Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Even in former days Korea was known as the hermit kingdom for its stubborn resistance to outsiders, and if you wanted to create a totally isolated and hermetic society, northern Korea in the years after the 1953 'armistice' would have been the place to start. It was bounded on two sides by the sea, and to the south by the impregnable and uncrossable DMZ, which divided it from South Korea. Its northern frontier consisted of a long stretch of China and a short stretch of Siberia; in other words its only continuous neighbors were Mao and Stalin. (The next nearest neighbor was Japan, historic enemy of the Koreans, and cruel colonial occupier until 1945.) Add to that the fact that almost every work of man had been reduced to shards by the Korean War. Air Force general Curtis Lemay later boasted that 'we burned down every town in North Korea,' and that he grounded his bombers only when there were no more targets to hit anywhere north of the 38th parallel. Pyongyang was an ashen moonscape. It was Year Zero. Kim Il Sung could create a laboratory, with controlled conditions, where he alone would be the engineer of the human soul."

- Christopher Hitchens.

"I must study politics and war that my son may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy."

- John Adams

"It is change, continuing change, inevitable change, that is the dominant factor in society today. No sensible decision can be made any longer without taking into account not only the world as it is, but the world as it will be.... This, in turn, means that our statesmen, our businessmen, our everyman must take on a science fictional way of thinking."

- Isaac Asimov

1. The Phony Korean ‘Peace’ Movement

2.Rival Koreas mark armistice anniversary in two different ways that highlight rising tensions

3. Why America Forgets—and China Remembers—the Korean War

4. Travis King: How the US negotiates with North Korea

5. North Korea reopens hot spring resort, but only the rich and connected benefit

6. Interview About Conditions Inside North Korea Pt.1 -Is it true that people have died of starvation?-Pt.2 -What people think about the satellite launch?

7. North Korea’s depleted coffers are filling up again thanks to Russia

8. South Korean POWs still held in NK, 70 years after armistice

9. This year's monsoon season ends after 3rd-heaviest rainfall on record

10. Defense chiefs of N. Korea, Russia hold talks in Pyongyang: TASS

11. N.K. leader pays respects to fallen soldiers ahead of Korean War armistice anniv.

12. Remains of 7 S. Korean troops killed during Korean War return home

13. Wang’s return good sign for S. Korea-China ties: experts

14. Veterans ministry highlights collective efforts for global peace with 22 countries

15. Seoul may have 1.5 years to take advantage of NCG: ex-national security adviser

1. The Phony Korean ‘Peace’ Movement

Thank you Ji Seong Ho. A voice of reason.

The Phony Korean ‘Peace’ Movement

Its leader, Christine Ahn, wants the U.S. troops out of the Peninsula and the Pacific—even Hawaii.

By Ji Seong-ho

July 25, 2023 6:25 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-phony-korean-peace-movement-women-cross-dmz-human-rights-ahn-73d74222?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

The demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea, July 19, 2022. PHOTO: KIM HONG-JI/REUTERS

Seoul

A coalition of self-styled peace groups are planning a “National Mobilization to End the Korean War” in Washington this week—a conference, a rally and lobbying meetings with my counterparts in the U.S. House and Senate. Some lawmakers are already on board: Rep. Brad Sherman’s Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act has drawn 33 co-sponsors.

The effort is a deception. Both the mobilization and the legislation promote the North’s demand that the U.S. sign an unconditional peace agreement. Pro-Pyongyang groups are parroting the regime’s “hostile policy” refrain—that tensions on the Korean Peninsula result from U.S.-South Korean military exercises, the presence of U.S. troops in Korea, and U.S. economic sanctions.

This issue is personal for me. I was born in North Korea in 1982. In 1996 my family and I were close to death from starvation. To survive, I had to scavenge bits of coal from freight trains, which I would sell to buy food on the black market. When I passed out from hunger on the railroad tracks, a train ran over me and almost totally severed my left leg and arm, which both had to be amputated without anesthesia or antibiotics.

In 2006 I fled on crutches and traveled thousands of miles across China and Southeast Asia before reaching South Korea. I defected and in 2020 was elected to the National Assembly.

As I made my way to freedom, I couldn’t have imagined that in South Korea and the U.S. there are people and organizations who favor the North Korean regime. Their long-term goal is the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. That would likely lead to Korean reunification on Kim Jong Un’s terms.

One of the main organizers of this week’s mobilization, Christine Ahn of Women Cross DMZ—whose advisory board includes celebrities such as Abigail Disney, Gloria Steinem and Alice Walker—has said that she is “trying to liberate Korea” from “the yoke of U.S. imperialism” and that America is “the world’s aggressor and empire.” She also urges the removal of all U.S. military bases and forces from the Asia-Pacific region—even Hawaii, which she describes as “occupied territory.”

Ms. Ahn has opposed North Korea-related human-rights legislation in the U.S. and South Korea. Women Cross DMZ’s policy statements seem to blame all of the world’s problems on American “imperialism” and Israeli “apartheid.” Its statements condemn sanctions against North Korea, Iran, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

As one who escaped the dystopian nightmare state that is North Korea and is now blessed to live in freedom, I have an obligation to warn my American friends. South Korea has lived securely for 70 years thanks to the alliance with the U.S. and the stabilizing presence of its troops, which the vast majority of Koreans support. Americans shouldn’t grant legitimacy to pro-Pyongyang extremists who regard the U.S. as a force for evil.

Mr. Ji is a member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

WSJ Opinion: The Debate Over the House Defense Bill

Rival Koreas mark armistice anniversary in two different ways that highlight rising tensions

AP · July 26, 2023

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — The truce that stopped the bloodshed in the Korean War turns 70 years old on Thursday and the two Koreas are marking the anniversary in starkly different ways, underscoring their deepening nuclear tensions.

North Korea has invited delegations from China and Russia as it prepares to stage huge celebrations with thousands of citizens who have rehearsed for months to commemorate the armistice it sees as a victory in the “Grand Fatherland Liberation War.” The festivities are likely to be capped by a giant military parade in the capital, Pyongyang, where leader Kim Jong Un could showcase his most powerful, nuclear-capable missiles designed to target neighboring rivals and the U.S. mainland.

The mood is more somber in South Korea, where President Yoon Suk Yeol has invited dozens of foreign war veterans to honor the fallen soldiers of the 1950-53 conflict, which killed and injured millions and set the stage for decades of animosity among the Koreas and the United States.

Yoon, a conservative condemned by Pyongyang as a “traitor,” will likely use this week’s events to highlight the North’s growing threat and double down on his goals of strengthening the South’s defense and its alliance with the U.S.

Tensions between the rivals are at their highest point in years, as the pace of North Korean missile tests and U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises has intensified in a tit-for-tat cycle. The dueling military activities have been punctuated by verbal threats, including North Korean talk of preemptive nuclear strikes and U.S. vows to “end” Kim’s regime in the event of such an attack.

The frictions provide a renewed reminder that the armistice has left the Korean Peninsula in a technical state of war. Through their 70 years of diplomatic ups and downs, the Koreas have consistently seen each other as existential threats, which is essentially why the armistice was never replaced by a peace treaty as originally intended.

Managing tensions is now more complicated than ever as Kim continues to reject dialogue with the U.S. while aggressively expanding a nuclear arsenal he sees as his strongest guarantee of survival.

Kim is also pushing for deeper cooperation with authoritarian allies China and Russia, which are locked in their own confrontations with Washington over regional influence and the war in Ukraine, as he aims to counter U.S. efforts to tighten trilateral security cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo.

North Korean state media on Wednesday highlighted the arrival of a Russian delegation led by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was greeted at Pyongyang’s airport by senior North Korean officials including Defense Minister Kang Sun Nam. China’s ruling Communist Party is also sending a mid-level official, Li Hongzhong, in hopes of further facilitating bilateral exchanges.

For Kim, bringing Shoigu and Li to his balcony at Pyongyang’s main square to watch a massive parade featuring goose-stepping soldiers, tanks and missiles would be the biggest accomplishment he could show to his domestic audience for the anniversary, said Park Won Gon, a professor at Seoul’s Ewha University.

Kim already displayed his most powerful missiles during a previous parade in February and there might not be meaningful new hardware to show after the North failed in its first attempt to launch a military spy satellite into orbit in May. Economic achievements have been scarce after pandemic-related border closures decimated an economy already crippled by decades of mismanagement and U.S.-led sanctions over Kim’s nuclear ambitions.

Park said the invitations of the Chinese and Russian delegations could also reflect Kim’s unease about the strengthening security cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea, which have included larger joint military exercises, increased deployments of strategic U.S. military assets and new rounds of nuclear contingency planning meetings.

Thursday’s anniversary comes after North Korea conducted three separate rounds of ballistic and cruise missile firings since last week, apparently to protest the U.S. sending major naval assets to the South in a show of force. They include the USS Kentucky, which last week became the first U.S. nuclear-armed submarine to dock in South Korea since the 1980s.

“The strengthening of nuclear deterrence strategies between South Korea, the United States and Japan and military moves like the docking of the ballistic-missile submarine (in South Korea) are a huge burden and threat for North Korea,” Park said. “Since North Korea has limited ability to deal with these moves on its own, emphasizing cooperation with Moscow and Beijing for a combined response would be important (for Kim).”

Moscow and Beijing have already thwarted U.S.-led efforts since last year to strengthen U.N. Security Council sanctions on Pyongyang over its intensified missile testing activity, underscoring a divide between the council’s permanent members deepened over Russia’s war on Ukraine.

When asked about the visits, U.S. State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel urged Beijing and Moscow to play a more constructive role in defusing tensions and to bring Pyongyang back to dialogue.

The Korean War was triggered by a North Korean sneak attack on the South. The North was backed by forces from the newly created People’s Republic of China, which was aided by the then-Soviet air force. South Korea, the U.S. and troops from various countries under the direction of the United Nations fought to push back the invasion.

For South Koreans, the major outcome of the 1953 armistice was the subsequent signing of the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, which was mainly aimed at calming South Korean security jitters about the truce and continues to serve as the foundation for the countries’ military alliance. Facing growing nuclear threats, Yoon is now seeking stronger U.S. assurances that it would swiftly and decisively use its nuclear weapons to defend the South in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack.

Thousands of people are expected to attend an armistice ceremony Thursday in South Korea’s southern port city of Busan, which is the location of a cemetery honoring the U.N. soldiers killed during the war.

While there have been several skirmishes between the Koreas along their border in past years, the armistice has prevented a return to large-scale hostilities. A recent border incident involving an American soldier who bolted into the North through the truce village of Panmunjom — named after a town where the armistice was signed — has highlighted how the agreement could serve as a safety valve when relations are strained.

The U.S.-led U.N. Command, which was created to fight the war and then remained in the South to supervise the armistice’s implementation, says it is using the armistice’s communications mechanisms to negotiate the release of Pvt. Travis King. It’s likely referring to the so-called pink phone, a telephone line between the command and the North Korean People’s Army at Panmunjom.

“Despite innumerable provocations, challenges, misunderstandings and even deaths that resulted since the signing of the armistice agreement, it has in general withstood the test of 70 years,” Andrew Harrison, a British lieutenant general who is the deputy commander at the U.N. Command, said during a news conference Monday.

AP · July 26, 2023

3. Why America Forgets—and China Remembers—the Korean War

Excerpts:

The United States forgot the Korean War because its outcome was unsatisfactory—even shameful, in the eyes of some Americans. Meanwhile, despite some grim realities in its performance in the conflict, China has found the war to be a source of inspiration.

This aggressive revisionism is not limited to elite proclamations. In 2021, The Battle at Lake Changjin, a film retelling the fighting around the Chosin Reservoir, became the highest-grossing Chinese movie in history. Commissioned for the party’s centenary celebrations by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, the movie makes for surreal viewing, suggesting that the Korean War began with MacArthur’s invasion at Inchon. Mao Zedong, portrayed as a fatherly warrior-saint, deploys legions of strapping peasant boys to repel sinister hordes of capitalist warlords from the Chinese periphery. Mentions of the Soviet Union, and even more strikingly, Koreans are in short supply.

The United States must not practice its own form of fictionalization by forgetting or misinterpreting the Korean War’s lessons—particularly because China’s active, albeit highly distorted, revival of the war’s memory should be taken as an indication of its belligerent present-day intent. Anniversary speeches such as Xi’s and movies such as The Battle at LakeChangjin are themselves a form of preparation for war. Taken in combination with explicit statements by Xi that his generals must be ready to “dare to fight” and evidence that the Chinese have already begun to fight for Taiwan in the information and cyber domains, there can be little doubt about what is coming if Washington does not urgently commit to applying the Korean War's lessons, properly understood.

In its last war with China, Washington failed to deter its adversaries, failed to prepare its military, and prolonged the fighting, ultimately accepting outcomes in 1953 that would probably have been available in 1951 had it adequately projected its own resolve. The next time, the stakes will be even higher—and Washington must do better.

Why America Forgets—and China Remembers—the Korean War

The CCP’s Dangerous Historical Distortions and the Struggle Over Taiwan

By Mike Gallagher and Aaron MacLean

July 26, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Mike Gallagher and Aaron MacLean · July 26, 2023

Seventy years ago this week, the armistice that froze the Korean War was signed. During a year of savage battlefield maneuvering and two more of bitter stalemate, nearly 40,000 American troops gave their lives. Several thousand more allied troops also died, as did millions of Koreans, many of them heroically in combat against communist aggression, and even more as its civilian victims. The southern half of the Korean peninsula, now a thriving democracy, took decades to recover. The northern half never has, remaining impoverished, oppressed, and a source of instability.

The median age of surviving U.S. Korean War veterans is around 90. Recognition of their service has been unforgivably muted despite their valor in some of the most grueling combat American troops have ever faced. But the more general U.S. lack of interest in the war’s strategic lessons is also remarkable—and dangerous.

In China, by contrast, the “War to Resist America and Aid Korea,” as it is officially known, has never been forgotten. And in recent years, the Chinese Communist Party has been aggressively seeking to revive the public’s interest in an idealized version of it. In March, an essay in the CCP’s top theoretical journal praised how the Chinese army “defeated the world’s No. 1 enemy armed to the teeth on the Korean battlefield and performed mighty and majestic battle dramas that shocked the world and caused ghosts and gods to weep.”

In a disturbing 2020 speech commemorating the anniversary of China’s entry into the war, Chinese leader Xi Jinping made it clear that its legacy is central to his dark vision of China’s role in the world. Claiming that Beijing’s intervention began when “a war started by the imperialist aggressors reached China’s door,” Xi drew lessons for the present. In the Korean War, he said, China resolved to send those “aggressors” “a message they will understand.” Today, such aggressors can be reminded that “with an iron will,” China “wrote an earth-shaking epic defeating an enemy rich in steel but weak in will.”

In the view of the CCP, from 1950 to 1953, an immensely weak China, reeling from its own recently concluded civil war, fought the titanic power of the United States and its Western allies to a standstill, establishing that Beijing’s strategic demands could not be ignored. For the party, this conviction remains unshakable, even though the truth is that Communist aggression triggered the war and the performance of Chinese troops, hundreds of thousands of whom died, was vastly worse than CCP propaganda suggests.

In the light of China’s aggressions today, the United States must understand how China is using the Korean War’s legacy as a form of political preparation for wars to come. At the same time, there must be an honest reckoning with why the United States has buried its memories of the conflict for so long.

The Korean War is ambiguously sandwiched in the U.S. public consciousness between memories of victory in World War II and perceptions of tragedy in Vietnam. An elite consensus has settled on approval of President Harry Truman’s leadership during the Korean War, particularly his focus on preventing escalation. At the time, however, Americans took a dimmer view of Truman’s handling of the conflict, which opened with shocking military setbacks and continued for two years of self-imposed, costly stalemate before ending in a frustrating armistice. Americans have long struggled to interpret, let alone celebrate, this brutal but limited action fought in a secondary theater, coming so soon after victory and ending in a tie. But the American tendency to forget the truth and the Chinese eagerness to remember a complicated mix of fact and fiction offer their own lessons, which are especially relevant in view of potential for war over Taiwan.

UNREADY, UNSTEADY

The first lesson is that Washington must not neglect deterrence and readiness. The Korean War was almost lost as a consequence of the Truman administration’s failures on both fronts. By the late 1940s, America’s security establishment was committed to facing the challenge presented by Soviet power—but deeply divided about what doing so would require and what, precisely, should be defended. In January 1950, five months before North Korea invaded its southern neighbor, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech on U.S. policy in Asia at the National Press Club. When he listed the countries included within the U.S. “defensive perimeter” in the region, he conspicuously excluded South Korea, even though it was occupied by American troops until the middle of 1949.

It is not quite right to say, as Acheson’s political opponents later did, that this omission was the blunder that invited the North’s invasion. In truth, Acheson’s full remarks were a fair, if ambiguously worded, characterization of the Truman administration’s Korea policy. Acheson suggested that Washington’s “direct responsibility” for South Korea had ended. He implied that like any other sovereign country, South Korea would now need to rely on itself in the event of an attack, and failing that, to rely on “the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.” If anyone had bothered to ask who might do the fighting on behalf of the civilized world and the United Nations, the essential incoherence of the administration’s policy would have been swiftly revealed.

Acheson’s remarks were reviewed carefully in the Kremlin. The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was looking for opportunities to probe American resolve beyond the Cold War’s main European theater, and two weeks after Acheson spoke, he gave the North Korean ruler Kim Il Sung permission to invade. Together, the two despots wagered that the United States would not fight for the South, a wager that many American leaders would also have placed before the invasion began.

A Communist invasion in Asia coming on the heels of the CCP’s takeover of China was covered with shock and drama by the American media, and U.S. public opinion coalesced swiftly in support of intervention. A poorly timed Soviet boycott of the UN Security Council permitted that body to officially condemn the invasion, and Truman decided that U.S. intervention, described as a “police action,” would proceed under the UN banner.

The first lesson of the Korean War is that Washington must not neglect deterrence and readiness.

Washington, however, was unprepared to fight. The Truman administration’s tragic diplomatic shortsightedness was compounded by the deterioration of the U.S. military’s capabilities. From an admittedly unsustainable peak of over 12 million in 1945, the number of active U.S. troops had plummeted by nearly 90 percent; there were far too few to man the distant ramparts against the Soviet empire and its allies. Defense spending had similarly withered, dropping from 40 percent of GDP in 1945 to roughly 5 percent in 1950. The quality of the active force’s equipment and its training and fighting culture had also degraded in ways difficult to quantify but ably documented in histories of the period. The result was that when the United States responded to the Communist offensive by sending ground troops to the peninsula, large U.S. formations were frequently defeated and sometimes annihilated by Soviet-trained North Korean units and, later, Chinese “volunteers.”

Such outcomes were shocking then, and they should focus our attention now. In terms of both strategic deterrence and military readiness, contemporary U.S. policy has alarming parallels with 1950. From its recent peak of 4.5 percent of GDP in 2010, U.S. defense spending has fallen to 3.1 percent of GDP and is still shrinking. A manpower crisis threatens the all-volunteer force; the Army missed its 2022 recruiting goal by a shocking 25 percent, compelling changes in its force structure.

Washington’s official stance on defending Taiwan, forged in the 1950s, remains one of “strategic ambiguity.” But today, the ambiguity often seems distinctly less than strategic: President Joe Biden has repeatedly stated that the United States will use force to defend Taiwan, only to see his own staff intervene to soften his remarks. Meanwhile, the United States has failed to make sufficient military investments, especially in short-range and intermediate-range missiles, that would render a defense of the island more plausible. As in 1950, the United States seems to be tempting a tyrant in Beijing who harbors imperial ambitious to try his luck.

BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS, POLITICAL FAILURE

Following the near-disaster in the summer of 1950, troops under U.S. General Douglas MacArthur’s command made dramatic progress into the North. That, however, led to a Chinese intervention that MacArthur initially failed to detect and that brutally drove UN forces south again. Throughout these terrible surprises and setbacks, greater portions of the U.S. military machine were brought gradually to bear, with the result that by the summer of 1951, military prospects for Communist forces on the peninsula had grown bleak.

The momentum generated by the Chinese intervention had been reversed, and under the inspired leadership of U.S. General Matthew Ridgway, UN forces again went on the offensive, backed by enormous economic resources and tremendous American military might in the air and at sea. Conditions for Chinese and North Korean troops steadily deteriorated, obviating their advantage in manpower and ability to absorb shocking human losses. Meanwhile, in June 1951, the Truman administration, still rattled by its early battlefield losses and under significant international pressure, announced its desire for a cease-fire.

Given these circumstances, why did the war last another two years? The answer reveals a second valuable lesson: politics and combat are deeply intertwined. Today, as then, U.S. adversaries enjoy a much more sophisticated grasp of the interplay between battlefield maneuvering and political warfare than their American counterparts do. For the CCP, in particular, there is no dichotomy between peace and war.

Following expressions of support by the UN and the Truman administration for a cease-fire along the 38th parallel, the latitude line at which U.S. military planners chose to divide North and South Korea after World War II, Ridgway proposed that cease-fire talks take place at sea. The enemy agreed but insisted that the talks occur on land at Kaesong, one of the few places where Communist forces remained south of the 38th parallel. This forced the UN delegation to approach the site of the talks displaying white flags.

These delegates thought they were attending the first session of negotiations ultimately intended to achieve peace. They were slow to understand that the Communist delegation had entirely different objectives in mind. Communist negotiators refused even to agree to an agenda, furiously denounced the UN delegation’s use of the term “communist,” and insisted that UN forces withdraw further south.

The Western cannot accept that opponents of the United States do not think the way Americans do.

The themes of this embarrassing episode were recapitulated throughout two more tortuous years of talks. As T. R. Fehrenbach, a historian of the period, put it, Communist forces had succeeded in transferring the war from the battlefield, where they were losing, to the negotiating table, where they might still achieve something.

Having regained the advantage, Communist leaders would not soon relinquish it. They exploited the pause in the UN counteroffensive, which the UN had unilaterally offered in good faith with the commencement of talks, to dig deep into the earth around their own frontline. This action shielded their frontline formations from American airpower and rendered further major UN advances north—for example, to a naturally defensible line between Pyongyang and Wonsan—significantly more difficult.

Having consolidated their position on the battlefield, Communist negotiators declared in August that their UN interlocutors were acting in bad faith and broke off talks; negotiations did not resume until October. Thereafter, one outrageous pretext after the next was deployed to obstruct progress, take advantage of the UN’s naiveté, and humiliate the UN in the court of global opinion, especially regarding the issue of prisoners of war.

The UN sought to treat Communist prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Communist captors treated UN prisoners of war with remarkable cruelty, and approximately 40 percent of American POWs died in captivity. Meanwhile, according to surveys conducted in UN POW camps, many of the enemy prisoners held in the south expressed an understandable desire not to be repatriated to North Korea or China. But the Communists orchestrated a series of sophisticated gambits, integrating revolts by organized party cadres in the camps with positions taken at the negotiating table, to project an alternate reality. Many in the press and in foreign ministries around the world took it as a fact that the UN was mistreating POWs and preventing their longed-for repatriation. This would be the principal issue on which negotiations foundered, as Communist negotiators insisted until 1953 that the UN repatriate all of the prisoners it held.

Again, the parallels between the 1950s and today are clear. There is something innocent and irrepressible in the Western inability to accept that opponents of the United States do not think the way Americans do, and particularly that the CCP sees no shame in twisting the truth to advance its ambitions. Recently, after the COVID-19 pandemic began, international authorities rushed to assist China and to investigate the source of the outbreak in a spirit of genuine concern. In stark contrast, the CCP closed off all cooperation, destroyed evidence, caused key personnel to disappear, and mounted a campaign to claim that the virus originated in a U.S. military lab in Maryland. Political warfare is a constant for the CCP. The United States and the international order that it backs are still its targets today, even without a hot war.

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

The Korean War dragged on through 159 plenary sessions of talks and two long years of additional violence. There is a tendency in later commentary to forgive the Truman administration for these stalemate years on the ground that the president also managed to prevent the war from escalating. In April 1951, Truman relieved MacArthur of his command in Korea. This event now forms a central episode in positive accounts of Truman’s leadership of the war: a plain-mannered Cold War liberal devoted to containing the conflict and preserving alliances staring down a megalomaniacal right-wing general who told Truman first that the Chinese would not intervene and then argued for expanding the war by attacking China directly, including with nuclear weapons.

There is truth to this characterization. But beneath its tone of self-congratulation, this consensus account underrates the costs of prolonging the war and overrates the risk of escalation that existed in 1951. Absolving the Truman administration of blame for the war’s stalemate phase tends to assume that there were only two options available to decision-makers in the first half of 1951: what actually happened, or World War III. It also loses sight of how, in the face of the enemy’s intransigence, the United States’ lack of diplomatic sophistication combined with its self-imposed military restraint allowed many thousands more to die, only to achieve worse outcomes than were available in 1951. The consequences for the Korean peninsula and the growth of CCP power continue to resonate today.

To be clear, relieving MacArthur of his command was justified. If anything, Truman waited too long to do it after MacArthur failed to anticipate or even detect the Chinese intervention and then grew increasingly insubordinate, criticizing Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his communications with Congress. But reducing the Truman-MacArthur conflict to a ready-made morality tale obscures the more complicated policy debate that the two men were having. Between the extremes of Truman’s restraint and the possibility of global war, numerous options existed. Truman’s decision to renounce nuclear threats and to restrict combat operations to Korea and its airspace prolonged the war and, paradoxically, extended the period in which it could have escalated.

Excessive self-restraint can invite further aggression.

Truman’s restraint and the attitude of his successor, Dwight Eisenhower, make for a study in contrasts. Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 presidential election in no small part because of public disgust over the stalemate in Korea. Although Truman and his advisers mostly seemed to wish that the war wasn’t happening at all, as president-elect, Eisenhower traveled to the Korean peninsula and embraced the war’s challenges. From the outset of his tenure, he regularly contemplated and discussed the possibility of escalation, even approving the development of war plans that involved the use of nuclear weapons. In May 1953, U.S. Secretary of State John Dulles informed Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that the U.S. might escalate its tactics in Korea. By July, the Communists had signed the armistice.

What role Eisenhower’s willingness to raise the stakes played in the war’s end is still a subject of fierce debate among historians. Indeed, it remains unclear whether Nehru passed Dulles’s threat on to Stalin. And many other factors led to the armistice; most significantly, Stalin’s death in March 1953 removed the war’s true originator from the picture.

Nevertheless, when the Truman administration repeatedly offered olive branches and held back on the battlefield, the United States’ enemies redoubled their efforts. Eisenhower argued during his campaign that what Truman called a “police action” was in fact a necessary “crusade”; months after Eisenhower signaled that the party was about to come to an end one way or another, the armistice was concluded. Eisenhower would again exhibit this kind of determination during the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis, securing advance authorization from Congress to use military force, publicly stating that he was willing to use tactical nuclear weapons in a war with China, and surging military assets to the region. U.S. allies signaled their discomfort, as they surely would have in 1951 had Truman been more aggressive.

But the gambit in the strait succeeded. And Eisenhower was extremely meticulous when it came to alliance management. In 1957, he said his foreign policy vision was simple: “to wage the Cold War in a militant, but reasonable, style whereby we appeal to the people of the world as a better group to hang with than the Communists.” Today, as then, only the United States can mobilize the free world in order to prevent—and, if necessary, to win—a war.

Thus, a third lesson of the Korean War is that once fighting has broken out, excessive self-restraint can invite further aggression. Demonstrating a credible willingness to escalate and the capacity to dominate should such escalation be required can promote peace. To point out this paradox is not to express a desire for World War III, but to prescribe a course for its prevention.

DON’T FORGET THE ARMISTICE

The United States forgot the Korean War because its outcome was unsatisfactory—even shameful, in the eyes of some Americans. Meanwhile, despite some grim realities in its performance in the conflict, China has found the war to be a source of inspiration.

This aggressive revisionism is not limited to elite proclamations. In 2021, The Battle at Lake Changjin, a film retelling the fighting around the Chosin Reservoir, became the highest-grossing Chinese movie in history. Commissioned for the party’s centenary celebrations by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, the movie makes for surreal viewing, suggesting that the Korean War began with MacArthur’s invasion at Inchon. Mao Zedong, portrayed as a fatherly warrior-saint, deploys legions of strapping peasant boys to repel sinister hordes of capitalist warlords from the Chinese periphery. Mentions of the Soviet Union, and even more strikingly, Koreans are in short supply.

The United States must not practice its own form of fictionalization by forgetting or misinterpreting the Korean War’s lessons—particularly because China’s active, albeit highly distorted, revival of the war’s memory should be taken as an indication of its belligerent present-day intent. Anniversary speeches such as Xi’s and movies such as The Battle at LakeChangjin are themselves a form of preparation for war. Taken in combination with explicit statements by Xi that his generals must be ready to “dare to fight” and evidence that the Chinese have already begun to fight for Taiwan in the information and cyber domains, there can be little doubt about what is coming if Washington does not urgently commit to applying the Korean War's lessons, properly understood.

In its last war with China, Washington failed to deter its adversaries, failed to prepare its military, and prolonged the fighting, ultimately accepting outcomes in 1953 that would probably have been available in 1951 had it adequately projected its own resolve. The next time, the stakes will be even higher—and Washington must do better.

MIKE GALLAGHER is a Republican United States Representative from Wisconsin and Chairman of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.
AARON MACLEAN is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Foreign Affairs · by Mike Gallagher and Aaron MacLean · July 26, 2023

4. Travis King: How the US negotiates with North Korea

Travis King: How the US negotiates with North Korea

BBC · by Menu

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Image source, Reuters

Image caption,

Travis King, dressed in a black shirt and black cap, is seen on the tour before he crossed the border

By Chelsea Bailey

BBC News, Washington

A country with closed borders and few diplomatic channels... talking to North Korea is tricky at the best of times. Now the stakes are even higher with a young American soldier in their hands. How is the US going about securing his release?

The fate of Travis King, a US soldier who crossed into North Korea, remains unknown and experts say the US is at a critical stage to try and negotiate his return home.

The key challenge is America has never had an official diplomatic relationship with North Korea.

As a result, the US relies on a network of backchannels to negotiate the return of citizens detained in the country.

It is believed the 23-year-old soldier is being detained and questioned by North Korean authorities.

Pte 2nd Class King was last seen a week ago running across the demilitarised zone separating North and South Korea. Tensions have since escalated in the region, with North Korea firing two ballistic missiles into the sea late Monday after a US nuclear-powered submarine was stationed in the South.

"All sides are trying to understand what happened and what to do," said Mickey Bergman, executive director of the Richardson Center for Global Diplomacy.

Mr Bergman, who has spent nearly 20 years negotiating to return US citizens from hostile nations, said the best chance at releasing a prisoner is right after they are detained. This is when they are likely being interrogated by the country's officials but before they have been charged with a crime, like spying.

It was in that time before things became official that negotiators could best appeal to people's humanity, Mr Bergman said.

"I think there's a misconception about what negotiations are," he said.

"If we pound our chests, and flip tables, and demand that the evil North Koreans return our soldier, we are likely going to cause them to dig in."

Here is how the US has previously negotiated for an American citizen's return.

The New York Channel

Because the United States has never officially held diplomatic ties with North Korea, during a detainee crisis, Sweden has served as an intermediary from their embassy in Pyongyang and has helped to relay communications to North Korean officials.

But there are also backchannels. North Korea maintains a mission at the United Nations in New York. In times of crisis, the mission - dubbed the New York Channel - has become an avenue for officials for both countries to hold talks.

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,

Ambassador Robert King, pictured here in 2014, is the former special US envoy for North Korean human rights issues

For years, Robert King was one of the first people who received a call when an American was captured by North Korea. As the former special envoy for North Korean human rights at the US state department, the ambassador has helped negotiate for the release of multiple detainees including student Otto Warmbier and American missionary Kenneth Bae.

After 17 months in captivity, US college student Otto Warmbier was released from North Korean detention in 2017 in a comatose state. He returned to the United States with extensive brain damage and died days after reuniting with his family.

Otto Warmbier's death sparked international outrage and his family has levelled allegations of abuse and torture against the North Koreans.

After a brief period of diplomacy under the Trump administration, Mr King said renewed political tensions between the two countries often colour negotiations, making detainees a pawn in wider geopolitical fights.

"[The North Koreans] see this as, 'how do we use this opportunity to make the US look bad?' And whatever happens it's not going to be a happy outcome," Mr King said.

Fringe diplomacy

For nearly 20 years, Mr Bergman has worked alongside former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson to secure the release of prisoners from countries hostile to the United States.

Although the Richardson Center is not involved in the Travis King case, Mr Bergman said in his experience, when it came to North Korea, there was no playbook for negotiations.

Instead, he said, it is best to approach tense negotiations through what he calls "fringe diplomacy".

US non-profit-making organisations and humanitarian agencies have provided aid to North Koreans for decades. When official channels stall, these non-governmental backchannels are often called upon to negotiate on behalf of a detainee's family.

Image source, Reuters

An NGO's separation from the US government is a benefit, Mr Bergman said, because it allows negotiations to focus solely on the wellbeing and return of the detainee, instead of global politics.

"People can talk to us about policy issues but there's nothing we can do about that," he said. "We are much more able to insulate the issue and come up with pathways to resolve some of these situations."

Mr Bergman said the world often focuses on the moment of "intervention," when a political prisoner is rescued and returned home. But that moment, he said, is not possible without years of meaningful engagement.

"You have to build relationships so that when there is a crisis, you're not starting from scratch."

Complicating factors

But the Covid pandemic has made both of these avenues of negotiation more challenging.

North Korea completely closed its borders during the pandemic and Mr Bergman said it is unclear if the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang has returned to full capacity.

Complicating matters further, after a brief period of attempted diplomacy, the Trump administration imposed a travel ban to North Korea, rendering US passports and visas invalid.

The ban has remained in place under the Biden administration and has effectively ended humanitarian avenues for engagement, Mr Bergman said.

"North Korea is the only country in the world where there's a travel ban, that it's illegal for Americans to travel," he said. "The North Koreans see that as an insult."

Image source, Reuters

Image caption,

Otto Warmbier died days after returning to the US after his detention in North Korea

Mr Bergman, who was involved in the negotiations for Warmbier's release, said he believes the international blowback over Otto Warmbier's death has shifted the North Korean perspective on political detainees, and the country may be more amenable to compromise.

"After dealing with the Otto Warmbier negotiations, and the very tragic outcome, I believe that the North Koreans have chosen not play in the game of political prisoners anymore," he said.

But whether that means US army private Travis King will have a speedy release, remains to be seen, he said.

BBC · by Menu

5. North Korea reopens hot spring resort, but only the rich and connected benefit

Think about the Korean people in the north who are forced to sacrifice and suffer so Kim can not only develop nuclear weapons and missiles but also so that the elite can enjoy their lives. again, at the expense of the Korean people.

North Korea reopens hot spring resort, but only the rich and connected benefit

Admission is pricey and must be paid in foreign currency, making it a ‘pipe dream’ for most.

Reported by Son Hyemin and Park Jaewoo for RFA Korean

2023.07.25

rfa.org

Authorities in North Korea have reopened a lavish hot spring resort to the public that was shuttered for more than three years due to the coronavirus pandemic, according to residents of the secretive hermit kingdom.

The resort, located about a two-hour drive east of the capital Pyongyang in South Pyongan’s Yangdok county, boasts recreational facilities that include indoor and outdoor soaking pools as well as horseback riding parks, on a nearly 500-acre site.

“Yangdok Hot Springs Resort has been open since July 15 and business has resumed,” said a source in South Pyongan who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke to RFA Korean on condition of anonymity due to security concerns.

The source said that the resort was closed amid a national emergency quarantine just two months after it opened in January 2020 as part of a tourism promotion project ordered by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to earn foreign currency for the regime.

Its reopening 40 months later is part of a number of measures aimed at easing COVID-19 quarantine controls that began in early July, including the lifting of restrictions on domestic travel and an end to the mandatory use of facemasks, the source said.

While foreign tourists are not yet permitted to visit the resort due to ongoing pandemic restrictions, she said, “anyone in North Korea can go to Yangdok Hot Springs.”

Anyone with close ties to the regime and plenty of foreign currency to spend, that is.

People are seen at the outdoor baths in Yangdok Hot Springs Resort in this undated photo released Jan. 14, 2020 by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). KCNA via Reuters

US$10 will get you a ticket to the resort, which includes access to the baths and drinks for one day, she said, while accommodations range from US$10 to $100 per night, depending on the meals and drinks provided.

“The cost is too high,” the source said, adding that ordinary citizens would never be able to afford entry even if they had the required foreign currency, let alone the cost of lodging.

Exceptions for the politically connected

A second source in South Pyongan confirmed to RFA that the Yangdok Hot Spring Resort had been reopened “in the middle of the month,” adding that “anyone with money [in foreign currency] can go.”

But he said that exceptions are being made for the politically connected.

Officials, war veterans, and citizens who have been recognized at the national level for meritorious conduct are eligible for free 15-day vacation tickets to the resort, which include admission, lodging, food, and alcoholic beverages, the source said.

Additionally, residents of the capital and “innovators” at state-owned companies can purchase 15-day tickets to the resort that include three meals and access to one hot springs bath each day, at the state-set price of US$12.

Guests eat eggs boiled in hot spring water at North Korea’s Yangdok Hot Springs Resort, March 31, 2022. Credit: Kim Won Jin/AFP

All other North Korean citizens must pay market prices to enter and stay at the resort, he said.

“We don’t know the breakdown of free hot spring vacations, government-price hot spring vacations and market-price vacations, but those paying market prices in foreign currency exceed far more than half of the total visitors,” the source said.

“Yangdok Hot Springs Resort was built for the purpose of earning foreign currency. Domestic tourists as well as foreign tourists [when eventually permitted] are required to pay the price in foreign currency. However, to the general public, visiting the resort is a ‘pipe dream.’”

Tourism in North Korea

Reports of the resort’s reopening came a week after an American soldier in South Korea scheduled for disciplinary action crossed into North Korea in the Joint Security Area or JSA, at Panmunjom, where soldiers of both Koreas are stationed, sometimes facing each other.

The soldier, Pvt. Travis King, was on a civilian tour of the JSA and crossed the Military Demarcation Line into North Korea without authorization and is believed to be in custody there.

When asked whether the incident would further delay North Korea’s reopening of the country’s borders to foreign tourists, a tourism and travel agency official noted that not even most North Koreans who were outside of the country before the COVID-19 lockdown have been able to return.

“There are still thousands of them stuck abroad,” said the official, who requested anonymity in consideration of his country’s relationship with North Korea. “Before they have been able to return home, the start of North Korean tourism [to foreigners] is long off.”

Tourists from China pose for photos on Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, June 19, 2019. Credit: Ed Jones/AFP

The official said that while it was “looking positive” for foreign tours to begin again this year, he believes that “early to mid-2024” is now more likely.

He also predicted that the incident at the border would mean “trouble for JSA tours” organized by South Korean companies, noting that King had joined such a group prior to his crossing.

“They are already often canceled for whatever reason, so this is certainly going to be something that might affect them,” he said.

A representative of KTG, which operates tours to North Korea, agreed that the border incident would likely “have a bigger effect on those arranging the tours in South Korea” and suggested that such agencies might “modify the way tours are conducted.”

But he said that the crossing was unlikely to “have had a big effect on [North Korea] tourism” for when the country does eventually reopen its borders.

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Matthew Reed.

rfa.org

6. Interview About Conditions Inside North Korea Pt.1 -Is it true that people have died of starvation?-Pt.2 -What people think about the satellite launch?

Part 1 video is at this link: https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2023/07/movie/kiga1/

Part 2 video is at this link: https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2023/07/movie/kiga2/

Interview About Conditions Inside North Korea Pt.1 -Is it true that people have died of starvation?-

asiapress.org

There are increasing challenges in comprehending trends inside North Korea and what North Koreans are thinking due to the Kim Jong-un regime’s extreme measures to isolate the country following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020.

Despite this situation, ASIAPRESS was able to hear about conditions inside the country in early June through a reporting partner in the northern region of the country. Over the course of a two-part series, ASIAPRESS will publish the audio of the interview conducted with this reporting partner.

In May, the National Intelligence Service reported to South Korea’s National Assembly that starvation deaths and suicides have increased due to the worsening of North Korea’s food shortages. The American media outlet RFA and the South Korean media outlet Daily NK have also reported on food shortages in the country, which is so severe that it has led to starvation deaths.

ASIAPRESS has long reported on North Korea’s humanitarian crisis. We will now publish the audio of the interviews we conducted with North Koreans by phone about starvation deaths. (HAN Ha-yu)

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

Interview About Conditions Inside North Korea Pt.2 -What people think about the satellite launch-

asiapress.org

Interview About Conditions Inside North Korea Pt.2 -What people think about the satellite launch-

asiapress.org

In 2023, the Kim Jong-un regime conducted several ballistic missile test launches. In June, the country launched a military reconnaissance satellite, which ended in failure. What do North Koreans suffering under dire economic conditions think about these military provocations? ASIAPRESS conducted an interview with a reporting partner in the northern region of North Korea in early June to hear what people are thinking. (HAN Ha-yu)

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

Interview About Conditions Inside North Korea Pt.1 -Is it true that people have died of starvation?-

asiapress.org

7. North Korea’s depleted coffers are filling up again thanks to Russia

Key insights here:

Kim “has become the great pioneer and creator for realizing the socialist ideal to devote himself to building the people’s paradise as soon as possible,” KCNA said when Kim attended a ground-breaking ceremony in February punctuated by fireworks and cheers from the masses for a project to build 10,000 new apartments in Pyongyang.

These costs, though, pale compared to the money spent on armaments. Kim’s regime spent an estimated $400 million to $650 million to build and test the 33 missiles it fired off in the first half of 2022, data compiled by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, a government-affiliated military research center, show.

It ended up shooting off more than 70 that year, meaning it could have spent more than $1 billion for missiles tested. That is equal to about 4% of its $25 billion economy.

The U.S., South Korea and Japan have said Kim would be better off using the money spent on missiles to feed his people. But Kim’s defiance of the international community has gained him some measure of security against the risk of any U.S. action. His weapons program has evolved to a point that he could have enough in his arsenal to deliver a credible nuclear strike on South Korea and Japan — the two Asian nations that host tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel.

And he is showing no signs of slowing down. Following 2022’s record-breaking series of tests, Kim has again ramped up his military program this year. Just this month, he tested a new intercontinental ballistic missile designed to strike the U.S. mainland.

“Russia’s war in Ukraine is likely emboldening Kim Jong Un to behave more aggressively,’’ said Duyeon Kim, an adjunct senior fellow in Seoul at the Center for a New American Security. “China and Russia have both failed to fulfill their sanctions obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions, which is why sanctions have not been working properly and they’re enabling Pyongyang to continue with its nuclear weapons development and provocative behavior.’’

North Korea’s depleted coffers are filling up again thanks to Russia

Stars and Stripes · by Jon Herskovitz and Sangmi Cha · July 26, 2023

People visit the statues of the late North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on the 29th anniversary of Kim Il Sung's death, at Mansu Hill on July 8, 2023, in Pyongyang. (Kim Won Jin/AFP/Getty Images/TNS)

(Tribune News Service) — Reports of new types of sugar in the local markets. Satellite imagery of trains crossing borders. Cargo ships with their transponders off. When assessing North Korea’s opaque economy, rather than hard statistics, it’s these sorts of indicators experts pore over.

And all are pointing to one conclusion: Kim Jong Un has found fresh ways to fill his depleted coffers. This money is enabling him to ignore financial incentives designed to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, and press ahead with building his nuclear arsenal.

His grandfather, state founder Kim Il Sung, took the reins of the country with Soviet support. Now, as North Korea prepares to mark the 70th anniversary of the armistice that ended the Korean War on July 27, 1953, it’s once again Russia the regime must thank.

Russia has resumed sending oil to North Korea for the first time since 2020, the United Nations said last month. That follows an earlier restart of grain shipments. While it’s impossible to know what is going in the other direction, both the U.S. government and independent analysts have one main thesis: munitions from North Korea’s vast stockpiles.

These interventions, of course, aren’t sufficient to restore a tattered, isolated economy to full health. Yet together with the reopening of trade links with China and other sources of income such as cybercrime, the assistance from Russia is ensuring the economy remains stable enough to function, enabling Kim to continue defying the international community.

“North Korea always manages to find a way to survive,” said Rachel Minyoung Lee, a regional issues manager at the Vienna-based Open Nuclear Network who worked as an analyst for the CIA’s Open Source Enterprise for almost two decades. “There is no indication that it would return to nuclear talks anytime soon.”

Russia and China are showing their support for Kim by sending high-profile delegations to North Korea to mark the anniversary — the first such visits by foreign envoys since the COVID-19 pandemic. The Russian group arrived Tuesday night and received a welcome from top cadres.

Munitions Math

Pyongyang, which has been banned from arms sales for about 15 years, rejects accusations it is supplying Russia. Yet the White House in December said it had evidence North Korea completed an initial arms shipment to the Wagner Group for use in Ukraine that included infantry rockets and missiles.

One item that North Korea has and Russia likely wants is 152 mm artillery shells. These are interoperable with the Soviet-era weaponry that’s been pushed back into service in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s war machine has been burning through thousands daily, according to the Jamestown Foundation research group, and has been scrambling for supplies as the conflict continues.

North Korea possesses untold stores of munitions that could run into millions of rounds for an arsenal that has for decades held Seoul under the threat of devastation.

North Korea would likely jump at the chance to offload some of its stockpile at a hefty price, said weapons expert Joost Oliemans, who co-authored the book The Armed Forces of North Korea. Exactly how much they’d get would be down to their ability to negotiate.

For example, if North Korea sold shells at $1,000 each, selling 250,000 would be equal to about 1% of its GDP, according to Bloomberg News calculations. That’s a conservative estimate because high demand has driven up prices, with the 155 mm shells used by NATO forces priced at about $3,000 each.

Trade Signals

Given that both North Korea and Russia are subject to U.N. sanctions, both seek to conceal exactly how much trade is going on. But there are numerous signs that activity is picking up.

In late 2022, the two countries restored a rail link that had been suspended for nearly three years, according to satellite images including those from November that show a train crossing from Russia into North Korea and stopping at a freight handling station.

Kang Mi-jin, a North Korean defector who now runs a company in South Korea that watches the economy of her former home, says that her contacts report that Russian sugar has made its way into markets in recent months. It’s been warily received since it’s coarser and a darker color than what North Koreans are used to, Kang said.

There are also indications of increased activity with China after the two countries reopened their main rail link last year that had been closed since COVID-19. Traffic between the Chinese border city of Dandong and North Korea’s nearby city of Sinuiju can be watched on the streets in China.

The Daily NK website, part of a group of not-for-profit agencies affiliated with the South Korean Unification Ministry, said its sources on the ground have seen the length of freight trains increasing. It reports that foodstuffs and building materials are among the items making their way into North Korea.

What is nearly impossible to see is activity in a pipeline between the two cities that was exempt from sanctions and could be supplying as much as 750,000 tons (5.5 million barrels) of oil annually, according to a report from specialists David von Hippel and Peter Hayes.

Other Signs

Among the few items North Korea tries to sell abroad are commodities it can mine at home and then trade in ways that evade interception.

At its main international seaport of Nampo, the amount of shipping detectable by the outside world reached 100 vessels in the first half of this year and was on pace to triple the traffic the port had seen during the pandemic years, data from IHS Markit showed.

In a further sign that North Korea has money to spend, a United Nations Security Panel of Experts report said in March that deliveries of refined petroleum products in 2022 again exceeded the 500,000 barrel yearly amount of imports allowed under sanctions.

This year, the panel said, North Korea has also acquired six more cargo vessels in a violation of sanctions. Four of these ships were among a dozen that sailed to destinations for iron and coal in China over the past month in a bid to sell commodities mined in North Korea for hard currency, NK News reported.

Data from Bloomberg shows that five of the vessels identified by the U.N. have docked at least once in China since March. Vessel data showed multiple trips to a grain elevator berth near Dalian.

North Korea has also continued to dodge sanctions through the ship-to-ship transfer of commodities on the high seas often done in darkness with transponders turned off to avoid detection, the U.N. panel said.

Another likely source of income is cybercrime. Both the U.S. and South Korea have accused Kim’s regime of deploying hackers to various corners of the world to fund its weapons programs.

They say these in-demand workers can make as much as $300,000 a year abroad — often remotely through freelance platforms with falsified or stolen identification — and can assist in enabling cyberattacks and cryptocurrency thefts that helped North Korea earn an estimated $1.7 billion in 2022.

Putting It Together

North Korea releases no official statistics on the size of its overall economy. With so much off the books and deliberately obscured, it is difficult to make overall assessments about the amount of economic activity.

What’s more, the country is still suffering from the pandemic, and is one of the few countries in the world not to have started a vaccination program, said Anwita Basu, an expert on North Korea and head of Europe country risk at BMI, a Fitch Solutions company.

Still, signs of a resumption of trade with China, historically North Korea’s biggest trading partner, means Fitch estimate the economy returned to growth after two full years of contraction, though significant uncertainties remain.

“The outlook for the North Korean economy is murky,” Basu said. Still, “we anticipate that the economy will remain sufficiently stable to enable Kim Jong Un to remain in power.”

However, conditions on the ground in North Korea remain bleak for the majority of the population. The World Food Programme, which had been on the ground in North Korea for years until the pandemic, estimates that 40% of the population is undernourished.

Flooding over the past few years has devastated farm land and wiped out crops, while Kim’s decision to shut the borders cut off a flow of foodstuffs that made their way to markets. The WFP is no longer distributing food, raising worries about a possible return to the famine of the late 1990s that some estimates said killed as many as 3.5 million people over a number of years.

Self-Reliance Doctrine

Kim’s state propaganda machine still leans heavily on a self-reliance doctrine forged by his grandfather calling on its citizens to help one another in the face of what it sees as the hostile intents of the U.S. to cripple its economy and topple its rulers.

Even as investment in big-ticket items such as power plant construction have faltered after sanctions were tightened in 2017 to halt the import of machinery, Kim’s government has stepped up other symbolic projects.

The state-run Korean Central News Agency has mentioned “housing construction” about 200 times in about the past two years, according to a database search.

Kim “has become the great pioneer and creator for realizing the socialist ideal to devote himself to building the people’s paradise as soon as possible,” KCNA said when Kim attended a ground-breaking ceremony in February punctuated by fireworks and cheers from the masses for a project to build 10,000 new apartments in Pyongyang.

These costs, though, pale compared to the money spent on armaments. Kim’s regime spent an estimated $400 million to $650 million to build and test the 33 missiles it fired off in the first half of 2022, data compiled by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, a government-affiliated military research center, show.

It ended up shooting off more than 70 that year, meaning it could have spent more than $1 billion for missiles tested. That is equal to about 4% of its $25 billion economy.

The U.S., South Korea and Japan have said Kim would be better off using the money spent on missiles to feed his people. But Kim’s defiance of the international community has gained him some measure of security against the risk of any U.S. action. His weapons program has evolved to a point that he could have enough in his arsenal to deliver a credible nuclear strike on South Korea and Japan — the two Asian nations that host tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel.

And he is showing no signs of slowing down. Following 2022’s record-breaking series of tests, Kim has again ramped up his military program this year. Just this month, he tested a new intercontinental ballistic missile designed to strike the U.S. mainland.

“Russia’s war in Ukraine is likely emboldening Kim Jong Un to behave more aggressively,’’ said Duyeon Kim, an adjunct senior fellow in Seoul at the Center for a New American Security. “China and Russia have both failed to fulfill their sanctions obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions, which is why sanctions have not been working properly and they’re enabling Pyongyang to continue with its nuclear weapons development and provocative behavior.’’

Bloomberg staff writer Kevin Varley contributed to this story.

___

Visit bloomberg.com.

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Stars and Stripes · by Jon Herskovitz and Sangmi Cha · July 26, 2023

8. South Korean POWs still held in NK, 70 years after armistice

Here are my remarks on this issue that I made at an event in Korea last year. I am glad to see this issue being raised. This is another example of the evil nation of the Kim family regime.

The Forgotten South Korean Prisoners Of War Who Sacrificed And Suffered For Seven Decades For Korean Freedom

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/the-forgotten-south-korean-prisoners-of-war-who-sacrificed-and-suffered-for-seven-decades-for-korean-freedom/

South Korean POWs still held in NK, 70 years after armistice

No one wants to fight for country that abandons POWs, says former S. Korean POW who escaped NK after 47-year wait

By Ji Da-gyum

Published : Jul 26, 2023 - 16:09 Updated : Jul 26, 2023 - 17:44

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · July 26, 2023

Yoo Young-bok, a former prisoner of war, speaks to The Korea Herald in Icheon, Gyeonggi Province in 2013. (Photo -Lee Sang-sub/The Korea Herald)

ICHEON, Gyeonggi Province --- Yoo Young-bok, 93, recalls when he, then a 23-year-old South Korean rifle soldier, was captured by the Chinese People's Liberation Army during the Geumhwa area battle, in Gangwon Province in June 1953, a month before the Armistice Agreement was signed to cease the Korean War.

Upon his capture, he was sent to a prisoner-of-war camp in Sungho-ri, Kangdong County, South Pyongan Province, the following month. Little did he know at that moment that he would become a POW that nobody would want for an astonishing 47 years.

Despite 70 years having elapsed since the signing of the armistice on July 27, 1953, there are still South Korean POWs who remain in captivity, as recounted by Yoo, who managed to escape North Korea by himself in 2000 at age 70. Other POWs would also hold onto hope, yearning for the day when their country would bring them home.

"So day after day, I kept enduring, clinging to a glimmer of hope, praying for change to grace my life. But in the end, change never arrived, and time just kept passing by," Yoo said in an interview with The Korea Herald at his home in Icheon, Gyeonggi Province.

In North Korea, the war veteran was subjected to forced hard labor in mines for 37 years.

Yoo endured grueling and harsh conditions while working at a monazite mine in Cholsan County, North Pyongan Province, and later at the Komdok and Tongam mines in South Hamgyong Province. The relentless labor in the mines led to him contracting pulmonary tuberculosis.

During his time in North Korea, Yoo did not receive any payment for the first three years and two months of his forced labor. Afterward, he was provided with a minimum salary that barely allowed him to scrape by and make a living.

At 60, he quit his mining job, which had left his body weak and frail. But he was not better off, having to face hunger with no money, particularly during the deadly famine period of the 1990s.

As a South Korean POW, Yoo said he faced social disadvantages in the North.

"In North Korean society, one's social standing is evaluated based on their family background and the accomplishments of one's grandfather and father, as well as their own achievements," Yoo explained.

"South Korean prisoners of war who pointed guns at North Koreans are deemed to be part of the most malevolent group."

Children of South Korean POWs were also denied meaningful social advancement. They were not allowed to join the military and had no opportunity to become members of the ruling party.

The destinies of numerous POWs who fought for South Korea's freedom against communist adversaries during the 1950-53 Korean War were marked by tragedy in North Korea. While some were assimilated into the North Korean military, others were forced to endure decades of hard labor in mines and various locations, subjected to perilous and grueling conditions until they died or were unable to continue working due to old age.

Such treatment of POWs in North Korea is a clear violation of the Geneva Conventions, which state that POWs must always be treated humanely in all circumstances and protected against any act of violence and mistreatment.

93-year-old Yoo Young-bok speaks to The Korea Herald in the city of Icheon, Gyeonggi Province in July 2023. (Photo - Ji Da-gyum/The Korea Herald)

But in the oppressive shadows of North Korea, defying authority meant facing dire consequences. As a result, POWs had no choice but to endure, counting the agonizing moments, and yearning for an opportunity and the support of the South Korean government finally to return home and reunite with their loved ones.

"Those who resist the authorities in North Korea not only endure beatings but also vanish overnight, leaving their fate unknown to everyone," Yoo said.

"So, many people opted to feign compliance, patiently waiting for the right moment. They endured these hardships with the hope that over time, inter-Korean relations would improve one day."

Yoo personally had to relinquish the hopes of repatriation he had clung to for over four decades. He was determined to defect to South Korea, even though it meant risking his life, amidst the fervent atmosphere that enveloped the Korean Peninsula in the wake of the historic first inter-Korean summit in June 2000.

"I had hoped that President Kim Dae-jung would make an appeal to Kim Jong-il, allowing elderly prisoners of war like myself, who longed to return to our hometowns after being manipulated for such a long time by North Korea until the age of 60. We were discarded items as if we were just objects," Yoo said.

"But when the South Korean president came, there were no words spoken on our behalf, and I came to realize that I couldn't rely on anyone else for my salvation," he said.

Yoo escaped from North Korea on July 27, 2000 by crossing the Tumen River and eventually made it to South Korea on Aug. 30 of that year.

"I knew that getting caught could mean death," Yoo said. "But if fate was on my side, I believed I could safely make it through."

Yoo Young-bok held a belated retirement ceremony at the 5th Infantry Division headquarters located in Yeoncheon County, Gangwon Province, near the inter-Korean border in October 2000. (Courtesy of Yoo)

After arriving in South Korea, he became aware of the large number of South Korean soldiers who had disappeared during the Korean War. He also learned about the general lack of awareness among people regarding the reality of POWs.

Yoo faced probing questions, including accusations that he might have been a spy dispatched by the North Korean regime.

"The responsibility to testify and speak on behalf of those who were detained as prisoners of war in North Korea, shedding light on the duration of their detention, the reasons behind it, and the conditions they endured, is a burden that I felt upon returning from North Korea," Yoo said.

"Those who have been left behind in North Korea cannot fulfill this role."

Between 1994 and 2010, a total of 80 POWs detained in North Korea defected to South Korea. As of July, only 13 of them are still alive, with an average age of 93 or 94, according to Mulmangcho, a civic group supporting defected POWs. Under the Kim Jong-un regime, no prisoner of war has managed to reach South Korea.

None of these elderly individuals are able to move freely, and only around five of them can move with assistance.

North Korean forces turn over prisoners of war to the UN authorities at the POW receiving center at Panmunjom on the inter-Korean border in the process of repatriation. (Date unknown, US Air Force)

Yoo is considered somewhat luckier compared to the countless other POWs whom North Korea has refused to repatriate, despite the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

The agreement clearly stipulates the release and repatriation of all POWs held by each side, but unfortunately, many South Korean POWs remain in North Korean custody, their fates unresolved.

During the Korean War, approximately 82,000 South Korean soldiers were estimated to be missing in action, according to the UN forces. However, only a final count of 8,343 South Korean POWs were repatriated from April 1953 to January 1954.

The significant discrepancy suggests that a substantial number of South Korean POWs were likely forcibly detained in North Korea. At least 50,000 POWs from South Korea were not repatriated, according to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea.

But North Korea has never officially recognized the existence of POWs, except for the ones who were repatriated.

On the contrary, the South Korean and UN forces followed the principle of respecting the free will of POWs and repatriated all North Korean and Chinese POWs who wished to return. A total of 75,823 North Korean POWs were sent home.

"The repatriation of prisoners of war has been unfair," Yoo lamented.

"Exchanges should adhere to the principle of reciprocity, but there is a significant disparity in the number of prisoners of war repatriated from South and North Korea."

South Korea has failed to bring home any additional POWs from North Korea.

Portraits of Joseph Stalin and North Korean leader Kim II-sung can be seen near where UN troops are under fire. (Date unknown, US Department of Defense)

The plight of these individuals has been overlooked by previous South Korean governments, even during the three inter-Korean summits held between 2000 and 2018, with no mention of the thorny issue in the joint statements from the summits.

Now 23 long years since his escape to South Korea, Yoo's face bears a weary and disheartened expression. His heart weighs heavy, he said, with the disappointment of unfulfilled hopes for significant change over the years.

"Now, the problem has persisted for too long, and I find myself questioning what can be resolved at this point? Sadly, the majority of the South Korean prisoners of war have already passed away, and North Korea persists in making false claims," Yoo said.

"Prisoners of war always carry deep-seated resentment. So at the very least, we should document these experiences in history, so we can preserve them and potentially use them if there arises an opportunity in the future for North Korea to offer an apology," he said.

Despite North Korea's refusal, Yoo said the South Korean government should continue to persevere in its efforts to bring POWs home.

"Why should the country bring back elderly soldiers who were prisoners of war? What's the importance of doing so? Some might ask this," Yoo said.

Bringing back elderly soldiers who were POWs holds significant importance in recognizing their contributions to fighting for their country's freedom and motivating future generations to serve their country with dedication and pride.

If the country fails to demonstrate accountability and care for its veterans, it may deter others from willingly stepping up to serve in times of war, he said. Given that the Korean Peninsula is still technically at war, it is critical to address the issue.

"If the country doesn't take responsibility for prisoners of war, who will be willing to go to the front line if war breaks out?" Yoo asked.

"We have to remember that the Korean War is not yet over."

By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · July 26, 2023

9. This year's monsoon season ends after 3rd-heaviest rainfall on record

I arrived in Seoul last evening just as the Monsoon ended. Thankfully.

This year's monsoon season ends after 3rd-heaviest rainfall on record | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Cheong-mo · July 26, 2023

SEOUL, July 26 (Yonhap) -- The state weather agency on Wednesday declared an end to this year's monthlong monsoon season, saying scorching temperatures will grip the nation for the time being.

The annual monsoon season began on June 25-26, and the nation has since been drenched by frequent heavy rains resulting in casualties, property damage and floods.

The closing dates and duration of this year's monsoon season were similar to those of the previous years, but the amount of rainfall was the third highest on record, the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA) said.

The nation's average precipitation during the monthlong monsoon period was 648.7 millimeters, the third-largest volume after 704 mm in 2006 and 701.4 mm in 2020. The average number of rainy days was 21.2 days during the period, and the southwestern city of Gunsan received an all-time daily high of 372.8 mm on July 14.

This file photo provided by a reader shows flooding in the central city of Cheongju on July 15, 2023. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The KMA explained that this year's unusually heavy rains may have been affected by global warming and higher-than-normal sea surface temperatures in the western Pacific Ocean.

It said the nation has now escaped from the influence of the stationary front that has caused torrential rains, as Typhoon Doksuri has pushed the front northward. Doksuri was heading north toward southern China from the sea 490 kilometers north of Manila, the Philippines, as of 9 a.m.

Thus the rainy season came to an end in the central and southern regions on Wednesday and on the southern resort island of Jeju on Tuesday, the KMA said, forecasting a sweltering heat wave and sporadic showers will continue for the rest of summer.

The agency said the sensible temperatures will remain above 33C across the nation for the time being and the tropical night phenomenon will persist in the capital and southern and eastern coastal regions, in particular.

ycm@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Cheong-mo · July 26, 2023

10. Defense chiefs of N. Korea, Russia hold talks in Pyongyang: TASS

Discussion topic? How to create dilemmas for the US and the ROK/IUS alliance.

Defense chiefs of N. Korea, Russia hold talks in Pyongyang: TASS | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 26, 2023

SEOUL, July 26 (Yonhap) -- Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu held talks with his North Korean counterpart, Kang Sun-nam, in Pyongyang on Wednesday and expressed his determination to boost bilateral ties, Russian media reported.

Shoigu arrived in the North Korean capital Tuesday for a three-day visit to attend commemorative events to mark the 70th anniversary of the 1950-53 Korean War armistice.

"I am confident that today's talks will help strengthen cooperation between our defense ministries," TASS quoted Shoigu as saying.

The North is set to hold commemorative events for the landmark anniversary of the signing of the armistice on July 27, 1953, which is celebrated in the country as Victory Day.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (R) shakes hands with North Korean Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam after arriving in Pyongyang on July 25, 2023, in this photo released by the North's Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 26, 2023

11. N.K. leader pays respects to fallen soldiers ahead of Korean War armistice anniv.

(2nd LD) N.K. leader pays respects to fallen soldiers ahead of Korean War armistice anniv. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · July 26, 2023

(ATTN: CORRECTS info in 5th para; EDITS paras 10-13)

SEOUL, July 26 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has visited cemeteries to pay respects to the country's soldiers killed during the 1950-53 Korean War and to commemorate the anniversary of the signing of the armistice, state media said Wednesday.

The Korean War ended with an armistice agreement on July 27, 1953. The North calls the war the Great Fatherland Liberation War and designated the armistice signing date as Victory Day.

Kim visited the Fatherland Liberation War Martyrs Cemetery in Pyongyang on Tuesday on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice, and was accompanied by Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam and other military leaders, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

During his visit, Kim said the "miracle of July 27" is a "great victory of significance in the human history as they inflicted eternally indelible disgrace and defeat on the U.S. imperialism, the chieftain of aggression, and prevented a new world war."

It marked Kim's first public appearance in nearly two weeks. He was last seen in public guiding the launch of a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile on July 12, according to a KCNA report released the following day.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) bows to pay tribute to the North's soldiers killed in the 1950-53 Korean War and buried at the Fatherland Liberation War Martyrs Cemetery in Pyongyang on July 25, 2023, to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice that will fall on July 27, in this photo released by the North's Korean Central News Agency. North Korea refers to the three-year conflict as the Great Fatherland Liberation War. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim also visited the cemetery of martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) in Hoechang County, South Pyongan Province, to pay "high tribute" to the fallen Chinese soldiers on the occasion of the armistice anniversary, the KCNA said in a separate report.

Kim stressed that the "great victory won by the peoples of the DPRK and China at the cost of their blood is invariably displaying its great vitality still now, century after century."

Top officials accompanied Kim, including his powerful sister Kim Yo-jong and Jo Yong-won, secretary for organizational affairs at the ruling party, as well as Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui.

China fought alongside the North against South Korean, U.S. and United Nations troops during the Korean War.

Meanwhile, the KCNA said a Russian military delegation led by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu arrived in Pyongyang on Tuesday for commemorations of the armistice.

North Korean state media has not yet released any report on whether a Chinese delegation led by Li Hongzhong, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, has arrived in the country. The KCNA reported Monday that the North invited the Chinese delegation to attend the celebrations.

These two cases of the secretive regime inviting foreign guests are some of the first since it imposed rigid border lockdowns amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

With the invitations, the North appears to be emphasizing its solid ties with China and Russia in the face of growing defense cooperation among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo over Pyongyang's provocative acts.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un places a wreath to pay tribute to Chinese soldiers killed in the 1950-53 Korean War and buried at the cemetery of martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Hoechang, South Phyongan Province, on July 25, 2023, to mark the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice that will fall on July 27, in this photo released by the North's Korean Central News Agency. North Korea refers to the three-year conflict as the Great Fatherland Liberation War. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (R) shakes hands with North Korean Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam after arriving in Pyongyang on July 25, 2023, in this photo released by the North's Korean Central News Agency. A Russian military delegation, led by Shoigu, visited the North to celebrate the 70th anniversary on July 27 of the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · July 26, 2023

12. Remains of 7 S. Korean troops killed during Korean War return home

The shared values of the ROK and US: bring our fallen home.

(LEAD) Remains of 7 S. Korean troops killed during Korean War return home | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 26, 2023

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead, photo; UPDATES throughout with remains' arrival)

SEOUL, July 26 (Yonhap) -- The remains of seven South Korean soldiers killed in the 1950-53 Korean War returned home from the United States on Wednesday, after they were initially thought to be U.S. war dead and sent to America.

A ceremony marking the remains' return took place at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam, just south of Seoul, after a South Korean Air Force KC-330 transport aircraft carrying the remains arrived from Hawaii.

The latest sets of remains were among those excavated in South and North Korea and sent to the U.S. They were later identified as fallen South Korean soldiers through a joint analysis by the allies.

One set was confirmed to belong to Pfc. Choi Im-rak, who served as part of the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army program, better known as KATUSA, during the war. He died during the Battle of Chosin Reservoir in December 1950 at the age of 19.

President Yoon Suk Yeol and other senior South Korean and U.S. officials, including Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup, U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Paul LaCamera and U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg, attended the ceremony.

Prior to the event, Yoon met with Choi's bereaved family members and assured them that his remains would receive the highest military honors upon their arrival, according to the presidential office.

President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) bows during a ceremony marking the repatriation of the remains of seven South Korean troops killed in the 1950-53 Korean War from the United States on July 26, 2023, at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam, just south of Seoul. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Earlier, a ceremony marking the handover of the remains took place at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii on Tuesday (local time), with the attendance of senior South Korean and U.S. officials, including Seoul's Vice Defense Minister Shin Beom-chul and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander Adm. John C. Aquilino.

"The handover and repatriation of the troop remains is the fruit of joint efforts by South Korea and the U.S. to fulfill the noble mission to remember the great heroes, who safeguarded the Republic of Korea's freedom, forever, and take responsibility for them until the end," Shin was quoted as saying by Seoul's defense ministry.

At the handover ceremony, Choi's remains were delivered to the South Korean side via the U.N. Command. S. Cpo. Cho Ho-jong, a member of Choi's bereaved family, was present to reunite with his late uncle.

Since 2012, South Korea has received the remains of 313 South Korean troops, including the latest sets, on seven occasions from the U.S. Of them, the identities of 19 sets have been confirmed through DNA and other forms of analysis.

The remains of South Korean troops killed in the 1950-53 Korean War are transported on a KC-330 tanker transport plane bound for South Korea on July 25, 2023, in this photo released by Korea Defense Daily. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · July 26, 2023

13. Wang’s return good sign for S. Korea-China ties: experts

Wang’s return good sign for S. Korea-China ties: experts

koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · July 26, 2023

The Tuesday reshuffle that put China’s top diplomat Wang Yi back in his old job as foreign minister, a post he had held for almost a decade since 2013, could reinforce South Korea’s push to improve ties with its largest neighbor, experts said Wednesday.

According to China’s state media, former Foreign Minister Qin Gang was removed from the job, marking the shortest-ever tenure for the role. Qin assumed the position in December last year but disappeared from public view in June amid speculation that he had fallen from grace. No explanations were given for his departure.

Wang, foreign policy chief for the Chinese Communist Party, a position senior to foreign minister, is likely to assume both roles for the time being. He is expected to keep China’s current foreign policy on course, backing efforts to rebalance its relationship with the US while “managing ties with other countries,” according to experts.

“Overall, we have to wait and see how the reshuffle plays out but I find some optimism in the way Wang has publicly spoken of ties with neighbors,” said Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

Wang agreed with Foreign Minister Park Jin that Seoul and Beijing should expand joint work on all areas from security to civilian exchanges at a meeting held on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum two weeks ago, the biggest security gathering in the region.

Beijing seems to be pressing ahead with an agenda meant to reboot ties with not only South Korea, but also Japan, according to Choo Jae-woo, a professor of Chinese foreign policy at Kyung Hee University. Choo referred to Kyodo News reports this week that Wang proposed Beijing and Tokyo start discussions to potentially reopen the regular three-way talks that include Seoul.

“Wang has shown that China is interested in friendlier ties with its neighbors -- be it Korea or Japan. And he was specific about how to make that happen by giving suggestions. I think that’s something Korea can take as a good sign to try to improve ties,” Choo said.

As the host, Korea is pushing to revive the three-way talks within the year, with preparations still underway for a meeting that has taken place only eight times since 2008. The gathering, which the three countries take turns to host, has been put on hold since 2019, largely because of COVID-19 travel curbs. Strained Seoul-Tokyo ties had also played a role in the suspension.

“The three-way talks could take place ahead of the APEC meeting in November, where Chinese President Xi Jinping could meet with the US President Joe Biden on the sidelines,” Choo noted, referring to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation gathering set to be held in Washington this year.

In the run-up to the event, China is likely to seek friendly ties with South Korea, a country that is getting ever closer to not only Japan but also the US, Choo added.

However, Chung Jae-hung, director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute, said South Korea still needs to “work out fundamental differences with China” to expect a meaningful thaw.

Seoul and Beijing are still at odds over how Korea has maintained its position on Taiwan and the US-led chip alliance, Chung noted, saying that unless Seoul compromises on its current stance, China will be unlikely to accommodate Korea’s objectives.

By Choi Si-young (siyoungchoi@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · July 26, 2023

14. Veterans ministry highlights collective efforts for global peace with 22 countries

I want to re-emphasize a point I have made a number of times over the years. The ROK Veteran's Ministry (and the ROK government and the ROK people) honor the veterans of the sending states on a scale that is unmatched by any country. Few countries honor foreign veterans like the ROK. And the honor that they are providing to these veterans is not just because it is the 70th anniversary of the Armitics. Veterans are honored all year around from participating in events to President Yoon visiting with veterans when he visits their home countries to return to Korea programs for veterans multiple times per year. The ROK should be commended for these efforts.

Veterans ministry highlights collective efforts for global peace with 22 countries

The Korea Times · by 2023-07-26 22:12 | Politics · July 26, 2023

Patriots and Veterans Affairs Minister Park Min-shik, right of center in the rear, and government representatives of the 22 countries that helped South Korea in the 1950-53 Korean War, observe a moment of silence before the Ministerial Summit on Veterans Affairs at a hotel in Busan, Tuesday. Yonhap

Major ceremony marking 70th anniversary of armistice set for today

By Lee Hyo-jin

Minister of Patriots and Veterans Affairs Park Min-shik proposed a joint declaration, Wednesday, with 22 countries that helped South Korea in the 1950-53 Korean War, pledging collective efforts toward maintaining global peace and values of freedom.

"Through the joint declaration, we hope to share the value of prosperity and freedom achieved through 70 years of solidarity with our ally nations, and I hope this will serve as a new starting point of an alliance for the 70 years to come," Park said.

Park's proposal was made during the Ministerial Summit on Veterans Affairs with the 22 countries in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement that halted the inter-Korean conflict.

The meeting was held in the southeastern port city of Busan under the theme "Solidarity for the Value of Freedom." It was attended by government representatives of the 22 countries such as defense ministers and ambassadors.

The 22 nations that participated in the Korean War are the United States, Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand and Turkey.

On the same day, Park also held one-on-one meetings with representatives of Australia and France. With Australia's Minister for Veterans' Affairs and Minister for Defence Personnel Matthew Keogh, Park discussed ways for joint efforts to provide better support for surviving Australian veterans.

South Korean service members cover the casket of a South Korean soldier, killed in the 1950-53 Korean War, during a ceremony to hand over the remains of seven soldiers, held at Hickam Air Force in Hawaii, Tuesday (local time). The ceremony, attended by South Korea's Vice Defense Minister Shin Beom-chul and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander Adm. John Aquilino, took place ahead of the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Armistice Agreement which falls on July 27. Courtesy of Kookbang Ilbo

During a meeting with French Secretary of State for Veterans and Memory Patricia Miralles, the two sides signed a letter of intent (LOI) on veterans' affairs cooperation, with an aim to preserve and utilize the heritages related to the Korean War, including the "Path of Remembrance."

The signing of the document would enable the implementation of several cooperation projects, said the ministry, including an award ceremony of the Chungmu Order of Military Merit for the late Sgt. Park Dong-ha in recognition of his wartime service in the French Battalion.

Today, Park will meet with Luxembourg Prime Minister Xavier Bettel. Luxembourg, one of the smallest countries in Europe, dispatched 110 combat troops to the Korean War, which was the first overseas dispatch of troops in its history.

Bettel has shown great interest to relations with South Korea. During his term as the mayor of Luxembourg from 2011 to 2013, he actively engaged in events paying tribute to Korean War veterans and attended the annual South Korea-Luxembourg Friendship Concert held in Luxemburg every year.

Park will then have a separate meeting with Zafer Tarikdaroglu, Turkey's deputy minister of family and social services, to discuss various cooperation projects. The two countries' relations are often described as "blood brothers" as Turkey sent 15,000 troops to help South Korea in the Korean War.

The veterans ministry is planning to hold a large-scale ceremony today to mark the 70th anniversary of the armistice.

The ceremony will begin at 7:40 p.m. at the Busan Cinema Center. The venue was formerly an airport where Task Force Smith, a U.S. unit under the United Nations flag, first arrived in South Korea under a mission to protect the nation against North Korea's invasion.

Korean War veterans and their families wave on a KTX train bound for Busan, Wednesday, where they will attend various events honoring the veterans' wartime service. Yonhap

Under the main theme of "Freedom by Dedication, Future by Alliance," the event is expected to gather some 4,000 people including 170 representatives from 25 countries, foreign and Korean veterans, as well as their families and descendants.

The opening ceremony will feature a parade of 62 U.N. veterans down the "path of heroes" escorted by the South Korean military and the United Nations Command (UNC). The names of the veterans will appear on a large screen set up on the stage in a show of respect for their services.

Elementary school students currently living in Chilgok, North Gyeongsang Province, and Hoengsong, Gangwon Province, both of which were major battlefields in the Korean War, will be invited to sing the national anthem. Dame Cindy Kiro, governor-general of New Zealand, will deliver an opening speech.

The Korea Times · by 2023-07-26 22:12 | Politics · July 26, 2023

15. Seoul may have 1.5 years to take advantage of NCG: ex-national security adviser

Hmmm.... As I have said a major task of the NCG is information and informing the press, pundits, and the people exactly how it is enchanting ROK security.

But as many of my Korean friends tell me, the former NSA is worried about the outcome of the next US presidential election.

Excerpts:

"Next year's election would determine the U.S. direction between maintaining its importance on alliance and regressing into isolation … We should regard the next year and a half (before the election) as a 'golden time.'"

During that period, he said the government should develop the NCG into a more sustainable system while learning every detail about the operation of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. "Otherwise, after some photo sessions," he added, the opportunity could be wasted with nothing to show.

Seoul may have 1.5 years to take advantage of NCG: ex-national security adviser

The Korea Times · July 26, 2023

Former National Security Adviser Kim Sung-han / Newsis

Security experts express concern about possibility of Trump's return to White House

By Jung Min-ho

President Yoon Suk Yeol surprised the world earlier this year by mentioning the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons in response to growing nuclear threats from the North.

However, given the potentially destructive consequences to its economy and alliances, Seoul later came up with an alternative ― launching the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) with Washington to strengthen the U.S.' extended deterrence commitment to defending South Korea with all of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

Yet many of the more than 30 security and defense experts gathered at a seminar on the South Korea-U.S. alliance in eastern Seoul, Wednesday, expressed skepticism and concerns about the sustainability of the NCG, a policy agreement that could be overturned if Joe Biden loses the election next year.

In a clear reference to Donald Trump, a Republican contender who has a significant, perhaps insurmountable, lead in polls, former National Security Adviser Kim Sung-han warned that Seoul may not have much time left to take advantage of the NCG, saying the government should make the most out of the opportunity.

"There are presidential contenders promoting 'America Firsterism' and downplaying (the value of the) alliance," Kim said at the event organized by Chey Institute for Advanced Studies, a think tank.

"Next year's election would determine the U.S. direction between maintaining its importance on alliance and regressing into isolation … We should regard the next year and a half (before the election) as a 'golden time.'"

During that period, he said the government should develop the NCG into a more sustainable system while learning every detail about the operation of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. "Otherwise, after some photo sessions," he added, the opportunity could be wasted with nothing to show.

Donald Trump, former president and the favorite to win the Republican nomination for the 2024 presidential election, greets supporters as he arrives at New Orleans International Airport in New Orleans, Tuesday. AP-Yonhap

Many scholars and think tank analysts there said the Washington Declaration, a diplomatic deal that gave rise to the NCG, was the Yoon administration's achievement to be reckoned with. But they said it should be the beginning ― not the end goal ― of the allies' deterrence efforts against Pyongyang's evolving threats.

"It was the right placement of the stepping stone in the right direction," said Cheon Seong-whun, former chief of the Korea Institute for National Unification, a think tank. "North Korea forced us to realize that we had been stuck in the pre-nuclear mentality. We should change our thoughts, attitudes and perspectives as the nuclear era requires."

Some of the experts also said Seoul should not rule out the possibility of developing its own nuclear weapons. Amid swift geopolitical changes, relying almost entirely on the U.S. for its defense is too naive and risky, they said.

Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst on North Korea at the Sejong Institute, is one of those supportive of the idea.

"We should ponder whether it would be appropriate to rely on the U.S. (for security), which holds a presidential election every four years," he said. "It might take five, 10 or 20 years to develop the weapons. But we should have a long-term plan for that objective."

He added that if developing nuclear weapons is too costly, South Korea should first aim for the capabilities of producing them quickly by securing the required materials and technologies, as Japan did in the past.

Recent polls show that Trump is the huge favorite to win the Republican nomination for the 2024 presidential election. Experts on U.S. politics at the event said they believe Biden has a better chance of winning.

But if Trump wins, they worry his presidency could be even more damaging to the alliance than his first term from 2017 to 2021. According to the memoir of former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, pulling U.S. forces out of South Korea was one of his plans for his second term.

The Korea Times · July 26, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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