Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“As an alternative to combat, which, even if starting off limited, might escalate to something worse, there has been growing interest in nonviolent forms of pressure, such as cyberattacks, information warfare and economic sanctions, separately or in combination. Resort to these methods has become so regular, as the major powers compete for advantage and try to undermine their rivals, that a ‘grey area’ between war and peace has been identified as a busy arena of constant struggle. Here the aim is more disruption than destruction, undermining rather than overthrowing an opponent’s political system by spreading rumours and false news, triggering breakdowns in infrastructure, and adding to economic stress.”

- Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine by Lawrence Freedman

"The happiness of your life depends upon the quality of your thoughts: therefore, guard accordingly, and take care that you entertain no notions unsuitable to virtue and reasonable nature."

- Marcus Aurelius

Many hands make work light; many ideas open the way.

- Hmong proverb

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 19 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (19.09.22) CDS comments on key events

3. State Department watchdog gives failing grade to new counter-disinformation center

4. A 10-point plan to address our information crisis – People vs. Big Tech

5. Are Green Berets Turning Pink? Integrating Women into Special Forces

6. Physics Body Concedes Mistakes in Study of Missile Defense

7. US Soldiers Provide Telemaintenance as Ukrainians MacGyver Their Weapons

8. Putin prepares to step up his war against Ukraine

9. Going Nuclear by Lawrence Freedman

10. Here’s what we know about the state of Russia’s military

11. Ukraine’s Success Shows Mastery of 3 Essential Skills of Modern Warfare

12. China’s ungainly balancing act with Russia

13. Iranian-backed attacks on Albania highlights need for Cyber Capacity Building

14. U.S. frees Taliban narcotics kingpin in exchange for Navy veteran

15. Ukraine’s Counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson and the Road Ahead

16. America’s Education Crisis Is a National Security Threat

17. The Fractured Superpower

18. The SCO’s Clumsy Push to Disrupt the World Order

19. Russia decides to transfer paratroopers from Syria to Ukraine - General Staff

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 19 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19

Key Takeaways

Urgent discussion on September 19 among Russia’s proxies of the need for Russia to immediately annex Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (much of the latter of which are not under Russian control) suggests that Ukraine’s ongoing northern counter-offensive is panicking proxy forces and some Kremlin decision-makers.
Ukrainian counter-offensive successes are degrading morale among Russian units that were regarded as elite prior to the invasion of Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces are likely continuing limited and localized offensive operations across the Oskil River and along the Lyman-Yampil-Bilohorivka line.
Russian forces continued ground attacks south of Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces are continuing to strike Russian military, transportation, and logistics assets in Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity on September 19: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and in northern Kherson Oblast near Olhine.
The size of volunteer units Russia can generate is likely decreasing.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 19

Sep 19, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, Mason Clark, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 19, 9 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Urgent discussion on September 19 among Russia’s proxies of the need for Russia to immediately annex Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (much of the latter of which is not under Russian control) suggests that Ukraine’s ongoing northern counter-offensive is panicking proxy forces and some Kremlin decision-makers. The legislatures of Russia’s proxies in occupied Ukraine, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), each called on their leadership to “immediately” hold a referendum on recognizing the DNR and LNR as Russian subjects.[1] Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan spoke glowingly of the call, referring to it as the “Crimean scenario.” She wrote that by recognizing occupied Ukrainian land as Russian territory, Russia could more easily threaten NATO with retaliatory strikes for Ukrainian counterattacks, “untying Russia’s hands in all respects.”[2]

This approach is incoherent. Russian forces do not control all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Annexing the claimed territories of the DNR and LNR would, therefore, have Russia annex oblasts that would be by Kremlin definition partially ”occupied” by legitimate Ukrainian authorities and advancing Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian strikes into Russian-annexed Crimea clearly demonstrate that Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s illegally annexed territory do not automatically trigger Russian retaliation against NATO, as Simonyan would have her readers believe. Partial annexation at this stage would also place the Kremlin in the strange position of demanding that Ukrainian forces un-occupy “Russian” territory, and the humiliating position of being unable to enforce that demand. It remains very unclear that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be willing to place himself in such a bind for the dubious benefit of making it easier to threaten NATO or Ukraine with escalation he remains highly unlikely to conduct at this stage.

Russian leadership may be running out of ways to try to stop Ukrainian forces as they advance across the Oskil River in Luhansk Oblast. The Kremlin may believe that partial annexation could drive recruitment of additional forces, both from within Russia and from within newly annexed Ukrainian territory. Russian forces are desperately attempting to mobilize additional forces from all potential sources to backfill their heavily degraded and demoralized units but have proven unable to generate significant combat power, as ISW has repeatedly written.[3]

This latest annexation discussion also omits other parts of Russian-occupied southern Ukraine in which the Kremlin was previously planning sham annexation referenda. A willingness to abandon the promise to bring all the occupied areas into Russia at the same time would be a significant retreat for Putin to make in the eyes of the hardline pro-war groups he appears to be courting. It remains to be seen if he is willing to compromise himself internally in such a fashion. The Kremlin’s proxies in Donbas regularly outpace Kremlin messaging, on the other hand, and may have done so again as they scramble to retain their occupied territory in the face of Ukraine’s successful and ongoing counter-offensive.

Recent Ukrainian counter-offensive successes are further reducing the already poor morale among Russian units that had been considered elite before February 24. Independent Belarusian media outlet Vot Tak posted images of intercepted documents left behind by Russian soldiers of Unit 31135 of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division as they fled Izyum en masse.[4] The signed documents (dated to August 30, prior to Ukraine’s counter-offensive in Kharkiv on September 7) include written pleas to commanders of Unit 31135 to dismiss the letters’ authors due to persistent “physical and moral fatigue.”[5] Ukrainian intelligence claimed that 90% of the personnel of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment wrote damning reports on the state of morale as early as May 23, 2022.[6] The 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division is one of three divisions of the 1st Guards Tank Army, which, prior to the current war in Ukraine, was considered Russia’s premier mechanized force and was to be Russia’s key force in a large-scale conventional war with NATO.[7] The intercepted letters indicate pervasive morale issues among Russia’s most elite units and the degradation of Russia’s conventional capabilities against NATO.

Key Takeaways

Urgent discussion on September 19 among Russia’s proxies of the need for Russia to immediately annex Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (much of the latter of which are not under Russian control) suggests that Ukraine’s ongoing northern counter-offensive is panicking proxy forces and some Kremlin decision-makers.
Ukrainian counter-offensive successes are degrading morale among Russian units that were regarded as elite prior to the invasion of Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces are likely continuing limited and localized offensive operations across the Oskil River and along the Lyman-Yampil-Bilohorivka line.
Russian forces continued ground attacks south of Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces are continuing to strike Russian military, transportation, and logistics assets in Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity on September 19: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and in northern Kherson Oblast near Olhine.
The size of volunteer units Russia can generate is likely decreasing.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counter-offensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counter-offensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)

Ukrainian forces likely continued to consolidate their gains on the eastern bank of the Oskil River on September 19. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops destroyed a Ukrainian grouping in Dvorchne, a settlement on the left bank of the Oskil River near the Kharkiv-Luhansk border and approximately 40km south of the Russian border.[8] Another Russian source similarly noted that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian pontoon crossing near Dvorchne and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating in the area.[9] These unconfirmed Russian claims suggest that Ukrainian troops have continued limited and localized operations to cross the Oskil River and threaten Russian positions on the opposing bank. A Russian source additionally noted that Ukrainian troops are strengthening their grouping in Kharkiv Oblast using captured Russian T-72 tanks, suggesting that the initial panic of the counter-offensive led Russian troops to abandon higher-quality equipment in working order, rather than the more damaged equipment left behind by Russian forces retreating from Kyiv in April, further indicating the severity of the Russian rout.[10]

Ukrainian forces likely continued offensive operations along the Lyman-Yampil-Bilohorivka line on September 19. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that fighting is ongoing in Yarova, 20km northwest of Lyman, confirming that Ukrainian troops likely advanced eastward from previously captured positions in Sviatohirsk.[11] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are still in control of Yampil and Lyman, but that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating along the entire Lyman-Yampil-Bilohorivka line.[12] Geolocated combat footage confirms that Ukrainian troops have retaken Bilohorivka, which lies along the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border and within 20km of the Lysychansk-Severodonetsk area.[13]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence regarding the progress of Ukrainian operations in southern Ukraine on September 19, noting Russian forces continued efforts to improve their defensive positions.[14]

Ukrainian sources reported on continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas and lines of communication.[15] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported Ukrainian forces destroyed Russian ammunition depots in Mykolayiv Oblast (likely near frontline positions), two unspecified command posts, and a Russian electronic warfare system in Kherson City.[16] Geolocated social media footage confirmed a Ukrainian missile strike against a Russian barracks in Kherson City on September 18.[17] Odesa Military Administration Spokesman Serhiy Bratchuk reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian ammunition depots in Blahodatne (northwest of Kherson City) and in Kherson City itself on September 18.[18] Satellite imagery and local reporting confirmed continued Russian efforts to repair damage to ground lines of communication (GLOCs) inflicted by Ukrainian strikes. Satellite imagery released on September 19 depicted Russian operations to repair damage to the Nova Kakhovka dam from September 16-18, after Ukrainian strikes partially collapsed the bridge over the dam on September 2.[19]

Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity on September 19: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and in northern Kherson Oblast near Olhine. Russian milbloggers reported that the frontline did not change northwest of Kherson City on September 19, and Ukrainian official sources reported that Ukrainian forces consolidated their tactical positions along the front.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Shchaslyve and Bezimenne (in the Davydiv Brid bridgehead), but ISW cannot verify these reports.[21] A Russian milblogger also claimed that high water levels in the Inhulets River due to Russian strikes on dams upriver are impeding Ukrainian forces' ability to support forward positions.[22] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian reconnaissance groups in the Arkhanhelske (northern Kherson Oblast) region.[23] Geolocated social media footage separately confirmed the presence of Wagner private military company fighters in Arkhanhelske on September 19.[24]

Russian Main Effort- Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks south of Bakhmut on September 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks around Mykolaivka Druha (18km south of Bakhmut), Kurdyumivka (20km southwest of Bakhmut), Zaitseve (12km southeast of Bakhmut), and Vesela Dolyna (8km southeast of Bakhmut).[25] Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group fighters took control of the Donbasskaya 750 electrical substation, about 12km southeast of Bakhmut, although ISW cannot independently verify these claims.[26] Russian forces additionally fired on Ukrainian positions along the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontlines.[27] Several Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops are conducting counter-offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City near the border with eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[28] ISW cannot independently confirm claims of Ukrainian counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast, but growing concern amongst Russian sources regarding Ukrainian actions may prompt Russian forces to reallocate forces to this area.

Supporting Effort- Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast west of Hulyaipole and continued routine shelling against Ukrainian positions on September 19.[29] Ukraine’s Zaporizhia Regional Military Administration reported that Russian forces shelled critical infrastructure and residential areas across the oblast.[30] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Regional State Administration head Oleksandr Starukh reported that Russian S-300 missiles struck a transformer substation and several villages in central Zaporizhia Oblast.[31]

Official Ukrainian forces reported several Russian strikes on Mykolayiv City and the surrounding areas on September 19.[32] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that six S-300 missiles and three Smerch (MLRS) rockets struck industrial and civilian facilities in Mykolayiv City on September 19.[33] Local city authorities reported that the Russian strikes damaged several buildings and a segment of the city tram network.[34]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The effective size of volunteer units Russia can generate is likely decreasing. Republic of North Ossetia-Alania head Sergey Menyaylo announced the formation of a new combined volunteer “detachment” on September 19.[35] Menyaylo said that the detachment will be primarily made up of reservists and combat veterans, that some of the detachment is already in training, and that the detachment will be fully formed by the end of September to deploy to Ukraine. Detachments vary in size but are by definition smaller than the volunteer battalions that Russian regions originally organized. A Russian milblogger separately claimed on September 19 that an unnamed combined company from the Nenets Autonomous Okrug deployed to Donbas after completing training in Murmansk.[36] Russian forces have used steadily smaller echelons as their main tactical units — moving from battalions to companies and in some cases platoons dramatically reducing the combat power the new units bring.

Russian occupation authorities are attempting to mobilize additional forces from Ukrainian civilians in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 19 that Russian forces are failing to mobilize additional forces from occupied Luhansk Oblast and that local occupation officials failed to meet a 500-person quota for mobilization in Severodonetsk to replenish the depleted 2nd Army Corps, the armed forces of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR).[37] The GUR also reported that Russian occupation officials held a meeting in occupied Myrne, Kherson Oblast to discuss mobilizing local Ukrainian men to fight on Russia’s behalf. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on September 19 that occupation authorities rounded up all men under 40 years of age in Portivske, Mariupol Raion for forced mobilization.[38] Portivske is not part of the pre-February 24 borders of the Russian proxy Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and therefore would not have provided DNR units for the invasion. The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that women in Alchevsk, within the pre-February 24 borders of the DNR, rioted and tried to block a busload of mobilized men from leaving the town.

Russian forces are likely funneling low-quality Russian nationals derived from prisons or forced mobilizations into the already low-quality 1st and 2nd Army Corps, which are made of up DNR and LNR proxies respectively. Ukraine’s General Staff reported on September 19 that Russian forces set up a training facility in Torez, (also known as Chystiakove), Donetsk Oblast to train personnel recruited from prisons who will then be deployed to supplement the heavily degraded 1st Army Corps.[39]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Ukrainian partisan activity is likely driving panic among Russian occupation authorities and collaborators. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on September 19 that Ukrainian partisans used an IED to kill collaborationist policeman Denys Stefanok in Melitopol on September 18. Stefankov was reportedly responsible for interrogating Ukrainians and hunting for Ukrainian partisans.[40] Occupation authorities denied reports of his death on September 18.[41] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported on September 19 that Russian forces are increasingly hunting for saboteurs in Berdyansk following an attack that killed two collaborators on September 16.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 19 that Russian collaborators and pro-Russia residents of occupied Bilokorakinskyi and Troitskyi, the two northern raions of Luhansk Oblast that are closest to the Kharkiv border where Ukrainian forces are advancing, are fleeing to Russia. [43]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15798209; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15799709

[4] https://vot-tak dot tv/novosti/16-09-2022-proshu-uvolit-po-prichine-moralnoj-ustalosti-elitnye-rossijskie-voennye-otkazyvayutsya-voevat-v-ukraine/

https://twitter.com/ars_ves/status/1570758916258279424

[5] https://vot-tak dot tv/novosti/16-09-2022-proshu-uvolit-po-prichine-moralnoj-ustalosti-elitnye-rossijskie-voennye-otkazyvayutsya-voevat-v-ukraine/

https://twitter.com/ars_ves/status/1570758916258279424

[11] https://t.me/pushilindenis/2673; https://russian.rt dot com/ussr/news/1050059-pushilin-yarovaya-situaciya

[35] https://www.kavkaz-uzel dot eu/articles/381276/

[37] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-namahaiutsia-mobilizuvaty-cholovikiv-na-zakhoplenykh-terytoriiakh-i-obitsiaiut-turystychni-podorozhi-pensioneram.html

[38] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/09/19/okupanty-naroshhuyut-tempy-mobilizacziyi-na-tot/; https://t.me/andriyshTime/2979

[40] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/09/19/v-melitopoli-likviduvaly-zradnyka-policzejskogo/

[42] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/09/19/rosiyany-pochaly-zlamuvaty-porozhni-kvartyry-v-berdyansku/

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (19.09.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (19.09.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

After midnight on September 19, Russian troops fired a missile at the South Ukrainian nuclear power plant. According to preliminary information, the "Iskander" missile hit 300 meters near the nuclear reactors. The shock wave damaged the NPP buildings, and more than 100 windows were broken. One of the hydraulic units of the Oleksandrivska HPP, which is part of the South Ukrainian energy complex, shut down for a short period. Three high-voltage power lines were also disconnected. Currently, all three power units of the station are operating in regular mode. There are no casualties among the staff.

Russia refuses to release about 50 women from captivity, two of whom were extracted from the Azovstal plant in Mariupol and are currently pregnant, Olena Tolkachova, the head of the patronage service of the "Azov" regiment, told Ukrainiska Pravda. One of the women is about to give birth, and the other is four months pregnant. A total of 2,000 people were extracted from Azovstal, and more than 900 of them were from "Azov". Their whereabouts are not known exactly. Tolkacheva also said that when bodies are exchanged, the Russian side brings bodies of Ukrainian soldiers so badly decomposed that it's sometimes even impossible to get a DNA sample for identification.

Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin told the "Left Bank" publication that five children between the ages of 4 and 16 had been identified as victims of sexual violence committed by the Russian military. Kostin said there are more cases like this; however, identifying and collecting evidence is really hard.

At around 2:30 a.m. on September 19, the Russian forces fired 8 missiles at the city of Zaporizhzhya, Oleksandr Starukh, head of Zaporizhzhya Oblast Military Administration, said. City infrastructure was targeted, according to preliminary information. Another S-300 missile strike was carried out at around 5 a.m. in the morning. One missile hit the Dnipro River bank in the city, and the other one hit a village near the city, injuring a woman.

According to the head of Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration, 6 civilians were injured by landmine explosions in the de-occupied territories during the past day. 2 people hit a mine in a car in Derhachi district, 2 more in Izyum district, and 2 in Chuhuyiv district. All of them were hospitalized with injuries of various severity.

Last night, the Russian forces fired 6 S-300 missiles and 3 Smerch MLRS rockets at Mykolaiv. As a result, several private houses and a warehouse of an industrial enterprise were damaged. Before dawn, the Russian military attacked the Mykolaiv district with two Kh-59 cruise missiles from Su-35 fighter jets. One rocket was destroyed in the air; the second fell into a private garage. There are no casualties, operational command South reported.

According to the Head of Kyiv Oblast Military Administration, Oleksiy Kuleba, 27 out of 117 medical facilities damaged by the Russian military in Kyiv Oblast have already been completely restored. However, work continues on another 41, particularly on the completely destroyed Makariv and Hurivshchyna dispensaries.

On Kremyanets mountain near Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast, the Russian invaders destroyed stone Polovtsian women [monument] dating back to the 9th-13th centuries, the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmytro Lubinets, said.

As of this morning, 2,532 educational institutions in the liberated territories have been damaged, including 287 completely destroyed, Minister of Education and Science Serhiy Shkarlet said.

The number of COVID-19 cases in Ukraine increased to almost 37,000 last week, which is 50% more than was registered a week earlier (24,000 cases), Deputy Minister of Health, Chief State Sanitary Doctor Ihor Kuzin, said. He said there would be no lockdowns, although some quarantine measures could be taken at the regional level.

Occupied territories

Ukrainian OSCE employees Dmytro Shabanov and Maxym Petrov were convicted of "treason" and sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment by the illegal court of the so-called LPR. Shabanov worked as a security assistant at the Stakhanov forward patrol base of the OSCE mission, and Petrov worked as an interpreter. They were detained in the occupied Luhansk Oblast in mid-April. Later, Shabanov was accused of "transferring classified information to representatives of foreign special services." The Russian proxies claim that Shabanov was allegedly recruited by "a resident of the US CIA in Ukraine who worked in the SBU." They also falsely claimed that Shabanov "underwent special training in the USA" and then allegedly collected information about the movement of militants. OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau, and OSCE Secretary General Helga Maria Schmid issued a statement condemning the sentencing of the two Ukrainians as a result of so-called "legal proceedings" and calling for their immediate release.

Representation of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea said that the occupation administration issued a decree to hold so-called class hours in schools covering the following topics: for elementary school students "Heroes of special operations", for students of 5-7 grades "Friends and enemies of the Russian Federation", for students of 8-9 grades - "LPR, DPR, Crimea, Kherson - this is Russia", and for students of 10-11 grades "There is such a profession - to defend the motherland!" The advantages of contract service in the Russian Armed Forces.

Operational situation

It is the 208th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy continues to concentrate its efforts on establishing full control over the

territory of Donetsk Oblast, organizing defense and maintaining control over the captured territories, and disrupting intensive actions of the Ukrainian troops in certain directions.

The enemy fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces along the contact line. Russian military takes measures to regroup troops in different directions, deploys reserves and conducts aerial reconnaissance.

The Russian military continues to shell civilian infrastructure, violating the norms of International Humanitarian Law and laws and customs of war. Over the past 24 hours, it has carried out three missile and twenty-two air strikes, as well as more than 90 rounds of MLRS fire targeting objects on the territory of Ukraine. This morning, the enemy carried out three more missile strikes.

The infrastructure of more than 30 Ukrainian towns and villages sustained damage, particularly Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhya, Soledar, Bilohirya, Novopil, Pershotravneve, Temyrivka, Sukhy Stavok, Myrolyubivka, Petrivka, Bereznehuvate, Bilohorivka, Spirne, Krasnohorivka, Stepove and Olhivske.

The threat of air and missile strikes throughout the territory of Ukraine persists.

Due to the significant shortage of human and materiel resources, the Russian forces continue to resort to non-standard replenishment. For example, 400 people serving time for criminal offenses were sent from the Russian city of Tambov to strengthen units fighting in Ukraine. In Krasnodar Krai, "Afghan soldier" NGOs were tasked with collecting money from the local population to purchase warm clothes for the regional volunteer battalion.

It is planned to form up to four rifle battalions (up to 2,000 people in total) based on the 36th separate motorized rifle brigade (Borzya) of the 29th Combined Arms Army of the Eastern Military District. Officer positions in the newly created units will be filled with the teaching staff of the Far Eastern Higher Military College (Blagoveshchensk).

During the day, the aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces struck 16 areas of the Russian manpower concentration and 5 positions of anti-aircraft missile systems.

Over the past 24 hours, Ukrainian missile forces and artillery have fired at more than 14 enemy targets, including 6 control points, 3 strongholds, and personnel and military equipment concentration areas. Enemy air defense, EW and 3 ammunition depots were located in the affected area.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the

RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The Russian forces shelled the positions of the Ukrainian troops with tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of Hoptivka, Strilecha, Kozacha Lopan, Vysoka Yaruga, Kudiivka, Vovchansk, Budarky, Hatyshche, Dvorichna, Kupyansk, Mykolaivka, Kamianka. They inflicted air strikes in the areas of Dvorichna (with Mi-8) and Kamianka (with Mi-8 and Su-25).

In the southeastern corner of Kharkiv Oblast, the enemy military units of the 1st tank army cannot hold the front line along the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers. Still, they also have no clear withdrawal plan. They were forced to leave Yarova east of Sviatohirsk but still maintain the defense to the north and southeast of it.

The Russian troops' command is gradually restoring its grouping in the Russian Belgorod Oblast, which yesterday tried to attack the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the area of the village of Hoptivka. About four BTGs remained of the two brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army and the 11th Army Corps (although the claim is that there are eight). In the same area, several company groups from the 14th Army Corps, 20th Combined Arms Army and 1st Tank Army are moving to the defense.

The Russian military carried out provocative offensive actions in the direction of Zhuravlyovka (Belgorod Oblast, Russia, up to 2 km from the Ukrainian state border) and Hoptivka (Kharkiv Oblast), employing units of the 25th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 6th tank army. It had no success and retreated. Around Kupyansk, the Russian forces carried out remote mining of the area.

The missile battery of the 448th missile brigade (Kursk) of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District, which had performed tasks in Belgorod Oblast (Volokonovske), was returned to the permanent deployment location.

Despite the retreat from Kharkiv Oblast, the Russian military will continue to inflict damage on targets in the liberated territory and try to keep the occupied part of Kharkiv Oblast under control.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The Russian forces shelled the Ukrainian Defense Forces with tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Kryva Luka, Pyskunivka, Raihorodok, Bilogorivka, Ozerne, Serebryanka, Hryhorivka. In addition, they launched a rocket attack on Kramatorsk (with an S-300 anti-aircraft missile at civil infrastructure).

Russian proxy units prepare to defensive in Kremina, Lysychansk and Zolotarivka. They conduct sporadic unsuccessful counterattacks in the direction of Bilohorivka.

The enemy deployed elements of the "Pole-21" radio suppression system in the areas around Lysychansk (Luhansk Oblast, "Lysychansk Gelatin Plant") and Peremozhne (Luhansk Oblast) to protect their objects from the Ukrainian Defense Forces missile strikes and UAV actions.

During the last two days, the movement of at least three enemy engineering and sapper units of the platoon-company level was recorded through Starobilsk to Svatove and from the south to the Svatove district. The columns contain a variety of earthmoving equipment. A pontoon-bridge unit from the PMP Floating Bridge was moved through Novaidar in the direction of Sievierodonetsk (Luhansk Oblast) to establish crossings over water obstacles in the Kramatorsk direction.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet", 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces near Rozdolivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Vesela Dolyna, New York, Yuryivka, Rozivka, Zaitseve, Avdiivka, Opytne, Karlivka, Kostyantynivka, Maryinka, and Pervomaiske.

Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces have repelled enemy attacks in the areas of Mykolaivka Druga, Vesela Dolyna and Bakhmut.

The Russian proxy formations, reinforced by the PMC detachments, unsuccessfully attacked Bakhmut from the east and south.

Zaporizhzhya direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian forces did not take active actions.

The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces using tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of Vuhledar, Prechystivka, Velyka Novosilka, Mykilske, Neskuchne, Bilohirya, Novosilka, Stepove, Orikhiv, Hulyaipilske, Olhivske, Kamianske, Temyrivka, Zaliznychne, Novoandriivka, Mala Tokmachka, Mali Shcherbaky, Novopil, Zelene Pole, Chervone, and Novopavlivka.

Taking into account the possible offensive of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the direction of Orikhiv, Polohy and Hulyaipole, in the dark time of the day, the enemy strengthens the positions of the 123rd rifle regiment of mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps with units, probably from the 503rd motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army.

Kherson direction

● Vasylivka–Nova Zburyivka and Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line - 252 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 27, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.3 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiments of the 106th parachute airborne division, 7th military base of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 16th and 346th separate SOF brigades.

The Russian forces command is trying to hold both the bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro River and the city of Kherson itself at any cost. Over the past two days, the Russian military has concentrated up to 15 railway cars of ammunition and other materiel items and a BTG from the 35th Combined Arms Army (38-40 units of combat equipment, including at least 8 tanks) near the river crossings.

Kherson-Berislav bridgehead

● Velyka Lepetikha – Oleksandrivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 250 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces – 22, the average width of the combat area of one BTG –

11.8 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 108th Air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault brigade of the 7th Air assault division, 4th military base of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 239th Air assault regiments of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331 Air assault regiments of the 98th Air assault division, 126th separate coastal defense brigade, 127th separate ranger brigade, 11th separate airborne assault brigade, 10th separate SOF brigade, PMC.

The Russian forces shelled Ukrainka, Tavriyske, Pravdyne, Lymany, Ternovi Pody, Myrne, Novohryhorivka, Pervomayske, Partyzanske, Kvitneve, Shyroke, Blahodativka, Bilohirka, Bezymenne, Novorossiysk, Velyke Artakove, Lozove, Vysokopillya, Osokorivka, Trudolyubivka, Myrolyubivka, Petrivka, Bila Krynytsia, Pravdyne; and to the north Oleksandrivka, Kobzartsi, Vesely Kut, Novovoznesenske, Olhyne. In addition, they carried out airstrikes in the areas of Myrolyubivka (with five Su-25s and eight Mi-24s), Bilyaivka (with two Mi-24s), Vysokopillya (with two Mi-24s ).

As a result of the successful actions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, the enemy retreated from Mala Seideminukha to the Kalynivske district.

Employing units of the 56th air assault regiment of the 7th air assault division, the Russian military attacked in the direction of Myrne, Pravdyne, but did not succeed and retreated.

The 126th separate coastal defense brigade of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, with the support of forces and means of one of the BTGs of the 64th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, is trying to prevent the threat to its left flank.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine are confidently expanding their Inhulets bridgehead. The Russian defense areas near Chkalov and Tamarin are already under their fire control.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive

Ukraine of access to the sea and connect unrecognized Transnistria with the Russian Federation by land through the coast of the Black and Azov seas.

Due to the stormy weather, the number of enemy ships at sea has significantly decreased in the Black Sea. Currently, there are 6 warships at sea providing reconnaissance and blocking shipping in the Azov-Black Sea waters. Among them is one cruise missile carrier, namely a small missile ship of project 21631 "Buyan-M". Up to 8 Kalibr missiles can be ready for a salvo.

Three large enemy amphibious ships of project 775 are located along the southwestern coast of the Crimean Peninsula.

Russian missile and artillery attacks on Mykolaiv and Ochakiv have resumed. The Russian military uses cruise missiles, S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, MLRS, and artillery. On the night of September 19, the South Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Mykolaiv Oblast was shelled.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 8 Su-27, Su-30, and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.

9 amphibious ships are in the ports of Novorossiysk and Sevastopol for replenishment and scheduled maintenance. There are no indications of preparation for an amphibious assault on the southern coast of Ukraine.

All 4 submarines of project 636.3 are at their bases (in Novorossiysk and Sevastopol).

The movement of enemy military equipment by road and rail transport through the temporarily occupied Crimea in the direction of Kherson Oblast remains intensive. There are indications that the Russian Federation is moving its troops, equipment and ammunition to the right bank of the Dnipro by the river fleet vessels that they captured in Kherson. Thus, it replaces broken bridges and pontoon crossings.

On September 19, a humanitarian grain caravan of six ships left the ports of Odesa for the mouth of the Danube. The dry cargo ship FULMAR S is the first to arrive, making its third voyage with Ukrainian food. The bulk carriers ARCTURUS, GULMAR, AKSON SARA, ESENCE and TOMAHAWK are lined up in the wake of the FULMAR S. Notable that in this caravan, there are two giants at once - the 225-meter ARCTURUS and the 229-meter TOMAHAWK.

Four more vessels are currently on their way from the mouth of the Danube to the Odesa coast to docks for loading. To date, 3 million 900 thousand tons of Ukrainian agricultural products have been exported from the ports of Ukraine as part of the grain initiative. The dynamics for the first 18 days of September suggest that the export of agricultural products in September 2022 may amount to 5.4-5.5 million tons.

The Iranian drones already used by Russian forces in the war against Ukraine were probably delivered to Russia on board the Oboronlogistika LLC ["Defense logistics"] vessel. In September, the Russian cargo ship Sparta, owned by Oboronlogistika, was spotted arriving at the port of Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf. On September 2, the company reported that equipment "intended for the construction of facilities in the energy sector of Russia" was allegedly delivered to Novorossiysk on board a RORO (a vessel for transporting wheeled equipment). "Despite the specific conditions of sanctions pressure, Oboronlogistika aims to implement a promising logistics scheme with a friendly country. Iran has rich experience of development against the background of tough Western sanctions and has a high transit potential, which makes the port of Bandar Abbas a major hub in the Persian Gulf," the Russian company reported. Soon after, Iranian Shahed-136 drones began to be used against the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On September 16, the statement mentioned above was removed from the company's website.

"Oboronlogistika" operates three ships of the same type - Sparta, Sparta II, and Sparta IV. It is worth adding that on August 26, S-300PMU-2 anti-aircraft missile complexes were delivered from Syria to Novorossiysk on board the ship Sparta II owned by the same company. On August 29, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine handed the Embassy of Turkey a note on violation of the requirements of the Montreux Convention, which prohibits the passage of military vessels into the Black Sea and vessels with military cargo during a war in the region.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 19.09

Personnel - almost 54,650 people (+170);

Tanks – 2,212 (+2);

Armored combat vehicles – 4,720 (+2);

Artillery systems – 1,313 (+4);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 312 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 168 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,581 (+3); Aircraft - 251 (0);

Helicopters – 217 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level - 920 (+2); Intercepted cruise missiles - 238 (0);

Boats / ships - 15 (0).

Ukraine, general news

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy discussed with Larry Fink, the head of the world's largest investment company BlackRock, the possibilities of attracting public and private investments to Ukraine. "We have demonstrated that we know how to win on the battlefield. Another important task for us is to achieve victory in the economy", Zelenskiy said. "We are able and willing to restore a normal investment climate", he added.

According to a pessimistic forecast, farmers will reduce the amount of winter wheat, rye and barley crops by 20% this year. However, winter rapeseed crops will remain at the same level as

last year, First Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Taras Vysotskyi said in a comment for Ukrinform. According to the deputy minister, farmers in the de-occupied territories, particularly in Kharkiv Oblast, will also have enough time to sow winter crops.

As of September 9, the funds of legal entities in the banking system increased by UAH 120 billion. In addition, individual Hryvnia deposits increased by 32% compared to the beginning of the war, Deputy Chairman of the NBU Council, Vasyl Furman, said. The increase in deposits shows that citizens trust the banking system, the Deputy Chairman of the NBU Council emphasized.

International diplomatic aspect

Russian strikes had increasingly picked out civilian targets over the past weeks, even when no immediate military benefit could be perceived, stated the UK Defence Ministry. A Russian missile struck close to the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant. Though it didn't cause damage to the three reactors, it destroyed other industrial equipment. The Russian nuclear terrorism derived from the impunity for its previous criminal actions, particularly the illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and the defunct Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant at the beginning of the all-out invasion.

Commenting on the Russian shelling of the Southern Ukrainian NPP, the Minister of Energy of Ukraine, Herman Halushchenko, said that this way, the Russian Federation wants to "get at least some concessions out of Europe by its energy blackmail." "We see Europe's resilience in countering Russia's energy aggression. But stopping Russian nuclear terror in Ukraine requires double efforts. If the "nuclear winter" comes, the problem of high electricity prices will no longer be relevant. The world must finally retaliate against the terrorist country. It is not too late, and a nuclear catastrophe is only a threat, which, unfortunately, is becoming more and more real every day," he stressed.

The Baltic states closed their borders to the lion's share of Russian citizens after the EU failed to properly address the issue by introducing mostly symbolic restrictions. "Russia is an unpredictable and aggressive state. Three-quarters of its citizens support the war. It is unacceptable that people who support the war can freely travel around the world, into Lithuania, the EU," said the Lithuanian Interior Minister. Even bearers of Schengen visas issued in other countries will not be allowed to cross the border. However, there're exceptions for humanitarian reasons, Russian dissidents, diplomats, family members of EU citizens, transportation employees and Russians with residence permits or long-stay national visas.

"It's time to erase the non-existent border between our states, as it has long been erased in our hearts, and hold a referendum on the issue of joining the Donetsk People's Republic to the Russian Federation," a pseudo non-governmental organization from Donetsk appealed to the Russian proxy "government". Russia planned to hold a "referendum" on Kharkiv region's accession to the Russian Federation in early November with some 75% approval results, Ukrainian media reports with references to intelligence sources.

Russia still plays with the idea of annexing more Ukrainian territories in a pretend "legal way". A sham referendum in Crimea in 2014 didn't provide Russia with "legality" of its actions. Only ten countries voted against the UN General Assembly's resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine (Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, DPRK, Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria, Zimbabwe and Venezuela), while 100 voted aye and 58 abstained. Only Russia, Syria and North Korea recognized "the independence" of a puppet Donetsk People's Republic. Ironically, Russia plays legal games while Russians haven't been enjoying even relatively free and fair elections nor a slight likeness of the rule of law for decades, if ever. The predatory nature of Putin's regime raises the question of doubting the territorial integrity of Russia itself.

"Despite the tense own material situation, the Bundeswehr will provide Ukraine with another four Panzerhaubitze 2000 artillery pieces, supplemented by another ammunition package," the German Defense Ministry announced.

Russia, relevant news

The largest banks in Turkey, Is Bankasi and DenizBank, have stopped servicing Russian Mir cards. According to Bloomberg, the decision was made against the backdrop of the possible imposition of US sanctions. When using the Mir card, Russian government agency TASS reports, ATMs report a transaction confirmation error and return the card.

Bunge, an American agro-industrial company, has agreed to sell its Russian business, including a sunflower oil plant in Voronezh, to entrepreneur Karen Vanetsyan, the controlling shareholder of Exoil Group, Kommersant reports.

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3. State Department watchdog gives failing grade to new counter-disinformation center

Perhaps it is because we are neophytes at conducting political warfare.

But the headline itself illustrates why we have problems. The press and pundits focus on countering disinformation. Of course that appears totally reactive. Rather than countering disinformation, what agency is responsible for overtly orchestrating the superior narrative of American values and messaging regarding our policies. IWe need to lay the overt messaging narrative groundwork and sustain it over time. Then we would have a foundation for being able to counter disinformation or in some cases disinformation would ideally be dead on arrival.

State Department watchdog gives failing grade to new counter-disinformation center

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

The State Department unit devoted to countering disinformation and propaganda is failing to take the lead on government-wide efforts to expose foreign lies and deception, according to a new survey by the department’s internal inspector general.

The Global Engagement Center (GEC) still lacks the authority to carry out its mission and has not been led by presidentially-appointed officials for nearly half its existence, the IG stated following an eight-month probe that ended in March — despite having a staff of 167 people, mostly non-government contractors, and an annual budget of over $74 million.

The GEC was first set up in 2016 to counter terrorist propaganda and expanded under a provision of the 2017 defense authorization act to lead government-wide efforts to expose and counter foreign disinformation.

The IG “observed, and GEC senior leadership and department and interagency officials confirmed, the center’s role in countering disinformation was limited to supporting the various U.S. government efforts rather than leading and coordinating a whole-of-government approach as mandated by law,” according to the report, which was made public last week.

The poor performance “contributed to a lack of coordination among countering disinformation programs across the U.S. government,” the report said. “Foreign actors spend billions of dollars on disinformation campaigns to establish and legitimize their narratives using constantly changing technology, requiring an agile response from the U.S. government.”

The IG found that the center’s response was hampered by problems with contracting, communicating and operating efficiently in dealing with foreign propaganda. Additionally, the center’s mission must deal with competing counter-disinformation programs at multiple government agencies, including the Homeland Security Department, Pentagon and Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

In one instance cited by the IG auditors, the center could not evaluate whether $8.5 million sent to 34 U.S. embassies last year for counter-disinformation activities achieved the desired results.

Within the State Department, the IG found that GEC was blocked from publishing a report on Iranian disinformation aimed at influencing U.S. policy toward Syria by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. The bureau opposed publishing the report apparently over concerns it would upset delicate diplomatic activities underway with Iran, the report said.

A cloud computing site called “DisinfoCloud” set up outside the State Department also was canceled before creating an internal replacement. The cloud site allows government agencies and others to monitor hundreds of companies and test tools and technologies needed in countering foreign disinformation.

The disjointed organizational structure and staffing at GEC also limited its effectiveness, the report stated, noting poor communication within divisions and unclear chains of command.

GEC carried out an internal restructuring in 2021 that the IG said “merely formalized an existing contractor-heavy structure.”

Foreign disinformation and propaganda from terrorists and foreign governments is a growing problem, the IG report said. Recent examples include attempts to influence the 2020 U.S. elections and ongoing disinformation campaigns online about the safety of U.S.-produced COVID-19 vaccines.

Critics have said products produced by the center have lacked useful information about disinformation operations targeting the United States.

The GEC initially focused on foreign terrorism and then reported mostly on Russian activities.

Last month, the center produced a comprehensive assessment on the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to shape global public opinion regarding what the U.S. government has concluded is a genocide program targeting minority Uyghurs in western China.

A review of the GEC website shows that 14 of its 16 published reports highlighted Russian disinformation. Only two were devoted to exposing Beijing disinformation.

The IG report said the center received mixed reviews for its work. A regional State Department office praised GEC’s Analytics and Research Division for a report on Chinese repression of Uyghurs in China and details it provided on Chinese exploitation of Twitter for propaganda, and another office lauded a report on internet troll farms in El Salvador.

“However, others told [the office of inspector general] they did not view the division’s reports as responsive to their needs or containing usable information and criticized their lack of context and analysis,” the report said.

One example was a GEC report on the murky origins of the COVID-19 virus that the IG said lacked context in explaining the data it published.

One GEC success was an August 2020 report, “The Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem,” which used publicly available information to expose Russian disinformation tactics and sources. That report was useful for foreign governments, civil society organizations, academia, the media and the general public in helping analyze Russia’s disinformation, the IG report concluded.

GEC officials said the report helped “significantly degrade” the ability of Russian proxy sites on social media platforms to influence public opinion around the world.

Leah Bray is the center‘s special envoy and coordinator and has held the post since July 2021. Her principal deputy, Daniel Kimmage, was on loan to the National Defense University at the time of the IG inspection.

The IG listed 18 recommendations for improving GEC operations and the center said it would implement the changes.

A GEC spokeswoman did not immediately respond to an email request for comment.

In an appendix to the IG report, Joe Parente, deputy coordinator for support, acknowledged the center has struggled since its creation. Setting up a new office while working to counter disinformation is like “building the plane while flying it,” he stated.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

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4. A 10-point plan to address our information crisis – People vs. Big Tech

I was able to listened to my good friend Nobel Peace Prize winner Maria Ressa (and Sohn Ji Ae as well) at the World knowledge Forum in Seoul today talk about freedom of the press and today's information ecosystem, how tech has taken over distribution of "news," and how platforms use algorithms to create clones of each of us and then use those algorithms to tailor the news for us in ways so that we no longer have a shared vision of reality. Her main message is that we need to stop the surveillance for profit model. I commend her 10 point action plan at the UN here.

A 10-point plan to address our information crisis – People vs. Big Tech

peoplevsbig.tech

Presented by 2021 Nobel Peace Prize laureates Maria Ressa and Dmitry Muratov at the Freedom of Expression Conference, Nobel Peace Center, Oslo 2 September 2022

We call for a world in which technology is built in service of humanity and where our global public square protects human rights above profits.

Right now, the huge potential of technology to advance our societies has been undermined by the business model and design of the dominant online platforms. But we remind all those in power that true human progress comes from harnessing technology to advance rights and freedoms for all, not sacrificing them for the wealth and power of a few.

We urge rights-respecting democracies to wake up to the existential threat of information ecosystems being distorted by a Big Tech business model fixated on harvesting people’s data and attention, even as it undermines serious journalism and polarises debate in society and political life.

When facts become optional and trust disappears, we will no longer be able to hold power to account. We need a public sphere where fostering trust with a healthy exchange of ideas is valued more highly than corporate profits and where rigorous journalism can cut through the noise.

Many governments around the world have exploited these platforms’ greed to grab and consolidate power. That is why they also attack and muzzle the free press. Clearly, these governments cannot be trusted to address this crisis. But nor should we put our rights in the hands of technology companies’ intent on sustaining a broken business model that actively promotes disinformation, hate speech and abuse.

The resulting toxic information ecosystem is not inevitable. Those in power must do their part to build a world that puts human rights, dignity, and security first, including by safeguarding scientific and journalistic methods and tested knowledge. To build that world, we must:

Bring an end to the surveillance-for-profit business model

The invisible ‘editors’ of today’s information ecosystem are the opaque algorithms and recommender systems built by tech companies that track and target us. They amplify misogyny, racism, hate, junk science and disinformation – weaponizing every societal fault line with relentless surveillance to maximize “engagement”. This surveillance-for-profit business model is built on the con of our supposed consent. But forcing us to choose between allowing platforms and data brokers to feast on our personal data or being shut out from the benefits of the modern world is simply no choice at all. The vast machinery of corporate surveillance not only abuses our right to privacy, but allows our data to be used against us, undermining our freedoms and enabling discrimination.

This unethical business model must be reined in globally, including by bringing an end to surveillance advertising that people never asked for and of which they are often unaware. Europe has made a start, with the Digital Services and Digital Markets Acts. Now these must be enforced in ways that compel platforms to de-risk their design, detox their algorithms and give users real control. Privacy and data rights, to date largely notional, must also be properly enforced. And advertisers must use their money and influence to protect their customers against a tech industry that is actively harming people.

End tech discrimination and treat people everywhere equally

Global tech companies afford people unequal rights and protection depending on their status, power, nationality, and language. We have seen the painful and destructive consequences of tech companies’ failure to prioritize the safety of all people everywhere equally. Companies must be legally required to rigorously assess human rights risks in every country they seek to expand in, ensuring proportionate language and cultural competency. They must also be forced to bring their closed-door decisions on content moderation and algorithm changes into the light and end all special exemptions for those with the most power and reach. These safety, design, and product choices that affect billions of people cannot be left to corporations to decide. Transparency and accountability rules are an essential first step to reclaiming the internet for the public good.

Rebuild independent journalism as the antidote to tyranny

Big tech platforms have unleashed forces that are devastating independent media by swallowing up online advertising while simultaneously enabling a tech-fueled tsunami of lies and hate that drown out facts. For facts to stand a chance, we must end the amplification of disinformation by tech platforms. But this alone is not enough. Just 13% of the world’s population can currently access a free press. If we are to hold power to account and protect journalists, we need unparalleled investment in a truly independent media persevering in situ or working in exile that ensures its sustainability while incentivizing compliance with ethical norms in journalism.

21st century newsrooms must also forge a new, distinct path, recognizing that to advance justice and rights, they must represent the diversity of the communities they serve. Governments must ensure the safety and independence of journalists who are increasingly being attacked, imprisoned, or killed on the frontlines of this war on facts.

We, as Nobel Laureates, from across the world, send a united message: together we can end this corporate and technological assault on our lives and liberties, but we must act now. It is time to implement the solutions we already have to rebuild journalism and reclaim the technological architecture of global conversation for all humanity.

We call on all rights-respecting democratic governments to:

1. Require tech companies to carry out independent human rights impact assessments that must be made public as well as demand transparency on all aspects of their business – from content moderation to algorithm impacts to data processing to integrity policies.

2. Protect citizens’ right to privacy with robust data protection laws.

3. Publicly condemn abuses against the free press and journalists globally and commit funding and assistance to independent media and journalists under attack.

We call on the EU to:

4. Be ambitious in enforcing the Digital Services and Digital Markets Acts so these laws amount to more than just ‘new paperwork’ for the companies and instead force them to make changes to their business model, such as ending algorithmic amplification that threatens fundamental rights and spreads disinformation and hate, including in cases where the risks originate outside EU borders.

5. Urgently propose legislation to ban surveillance advertising, recognizing this practice is fundamentally incompatible with human rights.

6. Properly enforce the EU General Data Protection Regulation so that people’s data rights are finally made reality.

7. Include strong safeguards for journalists’ safety, media sustainability and democratic guarantees in the digital space in the forthcoming European Media Freedom Act.

8. Protect media freedom by cutting off disinformation upstream. This means there should be no special exemptions or carve-outs for any organisation or individual in any new technology or media legislation. With globalised information flows, this would give a blank check to those governments and non-state actors who produce industrial scale disinformation to harm democracies and polarise societies everywhere.

9. Challenge the extraordinary lobbying machinery, the astroturfing campaigns and recruitment revolving door between big tech companies and European government institutions.

We call on the UN to:

10. Create a special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General focused on the Safety of Journalists (SESJ) who would challenge the current status quo and finally raise the cost of crimes against journalists.

Signed by:

Dmitry Muratov, 2021 Nobel Peace Prize laureate

Maria Ressa, 2021 Nobel Peace Prize laureate

Endorsed by:

Amnesty International, 1977 Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director, ICAN - the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 2017 Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Kailash Satyarthi, 2014 Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Jody Williams, 1997 Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Economics Prize laureate
Juan Manuel Santos, 2016 Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Leymah Gbowee, 2011 Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Nadia Murad, 2018 Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Shirin Ebadi, 2003 Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Tawakkol Karman, 2011 Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Alexandra Geese, Member of the European Parliament
Dr. Anya Schiffrin, Director of the Technology, Media, and Communications specialization at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs
Bruce Mutsvairo, Associate Professor, Media and Performance Studies, University of Utrecht
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Christophe Deloire, Chair of the Forum on Information and Democracy
David Carroll, Associate Professor of Media Design, The New School
Frances Haugen, Facebook Whistleblower
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Irene Khan, UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression and opinion
Julie Posetti, Deputy Vice President and Global Director of Research, International Center for Journalists
Khadija Patel, Chair of the International Press Institute
Marietje Schaake, Stanford Cyber Policy Center
Mogens Blicher Bjerregård, International Advisor, Danish Union of Journalists
Peter Pomerantsev, Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins University
Paul Tang, Member of the European Parliament
Phumzile van Damme, Ethical Tech Activist and Former South Africa MP
Roger McNamee, former advisor to Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg; author of Zucked: Waking Up to the Facebook Catastrophe
Safiya Umoja Noble, MacArthur Fellow, Professor, and Author, Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism
Shoshana Zuboff, Author, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism; Professor Emeritus Harvard Business School; Co-Chair Steering Committee, International Observatory on Information and Democracy
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5. Are Green Berets Turning Pink? Integrating Women into Special Forces

Conclusion:

Researching potential bias in assessment and selection is the first step in analyzing the integration of women into Special Forces. From a Special Warfare Center and School perspective, there is no pressure to force women through this program, but there is pressure to follow the process, and that pressure continues long after assessment and selection. Now that women have entered, and graduated from, the Special Forces Qualification Course, it is time to consider the next phase of integrating women. The course is the first time the Special Forces community at-large will get a glimpse at the reality of having mix-gendered teams. However, even as the first women graduate, they become a data point of low digits. There is still a lot of time before the community will have enough data to make any wholesale, informed changes. Military and civilian defense leaders should take caution before making drastic changes or sweeping conclusions with such little data to inform reforms. But it does not mean we cannot explore ideas, contemplate contingencies, and develop responses. In the meantime, American citizens, leaders, and military personnel should remain confident that Special Forces Assessment and Selection still works and is free of bias for all candidates.

Are Green Berets Turning Pink? Integrating Women into Special Forces - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by David Walton · September 20, 2022

We are seeking to fill two positions on our editorial team: An editor/researcher and a membership editor. Apply by Oct. 2, 2022.

Is advancing women’s interests worth destroying America’s most elite military units? One can hardly peruse media (social and otherwise) without hearing histrionic tales of plummeting standards and woeful urban legends of the crumbling of our sacred institutions. Gender-neutral physical fitness tests, time-honored events removed from the training calendar, and gender-integrated barracks — with all these changes, its easy to question if the standard is still the standard. Can America’s special operators withstand yet another social experiment? The reality is that there is no real evidence to support this narrative: Standards have not been altered to accommodate women. Our investigation suggests that assessment and selection for U.S. Army Special Forces is as hard as it has always been.

The lifting of the Combat Exclusion Policy in January 2013 opened the ranks of U.S. Army Special Forces, the vaunted Green Berets, to female soldiers. To date, only a handful of women have qualified for Special Forces Assessment and Selection, and even fewer have been successful. In fact, assessment and selection standards are so rigorous that it took years for the first woman to be selected. Regardless, now that women have successfully navigated assessment and selection, there is an opportunity to evaluate the possibility of bias in assessment and selection and apply corrective measures if need be. The assessment and selection model is a decades-old system originally designed to assess only male candidates, which was created in 1988 by Gen. James A. Guest of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Institutionally, the schoolhouse is dutybound to evaluate the efficacy of the model.

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While the contemporary addition of female candidates has not changed the original charter of Special Forces Assessment and Selection, it has revealed potential vulnerabilities regarding the selection, training, and integration of women into Special Forces. This process employs a unique training environment that allows the training cadre to identify and assess hopeful Special Forces candidates across multiple domains simultaneously. Considering that the mission is to identify and select the most qualified soldiers for the Army’s most critical missions, it is imperative to determine if the selection and training model correctly and accurately reflects the differences presented by introducing female candidates. My purpose here is not to evaluate the merits of women in Special Forces. Rather, I seek to explore the systems and processes in the training pipeline and their utility. The cognitive, psychological, and physical assessments in assessment and selection remain gender neutral and free of bias.

While the assessment and selection course remains steeped in mystery and rumor, there is a definite method to the madness. The 21-day course held at Camp Mackall assesses each candidate’s physical, mental, and emotional preparedness for continued participation in the Special Forces training pipeline, and it remains relatively unchanged since its inception. Special Forces Assessment and Selection follows a 3-week model of evaluation wherein week one is “individual week,” week two is “land navigation week,” and week three is “team week.” Standards of performance are key to the selection model and the process collects over 300 separate performance data points on each candidate. The first week includes standardized physical and cognitive assessments, timed ruck-march and run events, and the notorious “Nasty Nick” obstacle course. Land navigation week is a straightforward series of solo land navigation exercises.

Those who have attended assessment and selection, even “non-selects,” generally agree that team week is the defining essence of the experience. Team week places candidates into assigned teams and confronts them with a series of challenges focused on intense field-based load carriage, problem-solving, and interpersonal dynamics that often seem herculean in execution. It is during team week that the cadre can evaluate each candidate’s ability to display attributes unique to the assessment and selection environment.

Despite course updates and refinements, the selection rate remains near the historical average of approximately 36 percent. As of the date of publication of this article, the selection rate for women is approximately 10 percent. Special Forces Assessment and Selection remains one of the most physically, emotionally, and psychologically challenging military training regimens in the world. Does this mean that contemporary selected candidates are just as qualified as the generations of Green Berets before them? The evidence is clear: Standards remain in place and are rigorously enforced. However, a lack of change in standards does not necessarily equate to a lack in biases.

Method to the Madness

To assess the validity of assessment and selection and determine if the methods are sound and whether systemic bias exists, our research team evaluated three key areas: the system, the training staff (the cadre), and the candidates. For two years, our team of researchers were granted nearly unrestricted access to Special Forces Assessment and Selection. Our conclusions are drawn from interviews of male and female candidates, the cadre and command teams, hundreds of hours of training observations by our research staff, and a quantitative analysis of candidate performance data.

The “Special Forces Assessment and Selection system” is a broad term our team used to encompass everything from recruiting, administration, and reporting for training to the actual course execution, out-counseling, and selection. Training observations include those from assessments of fitness, training, and combat readiness, as well as the obstacle course and team week. Our observations of each of these three categories of evidence indicate that the standards for assessment and selection have not been changed to accommodate women. Therefore, the selection process, while having evolved since its inception, displays no clear evidence of bias.

For the quantitative analysis, as mentioned above, each assessment and selection candidate has over 300 assessable data points. The specific data collected is part of a closely guarded and purposefully obfuscated process of assessment that includes physical, mental, and emotional components. As such, we can’t reveal the specifics of the process or the data. But we were able to evaluate each candidate’s individual performance data, in particular each female candidate’s performance, and compare it to all other candidates with specificity across assigned courses to ensure a consistent evaluation. The research team took the aggregate performance measure of female candidates and compared this to the aggregate performance of their male counterparts. In no case was a female candidate who performed below this aggregate selected. All selected women performed above this metric. Performance, and only performance, is the determining factor in selection.

While the cadre go to great lengths to remain unbiased, such precautionary measures cannot ensure that male and female candidates experience the Special Forces Assessment and Selection system exactly the same. For example, women have a different packing list than men. There are female-only items like brassieres, sanitary supplies, and a female urinary diversion device. During the packing list inventory event, or “shakedown,” female candidates must present these items to the cadre prior to beginning the course. While it takes the cadre about 30 seconds to verify these items during the event, it is a brief instance where female and male candidates are separated based on gender. Additionally, female candidates are required to demonstrate proof of non-pregnancy during in-processing. Early in the integration process, female candidates are required to take a urinary pregnancy test on site. This practice has since been modified to allow female candidates to bring in paperwork indicating a negative pregnancy test administered within 30 days of reporting for assessment and selection. This precautionary step is done to accommodate health and only takes a brief time to complete, yet it is another instance of a difference between men and women. However, none of the interviewed female candidates, the cadre, or members of the research team identified the shakedown or pregnancy test as biased.

During assessment and selection, women and men live in the same barracks, often sharing a bunk, with all of the normal barracks activity. Critics of integrating women into Special Forces often cite the close-quarters living conditions of forward-deployed Special Forces teams as potential areas of incongruity, yet no candidate cited barracks living as a point of contention. One might reasonably speculate that disrobing in close quarters would be problematic from a sense of privacy, societal conditioning, or simple humility, but no candidate, male or female, cited this as an issue. In addition to barracks activity, the research team’s evaluation of living conditions included a detailed assessment of latrine placement. Latrines for women are slightly further away from the barracks than the male latrines, which was a repeated point of discussion during the interview process. A 40-meter difference in location sounds like a small thing, but every step at assessment and selection counts, especially after a grueling day of physical exertion. Our research team determined that this area of difference did not equate to bias. However, what is perhaps the largest potential for bias or even inconsistency in assessment is that of the cadre.

The Keepers of the Standard

The cadre are key to the success of assessment and selection. The efficacy of the system is rooted in their high performance, professionalism, and ability to administer the training effectively. Special Forces culture is designed to minimize cadre “interference,” so that the only thing that separates selects and non-selects is the candidate’s own individual performance. In this environment, the strong candidates separate themselves from the weak with the cadre acting as a non-partisan, outside observer. Throughout years of observing and working closely with the assessment cadre, the research team observed the cadre make consistent, unbiased, and accurate decisions regarding course execution, candidate interactions, and event management. In my judgment, the cadre are unbiased in their assessment, or at least they are not operationalizing any existing bias. They are professional when discharging their duties, which is critical moving forward as more women qualify for selection. The cadre view their role in upholding fairness and impartiality at assessment and selection as almost sacred. They neither encourage nor discourage candidates. Our findings indicate that they do not allow rank, race, gender, or any immutable demographic trait to enter into the assessment process.

Not one candidate, male or female, cited any bias from the cadre — from the moment a candidate steps foot on the bus to Camp Mackall to the minute he or she leaves. In fact, most interviewed candidates communicated that they anticipated and expected bias from the cadre but could not cite a single incidence of such. The cadre have the potential to apply almost infinite pressures and bias, and they represent the single most impactful variable in the selection process. However, in reality, the cadre go to great lengths to remain unbiased in their selections. The cadre may deliver bad news when not selecting a candidate, but it is at the hands of the candidates’ own performance. While the research team found no bias within the system or the cadre, the same cannot be said for the candidates themselves.

Candidates Are Human Too

Candidates arrive at assessment and selection with established and engrained socialization skills that they exhibit throughout their assessment. During multiple observations under multiple conditions, the research team observed male candidates demonstrate preferential treatment to female candidates, which the team determined as the only source of bias. For example, male candidates were less likely to verbally call out weak physical performance from female candidates than from male candidates. Likewise, male candidates were more likely to physically assist weak physical performance from female candidates than they were to physically assist a male candidate’s weak physical performance. Our research team observed this phenomenon repeatedly and consistently, which leads us to consider candidates’ socialization as the biasing factor to assessment and selection. However, even with this phenomenon, the selection model still worked: No female candidate demonstrating sustained weak physical performance was selected. Nevertheless, our research team interviewed candidates and the cadre to evaluate this phenomenon further.

As noted previously, candidates were reluctant to call out weak performance from female candidates in the moment. When the research team interviewed candidates about this behavior, male candidates asserted that they were confident that the cadre were appropriately monitoring the events. In other words, male candidates were aware of the weak performance, but were reluctant to draw attention to the weak performance. However, this was only true for weak performance from female candidates. Male candidates did not show similar restraint with weak performance from other male candidates. The cadre simply noted the performance and allowed the candidate-teams to continue training. When discussing this phenomenon, the male candidates noted that they were just “acting naturally.” This reinforces the idea that this behavior is intrinsically encoded and is sub-conscious behavior as a component of the social environment.

The cadre insist on maintaining an atmosphere of non-interference so there is no established mechanism to intervene. What does this mean? The cadre can direct candidates to conduct a specific task or play a specific role. However, this is considered “interference” or bias. It happens only very rarely. The cadre will instead direct a team to do a task, but not individual candidates.

For example, one event involves the teams carrying a duffel bag full of sand, weighing about 700 pounds with a rig of lashed-up metal poles (this event is euphemistically called The Sandman) . This is combined with a jeep push for about eight miles. Since the load is heavy, pushing the jeep becomes a sort of ‘rest’ position. Candidates are in charge of the work/rest cycle and the rotation of positions. We learned that physically weaker female candidates stayed in the jeep-pushing position while stronger male candidates remained in the load-carrying positions. Male candidates would not enforce the rotation cycle between these positions, so the women did less work. The fact that weaker candidates tended to avoid the more difficult position is not noteworthy. The fact that male candidates would call out this behavior when it was other men doing it, while not calling it out when women did it is noteworthy.

The training cadre can and do easily observe this. I observed it myself and discussed it with many of the cadre. The cadre could (but never do) intervene and make a female candidate rotate to one of the more difficult positions. Doing so would violate the ‘neither-encourage-or-discourage’ culture of the assessment course. So, Assessment and Selection does demonstrate bias, but that bias is only from male candidates rather than the training cadre or the rules. Further, this bias favors women.

Is this a lowering of standards, as critics would claim? Not really. It’s not a performance standard. Rather, it’s an operational culture issue. If the Army were to alter the ‘neither-encourage-or-discourage’ ethos, then it would be introducing bias against women. Special Forces is beating itself on a technicality with its own rules. This might be the best argument for changing the selection methodology to allow for cadre to manipulate interactions so they can get a more holistic assessment. Taken to the extreme, the cadre could explicitly direct that a candidate remains in a position without rest for an entire event. In the case of the above-mentioned event, this might be catastrophic. This event humbles even the strongest of candidates. If the cadre were to maliciously manipulate work/rest cycles, they could easily force an entire team to quit. But I wouldn’t endorse any changes to the current system. Put plainly, it works. Having casually observed Special Forces Assessment and Selection for almost 3 decades, and closely studying it for nearly 15 years I am more confident than ever that it does what it was chartered to do. This is specifically true for female candidates. Our observations demonstrate that only performance matters.

Conclusion

The topic of integrating women into Special Forces is emotionally charged. Opponents cite liberal ideology, social experimentation, and a purposeful and targeted eroding of traditions as motivation for the change. It seems that the most often cited argument against integration is that “standards” will be lowered to accommodate women. The research team has reviewed training records from the last 12 years and physically observed operations across that timespan — beyond the two-year focused assessment of this study — and can confidently report that standards have not been altered to accommodate women. In fact, we are steadfast in our conclusion that assessment and selection is as hard as or perhaps even harder than it has ever been. The weights are the same, the individual events measure the same attributes, and Camp Mackall is still Camp Mackall. The barracks and latrines are nicer, but that’s about it.

Perhaps the only difference is that while standards are identical for all candidates, not all candidates are identical. Women have physiological differences compared to men. The gender-neutral standards for selection are quite high, which naturally favor bigger, stronger candidates, but that is not bias, it is just biology. To that end, the cadre endeavor to exercise systems and processes free from bias. Only top performance — physical, emotional, and interpersonal — is rewarded. The empirical human performance data supports this conclusion. However, candidate’s physical performance is not the only source of quantitative data at Special Forces Assessment and Selection. Considering the mixed opinions about integrating women into the Special Forces community, our research team predicted that peer evaluations would be consistent opportunities for bias. In this regard, we can report no bias exists. Female candidates that scored above average on peer evaluations were selected and female candidates that were evaluated to be below average were not selected — just as it should be. The evaluation model is working if candidates who perform and peer evaluate above average are selected and candidates who perform and peer evaluate below average do not get selected — regardless of rank, race, or gender.

Researching potential bias in assessment and selection is the first step in analyzing the integration of women into Special Forces. From a Special Warfare Center and School perspective, there is no pressure to force women through this program, but there is pressure to follow the process, and that pressure continues long after assessment and selection. Now that women have entered, and graduated from, the Special Forces Qualification Course, it is time to consider the next phase of integrating women. The course is the first time the Special Forces community at-large will get a glimpse at the reality of having mix-gendered teams. However, even as the first women graduate, they become a data point of low digits. There is still a lot of time before the community will have enough data to make any wholesale, informed changes. Military and civilian defense leaders should take caution before making drastic changes or sweeping conclusions with such little data to inform reforms. But it does not mean we cannot explore ideas, contemplate contingencies, and develop responses. In the meantime, American citizens, leaders, and military personnel should remain confident that Special Forces Assessment and Selection still works and is free of bias for all candidates.

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David Walton, PhD is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer with 25 years of special operations experience. Walton spent a decade as a professor of national security affairs at the National Defense University. He has extensive operational experience in Latin America and the Middle East. He currently teaches with the Joint Special Operations Command. His work and research focus on operationalizing great strategy for better results. The views here are those of the author and do not represent those of U.S. Army Special Forces, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Dennis J. Henry Jr

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by David Walton · September 20, 2022

6. Physics Body Concedes Mistakes in Study of Missile Defense

"Science is not truth. Science is finding the truth. When science changes its opinion, it didn't lie to you. It learned more."

- Unknown (found on social media)

“The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers wisdom.” - Isaac Asimov

Physics Body Concedes Mistakes in Study of Missile Defense

Two scientists said the American Physical Society had erred in evaluating their plan to use drones to shoot down North Korean long-range missiles.

nytimes.com · by William J. Broad · September 19, 2022

An image released by North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency showed the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.Credit...KCNA, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The world’s largest body of physicists admitted on Monday that a report it had issued seven months ago contained errors that downplayed the effectiveness of a novel plan for shooting down missiles.

The American Physical Society published the 54-page report in February. It assessed the overall feasibility of thwarting missile strikes and concluded that a proposal that the United States use drones to shoot down North Korean missiles faced “very difficult challenges.” The group sent the report to Congress and officials in the Biden administration as part of the society’s long history of providing guidance on cutting-edge weapons to defense policy decision makers.

Three months later, in May, the group pulled the document from its website, saying in an online note that the report was under review by its authors and would be “re-posted when available.” The note gave no reason for the withdrawal.

But the scientists who proposed the drone idea say the reason was errors in the society’s technical analysis of the concept, which the society acknowledged on its website Monday but has yet to detail or explain.

“The whole thing is outrageous,” said Richard L. Garwin, the lead scientist behind the proposal. Dr. Garwin, 94, has advised the U.S. government on issues of national security for more than a half century. He also wields outsize influence in the scientific community because he’s credited with designing — at age 23 in 1951 — the world’s first hydrogen bomb.

He and the other proponent of the drone idea say they want Washington officials to have an impartial assessment of the plan as they consider how to improve the nation’s defenses against enemy missiles.

“It’s a potential system for the defense of the United States, and these people are trying to stop it,” said Theodore A. Postol, the other scientist and an emeritus professor of science and national security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

A group of 13 physicists and engineers wrote the February report. Its chairman was Frederick K. Lamb of the University of Illinois. The co-chairs were James D. Wells of the University of Michigan and Laura Grego of M.I.T. and the Union of Concerned Scientists. The private group, based in Cambridge, Mass., has often faulted antimissile defense as futile and destabilizing.

Academic and private groups have long vetted claims of breakthroughs in destroying enemy warheads fired from the earth’s far side. The task, one of the hardest in modern warfare, is likened to hitting a bullet with a bullet. Members of the American Physical Society have repeatedly caught the Pentagon in errors, exaggerations and what appear to be outright deceptions.

Now, the physical society has been caught in its own error. It says the episode is a first in its 123-year history.

Dr. Garwin and Dr. Postol’s antimissile plan zeros in on destroying North Korean missiles fired at the United States. After Pyongyang achieved a run of successful flight tests in 2017, American intelligence agencies described its intercontinental ballistic missiles and their nuclear warheads as an emerging threat.

According to the plan, American drones would loiter over the Sea of Japan. If North Korea began a nuclear attack, the drones would fire rocket interceptors that would track the fiery exhaust of the rising missiles and annihilate them.

If feasible, the idea is seen as superior to the traditional missile defense method — shattering a missile’s incoming warheads as they race toward their targets. Experts agree that rising missiles are slower, easier to track and far more vulnerable to attack.

In 2004, the Bush administration began deploying, in Alaska and California, a system of interceptor missiles that has about a half-hour to track long-range warheads fired from North Korea. Even so, top experts say it has major shortcomings.

By contrast, the drone interceptors would linger relatively close to enemy launchers. Dr. Garwin and Dr. Postol detailed their plan in 2017 and 2018 studies, prompting the Trump administration to examine the idea as a possible way to thwart the new generation of more threatening North Korean missiles.

In 2020, the physical society began its own antimissile study. It looked at the feasibility over the next 15 years of both the old and new approaches, including Dr. Garwin and Dr. Postol’s. It released its report in February.

The main error uncovered by Dr. Garwin and Dr. Postol in the society’s report centers on the speed of their proposed interceptor rockets and thus how far they would have to fly. The report’s diagram shows the carrier drones as having to loiter over North Korea’s mainland or a narrow strip of its coastal waters in order to knock out missiles fired at Boston, New York or Washington. In such locations, the drones could be shot down.

But the two scientists found that the study group had used the wrong interceptor speed — less than 2.5 miles per second instead of the faster pace of more than 3.1 miles per second. That error might seem small, but the military upshot was not. For an interceptor flight of 195 seconds, the baseline, the correct number was seen as moving the drones more than 100 miles farther out to sea.

“It puts you deep inside the Sea of Japan, where you can loiter and take aim at your leisure,” Dr. Postol said. “Theirs puts you into an area where you can’t operate.”

Soon after the report’s February release, Dr. Garwin and Dr. Postol began exchanging emails with the report’s authors, which The Times has reviewed. In them, the authors admit to mistakes and suggest corrections.

Frances Hellman, a physicist at the University of California, Berkeley, who is president of the physical society, said that in late May and early June, it had privately notified key recipients about problems with the report, including staff members at the National Security Council and the Department of Defense, as well as House and Senate armed services subcommittees.

But making public a corrected version of the report, she added, “may take a year” from the time of its publication.

“We take the integrity of our reports extremely seriously,” Dr. Hellman said in an interview. But removing the errors, she said, is inevitably a slow process because it involves dozens of experts and society officials. “They want it to happen overnight,” she said of Dr. Garwin and Dr. Postol.

Dr. Lamb, the report committee’s chairman, said one snag in the revision was that the study group’s members are busy people who “committed time” to the report. “Now we’re in overtime,” he said. Dr. Lamb added that the job required enormous care. “The worst possible thing,” he said, “is to try to correct something and make another mistake.”

Dr. Hellman, the society’s president, said that the group was seeking ways to better handle such situations in the future.

The long current delay “is not dissimilar to the time it takes to correct a scientific paper,” Dr. Hellman added. “We need to be sure we have the science correct. This argues for more care, not less.”

nytimes.com · by William J. Broad · September 19, 2022

7. US Soldiers Provide Telemaintenance as Ukrainians MacGyver Their Weapons

I hope we are learning a lot.

US Soldiers Provide Telemaintenance as Ukrainians MacGyver Their Weapons

Milley visits Polish airbase to check on defenses, American repair crew.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

A MILITARY BASE, Poland—Some four dozen U.S. troops here are helping their Ukrainian counterparts across the border fix and maintain 155mm howitzers, Javelin launders, HIMARS and other weapons. But since the Americans aren’t in Ukraine, they’re providing assistance via encrypted digital chats, sending replacement parts, and consulting on parts the Ukrainians make themselves. It’s vital work at an airbase that could be among the first targets if Russia expands the war beyond Ukraine.

With the help of some Ukrainian linguists, the U.S. maintenance specialists communicate in 14 chatrooms, one for each weapon and system the Ukrainians need help with. The Ukrainians use Starlink satellite communication terminals to share video clips as needed.

“Ukrainians are going to identify a need, the experts are going to diagnose…what's needed and either walk them through it or put parts on order. And then we use the American supply system to get that part here to transfer right down,” said one lieutenant colonel involved in the effort. (Defense One is not allowed to publish the names of the personnel involved or the name of the base.)

Some of the needs are new even to the U.S. specialists. The Ukranians have been using long-range fires like howitzers much more heavily than the United States has used such weapons in decades.

“The wear and tear on these guns is something that we just weren't ready for because of the rates that [the Ukranians] are firing these rounds. Their dependency on that field artillery system is what's keeping them in this fight,” said the colonel. “When they're firing them in this way, you're seeing trends, you're seeing common faults. They haven't been tested in this manner…because they're just, these are not [firing] numbers that the product or the program managers even use to stress us.”

For instance, the heavy use is wearing down the internal grooves of howitzer barrels, requiring frequent replacement. Other problems, such as damage from bullets or normal wear and tear the Ukranians can fix themselves.

But certain hard-to-get parts require the full spectrum of Ukrainian ingenuity. They use computer-assisted design to draw up designs, run them past U.S. specialists for guidance, and make the parts themselves.

The Ukrainains have no a direct line to U.S. weapons manufacturers and there are no U.S. personnel in the country to order replacement parts or coordinate shipments, much to the frustration of some volunteers who have journeyed to Ukraine to assist in the war effort.

There’s “zero supply on a lot of things. And so … we're not stopping to try and solve those problems. Every single gun in the fight matters,” said the colonel.

On Sunday, the base received a visit from the top U.S. officer, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley, who was in Europe this week for a meeting with NATO defense chiefs in Estonia. Milley, said his main purpose for visiting the base, which is guarded by Patriot missile batteries as well as other air defense systems, is to make sure the base is adequately protected, especially from possible Russian missile strikes. He told reporters such checks were “not an indicator of something that might happen,” and that he had no specific intelligence to suggest a threat to the base.

“I’m particularly interested in checking things like force protection to ensure that they are in an inadequate state of readiness in the event of anything ever happening. It's my job,” Milley said. “It's our job; it's the commander of EUCOM’s, it's the commanders’ on the ground job to ensure that our forces are in a state of readiness at all times for whatever might happen.”

Milley again discussed the recent Ukrainian advances and said that they were an indicator that Russia had lost “strategic initiative” in the war. But that didn’t mean that the Russians were less of a threat. “I don't think [the threat of Russia to U.S. troops in Poland] is any greater or less. I just think that there's an active war going on in Ukraine….The war is not going too well for Russia right now. So it's incumbent upon all of us to maintain high states of readiness alert. You just don't know with a high degree of certainty what will happen next. So maintaining high degrees of force protection and readiness is always incumbent upon us.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

8. Putin prepares to step up his war against Ukraine

Excerpts:

Dmitry Medvedev, a staunch Putin ally, then vowed 'all forces of self-defence' will be used to protect the 'new territories' - marking the start of a new phase in the conflict and raising fears that NATO could be sucked in, sparking World War Three.

Underlining that point was Moscow's rubber-stamp parliament which passed new laws paving the war for Putin to end his 'special military operation', officially declare war, and start press-ganging people into the army.

It comes after Ukraine humiliatingly routed Putin's armies to the east of Kharkiv and recaptured a swathe of territory, with the despot's allies, propagandists and political hardliners piling pressure on him to escalate amid calls for his resignation.

Putin was said to be preparing an address to the nation tonight, Russia's national broadcaster reported, without giving any further details.

Putin prepares to step up his war against Ukraine

WW3 fears as Putin prepares to go all in on Ukraine: Russia paves the way for conscription and scrambles to annex Ukrainian territories, warning the West 'all forces' will be used to defend them

Vladimir Putin will address Russia tonight after day of quick-fire developments
Puppet leaders in occupied Ukraine vowed to hold referendums on becoming part of Russia later this week, with sham votes expected to easily pass
Putin ally warned 'all forces of self-defence' will then be used to protect them
Rubber-stamp parliament passed law paving war for official declaration of war

By CHRIS PLEASANCE and WILL STEWART FOR MAILONLINE and AFP

PUBLISHED: 04:09 EDT, 20 September 2022 | UPDATED: 12:41 EDT, 20 September 2022

Daily Mail · by Chris Pleasance · September 20, 2022

Vladimir Putin appeared poised to go all-in on his war in Ukraine today as a plan to annex occupied regions swung into action, a law change paved the way for conscription, and a presidential address was rumoured to be taking place tonight.

In a day of rapid-fire developments, Kremlin stooges in Ukraine's Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions simultaneously announced referendums on becoming part of Russia between September 23 and 27, with the sham votes expected to easily pass.

Dmitry Medvedev, a staunch Putin ally, then vowed 'all forces of self-defence' will be used to protect the 'new territories' - marking the start of a new phase in the conflict and raising fears that NATO could be sucked in, sparking World War Three.

Underlining that point was Moscow's rubber-stamp parliament which passed new laws paving the war for Putin to end his 'special military operation', officially declare war, and start press-ganging people into the army.

It comes after Ukraine humiliatingly routed Putin's armies to the east of Kharkiv and recaptured a swathe of territory, with the despot's allies, propagandists and political hardliners piling pressure on him to escalate amid calls for his resignation.

Putin was said to be preparing an address to the nation tonight, Russia's national broadcaster reported, without giving any further details.

Vladimir Putin today paved the way to escalate his war on Ukraine with a series of quick-fire developments that signalled the start of a new phase in the war

It comes in the wake of Ukraine's advances across the east of the country, with troops capturing the town of Bilohorivka (pictured) in Luhansk yesterday

Kyiv's men are continuing to advance following the rout of Russian forces near Kharkiv, as Zelensky says they are 'panicking'

"All this talk about immediate referendums is an absolutely unequivocal ultimatum from Russia to Ukraine and the West," said Tatiana Stanovaya, founder of the political analysis firm R.Politik.

Asked about the referendums, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said: "From the very start of the operation... we said that the peoples of the respective territories should decide their fate, and the whole current situation confirms that they want to be masters of their fate."

Reacting to the news, leading propagandist Margarita Simonyan said: 'Judging by what is happening and what is about to happen, this week marks either the eve of our imminent victory or the eve of nuclear war. I can't see any third way.'

Hardline MP Leondid Slutsky welcomed the move, saying 'mobilisation is timely and necessary'.

'It is not Kiev and the Ukrainian people who are at war, but the puppet regime of the NATO bloc and the US president.'

Putin has held off from declaring mobilisation, apparently fearing the wrath of ordinary Russians who have so-far ignored the war or voiced support while knowing they had nothing to lose from it.

It also comes against the backdrop of a growing number of politicians and public figures calling for him to resign over the military failings.

The rout in Kharkiv handed Ukraine some 3,000 square miles of territory back and has split Russian forces across the Donbas and Kharkiv front, with Putin lacking the manpower to defend both simultaneously.

Putin's commanders are now trying to reinforce and push the Ukrainians back, while Zelensky's men hold the new line, probe defences, and advance where possible.

A Russian tank sits rusting on the battlefield after Ukraine's stunning counter-attack out of Kharkiv

Summing up the situation overnight, Zelensky said: 'We are stabilising the situation, holding our positions. Firmly. So firmly that the occupiers are panicking tangibly.

'We warned the Russian soldiers in Ukraine that they have only two options: Flee our land or surrender...

'Thanks to the Security Service of Ukraine, we are now confident that the occupiers will not have any foothold on Ukrainian soil.'

Serhiy Gaidai, governor of the occupied Luhansk region, said soldiers had pushed into the village of Bilohorivka - the first in Luhansk to be recaptured.

It will provide the jumping-off point for an assault on the wider region with the aim of returning it to Ukrainian control, he added.

However, he warned that Russia is preparing its defences and 'we will not simply march in' - seeking to dampen anticipation of another Kharkiv-style rapid advance.

Ukraine is also attacking towards the south, in Kherson, where its forces sank a Russian pontoon bridge transporting weapons and troops across the Dnipro River on Monday.

'The situation remains tense, but under our control,' a spokesman for Ukraine's southern command said.

Luhansk and the neighbouring province of Donetsk comprise the industrialised eastern region of Donbas, which Moscow says it intends to seize as a primary aim of what it calls the 'special military operation' in Ukraine.

Ukrainian troops have begun to push into Luhansk since driving Russian forces out of northeastern Kharkiv province in a lightning counter-offensive this month.

In a sign of nervousness from a Moscow-backed administration in Donbas about the success of Ukraine's recent offensive, its leader called for urgent referendums on the region becoming part of Russia.

Denis Pushilin, head of the Moscow-based separatist administration in Donetsk, called on his fellow separatist leader in Luhansk to combine efforts toward preparing a referendum on joining Russia.

The Ukraine general staff said on Monday that fighting had been limited to the Donetsk region.

'During the past 24 hours, units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine repelled enemy attacks in the areas of Mayorsk, Vesele, Kurdyumivka and Novomykhailivka settlements,' it said in a daily update.

In the south, where another Ukrainian counter-offensive has been making slower progress, Ukraine's armed forces said they had sunk a barge carrying Russian troops and equipment across a river near Nova Kakhovka in the Kherson region.

'Attempts to build a crossing failed to withstand fire from Ukrainian forces and were halted. The barge ... became an addition to the occupiers' submarine force,' the military said in a statement on Facebook.

Ukraine is still assessing what took place in areas that were under Russian control for months before a rout of Russian troops dramatically changed the dynamic of the war earlier this month.

At a vast makeshift cemetery in woods near the recaptured town of Izium, Ukrainian forensic experts have so far dug up 146 bodies buried without coffins, Kharkiv regional governor Oleh Synehubov said on Monday. Some 450 graves have been found at the site, Zelenskiy has said

There are claims that Putin's circle are deeply divided over any move to force men into the army and to the frontline in the war.

They believe it could be a tipping point triggering opposition and leading to Putin's demise.

One claim is that FSB director Alexander Bortnikov is 'categorically against' mobilisation.

The move comes after some loyalist governors have agreed to 'self-mobilisation' of men in their regions following a call from Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.

While such moves do not have the force of law, it means an intensification of efforts to recruit soldiers.

The head of Kemerovo region Sergei Tsivilev said: 'A large number of Kuzbass residents are ready to defend our Great Motherland today [...].

'I have no doubt: all the tasks of the special military operation will be completed,'

Ukraine is continuing to exhume a mass grave site in Izyum where the bodies of civilians and soldiers - some of whom appear to have been tortured - after liberating it from Russia

Ukrainian forensic scientists and war crimes investigators dressed in hazmat suits work to exhume graves in a forest near the city of Izyum

Recent days have also seen calls from minor party leaders for mobilisation, evidently a sign that Putin would soon throw his weight behind such a plan.

Political expert Dmitry Oreshkin said: 'It is obvious that the words about mobilization uttered by [Communist Gennady] Zyuganov, [LDPR Leonid] Slutsky and [Just Russia Sergei] Mironov will inevitably be followed by 'some organizational steps'.

'The Kremlin does not want to say this word, but instructs deputies appointed from the Kremlin to say it,' Oreshkin said in an interview with Vozdukh.

'What is happening in Ukraine is unequivocally interpreted as a military defeat.

'Holes need to be filled, and if so, then you need more cannon fodder.

'The regime cannot do without mobilisation in one form or another.'

He warned: 'The 'Putin majority', 75%, who allegedly support the military operation, support it theoretically, as long as they can watch it on TV, lying on the couch, and as long as it does not concern them personally [...].

'The problem is that this TV picture is increasingly at odds with reality.

'The second problem is that a crawler sofa with a long-range weapon begins to crawl out from under the viewer's ass.

'Either he can be called, or his son can be called, and in return he can get a bag of bones.

'Then it's a completely different feeling.

'People like to fight and win, but not at their own expense,' the political scientist concludes.'

Powerful Putin ally Radyrov, the Chechen leader, said a week ago in words that now seem prophetic: 'If you ask me, my opinion as Ramzan Kadyrov, I would declare martial law, I would declare mobilisation.

Liz Truss will make her debut speech at the UN today, where she will promise to at least match the £2.3billion in support that the UK gave to Ukraine this year in 2023

'I would start preparing people for martial law.

'We don't know what will happen tomorrow..…

'We must not wait for the leadership of the state to declare mobilisation, we must all mobilise, each region must give the forces and means that it has.

'Offer what they can to support our military.'

Pro-war hardliner Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin who has long claimed the Kremlin war plan is flawed, said: 'Thank God, finally, someone decided to call the Russian authorities to work instead of the Defence Ministry, because it is clear that MOD failed in replenishing and most likely will not be able to handle mobilisation.'

Among those sponsoring today's mobilisation move are MPs Dmitry Vyatkin, 48, from the ruling United Russia party, Ernest Abdulov, 72, United Russia ,

Vasily Piskarev, 58, United Russia, Andrei Kartapoolov, 58, United Russia,

and leader of the hardline Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] Leonid Slutsky, 54.

Also sponsoring were: Nikolai Kolomeytsev, 66, Communist,

Vladislav Davankov, 38, a New People's Party, and

Oleg Nilov, 60, Just Russia, Viktor Sobolev, 72, a Communist former army officer.

Senators Andrei Klishas, 49, and Olga Kovitidi, 60, backed the mobilisation laws.

Daily Mail · by Chris Pleasance · September 20, 2022

9. Going Nuclear by Lawrence Freedman

Even in nuclear war you still have to "pacify" the population - there is still a political problem. (unless you are going to burn a village to save it)

Excerpts:

Even if use did make a difference the fundamental political problem would still be there: how to pacify a hostile population with a depleted army. Meanwhile nuclear threats do serve an important purpose for Putin, in deterring more direct NATO engagement. Should he use nuclear weapons in a limited and possibly futile way, the threshold would still have been crossed and all bets would be off in terms of a NATO response, which might well include doing exactly those things Putin was trying to deter. This would also be true of possible Ukrainian moves against Belgorod and Crimea.

There is one qualification to this analysis, which is Crimea. This territory was seized from Ukraine in 2014 and Ukraine wants it back. Militarily this would be even more challenging than the other acts of ‘de-occupation’ that Ukraine wants to achieve. There are ways of making the Russian hold on Crimea more difficult without a military assault, and Zelensky has spoken of this as a problem that might require a diplomatic solution, although if Russia shows no interest in a negotiated withdrawal his forces will keep on going. Rather than fretting about some future craziness, efforts might more usefully be put into preparing for the moment when Putin realises that he has lost and may seek to hold on to Crimea. At this time all the issues connected with ending this war – sanctions, reparations, war crimes, prisoner exchanges, and security guarantees – would need to be addressed. We may find it difficult to imagine that Putin can lose, and wonder about how well he will cope with his failed aggression, but it is entirely possible that at some point he will run out of options, and have to look failure in the eye.

Going Nuclear

On thinking the unthinkable

samf.substack.com · by Lawrence Freedman

The control room of a Russian nuclear missile base, outside of Moscow (Photo by robert wallis/Corbis via Getty Images)

Supreme leaders achieve their positions and then hold them by controlling events to their advantage. It is natural, therefore, to assume that even when they appear to have lost control, they will find a way to regain it. This assumption is behind the common refrain these days, even heard from people who would dearly like Vladimir Putin to fail, that he will not allow it to happen, that even at this late stage he will find something to do that will turn the tide of the war. That something will have to go beyond adding to the hurt and misery already caused, which we know he can do. It must also stave off Russia’s defeat and that is another matter. In addition, therefore, to speculating about what Putin might do next, we also need to ask what good it will do him.

Russia’s Way Forward

On Friday 16 September Putin spoke at a news conference at the conclusion of a conference in Uzbekistan. This conference was most memorable for evidence of Russia’s increasing isolation, even among countries that might have been expected to be more sympathetic. As there were visible signs of Central Asian states distancing themselves further from Russia, Putin was obliged to acknowledge that both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had concerns about the war.

Putin sought to explain how he would win the war. Asked about the Ukrainian counter-offensive he said: ‘Let’s see how it goes and how it ends.’ Then, asked if the war plan needed to be adjusted, he stressed Russia’s minimum rather than maximum objectives: ‘The main goal is the liberation of the entire territory of Donbas’. This is a narrower focus than the one with which he started and with which he was still toying a few weeks ago. He reported that the work to achieve this objective ‘continues despite these counteroffensive attempts by the Ukrainian army. The general staff considers some things important, some things secondary, but the main task remains unchanged, and it is being implemented.’ Perhaps he appreciates that Kharkiv is lost and Kherson may go soon. Certainly it informs the Russian offensive in Donetsk, which still continues, very much as before, despite the setbacks elsewhere.

While the West worries that Russia might resort to escalation in response to Ukrainian advances, Putin claims to see it the other way round. He spoke of ‘attempts to perpetrate terrorist attacks and damage our civilian infrastructure’, referring presumably to occasional Ukrainian attacks on the territory of the neighbouring Belgorod oblast and of Crimea. He added:

‘Terrorist attacks are a serious matter. In fact, it is about using terrorist methods. We see this in the killing of officials in the liberated territories, we even see attempts at perpetrating terrorist attacks in the Russian Federation, including – I am not sure if this was made public – attempts to carry out terrorist attacks near our nuclear facilities, nuclear power plants in the Russian Federation. I am not even talking about the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant.

We are monitoring the situation and will do our best to prevent a negative scenario from unfolding. We will respond if they fail to realise that these approaches are unacceptable. They are, in fact, no different than terrorist attacks.’

Somewhat bizarrely for the head of a country that has been systematically terrorizing people in occupied territories and launching missiles on a regular basis against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, he insisted that Russia had been ‘responding rather restrainedly, but that’s for the time being.’ Noting that ‘a couple of sensitive blows’ had been delivered against Ukraine, he added: ‘Well, what about that? We will assume that these are warning strikes. If the situation continues to develop in this way, the answer will be more serious.’ This was apparently a reference to the strikes that followed Ukraine’s successful offensive in Kharkiv, causing widespread blackouts and damaging a dam in the southern city of Kryvyi Rih. The reference to more to come may well have been intended to keep alive fears that at some point along this line nuclear weapons might be used, but that was not explicit and Russia still has means to inflict such damage without resorting to these weapons.

Nuclear Use

Yet the nuclear issue now comes up frequently. It is currently probably the matter for the greatest speculation, including in Kyiv and Washington, when officials and commentators ask what Putin might do next. Rose Gottemoeller, a former top US nuclear policy-maker and NATO’s deputy secretary general until 2019, told the BBC of her fear that ‘Putin and his coterie’ will ‘strike back now in really unpredictable ways that may even involve weapons of mass destruction.’ She did not expect ICBM launches, but possibly another form of nuclear sabre-rattling - ‘a single strike over the Black Sea, or perhaps a strike at a Ukrainian military facility’ to ‘strike terror not only into the hearts of the Ukrainians’ and its allies.

This is not a possibility that should be dismissed in a cavalier fashion. Russia has abundant stores of nuclear weapons, in a variety of shapes and sizes, and Putin might be desperate enough to use them. Because he has already done some really stupid things who can say for sure that he won’t do anything even stupider. This possibility is not negligible, and that is worrying enough in itself. But it is not enough to answer the question of whether he might give a nuclear order by references to his mental state or assumptions that because he is being humiliated he might respond with a tantrum to end all tantrums. We need to consider exactly what problems, military and/or political this might solve. Matthew Kroenig writing for the Atlantic Council warns that a Russian nuclear strike ‘could cause a humanitarian catastrophe, deal a crippling blow to the Ukrainian military, divide the Western alliance, and compel Kyiv to sue for peace.’ But will it?

To act this way would break a ‘taboo’ that has developed around nuclear use since the only time they were used in anger in August 1945. It was a taboo that Putin himself acknowledged with President Biden in June 2021, when they reaffirmed the observation affirmed by Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan in 1985: ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’

It would also represent an extreme version of the behaviour his forces have already been following. Russia is not short of means of causing hurt and suffering and has shown no reluctance to use them. Ukrainian towns and cities have been pummelled by Russian shells, rockets and missiles, directed against residential buildings, factories, transportation hubs, power plants and much more. Over last weekend the Pivdennoukrainsk nuclear power plant in Mykolaiv oblast was struck. Thankfully the reactor was not hit, although there were explosions only 300 metres away.

Russia’s campaign has seen thresholds of violence being passed with disturbing regularity. In addition to the long-distance strikes there have been the more intimate crimes uncovered after the occupying forces have left, of tortures, murders, rapes, abductions, and looting. If these were supposed to have a strategic purpose, and are not just random acts of cruelty and malevolence (some clearly come into this category), then one would suppose the intention would be to make the Ukrainians ready to concede. In practice the effect has been the opposite. It has hardened their resolve and made them even more determined to rid their country of a Russian presence. Despite all that they have been through Ukrainians are showing extraordinary levels of resilience, unity, and determination. When asked, the Ukrainian government says that even nuclear use would have the same effect.

It is especially important to note that just because nuclear weapons have not been employed that does not mean that they have had no influence on the course of this conflict. They have played an important deterrent role. Just before the invasion began Putin took part in an annual drill involving Russian missiles. Then, when he announced the ‘special operation’ on 24 February, he remarked that ‘whoever tries to hinder us’ will face ‘consequences that you have never faced in your history.’ Three days later he publicly ordered his defence minister Shoigu and chief of the general staff Gerasimov ‘to transfer the army’s deterrence forces to a special mode of combat duty’. This did not amount to much in practice: the point was to underline a deterrence threat.

The threat was directed against any thoughts in NATO countries about directly intervening to support Ukraine. Threats of this type were made in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea. Then Putin stated that other countries ‘should understand it’s best not to mess with us,’ adding unnecessarily that ‘Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers’. At the time, as now, Russian media broadcast regular, lurid descriptions of the terrible things Russia would do to any countries that interfered, neglecting to mention what these countries could do back in return. The aim was to present Russia as a country with unlimited power, a will to use it, and little sense of proportion, so that any minor provocation could result in terror raining down on the perpetrator.

These threats were geared to reinforcing Putin’s original message. Take the contributions of Andrei Gurulev, a Lieutenant General, member of the Duma, and regular media commentator, who was directly involved in Russia actions in the Donbas in 2014-15. He is something of a charmer. The Ukrainian authorities have released an intercepted call from him on February 28, 2022, just after the invasion, issuing orders to set Ukrainian households on fire. He instructed an invading unit: ’Burn them, damn it, burn them! Once you’ve thrown them out of there – finish the house, burn it down! Spit at that f*cking humanism!’ He has a thing about destroying Britain. On state television in August, when asked if Britain was readying for war with Russia, Gurulev replied that this was already the case. Russia was fighting both Britain and the US in Ukraine.

‘Let's make it super simple. Two ships, 50 launches of Zircon [missiles]—and there is not a single power station left in the UK. Fifty more Zircons—and the entire port infrastructure is gone. One more—and we forget about the British Isles. A Third World country, destroyed and fallen apart because Scotland and Wales would leave. This would be the end of the British Crown. And they are scared of it.’

More recently Gurulyov noted that Biden had warned Russia against using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He observed that ‘we may use them but not in Ukraine.’ This time he made particular mention of strikes against decision-making centres in Berlin, threatening Germany with total chaos, along with his familiar theme of turning the British Isles into a ‘martian desert’ in 3 minutes flat.’ He added, oddly, that this could be done with ‘tactical nuclear weapons, not strategic ones,’ and, confidently, that the US would not respond. All this was linked to preventing NATO getting directly involved. ‘We shouldn’t be shy about it or fear it. … They should tuck their tails in and keep up yapping.’

Strip away the absurd rhetoric and braggadocio, and it is clear the focus remains on deterring NATO countries, now including the provision of Ukraine with the means to mount deep strikes against Russian territory. As another recent example, Russian TV presenter Olga Skabeyeva, who regularly describes the current conflict as World War III, made specific threats with regard to the potential delivery of the long-range (300km) Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile from the US to Ukraine. ‘Russia has every right to defend itself. That's to say, to strike Poland or the US's Ramstein base in Germany, for example.’ The current narrative in Moscow is that the troubles they now face are not because of the exertions of the Ukrainians but because they are backed by the best Western weapons. It is a familiar refrain that they are at war with NATO.

These threats have not been ignored by NATO. It was determined right at the start that there would be no direct intervention by member states. That was behind their refusal to agree to Kyiv’s pleas to set up a non-fly zone to push Russian aircraft from the skies over Ukraine. President Biden has been clear that he does not want to give Putin an excuse to escalate, which is one reason why he has been reluctant to authorise the ATACMS deployment. Another reason is that the Pentagon is unconvinced that this would make a large difference to Ukraine’s military performance.

The Americans have also sought to warn the Russians about the risks associated with nuclear escalation. In an interview with CBS, the President explained that turning to nuclear or other unconventional weapons would ‘change the face of war unlike anything since World War II. … They’ll become more of a pariah in the world than they ever have been.’ He added that ‘depending on the extent of what they do will determine what response would occur.’

Backed Into a Corner

Yet while the nuclear threats are directed against NATO countries rather than Ukraine, Ukraine is the reason why Russia is in trouble and which now seems to offer the most troubling scenario. Colin H. Kahl, under secretary of defense for policy, said in a statement to The New York Times that ‘Ukraine’s success on the battlefield could cause Russia to feel backed into a corner, and that is something we must remain mindful of.’ This point was reinforced by the deputy director of the CIA, David S. Cohen, urging not to ‘underestimate Putin’s adherence to his original objective, which was to control Ukraine’ or ‘his risk appetite.’

One can note that Russia is not truly backed into a corner. At the moment there is no existential threat to the Russian state, even if one might be developing to Putin’s personal position, and that the way to get out of any corner is to cross the border back home. And if he wants to escalate he has other options. To quote the New York Times again:

‘more indiscriminate bombardment of Ukrainian cities, a campaign to kill senior Ukrainian leaders, or an attack on supply hubs outside Ukraine — located in NATO countries like Poland and Romania — that are channelling extraordinary quantities of arms, ammunition and military equipment into the country.’

More might be done against critical infrastructure or Ukrainian government buildings.

Yet these are all things he has either done to a degree, tried and failed to do, or simply not attempted because they are too difficult. If the option was there it would have made no sense to wait to interdict the weapon supply lines from the western borders into Ukraine, but Russia has not been able to do this. Attacking Poland or Romania would invoke NATO’s Article V. Russian leaders are well aware of this for they refer to it often. This is how nuclear deterrence works in the other direction and keeps the conflict contained.

So if initiating a direct war with NATO is too dangerous, and the value of deterrence lies in limiting the forms of assistance provided to Ukraine, what about using such weapons against Ukrainian targets?

There is a view that Russian forces might hold on until the winter and recreate the sense of stalemate and mutual attrition that was felt last summer while the battle for Luhansk was underway. Another view is that their army is in a shambolic state and will be unable to regain any grip on the situation. Should the Ukrainians start moving against Russian position in the Donbas, or capture the large number of Russian troops defending territory in Kherson and cut off from new supplies, then Putin would face calamity. In the face of such calamity would nuclear use be of any value?

Two possible roles are identified: first, to affect the course of the fighting on the ground, and second, more coercive, to threaten to raise the stakes to terrifying heights, including attacks on cites, persuading the Ukrainians to give up. To a degree this second role is inherent in the first. Once the nuclear threshold has been passed then the barriers to further escalation has been reduced. How might this be done? Options range from a demonstration shot at one end of the spectrum, perhaps against a significant but currently uninhabited site (Snake Island has been mentioned) to make the point that a process has been set in motion with an unpredictable end, to direct strikes against Kyiv at the other end, with battlefield nuclear use in the middle.

The problem with a demonstration is that the message may be unclear. It will show that Russia is ready to ignore the strong normative prohibition on any nuclear use yet is still cautious on making the most of the explosive power. When a similar option was discussed in 1945 prior to the decision to target the city of Hiroshima one concern was that while this could show that the US had a new weapon of unprecedented power, and do so without killing large numbers of people, unless the Japanese could see its destructive effects directly it would make no impression on their leadership.

Another issue was whether the bomb would work. It would be embarrassing to encourage the Japanese to watch and then for the spectacle to turn out to be a dud. It is possible that this could be a non-trivial consideration in any Russian deliberations: while missiles are regularly tested this is not the case with their warheads. The last such test under the Soviet Union was during the early period of the Cold War. As we have seen with other weapons that have been bought out of storage they have not always been well maintained and do not work as advertised.

Another decision made in 1945 was not to warn the Japanese in advance what was coming. Because this would be a lone aircraft they did not want the Japanese to make an effort to shoot it down. As it was, although the air raid sirens sounded over Hiroshima, the absence of a large raiding force meant that it was turned off, and so many people were outside when the bomb exploded. Presumably the Russians would want to add to the shock value of a strike, and to reduce the risks of it being caught by air defences, by keeping it a surprise. This would mean that any coercive value would have to be extracted after the event, using it as a warning of more to come.

What sort of event? It is assumed, but who can know, that the aim would be to combine any coercive value with a direct military value. This is why the focus is on the short-range low-yield ‘battlefield’ weapons, sometimes mistakenly described as ‘tactical’ (any nuclear use has strategic repercussions). This is where the analysis gets tricky.

The Russian armed force have thought long and hard about nuclear strategy. A detailed and subtle analysis by Michael Kofman and Anya Loukianova Fink shows that at least in theory the Russian military do not believe that limited nuclear use necessarily leads to uncontrolled escalation. The potential targets for limited nuclear strikes are those already identified for conventional strikes –critical infrastructure more than cities. How far this would be taken once the first threshold had been passed would depend on the opponent’s reaction. Russian thinking on the matter, however, is geared to great power conflicts, and not an attempt to crush a supposedly weaker and smaller neighbour. Moreover, this is the sort of escalation that Putin was talking about in his Uzbekistan press conference for which he does not need nuclear weapons to have the desired effect.

That leaves the question of using the weapons to affect the ongoing battles underway on the ground. Here it is worth noting the issues that surround any attempt to use these as if they were normal weapons of war. In this role they can be seen as uniquely powerful versions of conventional munitions – from bombs, depth charges, shells, and mines, with the added ingredient of radiation. In this regard they are best employed against large targets, for example a gathering of troops preparing for an offensive. The alternative would be a strong defensive position. Ideally this target would be some distance away from Russian troops. (The Americans famously developed a nuclear gun – the Davy Crockett – which had a lethal radius greater than its range).

Given the nature of the fighting in Ukraine this is not at all straightforward. There are rarely massed formations operating in either defence or attack. Units tend to be dispersed. Consider an account (from a Russian source) about the offensive in Kherson. It notes that the Ukrainians have made their impact by messing with the Russian supply lines while advancing not by armoured thrusts (unlike Kharkiv) but instead by using small groups of infantry ‘creeping’ forward over watery ground, for this is an area cut through by irrigation canals. Finding a useful target for nuclear use in such circumstances would be difficult, and, given how little it might achieve, a strange way to start a nuclear war. Moscow has shown no great care for the populations of Luhansk and Donetsk, but as their liberation is supposedly at the heart of Russian war aims it would also be strange to mark this by nuclear detonations.

Conclusion

There is no evidence for now that weapons are being moved into position or being prepared for such strikes. US intelligence, which has been extraordinarily precise so far can be expected to pick up any details (or at least the Russian would need to assume that). No effort has been made to explain to the Russian public why such strikes might be necessary. After all Putin still insists that this is a limited operation and has refused to put the country on a war footing. As we have seen Russian figures talk garrulously about scenarios for nuclear use against NATO countries but not Ukraine. We can also assume that neither of Putin’s recent interlocutors - Xi and Modi - would be enthused. This is a scenario largely generated in the West trying to anticipate contingencies that have yet to be reached.

It is true that the prospect of nuclear use might engender panic in Ukraine and NATO. It is also hard to imagine that the news would be greeted calmly in Russia. It could intensify opposition in Moscow to Putin. He would of course need a compliant chain of command to implement an order to go nuclear, especially as part of a complex military operation on the ground. If the wind catches radioactive dust close to the borders it could fall on Russian territory.

Even if use did make a difference the fundamental political problem would still be there: how to pacify a hostile population with a depleted army. Meanwhile nuclear threats do serve an important purpose for Putin, in deterring more direct NATO engagement. Should he use nuclear weapons in a limited and possibly futile way, the threshold would still have been crossed and all bets would be off in terms of a NATO response, which might well include doing exactly those things Putin was trying to deter. This would also be true of possible Ukrainian moves against Belgorod and Crimea.

There is one qualification to this analysis, which is Crimea. This territory was seized from Ukraine in 2014 and Ukraine wants it back. Militarily this would be even more challenging than the other acts of ‘de-occupation’ that Ukraine wants to achieve. There are ways of making the Russian hold on Crimea more difficult without a military assault, and Zelensky has spoken of this as a problem that might require a diplomatic solution, although if Russia shows no interest in a negotiated withdrawal his forces will keep on going. Rather than fretting about some future craziness, efforts might more usefully be put into preparing for the moment when Putin realises that he has lost and may seek to hold on to Crimea. At this time all the issues connected with ending this war – sanctions, reparations, war crimes, prisoner exchanges, and security guarantees – would need to be addressed. We may find it difficult to imagine that Putin can lose, and wonder about how well he will cope with his failed aggression, but it is entirely possible that at some point he will run out of options, and have to look failure in the eye.

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samf.substack.com · by Lawrence Freedman

10. Here’s what we know about the state of Russia’s military

Conclusion:

“At a certain point, you can, in theory, understand a certain miscalculation,” Konaev told Vox. “Everyone, even much better-equipped, trained, and learned organizations like the US military make mistakes and make incorrect assumptions about their enemy, and miscalculate their levels of commitment and resistance. But the fact that [the Russians] have continuously made mistakes throughout the war that are of a very similar kind is unforgivable, from that standpoint.”

Here’s what we know about the state of Russia’s military

Ukraine’s recent victories expose even more systemic failures.

Vox · by Ellen Ioanes · September 18, 2022

Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty Images

Ukraine’s continuing rout of Russian forces in the east has exposed fundamental problems within the Russian military, including deficiencies and power struggles in its command structure and gaps in intelligence gathering and processing. Though Russia’s early failures and difficulty recruiting enough soldiers for the frontline have been clear for months, the latest operation shows the depth of the disarray and stasis in Russia’s armed forces.

Ukraine’s lightning strike operation in Kharkiv oblast demonstrated the Ukrainian military’s ability to take advantage of those deficiencies to recapture not just territory, but strategically important transport and resupply hubs for the Russian military’s eastern front. Although the war is far from over, and Russia still controls around 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory, the Kharkiv operation provided a strategic and moral win for Ukraine, and revealed a Russian military seemingly unable — or unwilling — to learn from its previous errors.

Fighting continues in southern Ukraine near Kherson and in the Donbas, where Russia had sent its more experienced soldiers prior to the Kharkiv blitz. While it’s impossible to predict how the fighting will play out there, Ukraine’s ability to take the battlefield initiative and exploit Russian weaknesses — as well as materiel, financial, and intelligence support from Western countries — put Ukraine’s military in a stronger position.

Since the beginning of the war, Russian failures — its inability to achieve its initial goal of a short, surgical operation to remove Ukrainian leadership, its withdrawal from Kyiv and reorientation toward the south in the spring, and numerous tactical blunders — have been surprising. Earlier, devastating campaigns in Syria and Chechnya, as well as sophisticated military doctrine and strategic shows of force, successfully burnished the Russian military’s image, but in a large-scale ground war against a well-equipped and organized adversary, that same organization is buckling under serious miscalculations and a chaotic military structure.

Strikingly, the Ukrainian military’s recent victories have even forced the Russian media to acknowledge that “there are setbacks,” Rita Konaev, deputy director of analysis at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), told Vox.

“Of course, there’s still a message of, ‘We will stay in it until we reach our goals,’ although the goals continue to evolve and shift and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has demonstrated that he is able to re-articulate the goals to fit the changing reality on the ground without suffering much,” she said. “He doesn’t have to comply with reality” when it comes to his messaging on Ukraine, she continued.

The Russian military’s command structure is a mess

While neither Russia nor Ukraine disclose official military death tolls, the losses on each side are likely in the tens of thousands. An August estimate from the US Department of Defense put Russian battlefield injuries and deaths at “70 or 80,000 casualties in less than six months,” undersecretary of defense for policy Colin Kahl said. The death toll specifically was estimated to be around 20,000 — 15,000 of which were regular troops and about 5,000 private mercenaries like those from the Wagner Group, the New York Times’ Helene Cooper reported at the time.

In the past week, reporting on Russian efforts to recruit soldiers both for regular units and for the Wagner Group has shown the military’s difficulty in attracting qualified troops to fight in Ukraine. A New York Times piece by Christiaan Triebert studied a leaked video of a man resembling Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of Putin’s and long rumored to be Wagner’s head, trying to recruit shock troops at a penal colony in Yoshkar-Ola, about 400 miles east of the Russian capital of Moscow. The man in the video promises prisoners their freedom in exchange for a six-month tour of duty in Ukraine; while it’s unclear when the video was filmed, experts assess it was made sometime in the past three months, indicating that the recruitment efforts are not new.

“To turn somebody who is a convicted felon with, as far as we know, no real military — or at least combat — experience, to marshal hundreds of thousands of men to the front line of what is arguably one of the most important wars in Russia’s modern history, tells you something about the mentality in the Kremlin right now,” Candace Rondeaux, the director of Future Frontlines at the New America think tank, told the Times.

It’s also an indication of the Kremlin’s continuing desire to shield Russian people from the realities of the war, although the armed forces are also trying to bring in volunteers from the civilian population — touting high wages and leaning heavily on patriotism and hyper-masculine posturing to do so, Reuters reported Sunday.

Even if the Russian armed forces somehow solve the recruitment problem, the intertwined issues of leadership and training remain. “We’ve seen such high levels of Russian officer casualties, and the officers coming are even less experienced,” Mason Clark, the Russia team lead at the Institute for the Study of War, told Vox. “We’ve seen cadets rushed out of Russian military educational institutions early and sent to the front lines, and the replacements are not getting the full training that they would if the Kremlin pursued large-scale mobilization. It’s just pushing forward largely unfit personnel to replace initial losses.”

That played out in the Kharkiv offensive in early September, when Russian forces fled in the face of oncoming Ukrainian troops, as opposed to a planned, orderly withdrawal, John Spencer, the chair of urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum, told Vox. “Organizationally, it means they don’t even have the capability to do a measured withdrawal,” he said. Though the units that fled Kharkiv oblast aren’t representative of the whole Russian military, their strategy — or lack thereof — does point toward a potentially force-wide problem that can play to Ukraine’s advantage.

“Ukrainians have been attacking Russian sources of power — their ammunition supply, their command and control networks, because they don’t have a flexible command and control network,” Spencer said. “So if you take out their control cells and their generals, it weakens the enemy.”

There’s also a political element to the disarray in leadership, Konaev said. Not only do the armed forces lack qualified leaders because they’re being taken out on the battlefield, they’re also “being purged continuously from within,” she told Vox. “We’ve seen a lot of turnover in who has the military districts, who’s the head of the airborne forces, the VDV— they’re elite forces — the commander of the Black Sea fleets, and a bunch of junior commanders have all been continuously replaced,” causing a lack of “institutional knowledge, lack of trust, not enough time to prove any sort of an independent concept of how they would reorient and regroup or perform better — there’s not enough time to implement it.”

The culture of fear is also “likely further impeding the willingness [of commanders] to take risks or plot effective operations,” Clark said, making a tactical shift next to impossible.

So while Ukraine is attacking Russia’s command structure on the battlefield, the Kremlin and personal politicking at the highest levels are doing plenty to push that process along.

“A lot of this starts with the problems at the top,” Konaev said. “There’s a bit of a tension between vying for power and trying to avoid responsibility” for Russia’s failures on the battlefield. “So you always have these levels of command who want more leadership and prestige and power, but at the same time, nobody wants to be the last one standing, caught responsible for all of these failures.”

The challenges of intelligence collection are amplified

Another major area of weakness is Russia’s reconnaissance capabilities, which leaves Russian forces vulnerable and has also caused havoc on the frontline, as Clark told Vox. After the fast and continued successes of the Kharkiv offensive, he said, “there’s been a lot of exaggerated reports from Russian sources of imminent Ukrainian attacks all along the line” — a testament to the demoralizing nature of the attack, but also units’ inability to get good information.

Part of Russia’s challenges with intelligence collection are apparently due to the heavy losses that some of its elite teams — including reconnaissance units — have suffered due to poor planning and lack of heavy armored support, according to a recent report from the Congressional Research Service. Ukraine has also destroyed and captured Russian surveillance drones like the Orlan-10, according to reporting from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Moscow has reportedly lost 918 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) during the war, both surveillance and attack varieties, according to the Kyiv Independent and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

But it’s not just a problem of collecting intelligence, Konaev told Vox; intelligence analysis and dissemination on the Russian side also suffer from disorganization, mistrust, fear, and failure of command and control, leading to “institutional incapacitation.” It’s a fundamental question of “who is in charge of the intelligence gathering, processing, and coordination, on which front, and are they speaking to each other,” she told Vox.

Adding to the confusion, Putin in May switched responsibility for intelligence gathering in Ukraine to the GRU, the military intelligence unit, after repeated failures on the part of the FSB, the state security services, prior to and in the early stages of the war. “There’s a lot of conflicting, and often rivaling, intelligence bodies and groups that are active there,” Konaev said. “And this multi-layered, disorganized, and incoherent approach to intelligence collection, analysis, and coordination has undermined them at every part of the war.”

“Intelligence is notoriously difficult to get right and to coordinate, especially when you have a country like Russia where the intelligence services have accumulated so much power,” Konaev explained. Intelligence services have significant influence at the political level, as well as “massive amounts of control over information that they can disclose or choose not to disclose but at the same time, they still very much fear the consequences of disclosing something that might dissatisfy Putin.”

Doctrine and practice are two different things

Ultimately, Russian military doctrine — the planning, systems, and strategy that’s supposed to underpin how it conducts war — hasn’t been particularly effective in Ukraine. Hybrid warfare, a vaunted aspect of that doctrine, has broken down to the extent that it was even used in this conflict. Russian military parades and shows of force aren’t the same as doing battle with an adversary. It also seems as though Russia is operating from a Soviet-era personnel playbook that doesn’t function in the current landscape.

“One of the hallmarks of the Russian, and before that the Soviet system, was they effectively designed around the fact that their baseline infantry men were not as skilled as in the US, or NATO, or, in World War II, the Axis powers,” Clark told Vox. “But the intent was that the officers were competent, and the overall operational minds were very effective, and they sort of played to their own strengths.” Under that logic, pushing inferior troops onto the battlefield would still be operationally useful, because they’d be operating under strategically superior leadership executing a well-designed battle plan. “We’re not seeing that here,” he said.

That sense of stasis permeates the whole structure, top to bottom, with the “paralysis in the Kremlin’s decision making,” since the spring, as Clark said, resulting in a “Russian approach to the war [which] has not really changed since then,” to its own detriment.

It’s also unclear to what extent Russian wargaming, such as it is, has tested the pain points of its operational strategy. Though Russia is part of its own military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and conducted war games just this month, “the public wargaming that we see, that is essentially a show of force,” Konaev said. The covert wargaming — in which militaries are supposed to probe their own weaknesses and strengthen or otherwise compensate for those areas — are kept under wraps for a reason. If the Kremlin did conduct these kinds of stress tests, it’s not clear what lessons were learned, if any.

“At a certain point, you can, in theory, understand a certain miscalculation,” Konaev told Vox. “Everyone, even much better-equipped, trained, and learned organizations like the US military make mistakes and make incorrect assumptions about their enemy, and miscalculate their levels of commitment and resistance. But the fact that [the Russians] have continuously made mistakes throughout the war that are of a very similar kind is unforgivable, from that standpoint.”

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Next Up In Politics & Policy

Vox · by Ellen Ioanes · September 18, 2022

11. Ukraine’s Success Shows Mastery of 3 Essential Skills of Modern Warfare

Precision fires, deception, and operational art.

Excerpts:

1. Deception is still possible in conflict

2. Precision strikes facilitate depth and produces cascading effects

3. War remains a continuation of politics

Ukraine’s Success Shows Mastery of 3 Essential Skills of Modern Warfare

Operational art can still trump relative combat power, and deception is still possible in our age of satellites and cellphones.

defenseone.com · by Benjamin Jensen

Ukrainian forces, aided by Western firepower, have upset traditional military logic once again.

Advancing deep into Ukrainian territory seized by Moscow earlier in its invasion, a counteroffensive launched in September 2022, has forced back the invading Russian army. In the process Kyiv has recaptured over 2,000 square miles of land in the country’s northeast and left Moscow’s prized units like the 1st Tank Guards Army in disarray.

The success of the counteroffensive has shown that what is known in military circles as “operational art” – the creative use of time, space and forces to achieve a position of advantage – can be more important than relative combat power and simply counting the tanks and artillery possessed by either side in conflict.

And while this latest operational turning point in Ukraine is not the end of the conflict, as a defense strategist with more than 19 years of military experience, I see three key insights about modern warfare in the recent Ukrainian success.

1. Deception is still possible in conflict

Modern war takes place during an open-source intelligence revolution in which commercial satellite photos and a constant stream of social media facts and fiction bombard politicians, soldiers and citizens. This flood of information makes hiding large military formations increasingly difficult, if not impossible. Yet, Ukrainians have shown the world that a globally connected information environment does not mean the art of deception is dead.

Ukraine’s military planners used old concepts optimized for a new era in designing its counteroffensive. They employed a variant of the 19th-century military concept of “central position.” This concept is associated with Napoleon, who when confronted with two armies, positioned his forces between them to split the enemy. This allowed the French leader to concentrate his forces in one location, even when they were outnumbered overall.

In the recent counteroffensive, Ukraine used a central position to confront two concentrations of Russian forces, one in the east around the city of Kharkiv and the Donbas region – which includes portions of Donetsk and Luhansk – and a second in the south along the Dnieper River and Kherson. These Russian forces collectively outnumbered Ukraine’s army and possessed greater numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and attack aircraft.

While Ukraine was building up forces in Kherson in the south and using rocket artillery, sabotage and unconventional warfare to attack infrastructure to isolate Russian troops, it also maintained a large armored force in the east. This gave Ukraine the ability to fix Russian forces along one front while attacking on another.

Ukraine’s central position made Russia have to factor in the possibility of Ukrainian troops attacking in either direction.

Ukraine also employed a clever form of deception adopting elements of what is known as “Magruder’s Principle.” This maxim holds that it is easier to induce a target to maintain a pre-existing belief than introduce a new idea.

By conducting strikes that isolated Russian forces along the Dnieper River and making public statements that suggested Ukraine would attack Kherson, Ukraine reinforced Russian views that Kherson would be the initial main area of attack during the counteroffensive. This use of public statements and action to shape an adversary’s decision-making is also consistent with the old Soviet concept of “reflexive control,” which uses misinformation to skew how the target perceives the world and conditions them to make self-defeating decisions.

As a result, Russia moved forces to the south to bolster its fighting positions in Kherson. Doing so likely hollowed out Moscow’s forces in the east and compromised its ability to deploy reserves.

Combined with Ukraine’s central position, this clever ruse meant that Kyiv set the conditions for the large-scale rout of Putin’s army in the east and future operations to retake Kherson.

2. Precision strikes facilitate depth and produces cascading effects

At a more tactical level, Ukraine has proven a master of using precision strikes to hamper the movement of Russian troops. Kyiv has employed swarms of “loitering munitions” – airborne drones that locate and then attack targets – alongside a mix of anti-tank guided missiles as well as traditional armored formations and artillery to pressure Russian ground forces.

This combination has freed up the country’s warplanes, special operations teams and long-range precision missiles to hunt Russian radars, command posts and supply depots. The net result is that Russian forces have had to confront multiple dilemmas and have struggled to build up sufficient combat power to counterattack and halt the Ukrainian advance.

War is a complex system governed more by power laws than linear dynamics. That is to say, smaller, mobile force – like the Ukrainians – can defeat larger armies. The depth and simultaneity of the Ukrainian tactical approach in the counteroffensive produced shock and dislocation. Information operations compounded this effect by circulating images of retreating soldiers, thus making defection and surrender contagious.

3. War remains a continuation of politics

A political timeline drove the sequence and setting of Ukraine’s recent counteroffensive. Kyiv needed to disrupt the ability of Russia to hold an illegitimate referendum in Kherson and occupied territory in the east – the same playbook Moscow used to seize Ukrainian territory in 2014 through the Minsk agreement.

Moscow wanted to use the referendum to justify annexing Ukrainian territory and show progress to a weary Russian public.

At the same time, Putin was likely trying to consolidate territorial gains before using the looming threat of winter to divide Western support for Kyiv. In other words, at the strategic level even if the recent counteroffensive had not gained large amounts of territory or defeated entire Russian divisions it could have complicated Moscow’s ability to hold a referendum in occupied territory. Russian forces would be forced to defend the front as opposed to securing polling sites.

So while the operational and tactical gains produced by the counteroffensive are important, the underlying underlying objective Ukraine is pursuing at the strategic level remains political.

This political logic, despite the success of the counteroffensive, casts doubt on the prospects of the conflict ending with a decisive battlefield defeat of Russian forces in the near term. Even if Ukraine makes significant gains in the south and retakes Kherson, Moscow can still opt for a large-scale mobilization and continue the war until either Russian elites or its citizens turn on Putin and his inner circle.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

defenseone.com · by Benjamin Jensen

12. China’s ungainly balancing act with Russia

Excerpts;

This was underlined during the Xi-Putin meeting in Samarkand. Here, Putin appeared almost apologetic, acknowledging publicly that China had “questions and concerns” about Russia’s “special military operation” that he would “explain in detail” to his counterpart.

The Chinese readout, in contrast, made no reference to Ukraine and paid lip service to Sino-Russian efforts to build a “more equitable and reasonable international order”. Significantly, although Xi noted that "China is willing to strongly support each other with Russia on issues involving each other’s core interests”, the “core interests” of Russia’s that China is prepared to support were not specified. Russia’s commitment to common positions on China’s “core interests” are, however: commitment to the “One China principle”, condemnation of “provocative moves by individual countries on issues concerning China’s core interests”, and Sino-Russia commitment to “promote” regional security and stability “based on the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs”.

While for some this demonstrates not only that China now has the “upper hand” in the Sino-Russian relationship but that Xi may “ditch” Putin, we must recognise the big ticket item that Xi gets out of continuing the relationship on its current course.

Xi’s driving agenda has been the “struggle” to attain the “China Dream” of “great national rejuvenation” and the primary obstacle to that is a truculent and declining US hegemon. Close Sino-Russian ties, from China’s perspective, are judged to be important in this context so long as they contribute to China’s economic and military strength and assist in constraining the United States.

This calculus means that absent a complete Russian military collapse and/or overthrow of Putin, Beijing will likely continue its attempt to preserve Sino-Russian alignment, while deflecting potential collateral damage to its own interests.

China’s ungainly balancing act with Russia | Lowy Institute

The promise is a “no limits” friendship. But there are evident boundaries, all the same.

lowyinstitute.org · by Michael Clarke

President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Uzbekistan has prompted another round of speculation about China’s stake in its Russian relations.

Some would argue that combined with the earlier visit to by Li Zhanshu, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (the third-most senior leader within the Chinese Communist Party), the Xi-Putin meeting demonstrates that the normative basis of the “no limits” relationship between Beijing and Moscow proclaimed in February remains firm.

Prominent commentary on Sino-Russian ties often swings between alarmism and triumphalism.

But an interests-based assessment of China’s behaviour since the Russian invasion of Ukraine indicates that Beijing is attempting an ungainly balancing act between its simultaneous desire to maintain the strategic partnership with Russia and minimise collateral damage to its economic interests and diplomatic reputation, while also extracting leverage from Moscow’s travails.

This stands in contrast to some prominent commentary on Sino-Russian ties, which often swings between alarmism and triumphalism.

Prior to the war, some asserted that Moscow and Beijing were building a “grand coalition” that was “increasingly joining forces in the international arena to balance against America”. With Russia’s military reversals, however, the pendulum has swung back towards confident assertions that a defeat for Moscow in Ukraine is a defeat for China, and that Putin’s misadventure marks a “huge embarrassment” for Xi.

These swings misread the nature and extent of Beijing’s stakes in its relationship with Moscow, and how Beijing sees it as contributing to its broader geopolitical goals.

Balakliya, Kharkiv region on 18 September 2022, recently recaptured by the Ukrainian army following the retreat of Russian troops (Sergey Bobok/AFP via Getty Images)

Beijing has sought to bolster the “no limits” rhetoric through a number of measures such as abstaining from the 25 February UN Security Council vote to condemn Russia’s invasion, regularly asserting its opposition to economic and diplomatic sanctions on Moscow, and continued promotion of the idea that China and Russia are building an alternate international order to that authored by the West. This has been coupled with regular repetition of the Russian narratives regarding the causes of the war in Ukraine, including by Li Zhanshu if we are to believe the Russian readout of his meeting with leaders of the Russian Duma on 9 September.

Further belying the “no limits” rhetoric has been Beijing’s efforts to leverage Russian weakness.

Even so, Beijing is reticent about lending full-throated support to Moscow. In contrast to the Russian version, the Xinhua report of Li’s remarks in Vladivostok makes no mention at all of the war in Ukraine. Instead, it highlighted the standard boilerplate that relations between the countries set “a good example of good-neighbourly friendship and win-win cooperation between major countries”, and the vague declaration that “China is willing to continue to work with Russia to firmly support each other on issues concerning each other's core interests”.

Beijing has also limited collateral damage to its economic interests and diplomatic reputation by not assisting Russia to evade US and European sanctions, as well as restricting Chinese state bank financing for Russian commodity purchases. Importantly, Chinese companies have also halted or paused projects with Russia.

Further belying the “no limits” rhetoric has been Beijing’s efforts to leverage Russian weakness. This has been most apparent in an economic context as Western-imposed sanctions have forced Moscow to turn towards China, making Russia even more of a junior partner in the relationship. This has been most noticeable in the energy sector where Russia overtook Saudi Arabia as China’s leading source of oil in May and June. China’s economic interest rather than political solidarity has driven this as international sanctions on Russian oil “mean traders have been wary of handling Russian crude, creating a mini glut that sees Russia’s oil trading $20 to $30 cheaper than international benchmark prices”.

Beijing’s efforts to balance Sino-Russian relations with its broader economic and diplomatic interests may indeed look ungainly. However, they demonstrate that it will not sacrifice its own core interests on the altar of Putin’s folly.

This was underlined during the Xi-Putin meeting in Samarkand. Here, Putin appeared almost apologetic, acknowledging publicly that China had “questions and concerns” about Russia’s “special military operation” that he would “explain in detail” to his counterpart.

The Chinese readout, in contrast, made no reference to Ukraine and paid lip service to Sino-Russian efforts to build a “more equitable and reasonable international order”. Significantly, although Xi noted that "China is willing to strongly support each other with Russia on issues involving each other’s core interests”, the “core interests” of Russia’s that China is prepared to support were not specified. Russia’s commitment to common positions on China’s “core interests” are, however: commitment to the “One China principle”, condemnation of “provocative moves by individual countries on issues concerning China’s core interests”, and Sino-Russia commitment to “promote” regional security and stability “based on the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs”.

While for some this demonstrates not only that China now has the “upper hand” in the Sino-Russian relationship but that Xi may “ditch” Putin, we must recognise the big ticket item that Xi gets out of continuing the relationship on its current course.

Xi’s driving agenda has been the “struggle” to attain the “China Dream” of “great national rejuvenation” and the primary obstacle to that is a truculent and declining US hegemon. Close Sino-Russian ties, from China’s perspective, are judged to be important in this context so long as they contribute to China’s economic and military strength and assist in constraining the United States.

This calculus means that absent a complete Russian military collapse and/or overthrow of Putin, Beijing will likely continue its attempt to preserve Sino-Russian alignment, while deflecting potential collateral damage to its own interests.

lowyinstitute.org · by Michael Clarke

13. Iranian-backed attacks on Albania highlights need for Cyber Capacity Building

Conclusion:

The United States and its NATO allies must support the alliance’s less developed partners in protecting their critical infrastructure from cyberattacks. Attacks like the ones by Iran on Albania are best countered by a combination of cost imposition efforts that hold malicious cyber actors accountable for their actions and proactive measures to strengthen the defense and resilience of NATO systems. Investments in the cyber capacity building efforts highlighted above will go a long way to addressing the defensive requirements.

Iranian-backed attacks on Albania highlights need for Cyber Capacity Building

thecipherbrief.com

September 19th, 2022 by Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, |

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior director at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he is also a senior fellow. He directs CSC 2.0, which works to implement the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission, where he previously served as executive director. Follow him on Twitter @MarkCMontgomery

View all articles by Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Albania, a NATO member state, cut diplomatic ties with Iran earlier this month after blaming Tehran for a cyberattack against Albanian government networks. It is an unprecedented response to a cyberattack that highlights the impact of such attacks and how they could rapidly move NATO into a crisis or contingency.

Cyber deterrence relies on both maintaining offensive cyber capabilities and improving the resilience of cyber networks. This reality reinforces the importance of building the cyber defense capabilities of NATO allies.

Albania says July’s ransomware attack destroyed government data and temporarily disabled digital services. A group calling itself HomeLand Justice, claiming to be Albanian citizens, claimed responsibility for the attack. The group said in a telegram message that it was upset about the government’s decision to provide refuge to roughly 3,000 members of the Iranian opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which the United States has designated as a terrorist group.

But in announcing his country’s decision to sever diplomatic ties, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama called the cyberattack “state-sponsored aggression,” explaining that investigations aided by Microsoft and the FBI provided “indisputable” evidence that four Iranian government-backed groups were responsible.

The United States and United Kingdom expressed agreement with Albania’s attribution, with Washington pledging to “take further action to hold Iran accountable for actions that threaten the security of a U.S. ally.” NATO also condemned the attack. Following the severing of diplomatic ties, Albania experienced further cyberattacks last week, allegedly from Iran, that disrupted Albanian police and border control networks.

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Albania is not the only NATO ally to come under attack from state-backed and criminal hacking groups. An independent Russian hacking group, for example, has declared “war” against 10 countries, including the United States and several of its allies. Earlier this month, the criminal Cuba Ransomware group crippled government systems in Montenegro. Like Albania, Montenegro is receiving remediation and investigative support from Washington and its NATO allies.

NATO takes these attacks seriously at least in part, because if the critical infrastructure or government systems of NATO member states are disrupted, the alliance’s ability to project power in a time of conflict could be weakened. Recognizing this problem, NATO allies pledged in June to “significantly strengthen our cyber defenses through enhanced civil-military cooperation.”

The Biden administration should support this pledge by having the Department of State’s newly formed Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy spearhead a resilience summit with NATO allies. This gathering should have the goal of improving member states’ cyber defenses and coordinating an alliance-wide cyber capacity building effort to strengthen vulnerable NATO allies. The administration should also work with Congress to ensure full resourcing of the numerous State and Defense Department programs that improve the cyber defenses of U.S. partners.

The administration can fund this capacity building support in at five least ways.

First, it can expand State Department funding for the Assistance to Europe and Eurasia program to support cybersecurity programs in Eastern Europe that improve incident response and remediation capabilities. These programs could also train personnel on international cyberspace law and the policy and technical aspects of attribution of cyber incidents.

Second, there are funding opportunities to counter international cybercrime within the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The INL programs build the capacity of partners to counter cybercrime by strengthening their ability to develop and implement national laws, policies, and procedures to hold malign actors accountable.

Third, Washington could utilize the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership. This State Department program supports international capacity building efforts that foster government-industry cooperation on cybersecurity and that build cyber resilience in partner networks.

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Fourth, the State Department could expand Foreign Military Financing for cybersecurity capacity building efforts. This funding strengthens the readiness of partner military forces and encourages regional cooperation against nation-state cyber threats such as those demonstrated by Iran as well as Russia, China, and North Korea.

Finally, the Department of Defense could continue to expand funding for “hunt forward operations” by U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). These operations allow forward deployed CYBERCOM operators to sit in partner networks and observe and identify malicious activity that threaten partners. The operators can then use these insights to increase the resilience of critical allied networks. As of May 2022, CYBERCOM had conducted 28 such hunt forward operations in 16 countries.

The United States and its NATO allies must support the alliance’s less developed partners in protecting their critical infrastructure from cyberattacks. Attacks like the ones by Iran on Albania are best countered by a combination of cost imposition efforts that hold malicious cyber actors accountable for their actions and proactive measures to strengthen the defense and resilience of NATO systems. Investments in the cyber capacity building efforts highlighted above will go a long way to addressing the defensive requirements.

Michael Sugden, intern with CCTI and a master’s student in security policy studies with a concentration in science and technology from The George Washington University, contributed to this column.

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14. U.S. frees Taliban narcotics kingpin in exchange for Navy veteran

U.S. frees Taliban narcotics kingpin in exchange for Navy veteran | FDD's Long War Journal

longwarjournal.org · by Bill Roggio · September 19, 2022

The Taliban released Mark Frerichs, an American veteran who had been held hostage since early 2020, in exchange for Haji Bashir Noorzai, a convicted Taliban drug kingpin who was serving a life sentence for smuggling heroin into the United States. The U.S. routinely claims it does not negotiate with terrorist groups, but this prisoner swap is just the latest example.

The Taliban, which also claims to be against narcotics production and smuggling, gave Noorzai a hero’s welcome upon his return to Kabul on Sept. 19. He was given a military escort and showered with garlands of flowers.

Haji Bishar, last Afghan prisoner in #Guantanamo prison, was freed by efforts of the Islamic Emirate. He was imprisoned in Guantanamo for almost 17 years, and after his liberation, he arrived in #Afghanistan today. pic.twitter.com/fhPWZnYfV5

— RTA English (@rtaenglish1) September 19, 2022

Before his arrest in 2005, Noorzai was added to the list of the U.S. government’s foreign narcotics kingpins and was considered to be one of the world’s 10 most wanted narcotics traffickers. The U.S. government claimed Noorzai smuggled more than $50 million in heroin into the U.S. In 2008, Noorzai was sentenced to life in prison.

Noorzai had longtime ties to the Taliban. At the time of his arrest, U.S. Attorney David Kelley described Noorzai as “perhaps the most notorious Afghan drug lord and has built, over the last 15 years, a multimillion-dollar heroin business by forging an unholy alliance with [Taliban founder and first emir] Mullah Mohammad Omar and the Taliban.”

“Between 1990 and 2004, Noorzai and his organization provided demolitions, weaponry, and militia manpower to the Taliban. In exchange, the Taliban permitted Noorzai’s business to flourish and served as protection for Noorzai’s opium crops, heroin laboratories, and drug transportation routes out of the country,” Kelley said.

Frerichs kidnapped by the Taliban’s Haqqani Network

Frerichs, a U.S. Navy veteran who was working as a civil engineer in Afghanistan, was kidnapped in Jan. 2020, just one month before the Trump administration cut a deal with the Taliban that paved the way for the U.S. withdrawal under the Biden administration.

Frerichs was kidnapped in the eastern Afghanistan province of Khost, a bastion of the Al Qaeda-allied Haqqani Network, the powerful and arguably the most influential Taliban subgroup in Afghanistan. Frerichs’ disappearance triggered a multi-agency search across Afghanistan.

While the U.S. military was frantically searching for Frerichs in Afghanistan, it was highly likely he was moved across the border to Pakistan, where the Taliban has previously detained other U.S. and foreign hostages. The Haqqani Network controls territory in the Pakistani tribal districts of North and South Waziristan, as well as in Kurram, despite claims by the Pakistani government and military that it has rooted out the group through military operations.

The Haqqani Network is led by Sirajuddin Haqqani. Sirajuddin is the Taliban’s Interior Minister, and also serves as one of the two deputy emirs of the Taliban. Sirajuddin played a key role in the Taliban’s military takeover of Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network is closely tied to Al Qaeda and other foreign terror groups, and helped institutionalize suicide tactics within the ranks of the Taliban.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

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longwarjournal.org · by Bill Roggio · September 19, 2022

15. Ukraine’s Counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson and the Road Ahead

Ukraine’s Counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson and the Road Ahead | FDD's Long War Journal

longwarjournal.org · by John Hardie · September 16, 2022

Ukraine’s stunning victory in Kharkiv Oblast has reshaped the battlefield and dealt a powerful blow to Vladimir Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continue to wage a more gradual but no less important counteroffensive in southern Ukraine. This analysis will unpack them both and highlight some factors that will shape the road ahead.

Kharkiv Counteroffensive

The Ukrainian General Staff, with Western assistance, formulated a plan to retake territory on two fronts: Kherson Oblast in southern Ukraine and Kharkiv Oblast in the east. For months, Kyiv telegraphed its intention to launch a counteroffensive in Kherson, while keeping its plans in Kharkiv under wraps. This led Russia to bolster its previously thin presence in the south, including by redeploying much of its forces from the area around Izyum, where Russian forces had been trying — without success — to push toward Slovyansk, one of two major cities in the Donbas that remain under Ukrainian control.

In recent weeks, Russian military correspondents and commentators began warning of a Ukrainian buildup south of Izyum and particularly near Balakliya, a city key for protecting the northwestern flank of Russia’s Izyum grouping. Ukraine had already been pressuring at Russian positions south of Izyum and around Balakliya, where Russian forces had been left thin. Yet the Russian military command evidently did not add reinforcements. The top Russian-installed official in Kharkiv Oblast later said Ukrainian forces outnumbered Russian troops by eight to one during the counteroffensive.

Ukrainian forces in the Balakliya area included some of the country’s most capable units, comprising elements of the 14th and 92nd mechanized brigades, 25th Airborne Brigade, 80th Airborne Assault Brigade, 3rd and 4th brigades, 214th Separate Rifle Battalion, 112th and 113th territorial defense brigades, and possibly the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, along with a battalion from the 1st Special Purpose Brigade and various other special operations forces. Near Izyum, Ukraine had elements of its 30th and 93rd mechanized brigades, including the latter’s Carpathian Sich Battalion, as well as the 95th and 79th airborne assault brigades, 81st Airmobile Brigade, and 71st Jaeger Infantry Brigade. Elements of several artillery brigades were also deployed in the area.

Prior to launching the counteroffensive, Ukraine conducted shaping operations targeting ammunition and fuel depots, command-and-control nodes, and other high-value targets in the Russian rear. Early on September 6, Ukraine reportedly massed armor and punched into western Balakliya and the nearby suburbs of Verbivka and Yakovenkove as well as Chkalovs’ke to the north, while pushing toward road junctions at Volokhiv Yar and Shevchenkove.

Russian lines broke quickly. Forces from the so-called “people’s republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, who typically are poorly trained and equipped and have low morale, reportedly manned the front line around Balakliya. Two units from Rosgvardia, or Russia’s national guard, which is not trained or equipped for heavy combat, apparently manned the second line. Rosgvardia generally has low interoperability with regular Russian forces, reportedly resulting in poor coordination between those Rosgvardia units and their artillery support (likely provided by forces from the 288th Artillery Brigade of Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army). Personnel from the “Redut” private military company reportedly were also in the area.

Russia seems to have had few reserves nearby that could stem the Ukrainian advance. Russian forces in the area consisted primarily of understrength units from the Western Military District, which took debilitating losses during the first phase of the war. Elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army’s 144th and possibly 3rd motor rifle divisions were in the area, including the former’s 488th Motor Rifle Regiment. So were elements of the Baltic Fleet’s 18th Motor Rifle Division, including its 7th Motor Rifle Regiment, along with the 26th Tank Regiment of the 1st Guards Tank Army’s recently formed 47th Tank Division. Some elements of the 150th Motor Rifle Division, part of the Southern Military District’s 8th Combined Arms Army, also appear to have been in the area. Unconfirmed accounts from Ukrainian and Russian sources suggest at least some regular Russian units simply abandoned Balakliya.

The Russian Air Force also appears to have been ineffective in staunching Ukrainian advances. While open-source information provided a very partial picture of the air domain, it appears Ukraine had dense air defense coverage of the area, having deployed additional air defense systems near Balakliya during its buildup there. This reportedly led Russian aircraft to be particularly cautious, degrading their ability to support Russia ground forces — a task with which the Russian Air Force has already struggled throughout the war. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian airstrikes in three or four different settlements in the Balakliya-Izyum area on September 6 but none thereafter. The chaotic battlefield may have caused friendly-fire concerns or made Russian forward air controllers — on whom Russian aircraft reportedly relied almost exclusively for target acquisition — unable to deliver timely coordinates.

Ukrainian forces quickly exploited their initial breakthrough. Ukrainian commanders employed shrewd operational art, largely bypassing Volokhiv Yar and Shevchenkove to penetrate deeper behind Russian lines, pressing toward Vesele, Sen’kove, and Kup’yans’k, while also pushing northward — and eventually southward — toward Izyum. Ukrainian forces appear to have been effective in combining infantry and armor, much of the latter donated from the West.

Russia scrambled to send reinforcements, including elements of the 90th Guards Tank Division and possibly parts of the newly formed 3rd Army Corps. But they did not arrive in time to halt Ukrainian advances, although one Russian source indicated the reinforcements in Izyum may have bought Russia some time to avoid the encirclement of its forces there.

By September 10, Ukraine had taken part of Kup’yans’k, the key road and rail hub supporting the Russian grouping at Izyum. This left Moscow little choice but to abandon the Izyum axis or risk the encirclement of a large portion of its forces. Russia’s Defense Ministry announced that Russian troops in the area would retrograde across the Oskil River, attempting to spin the defeat as a refocusing on Moscow’s original goal of taking the rest of Donetsk Oblast.

However, Ukraine’s stunning victory in Kharkiv Oblast has almost certainly dashed Russia’s (already small) chances of taking Slovyansk and nearby Kramatorsk. Russia’s enormous equipment losses during the counteroffensive will further degrade its offensive potential. The Oryx blog documented over 580 visually confirmed Russian equipment losses from September 7 to September 13, many of them abandoned by fleeing Russian troops.

What is more, Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast and norther Donetsk Oblast, for which the Russian military sacrificed a great deal of blood and equipment during the summer, are now at risk. Indeed, Ukrainian forces have already retaken or contested a number of towns in those areas.

Kherson Counteroffensive

Kherson Oblast and its eponymous capital city carry greater strategic importance for Ukraine than does the east. Kherson is a key port city and holds considerable political significance as the only regional capital taken since Putin launched his full-scale war in February. Militarily, retaking Kherson would close the door to an (already unlikely) Russian push toward Mykolaiv and Odesa. Kyiv also sought to thwart Moscow’s plans for a sham annexation referendum, which a Russian-installed official last week said had been “paused” due to the security situation.

Ukraine preceded its Kherson counteroffensive with a monthslong effort to strike high-value Russian targets such as ammunition and fuel depots, command-and-control nodes, air defense systems, and several key bridges on which Russian forces relied to move supplies across the Dnipro and Inhulets rivers. Ukrainian forces conducted long-range precision strikes using HIMARS rocket artillery systems and other Western-provided weapons, while Ukrainian special operations forces and partisans worked conducted sabotage and provided intelligence behind Russian lines.

Russia has sought to compensate by dispersing its depots and using pontoon bridges and ferries, which Ukraine has also targeted. Russia has continually repaired the damaged bridges, enabling a lower volume of light vehicles to use the bridges in between Ukrainian strikes. But now, at least one of the bridges has fully collapsed, and the others are likely on their last legs. The strain on its logistics makes it harder for Russia to supply its troops on the western side of the Dnipro River and has likely resulted in a decrease in the rate of Russian artillery fire there.

Following several days of particularly intense strikes, a spokesperson from Ukraine’s southern command announced ground operations had commenced on August 29, although they may have begun slightly earlier. Ukrainian forces have advanced along three axes. The main effort centers on Ukraine’s pre-existing bridgehead over the Inhulets River near Andriivka, with auxiliary efforts in the Vysokopillya and Posad-Pokrovs’ke areas.

Ukraine evidently aims to split the Russian grouping on the western side of the Dnipro by pushing from its bridgehead to split the grouping of Russian troops on the Dnipro’s western bank, while continuing to squeeze Russian logistics. Kyiv likely hopes to force the Russian command to abandon an untenable position and withdrawal across the river, allowing Ukraine to liberate Kherson city without a destructive urban battle.

So far, Ukrainian forces have made modest progress, with the most notable gains coming in the Andriivka area, where Ukraine has expanded its bridgehead by around 15 kilometers. While it is difficult to discern through open sources exactly how Ukraine allocated forces between the Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives, it is clear the Kherson effort is well-resourced, although it will likely take time given the substantial Russian presence there.

Russia likely retains advantages in massed artillery, electronic warfare, and aviation despite Ukraine’s success in using Western-supplied weapons to degrade Russian logistics and free up Ukrainian manned and unmanned aircraft by suppressing or destroying Russia’s capable air defense and electronic warfare systems. Ground warfare generally favors the defender, and the region’s open terrain and irrigation canals enhance that advantage.

The Road Ahead

Ukraine appears to have seized the strategic initiative and will likely continue to pressure Russian defenses across multiple fronts. The Ukrainian military has proven it can resource two simultaneous counteroffensives, while Moscow faces a dilemma between allocating its increasingly thin and exhausted forces between the east and south, and redeploying forces between the two takes time. Ukraine has already capitalized on these challenges through its Kharkiv counteroffensive and will likely look to continue exploiting them to maintain its momentum and retake additional territory.

In addition to pressing in Luhansk Oblast as discussed above, Ukraine could launch a counteroffensive in the Vuhledar or Zaporizhzhia areas. Over the past week, Russian observers have warned that Ukraine is massing forces and removing minefields in the Vuhledar area, potentially seeking to retake Volnovakha, a road and rail hub, and then push down to Mariupol, thereby severing Russia’s “land bridge” to Crimea. Russian sources have offered similar warnings about the Zaporizhzhia direction.

In fact, Kyiv reportedly initially planned to pursue something along these lines but opted to go with the Kharkiv counteroffensive on U.S. advice. Russia is now reinforcing its defensive lines in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts with elements of the 3rd Army Corps and units withdrawn from Kharkiv Oblast, according to Ukraine’s General Staff.

Indeed, manpower has been Russia’s central weakness since the war’s second phase began and will remain so. As the analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee have shown, many Russian units came into war significantly understrength. Russia’s heavy casualties during the Battle of Kyiv exacerbated that problem. Russian forces continued to take significant casualties during the summer campaign in Luhansk Oblast, achieving relatively meager gains while undermining Russia’s ability to sustain the war effort.

Putin could ameliorate his manpower issue by deploying conscripts en masse or conducting a partial mobilization. Conscripts comprise around 30 percent of Russia’s military and a slightly higher percentage of its Ground Forces, making them a substantial pool of potential manpower. Likewise, mobilization would allow the Russian military to take in additional troops, particularly reservists with key specialties. It would also impose criminal penalties for servicemen who refuse to participate in the war, whereas they currently are not supposed to face criminal consequences for refusing to fight. This has led many Russian troops — probably in the thousands — to quit the conflict, a number that will likely increase as Russia’s forces grow increasingly exhausted.

However, these measures would be politically unpopular, and Moscow has repeatedly promised they are not on the table. Instead, Russia has pursued half-measures: offering high pay to recruit former servicemen and untrained volunteers on short-term contracts, forcibly mobilizing men from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk, and relying on private military companies, chiefly Wagner, which has been recruiting in prisons.

In addition to having lower training and motivation (with the exception of some Wagner forces, who are relatively few in number), these pools of manpower are also finite. Piecemeal solutions will likely offer diminishing returns as the war progresses and Moscow exhausts the number of Russians willing to volunteer and the number of Donbas men who can be pressed into service. Still, the Kremlin continues to resist growing calls from Russian hawks for mobilization.

Meanwhile, Russia is cannibalizing its regular forces. Although Putin will not deploy conscripts, Russia likely has deployed many of the officers and non-commissioned officers responsible for training and leading them. Russia is also trying to fill shortfalls in infantry with personnel from other types of units, degrading their effectiveness. For instance, personnel from the 11th Army Corps’ 152 Missile Brigade appear to have fought as infantry during the Kharkiv counteroffensive, which tracks with Ukrainian military intelligence’s previous reports that Russia is attempting to recruit missile specialists and sailors to fight as part of ground units. Likewise, one Russian source blamed Russia’s shortage of infantry for its failure to destroy Ukrainian air defense systems during the Kharkiv counteroffensive, as personnel ordinarily tasked with locating such systems were instead diverted to the front lines.

Conversely, Kyiv possesses a large pool of well-motivated manpower, which has enabled Ukraine to replace losses and fill out reserve units with Western kit. However, many of these people have no prior military experience, which particularly limits their effectiveness in offensive operations. To address this issue, the United Kingdom in July launched Operation INTERFLEX, seeking to provide basic training to 10,000 mobilized Ukrainian troops every 120 days. A number of other Western contributors have since joined the effort. The Ukrainian General Staff said this week that almost 5,000 have completed the program, which reportedly is now being expanded from three to five weeks per training cycle to allow for more advanced training.

Overall, the correlation of forces will likely continue to shift in Ukraine’s favor — provided Western military aid continues to flow. Kyiv’s needs are vast. The country is increasingly reliant on Western largesse to sustain the war effort. Ukraine’s stocks of ammunition for its Soviet-made artillery systems are running low, and Kyiv is clamoring for more tanks and armored vehicles to enable further offensive success. Last week, General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, the Ukrainian military’s commander-in-chief, wrote that he hopes for enough Western kit to equip 10 to 20 combined-arms brigades, which Kyiv could use “to launch several consecutive, and ideally, simultaneous counterstrikes throughout 2023.”

In this respect, Ukraine’s success in Kharkiv Oblast was important because it demonstrated to Kyiv’s Western backers that Ukraine can put their aid to good use in retaking territory. For Kyiv, maintaining enthusiasm among its Western supporters will be critical as the Kremlin squeezes Europe’s gas supplies this winter and U.S. and European governments deplete their own stockpiles of materiel.

The war is far from over. There will likely be many months of hard fighting ahead. But there is room for cautious optimism that the conflict has reached a turning point.

John Hardie is the deputy director of FDD’s Russia Program and a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.

Tags: russia, ukraine

longwarjournal.org · by John Hardie · September 16, 2022

16. America’s Education Crisis Is a National Security Threat

Excerpts;

Fortunately, the United States still has good options for coping with loss of educational hegemony. But they all require Washington to take initiative—something it seems unaccustomed to lately. Through more active and imaginative diplomacy, the United States could seek to forge new coalitions or alliances that would add human resource ballast to the liberal order. This might entail patient cultivation of new security partnerships with some of tomorrow’s major centers of highly educated labor: India, Indonesia, Vietnam—maybe even Iran. Other intriguing possibilities include a closer integration of Canada, Mexico, and the United States, which might bring North America’s strategic potential more in line with its tremendous demographic and economic potential.

Meanwhile, the United States could attempt to reverse its ominous educational slowdown. Stagnation in educational attainment is impeding economic growth and likely robbing the United States of trillions of dollars in output each year—a price that will only rise if the United States doesn’t shift course. Part of the problem is that Americans do not want to buy a lot of what U.S. educators want to sell, and it is hard to blame them. The quality of public primary and secondary schooling is woefully uneven, and a high school diploma does not always come with marketable skills. Higher education is increasingly bureaucratized, ideological, and expensive. If Americans treated education as if their future depended on it, they would look for far-reaching overhauls, not marginal changes, and they would look beyond teachers’ unions and university administrators for better ideas. Revitalizing the country’s human resources—not just educational attainment, but health, workforce participation, and even family—will increasingly be strategic imperatives for the United States.

The coming demographic and educational changes are predictable. But they are not entirely inevitable, and they are unfolding slowly. The United States has time to adapt and address its educational shortcomings before it is too late. To avoid squandering its educational edge and putting its position of global primacy at risk, however, Washington must acknowledge that education is no longer just a domestic policy issue but a national security issue on which the very future of the United States depends.

America’s Education Crisis Is a National Security Threat

How a Smarter World Is Changing the Balance of Power

By Nicholas Eberstadt and Evan Abramsky

September 20, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Nicholas Eberstadt and Evan Abramsky · September 20, 2022

Since the end of World War II, the world’s population has not only gotten vastly bigger; it has also become vastly more educated. In nearly every country on earth, the total number of years that citizens have attended school has grown faster than the population itself, and the number of college degrees conferred has grown even faster. Although population growth is now slowing almost everywhere (and depopulation is an emerging reality for some countries), the overall pace of educational expansion will remain much faster than natural population growth as far into the future as a demographer’s eye can see.

Education is a crucial component of human capital and, by extension, of national might. A better-educated citizenry means a more productive economy and thus greater military potential. But because the educational explosion of the last 70 years has been uneven—some countries have made greater strides than others, and the pace of progress has varied over time—this dramatic transformation hasn’t just increased the overall size of the global economy. It has also shifted the distribution of economic potential among countries, including great powers.

Comparatively speaking, Western nations, including the United States, have been the biggest losers in this great reshuffling of educational and economic heft, as we detail in a recent report for the American Enterprise Institute. During the Cold War, the United States was the uncontested education superpower; Americans enjoyed the world’s highest levels of educational attainment and accounted for far more of the world’s highly educated workforce than any other country. But that epoch is now history. An increasing number of countries are overtaking the United States in educational attainment, when measured by mean years of schooling, and it will soon cede its first-place ranking in college-educated workers to China. Sometime in the next two decades, India may also surpass the United States in total numbers of working-age men and women with higher education.

Such changes reflect major shifts in the international environment that have occurred over the past generation and foreshadow still others that will shape the world order in the decades ahead. Whether the United States can weather these changes without forfeiting its position of economic and military dominance will depend in part on its ability to recognize and address the ominous stagnation in its classrooms and lecture halls. That will require thinking creatively about partnerships and alliances with tomorrow’s centers of educational excellence—whether in Asia or in the United States’ backyard—and getting serious about reversing the unwelcome trends in U.S. education that policymakers have overlooked for more than a generation.

SMARTER WORLD

Scholars and strategists have long understood that nations draw strength from their populations. Until recently, however, most have focused on head counts: numbers of people, broken down by age and sex, inhabiting different countries or alliances. But that simple approach makes little sense in a world where people from some countries have much greater economic potential than people from others. Switzerland has fewer residents than Burundi, for instance, but its GDP per capita is more than 90 times greater.

In an era when a single person’s productivity in one country can be greater than that of 90 people in another, human productivity will increasingly affect the global balance of power. Productivity, in turn, is driven primarily by improvements in human capital—in health, knowledge, skills, and other intrinsically human factors. Rapid but sharply differential increases in human capital can open wide productivity gaps between countries, including between great powers, in just a few decades. One of the most important ingredients in human capital is education: more specifically, the sheer quantity of schooling received by national populations. Overwhelming evidence shows that more schooling means more productive potential at the national level, regardless of how high or low a nation’s baseline level of educational attainment.

Two projects have sought to chart the postwar educational explosion around the globe, and their findings offer clues about its effect on the international balance of power: the Human Capital Data Explorer, published by the Vienna-based Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Human Capital, and the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset, run by Harvard University’s Robert Barro and Korea University’s Jong-Wha Lee. The Wittgenstein research provides estimates of the world’s overall demographic and educational profile from 1950 to 2020, with projections up to 2100, while Barro and Lee’s work offers educational attainment estimates for 146 countries from 1950 to 2040. The assessments of these two projects are close but not identical, and we rely on data from both.

Educational progress over the last 70 years has been profound. The global share of adults who have received no schooling dropped from about 45 percent in 1950 to about 13 percent in 2020, and the Wittgenstein Centre projects that that figure could fall to eight percent by 2040. Between 1950 and 2020, the mean years of schooling for people aged 15 and older worldwide steadily rose from 3.7 years to 8.8 years—almost a two-and-a-half-fold increase. Around the world, average levels of adult schooling in 2020 were nearly five and a half years above what they were in 1950. That amounts to a long-term pace of improvement of over 0.7 years per decade, a rate that is projected to continue at a slightly slower tempo over the next 20 years.

Western nations have been the biggest losers in the great reshuffling of educational heft.

These advances have occurred despite significant headwinds created by the shifting composition of global population. In 1950, the world’s less developed regions—where educational attainment remains lowest—accounted for two-thirds of the global population; today they account for five-sixths of the world’s population and virtually all the population growth projected for the next two decades. The countries with the most rapidly increasing populations tend to be those with the lowest baseline levels of schooling, meaning that their weight in the total global composition is steadily growing—and pulling down the global average for education.

Worldwide, the average level of educational attainment is now slightly above a completed grade-school education. If that sounds low, it is because expectations and norms in the developed world are very different today from what they were only a few decades ago. The current mean years of schooling for adults globally is roughly the same as the U.S. mean in the 1950s—a time when the United States led the world in educational attainment. That fact reflects a remarkable degree of convergence between nations: mean years of schooling levels have risen much more rapidly in poorly educated regions (mainly Africa, Asia, and Latin America) than in highly educated regions of Europe and North America. In other words, as global educational attainment has increased, educational inequality between nations has decreased—and is projected to continue to do so. According to Barro and Lee, inequality in mean years of schooling for the global adult population has dropped by as much as 60 percent over the last 70 years, and it could fall by another third between now and 2040.

The dramatic increase in educational attainment has been accompanied by a similarly dramatic increase in productivity. All else being equal, every additional mean year of schooling for a country tracks with about a ten percent increase in its level of per capita output, even where educational levels are already relatively high. This strong relationship is perhaps even more striking given the imperfect nature of this measure of educational attainment, which does not account for differences in the quality of schooling across countries or time. Around the world, educational advancement has helped power tremendous gains in income and living standards. Between 1950 and 2018, global per capita GDP more than quadrupled, growing at an estimated 2.2 percent per year. Our analysis suggests that increased schooling accounted for roughly a third of that productivity improvement—with gains in health, urbanization, and business climate accounting for most of the rest.

But if increasing educational attainment has auspicious implications for human welfare and individual well-being, it has very different implications for geopolitics and international security. The same educational convergence that has reduced global inequality and lifted millions out of poverty has steadily eroded the advantages once enjoyed by the global leaders in educational attainment—in particular, the United States.

RISE OF THE REST

After mean years of schooling, the next most important quantitative indicator of educational attainment is advanced training: postsecondary, college, graduate education, and the like. The number and share of people with higher education matters for both national economic and geopolitical potential, since highly skilled labor is important in an industrial economy and indispensable in a knowledge-intensive, postindustrial economy.

Globally, postwar growth in higher education has been extraordinary. In 1950, according to the Wittgenstein Centre, roughly 30 million people around the world aged 15 or older had completed some higher education; by 2020, that number had exceeded 930 million, and it is projected to top 1.5 billion by 2040. Meanwhile, the share of the global adult population with at least some graduate education leaped from under two percent in 1950 to about 16 percent today and will approach 22 percent by 2040. Higher education is not yet the global norm, nor will it be in 20 years—but it is becoming more common every year.

Today, the United States is on the cusp of losing its preeminent status in skilled labor.

From the standpoint of national economic performance, the educational attainment of men and women aged 25 to 64 is key; this cohort accounts for most of the labor force and the overwhelming majority of highly skilled workers in all modern societies. Both the Wittgenstein and the Barro-Lee datasets reveal the rapid worldwide growth for this essential group: in 1950, the world had barely 25 million people between the ages of 25 and 64 with at least some higher education. By 1990, that number had grown almost tenfold, to roughly 230 million. Since then, it appears to have tripled again; according to the Wittgenstein Centre’s estimates, today’s total is approaching 750 million, and by 2040 it will be nearly 1.2 billion.

Even in countries where the working-age population is declining, the pool of highly skilled working-age men and women is set to grow in the next decades—but not as fast as in other places. The explosion in higher education is redistributing the share of highly educated workers across the world, potentially affecting the balance of power among nations.

These postwar trends have consigned Western countries to severe and continuing relative decline when it comes to their share of the globe’s highly skilled workforce, knocking former Western heavyweights out of the world’s top ten, one after another. In 1950, eight of the ten largest highly educated workforces were in more developed countries—India and China being the two exceptions. By 2020, just five developed countries were still in the top ten, joined by newcomers Brazil, Indonesia, and South Korea. By 2040, just three highly developed countries are projected to make the list: Japan, Russia, and the United States.

The emerging economies that will challenge or surpass Western nations in the decades ahead are now achieving higher levels of educational attainment than most advanced Western economies did in the early postwar era. For example, 16 percent of 24- to 64-year-olds in Mexico are college educated—roughly twice the U.S. rate in 1950—and in Turkey, the share of this age cohort with some higher education is 22 percent, close to Germany’s share at unification in 1990. South Korea’s workforce is even more skilled, and its transformation over the last half century has been truly astounding. In 1970, barely five percent of its working-age population had college degrees. Half a century later, the country has likely crossed the 50 percent mark—outpacing the United States and other erstwhile educational attainment leaders. By 2040, nearly two-thirds of South Korean workers could have college degrees and three-quarters could have at least some higher education. It is a trajectory that other aspiring powers seek to replicate. If they succeed, they will dramatically alter the global distribution of human capital.

BIG FIVE

When it comes to highly educated populations, five countries have dominated the rest of the world over the last 70 years: China, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Scale is a prerequisite for membership in this club; it is hardly a coincidence that the world’s largest highly skilled labor forces—today and likely well into the future—are so populous. The global share of highly educated working-age people residing in these five countries has remained mostly stable over time, accounting for around half the world’s total from 1950 to the present. But the educational trajectories of the big five vary tremendously, and their shifting weights within the world’s high-skill labor force portend momentous geopolitical changes.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States was in a league of its own. From 1950 to 1990, the sheer magnitude of its highly educated workforce meant that it had no close competitors. China, India, Japan, and Russia were all roughly comparable on this metric and a far cry from the United States. Of course, during these years, the Kremlin commanded the Soviet Union, not just the part of it that would become today’s Russia. But by our estimates, the Soviet Union never managed to amass even a third of the United States’ highly skilled workforce at any point in its existence.

The end of the Cold War saw a reshuffling of the big five, as India and China surged ahead of Japan and Russia in terms of the size of their highly educated workforces, powered in part by their much larger populations. But the United States held strong as the biggest repository of skilled labor, despite its much smaller population.

China’s transformation since the end of the Cold War has been stunning.

Today, however, the United States is on the cusp of losing its preeminent status in skilled labor; China will soon overtake it (if it hasn’t already) as India likely will sometime before 2040. India began rapidly closing the highly educated labor gap with the United States in the late 1990s. Back then, India’s labor pool of college graduates was a third the size of that of the United States. Now, it is roughly two-thirds the size.

China’s transformation since the end of the Cold War has been no less stunning. In 1990, the country’s college-educated labor pool may have been the smallest of the big five. Since then, however, that segment of its workforce has exploded—a consequence, as in India, of demographic and developmental trends already in the making. Today, China’s population of college graduates aged 25 to 64 is between 80 and 90 percent of that of the United States. Barro and Lee have projected that China could have more working-age college graduates than the United States by 2025 and that its highly educated labor pool could be more than double the United States’ by 2040. That year, Barro and Lee have projected that India could overtake the United States in terms of its total number of college-educated 25- to 64-year-olds (see Figure 2).

Another way to look at the changing fortunes of the big five is to trace their past and projected shares of the world’s highly educated workers between 1950 and 2040. Such a comparison vividly highlights the United States’ relative decline (see Figure 3). In 1950, the United States accounted for over 40 percent of the world’s college-educated workers; by 1990, its share had fallen to about 27 percent. Today, the U.S. share sits at about 16 percent—and is projected to fall as low as ten percent by 2040, against 11 percent for India and 13 percent for China, according to the Wittgenstein Centre. Roughly similar trends are evident for workers with only some higher education.

Interestingly, although the U.S. totals for highly educated workers fall far behind the Chinese totals in these projections, the combined totals of highly educated workers in Canada, Mexico, and the United States do not. Indeed, it is possible that this swath of North America covered by the North American Free Trade Agreement and its successor, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, will maintain a highly educated workforce roughly the same size as China’s until at least 2040. Credit here goes largely to educational gains in Mexico.

THE GREAT STAGNATION

The long-term educational rise and ultimate ascendance of China and India in higher education headcounts should not come as a surprise. Nor should the United States’ long-term relative decline. Indeed, the only way that the United States might have maintained its early postwar educational edge into the twenty-first century would have been as a consequence of catastrophe: global failure to develop, worldwide mortality setbacks, or both.

What should surprise—and dismay—American observers is the remarkably poor educational performance that hastened the United States’ relative deterioration. Growth in the mean years of schooling for Americans in their late 20s is barely a third of what it was in the early postwar era, and growth in the cohort of working-age college graduates has sharply slowed when compared with the early postwar period. Amazingly, college graduation rates for American men in their late 20s flatlined from the mid 1970s to the early years of the twenty-first century—an alarming peacetime performance somehow overlooked by academics and policymakers alike (see Figure 4).

This broad educational slowdown has not occurred because Americans are so overeducated that they have hit an attainment ceiling. To the contrary, a growing roster of East Asian and European societies have surpassed the United States in either mean years of schooling or rates of postsecondary training for workers aged 25 to 34. Australia, Ireland, South Korea, and Switzerland, among others, have done so, but their small population size has prevented them from challenging the absolute educational dominance of the big five. In other words, the United States can do better. And although it may not be able to prevent China and India from surpassing its highly educated workforce, it can postpone the date at which this happens—possibly by decades.

BACK FROM THE BRINK

Just as it transformed the global economy in the last century, the worldwide explosion in education is set to transform geopolitics in this one. Over the next two decades, more people are likely to enter the world’s highly educated labor pool than did in the previous two decades—or ever before. By 2040, there could be 250 million more working-age college graduates in the global workforce than there are today—a jump of 70 percent—and almost half a billion more people with at least some higher education.

From the standpoint of global prosperity, the postwar educational explosion has been an unmitigated boon, helping fuel a near quintupling of worldwide GDP per capita since 1950. Although those gains in income and wealth have by no means been equally shared, nearly all humanity has nevertheless benefited from them: falling poverty, growing life expectancies, and improving well-being are all partly due to educational advances.

From the standpoint of geopolitics, however, the consequences of the educational explosion are less propitious, at least for the United States. The surge of highly educated people into the global workforce has shifted the balance of economic power and, by extension, military power among countries, undercutting the United States’ primacy. For the first three postwar generations, the United States’ college-educated workforce was unmatched in terms of size, giving the country a powerful economic advantage that helped sustain it during and immediately after the Cold War. Today, it is neck and neck with China in total highly trained worker, with India closing in. By 2040, China and India will be vying for the lead in total highly trained labor, with the United States a distant third.

The erosion of the United States’ educational edge will eventually weaken the country’s global reach.

To be clear, there is no reason to presume that Chinese or Indian higher education will be of the same quality as that in the United States. And the United States will still be able to count on many other assets that reinforce its global advantage: among others, its prowess in research and technological development, its dynamic business sector, its sophisticated financial system, and its dominant currency. But these realities should only afford a limited measure of consolation in the face of otherwise troubling educational trends.

The erosion of the United States’ educational edge will eventually weaken the country’s global reach. With a less highly educated workforce than it could or should have, the United States will have less economic, political, and military heft with which to defend its interests and uphold the economic and security architecture that has defined the postwar order. Eventually, Pax Americana will come under pressure. It is not hard to imagine a progressively less peaceable and more economically insecure international environment in which the United States has much less influence as a result of its stagnating pool of high-skilled labor.

NICHOLAS EBERSTADT is Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute.
EVAN ABRAMSKY is a former Senior Research Associate in International Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

Foreign Affairs · by Nicholas Eberstadt and Evan Abramsky · September 20, 2022

17. The Fractured Superpower

Excerpts:

That said, leaders in major states should also plan for the possibility of severe or prolonged federal dysfunction, especially involving future disruptions of the electoral process. As a start, state policymakers can help the public become more educated about the federal system and how it could be manipulated for malign purposes. Although the federal-state balance is an underappreciated source of strength with the potential to drive progress on a host of global issues, it also raises difficult and sometimes painful questions for the United States and the world. In the United States, federalism also reflects a racist history, in which states were able to prevent Blacks from voting, receiving quality education, and fully participating in the economy, as well as restrict where they could live and socialize. As major states become more assertive, their actions will bring new risks as well as new possibilities. Whether this more complex federal system improves policy, bolsters democracy, and enhances America’s role in the world depends on who uses the instruments of federalism and for what purposes. When citizens fail to pay attention, states are vulnerable to strategic abuse by those who would weaponize federalism for party or private interests, against the public and against democracy.

At its best, the constant interplay between the states and the federal government can provide a powerful strategic advantage to the United States. States can contribute to continued U.S. leadership on the most vital international policy challenges of our time, as well as ensure the resilience of the U.S. system, helping to preserve and defend democratic institutions and practices. In a more pessimistic scenario, however, the federal bargain could become a source of conflict and tension. And as other countries exploit growing rifts, key states could be left looking to each other and the world rather than to the federal government for leadership.

What no one should ignore is that U.S. states have the power as well as the motivation to both challenge Washington and shape the global policy agenda. State policymakers and leaders of countries large and small must consider the United States a vast entity with presumed national interests but also as an archipelago of powerful, competing jurisdictions, with certain shared ties, as well as an array of divergent interests and values. Increasingly, the story of U.S. democracy and U.S. leadership abroad will depend not only on developments on the shore of the Potomac but on how Americans and the world understand that archipelago—and how its various individual centers of power learn to use their own potential to shape and adapt to a fast-changing world.

The Fractured Superpower

Federalism Is Remaking U.S. Democracy and Foreign Policy

By Jenna Bednar and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar

September/October 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies · September 20, 2022

Amid the continuing revelations about what led to the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, one aspect of the crisis has received comparatively little attention: how the effort to negate the presidential election outcome was built on the malign use of the United States’ federal system of government. Since the slates of electors that collectively certify the presidential election are chosen at the state level, the January 6 conspirators sought to appoint alternative slates of electors in several states to overturn the results. In the end, Republican state officials in Arizona, Georgia, and other states refused to undermine democracy on behalf of their partisans. But the conspiracy underscored the far-reaching importance of the states in some of the most fundamental decisions of the U.S. government, as well as how much it matters who controls those governments and what interests they serve.

Although it was an extreme case, the January 6 crisis was not the only situation in recent years in which the states have played a crucial role in setting the direction of the country as a whole. In areas as varied as access to firearms, emergency health care, immigration enforcement, cryptocurrency regulation, and the climate crisis, states have been asserting their powers to influence, and in some cases to challenge, U.S. policy. State leaders aggressively litigate to block federal policy and are active in responding to federal developments that contrast with the preferences of state electoral majorities. And some of the largest states—California, Florida, New York, and Texas collectively account for about 37 percent of U.S. GDP—are becoming more involved in foreign affairs, not only on economic and social issues but also through the soft diplomacy of values and culture. In the summer of 2022, even as the Biden administration was reeling from West Virginia’s successful litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court to limit federal regulations on greenhouse gas emissions, the president asked California Governor Gavin Newsom to join a ministerial meeting on climate with Chinese Minister of Ecology and Environment Huang Runqiu.

To many observers, such examples may seem anomalous because—according to the most common understanding of the federal system—the U.S. government is the country’s preeminent source of policy direction and bears sole responsibility for foreign affairs. Together with lawmakers in Congress, the president and senior executive branch officials are viewed as the key agenda-setters on U.S. leadership and how it is exercised in a tumultuous world. And since the rise of the United States as a global power is closely associated with the growing centralization and capacity of the federal government during the twentieth century, U.S. authority on the world stage has often been associated with a federal system in which Washington is dominant.

But this conventional understanding is both flawed and out of date. It is true that the federal government imposes a variety of constraints on the states and controls key levers of foreign policy. When it comes to policymaking capacity and on-the-ground implementation, however, states increasingly hold a decisive edge—particularly in an era of partisan gridlock in Washington. And in a world in which economic, technological, and cultural influence is often spread through subnational regions, the largest U.S. states can make policies with direct global impact.

As the federal bargain moves in the direction of state power, it will have far-reaching consequences for the United States’ global profile and the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Harnessed in the right way, the states can enhance U.S. power, providing new and more dynamic ways to advance an international agenda at a time of federal gridlock, while strengthening U.S. democracy at home. But as the January 6 crisis illustrates, states can also be used to undermine the country’s longstanding alliances or even to subvert the democratic process. How leaders in Washington, the courts, diplomatic circles in different regions, and local and state governments approach this shift will determine whether state-level action becomes a source of resilience or a destabilizing force for Americans and the world.

The Evolving Federal Bargain

By outward appearance, the expansion of federal powers in the twentieth century has given Washington the advantage in the federal-state balance. The Civil War, after all, established the federal government’s control of the military as well as the illegality of unilateral secession by any state. And the civil rights movement cemented a broad understanding of federal power to enforce desegregation, voting rights, and school integration. Moreover, states are limited by balanced-budget requirements, as well as by their dependence on federal funds for between a quarter and a third of their budgets—giving the federal government considerable leverage in getting them to do its bidding. Congress has made liberal use of its spending powers, for example, to direct state policy on K–12 education, on the conduct of public officials through the Hatch Act, and on the expansion of Medicaid through the Affordable Care Act. Bolstered by constitutional provisions, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce and fund the military, the federal government can sometimes preempt state action.

But this account misses much of the story. For one thing, it is true that the federal government’s overall spending is slightly higher than the combined total spending of states and local governments ($4.4 trillion to $3.3 trillion, respectively, in 2019). But states dwarf the federal government in their budgetary impact on voters: setting aside military funding, service on the national debt, and entitlements, in most years states and their dependent local governments are responsible for the lion’s share of government expenditures. Together, they also employ a far larger workforce. As of 2020, state and local governments employed nearly 20 million people, whereas the federal government had only about 2.2 million civilian employees and 1.3 million active-duty military personnel. State and local administrations, not the federal government, set most of the policies that affect the day-to-day lives of their residents, including policies relating to policing, education, land use, criminal justice, emergency response, and public health. States have far more control over education policy, providing over 90 percent of funding for schools in almost every state. Moreover, the federal government depends on states to implement nearly all major federal policies, including the most costly: health insurance and welfare. As states implement federal policy, they exercise discretion, adjusting it around the margins to suit their own interests. And thanks to their sizable economies, the largest states can make decisions that have an impact beyond their own borders. All this has meant that the federal system is far more adaptable, and states far more powerful, than has generally been recognized.

Many of the most important U.S. policy innovations were first tried at the state level.

Particularly striking is the extent to which states can be centers of policy innovation. They have distinct economies, and although they vary greatly in size, even the largest and most diverse states have populations whose interests and attitudes are more cohesive than those of the country at large. States also tend to be better at assembling big coalitions to support major policy action, and they do not have the kinds of procedural hindrances—the filibuster and the absence of the line-item veto—that often hamper the federal system. As a result, states have long been drivers of progress and change. As early as the nineteenth century, for example, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania lifted bans on interracial marriage, even as other states imposed them. Over time, however, states with bans repealed them as public support for interracial marriage grew; the Supreme Court’s landmark 1967 Loving v. Virginia decision extended the repeal to the federal level. Indeed, many of the most important federal policy changes—including ending slavery; expanding marriage rights, voting rights, and civil rights; changing health-care access, reproductive rights, and welfare coverage; reforming public education; and protecting the environment—were first tried at the state level, making states what U.S. Justice Louis Brandeis called “laboratories of democracy.”

But states do more than test new policy; they also fill in existing policy gaps when the federal government stalls. Consider the issue of immigration. Despite an economy that relies heavily on an immigrant workforce, the United States often leaves those seeking permanent status in legal limbo for years. As a result, states have filled the policy gap, with blue states such as California and New York offering access to health care and education for the undocumented, and red states such as Arizona and Texas using their own resources to increase border enforcement and internal patrols. Similarly, when the federal government failed to impose a strict national standard on auto emissions, California created its own and, because of the size of its market, was able to force automakers to manufacture cars nationwide that meet California’s standards. And in the absence of federal policy to address social media companies’ banning users because of their political viewpoints, Texas legislators enacted a law in 2021 limiting content moderation. (The law has been temporarily blocked, pending a lawsuit now making its way through the courts.)

Over the past two decades, states have also gained leverage to experiment in areas such as legalizing marijuana, despite conflicting federal law. The states are taking advantage of a federal government that has pulled back on marijuana-related enforcement unrelated to organized crime but has failed to repeal federal criminal penalties on marijuana possession and sale. And with federal action on climate change increasingly impeded—including, paradoxically, by state-led challenges, such as West Virginia v. EPA—states have new opportunities to fill the breach. Already, many states are decarbonizing their energy sources, and 21 states have set 100 percent clean energy goals. Some are enacting zoning rules that ban gas hookups in new buildings and are prohibiting new industry on the basis of greenhouse gas emissions; New York State denied construction permits to a cryptocurrency mining operation on the grounds that it was at odds with the state’s sustainability goals. In this dance of adaptation and response between Washington and the states, the federal system builds in enough flexibility for U.S. policymakers to innovate and take on major issues facing the country, even when the federal government is hobbled by polarization, legislative gridlock, and court-imposed limits.

Networks, Not Nations

Despite their growing role in domestic policy, states may appear to have little sway in foreign affairs, where nation-to-nation diplomacy and hard power reign supreme. But in many regions of the world and on a host of issues such as aviation, ocean management, climate change, and refugee resettlement, those traditional tools now compete with other forms of influence. As the scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued, networks of institutions and individuals—scholars and scientists, government officials, business executives, and the leaders of social movements—have long been sharing ideas and coordinating strategies across borders. In areas of technology policy, these networks have allowed smaller countries to have global influence that far exceeds their relative size and hard power: Estonia, for example, has played a leading part in counter-disinformation strategy, and South Korea has been a pioneering force in public-private partnerships for online authentication.

In the United States, international networks have become a critical way for the country to assert its leadership on many issues. When bolstered by state governments’ power to develop policy experiments and set international standards, such cross-border exchanges can drive policy innovations—including in such areas as artificial intelligence (AI), biomedicine, block chain, and renewable energy—that are becoming more difficult to achieve at the federal level. It was in part to buttress such networks in the face of rising geopolitical competition that the U.S. government was spurred in May 2022 to create the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework—a loose arrangement to promote standard-setting, sustainable growth and broader economic connections between the United States and its allies in the region.

States with outsize stakes in energy, trade, and technology have special incentives to engage in foreign policy. In economic sectors that are underfunded or left unaddressed by Washington, larger states are seeking their own international partnerships or agreements to compensate. In 2014, California began a cap-and-trade agreement with Quebec, allowing the two regions jointly to create the largest carbon market in North America; in 2022, the Massachusetts Biotechnology Council launched a partnership with a European Union health industry trade body to promote cross-border biotechnology research. Although the U.S. Constitution prevents states from entering into formal treaty arrangements, the State Department has interpreted these constraints to apply only to agreements that are “legally binding,” leaving plenty of room for states to make international arrangements by other means.

Even in hard-power conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, subnational networks can play an important role. Notably, since the war began, Western corporations, responding to pressure from shareholders and the public, have left the Russian market en masse. Civil society institutions are working with Ukrainian officials and technology companies to thwart Russian disinformation efforts. And local communities are signaling their openness to receiving refugees. Of course, different U.S. states have different geopolitical interests: a more open trade policy tends to benefit oil-producing Louisiana and Texas far more than it does Michigan or North Carolina, whose populations may fear losing more jobs overseas under such a policy. Rather than leading to greater centralization of power, then, the current age of growing geopolitical conflict and accelerating technological change seems likely to push more states to become involved in national and international affairs.

A Hidden Arsenal

As states assert their interests even more actively in the coming years, they will have a variety of tools to choose from. For one thing, they can count on broad public support. Consider the impact over the past year of public discourse about such national controversies as school shootings, court decisions, business and environmental regulation, and natural disasters. Polling data suggest that the failure of the federal government to address these and other issues has alienated significant parts of the electorate. Gallup reports that 39 percent of Americans trust the federal government to handle domestic problems, down from the historical average of 53 percent. At the same time, more than half of Americans continue to have confidence in their state governments and two-thirds express trust in their local governments. Civil society and state leaders may therefore be emboldened to reject or refuse to comply with unpopular federal laws.

During the implementation of the U.S.A. Patriot Act following the September 11, 2001, attacks, for example, people began to question the act’s loose definition of “domestic terrorism” and its provisions for information sharing, and they expressed concern that protest and civil disobedience would be classified as terrorist acts, dampening citizens’ First Amendment rights. Five states—Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, and Vermont—passed resolutions questioning the act’s constitutionality and limiting its application. In the last decade, with respect to immigration policy, 11 states and hundreds of cities and counties have declared themselves to be “sanctuaries” for undocumented people, meaning that they will not comply with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement requests to extend detention and will otherwise separate their law enforcement from federal deportation activities. And in response to the Supreme Court’s overruling of Roe v. Wade in June 2022—which occurred despite recent polling by Gallup showing that a clear majority of Americans (55 percent) identify as pro-choice—nearly 100 elected prosecutors, including several state attorneys general, have pledged that they will not enforce abortion bans.

In fact, West Virginia v. EPA is only one of the most recent cases in which a state has successfully challenged a major federal policy. In 2007, Massachusetts successfully litigated a case forcing the EPA to plan regulatory measures addressing climate change. During the Obama administration, Texas challenged an executive action that protected certain undocumented immigrants from deportation. California challenged the Trump administration’s move to reduce the state’s flexibility to set vehicle emission standards. Under extreme circumstances, civil society leaders, candidates for local and state office, and state officeholders could support changes in state laws to limit cooperation between state and federal revenue authorities or even encourage companies and individuals not to comply with federal tax or regulatory mandates. They could draw on anti-commandeering doctrines enshrined in Supreme Court jurisprudence, establishing that the federal government cannot coerce states or state officials to adopt or enforce federal laws. With such a range of tools, states are well positioned to take advantage of the federal government’s inability to act. As narrow majorities and growing polarization have made the federal government less functional, many states have become more politically homogeneous, with a single party now controlling both the legislature and the governor’s office in 37 states, facilitating legislative action. At the same time, larger cities have found new ways to flex their economic muscle abroad, regardless of federal policy. In other words, the time is ripe for states and cities to assert themselves, and they are doing so.

From Sacramento to Seoul

The growing power of states is already reshaping U.S. foreign policy. As states experiment with policies that the rest of the country isn’t ready to support, they can exert an immediate impact abroad: California’s zero emission vehicle policy, for example, was a blueprint for a similar scheme in China. Given the special regional and international ties of some metropolitan areas—consider greater Miami’s profile in Latin America—states and their constituent cities can also leverage their soft power and convening capacity to facilitate policy coordination and form coalitions with like-minded foreign governments. And states can also use the flexibility in existing U.S. law to collaborate on international agreements to address problems of global significance neglected by Washington.

The potential for state-led action is large. Already, states have pledged adherence to international climate change treaty provisions and are forming agreements with foreign governments to achieve sustainability goals. Other areas in which states seem likely to take the lead include supply chain resilience and industrial policy coordination; regional trading arrangements; long-term research and development partnerships; international standard setting, as, for example, in environmental regulations; and new forms of international diplomacy. Just as important, however, are the risks that a more decentralized U.S. posture in the world could pose. Subnational diplomacy involving states and research institutions may conceivably complicate national strategies for safeguarding sensitive information from other countries. And as states increasingly use litigation to contest federal action, foreign governments may be able to exploit tensions between states and the federal government, for example, through disinformation operations. If functional federalism is a strategic asset, dysfunctional federalism could be a recipe for weakening U.S. power.

The States Strike Back

As the January 6, 2021, crisis revealed, federalism cuts both ways in the U.S. electoral process. In addition to designing and executing new policies in domains as varied as cryptocurrency, technology transfer, and immigrant integration, state officials are responsible for specific procedures to administer elections, count votes, and report results. For decades, Americans believed that the various democratic safeguards rooted in the court system, the media, and civic norms allowed the country to navigate federal-state tensions with sagacity. But particularly after the assault on the U.S. Capitol, it’s plausible to take a much darker view. With norms crumbling, a polarized public, and party leaders egging them on, many state officials could aggressively seek partisan advantage even if doing so means thwarting the public’s vote. The Supreme Court may embrace the so-called independent state legislature doctrine, which would potentially countenance state legislative efforts to ignore the popular vote in their states and appoint desired slates of replacement electors. If current efforts to reform the rickety Electoral Count Act are unsuccessful, partisan federal lawmakers could argue that the act allows federal legislative majorities to ignore duly appointed electoral slates.

But in such a scenario, states could fight back. In The Federalist Papers, no. 45 and no. 46, James Madison argued that states play a crucial role as backstops against federal overreach and called on them to sound the alarm in response to undemocratic action by the federal government. A particularly vivid example concerns a future effort to manipulate a presidential election result. If in a presidential contest in which their candidate loses, Republicans try to stir up sufficient suspicion about the outcome in, say, Georgia or Arizona to certify rival electoral slates and take the presidency, other states such as California or New York could take a variety of extreme measures to resist. Among other steps, they could suspend cooperation with the federal government, opt out of or subvert federal-state agreements, sever connections between state and federal law enforcement, and symbolically seize federal property. Whether these actions spur greater risk of political violence within and across states—particularly if pursued simultaneously by multiple states—they would virtually guarantee that a unified American global strategy would be severely undermined.

But the larger point is that such a course of action, however damaging, would allow the states to play a critical role in sustaining the democratic process in the event of a national crisis. When an election is at risk of being overturned by extraconstitutional means, and federal-level political or judicial safeguards fail to defend democracy, the states can serve as a last resort, drawing on the integrity of local officials and institutions as well as the states’ latent capabilities to frustrate routine federal activity in extraordinary circumstances. State resistance can prove to be a democracy-preserving action.

Resilience From Below

As policy innovators, shapers of foreign policy, and even defenders of U.S. democracy, states have far more influence than is commonly recognized, and they are poised to build on it in the years to come. To manage this growing role, the U.S. government, state leaders, and the voters themselves must approach the federal system strategically and mitigate the inherent risks of decentralization.

First, state governments should further develop their potential to act as “laboratories of democracy” in the U.S. federal system, collaborating with one another when they develop new policies and standards, to shape global developments in ways that advance U.S. interests. States can force action on international climate agreements, reinvigorate immigration strategies, and forge crucial international research partnerships. Doing so will help set the global agenda, but it will also help preserve the viability and strength of the United States in the world order.

Second, foreign governments can strengthen their long-term relationships with the United States, regardless of who is in power in Washington, by building ties with individual states and their dependent cities. Areas for collaboration include setting technology standards for AI and carbon footprint calculations, investment in scientific research and technology, and support for ideals such as humanitarian relief or freedom of religion through, say, assistance for refugee resettlement. In all these areas, states can be sources of progress as well as offer continuity in foreign relations.

Third, policymakers in Washington should recognize the value of allowing states to experiment on core issues and even engage with them globally. Congress should reestablish the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations—a federal panel defunded in 1996 that included state, local, and federal policymakers who periodically evaluated the current health of the federal system—to provide a further means for informal negotiation and sharing best practices. When congressional action on an issue isn’t possible, federal agencies should partner with their state equivalents to pursue policy goals. Federal courts, too, would do well to bear in mind—to the extent relevant disputes allow—that states need room to maneuver within the federal system.

In another January 6 crisis, states could act to safeguard U.S. democracy.

That said, leaders in major states should also plan for the possibility of severe or prolonged federal dysfunction, especially involving future disruptions of the electoral process. As a start, state policymakers can help the public become more educated about the federal system and how it could be manipulated for malign purposes. Although the federal-state balance is an underappreciated source of strength with the potential to drive progress on a host of global issues, it also raises difficult and sometimes painful questions for the United States and the world. In the United States, federalism also reflects a racist history, in which states were able to prevent Blacks from voting, receiving quality education, and fully participating in the economy, as well as restrict where they could live and socialize. As major states become more assertive, their actions will bring new risks as well as new possibilities. Whether this more complex federal system improves policy, bolsters democracy, and enhances America’s role in the world depends on who uses the instruments of federalism and for what purposes. When citizens fail to pay attention, states are vulnerable to strategic abuse by those who would weaponize federalism for party or private interests, against the public and against democracy.

At its best, the constant interplay between the states and the federal government can provide a powerful strategic advantage to the United States. States can contribute to continued U.S. leadership on the most vital international policy challenges of our time, as well as ensure the resilience of the U.S. system, helping to preserve and defend democratic institutions and practices. In a more pessimistic scenario, however, the federal bargain could become a source of conflict and tension. And as other countries exploit growing rifts, key states could be left looking to each other and the world rather than to the federal government for leadership.

What no one should ignore is that U.S. states have the power as well as the motivation to both challenge Washington and shape the global policy agenda. State policymakers and leaders of countries large and small must consider the United States a vast entity with presumed national interests but also as an archipelago of powerful, competing jurisdictions, with certain shared ties, as well as an array of divergent interests and values. Increasingly, the story of U.S. democracy and U.S. leadership abroad will depend not only on developments on the shore of the Potomac but on how Americans and the world understand that archipelago—and how its various individual centers of power learn to use their own potential to shape and adapt to a fast-changing world.

JENNA BEDNAR is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Michigan and a member of the external faculty at the Santa Fe Institute.
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR is President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was previously a justice on the California Supreme Court. He is the author of Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies.

Foreign Affairs · by Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies · September 20, 2022

18. The SCO’s Clumsy Push to Disrupt the World Order

Excerpts:

Mr. Putin’s war hasn’t destabilized only Eastern Europe. From the Middle East to Central Asia, governments face discontent as supply shocks raise food and energy prices. From Turkey to Kazakhstan, countries whose economies have deep ties to Russia struggle to navigate Western sanctions. The soaring dollar and global inflation make matters worse. This will be a bitterly hard and hungry winter for millions.

Russia, China and Iran all seek to disrupt the international system. Yet they have no positive agenda to propose. In Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, Iranian meddling produces only misery and ruin. Mr. Putin’s attack on Ukraine has weakened Russia, and greater upheavals may be in store. China’s saber-rattling over Taiwan has galvanized a stronger alliance against it. Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the two countries who tied their futures most closely to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, have fallen into deep crisis.

If SCO nations seriously want a new international system, they will have to do much better than this.

The SCO’s Clumsy Push to Disrupt the World Order

Russia, China and Iran seek a new global system but propose no positive agenda.

By Walter Russell Mead

Sept. 19, 2022 5:07 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-clumsy-push-to-disrupt-the-world-order-shanghai-cooperation-organization-summit-eurasia-iran-middle-east-borders-sanctions-china-putin-samarkand-11663614601?mod=opinion_featst_pos1

It was a busy week for Washington’s foreign-policy elite. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Armenia to express sympathy following a round of fighting with Azerbaijan that left an estimated 200 dead in their contested border regions. Before heading to London for Queen Elizabeth’s funeral, President Biden warned Vladimir Putin against using nuclear weapons in Ukraine and repeated that the U.S. will defend Taiwan with American troops if Beijing invades.

But the week’s biggest news didn’t come from Washington. It came from Samarkand, Uzbekistan, the fabled Silk Road city, where the eight nations that make up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization held their annual summit.

As Russian forces retreat in Ukraine, the Eurasian power balance is shifting. Xi Jinping is asking questions about the war, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is airing qualms. This is not a sign that things are going well for Mr. Putin. More significantly, while traveling to Samarkand, Mr. Xi stopped in neighboring Kazakhstan. A Russian military intervention in January quelled a revolt against President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s government. Mr. Putin undoubtedly hoped this would restore Russian power in a vast, resource-rich territory once part of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Xi doesn’t see things that way and expressed China’s undying support for Kazakhstan’s “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.” He also said China would “categorically oppose the interference of any forces in the internal affairs of your country.” Translation from the euphemisms of professional diplomats: Hands off, Vlad.

Russia decides to transfer paratroopers from Syria to Ukraine - General Staff

ukrinform.net

This was reported by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Facebook, Ukrinform reports.

"Due to the unsuccessful covert mobilization effort, the military and political leadership of the Russian Federation made a decision to withdraw the units of the 217th Parachute Regiment from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and further prepare them for transfer to the territory of Ukraine," the statement reads.

The General Staff also notes that medical facilities in the occupied city of Horlivka in Donetsk region are at capacity amid the flows of seriously wounded Russian servicemen. In addition, two large trucks carrying bodies of the 1st Army Corps soldiers arrived from Kherson region to the temporarily occupied territory of Donetsk region. The number of bodies is yet to be specified, the General Staff wrote.

As reported, the Russian military death toll in Ukraine currently stands at 54,810, with 160 servicemen killed in the past day alone.

Photo: SBU

ukrinform.net

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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