Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"True ignorance is not the absence of knowledge, but the refusal to acquire it."

- Karl Popper

"Monsters exist, but they are too few in number to be truly dangerous. More dangerous are the common men, the functionaries ready to believe and to act without asking questions."

- Primo Levi

"Success is not achieved by the impractical who merely contemplate, but by the individuals who face reality head-on and take purposeful action."

- Plato

1. Ukrainian Troops Trained by the West Stumble in Battle

2. Taiwan Arrests Special Forces Colonel Over Alleged China Spy Ring

3. Women face disparities, gender discrimination, sexual harassment in Special Operations Forces, according to Government Accountability Office

4. Russ ians Are Being Tricked Into Setting Fire to Enlistment Offices

5. The West Attacked Russia’s Economy. The Result Is Another Stalemate.

6. China is not as powerful as the West might think

7. Top Medical Journals Publish Unprecedented Joint Call for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

8. Ukraine Situation Report: Kyiv Changes Counteroffensive Tactics

9. U.S. raises concerns over China's counter-espionage push

10. Why China Has a Giant Pile of Debt

11. A corporate takeover of the UN must be stopped

12. How the Ukraine Counteroffensive Can Still Succeed

13. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2, 2023

14. Davis-Monthan selected as the preferred location to host special operations command

15. China's Strategy of Political Warfare

16. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 3, 2023

1. Ukrainian Troops Trained by the West Stumble in Battle

Ukrainian Troops Trained by the West Stumble in Battle

By Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper

Reporting from Washington

Aug. 2, 2023, 9:01 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Helene Cooper · August 2, 2023

Ukraine’s army has for now set aside U.S. fighting methods and reverted to tactics it knows best.

Members of a Ukrainian mortar team from the 24th Mechanized Brigade fired on a Russian position in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine last month.Credit...Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times

Aug. 2, 2023, 9:01 a.m. ET

The first several weeks of Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive have not been kind to the Ukrainian troops who were trained and armed by the United States and its allies.

Equipped with advanced American weapons and heralded as the vanguard of a major assault, the troops became bogged down in dense Russian minefields under constant fire from artillery and helicopter gunships. Units got lost. One unit delayed a nighttime attack until dawn, losing its advantage. Another fared so badly that commanders yanked it off the battlefield altogether.

Now the Western-trained Ukrainian brigades are trying to turn things around, U.S. officials and independent analysts say. Ukrainian military commanders have changed tactics, focusing on wearing down the Russian forces with artillery and long-range missiles instead of plunging into minefields under fire. A troop surge is underway in the country’s south, with a second wave of Western-trained forces launching mostly small-scale attacks to punch through Russian lines.

But early results have been mixed. While Ukrainian troops have retaken a few villages, they have yet to make the kinds of sweeping gains that characterized their successes in the strategically important cities of Kherson and Kharkiv last fall. The complicated training in Western maneuvers has given the Ukrainians scant solace in the face of barrage after barrage of Russian artillery.

Members of the 24th Mechanized Brigade in Donetsk last month. A change in tactics has raised questions about the quality of the training the Ukrainians received from the West. Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Ukraine’s decision to change tactics is a clear signal that NATO’s hopes for large advances made by Ukrainian formations armed with new weapons, new training and an injection of artillery ammunition have failed to materialize, at least for now.

It raises questions about the quality of the training the Ukrainians received from the West and about whether tens of billions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including nearly $44 billion worth from the Biden administration, have been successful in transforming the Ukrainian military into a NATO-standard fighting force.

“The counteroffensive itself hasn’t failed; it will drag on for several months into the fall,” said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who recently visited the front lines. “Arguably, the problem was in the assumption that with a few months of training, Ukrainian units could be converted into fighting more the way American forces might fight, leading the assault against a well-prepared Russian defense, rather than helping Ukrainians fight more the best way they know how.”

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has increasingly signaled that his strategy is to wait out Ukraine and its allies and win the war by exhausting them. American officials are worried that Ukraine’s return to its old tactics risks that it will race through precious ammunition supplies, which could play into Mr. Putin’s hands and disadvantage Ukraine in a war of attrition.

Biden administration officials had hoped the nine Western-trained brigades, some 36,000 troops, would show that the American way of warfare was superior to the Russian approach. While the Russians have a rigidly centralized command structure, the Americans taught the Ukrainians to empower senior enlisted soldiers to make quick decisions on the battlefield and to deploy combined arms tactics — synchronized attacks by infantry, armor and artillery forces.

Western officials championed that approach as more efficient than the costly strategy of wearing Russian forces down by attrition, which threatens to deplete Ukraine’s ammunition stocks.

Much of the training involved teaching Ukrainian troops how to go on the offensive rather than stay on defense. For years, Ukrainian troops had worked on defensive tactics as Russian-backed separatists launched attacks in eastern Ukraine. When Moscow began its full-scale invasion last year, Ukrainian troops put their defensive operations into play, denying Russia the swift victory it had anticipated.

The effort to take back their own territory “is requiring them to fight in different ways,” Colin H. Kahl, who recently stepped down as the Pentagon’s top policy official, said last month.

But the Western-trained brigades received only four to six weeks of combined arms training, and units made several mistakes at the start of the counteroffensive in early June that set them back, according to U.S. officials and analysts who recently visited the front lines and spoke to Ukrainian troops and commanders.

Some units failed to follow cleared paths and ran into mines. When a unit delayed a nighttime attack, an accompanying artillery bombardment to cover its advance went ahead as scheduled, tipping off the Russians.

Ukrainian marines participated in anti-mine training near the front line in southeast Ukraine last month.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

In the first two weeks of the counteroffensive, as much as 20 percent of the weaponry Ukraine sent to the battlefield was damaged or destroyed, according to U.S. and European officials. The toll included some of the formidable Western fighting machines — tanks and armored personnel carriers — that the Ukrainians were counting on to beat back the Russians.

Military experts said that using newly learned tactics for the first time was always going to be hard, especially given that the Russian response was to assume a defensive crouch and fire massive barrages of artillery.

“They were given a tall order,” said Rob Lee, a Russian military specialist at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and a former U.S. Marine officer, who has also traveled to the front lines. “They had a short amount of time to train on new equipment and to develop unit cohesion, and then they were thrown into one of the most difficult combat situations. They were put in an incredibly tough position.”

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine acknowledged in late July that his country’s counteroffensive against dug-in Russian troops was advancing more slowly than expected.

“We did have plans to start it in the spring, but we didn’t because, frankly, we had not enough munitions and armaments and not enough properly trained brigades — I mean, properly trained in these weapons,” Mr. Zelensky said via video link at the Aspen Security Forum, an annual national-security conference.

He added that “because we started it a bit late,” Russia had “time to mine all of our lands and build several lines of defense.”

Ukraine may well return to the American way of warfare if it breaks through dug-in Russian defenses, some military experts said. But offense is harder than defense, as Russia demonstrated last year when it abandoned its initial plans to advance to Kyiv.

“I do not think they’re abandoning combined arms tactics,” Philip M. Breedlove, a retired four-star Air Force general who was NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, said in an interview. “If they were to get through the first, second or third lines of defense, I think you’re going to see the definition of combined arms.”

Speaking at the Aspen forum, Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, said, “Ukraine has a substantial amount of combat power that it has not yet committed to the fight, and it is trying to choose its moment to commit that combat power to the fight when it will have the maximum impact on the battlefield.”

That moment appeared to come last week when Ukraine significantly ratcheted up its counteroffensive with two southward thrusts apparently aimed at cities in the Zaporizhzhia region: Melitopol, near the Sea of Azov, and Berdiansk, to the east on the Azov coast. In both cases, the Ukrainians have advanced only a few miles and have dozens more to go.

A Ukrainian soldier walking through a former Russian position outside a village in the Zaporizhzhia region. In two cities there, the Ukrainians have advanced only a few miles.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

But analysts question whether this second wave, relying on attacks by smaller units, will generate enough combat power and momentum to allow Ukrainian troops to push through Russian defenses.

Gian Luca Capovin and Alexander Stronell, analysts with the British security intelligence firm Janes, said that the small-unit attack strategy “is extremely likely to result in mass casualties, equipment loss and minimal territorial gains” for Ukraine.

U.S. officials said, however, the surge in Ukrainian forces in the past week came at a time when the Ukrainians were clearing paths through some of the Russian defenses and beginning to wear down Russian troops and artillery.

A Western official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational details and intelligence assessments, said the Russians were stretched and still experiencing problems with logistics, supply, personnel and weapons.

General Breedlove concurred and said he still expected the Ukrainian counteroffensive to put Russia at a disadvantage.

“The Ukrainians are in a place now where they understand how they want to employ their forces,” he said. “And we’re starting to see the Russians move backwards.”

Thomas Gibbons-Neff contributed reporting from London.

Eric Schmitt is a senior writer who has traveled the world covering terrorism and national security. He was also the Pentagon correspondent. A member of the Times staff since 1983, he has shared four Pulitzer Prizes. More about Eric Schmitt

Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent, and was part of the team awarded the 2015 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting, for its coverage of the Ebola epidemic. More about Helene Cooper

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The New York Times · by Helene Cooper · August 2, 2023

2. Taiwan Arrests Special Forces Colonel Over Alleged China Spy Ring

When I attended an asymmetric warfare conference in Taipei the Chief of Staff of the Taiwan Army said the PRC recruitment of retired military officers was especially problematic.

Taiwan Arrests Special Forces Colonel Over Alleged China Spy Ring

themessenger.com · August 2, 2023

Authorities in Taiwan have arrested a lieutenant colonel in the special forces as part of a damaging investigation into spying for China by senior military officers, the state news agency said Wednesday.

Investigators raided the command headquarters of the army’s aviation and special forces command in the northern city of Tauyuan earlier this week, the official Central News Agency reported.

The spy sweep comes amid rising tensions between China and the U.S. over American arms sales to independent Taiwan, and growing concern over Chinese espionage.

Beijing is becoming more successful at “reaching into Taiwan” to corrupt military officials, Weng Wei-lun, a lawyer and former prosecutor told the Taipei Times.

Taiwanese soldiers fly in US made Black Hawk helicopters during the military Han Guang drill at the Taoyuan International Airport on July 26, 2023.Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images

In addition to the lieutenant colonel, who was only identified by his surname, Hsieh, four retired officers and a middleman were implicated in the probe. The middleman was also detained.

Hsieh was accused of passing national defense secrets to Chinese or other foreign agents, and of building a spy ring composed of current and retired military personnel, prosecutors said.

"Facing infiltration by the Chinese Communist Party, the national forces will continue to boost counter-espionage education and raise awareness," the defense ministry said.

The ministry condemned unnamed people it said were "selling out the country and people."

A retired army major and three other people were questioned in the case and released on bail between 20,000 New Taiwan Dollars ($630) and 600,000 New Taiwan Dollars ($19,000), the Taipei Times reported.

Last month, Taiwanese authorities detained five people, including a Chinese yo-yo instructor, on suspicion of spying for China.

themessenger.com · August 2, 2023

3. Women face disparities, gender discrimination, sexual harassment in Special Operations Forces, according to Government Accountability Office

Women face disparities, gender discrimination, sexual harassment in Special Operations Forces, according to Government Accountability Office

13newsnow.com

WASHINGTON — Women face wide disparities and barriers when it comes to serving in the U.S. military's elite special operations forces such as the Army Rangers and the Navy SEALs, according to a government watchdog agency.

The Government Accountability Office says females are under-represented and they face discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual assault.

Women have served in ground-combat roles, including Special Ops since 2013.

But they continue to face lower representation and discrimination, according to a newly re-published December 2022 report from the GAO.

The GAO found that the percentage of female service members in the 78,000-member U.S. Special Operations Command only increased from 7.9% in 2016 to 9.8% in 2021. The GAO notes that that number is still low compared to women's overall representation in the military, which was about 19% in Fiscal Year 2021.

In an interview with 13News Now, GAO Defense Capabilities and Management Team Director Brenda Farrell said that "gender discrimination" and the "male-dominated culture" were listed as the top two most frequently-cited barriers that women face.

"We did hear that this is something that is ingrained in the culture, that women are considered weak, that women can't possibly be a mother and serve in special ops. That seems to be deeply ingrained," she said, adding: "It's important for national security. And it's important for equality."

Twenty-five of 51 current and former special operations women who were interviewed by the GAO reported being sexually harassed. Thirteen said they'd been sexually assaulted and 15 said they experienced retaliation for reporting what happened to them.

13newsnow.com

4. Russians Are Being Tricked Into Setting Fire to Enlistment Offices

Russians Are Being Tricked Into Setting Fire to Enlistment Offices

kyivpost.com

Authorities are now investigating the potential involvement of organized groups or a network of scammers manipulating individuals into carrying out these acts.

by Kyiv Post | August 2, 2023, 12:32 pm |

Photo :ukrinform

NATO

Twelve military enlistment offices across Russia have been set on fire, with reports suggesting Russians are being duped into carrying out the acts of arson by unknown persons.

The first incident was reported in St. Petersburg on the evening of July 31, where a 53-year-old man hurled Molotov cocktails at the entrance of the military commissariat department on Tchaikovsky Street. He claimed that he had fallen victim to a devious scam orchestrated by fraudsters.

He claimed he was lured into taking out multiple loans and then coerced by a person pretending to be an “FSB officer” who promised to help clear his debts in exchange for setting fire to the military enlistment office.

The “FSB motive” behind this request was “to distract the military personnel and enable an investigation into fraudulent activities among the office staff.”

Similar odd stories emerged from other regions of Russia. In Rossosh, a 24-year-old teacher was detained after throwing a Molotov cocktail at the military enlistment office, sharing a similar account of being manipulated into committing the act.

In Mozhaysk, a 45-year-old woman was tricked by scammers posing as bank employees. They convinced her that criminals were hiding within the military enlistment office and asked her to pour flammable liquid on its windows to flush them out.

In the village of Aginskoye, a 17-year-old girl attempted to set fire to the military enlistment office after receiving a call from scammers who falsely claimed that there was a traitor within the office transmitting information to Ukrainian intelligence about local residents participating in the war in Ukraine.

In Sestroretsk, a woman came into the military enlistment office with packages and warned that she would set fire to the building. According to eyewitnesses, she was nervous and was holding a phone in her hands.

A dozen reports of arson or attempted arson emerged from various small cities and villages across Russia.

Authorities are now investigating the potential involvement of organized groups or a network of scammers manipulating individuals into carrying out these acts.

kyivpost.com

5. The West Attacked Russia’s Economy. The Result Is Another Stalemate.

Economic warfare alone is not a silver bullet.

The West Attacked Russia’s Economy. The Result Is Another Stalemate.

Failure to quickly bring the Russian economy to its knees for its invasion of Ukraine mirrors a larger stalemate on the battlefield

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-attacked-russias-economy-the-result-is-another-stalemate-99ec913b?mod=hp_lead_pos10

By Alan Cullison and Georgi Kantchev

Aug. 2, 2023 7:18 am ET

Economists expect sanctions to cause Russia to stagnate in the years ahead. PHOTO: SOFYA SANDURSKAYA/TASS/ZUMA PRESS

Weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine last year, a White House official warned Moscow that a raft of U.S.-led sanctions could cut Russia’s economy in half.

Last week the International Monetary Fund gave some upbeat news for the Kremlin, saying it now expects Russia’s economy to grow 1.5% this year, supported by extensive state spending. That follows a shrinkage of 2.1% the year before, when Russia became the most sanctioned major economy in the world.

Economists expect the sanctions to cause Russia to stagnate in the years ahead and the fault lines are already emerging. But the West’s failure to quickly bring the Russian economy to its knees for its invasion of Ukraine mirrors a larger stalemate on the battlefield there, despite a raft of Western lethal aid to Kyiv and economic support for the Ukrainian cause.

Russia’s real GDP, change from a year earlier, with projections for 2023 and 2024

2023 (projected)

1.5%

−2

−4

2010

’15

’20

Note: 2023 and 2024 projections as of July 2023.

Source: International Monetary Fund

When they were unveiled, the sanctions were described by Biden administration officials as the most consequential in history, and the initial shock and awe roiled Moscow’s financial markets. But today the economy has muddled through enough for the Kremlin to support an attritional war that the U.S. had hoped to avoid.

Sanctions initially starved Russia of microchips and high-tech components last year, crimping its ability to produce precision-guided missiles. But since then Moscow has found loopholes through neighboring countries, and is bombing Ukraine daily with precision weaponry.

Russia’s crude oil continues to flow, even if the lower prices it fetches have hit state coffers. Analysts say that the main effect of sanctions—technological backwardness and an inability to modernize—will hamper its economic growth in the longer term.

“Sanctions have not destroyed the Russian economy just yet,” said Sergei Guriev, a professor at Sciences Po in Paris and a former Russian government adviser. “They have started to constrain but not stop Putin’s ability to finance this war.”

Sanctions became an often-used foreign policy tool of the U.S. after it became an economic powerhouse in the previous century. They have had a mixed record, often falling short of causing a dramatic change in behavior, particularly in authoritarian states such as Russia, according to analysts who study them.

Moscow’s quick pivot to Asia from Europe as a trading partner could be to Russia’s advantage. PHOTO: MAXIM SHIPENKOV/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK

How Russia has managed to avoid collapse and eke out some growth within a year despite a Western economic blockade will be a case study for analysts pondering where sanctions make sense as a policy tool in the future.

Behind Russia’s economic resilience has been a significant government stimulus, a shift to a war economy and an unprecedented rerouting of its trade to Asian partners, primarily China and India, analysts say.

The Biden administration defends the sanctions as vital to driving up the price that Russia pays for its war in Ukraine. The latest growth statistics mask the real pain being felt by the economy, a senior administration official said.

“We are making Russia’s economy less resilient and less capable of sustaining itself over time,” the official said. “It’s more difficult for them to run their war on Ukraine.”

Government spending as part of gross domestic product has jumped by 13.5% in the first quarter compared with the same period last year, the highest growth rate in data going back to 1996.

Economists attribute much of the growth in Russian industrial production this year to weapons and materiel. President Vladimir Putin has ordered the government to provide unlimited funding for the war machine.

The output of “finished metal goods”—a line that analysts say includes weapons and ammunition—rose by 30% in the first half of the year compared with last. Other lines associated with military output have also increased: Production of computers, electronic and optical products also rose by 30%, while the output of special clothing has jumped by 76%. By contrast, auto output is down over 10% year-over-year.

“What we’re seeing now is a massive boost in demand distribution via military-industrial complex and war beneficiaries, we can call it military Keynesianism,” said Alexandra Prokopenko, a former Russian central-bank official who is now a nonresident scholar at the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

Russia Strikes Odesa Port After Exiting Grain Deal

China is not as powerful as the West might think

Politico · by Lili Bayer · August 3, 2023

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President Xi Jinping wants to project China as a powerful trade partner — or dangerous adversary — to virtually any country hoping to be successful in the 21st century.

“The rise of the East, and the decline of the West” is his motto. As Chinese growth rocketed and Western politicians fretted over how to respond, it became a national catchphrase, too.

But among the Chinese people — and increasingly in the chancelleries and boardrooms of Europe — a different story is beginning to be told: Beijing’s march toward global economic domination may not be invincible after all.

China managed only weak GDP growth after belatedly liberating itself from pandemic restrictions. The property market is in crisis and youth unemployment has risen to hazardous levels, with one estimate putting it at 50 percent. Private entrepreneurs increasingly live in fear of what the state will do to their businesses and consumers have stopped spending the way they did in the pre-COVID good times.

In Shanghai, London and New York, Chinese and foreign businesses alike are now grappling with a new scenario: What if the slowdown is here to stay?

“The risks of a major economic crisis in China, or perhaps more probable an imminent stagnation in sustainable economic growth, are […] rising,” Jacob Kirkegaard, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute For International Economics, told POLITICO.

What happens to China’s economy matters hugely for the world.

According to the latest statistics, the Chinese economy grew at a weak pace in the second quarter of this year, with GDP just 0.8 percent up in April-June from the previous quarter, on a seasonally adjusted basis. Year-on-year, GDP expanded 6.3 percent in the second quarter — below the 7.3 percent forecast.

These numbers are still far healthier than most Western economies can boast.

But the uncertain outlook adds to doubts over how Beijing will approach the West. For now, the jury is still out on whether Xi will put on a friendlier face or if instead tougher economic times will embolden Communist Party hardliners to seek out flashpoints with the U.S. or Europe to distract public opinion and shore up nationalistic sentiment.

President Xi Jinping wants to project China as a powerful trade partner — or dangerous adversary — to virtually any country hoping to be successful in the 21st century | Pool photo by Leah Millis via AFP/Getty Images

Even the Communist Party leaders aren’t hiding their problem. At their annual pre-summer Politburo meeting, which sets the tone for the economic work for the remainder of the year, party officials judged that the economy “is facing new difficulties and challenges, mainly due to insufficient domestic demand, difficulties in the operation of some enterprises, many risks and hidden dangers in key areas, and a grim and complex external environment,” state news agency Xinhua quoted the Politburo as saying.

Getting out

In Europe, as well as the U.S., governments are reassessing their own economic vulnerabilities radically. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shocked EU governments into revising their dependence on supply chains controlled by potentially unfriendly regimes.

Europe mostly has decoupled itself from imports of Russian fossil fuels but remains reliant on China for critical raw materials that make up battery components that will be vital for the green energy transition, among other areas.

Western leaders from the EU’s Ursula von der Leyen to U.S. President Joe Biden now routinely talk about economic “de-risking” from China. The peril of linking too closely to the Chinese economy has even hit home with Olaf Scholz, traditionally seen as Europe’s leading dove on China policy.

Behind closed doors in the October summit of the European Council last year, Scholz shared his fears about China’s outlook. Speaking shortly before his first trip as German leader to Beijing, he told his EU counterparts that “a massive financial crisis” could be triggered if Beijing failed to manage its property crisis, according to two diplomats briefed on the conversation, who were granted anonymity to speak candidly.

Italy’s new prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, is preparing to pull out of a deal under which Rome signed up to be part of Xi’s global infrastructure plan, the Belt and Road Initiative. And the government of Emmanuel Macron, the French president, has in recent weeks taken a more critical line toward Beijing, especially over its stance on Ukraine.

Against that backdrop, the Beijing government is now focused on engaging with the West in a less frosty manner, even when it comes to its arch-rival in Washington. Several U.S. officials — from Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen — have visited China in recent months, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo is expected to go later this summer. An EU-China summit is also in the pipeline, according to one diplomat speaking anonymously because the plans are yet to be finalized.

Beijing is also keen to reassure private businesses in China, but it doesn’t seem to be working.

“What we saw was actually a decrease in the overall confidence level” among 570 EU companies operating in China who took part in a recent survey, according to Jens Eskelund, president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China. “And a lot of that has to do with an increased level of uncertainty where China is, in particular about the Chinese economy,” said Eskelund, whose chamber represents 1,700 mostly European companies and entities in China.

Xi consistently demonstrated a preference for the state-owned sector. His most radical moves against the private sector have been targeted at tech giants, even though they’re widely considered the best hope for China to compete with the West. On Xi’s watch, the Chinese bureaucracy has cracked down on multinational e-commerce platform Alibaba’s billionaire-founder Jack Ma, restricted the development of online gaming and private tutorial classes, and heavily regulated data even for foreign companies.

Some Western companies are already looking elsewhere. According to Eskelund, the EU chamber chief, 11 percent of businesses surveyed last year said they were weighing up whether to leave China. This year, the exact same share of companies reported they had already taken the decision to go.

“When you’re sitting in an economy that is growing 10 percent per year, it’s good for everyone,” Eskelund said. “If you’re slowing down to 5 percent, 5.5 percent, then there will be sectors of the economy that will not be growing the same way as before.”

Xi has accrued vast personal power at the apex of China’s political system. Whether Xi-conomics works in the end will depend to a large extent on him.

Politico · by Lili Bayer · August 3, 2023

7. Top Medical Journals Publish Unprecedented Joint Call for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Excerpts:

"That all of these leading journals have agreed to publish the same editorial underlines the extreme urgency of the current nuclear crisis and the need for prompt action to address this existential threat," said Zielinski.

The editorial was released as parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons convened in Vienna in preparation for the 2026 treaty review conference. Last year, the 10th review conference of the nonproliferation treaty ended without a consensus agreement as Russia opposed a draft summary document.

All the while, the global nuclear stockpile continued to grow.

According to recent research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the nine nations currently known to possess nuclear weapons had 9,576 working nukes at the start of 2023, up slightly from the 9,490 total in January of last year.

The U.S.—the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons in war—and Russia control roughly 90% of the world's nuclear arsenal.

Top Medical Journals Publish Unprecedented Joint Call for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

commondreams.org · by Jake Johnson · August 2, 2023

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Ukraine Situation Report: Kyiv Changes Counteroffensive Tactics

Ukraine is reverting to wearing down the Russians with artillery instead of plunging into minefields under fire, according to a new report.

HOWARD ALTMAN

PUBLISHED AUG 2, 2023 7:55 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · August 2, 2023

Despite tens of billions of dollars of weapons poured into Ukraine and training of many of the country's troops by the U.S. and its allies, progress in the counteroffensive has been limited. So Kyiv is changing its tactics.

The New York Times on Wednesday reported that Ukrainian military commanders are now "focusing on wearing down the Russian forces with artillery and long-range missiles instead of plunging into minefields under fire." This comes as a troop surge is underway in the country’s south, "with a second wave of Western-trained forces launching mostly small-scale attacks to punch through Russian lines.”

The results, to date, have “been mixed,” the publication reported. While Ukrainian troops have retaken a few villages, “they have yet to make the kinds of sweeping gains that characterized their successes in the strategically important cities of Kherson and Kharkiv last fall. The complicated training in Western maneuvers has given the Ukrainians scant solace in the face of barrage after barrage of Russian artillery.”

The tactical change up “is a clear signal that NATO’s hopes for large advances made by Ukrainian formations armed with new weapons, new training and an injection of artillery ammunition have failed to materialize, at least for now,” the paper reported.

The situation on the battlefield “raises questions about the quality of the training the Ukrainians received from the West and about whether tens of billions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including nearly $44 billion worth from the Biden administration, have been successful in transforming the Ukrainian military into a NATO-standard fighting force.”

The Times piece includes analysis from Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Michael Kofman, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment and Principal Research Scientist, CNA. Kofman noted that there were challenges with how Ukrainian troops were trained to fight the NATO way. Lee said the training timetable was too compressed.

That dovetails with the findings we reported last month by Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow with the Institute for International Strategic Studies and the Center for New American Security who traveled with Kofman and Lee to Ukraine recently.

Gady told us that in his view, Ukrainian troops were struggling to apply the lessons learned during the truncated training. You can read more about that in our story here.

Last week, Ukraine launched what appeared to be the main thrust of its counteroffensive. Given the challenges we've noted above, Kofman told the Times that the "counteroffensive itself hasn’t failed; it will drag on for several months into the fall.”

While the U.S. has repeatedly promised to back Ukraine for as long as it takes, it remains to be seen just how long the pace of support and donations continues. That could be an increasing concern as the Pentagon is now sending Taiwan military hardware in Presidential Drawdown packages like the ones provided to Kyiv.

We will continue to monitor this situation and provide updates as warranted.

Before we head into the latest news from Ukraine, The War Zone readers can catch up on our previous rolling coverage of the war here.

The Latest

On the battlefield, there have been no major ground gains by either side. Ukraine continues to push its counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and the Donbas and Russian troops are fighting an offensive of their own trying to regain territory and sap Ukrainian resources.

Here are some key takeaways from the latest Institute for the Study of War assessment:

The Russian MoD continues to posture Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov as an effective and involved overall theater commander in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 1.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 1 and made advances in certain areas.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 1 and advanced near Kreminna and Bakhmut.

The Economist took a deep dive into Ukraine’s counteroffensive, spending times with troops in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

“Ukraine’s push south is proceeding painfully slowly. Russian troops have prepared formidable defenses which the Ukrainians are finding hard to breach,” the publication reported. ”These include drones transmitting live pictures back to their operators, minefields and loitering munitions. They have hugely increased the challenges that Ukraine’s soldiers are facing compared with last year.”

“The worst are tripwires,” says Pole, one of the soldiers the Economist interviewed, “which you cannot see at night, and set off a whole string of connected mines.”

Poland will deploy more troops the border with Belarus after it accused Minsk of violating its airspace, according to CNN, as tensions increase between the NATO member and Vladimir Putin’s vassal state.

On Tuesday, Poland said two Belarusian helicopters allegedly violated it airspace during training exercises. The Belarusian defense ministry vehemently denied and dismissed that accusation as “far-fetched.”

All this comes amid increased activity near a thin strip of land between Poland and Lithuania, known as the Suwalki gap or corridor. Troops from Yevgeny Prigozin's Wagner mercenary group are moving toward there in an apparent attempt to increase pressure on NATO and EU members, CNN reported.

Last week, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said Wagner mercenaries were heading towards the Suwalki corridor via Grodno, a city in western Belarus, in a situation that is “becoming even more dangerous” as Russian-allied forces attempt to increase their presence near the NATO border.

The Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) on Wednesday claimed Ukraine carried out a second unsuccessful uncrewed surface vessel (USV) attack on one of its ships in the Black Sea in as many days.

The latest attack came against a Russian Navy ship escorting civilian maritime transport, the MoD said on its Telegram channel, without offering proof. “As a result of professional actions of the Russian ship's crew, the Ukrainian boat was promptly detected and destroyed.”

On Tuesday, the MoD claimed Ukraine “unsuccessfully attempted to attack patrol vessels Sergey Kotov and Vasily Bykov of the Black Sea Fleet, which are carrying out tasks to control navigation in the southwestern part of the Black Sea.”

Ukraine used three USVs in that attack, 340 kilometers (211 miles) southwest of Sevastopol, the MoD claimed.

Russia claims its Navy ships were subjected to two unsuccessful Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessel (USV attacks) in the Black Sea in as many days. (Google Earth image)

“In the course of repelling the attack, all three unmanned enemy boats were destroyed by fire from the regular weapons of the Russian ships” which are continuing their missions.

Following the Russian MoD claims, Ukrainian presidential official Mykhailo Podolyak on Tuesday told Reuters: "Undoubtedly, such statements by Russian officials are fictitious and do not contain even a shred of truth. Ukraine has not attacked, is not attacking and will not attack civilian vessels, nor any other civilian objects."

These are the latest in a series of claims Russia has made about its ships coming under attack by Ukrainian USVs. The Russian MoD claimed the Sergey Kotov also repelled an attempted USV attack in June.

While it’s unclear if the attacks were real or staged, Ukraine clearly has developed a capacity to attempt increasingly advanced USV strikes. There have been several on Sevastopol, home of the BSF, and on Sunday, Ukrainian and Russian officials said the Kerch Bridge was attacked by Ukrainian USVs.

CNN was recently given exclusive access to the most advanced versions of Ukrainian USVs.

In a sobering analysis of the scope of this war that draws comparisons to World War I, The Wall Street Journal on Tuesday reported that between 20,000 and 50,000 Ukrainians have lost at least one limb.

The publication derived that figure from ”previously undisclosed estimates by prosthetics firms, doctors and charities.”

The actual figure could be higher, the publication reported, “because it takes time to register patients after they undergo the procedure. Some are only amputated weeks or months after being wounded.” The ongoing counteroffensive will likely greatly increase that figure.

“By comparison, some 67,000 Germans and 41,000 Britons had to have amputations during the course of World War I, when the procedure was often the only one available to prevent death. Fewer than 2,000 U.S. veterans of the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions had amputations.”

In the wake of recent Ukrainian drone attacks on Moscow, a member of the Russian Duma legislative body is pitching a 2 billion ruble ($21 million) AI-based air defense plan, the Russian PNP news outlet reported Tuesday.

“Our colleagues proposed a complex consisting of a detection device and a destruction device,” State Duma Committee on Defense member Dmitry Kuznetsov told the publication.

The detection device is “a software and hardware system based on artificial intelligence, which can detect drones by visual and acoustic features - in appearance, dimensions and the noise they produce,” Kuznetsov said.

The destruction device “is an air gun,” he explained. “It is capable of shooting at a distance of up to a kilometer, and its power and muzzle energy are quite enough to smash the drone into fragments that cannot harm anyone. These are the systems we now consider as a priority and we will send proposals for their installation to Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and Head of the Department of Transport and Road Infrastructure Development Maxim Liksutov.”

The plausibility of such a plan is highly dubious.

Meanwhile, in Russia's Belgorod Oblast - which has been subjected to repeated Ukrainian drone attacks - territorial defense forces there for the first time have been given weapons to defend against them.

"Small arms, anti-drone guns and [Russian Ulyanovsky Avtomobilny Zavod] UAZ vehicles were issued to members of the territorial self-defense in the Belgorod region," the official Russian Ukraine has already developed a somewhat similar approach, which you can read more about here.

"We have come to the point that we are solving the issues of providing weapons for our self-defense within the framework of the current legislation. The situation continues to be difficult," Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov said at the ceremony.

Speaking of drones, we've seen many videos of grenade-like munitions being dropped by both sides. Now a group of Ukrainians has developed 3-D printed munitions they say pack more punch because they are filled with C-4.

"With a typical weight of just 300 grams, grenades are short on 'killing power,'" an amateur weapons-maker based in Kyiv recently told the Economist.

Three months ago that volunteer and a group of friends, working in their homes, designed an alternative, the publication reported: "an 800-gram anti-personnel bomb called the 'Zaychyk,' or 'Rabbit.' The group uses 3D printing to produce the bomb’s casing, before sending it to be filled with C4, an explosive, and pieces of steel shrapnel."

In tests, the volunteer said this shrapnel cuts into wooden planks 'like butter.'"

Ukrainian officials say that thanks to the efforts of pro-Kyiv partisans working in occupied Kherson Oblast, dozens of Russian troops were spotted on the Dzharylach peninsula and killed in an ensuing strike by M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, according to Ukrainian Pravda.

Pro-Ukrainian partisans in Russian-occupied Crimea are stepping up their attacks on military facilities, the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed on Tuesday.

"In particular, attacks on military facilities using ‘Molotov cocktails’ (bottles with a flammable mixture) have become systematic. Civilians who support Ukraine are the organizers and executors of most of them," the GUR claimed.

Russian troops "have been put on high alert to resist such attacks," said the GUR, adding that . "'suspicious persons' who could potentially be involved in similar incidents are being monitored. Using physical force and weapons is allowed; mass detentions and arrests are carried out."

Meanwhile, it appears that partisans sympathetic to Ukraine are continuing to operate inside Russia as well, in this case attacking railway equipment. As we have noted in the past, Russia relies heavily on railroads for supply.

Russian Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopters firing anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) have proven a bane to Ukraine's armor as can read about in our deep dive here. This video below shows an Alligator attacking Ukrainian armor near Robotyne in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, reportedly with a laser-guided 9A4172K Vikhr-1 ATGM that can reach targets at 5-6 miles.

New satellite imagery appears to show Russia has built out additional fortifications at the Russian occupied Berdyansk airport.

"This imagery shows the continued use of the site by Russian forces," researcher Brady Africk told us. "The new revetments are also a bit interesting and are likely there for air defense systems."

The U.S.-donated Bradley Fighting Vehicles continue to show their value saving Ukrainian lives. This video below shows one apparently outfitted with Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles (BRAT) surviving a hit by a Russian Lancet drone. You can read more about BRAT in our story here.

If you want to get an up-close and personal view of Ukrainian troops operating a Czech-donated Vampire multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), check out this video. The operators talk about how they can load in target coordinates and be ready to fire within four minutes.

Trenches offer only so much protection in this war, as once again demonstrated in this video below. Russian forces are seen trying to escape incoming Ukrainian rounds, that land in the trenches and fill them with billowing smoke.

Sometimes, you need a little elevation to hit armor with an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM). That's what the Ukrainian troops in this video below did, climbing a tree to get some height to fire off a Javelin ATGM.

If you want a sense of what it is like for soldiers under indirect fire, check out this video below of Ukrainian forces scrambling from a building that appears to be under attack.

Ukrainians managed to save some history out of the rubble of a Russian attack on the city of Sumy.

And finally, pizza remains a universal happy snack, as this Ukrainian infantry fighting vehicle crew proves.

That's it for now. We'll update this story when there's more news to report about Ukraine.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · August 2, 2023

9. U.S. raises concerns over China's counter-espionage push

Excerpts:

"We are closely monitoring the implementation of China's new counter-espionage law as we have been, which as written greatly expands the scope of what activities are considered espionage," he said.

In recent years, China has arrested and detained dozens of Chinese and foreign nationals on suspicion of espionage, including an executive at Japanese drugmaker Astellas Pharma in March. Australian journalist Cheng Lei, accused by China of providing state secrets to another country, has been detained since September 2020.

China's declaration that it is under threat from spies comes as Western nations, most prominently the United States, accuse China of espionage and cyberattacks, a charge that Beijing has rejected.

U.S. raises concerns over China's counter-espionage push

Reuters · by Daphne Psaledakis

WASHINGTON, Aug 2 (Reuters) - The United States on Wednesday raised concerns over a Chinese call to encourage its citizens to join counter-espionage work and said it has been closely monitoring the implementation of Beijing's expanded anti-spying law.

China's Ministry of State Security on Tuesday said China should encourage its citizens to join counter-espionage work, including creating channels for individuals to report suspicious activity and rewarding them for doing do.

A system that makes it "normal" for regular people to participate in counter-espionage should be established, the ministry said.

That followed an expansion of China's counter-espionage law that took effect in July and bans the transfer of information it sees as related to national security. It has alarmed the United States, which has warned that foreign companies in China could be punished for regular business activities.

"We do have concerns over it, certainly encouraging citizens to spy on each other is something that's of great concern," State Department spokesperson Matt Miller told a daily news briefing.

"We are closely monitoring the implementation of China's new counter-espionage law as we have been, which as written greatly expands the scope of what activities are considered espionage," he said.

In recent years, China has arrested and detained dozens of Chinese and foreign nationals on suspicion of espionage, including an executive at Japanese drugmaker Astellas Pharma in March. Australian journalist Cheng Lei, accused by China of providing state secrets to another country, has been detained since September 2020.

China's declaration that it is under threat from spies comes as Western nations, most prominently the United States, accuse China of espionage and cyberattacks, a charge that Beijing has rejected.

Reporting by Daphne Psaledakis and Humeyra Pamuk; Editing by Mark Porter and Rosalba O'Brien

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Humeyra Pamuk

Thomson Reuters

Humeyra Pamuk is a senior foreign policy correspondent based in Washington DC. She covers the U.S. State Department, regularly traveling with U.S. Secretary of State. During her 20 years with Reuters, she has had postings in London, Dubai, Cairo and Turkey, covering everything from the Arab Spring and Syria's civil war to numerous Turkish elections and the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast. In 2017, she was won the Knight-Bagehot fellowship program at Columbia University’s School of Journalism. She holds a BA in International Relations and an MA on European Union studies.

Reuters · by Daphne Psaledakis

10. Why China Has a Giant Pile of Debt

Excerpts:

China’s domestic debt overhang defies quick fixes. The country needs to gradually move away from debt-fueled government construction projects and heavy national security spending, toward an economy based more on consumer spending and services.

Powerful constituencies in Beijing and Chinese provincial capitals protect the current economic priorities. Ms. Yellen will be trying to learn more about China’s economic plans, but can do little to influence them.

Last winter, 21 Chinese banks agreed to let a local government financing unit in southwestern China extend to 20 years the repayment of loans that were close to coming due, and said that only interest payments, not principal, needed to be repaid for the first 10 years. But that arrangement meant heavy losses for the banks — and almost every province in China has similarly troubled local financing units.

Yet solving the developing country debt problem will be hard. “Yellen’s ability to exhort China to accept debt write downs is limited,” said Mark Sobel, a former longtime United States Treasury official. “The U.S. and Yellen have little leverage,” he added.

Why China Has a Giant Pile of Debt

A major lender abroad, China is facing a debt bomb at home: trillions of dollars owed by local governments, their financial affiliates, and real estate developers.

The New York Times · by Keith Bradsher · July 8, 2023

During her visit to Beijing, Treasury secretary Janet L. Yellen, seen here meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, has tried to persuade China to cooperate more to address the debt crisis in lower-income countries.Credit...Pool photo by Mark Schiefelbein

Reporting from Beijing

July 8, 2023

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

China, which has lent nearly $1 trillion to some 150 developing countries, has been reluctant to cancel large debts owed by countries struggling to make ends meet. That is at least in part because China is facing a debt bomb at home: trillions of dollars owed by local governments, their mostly off-the-books financial affiliates, and real estate developers.

One of the main issues for Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen during her visit to Beijing this week is whether she can persuade China to cooperate more to address an evolving debt crisis facing lower-income countries. But China’s state-controlled banking system is wary of accepting losses on foreign loans when it faces far greater losses on loans within China.

How much debt does China have?

It’s hard to know exactly because official data is scant. Researchers at JPMorgan Chase calculated last month that overall debt within China — including households, companies and the government — had reached 282 percent of the country’s annual economic output. That compares with an average of 256 percent in developed economies around the world and 257 percent in the United States.

What distinguishes China from most other countries is how fast that debt has accumulated relative to the size of its economy. By comparison, in the United States or even deeply indebted Japan, debt has risen less precipitously. The steep increase in China’s debt, more than doubling compared with the size of its economy since the global financial crisis 15 years ago, makes managing it harder.

China’s lending to developing countries is small relative to its domestic debt, representing less than 6 percent of China’s annual economic output. But these loans are particularly sensitive politically. Despite heavy censorship, periodic complaints emerge on Chinese social media that banks should have lent the money to poor households and regions at home, not abroad. Accepting heavy losses on these loans would be very unpopular within China.

Chinese construction workers walking home from work at a site in Colombo, Sri Lanka.Credit...Adam Dean for The New York Times

How did China get into such a deep debt hole?

It started with real estate, which suffers from overbuilding, falling prices and beleaguered potential buyers. In the past two years, several dozen real estate developers that borrowed money from overseas investors have defaulted on those debts, including two more in recent days. Developers have struggled to continue paying far larger debts to banks inside China.

Compounding the problem has been borrowing by local governments. Over the past decade, many cities and provinces set up special financing units that were lightly regulated and borrowed heavily. Officials used the money to cover daily expenses, including the interest on other loans, as well as the construction of roads, bridges, public parks and other infrastructure.

The real estate and government debt problems overlap. For many years, the main source of revenue for localities came from the sale to developers of long-term leases for state land. As many private-sector developers have run out of money to bid for land, this revenue has fallen. The local financing affiliates have instead done the heavy borrowing to buy the land that such developers could no longer afford, at steep prices. As the real estate market continues to weaken, many of these financing affiliates are in trouble.

That debt has piled up. Fitch Ratings, the credit rating agency, estimates that local governments have debts equal to about 30 percent of China’s annual economic output. Their affiliated financing units owe debt equal to an additional 40 to 50 percent of national output — although there may be some double counting as local governments borrow and then shift the debt to their financing units, Fitch said.

Why does this matter?

For any government or business, borrowing can make good economic sense if the money is used productively and efficiently. But borrowers who binge on debt that doesn’t generate sufficient returns can get into trouble and struggle to repay their lenders. That’s what has happened in China. As its economy slows, a growing number of local governments and their financing units are unable to keep paying interest on their debts. The ripple effect means many localities lack money to pay for public services, health care or pensions.

Debt troubles have also made it hard for banks in China to accept losses on their loans to lower-income countries. Yet many of these countries, like Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Suriname, now face considerable economic difficulties.

Pakistan, one of the largest borrowers from China, is among the countries facing an acute debt crisis.Credit...Kiana Hayeri for The New York Times

Almost two-thirds of the world’s developing economies depend on commodity exports. The World Bank forecast in April that commodity prices will be 21 percent lower this year than last year.

In 2010, only 5 percent of China’s overseas lending portfolio supported borrowers in financial distress. Today, that figure stands at 60 percent, said Bradley Parks, the executive director of AidData at William & Mary, a university in Williamsburg, Va.

China is by far the largest sovereign lender to developing countries, although Western hedge funds have also bought many bonds from these countries. The bonds tend to be at fixed interest rates. But China’s banks have tended to lend dollars at adjustable interest rates that are linked to rates in the West. As the Federal Reserve has pushed rates up steeply since March 2022, developing countries have faced soaring debt payments to China.

If little is done to reduce their debt, many of the world’s poorest governments will continue to spend heavily on debt repayment, money that could otherwise be used for schools, clinics and other services. “The biggest losers will end up being ordinary people in the developing world who are denied basic public services because their governments are saddled with unsustainable debts,” Mr. Parks said.

What is the solution?

China’s domestic debt overhang defies quick fixes. The country needs to gradually move away from debt-fueled government construction projects and heavy national security spending, toward an economy based more on consumer spending and services.

Powerful constituencies in Beijing and Chinese provincial capitals protect the current economic priorities. Ms. Yellen will be trying to learn more about China’s economic plans, but can do little to influence them.

Last winter, 21 Chinese banks agreed to let a local government financing unit in southwestern China extend to 20 years the repayment of loans that were close to coming due, and said that only interest payments, not principal, needed to be repaid for the first 10 years. But that arrangement meant heavy losses for the banks — and almost every province in China has similarly troubled local financing units.

Yet solving the developing country debt problem will be hard. “Yellen’s ability to exhort China to accept debt write downs is limited,” said Mark Sobel, a former longtime United States Treasury official. “The U.S. and Yellen have little leverage,” he added.

Keith Bradsher is the Beijing bureau chief for The Times. He previously served as bureau chief in Shanghai, Hong Kong and Detroit and as a Washington correspondent. He has lived and reported in mainland China through the pandemic. More about Keith Bradsher

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 6 of the New York edition with the headline: How China’s Debt Rose, And Why It May Cost Poor Nations the Most

The New York Times · by Keith Bradsher · July 8, 2023

11. A corporate takeover of the UN must be stopped

Excerpts:

But Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s vision for that evolution – as set out in his report to the General Assembly, Our Common Agenda – is ill-conceived and underwhelming.

Instead of expanding access to the UN system to communities of people impacted by today’s crises, it gives more influence and power to corporate actors who are most culpable of bringing us to the precipice of ecological and social disaster.

The secretary-general’s approach, called multistakeholder governance, would increase corporate influence over global governance, deepening the damaging consequences of prioritising ‘return on investment’ above social and ecological needs. In a multistakeholder world, corporate executives and other founders bring together a friendly group of civil society organisations, governments, academics, UN staff, and other non-state organisations to take on a global governance role.

This would marginalise over two-thirds of the nations of the UN. Instead, a new vision and institutional arrangement that focus on people and the planet should be at the heart of the Summit for the Future.

A corporate takeover of the UN must be stopped

The UN’s vision for the future involves giving corporate executives crucial say in decisions. That is too dangerous to be allowed.

Harris Gleckman
Associate, Transnational Institute, and Senior Fellow at the Center for Governance and Sustainability, University of Massachusetts Boston

Al Jazeera English · by Harris Gleckman

The United Nations needs a revamp. There can be little dispute about that. And the UN’s September 2024 Summit for the Future is an ideal opportunity for this upgrade.

The people of the world expect a global form of governance that can confront the unique challenges of the 21st century. The UN’s creaking, post-World War II structures have been struggling to meet the challenges of the modern world for a long time. The many crises we face demand that the UN evolves to meet these challenges.

But Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s vision for that evolution – as set out in his report to the General Assembly, Our Common Agenda – is ill-conceived and underwhelming.

Instead of expanding access to the UN system to communities of people impacted by today’s crises, it gives more influence and power to corporate actors who are most culpable of bringing us to the precipice of ecological and social disaster.

The secretary-general’s approach, called multistakeholder governance, would increase corporate influence over global governance, deepening the damaging consequences of prioritising ‘return on investment’ above social and ecological needs. In a multistakeholder world, corporate executives and other founders bring together a friendly group of civil society organisations, governments, academics, UN staff, and other non-state organisations to take on a global governance role.

This would marginalise over two-thirds of the nations of the UN. Instead, a new vision and institutional arrangement that focus on people and the planet should be at the heart of the Summit for the Future.

The role of national governments in the UN would be diluted by the addition of corporate-led bodies, which might soon take on more decision-making, managing everything from the oceans to financial markets. In this brave new world, a fossil fuel giant could have a privileged voice in decisions about providing important energy for all – conflicts of interest be damned. Do we really want the world’s biggest tech behemoths and profit-oriented Big Pharma firms ‘legislating’ global rules?

Perhaps most worrying of all in this new vision of the UN is the absence of ideas for new intergovernmental negotiations to deal with current social, economic, environmental or gender debates.

As it stands, governments, as representatives of their citizens, take the final decisions on global issues and direct international organisations to implement these decisions. This proposed new system would make ‘stakeholders’ the main players.

But who exactly is a ‘stakeholder’ and why? There are countless possible stakeholder categories. At last year’s multistakeholder Food System Summit, organised out of the Office of the Secretary-General, for example, the ‘stakeholders’ were large agribusinesses, data management firms and commodity dealers, not the six billion people who actually need the food or their local representatives or civil society advocates.

Much of this thinking stems from the 2012 Global Redesign Initiative report of the World Economic Forum (WEF), which proposed such a shift in global governance.

According to the WEF (and now the UN secretary-general), nation-states and governments alone cannot solve the main issues of global governance, and other actors need to be involved. The best of those actors according to them in WEF are corporations.

Indeed, we have already witnessed an increased role of the corporate private sector through their involvement in the implementation – or rather the non-implementation – of the Sustainable Development Goals.

In 2021, the WEF and the Office of the Secretary-General concluded a memorandum of understanding on this, which, not incidentally, was never made publicly available by the UN nor submitted to the General Assembly.

By displacing governments and states from decision-making, a brand-new parallel set of corporate-compromised institutions will sit with a voice and a de facto vote to decide on global policies that impact the planet and its people.

For decades, the corporate world has fraudulently claimed greater efficiency than all others. This efficiency can be seen in the hollowed-out public services of the rich world, the crippling debt burdens of the poor world, and almost universal cultural impoverishment.

Now, sweetening its proposition with insinuations of massive philanthropic financing, the corporate world – the only real beneficiaries of these proposed changes – has international decision-making in its sights.

Where nongovernmental organisations were once the largest non-state entities attending UN system meetings, transnational corporations (TNCs) have grown to become the biggest players. Civil society organisations, educators, scientists, women and other social communities now have less space to influence the behaviour of the UN and intergovernmental processes.

This approach erodes sovereignty. When other actors are seen as equivalent to states, it undermines the longstanding concepts of state responsibilities, obligations and liabilities, as the new actors are unencumbered by any such legal requirements.

Multistakeholder groups and their corporate participants get to choose which policy issues they want to participate in, picking and choosing the ones likely to generate a profit, reduce the rate of return or which may limit the continued acceptance of globalisation. When they do get involved in the governance of a certain issue, they act in such a way as to narrow the range of policy decisions to only those that are compatible with a commercial return. Needless to say, this is not always aligned with the public good.

Communities around the world already feel the international community is failing to solve problems. Multistakeholderism adds to this loss of trust by throwing up a smokescreen around conflicts of interest and proposing commercially viable ‘solutions’, which cannot address today’s major structural crises.

Meanwhile, rich country governments get to side-step their funding promises, while multistakeholder groups pose as open wallets that can underwrite global public goods and development. But direct payments and loans from governments are very different from investment flows, discounts on technology licensing, negotiated tax payments and supply chain funding.

Even linguistically, multistakeholderism is taking us in the wrong direction. Public services around the world have subtly shifted their language from talking about ‘citizens’ to talking about ‘customers’. The longstanding UN vocabulary speaks of ‘peoples’, ‘citizens’, ‘communities’, ‘constituencies’ and ‘nongovernmental organisations’. Now everyone is a ‘stakeholder’.

This leads to absurdities such as equating the needs, interests and influence of huge corporations with those of governments or small economies or local nonprofit community organisations.

The future at stake

As the UN resets its agenda for the next 25 years, states from the Global South, represented by the G-77 at the UN, are pushing back against this dangerous new mission to quietly redefine how the UN works towards its mandate.

They are making sure that their voices are heard in the September 2023 Sustainable Development Goals Summit and the September 2024 Summit for the Future.

The UN Secretariat had originally proposed a September 2023 multistakeholder Summit of the Future, which was intended to solidify the secretary-general’s blueprint for reform.

At the end of 2022, however, a coalition of developing countries intervened to shift planning and decision-making to the General Assembly and erased the proposed lead role for multistakeholderism – for now. They also chose to halt the event’s preparations until 2024, arguing that the UN must focus this year on implementing its existing and faltering Sustainable Development Goals.

Thanks to effective lobbying and continuing pressure from activists and scholars, the G-77 is continuing to fight back against the preponderance of corporate-friendly language and policies, and the increased role of corporations in global governance.

The secretary-general must take heed, reverse course and keep ‘nations’ and ‘peoples’ at the centre of global governance. A possibly irreversible corporate takeover of the UN system must be prevented.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Al Jazeera English · by Harris Gleckman

12. How the Ukraine Counteroffensive Can Still Succeed

I do not think I have heard the elastic defense since attending the Infantry Officers Advanced Course in 1985.

The elastic defense is tactically effective, but it puts a significant burden on the defenders. They have to receive the brunt of a prepared Ukrainian attack each time, withdraw in good order in the face of it, and then either motivate themselves or have a second line of forces motivated enough to launch and press a counterattack. The tactical engagement thus ebbs and flows in a very dynamic manner with a lot of moving and fighting that is concealed by the fact that the control lines on the map remain the same at the end of the day as they were at the start.

Excerpts:

This situation is not a stalemate, however, and won’t become a stalemate if the current Ukrainian push falls short of expectations or bogs down again after initial successes. Stalemate occurs when neither side can materially change the situation and there is no meaningful prospect that either side will be able to do so in the future. The Ukrainians have not yet demonstrated that they can make rapid and dramatic penetrations at this time, but neither have the Russians shown that they can sustain their current defensive approach against a protracted and probably increasingly effective Ukrainian pressure campaign. The Ukrainians still have the initiative in the theater overall and especially in the south. They choose when, where, and how they will attack. The Russians must defend everywhere and always. The theater geometry may come to play a critical role here as well—the Russians have to win every time; the Ukrainians only have to win once.

The likeliest path to Ukrainian success in this counter-offensive will be slow and staccato. Ukrainian troops continue to press along the front and with attacks against Russian rear areas until front-line Russian defenders lose the will or ability to continue the counter-attacks required by their elastic defense approach. At that point, Ukrainian forces may begin to grind through the Russian defenses 500 or 1,000 meters a day for a time in several locations, creating a series of footholds in the Russian lines until they reach points threatening the Russians’ ability to continue to hold the areas in between these footholds. This pattern shaped the first parts of the Kherson counter-offensive and led to a rather sudden Russian withdrawal from their initial lines to a much smaller pocket. The Ukrainians would likely follow such a limited Russian withdrawal this time by consolidating their gains, resting, and preparing to renew the effort from positions further to the south.

Another possible path, which the Ukrainians are now exploring, relies on more dramatic, large-scale mechanized penetrations of the Russian lines, seeking to unhinge them and facilitate rapid gains for a time. Even successful penetrations and exploitations will culminate, however, before they reach the sea, likely followed by operational pauses.

...

We must therefore focus less on how to end this war quickly and more on how to ensure that another war does not soon follow. That means committing to Ukraine’s success in this endeavor and avoiding the temptation to say, “Well, we gave them what they needed to take a shot and they missed. What a shame.” It will be more than a shame if Western support for Ukraine erodes to the point of compelling Kyiv to accept a peace (which Russia is still not offering, it is important to note) on lines that make the renewal of war on unfavorable terms more likely. It will be a major policy failure. It is also unnecessary.

Ukraine is still very much in the game, and the many structural advantages it has offer good reason to expect that Ukrainian forces will liberate vital lands and the people living on them if only the West holds firm in its support.

...

How the Ukraine Counteroffensive Can Still Succeed

By Frederick W. Kagan , Karolina Hird and Kateryna Stepanenko

TIME · by Frederick W. Kagan · August 3, 2023

The situation in Ukraine still favors Kyiv despite the limited progress made in the counteroffensive so far. Ukrainian forces attempted a limited mechanized penetration of prepared Russian defenses in the south in early to mid-June, but failed to break through the Russian lines. They then switched to slower and more careful operations while disrupting Russian rear areas with long-range precision strikes. Ukraine began the next, reportedly main, phase of its counteroffensive on July 26 with a determined drive to penetrate Russian lines in western Zaporizhia Oblast. It’s far too soon to evaluate the outcome of that effort, which is underway as of the time of this writing, but it is vital to manage expectations. Ukrainian forces are fighting now to break through the first line of long-prepared Russian defenses. Several lines lie behind it, stretching for many miles. Ukrainian progress will very likely alternate periods of notable tactical advances with periods, possibly long periods, of pause and some setbacks. Much as we might hope that the road to the Sea of Azov will simply open for Ukrainian forces the odds are high that fighting will remain hard, casualties high, and frustration will be a constant companion. All of which is normal in war.

But the Ukrainian counteroffensive can succeed in any of several ways. First, the current Ukrainian mechanized breakthrough could succeed, and the Ukrainians could exploit it deeply enough to unhinge part or all of the Russian lines. Second, Russian forces, already suffering serious morale and other systemic problems, could break under the pressure and begin to withdraw in a controlled or uncontrolled fashion. Third, a steady pressure and interdiction campaign supported by major efforts such as the one now underway can generate gaps in the Russian lines that Ukrainian forces can exploit at first locally, but then for deeper penetrations. The first and second possibilities are relatively unlikely but possible.

The wooden Orthodox Church of John the Theologian is shown destroyed as a result of shelling by Russian troops in the village of Kuprylivka, Kharkiv region, Ukraine on June 28, 2023.

Sofiia Bobok—Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

The third is the most probable path to Ukrainian success. It will be slower and more gradual than the other two—and slower than Ukraine’s Western backers desire and expect. It depends on the West providing Ukraine with a constant flow of equipment likely over many months so that Ukraine can maintain its pressure until the Russian forces offer the kinds of frontline cracks the Ukrainians can exploit. It is not primarily a matter of attrition. The slow pace of the pressure campaign Ukraine had been using before July 26 is designed to minimize Ukrainian losses. It is not primarily oriented towards attriting Russians either, but rather towards steadily forcing the Russians out of their prepared defensive positions in ways that the Ukrainians can take advantage of to make operationally significant advances. It is still warfare rather than attritional warfare, just at a slower pace. It therefore requires patience, but it can succeed.

The Ukrainians have been successful with such an approach both in Kherson and in the Kharkiv counteroffensive. The rapid collapse of Russian positions around Kharkiv in October 2022 was the result of months of steady Ukrainian pressure on the ground and in the rear. Ukrainian forces stopped determined Russian advances around Izyum in southeastern Kharkiv Oblast and then launched their own limited counterattacks in mid-September 2022. They targeted Russian logistics hubs and concentration areas behind the front lines for months before launching their decisive effort. That effort caught the Russians by surprise, leading to the sudden collapse of Russian defenses and rapid, dramatic Ukrainian gains. A similar approach in Kherson did not achieve surprise and so did not generate such a large-scale rapid Russian collapse, but it still liberated a large and heavily defended area. A similar approach in southern Ukraine now can offer similar prospects for success.

Ukraine has reportedly committed the main body of the forces it had prepared for counteroffensive operations, although it is not clear what proportion of those forces are actively engaged in combat. Ukraine retains the initiative and benefits from the many advantages discussed below. Its counteroffensive could nevertheless fail. The Russians might prove more resilient than they seem. The Ukrainians might be unable to develop the tactical skills they need to overcome well-prepared Russian defenses. The West might fall short of providing Ukraine the equipment and support it needs in time. The last is the only thing fully under the West’s control. As long as Ukraine still has a serious prospect of liberating strategically vital areas, which it still does, the West’s task is to ensure that Ukraine has what it needs to succeed.

Russia’s Problems

Reasons for confidence in the possibility of significant Ukrainian successes are closely tied to a number of fundamental challenges inherent to the Russian position in Ukraine and the Russian military. These cannot be resolved in 2023, so the opportunities they offer Ukraine are not fleeting. At the strategic level, the geometry of the theater favors Ukraine. At the strategic and operational levels, the lack of Russian reserves forces difficult and complex choices on the Russian military command in the face of Ukrainian counteroffensives. And at the tactical level the way the Russians are conducting defensive operations puts much greater pressure on Russian combat units than the lack of regular or large-scale movements on the map would suggest. All these problems are exacerbated by fundamental flaws in the Russian military itself.

Theater Geometry

The defining characteristic of this phase of the war is that the Russians must defend a ground line of communication (GLOC) consisting of a road and a rail line that runs from Rostov-on-Don at the northeastern edge of the Sea of Azov to Crimea. Vast quantities of food, fuel, ammunition, personnel, and other supplies are required by the tens of thousands of Russian troops in southern Ukraine and must travel along this road and rail line. The Russians were already relying on (and dependent on) this GLOC to supply their troops in southern Ukraine before the most recent break in the Kerch Strait Bridge, because Russian President Vladimir Putin had ordered Russian forces not to rely on the bridge for their logistics after the last major attack on the bridge. The break in that road bridge deprives the Russians of any fallback if the Ukrainians can threaten or cut the Rostov-to-Crimea GLOC.

Ukrainian soldiers of 3rd Separate Assault Brigade hide in a dugout during the shelling of Russian tanks and guns on the Bakhmut direction on July 1, 2023 in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine. Bakhmut and its surroundings continue to be places of most fierce battles since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Serhii Mykhalchuk—Global Images Ukraine/Getty Images

This state of affairs favors Ukraine in an important way. If the Ukrainians can reach the Sea of Azov anywhere and hold their positions, they will have cut the GLOC. The Russians, thus, have to hold the entire thing. Put another way, the Ukrainians only have to win and hold in one sector to render virtually all the Russian-held territory west of their advance untenable. The Russians have to win everywhere all the time. The Ukrainians don’t even have to make it all the way to the water. The GLOC does not hug the coast all the way, for one thing, and is thus closer to the current front lines in some areas than the shoreline. If the Ukrainians can push to within artillery range of the GLOC (about 25 kilometers), moreover, they can begin to shell it intensively in a way that would badly degrade the Russians’ ability to continue to use it. The Ukrainians are thus free to choose any sector of the line or take advantage of any hole that opens anywhere in the line, to push to cut the GLOC in a way very likely to collapse the Russian defenses west of that break. The Russians cannot allow any such holes to appear.

Reserves

The Russians suffer from an additional challenge in that they lack operational or strategic reserves. Reserves are uncommitted combat forces able to respond to developing situations in the battlespace. They can be used to take advantage of opportunities such as to break through the lines during an offensive operation or to handle emergencies, for example by rushing in to close a gap in friendly lines before the enemy can exploit it. Reserves are essential in mechanized maneuver war when the combatants can break through each others’ lines and then exploit those breakthroughs to make large-scale and rapid advances. Reserves can play a different role in protracted war, whether attritional or to simply slow maneuver, because the frontline troops in such a conflict become exhausted over time. Reserves can then rotate onto the frontlines to allow the exhausted troops there to move to safer areas in the rear, rest, receive replacements and new equipment, and prepare to take their turns again on the front lines. A military without significant reserves has to require its troops on the frontlines to stay there indefinitely and can temporarily generate the effects of reserves only by pulling forces from one sector of the line to another to deal with unexpected opportunities or reverses. This is exactly the situation the Russians find themselves in now, and the Russian force generation apparatus is currently incapable of bringing up quality reserves to fulfill these roles fast enough.

Lack of dramatic advances or withdrawals does not mean lack of action, still less stalemate. Ukrainian forces continue to press Russian defenders all along the lines with combinations of artillery strikes and ground combat. The Russian defenders are tiring—and complaining about it publicly. It is clear that Russian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, who is also the overall theater commander for Ukraine, has established a policy that seriously limits troop rotations across the theater. One Russian senior commander resigned or was fired over the issue. Russian soldiers or their families periodically release videos complaining about the lack of rotations. Russian milbloggers constantly express concern about the problem. These indicators clearly suggest that Gerasimov’s policy is largely pinning the same Russian forces on active front lines for a long time, forcing them to continue to receive Ukrainian artillery strikes and ground attacks for weeks or months without rest. Since the nature of the Russian defense requires considerable activity of the defenders, as we will consider below, the burden on soldiers required to execute that defense continuously for a long time is wearing.

Gerasimov’s anti-rotations policy is likely based on the reality that Russia simply doesn’t have enough combat forces to hold in uncommitted reserve either to respond to crises or to relieve exhausted front-line troops. Just about all the major Russian ground combat units known to exist in the Russian military have been spotted operating on one sector of the front line or another. A few exceptions appear to be units that were destroyed in Ukrainian counteroffensives and not reconstituted, although it is remotely possible that they are being held in reserve somewhere. That is unlikely, however, judging from the Russian response to Ukrainian advances around Bakhmut. After the Wagner Group forces completed their seizure of almost all of the city of Bakhmut in May 2023 they stopped fighting and then began withdrawing almost immediately. Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin did not coordinate his plans well with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or Gerasimov, who scrambled to find regular Russian combat units to replace the withdrawing Wagner forces. The Russian forces in the area around Bakhmut thus went from attack to defense without proper preparations. They specifically did not have time to dig good trenches, lay out minefields, and establish other obstacles as their compatriots defending in southern Ukraine did. The Ukrainians took advantage of that situation by rapidly launching counterattacks, particularly on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks. Within a few weeks the Ukrainians were making significant gains and looking as if they might make a breakthrough that could force the Russians to abandon their newly captured prize. The Russians clearly needed to send reinforcements to hold Bakhmut and did so, but in a way that made clear that they likely do not have uncommitted reserves. They drew instead on elite forces from the southern Luhansk Oblast sector of the front line, where they had been attempting to press their own attacks and hurled them directly into the defense of key areas around Bakhmut.

A wall of a destroyed hospital remains riddled with shrapnel on June 3, 2023 in Kalynivske Village, Kherson Oblast, Ukraine. Kalynivske is an urban type settlement in Beryslav Raion in Kherson Oblast located on the left bank of Inhulets river. On March 9, 2022 it was occupied by the Russian troops and liberated by Ukrainian Armed Forces on November 9, 2022.

Les Kasyanov—Global Images Ukraine/Getty Images

The Russian command followed a similar pattern in the south. As the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast began the Russians transferred elements of the 7th airborne (VDV) division that had been holding the Dnipro River line in Kherson Oblast directly to Zaporizhia (taking advantage of the flooding of the Dnipro caused by the Russians’ demolition of the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant Dam, which temporarily precluded a Ukrainian cross-river assault and reduced Russia’s need for the VDV units to defend that sector of the front line), to the complaints of the division’s personnel.

Lateral transfers of forces from one part of an active line to another are undesirable. They can disrupt offensive or defensive operations in the sectors from which they are drawn and put great pressure on soldiers who must withdraw from combat in one area, move rapidly to another, and immediately launch into new fighting without time to rest men and repair or replace equipment. The fact that the Russian command has generated reinforcements for threatened sectors in this fashion rather than by sending uncommitted reserves, together with the widespread complaints about the lack of rotations of frontline units, strongly suggests that the Russians simply do not have uncommitted operational or strategic reserves.

If the Ukrainians are able to wear through Russian frontline units, let alone if they are able to make a serious penetration somewhere in the Russian line, the Russians will likely be forced to rely on lateral transfers from other parts of the front line to stop them. Executing such maneuvers in the face of an advancing mechanized penetration is extremely difficult. It requires that the Russian command recognize the seriousness of the penetration immediately, pull forces from another point on the line near enough for them to get promptly to the point of penetration, extricate those forces from whatever fighting they were engaged in without opening a different hole for the Ukrainians to exploit, and have them rush right into combat on terms that likely do not favor them. The Russians appear to have managed to accomplish this task twice so far—once around Bakhmut and once in western Zaporizhia—but the odds are that they will ultimately make at least one mistake if the Ukrainians keep presenting them with such crises. The lack of uncommitted Russian reserves, therefore, is another structural factor giving Ukraine an advantage.

Elastic defense

The manner in which Russian forces are slowing the Ukrainian advances especially in the south is doctrinally sound but exhausting for the defender. When the lines on the map do not move very much it may seem that the defenders have it relatively easy—that they are just holding their positions, admittedly under fire, until the attackers tire and pull back. That is not what the Russians are doing, however, for the excellent reason that it would likely fail. Mechanized attacks and even robust infantry attacks can often push through the initial defenses they face—the attackers have the initiative, after all, and attack at times and places of their choosing having prepared themselves for the fight. Defenders have to receive the attacks whenever they come and with whatever the defenders happen to have ready. Trying to stop an attack cold at the first line of defense risks having that line broken in a way that the attackers can exploit for greater gains. Military theory and doctrine thus prescribe an alternative approach similar to the elastic defense that Soviet forces employed in the 1943 Battle of Kursk.

In the current Russian defensive approach a front line of troops most often meets the initial attack but then falls back to prepared defensive positions manned with other Russian troops. The Ukrainians generally advance several hundred meters or up to a kilometer or so, taking losses from mines, artillery, and helicopter and/or drone strikes, and getting tired as they do. When the local Russian commander judges the moment to be right, Russian forces then launch a counterattack to push the Ukrainians back to their original positions, which often succeeds. This approach is generally optimal as it causes the attack to expend much of its power making initial small-scale gains against limited numbers of Russian defenders such that the Russian counter-attacking forces have a relatively easier time pushing them back. Russian forces have in some instances – particularly in early June – repelled Ukrainian attacks without needing to temporarily fall back, most often through the devastating use of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) fired both by ground forces and Russian attack helicopters. However, these Russian successes are the exception rather than the norm, and the Russian defense is based around the use of the elastic defense described above.

The elastic defense is tactically effective, but it puts a significant burden on the defenders. They have to receive the brunt of a prepared Ukrainian attack each time, withdraw in good order in the face of it, and then either motivate themselves or have a second line of forces motivated enough to launch and press a counterattack. The tactical engagement thus ebbs and flows in a very dynamic manner with a lot of moving and fighting that is concealed by the fact that the control lines on the map remain the same at the end of the day as they were at the start.

A soldier covers his ears after the firing of an air cannon as Ukrainian artillery division supports soldiers in a counteroffensive on the Zaporizhzhya frontline with M777 in Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine on July 16, 2023.

Gian Marco Benedetto—Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

Ukrainian soldier firing artillery in the direction of Bakhmut, Ukraine, July 22, 2023.

Diego Herrera Carcedo—Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

The elastic defense exhausts the attackers, as it is meant to, and inflicts losses on them without allowing them to make permanent gains. But it also takes a heavy toll on the defenders, who must remain motivated and able to continue to launch counterattacks from prepared and defensible positions each time. Exhaustion, losses, and demoralization can all undermine the willingness and ability of defenders to continue launching those counterattacks, especially when the same units and same soldiers have to keep doing it for weeks and months on end without relief, as is the case here because of the current Russian rotational policies. If the Ukrainians can continue pressing the same sectors of the line and the same units, particularly if the Ukrainians themselves can rotate units onto and off the line as it has been reported that they can and do, then the advantages of the elastic defense can fade and ultimately become significant disadvantages. Since each attack starts with Ukrainian gains, if the defenders do not launch their counterattacks or do so only half-heartedly, then each attack will end with Ukrainian gains. This dynamic can thus turn into a Ukrainian advantage over time.

Fundamental problems with the Russian military

Many of the challenges facing the Russians identified above result from structural problems in the Russian military, the Russian defense industrial base, and Putin’s policies that cannot be remedied in any short period. Putin has still not put Russia fully on a war footing—or even admitted that Russia is engaged in a war. Putin and Russian officials still describe their full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a “special military operation.” Putin has not ordered the full mobilization of Russia’s reservists. Russian conscripts are not technically allowed to fight in Ukraine and generally do not. Russia has not maintained a cadre of trainers or the necessary training facilities and equipment to handle a mass mobilization, moreover, and made the further error of sending some of its limited trainers to fight earlier in the war. The Kremlin has turned to an array of irregular forces to make up for Russia’s military manpower deficiencies. The Wagner Group was the most notable such force, but Chechen troops loyal to strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, the militias of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (now technically incorporated into the Russian military), Cossack units and other volunteer formations, and a variety of smaller private military companies are all intermingled with Russian conventional forces throughout the theater. This reliance on a multiplicity of different kinds of irregular formations undermines the cohesion and effectiveness of the entire Russian war effort. Russia’s defense industries are also only partially and slowly moving to 24/7 operations, partly because they are suffering from shortages in available trained personnel – in large part exacerbated by Russia’s manpower shortages at the front line, as in some cases the Kremlin must choose between manning frontline units and manning its industrial plants. Russia’s military factories, moreover, have long been inefficient and rife with corruption, problems that the Kremlin and the MoD are struggling to address. Modern Russian military equipment also relies heavily on components that Russia cannot produce domestically, particularly microchips.

These factors and more contribute to Russia’s inability to generate enough trained combat forces—properly equipped to fight modern war - to Ukraine to permit unit rotations, reinforcements, and replacements at the necessary levels. The limitations of Russia’s defense industries have forced Russian troops repeatedly to reduce their rates of artillery fire for lack of ammunition. Russia has reached deep into its stock of ancient tanks, including some dating back to the 1950s, to make up for its inability to produce large numbers of modern tanks, but those old tanks are far more vulnerable to modern anti-tank systems and still require trained crews, which are in short supply. Russian forces have largely used up their arsenal of precision missiles as well, which is one of the reasons for Moscow’s increasing dependence on Iranian drones. Russia’s failure to produce a fifth-generation stealth fighter before the war (or during the war) and continued Russian failures to effectively track and target mobile Ukrainian air defenses has largely kept Russian fixed-wing aircraft out of the skies over unoccupied Ukraine as Western air defense systems began to flow in. Putin might be able to address some of these problems rapidly if he ordered the full mobilization of the Russian Federation, as many Russian ultranationalists demand. But Putin clearly fears the backlash from Russian society and has steadfastly not only refused to issue any such order but also consistently denied the need for it. It is not clear, in any case, that Russian military, economic, and governmental structures are robust and competent enough actually to execute such a mobilization.

We must not overstate the failures and incompetence of the Russian military, however. Russian officers have learned and adapted from their over 500 days of war. Russian attack helicopter pilots, especially in the south, have become extremely skilled and lethal and are the bane of Ukrainian counter-offensive efforts. Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities were superb before the war and have only become better, especially in their ability to jam GPS signals on which many precision munitions rely and to interfere with drone operations. Russian troops especially in southern Ukraine, where the Russian military command allowed them to focus on preparing for defensive operations for months rather than insisting on meaningless attacks, have constructed intelligent and deep defensive positions. The execution of the elastic defense described above is another improvement—the Russians have relearned and adapted lessons of conventional wars past and trained their soldiers while in the field to implement them, at least in some areas. And the Russians have repeatedly adapted to Ukraine’s acquisition of longer-range precision weapons (though usually after suffering significant losses) to maintain a rickety and unreliable logistics system that nevertheless generally meets the minimum necessary levels of supply. Involuntarily mobilized reservists now comprise a significant proportion of Russian troops in the theater. They appear to be generally unhappy about fighting, suffer from demoralization, are poorly trained, and frequently complain. But they do fight, on the whole, and sometimes rather well.

These Russian improvements and adaptations have been essential to keeping Russia in the war. They mitigate and work around the fundamental structural problems hobbling Russia’s war effort, but they cannot fix them. They do not offset the advantages Ukraine has that are outlined above.

Ukraine’s Changing Approach

The Ukrainians are also adapting their counteroffensive efforts. They began counteroffensive operations on June 4 and attempted to make several penetrations through prepared Russian defenses in the south using Western-provided equipment. Those counteroffensives were limited in scale, involving a fraction of the brigades the Ukrainians had prepared and equipped especially for the counteroffensive, and limited in duration. They were largely unsuccessful, generating limited gains accompanied by losses that the Ukrainians rightly judged to be unacceptably high. Ukrainian forces had mainly abandoned that approach by mid-to-late June, shifting instead to much smaller attacks conducted primarily by light infantry, often at night and unaccompanied by mechanized vehicles. They have made limited gains in the south using this approach in the ensuing weeks at much lower losses in personnel and equipment before resuming major counteroffensive operations on July 26.

This shift in tactics was part of a larger shift in focus away from seeking a dramatic and rapid mechanized penetration back to the kind of slow and protracted pressure campaign that had succeeded in liberating western Kherson Oblast in November 2022. Ukrainian forces have been attacking Russian supply points, convoys, and headquarters throughout the south for months. They have continued and expanded this campaign in conjunction with the shift to small but constant attacks on the front line with the likely aim of pressuring Russian forces systemically.

Ukrainian soldiers from the 24th separate mechanized brigade on duty at the frontline near Toretsk in Donetsk, Ukraine on June 27, 2023.

Wojciech Grzedzinski—Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

The complaints from Russian soldiers and the milbloggers who speak for them about conditions on the front lines in the south in the face of even these relatively small-scale Ukrainian attacks suggest that the pressure is having an effect. Russian troops are clearly not finding it a simple task to fend off continuous or nearly continuous limited Ukrainian infantry attacks for the reasons outlined above. The better Russian commanders, some of them likely responsible for the improvement in the performance of Russian troops in the south, have apparently begun to complain to Gerasimov about the inadequate support their troops are getting. Those complaints reached a boiling point when Gerasimov fired Major General Ivan Popov, commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army and the officer responsible for holding western Zaporizhia Oblast, and that commander sent around a scathing audio recording criticizing the Russian high command that made its way rapidly and predictably onto Telegram. Rumors of other commanders complaining and being fired rapidly followed. Those rumors have died down for the moment, and these firings and complaints are unlikely to generate major short-term changes in the Russians’ ability to continue holding their lines, but they serve to show at a minimum the strain Russian forces feel even under the limited front-line pressure they now face.

Ukrainian forces are also clearly working to improve their ability to conduct combined arms operations (by integrating infantry, armor, artillery, and engineering assets—particularly, in this case, mine clearing systems) and appear to be testing small units in combat periodically. They have requested and seem to be receiving additional mine-clearing equipment as well as cluster munitions, which can help them clear trenchlines more rapidly and at lower cost in casualties and equipment.

Ukraine’s struggles to use Western vehicles effectively in mechanized penetration battles are disappointing but should not be too surprising in retrospect. The counteroffensive brigades that received the Western kit were largely new units and lacked the skills that Ukraine’s experienced brigades have developed over many months of combat. The Western equipment itself differs from the Soviet-era vehicles that Ukrainians are used to, and it is understandable that Ukrainian soldiers struggled to use it optimally on their first attempts in combat against a foe that had prepared itself well.

The Ukrainians are learning the ins-and-outs of their new systems, however, and figuring out how to integrate them as the newly formed counteroffensive units get combat experience. Ukrainian performance in the field is therefore likely to improve over time. The Russians, on the other hand, likely generated their peak performance at the start of the counteroffensive. That is when they had been fully prepared, relatively rested, fully supplied, and ready to fight. As the fight goes on and those Russian units are not relieved they are becoming tired, starting to struggle with supplies, and may be becoming demoralized. The Russian performance will thus likely degrade unless the Russians can bring significant reinforcements to bear.

Bakhmut

Ukrainian forces, however, appear to be taking steps to prevent the Russians from reinforcing their lines in the south by attacking the Russian military’s key territorial point—the city of Bakhmut, which Russian forces captured at horrendous cost by May 2023. As discussed above, Russia rushed troops to Bakhmut from other sectors by mid-July, including at least two airborne divisions, one and likely two airborne brigades, at least one Spetsnaz brigade, and several other units. It is unclear if the Ukrainians expected the Russians to send forces from the south to Bakhmut or if they expected the Russians to pull them from Luhansk, as they did. Ukrainian ex post facto statements, however, suggest that they did expect and desire to draw Russian reinforcements to Bakhmut. The result is that, at a minimum, a number of elite Russian airborne and Spetsnaz brigades and regiments are now pinned on Bakhmut and unavailable to relieve the pressure on Russian troops in the south.

Luhansk

The Russians, for their part, are attempting to return the favor by launching offensive operations in Luhansk Oblast likely designed to draw Ukrainian reserves there and away from counteroffensive efforts in the south. This Russian effort has likely been somewhat muted by the diversion of elite troops from southern Luhansk to Bakhmut, but Russian troops further north in Luhansk have continued to advance slowly, putting pressure on Ukrainian troops in the area. Russian gains in Luhansk have been generally less significant than Ukrainian gains around Bakhmut, and the Ukrainians are closer to threatening important lines of communication in Bakhmut than the Russians are to any particularly significant objectives in Luhansk. It is far from clear, therefore, if the Russians will benefit as much from their diversionary efforts in Luhansk as the Ukrainians from their attacks on Bakhmut’s flanks, but it is too soon to tell for sure.

Ukrainian soldier from the 24th separate mechanized brigade eats lunch during his break at the frontline near Toretsk in Donetsk, Ukraine on June 27, 2023.

Wojciech Grzedzinski—Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

The likeliest outcome for now appears to be that both sides will end up fixing in place the forces currently arrayed along the Luhansk-Bakhmut line, making those forces unavailable for redeployment either to conduct or to defend against Ukrainian counter-offensive operations in the south. That situation likely favors Ukraine for the reasons described above. Ukraine has not yet committed the main body of the forces it has available for counter-offensive operations whereas the Russians appear to have all available combat power already on or near the front line.

Lateral reinforcement

The Ukrainians seem, finally, to be working to foreclose the last option the Russians could try to relieve their wearying defenders—shifting forces from a dormant segment of the front line to an active segment. The Russians made a move in this direction early in the counter-offensive, shifting elements of the 7th Airborne Division from near the Dnipro in Kherson to the front line in Zaporizhia—a move enabled in part by the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Dam and the ensuing flooding. They do not appear to be comfortable moving more forces from Kherson—where there are not too many Russian combat forces to begin with—as Ukrainian troops have reestablished small footholds on the eastern bank of the Dnipro, and the Russians seem to fear a Ukrainian crossing of the river.

The Ukrainians are deterring similar movements of Russian troops from one part of Zaporizhia or western Donetsk Oblasts to another by conducting their limited attacks against most of the Russian units manning the Russian defensive lines. The Ukrainians have not concentrated their attacks on one or two areas—which would have been more normal practice for an intended large-scale and rapid mechanized penetration—but have rather ensured that their attacks affect all three of the Russian combined arms armies (the 58th, 49th, and 29th) and most if not all of the Russian divisions and brigades or regiments subordinated to those armies on the line from the Kakhovka reservoir to near Donetsk City. The continuation of even small-scale attacks against all these units will likely preclude the Russians from pulling any of them out of the line to relieve or reinforce more threatened or exhausted sectors. This pattern of Ukrainian attacks is thus likely an important component of the overall pressure campaign. It should have the effect of preventing Russian forces from moving rapidly to stop the more determined counter-offensive push Ukraine launched on July 26.

Prospects

It is far too soon to tell how the Ukrainian counteroffensive will turn out or especially over what period of time. War is inherently non-linear, and even the most fluid maneuver war alternates periods of rapid advance with periods of relative stasis. The Russians and Ukrainians have been putting great pressures on one another without generating much movement, much as two wrestlers sometimes do before one gains the upper hand and throws the other. The Ukrainians appear to be trying for a throw now, but it is too soon to judge the outcome of this effort which, in itself, is unlikely to lead directly and rapidly to victory.

This situation is not a stalemate, however, and won’t become a stalemate if the current Ukrainian push falls short of expectations or bogs down again after initial successes. Stalemate occurs when neither side can materially change the situation and there is no meaningful prospect that either side will be able to do so in the future. The Ukrainians have not yet demonstrated that they can make rapid and dramatic penetrations at this time, but neither have the Russians shown that they can sustain their current defensive approach against a protracted and probably increasingly effective Ukrainian pressure campaign. The Ukrainians still have the initiative in the theater overall and especially in the south. They choose when, where, and how they will attack. The Russians must defend everywhere and always. The theater geometry may come to play a critical role here as well—the Russians have to win every time; the Ukrainians only have to win once.

The likeliest path to Ukrainian success in this counter-offensive will be slow and staccato. Ukrainian troops continue to press along the front and with attacks against Russian rear areas until front-line Russian defenders lose the will or ability to continue the counter-attacks required by their elastic defense approach. At that point, Ukrainian forces may begin to grind through the Russian defenses 500 or 1,000 meters a day for a time in several locations, creating a series of footholds in the Russian lines until they reach points threatening the Russians’ ability to continue to hold the areas in between these footholds. This pattern shaped the first parts of the Kherson counter-offensive and led to a rather sudden Russian withdrawal from their initial lines to a much smaller pocket. The Ukrainians would likely follow such a limited Russian withdrawal this time by consolidating their gains, resting, and preparing to renew the effort from positions further to the south.

Another possible path, which the Ukrainians are now exploring, relies on more dramatic, large-scale mechanized penetrations of the Russian lines, seeking to unhinge them and facilitate rapid gains for a time. Even successful penetrations and exploitations will culminate, however, before they reach the sea, likely followed by operational pauses.

The Motherland Monument is seen after workers removed a Soviet emblem from the shield of the monument in Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, Aug. 1, 2023.

Jae C. Hong—AP

The Russians are likely to begin suffering from several problems in either case. First, the defensive belts they have established full of dense and well-laid minefields do not appear to extend more than 10-15 miles from the front lines in most areas. Unless they are able to establish new lines further to the rear as their defending forces fight and withdraw, they will find themselves at some point having to defend much less well prepared positions. Considering that the forces currently fighting are the ones that dug and prepared the current defenses and that the Russians do not have enough troops to man multiple defensive lines (which we assess to be true because such forces would be suitable for use as reserves, whereas the Russians clearly do not have reserves), it is unlikely that they will be able to replicate their current defensive lines further to the rear. Even if they could, however, the Russians would find themselves with another problem as Ukrainian troops move to within artillery range of critical supply nodes and road junctions. As the Ukrainian advance grinds on, in this scenario, Ukrainian forces will ultimately move to within artillery range of the primary Rostov-to-Crimea GLOCs themselves, which would likely begin to unhinge the Russian defenses along the entire line if they had held thus far.

This entire process would likely take months. The fall muddy season would likely slow it, but probably would not stop it—both sides have continued to fight through Ukraine’s horrible muds. The advance would likely speed up again when the ground hardened and then froze. A campaign of this sort will likely be frustrating. It will alternate periods of relatively rapid but limited Ukrainian gains with long periods of slow, gradual slogging interspersed with pauses in which nothing much seems to be occurring. But as long as Ukrainian forces continue periodically to move forward and the Russians prove unable simply to stop them and hold them, the war will not be stalemated.

Less likely scenarios could lead to more rapid Ukrainian gains. The Ukrainians could figure out how to cohere their various bits of Western and Soviet kit into an effective penetration force and drive through the Russian lines rapidly at one or two locations, unhinging the Russian defenses. It is impossible from outside the Ukrainian military to know if the counteroffensive begun on July 26 is meant to achieve such a large objective, let alone whether it can. It is, however, definitely plausible that the war could take such a turn.

Still another unlikely but possible scenario is that the Russian forces suffer a general collapse under protracted Ukrainian pressure and break in important sections of the line even in the absence of a Ukrainian penetration. Parallel collapses largely removed the French army from active fighting in World War I following the 1917 mutinies and, of course, the Russian army that year as well. It is even more impossible to forecast this sort of contingency, which depends entirely on the prevalent mood and psychology of Russian forces combined with specific events or rumors or events that could trigger such a collapse. What we know of the mood and situation of Russian soldiers, however, suggests that a similar collapse remains possible if unlikely.

Or, of course, the Ukrainian counteroffensive could simply stall out. If it is not clear that the Russians can actually stop the Ukrainians from advancing indefinitely, neither is it certain that the Ukrainians can sustain the pressure long enough to wear the Russians down.

Recommendations

But the Ukrainians can succeed in any of several ways, whereas the Russians must doggedly hold on with almost no real options. Regardless of the outcome of the ongoing effort in Zaporizhia, the situation favors Ukraine.

Ukraine’s backers must avoid rushing to premature conclusions about Ukraine’s prospects. It is far too soon to forecast the outcome of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, and there is no basis for assuming that it will fail. The West must internalize the reality that Ukrainian success is likely to be slower and more costly than many had hoped. It will be punctuated by moments of hope and disappointment. The West must therefore prepare to lean in to providing Ukraine with the materiel it will require for a long campaign and focus on getting it all to Ukraine as rapidly as possible rather than dripping it in gradually over time. Getting Ukraine more mine-clearing equipment is obviously the most urgent requirement. But Ukraine will need a lot more Western armored vehicles including both tanks and armored personnel carriers—since there are no more Soviet-era tanks to be had. Ukraine will also need Western combat aircraft. It is baffling to hear in the West arguments that Ukraine does not need combat aircraft. NATO forces would never undertake to conduct mechanized penetrations of prepared defensive positions without air superiority. The Ukrainians are doing so now because they have no choice, but they are paying a heavy price. They need the ability to keep Russian aircraft out of the skies over the battlefield and to use their own aircraft to assist in their advance.

Relatives and friends kneel down next to the coffin of Anton Klitnyi, a Ukrainian serviceman, who was killed fighting Russian troops in the Zaporizhzhia region, during the funeral on July 2, 2023 in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Roman Pilipey—Getty Images

Western support by itself cannot make Ukraine win—but limiting or withholding that support can make Ukraine fail. Ukraine’s Western partners should focus on the variables they can directly affect and avoid falling into the trap of ignoring what they can change in favor of bemoaning what they can’t alter. Ukrainian forces certainly face numerous challenges in the ongoing counteroffensive beyond a lack of equipment the West can provide, and there is no monocausal explanation for Ukraine’s slower-than-hoped-for pace. As laid out above, Russia’s prepared defenses are daunting and the Russian military is degraded but not defeated, and no matter how Ukraine proceeds, its forces face hard fighting against a dangerous enemy. Ukraine’s forces, particularly green and untried counteroffensive brigades, face several challenges that cannot be directly remedied by equipment supplies. Ukrainian forces switched to a slower approach due to the failure of early attempts at large-scale mechanized attacks and heavy initial losses, not because the slower approach is preferable.

Ukraine faces its own manpower challenges after 17 months of war, particularly due to the loss of veteran personnel. Kyiv’s forces are attempting to integrate new personnel, new equipment, and new NATO-taught approaches amidst major operations and are understandably encountering complications. The tendency of some analysts and government officials to focus on Ukrainian challenges to the exclusion of exogenous factors– and at times to argue that Ukrainian forces would succeed with what they have if they only fought how NATO asserts it would fight – is dangerous. Among many other things, the Ukrainians cannot fight the way NATO would actually fight because it lacks so many capabilities that NATO forces would naturally bring to bear, especially airpower and quantities of long-range precision strike.

There is one thing the West must not do. It must not lose sight of the importance of helping Ukraine liberate the strategically vital terrain in the south on which the counteroffensive is now focused. This is not a matter of altruism. Europe and the U.S. need this war to end in a way that reduces as much as possible the likelihood that the Russians will launch a new war of vengeance and conquest some years hence. The positions the Russians now hold in the south are far more advantageous militarily and economically than those they held before the 2022 invasion. They will make the prospect of reversing Russia’s embarrassments through a new invasion far more enticing. They will also badly complicated Ukraine’s efforts to prepare to defend against such an attack. They cripple Ukraine’s economy by severing it from access to international trade through the Black Sea and depriving it of the mineral wealth in the east that had been one of its major economic engines, as well as large areas of agricultural land. It matters to Ukraine and to the West where the lines are drawn when the fighting stops—and both Western and Ukrainian interests are badly harmed by allowing the lines to remain where they are.

We must therefore focus less on how to end this war quickly and more on how to ensure that another war does not soon follow. That means committing to Ukraine’s success in this endeavor and avoiding the temptation to say, “Well, we gave them what they needed to take a shot and they missed. What a shame.” It will be more than a shame if Western support for Ukraine erodes to the point of compelling Kyiv to accept a peace (which Russia is still not offering, it is important to note) on lines that make the renewal of war on unfavorable terms more likely. It will be a major policy failure. It is also unnecessary.

Ukraine is still very much in the game, and the many structural advantages it has offer good reason to expect that Ukrainian forces will liberate vital lands and the people living on them if only the West holds firm in its support.

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TIME · by Frederick W. Kagan · August 3, 2023

13. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2023

Key Takeaways:

A dispute among prominent voices in the Russian information space highlights the Kremlin’s sensitivity to Russian reporting about setbacks in Crimea in particular and possibly in Ukraine in general and has further exposed fault lines within the milblogger community. This dispute, alongside the accompanying allegations, suggests that the issue of strikes against Crimea is a distinctly neuralgic point in the pro-war Russian information space.
The highest echelons of the Russian military command may have directed milbloggers to stay silent about problems that can be directly blamed on the Russian military command.
Russian forces conducted a drone strike on the night of August 1-2 that destroyed port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast including 40,000 tons of grain.
Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky announced the formation of up two new VDV regiments and the reestablishment of the 104th VDV Division by the end of 2023. Teplinsky’s announcement indicates that he maintains his position and the public support of the Russian MoD following rumors of his arrest, possibly as a result of his affiliations with the Wagner Group, in mid-July.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially provided weapons and vehicles to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces on August 2, reallocating conventional military assets as a part of the Kremlin’s efforts to steadily expand Russia’s internal security capabilities following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 2.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Kreminna, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and advanced in some areas.
Russian civilians are increasingly targeting military registration and enlistment centers across Russia as a result of what Russian sources claim are targeted scam calls.
Russian President Vladimir Putin pushed the Kremlin narrative of “Novorossiya” and announced Russian government initiatives to provide books to occupied territories of Ukraine on August 2.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 2, 2023

Aug 2, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov,

Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 2, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A dispute among prominent voices in the Russian information space highlights the Kremlin’s sensitivity to Russian reporting about setbacks in Crimea in particular and possibly in Ukraine in general and has further exposed fault lines within the milblogger community. A pro-war milblogger accused other prominent pro-war milbloggers who have been critical of the Russian conduct of the war on August 2 of being “imbeciles” who support “provocative publications” and the “frantic criticism of the [Russian Ministry of Defense]” because the milbloggers posted images reportedly showing the aftermath of recent Ukrainian strikes near Sevastopol and on the Chonhar Bridge, which some sources suggested would irresponsibly spread panic.[1] A notorious Kremlin-backed pro-Russian Ukrainian blogger additionally accused one of the critical milbloggers under attack of stealing crowdsourced collection funds meant for Russian forces.[2] Both these specific critiques drew significant attention from other pro-war Russian commentators, many of whom supported the critical channels being attacked for reporting on the Crimea strikes.[3] One milblogger noted that the crux of the issue lies with the fact that these two channels post pictures of purported Ukrainian strikes on Crimea but emphasized that the original images came from Ukrainian Telegram channels.[4] Another prominent milblogger claimed that the dispute over posting images of strikes in Crimea became so intense that it attracted the attention of the Crimean Federal Security Service (FSB) branch and Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov, likely because these entities are interested in preventing panic in Crimea.[5]

The dispute over these two milbloggers, alongside the accompanying allegations, suggests that the issue of strikes against Crimea is a distinctly neuralgic point in the pro-war Russian information space. ISW previously noted that following an apparent Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar Bridge on July 29 the vast majority of Russian milbloggers stayed silent with a few select channels simply reposting imagery of the resulting damage in the days that followed.[6] ISW assessed that the lack of milblogger discussion following the Chonhar strike suggests that the Kremlin may have formally directed milbloggers not to cover it.[7] The criticism of the two critical milboggers’ coverage of the Crimean strikes further supports ISW’s previous assessment and underlines the fact that coverage of events in Crimea has created substantial tension in the Russian information space. Russian authorities, including the Crimean occupation administration, have a vested interest in restricting the dissemination of information about the strikes and their implications for Russian logistics through the occupied peninsula due to concerns that this information will cause panic in the population and call into question Russia’s ability to effectively secure its occupied territory.

The highest echelons of the Russian military command may have directed milbloggers to stay silent about problems that can be directly blamed on the Russian military command. Russian milbloggers’ very muted reactions to recent strikes against Crimea contrast sharply with their reactions to recent drone strikes against Moscow. Milbloggers have been relatively vocal in responding to Ukrainian drone strikes on Moscow City in recent days, with some Russian sources directly blaming Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin for the strikes due to his administration’s failures to secure Moscow’s air space.[8] The defense of Russian positions in Crimea, by contrast, is clearly the responsibility of Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, who is also the overall theater commander in Ukraine. Gerasimov is ultimately responsible for the security of Moscow as well, but he has neither portrayed himself nor been portrayed as directly involved in defending the capital’s airspace whereas he, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and the Russian military high command in general have made much of their control over the war in Ukraine. The Russian General Staff may fear that milbloggers reporting on Ukrainian attacks against Crimea are fueling negative perceptions of Gerasimov’s competence as well as risking stimulating panic on the peninsula, whereas Russian authorities may feel comfortable letting more local officials such as Sobyanin take the fall for attacks on Moscow and other Russian cities. If this hypothesis is valid then the Kremlin’s pressure on milbloggers to censor themselves may be confined to pressure to avoid reporting on dramatic events that clearly reflect badly on Gerasimov, Shoigu, or Putin rather than to avoid discussing all negative events.

Russian forces conducted a drone strike on the night of August 1-2 that destroyed port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast including 40,000 tons of grain. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike targeting Kyiv and Odesa oblasts and that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 23 drones, but an unspecified number of drones struck port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[9] BBC Russia reported that the Russian strike destroyed 40,000 tons of grain intended for shipment to several African countries, China, and Israel at the Izmail port in Odesa Oblast.[10] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported on July 31 that Russian forces destroyed 180,000 tons of grain between Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17 and July 26.[11] The Kremlin has repeatedly pledged to send 25,000 to 50,000 tons of grain to six unspecified African countries in the next three to four months free of charge--a fraction of the Ukrainian grain it has destroyed.[12] Russian forces are likely striking grain storage infrastructure while claiming that they are striking military targets, in an attempt to have Russia supplant Ukraine as the supplier of grain to Africa and other states to ensure that Moscow rather than Kyiv benefits financially. The destruction of Ukrainian grain and the disruption of grain shipments following Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal and Russian posturing and threats to attack neutral shipping going to and from Ukraine are also causing grain prices to fluctuate, and the Russians may hope to benefit from higher prices if they can keep Ukrainian grain largely off the global market.

Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky announced the formation of up two new VDV regiments and the reestablishment of the 104th VDV Division by the end of 2023. Teplinsky announced that the existing 31st Guards Separate VDV Assault Brigade will be subordinated to the 104th VDV Division.[13] Teplinsky claimed that one battery of a new artillery brigade (presumably of the 104th Division) is already fighting in Ukraine. The Russian military has been attempting to stand up multiple new division and army corps-level formations since the end of 2022 when Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s announced the reconstitution of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts and the establishment of several new formations.[14] Ongoing Russian force generation efforts will likely staff the new VDV formations with new, untrained personnel rather than recruit experienced personnel more typical of the VDV’s historical elite status. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian MoD has likely begun staffing its new formations including the new 25th Army Corps (Central Military District), but that Russia is unlikely to recruit enough personnel to staff even one new army-level formation without conducting a general mobilization.[15]

Teplinsky’s announcement indicates that he maintains his position and the public support of the Russian MoD following rumors of his arrest, possibly as a result of his affiliations with the Wagner Group, in mid-July.[16] Teplinsky credited Shoigu and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for strengthening the VDV by forming new units prior to the start of the 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine in a show of deference.[17] Teplinsky specifically credited Shoigu with provisioning the VDV with modern equipment and helping develop VDV formations.[18] Teplinsky has been hostile to Gerasimov and has previously directed forceful complaints against the seniormost Russian military command, setting a precedent for insubordination among other Russian military commanders.[19] Teplinsky’s public appearance and comments in direct support of the MoD command structure indicate that the MoD has coerced Teplinsky into publicly realigning with the MoD following the June 24 rebellion and July rumors of significant military command changes.

The Russian MoD officially provided weapons and vehicles to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces on August 2, reallocating conventional military assets as a part of the Kremlin’s efforts to steadily expand Russia’s internal security capabilities following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24. Russian media reported that the Russian MoD provided machine guns, anti-drone guns, and UAZ vehicles to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces.[20] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov stated that Russian authorities provided each of the Belgorod Oblast Territorial Defense‘s eight battalions with five UAZ vehicles, additional car radios, quadcopters, and anti-drone guns.[21] Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit also announced that the first batch of weapons arrived in Kursk Oblast and that more weapons will arrive “in the near future.”[22] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reportedly stated that the Kremlin issued the weapons to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces against the backdrop of attacks from the territory of Ukraine.[23]

The repeated allocation of additional military assets to Belgorod and Kursk oblasts indicates that the Kremlin is growing increasingly concerned about continued attacks on Russia's border with Ukraine. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on June 15 that he deployed Chechen “Akhmat” special forces to Belgorod Oblast to protect the border from raids into Russian territory.[24] Ukrainian officials reported on June 22 that Russian forces transferred several GRU Spetsnaz units to Kursk Oblast to fight pro-Ukrainian Russian partisans.[25] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities will store the weapons provided to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces in a centralized location and noted that it is unclear how the territorial defense forces will be able to access the weapons in an emergency if they are stored in a locked storage facility.[26] The claim that Russian authorities will lock up the weapons provided to the Belgorod and Kursk Territorial Defense forces, if true, indicates that the Kremlin is attempting to balance the need for increased border security with the need to avoid empowering decentralized military formations that might one day be able to launch an armed rebellion similar to Wagner’s actions on June 24.[27] Moscow might also fear the results of large numbers of small arms getting into the hands of poorly trained territorial forces or the general population.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut and in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast area) and Melitopol directions (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[28] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kurdyumivka in the Bakhmut area.[29] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line in the Lyman direction, near Staromayorske on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border, and near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[30]

Key Takeaways:

A dispute among prominent voices in the Russian information space highlights the Kremlin’s sensitivity to Russian reporting about setbacks in Crimea in particular and possibly in Ukraine in general and has further exposed fault lines within the milblogger community. This dispute, alongside the accompanying allegations, suggests that the issue of strikes against Crimea is a distinctly neuralgic point in the pro-war Russian information space.
The highest echelons of the Russian military command may have directed milbloggers to stay silent about problems that can be directly blamed on the Russian military command.
Russian forces conducted a drone strike on the night of August 1-2 that destroyed port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast including 40,000 tons of grain.
Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky announced the formation of up two new VDV regiments and the reestablishment of the 104th VDV Division by the end of 2023. Teplinsky’s announcement indicates that he maintains his position and the public support of the Russian MoD following rumors of his arrest, possibly as a result of his affiliations with the Wagner Group, in mid-July.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially provided weapons and vehicles to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces on August 2, reallocating conventional military assets as a part of the Kremlin’s efforts to steadily expand Russia’s internal security capabilities following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 2.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Kreminna, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and advanced in some areas.
Russian civilians are increasingly targeting military registration and enlistment centers across Russia as a result of what Russian sources claim are targeted scam calls.
Russian President Vladimir Putin pushed the Kremlin narrative of “Novorossiya” and announced Russian government initiatives to provide books to occupied territories of Ukraine on August 2.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and made unconfirmed gains on August 2. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued successful offensive efforts towards Kupyansk, and one milblogger reported that Russian forces advanced up to the eastern bank of the Oskil River near Kalynove (9km northeast of Kupyansk).[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Western Grouping of Forces, including the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District), improved their tactical positions near Tymkivka (20km due east of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), and in a forested area in the Kuzemivka direction (14km northwest of Svatove).[32]

Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and did not make claimed or confirmed advances on August 2. A Russian milblogger warned that the Ukrainians are accumulating forces in the area in preparation for a large counterattack.[33] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novoselivske, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked north of Kuzemivka.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kreminna on August 2 and made confirmed gains. Geolocated footage posted on August 2 shows that Russian forces made marginal advances south of Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) around July 31.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue successful attacks on Ukrainian positions west of Kreminna near Torske and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area.[36] Russian Center Group of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Savchuk additionally claimed that elements of the Russian Center Group of Forces captured seven Ukrainian strongholds near Karmazynivka (28km northwest of Kreminna) and Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna).[37]

Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Kreminna but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on August 2. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks between Svatove and Kreminna on the Raihorodka—Karmazynivka line (roughly 30km northwest of Kreminna).[38] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian troops repelled unsuccessful Ukrainian ground attacks northwest of Kreminna near Novovodyane, west of Kreminna of Torske, and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area.[39] Russian sources noted that Ukrainian forces continue continuous and unsuccessful attacks against Russian positions in the Serebryanske forest area.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut area on August 2 and reportedly advanced in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations south of Bakhmut.[41] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked several Russian positions along the Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line (8km to 13km southwest of Bakhmut) and advanced north of Kurdyumivka.[42] The milblogger claimed that the situation in Bakhmut has stabilized and that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in positional battles near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[43] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near Mayorske (20km south of Bakhmut).[44]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on August 2 and did not make claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north and west of Klishchiivka, south of Andriivka, and northwest and west of Kurdyumivka.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces retreated from positions south of Andriivka.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked north and west of Klishchiivka.[47] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces have increased the intensity of their artillery fire in the Bakhmut direction.[48] A Russian milblogger amplified footage on August 2 claiming to show elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) operating in the Bakhmut direction.[49] The suggestion that an element of the 5th Combined Arms Army, which is predominantly operating in western Donetsk Oblast, has partially deployed to the Bakhmut area suggests that Russian forces may be rushing disparate elements to the area to hold the defense unless the milblogger simply misidentified the unit.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on August 2 and did not make claimed or confirmed advances. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Staromykhailivka (19km southwest of Avdiivka).[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near Marinka.[51] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are entrenched in positions near Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka) and are attempting to advance near Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[52]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made confirmed advances in the area as of August 2. Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows that Russian forces advanced north of Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka).[53] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka and Marinka.[54] A Russian media aggregator and a milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka and Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City).[55]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and did not make any confirmed or claimed advances on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area).[56] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[57] A Russian news aggregator claimed that positional battles are ongoing near Staromayorske.[58]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and did not make any confirmed or claimed advances on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to restore lost positions east and west of Staromayorske and north of Urozhaine.[59] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces hold the northern part of Staromayorske, while Russian forces control the heights and the fields south of Staromayorske and all of Urozhaine.[60] One Russian milblogger claimed that most of Staromayorske remains contested, however.[61]

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make any confirmed or claimed advances on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[62] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled small Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv).[63] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian advance of up to 10 personnel and a mine clearing vehicle with armored vehicle support near Robotyne and a platoon-sized Ukrainian attack and one tank near Pyatykhatky.[64] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an attack in the Mala Tokamachka-Bilohirya direction (9-16km southeast of Orikhiv).[65]Footage published on August 2 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment of Territorial Troops (TRV) operating near Robotyne.[66]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike on occupied Crimea. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 2 that Ukrainian forces launched a missile strike on the Hvardiiske airfield (about 15km north of Simferopol), but that the missile fell near the airfield.[67]

The Russian MoD continues to accuse Ukraine of attacking Russian vessels in the Black Sea, likely in an attempt to set conditions to escalate Russian naval activity and increase Russian control over the Black Sea. The Russian MoD claimed that an unspecified Russian naval vessel destroyed a Ukrainian unmanned boat that attacked the Russian naval vessel while it was escorting a civilian transport ship in the southwestern part of the Black Sea.[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian civilians are increasingly targeting military registration and enlistment centers across Russia as a result of what Russian sources claim are targeted scam calls. Russian opposition media outlet Meduza reported that arsonists made 28 attempts to set fire to military registration and enlistment offices primarily in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan between July 29 and August 2.[69] Other affected cities include Feodosia, occupied Crimea; Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast; St. Petersburg and Vsevolozhsk, Leningrad Oblast; Mozhaisk and Podolsk, Moscow Oblast; Aginskoye, Trans-Baikal Krai; Rossosh, Voronezh Oblast; Omsk; Kopeysk and Verkhneuralsk, Chelyabinsk Oblast; Volsk, Saratov Oblast; Kaluga; Ulan-Ude; Volgograd; Nizhnekamsk, Tatarstan; Stavropol; Nakhodka, Primorsky Krai; and Khabarovsk.[70] Russian sources claimed that many of the attackers corresponded with “curators” who claimed to be Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers, who directed the arsonists to attack the military registration and enlistment offices.[71] The “curators” reportedly claimed that scammers stole the arsonists’ money and stored the funds in the military registration and enlistment offices, and Russian sources claimed that the “curators” targeted elderly Russian civilians.

The Russian government will provide legal combat veteran status to private military company (PMC) personnel who fought in Ukraine in a significant victory for pro-Wagner Group voices. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed resolutions on August 1 clarifying rules on issuing combat veteran status to fighters contracted with organizations assisting the Russian military, including PMCs, who fought in occupied Donbas since February 24, 2022, and occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts since September 30, 2022.[72] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has long advocated for legal combat veteran status and other Russian government benefits for PMC personnel already afforded to conventional Russian military personnel, and this provision is notable following Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion.[73]

The Russian MoD reportedly continues recruitment efforts in penal colonies as part of crypto-mobilization efforts. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported that the MoD recruited 30 women from the IK-7 penal colony in Lipetsk Oblast under two-year contracts to perform unspecified tasks.[74]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian President Vladimir Putin pushed the Kremlin narrative of “Novorossiya” and announced Russian government initiatives to provide books to occupied territories of Ukraine on August 2. Putin began a videoconference with Russian government officials on August 2 by discussing the integration of Russian occupied territories in Ukraine into the “all-Russian cultural space” as “the primordially Russian lands of the Donbas and Novorossiya returned home to their native [land].”[75] Putin announced that the Russian government will print and deliver more than 2.5 million books from a government-approved list to libraries and schools in occupied territories of Ukraine.[76] The President’s Reserve Fund will finance the program and the Presidential Administration will oversee its implementation.[77]

Russian authorities are using public goods and services to further force passportization efforts in occupied territories of Ukraine. Russian Minister of Digital Development Mikhail Shadayev announced on August 2 that citizens in Russia and in Russian occupied territories in Ukraine will be able to access digital books through a smartphone application after registering their Russian passport with a public library.[78] This program requires citizens to obtain Russian passports and register with local authorities in order to receive certain public goods and services and is an iteration of previous seemingly-innocuous measures in which Russian authorities have required Ukrainian citizens to register and interact with government entities in order to receive social benefits or official Russian documents.[79] These regulations enable Russian authorities to increase their control over occupied territories in Ukraine.

Russian authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate and strengthen control over the youth population in Russia and in occupied territories of Ukraine. Russian Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov announced that the Russian government has recently updated the history textbooks for 11th grade students in Russia and in occupied territories in Ukraine to cover more contemporary topics such as the “reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol,” “the 2014 coup d'état in Ukraine,” and “the causes and course of the ‘special military operation’” in Ukraine.[80]

Russian authorities continue to deport or threaten to deport Ukrainian citizens to Russian territory. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian authorities in occupied territories in Kherson Oblast are threatening Ukrainian citizens with deportation to Russia if they do not obtain Russian passports.[81] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 2 that Russian authorities in occupied territories of Ukraine have plans to relocate 10,000 Ukrainian children to camps in Russia.[82] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that deported Ukrainian children are often victims of crimes in these camps, highlighting a camp in Anapa, Krasnodar Krai where Ukrainian children have faced sexual assault.[83] These reports of abuse parallel previous reports on the mistreatment of deported Ukrainian children in state-sponsored orphanages in Crimea.[84] ISW has previously reported on numerous instances of Russian occupation officials deporting Ukrainian children to Russia.[85]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

14. Davis-Monthan selected as the preferred location to host special operations command

I think this is what caused some confusion. I do not think AFSOC is moving from Hurlburt. A new organization is being activited at Davis Monthan.

Davis-Monthan selected as the preferred location to host special operations command

Process will include relocations from other bases to the Tucson base

kgun9.com · by By: Dave Ord · August 3, 2023

TUCSON, Ariz. (KGUN) — Davis-Monthan Air Force Base has been selected by the Department of the Air Force as the preferred location to host its special operations command's third power projection wing, according to an Air Force news release.

Standing up the new wing at Davis-Monthan requires several relocations, planned throughout the next five years. The final decision will be made following completion of the environmental impact analysis process.

Some of the planned transition actions include:

The 47th Fighter Squadron (24 A-10s), the 354th Fighter Squadron (26 A-10s) and the 357th Fighter Squadron (28 A-10s) at Davis-Monthan will inactivate and their respective A-10s will be retired. The 47th FS and 357th FS will continue A-10 formal training until inactivation.
The 492nd SOW at Hurlburt Field, Florida, will relocate to Davis-Monthan.
The U-28 Draco fleets at Cannon AFB, New Mexico, and Hurlburt Field will be replaced by the OA-1K Armed Overwatch aircraft. As part of the 492nd SOW’s transition to a power projection wing, one OA-1K Armed Overwatch squadron will relocate from Hurlburt Field to Davis-Monthan.
An MC-130J Commando II squadron will relocate from Cannon AFB to Davis-Monthan to join the 492nd SOW.
An additional MC-130J squadron will activate at Davis-Monthan.
The 21st Special Tactics Squadron will relocate from Pope Army Airfield, North Carolina, to Davis-Monthan.
The 22nd Special Tactics Squadron will relocate from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, to Davis-Monthan.
The 492nd Theater Air Operations Squadron will activate at Duke Field and transfer to Davis- Monthan.
The 34th Weapons Squadron and the 88th Test and Evaluation Squadron will relocate from Nellis AFB, Nevada, to Davis-Monthan, transferring five HH-60W Jolly Green IIs.

----

STAY IN TOUCH WITH US ANYTIME, ANYWHERE

kgun9.com · by By: Dave Ord · August 3, 2023

15. China's Strategy of Political Warfare

The 145 page report can be downloaded here: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-08/230802_Jones_CompetingwithoutFighting.pdf?VersionId=Zb5B2Le0lf0kk7.QH7E0meA9phGqQEZf

China's Strategy of Political Warfare

Report by Seth G. Jones , Emily Harding , Catrina Doxsee , Jake Harrington , and Riley McCabe

Published August 2, 2023

csis.org

Photo: CSIS

Available Downloads

Audio Brief

A short, spoken-word summary from CSIS’s Seth Jones on his report with Emily Harding, Catrina Doxsee, Jake Harrington, and Riley McCabe, Competing without Fighting: China’s Strategy of Political Warfare.

Audio file

China is conducting an unprecedented campaign below the threshold of armed conflict to expand the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and weaken the United States and its partners. This campaign involves sophisticated Chinese espionage activities, offensive cyber operations, disinformation on social media platforms, economic coercion, and influence operations targeting companies, universities, and other organizations. The scale of China’s actions in the United States is unparalleled. This report offers one of the most comprehensive analyses to date of Chinese political warfare activities and examines China’s main actions, primary goals, and options for the United States and its partners.

This report is made possible by generous support from the Diana Davis Spencer Foundation.

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Seth G. Jones

Senior Vice President; Harold Brown Chair; and Director, International Security Program

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Emily Harding

Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, International Security Program

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Catrina Doxsee

Associate Director and Associate Fellow, Transnational Threats Project

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Jake Harrington

Former Intelligence Fellow, International Security Program

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Riley McCabe

Program Coordinator and Research Assistant, Transnational Threats Project

Programs & Projects

Center for Strategic and International Studies

1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

Tel: 202.887.0200

Fax: 202.775.3199

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16. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 3, 2023

CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, AUGUST 3, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-3-2023

Aug 3, 2023 - Press ISW

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 3, 2023

Author: Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War

Data Cutoff: August 1 at 11:59pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Mao Ning’s condemnation of imperial era Japanese military aggression indicates that the CPP aims to portray itself as a pan-Asian leader to legitimize its military buildup.
The purge of People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) leadership indicates that Xi Jinping needs to reestablish confidence in portions of the military leadership.
The Ministry of State Security (MSS) called for the masses to participate in counter-espionage work, which may lead to the new expansion of the CCP’s online security apparatus.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

The Republic of China (Taiwan) Vice President and Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te is scheduled to transit through the United States in mid-August. ISW will produce a forthcoming forecast for CCP responses to this transit.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Mao Ning’s condemnation of imperial era Japanese military aggression indicates that the party aims to portray itself as a pan-Asian leader to legitimize its military buildup. Mao cited the history of “Japanese militaristic aggression” and increases in the Japanese defense budget in order to justify her condemnation of the 2023 Defense of Japan White Paper. The annual paper outlines Japan’s defense priorities for the coming year. It specifically mentioned Chinese military modernization as well as the CCP unilaterally changing the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas as threats to regional order.[1] Mao urged Japan to change course to “win the trust of its Asian neighbors.”[2] Her comments draw on the historical memory of the imperial Japanese past of the 1930s and 1940s in order to portray Japan as a threat to all of Asia and undermine Japan’s role as a regional leader. On July 3, CCP Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi accused Japan of needing to know “where our roots lie” while stating that “no matter how blonde you dye your hair, how sharp you shape your nose, you can never become European or American, you can never become a Westerner.”[3] His comments portray Japan as subservient to Western powers and abandoning their Asian roots. Wang laying claim to Pan-Asianism demonstrates that the CCP aims to win the trust of its Asian neighbors by justifying its military buildup to protect Asia against foreign powers, such as Japan and the United States. This CCP rhetoric supports the party’s internal narrative that China is righteous in throwing off foreign domination, which in this case it views as the United States-led security architecture. Pan-Asian narratives also allow the party to argue it promotes “win-win cooperation” across the region rather than what it portrays as ongoing United States hegemony and imperialism.[4]

The purge of People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) leadership indicates that Xi Jinping needs to reestablish confidence in portions of the military leadership. The anti-corruption purge included the PLARF leader Li Yuchao as well as his deputies Zhang Zhenzhong and Liu Guangbin.[5] Xi promoted General Wang Houbin to become the new PLARF leader. Xi also promoted General Xu Xisheng to become the new PLARF political commissar.[6] Wang and Xu have service experience in the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, respectively, but not the PLARF before this posting. The Financial Times cited an unnamed foreign government official as stating that the trigger for the purge was foreigners gaining an overall better understanding of the PLARF and the CCP suspicion that PLARF leadership divulged secrets.[7] The choice to promote from outside of the PLARF indicates that Xi lacks confidence in the lower echelon of PLARF general officers, who could have internal patronage networks pertaining to the past leadership. This purge fits into Xi’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign targeting economically and ideologically corrupt officials that began when he entered office in 2012.

Xi stated in late July that he aimed to strengthen military governance by ensuring party control over the military, indicating he thinks that the PLA is still not sufficiently ideologically loyal to the party.[8] He explicitly repeated this message and the need for the PLA to reject corruption on August 1, the 96th anniversary of the PLA.[9] This purge demonstrates to a new generation of PLA general officers that anti-corruption is still a top priority for Xi and an active tool to ensure their loyalty to the party.

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) called for the masses to participate in counter-espionage work, which may lead to the new expansion of the party’s online security apparatus. The MSS called for the normalization of the masses in participating in counter-espionage work on August 1 via creating and posting its first publicly available WeChat message, which state media also repeated.[10] This demonstrates the MSS’s aim to communicate directly to the Chinese people as WeChat is a dominant communication platform in the PRC. ISW previously assessed that the anti-espionage law could include the participation of individual citizens to serve societal policing functions either in an online or in person capacity via anonymous reporting systems.[11] The MSS has confirmed this assessment by unveiling an anonymous reporting system for users in Chinese and English, indicating that the party aims to coopt both PRC and foreign nationals in their new counter espionage drive.[12] The anonymous reporting system and opening of an MSS WeChat account indicate that the party aims to expand its influence on individual user behavior to enforce state sanctioned norms.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

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The West Attacked Russia’s Economy. The Result Is Another Stalemate.

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By Frederick W. Kagan , Karolina Hird and Kateryna Stepanenko

Russia’s Problems

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Prospects

Recommendations

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 2, 2023

Davis-Monthan selected as the preferred location to host special operations command

China's Strategy of Political Warfare

Table of Contents

Available Downloads

Seth G. Jones

Emily Harding

Catrina Doxsee

Jake Harrington

Riley McCabe

Programs & Projects

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CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, AUGUST 3, 2023