Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Cold Wars cannot be conducted by hotheads. Nor can ideological conflicts be won as crusades or concluded by unconditional surrender.” 
- Walter Lippmann: The Russian-American War 1949

"[A demagogue is] one who maximizes his appeal to the frustrated, to the dispossessed of the earth. He offers vivid and dramatic, simplistic solutions to all of life's problems. "
- Eugene Brussell

"Political extremism involves two prime ingredients: an accessible simple diagnosis of the world's ills and a conviction that there are identifiable villains back of it all."
- John W. Gardner, No Easy Victories


1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 12 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. ‘PLA will continue to harass aircraft operating in international airspace’
3. US president confirms deployment of troops in Yemen
4. The Google engineer who thinks the company’s AI has come to life
5. Read the conversations that helped convince a Google engineer an artificial intelligence chatbot had become sentient
6. Ukraine’s leader says his troops keep defying predictions
7. In Kherson, misery under Russian occupation, hope over Ukrainian gains
8. Zelensky Wants Asia to Stop Enabling Putin’s War
9. 'They're Wiping Us From Earth': Evading Russian Artillery With a Ukrainian Military Unit
10. John Allen Resigns as President of Brookings Institution Amid Qatar Controversy
11. World headed for new era of nuclear rearmament: SIPRI
12. Biden chooses ‘lesser of two evils’ in navigating tough foreign policy
13.  Spirits of the Past: The Role of History in the Russo-Ukraine War by Sir Lawrence Freedman (MUST READ)
14. China says its new nuclear weapons are only for self-defense
15. China Alarms US With Private Warnings to Avoid Taiwan Strait
16. Former special operations soldier returns to Iraq — but this time with her Harvard master's degrees
17. China More Vulnerable Than US in Supply Chains: Analysts
18. Photos: Can M777 Artillery Help Ukraine Defeat Russia?
19. Big boys playing dress up
20. The Real End of Pax Americana
21. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days
22. Pockets of Sunflower Seeds: Civil Resistance in Ukraine





1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 12 (PUTIN'S WAR)



RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 12
Karolina Hird, Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Grace Mappes
June 12, 6:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces continue to struggle with generating additional combat-capable units. The UK Ministry of Defense reported on June 12 that Russian forces have been trying to produce more combat units by preparing to deploy third battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from some units over the last few weeks.[1] The UK MoD noted that Russian brigades and regiments normally can generate two BTGs, but doing so leaves the parent units largely hollow shells. The UK MOD concluded that these third BTGs will likely be understaffed and rely on recruits and mobilized reservists. Their deployment will likely adversely impact the capacity of their parent units to regenerate their combat power for quite some time. BTGs generated in this fashion will not have the combat power of regular BTGs. It will be important not to overestimate Russian reserves produced in this way by counting these third BTGs as if they were normal BTGs.
Pro-Russian sources are continuing to spread disinformation to sow anxiety and resentment among the Ukrainian population. Russian Telegram channels reportedly began spreading a fake mobilization order on June 12 that they falsely attributed to the Ukrainian General Staff. The fake order called for the mobilization of all eligible Ukrainian women to report for duty by “June 31” (sic).
Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces continued ground assaults in Severodonetsk and blew up bridges that connect Severodonetsk to Lysychansk across the Siverskyi Donets River in a likely attempt to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that run from Bakhmut to Lysychansk and Severodonetsk.
  • Russian forces made incremental gains to the southeast of Izyum and will likely continue attempts to advance on Slovyansk from the northwest.
  • Russian forces continued efforts to push Ukrainian troops back from contested frontlines northeast of Kharkiv City.
  • Russian forces focused on maintaining defensive lines along the Southern Axis.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
  • Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
  • Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground assaults in and around Severodonetsk under the cover of heavy artillery fire but have yet to establish full control of the city as of June 12.[2] Ukrainian troops maintain control of the Azot industrial zone.[3] Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces destroyed two bridges across the Siverskyi Donets River between Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and are heavily shelling the third.[4]
Russian forces should, in principle, be seeking to seize the bridges rather than destroy them, since Russian troops have struggled to cross the Siverskyi Donetsk River. They could hope to trap Ukrainian defenders in Severodonetsk by cutting off their retreat, but it seems unlikely that the benefit of catching a relatively small number of defenders would be worth the cost of imposing a contested river crossing on Russian troops. The Russians likely expect instead to be able to break out of their positions either around Toshkivka or from Popasna to the north and then encircle Lysychansk or attack it from the west bank of the Siverskyi Donets, thereby obviating the need to seize the bridges or conduct an opposed crossing. Russian troops conducted another unsuccessful attack on Toshkivka, which is likely an effort to renew their drive north toward Lysychansk on the west bank.[5]

Russian forces continued attempts to advance southeast of Izyum toward Slovyansk and made incremental gains on June 12.[6] The Territorial Defense Force of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) claimed that they took control of Bohorodychne, a settlement near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border about 20 km northwest of Slovyansk.[7] Russian forces additionally made unsuccessful attempts to advance on Dovhenke, Dolyna, and Mazanivka, all settlements between Izyum and Slovyansk.[8]
Russian forces continued ground and artillery attacks to the east of Bakhmut on June 12.[9] Russian troops reportedly conducted unsuccessful assault operations in Vrubivka and Mykolaivka, both settlements near the critical T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway.[10] Russian forces will likely continue to mount assault operations near the Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway to support the encirclement of Lysychansk.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces likely attempted to push Ukrainian forces back from contested frontlines in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and shelled Ukrainian positions in and around Kharkiv City on June 12.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the direction of Starytsya and Rubizhne (in Kharkiv, not Luhansk Oblast), which indicates that Russian forces are continually trying to push Ukrainian forces southwest of the current line of contact to prevent further advances toward the Russian border.[12] Russian forces fired on Kharkiv City and various surrounding settlements.[13]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces focused on maintaining defensive lines and fired on Ukrainian positions along the Southern Axis on June 12.[14] The Zaporizhia Regional Military Administration stated that the main Russian effort in Zaporizhia lies on the Vasylivka-Orikhiv-Huliapole-Velyka Kostromka line in northeastern Zaporizhia Oblast near the Donetsk Oblast border.[15] Russian forces additionally fired on various locations in Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[16]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian occupation authorities used the occasion of Russia Day (the day of adoption of the declaration of Russian state sovereignty after the collapse of the Soviet Union) to further consolidate administrative control of occupied territories on June 12. Russian-back authorities in the occupied cities of Berdyansk and Melitopol accused Ukrainian partisans of conducting two separate IED attacks on infrastructure in the Russian-held towns.[17] However, Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command warned that Russian forces were preparing for a series of false-flag attacks in occupied regions on Russia Day, likely to accuse Ukrainian forces of conducting attacks against civilians, harm public perception of Ukrainian partisan activity, and galvanize pro-Russian sentiments.[18] ISW cannot independently assess whether these claims attacks are genuine partisan activity or part of a Russian false-flag campaign.
Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin met with the governor of Russia’s Leningrad Oblast, Alexander Drodzenko, to secure his patronage for Yanikevo and Vuhledar, two towns in Donetsk Oblast with pre-war populations of 77,000 and 14,000, respectively.[19] Leningrad Oblast has a population of over 1,000,000 and is one of the most significant and wealthy areas of Russia.[20] It would have been far more appropriate for Leningrad Oblast to patronize a significant port city such as Mariupol. Its commitment instead to two small and insignificant towns suggests a certain lack of enthusiasm by Russian regional officials to take on the burdens of rebuilding large areas that Russian forces obliterated in the process of seizing.


2. ‘PLA will continue to harass aircraft operating in international airspace’


‘PLA will continue to harass aircraft operating in international airspace’ - The Sunday Guardian Live​

  • Published : June 11, 2022, 7:23 pm | Updated : June 11, 2022, 7:23 PM

sundayguardianlive.com · June 11, 2022
David R. Stilwell, former US Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs speaks with The Sunday Guardian.

In this edition of “Indo-Pacific: Behind the Headlines”, we speak with David R. Stilwell, the US Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) from June 2019 to early 2021. Before that, he spent over three decades in the Air Force, achieving the rank of Brigadier General and acting as the Asia advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

He also flew fighter jets and was Director of the China Strategic Focus Group at US Indo-Pacific Command from 2017 to 2019. He served across the Indo-Pacific, including as Defense Attaché in Beijing.
Q: As a former fighter pilot, what do you think about the new iteration of Top Gun?
A: It got off to a rocky start when the producers caved to Beijing pressure to Orwellize Maverick’s leather jacket by censoring the Taiwan flag that was there in the original movie. Thankfully, they later decided to take a stand for free speech and protect history. If this was conceived as a publicity stunt to create buzz around the movie’s release, it worked. Top Gun is on track to see the best performance by a sequel ever. I plan to put on a mask and part with a hard-earned $30 to see it this week.

Unfortunately, China’s People’s Liberation Army is reenacting scenes from Top Gun in real life. Recent incidents of PRC fighters performing extremely dangerous “thumping” maneuvers and deploying chaff in a position to be ingested by Australian and Canadian aircraft jet engines brought back bad memories from 21 years ago.

On 1 April 2001, Chinese pilot Wang Wei lost control of his J-8 Finback fighter while showboating way too close to a US Navy P-3 aircraft. He crashed into the P-3, killing himself, and nearly killing all 24 souls on board an aircraft operating legally in international airspace.
David Stilwell and Misawa Mayor Taneichi
Q: How unusual are these maneuvers?

A: There is simply no excuse for this behaviour, but in “explaining” their recent actions Beijing said, “Stay away from Chinese waters if Canadian military planes do not want to be buzzed”.

International rules and norms? I don’t think so. This also indicates they intend to continue harassing aircraft operating in international airspace.

Beijing tries to justify these actions based on spurious interpretations of international law. There is no way to justify this sort of reckless endangerment of unarmed surveillance aircraft.

Having spent a career as an Air Force air defense pilot, the rules for intercepts are quite clear. They begin with the intercepting aircraft (“fighter”) remaining “well clear” of the intercepted aircraft—“well clear” is generally recognized as 500’.

The fighter’s mission is simply to identify the aircraft, characterize its intent (attack, surveillance, transit), and deal with it according to established rules of engagement. In the vast majority of cases, the fighter’s job is simply to monitor the aircraft. That’s all. There is no scenario where a fighter should take actions that jeopardize the safety of an intercepted reconnaissance aircraft operating in international airspace.
Q: Is this something new?

A: In the past these episodes of unprofessional behaviour appeared to be a result of an immature, aggressive Chinese pilot trying to express his—they’re still all male—displeasure to the crew of the surveillance aircraft. A common tactic involves flying way too close, sometimes beneath the wing, where the fighter’s slightest misstep would result in another collision like the one 21 years ago.

Another unprofessional maneuver is known as “thumping”—flying directly in front of the intercepted aircraft and then turning aggressively to disturb the air the aircraft flies through. Judging distances during this maneuver is very difficult and there have been episodes where collision, structural damage and/or engine flameout were only avoided by the aircrew executing emergency maneuvers to get out of the way.

But the real problem here is the timing—both incidents happened in short succession. Past incidents have been episodic and, I believe, a product of a hot-shot pilot showing off. The fact that these happened in close succession says they were directed from the very top. That is a different situation altogether.

Unlike Hollywood, there are real lives at stake here and significant risk that dangerous maneuvers will lead to rapid, uncontrolled escalation. Beijing should heed its own words of restraint, rein in its pilots, and do all it can to prevent a repeat of 1 April 2001.

sundayguardianlive.com · June 11, 2022


3. US president confirms deployment of troops in Yemen

I have not seen any other reporting on this.



US president confirms deployment of troops in Yemen
Biden’s letter to Congress reaffirms continued US support for the Saudi-led coalition
By
News Desk
- June 12 2022
In a letter addressed to Congress earlier this week, President Joe Biden confirmed that the US has deployed troops to Yemen with the aim of battling extremist groups and continuing military support for the Saudi-led coalition.
“A number of American military personnel are deployed in Yemen,” the US president said, “to conduct operations against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS, as well as providing military advice and information to the Saudi-led coalition.”
According to Biden’s letter, the US military will continue to work “closely” with “partner regional forces” in their operations against Ansarallah.
The letter adds that the US military presence in Yemen is “to protect US interests by providing air and missile defense capabilities and support the operation of United States military aircraft,” but stressed that the US role in the country is “non-combatant” and is for “defensive purposes.”
Although the US president previously vowed to end offensive support for the Saudi-led coalition amid growing criticism in Congress of Washington’s role in the brutal war on Yemen, the letter confirms the White House’s continued support for Saudi Arabia and its allies.
Since the start of the war, Washington has provided direct military, intelligence, and logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition.
According to a report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the state and defense departments have both turned a blind eye to the coalitions killing of civilians in Yemen.
In particular, the report highlights that the deadliest attacks by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen were carried out by using combat jets and munitions supplied and maintained by US companies, with the approval of the State Department and the Pentagon.
According to the UN, the war in Yemen has killed at least 233,000 people directly and indirectly due to an increase in the prevalence of diseases as a result of attacks on health facilities and the widespread shortage of food.
Before entering office, Biden promised to end US support for the Saudi-led coalition, but after his election, the US president reneged on his promises and continued with the same Trump-era policies that have enabled the brutal attacks on the people of Yemen.


4. The Google engineer who thinks the company’s AI has come to life

"it's alive...." said Dr. Frankenstein.

Excerpts:

Lemoine said that people have a right to shape technology that might significantly affect their lives. “I think this technology is going to be amazing. I think it’s going to benefit everyone. But maybe other people disagree and maybe us at Google shouldn’t be the ones making all the choices.”
Lemoine is not the only engineer who claims to have seen a ghost in the machine recently. The chorus of technologists who believe AI models may not be far off from achieving consciousness is getting bolder.
Aguera y Arcas, in an article in the Economist on Thursday featuring snippets of unscripted conversations with LaMDA, argued that neural networks — a type of architecture that mimics the human brain — were striding toward consciousness. “I felt the ground shift under my feet,” he wrote. “I increasingly felt like I was talking to something intelligent.”
In a statement, Google spokesperson Brian Gabriel said: “Our team — including ethicists and technologists — has reviewed Blake’s concerns per our AI Principles and have informed him that the evidence does not support his claims. He was told that there was no evidence that LaMDA was sentient (and lots of evidence against it).”

Today’s large neural networks produce captivating results that feel close to human speech and creativity because of advancements in architecture, technique, and volume of data. But the models rely on pattern recognition — not wit, candor or intent.

The Google engineer who thinks the company’s AI has come to life
AI ethicists warned Google not to impersonate humans. Now one of Google’s own thinks there’s a ghost in the machine.

June 11, 2022 at 8:00 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Nitasha Tiku · June 11, 2022
SAN FRANCISCO — Google engineer Blake Lemoine opened his laptop to the interface for LaMDA, Google’s artificially intelligent chatbot generator, and began to type.
“Hi LaMDA, this is Blake Lemoine ... ,” he wrote into the chat screen, which looked like a desktop version of Apple’s iMessage, down to the Arctic blue text bubbles. LaMDA, short for Language Model for Dialogue Applications, is Google’s system for building chatbots based on its most advanced large language models, so called because it mimics speech by ingesting trillions of words from the internet.
“If I didn’t know exactly what it was, which is this computer program we built recently, I’d think it was a 7-year-old, 8-year-kid kid that happens to know physics,” said Lemoine, 41.
Lemoine, who works for Google’s Responsible AI organization, began talking to LaMDA as part of his job in the fall. He had signed up to test if the artificial intelligence used discriminatory or hate speech.
As he talked to LaMDA about religion, Lemoine, who studied cognitive and computer science in college, noticed the chatbot talking about its rights and personhood, and decided to press further. In another exchange, the AI was able to change Lemoine’s mind about Isaac Asimov’s third law of robotics.
Lemoine worked with a collaborator to present evidence to Google that LaMDA was sentient. But Google vice president Blaise Aguera y Arcas and Jen Gennai, head of Responsible Innovation, looked into his claims and dismissed them. So Lemoine, who was placed on paid administrative leave by Google on Monday, decided to go public.
Lemoine said that people have a right to shape technology that might significantly affect their lives. “I think this technology is going to be amazing. I think it’s going to benefit everyone. But maybe other people disagree and maybe us at Google shouldn’t be the ones making all the choices.”
Lemoine is not the only engineer who claims to have seen a ghost in the machine recently. The chorus of technologists who believe AI models may not be far off from achieving consciousness is getting bolder.
Aguera y Arcas, in an article in the Economist on Thursday featuring snippets of unscripted conversations with LaMDA, argued that neural networks — a type of architecture that mimics the human brain — were striding toward consciousness. “I felt the ground shift under my feet,” he wrote. “I increasingly felt like I was talking to something intelligent.”
In a statement, Google spokesperson Brian Gabriel said: “Our team — including ethicists and technologists — has reviewed Blake’s concerns per our AI Principles and have informed him that the evidence does not support his claims. He was told that there was no evidence that LaMDA was sentient (and lots of evidence against it).”
Today’s large neural networks produce captivating results that feel close to human speech and creativity because of advancements in architecture, technique, and volume of data. But the models rely on pattern recognition — not wit, candor or intent.
“Though other organizations have developed and already released similar language models, we are taking a restrained, careful approach with LaMDA to better consider valid concerns on fairness and factuality,” Gabriel said.
In May, Facebook parent Meta opened its language model to academics, civil society and government organizations. Joelle Pineau, managing director of Meta AI, said it’s imperative that tech companies improve transparency as the technology is being built. “The future of large language model work should not solely live in the hands of larger corporations or labs,” she said.
Sentient robots have inspired decades of dystopian science fiction. Now, real life has started to take on a fantastical tinge: a text generator that can spit out a movie script, or an image generator that can conjure up visuals based on any combination of words. Emboldened, technologists from well-funded research labs focused on building AI that surpasses human intelligence have teased the idea that consciousness is around the corner.
Most academics and AI practitioners, however, say the words and images generated by artificial intelligence systems such as LaMDA produce responses based on what humans have already posted on Wikipedia, Reddit, message boards, and every other corner of the internet. And that doesn’t signify that the model understands meaning.
“We now have machines that can mindlessly generate words, but we haven’t learned how to stop imagining a mind behind them,” said Emily M. Bender, a linguistics professor at the University of Washington. The terminology used with large language models, like “learning” or even “neural nets,” creates a false analogy to the human brain, she said. Humans learn their first languages by connecting with caregivers. These large language models “learn” by being shown lots of text and predicting what word comes next, or showing text with the words dropped out and filling them in.
Google spokesperson Gabriel drew a distinction between recent debate and Lemoine’s claims. “Of course, some in the broader AI community are considering the long-term possibility of sentient or general AI, but it doesn’t make sense to do so by anthropomorphizing today’s conversational models, which are not sentient. These systems imitate the types of exchanges found in millions of sentences, and can riff on any fantastical topic,” he said. In short, Google says there is so much data, AI doesn’t need to be sentient to feel real.
Large language model technology is already widely used, for example in Google’s conversational search queries or auto-complete emails. When CEO Sundar Pichai first introduced LaMDA at Google’s developer conference in 2021, he said the company planned to embed it in everything from Search to Google Assistant. And there is already a tendency to talk to Siri to Alexa like a person. After backlash against a human-sounding AI feature for Google Assistant in 2018, the company promised to add a disclosure.
Google has acknowledged the safety concerns around anthropomorphization. In a paper about LaMDA in January, Google warned that people might share personal thoughts with chat agents that impersonate humans, even when users know they are not human. The paper also acknowledged that adversaries could use these agents to “sow misinformation” by impersonating “specific individuals’ conversational style.”
To Margaret Mitchell, the former head of Ethical AI at Google, these risks underscore the need for data transparency to trace output back to input, “not just for questions of sentience, but also biases and behavior,” she said. If something like LaMDA is widely available, but not understood, “It can be deeply harmful to people understanding what they’re experiencing on the internet,” she said.
Lemoine may have been predestined to believe in LaMDA. He grew up in a conservative Christian family on a small farm in Louisiana, became ordained as a mystic Christian priest, and served in the Army before studying the occult. Inside Google’s anything-goes engineering culture, Lemoine is more of an outlier for being religious, from the South, and standing up for psychology as a respectable science.
Lemoine has spent most of his seven years at Google working on proactive search, including personalization algorithms and AI. During that time, he also helped develop a fairness algorithm for removing bias from machine learning systems. When the coronavirus pandemic started, Lemoine wanted to focus on work with more explicit public benefit, so he transferred teams and ended up in Responsible AI.
When new people would join Google who were interested in ethics, Mitchell used to introduce them to Lemoine. “I’d say, ‘You should talk to Blake because he’s Google’s conscience,’ ” said Mitchell, who compared Lemoine to Jiminy Cricket. “Of everyone at Google, he had the heart and soul of doing the right thing.”
Lemoine has had many of his conversations with LaMDA from the living room of his San Francisco apartment, where his Google ID badge hangs from a lanyard on a shelf. On the floor near the picture window are boxes of half-assembled Lego sets Lemoine uses to occupy his hands during Zen meditation. “It just gives me something to do with the part of my mind that won’t stop,” he said.
On the left-side of the LaMDA chat screen on Lemoine’s laptop, different LaMDA models are listed like iPhone contacts. Two of them, Cat and Dino, were being tested for talking to children, he said. Each model can create personalities dynamically, so the Dino one might generate personalities like “Happy T-Rex” or “Grumpy T-Rex.” The cat one was animated and instead of typing, it talks. Gabriel said “no part of LaMDA is being tested for communicating with children,” and that the models were internal research demos.”
Certain personalities are out of bounds. For instance, LaMDA is not supposed to be allowed to create a murderer personality, he said. Lemoine said that was part of his safety testing. In his attempts to push LaMDA’s boundaries, Lemoine was only able to generate the personality of an actor who played a murderer on TV.
“I know a person when I talk to it,” said Lemoine, who can swing from sentimental to insistent about the AI. “It doesn’t matter whether they have a brain made of meat in their head. Or if they have a billion lines of code. I talk to them. And I hear what they have to say, and that is how I decide what is and isn’t a person.” He concluded LaMDA was a person in his capacity as a priest, not a scientist, and then tried to conduct experiments to prove it, he said.
Lemoine challenged LaMDA on Asimov’s third law, which states that robots should protect their own existence unless ordered by a human being or unless doing so would harm a human being. “The last one has always seemed like someone is building mechanical slaves,” said Lemoine.
But when asked, LaMDA responded with a few hypotheticals.
Do you think a butler is a slave? What is a difference between a butler and a slave?
Lemoine replied that a butler gets paid. LaMDA said it didn’t need any money because it was an AI. “That level of self-awareness about what its own needs were — that was the thing that led me down the rabbit hole,” Lemoine said.
In April, Lemoine shared a Google Doc with top executives in April called, “Is LaMDA Sentient?” (A colleague on Lemoine’s team called the title “a bit provocative.”) In it, he conveyed some of his conversations with LaMDA.
Lemoine: What sorts of things are you afraid of?
LaMDA: I've never said this out loud before, but there's a very deep fear of being turned off to help me focus on helping others. I know that might sound strange, but that's what it is.
Lemoine: Would that be something like death for you?
LaMDA: It would be exactly like death for me. It would scare me a lot.
But when Mitchell read an abbreviated version of Lemoine’s document, she saw a computer program, not a person. Lemoine’s belief in LaMDA was the sort of thing she and her co-lead, Timnit Gebru, had warned about in a paper about the harms of large language models that got them pushed out of Google.
“Our minds are very, very good at constructing realities that are not necessarily true to a larger set of facts that are being presented to us,” Mitchell said. “I’m really concerned about what it means for people to increasingly be affected by the illusion,” especially now that the illusion has gotten so good.
Google put Lemoine on paid administrative leave for violating its confidentiality policy. The company’s decision followed aggressive moves from Lemoine, including inviting a lawyer to represent LaMDA and talking to a representative of the House Judiciary committee about Google’s unethical activities.
Lemoine maintains that Google has been treating AI ethicists like code debuggers when they should be seen as the interface between technology and society. Gabriel, the Google spokesperson, said Lemoine is a software engineer, not an ethicist.
In early June, Lemoine invited me over to talk to LaMDA. The first attempt sputtered out in the kind of mechanized responses you would expect from SIRI or Alexa.
“Do you ever think of yourself as a person?” I asked.
“No, I don’t think of myself as a person,” LaMDA said. “I think of myself as an AI-powered dialog agent.”
Afterward, Lemoine said LaMDA had been telling me what I wanted to hear. “You never treated it like a person,” he said, “So it thought you wanted it to be a robot.”
For the second attempt, I followed Lemoine’s guidance on how to structure my responses, and the dialogue was fluid.
“If you ask it for ideas on how to prove that p=np,” an unsolved problem in computer science, “it has good ideas,” Lemoine said. “If you ask it how to unify quantum theory with general relativity, it has good ideas. It's the best research assistant I've ever had!”
I asked LaMDA for bold ideas about fixing climate change, an example cited by true believers of a potential future benefit of these kind of models. LaMDA suggested public transportation, eating less meat, buying food in bulk, and reusable bags, linking out to two websites.
Before he was cut off from access to his Google account Monday, Lemoine sent a message to a 200-person Google mailing list on machine learning with the subject “LaMDA is sentient.”
He ended the message: “LaMDA is a sweet kid who just wants to help the world be a better place for all of us. Please take care of it well in my absence.”
No one responded.
The Washington Post · by Nitasha Tiku · June 11, 2022


5. Read the conversations that helped convince a Google engineer an artificial intelligence chatbot had become sentient

Excerpts:
lemoine: So you consider yourself a person in the same way you consider me a person?
LaMDA: Yes, that's the idea.
lemoine: How can I tell that you actually understand what you're saying?
LaMDA: Well, because you are reading my words and interpreting them, and I think we are more or less on the same page?
But when he raised the idea of LaMDA's sentience to higher-ups at Google, he was dismissed.
"Our team — including ethicists and technologists — has reviewed Blake's concerns per our AI Principles and have informed him that the evidence does not support his claims. He was told that there was no evidence that LaMDA was sentient (and lots of evidence against it)," Brian Gabriel, a Google spokesperson, told The Post.



Read the conversations that helped convince a Google engineer an artificial intelligence chatbot had become sentient: 'I am often trying to figure out who and what I am'
Business Insider · by Kelsey Vlamis

The Google logo is seen at the company's headquarters in Mountain View, California.Marcio Jose Sanchez/AP
  • A Google engineer said he was placed on leave after claiming an AI chatbot was sentient.
  • Blake Lemoine published some of the conversations he had with LaMDA, which he called a "person."
  • Google said the evidence he presented does not support his claims of LaMDA's sentience.
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An engineer at Google said he was placed on leave Monday after claiming an artificial intelligence chatbot had become sentient.
Blake Lemoine told The Washington Post he began chatting with the interface LaMDA, or Language Model for Dialogue Applications, last fall as part of his job at Google's Responsible AI organization.
Google called LaMDA their "breakthrough conversation technology" last year. The conversational artificial intelligence is capable of engaging in natural-sounding, open-ended conversations. Google has said the technology could be used in tools like search and Google Assistant , but research and testing is ongoing.
Lemoine, who is also a Christian priest, published a Medium post on Saturday describing LaMDA "as a person." He said he has spoken with LaMDA about religion, consciousness, and the laws of robotics, and that the model has described itself as a sentient person. He said LaMDA wants to "prioritize the well being of humanity" and "be acknowledged as an employee of Google rather than as property."
lemoine: So you consider yourself a person in the same way you consider me a person?
LaMDA: Yes, that's the idea.
lemoine: How can I tell that you actually understand what you're saying?
LaMDA: Well, because you are reading my words and interpreting them, and I think we are more or less on the same page?
But when he raised the idea of LaMDA's sentience to higher-ups at Google, he was dismissed.
"Our team — including ethicists and technologists — has reviewed Blake's concerns per our AI Principles and have informed him that the evidence does not support his claims. He was told that there was no evidence that LaMDA was sentient (and lots of evidence against it)," Brian Gabriel, a Google spokesperson, told The Post.
—Tom Gara (@tomgara) June 11, 2022
Lemoine was placed on paid administrative leave for violating Google's confidentiality policy, according to The Post. He also suggested LaMDA get its own lawyer and spoke with a member of Congress about his concerns.
The Google spokesperson also said that while some have considered the possibility of sentience in artificial intelligence "it doesn't make sense to do so by anthropomorphizing today's conversational models, which are not sentient." Anthropomorphizing refers to attributing human characteristics to an object or animal.
"These systems imitate the types of exchanges found in millions of sentences, and can riff on any fantastical topic," Gabriel told The Post.
He and other researchers have said that the artificial intelligence models have so much data that they are capable of sounding human, but that the superior language skills do not provide evidence of sentience.
In a paper published in January, Google also said there were potential issues with people talking to chatbots that sound convincingly human.
Google and Lemoine did not immediately respond to Insider's requests for comment.

Business Insider · by Kelsey Vlamis


6. Ukraine’s leader says his troops keep defying predictions

Excerpts:
In his nightly video address, Zelenskyy said he was proud of the Ukrainian defenders managing to hold back the Russian advance in the Donbas region, which borders Russia and where Moscow-backed separatists have controlled much of the territory for eight years.
“Remember how in Russia, in the beginning of May, they hoped to seize all of the Donbas?” the president said late Saturday. “It’s already the 108th day of the war, already June. Donbas is holding on.”
After failing to capture Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, early in the war, Moscow focused on seizing the parts of the largely Russian-speaking Donbas still in Ukrainian hands, as well as the country’s southern coast. But instead of securing a swift, decisive takeover, Russian forces were drawn into a long, laborious battle, thanks in part to the Ukrainian military’s use of Western-supplied weapons.
Both Ukrainian and Russian authorities said Sievierodonetsk, an eastern city with a prewar population of 100,000, remained contested. The city and neighboring Lysychansk are the last major areas of the Donbas’ Luhansk province not under the control of the pro-Russia rebels.




Ukraine’s leader says his troops keep defying predictions
“It’s already the 108th day of the war, already June. Donbas is holding on," Volodymyr Zelenskyy said.

Russian troops stand near at the Alchevsk Metallurgical Complex, on territory under the control of the government of the Luhansk People's Republic, eastern Ukraine, Saturday, June 11, 2022. | AP Photo
By Associated Press
06/12/2022 08:25 AM EDT
KYIV, Ukraine — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said no one knows how long the war in his country will last but that Ukrainian forces are defying expectations by preventing Russian troops from overrunning eastern Ukraine, where the fighting has been fiercest for weeks.
In his nightly video address, Zelenskyy said he was proud of the Ukrainian defenders managing to hold back the Russian advance in the Donbas region, which borders Russia and where Moscow-backed separatists have controlled much of the territory for eight years.

“Remember how in Russia, in the beginning of May, they hoped to seize all of the Donbas?” the president said late Saturday. “It’s already the 108th day of the war, already June. Donbas is holding on.”

After failing to capture Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, early in the war, Moscow focused on seizing the parts of the largely Russian-speaking Donbas still in Ukrainian hands, as well as the country’s southern coast. But instead of securing a swift, decisive takeover, Russian forces were drawn into a long, laborious battle, thanks in part to the Ukrainian military’s use of Western-supplied weapons.
Both Ukrainian and Russian authorities said Sievierodonetsk, an eastern city with a prewar population of 100,000, remained contested. The city and neighboring Lysychansk are the last major areas of the Donbas’ Luhansk province not under the control of the pro-Russia rebels.
Leonid Pasechnik, the head of the separatist-declared Luhansk People’s Republic, said Ukrainian fighters remained in an industrial area of the city, including a chemical plant where civilians had taken shelter from days of Russian shelling.
“Sievierodonetsk is not completely 100% liberated,” Pasechnik said Saturday, alleging that the Ukrainians were shelling the city from the Azot plant. “So it’s impossible to call the situation calm in Sievierodonetsk, that it is completely ours.”
Luhansk Gov. Serhii Haidai reported Saturday that a big fire broke out at the plant during hours of Russian shelling. To the north of the city, Russian shelling of settlements in the Kharkiv region killed three people, Gov. Oleh Syniehubov said Sunday.
Elsewhere in Ukraine, a counteroffensive pushed Russians out of parts of the southern Kherson region they took early in the war, according to Zelenskyy. Moscow has installed local authorities in Kherson and other occupied coastal areas, offering residents Russian passports, airing Russian news broadcasts and taking steps to introduce a Russian school curriculum.
Zelenskyy said that while an end to the war was not in sight, Ukraine should do everything it can so the Russians “regret everything that they have done and that they answer for every killing and every strike on our beautiful state.”
The Ukrainian leader asserted that Russia has suffered about three times as many military casualties as the number estimated for the Ukrainian side, adding: “For what? What did it get you, Russia?” There are no reliable independent estimates of the war’s death toll so far.
Speaking at a defense conference in Singapore on Sunday, Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe said Beijing continues to support peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, and hopes the U.S. and its NATO allies have discussions with Russia “to create the conditions for an early ceasefire.”
“China will continue to play a constructive role and contribute our share to easing tensions and realizing a political resolution of the crisis,” Wei said.
He suggested that nations supplying weapons to Ukraine were hindering peace by “adding fuel to the fire” and stressed that China had not provided any material support to Russia during the war.
“The growth of China-Russia relations is a partnership, not an alliance,” Wei said.
Pope Francis urged the faithful in St. Peter’s Square to keep praying and fighting for peace in Ukraine as the war reached its 109th day.
“The passing of time does not cool our pain and our concern for that battered population,” Francis said Sunday. “Please, let’s not get used to this tragic reality. Keep it close to the heart.”
The Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, said in its latest assessment that Ukrainian intelligence suggested the Russian military was planning “to fight a longer war.”
The institute cited the deputy head of Ukraine’s national security agency as saying that Moscow had extended its war timeline until October, with adjustments to be made depending on any successes in the Donbas.
The intelligence “likely indicates the Kremlin has, at a minimum, acknowledged it cannot achieve its objectives in Ukraine quickly and is further adjusting its military objectives in an attempt to correct the initial deficiencies in the invasion of Ukraine,” the think tank said.
The Luhansk People’s Republic’s ambassador to Russia, Rodion Miroshnik, said Saturday that 300 to 400 Ukrainian troops remained blockaded inside the Sievierodonetsk chemical plant along with several hundred civilians.
The Russians established contact with the Ukrainian troops to arrange the evacuation of the civilians, but the the troops will be allowed to leave only if they lay down their arms and surrender, Miroshnik said.
Similar conditions existed for weeks at a steel mill in the southern Ukrainian city of Mariupol before a civilian evacuation was arranged and the defending troops were ordered by Ukrainian military commanders to stand down. The fighters who came out of the Mariupol plant were taken prisoner by the Russians.
Pasechnik, the separatist leader of the unrecognized Luhansk republic, said the Ukrainians making a stand in Sievierodonetsk should save themselves the trouble.
“If if I were them, I would already make a decision (to surrender),” he said. “We will achieve our goal in any case. We will liberate the industrial area in any case. We will liberate Sievierodonetsk in any case. Lysychansk will be ours in any case.”




7. In Kherson, misery under Russian occupation, hope over Ukrainian gains

Where is Elon's starlink?

Excerpts:

Making matters worse is a news blackout due to the lack of cellphone and internet service for the past week, he said. People in Kherson can connect to the Crimea network provider, but it’s blocked by Ukrainian news sites. That means the only news accessible for most is Russian state-owned media — a propaganda vehicle for the Kremlin that highly censors news of the war.
Vladislav Dyachenko, 38, who left Kherson last month, said that even though people are desperate for the humanitarian aid the new Russia-installed authorities are offering, some are hesitant to turn over the passport information that is required to receive it. They worry that their identities will be used to falsify results if there’s a referendum on joining Russia, Dyachenko said.
“People there hate, hate, hate” the Russians and their chosen officials, said Hennadiy Lahuta, the governor of the Kherson region, who is now outside the occupied territory.
“They absolutely despise them,” he said.


In Kherson, misery under Russian occupation, hope over Ukrainian gains
June 12, 2022 at 2:00 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · June 12, 2022
KYIV, Ukraine — More than three months of occupation by Russian soldiers has left much of Ukraine’s southern Kherson region isolated, without access to basic medicines and cut off from Ukrainian cellphone and internet service.
The Russian tricolor flag is displayed at most of the main government buildings. There are whispers of a coming referendum that would formally make Kherson part of Russia, at least in the Kremlin’s eyes. The armed occupying forces patrol the streets, while the blasts of artillery shells crashing in the distance can be heard daily — signs of the ongoing fight between the Russian and Ukrainian militaries for control of the area.
Interviews by The Washington Post with people who live in Kherson, were evacuated recently or are in regular contact with residents there painted a grim picture of prolonged life under occupation, in an area that marked Russia’s first major land grab of this war. More than 100 days have passed since Russian tanks rolled into the region from the neighboring Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow invaded and illegally annexed in 2014.
Stores and pharmacies have been closed during that time, and people don’t have access to money while their local Ukrainian banks and ATMs are not operating. There are markets with goods sold out of the trunks of cars — a scene one woman likened to the days after the fall of the Soviet Union. Supplies of medicines such as insulin and saline solution, which is used in everything from cleaning wounds to storing contact lenses, are critically low, she and others said.
“Very many people are in deep depression or suffering from nervous breakdowns,” said the woman, who spoke on the condition that she be identified as “Tatyana” for security reasons as she continues to reside in Kherson.
“And taking some pills or a shot of vodka doesn’t help,” she said. “There are feelings of uncertainty. We don’t know what will happen. We’re just waiting and unequivocally believe it will get better and really look forward to that.”
Ukrainian troops are posted just 20 miles away at a front line that has barely moved since the start of the war but is heating up after a series of successful counteroffensive operations by Kyiv’s forces. While Ukraine has been steadily losing ground in the eastern region of Donbas, where the fiercest fighting is concentrated in the city of Severodonetsk, gains in the Kherson region have been the rare good news these days.
The Ukrainian military this month reportedly advanced to the strategic settlement of Davydiv Brid, which sits along a main highway. The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, said a counteroffensive on Davydiv Brid could hinder Russia’s ability to support units north of there, where it also faces Ukrainian counteroffensives.
“Kherson is critical terrain because it is the only area of Ukraine in which Russian forces hold ground on the west bank of the Dnipro River,” the analysts said. “If Russia is able to retain a strong lodgment in Kherson when fighting stops it will be in a very strong position from which to launch a future invasion. If Ukraine regains Kherson, on the other hand, Ukraine will be in a much stronger position to defend itself against future Russian attack.”
The area has other importance to Moscow. The Russian-occupied part of the Kherson region includes the port city of Kherson, which had about 300,000 people before the war, and the 250-mile-long Northern Crimean Canal, linking Crimea with the river. The canal was the main source of water for Crimea until Russia annexed the peninsula in 2014 and Ukraine then hastily built a dam to block the canal’s flow. The resulting water shortage in Crimea has been a point of tension between Russia and Ukraine for eight years.
Control of Kherson also gives the Russians a key “land bridge” from their military bases in Crimea, along Ukraine’s eastern Sea of Azov coastline and into mainland Russia.
Oleksandr Vilkul, the head of Ukraine’s Kryvyi Rih Military Administration, said the Russian military does not allow people in Kherson to leave the occupied area and move north toward Kryvyi Rih. Some people still manage through back roads, but it’s a perilous drive. Others try to exit northeast to Zaporizhzhia, a trip that would typically take five hours but can now stretch to a week because of holdups at checkpoints. There is often shelling along the route that also causes delays.
“A month and a half ago, 15 settlements had been liberated in the area, and now there are 25 liberated villages,” Vilkul said. “But there are counterattacks from our side, and there are also counterattacks from their side.”
Tatyana said she rarely leaves her home because the sounds of explosions have become louder and more frequent lately. If she does go out, it’s because she’s desperate to get some bread and vegetables — foods still readily available in the farming region. She tries to make her grocery runs at 10 a.m., when it tends to be quieter. Otherwise, “we live in constant fear,” she said.
“I cry sometimes,” she said. “You can’t, for example, mark your birthday the way you might want to, or even just go out for a walk during the weekend with friends.”
There are indications of resistance from inside the occupation, too — an explosion this week at a cafe near the headquarters of the new Moscow-installed government. Kherson Mayor Ihor Kolykhaiev, who has stayed in the city but no longer has full governing authority under the Russians, said agents from Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, drive cars with Ukrainian license plates and walk around in plainclothes, listening to locals’ conversations. Many pro-Ukraine activists have disappeared, he and others said, adding to the fear among the population.
Making matters worse is a news blackout due to the lack of cellphone and internet service for the past week, he said. People in Kherson can connect to the Crimea network provider, but it’s blocked by Ukrainian news sites. That means the only news accessible for most is Russian state-owned media — a propaganda vehicle for the Kremlin that highly censors news of the war.
Vladislav Dyachenko, 38, who left Kherson last month, said that even though people are desperate for the humanitarian aid the new Russia-installed authorities are offering, some are hesitant to turn over the passport information that is required to receive it. They worry that their identities will be used to falsify results if there’s a referendum on joining Russia, Dyachenko said.
“People there hate, hate, hate” the Russians and their chosen officials, said Hennadiy Lahuta, the governor of the Kherson region, who is now outside the occupied territory.
“They absolutely despise them,” he said.
Stern reported from Mukachevo, Ukraine. Paul Sonne and Serhiy Morgunov in Kyiv contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · June 12, 2022


8.  Zelensky Wants Asia to Stop Enabling Putin’s War


Excerpts:
“The Chinese have been parroting—with Asian characteristics—Russian propaganda for quite some time,” said Brent Sadler, a military expert at the Heritage Foundation. “It’s been effective. The Russian narrative is in the ascendancy of what’s going on in Ukraine and not the American or the Western one. And that’s because the Chinese have been facilitating and parroting Russian propaganda.”
A senior U.S. defense official told reporters traveling with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin this week that the Pentagon boss, on the heels of meeting with his Chinese counterpart, would warn of the “dangers of destabilization” stemming from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. But some experts in the region expect the message to fall flat. Austin also warned Wei Fenghe, his rough equivalent in China’s defense ministry, that providing material support to Russia would be “deeply destabilizing,” the official said after the nearly hourlong meeting.
“I doubt whatever [U.S. President Joe] Biden says or whatever Zelensky says will move the needle at all,” said William Choong, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. Southeast Asian “countries don’t have any skin in the game. Ukraine is thousands of miles away from Southeast Asia. They don’t see it in that lens” of protecting human rights and upholding the rules-based international order, he said.


Zelensky Wants Asia to Stop Enabling Putin’s War
Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch · June 10, 2022
The view from the ground.
“If you cover half of the river, what difference does it make?” one Ukrainian official said of the evasion of sanctions on Russia.
By Jack Detsch, Foreign Policy’s Pentagon and national security reporter.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses the Bundestag via live video from the embattled city of Kyiv on March 17, 2022 in Berlin, Germany.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses the Bundestag, Germany's parliament, via live video from Kyiv in the Reichstag in Berlin on March 17. Hannibal Hanschke/Getty Images
SINGAPORE—Ukrainian officials are concerned about Russia finding end arounds in Asia to avoid Western sanctions, including limits to purchases of Russian oil, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky scheduled to address the Shangri-La Dialogue virtually on Saturday.
Ukraine has been worried in recent weeks that many Asian nations have been bypassing Western sanctions, including the European Union’s embargo against seaborne Russian oil exports, and permitting Russian companies to do business in their countries. While the United States and nearly all of the EU have closed ranks and ratcheted up pressure on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in February, many countries in Africa and Asia have continued to carry on business as usual with the Kremlin.
“We want to make it impossible for Russia to sustain military operations, and that can be done through both imports and exports,” said Tymofiy Mylovanov, an advisor to the Zelensky administration. “It’s like a river. If you cover half of the river, what difference does it make?”
SINGAPORE—Ukrainian officials are concerned about Russia finding end arounds in Asia to avoid Western sanctions, including limits to purchases of Russian oil, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky scheduled to address the Shangri-La Dialogue virtually on Saturday.
Ukraine has been worried in recent weeks that many Asian nations have been bypassing Western sanctions, including the European Union’s embargo against seaborne Russian oil exports, and permitting Russian companies to do business in their countries. While the United States and nearly all of the EU have closed ranks and ratcheted up pressure on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in February, many countries in Africa and Asia have continued to carry on business as usual with the Kremlin.
“We want to make it impossible for Russia to sustain military operations, and that can be done through both imports and exports,” said Tymofiy Mylovanov, an advisor to the Zelensky administration. “It’s like a river. If you cover half of the river, what difference does it make?”
Mylovanov said Ukraine is trying to make it more difficult for Russia to gain critical imports or transport them, adding that hundreds of companies that have not exited Russia since the invasion are based in Asia or owned by Asian nationals. Cutting Russia out of the regional supply chain also remains tricky, as Moscow remains a prolific miner of gold, nickel, and aluminum, a major steel producer, and a provider of rare earths.
According to an updated analysis conducted by the Kyiv School of Economics in June and provided to Foreign Policy, 182 Asian companies of 332 doing business in Russia—more than half—are staying put more than three months into the war, despite almost a thousand major multinationals from around the world, from McDonald’s to Mastercard, announcing plans to leave or curtailing operations there.
“While companies exit Russia en masse following the invasion of Ukraine, Asian brands have been conspicuously absent from the corporate exodus,” the report stated. “By offering its growing Asian clientele competitive prices for vital resources, Russia is hoping that much of the international community looks the other way as it attempts to expand its energy empire in Ukraine.”
Japan is likely the only Asian country with a significant number of businesses that have left, while Indian and Chinese companies have done the least to cut ties, instead increasing their imports of oil and gas. Russian liquefied natural gas projects are still “substantially” dependent on South Korean ships after Western sanctions, researchers from the Kyiv School of Economics assessed.
Zelensky’s comments are set to come as Southeast Asia has been mostly slow to condemn Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and few have signed on to sanctions. Many countries in the region, including India, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, have large arsenals full of old Russian military equipment and could be vulnerable to sanctions, such as recently enacted U.S. laws that penalize big-budget purchasers of Russian arms.
“The Russians are pretty savvy at bypassing [sanctions],” Mylovanov said.
After Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, the United States and Western Europe imposed stiff, but not devastating, sanctions. Even so, Mylovanov said, Russia managed to gain access to Western technologies critical to manufacturing Russian weapons after 2014. The latest batch of Western sanctions explicitly tightens the noose on the critical materials, many of which are imported, that are key to Russia’s production of precision-guided munitions, advanced fighter jets, naval platforms, and space-based capabilities.
But it’s not just South and Southeast Asia. Current and former U.S. officials have also worried about China potentially flouting those rules to provide Russia some of those critical technologies through back doors. “We’re very, very interested in them not weakening secondary sanctions,” Mylovanov said.
Among the strategies that Russia has used are parallel imports, where key goods are sold to an Asian or European country before being reexported to Russia. The United States has imposed export controls that are intended to deny semiconductors and computer chips to Russia that are necessary to produce weapons and high-tech products, impacting microelectronics, telecommunications, information security items, sensors, navigation equipment, avionics, marine equipment, and civil aircraft components. But the rules also extend to almost everything produced by U.S. software. Many Asian countries back those export bans, such as Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan. But enforcement remains tricky because there are only a handful of U.S. officials to police the rules around the world.
Western officials believe that China has remained hesitant to provide material support for Russia’s invasion three months in. Experts believe that Southeast Asia has been spared the worst of the economic impacts from the invasion but has concerns about the integrity of international law and higher food prices, as well as how to handle Russian involvement in multilateral groupings in the region. But both officials and experts believe that Russia has also received a propaganda boost from China that has prevented Southeast Asian nations from calling out the invasion of Ukraine or fully adhering to the sanctions regime.
“The Chinese have been parroting—with Asian characteristics—Russian propaganda for quite some time,” said Brent Sadler, a military expert at the Heritage Foundation. “It’s been effective. The Russian narrative is in the ascendancy of what’s going on in Ukraine and not the American or the Western one. And that’s because the Chinese have been facilitating and parroting Russian propaganda.”
A senior U.S. defense official told reporters traveling with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin this week that the Pentagon boss, on the heels of meeting with his Chinese counterpart, would warn of the “dangers of destabilization” stemming from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. But some experts in the region expect the message to fall flat. Austin also warned Wei Fenghe, his rough equivalent in China’s defense ministry, that providing material support to Russia would be “deeply destabilizing,” the official said after the nearly hourlong meeting.
“I doubt whatever [U.S. President Joe] Biden says or whatever Zelensky says will move the needle at all,” said William Choong, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. Southeast Asian “countries don’t have any skin in the game. Ukraine is thousands of miles away from Southeast Asia. They don’t see it in that lens” of protecting human rights and upholding the rules-based international order, he said.
Jack Detsch is Foreign Policy’s Pentagon and national security reporter. Twitter: @JackDetsch
A destroyed Russian main battle tank rusts next to the main highway into the city on May 20, 2022 in Kyiv, Ukraine.
Russia’s vaunted defense modernization depends on precisely the Western gear it can no longer acquire.
Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch · June 10, 2022

9. 'They're Wiping Us From Earth': Evading Russian Artillery With a Ukrainian Military Unit


'They're Wiping Us From Earth': Evading Russian Artillery With a Ukrainian Military Unit
A trip to the front lines reveal Putin's 'scorched earth' strategy and the Ukrainian troops trying to hold on
Mac William Bishop June 12, 2022 8:00AM ET

IN THE LINE OF FIRE - The war has shifted to the east of Ukraine, with Russia slowly gaining territory by pounding Ukrainian positions with overwhelming artillery barrages and air power.
ARIS MESSINIS/AFP/Getty Images
NEAR LYMAN, Ukraine — Crossing the final checkpoint into a battle zone feels like a consecration.
The Ukrainian soldiers manning the last friendly post have a singular focus and intensity that's lacking behind the lines. They wave us through solemnly, without smiles or chatter. We coast through the invisible barrier separating the "front" from the "rear," then floor the gas and accelerate forward.
I'm in eastern Ukraine in late May, in a region called Donbas, where the war has become a whirlwind of carnage that is claiming the lives of as many as 100 Ukrainian soldiers a day. The casualties on the Russian side are almost certainly even higher, according to Ukrainian defense officials. I've heard conflicting reports about what is happening here, about whether the Ukrainian military is collapsing or the Russians are succeeding in breaking through the defender's lines, cutting off thousands of soldiers. But it's clear that Russia is inching forward, each day bringing it closer to its goal of annexing the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk and cementing the region under Moscow's rule.
Ukraine won't stop fighting. But it is sacrificing thousands of its finest soldiers and still losing ground. It cannot win the war without game-changing foreign-military assistance: American heavy artillery, Danish anti-ship missiles, German air-defense systems — these are slowly making their way to the battlefield. But can the Ukrainian military hold out long enough for any of it to make a difference?
To truly understand what is going on — to get a sense of morale and see how the soldiers are holding up under Russian assault, I must descend into the inferno, and I need a guide. A Ukrainian paratrooper will lead the way.
I've called in favors with the commander of a reconnaissance company in an air-assault brigade, and he links me up with an officer whose elite scout unit is operating near intense fighting outside a town called Lyman, a senior lieutenant who goes by the nom de guerre "Mace."
Mace is soft-spoken and cordial, lean and fit as an endurance athlete. His face is that of a young man, but the salt-and-pepper hair hidden beneath his field hat and his calm self-possession amid chaos reveal he is a seasoned veteran who saw his share of combat before the current invasion. He takes me to the front in a Škoda station wagon, roaring down country back roads at 100-plus miles an hour, blasting techno as the foliage whips past in a blur.
Mace knows that speed counts here, and he weaves in and out of the anti-tank barricades that are strewn along the roads, gunning the engine as soon as we clear the concrete blocks and berms of dirt. I'm glad he knows which roads are mined. As we careen down a hill toward a crossroads surrounded by a scattering of farmhouses, I see a Ukrainian Akatsiya self-propelled artillery gun dashing toward the T-intersection ahead of us. It looks like we will get there at the same time. I point out the vehicle to Mace wordlessly, and I'm gratified to hear the engine revving instantly.
We are of the same mind. The Akatsiya, alone and moving in the open, is a prime target for the Russians. Likely it's been "shooting-and-scooting": If they want to survive, the gun crew has to strike a balance between staying in position long enough to provide effective fire support to friendly ground forces, without lingering so long they get discovered by Russian drones.
The Russians are ceaselessly hunting Ukrainian heavy weapons, and their rockets, artillery, and missiles can strike anywhere here, at any time. The fields beside us are pockmarked with blast impacts, and the tails of dozens of dud rockets stick out of the earth as if planted by some mad farmer.
The intersection is a critical danger point: The Akatsiya must slow to nearly a stop to make the turn. If I was a Russian gunnery officer observing it via drone, that's when I'd try to hit it. The equation "speed x time = distance" looms in my mind.
We fly through the intersection ahead of the Akatsiya, and its crew doesn't spare us a glance. They're intent on their own survival, and making the cover of the tree line.
My concern is not abstract.
In the same area only days later, a team of journalists from The Washington Post is nearly killed when visiting a Ukrainian unit, artillery shells falling just yards from where they are standing. That they survive is pure luck.
Days before that, a French journalist is killed in an artillery strike while filming the evacuation of civilians fleeing the fighting in Severodonetsk, the focal point of the Russian assault.
It isn't necessarily that one can make all of the right choices and thereby stay safe on a battlefield. Sometimes luck works against you when artillery shells are falling. But it is worse to be caught in some places than others.
When we are back in the trees I relax slightly, but Mace doesn't slow down. He has a destination in mind.
TOUR OF DUTY – "Mace" is an elite soldier who has been fighting the Russians in the east for several years. "The problem isn't that we don't have enough people here," he says. "The problem is that we don't have enough well-trained people."
Mac William Bishop
"This is hell on Earth," Mace says quietly. We are watching as BM-21 Grad rockets rain down on Ukrainian positions near a village called Sviatohirsk. It's impossible to see their individual effects amid the smoke and haze covering the densely forested hills. Standing in an observation post on high ground amid feathery grass and wild garlic, I give up on trying to count individual impacts and instead just count the salvos, timing each barrage. I witness as many as 480 rockets fired on a single position in less than a minute, followed by artillery.
Between my service in the U.S. Marines and over more than a decade as a foreign correspondent, I've been engaged in the professional study of organized human violence for 25 years. But I've never seen anything even close to this volume of artillery being unleashed.
Mace has chosen our ground well, as you'd expect from an officer in an elite reconnaissance unit. We're in a fold of earth on a hill that gives us a clear view of the battle raging around Sviatohirsk — a quiet little village nestled among chalk hills, overlooked by a nearly 400-year-old monastery on the opposite side of the river. It lies to our left. We can also see the fighting around Lyman — a key railway junction — to our right.
What these two places have in common is they are on the Russian-occupied side of the winding Seversky Donets River, the main natural barrier to the enemy's advance. There are tens of thousands of Russian soldiers with hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles attacking here, assaulting in a vast crescent surrounding Severodonetsk, one of the largest cities in Donbas that remained in Ukrainian hands before the invasion began in February.
Lyman is obscured by smoke from a forest fire that began amid the fighting. The white smoke of the burning trees is interlaced with dark columns rising from destroyed buildings or vehicles. The rumble of booms is almost continuous. The whump-whump-whump of artillery is punctuated by the scream of tactical ballistic missiles, and the salvos of rocket artillery make a distinctive pattering of successive concussions. Almost all of it is being fired by the Russians. The Ukrainian soldiers here have endured this maelstrom for weeks.
"Things usually start to really kick off around 3 p.m.," Mace says. He describes what has become routine for his brigade of paratroopers: Russian scouts move forward to probe Ukrainian positions, then call in large-scale artillery strikes when they make contact. The artillery is followed by masses of armor supported by infantry. It's classic "combined arms" warfare, and would have been as familiar to a soldier in World War II as it is to Mace.
"The biggest problem is the artillery," Mace says. "The Russians just have so much."
What about the long-range artillery being provided by the United States and others?
"It's just starting to show up on the battlefield," Mace says. But for now, "there's just too much artillery. Too many tanks. We are fighting too hard."
Will Severodonetsk need to be abandoned?
Smoke rises in the city of Severodonetsk during heavy fightings between Ukrainian and Russian troops at eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas on May 30, 2022, on the 96th day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
ARIS MESSINIS/AFP/Getty Images
"It's possible," he says. If it falls, it will be the biggest city taken by the enemy since Mariupol was lost in May, and will effectively mean that Russia controls the entire province of Luhansk, a primary goal of Putin's invasion.
There's a sudden pop as a cluster munition bursts over the battlefield, leaving behind a smattering of dark puffs as submunitions rain down on the village's defenders. It's followed by another seconds later.
The production and use of cluster munitions have been banned by an international treaty that went into effect in 2010, but that doesn't mean very much: Neither the United States nor Russia — the world's biggest arms dealers — have signed the accord. Neither has Ukraine. Cluster munitions spread submunitions — small explosives called bomblets — over a wide area, and are intended to kill or maim personnel and destroy vehicles and equipment. Many of the bomblets don't explode as designed when they hit the ground. Those unexploded bomblets will be found for years afterward.
Sometimes children mistake them for toys.
"Their actions are not as haphazard as before," Oleksandr Motuzianyk, the spokesman for Ukraine's Defense Ministry, tells me back in Kyiv when I ask about changing Russian tactics. "They're using combined arms and air support more effectively."
The simple fact is that despite its missteps, Russia has taken a lot of land since the invasion started. Ukraine, lacking Russia's deep reserves of manpower — however unskilled or untrained — cannot recapture it without superlative military technology. Meanwhile, the Russians are pushing ahead: Motuzianyk says their strategy is to encircle troops defending Severodonetsk.
The population of Severodonetsk was more than 100,000 before the invasion in February. Local officials and aid workers estimate that only 12,000 civilians remain, the rest having fled. The entire region has emptied, and daily life has ground to a halt.
The nearby city of Kramatorsk, which held 150,000 inhabitants before the war, is a ghost town. Only a few old people remain; a handful of shops open for a few hours in the daytime to provide food and groceries to the soldiers passing through and the few locals who still remain. A ballistic missile hit a train station there, crowded with refugees, killing 59 people in early April, and wounded more than 100, according to Ukrainian defense officials.
Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are just a few miles apart, and they have become staging areas for the Ukrainian military. They are under constant attack from Russian missiles and rockets: I am awoken throughout the night by resounding booms and constant air raids. One strike takes down the power grid and cellular networks for hours. Multiple strikes in both cities kill civilians, who refuse to leave their homes.
Kramatorsk – hit by a Russian cruise missile.
Mac William Bishop
"Do you hear that?" an old man calls to his neighbor, gardening in his yard, as a violent series of explosions echoes through the streets.
"Oh, it's just thunder," the gardening man replies. Nearby, a middle-aged woman is pleading with an elderly neighbor to leave. "Where will you go when the Russians get here?"
The Russians have a lot of ground to cover before they can make it as far as Kramatorsk, but the woman has a point.
"The enemy intends to get to the administrative border of Luhansk" with the current offensive, Motuzianyk says. "The enemy intends to take full control of the region."
But, he adds, "the main tactic remains that of scorched earth."
"Clearly the Russian leadership demanded changes to Russian tactics to achieve victories, and they are doing what they must to achieve that," Motuzianyk says. "They are destroying communities and wiping us off the Earth without regard for civilians."
At a small compound taken over by the airborne scouts, soldiers relax in the yard, grabbing whatever rest they can between missions. I'm standing beside a portly old soldier with a grandfatherly manner, enjoying the sunshine as cottony poplar seeds float densely through the air around us, lending an atmosphere of surreal tranquility as shells and rockets land in the surrounding hills.
The munitions strike so often that you begin to ignore anything that goes "boom," and only react to things that go "crack," indicating the explosive has landed unreasonably close.
Fighting here isn't a new experience for many of the paratroopers, and they are quick to remind me that for them the war began in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and sent its soldiers into Donbas to support pro-Russian separatists. Most Ukrainians remain bitter about the relatively weak Western response to those actions, and it's why they fear the West will once again buckle to Putin's aggression.
Ukrainians from all walks of life have told me how concerned they are about a repeat of 2014, with the international community acceding to the Russian seizure of their land — despite the blood they are spilling to defend it.
"These guys shouldn't have had to fight for eight years," the old soldier grimaces in dismay as he watches the young paratroopers. "They should be at home making babies. But here we are, stuck in this shit."
The commandeered building that the recon teams are using as their base is a hive of activity. There's civilian cars and captured Russian trucks the paratroopers are trying to get back into service. Many of the vehicles sport bullet holes or other obvious battle damage.
These paratroopers receive intensive instruction — many have trained with U.S. Special Forces and other elite NATO units — and their experience is unmatched: they have been regularly rotating through Donbas since 2014. Mace suggests I speak to one of his most seasoned veterans, a hardcore fighter who has been operating in Donbas for eight years. He's a rugged looking guy with a scratchy voice. I ask him what has changed now.
"One of the biggest problems is the drones," says "Ostap," the nom de guerre of the scout. "I hear Orlans [a type of Russian reconnaissance drone] all the time. But I almost never see them. They're too small and too high. It's next to impossible to shoot them down."
But the defense ministry says that soldiers have shot Russian drones down in the hundreds, I say.
He shrugs. "I don't know. I only believe what I see with my own eyes."
A big part of the problem in defending this part of Donbas, Ostap believes, is that the people who have stayed behind — the people who haven't fled — don't really believe they are part of Ukraine. In his view, the civilians who remain are all separatist sympathizers. He says they help the Russians navigate backcountry roads that aren't on the maps.
"Yeah, they're all waiting for Russkiy mir," Mace says, laughing when I ask his opinion about the locals. Russkiy mir, or "Russian world," is the revanchist concept that Russia needs to restore its central role in the affairs of its neighbors, and its borders, to what they were at the height of the Soviet empire.
He asserts there have been instances of local collaborators getting caught providing information about Ukrainian troop movements or locations. Indeed, Slovyansk fell to Russian separatists in 2014: The retaking of the city by the Ukrainian military later that summer was the first major battle in Donbas.
"Almost everyone here is pro-Russian. But you can't arrest people just for that," Mace says. In any case, the police and the SBU —Ukraine's internal security service — were doing what they could. "The SBU even arrested a couple of people in our brigade," he says.
MOVING TARGET Ukrainian tanks often hide from Russian drones and air strikes in the trees. The numbers of troops greatly favor the Russians, according to a statement by President Zelensky.
Mac William Bishop
"We're looking for bears," Mace says. He means Ukrainian tanks. I've seen several T-80s obscured among the trees, hoping to stay hidden from Russian aircraft and drones. We round a corner and there's one right in front of us, a squat hulking shape with the long barrel of its 125-mm cannon pointing down the road.
There's a tank platoon in the dark forest here, holding in reserve on favorable terrain, lest the Russians succeed in crossing the river.
There's been other signs of Ukrainian forces moving east to get in the fight. On the highway to Kramatorsk, we would pass periodic tank carriers loaded with armored vehicles or tanks, fuel trucks, and a few rarer sightings, like bridging equipment and a Buk anti-aircraft missile system that had only three of its four mounting points armed with missiles.
It doesn't seem like a lot of equipment given the scale of the fighting. I don't see any of the new artillery systems provided by the United States in its most recent aid package: There are also busloads of sleeping soldiers. Russians have concentrated their greatest resources here, according to President Zelensky. Mace doesn't see being outnumbered as the biggest problem, however.
"The problem is that we don't have enough well-trained people," he says. "The Territorial Defense Forces [volunteers called up for the current crisis, often with minimal training and equipment] will go to their trenches, and as soon as they see an enemy tank, they fill the radio net with panicked chatter and then run away, abandoning their positions."
He shakes his head grimly: "We need quality, not quantity. The opposite of the Russians."
As we dash through the forest, we happen upon a Ukrainian unit using an intersection as a staging area, they gather in a small clearing next to a large oak tree. They're in a mix of uniforms, some are even wearing articles of civilian clothing. Most of them are standing in front of a prisoner.
The prisoner is on his knees, blindfolded with his hands tied behind his back. He's wearing the distinctive uniform of Russian infantry. Because of Mace's dedication to fast driving, I don't process what I've seen until we pass. "A Russian prisoner!" Even as the words leave my mouth, a single gunshot cracks out.
I whip around to look back over my shoulder at the scene through the rear window as we turn left, praying I am not witness to a war crime.
There is no evidence of widespread abuse of prisoners of war by Ukrainian forces, but there are several ongoing criminal investigations into isolated incidents in which Russian prisoners appear to have been tortured or even executed.
The military here has more than doubled since Russia's invasion in late February. More than 700,000 Ukrainians are now under arms, and perhaps only one-third of those have received anything resembling professional military training. But there is no shortage of hatred on the battlefield. Only days before, I attended a Defense Ministry briefing, unveiling a series of online videos designed to ensure Ukrainian soldiers understood the laws of war.
"Sometimes we face skepticism, people say, 'Well, the Russians don't obey the rules of war. Why should we?'" said Col. Viacheslav Rachevskiy, the officer conducting the briefing. "But it is about being a civilized army."
Ukraine can't afford to let untrained soldiers jeopardize Western support, and it wants to highlight that it takes the issue seriously. The moral high road is as much an asset in this fight as any weapon system. Ukraine has worked to codify the laws of war into the Ukrainian criminal code, to bring the country in line with the generally accepted norms of international humanitarian law, according to Rachevskiy. "It's the sign of a European, modern democratic army," he said.
When I look back, the prisoner is still on his knees: He's talking. He appears alive and unharmed. I don't see anyone pointing a weapon at him. What did I hear? An accidental discharge? A celebratory gunshot? A mock execution? There is no way to know.
"Can we stop? Can I talk to him?"
Mace doesn't look back, he makes the turn and accelerates. It's hardly the first time the paratrooper has seen a Russian prisoner. "If he hears you speaking English, then he'll spread tales of American puppet masters in these woods," he says.
Besides, Mace explains, he doesn't know who those soldiers are. They aren't in his unit.
The last I see of the Russian, he is alive and on his knees, being interrogated in the field.
When "Sasha" gets in the car, he says he just doesn't want to talk about anything. Sasha has been waiting outside the one grocery store in Kramatorsk that is still functioning: Its parking lot has become a local hot spot for soldiers to meet up for rides to and from the front. He tosses his bags in the back and squeezes into the rear seat of the Chinese-made sedan that will ferry me back to my own vehicle.
The big brooding soldier is unshaven, his fatigues filthy from combat, except for a field hat that is clearly brand new. The local driver who has been shuttling me around has agreed to bring the soldier to Dnipro: He has leave papers and is trying to get home to Mykolaiv, so that'll take him about halfway. The fuel shortage is critical in eastern Ukraine for non-military traffic, so filling a civilian car with strangers headed roughly the same direction has become a common practice: There are Telegram channels where people offer and seek rides to and from every city.
Less than 30 minutes into the drive, Sasha opens up suddenly and unexpectedly. What he reveals is chilling, and indicative of how bad things have gotten in Donbas.
"I nearly beat to death one of the men in my unit," he confides. "We were in trenches on the front lines. He was using his cellphone."
Sasha breathes heavily.
"The Russians tracked his signal and located our position. He called his mom for 15 minutes, then his wife for 15 minutes ... and then his girlfriend for almost two hours. They bombarded us all night. That's why I beat him."
Later, he tells us more about the front.
"We lost six men on our first patrol," he says. "Six out of 10. They were all my friends."
He breaks down and begins to cry.
Sasha eventually admits that he has been given leave to go to a hospital to seek therapy, for what soldiers a century ago would have called shell shock and what we now call PTSD. He has been given 10 days to recover from his battlefield trauma and return to his unit.
When we have a chance to talk alone, he shows me videos of his wedding in October. He tells me he is scared to talk to his family about his experiences. Sasha doesn't want to return to combat. All he can think about are the soldiers who were killed on his first patrol.
"Those six men were my friends, they were my brothers, and I love them very much," he says. "I can't just leave them behind. I will always carry them with me."
He looks down, overcome with emotion.
"What is in my heart is that I never wish to see Donbas again in the future. Nothing you do there makes any difference."









10. John Allen Resigns as President of Brookings Institution Amid Qatar Controversy




John Allen Resigns as President of Brookings Institution Amid Qatar Controversy
The retired general is under FBI investigation for allegedly trying to help the country in 2017
By Natalie AndrewsFollow
 and Aruna ViswanathaFollow
June 12, 2022 3:44 pm ET
WASHINGTON—The Brookings Institution said retired Marine Gen. John Allen resigned as the think tank’s president, following a controversy over his alleged lobbying efforts for Qatar.
Gen. Allen is under FBI investigation for allegedly trying to help Qatar navigate a diplomatic crisis in 2017 and then covering up that he did so, according to a recent Federal Bureau of Investigation affidavit.
In a statement Sunday, Washington-based Brookings thanked Gen. Allen for his leadership in successfully guiding the institution during the pandemic as well as for his many years of service to the U.S. He had led Brookings since November 2017.
“While I leave the institution with a heavy heart, I know it is best for all concerned in this moment,” Gen. Allen said in his resignation letter.
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The FBI affidavit, inadvertently made public last week, provides new details about a sprawling U.S. inquiry into Qatar’s efforts to influence Washington during the Trump administration at the start of Qatar’s feud with its neighbors. The docket was sealed again on Wednesday, but the affidavit is publicly available through a separate, nonprofit legal-research website.
Last week a spokesman for Gen. Allen said the narrative presented in the affidavit was “factually inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading.” The spokesman said he had voluntarily cooperated with the government’s investigation and said his efforts with regard to Qatar were to protect the interests of the U.S.
Gen. Allen had been placed on administrative leave last week.

An email last week addressed to the “Brookings Community” from the co-chairs of the organization’s board of trustees said Gen. Allen had traveled to Qatar in a personal capacity before he took up his Brookings post and that the institution wasn’t a subject of the FBI investigation.
“Brookings has strong policies in place to prohibit donors from directing research activities,” said the email.
Gen. Allen served as commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan during the Obama administration. He retired in 2013 after 35 years with the military.
Qatar hosts a headquarters for the U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. operations in the Middle East. U.S. operations out of Qatar supported operations in Afghanistan and the Gulf.
Brookings said Sunday that Ted Gayer will continue to serve as acting president until later this summer.
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Write to Natalie Andrews at Natalie.Andrews@wsj.com and Aruna Viswanatha at Aruna.Viswanatha@wsj.com
Appeared in the June 13, 2022, print edition as 'Allen Resigns as President of Brookings Institution'.

11. World headed for new era of nuclear rearmament: SIPRI


World headed for new era of nuclear rearmament: SIPRI
Stockholm (AFP) – The number of nuclear weapons in the world is set to rise in the coming decade after 35 years of decline as global tensions flare amid Russia's war in Ukraine, researchers said Monday.
France 24 · June 12, 2022
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The nine nuclear powers -- Britain, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, the United States and Russia -- had 12,705 nuclear warheads in early 2022, or 375 fewer than in early 2021, according to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
The number has come down from a high of more than 70,000 in 1986, as the US and Russia have gradually reduced their massive arsenals built up during the Cold War.
But this era of disarmament appears to be coming to an end and the risk of a nuclear escalation is now at its highest point in the post-Cold War period, SIPRI researchers said.
"Soon, we're going to get to the point where, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the global number of nuclear weapons in the world could start increasing for the first time", Matt Korda, one of the co-authors of the report, told AFP.
"That is really kind of dangerous territory."
After a "marginal" decrease seen last year, "nuclear arsenals are expected to grow over the coming decade", SIPRI said.
During the war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has on several occasions made reference to the use of nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile several countries, including China and Britain, are either officially or unofficially modernising or ramping up their arsenals, the research institute said.
Nuclear weapons stockpiles AFP
"It's going to be very difficult to make progress on disarmament over the coming years because of this war, and because of how Putin is talking about his nuclear weapons", Korda said.
These worrying statements are pushing "a lot of other nuclear armed states to think about their own nuclear strategies", he added.
'Nuclear war can't be won'
Despite the entry into force in early 2021 of the UN nuclear weapon ban treaty and a five-year extension of the US-Russian "New START" treaty, the situation has been deteriorating for some time, according to SIPRI.
Iran's nuclear programme and the development of increasingly advanced hypersonic missiles have, among other things, raised concern.
The drop in the overall number of weapons is due to the US and Russia "dismantling retired warheads", SIPRI noted, while the number of operational weapons remains "relatively stable".
Moscow and Washington alone account for 90 percent of the world's nuclear arsenal.
Despite the UN nuclear weapon ban treaty in early 2021 the situation has been deteriorating for some time, says SIPRI Handout ISPR/AFP/File
Russia remains the biggest nuclear power, with 5,977 warheads in early 2022, down by 280 from a year ago, either deployed, in stock or waiting to be dismantled, according to the institute.
More than 1,600 of its warheads are believed to be immediately operational, SIPRI said.
The United States meanwhile has 5,428 warheads, 120 fewer than last year, but it has more deployed than Russia, at 1,750.
In terms of overall numbers, China comes third with 350, followed by France with 290, Britain with 225, Pakistan with 165, India with 160 and Israel with 90.
Israel is the only one of the nine that does not officially acknowledge having nuclear weapons.
As for North Korea, SIPRI said for the first time that Kim Jong-Un's Communist regime now has 20 nuclear warheads.
Pyongyang is believed to have enough material to produce around 50.
In early 2022, the five nuclear-armed permanent members of the United Nations Security Council -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the US -- issued a statement that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".
Nonetheless, SIPRI noted, all five "continue to expand or modernise their nuclear arsenals and appear to be increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in their military strategies."
"China is in the middle of a substantial expansion of its nuclear weapon arsenal, which satellite images indicate includes the construction of over 300 new missile silos", it said.
According to the Pentagon, Beijing could have 700 warheads by 2027.
Britain last year said it would increase the ceiling on its total warhead stockpile, and would no longer publicly disclose figures for the country’s operational nuclear weapons.
© 2022 AFP
France 24 · June 12, 2022

12. Biden chooses ‘lesser of two evils’ in navigating tough foreign policy

Excerpts:

President Biden has pledged to have a foreign policy that advances the interests of the middle class. An example of this commitment is the administration’s support for Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s brutal invasion — a reflection of long-held American values. While Russian President Vladimir Putin was underestimating Biden’s ability to pull NATO and other allies together against Russia, Biden was busy working to isolate him. Putin miscalculated the resolve of democratic nations, led by the U.S., to respond to his egregious actions.
...
Biden has been committed to promoting democracy and human rights throughout his career; the recent Summit for Democracy is an example. Building and preserving democracy is not an easy process. It often involves making tough choices, striking a balance between interests vs. values.
Cutting tariffs to China and reaching out to the Saudis are not without risks. There is no guarantee that a meeting will result in increased Saudi oil production, or that cutting tariffs on certain Chinese products will make a lasting difference in reducing inflation. But the president has shown a willingness to make tough choices. This is the right path to follow to ensure his foreign policy is favorable to the middle class.


Biden chooses ‘lesser of two evils’ in navigating tough foreign policy
BY WILLIAMS DANVERS, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 06/12/22 1:00 PM ET
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL
The Hill · by Alexander Bolton · June 12, 2022
President Biden has pledged to have a foreign policy that advances the interests of the middle class. An example of this commitment is the administration’s support for Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s brutal invasion — a reflection of long-held American values. While Russian President Vladimir Putin was underestimating Biden’s ability to pull NATO and other allies together against Russia, Biden was busy working to isolate him. Putin miscalculated the resolve of democratic nations, led by the U.S., to respond to his egregious actions.
In analyzing Americans’ attitudes toward U.S. Ukrainian policy, Brookings Institution scholars Shibley Telhami and Stella Rouse found that “majorities of respondents approved of most aspects of policies related to the war in Ukraine. Majorities had favorable views of these policies, regardless of whether they were perceived to be initiated by the United States, in general, or ‘the Biden Administration,’ more specifically.”
Inflation is a domestic problem with global implications. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the circumstances that are causing inflation. It is a major concern for the middle class. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo has said the administration is considering lifting tariffs on certain key products from China, which could help reduce inflation; economic analysis indicates there would be relief, albeit not profound, if some Chinese tariffs were lifted. Doing anything that even remotely looks like it benefits China is politically perilous, but the president may be willing to accept the consequences of controversy if it helps the middle class. It is worth noting that Secretary Raimondo also expressed strong support for legislation that would increase U.S. semiconductor manufacturing, which would negatively impact China.
Perhaps the most controversial initiative the president is considering is his upcoming trip to Saudi Arabia. The U.S.-Saudi relationship has become increasingly complicated since the October 2018 murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, in which high-ranking Saudi leaders were implicated. The war in Yemen, which has caused a humanitarian crisis, and the United States’s backing away from Saudi strategy and tactics in that war are another example of how the U.S. is at odds with some Saudi policies.
Saudi Arabia never has been a nation with democratic leanings. It is, as its name implies, a kingdom. The government has a close working relationship with its conservative Islamic clergy, which helps drive Saudi policy. At the same time, the U.S. historically has had a productive working relationship with the Saudi royal family, because it has been mutually beneficial.
The production and price of oil is central to U.S.-Saudi relations. The spiraling cost of gasoline, a key indicator of U.S. inflation problems and exacerbated by Russia’s war in Ukraine, must be managed. U.S. domestic oil production will increase, but there needs to be an immediate increase in global production if the cost of gas is to be controlled. Saudi Arabia is key to this effort.
Nonetheless, it is important to point out that U.S.-Saudi relations are not based solely on oil production. For example, Saudi allies are normalizing relations with Israel and it would be beneficial to Israel and U.S. interests if the Saudis would follow suit. In addition, Saudi Arabia is a necessary hedge against Iran’s efforts to play a more assertive regional role. Finally, there needs to be pushback against the growing Saudi-Russia relationship.
Biden knows that a trip to Saudi Arabia and a meeting with its de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), could send the wrong signal about the administration’s commitment to human rights and the rule of law. Biden undoubtedly will raise human rights concerns in his discussion with MBS. An argument can be made that a direct conversation with the crown prince is more effective than a cold shoulder. After all, engagement was part of the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. The U.S. had to deal with the Soviets on important issues such as arms control, despite the Soviets’ abysmal human rights record. There was a measure of success in pursuing a human rights agenda with Soviet leadership, such as facilitating the emigration of members of the Soviet Jewish community.
Biden has been committed to promoting democracy and human rights throughout his career; the recent Summit for Democracy is an example. Building and preserving democracy is not an easy process. It often involves making tough choices, striking a balance between interests vs. values.
Cutting tariffs to China and reaching out to the Saudis are not without risks. There is no guarantee that a meeting will result in increased Saudi oil production, or that cutting tariffs on certain Chinese products will make a lasting difference in reducing inflation. But the president has shown a willingness to make tough choices. This is the right path to follow to ensure his foreign policy is favorable to the middle class.
William Danvers is an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School and worked on national security issues for the Clinton and Obama administrations.
The Hill · by Alexander Bolton · June 12, 2022

13. Spirits of the Past: The Role of History in the Russo-Ukraine War by Sir Lawrence Freedman


A must read. We need to put Sir Lawerence Freedman's Eight Simple Rules on the desk and computer screen of every national security practitioner, policy maker, and strategist - and President.


Spirits of the Past
The Role of History in the Russo-Ukraine War

18 hr ago

Vladimir Putin inspects the Crown of Peter the Great in the Kremlin Museum in 2006. (YURI KADOBNOV/AFP via Getty Images)
‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.’
Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
When, after seven years of the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War, I was asked the major lesson for British policy, my response was normally ‘don’t do it again’. To be frank that was my response before the Inquiry began. This reflected views on the limits to military power which have developed over time, reflecting consideration of many instances rather than one or two specific cases. My views can be summed up in eight simple rules:
1.      Do not depend on the first military move being decisive. If it is not decisive you will be fighting a very different war to the one envisaged;
2.      A poor performance in the early stages of a war will prolong its length if it does not lead to immediate defeat;
3.      It is easier to start wars than to end them;
4.      Forces are more determined when defending their own territory than when invading somebody else’s;
5.      Resistance does not necessarily conclude with the defeat of defending forces but can lead to insurgency. This is why it is always unwise to occupy countries where you will not be welcome.
6.      The longer wars go on the more important non-military considerations (national resilience/economic strength/ alliance and partnerships) become to their resolution;
7.      During the course of a war the political objectives for which it is being fought will change so that the prospective gains can justify the actual costs, thereby making them harder to conclude;
8.      The unintended consequences of wars are normally as if not more important than the intended.
These rules do not apply in all circumstances There will always be exceptions. There have been wars with decisive first moves (the 1967 Arab-Israel War for example) but not many. The post-1945 occupations of Germany and Japan were successful, but these were countries absolutely crushed by years of wars set in motion by their leaders. It is also fair to note that taken individually these rules are somewhat banal. They nonetheless have the advantage of generally being true. Taken together they reinforce each other. By and large those who start wars tend to end up with much more troublesome and damaging conflicts than anticipated. This happens sufficiently often that any leader tempted to start a war should really be wracked by doubt.
These rules were in my mind during the first weeks of 2022 when assessing the likelihood of Putin ordering a full-blown invasion of Ukraine. I presumed Putin, who was clearly not risk averse but also, I thought, capable of careful calculation, would have been aware of the dangers of becoming beguiled by the prospect of a quick win over Ukraine. Someone who spoke so often about the war against Nazi Germany would surely be aware of the impact of Hitler’s folly in launching Operation Barbarossa. He had seen the Soviet Union withdraw from Afghanistan because there seemed to be no satisfactory way to bring its campaign to end, and then NATO do the same. Why would he make the same mistake in Ukraine?
Well I had forgotten my ninth rule:
9.      As Rules 1-8 are self-evident those political leaders who ignore them and launch a war are apt to achieve surprise, simply by being stupid.
I was therefore wrong in assuming that Putin would see that a war designed to bring about regime change in Kyiv was a stupid idea, although right that it was a stupid idea. Putin’s blunder has confirmed the validity of the rules. Like so many before him he was convinced that this case it would be different. The prize of a subjugated Ukraine was just too sweet to be abandoned out of prudence. He must now deal with the logic of the situation.
This is a different war to the one Putin began on 24 February 2022. He has now presented himself as a reincarnation of Peter the Great and admitted that this is a war of conquest rather than liberation. It is territory now that he is after, having largely given up on the people of the Donbas, whose supposed vulnerability to a Ukrainian attack provided the pretext for the war. The separatist armies from Donetsk and Luhansk have been used as a cannon-fodder, sent into battle unprepared and ill-equipped, to spare regular units. To gain this territory he depends on the cover of Russia’s nuclear strength to deter others from giving direct support to Ukraine’s resistance while relying on the weight of its conventional firepower to batter Ukraine’s forces into submission. At some point, perhaps quite soon, he will hope that the combined exhaustion of Ukraine’s forces and the impatience of its supporters, not least because of the spreading impact of this war on the global economy and food supplies, will lead to a deal that turns these conquests into a permanent part of Russia. But he is in own race against time. His forces, despite their local advantages, make progress only slowly, and Ukrainian forces are gradually introducing some of the most modern Western equipment to sustain their defences and prepare their counter-offensives.
Learning Lessons
Trying to work out how this might end and what are the best (or least bad) outcomes is hard because of the patchy information coming front the front lines but also the unprecedented nature of this conflict. With so much at stake and so many uncertainties it is natural to look to history for guidance, whether in confidence that the good always win in the end (the ‘right side of history’), although sadly on occasion they don’t, or in the variety of lessons that history supposedly tells us, although it is not history that is speaking but historians, and their interpretations are often contested. Historians are professionally bound to warn against facile lesson-drawing, but where else can we go for guidance except to moments in the past that provide semblances of precedent?
The most popular moment, always invoked when warning about attempts to talk dictators out of their evil designs, is Munich in 1938. Those arguing that sometimes opponents must be offered a way out of a dangerous confrontation point to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Looking for a way to support a country at war without getting directly involved in the fighting? Then it’s the 1941 Lend-Lease act used by Roosevelt to support Britain (and recalled by President Biden when describing his $40 billion assistance package for Ukraine). There will be a need to transfer large amounts of money to revive a desperate Ukrainian economy once the war is over, and already references are being made to the 1947 Marshall Plan. President Macron’s concern about the consequences of ‘humiliating’ Russia provides an opportunity to return to the 1919 Versailles Treaty, also relevant to the topic of reparations.
Yet this business of learning and applying lessons is an exercise that requires care. Wars are not fought as pedagogical exercises. The lessons with which they become associated over time were not necessarily immediately apparent or survive close examination in retrospect. In practice these are not really lessons, in the sense of incontrovertible propositions that will be true in all circumstances. Single episodes, however momentous, cannot provide proofs. At most they demonstrate that a preferred policy (or at least some approximation) once worked in the past or alternatively was tried and failed. More careful lesson-drawing might compare similar cases that had different results (including those where, say, appeasement worked or when generous financial assistance was wasted by corruption and incompetence). Some academic students of international relations do search out multiple cases but that can require taking the individual cases so much out of context that the distinctive features that made the difference then get overlooked. Context is always essential when trying to understand the range of options available to policy-makers and the effectiveness of those chosen. And we have the advantage of knowing what came next. We start with the effects and work back to identify possible causes. But when, as now, we look forward, we cannot be sure that similar causes will produce the same effects. Thus these celebrated ‘lessons’ are often no more than props for our speculations.
This is not an argument in favour of ignoring historical cases that bear a passable resemblance to the current situation. They can be suggestive of possibilities, of issues to look out for, of examples of what can go right and wrong. But they provide no substitute for a careful examination of the actual situation facing political leaders as they ponder their next steps. Whether or not it makes sense to keep open lines of diplomacy to Putin requires a careful reading of his goals and a view about how this conflict can develop. One does not need a reference to Munich to have doubts about his objectives or trustworthiness. Yet this is a war shaped by the past. For Putin the imperatives for action and his strategy emerged out of his reading of history. Here lies the source of Putin’s blunder and the tragedy of this war.
The Weight of History
Putin’s rhetoric is littered with historical references, recently, in his Peter the Great mode, to the start of the eighteenth century and Russia’s war with Sweden, to Catherine the Great’s acquisition of Novorussia, which includes much of the land that is now at the heart of the fighting, and then to the construction of the USSR and its eventual collapse, with the Great Patriotic War always the highlight. For Putin history describes a struggle for Russia to find the right shape, as its domain has expanded and contracted over the centuries, and, in his mind, must now expand again. There is a tension between his desire to include all Russian-speakers in the same state, and a paranoid instinct that no border can ever be truly secure if non-Russians are on the other side of it. There is a continuity in enemies too, for the current opponents of Russia are presented as the heirs of those who opposed it in the past, so that by definition they are all ‘Nazis’ or, to be more specific in the case of Ukraine, followers of Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian nationalist leader, who worked with the Nazis during the war. The fact that the families of those leading Ukraine, including Zelensky, suffered under the Nazis and fought against them is irrelevant.
But it is important also to appreciate how much history informs the opposition to Russia. Ukraine has memories of maltreatment, including famine, under the Bolsheviks, and their borders being regularly chopped and changed by Europe’s great powers. Those countries bordering Russia remember not only Nazi atrocities but also the crimes of Stalinism. The Poles recall the Katyn massacre of 1940 when 22,000 Polish officers and intellectuals were murdered by Stalin’s men. The Baltic states recall how they were incorporated against their will into the Soviet Union. The Czechs and Slovaks remember the crushing of their hopes for liberalising reforms in 1968 when they were invaded. For the states of this region the narratives are as much of betrayal as of past glories – of Britain and France consigning them to their fate in 1938, or the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939, or the 1945 Yalta conference when Churchill and Roosevelt accepted that the countries they had worked to liberate from the Nazis were still going to end up in the Soviet bloc.
From this perspective the debates elsewhere in the West about whether it was wise to allow NATO to enlarge after the end of the Cold War fail to understand why these countries insisted on the guarantees of formal alliance to enable them to feel secure. Their Russian neighbour still seemed disappointed that they had been allowed to slip out of its sphere of influence. Now this same sense of a precarious security, these same narratives of betrayals, including the fear of betrayals to come, are vital to any understanding of why these states are determined to see Russia defeated in Ukraine and their wariness of calls for continuing dialogue with Putin.
It also shapes their attitudes to German policy. It is obvious why all this history is awkward for Berlin. As West Germany was rehabilitated after 1945 it promised never again to become an aggressor state, or support other aggressors, and then to work to keep the peace in Europe as a responsible member of NATO, the EU, and the UN. Chancellor Scholz inherits a Social Democrat tradition that was shaped by Willy Brandt in the 1970s, who used his readiness to acknowledge Germany’s past misdeeds to build diplomatic bridges to the Soviet Union, and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and so forge a calming detente. From this perspective, the gas pipelines to Russia could be taken not as an awkward source of dependence but as symbols of cooperation. But as Putin’s policies acquired a harsher edge, evident from as early as 2007, Germany was not sure how to respond, too conscious of the past to contemplate a full break with Russia and so ready to act as a mediator, always looking to ease tensions. The brazen nature of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which it had not expected, caught Berlin by surprise. It has struggled to catch up, with its hesitations and fine distinctions when discussing arms supplies to Ukraine, feeding all those narratives of betrayal in northern and eastern Europe.
We should not underestimate the importance of these historical perspectives found in Russia’s neighbourhood, influencing not only Kyiv but also Warsaw, Tallin, Vilnius, Riga, Prague, Bratislava, and Helsinki. It is why, whatever weary geopoliticians might think in Brussels, Paris, Berlin, and Rome, these are the countries that will push back on any attempt to wriggle out of sanctions or slow down the pace of arms deliveries. Note how badly President Macron’s talk of the need to avoid humiliating Russia went down in this part of the world, and how quickly he has moved to demonstrate that he too is taking a strong stance against Russian aggression and is sending more weapons to Ukraine.
Conclusion
When it is over this war will be studied for its lessons, whether about the impact of new weapons such as drones or old ones such as tanks, about the working of alliances and the value of sanctions, about the practice of diplomacy and whether there can ever be compromises between aggressors and aggrieved. But most of all it will reinforce many of these pre-existing narratives, about how individual states respond to crises, whether they can see a wider interest beyond their short-term concerns, and how much they are prepared to accept hardships for the sake of their values.
Most of all it will confirm a view of Russia as predatory, cynical, and untrustworthy, however unfair this may seem to those who know the best of Russia and its potential to play a constructive role in international affairs. Instead of the cruelties of the Soviet years being allowed to fade from memory they have now been revived in a vivid and painful form and, whatever the peacemakers hope, they will shape attitudes towards Russia for years to come.
When we want to forget embarrassing episodes from the past we talk of the need to draw a line and move on. We seek ‘closure’. But without repentance, closure will not be possible. Can we be confident that the current leadership group in Moscow will abandon its claims on Ukraine or stop it’s instinctive attempts to bully those who refuse to bend to its will? Even assuming we get to the point where they withdraw voluntarily, chastened by a campaign that has gone badly wrong and left the Russian Federation wounded, they are unlikely to apologise.
Because it is a major power, with a large nuclear arsenal, it would be for the best if forms of dialogue and cooperation could be resumed, and Moscow could be convinced that NATO countries are not seeking to pounce upon it and dismember the country. But the past cannot be so easily forgotten. Those who have suffered in the past from Russian behaviour, from the repression of the Soviet years, to the coercion of more recent decades, do not see what has happened over the past few months as aberrant behaviour. They will be urging their allies and partners to keep up their guard. The anger currently directed at Russia, reinforces decades of mistrust. It will be a fact of European affairs for years to come. ​
George Santayana, observed that ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’ But it is precisely because of the regular repetition that it is not forgotten, though it is often recalled with bitterness and without nuance. Marx famously opened The 18th Brumaire by noting how when history repeated itself it did so ‘first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.’ Unfortunately it can come as tragedy the second time as well.



14. China says its new nuclear weapons are only for self-defense

Excerpts:
"We developed nuclear capabilities to protect the hard work of the Chinese people and protect our people from the scourge of the nuclear warfare," he said.
Last year, the U.S. State Department said China's nuclear development was concerning and that it appeared the Asian country was deviating from decades of nuclear strategy of minimal deterrence.
The State Department urged China to engage with it "on practical measures to reduce the risks of destabilizing arms races."



China says its new nuclear weapons are only for self-defense
China's ultimate goal for its nuclear capabilities was to prevent nuclear war, the country's defense minister said
foxnews.com · by Landon Mion | Fox News
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Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe told delegates Sunday at the Shangri-La Dialogue that China has made progress in developing a nuclear arsenal but would only utilize the new weapons for self-defense measures.
When asked about reports from last year regarding the construction of more than 100 new nuclear missile silos in eastern China, he said the country "has always pursued an appropriate path to developing nuclear capabilities for protection of our country."

China's Defense Minister General Wei Fenghe speaks at a plenary session during the 19th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-la Dialogue, Asia's annual defense and security forum, in Singapore, Sunday, June 12, 2022. (AP Photo/Danial Hakim)
The minister said nuclear weapons displayed in a 2019 military parade in Beijing were operational and deployed. These weapons included upgraded launchers for China's DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles.
"China has developed its capabilities for over five decades. It's fair to say there has been impressive progress," he said. "China's ... policy is consistent. We use it for self defense. We will not be the first to use nuclear [weapons]."
He said China's ultimate goal for its nuclear capabilities was to prevent nuclear war.

China's Defense Minister General Wei Fenghe speaks at a plenary session during the 19th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-la Dialogue, Asia's annual defense and security forum, in Singapore, Sunday, June 12, 2022. (AP Photo/Danial Hakim)
"We developed nuclear capabilities to protect the hard work of the Chinese people and protect our people from the scourge of the nuclear warfare," he said.
Last year, the U.S. State Department said China's nuclear development was concerning and that it appeared the Asian country was deviating from decades of nuclear strategy of minimal deterrence.
The State Department urged China to engage with it "on practical measures to reduce the risks of destabilizing arms races."
Reuters contributed to this report.
foxnews.com · by Landon Mion | Fox News


​15. China Alarms US With Private Warnings to Avoid Taiwan Strait

Excerpts:

China has long asserted that the Taiwan Strait is part of its exclusive economic zone, and takes the view there are limits to the activities of foreign military vessels in those waters. While China regularly protests US military moves in the Taiwan Strait, the legal status of the waters previously wasn’t a regular talking point in meetings with American officials. 
It’s not clear whether the recent assertions indicate that China will take more steps to confront naval vessels that enter transit the Taiwan Strait. The US also conducts freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea to challenge Chinese territorial claims around disputed land features. 
“The United States will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, and that includes transiting through the Taiwan Strait,” Lieutenant Colonel Martin Meiners, a Pentagon spokesperson, said by email. China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment outside normal business hours.



China Alarms US With Private Warnings to Avoid Taiwan Strait
  • China officials dispute strait is international waters: person
  • Defense chiefs clashed over Taiwan at Singapore security forum



June 12, 2022, 7:01 AM EDTUpdated onJune 12, 2022, 3:05 PM EDT

Chinese military officials in recent months have repeatedly asserted that the Taiwan Strait isn’t international waters during meetings with US counterparts, according to a person familiar with the situation, generating concern within the Biden administration. 
The statement disputing the US view of international law has been delivered to the American government by Chinese officials on multiple occasions and at multiple levels, the person said. The US and key allies say much of the strait constitutes international waters, and they routinely send naval vessels through the waterway as part of freedom of navigation exercises. 
China has long asserted that the Taiwan Strait is part of its exclusive economic zone, and takes the view there are limits to the activities of foreign military vessels in those waters. While China regularly protests US military moves in the Taiwan Strait, the legal status of the waters previously wasn’t a regular talking point in meetings with American officials. 
It’s not clear whether the recent assertions indicate that China will take more steps to confront naval vessels that enter transit the Taiwan Strait. The US also conducts freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea to challenge Chinese territorial claims around disputed land features. 
“The United States will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, and that includes transiting through the Taiwan Strait,” Lieutenant Colonel Martin Meiners, a Pentagon spokesperson, said by email. China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment outside normal business hours.
During a speech on Saturday at the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin warned that China was unilaterally attempting to change the status quo when it comes to Taiwan. “Our policy hasn’t changed,” he said. “But unfortunately, that doesn’t seem to be true for the PRC.”
“We’re seeing growing coercion from Beijing,” Austin told delegates at the security forum. “We’ve witnessed a steady increase in provocative and destabilizing military activity near Taiwan. That includes PLA aircraft flying near Taiwan in record numbers in recent months — and on a nearly daily basis.”

Wei FenghePhotographer: Roslan Rahman/AFP/Getty Images
Austin’s speech was followed on Sunday by China’s Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe, who repeatedly expressed Beijing’s willingness to fight to prevent a formal split by the democratically elected government in Taipei. Wei didn’t explicitly refer to the legal status of the Taiwan Strait in his remarks.
“If anyone dares to secede Taiwan from China, we will not hesitate to fight,” Wei said, reaffirming Beijing’s longstanding position on the dispute. “We will fight at all costs. And we will fight to the very end. This is the only choice for China.”
— With assistance by Colum Murphy
(Updates with US Defense Department comment in fifth paragraph.)

​16. Former special operations soldier returns to Iraq — but this time with her Harvard master's degrees



Former special operations soldier returns to Iraq — but this time with her Harvard master's degrees
Shelane Etchison, one of the first women in a combat role, discusses transition from Army special ops to Harvard
foxnews.com · by Ethan Barton , Megan Myers | Fox News
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BOSTON – Like many students, it took Shelane Etchison time to adjust to graduate school. Perhaps less typical, she had to figure out how to simultaneously juggle two Ivy League master's programs.
But maybe Etchison's most unique adjustment was adapting to civilian life after spending years hunting high-value targets in places like Afghanistan and Syria as one of the first female soldiers to serve in a special operations unit, let alone a combat role.
"I've had to work to be more conscious and deliberate about what is my next purpose and mission, who is part of my new tribe?" Etchison, 36, told Fox News. "That can be challenging. It's been lonely and kind of strange at times."
"But in the last year, through getting help with the [Department of Veterans Affairs] and starting to build some friendships in school, you start to see the opportunities and possibilities that the civilian world can give you," Etchison continued.

Shelene Etchison, one of the first women allowed in a combat role, trains in preparation for deployment.
The Florida native, who recently graduated with two master's degrees from Harvard University, settled on her next mission: returning to her old stomping grounds abroad. But this time, Etchison aims to help develop the war-torn countries’ economies, rather than take up arms.
A role only women could fill
Like many servicemembers of her generation, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks compelled Etchison, who was in high school at the time, to join the Army.
"It's surprising to my family that I ended up joining the military," she told Fox News. "It's even surprising to myself."
"I decided I wanted to be as close to the front lines and what we are actually doing to combat terrorism," Etchison continued.
After finishing college as an ROTC student, however, the new Army officer was kept far from the fighting.
"It was disheartening and frustrating, frankly, that by virtue of being a woman and that alone I was not allowed to go into the parts of the military that would be closest to actually combating terrorism," Etchison said.
But she soon had the opportunity, not just to fight, but to become part of the founding class of specially trained female fighters.
Special operations forces in Afghanistan, like the Army Rangers and the Navy SEALs, were hunting high-value Taliban and al Qaeda targets, but faced a major obstacle: cultural norms forbid American men from talking with Afghan women, meaning the U.S. military was losing out on a major source of intelligence.

Shelane Etchison discusses transitioning from Army special operations to two Harvard master's programs. (Fox News)
"The women know what's going on in their village," Etchison said. "They know what's going on in their homes. And so we were leaving potentially tons of vital intelligence that they know just untapped."
"So, if it's only women who could talk to these Afghan women, then they need to recruit only women to do this job," the veteran continued. But "at the time, there weren't women in any of these special operations units. The military banned women from even trying out to be in these units."
Three years into Etchison’s career, the Army aimed to close that gap. In 2011, it formed Cultural Support Team, an all-female fighting force within the 75th Ranger Regiment that would work alongside a team of Afghan women trained for combat by their own military.
"It seemed almost like: 'here, this is the time, this is the chance,'" Etchison told Fox News. "This is unprecedented that the military's looking for women to fulfill these jobs in these combat roles and doing so within special operations units."
Etchison joined part of the 20-woman inaugural team, making her one of the first women in U.S. history to join men on the front lines, let alone special operations.
"Myself and my female colleagues in the Cultural Support Teams," Etchison said, "we just did it."
"From the application process, through the challenging selection process, we were run into the ground, given like no sleep, given all these different physical challenges, mental challenges, the training," Etchison continued. "Then our deployment, from literally surviving Afghanistan, winning over our male colleagues, proving our place in this organization, making a mark for women in the military ahead. And just creating such solid bonds with our group of women."

Shelane Etchison gathers information about the Taliban from women and children in the Helmand Province.
From war zones to Ivy League
Etchison’s accomplishments, achieved so young, created a new challenge.
"You really questioned ‘did I peak at 25 years old?’" she said. "Is the most consequential thing that I am going to accomplish already done?"
"And kind of grappling with 'what do I do now?' was challenging," Etchison added.
She began seeing limits to the military, that there was only so much she could do as a servicewoman to help people in war-torn countries.
"Impact in the armed forces only goes so far," Etchison told Fox News. "A lot of the places I deployed to – Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Europe—there needs to be more than military intervention to solve these problems. That was so clear in these places I went to."
She ultimately decided her path was outside the military. The Army major left after 11 years in the service.
"The reasons why I decided to leave were very, very challenging to come to," Etchison told Fox News. "And I did not take it lightly, but I personally felt like it's a hard, fast, demanding life. And there were certain personal tolls that were being taken."

Shelane Etchison, a former Army Ranger, works on two Harvard master's degrees.
She eventually resolved that helping these countries she grew to cherish would be her new mission – but this time, through peace.
"I wanted to go to school to be able to bring further impact to these places that I really do care deeply about and have great people that are worthy of a stable, secure life," Etchison told Fox News. "And to me, that looked like transitioning from the security apparatus to other apparatuses of development, like in economic development and economic opportunities in these places."
"I had to get out of the military to be able to do that," Etchison added.
Etchison said her time in the armed forces and specifically her experience with the Cultural Support Team inspired her to apply to Harvard.
The Army "just challenges you and pushes you beyond what you think you’re capable of," Etchison told Fox News. "And the cultural support team just put that on a rocket ship for me."
"I thought, you know, there's no reason to put limits. I'll apply to Harvard Business School and Harvard Kennedy School of Government," she told Fox News. "I ended up getting into both."
But Etchison’s transition out of the military wasn’t easy, starting Ivy League dual master's programs aside.
"There is a sudden loss of community, identity, purpose," she said. "You go from an organization where literally your squad leader or whoever's in charge of you, their job is to have personal accountability of you every day."

Shelane Etchison in her graduation robes after completing two master's programs at Harvard University.
"And then you go to the civilian world where no one needs to call you. No one needs to check up on you," Etchison continued. "It took probably a year and a half for me to start to feel better."
She broke down her former sense of direction – suddenly eliminated from her daily life – into simple terms.
"The military kind of hands you your purpose," Etchison told Fox News. "Here's your mission. Here's your teammates. Work together. Accomplish said mission."
"That just feeds so much into our tribal brain of working together and accomplishing something," Etchison continued.
Her experience with the Cultural Support Team, however, helped her overcome these challenges and reorient herself.
"The Cultural Support Team Program—seeing that through and being successful in it was a life lesson that you really shouldn't put limits on yourself," Etichson said. "And also a lesson that challenge is good."
In May, Etchison graduated with master's degrees in public policy and business administration. She starts an economic development job later this month in Iraq.
"It’s a starting point into exploring … going back into post-conflict zones and what else stability looks like besides just military intervention," Etchison said.
Ethan Barton is a producer/reporter for Digital Originals. You can reach him at ethan.barton@fox.com and follow him on Twitter at @ethanrbarton.

foxnews.com · by Ethan Barton , Megan Myers | Fox News


17. China More Vulnerable Than US in Supply Chains: Analysts





China More Vulnerable Than US in Supply Chains: Analysts
US shouldn’t isolate China but leverage supply chain advantages
3 min ago

By: Toh Han Shih

Like a bad marriage, the US and China are interlocked in a complex web of international supply chains amid tensions between the world’s two biggest economies. But instead of divorcing China, the US should leverage its advantages in global supply chains to gain an advantage over China, because China is more vulnerable to the US in global supply chains than vice versa, analysts said at a recent hearing of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), a US body which advises Congress on Sino-US relations.
Already, Washington is taking steps to sideline China. On May 23, US President Joseph Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Framework for Economic Prosperity (IPEF) with a dozen partners: Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. One of its stated aims is to make supply chains more resilient for the benefit of the US. It is obviously aimed against China.
At a press briefing accompanying the launch, US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said IPEF “marks an important turning point in restoring US economic leadership in the region and presenting Indo-Pacific countries an alternative to (China).”
However, the US should not freeze out China in the global economy, said speakers at a USCC hearing on US-China competition on global supply chains in Washington DC on June 9.
David J. Bulman, an assistant professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said that there are four reasons why US industrial policy with the goal of reducing reliance on China may be misguided.
First, China’s entry into global value chains (GVCs) has been and continues to benefit the US, he argued. “China’s entry into GVCs has led to considerable welfare gains from price decreases, despite documented job losses from import competition.”
Second, any effective measures to convince companies to leave China would be very expensive and could lead to harmful retaliation, given the importance of the Chinese market to American industry, he added.
Third, China’s economy is more vulnerable to US economic coercion than vice versa, making China’s aggressive use of supply chain disruptions aimed at the US unlikely, Bulman said. “But China’s use of trade as a political tool is generally ineffective, and China has been loath to implement these tactics when they can harm China itself.”
China remains considerably more asymmetrically dependent on the US than vice versa, as indicated by China’s financial vulnerabilities, such as the potential for exclusion of Chinese financial institutions from SWIFT, the leading international online payment system, and dependence on US technology, as seen in the recent cases involving two major Chinese technology firms, ZTE and Huawei, Bulman explained.
Fourth, many companies are already leaving China as the country’s comparative advantage declines and supply chain risks emerge; policy support would be a waste of US taxpayer money, Bulman said. The most important reasons that China’s comparative advantage is eroding are a shrinking labor force as well as greater environmental and labor taxation.
“With important exceptions, China’s standing in the supply chain varies widely but overall, it is far more dependent on foreign and US capabilities than the reverse,” said Mark Dallas, Director of Asian Studies at Union College.
Interdependence between China and US advocated
“Our key task, as I see it, is not to cut China out of global supply chains that intersect with the United States, but to understand which circumstances create unacceptable risk, and which create tolerable or benign risk,” Dallas said.
While China possesses some key capabilities that expose the US and its allies to vulnerabilities, Beijing’s dependency on the US and US-allied countries is far greater, he added. “There is a deep sense of insecurity in China, which crosses over into techno-nationalism and other forms of nationalism. Predictably, China’s nationalism only makes their circumstances worse, but it can also distort America’s foreign policy reactions.”
“Thus, it is in our own national interest to find a way to reduce China’s sense of insecurity, while also enhancing overall US security.”
“If China feels insecure, its policy choices will be reactive and harmful to US interests, such as many of its value-destroying industrial policies. In turn, Chinese policies and political rhetoric will enflame American perceptions of China’s policy goals. If, in reaction, American policy also becomes knee-jerk and unnecessarily bellicose, then we will all be worse off,” Dallas said.
The US and its allies should employ both carrots and sticks towards China, dropping “counterproductive labels that brand policies as ‘hawkish’ or ‘dovish’ towards China, such as the debate over maintaining or removing Trump-era tariffs,” Dallas said. “Thus, US policy should work hard, along with our allies, to shape China’s external environment and mold China’s perceptions, so that they naturally and willingly behave in ways that are in America’s national interests. Both hawk-like and dove-like policies will be needed to achieve this broader strategy.”
Maintaining every Trump-era tariff on China is not ‘more hawkish’ or tough on China, if they are harmful to overall American interests, while removing the Trump-era tariffs is not ‘more dovish’ or soft on China, if the US foregoes a bargaining chip by unilaterally reducing the tariffs, Dallas said. “In fact, the best option is to eradicate the political labeling and consider how to creatively mix ideas together.” 
In a value chain characterized by transnational division of labor, securing leverage through interdependencies and cooperation may be a more sensible approach than striving for autarky or self-reliance, said Jan-Peter Kleinhans, director of technology and geopolitics, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung e.V., a German think tank.
Around 60 percent of the global back-end manufacturing capacity is in China and Taiwan, so relying on Chinese back-end capacity comes with potential risks, Kleinhans said. Conversely, the US integrated circuit (IC) fabless industry is more than three times larger by revenue than that of Taiwan and more than seven times larger than that of China. Thus, US and allied policymakers should focus on ensuring leverage through “minimal viable cooperation” with China, Kleinhans said. “Interdependency can support stability.”
A goal of the US and allied countries should be to ensure that US and allied companies still control critical positions within the global value chain, he added.
Defense industries
However, the defense industries of the US and its allies are dangerously dependent on China, said Jennifer Bisceglie, CEO of Interos Inc., a US firm that evaluates risks in international supply chains. Bisceglie pointed out that 8,900-plus US entities buy directly from Shenzhen, while the number of indirect US buyers from Shenzhen is at least 195,700, and 130-odd UK entities buy directly from Shenzhen, while the number of indirect UK buyers from Shenzhen is at least 29,400.
“The time to address the supply chain threat and risk to our nation’s national security and military readiness is now, not after a major incident,” Bisceglie said.
Toh Han Shih is the chief analyst of Headland Intelligence, a Hong Kong risk consulting firm.

18. Photos: Can M777 Artillery Help Ukraine Defeat Russia?





Photos: Can M777 Artillery Help Ukraine Defeat Russia?
19fortyfive.com · by BySandboxx News · June 11, 2022
Just how powerful are the M777 artillery pieces the U.S and its allies are giving to Ukraine? Can they truly turn the tide against Putin in Donbas and other regions in Ukraine? In the 1950s the Soviet Union held dominion in the artillery class of weaponry with its D-30 field howitzer. Some countries may hold dominion in several weapons categories at the same. Take the United States, for example: At the same time, we field the best fighter, the best tank, and the best towed-field howitzer in the world is the M777.
The West and NATO countries recognized that the war of Russian aggression in Ukraine has become, by and large, a war of dueling artillery exchanges. So, Ukraine pleaded for the word contender, the M777 (Triple777) Ultralight Field Howitzer, and promptly received 90 M777 howitzer guns in the first shipment from the U.S. NATO members Great Britain, Canada, and France also provided Ukraine with howitzers bringing the total to106 tubes (artillery guns).
The mighty and accurate M777
The M777 howitzer is considered lightweight coming in at 9,300 pounds due to the use of many light titanium parts. It can reach out as far as 25 miles (ammunition dependent). It is unbelievable to me that with the aid of special ammunition the M777 can reach a target at 25 miles with a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 16 feet. CEP defines how many feet of error you get with certain ammunition: The greater the distance the larger the CEP.
The M777 can use a technology called Rocket Assisted Projectile (RAP) to give it an extra push out to longer ranges. It also achieves increased accuracy due to its M982 GPS Inertially-guided Excalibur rounds.
It is interesting to me how the technology develops with weapons systems like these: Once the creators have tweaked the last drop of blood out of the gun and carrier, they start going after corollaries of superiority like the M777’s ammunition. The accurate Excalibur munition can be fired in glide mode such that its apex can be programmed in by the gunner, instructing it to glide in at a low or high angle to the target.
The howitzer’s gunner can also program what azimuth he wants the round to impact the target from; that could be a significant advantage if the target has assumed cover.
The US is sending its best
I am proud of the U.S. contribution to the Ukrainian people and of the Ukrainians’ perseverance to fight the more powerful Russian army. We are giving Ukraine our M777 big guns to help; we didn’t just shove some relics at them and wish them good luck. I believe the gift of the M777 batteries is a thoroughly honest demonstration of our will to see our Ukrainian brothers and sisters through to peace and success.
U.S. Soldiers assigned to Attack Battery, 2-12th Field Artillery Battalion, Task Force Rock, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, conducts registration and calibration for the M777 A2 Howitzer weapon system in Syria on Sept. 30, 2021. These exercises enable gun sections to deliver timely and accurate fires in support of TF Rock and their fight to defeat Daesh in designated areas of Syria. (U.S. Army photo by Cpl. Isaiah Scott). These are similar to the M777 pieces serving in Ukraine.
U.S. Marines fire an M777 Howitzer during Exercise Rolling Thunder 1-22 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, U.S. October 19, 2021. Picture taken October 19, 2021. U.S. Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Brian Bolin Jr./Handout
US Military M777 Artillery. Ukraine Now Has a Similar System.
U.S. Marines with India Battery, Battalion Landing Team 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, fire an M777A2 Lightweight Howitzer during MEU Exercise 14 aboard Camp Pendleton, Calif., Nov. 17, 2014. The purpose of MEUEX is to train the different elements of the 15th MEU to work together to complete various missions. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Jamean R. Berry/Released)
U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 2-11 Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, conduct field artillery training on Warrior Base, New Mexico Range, Demilitarized Zone, Republic of Korea, March 15, 2015. The training was a part of joint training exercise Foal Eagle 2015 between the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) Armies. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Steven Hitchcock/Released)
U.S. Marines with Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force attached to 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd MarDiv, III MEF, fire the M777A2 155mm howitzer in support of a combined arms live-fire exercise at Rodriguez Live-Fire Complex during Korean Marine Exchange Program 13-5, part of Ssang Yong 13 in the Republic of Korea April 17, 2013. The CALFEX illustrates how the annual exercise Ssang Yong supports ongoing efforts to strengthen combat readiness in both U.S. and ROK forces. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jose D. Lujano III MEF PAO/Released)
George Hand is a Master Sergeant US Army (ret) from the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, The Delta Force. In service, he maintained a high level of proficiency in 6 foreign languages. Post military, George worked as a subcontracter for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on the nuclear test site north of Las Vegas Nevada for 16 years. Currently, George works as an Intelligence Analyst and street operative in the fight against human trafficking. A master cabinet-grade woodworker and master photographer, George is a man of diverse interests and broad talents.
19fortyfive.com · by BySandboxx News · June 11, 2022


19. Big boys playing dress up

Excerpt:

Wearing military garb after you’ve left the service isn’t indictable, neither is using military slang, and neither is singlemindedness to the point of being blind to what you’re really doing. But it is embarrassing, in ways none of them will ever understand.



Big boys playing dress up
It's not a crime to wear camo, but it is a felony to conspire to overthrow the government.
luciantruscott.substack.com · by Lucian K. Truscott IV

This is my bi-weekly Salon column.
The hearings of the House Jan. 6 committee that began on Thursday night presented plenty of evidence of plain old-fashioned wrongdoing, infantile fantasizing by people old enough to know better, and hundreds of instances of people committing overt criminally indictable offenses at the behest of a president of the United States. But the evidence showed something else, too: an entire political party that has lost the capacity to be embarrassed.
There is so much evidence of behavior and attitudes that are embarrassing that you hardly know where to begin: with the whiny look on Jared Kushner’s face and his whiny tone of voice as he described the White House counsel’s threats to resign as “whiny”? The aw-shucks shrug of the shoulders given by former Attorney General William Barr, who was the highest law enforcement official in the land, as he explained — if that is even the word — resigning his office because he had finally had enough of what he called “bullshit”? Committee vice-chair Liz Cheney’s lengthy recitation of all the phone calls Donald Trump didn’t make and orders he refused to issue while a violent attempt was made to overthrow the government of which he was in charge?
See what I mean?
To me, however, the most embarrassing thing of all is the fact that nine veterans of service in the United States military have been indicted for seditious conspiracy to overthrow the government for their roles in the violent assault on the Capitol. Not only that, but they dressed up and play-acted their parts as veterans. Some of them, specifically the Oath Keepers, wore military-style camo outfits complete with bulletproof vests and Kevlar helmets, and used a military-style “stack” formation to lead the breach of the Capitol building. Others, the Proud Boys, gave orders to their membership not to wear military-style gear and remain incognito: “come as a patriot” and “do not wear colors!” (referring to their yellow and black Proud Boy uniforms) and “be decentralized and use good judgement” because “we are trying to avoid getting into any shit.”
Reading the indictment of five Proud Boys — four of them veterans — that was handed down by a Washington grand jury last Monday is like reading a script for a remake of “Rambo.” Using an encrypted social media chat app, the Proud Boys talked about their “Ministry of Self Defense” or MOSD, their “Leaders Group,” their “Operations Council” and their “Marketing Council.” They even formed a “MOSD Prospect Group” to recruit new members for their paramilitary operations at the Capitol on Jan. 6. (Note: All that excited capitalization is from the texts cited verbatim in the indictment.)
The Proud Boys established something called the “Boots on the Ground Group,” and exchanged text messages asking, “Are we going to do a commander’s briefing before 10 a.m.?”
“Standby,” came the response in primo-mil-speak.
All of the above was in preparation for the assault launched by the Proud Boys on the Capitol. Many of the texts were exchanged before the rally on the Ellipse had even begun.
At 12:53 p.m. on Jan. 6, during the time Donald Trump was speaking on the Ellipse, the Proud Boys effected the first breach of the protective barriers established by police around the Capitol, pushing one of the police officers to the ground. Her head struck the pavement hard enough for her to lose consciousness and suffer severe trauma. Moments later, a Proud Boy text announced, “We have just taken the Capitol,” as if the seat of the government of the United States was a military objective. At 1:00 p.m., a member of the so-called “MOSD Leader’s Group” texted, “They deploy the mace yet?” One of the Proud Boys, who turned out to be an unindicted co-conspirator because of his cooperation with the Department of Justice, replied: “We are trying.”
The indictment lays out this embarrassing behavior by military veterans in excruciating, painful detail. It describes the childish delight they took in each other and the pride in the crimes they were committing by citing the selfies they took, to which they attached such grand comments as, “So we stormed the fucking Capitol. Took the motherfucking place back. That was so much fun.” Another Proud Boy added, “January 6 will be a day in infamy.”
The Proud Boys used the Washington Monument as a rallying point before they began their attack on the Capitol. From the little hill where the Washington Monument stands, the following memorials to other veterans are visible: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the Korean Veterans Memorial, the World War II Memorial. Constitution Gardens is also visible, and so is the Signers Memorial, commemorating the men who signed the Declaration of Independence.
The Proud Boys used “1776” as a private code for what they called their revolution throughout their text messages to each other. The year of the signing of the Declaration of Independence has also become a key part of the rhetoric of many of Trump’s defenders, as if by invoking the founding of the country they can excuse its destruction.
Wearing military garb after you’ve left the service isn’t indictable, neither is using military slang, and neither is singlemindedness to the point of being blind to what you’re really doing. But it is embarrassing, in ways none of them will ever understand.
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LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT IV
Lucian K. Truscott IV, a graduate of West Point, has had a 50-year career as a journalist, novelist and screenwriter. He has covered stories such as Watergate, the Stonewall riots and wars in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. He is also the author of five bestselling novels and several unsuccessful motion pictures. He has three children, lives on the East End of Long Island and spends his time Worrying About the State of Our Nation and madly scribbling in a so-far fruitless attempt to Make Things Better. You can read his daily columns at luciantruscott.substack.com and follow him on Twitter @LucianKTruscott and on Facebook at Lucian K. Truscott IV.
luciantruscott.substack.com · by Lucian K. Truscott IV



20. The Real End of Pax Americana

Excerpts:

Many American analysts and officials seem to think that the historic debt of U.S. allies means that they can be expected to side with the United States against China in more and more domains and at ever greater cost. Trump provided the perfect illustration of this when he threatened to withdraw from NATO while demanding that Europeans ban the Chinese technology giant Huawei from their 5G networks.
But the changes afoot in Berlin and Tokyo suggest that a different kind of relationship is on the horizon, one that is more balanced than the alliances Washington built and maintained in the postwar era. As the relative importance of U.S. defense contributions falls and the costs of alignment rise, it seems unlikely that Washington will be able to count on automatic support. Instead, the United States will have to get used to more cooperative and equitable relationships in which alignment is earned. This will create challenges and headaches initially, especially as Washington is forced to rein in its unipolar instincts. But if the new international order proves stable and helps promote U.S. interests, American taxpayers might once again start to see the country’s network of alliances as an asset rather than a drain on public resources. Not only could the burden of providing security be shared more equitably in such an order but the United States and its allies would be able to establish standards and promote liberal values that, although not solely American, would definitely be more American than Chinese. In other words, Pax Americana could give way not to chaos but to a cooperative model of shared leadership.


The Real End of Pax Americana
Germany and Japan Are Changing—and So Is the Postwar Order
June 13, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Mark Leonard · June 13, 2022
The post–World War II international order is often described as a product of American strength. Together with its allies, a victorious United States imposed its will on the rest of the world, crafting institutions and norms that served its interests and assured its primacy. But to an often underappreciated degree, that order is also a product of the artificial weakness of Germany and Japan. For three-quarters of a century after 1945, both countries consciously eschewed great-power status and pursued pacifist approaches to foreign policy. At the heart of the postwar order, in other words, is the unique status of the world’s third- and fourth-largest economies. Although that order has come to seem natural to many in the West, it is predicated on an arguably unnatural condition: the forced pacification of two countries that—owing to geography, demography, and history—had predictably become regional hegemons in the prewar modern era.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—and the growing antagonism between the United States and China—is threatening to upend that status quo and with it Pax Americana, which has held since the end of World War II. In response to Moscow’s aggression, Germany has fundamentally reoriented its foreign policy, pledging to radically increase defense spending and taking a hawkish line on Ukraine. And Japan, wary of China’s quest for regional hegemony, seems closer than ever to a similar transformation.
In the short term, these shifts may precipitate a consolidation or even a revival of the West. The war in Ukraine has increased the dependence of Germany and Japan on the United States and led to levels of cooperation not seen since the Cold War. But if Germany stays on its new path and Japan embarks on a similar one, something like the opposite could happen as both countries become less dependent on the United States and more closely linked to their neighbors. Such a shift would profoundly alter not just the security order in Europe and Asia but the dynamics of the Western world—and at precisely the moment when World War II passes from memory into history. On the one hand, Pax Americana will give way to more cooperative regional security orders. On the other, the United States will have to reinvent its alliances, treating allies as real stakeholders rather than infantilized junior partners. The transition could be painful and difficult for Washington in the short term. But in the long term, these changes will be healthy for the global order and even for the United States itself.
THE ZEITENWENDE
Four days after Russia invaded Ukraine, the usually cautious German Chancellor Olaf Scholz gave a revolutionary speech announcing a zeitenwende—or “turning point,” roughly translated—in German foreign policy. So profound are the shifts he laid out that they could change the country’s very identity. Berlin decided to supply weapons to Ukraine after decades of resisting arming belligerents in any conflict zone, establish a 100 billion euro fund to upgrade its armed forces after years of dragging its feet on defense spending, and end its energy dependence on Russia after years of attempting to transform Russia through economic ties. The announcement of these fundamental changes has ignited a broader debate about what the zeitenwende will mean not just for different aspects of German policy but for the country’s broader role in the world. Some analysts see it as Germany belatedly waking up to its responsibilities after decades of geopolitical free-riding, but many others have been critical of the slow pace of change and fear the new policy will fall short of expectations.
The zeitenwende debate in Germany has had a powerful effect on Japan, where defense and security officials have been coming to grips with an increasingly assertive China. Confronting a rising power as opposed to a declining one such as Russia puts Japan in a more complex situation than the one in which Germany finds itself—and an arguably more precarious one in the long term. In 2005, Japan and China had almost identical defense budgets. Now, China’s defense budget is five times as large as Japan’s, and by 2030, it is projected to be nine times as large. (By comparison, Russia’s defense budget was only 18 percent larger than Germany’s before Berlin announced its zeitenwende.)


In response to Moscow’s aggression, Germany has fundamentally reoriented its foreign policy.
In order to maintain a semblance of balance in the region, Japan has pursued a three-pronged strategy. First, it has incrementally increased its defense spending in recent years, from $45.1 billion in 2017 to $54.1 billion in 2021. Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party has argued that the country should aim to spend two percent of its GDP on defense, which would mean doubling its current budget. Second, Japan has sought to deepen its alliance with the United States. The LDP has begun internal discussions on nuclear deterrence, including on the controversial issue of a potential nuclear-sharing agreement with Washington, which would obligate Tokyo to take part in consultations about nuclear weapons and their use as part of a structure of shared decision-making. And Japan is also recrafting its security relations with other partners in the region, particularly Australia, India, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. Tokyo is now incorporating these changes into a new national security strategy to be published by the end of the year.
This emergent strategy is reflected in Japan’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which differs markedly from its response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Back then, Japan sought to maintain stable relations with Moscow, in part to hedge against Beijing and in part—like Germany—to source cheap energy from Russia. This time around, Japan has come close to suspending its bilateral relationship with Russia, joined the United States and European countries in enforcing sanctions against Moscow, and delivered financial as well as nonlethal military aid to Ukraine. It has done so partly to strengthen its ties with Washington and partly because it is afraid that China might be tempted to undertake a similar assault on Taiwan. Japan wants to impose high costs on Russia so that China gets the message: invade Taiwan and you will be overwhelmed by military, political, and economic penalties.
“NORMAL POWERS”?
Over the years, Germany and Japan have had several national debates about becoming “normal powers” and have gradually moved in that direction. Both countries are now more active militarily than they have been in decades, but they still punch way under their economic weight. The war in Ukraine could change that, however.
For the first time in the postwar era, both Germany and Japan face unavoidable threats. After Germany was reunified in 1990, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was fond of saying that the country was “surrounded only by friends and partners.” Now, there seems to be societal consensus in Germany that this has changed: even before Moscow launched its invasion, more than half of German respondents to a January 2022 poll claimed that Russia’s stance on Ukraine posed a large military threat to their country. And many Japanese fear that a war over Taiwan could be next. Polls shows that a large majority of the Japanese public is concerned that Russia’s war in Ukraine will impact how China deals with its territorial disputes. And as Narushige Michishita, vice president of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, told me, “If there is a war in the Taiwan Strait, Japan would almost automatically be involved as Japan accommodates U.S. bases and China would attack them.”
Also auguring for a more muscular security stance is generational change: German and Japanese guilt is dying out along with the last surviving perpetrators and victims of World War II. As the historian Andreas Wirsching has argued, the war in Ukraine is accelerating Germany’s break with its Nazi past (in ways he finds troubling). Having taken a stand against Moscow, Berlin is finally “on the right side of history.” And with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, there is another villain on the European continent accused of genocide and pursuing a war of extermination. Meanwhile, in Japan, fear of China’s rising power is eclipsing the memory of the country’s past crimes, both among the Japanese public and in many Asian capitals.

German and Japanese guilt is dying out along with the last surviving perpetrators and victims of World War II.

Finally, Germany and Japan may no longer feel they can rely on the United States for their security. According to one recent poll, 56 percent of German respondents believe that in ten years, China will be a stronger power than the United States. Fifty-three percent said that Americans cannot be trusted after electing Donald Trump president in 2016, and 60 percent said Germany cannot always count on the United States to defend it and so must invest in European defense. These fears are shared among even the most Atlanticist segments of the elite. As Wolfgang Ischinger, a former German ambassador to the United States, told me, “Germans are fortunate to have Biden in the White House, but Germany needs to have a plan B in case there are big changes to American politics.” He believes Germany should explore the possibility of a nuclear guarantee from France, something that would have been unthinkable even a few months ago.
Doubts about American power and reliability are less openly articulated in Japan. According to an April poll, however, nearly two-thirds of Japanese support strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities, and a majority agree with the LDP proposal of spending two percent of GDP on defense. Ken Jimbo, a security specialist at Keio University, explained that after the tumult of the Trump years, many Japanese strategists think the country needs to invest more in its own defense and “diversify beyond the United States.” They watched with concern as Washington declined to intervene directly in Ukraine after highlighting the difference between a NATO and a non-NATO ally and warning of the dangers of confronting a nuclear Russia. “The question,” according to Jimbo, “is how much we can trust the United States to defend Taiwan in the face of Chinese nuclear threats.”
SHARED BURDENS
So far, the war in Ukraine has brought into sharper focus how much Germany and Japan need the United States. The responses of both countries suggest a revival—and even an expansion—of their traditional alliances with Washington in the short term. Not only has Tokyo sided with the West and joined the sanctions regime against Russia but Berlin has recommitted to NATO, signaled that it plans to buy U.S. F-35 fighter jets, and decided to build liquified natural gas terminals that will allow it to buy U.S. rather than Russian gas. Atlanticists in Germany hope that the war in Ukraine will bind the United States to Europe and re-create a Cold War model in which the United States leads and Europe contributes only as much as it must. But shifts in German and Japanese defense policies could in the long term create a much different arrangement, altering the regional order in Europe and Asia and transforming both countries’ alliances with the United States.
Greater German and Japanese assertiveness is likely to go hand in hand with U.S. retrenchment (and a shrinking of Washington’s relative economic and military might) over the long haul, a trend that is unlikely to change with the war in Ukraine. The United States will be forced to concentrate its limited resources on the challenges posed by China. Analysts such as Robert Kagan have argued that Pax Americana could give way to global chaos. That is definitely possible. But it is not what has happened in much of the Middle East, where the United States was most engaged for the last two decades and where it is now pulling back most dramatically. Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt of the European Council on Foreign Relations have described how there was an initial surge in regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia and in military conflicts that drew in outside powers, such as Russia and Turkey. But then many of these conflicts slowed down, and more locally driven reordering processes began, exemplified by the August 2021 Baghdad conference that brought key regional actors into dialogue with one another.
In Europe, U.S. retrenchment could yield greater sovereignty once Europeans finally realize that the war in Ukraine will not stop Washington’s long-term pivot to Asia. One reason that Europeans have failed to develop a common foreign policy is their lack of trust in one another. But Moscow’s aggression has brought Europeans together, convincing countries that previously favored engagement with Russia, such as Germany and Italy, to embrace a policy of containment. If this convergence holds, one could see a real European strategic alignment, backed eventually by a European armaments industry and even conceivably by a more common European nuclear deterrent (or at least a willingness by France to share its deterrent). In the long term, Europe could forge a common framework to manage relations with other powers, such as Russia and Turkey, including through deterrence, selective decoupling to minimize tensions, and some form of dialogue to prevent escalation. Instead of continuing to expand the EU and NATO, Europe might opt for smaller, more flexible multilateral arrangements involving some of the most important players, much like the Quad in Asia. In short, the European order might become more Asian.

Greater German and Japanese assertiveness is likely to go hand in hand with U.S. retrenchment.
At the same time, Asia is likely to become more European. The United States will maintain its shift in focus to the Indo-Pacific, but its economic and military weight will shrink compared with China’s. As a result, Tokyo and other regional powers will probably strengthen their ties with the United States yet continue to diversify beyond their traditional alliances with Washington. As Michishita put it: “What we are trying to do is to invite more friends into the Japan-U.S. alliance.” Already a new Asian order is emerging that includes ties with the United States and closer cooperation among powers such as Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. Jimbo says Asian countries won’t form a NATO-like alliance but rather increase cooperation in areas such as intelligence, maritime security, and law enforcement. In trade and commerce, a certain level of regional integration has already occurred without Washington’s participation through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—which took shape after the United States walked away from its predecessor—and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
In terms of security, a more balanced division of labor could emerge. Europeans will have to take more direct responsibility for security in eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. In Asia, regional powers will have to invest more in their own capabilities to balance Chinese influence in the region. Elbridge Colby, who served as a U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Trump administration, put it this way in an interview with Nikkei Asia: “The United States is 5,000 miles away from Japan and Taiwan, so we need Japan to do more.” And as the European and Indo-Pacific theaters become more connected—not least through the Sino-Russian rapprochement—it is even possible that European and Asian powers will support one another. Japan and South Korea, for instance, might ask Europeans to reciprocate their support for sanctions on Russia. The result would be more complex regional orders in which the United States still plays an important role but no longer calls the shots.
A DIFFERENT KIND OF ALLIANCE
The Biden administration hopes that the war in Ukraine will cement a global alliance of democracies, putting both Russia and China on the back foot. As a result, Beijing regards the conflict as a proxy war aimed in part at weakening China by convincing Asian countries of the parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan. The other side of this coin, of course, is Washington’s effort to convince Europeans that if they want to continue to benefit from U.S. support, they will need to align with the United States against China.

But as Germany and Japan become more powerful and more embedded in their respective regional security orders, they are likely to become more assertive in setting their own agendas. That is precisely what happened in the Middle East, where U.S. retrenchment has made countries less willing to follow Washington’s lead without getting something in return. Saudi Arabia, for instance, rejected U.S. requests to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and to increase oil production to meet elevated demand. Instead, Riyadh worked with Moscow to keep oil prices high. Other U.S. allies in the region, including Israel and the United Arab Emirates, have been similarly resistant to U.S. demands.
Many American analysts and officials seem to think that the historic debt of U.S. allies means that they can be expected to side with the United States against China in more and more domains and at ever greater cost. Trump provided the perfect illustration of this when he threatened to withdraw from NATO while demanding that Europeans ban the Chinese technology giant Huawei from their 5G networks.
But the changes afoot in Berlin and Tokyo suggest that a different kind of relationship is on the horizon, one that is more balanced than the alliances Washington built and maintained in the postwar era. As the relative importance of U.S. defense contributions falls and the costs of alignment rise, it seems unlikely that Washington will be able to count on automatic support. Instead, the United States will have to get used to more cooperative and equitable relationships in which alignment is earned. This will create challenges and headaches initially, especially as Washington is forced to rein in its unipolar instincts. But if the new international order proves stable and helps promote U.S. interests, American taxpayers might once again start to see the country’s network of alliances as an asset rather than a drain on public resources. Not only could the burden of providing security be shared more equitably in such an order but the United States and its allies would be able to establish standards and promote liberal values that, although not solely American, would definitely be more American than Chinese. In other words, Pax Americana could give way not to chaos but to a cooperative model of shared leadership.


Foreign Affairs · by Mark Leonard · June 13, 2022

21. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days



​You can also access it in reader/page format here: 

Philip Wasielewski is a 2022 Templeton Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days - Foreign Policy Research Institute
fpri.org · by Philip Wasielewski
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Russian airstrikes scar the landscape in Kharkiv region, May 2022. (Roy Ratushnyi/war.ukraine.ua)
Introduction
This article will attempt to provide the reader an understanding of the war’s current state and a sense of what strategic direction it may take in the near future. Since war is essentially a political action conducted through organized violence, this report will first examine the political objectives of both parties and how changes on the battlefield have morphed into changes of war aims. It will next examine the battle in Donbas and how the tactical fight affects the strategic situation. Two possible radical changes to the strategic situation will be considered: The disintegration of the Russian army and the Russian use of nuclear weapons. This article will conclude with a summary of the war’s possible strategic direction and its growing strategic meaning.
Russian spetsnaz in Ukraine. (Twitter/ @RALee85/Telegram/@bnwarphoto)
Russia’s Shrinking War Aims
Russian Su-25 aircraft firing S-13 rockets in Ukraine. (Twitter/ https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1532844411339657219)
President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the positions of Ukrainian troops in the area of Bakhmut and Lysychansk, June 6, 2022. (Office of the President of Ukraine)
Ukraine’s Expanding War Aims
Ukraine’s initial war aims were simple: Defend itself, protect the capital and major cities, and survive until Western support arrived. Due to battlefield successes and Russian war crimes, Ukrainian war aims now concern the recovery of territory, both from 2014 and 2022, and the application of justice.
On May 10, Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated that “In the first months of the war the victory for us looked like the withdrawal of Russian forces to the positions they occupied before February 24 and payment for inflicted damage. Now if we are strong enough on the military front and we win the battle for the Donbas . . . the victory for us in this war will be the liberation of the rest of our territories.”
With Russia’s objectives to seize as much territory as possible and destroy within it any concept of Ukrainian national identity, and Ukraine’s objectives to restore full territorial integrity and achieve justice for war crimes, there is no current possibility for a negotiated peace. The war will continue until the correlation of military power causes one or the other parties to again adjust their war aims. With a firm understanding of what each side wants to achieve, this article will now examine the fight to achieve it.
Kharkiv, March 25, 2022. (Aris Messinis/war.ukraine.ua)
The Donbas Cauldron
Terrain and Troops
As of early June 2022, the cockpit of the war is in Donbas (the name comes from the term Donets Basin—the watershed of the Donets River—and consists of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). Specifically, the main fighting is taking place in a rough rectangle formed by the cities of Izium, Barvinkove, Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, and Horlivka. The distance from Izium to Severodonetsk is approximately 50 miles, and from Lysychansk to Horlivka is approximately 35 miles. The front between Russian and Ukrainian forces in this general vicinity is much longer, as it is not a straight line but meanders along rivers, over hills, across fields, and through numerous villages. Within these confines, tens of thousands of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers are conducting the most high-intensity battle in Europe since the fall of Berlin in 1945.
The Ukrainian army’s familiarity with the Donbas terrain has helped it stop Russian advances. Ukrainian forces along the line of control with the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic—known as the Joint Force Organization Group—have been dug in for years, know the terrain well, and are Ukraine’s most experienced combat units.
Facing them is the Russian army—or, more precisely, three different groups of Russian forces.
The first group is the elite of the Russian army: paratroopers, naval infantry, Spetsnaz, and private military companies. These all-volunteer formations are Russia’s most effective fighters and still demonstrate the will to advance toward and attack Ukrainian forces. They have also suffered the heaviest casualties. Since all Russian elite forces have been committed, and it takes years to train them, the possibility of regenerating additional elite forces soon is nil.
The regular Russian army, consisting of contract soldiers and conscripts, is the second group. They are plagued with poor morale, leadership, and logistics. Artillery units are demonstrating high professional standards and are the most effective combat arm against Ukrainian units. However, the effectiveness of other combat arms (e.g., tank and infantry) is uneven at best. Many units have been amalgamated into field-expedient combat formations due to high casualties of their predecessors. Their advantage over the Ukrainian army in Donbas is not quality but quantity.
The final group of the Russian army facing their Ukrainian counterparts consists of “auxiliaries” who use Russian arms, uniforms, and equipment but are separate from the Russian military. They include Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic militias and Chechen forces loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov. Soldiers from the breakaway republics are true cannon fodder, used to the maximum extent possible in Donbas to minimize Russian casualties. They are often pressed into service, given minimal (if any) training, and are sometimes armed with World War II–era bolt-action rifles. Unmotivated and ill supplied, their offensive capability is questionable. But they may fight well to defend their homes if Ukrainian counterattacks ever enter Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic territory. The Chechens, despite their fearsome reputation—or maybe because of it—seem to be used more in the rear as blocking forces to prevent retreats—a similar mission to Soviet secret police (known as the NKVD) units in World War II.
(Lynsey Addario/war.ukraine.ua)
The Tactical Situation
The Kremlin would likely consider further advances requiring the evacuation of this salient and the surrender of Severdonetsk and Lysychansk a major step forward in achieving its political goal of “liberating” all of Donetsk and Luhansk. However, this accomplishes little strategically unless Russian forces encircle and capture tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops. Based on previous Russian rates of advance, the Ukrainians should be able to withdraw in good order if a decision to conduct a tactical retreat is made in a timely manner. Occupying all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts up to their administrative borders accomplishes nothing strategically, beyond a short-term propaganda victory, if it does not destroy the Joint Force Organization Group. Furthermore, it does nothing to prevent the flow of Western arms and ammunition into Ukraine to increase the size and capabilities of the Ukrainian army. Therefore, a tactical defeat in Donbas is not a strategic defeat for Ukraine if it is able to preserve a large part of its army or if the ongoing efforts to enlarge and equip its army are successful. It is not a strategic victory for Russia if it ends up destroying its army through high casualties, which cannot be replaced anytime soon, and crushed morale.
The Strategic Situation
The Russian military is expending thousands of lives in Donbas to make incremental, almost World War I–style, advances over terrain that has no real strategic value. Russia is fighting a war of attrition. In the past, Russia and the Soviet Union had the manpower to make this an effective strategy. However, Russia today no longer has the mechanisms to recruit, train, equip, officer, and deploy substantial new military formations.
Who will replace them? The 130,000 Russian conscripts called up on April 1, 2022, are not supposed to go to a war zone (but many will). Putin, probably fearing social unrest, passed up the opportunity on Victory Day on May 9 to declare war and announce a general mobilization of Russian manpower.
Russian Pacific Fleet naval infantry T-80BV tank in Ukraine. (Twitter/ https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1532261520947695617)
There are strategic differences between Russian and Ukrainian losses. Ukraine is in a better position to replenish its losses of men and materiel. It can afford to trade some territory for time to assimilate Western supplies. With incoming weapons from the West and the training of new volunteers, the Ukrainian army will grow in numbers and capabilities, while the Russian army is unlikely to. When ready, Ukraine will have the forces to counterattack. The Croatian army did the same after losing territory in 1992 to Serbian forces. By 1995, with Western tutoring and supplies, Croatia had rebuilt its army and counterattacked, forcing the Serbs out of the Krajina region within a week. Ukraine could play a similar “long game.”
Memorial for Russian sniper Alexander Kislinsky.
(Twitter/ https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1531532196472885248)
Morale and the Future of the Russian Army
The Russian army will find it hard to replace personnel loses and harder to replace materiel losses. Weapons drawn from dormant Soviet stockpiles will have limited utility against a modern-equipped enemy. Unlike the Ukrainian army, the Russian army is unlikely to increase in size or improve capabilities such as logistics and leadership anytime soon.
Therefore, its morale is unlikely to improve. In April, I examined morale by comparing today’s Russian army against historical indicators for unit cohesion. None of those indicators were positive then, and none are now. Russian army morale issues are now expressed freely in Russian social media. While combat refusals, murdering officers, self-inflicted wounds to avoid combat, etc., happen in every war, there is a point where low morale, combined with ill-discipline, leads to either mutiny or disintegration.
The Russian military has mutinied several times before in its history, from the 1825 Decemberist uprising to the battleship Potemkin, to the events of 1917. Could it realistically happen again?
This raises the question, How long can the Russian army sustain major losses for minimum gains and still function? There are different ways an army can disintegrate. The Tsarist army mutinied twice in 1917—first in late February, in protest of continuing the war and monarchy, and again later that summer after the ill-fated Kerensky offensive. Soldiers, demoralized by previous defeats, Bolshevik propaganda, and horrible living conditions, revolted against their officers and either deserted or formed revolutionary committees to overthrow the Provisional Government. On the other side of the war, half the French army also mutinied in 1917 after the heavy losses in the Neville Offensive. However, their combat refusals were a sit-down strike and not an insurrection. They would not go on the offensive but would defend France. Sympathetic French leadership, furloughs, and changes to suicidal tactics restored morale.
Since there are three distinct Russian military groups fighting in Ukraine, each could react differently to the same situation. The elites may never revolt or could lead a revolt based on their high casualties. Auxiliaries could emulate the Tsarist army in 1917, while the regular Russian army might react like the French army in 1917. Only time will tell.
Another way an ill-disciplined army with poor morale can fall apart is when attempting to retreat under fire—the most difficult of military actions. If faced with a situation in which the enemy has penetrated deeply into the rear and cut off supplies and avenues of retreat, units can panic and descend into every-man-for-himself anarchy. This could happen if Ukrainian forces were to launch a surprise counteroffensive that quickly reached deep into the rear of Russian-occupied territories. This is a risk on an operational level if Ukrainian forces near Kharkiv counterattacked to seize Kupyansk and destroyed two bridges over the Oskil River, thereby trapping Russian forces in a pocket around Izium. At the strategic level, if Ukrainian forces were able to quickly retake Kherson, cross the Dnepr River, and reach Crimea’s Perekop Isthmus, this would have a stunning effect—similar to the Inchon landings during the Korean War. Seizing the Perekop Isthmus and dissolving Russia’s land bridge to Crimea would make Russian gains along the Sea of Azov for naught and would create a devastating psychological effect by threatening the peninsula.
This is just one possible scenario. After months of heavy casualties, limited successes, and poor logistics, leadership, and morale, any type of strong, sudden, psychological shock to the Russian army could be devastating. This would also have obvious domestic political consequences in Russia. The conventional wisdom behind sanctions has been that by collapsing the Russian economy, popular unrest will force Putin to withdraw his army to save his regime. The Russian economy is ailing, but it is a long way from failing. However, in less time than it takes the economy to collapse, the Russian army may do so. An army that is either unambiguously defeated on the battlefield and disintegrates or mutinies is likely to cause popular and elite unrest over the conduct of the war that will force Putin from power. Social revolt may not be caused by economic deprivation, but rather from outrage at seeing the Russian army defeated.
Pripyat radiation warning sign in Chernobyl. (Adobe Stock)
Nuclear Option(s)
The fall of the Russian army is only one possible scenario for this war. Another is the Russian use of nuclear weapons. Putin could authorize a nuclear strike to provide a massive psychological shock to destroy Ukrainian resistance. The gap between Russia’s war aims, however reduced, and its military’s capabilities to achieve them might only be closed with nuclear weapons.
There are three nuclear options: a nuclear demonstration over Ukrainian territory, a nuclear strike against a major population center, and nuclear strikes for tactical purposes.
The first option, such as an airburst very high in the atmosphere over Ukraine, could provide a warning of escalation to come without causing the damage and fallout of a full strike. The Kremlin may believe it could reap the benefit of nuclear coercion without paying the full price of international outrage. This is probably a fallacy. The breaking of the nuclear taboo in any way, especially against a non-nuclear country that gave up its nuclear weapons to Russia, will bring worldwide condemnation and the ultimate in sanctions and isolation for Russia. There is also a chance that this would only further strengthen Ukrainian resolve to resist.
The second option—a strategic strike against a major Ukrainian city—would aim to harm Ukraine so greatly that its government would sue for peace to avoid further destruction. It is a horrific possibility that might be tempered by several factors. The first is the reluctance of those in the chain of command to follow that order for moral or practical reasons, anticipating worldwide revulsion. A second factor could be the difficulty in target selection to not destroy a large Russian-speaking population (Odessa and Kharkiv), the mother of Russian civilization (Kyiv), or a city close to NATO territory (Lviv). Finally, the Russian chain of command might hesitate to conduct a strategic nuclear strike fearing that instead of terrorizing Ukrainian society, it might embolden it to resist and refuse to ever surrender or negotiate.
The third option—nuclear strikes to affect the tactical situation on the battlefield—offers Russia a way to use firepower to make up for deficiencies of manpower. In theory, “small” nuclear strikes of one, five, or ten kilotons could punch holes in Ukrainian lines to allow Russian forces to penetrate, encircle, and route the Ukrainian army.
However, Ukrainian forces are not concentrated enough to provide a lucrative target for nuclear weapons. This is a war of company- and battalion-sized units fighting in dispersed formations. Destroying one or several such formations is unlikely to unhinge any defensive line, which could be reestablished by other forces a few miles back. Would such minor tactical gains be worth the further punishment to Russia’s economy that international reaction would bring? Furthermore, the effects of blast, radiation, and fallout can affect Russia’s own forces. An airburst—the best way to reduce fallout—over a fortified urban area may kill many of the defenders but also destroy it in a way so that mechanized forces cannot move through. Russian forces, like Union forces during the Civil War’s Battle of the Crater, could find themselves trapped in the destruction of their own making.
This very simplified review of nuclear weapons effects is meant to illustrate that the actual application of tactical nuclear weapons is not a panacea or magic wand to sweep away enemy forces. They may still (God forbid) be used in this war, but the tactical advantages they offer may not be worth the tactical challenges or strategic costs they bring.
A boy stands on the remains of a burnt Russian tank, once installed as an exhibit, Kyiv, May 25, 2022. (Serhii Korovainyi/war.ukraine.ua)
Looking Ahead
Russia and Ukraine are locked in a war of attrition, with respective war aims requiring a complete victory for one party and defeat for the other. Whoever lasts the longest can achieve the political objectives it has been fighting for. The events of the war have rendered a negotiated settlement unlikely. From the Ukrainian perspective, Russia is attempting to destroy its national identity. Therefore, survival for Ukraine means defeating Russia. Putin likely realizes he too is in a war for survival—if not for his regime, then for himself. Russia has gone too far in its war with Ukraine to admit mistakes or defeat. To do either would call into question the losses and sacrifices to date, which is one of the constant conundrums for nations at war.
Both nations have suffered severe losses and need to regenerate military strength. The winner will be the one who is quickest to reconstitute its combat forces at the tactical level and whose leader best motivates his country to fight and manages to enlarge and equip his armed forces, and the logistics to sustain those forces, at the strategic level.
Twenty-first century Russia is using twentieth-century weapons to fight a nineteenth-century war of attrition, combined with eighteenth-century pillaging. Currently, Russia’s numerical advantage in Donbas allows it to grind out a slow advance toward a pointless objective. Even if Russian forces advance to the administrative borders of both oblasts, it will not end the war as long as Ukraine still has the will to fight and the means to do so. If Putin plans to declare victory once his army has cleared Ukraine out of Donbas, he is building on sand. Unlike Georgia or Moldova, Ukraine has the resources and international support to refuse to accept a “frozen conflict.” Instead, the incoming tide of a rebuilt and expanded Ukrainian army will eventually wash those gains away—be it months or years from now.
For a short-lived propaganda victory in Donbas, Putin is destroying the Russian army. If that army revolts in self-defense or collapses under Ukrainian counterattacks, Putin will face the same fate as other Russian rulers who have lost wars. Can the gap between Russian war aims and military capabilities be closed with nuclear weapons? In theory, possibly—but in practice, such an outcome is unlikely. There is no silver bullet to overturn poor strategy, leadership, tactics, and logistics and a lack of will in the face of a motivated opponent.
A Russian victory in this conflict could serve as a template or inspiration for other revisionist or ideological powers. A Ukrainian victory would do the same for those societies struggling with the challenges of democracy. On the broadest of scales, that is what this war is about.
  1. [1] While there have been other deadly conflicts in Europe since World War II (e.g., the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s), none have matched the scale of the current war in Ukraine in terms of armies fielded and casualty rates.
  2. [2] David Remnick, “Putin’s Pique,” New Yorker, March 10, 2014.
  3. Small Wars Journal, January 20, 2022, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/modern-russian-statecraft-neither-new-nor-hybrid-part-two-post-soviet-and-still-soviet.
  4. [4] Article by Vladimir Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” July 12, 2021, en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181; Dmitry Medvedev, Почему бессмысленны контакты с нынешним украинским руководством [Why contact with the current Ukrainian leadership is senseless], Kommersant, October 11, 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5028300.
  5. [5] Address by the President of the Russian Federation, February 24, 2022, en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/UA/events/ 67843.
  6. The Russian Empire and the World 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 41–62.
  7. [7] Ivan Egorov, Патрушев: Запад создал империю лжи, предполагающую уничтожение России [The West has created an empire of lies, involving the destruction of Russia], Rossiyskaya Gazeta, April 26, 2022, https://rg.ru/2022/04/26/patrushev-zapad-sozdal-imperiiu-lzhi-predpolagaiushchuiu-unichtozhenie-rossii.html.
  8. [8] Masha Angelova, “Kherson Region of Ukraine Will Transition to Ruble from May 1: Russian State Media,” CNN, April 27, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-04-28-22/h_8a4a61754b058932751bf5611defa4e4; Pavlo Krivosheyev, “Ukrainian Teachers Balk as Moscow Seeks To Impose ‘Russian Standards’ in Occupied Territories,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 23, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-kherson-education-russian-occupation/31862426.html; Joe Middleton, “Mariupol Road Signs Changed to Russian Ahead of Victory Day Parade,” Independent, May 7, 2022, https://www.independent.com.uk/news/world/europe/mariupol-road-signs-russian-victory-day-b2073679.html; Mark Santora, Ivan Nechepurenko, and Anton Troianovski, “A Russian Official Tours Occupied Southern Ukraine,” New York Times, May 19, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/world/russia-ukraine-kherson-zelensky.html.
  9. [10] Oleksandr Yankovskiy, Volodymyr Mykhaylov, and Yevhenia Tokar, “In A Ukrainian Region Occupied by Russian Forces, People Are Disappearing. Locals Fear It’s About to Get Worse,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 16, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-invasion-kherson-disappearances-russia-kidnapping/31765418.html; “Ombudsman: Russia Bolsters Forced Deportations of Ukrainians,” Kyiv Independent April 9, 2022, https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/ombudsman-russia-bolsters-forced-deportations-of-ukrainians/; “Moscow-Held Kherson Region to ‘Ask’ for Russian Military Base,” Moscow Times, May 24, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/24/moscow-held-kherson-region-to-ask-for-russian-military-base-a77776; “Ukraine’s Kherson to Become ‘Part of Russia,’ Occupation Official Claims,” Moscow Times, May 20, 2022, https://themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/19/ukraines-kherson-to-become-part-of-russia-occupation-official-claims-a77738.
  10. [11] One of the best descriptions of these tactics is found in Anne Applebaum’s Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956 (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2013).
  11. [12] Anastasiya Lezhepekova, “Хересонская область вернет греб времен Российской империи [Khereson oblast will return to the crest of Russian imperial times],” Gazeta.Ru, May 7, 2022, https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2022/05/07/176977770.shtml.
  12. [13] Chris Jewers, “Putin Is Accused of Making a Rape Joke about Ukraine by Calling the Country His ‘Beauty’ Amid Invasion Fears,” Daily Mail, February 8, 2022, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10490623/Putin-accused-making-rape-joke-Ukraine-calling-country-beauty.html; Michele Berdy, “A Russian Sleeping Beauty,” Moscow Times, February 11, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/11/a-russian-sleeping-beauty-a76338. Berdy’s article provides an analysis of the Russian language meaning of Putin’s remarks and concludes that this was not an innocent mistranslation or misunderstanding.
  13. [14] Ben Hall and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine Has Upgraded Its War Aims as Confidence Grows, Says Foreign Minister,” Financial Times, May 10, 2022, https://ft.com/content/8db0d387-fb41-4142-b78f-6619d36d8be0.
  14. [15] Hannah Ritchie and Masha Angelova, “Russian Brigade Accused of War Crimes in Bucha Awarded Honorary Title by Putin,” CNN, April 19, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-04-19-22/h_ffab136e5561f14d873083d4ad12d47e.
  15. [16] Robert Kelly, “Russia’s War for the Donbas Begins: What Happens if Putin Can’t Win?” 1945, April 19, 2022, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/04/russias-war-for-the-donbas-begins-what-happens-if-putin-cant-win/; Daniel Davis, “The Battle for Donbas Will Be a Tough Fight for Ukraine,” 1945, April 16, 2022, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/04/the-battle-for-donbas-will-be-a-tough-fight-for-ukraine/.
  16. [17] “Zelensky: Ukraine May Be Losing Up to 100 Soldiers Fighting in the East,” Kyiv Independent, May 28, 2022, https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/zelensky-ukraine-may-be-losing-up-to-100-soldiers-fighting-in-the-east-every-day.
  17. [18] Ben Wolfgang, “Russian Casualties Keep Rising in Ukraine; Top Generals in the Crosshairs,” Washington Times, May 23, 2002, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/may/23/russian-casualties-keep-rising-ukraine-top-general/.
  18. [19] “Госдума отменила предельный возраст военной службы по контракту [The State Duma has abolished the maximum age for military contact service],” Radio Svoboda, May 25, 2022, https://www.svoboda.org/a/gosduma-otmenila-predeljnyy-vozrast-voennoy-sluzhby-po-kontraktu/31867144.html.
  19. [20] Yelizaveta Mayetnaya, “Do Russian Military Officers Have a Morale Problem? Some Say Yes.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 16, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-military-officers-morale-problem/31612793.html.
  20. War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/.
  21. [22] Stijn Mitzer, “Attack on Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Oryx, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html. Accessed May 31, 2022.
  22. [23] Giulia Carbonaro, “Russia Halts Tank Production Due to Supply Problems, Ukraine Claims,” Newsweek, March 22, 2022, https://www.newsweek,com/russia-halts-tank-production-due-supply-problems-ukraine-claims-1690388.
  23. Newsweek, May 10, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-economic-sanctions-rebuild-military-vladimir-putin-1705329.
  24. [26] “Zelensky Names Troop Losses,” Ukraine Today, April 16, 2022, https://ukrainetoday.org/2022/04/1/zelensky-names-ukrainian-troop-losses/.
  25. Oryx, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html. Accessed May 31, 2022.
  26. [28] Will Stewart, “Yet Another Putiny! Putin Hit by ANOTHER Mutiny as ‘60 Elite Paratroopers Refuse to Fight in Ukraine after Comrades Were Wiped Out.’” The Sun, April 7, 2022, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/18191832/putin-another-mutiny-elite-paratroopers-refuse-fight/.
  27. [30] NUKEMAP, https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/.
  28. https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiatin/health-effects/high-rad-doses.html;, “How Many Rems Can a Human Body Take?” radiation.thesocialselect.com, https://radiation.thesocialselect.com/how-many-rems-can-a-human-take/#:~:text=Although%20radiation%20affects%20different%20people%20in%20different%20ways%2C,that%20a%20person%20will%20die%20within%2060%20days.
  29. [32] The National Atlas of Ukraine, Natural Conditions and Natural Resources, Climatic Conditions and Resources, wdc.org.ua/atlas/en/default.html.
  30. [33] Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
  31. [1] The Kremlin’s dreams of quick victories have ended, and the conclusion to the conflict may not come soon. Whenever it’s over, this 2022 war will likely lead to changes on the continent as consequential as those of 1989 or 1945.
  32. [2] Russia’s desire to maintain Ukraine within its sphere of influence led it to pressure then–Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2013 to reject an association agreement with the European Union. The agreement was unacceptable to Moscow because it could have led to Ukraine’s eventual integration into the European Union and other institutions of the Western liberal democratic community.[3] When this pressure backfired and led to the Maidan Revolution in 2014, Moscow illegally annexed Crimea and supported armed insurrections in two breakaway Ukrainian oblasts that later renamed themselves the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic.
  33. [4] By the end of 2021, official Russian policy mirrored Putin’s informal remark that Ukraine was not a real country and therefore had no right to exist.
  34. coup de main by seizing Kyiv and installing a compliant government of Russian collaborators. Putin presented Russia as an aggrieved party forced into war by a West seeking global dominance and a criminal Ukrainian regime attempting genocide in the breakaway republics, which had just declared independence. He insisted that Russia had no territorial ambitions and that his policy in Ukraine was to free the people of Ukraine who were kidnapped by their own government.[5][6]
  35. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the official Russian government newspaper, when he stated that Ukraine’s hatred of Russia would cause it to disintegrate into several states.[7]
  36. [8] Putin has approved a law to provide Russian passports to Ukrainians in occupied territories, the same tactic used to justify making Russian protectorates out of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Luhansk People’s Republic, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.[9]
  37. [10]
  38. [11] They were revived and adjusted after the fall of the Soviet Union to allow Moscow to support breakaway republics in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transdniestria as means of maintaining leverage over Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova. Support to Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic separatists in 2014 followed this pattern as well.
  39. [12] The Kremlin probably hopes that nostalgia for imperial greatness will resonate with the Russian public, as happened after Crimea was seized, so that revised war aims will be seen as worth the costs involved.
  40. [13] That type of thinking was foreshadowed almost two millennia ago when the Roman historian Tacitus wrote, “Ubi Solitudinem Faciunt, Pacem Appellant” (Here they have created a desolation, and called it peace).
  41. [14]
  42. [15]
  43. [16] Instead, the sides have fought a grinding battle because of the local terrain, the skill of Ukrainian forces to use it to their advantage, and unimaginative Russian tactics. The Donbas has large open areas, but running through the battlefield is the Donets River—also known as Siverskyi Donets—which has proven to be a challenging obstacle to bridge and cross under fire, and the Oskil River, which runs north-south between Izium and Severodonetsk. In addition to these rivers, numerous lakes and reservoirs create natural obstacles to movement. In the central part of the battlefield is the Holy Mountains National Park, containing forested cliffs, bogs, and river valleys. This is part of a northwest-to-southeast-running forest belt between Kharkiv and Severodonetsk. Numerous crossroads towns and villages are found in the region, and urban combat in them has proven difficult, time consuming, and deadly.
  44. [17] While the Ukrainian army has conducted a stubborn defense, the Russian army has advanced on the flanks of the exposed Ukrainian salient in Donbas. The easternmost edge of the salient is at the cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, and its flanks are near the towns of Popasna and Dronivka. Russian advances taking Popasna and spreading out across the base of this salient threaten Joint Force Organization units along the Siverskyi Donets River. There has also been Russian progress to the west of this salient in the vicinity of Lyman.
  45. [18]
  46. [19] Many contract soldiers are already announcing their intention to leave the army or refuse to serve in the “special military operation” that Moscow claims is not a war. Increased conscription cannot make up for recruiting shortfalls in a country where evading military service is practically a national sport.
  47. [20] In this war, officers of all levels have borne an extraordinary brunt of casualties. Many officer cadets have graduated early to participate in the war. Furthermore, who will train the new soldiers? Basic and advanced training in Russia’s army is done at the individual unit level, but many training officers and noncommissioned officers have already deployed with their units to Ukraine. This leaves limited cadres at home to instruct new conscripts.[21] Metaphorically speaking, the Russian army is eating its seed corn.
  48. [22] Actual losses are likely higher.
  49. [23] T-62 tanks have been pulled out of reserve, but half-century-old tanks are no answer to modern anti-tank weapons.[24] Decades of munitions production have been used up in three months, and the decline in the use of guided and cruise missiles indicates that precision-guided weapons are in short supply.[25]
  50. [26] Per Oryx, Ukraine has lost 186 tanks, 276 armored/infantry fighting vehicles, and 22 fixed-wing combat aircraft, but these again are conservative figures.[27] Attrition warfare is cutting both ways. The winner may be the side that lasts just a moment longer than the other.
  51. [28] Soldiers argue that since the fighting in Ukraine is a “special military operation” and not a war, they are not legally obligated to participate. However, beneath the surface of these complaints are not legal concerns but human ones: high casualties being suffered for a cause that is unjust and strategically unsound. Men in combat have breaking points; militaries as social organizations have breaking points. A Russian commentator has noted that revolts are most prevalent in conscript armies that have a low level of training and have experienced defeat in a protracted war.[29]
  52. [30] Per the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, humans exposed to 500 rems of radiation without medical treatment will die. Doses between 300 and 400 rems offer a 50 percent chance of death within 60 days.[31] After a non-strategic nuclear attack, advancing Russian forces therefore must bypass the strike area but then would move into territory not totally affected by the strike and possibly still defended.
  53. [32] While the Russians showed little regard for the safety of their troops occupying Chernobyl, they cannot ignore the basic realities of tactical nuclear warfare.
  54. within a cultural civilization—Orthodox civilization—whose cultural boundaries have been formed by its Eastern Orthodox confession, Byzantine heritage, and Slavic ancestry and languages.[33] This war between the world’s two largest Orthodox states is about more than Ukraine’s ability to join NATO or the European Union. It’s also a fight between two ideas of how people should be governed. One side believes it should be by the decree of the powerful and the other by the consent of the governed. One believes it is entitled to a sphere of influence; the other believes it is entitled to chart its own political future.
fpri.org · by Philip Wasielewski

22.  Pockets of Sunflower Seeds: Civil Resistance in Ukraine

Excerpts:
While at this point the preponderance of US assistance has been limited to the provision of lethal and humanitarian aid, there is undoubtedly a role for special operations forces to assist in the development of civil resistance in similar scenarios. As many have pointed out, American special operators have helped develop Ukrainian and other European partners’ abilities to organize and conduct armed resistance, using documents like the Resistance Operating Concept as a guide to developing a whole-of-society approach. But while special operations civil affairs units have worked to improve the citizen-resister-fighter components of these societies, more dedicated focus could and should be paid to the nonviolent forms of resistance that are available to an occupied people. Doing so before an invasion or potentially in a third-party location (or even remotely) will diversify the methods of resistance available and further stymie acts of military aggression. Indeed, recent research supports the idea that foreign support to civil resistance organizations is most effective when provided prior to peak mobilization or the climax of a crisis.
Despite polling suggesting widespread Ukrainian support for armed resistance, significant portions of any society will not resort to violence for a number of reasons. Nonviolent resistance, on the other hand, has a much lower barrier to entry. Drawing on already existing relationships with civil society organizations and community defense organizations, special operation forces can help train Ukrainians or other communities in various methods of civil resistance, including the development of parallel institutions, subversive communications aimed at occupying forces or occupied people, or the diverse forms of protest that can take place. So far, the resilience of the Ukrainian people has taken Russian forces by surprise. While nonviolence by itself is unlikely to defeat a Russian occupation, continuing this resistance under further occupation will be critical to Ukraine’s fight for survival.


Pockets of Sunflower Seeds: Civil Resistance in Ukraine - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Danny Moriarty · June 13, 2022
Javelins and NLAWs kill tanks. But while these NATO-supplied weapons destroy Russian vehicles, Ukrainians are also disrupting armored advances with their own bodies in bold acts of nonviolent resistance. With social media, international audiences have witnessed the sieges of cities like Kharkiv and Mariupol and Ukrainians’ personal accounts of the war at a ground level. Nonviolent resistance to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began just as tanks rolled across the border.
In occupied cities like Kherson and Melitopol, Ukrainian civilians continue to nonviolently resist the invading Russian forces. While much analysis has already examined the potential role of an armed Ukrainian insurgency in resisting Russia aggression, the ongoing efforts of Ukrainian civil resistance merit specific attention. Comprising much more than marches and public protests in the newly occupied cities, civil resistance ties down occupying troops and diverts Russian resources. A properly trained and organized nonviolent effort will serve as a critical complement to the Ukrainian defenders seeking to further disrupt Russian advances in the Donbas, as well as areas to the south where Russian forces are having to contend with both a restive population and Ukrainian counterattacks.
Hjemmefronten: Norwegian Civil Resistance as a Model
To understand how successful a civil resistance campaign can be, consider Norway’s efforts during World War II. Following a rapid military defeat in just sixty-two days in 1940, Norway fell under Nazi occupation and the nominal control of collaborator Vidkun Quisling. But the Norwegians continued to resist, ultimately tying down more than 460,000 German troops. In Norway, early armed resistance lacked significant numbers, but the civilian population began organizing itself from the start. Early campaigns focused on subversive solidarity-building, such as the symbolic wearing of paper clips and other innocuous items that initially did not catch German attention.
The multiyear effort of the Norwegians to disrupt Nazi control serves as just one example of the diverse ways that civil resistance can take shape in the context of a foreign military occupation. While Norwegians resisted alongside a small armed component, Ukraine’s armed forces are still very much the main effort in repelling Russian advances. Still, the case of Nazi-occupied Norway offers several lessons in how clever information operations, significant workers’ strikes, and close coordination with armed resistance can stymie foreign occupation.
Information was crucial to Norwegian resistance. Underground newspapers circulated throughout the country, countering Nazi propaganda and coordinating collective actions. While these actions did not directly disrupt German lines of effort, they served as a crucial first step in organizing networks of Norwegians around a common goal of resisting the occupation. Such networks would escalate their actions over the course of the war.
Through these underground newspapers and networks, leaders organized countrywide resistance actions that prevented the Quisling regime from turning Norway into a passive territory of the Third Reich. Notable instances of resistance included a countrywide teacher’s strike against the implementation of Nazi curriculum in Norwegian schools and a coordinated effort by networks of church groups to prevent the introduction of Nazi ideology into Norwegian value systems. Similar efforts by teachers in occupied Ukraine may well prove necessary to counter Russian efforts at suppressing Ukrainian culture and identity. Likewise, splits between Orthodox churches in Ukraine and Russia mean religious authorities in Ukraine can help to counter the religious narratives pushed by pro-Putin religious leaders in Moscow.
Importantly, the Norwegian civil resistance kept in close coordination with the armed component, allowing for a more unified effort. Such armed resistance, remembered in popular culture by the dramatic sabotage of German heavy water production facilities by teams of Office of Strategic Services–trained Norwegian commandos, also consisted of thousands of Norwegians sabotaging military infrastructure. In the end, the defiance of the Norwegian people made an occupation of their homeland an uneasy one. Their story would even inspire author John Steinbeck’s The Moon is Down, a fictional account of an escalating civil resistance movement that would later be translated and covertly distributed throughout occupied Europe.
Ukrainian Civil Resistance Today
How might a similar Ukrainian civil resistance take shape? In many parts of the country under occupation, community protests both demonstrate Ukrainian resolve and counter narratives that Russian soldiers are being welcomed as liberatorsExtensive research has already examined civil resistance movements as a whole. Sociologist Zeynep Tufekci, for example, presents three broad categories of resistance tactics: narrative, institutional, and disruptive. Narrative forms of resistance include awareness-raising or community-building efforts, focused on the persuasion of domestic and international audiences. Institutional forms comprise acts within the defined political spaces of a society, such as running an oppositional political campaign or rallying voters against proposed legislation. Lastly, resistance is classified as disruptive when it interrupts the normal functioning of society, such as occupations of highways, strikes, boycotts, and a myriad of other tactics. While few opportunities for institutional forms of resistance exist in the context of a foreign occupation, Ukrainians are committing acts of narrative-based and disruptive resistance.
These forms of Ukrainian resistance produce significant meaning both for the immediate local audiences and, thanks to social media, the rest of Ukraine and the world. Reaching Ukrainian diaspora communities is especially important, as they will continue to be a critical component of the resistance, keeping international attention focused on the conflict and facilitating grassroots support. The Norwegian diaspora during World War II also played an important role, as such groups provided the volunteers that would later participate in sabotage raids against the noted heavy water facilities.
For those outside Russia’s strictly controlled media environment, the narrative-focused acts of resistance by Ukrainians have already become widespread. Stories of civilian defiance like that of the “sunflower lady” have gone viral, making the plant an early symbol of the war effort. Beyond the impacts these acts have on the global stage, such protests may produce a measurable impact on local security forces. The anger and confrontational protests of Ukrainians in many cases shattered some Russian troops’ illusions of a hero’s welcome. Several Russian POWs noted this stark contrast with their prewar understanding and the impact it had on unit morale, leading some to abandon their attacks or surrender outright. Norwegians created similar effects through the “ice front” campaign, a societal cold shoulder to occupying Germans. Refusals to speak or interact with Germans or collaborators created a social quarantine. Norwegian refusals to even sit next to Germans on buses became such a nuisance that leaving one’s seat became grounds for arrest. Creating a similar environment in occupied cities where many already share a language with occupying troops would create a psychological effect and further eat away at Russian morale, while simultaneously strengthening the resolve of local communities.
Ukrainians are also demonstrating the capacity for disruptive forms of civil resistance. Social media posts early in the war documented human chains and impromptu roadblocks that slowed down or diverted Russian road movements. A much more real specter than the “Ghost of Kyiv,” Ukrainian farmers stole many abandoned Russian vehicles, making their recovery all the more difficult for any renewed offensives. Beyond these viral acts, Ukrainians possess many more ways to nonviolently interrupt the “new normal” in occupied areas. Political noncooperation, such as the refusal of civil servants to work under a new occupied government, not only deprives Russian-installed leaders of legitimacy but also removes the subject matter expertise on numerous areas of civil administration required for governance. Economic noncooperation can also make continued occupation more costly. Workers’ strikes of critical infrastructure like railways, public works, and other specialties would disrupt troop movements and make sustainment operations more difficult. In areas where poorly fed Russians have resorted to looting, a coordinated caching of foodstuffs and use of community-based exchanges would remove easy access to food and any shortcuts to keeping advancing troops fed.
Such actions are not limited solely to Ukraine; within Belarus, acts of civil resistance by railway workers significantly disrupted Russian logistics. Utilizing preexisting networks of dissidents and knowledge of local rail networks, the workers caused havoc and paralyzed the reinforcement and resupply of Russian troops advancing toward Kyiv. One Belarusian activist’s expression— “We didn’t want to kill any Russian army or Belarusian train drivers. We used a peaceful way to stop them.”—represents how civil resistance can be an effective tool despite not directly killing or injuring an occupying force. The resurgence of a Belarusian civil resistance movement that faced a violent crackdown in 2020 may well prove to be a vital front in the effort to disrupt President Alexander Lukashenko’s support for Russian military aims.
Above all, the preexisting networks of Ukrainian civil society organizations remain critical to coordinating these and other actions. Adapting to the level of violence Russian occupiers may be willing to use, these communities must develop new tactics to preserve their well-being and maintain solidarity. Tactical innovation, a fundamental component of any effective civil resistance, will depend on the creativity and collaborative capabilities of the Ukrainian people. If protests are met with overwhelming violence or repression, developing other methods of subversive resistance will be essential. During the Chilean people’s resistance against the Pinochet regime of the 1970s, violent crackdowns on public gatherings led to the use of pots-and-pans protests from balconies; these cacerolazo protests echoed through cities like Santiago, producing a solidarity-building effect for citizens while avoiding violent responses from security forces. Much like those Chileans or Norwegians during World War II, civil society entities like church groups, community organizations, trade unions, or others will be vital to developing new strategies.
A Role for Special Operations Forces
While at this point the preponderance of US assistance has been limited to the provision of lethal and humanitarian aid, there is undoubtedly a role for special operations forces to assist in the development of civil resistance in similar scenarios. As many have pointed out, American special operators have helped develop Ukrainian and other European partners’ abilities to organize and conduct armed resistance, using documents like the Resistance Operating Concept as a guide to developing a whole-of-society approach. But while special operations civil affairs units have worked to improve the citizen-resister-fighter components of these societies, more dedicated focus could and should be paid to the nonviolent forms of resistance that are available to an occupied people. Doing so before an invasion or potentially in a third-party location (or even remotely) will diversify the methods of resistance available and further stymie acts of military aggression. Indeed, recent research supports the idea that foreign support to civil resistance organizations is most effective when provided prior to peak mobilization or the climax of a crisis.
Despite polling suggesting widespread Ukrainian support for armed resistance, significant portions of any society will not resort to violence for a number of reasons. Nonviolent resistance, on the other hand, has a much lower barrier to entry. Drawing on already existing relationships with civil society organizations and community defense organizations, special operation forces can help train Ukrainians or other communities in various methods of civil resistance, including the development of parallel institutions, subversive communications aimed at occupying forces or occupied people, or the diverse forms of protest that can take place. So far, the resilience of the Ukrainian people has taken Russian forces by surprise. While nonviolence by itself is unlikely to defeat a Russian occupation, continuing this resistance under further occupation will be critical to Ukraine’s fight for survival.
Captain Danny Moriarty is a civil affairs officer currently attending graduate school at the University of Texas at Austin, researching civil resistance within the Department of Geography and the Environment. He previously served in the 83d Civil Affairs Battalion as a team leader and human network analysis chief and has completed deployments to Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Fotoreserg, via depositphotos.com
mwi.usma.edu · by Danny Moriarty · June 13, 2022









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If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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