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Quotes of the Day:
"I have been impressed with the urgency of doing. Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Being willing is not enough; we must do."
– Leonardo da Vinci
"A good question is never answered. It is not a bolt to be tightened into place but a seed to be planted and to bear more seed toward the hope of greening the landscape of idea."
– John Ciardi
"If you ever need a helping hand, it's at the end of your arm. As you get older, you must remember you have a second hand. The first one is to help yourself, the second one is to help others."
– Audrey Hepburn
1. N. Korea installs mines on inter-Korean road within DMZ
2. N. Korea decries U.S. shipment of long-range tactical missiles to Ukraine as 'mean' policy
3. Yoon's approval rating falls for 3 weeks straight to 30.2 pct
4. Hanwha Systems to break ground on space center on Jeju Island
5. Pukchang Military Airfield Modernization Making Progress
6. S. Korean ministers, Australian PM agree to enhance security, defense industry cooperation
7. North mined all roads connecting the two Koreas: JCS
8. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un seeks to build on Russia ties to resuscitate economy
9. Experts are guiding the U.S. to the wrong policy on North Korea: we must not accept Kim’s nuclear-weapon-program
10. N. Korea updates training video for overseas workers in response to Daily NK reports
11. N. Korean military orders end to violence at boot camps
12. Luxury on Display: Kim Jong-un’s motorcade challenges UN sanctions
13. AMCHAM spotlights education infrastructure as key to S. Korea’s Asia-Pacific hub success
14. Editorial: What’s going on in South Korea, pushing the ‘world’s top semiconductor cluster’?
15. After Zhao Leji’s Visit, What’s Next for China-North Korea Relations?
16. South Korea tries to Trump-proof the alliance
17. Deciphering North Korea’s Policy Shift: Annihilation of ROK vs. End of Kim Regime
1. N. Korea installs mines on inter-Korean road within DMZ
Who demonstrates the real hostile policies?
Excerpts:
In January, North Korean troops were spotted installing mines on two inter-Korean roads -- the Gyeongui road between the South's western border city of Paju and the North's Kaesong and the Donghae road along the east coast.
Last month, the military also detected the North removing dozens of streetlights along the two roads.
The moves came after the North's leader Kim Jong-un called for scrapping a decadeslong policy of seeking unification with South Korea and defining their relations as those between "two states hostile to each other."
In January, Kim gave instructions for "strict" measures to block all the channels of inter-Korean communication along the border, such as cutting off the Gyeongui land route to an "irretrievable level."
N. Korea installs mines on inter-Korean road within DMZ | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 29, 2024
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has installed land mines on an inter-Korean road within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas, a South Korean military official said Monday, the latest in a series of moves to shut down cross-border roads.
The military detected the North laying mines on the unpaved road inside the DMZ late last year near Arrowhead Hill in Cheorwon, 85 kilometers northeast of Seoul, according to the official.
The path was created under a 2018 inter-Korean military agreement to connect the South and the North for joint efforts to excavate remains of those killed near the hill during the 1950-53 Korean War.
Since late last year, the North has installed mines on all roads between the two Koreas once seen as symbols of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.
In January, North Korean troops were spotted installing mines on two inter-Korean roads -- the Gyeongui road between the South's western border city of Paju and the North's Kaesong and the Donghae road along the east coast.
Last month, the military also detected the North removing dozens of streetlights along the two roads.
The moves came after the North's leader Kim Jong-un called for scrapping a decadeslong policy of seeking unification with South Korea and defining their relations as those between "two states hostile to each other."
In January, Kim gave instructions for "strict" measures to block all the channels of inter-Korean communication along the border, such as cutting off the Gyeongui land route to an "irretrievable level."
A South Korean military official (R) shakes hands with his North Korean counterpart as they meet inside the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas to take part in a project to establish a cross-border road, in this file photo provided by Seoul's defense ministry on Nov. 22, 2018. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 29, 2024
2. N. Korea decries U.S. shipment of long-range tactical missiles to Ukraine as 'mean' policy
Mean toward who?
Excerpts:
The official said the U.S. has adopted a "mean" policy of offering such long-range missiles for use against Russia in a bid to tip the scales of the war.
"The U.S. can never defeat the heroic Russian army and people with any latest weaponry or military support," the North's official said.
North Korea is among a few countries that have expressed its support for Russia in the war with Ukraine. Pyongyang and Moscow have been deepening military ties following the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September last year.
N. Korea decries U.S. shipment of long-range tactical missiles to Ukraine as 'mean' policy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 29, 2024
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korea condemned the United States on Monday for sending longer-range tactical missiles to Ukraine for use in its fight against Russia, claiming that Washington cannot turn the tide of the war with such a "mean" policy.
The White House confirmed last week that the U.S. has sent a "significant" number of Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles to Ukraine for use inside the Ukrainian territory following Russia's use of North Korean ballistic missiles against Kyiv.
An unnamed director at the foreign military affairs department of North Korea's defense ministry issued a statement denouncing Washington as a "harasser" of peace that has been aggravating the war by providing Ukraine with such weapons, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
"Long-range missiles offered by the U.S. will never tip the scale in favor of Ukraine on the battlefield but result in fanning the reckless confrontational hysteria of the Zelenskiy puppet clique," read the English-language statement carried by the KCNA.
The official said the U.S. has adopted a "mean" policy of offering such long-range missiles for use against Russia in a bid to tip the scales of the war.
"The U.S. can never defeat the heroic Russian army and people with any latest weaponry or military support," the North's official said.
North Korea is among a few countries that have expressed its support for Russia in the war with Ukraine. Pyongyang and Moscow have been deepening military ties following the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September last year.
This undated file photo, provided by the U.S. Army via the Associated Press, shows Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 29, 2024
3. Yoon's approval rating falls for 3 weeks straight to 30.2 pct
Hardly a surprise after the election.
Yoon's approval rating falls for 3 weeks straight to 30.2 pct | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · April 29, 2024
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol's approval rating fell for a third consecutive week to 30.2 percent, marking its lowest point since August 2022, a poll showed Monday, following his party's crushing defeat in the recent general elections.
The survey, conducted by the polling agency Realmeter, showed that the positive assessment of Yoon's performance went down by 2.1 percentage points from the previous week, while 66.9 percent of respondents disapproved of his performance, up 2.6 percentage points.
Yoon's approval rating has seen a continuous decline over the past three weeks, dropping from 37.3 percent in the first week of April to 32.6 percent, then to 32.3 percent and finally dropping further to 30.2 percent.
In the general elections, the opposition bloc, led by the main opposition Democratic Party (DP), won 192 seats in the 300-member National Assembly, while the ruling People Power Party (PPP) secured only 108.
The poll, conducted on 2,518 adults from April 22-26, had a margin of error of plus or minus 2 percentage points.
In a separate poll, the approval ratings of the PPP and the DP came to 34.1 percent and 35.1 percent, respectively. The PPP's approval rating fell 1.7 percentage points from a week before.
The survey on the approval ratings of the political parties was conducted on 1,004 adults Thursday and Friday and had a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points.
President Yoon Suk Yeol announces a public statement on the government's medical reform efforts at the presidential office in Seoul on April 1, 2024, amid a prolonged walkout by trainee doctors across the nation in protest against a plan to increase the number of medical students, in this file photo provided by the office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · April 29, 2024
4. Hanwha Systems to break ground on space center on Jeju Island
Hanwha Systems to break ground on space center on Jeju Island | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · April 29, 2024
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- Hanwha Systems Co., a defense electronics and ICT solutions unit under Hanwha Group, said Monday it will hold a groundbreaking ceremony for a new space center on South Korea's southern island of Jeju.
The Jeju Hanwha Space Center, set to be built at Hawon Techno Campus in southern Jeju, will serve as a satellite development and manufacturing facility spanning some 11,000 square meters, according to Hanwha Systems.
The construction of a two-story building with one basement floor is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2025.
The center will be capable of producing four to eight satellites per month by optimizing the production process and leveraging Hanwha's extensive experience in the space business.
Hanwha Systems said it will establish the Jeju Hanwha Space Center as a pivotal production base for satellite development and manufacturing in line with South Korea's new space industry and expand its presence in both domestic and global space markets.
This photo provided by Hanwha Systems Co. shows an aerial view of the Jeju Hanwha Space Center on Jeju Island. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
brk@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Boram · April 29, 2024
5. Pukchang Military Airfield Modernization Making Progress
Imagery at the link below.
Pukchang Military Airfield Modernization Making Progress
https://www.38north.org/2024/04/pukchang-military-airfield-modernization-making-progress/
Commercial satellite imagery indicates that major progress has been made on modernizing North Korea’s Pukchang Military Airfield. Among several improvements, such as a new taxiway and additional aprons, the most notable is the extension of the main runway to 2,800 meters, now matching the extended runway at the recently renovated Sunchon Airfield.
The majority of North Korea’s military airfields currently have 2,500-meter runways. It is possible a decision was made to upgrade more of them in the near future. The added runway length and width enable multiple takeoffs in a compressed period of time, which can get more aircraft into the air to meet incoming threats or quickly amass for a first strike.
Background
The Pukchang Airfield is about 53 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang and 11 kilometers northeast of Sunchon Airfield, which was redeveloped and modernized between 2021 and 2023.
Pukchang and Sunchon are two of four military airfields that surround Pyongyang and are home to North Korea’s newest aircraft. Sunchon has MiG-29s and Su-25s, and Pukchang has MiG-23s and MiG-29s. The airfields are in the Taedong River valley, protected by mountains and can be expected to play a key role in defending Pyongyang, should a conflict occur on the Peninsula.
Work on the Pukchang Airfield began in September last year and was preceded by the removal of most of the jet aircraft at the site.
Modernization Progress
In November 2023, ground clearing began to extend the main runway by 300 meters. This will make the final runway length 2,800 meters, the same length as the extended runway at the Sunchon Airfield.
Figure 1. Initial construction progress of runway extension visible on imagery from November 4, 2023. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Imagery from April 17, 2024, shows significant progress has been made on the runway extension, and a large parking apron has been added.
Vehicles are on the runway, likely grading it prior to laying concrete or tarmac.
A number of buildings around the old parking apron have been demolished and removed in the last month, including some hardened aircraft shelters. Two new buildings are under construction. However, the two groups of hardened aircraft shelters near the runway extension remain untouched.
Figure 2. Progress on runway extension and new apron on imagery from April 17, 2024. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3. Overview of building demolition and new construction around old parking apron observed on imagery from April 17, 2024. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Image: DEMOLISHED AND NEW BUILDINGS
Work on a new taxiway—more than 1 kilometer in length—and apron has begun parallel to the main runway. If following the same pattern as observed at Sunchon, new environmental shelters will likely be added towards the end of the construction project.
Figure 4. New taxiway has been constructed parallel to main runway. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Pukchang, like Sunchon, has sheltered aircraft storage under an adjacent hillside. However, no work appears to be taking place in that area yet.
Seven MiG-23 and five MiG-21 jets remain outside of that underground aircraft storage facility, on the taxiway, where they have been parked for several months. This indicates they are likely not airworthy. Derelict MiG-21s are a common sight in North Korea, but to have seven much newer MiG-23s out of service could point to a maintenance or supply problem.
Figure 5. Jets parked on taxiway at Pukchang Airfield, where they have sat for several months. Image © 2024 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
6. S. Korean ministers, Australian PM agree to enhance security, defense industry cooperation
(LEAD) S. Korean ministers, Australian PM agree to enhance security, defense industry cooperation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · April 29, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS more details in last 2 paras, photo)
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's foreign and defense ministers met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra on Monday to discuss ways to expand cooperation in regional security and the defense industry.
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul and Defense Minister Shin Won-sik held a meeting with Albanese and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong to exchange opinions on Indo-Pacific strategic cooperation, the military and defense industry, and North Korean issues, their ministries said.
The meeting took place ahead of the Korean ministers' "two plus two" talks with Wong and Defense Minister Richard Marles, slated for Wednesday.
South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik (L), Australian foreign minister Penny Wong (2nd from L), Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese (2nd from R) and South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul pose for a photo during their meeting in Canberra on April 29, 2024, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The ministers vowed to further advance the "comprehensive strategic partnership" and bolster defense industry ties, according to their ministries.
After the meeting, Albanese emphasized the importance of continuing to develop bilateral relations for regional security.
"South Korea is a crucial regional partner for Australia. Our two countries are working together towards an open, stable, and prosperous region," Albanese wrote on X, formerly Twitter.
Earlier in the day, Cho paid tribute at the Australian National Korean War Memorial in Canberra.
Cho laid wreaths at the memorial stone and paid his respects for the "noble dedication of the 17,164 Australian veterans who fought in the war to protect freedom and democracy in the Republic of Korea, and commemorated their courage and sacrifice," the foreign ministry said, referring to South Korea by its official name.
Australia was among the 22 countries that sent troops or gave medical aid to South Korea under the U.N. flag during the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended in a ceasefire, not a peace treaty. Of the total service members Canberra had sent, 340 were killed in action, according to South Korean data.
Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul pays his respects to the fallen soldiers who participated in the 1950-53 Korean War, at the Australian National Korean War Memorial in Canberra, during his visit to Australia on April 29, 2024, as provided by Cho's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · April 29, 2024
7. North mined all roads connecting the two Koreas: JCS
Is this to defend north Korea from attack or to prevent those wishing to leave from doing so? Or is this simply symbolic because of its withdrawal from the Comprehensive Military Agreement.
Monday
April 29, 2024
dictionary + A - A
Published: 29 Apr. 2024, 17:26
North mined all roads connecting the two Koreas: JCS
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-04-29/national/northKorea/North-mined-all-roads-connecting-the-two-Koreas-JCS/2035956
North Korean and South Korean soldiers shake hands during a road construction project near the military demarcation line (MDL) in November 2018. [MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE]
North Korea has laid landmines along all roads connecting the two Koreas, according to the South Korean military on Monday.
North Korea laid mines late last year on a tactical road within the demilitarized zone (DMZ) near Arrowhead Hill in Cheorwon County, Gangwon, according to the South Korean military.
The road was constructed for a joint project to unearth the remains of South and North Korean soldiers who fell during the Korean War, in accordance with the September 2018 inter-Korean military agreement.
During the construction work, South Korean and North Korean soldiers were photographed meeting and shaking hands across the military demarcation line (MDL). North Korea has since refused to participate in joint excavations.
Related Article
Last January, North Korean troops were seen planting landmines on the Gyeongui road between the South’s westernmost city of Paju in Gyeonggi and the North’s Kaesong, connected in 2004, and the Donghae road along the east coast, which opened in 2005.
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, South Korean officials closed its joint liaison office in Kaesong in 2020, marking the last time the Gyeongui road was used. Since the failed 2019 Hanoi summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and then-U.S. President Donald Trump, the Donghae road has remained unused.
The South Korean military also detected North Korean troops removing dozens of streetlights along the two roads last month.
Such moves are interpreted as North Korea continuing its work to completely cut off physical links with the South after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared last December that relations between Seoul and Pyongyang were of “two states hostile to each other.”
“We must strictly implement step-by-step measures to completely separate all North-South connection conditions in the border area, including completely cutting off the section of the Gyeongui line, which existed as a symbol of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to an irreparable level,” Kim said in January.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) addressed the landmines during a regular press briefing Monday, with the JCS spokesperson, Col. Lee Sung-jun, saying that the South’s military is taking “necessary” measures.
The September 2018 agreement between the two Koreas was reached during the third and final inter-Korean summit in the 2018-19 peace process, attended by then-South Korean president Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Defense Ministers of North and South Korea, No Kwang-chol and Song Young-moo, signed a comprehensive military agreement calling for the removal of landmines, guard posts and weapons in the Joint Security Area.
South Korea partially suspended the 2018 accords last year in response to the North's launch of a military spy satellite. North Korea responded by effectively scrapping the agreement, saying it would "not be bound by" the accords.
8. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un seeks to build on Russia ties to resuscitate economy
Because Russia is such a good economic example for a mafa-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime?
North Korea’s Kim Jong Un seeks to build on Russia ties to resuscitate economy
Pyongyang mobilises army to increase industrial capacity in battered regions
Financial Times · by Christian Davies · April 28, 2024
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un raised fears he was preparing for war this year when he renounced the country’s commitment to peaceful reunification with the south.
But since then, North Korea’s armed forces have had a more prosaic task: making good on the 40-year-old leader’s promise to build a factory in each of the country’s 200 counties and cities over the next 10 years.
“The overall regional economy is in a terrible situation,” Kim told the country’s rubber stamp parliament in January as he acknowledged his own “failure to provide the people in local areas with basic living necessities”.
With many of North Korea’s existing factories already running under capacity, experts are sceptical that the regime’s latest development initiative — the regional development 20x10 policy — will bear fruit.
But they said its ambition — and Kim’s unusual willingness to outline concrete metrics for success — reflected his growing confidence as a result of his burgeoning relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago.
“The war in Ukraine has proven a bonanza for North Korea,” said Peter Ward, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute think-tank in Seoul. “After years of severe hardship for ordinary North Koreans during the coronavirus pandemic, Kim appears determined to use some of his windfall to improve living standards and increase his industrial base.”
Kim Jong Un attends the groundbreaking ceremony for a factory in February. His ‘20x10’ development drive has got off to an energetic start © KCNA/Reuters
Last month, Moscow vetoed a UN panel’s mandate to monitor compliance with international sanctions on North Korea, in effect collapsing a central pillar of the sanctions regime.
The Financial Times had earlier revealed that Russian ports are being used by sanctioned North Korean tankers to collect tens of thousands of barrels of oil and petroleum products, in apparent payment for the delivery of millions of artillery shells for use on the battlefield in Ukraine.
North Korea has welcomed Russian tourist groups in recent months, while Russia’s ambassador to North Korea said in February that Moscow and Pyongyang were discussing new rail, ferry and car routes.
A North Korean delegation led by a high-ranking agricultural official visited Russia this week, according to North Korean state media.
South Korean defence minister Shin Won-sik said North Korea’s economic situation “has improved significantly” in recent months as a result of Russian deliveries of food, raw materials and oil products.
This marks a turnaround in fortunes since 2021, when the regime admitted to a “food crisis” brought on by pandemic-era border closures, tough international sanctions and a miserable harvest.
Experts stressed that the exact state of North Korea’s economy is impossible to measure in the absence of reliable official data.
South Korea’s central bank estimated last year that the North Korean economy contracted for the third straight year in 2022, with a real gross domestic product of $24.64bn, equating to an annual GDP per capita of $1,123 — about 30 times less than that of South Korea.
The economy, which largely relies on the production of coal, concrete and industrial plastics, has been kept afloat by food, fuel and fertiliser from neighbouring China, Pyongyang’s biggest trading partner.
The state’s resources, topped up by criminal enterprises including smuggling and crypto theft, are directed towards the military and Pyongyang. Provincial areas are largely expected to fend for themselves, with ordinary North Koreans surviving on small-scale farming and grassroots market activity.
“Kim will have been worried about what he saw when he travelled the country during the pandemic — not just its state of disrepair and the plight of his people, but the extent to which it relies on China for necessities,” said Ward.
The regional development drive is “perfectly compatible” with Kim’s desire to build up the country’s capabilities for a future conflict, said Rachel Minyoung Lee, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center think-tank in Washington.
“If North Korea can encourage its regional economy to take care of itself, that will eventually free the centre to devote more attention and resources to its real priorities, which include building its military capabilities and providing for the elites in Pyongyang,” said Lee.
“Whether or not Kim Jong Un cares about the ordinary North Korean, it’s important for him to be seen to care,” she added. “If the time comes, he needs a loyal and motivated population that is prepared to fight for him.”
So far, Kim’s “20x10” factory initiative has got off to an energetic start. Over a six-day period in March, 13 groundbreaking ceremonies took place, state media reported.
While North Korean state media have not said what the individual factories will make, Ward noted that Kim Jong Un — who has talked repeatedly of the country’s “import disease” — was likely to prioritise the production of basic goods such as paper and soap as well as processed food and clothing that are traditionally imported from China.
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“Kim wants to reduce his exposure to global markets, not increase it,” said Ward. “You can make a quick buck in the Chinese market, but from a North Korean perspective to rely on the good graces of Beijing for such basic things is a security nightmare.”
But he added that “with so many of their existing factories already running under capacity, to build 200 more is irrational”.
Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, an expert on the North Korean economy at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, said that Kim appeared to be motivated by a desire to return to a situation similar to the cold war, when Pyongyang could “exploit the benefits of having two patrons rather than one”.
“By strengthening his economic partnership with Russia while reducing his dependence on China, Kim is reviving that strategy,” he said.
Financial Times · by Christian Davies · April 28, 2024
9. Experts are guiding the U.S. to the wrong policy on North Korea: we must not accept Kim’s nuclear-weapon-program
Is this. averiled argument for appeasement?
And beware of regime collapse.
The reform paradox: The regime must reform economically to sustina the regime and the nation. However, by reforming economically the regime will be signing its own death warrant.
Excerpts:
In order to offer a deal in which the benefits outweigh the costs, one must understand the losses Kim will incur from denuclearization. Such losses entail the following five attributes: a) they are a deterrence against U.S. military threats both real and imagined, b) they enable military parity with the South, c) as Kim’s monumental achievement they provide regime legitimacy, d) they are part of the Byungjin policy of economic growth in parallel with military development, and e) they enable Kim to wage a hostile foreign policy. The package deal should comprise security guarantees, the lifting of all sanctions, the normalization of relations with the U.S., a peace treaty with South Korea, and sufficient development funds. Undertaking market-oriented reforms and renouncing class struggle will enable sustained and rapid economic development, which will serve as a new means of legitimacy.
Experts are guiding the U.S. to the wrong policy on North Korea: we must not accept Kim’s nuclear-weapon-program - Daily NK English
The DPRK’s socialist system, which was adapted from that of the Soviet Union, has lost its efficacy, and thus the state is destined to collapse without reform
By Chan Young Bang, Ph.D. -
April 29, 2024
dailynk.com · by Chan Young Bang, Ph.D. · April 29, 2024
North Korea's nuclear facility in Yongbyon County, South Pyongan Province. (Yonhap)
Distinguished North Korea experts Jeffrey Lewis, in 2022, followed by John Delury, in 2024, published articles of the same tone in the New York Times. Both authors argue that accepting North Korea as a de jure nuclear weapon state and providing economic assistance would not only alleviate, but end its armed provocation, and also hold back a further solidification of its nuclear arsenal.
The authors’ rationale can be summarized in three points.
- Lewis and Delury acknowledge that thirty years of U.S. policy based upon a choice between a relationship with the U.S. versus isolation with nuclear weapons has not only failed but was also not able to prevent the continued development of North Korea’s arsenal.
- Both authors state that former President Donald Trump’s attempts to achieve the DPRK’s denuclearization with a trade of nuclear weapons in return for economic assistance have failed. Delury states that “a rare opportunity was wasted” as a result of Mr. Trump’s demand that Kim completely denuclearize.
- Lewis and Delury both argue that accepting the DPRK as a de jure nuclear-weapon state and providing economic assistance to the Kim regime will ease the North Korean threat, normalize the U.S.-North Korea relationship, and halt further expansion of the nuclear arsenal.
Their arguments are based on false premises and are therefore untenable.
First, de jure acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapon state and the provision of economic aid will not normalize DPRK-U.S. relations, alleviate the threat posed by Kim Jong-un, or end the North Korean nuclear weapon program.
The DPRK’s hostile foreign policy is rooted in its ideology and class struggle, and not in its weapons of mass destruction. The deep-rooted hostile policy towards the U.S. and South Korea has endured since the division of Korea at the end of World War II, culminating in the invasion of the South by the North in 1950, and persisted even after the armistice agreement between the Koreas in 1953. As we have witnessed, the acute struggle between the U.S.-led Western Bloc and the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, an acrimonious confrontation, stemmed from hostile ideology. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the architect of glasnost and perestroika, underscored how ideology shapes foreign policy when he noted that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, and domestic policy is an embodiment of ideology.
As long as the DPRK clings to class struggle as a ruling ideology, North Korea will continuously 1) wage conflict and seek confrontation, 2) relentlessly pursue internal and external repression, and 3) prepare for war. The following eloquent statement by Eduard Shevardnadze, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs under Gorbachev, should be understood in the same context: “Coexistence based on such premises as nonaggression, respect of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and so on is incompatible with class-struggle. Equating intergovernmental relations with class struggle places an insurmountable barrier in the way of mutual cooperation between countries with different sociopolitical systems.” He further elaborated: “Returning to the absolute of class origin means to resurrect the ‘image of the enemy,’ internal or external, and thus justifies repressions inside and outside the country. Presupposing a totally hostile encirclement means cultivating a siege mentality, preparing for war, and engaging in confrontations and conflicts without respite” (Eduard Shevarnadze, The Future belongs to Freedom, 1991).
It thus follows that, as long as the DPRK clings steadfastly to its ideology of class struggle, it cannot achieve economic development. Moreover, as income disparity between the North and the South deepens, the relationships between the Koreas and between the DPRK and the U.S. will become increasingly contentious.
Second, the arguments presented by Lewis and Delury for the failure of U.S. policies are based upon irrational grounds and are thus untenable. U.S. policies have been unsuccessful for the following two main reasons:
- To succeed, both “sticks” and “carrots” must be effectively calibrated. The U.S. does not have the capacity to offer either credible “sticks” and “carrots” requisite for peaceful denuclearization. Only if all five stakeholders – China, South Korea, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. – work jointly can they make Kim an offer he cannot refuse. The offer must ensure the DPRK a better chance of survival as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The benefits (promises made jointly by the stakeholders) of denuclearization must clearly outweigh the costs (punitive measures threatened by stakeholders). As North Korea expert Scott Snyder argued, strategic success can be achieved only through a shared policy that takes into account the stakeholder states’ strategic interests.
In order to offer a deal in which the benefits outweigh the costs, one must understand the losses Kim will incur from denuclearization. Such losses entail the following five attributes: a) they are a deterrence against U.S. military threats both real and imagined, b) they enable military parity with the South, c) as Kim’s monumental achievement they provide regime legitimacy, d) they are part of the Byungjin policy of economic growth in parallel with military development, and e) they enable Kim to wage a hostile foreign policy. The package deal should comprise security guarantees, the lifting of all sanctions, the normalization of relations with the U.S., a peace treaty with South Korea, and sufficient development funds. Undertaking market-oriented reforms and renouncing class struggle will enable sustained and rapid economic development, which will serve as a new means of legitimacy.
The deal must not only entail transaction, but transformation. In order to accomplish this, the package deal, once consummated, must bring rapid and sustainable economic development to North Korea. The DPRK’s socialist system, which was adapted from that of the Soviet Union, has lost its efficacy, and thus the state is destined to collapse without reform. Accepting the DPRK as a de jure nuclear weapon state will lead to further nuclear proliferation: South Korea and Japan would follow, instigating acute instability. Only if all stakeholder states work together to avert the disaster will they be able to establish lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia through the amicable denuclearization of the DPRK.
-
[1] “Socialism”, Oxford Reference, URL: https://www.oxfordreference.com/.
-
[2] David, J. W. (2002). Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence. Johns Hopkins University Press
-
[1]) is that, without exception, countries that adopted a socialist system all singularly failed to achieve economic development. China’s remarkable experience of economic success exemplifies why, in order to achieve economic development, a socialist country must relinquish its ideology of class struggle. By removing China’s ideology, Deng Xiaoping was able to implement market-oriented reform, privatize the means of production, integrate China into the world economy, and replace the hostile foreign policy with an amicable one.
-
[2], are threats and promises (euphemistically referred to as “sticks” and “carrots”). For three decades, the U.S. has leaned far too heavily on “sticks”- a strategy that has culminated in failure. Trump could have succeeded if he had made Kim an offer in which the benefits of giving up nuclear weapons were greater than the costs. Much like previous administrations, Trump relied too much on “sticks” and offered few viable “carrots.”
dailynk.com · by Chan Young Bang, Ph.D. · April 29, 2024
10. N. Korea updates training video for overseas workers in response to Daily NK reports
Another form of human rights abuse. Holding families of overseas foreign workers hostage.
N. Korea updates training video for overseas workers in response to Daily NK reports - Daily NK English
While you’re overseas, think of your beloved children and other family members who remain back home as you give your all to your country while resisting every dark whisper of temptation,” the video said
By Lee Ho Jin - April 29, 2024
dailynk.com · by Lee Ho Jin · April 29, 2024
FILE PHOTO: Several different construction sites in the Russian city of Ussuriysk in June 2019. (Daily NK)
Following a Daily NK report on Apr. 8 about the financial exploitation of North Korean workers in Russia, North Korea’s Ministry of State Security updated a training video for overseas workers, Daily NK has learned.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in North Korea told Daily NK on Thursday that this month the overseas workers training subsection (a nonpermanent organization) of the Overseas Counterintelligence Bureau at the Ministry of State Security revised a video that is screened for workers selected for overseas assignments. The revised video emphasizes the danger of leaking information and fraternizing with foreign organizations.
The revision of the training video appears to be a response to a series of articles Daily NK has printed based on tips received since it posted a banner on its website last November soliciting tips and contact from North Koreans living overseas.
“The training video goes into detail about how making contact with reactionary media operating in capitalist states damages national security,” the source said.
Significantly, the video specifically mentioned the word “tip.” “Don’t commit the foolish act of getting mixed up with foreign newspapers on the pretext of providing a tip. We’ll never stop until we’ve hunted down all reactionary elements of that sort,” the video said.
The Ministry of State Security appears to be striving to shore up the ideological commitment of workers scheduled to be assigned overseas because Daily NK keeps receiving tips that enable it to write more articles about the situation in North Korea despite the ministry’s orders to stamp out “impure elements” inside the country.
“In the video, [the Ministry of State Security] explained in detail how “a handful of enemies” are using cunning methods to seduce and buy off North Korean officials and workers dispatched overseas and involving them in acts of hostility against the Republic. The video also stressed that [the ministry] will take measures to prevent and crush any attempts by overseas workers to leak information or engage in reactionary behavior,” the source said.
“[The video] also explained how agreeing with or engaging in reactionary behavior is considered a serious crime against the Republic that carries the penalty of ‘the annihilation of three generations.’ Workers were advised to be on their best behavior since they will remain under surveillance while overseas,” the source added.
The video also sought to reassure workers. “There’s no reason to be scared because this is intended to help you more effectively resist the various temptations that you may encounter in your work overseas. While you’re overseas, think of your beloved children and other family members who remain back home as you give your all to your country while resisting every dark whisper of temptation,” the video said.
The video uses a “good cop, bad cop” approach of first terrifying workers with language about “the annihilation of three generations” and then reassuring them that “there’s no reason to be scared.” That reflects how the North Korean authorities are doing everything in their power to keep overseas workers loyal to the regime.
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Lee Ho Jin · April 29, 2024
11. N. Korean military orders end to violence at boot camps
"Recruiting" challenges?
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, the main reason North Korean authorities issued their order to stamp out barracks violence is that recruitment is becoming increasingly difficult as young North Koreans dodge the draft.
Daily NK reported earlier that North Hwanghae Province has been unable to reach even 40% of its target number of recruits as the draft evasion has become more serious.
“It is the basic training period, but the state is worried because the troop strength is shrinking as the number of raw recruits is much lower than in the past,” said the source in North Pyongan Province. “Young people will enlist only if they are not beaten up in the army.”
N. Korean military orders end to violence at boot camps - Daily NK English
A teenage raw recruit who enlisted last fall right out of high school died from a beating he received from a higher-ranking soldier, a source told Daily NK
By Seulkee Jang - April 29, 2024
dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · April 29, 2024
FILE PHOTO: North Korean soldiers walking near Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province. (© Daily NK)
Amid a rise in violence among soldiers in the military, North Korea’s military recently ordered an end to beatings in boot camps amid concerns that such violence is driving more young people to dodge the draft.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Daily NK source in North Pyongan Province said Thursday that the security department of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) sent an order to all units, including boot camps, demanding an end to barracks beatings.
North Korean military authorities enrolled their spring batch of raw recruits last month and began training them in early April. The authorities appear to have ordered the eradication of beatings in boot camps because beatings occur every year during basic training, resulting in injuries – and even deaths – among new recruits.
For example, a teenage raw recruit who enlisted last fall right out of high school died from a beating he received from a higher-ranking soldier, the source said.
Suffering from poor food, psychological tension and frequent beatings, some soldiers lose their minds or, in the worst cases, die.
Barracks beatings are a long-standing problem in North Korea, but it has become an even bigger issue as the average age of raw recruits has risen in recent years.
Another source with knowledge of the situation inside the North Korean military said that “more people are enlisting at an older age than in the past because they want to study more,” and that “younger but higher-ranking soldiers often beat older raw recruits to bring them into line.”
In other words, more people are joining the military in their mid-20s after attending college or graduate school, making it harder for younger veteran soldiers to train them.
Moreover, with the introduction of new weapons since North Korea’s military authorities began their five-year defense development and weapons systems development plan after the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, soldiers move around more as unit formations often change, exacerbating violence among soldiers.
“When soldiers are transferred to a new unit, they are often beaten by higher-ranking soldiers who have been in the unit longer,” the source said. “In the past few years, the beatings have become more frequent, as unit formations change frequently.”
Meanwhile, the main reason North Korean authorities issued their order to stamp out barracks violence is that recruitment is becoming increasingly difficult as young North Koreans dodge the draft.
Daily NK reported earlier that North Hwanghae Province has been unable to reach even 40% of its target number of recruits as the draft evasion has become more serious.
“It is the basic training period, but the state is worried because the troop strength is shrinking as the number of raw recruits is much lower than in the past,” said the source in North Pyongan Province. “Young people will enlist only if they are not beaten up in the army.”
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · April 29, 2024
12. Luxury on Display: Kim Jong-un’s motorcade challenges UN sanctions
Why take the logo off? Does that fool anyone?
Luxury on Display: Kim Jong-un’s motorcade challenges UN sanctions
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/04/28/LT4O7WF3VBDXDMU7U4W4DYIHYU/
By Kim Hwee-won,
Lee Jung-soo
Published 2024.04.28. 15:30
Updated 2024.04.28. 15:39
A Toyota Land Cruiser 300 model vehicle (on the left), with its logo removed, appeared in the motorcade of Chairman Kim Jong-un during his visit to Kim Il-sung University on Apr. 26, 2024. /Korean Central News Agency
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un was seen in a motorcade with high-end luxury vehicles, indicating a disregard for UN sanctions on importing restricted luxury vehicles and potential weapons and related equipment.
According to NK News, the North Korea-specialized media on Apr. 26 six Toyota Land Cruiser 300 vehicles were spotted in the motorcade of Kim Jong-un, the supreme leader of North Korea.
This was observed during Kim Jong-un’s visit to the Kim Il-sung Military University, which was aired on North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency. The six Toyota vehicles captured in the video all had their brand logos removed and were equipped with flashing lights. The Land Cruiser model from the year 2021 costs approximately $80,000.
It is unclear when and how North Korea imported these vehicles. However, this is evidence that North Korea is circumventing United Nations sanctions that have prohibited the export of transportation means to the country since 2017.
In addition to Toyota, various luxury vehicles were found in the parade, including two Mercedes-Benz Maybach SUVs, two Lexus LX SUVs, two Ford Transit vans, five older Mercedes sedans, and one unidentified SUV.
Apart from these, Kim is known to own a few other high-end vehicles. One of them is a new Cadillac SUV of American origin, the source of which is unclear. Another one is a Russian-made Aurus limousine, which is often referred to as the ‘Russian Rolls Royce.’ This vehicle was gifted to him by Vladimir Putin earlier this year.
According to NK News, Kim Jong-un’s recent display of foreign cars in a parade indicates that North Korea is finding ways to import large items, such as vehicles, despite international sanctions. This raises concerns that they might also be importing weapons and related production equipment, which could further violate the existing sanctions.
13. AMCHAM spotlights education infrastructure as key to S. Korea’s Asia-Pacific hub success
AMCHAM spotlights education infrastructure as key to S. Korea’s Asia-Pacific hub success
Dulwich College Seoul highlights role of foreign schools in attracting FDI
https://www.chosun.com/english/2024/04/29/4KOGWSXFEFAEDNORQIEI3YXMFI/
By Kim Seo-young,
Kim Mi-geon
Published 2024.04.29. 16:36
Updated 2024.04.29. 16:37
Paul Smith, Director of Business Administration at Dulwich College Seoul, speaks at the annual Doing Business in Korea Seminar hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM), on April 23, 2024. /Courtesy of AMCHAM
The American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM) held its sixth annual Doing Business in Korea Seminar at the Grand Hyatt Seoul on April 23, themed “Key Policy Agenda to Make Korea a Regional Headquarters.” South Korean and U.S. officials, policymakers, and business leaders attended the event to discuss strategies to enhance Korea’s position as a competitive business hub in the Asia-Pacific region.
One key discussion point was the crucial role of international education in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to Korea. Dulwich College Seoul, a leading international school, emphasized the importance of such institutions in making Korea a top destination for global firms.
Paul Smith, Director of Business Administration at Dulwich College Seoul, shared that top-tier professionals often prioritize cities offering excellent educational opportunities for their children, underscoring the critical role such institutions play in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). He highlighted that educational supply-demand imbalances, such as long waiting lists and oversubscription at international schools in Seoul, create uncertainty for global professionals considering relocation, which can potentially affect recruitment and deter foreign investment. Smith cautioned, “Without adequate educational provisions, Seoul and Korea risk losing the current window of opportunity to become a regional hub for FDI to alternative destinations.”
Paul Smith, Director of Business Administration at Dulwich College Seoul, speaks at the annual Doing Business in Korea Seminar hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM), on April 23, 2024. /Kim Mi-geon
Smith also noted that while Seoul’s traditional competitors like Hong Kong and Singapore face challenges such as geopolitical shifts and high living costs, emerging contenders like Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and notably Dubai are leveraging the strength of their international school industries to lure global investment. “Seoul stands at a critical juncture, with a small window of opportunity to navigate these dynamics and emerge with a competitive edge in the global market,” he said.
To capitalize on this opportunity, Smith called for proactive collaboration between government, businesses, and educational institutions to tackle immediate enrollment challenges and promote long-term stability and growth within Seoul’s foreign and international school sector. “Through partnerships and collaboration, we can explore strategies that not only address immediate enrollment challenges but also foster long-term stability and growth within Seoul’s foreign and international school sector,” he concluded.
Dulwich College Seoul, known for its rich British heritage, serves a diverse student body of 700 pupils aged 3 to 18 from 46 different countries. The school offers a comprehensive curriculum that includes the British National Curriculum, IGCSE, and the International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme. One of the school’s standout features is its holistic curriculum, encompassing various disciplines. Many alumni are said to credit this curriculum with preparing them to assume leadership roles on a global scale. School officials emphasize that the institution operates with the active involvement of staff and the entire student body. They maintain an open-minded approach, actively soliciting and incorporating feedback from students and parents into their teaching methodologies.
14. Editorial: What’s going on in South Korea, pushing the ‘world’s top semiconductor cluster’?
Editorial: What’s going on in South Korea, pushing the ‘world’s top semiconductor cluster’?
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/04/29/VEUKDZNNVFELVI2KB6ZTNDE44E/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2024.04.29. 08:25
Updated 2024.04.29. 09:22
An aerial view of SK Hynix's proposed semiconductor cluster in Wonsam-myeon, Yongin-si, South Korea./SK Hynix
AMAT, the world’s leading semiconductor equipment company, has encountered obstacles in its plans to establish an R&D center in Osan, Gyeonggi Province, South Korea, primarily due to governmental inaction. Despite being heavily promoted by President Yoon Suk-yeol during his 2022 visit to the United States, the investment had progressed to AMAT purchasing the land and completing basic architectural designs. However, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport of Korea designated the easternmost part of Osan as public land, where development activities are prohibited, thus making it impossible to construct the R&D center.
The chosen site for AMAT’s R&D center lies a mere 18 kilometers from Yongin, Gyeonggi Province, home to the world’s largest semiconductor cluster. This situation poses a paradox for a government that champions the semiconductor industry as a ‘national strategic asset.’ Despite such rhetoric, the government has failed to support a global company willing to invest in Korea’s semiconductor ecosystem.
Meanwhile, SK Hynix’s plans for a semiconductor cluster in Yongin have faced numerous setbacks over the past three years. These range from site and water issues to the recent hurdle posed by the construction of a power plant. SK intends to construct an LNG plant to power the semiconductor factory, but the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy has halted the project, citing concerns about “carbon neutrality.” Renewable energy sources like solar and wind are insufficient to meet the substantial electricity demands of semiconductor factories, leaving companies in a quandary.
Across the globe, countries like the U.S. and Japan are enticing semiconductor factories with generous subsidies. At the same time, Taiwan has taken proactive measures to address such facilities’ power and water supply issues. In contrast, South Korea has struggled to streamline the process. For instance, the Samsung Electronics semiconductor factory faced a five-year delay due to transmission line problems alone. With a tax credit system offering a mere 15% of a company’s investment and regulatory hurdles hindering construction efforts, Korea’s ambition to establish the world’s largest semiconductor cluster appears increasingly untenable.
During a semiconductor-focused meeting on Apr. 9, President Yoon said, “We need to combine all of the country’s capabilities to make the semiconductor cluster a success,” and instructed the government to “assess the progress of infrastructure development, encompassing power, water, housing, and transportation.” Yet, the execution of this presidential directive and the actions of frontline ministries seem disjointed.
15. After Zhao Leji’s Visit, What’s Next for China-North Korea Relations?
Excerpts:
What will China-North Korea relations look like moving forward?
First of all, it is highly likely that the movement of people between the two countries will increase significantly.
...
Second, we should not overlook cooperation in the cultural field. Particularly noteworthy here are the mutual translation and publication of classical works and cooperation in TV and radio broadcasting.
...
Third, North Korea and China are also likely to strengthen cooperation in surveillance and control. Since many North Koreans go to China, it is important for the North Korean authorities to figure out how best to manage and supervise these citizens.
...
That makes it highly likely that China’s intelligence authorities will cooperate closely with North Korea on monitoring and arresting North Korean workers in China for problematic behavior. Ultimately, the political freedom of North Korean workers will likely be violated in China, just as it currently is in Russia.
What should the international community’s role be here? The first thing is to keep an eye on when and how North Korean workers are sent to China. We also need to make note of who comes in as students and carefully examine how they are subjected to labor exploitation. Careful attention should also be paid to where North Korean IT experts are sent and what they plan on doing in the future. To keep North Korea’s actions in check, in other words, the international community must keep sending the message that it will never tolerate Pyongyang’s bad behavior.
It is also important to consider whether increasing cooperation between China and North Korea could serve as a valuable opportunity for the international community. As more people and materials move across borders, that creates more openings for communicating with North Koreans. It is surely important to make the most of that opportunity.
After Zhao Leji’s Visit, What’s Next for China-North Korea Relations?
thediplomat.com
Recently, North Korea’s relations with Russia have seemingly outpaced ties with China. But Pyongyang has more to gain from China than from Russia.
By Lee Sang-yong
April 26, 2024
In this photo provided on April 12, 2024, by the North Korean government, Choe Ryong Hae, right, vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of North Korea, talks with Zhao Leji, left, chairman of the National People’s Congress of China, during a reception, at the Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang, North Korea, on April 11, 2024.
Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP
A Chinese party and government delegation led by Zhao Leji, the third-highest ranking member of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, made a visit to North Korea on April 11-13. Zhao’s visit has attracted significant attention from the international community, with experts predicting a likely increase of cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang in the near future.
North Korea’s relations with China seem weaker compared to its relations with Russia. Pyongyang and Moscow have significantly boosted their economic, political, diplomatic, and military cooperation since the summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un last year.
For instance, while Russia sent Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to Pyongyang last year to commemorate the signing of the Korean War Armistice Agreement, China sent Li Hongzhong, a lower-ranking official who is vice chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
Beijing decided to send a higher-level official like Zhao to North Korea this time, suggesting that it may intend to strengthen ties with Pyongyang.
Another factor that likely influenced China’s decision is the perception that China is manipulating North Korea within the framework of a new Cold War with the United States. As such, from China’s perspective, cozy ties between Russia and North Korea, both internationally defiant states, are a major variable, and Beijing means to show the international community that its relations with Pyongyang remain solid.
From North Korea’s perspective, the fact is that it has more to gain from China than from Russia. Even though Russia is reportedly sending rice, flour, and oil products (such as gasoline and diesel) to North Korea, China could send much larger quantities of those same products if it chose to. The same goes for tourism. While Russia accounts for a small number of tourists to North Korea, Pyongyang may see tourism from China as a great opportunity to generate funds.
Moreover, another key variable that North Korea must keep in mind is the fact that there is no guarantee that Russia’s war in Ukraine will continue indefinitely. Although North Korea is taking advantage of Russia’s “war economy” by sending weapons in exchange for food, Pyongyang surely knows that this arrangement has an expiration date. Accordingly, it can be concluded that cooperation with China is necessary for North Korea to achieve its long-term political and economic aims.
Since China and North Korea’s interests align, Beijing sent a high-level official to Pyongyang, and the two sides are highly likely to take steps to further improve relations in the near future.
Even within North Korea, some see it as entirely possible that Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping will hold a summit this year to commemorate 75 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. There are rumors that preparations and discussions are being carried out behind the scenes in connection with a possible Kim visit to China, followed by a return visit by Xi to North Korea.
The Possibility of Wide-ranging Collaboration Between North Korea and China
What will China-North Korea relations look like moving forward?
First of all, it is highly likely that the movement of people between the two countries will increase significantly. Mutual exemptions have already been made for diplomatic visas and other visas related to official government business. When diplomatic representatives from the two countries are in close communication, they can play the role of enablers, helping expand each other’s influence in the international community.
The possibility of increased economic cooperation is also likely in the form of Chinese traders going to North Korea to discuss the establishment of joint ventures. All these forms of cooperation could be interpreted as falling under the category of official “government business.” Under this broad definition of cooperation, North Korea will actively seek to send students to China and could also use student visas as a pretext for sending not only workers but also cyber experts (such as hackers).
Since North Korea’s IT experts are being closely monitored by the international community, many will have to be replaced. Pyongyang’s plan seems to be using unknown individuals to carry out cyberattacks and virtual currency theft. North Korea’s sprawling and illicit foreign currency-earning operations will likely expand under Chinese protection.
Also noteworthy is how China and North Korea agreed to ease customs-related quarantine measures. That is related to the “20×10 regional development policy” that Kim Jong Un has been promoting. North Korea’s goal now is to gain quick access to the raw materials and intermediate materials necessary for the construction of factories in rural North Korea.
Pyongyang seems to have concluded that taking such steps is needed to circumvent international sanctions and that relying on its “big brother” China can help it get projects off the ground. Also, given the mutual visa exemptions for government business mentioned above, it is now easier for Chinese investors to visit North Korea. As a result, Pyongyang seems to expect that the construction of factories in the countryside will be accelerated thanks to Chinese investment.
Second, we should not overlook cooperation in the cultural field. Particularly noteworthy here are the mutual translation and publication of classical works and cooperation in TV and radio broadcasting. North Korea is trying to keep a lid on South Korean entertainment and publications while simultaneously bringing in Chinese works on a large scale. That can be seen as Pyongyang’s strategy for rooting out interest in the “Korean Wave” from the minds of its citizens.
North Korean authorities seem to believe that if they can provide the public with an unlimited supply of Chinese movies translated into Korean, they can satisfy North Korean people’s desire for foreign content while nipping ideological defections in the bud. Pyongyang may also assume that China’s abundance of media centered on anti-Japan and socialist ideology could serve the dual purpose of reinforcing government-approved ideology among the masses.
As such, a large amount of Chinese media is being imported and translated under the oversight and control of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Once this work is done, the apparent plan is to upload this Chinese content to North Korea’s video streaming service “My Companion” so that North Koreans can freely watch it.
Third, North Korea and China are also likely to strengthen cooperation in surveillance and control. Since many North Koreans go to China, it is important for the North Korean authorities to figure out how best to manage and supervise these citizens. Accordingly, many North Korean security agents will be sent to China and request close cooperation with Chinese authorities to monitor North Korean workers there. (According to some reports, an arrangement has already been reached for mutual cooperation in this area).
That makes it highly likely that China’s intelligence authorities will cooperate closely with North Korea on monitoring and arresting North Korean workers in China for problematic behavior. Ultimately, the political freedom of North Korean workers will likely be violated in China, just as it currently is in Russia.
What should the international community’s role be here? The first thing is to keep an eye on when and how North Korean workers are sent to China. We also need to make note of who comes in as students and carefully examine how they are subjected to labor exploitation. Careful attention should also be paid to where North Korean IT experts are sent and what they plan on doing in the future. To keep North Korea’s actions in check, in other words, the international community must keep sending the message that it will never tolerate Pyongyang’s bad behavior.
It is also important to consider whether increasing cooperation between China and North Korea could serve as a valuable opportunity for the international community. As more people and materials move across borders, that creates more openings for communicating with North Koreans. It is surely important to make the most of that opportunity.
Authors
Guest Author
Lee Sang-yong
Lee Sang-yong is the director of research and analysis at Daily NK.
thediplomat.com
16. South Korea tries to Trump-proof the alliance
Excerpts:
The ROK is once again forced to confront the possibility of weakening US support – just as Korea’s always-rough neighborhood is getting scarier.
The DPRK has recently made itself more intimidating to the ROK in three ways. First, the North Korean military continues to deploy different ways of delivering nuclear weapons to its adversaries.
Second, Pyongyang alarmingly changed its official policy this year to renounce unification, reclassify South Koreans as foreigners and label the ROK as North Korea’s main enemy country.
And third, Pyongyang has enhanced its tangible security cooperation with Russia. Putin’s technicians are apparently helping the DPRK improve its missiles as payment for North Korea supplying Russia with munitions.
In addition to North Korea’s persistent hostility, China increasingly insists on controlling territory on its periphery and holding veto power over the foreign policies of its neighbors. That potentially exposes South Koreans to either Chinese domination or the flames of regional war caused by US and/or Japanese attempts to stave off Chinese expansionism.
In this year’s negotiations for a new special measures agreement, the US delegation will likely ask for another increase, and Seoul will likely agree to pay more. Seoul, still in a precarious external situation despite flourishing economically, needs to reduce the ROK’s vulnerability to further criticism in case Trump returns to the White House.
South Korea tries to Trump-proof the alliance - Asia Times
Fears that Kim, ratcheting up tensions, could position Trump to negotiate ‘peace’ in exchange for troops withdrawal
asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · April 24, 2024
US and South Korean delegations met in Hawaii on April 23 to begin talks about how much host nation support Seoul will pay toward the cost of operating US military bases in South Korea. Under a “special measures agreement” that is renewed every few years, Seoul helps pay for the land and electricity used by US bases, the salaries of Korean civilians who work on the bases and construction of new facilities.
The current agreement will not expire until the end of 2025, but the talks are beginning unusually early out of fear that Donald Trump might win a second term as US president in the November election. Both the US and Republic of Korea (ROK) governments want to lock in a new agreement before Trump could take office.
Negotiations prior to the current agreement were traumatic. They broke down in 2019 over the Trump Administration’s demand that the ROK’s annual payment increase from about $1 billion to $5 billion per year. That amount might have pushed Seoul to abrogate the alliance.
The Trump Administration left office with the issue unresolved. Under the incoming Biden Administration, the US and ROK agreed that Seoul’s payment would increase by a much smaller 13.9%, which was still the largest increase in almost two decades.
South Koreans such as Kim Hyun-wook, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, foresee “the likelihood of another crisis emerging within the Korea-US alliance” if Trump is re-elected.
Kim Won-soo, former under-secretary-general of the United Nation, says, “We need a Plan B” if Trump returns to power.
Or, as Asan Institute researcher Yang Uk puts it, South Korea needs “to contain the Trump risk.”
A Trump II Administration might “demand an increase in defense costs sharing or the withdrawal of US forces,” warns Lee Ki-tae of the Korea Institute for National Unification.
“What happens if the US president says he’s going to pull US troops from Korea?” wonders Chun In-bum, a retired ROK Army general.
South Koreans are right to worry. Trump has famously criticized the US ally as a wealthy free-rider, demonstrating a lack of appreciation of the strategic benefits America enjoys from its alliances. But it’s worse than that.
First, Trump has expressed sympathy for parts of Kim Jong-un’s agenda. He has called joint US-ROK military exercises “very provocative” and noted that Kim “feels threatened” by them, echoing one of Pyongyang’s propaganda points.
According to multiple sources, while he was president Trump seriously considered withdrawing US troops from South Korea. He has said publicly “I want to get our soldiers out. I want to bring our soldiers back home.” Trump has also reportedly indicated he plans to end the US-ROK alliance if he gets a second term.
Second, Trump seems to prioritize the appearance of a win over substantive improvement of America’s strategic circumstances. Trump prematurely claimed in 2018 that, because of his meeting with Kim, “there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea.”
That year Trump said that “everyone” thought he deserved a Nobel Prize for his North Korea policy. Trump boasted in 2019 that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had nominated him for the honor. (Abe used flattery as a tactic to manage Trump, who had criticized Japan as another free-riding US ally.)
Trump and Abe. Photo: Kyodo
According to a Politico story in December 2023 based on interviews with people “briefed on his thinking,” a re-elected Trump would seek a quick deal with North Korea so he could claim success and turn his attention elsewhere.
One possibility would be a “freeze” in which Pyongyang would keep its existing nuclear arsenal but stop making new bombs. In return, the US would drop economic sanctions and provide additional financial aid.
Some analysts have argued in favor of such a deal, but it would face serious problems, such as the near impossibility of credibly verifying that North Korea was complying with the terms of the deal and the likely consequence that South Korea and Japan would seek to deploy their own nuclear arsenals.
For South Koreans and other US friends, the Trump experience has inescapably eroded America’s reputation for reliability as a security partner. Trump has shown that an anti-alliance candidate can get elected president.
That event might appear an aberration were it not for the fact that – even after Joe Biden’s presidency has restored a more conventional US policy toward the Koreas – Trump is again the Republican Party’s candidate for president and has a very good chance of winning another term.
A populist wave in US politics has birthed a Republican Party faction that prioritizes ideological purity and embraces obstructionism rather than the traditional approach of working out compromises with the opposing party to address urgent legislative issues. One of the results is a recrudescence of America’s latent isolationism.
Although the Republican Party is hawkish on China, 34 Republican members of the House of Representatives voted against the $8 billion Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act on April 20. Their main objection was that Congress should be spending that money to fix problems at home rather than overseas. That attitude could easily spread to US-Korea relations.
The US Congress is Trump-proofing as well. In December members inserted into the annual National Defense Authorization Act, which funds the US armed forces, a section forbidding the US president from withdrawing from NATO without the assent of two-thirds of the Senate or a separate bill by Congress approving the withdrawal.
A similar measure to protect the US alliances with the ROK and Japan might be a good idea.
Pyongyang might be preparing for Trump II in a different way. South Korean analysts believe the Democratic Pe0ple’s Republic of Korea might try to influence the US election in Trump’s favor through missile test launches, which remind US voters that the Biden Administration has not solved the security problem created by a hostile and well-armed North Korea. DPRK cyber operations might might flood US social media with pro-Trump messaging.
Thomas Schafer, former German Ambassador to North Korea, opines that Pyongyang will “continue to ratchet up tensions with South Korea” with the intent of setting up Trump to negotiate a deal that would achieve “peace” for the price of withdrawing US troops or weakening the US-ROK alliance.
South Korea has endured decades of anxiety about its dangerous neighborhood combined with the fear of abandonment by its superpower ally. Throughout pre-modern history, Korea struggled to maintain its distinct civilization against pressures and intrusions from China and Japan.
Competition for influence in Korea led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. After World War II, while North Koreans suffered from the hardships imposed by their own government, South Koreans faced a triple challenge: staving off attempted absorption by the Kim regime, building a prosperous economy and pushing their political system to become more just and democratic.
The ROK achieved admirable success in economic development and democratization. Sadly, however, South Korea’s massive supremacy over the DPRK in economic, technological, diplomatic and cultural power have not ensured the ROK’s security. The Kim regime still menaces the South with nuclear missiles and the capability to inundate Seoul with conventional ordnance.
Trump is not the first US leader to raise the possibility of abandoning the ROK. In 1977, US President Jimmy Carter ordered his government to plan for the withdrawal of US ground troops from Korea, a goal Carter had talked about during the presidential election campaign.
Former US President Jimmy Carter and North Korean President Kim Il Sung meet in June 1994, just weeks before Kim’s death. Photo: Korean Central News Agency
ROK President Park Chung Hee considered Carter’s plan a betrayal that was especially egregious because South Korea had dispatched troops to support the US military campaign in South Vietnam.
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Richard C. Holbrooke as assistant secretary of state was instrumental in thwarting President Jimmy Carter’s plan to withdraw US troops from South Korea. Photo: Brown University
Stiff bureaucratic opposition prevented the implementation of Carter’s plan, but Koreans took notice.
In 2003, US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld said he intended to withdraw US forces because they were no longer needed to deter a North Korean attack.
Although a full withdrawal did not happen, 3,600 US troops based in Korea redeployed to Iraq in 2004, never to be replaced.
The ROK is once again forced to confront the possibility of weakening US support – just as Korea’s always-rough neighborhood is getting scarier.
The DPRK has recently made itself more intimidating to the ROK in three ways. First, the North Korean military continues to deploy different ways of delivering nuclear weapons to its adversaries.
Second, Pyongyang alarmingly changed its official policy this year to renounce unification, reclassify South Koreans as foreigners and label the ROK as North Korea’s main enemy country.
And third, Pyongyang has enhanced its tangible security cooperation with Russia. Putin’s technicians are apparently helping the DPRK improve its missiles as payment for North Korea supplying Russia with munitions.
In addition to North Korea’s persistent hostility, China increasingly insists on controlling territory on its periphery and holding veto power over the foreign policies of its neighbors. That potentially exposes South Koreans to either Chinese domination or the flames of regional war caused by US and/or Japanese attempts to stave off Chinese expansionism.
In this year’s negotiations for a new special measures agreement, the US delegation will likely ask for another increase, and Seoul will likely agree to pay more. Seoul, still in a precarious external situation despite flourishing economically, needs to reduce the ROK’s vulnerability to further criticism in case Trump returns to the White House.
Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.
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asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · April 24, 2024
17. Deciphering North Korea’s Policy Shift: Annihilation of ROK vs. End of Kim Regime
An article I missed last month. I like how the headline of the article frames the issue.
But I fear the authors are engaging in some wishful thinking because they do not appear to fully understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Excerpts:
Finally, it is crucial to fully support the transition of a denuclearized DPRK into an information-knowledge state. The new standard of civilization in 21st century is informatization and intelligentization, driven by the development of cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), and North Korea is no different. To ensure its survival, North Korea should aim for robust economic growth through a tailored Open Door Policy, choosing a survival strategy in a denuclearized context. As indicated by 21st-century evolutionary biology, an entity that does not engage in self-organization and coevolution loses its vitality. Hence, international collaboration is critical to assist North Korea in finding a new path for self-organization and coevolution.
Therefore, the development of a four-dimensional strategy, which includes (1) bolstering South Korean model of integrated deterrence, (2) ensuring survival of a nuclear-free regime, (3) promoting economic development in a denuclearized North Korea, and (4) collectively supporting Pyongyang’s informatization and intellectualization to align with the 21st-century global standards, is essential. This strategy will enable the Korean Peninsula to shift from conversations centered on the “end of the regime” and the “destruction of the ROK,” towards creating a peaceful and prosperous region.
Deciphering North Korea’s Policy Shift: Annihilation of ROK vs. End of Kim Regime
https://www.globalnk.org/commentary/view?cd=COM000133&utm
Commentary | March 11, 2024
Young-Sun HA
Chairman, EAI
Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University
Yang Gyu KIM
Principal Researcher, EAI
Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University
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Editor's Note
Young-Sun Ha (Chairman, EAI) and Yang Gyu Kim (Executive Director, EAI) analyze North Korea’s recent proclamation of a “fundamental turnabout” in its policy towards South Korea, asserting that the regime is threatening to annilate its neighbor as the best alternative strategy to address their inability to establish Mutual Assured Destruction against the U.S. The authors suggest a four-fold strategy for South Korea: (1) bolstering South Korean model of integrated deterrence, (2) guaranteeing regime survival if DPRK abandons its nuclear arsenal, (3) fostering economic growth in a nuclear-free North Korea, and (4) collectively aiding Pyongyang’s informatization and intellectualization to align with the modern day global standards.
Following the DPRK’s declaration of a “fundamental turnabout” in its policy towards South Korea and redefinition of the inter-Korean relationship as “relations between two states hostile to each other” (Rodong Sinmun 2023/12/31), widespread confusion and disoriented debates prevail both within South Korea and internationally. To clarify this situation, this briefing begins by analyzing the recent changes in North Korea’s policy towards South Korea, which were disclosed at the 9th Enlarged Plenum of the 8th Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee last December, in the context of their historical policy progression. It also addresses North Korea’s recent proclamation of “the legal right to annihilate South Korea,” viewed as a reaction to the Biden administration’s tailored extended deterrence strategy that emphasizes the “end of regime.” Ultimately, the briefing outlines a set of four-dimensional policy approaches for South Korea, aiming to transcend the current discourse focused on “end” and “annihilation,” and to establish a path toward a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula.
1. North Korea’s “Fundamental Turnabout”: Annihilation of South Korea
During the 9th Plenum last December, Kim Jong Un announced a “fundamental turnabout in the sector of work toward the south on the basis of a cool analysis of the bitter history of the north-south relations which has repeatedly suffered only distrust and confrontation” (Rodong Sinmun 2023/12/31). He criticized the ROK authorities for promoting “unification by absorption” or “regime collapse” under the guise of “North Korea policy” or “unification policy,” stating that these approaches contrast with the North’s vision of reunification, which he describes as “one nation and one state with two systems.” Kim also labeled South Korea as “nothing but a hemiplegic malformation and colonial subordinate state whose politics is completely out of order, whole society tainted by Yankee culture, and defense and security totally dependent on the U.S.” He asserted that as a result, the inter-Korean relations have irreversibly shifted to being “completely fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogeneous ones anymore.”
In a speech at the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) (KCNA 2024/01/15), Kim Jong Un highlighted two main reasons for the heightened risk of war: (1) the proximity of its “most hostile state [ROK]” and (2) “the regional situation … soaring due to the U.S.-led escalation of military tensions.” Kim Jong Un claimed that such a war would “terribly destroy the entity called the Republic of Korea and put an end to its existence,” and also “inflict an unimaginably crushing defeat upon the U.S.”
In his address at the Ministry of National Defense (KCNA 2024/2/9), Kim announced that North Korea “designated the puppet Republic of Korea as our most dangerous and first enemy state and invariable archenemy,” and decided as their “state policy to occupy and subjugate its territory in time of emergency.” In making this decision, North has “ridden [themselves] on [their] own initiative of the fetters of unrealistic developments,” moving away from a past where they were “taken captive by the rhetorical expression of fellow compatriots, had to endeavor for dialogue and cooperation.” This shift has reportedly established a “legal entitlement” to “strike and annihilate it at any moment if it dares to provoke.”
How new are these threats? Since Kim Jong Un’s speech at the military parade marking the 90th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army (KPRA) in April 2022, North Korea has already established two distinct missions for their nuclear forces. While the first mission highlights traditional defense and deterrence against perceived threats from U.S. military actions, the second mission is framed in more confrontational terms against the ROK. On September 8, 2022, North Korea revised its Nuclear Forces Policy Laws, which initially focused on the first mission when originally enacted in 2013. The revised law incorporates the second mission, stating that its nuclear forces “shall carry out an operational mission for repulsing hostile forces’ aggression and attack and achieving decisive victory of war in case its deterrence fails.” Nevertheless, back in 2022 when they were discussing this second mission, North Korea stopped short of explicitly mentioning the “annihilation” of South Korea. In this regard, this recent use of “annihilation” rhetoric represents a clear shift in North Korea’s policy towards the ROK.
Historically, the first shift in North Korea’s policy towards South Korea occurred post-1948, marked by their pursuit of unification through warfare that culminated in the Korean War of 1950. The second shift emerged in 1964 at the 4th WPK Congress, introducing the concept of unification through revolution. This policy shift was largely influenced by global geopolitical dynamics. With the U.S. deeply involved in the Vietnam War and the escalating conflict between the PRC and the USSR, it became impractical for North Korea to consider a unification strategy akin to a second Korean War. Consequently, North Korea shifted its focus towards fostering revolution, leveraging its superior economic position compared to the South at the time. The 1972 Joint Communique, emphasizing the three main principles of independence, peace, and national unity, was a manifestation of this strategic approach.
Transitioning into the third phase, North Korea is redefining its relationship with South Korea as “relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states”, aiming to adopt a North Korean version of tailored nuclear threat strategy against the South. Therefore, it’s crucial to examine this “two hostile states” narrative from a perspective distinct from the previous approaches of “unification through war” and “unification through revolution.”
2. The Essence of DPRK’s Policy Shift: Extended Deterrence and the “End of the Kim Jong Un Regime”
Although North Korea’s policy change towards ROK evolves within the intricate interplay of domestic policy, inter-Korean relations, and international politics, it is especially important to focus on the aspect of international politics.
The Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy, which includes the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), outlines the United States’ tailored approach to counter North Korea’s threats. The strategy asserts that any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its allies would be “unacceptable” and will lead to “the end of that regime,” and that “there is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.” In response, the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, “The U.S., the one and only country in the world which sets it as a main target of nuclear strategy to ‘topple the government’ of a sovereign state, must be prepared for paying an equal price for its attempt to use military forces against the DPRK” (KCNA 2022/10/31). Additionally, during the 6th Plenary of the 8th WPK Central Committee, Kim Jong Un labelled South Korea as an “undoubted enemy” and mentioned his commitment to carry out the second mission, “which will not be for defense” (Rodong Sinmun 2023/1/1). This shift in focus to South Korea as a target for nuclear attack is seen as a response to North Korea’s actual inability to effectively deter the U.S. through nuclear means.
After the ROK-U.S. Summit on April 26, 2023, and the Washington Declaration, a more comprehensive series of response followed. Kim Yo Jong, in her April 29 statement released on KCNA, emphasized three aspects: (1) the Washington Declaration is a “typical product of [ROK-U.S.’] extreme anti-DPRK hostile policy reflecting the most hostile and aggressive will of action, which “compelled [DPRK] to take more decisive action … to deal with the new security environment,” (2) “the chief executive of the enemy state [President Biden] officially and personally used the word ‘the end of regime’ under the eyes of the world,” and (3) the necessity for North Korea to strengthen its nuclear war deterrent and further refine the second mission. North Korea also held national rallies denouncing the ROK and U.S., and burned effigies of President Biden and President Yoon.
Subsequent DPRK actions always incorporate the phrase “end of regime.” In his address at the 9th Session of the 14th SPA, Kim Jong Un cited this term while explaining the inclusion of the Nuclear Forces Policy Law in North Korea’s constitution.
The U.S., which had already set it as its state policy to physically remove our state and even ignited a war to do so in the last century, has maximized its nuclear war threats to our Republic by resuming the large-scale nuclear war joint drills with clear aggressive nature and putting the deployment of its strategic nuclear assets near the Korean peninsula on a permanent basis after starting the operation of the “Nuclear Consultative Group” aimed at using nuclear weapons against the DPRK in collusion with the “Republic of Korea”, while frequently revising the aggression war scenario for realizing the “end of regime” in the DPRK (KCNA 2023/9/28).
The fundamental turnabout in their policy towards South Korea, revealed in the 9th Enlarged Plenum of the 8th WPK Central Committee, also points to Biden’s “end of regime” strategy.
Since the U.S. government first introduced the term “end of regime” in October 2022, North Korea has labeled South Korea as an enemy state, not a part of one nation, to which they could carry out the second mission. As the U.S. consistently displays its ability to actualize the “end of regime” scenario, North Korea is increasingly emphasizing its nuclear capabilities as a key aspect of its second mission, primarily directed at South Korea, despite its rhetorical focus on the first mission to deter Washington.
This shift is occurring within the context of North Korea’s unique approach to nuclear threat strategy. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union, both possessing reliable second-strike capabilities as a countermeasure to a potential nuclear attack, achieved Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). This led them to consciously avoid direct, physical conflict to prevent mutual annihilation. A key aspect of this “Nuclear Revolution” was the mutual vulnerability inherent in MAD (Jervis 1989, 23-38). Therefore, for North Korea to achieve strategic stability in its relations with the U.S. by ensuring MAD, it needs the capability to devastate population centers in the U.S., essentially holding the lives and assets of numerous people as leverage.
However, the disparity in nuclear capabilities between the U.S. and DPRK is vast. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports that the U.S. has 1,770 deployed nuclear warheads and 1,938 in central storage. In contrast, North Korea reportedly has around 30 nuclear warheads, none of which are deployed, making its arsenal roughly 1/100th the size of the U.S.’s. The exact number of North Korean tactical nuclear warheads ready for battlefield use remains uncertain, while the U.S. has 100 deployed across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Türkiye, plus 100 on the U.S. mainland. Currently, the U.S. is replacing its older B61-3 and B61-4 warheads with the more advanced B61-12. This new model, equipped with a guided tail-kit, can use lower yields to target underground facilities with reduced radioactive fallout. The B61-12 can be deployed not only by B-2 bombers but also by the 5th generation F-35A stealth combat aircraft, allowing for preemptive strikes on command and control centers and vital military installations (SIPRI 2023, 247-259).
The U.S. is further advancing its security strategy by building a complex defense infrastructure. This involves developing an “integrated deterrence” strategy that spans across military (including land, air, maritime, cyber, and space) and non-military (encompassing economic, technological, and informational) domains, combines nuclear and conventional forces, and prepares for grey zone warfare (White House 2022/10/12, 22). Clearly, the heyday of nuclear dominance is rapidly declining. The “end-of-regime” strategy is operational within this broader framework of integrated deterrence, expected to be much more efficient and effective (U.S. Department of Defense 2022/10/27, 8).
In light of the expanding U.S. military capabilities, the foremost concern for North Korea is the safety and survival of its “Supreme Leader.” An article in Rodong Sinmun (2024/2/2) by Ri Ji Song, a researcher from the DPRK Society for International Politics Study, referenced the U.S. plan to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in the UK, as mentioned by The Telegraph. In this article, he voiced concerns over the deployment of B-2 stealth nuclear strategic bombers in Guam, which are “capable of carrying and operating B61-12” and can “be used for any future operation in the Korean peninsula.” This has reportedly led to a call for the strengthening of North Korea’s own deterrent capabilities.
Realistically, North Korea currently lacks the ability to pose a credible threat to the United States by targeting key military and strategic non-military facilities integral to U.S. national interests. The concept of mutual vulnerability is not applicable as North Korea lacks second-strike capabilities, and hence is unable to create a stable mutual deterrence. Owing to these obvious constraints, North Korea is focusing more on its nuclear force’s second mission, the “annihilation of ROK,” rather than its first mission. This rhetoric of “annihilation” is North Korea’s unique approach to countering the U.S.’s “end of regime” extended deterrence strategy with a nuclear threat strategy of its own. In doing so, it accentuates the destruction of South Korea, which it views as a hostile country, rather than part of a single nation.
3. ROK’s North Korea Policy: Enhancing Integrated Deterrence and Proposing Comprehensive Assurance for the Survival of the Denuclearized Regime
Historically, North Korea has shaped its policy towards the ROK with the aim of strengthening its “revolutionary forces” across North Korean, South Korean, and international fronts. To respond effectively to North Korea’s recent policy shift that incorporates a tailored nuclear threat, South Korea must make prudent choice to contribute to the peace and prosperity of both the Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific region. This necessitates moving beyond a simplistic understanding of the interplay between North Korea’s internal political dynamics, changes in inter-Korean relations, and wider geopolitical considerations. It is essential to discern North Korea’s policy priorities and develop innovative strategies for engaging with the regime.
First, it is crucial to reinforce extended deterrence, a concept that aligns with the U.S.’s strategy of integrated deterrence. Both the Washington Declaration and the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) have emphasized the significance of developing and deploying the B61-12 warhead alongside the F-35 fighter aircraft. This advancement has lent greater credibility to the notion of “end of regime,” thereby elevating North Korea’s sense of concern. Unlike the MAD strategy during the Cold War, where the U.S. and the Soviet Union targeted each other’s extensive military, urban, and industrial bases and centers, the idea of regime collapse is evidently a much more potent deterrent for North Korea.
Given this situation, the ongoing debate in South Korea regarding the need for nuclear armament is outdated. Moreover, considering the current strategic climate of Europe and the Indo-Pacific, reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula is not a viable option. South Korea should leverage the U.S.’s efforts in creating an integrated deterrence framework through the NCG. Upgrading its security infrastructure with advanced technology is essential to minimize the costs of efforts required to counter Pyongyang’s growing nuclear threats, while also preparing for the impending era of algorithmic warfare.
Secondly, to prompt Pyongyang to reevaluate its nuclear-based survival strategy, South Korea’s approach should aim not only at practically neutralizing the primary and secondary objectives of North Korea’’s nuclear forces, but also at increasing the cost-effectiveness of denuclearization. As the integrated extended deterrence between ROK and the U.S. strengthens, the utility of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is bound to diminish, regardless of its advancements. However, breaking North Korea out of this vicious cycle is hardly attainable without assurances that the regime can survive without nuclear capabilities. North Korea is depleting its resources on outdated nuclear development while still under severe economic sanctions. With this, achieving the goal declared in its Five-Year Plan, intended to be accomplished before the 9th WPK Central Committee meeting in 2025, is virtually impossible. North Korea’s attempt to boost its diplomatic clout by increasing military provocations will likely backfire, as U.S. and ROK will further strengthen their deterrence capability. In other words, North Korea must understand that no matter how intense its provocations become, it will merely result in an unbreakable cycle of ever-strengthening ROK-U.S. integrated deterrence.
North Korea affirmed its commitment to continuing nuclear weapons development for survival at the 8th WPK meeting in 2021. Now, South Korea must offer an alternative “third way” for North Korea. This approach should ensure the survival rights of a denuclearized regime. Establishing security guarantee measures, not only at the bilateral level (e.g. DPRK-ROK, DPRK-U.S.), but also via multilateral arrangements that include China, Russia, Japan, and ultimately at a global scale through organizations like the United Nations, are critical.
Thirdly, it is imperative for South Korea to establish a comprehensive framework that supports the DPRK’s development rights. The primary domestic political issue for the regime, as they approach the 9th WPK Central Committee meeting in 2025, is to secure a future in economic development. Currently, their domestic policy is centered on the “Frontal Breakthrough” strategy, announced during the 5th plenary of the 7th WPK Central Committee in 2020, which emphasizes self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Despite attempts to modestly expand trade and exchanges with Russia and China, the strategy remains limited in scope and fails to extend beyond its initial objective. The dire state of North Korea’s economy starkly highlights the limitations of this self-reliance approach. North Korea’s economic reform and opening, similar to China’s remarkable economic growth under Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy for nearly four decades, appears inevitable if it seeks to become a prosperous state. The international community needs to develop a collaborative economic model that offers a viable “third way” for the North Korean regime to pursue its version of opening and reform.
Finally, it is crucial to fully support the transition of a denuclearized DPRK into an information-knowledge state. The new standard of civilization in 21st century is informatization and intelligentization, driven by the development of cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), and North Korea is no different. To ensure its survival, North Korea should aim for robust economic growth through a tailored Open Door Policy, choosing a survival strategy in a denuclearized context. As indicated by 21st-century evolutionary biology, an entity that does not engage in self-organization and coevolution loses its vitality. Hence, international collaboration is critical to assist North Korea in finding a new path for self-organization and coevolution.
Therefore, the development of a four-dimensional strategy, which includes (1) bolstering South Korean model of integrated deterrence, (2) ensuring survival of a nuclear-free regime, (3) promoting economic development in a denuclearized North Korea, and (4) collectively supporting Pyongyang’s informatization and intellectualization to align with the 21st-century global standards, is essential. This strategy will enable the Korean Peninsula to shift from conversations centered on the “end of the regime” and the “destruction of the ROK,” towards creating a peaceful and prosperous region.
References
Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. New York: Cornell University Press.
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2022. “Statement of Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry”. October 31. https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1667255750-351184696/statement-of-spokesman-for-dprk-foreign-ministry/
______. 2023. “Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong Clarifies Stand through KCNA” April 29. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/3eae34d50194630c927dd5dc68ede305.kcmsf
______. 2023. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at 9th Session of 14th SPA”. September 28. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/9c38c667ab8fc1a8ab39bded693ee120.kcmsf
______. 2024. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at 10th Session of 14th SPA”. January 15. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/f4bf631617198851f067bd66d7f48d18.kcmsf
______. 2024. “Speech Made by Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un on Congratulatory Visit to Ministry of National Defence.” February 9. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/1edaa936207ca2beb38ea8420cd9fc82.kcmsf
Rodong Sinmun. 2023. “Report on 6th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee” January 1. http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTJAMjAyMy0wMS0wMS1IMDA1QDE1QDFAQDBAMQ==
______. 2023. “Report on 9th Enlarged Plenum of 8th WPK Central Committee”. December 31. http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyMy0xMi0zMS1IMDEzQA==
______. 2024. “U.S. Reckless Act of Increasing Danger of Nuclear War”. February 3. http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTJAMjAyNC0wMi0wMy1IMDAxQDE1QDFAQDBAOQ==
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2023. SIPRI Yearbook 2023.
U.S. Department of Defense. 2022. “2022 National Defense Strategy.” October 27. https://www.defense.gov/National-Defense-Strategy/
White House. 2022. “FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy.” October 12. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy/
■ Young-Sun HA is the Chairman of the EAI and a Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University.
■ Yang Gyu KIM is the Executive Director of the EAI and a Lecturer of Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.
■ Typeset by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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