Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

(Note: Just to keep all my readers informed, I will be leaving the Foundation for Defense of Democracies when my contract ends on 31 March 2023. My contract won’t be renewed because of FDD’s priorities on other policy issues but I’ve thoroughly enjoyed my experience at FDD and know that I’ve had the full support, gratitude, and appreciation from FDD’s leadership. So, I will be available to put my knowledge and experience with Korea and Northeast Asia and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare to work elsewhere.

I will continue my pro bono work with my daily news commentary (which I have been doing since 1996 through the Informal Institute of National Security Thinkers and Practitioners (IINSTP)) and editing the Small Wars Journal. I will continue to be committed to the pursuit of a free and unified Korea as a Senior Fellow with the Global Peace Foundation and I will continue to advise the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS).

For what it is worth this is my personal objective, and I am willing to explore any opportunities along the lines outlined here:

To serve as a strategic advisor in the US Government (Civilian Agency or DOD), academia, or private sector with specific focus on three areas: the full spectrum of the Korean security problem, Special Operations integration, interoperability, and interdependence (to include Irregular, Unconventional, and Political Warfare), and civilian and professional military education (teach, coach, and mentor military and civilian agency personnel) capitalizing on 30 plus years of professional experience and education as a Special Forces officer and national security practitioner. )

Quotes of the Day:

"All war is a symptom of man's failure as a thinking animal."

- John Steinbeck, “Once There Was a War”

“Tolkachev could not simply step into a backroom at his institute and make photocopies. The Soviet authorities had long feared copiers. At its most basic, the machine helped spread information, and strict control of information was central to the Communist Party's grip on power. In most offices, photocopy machines were kept under lock and key. “A copying machine is located in a special room and operated by four or five employees,” Tolkachev wrote to the CIA of the situation at his work-place. “Entry into the copying room is not allowed to persons not working there.”

- David E Hoffman the Billion Dollar Spy

"If people write well, they cannot think well, and if they cannot think well, others will do their thinking for them."

- George Orwell

1. New US Envoy for North Korea Rights an 'Ideal' Fit, Activists Say

2. It's Time to Accept that North Korea is a Nuclear Power

3. North Korea issues 'extreme cold' weather alert

4. U.S. may appoint special envoy solely dedicated to N. Korea if dialogue resumes: State Dept.

5. Chinese hackers attack 12 S. Korean academic institutions: KISA

6. Military blames 'insufficient' threat perception, equipment, training for failure to shoot down N.K. drones

7. N.K. propaganda outlet slams S. Korea's plan to hold defense meeting with UNC members

8. 9 N. Korean workers in Russia defected to S. Korea last year: professor

9. U.S. closely monitoring N. Korea for possible nuclear test: Pentagon

10. South Korea, U.S. discussing redeployment of tactical nukes on peninsula

11. 'Respiratory illness' prompts lockdown of N. Korean capital

12. U.S. military presence in South Korea does not bother North: Pompeo

13. Iran pressures Seoul over frozen assets in Korean banks

14. UNC concludes both Koreas breached armistice by flying drones in each other's territory: source

15. Growing China dilemma (for South Korea)

16. Arms control talks likely to hurt alliance between Seoul and Washington

17. US-South Korea alliance needs urgent repair

18. Veterans ministry unveils emblem for 70th Korean War armistice anniv.

19. North Korea's Kim Jong-un described Chinese as liars: Mike Pompeo

20. Robert Einhorn on South Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Development

1. New US Envoy for North Korea Rights an 'Ideal' Fit, Activists Say

Now we can get to a human rights upfront approach.

I would hope that Ambassador (Select) Turner will spend a lot of time conducting interviews with VOA and RFA so she can communicate directly the target audiences in the north: The regime elite and military leaders, the 2d their military leaders, and the Korean people. I hope she will use VOA and RFA as a conduit to transmit US policy to the north.

I would establish a monthly (perhaps bi-weekly) human rights program focused on exposing the human rights abuses and the Kim family regime and providing the Korean people with practical information about how to effect change.

New US Envoy for North Korea Rights an 'Ideal' Fit, Activists Say

January 23, 2023 11:28 PM

William Gallo

voanews.com

Seoul, South Korea —

Human rights activists are welcoming the United States' appointment of an envoy for North Korean human rights, a position that had been vacant for six years.

The White House late Monday announced it would appoint Julie Turner, a veteran State Department foreign affairs officer, who has long focused on North Korea human rights issues.

Turner, who must be confirmed by the Senate, is currently the director of the East Asia and Pacific office of the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

She has worked in the office for 16 years, during which she has "primarily focused on initiatives related to promoting human rights in North Korea," according to a White House press release.

Under a law initially passed by Congress in 2004, the U.S. president must appoint a special envoy for North Korean human rights. However, no one has served in the position since 2017, when U.S. President Barack Obama's special envoy stepped down.

Former President Donald Trump, who prioritized his personal relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, never appointed a North Korean human rights envoy. Trump's first secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, at one point proposed eliminating the position.

It's unclear why it took President Joe Biden two years to name an appointee, especially since Biden has said he will prioritize human rights issues. Nonetheless, activists praised the move, calling Turner an ideal fit.

Turner is "terrific, with full awareness and understanding about the North Korean human rights situation," according to Lee Shin-wha, South Korea's human rights envoy for North Korea.

"I am so pleased to get the news and look forward to closely cooperating with this highly capable lady," Lee told VOA.

Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director for the Washington D.C.-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, said Turner is "a truly great scholar and champion of North Korean human rights."

Once confirmed, Scarlatoiu said he hopes the new envoy will adopt a "human rights up front approach" to North Korea.

North Korea is a totalitarian state that tightly restricts nearly every aspect of its citizens' civil and political liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, religion and movement. It consistently ranks at or near the bottom of global human rights rankings.

Activists say the situation has worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been used as a pretext to sever the country's already fragile links to the outside world.

"It's the darkest period in the history of human rights in North Korea, believe it or not," Scarlatoiu said.

During Turner's time at the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the office has been involved with several projects that aim to promote the free flow of information into and out of North Korea and raise awareness of North Korea's rights violations.

North Korea has not reacted to Turner's nomination. It often becomes enraged when other countries or international bodies mention its rights violations.

However, at various points, North Korea has interacted with the U.S. human rights envoy — including in 2011, when Ambassador Robert King led a mission to assess North Korea's food situation.

It's unclear whether any similar humanitarian initiatives can succeed now. In recent years, North Korea has ignored U.S. offers of pandemic assistance, shunning virtually all contact with U.S. officials.

While placing human rights at the forefront of engagement with North Korea is not easy, Turner is "precisely the sort of savvy and strategic representative to get difficult things like this done," said Phil Robertson, Deputy Asia Director at Human Rights Watch.

"Turner has excelled on promoting and protecting human rights across her portfolio," Robertson said, "And she is precisely the kind of dogged advocate that rights issues in the DPRK require for any sort of change to occur."

Activist groups have long complained that human rights were not discussed during the Trump-Kim talks, which instead focused on eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons and improving Pyongyang's relations with Washington and Seoul.

The talks broke down in 2019. North Korea has since resumed major weapons tests and says it will not resume talks until the United States drops what it calls its "hostile policy." Specifically, North Korea objects to U.S.-led sanctions that have battered its economy and the heavy U.S. military presence in the region.

voanews.com

2. It's Time to Accept that North Korea is a Nuclear Power

We have to accept that Kim Jong Un is not going to give up his nuclear weapons. But we do not have to accept the north as a nuclear power. We need to conduct to press to interrupt and hinder nuclear development and especially work to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and all related capabilities.

And we must realize the path to denuclearization is through a human rights up front approach, a sophisticated information and influence activities campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea (while resting the solid foundation of deterrence and defense).

It's Time to Accept that North Korea is a Nuclear Power

thecipherbrief.com

Fine Print

January 24th, 2023 by Walter Pincus, |

Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Walter Pincus is a contributing senior national security columnist for The Cipher Brief. He spent forty years at The Washington Post, writing on topics that ranged from nuclear weapons to politics. He is the author of Blown to Hell: America's Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders. Pincus won an Emmy in 1981 and was the recipient of the Arthur Ross Award from the American Academy for Diplomacy in 2010.

View all articles by Walter Pincus

OPINION — It’s time for the U.S. to drop denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as its goal and begin to deal with North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, since Kim Jong-un, its leader, has shown no indication that he will ever give them up.

To the contrary – Kim announced on New Year’s Eve, “the importance and necessity of a mass-producing of [more] tactical nuclear weapons and…an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal.”

South Korea’s relatively new President Yoon Suk Yeol picked up on Kim’s remarks on January 11 when he said, “It’s possible that the [North Korean nuclear weapons] problem gets worse and our country will reintroduce [U.S.] tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own…If that’s the case, we can have our own nuclear weapons pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities,” according to a transcript of his remarks released by his office and obtained by The New York Times.

Last Friday, talking to reporters at the Davos Conference, President Yoon backed down a bit and said, “I can assure you that the Republic of Korea’s realistic and rational option is to fully respect the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] regime…I’m fully confident about the U.S.’s extended deterrence.”

Supporting that, on May 21, 2022, in a joint leaders’ statement on the occasion of President Joe Biden’s visit to South Korea, Biden affirmed, “the U.S. extended deterrence commitment to the ROK [Republic of Korea] using the full range of U.S. defense capabilities including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities.” Presidents Biden and Yoon also agreed to resume the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), a forum for discussing diplomatic, economic, informational, and military coordination to deter threats to the alliance.

The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recognized that North Korea “poses a persistent threat and growing danger to the U.S. homeland and the Indo-Pacific region as it expands, diversifies, and improves its nuclear, ballistic missile, and non-nuclear capabilities… A crisis or conflict on the Korean Peninsula could involve a number of nuclear-armed actors, raising the risk of broader conflict.”

The Biden NPR goes on to describe “our strategy for North Korea” was “to make clear to the Kim regime, the dire consequences should it use nuclear weapons. Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime. There is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.”

Beyond that threat, the Biden administration strategy appears to be in a waiting game — that the U.S. would meet with North Korean officials without preconditions to talk over both nuclear and non-nuclear issues. So far, there has been no publicly-known response from Pyongyang, other than multiple tests of North Korean ballistic missiles and threat of a new nuclear test.

Meanwhile, earlier this month, U.S. and South Korean officials met to talk about joint planning with conventional forces for the Korean Peninsula in the face of the North Korean threat.

I doubt most Americans know that North Korea’s possession and potential use of nuclear weapons are built into the country’s law, first by an act passed by its Supreme People’s Assembly back in 2013 and amended last year, on September 8, 2022.

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The law describes North Korea as “a responsible nuclear weapons state” that “opposes all forms of wars including nuclear war.” The law also says North Korea’s nuclear weapons are “a main force of the state defense which safeguards the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and the lives and safety of the people from outside military threat, aggression and attack.”

As amended last September, the law now lists cases when North Korea could use its nuclear weapons: Among them are when North Korea is attacked by an enemy’s nuclear weapons; when a hostile non-nuclear attack is made against North Korea’s state leadership and the country’s nuclear forces; and when a catastrophic crisis threatens the existence of the state and the safety of its people.

When the law was amended last September, Kim told the People’s Assembly, “The utmost significance of legislating nuclear weapons policy is to draw an irretrievable line so that there can be no bargaining over our nuclear weapons.” According to Reuters, he added that he would never surrender the weapons even if the country faced 100 years of sanctions.

This past week, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a study titled, North Korean Policy and Extended Deterrence in which it claims “shifts in the strategic landscape call for the United States and its allies to reexamine traditional approaches to the North Korea nuclear issue and devise ways to increase the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.”

The CSIS study specifically says, “The allies should not consider the re-deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula, or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea under current circumstances.”

However, it not only recommends, “Resume U.S.-ROK joint military exercises that were suspended or downgraded in previous negotiations,” but also calls for reconsideration of exercises that “lay pre-decisional groundwork for possible redeployment of U.S. low-yield nuclear weapons.”

In addition, the CSIS study calls for creation of “a framework for joint nuclear planning…similar to a NATO planning group for nuclear weapons use, with planning conducted bilaterally and trilaterally (with Japan) and control remaining in the hands of the United States.”

It also suggests sending a senior South Korean liaison officer to U.S. Strategic Command and reviving the Blue Lightning exercises, which involved the deployment of B-52H or B-1B strategic, nuclear-capable bombers from the U.S. Air Force’s Andersen Base in Guam to the Korean Peninsula. Fighters from South Korea, the U.S. and Japan were also mobilized to escort the long-range bombers.

A new book published this month, provides a serious study of how North Korea – over almost 40 years – has followed two paths — nuclearization and diplomacy. Hinge Points: An Inside Look at North Korea’s Nuclear Program, was written by Siegfried S. Hecker, a former head of Los Alamos National Laboratory and currently a senior fellow and professor emeritus at Stanford University. Between 2004 and 2010, Hecker made yearly visits to North Korea and visited its nuclear facilities.

Hecker writes that the U.S. has “had a singular focus on denuclearization,” while three North Korean leaders have chosen “to pursue diplomacy plus nuclearization, not one or the other,” in order to “hedge against failure in one track or the other and mitigate the risks inherent in the vicissitudes of the post–Cold War international system and its own authoritarian domestic politics.”

“While the North has slowed its nuclear progress at times, it has never fully abandoned the nuclear track,” Hecker writes. At the same time, Washington, he says, “failed to deal with Pyongyang’s dual-track strategy, missing key opportunities for diplomacy and misinterpreting some of the North’s actions, which led to bad decisions.”

Hecker said former-President Trump’s threatening Kim with “fire and fury,” resulted in the North Korean leader putting “his nuclear and missile programs into high gear, achieving both hydrogen bomb capability and ICBM missiles much sooner than anyone had predicted. Kim ended the year [2017] by indicating that he had completed his nuclear force.”

Doing a 180-degree turn, Trump, according to Hecker, “sent a secret message via a U.N. official to Kim that he was willing to meet.”

The resultant June 2018, U.S.-North Korea, Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore, produced what Hecker described as “a short but important joint statement pledging to pursue denuclearization and normalization of relations…I viewed it as a critical step in the right direction.”

However, Hecker says, Trump’s National Security Advisor John Bolton at the Hanoi Summit in February 2019, “convinced Trump that it was better for him to walk away unless the North totally capitulated its nuclear program…Kim returned home angry and disillusioned. Trump continued to hope for a deal, but Kim expressed his utter disappointment in personal letters to Trump.”

I assume these are among the letters that Trump attempted to keep and eventually were turned over to the National Archives.

In any event, Hecker marks the Hanoi Summit along with events in the George W. Bush and Obama administrations as “hinge points” in Washington-Pyongyang nuclear relations.

I would add one more historic moment – or hinge point — that needs recalling when talking about North Korea’s long-term desire to become a nuclear power.

It was the Eisenhower administration in 1958, that first sent atomic weapons into South Korea, breaking a provision of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, which barred the introduction on either side, of “new” weapons, which included nuclear ones. Then-President Eisenhower wanted to reduce defense spending by removing some American troops from South Korea and the Joint Chiefs would only agree if the departing forces were replaced by nuclear weapons. At the time, the U.S. tried to justify its action by saying Russia had supplied North Korea with MIG aircraft that were capable of carrying nuclear bombs, but no such bombs were supplied.

By the mid-1960s, the U.S. had more than 900 nuclear artillery shells, nuclear tactical bombs, and other nuclear weapons in South Korea and the North Koreans had none. Although all U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from South Korea in 1991, the desire for North Korea to have its own nuclear weapons remained for Kim Jong-un — as it had for his father and grandfather.

Today’s situation is not quite the reverse. The U.S. nuclear umbrella still covers South Korea, and if events now in planning take place, that umbrella will be more apparent in the future.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and four original nuclear powers – Russia, England, France and China – have learned to live with nuclear-armed India, Israel and Pakistan. I believe today’s facts mean that North Korea is part of that latter group — like it or not.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

3. North Korea issues 'extreme cold' weather alert

The coldest I can recall ever being was on the DMZ in Korea in the 1980s. But we had good cold weather gear and when we returned from patrols we were able to get a hot meal and return to barracks and hooches that had reliable heating. Just imagine how much the Korean people in the north are suffering in this cold. I realy feel for them.

North Korea issues 'extreme cold' weather alert

BBC · by Menu

Published
1 hour ago

Image source, Getty Images

Winter in Hyesan, in the Ryanggang province of North Korea

By Kelly Ng

BBC News

North Korean authorities have warned of extreme weather conditions in the country as a cold wave sweeps the Korean peninsula.

Temperatures are likely to dip below -30C in the northern regions, which are also the poorest part of the country, the state radio broadcaster said.

Coastal areas are also expected to see high winds, according to state media.

South Korea too has issued a cold wave warning and northern China has been experiencing record low temperatures.

Temperatures are also expected to drop to their lowest in a decade in Japan this week.

While North Korea has been affected by extreme or adverse weather much like other places, little is known about the impact of this on its people.

Ryanggang, North Hamgyong and South Hamgyong, the country's poorest provinces and those expected to be most vulnerable to climate shocks, are all located in the north.

Electricity is uncommon outside the capital Pyongyang, and households in these places reportedly burn wood, and dried plants for warmth during the winter, NK News has reported. It also says many merely use plastic wrap around their doors and windows for insulation.

Radio Free Asia reported in December that "large numbers" of people in the country had gone missing late last year during another extremely cold spell - many are thought to have either starved or frozen to death, as the mercury dipped below freezing and food became scarce.

Food insecurity in North Korea is said to be at its worst since a widespread famine in the 1990s, according to Lucas Rengifo-Keller, a research analyst at Peterson Institute for International Economics in the US.

In 2019, North Korea said it was suffering its worst drought in nearly four decades. This comes after the UN said that up to 10 million North Koreans were "in urgent need of food assistance", reporting that the people had been surviving on just 300g (10.5 oz) of food a day that year.

In 2020, North Korea was struck by five major typhoons, which caused major structural damage to buildings, roads, factories and water systems and displaced thousands of citizens.

Scientists say extreme weather, including cold waves, is becoming more common because of climate change.

Tuesday's cold wave alerts come as Pyongyang prepares to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army next week.

U.S. may appoint special envoy solely dedicated to N. Korea if dialogue resumes: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 25, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 (Yonhap) -- The United States may consider appointing a special envoy solely dedicated to issues related to North Korea should there be active dialogue with the reclusive country, a state department spokesperson said Tuesday.

The department spokesperson, Ned Price, also underscored Pyongyang continued disregard for U.S. overtures as a reason for Sung Kim concurrently serving as special envoy for North Korea and U.S. ambassador to Indonesia.

"If we are to arrive at a position where it does make sense to have an individual singularly focused as special envoy for the DPRK, we can cross that bridge. But right now Sung Kim has been doing a really tremendous job as our ambassador and as a special envoy," Price said when asked if the U.S. would consider appointing a special envoy solely dedicated to North Korea issues.

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

Department of State Press Secretary Ned Price is seen speaking during a daily press briefing at the department in Washington on Jan. 24, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)

Price blamed the current lack of North Korea's interest in dialogue for Kim having to serve two positions.

"There's a very practical issue at play. We have made very clear that we seek to engage directly with the DPRK and see if we can arrive at practical, pragmatic steps we can take towards what is our ultimate objective, which complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," he told the press briefing, adding the North has shown no interest in engaging in dialogue so far.

"So it may be a different story were there active diplomacy ongoing with the DPRK, were there active dialogue ongoing. In the absence of that, Sung Kim has been very focused on working with our Japanese allies, our South Korean allies, other allies in the Indo Pacific, other allies and partners around the world," he added.

President Joe Biden recently nominated a state department official, Julie Turner, to serve as special envoy for North Korean human rights, a post that has been vacant for over six years since January 2017.

The state department spokesperson noted there were "few people" with the experience and knowledge that Julie would bring to the post if appointed.

However, Price insisted the department has worked tirelessly to help improve human rights conditions in North Korea and elsewhere.

"Even as this position has been vacant, and of course, it is a position that wasn't filled by the previous administration so it's been some time since we've had Senate confirmed individual in this position, state department officials at all levels from the secretary on down have been actively engaged on issues of human rights," he said.

"This administration, as you know, is committed to placing human rights at the center of our foreign policy. And for decades, the United States has championed efforts to improve respect for human rights and indignity of North Koreans and will continue to promote accountability for the DPRK government, for its egregious human rights record," added Price.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

Biden nominates new special envoy for N. Korean human rights

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 25, 2023

5. Chinese hackers attack 12 S. Korean academic institutions: KISA

(2nd LD) Chinese hackers attack 12 S. Korean academic institutions: KISA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 우재연 · January 25, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS more details throughout)

SEOUL, Jan. 25 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's internet safety watchdog said Wednesday a Chinese hacking group has launched a cyberattack against 12 South Korean academic institutions but it did not cause serious damage.

The Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) said the attackers hacked into the websites of 12 institutions Sunday, which included some departments of Jeju University and the Korea National University of Education.

Most of the 12 websites, including that of the Korea Research Institute for Construction Policy, had still been unavailable for access as of 2 p.m. Wednesday.

An official at the Ministry of Science and ICT told Yonhap News Agency the attacked institutions had a lack of cyber security and that the attack did not seem to cause a serious breach of personal data.

KISA said the Chinese hacking group had warned of a cyberattack against multiple S. Korean agencies, including KISA.

But the internet watchdog's site was not affected, it said.

The Chinese hacking group, identifying itself as the Cyber Security Team, claimed it had successfully compromised the computer networks of 70 South Korean educational institutions around the Lunar New Year holiday that ran from Saturday to Tuesday.

The group also warned that it will disclose 54 gigabytes of data it claimed to have stolen from South Korea's government and public institutions.

The science ministry asked government agencies and individuals to stay vigilant against rising hacking threats.

Science Minister Lee Jong-ho visited the Korea Internet Security Center the previous day to check on the security posture against possible cyberattacks.

The ministry said it was thoroughly monitoring the group's activities to detect further possible attacks.

Youtube

https://youtu.be/AX1JSmEtrVA

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 우재연 · January 25, 2023

6. Military blames 'insufficient' threat perception, equipment, training for failure to shoot down N.K. drones

I want to know if the "threat perception" was hindered due to the Comprehensive Military Agreement. As part of the agreement no fly zones were established (about the DMZ- 20 KM in the west and 40 KM in the east. Did this create a sense of complacency among military units since they assumed the agreement would be honored. If so I will say again that the security of South Korea is not enhanced by a piece of paper and in this case security was actually weakened because of that paper.

Excerpts:

In its briefing, the JCS said that the military's perception of threat over small North Korean drones was "somewhat insufficient" due to its focus on threats from the North's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, according to the sources.

It also pointed out that an anti-drone operational system, called "Durumi," exposed operational "limits" as it does not necessitate the simultaneous mobilization of both monitoring and strike assets in consideration of hostile drones' flight speeds and other features.

Other contributing factors included insufficiencies in information-sharing and communication among relevant military units, the absence of "realistic" training against drone infiltrations and a lack of effective detection and interception equipment.

Military blames 'insufficient' threat perception, equipment, training for failure to shoot down N.K. drones | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · January 25, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 25 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean military has cited "insufficiencies" in its threat perception, internal information-sharing, equipment and training for its botched operation to shoot down North Korean drones last month, informed sources said Wednesday.

Ahead of the National Assembly's full defense committee session set for Thursday, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) briefed its lawmakers on the outcome of its weekslong inspection of the operation against the five North Korean drones that violated the South's airspace on Dec. 26.

The JCS admitted to a lack of readiness against North Korean drone infiltrations, but made no mention of the need to hold anyone responsible for the failure to bring down the drones, including one that flew close to the office of President Yoon Suk Yeol in Seoul.

In its briefing, the JCS said that the military's perception of threat over small North Korean drones was "somewhat insufficient" due to its focus on threats from the North's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, according to the sources.

It also pointed out that an anti-drone operational system, called "Durumi," exposed operational "limits" as it does not necessitate the simultaneous mobilization of both monitoring and strike assets in consideration of hostile drones' flight speeds and other features.

Other contributing factors included insufficiencies in information-sharing and communication among relevant military units, the absence of "realistic" training against drone infiltrations and a lack of effective detection and interception equipment.

Based on the inspection results, the JCS outlined a series of counter-drone plans, including establishing an operational system suited to counter small drone infiltrations, holding quarterly "realistic" air defense drills and swiftly securing non-kinetic strike capabilities.

Despite the failure to intercept the North's drones, the JCS did not mention any disciplinary measures against those responsible for it.

"As the inspection is not over yet, we are not at the stage to mention a disciplinary step if any," a military official said on condition of anonymity.

This file photo shows a North Korean drone discovered in a mountainous area in the northeastern county of Inje in 2017. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · January 25, 2023

7. N.K. propaganda outlet slams S. Korea's plan to hold defense meeting with UNC members

The ROK is sustaining the international coalition to defend the freedom of South Korea. This is why we ensure that UN Security Council Resolutions 82 through 85 remain in effect.

N.K. propaganda outlet slams S. Korea's plan to hold defense meeting with UNC members | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · January 25, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 25 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean propaganda outlet on Wednesday denounced South Korea's plan to hold a defense ministerial meeting with members of the U.S.-led U.N. Command (UNC), accusing it as an attempt to wipe out Pyongyang.

Uriminzokkiri took issue with Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup's remarks earlier this month that Seoul and Washington will host the meeting later this year to mark the 70th anniversary of the establishment of their alliance, during his report to President Yoon Suk Yeol on major policy tasks.

"This is yet another serious provocative act that openly declares it will crush our republic with force even by bringing back the U.S.-led multinational forces in case of emergency," it said.

The outlet also accused the UNC as a "tool of war" for Washington disguised under the United Nations, claiming it seeks to help the United States unfold its Indo-Pacific strategy.

"The Yoon Suk Yeol gang of mobsters saying it will renew the function and role of the UNC is like volunteering to act as cannon fodders and troopers of the Indo-Pacific strategy," the outlet added.

South Korea and the U.S. have been discussing the "updating" of cooperation mechanisms within the UNC, launched soon after the 1950-53 Korean War, so as to ensure its relevance with the present time, according to Seoul officials. They plan to wrap up the updating process this year.

Youtube

https://youtu.be/gofLVnztt-g

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup speaks during a briefing at the government complex in Seoul on Jan. 11, 2023, in this Associated Press photo. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · January 25, 2023

8. 9 N. Korean workers in Russia defected to S. Korea last year: professor

9 N. Korean workers in Russia defected to S. Korea last year: professor | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · January 25, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 25 (Yonhap) -- Nine North Korean workers dispatched to Russia for dollar earnings defected to South Korea late last year amid Moscow's protracted war with Ukraine, according to a professor in the South on Wednesday.

The North Koreans, all men aged between 20s and 50s, came to the South in December 2022 and have been receiving education at the state-run resettlement center for the North's defectors, according to Kang Dong-wan, professor at Dong-A University.

"The outbreak of Russia's war with Ukraine caused a stir (among the North's workers) and prompted them to decide to go to the South," Kang said of their motive for defection.

The professor said two of them were soldiers in their 20s, and others included longtime loggers aged between 40s and 50s, adding they were not acquainted with each other, as they have different social backgrounds.

U.S.-based media outlet Radio Free Asia (RFA) earlier reported North Korean workers in Russia are trying to flee on concerns that they could be forcibly sent to Russian-occupied east Ukraine.

Seoul's unification ministry handling inter-Korean affairs said the government cannot confirm whether the North's workers in Russia defected to the South.

"We cannot confirm issues related to North Korean defectors due to safety concerns," a ministry official said.

This undated file photo, provided by Kang Dong-wan, professor at Dong-A University, and carried in his book, shows North Korean workers at a construction site in Russia. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · January 25, 2023

9. U.S. closely monitoring N. Korea for possible nuclear test: Pentagon

One question is if there is a test what effect (beyond testing to advance their program) does the regime seek to achieve? The test could only be necessary to move the program forward; however, if it is intended to send a message, what is the message, and what does the regime seek to achieve with that message? We must recognize that message, understand it, expose it, and attack it with a superior political warfare strategy.

U.S. closely monitoring N. Korea for possible nuclear test: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 25, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 (Yonhap) -- The United States continues to closely monitor North Korea for a possible nuclear test, a Pentagon spokesperson said Tuesday.

The spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, said the U.S. is also working closely with its allies in preparation for a potential nuclear test.

"You have heard us say before that we do remain concerned that North Korea is prepared to conduct a seventh nuclear test," the Pentagon spokesperson told a daily press briefing.

"It would certainly be a destabilizing action in the region, and so it's something that we continue to keep a close eye on," Ryder added.

North Korea conducted its sixth and last nuclear test in September 2017. However, officials in Seoul and Washington have said that Pyongyang may conduct a nuclear test "at any time," adding it appears to have completed all preparations for a test.

"We will work closely with our partners and our allies in the region to be prepared in that eventuality," Ryder said when asked about U.S. countermeasures in response to a North Korean nuclear test.

Youtube

https://youtu.be/aHh_Kdq3dkg

Department of Defense spokesperson Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder is seen answering a question during a daily press briefing at the Pentagon in Washington on Jan. 24, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · January 25, 2023

10. South Korea, U.S. discussing redeployment of tactical nukes on peninsula

As I have previously mentioned, I think the recent remarks from President Yoon about the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons may be a coordinated effort to lay the ground work for the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons.

Wednesday

January 25, 2023

dictionary + A - A

South Korea, U.S. discussing redeployment of tactical nukes on peninsula

Bruce Klingner [HERITAGE FOUNDATION]

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/25/national/defense/Korea-South-Korea-North-Korea/20230125181728396.html

South Korea and the United States are discussing the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, according to a former U.S. intelligence official.

Speaking at an online conference titled “Confronting Growing Threats from North Korea,” held by the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) on Monday, Heritage Foundation senior research fellow and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official Bruce Klingner said top officials from Washington and Seoul are discussing three options for dealing with the escalating North Korean military threat, one of which is the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the South.

The other two options are a nuclear weapons sharing arrangement between the allies and Seoul’s development of its own independent nuclear deterrent, according to Klingner.

The conference was also attended by Anthony Ruggiero, the senior director of the nonproliferation and biodefense program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

In his remarks, Klingner noted that he heard many high-ranking South Korean officials and experts express doubt about Washington’s extended deterrence commitment to Seoul, adding that this doubt appeared to be the “dominant” opinion among South Koreans.

Although Klingner noted that U.S. officials have been proactive in their attempts to assuage South Korean concerns about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, he also said alternative options for strengthening Seoul's defense was being discussed at “very senior levels” of both governments.

Klingner expressed his personal opposition to the idea of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, saying their placement in the South would degrade U.S. strike capabilities.

Both Klingner and Ruggiero also expressed concern that the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden is currently neglecting the North Korean nuclear issue and urged Washington to apply stronger pressure on the North Korea.

Klingner also argued that the Biden administration should not offer incentives to bring North Korea back to the dialogue table or settle for nuclear disarmament that does not entail the regime’s complete denuclearization.

Ruggiero, who served as the White House National Security Council director for North Korea under Donald Trump, argued that the Biden administration should bolster both U.S. sanctions against Pyongyang while strengthening its deterrence posture.

Ruggiero claimed that North Korea is able to continue developing nuclear weapons and cooperate with Russia and Iran because it faces no new pressure from sanctions.

He argued that the Biden administration should strengthen enforcement of existing sanctions to induce the North to return to talks, adding that North Korea should also be prevented from dispatching workers to China and the regime’s coal exports should be completely cut off.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

11. 'Respiratory illness' prompts lockdown of N. Korean capital

WIll this outbreak be the one that cannot be contained and then lead to catastrophic effects for the regime?

Wednesday

January 25, 2023

dictionary + A - A

'Respiratory illness' prompts lockdown of N. Korean capital

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/25/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-lockdown/20230125183628523.html

A military parade takes place in Pyongyang on April 25, when the regime displayed a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile. The North reported its first suspected major outbreak of Covid-19 shortly thereafter. [YONHAP]

Pyongyang entered a five-day lockdown on Wednesday to combat a rise in cases of respiratory illness, according to an official North Korean government notice seen by NK News.

Although the government notice mentioned several illnesses spreading in Pyongyang, including the common cold, it did not mention Covid-19.

During its last mass outbreak of Covid-19, which began at the end of April and was declared over in August, the regime’s quarantine authorities only reported cases of people presenting fever symptoms.

According to the new notice, residents of the North Korean capital must stay inside their homes until the end of the weekend and undergo temperature checks several times per day.

NK News reported Tuesday that Pyongyang residents were stockpiling goods in anticipation of the lockdown announcement.

It remains unclear what effect the lockdown will have on a major military parade scheduled for Feb. 8 to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the North’s armed forces.

Satellite images in recent weeks have captured tens of thousands of civilians and soldiers practicing propaganda display formations at Mirim Parade Training Ground outside Pyongyang in preparation for the parade.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

12. U.S. military presence in South Korea does not bother North: Pompeo

Yes, and his father Kim Jong Il allegedly made similar comments. This is something some people want to hear and believe. But in reality north Korea is a master of denial and deception and we should take these comments with a grain of salt and rather than believe the words, assess the actions. Understand the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategy and the nature, strategy, and objectives of the regime.

Wednesday

January 25, 2023

dictionary + A - A

U.S. military presence in South Korea does not bother North: Pompeo

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/25/national/northKorea/north-korea-pompeo-china/20230125095052852.html

Then U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, left, shaking hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during their meeting in Pyongyang on Oct. 7, 2018. [KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY]

North Korea and its leader Kim Jong-un are not bothered at all by the U.S. military presence in South Korea, former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued in a memoir published Tuesday.

They rather consider U.S. troops in South Korea as a protection against Chinese dominance, according to Pompeo.

Pompeo said the North Korean leader had raised the issue of U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises during their first meeting in Pyongyang.

"I insinuated that he was a little hypocritical to get worked up about them, given how his planes and rockets could within minutes, or perhaps seconds, lay waste to the city of Seoul, South Korea, a city of ten million people and only a few dozen kilometers from the demilitarized zone [DMZ]," he wrote.

Pompeo frequented the reclusive country during the height of U.S.-North Korea summitry that led to three historic meetings between then U.S. President Donald Trump and the North Korean leader in 2018 and 2019. The U.S. has some 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea.

Pompeo said he had also told Kim that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had "consistently told the United States that American forces leaving South Korea would make Chairman Kim happy."

"At this, Kim laughed and pounded on the table in sheer joy, exclaiming that the Chinese were liars," wrote Pompeo.

"He [Kim] said that he needed the Americans in South Korea to protect him from the CCP, and that the CCP needs the Americans out so they can treat the peninsula like Tibet and Xinjiang," he added.

Pompeo also offered to U.S. policymakers: "expanding U.S. missile and ground capabilities on the Korean Peninsula won't bother the North Koreans at all."

The former state secretary said Kim had made three commitments during his short visit to Pyongyang.

"He committed to completely getting rid of his nuclear weapons, saying they were a massive economic burden and made his nation a pariah in the eyes of the world," said Pompeo.

"He further committed to putting a moratorium on his nuclear and missile development programs. He also committed to meeting with President Trump," he added.

Kim and Trump held the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore in June 2018, two months after Pyongyang declared a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests.

The second Trump-Kim summit, held in Vietnam in February 2019, ended without a deal. The two met again briefly inside the DMZ during Trump's trip to Seoul in June 2019, but the meeting again ended without any progress.

North Korea ended its self-imposed moratorium on weapons testing last year, firing 69 ballistic missiles, including eight intercontinental ballistic missiles, replacing its previous record of 25 ballistic missiles launched in one year.

Yonhap

13. Iran pressures Seoul over frozen assets in Korean banks

Wednesday

January 25, 2023

dictionary + A - A

Iran pressures Seoul over frozen assets in Korean banks

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/01/25/national/diplomacy/korea-iran-frozen-assets/20230125183633670.html

Nasser Kanaani, spokesman of the Iranian foreign ministry. [IRAN GOVERNMENT WEBSITE]

The Iranian foreign ministry released another statement pressuring Korea on the years-long dispute surrounding frozen Iranian assets in Korea.

“Iran’s financial demands from South Korea are the legal right of the Iranian nation, and the Korean government is responsible to pay the legal rights of the Iranian nation without any conditions and within the framework of bilateral relations,” said the Iranian foreign ministry in a statement released Monday.

It was the latest statement released by the Iranian foreign ministry regarding Korea since President Yoon Suk Yeol sparked controversy with comments about Iran during a visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) earlier this month.

Speaking to the UAE-based Akh unit of the Korean military on Jan. 15, Yoon told troops, "The UAE's enemy and biggest threat is Iran, while ours is North Korea."

In its first statement following the incident, the Iranian foreign ministry focused its criticism on Yoon’s comments, but it has since taken actions to draw Korea’s attention to the frozen Iranian assets.

Despite the Korean government’s explanations, the Iranian government summoned the Korean ambassador in Tehran on Jan. 18 to lodge a complaint on Korea’s “failure” to resolve issues regarding frozen Iranian assets in Korean banks.

“The cooperation of the Korean government in this regard was not satisfactory,” the ministry said in its statement on Monday.

Bilateral relations between Seoul and Tehran have frayed in recent years due to Iranian money frozen in two Korean banks.

Some $7 billion in Iranian assets have been frozen at the Industrial Bank of Korea and Woori Bank since September 2019, when U.S. sanction waivers for Korea's imports of Iranian oil expired.

Some experts said recent responses from Iran were predictable given how the country has responded to the frozen asset issue for years.

“Iran played the same card when a Korean tanker and its crew were seized near the Strait of Hormuz" by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in January 2021, said Paik Seung-hoon, researcher at the Institute for Middle Eastern Studies of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

“From the Iranian government’s perspective, it could make sense to make a strong statement on the issue with Korea now, so that it can have a better diplomatic leverage later if and when negotiations take place on the frozen assets.”

The Korean Foreign Ministry said last week it has addressed Iran’s concerns through diplomatic channels.

“The frozen assets issue cannot be solved at the level of our government, because it has to do with the sanctions against Iran,” a Foreign Ministry official told reporters in Seoul on Jan. 19.

U.S. sanctions on Iran were reimposed after former President Donald Trump in 2018 withdrew from a landmark 2015 nuclear accord with Iran, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The Iranian foreign ministry criticized the United States and European Union in its statement on Monday as well, calling for “practical action of the western members of the JCPOA.”

It also called recent U.S. government comments regarding ongoing protests in Iran “hostile.”

Demonstrations and protests have erupted throughout Iran since last September, sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman who was arrested for allegedly not wearing a hijab in accordance with Iranian law.

Thousands of people have since taken to the streets to protest against the government of Iran.

In response to the Iranian foreign ministry’s summoning of its ambassador in Tehran, the Korean government summoned the Iranian ambassador in Seoul on Jan. 19.

The Foreign Ministry last summoned the ambassador of Iran in Seoul after the 2021 tanker seizure.

BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]

14. UNC concludes both Koreas breached armistice by flying drones in each other's territory: source

Yes, there is likely to be some friction.

UNC concludes both Koreas breached armistice by flying drones in each other's territory: source | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · January 25, 2023

SEOUL, Jan. 25 (Yonhap) -- The U.S.-led U.N. Command (UNC) has concluded both South and North Korea violated the armistice by sending drones into each other's territory last month, an informed source said Wednesday.

The UNC recently reached the conclusion after its special team investigated the North's Dec. 26 drone infiltrations, which led the South to send its drones into the North in a "corresponding" step.

UNC Commander Gen. Paul LaCamera has been briefed on the investigation outcome, the source told Yonhap News Agency, requesting anonymity.

LaCamera, who also heads the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the U.S. Forces Korea, is said to have been pondering whether to disclose the outcome amid concerns that it could risk friction with the Seoul government.

Seoul's defense ministry defended its sending of the drones into the North's territory as the exercise of its right to "self-defense," stressing the right is not restricted by the armistice.

Yonhap News Agency has requested official comment from the UNC on the issue, but it was not immediately available.

The UNC is an enforcer of the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War.

This undated file photo shows a North Korean drone that was found in Inje County, Gangwon Province, in 2017. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · January 25, 2023

15. Growing China dilemma (for South Korea)

Excerpts:

Korea needs two things to back it up: maintain the principle of adhering to justifiable causes, be it global peace, free trade or climate change. It must also nurture economic and technological capabilities to back up such principles.

Regrettably, the Yoon Suk Yeol government has yet to unveil much regarding its China or global strategy for the, long or short term

Growing China dilemma

The Korea Times · January 25, 2023

Long-term strategy needed to reshape bilateral ties

During the Lunar New Year holiday, an "incident" spoke much about the current relationship between Korea and China.

Last Friday, the British Museum held an event to introduce Korea's traditional music and dance. It then posted an article titled "Celebrating Seollal" on Twitter, explaining the day as the "Korean Lunar New Year." Many Chinese users attacked it, saying, "A renowned museum helped Korea steal the Chinese culture." The museum yielded, changing the words to "Chinese Lunar New Year" immediately.

Other East Asian countries than China celebrate the Lunar New Year, like Korea, Vietnam and Malaysia. The British institution did nothing wrong calling Seollal the Korean Lunar New Year, as it differed from China's "Chunjie," or Spring Festival. But this could not have worked for nationalistic Chinese.

Foreigners, including Koreans, acknowledge China is a big country. If China wants to become a great and respected country, it must also respect other countries, large or small. Some Chinese people appear unwilling or unable to do so.

Koreans do not deny the influence of China and its culture, including Chinese characters and Confucianism. But Koreans will not accept their fermented vegetable dish or traditional dress also being called Chinese.

The two countries squabble increasingly frequently over culture and history because they are more similar than different. But they are getting further away from each other, especially if the mutual animosity of the younger generation is any indicator. Repeated surveys show China is the least-liked country among the Korean MZ generation, more disliked than Japan, Russia and North Korea.

One reason is these youngsters had grown when their countries grew stronger.

China has become the world's second-largest economy over the past few decades. Korea also became a country with high income and pop culture enjoying global popularity. The mutual estrangement in the younger generation is not beneficial to each other, particularly for China, which seeks to become the global leader. The establishments should educate their youngsters to understand each other better.

Not least because things are changing rapidly for both countries.

For China, 2022 was not a very good year. China's economic growth remained at its lowest since the Cultural Revolution in 1976. Its population also fell for the first time in 61 years. At this rate, China will likely enter a superaged society (with people 65 or older accounting for 20 percent of the population) in the early 2030s, with the economy growing below 5 percent. That is a wake-up call for Korean officials used to "high-flying China" as a constant in making economic policies.

Korea still ships out a quarter of its export products to China, larger than the shipments to the U.S. and Japan combined. China is also the biggest supplier of about 8,000 items Korea needs most. If China's economic growth drops by 1 percentage point, Korea's growth also falls by 0.15 percentage points. All this shows the urgent need for Korea to diversify its export markets to India, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe. No countries should be excluded. Terming a middle power like Iran as a virtual enemy certainly does not help. Tehran still wants an explanation from the one who made the remark.

It will become increasingly difficult for Korea to chart its diplomatic courses between the U.S. and China. However, one thing is sure: the Korea-China relationship must not become subordinated to the Korea-U.S. or even the U.S.-China relationship. Korea must have a long-term strategy to maximize its national interests in relationships with the two superpowers, not leaning to one side.

Korea needs two things to back it up: maintain the principle of adhering to justifiable causes, be it global peace, free trade or climate change. It must also nurture economic and technological capabilities to back up such principles.

Regrettably, the Yoon Suk Yeol government has yet to unveil much regarding its China or global strategy for the, long or short term.

The Korea Times · January 25, 2023

16. Arms control talks likely to hurt alliance between Seoul and Washington

Don't do it. Arms control negotiations with north Korea will not succeed and will reinforce Kim's belief that his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies are working.

Arms control talks likely to hurt alliance between Seoul and Washington

The Korea Times · January 25, 2023

gettyimagesbank

By Kang Seung-woo

Against the backdrop of 38 ballistic missiles launched last year, North Korea has shown its intention not to give up on its nuclear ambitions, raising speculation that nuclear arms control is emerging ― in the United States ― as an alternative method to contain Pyongyang's evolving nuclear program.

However, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a Seoul-based think tank, claims that negotiations with North Korea on nuclear arms control would be the starting point from which the South Korea-U.S. alliance could begin to fragment.

An arms control deal would mean curbing North Korea's nuclear development and avoiding the use of its existing weapons, but there are lingering concerns that, should the U.S. reach such a deal with the North, it would formally recognize the Stalinist state as a nuclear power ― a status the country has been aggressively seeking.

"Negotiations on arms control between the U.S. and North Korea will open a Pandora's box that could break the alliance and that is what North Korea is aiming for," its latest report said, Wednesday.

"North Korea has so far insisted on halting the South Korea-U.S. combined military exercises, the deployment of U.S. strategic assets and withdrawing U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula as prerequisites for denuclearization, which have played a role in deterring North Korean provocations. However, with the beginning of arms control talks, it will ultimately seek to dismantle the ROK-U.S. alliance."

The ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, the official name of South Korea.

The report also said that the arms control talks are likely to spark questions among American citizens on why Washington is keeping the alliance with South Korea and keeping U.S. Forces Korea on the peninsula, with threats from North Korea decreasing.

The Asan report came as the U.S. government, seemingly, hasn't ruled out the possibility of engaging in arms control talks with the Kim Jong-un regime.

"If they would have a conversation with us … arms control can always be an option if you have two willing countries willing to sit down at the table and talk," Bonnie Jenkins, State Department undersecretary for arms control, said last October.

In addition, experts, who advocate for the non-proliferation of North Korean nuclear weapons, claim that the international community should admit that North Korea has secured nuclear capabilities and that arms control negotiations are necessary in order to prevent its nuclear and missile programs from advancing further.

Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear non-proliferation expert at Middlebury Institute, said in his New York Times op-ed in October that it is time to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power.

However, the Asan report says that arms control talks are against the U.S. national interests because that is an idea that China and Russia, the two main foes of Washington, are supportive of.

"As for China and Russia, the breakup of the South Korea-U.S. alliance would undermine the U.S.' global leadership and make it lose its presence in Northeast Asia," it said.

In addition, the arms control talks are likely to result in shaking the international non-proliferation regime that the U.S. has consistently tried to maintain since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970.

"Arms control negotiations cannot prevent North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations," the report said.

"North Korea will interpret the U.S.' willingness toward arms control talks as the success of its tactics and further modernize its nuclear and missile programs before the negotiations. Eventually, the arms control talks will promote North Korea's provocations."

Amid concerns that North Korea succeeds in its seventh nuclear test and test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile, this would back up the argument for arms control talks. The think tank advised government and private groups to seek countermeasures.

"The government should ask the U.S. to establish a clear position related to arms control negotiations, while private and academic groups should actively point out the logical contradiction," it added.

The Korea Times · January 25, 2023

17. US-South Korea alliance needs urgent repair

Quite the hyperbolic headline.

Yes the IRA is a self inflicted wound and a mistake. But the alliance is not in need of "urgent repair." The alliance is in very good shape overall because the efforts of Korea and US officials at levels and across all the instruments of power.

US-South Korea alliance needs urgent repair

Biden administration has alienated an indispensable and reliable military alliance partner with its protectionist economic policies

asiatimes.com · by Mason Richey and Robert York · January 25, 2023

Two critical issues have been increasingly affecting the situation between Washington and Seoul, whose frequent invocations of rock-solid alliance cooperation belie unease about crucial areas of partnership

First, South Korea desires ever more alliance-partner defense and security reassurance from the US in the face of a growing North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese revisionism. Yet the US has downward-trending limits on credible reassurance, as North Korea masters nuclear weapons technology that threatens US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea.

The US also faces less geopolitical pressure to effusively reassure its Indo-Pacific allies – including South Korea – as China grows to menace the regional order and the US consequently faces lower risks of ally hedging or realignment.

Second, in part to compete with China by partially decoupling from it, over the last decade US economic statecraft – globally and regionally in the Indo-Pacific – has solidified a dramatic deglobalization shift that demands disruptive geo-economic bandwagoning by allies (such as South Korea) while giving little in return.

Washington’s weak-sauce Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and its dismissive attitude to Seoul regarding the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) are potent symbols of this.

Thus, although the US and South Korea remain allies and partners with shared values and deep incentives and path dependence for cooperation, there are real, substantive, vigorously roiling challenges to the relationship that cannot be successfully met with traditional “ironclad,” “linchpin” shibboleths.

The lead issue for the US-South Korea alliance is typically North Korea, notably as concerns defense and security. This makes sense, as the US-South Korea alliance primarily exists to defend South Korea from North Korean attack and thus provide for stability in Northeast Asia, which is also valuable for the US.

People watch a television broadcast showing footage of a North Korean missile test at a railway station in Seoul on September 28, 2021. Chun Su-jun hopes to pain a more nuanced picture of what is often seen as a rogue regime and garrison state. Photo: AFP / Jung Yeon-je

Over time, of course, Washington-Seoul relations have grown into a comprehensive strategic partnership that includes the military alliance, tight economic/trade relations, shared political values, and cooperation in the maintenance of the post-WWII rules-based international order.

And therein lies the rub at present: the US remains an indispensable, formidable and reliable military alliance partner for South Korea, but is also conducting economic statecraft both globally and in the Indo-Pacific seemingly detrimental to and dismissive of South Korean economic interests, not to mention broadly out of step with trade rules anchored in international law.

The principal proximate problem in US-South Korea trade relations is the IRA, US economic legislation from August 2022 that provides discriminatory subsidies for electric vehicles (EV) in order to incentivize production in the US.

Among others, this part of the IRA – which is generally considered against WTO rules and violates the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement – will hurt South Korean auto manufacturers Hyundai and Kia, as well as Korean suppliers downstream of them. South Korean officials have referred to the subsidies as a “betrayal.”

The issue has taken up a lot of time and energy for alliance managers. The Yoon administration has at points dispatched its trade minister, foreign minister, prime minister and sundry other senior officials to discuss the issue with the US trade representative, commerce secretary, secretary of state, deputy secretary of state, national security advisor and members of Congress.

Meetings have been held bilaterally in Washington and Seoul, as well as on the sidelines of multi-lateral diplomatic gatherings such as the G20, the UN General Assembly and APEC.

President Yoon has personally discussed the issue with President Biden. South Korea is considering bringing the matter before the WTO if it is not satisfactorily remedied, and has been in consultations with other aggrieved US trade partners (notably the EU and Japan) on how to proceed in pressuring the US to alter the IRA.

For its part, the Biden administration has been reluctant to admit that the IRA represents a problem for South Korea. Instead, it has proffered typical bromides that acknowledge notice of Seoul’s concerns while also downplaying them and minimizing the possibility of substantive change to the law – which would have to pass a generally dysfunctional Congress unlikely to treat the specific issue of the IRA as a priority.

The most the Biden administration has offered heretofore is to use executive authority to interpret the law in a way that will allow overseas companies (such as Hyundai and KIA) to qualify for the subsidy for electric vehicles that are sold for commercial purposes (for example, vehicles for the rental car market).

Biden in Yoon exchange views on the sidelines of the UN. Image: Twitter

Washington’s response to Seoul’s objections to the new law has not mollified Seoul. Meanwhile, a weekly – seemingly daily – drumbeat of stories on the topic in South Korean media has exacerbated the negativity and weakened, even if only very moderately, the trust and mutual respect that should underly the alliance.

The IRA is also symbolic of a larger issue in relations between the US and its allies, notably in the Indo-Pacific: lack of US economic statecraft keyed to producing outcomes desired by regional allies and partners.

Under both Trump and Biden, the US has remained allergic to contemplating (re-)joining regional multi-lateral trade deals, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) for one. The Biden administration’s signature regional economic proposal, IPEF, is a largely undeveloped project with unknown staying power.

The only certainty is that the framework does not contain market access provisions – which is the main item that IPEF members, including South Korea, want. The suspicion is that IPEF is largely an exclusive US policy intended as a part of Washington’s strategic competition with Beijing – a dynamic in which many US partners and allies, including South Korea, have extremely limited interest, in part because China is much more present economically in the Indo-Pacific, including in market-access trade deals such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

South Korea signed on to IPEF – as well as to the US-led Chip 4 grouping intended to limit Chinese access to high-end semiconductors – out of alliance obligation more than conviction. Thus, to be rewarded with US protectionism in the IRA and controversial technology export controls has been a bitter pill to swallow, a source of significant alliance friction and another data point for questioning US strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

South Korea released its own long-awaited Indo-Pacific Strategy, which struck a balance between dovetailing with US interests in the region and reassuring China that Seoul remains a partner solicitous of good economic relations with Beijing.

Beyond economics and trade, the more visible challenge for the US-South Korea alliance is the maintenance of effective deterrence and warfighting readiness vis-à-vis North Korea.

Although the Yoon and Biden administrations largely (though not completely) have mended some of the spots that frayed during the Moon and Trump administrations, solidified Washington-Seoul military cooperation now faces increasingly complicated external threats from North Korea.

At root, this is due to Pyongyang’s improving nuclear arsenal, especially its missile capabilities, which were on unprecedentedly frequent display in tests and demonstrations during the fall of 2022.

The Kim regime’s apparent qualitative and quantitative progress on short-, medium-, intermediate- and long-range conventional and nuclear-capable missiles, when added to likely development of tactical nuclear weapons poses a challenge to both US-South Korea conventional deterrence and US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. Much US-South Korea military alliance activity has been dedicated to trying to meet that challenge.

The US and South Korea conducted several combined military exercises focused on the North Korea threat, including Ulchi Freedom Shield; naval exercises (both bilateral and trilateral with Japan) involving the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier strike group; Vigilant Storm air power exercises, (which were prolonged as a response to North Korean missile launches) with more than 240 air assets, including stealth fighters and B1B bombers; and South Korean “Hoguk” drills that included US Forces Korea (USFK) troops.

Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) along with Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) guided-missile destroyer JS Chokai (DDG 176) and Republic of Korea Navy guided-missile destroyer ROKS Sejong The Great (DDG 991) conduct a tri-lateral ballistic missile defense exercise in the Sea of Japan, October 2022. Photo: US Navy

USFK troops also carried out unilateral Teak Knife “surgical strike” training, and there were several trilateral (US-South Korea-Japan) naval exercises covering anti-submarine warfare and combined operations involving the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group.

Yet, despite all the right words and signals of alliance military strength, there remains a nagging sense that deterrence – conventional and extended nuclear – on the Korean Peninsula is fragile and under heightened threat.

This sense is not unreasonable, as North Korea’s quantitatively growing and quantitatively improving nuclear/missile capabilities are matched by Pyongyang’s worrisome nuclear doctrine and posture pronouncements (which countenance pre-emptive nuclear strikes), as well as provocative actions and harassment of South Korean territory, including a missile crossing the de facto North-South maritime border (Northern Limit Line), aircraft sorties approaching South Korean airspace, and drones actually violating South Korean airspace.

The official Washington and Seoul approach to these challenges has mostly been “more of the same, but better”: more and better consultation, more and better exercises, more and better strategic asset deployment, etc. There have been two main exceptions to that.

First, Yoon instigated an alliance communication kerfuffle by insisting in public statements that the US and South Korea would engage in combined “nuclear exercises” in order to solidify extended nuclear deterrence, an assertion leading to minor diplomatic disagreement over several days, including finally a terse rejection of Yoon’s statement by President Biden.

The poor alliance management during the confused spat was bad enough, but the real news is the underlying belief, apparently held by Yoon, that US extended nuclear deterrence is indeed not currently sufficient or credible, and that “more of the same” in US-South Korea military alliance relations is not a viable answer for Seoul.

Second, the one obvious, feasible shift that could in principle rearrange the status quo vis-a-North Korea is improved, scaled-up trilateral defense and security cooperation with Japan, and indeed the US and South Korea are enacting that (or planning on it) in areas such as naval exercises, intelligence sharing, and (potentially) anti-missile defense cooperation.

This would help neutralize some of North Korea’s stratagems, and potentially make a North Korean attack either more costly or less likely to succeed (or both).

It would also be a source of concern (and potentially serious discord) with China. Perhaps that is a feature, not a bug, as Washington has made clear that if Beijing does not help rein in Pyongyang, the US-South Korea-Japan military cooperation that worries China so much could be in the offing.

It is also worth noting that outside officialdom, there has been a growing sense that the fragility of and heightened threats to deterrence on the Korean Peninsula require a new set of answers.

South Korean soldiers in the DMZ. Image: Twitter

A significant part (around 70%) of South Korea’s population, as well as a small number of mainstream think-tank analysts and politicians, are now in favor (in the abstract) of acquiring indigenous nuclear weapons, with support correlating with beliefs that North Korea will not denuclearize and that US extended nuclear deterrence guarantees are insufficiently credible (although national pride and a forward-looking desire to deter China are also factors).

Going in the opposite proliferation direction, there are growing voices arguing for arms control talks with North Korea. Richard Haass, former US State Department policy planning director under President George W Bush and the living embodiment of the Washington foreign policy mainstream, acknowledged that denuclearization was unrealistic and arms control thus advisable.

This perspective also got a small boost from “official Washington” when Bonnie Jenkins, US State Department Undersecretary for Arms Control, made a lengthy public statement positively assessing the possibility of arms control negotiations with North Korea. Jenkins’s remarks were quickly walked back by the Biden administration

In any event, arms control proponents have one thing on their side: the assumption that denuclearization is dead, that the era of long-term extended nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea has arrived (but that deterrence may not hold), and that security dilemma risks will thus grow in the absence of mechanisms to mitigate them.

Summing up as we move into 2023, there appears to be appetite on both sides to continue dialogue over the IRA, especially as South Korea has lent its weight to the Biden administration’s IPEF and Chip 4 Alliance initiatives (nebulous as they are), and support for the alliance remains a matter of mostly bipartisan consensus (for now).

However, if US congressional action is required to address impasses in the alliance, recent events on Capitol Hill suggest that what was once procedurally standard can no longer be taken for granted.

Mason Richey is an associate professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul and a senior contributor at the Asia Society (Korea). Rob York (rob@pacforum.org) is the director for regional affairs at Pacific Forum and editor of Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific.

This is the first of two pieces excerpted from their original article in . It is republished with permission. The second piece, focusing on North Korean weapons tests, is coming tomorrow.

asiatimes.com · by Mason Richey and Robert York · January 25, 2023

18. Veterans ministry unveils emblem for 70th Korean War armistice anniv.

"ALLIAZING"

Please go to the link to view the new emblem. https://koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/01/205_344136.html?utm_source=fl

I think the ROK government must have hired a US public relations and marketing firm to create these graphics as well as symbols for other agencies and actions ("Unification On" or "UniOn" for the Ministry of UNification). I think there is a deliberate attempt to appeal to an English speaking audience. I doubt "ALLIAZING" is a translation of some Korean words))

Veterans ministry unveils emblem for 70th Korean War armistice anniv.

The Korea Times · January 25, 2023

Participants offer flowers during a ceremony to bury the remains of the Netherlands' Mathias Hubertus Hoogenboom and Eduard Julius Engberink, who fought during the Korean War, at the U.N. Memorial Cemetery in South Korea's largest port city of Busan in this Nov. 11, 2022 file photo. YonhapSouth Korea's veterans ministry on Wednesday unveiled an emblem marking the 70th anniversary of the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War.

The emblem is composed of the word "amazing" and the number "70" to highlight the progress the country has made since the armistice was signed in July 1953 by the U.S.-led U.N. Command, North Korea and China, according to the ministry.

The number "70" in the emblem is tilted by 22 degrees to represent the number of countries that participated in the war to support the South, while its red and blue colors are meant to represent the "taegeuk" symbol of South Korea's national flag.

The emblem of the 70th anniversary of the armistice signing of the 1950-53 Korean War is shown in this image provided by the veterans ministry, Jan. 25. Yonhap"(We) will carry out various 70th armistice anniversary projects to instill pride among the people and the 22 countries that took part in the war in the history of success ― the amazing 70 years built by the efforts of the people based on the war veterans' great sacrifices," Veterans Minister Park Min-shik said in a release.

The ministry said it will kick off the events with next month's opening of an online platform of over 5,000 pieces of content on the conflict it curated in collaboration with Google over the past 30 months.

As the Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty, the two Koreans remain technically at war. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · January 25, 2023

19. North Korea's Kim Jong-un described Chinese as liars: Mike Pompeo

There is no love between China and north Korea.

North Korea's Kim Jong-un described Chinese as liars: Mike Pompeo

firstpost.com · by Asian News International · January 25, 2023

In his new memoir titled 'Never Give an Inch, Fighting for the America I Love', the former US Secretary detailed a conversation with the North Korean leader during his first trip to Pyongyang on March 30, 2018, ahead of the US-North Korea summit held three months later

January 25, 2023 13:03:04 IST

Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo

Washington: Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has alleged in his new memoir that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un once told him that he needed the US military in South Korea in order to protect himself from the dominance of China.

In his new memoir titled “Never Give an Inch, Fighting for the America I Love”, the former US Secretary detailed a conversation with the North Korean leader during his first trip to Pyongyang on March 30, 2018, ahead of the US-North Korea summit held three months later.

North Korea and its leader Kim Jong-un are not bothered at all by the US military presence in South Korea, Pompeo said, as reported by The Korea Times.

Pompeo said he told Kim Jong-un that the Chinese Communist Party was repeatedly telling the United States that the North Korean leader wants US Forces Korea (USFK) to withdraw from South Korea. In his response, Kim Jong-un said that the Chinese are liars.

In his memoir which was released on Tuesday, Pompeo said Kim talked about his concerns about China, which is considered as North Korea’s ally. Pompeo said he told Kim that China believes North Korea wants US forces out of South Korea, “Kim laughed and pounded on the table in sheer joy, exclaiming that the Chinese were liars.”

“He (Kim) said that he needed the Americans in South Korea to protect him from the CCP, and that the CCP needs the Americans out so they can treat the peninsula like Tibet and Xinjiang,” Pompeo wrote according to The Korea Times.

Pompeo who was sent by then US President Donald Trump to met Kim Jong-un recounts his his candid conversation with the North Korean leader.

According to Washington Post’s review of Pompeo’s book, the meeting of the former US Secretary began with Kim saying, “‘Mr. Director, I didn’t think you’d show up. I know you’ve been trying to kill me.’ Pompeo says he replied, ‘Mr. Chairman, I’m still trying to kill you.” Smiles all around. The tyrant swore he would give up his nuclear arsenal. Trump believed him. Spoiler alert: Kim was lying.”

Pompeo also notes how India and Pakistan were on the verge of nuclear war in 2018 and that US had to intervene to de-escalate the situation. The former US Secretary of State claimed that the world was not aware about the situation between India and Pakistan. “I do not think the world properly knows just how close the India-Pakistan rivalry came to spilling over into a nuclear conflagration in February 2019,” Pompeo wrote in his memoir.

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Updated Date: January 25, 2023 13:03:04 IST

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20. Robert Einhorn on South Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Development

The issue will likely be resolved when the US re-deploys nuclear weapons. That is what I think these past few weeks have been all about.

Excerpts:

How would a decision by South Korea to pursue its own nuclear weapons impact the ROK-U.S. alliance? And how would such a decision impact other U.S. alliances in the region, particularly with Japan?

South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not necessarily mean the end of the U.S.-Republic of Korea mutual defense treaty. But the nature of the alliance would fundamentally change. The U.S. nuclear umbrella – the commitment to defend South Korea with nuclear weapons if necessary – would either be gone or significantly qualified. The United States presumably could still station military personnel in South Korea, but U.S. support for those deployments could erode. Why, Americans might ask, should the United States bear the costs and risks of keeping troops in the South when Seoul claims to be able to defend itself and no longer has faith in U.S. commitments?

A South Korean decision to acquire nuclear weapons could affect other U.S. alliances in the region. Many experts assume, for example, that if South Korea became a nuclear-armed state, Japan would follow suit, which would fundamentally affect the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Robert Einhorn on South Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Development

“If North Korea’s nuclear threat continues to grow, the answer is not for the United States to support a South Korean nuclear weapons program.”

thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · January 24, 2023

Since South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol took office in May 2022, South Korea has aimed to tackle North Korea’s nuclear programs by strengthening its military alliance with the United States. Denouncing his predecessor’s dovish overtures centered on dialogue on North Korea, Yoon vowed to enhance the country’s defense capabilities to ensure overwhelming superiority in a war scenario.

With the North’s resumption of testing various ballistic missile programs – including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) – South Korea and the U.S. have reinvigorated their joint military drills to effectively respond to the North’s nuclear and missile threats.

Under Seoul’s strong demand to scale up the military drills, Washington has also pledged to utilize the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear assets, under the U.S. extended deterrence to defend Seoul from any nuclear attacks. However, the U.S. extended deterrence appears to have failed to stem South Koreans’ desire to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

According to a survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs released in February 2022, 71 percent of the respondents supported the country obtaining nuclear weapons, regardless of their faith in the South Korea-U.S. alliance. When asked to choose between developing South Korea’s own nuclear weapons and redeploying U.S. nuclear weapons on South Korean soil, 67 percent supported the country’s own nuclear development, while only 4 percent supported the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons.

In other words, after three decades of implementing alternatively dovish and hawkish overtures towards North Korea, most South Koreans now believe possessing nuclear weapons is the most effective means to deter the North’s missile launches.

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Proponents of the idea say it’s the only way to guarantee Seoul’s safety amid North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal; critics counter that it would gut the international non-proliferation regime and deal severe damage to South Korea’s international reputation.

The United States has already made clear that it does not support South Korea’s nuclear development due to its continued emphasis on the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization” (CVID) of the Korean Peninsula. Washington also is not considering redeploying tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula at this stage.

However, Yoon has not excluded the possibility of his country developing its own nuclear weapons, saying that this option can be considered as the North’s nuclear threat grows.

In this context, the possibility of South Korea going nuclear must be taken seriously – and the potential consequences carefully weighed.

For an in-depth look, The Diplomat’s Mitch Shin conducted an exclusive interview with Robert Einhorn, a senior fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Strobe Talbot Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Washington, D.C.-based Brookings Institution.

Einhorn previously served as a special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control in the U.S. Department of State, a position created by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2009. Along with his initiatives focused on nonproliferation, he served as U.S. delegation head in negotiations with South Korea on a successor civil nuclear agreement.

What is the United States’ formal position on the idea of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons?

The United States has long opposed South Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. That remains the U.S. position, although U.S. officials may be reluctant to state that position forcefully and publicly for fear of appearing to pressure a close ally on a matter affecting its vital interests.

The Biden administration recognizes the acute threat to South Korea’s security posed by the rapid growth of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. But it believes the U.S.-South Korean alliance already provides a strong deterrent against North Korean aggression – a deterrent consisting of the allies’ combined conventional military capabilities (including South Korea’s powerful conventional forces) and the U.S. commitment to come to the defense of its ally using the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

Washington believes that a decision by South Korea to acquire its own nuclear weapons could significantly increase tensions in Northeast Asia, lead other countries to acquire nuclear weapons, and weaken the U.S.-South Korea alliance, which would undermine deterrence against the North.

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Is extended deterrence the best policy Washington can implement to defend South Korea from nuclear attacks?

The Biden administration believes the best approach to addressing the North Korean threat is to rely on a combination of the allies’ formidable conventional military capabilities and the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, which includes U.S. submarine-launched and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles as well as dual-capable fighter aircraft and strategic bombers that could be forward deployed in the region when needed.

If North Korea’s nuclear threat continues to grow, the answer is not for the United States to support a South Korean nuclear weapons program. It is to continue strengthening the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.

To what extent can Washington bolster extended deterrence in response to allies’ concerns?

President Biden and South Korean President Yoon have pledged to identify ways of reinforcing extended deterrence. The United States has agreed to increase the frequency and intensity of its rotational deployments to the region of U.S. strategic assets, to conduct high-profile demonstrations of U.S. commitment and resolve such as the participation of U.S. strategic bombers in joint air exercises, and to reactivate a high-level bilateral consultative group to address extended deterrence.

The South Koreans appreciate these steps but would like to see more, in terms of the forward presence of U.S. strategic assets and especially the role South Korea can play in formulating and implementing extended deterrence policies and in influencing crisis decision-making related to the possible use of nuclear weapons. The South Koreans will not get everything they want, but the U.S. government should be more flexible in giving its close ally a greater voice in matters affecting their vital interests.

How would a decision by South Korea to pursue its own nuclear weapons impact the ROK-U.S. alliance? And how would such a decision impact other U.S. alliances in the region, particularly with Japan?

South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not necessarily mean the end of the U.S.-Republic of Korea mutual defense treaty. But the nature of the alliance would fundamentally change. The U.S. nuclear umbrella – the commitment to defend South Korea with nuclear weapons if necessary – would either be gone or significantly qualified. The United States presumably could still station military personnel in South Korea, but U.S. support for those deployments could erode. Why, Americans might ask, should the United States bear the costs and risks of keeping troops in the South when Seoul claims to be able to defend itself and no longer has faith in U.S. commitments?

A South Korean decision to acquire nuclear weapons could affect other U.S. alliances in the region. Many experts assume, for example, that if South Korea became a nuclear-armed state, Japan would follow suit, which would fundamentally affect the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Mitch Shin

Mitch Shin is an assistant editor at The Diplomat and nonresident Korea Foundation fellow at Pacific Forum.

thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · January 24, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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North Korea's Kim Jong-un described Chinese as liars: Mike Pompeo

In his new memoir titled 'Never Give an Inch, Fighting for the America I Love', the former US Secretary detailed a conversation with the North Korean leader during his first trip to Pyongyang on March 30, 2018, ahead of the US-North Korea summit held three months later

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Robert Einhorn on South Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Development

South Korea, U.S. discussing redeployment of tactical nukes on peninsula