geared toward convincing a small subset of the U.K. population that she was leadership material. As prime minister, she has to convince the entire U.K. public that she is doing a good job.
It should be expected that Truss’ positions on the Indo-Pacific and core foreign policy issues like China will sound different during her tenure as head of government, as the hard work of delivering on bold promises becomes a reality. Truss’ previous roles and actions offer insight into how she plans to do this. In the early days of the leadership race during her tenure as trade minister, Truss put great stock into her work to secure many of the U.K.’s post-Brexit trade deals with nations in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia and Japan.
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She is clearly a figure who sees the Indo-Pacific as an integral part of the U.K.’s future, and the U.K. as a real player in the region. However, Truss is frequently criticized for depending on optics and headline-grabbing stances over substantial, reasoned policy. It is one thing to make bold promises on China and the Indo-Pacific during a leadership contest, but another thing entirely to actually deliver on them once in power.
A Hard Line on China
Truss has been loud in her extensive criticism of China. In return, Truss is intensely disliked by China’s leadership. China-U.K. relations have swung between poles over the past decade, from the “Golden Era” of the mid-2010s to the increasingly bitter and combative engagement of recent years, notably through the sanctions tennis of early 2021, during which the U.K. and China sanctioned one another’s officials. Relations will likely deteriorate further under Truss.
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Throughout the leadership campaign, both Liz Truss and her opponent Rishi Sunak went to great lengths to flaunt their tough stances on China. While Sunak pledged to ban Confucius Institutes from the U.K., Truss said that she would declare the atrocities in Xinjiang to be a genocide. It is possible that Truss may soften on this promise once in office. Declaring genocide in Xinjiang will put the U.K. in a complicated position, given states’ obligations to not only prevent but also punish genocide when it is committed.
As foreign secretary, Truss allegedly made the decision to gut funding for the Great Britain China Centre, one of the U.K.’s major sources of China expertise. Truss has spoken at length about the need for democratic nations to rally against authoritarianism. In a speech at the Lowy Institute, Truss spoke about the need for democracies to build a “Network of Liberty” – a thinly-veiled call for liberal actors to band against Russia and China.
This may run the risk of alienating less clearly aligned countries such as India. David Lawrence, a research fellow at Chatham House, said in an interview that building coalitions through overt use of liberal values “puts a lot of countries in a difficult position,” as they seek to balance their alignment between different poles of global power. “Framing networks in terms of more specific infrastructure and economic projects would make the U.K. more likely to find helpful partnerships,” Lawrence added.
Apparently, greater liberal coalition building should also involve NATO defending Taiwan against invasion by China, with Truss rejecting Euro-Atlantic security as NATO’s sole purpose and instead calling for a “global NATO.” Truss has even gone as far as pledging to declare China an official threat to U.K. interests and security. Such hawkishness tells us that Truss’ premiership will see increased U.K. efforts to balance China in the Indo-Pacific, with a greater focus on strategic competition in the region over the cooling of tensions.
The U.K. will likely ramp up its condemnation of China’s human rights record through fora like the U.N. Human Rights Council. An emphasis on building more Anglophone coalitions like AUKUS, and efforts to strengthen regional groupings like the Five Power Defense Arrangements, should also be expected. While this will help pile the pressure on China over important issues like its growing military provocativeness and Xinjiang, it may also drag the U.K. further into the orbit of China-U.S. strategic competition, which would not necessarily be helpful for any party in the Indo-Pacific.
ASEAN
Truss appears keen to build the U.K.’s credibility among ASEAN member states. In November 2021, then-Foreign Secretary Truss visited Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, calling for the U.K.’s relationships with these countries to be “turbo-charged.” In July, ASEAN and the U.K. recommitted to strengthening cooperation in existing areas and building cooperation in new areas, including counterterrorism and cybersecurity.
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This is promising, but maintaining focus and willpower on engagement with ASEAN will be needed. Truss will need to build on policies like U.K.-ASEAN engagement and the U.K.’s new Dialogue Partnership in order to ensure that sufficient governmental capacity is allocated toward building strong engagement with an organization as complex and pluralistic as ASEAN. She will need to make full use of the U.K.’s particular role to play in mediating the ongoing violence in Myanmar, strengthen regional knowledge and capacity within the U.K.’s diplomatic service, and place due focus on strengthening bilateral relations with member states rather than simply treating ASEAN as a monolith.
However, embracing the full potential and navigating the complexities of engagement with ASEAN may prove challenging, given issues closer to home.
Domestic Challenges
Truss’ time in office may well be short. Her election has not reset the U.K.’s electoral clock, and the next general election will take place no later than January 2025. Truss inherits the leadership of a Conservative Party that is currently polling poorly with the wider British public, wracked by sleaze scandals and a skyrocketing cost of living in the U.K. An increasing focus on domestic issues should be expected as Truss tries to broaden her appeal beyond her own party, as well as resuscitate the Conservative Party’s moribund popularity.
These factors will likely divert the Truss ministry’s attention away from considered and productive foreign policymaking, instead leading to a preference for quick wins in the region that can be held up as easy, vote-winning successes. Truss may continue to highlight existing gains in the Indo-Pacific – such as the U.K.’s impending membership in the CPTPP – for quick political capital back home. Issues where nuance of statecraft is needed, as with China and Myanmar, for example, may fall victim to rash hawkishness in the case of the former and neglect with the latter.
With a tight time limit on office, an increasingly challenging environment in the Indo-Pacific, and myriad domestic troubles, it will be a difficult time for Truss to develop substance over style.
James Jennion
James Jennion is a U.K.-based foreign policy adviser and analyst. He is an incoming PhD candidate at the University of Leeds, where his project will focus on the UK's human rights diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. He tweets at @jennionjames.
Jennion previously worked as an adviser to the UK Foreign Affairs Committee, where he led inquiries on human rights in China and the U.K.’s role in the Indo-Pacific. He recently completed the British Council’s Generation UK-China Leadership Programme and sits on the Executive Committee of the Labour Foreign Policy Group.
thediplomat.com · by James Jennion · September 5, 2022
16. Time to Rethink America’s Nuclear Strategy
Excerpts:
Cold War postures or strategic forces would be of little use in any of these scenarios. If the United States sought to disable a rogue regime’s nuclear capability, deter or respond to the tactical use of nuclear weapons by a great power, or strengthen Washington’s commitment to defend an ally, it would be better to build and deploy powerful weapons whose use would be more credible and compelling. The demonstrated ability to repel a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan, for example, or a clear superiority in cyber-operations, artificial intelligence, and space capabilities would be more likely to reassure concerned allies and deter foes than improved nuclear counterforce systems.
Critics will respond that this stance could weaken extended deterrence. Neither the United States nor its allies are eager to concede the obvious—that Washington is unlikely to use nuclear weapons first or even at all, save as a response to an attack on the American homeland. Proclaiming doctrines that are clearly untrue, however, while investing in expensive strategic nuclear counterforce capabilities whose use is unimaginable can have a corrosive effect and both invite complacency and tempt adversaries. Over time, adversaries are more likely to be deterred and allies are more likely to be reassured by tools that Washington might actually use.
The United States could also reconsider its policies on allies acquiring nuclear weapons. Washington retains its desire to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and should work hard to prevent proliferation. Almost 80 years after World War II, however, nuclear acquisition by democratic allies such as Germany or Japan would be far less threatening than during the Cold War, when it could have torn apart the Western alliance or provoked a Soviet attack. A future world with, for example, a nuclear Australia, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, or Vietnam would hardly be ideal for the United States. It would, however, be far worse for China and Russia.
The most important change Washington must make, however, is to its mindset. Cold War thinking about nuclear strategy has long outlasted the conflict itself. More than three decades into the post–Cold War era, policymakers have still not managed to fully update their view of the nuclear threats the United States faces and the proper way to deal with them. For the sake of U.S. national security and for the stability of the world, they need to pick up the pace.
Time to Rethink America’s Nuclear Strategy
How to Learn the Right Lessons From the Cold War
September 5, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Francis J. Gavin · September 5, 2022
Late in the afternoon of Sunday, February 27, Russian President Vladimir Putin convened a group of senior Kremlin officials to witness an extraordinary public statement. Putin announced that he had taken the “unprecedented” step of ordering Russia’s nuclear warheads to be prepared for “special combat readiness.” Between Putin’s nuclear saber rattling and growing anxiety over the prospect of a military conflict with China over Taiwan, once arcane questions of nuclear strategy and deterrence have returned to the center of world politics.
Not since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union has the fear of great-power nuclear conflict played such a central role in international affairs. The nuclear-strategy learning curve has been steep for many of the world’s policymakers and elected officials. Those old enough to remember Cold War–era nuclear debates are learning that the field has transformed and that the lessons and beliefs that once guided policy are rarely applicable today.
The unique challenges of the Cold War shaped strategic thinking about deploying nuclear weapons in particular ways. Today’s circumstances are quite different, and merely applying the lessons of the past would be wrong-headed and even dangerous. Unfortunately, much of the nuclear muscle memory in the United States—intellectual, strategic, and organizational—has its roots in a Cold War experience that sheds little light on our present and future nuclear challenges.
In particular, Washington should move away from the Cold War–era thinking that focused on preemptive postures and counterforce weapons designed for a massive strategic exchange. The United States should accept that it will probably never use nuclear weapons preemptively—or even at all—except in the unlikely event that the U.S. homeland is subject to a nuclear attack. Washington’s goals of extending deterrence and limiting nuclear proliferation could be better achieved if the United States and its allies enhanced military capabilities that are usable and effective during a conflict. Moreover, in the coming years, emerging technologies and a broad balance of conventional military power will have a far more significant impact on deterrence and defense outcomes than will nuclear weapons.
STRATEGY SHAPED BY WAR
At the start of the nuclear age, American strategic thinking was influenced by three decades of murderous global conflict that had pulled a reluctant United States into two world wars. World War II was driven by authoritarian states pursuing total war, two of which, Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, launched what were seen as surprise attacks in 1941: Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Based on this history, Washington assumed that the totalitarian Soviet Union similarly sought global conquest and might even launch a surprise attack on the United States—“a bolt from the blue” as it came to be known in the nuclear realm.
Another component of American thinking at the dawn of the nuclear era was the fact that the devastation wreaked by World War II, the weakening of traditional powers such as France and the United Kingdom, and the complete defeat of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had created massive power vacuums. The United States was separated from these power vacuums by two oceans. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had the world’s largest army—which it maintained through a command economy—and the benefit of proximity. If Moscow took advantage of this asymmetry to seize territory, it could build a Eurasian economic and industrial base that could present an existential threat to the United States.
That prospect caused the United States to break with its traditional avoidance of foreign entanglements and offer peacetime protection to far-flung allies and former adversaries.
Washington did not, however, have any reasonable, cost-effective means of defending them with conventional military forces, short of constructing a garrison state and potentially bankrupting its own economy. The other option—allowing vulnerable allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union—could restrict Washington’s freedom of action, expose it to emboldened regional actors, or entrap U.S. forces in avoidable conflicts. Allowing West Germany and Japan to possess nuclear weapons could destabilize Europe and Asia, fracturing efforts to build alliances and provoking Soviet intervention. For those reasons, nonproliferation became a core tenet of postwar U.S. grand strategy.
It is difficult to say whether U.S. Cold War nuclear strategy was ingenious or just lucky.
Furthering the strategic challenge, Europe would not recover economically—nor would it be possible to defend—without the recovery and participation of West Germany. Moscow and even Washington’s close European allies were understandably concerned about the rehabilitation of a divided country that had recently caused unimaginable death and destruction. For its part, West Germany was unenthusiastic about formalizing its second-class status and conceding its territory in a European war. Nor would Bonn embrace a military strategy that defeated the Soviet Union through a U.S. nuclear bombardment that left its territory an irradiated ruin. Similar calculations also affected Japan.
These circumstances shaped American thinking about nuclear weapons and the defense of Europe. If a war was imminent, U.S. strategy anticipated the massive and preemptive use of nuclear weapons to eliminate the Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities while blunting its conventional superiority before Soviet troops crossed the intra-German border. This aggressive strategy would, it was hoped, dissuade allies, especially West Germany, from acquiring independent nuclear capabilities. Such a daunting task necessitated enormous quantities of weapons, delivered with accuracy, speed, and stealth, with the ability to target Moscow’s strategic assets before they were launched. These objectives were captured in the United States’ nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), developed in the late 1950s and revisited and updated throughout the Cold War.
It remained unclear, however, whether a nuclear strategy that called for the United States to threaten a global thermonuclear war in a crisis and expose its homeland to devastation was credible. And over time, a combination of factors made the idea of a president of the United States launching the SIOP increasingly implausible. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union achieved second-strike survivability, or the ability to visit unacceptable damage on the United States even after it had been attacked, and eventually strategic parity with the United States. A revolution in satellite-based surveillance technology calmed worries about a surprise attack. Concurrently, the shared fear of nuclear catastrophe, the costs and dangers of the nuclear arms race, the political appeal of arms control, and a mutual interest in staunching proliferation generated superpower cooperation to limit the risks of nuclear weapons.
As a result, the contradictions in U.S. strategy ran deep. Washington sought strategic stability through arms control with Moscow based on mutual vulnerability and the removal of incentives for either side to use nuclear weapons first. But the United States simultaneously embraced strategies and weapons that sought an elusive nuclear advantage in order to extend deterrence, limit proliferation, and pressure the Soviet Union. The resulting strategy was expensive, contradictory, and lacked credibility. And yet arguably, it worked. Despite occasional disagreements, NATO partners and other allies accepted the strategy and cooperated. Nuclear proliferation remained constrained. And Washington’s efforts to achieve a nuclear advantage appeared to affect Soviet leaders, driving them into an expensive arms race that many analysts contend exposed the Soviet Union’s structural weaknesses and helped accelerate the process that eventually led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Looking back, it is difficult to say whether the United States and its nuclear strategy were ingenious or just lucky.
RISING COSTS OF CONQUEST
Although fraught and uncertain, the current international political environment does not rival the early Cold War in terms of danger. Neither China nor Russia is likely to dominate the Eurasian landmass the way the Soviet Union threatened to do in the middle of the twentieth century. Over time, the costs of conquest have risen dramatically, and the benefits have fallen. Instead of the exhausted, weak states that dotted the Soviet periphery, China and Russia are surrounded by a range of influential, economically vibrant countries possessing impressive military potential and strong ties to the United States. Moreover, Russia’s contemporary conventional capabilities have been exposed as overrated, and China’s remain untested. China has not responded with enthusiastic support, let alone cooperation, to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States can project impressive conventional military power relative to its adversaries better than it could during the Cold War. A surprise nuclear attack on the United States is improbable. Instead, contemporary China and Russia may use nuclear deterrence to prevent the United States from intervening in regional conflicts in their backyard.
Moreover, it has become increasingly difficult to imagine the United States using nuclear weapons to do anything but defend its homeland. It is hard, for example, to envision a U.S. president using nuclear weapons first, even if China invaded Taiwan or Russia overran Estonia. It is unrealistic to rely on a Cold War–era threat of strategic preemption to deter or defeat regional aggression by great-power adversaries.
For that reason, the relevance of the strategic nuclear balance between the great powers has diminished. Strategic nuclear superiority matters less in a world in which it is difficult to imagine the United States or another great power authorizing a preemptive first strike. China’s calculations toward Taiwan, for example, are unlikely to be decisively shaped by the United States’ significant strategic nuclear superiority. The balance, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of conventional military capabilities, especially those based on emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, will shape strategic behavior far more than one side being better able than the other to limit damage or dominate the “escalation ladder” in a hypothetical strategic nuclear exchange.
Nevertheless, the primary goal of U.S. nuclear strategy should still be to maintain its secure second-strike survivability. Although a coordinated Chinese-Russian nuclear strategy, to say nothing of a combined nuclear attack, is highly improbable, it might make sense to prepare for such an unlikely scenario, if only as a form of insurance. As part of that effort, the United States should guard against China or Russia developing asymmetrical capabilities, ranging from hypersonics to artificial intelligence, that might threaten the survivability of the United States’ own strategic forces. This mission is far easier and less expensive than Cold War–inspired efforts to seek an elusive strategic nuclear advantage.
Over time, the costs of conquest have risen dramatically, and the benefits have fallen.
In the years ahead, the United States will face at least three crucial questions regarding nuclear weapons. What role, if any, will nuclear weapons play against smaller, hostile nuclear states, such as North Korea and possibly Iran? How should Washington respond if a great power uses nuclear weapons at a sub-strategic or tactical level—for example, if Russia detonates a nuclear device for battlefield or demonstration purposes? Finally, what will become of extended nuclear deterrence in a world in which the United States acknowledges the futility of a strategic nuclear advantage?
Cold War postures or strategic forces would be of little use in any of these scenarios. If the United States sought to disable a rogue regime’s nuclear capability, deter or respond to the tactical use of nuclear weapons by a great power, or strengthen Washington’s commitment to defend an ally, it would be better to build and deploy powerful weapons whose use would be more credible and compelling. The demonstrated ability to repel a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan, for example, or a clear superiority in cyber-operations, artificial intelligence, and space capabilities would be more likely to reassure concerned allies and deter foes than improved nuclear counterforce systems.
Critics will respond that this stance could weaken extended deterrence. Neither the United States nor its allies are eager to concede the obvious—that Washington is unlikely to use nuclear weapons first or even at all, save as a response to an attack on the American homeland. Proclaiming doctrines that are clearly untrue, however, while investing in expensive strategic nuclear counterforce capabilities whose use is unimaginable can have a corrosive effect and both invite complacency and tempt adversaries. Over time, adversaries are more likely to be deterred and allies are more likely to be reassured by tools that Washington might actually use.
The United States could also reconsider its policies on allies acquiring nuclear weapons. Washington retains its desire to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and should work hard to prevent proliferation. Almost 80 years after World War II, however, nuclear acquisition by democratic allies such as Germany or Japan would be far less threatening than during the Cold War, when it could have torn apart the Western alliance or provoked a Soviet attack. A future world with, for example, a nuclear Australia, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, or Vietnam would hardly be ideal for the United States. It would, however, be far worse for China and Russia.
The most important change Washington must make, however, is to its mindset. Cold War thinking about nuclear strategy has long outlasted the conflict itself. More than three decades into the post–Cold War era, policymakers have still not managed to fully update their view of the nuclear threats the United States faces and the proper way to deal with them. For the sake of U.S. national security and for the stability of the world, they need to pick up the pace.
- FRANCIS J. GAVIN is Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished Professor and Director of the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
Foreign Affairs · by Francis J. Gavin · September 5, 2022
17. China seeks 'naval outpost' in Nicaragua to threaten US, Taiwan warns
China seeks 'naval outpost' in Nicaragua to threaten US, Taiwan warns
by Joel Gehrke, Foreign Affairs Reporter | September 04, 2022 07:00 AM
Washington Examiner · September 4, 2022
TAIPEI, Taiwan — China aspires to open a “naval outpost” in Nicaragua as part of a plan to dominate the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan has warned.
“The Chinese are talking with them about also potentially setting up a naval outpost,” Taiwanese Vice Foreign Minister Alexander Yui told reporters this week. “So they have a very large plan.”
Nicaragua severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan last year in favor of new ties with Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping’s regime, which claims sovereignty over the island democracy despite never having ruled in Taipei. Xi has deployed a mix of pressure and inducements to convince Taiwan's dwindling number of allies to establish a connection with Beijing, an initiative that China has used both to isolate Taipei and gain advantages in relation to the United States.
“It’s part of their expansionist agenda — take over Taiwan, and break from the first island chain into the rest of the Pacific, take over the Pacific,” Yui said. “They are expanding. They want to become the predominant power in the world and also export their way of thought, their way of living, to the rest of the world.”
SEVENTY-YEAR LIE: CHINA HAS NEVER HAD A SERIOUS CLAIM TO TAIWAN
China’s vaunted overseas infrastructure investment program, the Belt and Road Initiative, has been denounced by U.S. officials for years as a “predatory” lending scheme designed to allow Beijing to buy an empire. Nicaragua’s authoritarian leader, Daniel Ortega, seized the Taiwanese Embassy in Managua and transferred it to China in December, then signed a memorandum of understanding to join the BRI in January.
“The Chinese could do it and call it the beginning of the Nicaragua Canal if we ticked them off enough about Taiwan,” U.S. Army War College research professor Evan Ellis, who worked as a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff during then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s tenure, told the Washington Examiner. “It would symbolically be a big deal, because the Chinese know they could get military access if they asked, and the Russians could operate out of it, too.”
Nicaragua’s switch was a strategic setback for the government in Taipei, which regards international recognition as an important bulwark against China’s desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control. And by cutting ties with Taiwan, the Ortega government cleared an important obstacle from Beijing’s long-standing pursuit of port access in the region — although it remains unclear how those talks are progressing.
“China has very clear ambitions to become a major maritime power,” said Marcin Jerzewski, who leads the Taiwan office of the European Values Center for Security Policy in Taipei. “So it makes perfect strategic sense and is very consistent with Chinese strategic thinking, especially its maritime dimension.”
Ortega severed relations with Taiwan just weeks after the U.S. imposed sanctions on several members of his regime for “orchestrat[ing] a pantomime election” and arresting top opposition candidates and civil society activists. The idea of a Chinese port in Nicaragua offers both regimes an opportunity to pressure the U.S., although it “would be a big money loser” given Nicaragua’s corruption and the lack of an economic market to reward the project, as Ellis put it.
“I think there’s reasons why it could happen if the Chinese wanted to do a provocation that was big, but they could still [claim it was] a commercial port,” Ellis said. “Militarily, it would be more defensible than trying to operate out of Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, for example.”
For now, Nicaragua and China appear to be making only slow progress toward converting their newfound political affinity into major infrastructure developments, the analysts agreed, likely due to disagreements about to divide the cost of a port project.
If they can resolve such impediments, the development would be a symbol of the Chinese rivalry with the U.S. and a message to the global audience watching the competition unfold. “It would allow for more efficient power projection,” Jerzewski said. “Even if those bases are not used for kinetic conflict, their sheer presence would send a signal that China is indeed providing an alternative model for countries within the Indo-Pacific to follow.”
China has demonstrated in other parts of the world that success in convincing a country to cut ties with Taiwan can lead to other strategic benefits for Beijing, as well. The Solomon Islands, having severed relations with Taipei in 2019, struck a security agreement with Beijing in March, to the alarm of U.S. and Australian officials. Last week, the Solomon Islands refused to allow a U.S. Coast Guard vessel to make a port call during a patrol against illegal fishing.
CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER
“It’s the changing of the attitudes of the Solomon Islands after their connection to the PRC,” said Yui, the Taiwanese vice foreign minister.
Washington Examiner · September 4, 2022
18. Opposite Sides of the COIN: Understanding Unlikely Insurgent Successes and Failures
Excerpts:
These case studies strongly support my theory on the relationship between the strategic environment, insurgent strategies of violence, and resulting success or failure. They also support the development of two typologies for insurgent success. Insurgents who face a strong democratic country can effectively respond by utilizing terrorism to influence various government constituencies and achieve political success as the FLN did. Alternatively, those who face a materially equivalent government that has autocratic features can most effectively fight back through guerrilla warfare. Terrorism in this second case often fails to achieve larger goals, and conventional conflict is still out of the question. The LTTE made the mistake of prioritizing conventional fighting towards the end of the conflict and lost to a numerically and materially superior Sri Lankan military. Strategic environments change, and while insurgents themselves play a role in setting what that environment looks like, the most significant factor they can affect is how they conduct their campaign of violence. Insurgents can achieve success by matching their strategy of violence to their strategic environment in line with the typologies I have outlined and based on enduring themes of insurgent warfare.
Looking into the future, it is critical to build more typologies for insurgent success in order to understand how states can achieve the upper hand. Most important however is conceptualizing how insurgents successfully relate their strategy of violence to their environment. Had the United States, for example, spent more time analyzing what victory looked like for the Taliban and how they planned on achieving it based on their environment, they may have bolstered America’s own strategy. Sun Tzu’s words are meaningful here “know the enemy and know yourself.”[49] The historical record always has a peculiar way of informing the future.
Opposite Sides of the COIN: Understanding Unlikely Insurgent Successes and Failures
Joshua Damir September 5, 2022
thestrategybridge.org · September 5, 2022
Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked civilian and military students around the world to participate in our sixth annual student writing contest on the subject of strategy.
Now, we are pleased to present an essay selected for Honorable Mention from Joshua Damir, a recent graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point.
Introduction
The historical record unveils insurgent groups who have overcome massive odds to defeat their enemies, contrasted sharply against others who were well-organized and capable but were crushed mercilessly. There appears little continuity in what leads insurgents to victory and what results instead in their failure. What causes insurgent success? The Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) for example had the odds stacked against them yet were successful, while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had every advantage but were still defeated. Through thorough analysis of these two insurgent groups, my research establishes two specific typologies for insurgent success: insurgents facing strong democracies are most likely to succeed by focusing their efforts on terrorist campaigns to achieve political goals, while those fighting autocracies that they are more materially equivalent to succeed by prioritizing guerrilla warfare in order to win militarily first, and then politically. Insurgents achieve success by adapting their strategy of violence to address the specific strategic environment that they operate in based on enduring principles of insurgent warfare.
Scholars have identified four variables as important to insurgent success. These four are ruling government type, state capacity, insurgent resources, and the insurgent strategy of violence.[1] Previous research has established relationships between single variables, I build on this research using the most impactful variables to create a holistic view of insurgent success. I combine government type, state capacity and insurgent resources into a variable I call the strategic environment. I then match it with strategy of violence as my second variable to build a theory for insurgent success.[2] My research differentiates successful insurgent strategies of violence from unsuccessful ones by analyzing these variables and assessing how the FLN and LTTE’s strategies connected with their corresponding strategic environment.
Argument
Strategic environment is the first independent variable in my theory, consisting of the three sub-variables of government type, state capacity, and insurgent resources. The insurgents’ strategy of violence is the second independent variable. The interactions between these two independent variables will in turn impact the dependent variable, success. Success here means the achievement of the insurgents’ political goals determined at the onset of conflict. Importantly, success is political rather than military. If, for example, a group achieves their goals but disbands as a militia in favor of forming a political party, they are still considered successful.
I analyze two separatist case studies to understand how these insurgent groups used violence within their specific environments and whether they succeeded or failed. I am looking at the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria (1954-1962) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka (1976-2009).[3] These two groups share many similarities that are important to isolating key variables. The most important similarity is their end goal of separatism from what they considered an illegitimate ruler or occupying power. It is critical that these groups shared this similarity for two reasons. First, the existence of different constituencies will highlight variations in violence and targeting. Second, the equality in insurgent ends will prevent one group from achieving success substantially easier than the others. Kydd and Walter note that a state’s degree of interest in the dispute is fundamental to their commitment to fight.[4] Since each state here has a substantial territorial stake in the conflict, their commitment to fight will be comparable. Another critical similarity is the shared timeline of the conflicts. While they did not occur simultaneously, they both took place in the mid to late 20th century. This is important to prevent significant variation in technology that may favor either the insurgents or counterinsurgents and thereby affect success. Finally, since each conflict is officially resolved, I can make conclusions about the success of each group that would not be possible in ongoing conflicts.
I analyze each case study based on the four components of insurgencies that existing literature emphasizes as the most important as outlined previously. For government type, I identify whether the government is democratic, anocratic, or autocratic in each by looking at their score in the Polity Project and analyzing historical data about government type. The Polity Project is a research tradition that codes authority characteristics of states for the purpose of quantitative analysis. A score of 6 or greater indicates a democracy.[5] In conjunction with the Polity Project score, I analyze historical data to understand the causation involved in how government type impacts the strategic environment and each respective conflicts’ results.
I measure state capacity for each state using the Correlates of War (COW) project data set that analyzes the material capabilities of states through six categories.[6] These measurements encompass the demographic, military, and industrial dimensions of a state in order to understand their military power during each time period, and in this case, measure how militarily effective the state was against the respective insurgent group. Each of the six components is measured as a share of the system’s total, and then the component shares are averaged to make the composite index of national capability score (CINC), the total share of world power that a state possesses in a given year.[7] By analyzing these components for France and Sri Lanka in their respective time periods, combined with a qualitative, historical analysis for how they leveraged their armed forces, I can effectively compare these two states’ military effectiveness.
For the resources available to insurgents, I analyze the insurgents’ flows of different resources over time, as well as absolute levels, all based on RAND’s designation of resource importance.[8] RAND prioritizes sanctuary, financial resources, political support, and direct military support as most important for insurgencies, while secondary support is made up of training and weapons provisions.[9]
Finally, for the analysis of the insurgents’ strategies of violence, I analyze the variation in attack type, specifying between terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and looking into what specific people or groups were targeted. I want to frame these strategies based on the goals of the insurgents and look to see if they achieved their goals in the long term.
Six chefs du FLN (Wikimedia)
In sum, I bring together three well-established variables to classify insurgencies by their strategic environment, my first variable. My second variable is the strategies of violence that insurgents use, and the connections between the two will result in success or failure on a scale. The success or failure of different combinations of typologies and strategies will inform the future debate on separatist insurgencies and terrorist strategies.
FLN vs France
Strategic Environment
The strategic environment that surrounded the war in Algeria allowed the FLN to coerce the French into granting them independence through terrorism. France, as a republic, had a favorable government type for terrorism to be successful. The French state capacity the FLN faced was substantial however and wore down the FLN and restrained its resources to the point that they could put up little military resistance to the French at the end of the conflict. Combining these three components into one comprehensive environment, the FLN’s French opponent was a strong, democratic state that was able to drain their resources and render them ineffective militarily, but ultimately unable to overcome the anti-colonial tide of history that the FLN successfully harnessed.
France experienced significant, domestic political turmoil throughout the duration of the Algerian war that led the government to consolidate its power in the executive; however, this did not reduce France’s susceptibility to terrorism as a democracy because it retained the political features of one. Based on the Polity Project’s ranking for France during this time period, it was considered a democracy with a score of 8 during the reign of the fourth republic through 1957.[10] In 1958 as the government transitioned, France earned a polity score of 0, because the conditions that existed at the time did not reflect the attributes of a democracy. From 1959 until the end of the conflict in 1962, France earned a score of 4. While technically considered an anocracy, this score suggests that the government possessed many of the characteristics of democracy.[11]
Democracies are more susceptible to terrorism because they are cost-sensitive and less likely to have extreme kinetic responses due to the demands of their domestic constituents and international partners.[12] France did not pull punches in its military response to the FLN, but it faced the consequences of that decision in domestic and international backlash to its practices in Algeria. Torture was widely used by the French, as were extra-judicial confinements and executions.[13] International opinion was widely against the French as people began to realize that their interrogation measures surpassed even those of the Nazi’s occupation.[14] France may have been considered an anocracy through the Algerian war’s resolution in 1962, but it maintained its sensitivity to constituent wishes that make democracies susceptible to insurgencies, and this ultimately led France to the bargaining table.
France’s state capacity in the 1950s and 1960s was large enough to allow it to cordon off the borders of Algeria, divide and police the country by sector, and restrict the flow of insurgents and weapons to the point that the FLN could not support its forces in Algeria. Based on the National Material Capabilities dataset, France possessed 3.30% of global state power in 1954, establishing it as the sixth strongest state at that time. This remained relatively constant throughout the Algerian war, dipping down in the later years of the conflict to 2.94% in 1962, making it the eighth strongest power in the world.[15]
Algeria was the jewel of the French empire, it was designated as a part of Metropolitan France since the 1800s and was France’s single most important market.[16] France was one of the wealthiest countries in the world in the 1950s and furthermore had a first-rate military force, experienced from WWII and the First Indochina war. Considering France’s wealth and power, and combined with Algeria’s importance, it is no surprise that they committed 400,000 soldiers as well as large amounts of materiel to the fight against the FLN.[17] Notably, at the height of the United States’ war in Afghanistan, the number of U.S. soldiers in the region did not surpass 100,000.[18] France’s state capacity was one of its greatest strengths in the Algerian war and greatly reduced the FLN’s ability to make physical gains in the region. This factor played a large role in dampening the FLN’s effectiveness, and it is important to look at the other variables to understand how the FLN was successful in spite of France’s military ability.
The FLN’s resourcing proved to be one of its strengths and is largely responsible for their survival and eventual political victory. The FLN had strong support from outside nations that provided it with materiel resources and political support. Over time the French cut them off from many of these resources including weapons, recruits, and sanctuary; however, the Algerian independence movement had already reached critical mass on the international stage by that point and had cemented the FLN’s victory.
After the initial attacks on All Saints Day in 1954 when the FLN retreated to the countryside, they found critical outside support from multiple other Arab countries. Morocco and Tunisia played a large role by providing a sanctuary throughout the war for the FLN’s fighters and leadership.[19] Multiple members of the Arab league also provided funding, and Egypt and Syria helped arm and train the fighters.[20] Outside material support for the FLN was substantial, especially as they initiated the resistance; however, over time French forces were able to reduce the resources available to the insurgents through extensive border fences and patrolling. Along the Tunisian border in 1957, the French built the Morice line, and along the Moroccan border they built the similar Pedron line. These fences were reinforced with spotlights, minefields, and patrols, effectively cutting the flow of insurgents and supplies to Algeria.[21] The FLN attempted to break through these lines multiple times after their construction but were consistently beaten back. By the end of the war, there were still 20,000 fighters that had been forced to wait it out on the sidelines in Tunisia.[22]
France’s state capacity allowed them to achieve a stranglehold on the FLN’s resources, and combined with their overall military superiority, this allowed them to dominate the military fight under General Challe by mid-1960. The external support that proved invaluable here was the international political support that various Arab and Asian states provided, voicing concern over France’s imperialist actions in Algeria. Twenty-two African and Asian states introduced a request to the UN to make the Algerian question part of the General Assembly’s session in the late 1950s. Morocco and Tunisia were particularly supportive in international bodies, opening up their offices for bilateral peace talks between the FLN and French and aiding Algeria throughout the conflict.[23] The FLN’s materiel, moral, and political resources shaped their strategic environment and enabled them to survive the French military’s onslaught while simultaneously gaining international support on the global stage.
Strategy of Violence
The strategic environment set the conditions for the FLN to achieve independence, but it was the terrorist strategy that they aggressively pursued that actually opened the doors. Trinquier acknowledged as much, asserting that “The war in Indochina and the one in Algeria have demonstrated the basic weapon that permits our enemies to fight effectively with few resources and even to defeat a traditional army. This weapon is terrorism.”[24] The FLN used terrorism for several purposes, they used it to outbid their organizational rivals, intimidate the population in what Lieutenant Colonel Galula termed the “battle for silence,” provoke the French into mistakes and repression, attrit the French political will, and spread their message as propaganda.[25] Each of these strategies was successful in their own respective manner. Without outbidding rival groups, the FLN would have never been able to effectively organize against the French. Similarly, it was critical that the population supported the FLN for them to last as a movement. The two most critical strategies however were those of provocation and propaganda because they worked in tandem to advertise to the world the brutality of the French occupation and the spirit of Algerian independence; these two strategies ultimately achieved victory for the FLN.
Provocation was central to the FLN’s strategy from the beginning. They began pursuing provocation in 1955 when they realized its effectiveness in the Philippeville massacre, and heavily relied on it during the Battle for Algiers in 1957.[26] In a sense, the strategy backfired on them as the French reacted so strongly in Algiers as to effectively wipe out the insurgents living there. Regardless of this blunder however, the strategy achieved its goal of escalating the French response to alienate the Muslim population and, eventually, the international community. “During that period from 1956 to 1957 [in the Battle for Algiers], the FLN grew from having 50% of the population’s support to 95%.”[27] Propaganda was the second strategic aim of the FLN’s terrorism campaign. It was closely linked to their provocation but intended to bring attention to their cause with the attacks themselves, rather than waiting for the French response. Terrorism’s use as an act of propaganda led the FLN to realize that “a grenade or bomb in a café [in Algiers] would produce far more noise than an obscure ambush against French soldiers in the Ouarsenis Mountains.”[28] The propaganda was successful, with the issue of Algerian independence making it onto the agenda for the UN general assembly six times between 1954 and 1959.[29] Aided by several Arab countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan, the issue gained prominence in 1957 with the rise of the FLN and the onset of conflict in urban Algiers.[30]
The FLN were defeated in nearly every battle yet won the war for their independence through their effective use of terrorism to provoke the French and advertise their cause. They successfully matched their actions to their environment and won a political rather than a military victory as a result.
Discussion
The FLN were successful because they catered their strategy of violence to the unique strategic environment that the anti-colonial movement and France’s domestic situation created. France’s democratic features and its presence on the international stage put pressure on it to grant Algeria independence, especially considering the scrutiny they faced because of the methods by which the French military carried out the war. France’s state capacity allowed it to win militarily and mitigate the resources the FLN could bring to bear. This military power would have effectively destroyed a more traditional insurgency, but the use of terrorist cells kept the French off balance for much of the conflict. Overall, the most important resource the FLN received because of its value in achieving success was international, political support for Algeria’s independence that many nations provided. On the scale through which I am analyzing group success, the FLN were entirely successful because they achieved the goal of independence that they set out at the beginning of the conflict. This case study develops my first typology, that strong democracies are susceptible to terrorism. Strong democracies are able to fight well militarily but are weak politically, and terrorism preys on this weakness by skirting military victory and instead targeting political success.
LTTE vs Sri Lanka
Strategic Environment
The strategic environment that the LTTE encountered in Sri Lanka was characterized by a security focused anocratic government that proved resilient to terrorist demands but had weak control over the country. The Tamil Tigers additionally had broad domestic and international support via the large Tamil diaspora that allowed them to develop substantial conventional capabilities to the point of challenging Sri Lankan dominance across the island.
The Sri Lankan government was by official accounts a democracy at this time and had been since independence from Britain in 1948. Sri Lanka scores a 5 on the Polity Project’s scale for most of the conflict (1983-2000 and 2003-2005), making it an anocracy.[31] It had the primary components of a democracy but also maintained some autocratic features, primarily its heavy-handed policing. Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which was passed in 1979, enabled police to “exercise broad powers to search, arrest, and detain terrorist suspects without charges.”[32] ReliefWeb, a humanitarian organization created by the UN, asserts that the PTA “has been used for over 40 years to enable prolonged arbitrary detention, extract false confessions through torture, and target minority communities and political dissidents in Sri Lanka.”[33]
An LTTE bicycle infantry platoon north of Kilinochchi in 2004 (Wikimedia)
Sri Lanka’s Preventing Terrorism Act demonstrates that, even though it has many features of a democracy, Sri Lanka is not susceptible to terrorism for two reasons. First, the PTA in and of itself is a tool of repression; the first argument for terrorism affecting democracies is based on the idea that democracies will not go to the same lengths to target terrorists, but this is clearly not the case here. Second, the UN and international bodies have criticized Sri Lanka’s use of the PTA for decades and there has been little meaningful reform. This indicates that Sri Lanka is not open to changing its domestic policy based on international opinion and shows how unlikely it was to reform or change its behavior while it was combatting the LTTE. Sri Lanka was not vulnerable to terrorism for much the same reason that they would not reform the PTA – the government was not responsive to outside constituents for adjusting its policies.
While government type did not play a large role in the strategic environment, Sri Lanka’s weak state capacity did, allowing the Tamil Tigers to build up strong forces, challenge the military conventionally, and control large swathes of the island for years at a time. As late as 2006 for example, only a few years prior to the LTTE’s ultimate demise, Prabhakaran had de facto control of nearly a third of Sri Lanka’s coast and a quarter of its land.[34] In 1983, at the onset of the conflict, Sri Lanka was the 74th strongest state in the world with 0.10% of world power.[35] In 2009, when the government finally defeated the LTTE, they stood as the 59th strongest state after more than doubling their share of world power to 0.21%. Especially at the beginning of the conflict, Sri Lanka’s military was more for show than anything else.[36] Due to their incompetence in conducting effective military operations, the Sri Lankan government fell back on indiscriminate brutality to fight the insurgents.[37] This indiscriminate violence was particularly key to building the strategic environment that the LTTE succeeded in for so many years because it sharply increased the grievances of the Tamil population.
Sri Lanka improved its military power as the conflict dragged on, increasing defense spending by almost a third between 1995 and 1996 and purchasing modern equipment from Israel, China, and others.[38] Their upgrades paid off, allowing them to more effectively combat the LTTE in the last few years of the conflict. The government successfully turned around its military by increasing its size and investing extensively in contemporary equipment in the latter years of the conflict, but Sri Lanka’s ineptitude early on allowed the Tamil Tigers to create a strong organization that proved resilient to the military’s improvements.
The Tamil Tigers resourced materiel and finances to sustain their war effort by networking through a broad Tamil diaspora, appealing to outside states and humanitarian NGOs, and raiding Sri Lankan military bases to steal equipment. These three methods in tandem allowed them to sustain their operations and grow into one of the largest and most capable insurgent forces in history. In those countries that had high numbers of Tamils, the LTTE created front organizations used to funnel money back to Sri Lanka.[39] The LTTE also relied on direct military support and sanctuary from Tamils living in Tamil Nadu, India. This population provided recruits as well as a space to train cadres.[40] India itself supplied the LTTE with weapons at the beginning of the conflict too, eager to prevent other states from stepping in and establishing themselves so close to the southern tip of India.[41]
Beyond appealing directly to their ethnic brothers and sisters for aid, the Tamil Tigers leveraged the image of oppression that they created internationally to bring in humanitarian aid and political support through western NGOs, all while aggressively and proactively fighting the government. They were able to pull together large groups of Tamils to protest and build political support in established countries across the world.[42] When crowdsourcing weapons and equipment failed to suffice, the Tamil Tigers resorted to raiding military bases and stealing equipment to bolster their military.[43]
The LTTE’s strategic environment, consisting of a weak yet resilient and oppressive domestic government, as well as bountiful resources, was extraordinarily accommodating in their pursuit of Tamil Eelam. Had the Tigers played their cards right, they may have achieved that goal; however, their own military strategy and political conduct thwarted their attempts at separatism.
Strategy of Violence
The LTTE’s strategy of violence was sufficient to survive long-term conflict with the Sri Lankan military, but they failed to achieve decisive victory and adapt to increasing government strength towards the end of the conflict. The LTTE combined terrorist attacks with guerrilla and conventional style warfare to build international legitimacy, provoke the Sri Lankan government, and ultimately try to defeat it militarily. In the end, the Tigers were unsuccessful because they had insufficient force to achieve decisive victory while they fought a disadvantageous strategy of conventional conflict.
The Tigers’ terrorist attacks prioritized intimidation, provocation, and spoiling methods to build popular support for a sustained war. Their intimidation of uncooperative populations is well recorded, the LTTE on multiple occasions massacred non-Tamil people with the intent of asserting their dominance in various regions. Provocation attacks were utilized primarily at the beginning of the conflict with the goal of “provoking COIN force overreaction.”[44] They did not need to focus on these attacks for long however as the incompetent military embraced indiscriminate retaliation. They also used spoiling attacks throughout the conflict to prevent the creation of peace deals that would have drawn moderate supporters away from supporting the LTTE.[45] The LTTE used terrorism to effectively achieve tactical and operational goals; however, their failure to leverage guerrilla and conventional attacks to meet strategic goals facilitated their defeat.
The LTTE’s use of guerrilla and conventional tactics varied throughout the war, and while they achieved battlefield victories, they were never able to solidify those into strategic gains. The Tigers’ use of guerrilla warfare began at the onset of the conflict when they ambushed thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers, triggering ethnic riots and initiating the twenty-six-year war. They used guerrilla methods to great success throughout the conflict and supplemented those with conventional military operations as well.
The split between a conventional and guerrilla structure held for the majority of the conflict. It was towards the end, when the Tigers stopped functioning as guerrillas and operated instead as an entirely conventional force, that they were defeated.[46] Mao Tse-Tung emphasized the importance of not establishing conventional methods until the insurgency has reached the capacity to do so, and the LTTE’s failure to adhere to this rule foreshadowed their defeat.[47] The LTTE’s methods were individually successful for many years, but Prabhakaran made the crucial mistake of underestimating his opponent and failing to adapt as the stronger Sri Lankan military gradually defeated the LTTE in the final campaign from 2007-2009.
Discussion
The Tamil Tigers developed a system to bring in resources that enabled them to fight effectively against the disorganized Sri Lankan government for twenty-six years. At the strategic level however, the LTTE failed to achieve decisive results and turn battlefield success into political achievement. Sri Lanka’s anocracy and many democratic features belied their resilience to terrorist demands, clear in their enactment and sustainment of the repressive PTA. But while the government was not weak to terrorism by nature, Sri Lanka’s small state capacity created greed and grievance, making terrorism more attractive. The LTTE’s broad resource network increased their capabilities but could not make up for their ultimately fatal military strategy. This case study establishes the second typology that I will address. Insurgents facing governments with autocratic features who are nearly militarily equivalent can find success by prioritizing guerrilla warfare. Autocratic governments are not susceptible to terrorist demands, but when they are weak, they can be more easily impacted by guerrilla violence. The LTTE remained alive and found success when they focused on guerrilla warfare, it was when they switched to conventionally focused fighting that they lost the war. Prabhakaran’s refusal to accept the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord’s assurance of joint administration of the north and east provinces, as well as his not accepting the 2002 agreements’ acceptance of de facto LTTE control, are reminiscent of a gambler who does not know how to stop when he is ahead.[48] His insistence on complete military victory coupled with an ultimately mistaken conventional strategy led the LTTE to defeat.
Conclusion: Reconciling the Opposing Results of the FLN and LTTE
Insurgents’ strategies of violence are crucial, and to achieve success they must effectively tailor their use of violence to their respective strategic environment. The FLN adapted their strategy of violence to the strategic environment they faced. While France far surpassed them in military ability, terrorism allowed for the FLN to leverage the French people and the international community to pressure France’s government into granting Algeria independence. The LTTE alternatively had an extremely conducive environment for achieving success: a repressive state that increased popular grievances, a weak central government and military, and an abundance of resources from a broad diaspora and various states and non-state actors. Nevertheless, the Tigers failed to achieve decisive military victory, adapt to increasing government strength, or solidify what battlefield gains they did make into political victories.
These case studies strongly support my theory on the relationship between the strategic environment, insurgent strategies of violence, and resulting success or failure. They also support the development of two typologies for insurgent success. Insurgents who face a strong democratic country can effectively respond by utilizing terrorism to influence various government constituencies and achieve political success as the FLN did. Alternatively, those who face a materially equivalent government that has autocratic features can most effectively fight back through guerrilla warfare. Terrorism in this second case often fails to achieve larger goals, and conventional conflict is still out of the question. The LTTE made the mistake of prioritizing conventional fighting towards the end of the conflict and lost to a numerically and materially superior Sri Lankan military. Strategic environments change, and while insurgents themselves play a role in setting what that environment looks like, the most significant factor they can affect is how they conduct their campaign of violence. Insurgents can achieve success by matching their strategy of violence to their strategic environment in line with the typologies I have outlined and based on enduring themes of insurgent warfare.
Looking into the future, it is critical to build more typologies for insurgent success in order to understand how states can achieve the upper hand. Most important however is conceptualizing how insurgents successfully relate their strategy of violence to their environment. Had the United States, for example, spent more time analyzing what victory looked like for the Taliban and how they planned on achieving it based on their environment, they may have bolstered America’s own strategy. Sun Tzu’s words are meaningful here “know the enemy and know yourself.”[49] The historical record always has a peculiar way of informing the future.
Joshua Damir is a 2022 graduate from the United States Military Academy, where he was a Defense and Strategic Studies major and studied insurgencies and terrorism. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Header Image: “Attaque d'Alger par la mer, 29 juin 1830” (“Attack on Algeria from the Sea, 29 Jun 1830”), painted by Théodore Gudin (Wikimedia)
Notes:
[1] Jessica A. Stanton, “Terrorism in the Context of Civil War,” The Journal of Politics 75, no. 4 (2013): 1009–22, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613000984; Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 49–80; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–76; Daniel L Byman et al., “Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,” n.d., 13.
[2] Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[3] Christopher Paul et al., “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962: Case Outcome: COIN Loss,” in Paths to Victory, Detailed Insurgency Case Studies (RAND Corporation, 2013), 75–93, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.16; Christopher Paul et al., “Sri Lanka, 1976–2009: Case Outcome: COIN Win,” in Paths to Victory, Detailed Insurgency Case Studies (RAND Corporation, 2013), 423–40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.49.
[4] Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 60.
[5] “PolityProject,” accessed February 28, 2022, https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.
[6] National Material Capabilities Data Set (v6.0) in J. David Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985,” International Interactions 14, no. 2 (May 1, 1988): 115–32, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050628808434695, the categories measured are total population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditures, primary energy consumption, and iron and steel production.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Byman et al., “Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,” 83-91.
[9] Ibid.
[10] “INSCR Data Page,” accessed February 28, 2022, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Jessica A. Stanton, “Terrorism in the Context of Civil War,” The Journal of Politics 75, no. 4 (2013): 1012, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381613000984; Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 61.
[13] “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria | Small Wars Journal,” accessed February 16, 2022, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/french-counterinsurgency-in-algeria.
[14] Paul et al., “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962,” 90.
[15] Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985.”
[16] Christopher Harrison, “French Attitudes to Empire and the Algerian War,” African Affairs 82, no. 326 (1983): 75–76.
[17] Paul et al., “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962,” 82.
[18] Associated Press, “A Timeline of U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan since 2001,” Military Times, July 6, 2016, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/07/06/a-timeline-of-u-s-troop-levels-in-afghanistan-since-2001/.
[19] Paul et al., “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962.”
[20] Ibid.
[21] Paul et al., “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962,” 83.
[22] “French Counterinsurgency in Algeria | Small Wars Journal.”
[23] “Wilson Center Digital Archive,” The Internationalization of the Algerian Problem, accessed March 4, 2022, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121601.pdf?v=61f42a455d8d6ed82b162e27a720b2b0.
[24] Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, n.d., 16, https://permanent.fdlp.gov/lps68512/ModernWarfare.pdf.
[25] Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 51; Krause, “The Algerian National Movement,” 112-113; Galula and Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria,” 15; Paul et al., “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962,” 79.
[26] Paul et al., “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962,” 78-81.
[27] Krause, “The Algerian National Movement,” 122.
[28] Paul et al., “Algerian Independence, 1954–1962,” 89.
[29] “Wilson Center Digital Archive.”
[30] Krause, “The Algerian National Movement,” 120.
[31] “INSCR Data Page.”
[32] “Sri Lanka,” United States Department of State (blog), accessed April 15, 2022, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/sri-lanka/.
[33] “Sri Lanka: UN Experts Call for Swift Suspension of Prevention of Terrorism Act and Reform of Counter-Terrorism Law - Sri Lanka,” ReliefWeb, accessed April 16, 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-un-experts-call-swift-suspension-prevention-terrorism-act-and-reform.
“Defeating Terrorism - Why the Tamil Tigers Lost Eelam...And How Sri Lanka Won the War,” JINSA, accessed March 20, 2022, https://jinsa.org/archive_post/defeating-terrorism-why-the-tamil-tigers-lost-eelam-and-how-sri-lanka-won-the-war/.
[35] Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985.”
[36] Paul et al., “Sri Lanka, 1976–2009,” 425.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Paul et al., “Sri Lanka, 1976–2009,” 435.
[39] Chalk, “The Tigers Abroad,” 98.
[40] Paul et al., “Sri Lanka, 1976–2009.”
[41] “Defeating Terrorism - Why the Tamil Tigers Lost Eelam...And How Sri Lanka Won the War.”
[42] “Tamils Protest Outside UK Parliament - CNN.Com,” accessed April 16, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/04/07/uk.tamil.protest/index.html.
[43] Paul et al., “Sri Lanka, 1976–2009.”
[44] Paul et al., “Sri Lanka, 1976–2009,” 425.
[45] Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 72-73.
[46] Ibid, 437.
[47] “FMFRP 12-18 Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare,” n.d., 128.
[48] “IN LK_870729_Indo-Lanka Accord.Pdf,” accessed April 13, 2022, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN%20LK_870729_Indo-Lanka%20Accord.pdf; “LK_020222_CeasefireAgreementGovernment-LiberationTigersTamilEelam.Pdf,” accessed April 16, 2022, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LK_020222_CeasefireAgreementGovernment-LiberationTigersTamilEelam.pdf; “Chapter 9 Sri Lanka: State Response to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam as an Illicit,” PRISM | National Defense University, accessed April 16, 2022, http://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/780214/chapter-9-sri-lanka-state-response-to-the-liberation-tigers-of-tamil-eelam-as-a/.
[49] “The Art of War by Sun Tzu - Chapter 3.18: Attack by Stratagem,” accessed May 29, 2022, https://suntzusaid.com/book/3/18.
thestrategybridge.org · September 5, 2022
19. Why China is fuming over NASA’s Artemis program
Why China is fuming over NASA’s Artemis program
BY MARK R. WHITTINGTON, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 09/04/22 10:00 AM ET
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL
The Hill · by Mychael Schnell · September 4, 2022
Most of the civilized world is thrilled at the mission of Artemis 1, the NASA-led first step for returning human beings to the lunar surface. The same cannot be said about China. An article in the Global Times, China’s English language mouthpiece, has some snarky things to say about Artemis and NASA in general. The article stated, “as NASA is trying hard to relive its Apollo glories, China is working on innovative plans to carry out its own crewed moon landing missions.”
The article accused the United States of fomenting a new space race. “China’s crewed moon landing is more in line with scientific principles, but NASA might grow more hostile against China in the space domain given the huge pressure it is facing to maintain its global leadership in moon exploration.”
A recent CNN article suggests that the Chinese are right when they accuse the United States of conducting a space race. NASA Administrator Bill Nelson referred to such a contest.
Scott Pace, former executive director of the National Space Council and current director of George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, laid out the stakes of the new space race.
“It’s not just our machines or our people that we send into space. It’s our values. It’s who we are. It’s things like rule of law, democracy, human rights, and a free market economy. I see Artemis and our human expansion into space as a projection of our American values. It’s about diplomatically shaping this new domain that we depend on,” Pace said.
Zhao Lijian, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, accused the United States of “smearing” China’s “normal and reasonable outer space endeavors.” We are to believe a country that practices genocide against the Uyghur minority group, threatens Taiwan and engages in cyber espionage along with other clandestine activities around the world plans nothing alarming in space.
An old adage states that when you are receiving flack, you are over the target. So, it is with the Chinese complaints about Artemis. The snark with which Chinese officials are greeting Artemis does not demonstrate disdain for the program but more likely fear of the NASA-led international return to the moon effort.
Beijing knows what happened during the last race to the moon, when the Apollo 11 mission helped the United States win the Cold War. China also knows that soft political power, a nation’s ability to shape world events without direct use of military force, is one of many prizes that can be won by returning to the moon. The Chinese are determined that China and not the United States win that prize.
However, superpower competition for bragging rights is not the most important reason for expanding human civilization into space. Increasingly, human beings depend on a host of technological devices to prosper and survive. Everything from smart phones to electric cars and the technology to power them need natural resources to build and maintain them. Too little of those natural resources exist on Earth to keep the production lines going. Mining operations have environmental consequences that are hard to mitigate.
Mining natural resources from the moon, asteroids and other venues outside Earth will become increasingly important if human civilization is to survive and thrive. Every resource from industrial metals such as iron, aluminum and titanium, to rare earths is out there for the taking. Space is also a source of energy, from sunlight that can be captured by space-based solar power stations and beamed to Earth, to helium-3 mined on the moon and used as fuel in clean-burning fusion power plants.
Besides the development of an infrastructure to mine, process and transport space resources in an economic manner, the big question is, who will own them?
What the US can learn from Kenya’s fight for democracy Will Joe Manchin run for president?
The United States and the other signatories of the Artemis Accords envision a system in which private companies will own the resources they extract, although not the territory they reside on, because of the Outer Space Treaty. These companies will develop space resources and sell them to other companies that will build useful things out of them. This regime will usher forth a new era of abundance and peace.
If its behavior on Earth is any indication, China’s approach will be more imperial in its nature. Beijing will not be disposed to share the bounty that space has to offer. It will use control of space resources to dominate the Earth. Such a future should be avoided at all costs.
Mark R. Whittington is the author of space exploration studies “Why is It So Hard to Go Back to the Moon?” as well as “The Moon, Mars and Beyond,” and “Why is America Going Back to the Moon?” He blogs at Curmudgeons Corner.
The Hill · by Mychael Schnell · September 4, 2022
20. From China to Mexico to NYC: How fentanyl became ‘a weapon of mass destruction’ in the US
Tell me why someone would use fentanyl to counterfeit no pain relieving medication? It can only be to cause harm.
This seems like a page right out of unrestricted warfare.
From China to Mexico to NYC: How fentanyl became ‘a weapon of mass destruction’ in the US
By Brad Hamilton, MaryAnn Martinez and Isabel Vincent
September 3, 2022 9:12am Updated
New York Post · by Brad Hamilton · September 3, 2022
In the dark hours before dawn, there’s no busier place than the Hunts Point produce market in The Bronx, where throngs of chefs, grocers and deli owners jockey each morning to snag the plumpest peaches and leafiest lettuce.
But the bazaar, which handles as many as 30 million pounds of goods per day and is the largest produce outlet in the nation, also provides perfect cover for the importing of fentanyl, America’s deadliest drug, which smugglers sneak into New York amid boxes of fruits and vegetables, according law-enforcement officials.
Once fentanyl reaches the market, traffickers move it to nearby apartments where the drug gets chopped up and packaged into small glassine envelopes. The drugs are then sold on the streets of the city — and up and down the East Coast.
“It comes in with the produce,” said Bridget Brennan, who heads the city’s Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor, noting that densely packed fentanyl bricks, hidden in box trucks and 18-wheelers, travel by highways from the border with Mexico to the Great Lakes region before coming east.
Fentanyl is so potent that a dose just 2 milligrams in size — the same size as the powder next to the penny above — can prove fatal.
Drug Enforcement Administration
“The drugs are offloaded in New Jersey and then into The Bronx, where they are milled into glassines. The mills pump out millions of these glassines and they get distributed all over the country.”
Packaging operations inside apartments close to Hunts Point are staffed mostly by Dominican laborers decked out in full face masks, gloves and protective clothing to prevent them from being poisoned by the powerful narcotic, Brennan said.
“It tends to be an apartment in The Bronx with eight guys sitting around a big table working around the clock.”
Huge amounts of fentanyl are moved from the border to Hunts Point produce market, where it is easily hidden among produce and legitimate salespeople (seen here), then moved to nearby apartments where it’s cut up for distribution.
Bloomberg via Getty Images
They produce powder versions of the drug and press it into pills that look just like oxycodone, she said.
The fake oxy tablets are known as “blues” — 30 milligram pills so potent they are typically cut into halves or quarters, Brennan said. The amount of the drug can range from .02 to 5.1 milligrams, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration. While the agency says a dose as small as two milligrams can be enough to induce a fatal overdose, 42 percent of the pills the DEA tested had that much or more.
Oxy users, said Brennan, “think they know what they’re getting because they’re used to purchasing pills online. But sometimes it’s pure fentanyl.”
Hunts Point spokesman Robert Leonard said the market was “highly regulated by a number of city, state and federal agencies — including on-site presences. … Our market is committed to providing over 4,000 workers and thousands of customers who come into our market daily with a safe and law-abiding environment. …This includes cooperating fully with all levels of law enforcement.”
Fentanyl, which is manufactured by the cartels in Mexico, has become a plague in America amid the current border crisis, sources said.
A cache of fentanyl displayed by anti-narcotic officers. So potent — and risky — is the drug that some dealers brand their packets with terms like “Overdose” and “Game of Death.”
A group of border guards in Texas blasted President Biden last week for not stopping the rampant flow of the dangerous drug into the Lone Star State, with one lawman saying Biden’s inaction has created a “tsunami of death.”
“It’s quite frankly a tsunami of death that is crashing into the United States over our southern border,” Collin County Sheriff Jim Skinner told The Post of the thousands of pounds of the drug smuggled into the US.
Cartels are taking advantage of the wave of migrants surging over the border, experts said.
Special Narcotics prosecutor Bridget G. Brennan has chronicled the elaborate fentanyl processing and distribution operation set up near Hunts Point, which she said is mostly staffed by Dominican laborers.
Richard Harbus
“Ninety percent of our resources are tied up processing immigrants,” said Brandon Judd, president of the national Border Patrol union. “The cartels exploit that border patrol agents are tied up. That means the border is wide open for them.”
Since 1999, when fentanyl emerged as a popular alternative to heroin, nearly one million Americans have lost their lives to drug overdoses, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Overdose deaths from fentanyl were six times greater in 2020 than in 2015, skyrocking to 56,516 from less than 10,000, according to the CDC.
The production of fentanyl begins in China, where a network of underground labs batch up “precursor” chemicals needed to manufacture the drug. Those include the two most common ingredients of fentanyl: N-phenethylpiperidone and 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine.
The Jalisco New Generation cartel in Guadalajara is one of the main drug operations in Mexico manufacturing fentanyl from precursors in China. Cartels are exploiting weaknesses at the border to get the drug into the US, experts said.
CJNG
The US and China have both banned these and other components, but they continue to be made. In 2020, a reporter for NPR identified three suspected suppliers — in Shanghai and two provinces: Ningxia, in the north central mountains, and Hebei, near Beijing.
The compounds are then shipped to Mexico, where two notorious cartels — the Sinaloa gang in Culiacan, and the Jalisco New Generation cartel in Guadalajara — produce the bulk of the fentanyl consumed in the US, according to the DEA.
The drugs are smuggled over the border at crossings in Texas and New Mexico, according to Brennan, then trucked north on highway 25 toward Denver before heading east toward Chicago on Interstate 80.
Detained migrants and asylum seekers at a US border crossing — one of many such entry points where fentanyl enters the country before being trucked north and east.
USA TODAY NETWORK/Sipa USA
Though some shipments get seized, many more get through, in part because drug-sniffing dogs, who are capable of detecting opioids, have not been trained to identify fentanyl — for their own safety. The drug can be absorbed through the mucus membranes in dog’s noses, killing them just by getting too close to it.
Rand Henderson, the sheriff of Montgomery County, a suburb of Houston that’s been hit hard by fentanyl overdoses, said the smaller sizes of fentanyl bundles make it difficult to stop the trafficking.
“It’s not like moving bundles of marijuana,” he said. “These are much smaller bricks that are measured in pounds.”
Box trucks and 18-wheelers transport bricks of fentanyl from the border to the Great Lakes region and then New York City.
Bloomberg via Getty Images
Illegal fentanyl use in the US surged starting in 2015. Before then, in the early days of fentanyl, recreational users were mostly anesthesiologists who sedated surgery patients with the drug.
The drug took off because it was cheaper than heroin and became much more readily available, experts say. Even now, a single dose of fentanyl can cost as little as $2.
“It’s absolutely cheaper,” Henderson said. “Think about making something in a lab using these cheap chemicals. You have a room that it can be made in versus an organic product that you have to grow, like poppies, so you need a field, workers, water. You have to harvest it and package it. You don’t have any of that with fentanyl.”
A bag of fentanyl pills hidden within a dog costume illustrates both the elaborate — and disarmingly simple — methods dealers will employ to get their product to market.
It’s also much more profitable for dealers. According to one DEA estimate a kilo of fentanyl costing about $4,000 wholesale could reap as much as $1.2 million in revenue — whereas $4,000 of wholesale heroin might bring in just $60,000. More than one million pills can be made from a single kilo of raw fentanyl.
And experts said New York City has become a center for fentanyl distribution — not just because of its excellent connection to roadways — but because of recent bail reforms.
The change in bail requirements, which went into effect in January 2020 under Gov. Andrew Cuomo, mandated that non-violent and low-level drug offenders, including those accused of possession, were to be freed without cash bail.
One notorious Bronx pusher, José “Cataño” Jorge, who was charged with knowingly supplying a lethal dose of fentanyl to a 28-year-old man, got sprung in 2019 because the state’s bail reform law was about to take effect. He was facing 96 years in jail if convicted on all the charges, including conspiracy and selling a controlled substance, but after being released he failed to return to court.
Jose Jorge was arrested for pushing fentanyl on NYC streets but was sprung amid the city’s lax bail laws.
Erik Thomas/NY Post
Moments after his release, the 47-year-old infamously crowed, “Cuomo for president!”
Brennan’s office also recorded him on a wire saying fentanyl overdoses were “good for business,” because they prove the potency of his product. (Some dealers even stamp their products with morbid names like “Overdose” and “Game of Death,” Brennan said.) Jorge was ultimately arrested and is now serving a nine-year sentence, for criminal sale of a controlled substance, at Auburn state prison.
Brennan said she remains baffled as to the “massive overcorrection” on bail, which was partly meant to lower the state’s prison populations. “No prosecutors were consulted,” she said. “No judges were consulted.”
Some of the 5,000 brightly-colored fentanyl pills recently discovered by border patrol agents strapped to a suspect’s leg. The pills’ small size and high potency translate into big profits for traffickers — upwards of $1.2 million per kilogram.
Twitter / @CBPPortDirNOG
Brennan’s office has found that 78 percent of the overdose deaths in New York are linked to fentanyl. In the first two quarters of last year, 1,233 people in the city died of an OD, according to the NYC Health Department — up from 965 over the same period in 2020.
“Because drug packaging is imprecise, users are playing Russian roulette,” her office stated in its 2021 annual report.
Prosecutors continue to worry about how aggressively fentanyl is being marketed — particularly to kids. On Tuesday, the DEA put out a statement warning about brightly colored “rainbow” fentanyl pills and powder made to look like sidewalk chalk. The new form is “a deliberate effort by drug traffickers to drive addiction amongst kids and young adults,” said Anne Milgram, the agency’s administrator.
“Fentanyl is the single deadliest drug threat our nation has ever encountered,” she said in a statement.
Law enforcement officials display a massive seizure of fentanyl, which is responsible for 78 percent of all overdose deaths in New York City.
“I never thought in my career that I would see a drug that would trump methamphetamines,” added Henderson. Fentanyl, he said, has “been turned into a weapon of mass destruction.”
One former cop is upset about the lack of government funding to help law enforcement stop the flow of the drug.
“Our federal agents, they need more resources to interdict more fentanyl,” said Robert Almonte, a security consultant who worked as a narcotics investigator with the El Paso police for 25 years.
Despite major fentanyl busts such as this one, drug agents say not enough funding is available to stem the drug’s flow on the US-Mexico border.
“They need the technology to detect it coming across in commercial trucks. This is a crisis and we are not treating it as a crisis. I’m frustrated and angry and I think that every American should be.”
Almonte, however, did note one encouraging development.
At a meeting in Washington DC last month with the DEA, agents vowed to do more to cut off the supply of precursor chemicals from China into Mexico, he said.
“My hat goes off to the DEA,” he said. “Without those chemicals the cartels can’t produce fentanyl — or meth for that matter.”
“Fentanyl is the biggest threat to our national security,” he added.
“People are dying by the thousands and we are not doing enough to stop it from coming across the border. We’re not recognizing the gravity of the situation.”
THE FENTANYL ROUTE: How one of the most lethal drugs in the world enters the US, turning NYC into a hub and leaving thousands dead
NY Post
- 1. China: The production of fentanyl begins in China, where a network of underground labs batch up “precursor” chemicals needed to manufacture the drug. The US and China have both banned these and other components, but they continue to be made.
- 2. Mexico: Drug organizations including the Sinaloa cartel and the Jalisco New Generation cartel use precursor chemicals from China to manufacture fentanyl, which is cheaper and more profitable than heroin. One kilo of fentanyl can reap as much as $1.2 million compared to $60k from the same amount of heroin.
- 3. The Border: The flow of migrants over the US-Mexico border under Biden’s open-door policies has overwhelmed guards who have little time to check for small bricks of heroin, which make their way to NYC in box trucks and 18-wheelers.
- 4. En Route to NYC: “There’s a convergence of highways going north to Massachusetts and Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Long Island,” said Bridget Brennan, who heads the city’s Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor, noting that densely packed fentanyl bricks travel from the border to the Great Lakes region before coming east.
- 5. Destination NYC: Hunts Point produce market in The Bronx is a hub for the lethal drug, which gets smuggled into the city amid boxes of fruits and vegetables. Bricks of fentanyl are then moved to nearby apartments where laborers produce a powder version and press the drug into pills that look just like oxycodone, which are then sold on the streets of NYC.
New York Post · by Brad Hamilton · September 3, 2022
21. How the West is racing to stop Ukraine's guns falling silent
Can the arsenal(s) of democracy sustain Ukraine and sustain defense of NATO, the US, and other allies against the threats from revisionist, revolutionary, and rogue powers? Sustainment, logistics, procurement, etc ,was our superpower. Is it still?
How the West is racing to stop Ukraine's guns falling silent
Nato stockpiles were depleted to arm Kyiv – but the defence industry must ramp up production once more
By
Gareth Corfield
and
Howard Mustoe
4 September 2022 • 6:00am
The Telegraph · by Gareth Corfield
In the weeks after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a parody image began doing the rounds on the internet featuring ‘Saint Javelin’.
Depicted in the style of an orthodox Christian saint, a stern-faced female figure clad in the blue and gold of the Ukraine flag cradles an FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile launcher, nestling it against her cheek.
The image, it turned out, was devised by a Canadian marketer. But it nonetheless captures the essence of Ukraine’s dependence on the West for the influx of weapons, military vehicles and ammunition that has kept its military able to confront the Russian invaders.
The supply lifeline meant Russia’s initial blitzkrieg-style rush of infantry, armour, artillery and supporting air strikes mostly ground to a halt amid mounting casualties. The invaders inch forwards, consolidating and deepening their hold on conquered Ukrainian territory.
Meanwhile Ukraine’s defenders fiercely contest every street corner, road junction and field - and have launched an offensive of their own to reclaim the occupied city of Kherson.
Their ability to continue fighting back rests on the steady supply of Western arms, ammunition and materiel.
Yet a problem has begun to emerge which threatens that steady supply. Most Western weaponry supplied to Ukraine has either come from ready-use war stockpiles or from long term stores of vehicles and materiel that is obsolete by NATO standards. After six months of full intensity war fighting - and with winter on the horizon - those stocks are starting to run low.
Supply chain crisis
Earlier this week The Wall Street Journal reported that much American military aid “has come directly from US inventory, depleting stockpiles intended for unexpected threats”.
An unnamed US defence official told the newspaper that reserves of 155mm artillery shells were running “uncomfortably low” after the supply of 806,000 rounds to Ukraine. Production, inevitably, now needs to rise.
Mackenzie Eaglen, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank, added: “There are some problems you can buy your way out of. This is one of them.”
The military-industrial complex – Dwight Eisenhower’s description of the manufacturers and suppliers to the world’s armed forces – must step up to the mark. A debate is now under way between Nato governments, their own militaries and their treasuries about not only the quantity of materiel they want to supply to Ukraine, but the knock-on effect on their own nations of emptying their stockpiles.
Trevor Taylor, a research fellow from the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi), says the biggest challenge for Ukraine’s Western supporters is placing fresh contracts with defence suppliers, especially as Ukraine starts mounting full-scale counterattacks to regain lost territory.
“Offensive actions require more munitions and effort than do defensive actions,” says Taylor.
“But the military intent, what they can realistically think about mounting, is a function of the supplies they can get from outside.”
Two key factors for keeping a military offensive going are the rate at which army units consume ammunition and the speed with which their comrades can resupply them.
Ukraine’s artillery regiments are firing around 6,000 shells a day, according to estimates from Rusi. Even the simplest artillery ammunition needs time to make, and lead times for the increasingly complex weapon systems employed by modern militaries make forward planning to head off a supply crisis ever more important.
Nicholas Drummond, a defence industry analyst and former British Army officer, thinks part of the supply problem lies with politicians and generals who embraced post-Cold War peace dividend-driven thinking for far too long.
“Essentially, the Russo-Ukrainian war has exposed years of under-investment across many areas of defence, but particularly in war stocks of ammunition,” he says.
“There is a collective realisation that this conflict will not finish quickly and, worse, if Russia escalates, Nato armies could be drawn into it. So, without fanfare, huge efforts are being made to rebuild gifted ammo stocks and to build up our own contingency holdings.”
Shrinking US stockpiles have prompted action. The Biden government has said Stinger and Javelin manufacturing will be ramped up in order to restock US resources, with the implication that some of those weapons will be forwarded on to Ukraine.
President Biden, pictured visiting the Javelin assembly line in Alabama, has been forced to increase production Credit: JONATHAN ERNST/ REUTERS
The production line for the 1970s vintage Stinger anti-aircraft missile, which costs about $120,000 apiece (£91,300), recently reopened to accommodate another order. Additional staff may even be needed to speed up production, and alternatives for obsolete parts must be found and substituted into the production lines.
While production in the US is quicker to restart for artillery shells than for more complicated weapons like rockets and missiles, it can still take up to 18 months from order to delivery of the munitions.
Insiders at some of the UK’s arms companies say it takes about 10 years to commission, design and deliver a new missile, while restarting an old production line can take up to two years, depending on the complexity of the weaponry.
Anti-aircraft weaponry is harder to make, because of the extreme performance needed from missiles capable of destroying supersonic fighter jets.
The kit is much more expensive than its ground equivalents: the Thales-made Starstreak missile, which can travel at Mach 3, or 3,700km per hour (2,300mph), is said to cost about five times more than the NLAW anti-tank weapon.
Battlefield use in Ukraine is likely to have attracted more potential buyers to the NLAW, however, potentially giving its Swedish maker Saab economies of scale to exploit. The anti-tank weapon has played a decisive role in crippling the Russian invasion, earning it a cult status and huge popularity among Ukrainian soldiers.
Rusi’s Taylor says that during the Cold War, Nato countries’ militaries held about three weeks’ worth of ammunition. With nuclear armageddon expected to occur before those three weeks were up, the defence supply chains of many countries, including the UK, were trimmed to suit.
Kitchen sink approach
In Taylor’s view, the British system lacked depth – though he does say that he and his colleagues were surprised by the amounts of equipment that the Ministry of Defence was able to dredge up from storage at the start of the year.
British gifts to Ukraine have included Wolfhound and Husky light armoured vehicles, battlefield taxis designed to move soldiers around while protecting them from mines and shrapnel.
Helmets and body armour have also come out of the UK’s stockpile, along with 400,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, M109 self-propelled howitzers and anti-tank missiles such as the Javelin and the NLAW – whose full name of “Next Generation Light Anti-tank Weapon” is such a mouthful few try to remember it, much less use it, as one dry-humoured source comments.
Ukraine has received 5,000 NLAWs from the UK, together with thousands of Javelins, Brimstones and other anti-tank weapons, 16,000 artillery rounds, hundreds of missiles and six Stormer vehicles fitted with Starstreak anti-aircraft missile launchers.
Overall, the value of British military support for Ukraine has totalled £2.3 billion to date.
In the past six weeks the Government has promised to supply 20 M109 155mm self-propelled guns and 36 smaller L119 105mm artillery pieces. The M109 broadly resembles a tank but is designed to fire larger shells over much longer ranges to bombard enemy positions. Accordingly, it is more lightly armoured than a proper main battle tank. Firing high explosive shells, it has a range of 21km (13 miles) and requires a crew of six.
The L119 Light Gun, so named because it weighs less than competing designs and is therefore more easily moved around, is similar to the type of gun fired from Edinburgh Castle at 1pm every day. It is small enough to be lifted by a helicopter or towed by a road vehicle, and has a range of 11.4km (7.1 miles) using 105mm shells.
If this sounds like Britain and her allies have thrown everything including the kitchen sink at Ukraine, there is some truth in that view. Indeed, the assortment of military hardware being shipped to Kyiv may be creating its own problem of training, familiarisation and ease of resupply.
A Rusi report from July about the munitions supply difficulties facing Ukraine’s army said: “One challenge here is that Nato standardisation is not very standardised, with different countries’ howitzers not only having completely different maintenance requirements but also using different charges, fuses and sometimes shells.
“The current approach by which each country donates a battery of guns in a piecemeal way is rapidly turning into a logistical nightmare for Ukrainian forces, with each battery requiring a separate training, maintenance and logistics pipeline.
“Making support to Ukraine sustainable requires the provision of one or two kinds of gun, and for countries to step up production of the appropriate ammunition,” adds the report’s author, Jack Watling.
Ukraine will need a regular supply of shells which can vary widely even within the broad 155mm category, he warns. As current munition stockpiles dwindle, the Ukrainians are already hunting for new sources of supply.
Sources say they have been inspecting British foundries capable of making casings for 155mm artillery shells, as fired by Nato howitzers which have been gifted to Kyiv, such as US-provided M777s, French Caesars and German PzH 2000s.
The casings must be made to a high standard. BAE Systems builds the UK’s 155mm casings, but Ukrainian officials are understood to be keen to diversify their supplies, picking several sources to minimise any delays in production.
BAE’s Washington foundry in Tyne and Wear makes the metal shell casings. These are then sent to the former Royal Ordnance Factory at Glascoed in Monmouthshire, Wales, for filling with high explosive.
Precise figures on production capacity and the state of British military stockpiles are not made public, but there is little doubt that UK officials are now having similar conversations with the defence industrial base as their US counterparts.
In the UK there is thought to be some capacity to add shifts to production lines to increase supply, although some analysts say that basic 155mm rounds are not the critical bottleneck for Ukraine.
“Newer, exotic 155mm munitions are also experiencing delays for the same reason as MLRS rockets,” says Drummond, the defence analyst.
“Small arms, medium calibre and tank ammunition production has been expanded without too much trouble.
“Many companies, like BAE Systems, have increased production.”
So far there has been no need to increase the number of shifts at munitions factories, Drummond says. “Overall, I don’t see any serious barriers to resupplying ammunition stocks,” he adds. “The real issue is the manufacture of tanks and [infantry fighting vehicles]. “The timeline is basically 36 months from an order being placed to delivery.”
Levelling the playing field
With winter fast approaching, a three-year lead time for brand new military vehicles is clearly impractical. This is one of the reasons that Western stocks of ready-to-use munitions and vehicles are being sent east: buying new ones and waiting for factories to deliver simply isn’t an option for Ukraine.
It’s a rosier story for Vladimir Putin’s forces, at least as far as ammunition supply is concerned. The Russians have several years’ worth of artillery munitions at their disposal, according to a report last month from Rusi. Russia is firing 20,000 shells per day compared with Ukraine’s 6,000, it said.
The use of drones and radar jamming has made their strikes particularly effective against Ukrainian positions, although Ukraine’s forces have adapted recently by using decoy positions to draw Russian fire. Countering this means having the weapons available to destroy Russian military formations.
Drummond says that production of Javelins, NLAWs and “other complex weapons” is ramping up accordingly. But he sounds a cautionary note, adding that there are “delays with long-lead items such as chips and controller parts”.
“This particularly affects M31 rockets for Himars,” he says.
Ukraine has been given 16 of the US-made Himars systems, which have proven formidable for attacking Russian airfields and key strategic chokepoints such as bridges. But the ammunition is expensive and in short supply.
Himars, also known as the US-made M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, is essentially an armoured lorry with six rocket launcher tubes bolted onto a flatbed trailer. Its operating concept is simple: launch rockets at a target, then quickly drive away to a place of safety.
So-called “counter-battery fire”, the targeting of artillery batteries as they open up, has become a real problem for the Ukrainians because of Russia’s plethora of radar, sensor-laden drones and rapid-deployment artillery vehicles of their own; Himars is one of the pieces of Western artillery that levels the field for the Ukrainians.
Yet Himars’ M31 rockets, made by Lockheed Martin, are far more complex than the truck that launches them. The missiles are guided by an inertial measuring unit backed up by GPS, which means each weapon has a complex computer system built into it.
Each of those contains computer chips, antennas and processors, all of which are built to exacting standards so they can survive the stresses of being launched at the speeds necessary to fly for the rocket’s maximum range of 43 miles.
In July, a retired US lieutenant general, Mark Hertling, estimated that the 16 Himars rocket systems America sent to Ukraine could fire 192 missiles a day – equivalent to a year’s worth of production in less than two months.
The same missiles are also fired from the M270 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System launcher vehicle, which is Himars’ armoured and tracked elder sibling.
M270 multiple-launch rocket systems the UK will be sending to Ukraine
Depleted armouries
Taylor, from Rusi, observes that the US is now firmly in the realm of “starting to order from industry in order to deliver to Ukraine”.
“I would expect there have been significant conversations in the last six months between the American government and the private sector, and I suspect there have been some between the British Government and the private sector here about how responsive they can be to expand their production of certain items,” he says.
Ukraine has also been handed complex weapons from Britain such as the Brimstone guided missile, built by French-British company MBDA. A mainstay of the Royal Air Force’s air-to-ground attack capability, Brimstone can also be launched from the ground: footage and pictures that surfaced online in May show Ukrainians testing Brimstone from a truck-mounted launcher.
Brimstone Missile
Other battlefield photos published by the Russians show captured Brimstones, presumably weapons that misfired. One of these missiles in particular appears to be from one of the earliest Brimstone production batches.
“From its markings seen in the photographs it is clear that the weapon’s components were produced in September 2001 and February and June 2004,” says Matthew Moss, an arms historian and keen observer of the weapons being used in Ukraine.
As stockpiles of older missiles are shipped to Ukraine, the British Government must place fresh orders to renew its own stockpiles as well as keeping its allies’ armouries full.
At around £175,000 each, Brimstones are not cheap – though sources insist the price reflects what it can do, with the weapons capable of “swarming”, where operators mark an area of ground and launch a salvo of Brimstones at it. Each missile then “talks” to its neighbour in flight as they pick out the highest value targets within their defined impact area, ensuring no more than one missile destroys each one.
Those who have used Brimstone in anger speak highly of the missile. A story from the Afghanistan war still circulates in the RAF about a Brimstone launched against a Taliban truck. The missile locked on to the very centre of the truck’s cab, it is claimed, punching through the thin metal roof, missing the driver and passenger as it passed between them, and exiting through the floor before detonating to successfully destroy the vehicle.
Allies in cyberspace
As all this goes on, even the cyber front needs constant Western expertise in a parallel of the physical ammunition stockpile. Tech companies such as Microsoft and Amazon have given the Ukrainian state invaluable help in shifting the mundane burdens of civilian bureaucracy into their cloud data centres, helping avoid a total destruction of state capacity by Russian airstrikes.
Staving off Russian hackers’ activities needs ongoing Western support just as much as the front-line fighting does: the quantity of cyber intrusions faced by Ukraine has become firmly linked to “kinetic”, real-world military operations, says its cybersecurity chief Victor Zhora.
“This has been a huge help and assistance from our Western partners, and the support is continuous,” Zhora tells The Telegraph.
“But since the cyber war goes on, and Russian aggressors identify new targets, new countries for attack, it seems to me that for Ukraine, which continues to be on the front line, the support is crucial and should be kept.”
Ukraine recently signed a mutual cyber defence pact with Poland in which the two nations have pooled their resources.
“Ukraine’s expertise is invaluable for joint development and expansion of capacities in active defence against cyber threats,” General Karol Molenda, head of Poland’s national cyber defence agency, said at the time.
“The cruel war waged by Russia is still raging in Ukraine. However, cyberspace has no borders, and Russian hackers are attacking not our state only, but also other countries – actually, all countries supporting Ukrainian independence and democratic values.”
Growth industry
More sales opportunities for Western arms manufacturers are sure to present themselves as Nato irons out plans to put additional troops at high readiness from 2023 along the alliance’s border with Russia.
There is also another dimension to the Ukrainian supply problem that works in the West’s favour: profitability. Share prices in BAE are up 27 per cent since the invasion. France’s Thales has risen by 41 per cent, and Sweden’s Saab by 62 per cent. In the US, Lockheed Martin is up 8 per cent.
New recruits to Nato are obliged to switch to standard calibres of weaponry which can be shared between allies, ditching their old Soviet-era equipment. Recent share-price moves suggest orders will rise, both for improving Nato members’ resilience and potentially provisioning Ukraine.
Employee numbers at the factory in Belfast that completes assembly of the NLAW missiles, which also designs and makes the Starstreak anti-aircraft weapon, have grown from 500 to 650 in recent years. The same factory also makes Martlet air-to-surface missiles designed to be fired from helicopters.
Faster growth could be hampered by the complexity of the product together with the high level of skill and depth of training needed to design and make missiles.
With Ukraine politely refusing to engage in peace talks with Russia in the absence of major concessions and returns of occupied territory, Western arms manufacturers look set for further gains while the Ukrainian military continues to depend on weapons made overseas and supplied by foreign governments.
The supply chain appears to be solid for now – but offensives such as Kherson may expose weaknesses and bottlenecks that could be critical to Ukraine’s future military successes. The followers of Saint Javelin will need to continue their worship at factories across the West.
The Telegraph · by Gareth Corfield
22. New “gang of four” in Taiwan challenges China
These four will be on everyone's "to meet list" when they visit from now on.
New “gang of four” in Taiwan challenges China
Nancy Pelosi's meeting with the 4 rebels shows importance of concerns they represent
Issue Date: September 11, 2022 Updated: September 04, 2022 10:59 IST
theweek.in
If Mao Zedong had a “gang of four” to lead his Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, there is a new “gang of four” in action in Taiwan, challenging the legitimacy and human rights record of the Chinese government. They are Wuér Kaixi, a Tiananmen Square massacre survivor from Xinjiang; Lam Wing-kee, a bookseller from Hong Kong; Kelsang Gyaltsen, the Tibetan representative in Taiwan; and Lee Ming-che, a Taiwanese activist who was jailed for five years in China. During Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, she met with members of the “gang”, showing the importance of the geopolitical hotspots represented by them.
The four activists briefly shared their experiences with THE WEEK.
Wuér Kaixi, Tiananmen Square massacre survivor
Wuer Kaixi | Namrata Biji Ahuja
When I met Speaker Nancy Pelosi, I gave her chocolates. She loves chocolates. The chocolates were made by connoisseur Wu Kui Ni, who won four gold medals at the International Chocolate Awards (Asia Pacific) competition. I have met Pelosi at least two dozen times, but our latest meeting in Taiwan was a message to Chinese President Xi Jinping that democracy can never be defeated and that the US continued to support Taiwan. During the meeting, we talked about human rights violations in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.
I belong to the Uyghur heritage and my parents worked in China as translators. They were not working for the Communist Party, but everything was controlled by the CCP back then. In the 1980s, the Chinese people, especially the students, thought that the CCP was committed to making China an open society and they wanted to nudge the party in that direction. But when they went out to the Tiananmen Square in 1989, the true nature of the CCP was revealed. The party wanted power, but not reforms, and responded with military suppression. I managed to escape somehow, and I was put as number two on the CCP’s most wanted students’ list.
I escaped to Hong Kong and then to Europe and the US, before moving to Taiwan in 1996. I was distraught when China arrested Liu Xiaobo, a prominent intellectual and my mentor throughout the student movement. He was sent to jail in 2008 for challenging the CCP rule. Hearing that, I tried to turn myself in, yet I was not arrested. In 2010, Liu became the first Chinese citizen to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but it was tragic that he remained a prisoner till his death in 2017.
Today, I believe that the US is on the cusp of a change. It had adopted an engagement policy with China under president Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger to counter the Soviet Union. But when the policy continued even after the Cold War, it turned into appeasement. Pelosi’s visit is an indication of a change. China will have to either reject it or adapt to the impending change. I don’t think there is much substance behind Xi’s military threat, unless he has gone crazy. He is a calculating dictator who always sees what is beneficial for him. So he may not invade Taiwan. But he runs a totalitarian regime which is capable of irrational action.
Lam Wing-kee, bookseller from Hong Kong
I was kidnapped by suspected Chinese agents in 2015 and was jailed for eight months for selling books critical of the Chinese leadership. It showed that the CCP did not want to hear any voices against them. I escaped to Taiwan after Hong Kong proposed a law that would have allowed my extradition to China. I could have been sent to a Chinese prison and prosecuted under any charge they wanted. So I escaped, leaving behind my bookstore and my girlfriend.
After the Tiananmen Square massacre, people in Hong Kong suddenly wanted to know more about what was happening in China, and books were the most direct way to do that. I loved reading, so it was quite natural for me to open a bookstore. Gradually, I realised that the bookstore was also a way to focus on human rights, which is a bigger priority for any country. In Taiwan, too, I opened a bookstore to show the world and the CCP that I am still a rebel and that the people of Hong Kong will continue to fight.
I don’t have anyone in Hong Kong to go back to. My bookstore has been purchased by some Chinese investment firm. My sons are grown up and they have chosen to stay back. It is their decision and I don’t worry about them.
The situation in Taiwan is critical right now and it is good that the US has given a clear message to China with the visit of Speaker Pelosi. Taiwan is a democracy. But we must remember that democracy is not the destination. It is only a way to realise the actual goal, which is freedom.
Kelsang Gyaltsen, Tibetan representative in Taiwan
On the night of Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, I got a call from a Mongolian diplomat, asking about the chances of a war breaking out and whether they should airlift their students. I told him that Pelosi would visit Taiwan, but there would be no war. Later, he thanked me and invited me to dinner.
As Tibetans, we understand the Chinese mind because we have witnessed their aggression and oppression for decades, much before anyone else. Today, the Tibetan community in exile in Taiwan is of strategic importance as we assist, guide and join hands with the Taiwanese in times of crisis.
The Tibetans, the Uyghurs, the Mongolians, the Taiwanese and the Hong Kongers are facing the same kind of problem from the CCP. China fears that we could stop it from having good relations with other countries. We have come together under a common understanding against the dangerous policies of the CCP. Given the present situation, the people in Taiwan feel that war is imminent, but the only way to avoid war is to rally together the defenders of human rights, democracy and peace. This is the time we need the support of the international community. Countries like India should be more vocal in their support because the Tibetan refugees are already settled in India. It is home to the Dalai Lama and is a centre of Buddhism.
During the 2008 uprising in Tibet, Pelosi had visited India and met the Dalai Lama. At that time, I was a parliamentarian in the Central Tibetan Administration and I got a chance to meet her. This July, I visited the American embassy here in Taiwan for a human rights conference. All these engagements demonstrate our close relations and also the American commitment towards protecting human rights. Pelosi herself is one of the greatest supporters of the Tibetan cause and of the Dalai Lama, so it was our responsibility to receive her when she came to Taiwan.
Lee Ming-che, Taiwanese activist who was jailed for five years in China
I was arrested at the Gongbei port of entry [on the China-Macau border, in March 2017]. A black cloth was put over my face and I was forced into a car. My abductors asked me to cooperate and sent me to Guangzhou for RSDL (residential surveillance at a designated location), a type of undisclosed detention centre used against individuals accused of endangering national security. According to a Chinese court, all my “crimes” were online criticisms of the Chinese government. However, the places where I made those remarks were all in Taiwan. China treats the Taiwanese like its own citizens and imposes a charge of “subversion of state power” that should apply only to its own people. Such acts are an unlimited expansion of national sovereignty and a violation of Taiwan’s sovereignty.
I was in solitary confinement; even my lawyer and my family were not told about my condition. I was not allowed to read any books or magazines, or watch TV. Even the staff watching over me were forbidden to speak to me.
After I was released from RSDL on May 26, 2017, I was sent to the Chishan prison in Hunan and I got a public trial. The Chinese authorities could not prove espionage charges against me because those were false charges, but I continued to be in prison. I tried to preserve my willpower and sanity by constantly reminding myself that I had not done anything wrong. I called myself a human rights defender and decided to work to safeguard human rights whether or not I was released from jail one day.
I became free after five years, on April 14, 2022. Today, I am working to improve the human rights situation in Chinese prisons even as the Chinese government tries to snap ties between foreign NGOs and the Chinese people.
I believe that freedom is not for free. My parents were born in China and retreated with the Kuomintang army in 1949. My family embraced the idea of “Chinese nationalism”. But my wife is a local Taiwanese. So she inspired me to have a different worldview and I could see that Taiwan was gradually moving towards a democratic society.
I don’t want to be a citizen of an autocratic country. When I met Speaker Pelosi, she mentioned that she held aloft a protest banner at the Tiananmen Square in 1991. She has repeatedly asked Chinese leaders to set political prisoners free. She also expressed concern about human rights violations in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
AS TOLD TO NAMRATA BIJI AHUJA
theweek.in
23. Wife leaked intel about her husband's military unit to Russia, who then bombed it, says Ukraine's secret service
Wife leaked intel about her husband's military unit to Russia, who then bombed it, says Ukraine's secret service
Business Insider · by Bethany Dawson
Ukrainian soldiers ride a tank on a road in the Donetsk region on July 20, 2022, near the front line between Russian and Ukrainian forces
Anatolii Stepanov/Getty Images
- Ukraine's Security Service said it had detained a woman for leaking military intelligence.
- The unnamed woman tapped her soldier husband for information and leaked it to a Russian serviceman.
- She was reportedly promised Russian citizenship and a high standard of living when they captured the region.
Get a daily selection of our top stories based on your reading preferences.
The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) has announced it has detained a woman for revealing the whereabouts of her husband's military unit and other army assets to Russian forces.
The woman, a 31 wife, and mother from Dnipropetrovsk, informed Russian intelligence of the location of military buildings and the frontline positions of military equipment in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, two regions of eastern Ukraine that have seen intense fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces.
According to the statement from the SBU, the unnamed woman is a "traitor."
"The criminal used her husband "in the dark": she asked for information about the location of his military unit and other groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in advanced positions." said the SBU statement.
"She took such a step despite the fact that she is married to a serviceman of the Armed Forces, and they have a son together. Her husband, being on the eastern front, regularly transferred money for the maintenance of the child," it added.
She texted the classified intelligence about the location of her husband's military unit and other Ukrainian formations to a Russian serviceman, said the SBU. He passed it on to Russian military intelligence that shared it with the frontline battle groups who used it to launch artillery, mortar, and air strikes.
The SBU says she was promised Russian citizenship and a high standard of living should they succeed in capturing the region for her alleged betrayal.
The woman who started spying for the Russians in May was arrested on September 2, and Ukrainian forces seized her computers and mobile terminals, said the SBU.
Ukraine suffered considerable losses on the eastern front in the early summer. Russian artillery bombardments inflicted high casualties, and Putin's forces made some territorial gains in the Donbas.
In June, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy admitted Ukraine was losing up to 100 soldiers daily.
Business Insider · by Bethany Dawson
24. ‘A white nationalist pyramid scheme’: how Patriot Front recruits young members
No surprise here.
‘A white nationalist pyramid scheme’: how Patriot Front recruits young members
The Guardian · September 2, 2022
In June, police in Idaho arrested 31 members of the white nationalist group Patriot Front packed into the back of a U-Haul near a Coeur d’Alene Pride event. The group had planned to riot during the LGBTQ+ celebrations, authorities said, and carried riot gear, a smoke grenade, shin guards and shields.
Trump sought to mount ‘armed revolution’, militia ex-spokesman says
Read more
The mass arrest not only revealed the names of members of an extremist group that had long worked to keep those hidden, it provided extremist experts with new insight into how the group is meticulously planning, financing, organizing and publicizing armed demonstrations at public events that celebrate diversity.
Patriot Front’s fundraising and mobilizing efforts, those experts say, reveal a corporate-style organization that more resembles a media production company with satellite offices than a classic neo-Nazi group.
“No other white supremacist group operating in the US today is able to match Patriot Front’s ability to produce media, ability to mobilize across the country, and ability to finance,” says Morgan Moon, investigative researcher with the ADL Center on Extremism. “That’s what makes them a particular concern.”
When white nationalism meets media production
Patriot Front was founded after the 2017 Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville by Thomas Rousseau, a former member of the small, neo-Nazi group Vanguard America.
Disaffected members of Vanguard America left to join Rousseau’s organization, and for two years, primarily stickered college campuses and dropped banners with slogans like “Reclaim America” over highway overpasses.
Thomas Rousseau founded Patriot Front after the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville. Photograph: Bryan Dozier/Rex/Shutterstock
In the 18 months after the January 6 insurrection at the Capitol, many anti-government extremist groups, like the Proud Boys, Oathkeepers and Three Percenters, have lain low. But Patriot Front has geared up. The group has made unpermitted demonstrations its “bread and butter”, says Moon, making sure each event is heavily publicized on social media.
Since last December, the group has organized five such flash demonstrations. Two of them – the event in Idaho and a contentious march along Boston’s Freedom Trail on the Fourth of July holiday – resulted in national media attention.
At the rallies, Rousseau typically addresses the crowd, urging onlookers to rise up physically and “reclaim your country”.
To capture different angles of a rally, several camera operators circulate and shoot video while members wear body-worn cameras, according to Jeff Tischauser, senior research analyst at the Southern Poverty Law Center. Then, the media team edits the footage and circulates a video package on alt-tech platforms like Gab, Odyssey and Telegram.
No other white supremacist group ... is able to match Patriot Front’s ability to produce media, ability to mobilize across the country, and ability to finance
Morgan Moon
Afterward, Patriot Front’s social media team monitors the group’s mentions, shares news coverage on private servers, and tells members which social media accounts to harass, Tischauser says.
The video packages are specifically designed toward attracting a younger audience, says Stephen Piggott, program analyst with Western States Center, a Portland-based non-profit that promotes inclusive democracy. And while other far-right and white nationalist groups are engaging in meme culture and recruiting people online, the group has been effective at attracting young radicals and getting them off their laptops and into the streets, he adds.
Throughout its propaganda, the group is careful to craft an image that will appeal to younger users, promoting the “idea of a young warrior” and becoming the “warrior elite”, says Moon, the ADL researcher. The group emphasizes fitness, diet and training and often holds paramilitary drills before demonstrations.
The young recruits find the anonymity Patriot Front provides attractive. Photograph: Kent Nishimura/Los Angeles Times/Rex/Shutterstock
Also attractive to young recruits is the premium the group puts on anonymity. Banner drops and mural defacing typically happen after dark, and members keep their faces covered. Internal chats show members using code names. At protests, Rousseau is typically the only person whose face is shown.
‘A white nationalist pyramid scheme’
Undergirding Patriot Front’s activities is a rigid, top-down hierarchy, researchers say.
Rousseau is at the head. Lieutenants run departments of the group, including media production, recruitment and online security. Fifteen regional network directors organize local and national activities, and supervise members.
Once recruits become members, they are required to attend monthly roundups, hit a weekly activism quota, and show up to demonstrations, according to Moon. If they don’t, Rousseau expels them from Patriot Front.
Internal chats obtained by extremist experts show members complaining about the ongoing expenses they incur paying for stickers, stencils and other mandatory propaganda materials, which Rousseau charges them for.
Members of Patriot Front gather for an unpermitted rally in December 2021 in Washington DC. Photograph: Win McNamee/Getty Images
Rousseau charges members a premium for Patriot Front propaganda material, Tischauser said, adding that network directors are expected to push members to purchase flyers to go on several flyering runs a month. “In this sense, Patriot Front is close to a white nationalist pyramid scheme,” Tischauser notes.
The tightly organized structure enables Patriot Front to be responsible for up to 14 hate incidents a day, according to the ADL. Under the direction of network directors, Patriot Front members defaced 29 murals honoring Black history, LGBTQ+ pride, migrant history and police shooting victims, said Tischauser.
Patriot Front did not respond to a request for comment.
‘It lifted the veil a bit’
Recent events have somewhat disrupted the group’s carefully constructed image. Earlier this year, the leftwing non-profit Unicorn Riot leaked the group’s internal audio and chats, which helped investigators discover the identity of the national team, regional directors and many other members. And following the arrest in Coeur d’Alene, all 31 names of arrested members were broadcasted and published in local media outlets, along with their mugshots.
“They got kind of the opposite of what they wanted: they weren’t able to disrupt the LGBTQ Pride events, and they got a whole lot of mainstream media attention,” Piggott said.
The Idaho arrests also exposed that their members flew into the state from different parts of the country, Piggott added. “It lifted the veil a bit. They may not have the numbers they say they have.”
Members of the white supremacist group Patriot Front arrested near an Idaho pride event in June 2022. Photograph: Georji Brown/AP
Still, civil rights groups are increasingly concerned about violence breaking out at flash demonstrations. During Patriot Front’s unpermitted rally in Boston this July, for example, members of the group allegedly assaulted a Black artist and activist, Charles Murrell.
Murrell did not respond to an interview request.
The ADL, the Western States Center and other civil rights groups have urged the Department of Justice to launch a comprehensive investigation into the group, arguing that some of its activities could violate federal legislation.
“More must be done to hold the group accountable and ensure they do not continue to intimidate historically marginalized communities,” the organizations wrote in a letter to the US attorney general, Merrick Garland.
“This is particularly true at a time when Patriot Front is becoming increasingly emboldened and coordinating its activity at a national level, targeting specific locations across the country,” they added. “The Department of Justice may indeed be the only entity able to address these concerns effectively.”
The Guardian · September 2, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
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email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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