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Quotes of the Day:
“The analysis of war shows that while the nominal strength of a country is represented by its numbers and resources, this muscular development is dependent on the state of its internal organs and nerve system – upon its stability of control, morale and supply.”
- B.H. Liddell Hart
“The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do.”
- Michael Porter, What Is Strategy?
“It is the responsibility of leadership to work intelligently with what is given, and not waste time fantasizing about a world of flawless people and perfect choices.”
–Marcus Aurelius
1. S. Korea calls on N. Korea to respond to economic aid offer
2. Chinese ambassador says no Beijing-Seoul 'decoupling,' warns of impact from U.S.-led groups
3. Yoon, Bill Gates discuss vaccine development, cooperation
4. North Korea lifts COVID restrictions after ‘maximum emergency’ ends
5. Homes of ex-top security officials raided in probe into N. Korea's killing of fisheries official
6. U.S., South Korea, Japan hold missile defense exercise with eye on North Korea, China
7. Shunned by the West, Putin turns to Kim Jong Un as an ally
8. South Korea’s President Offers ‘Audacious Initiative’ for North Korea’s Denuclearization
9. U.S. supports S. Korean initiative to engage N. Korea: State Dept.
10. US, South Korea to begin expanded military drills next week
11. Kim Jong Un says he is ready to use his nuclear weapons
12. South Korea’s “Decapitation” Strategy Against North Korea Has More Risks Than Benefits
13. Can South Korea chart a path between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific?
14. The Door Opened by “Gangnam Style”
1. S. Korea calls on N. Korea to respond to economic aid offer
I think the regime will respond when the Propaganda and Agitation Department comes up with a response that will try to one up all the past insults of South Korean presidents.
(LEAD) S. Korea calls on N. Korea to respond to economic aid offer | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 16, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with foreign ministry official's remarks in last 3 paras)
SEOUL, Aug. 16 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government hopes North Korea will respond to President Yoon Suk-yeol's offer of an "audacious initiative" to help rebuild its economy in return for denuclearization steps, a unification ministry official said Tuesday.
In his Liberation Day speech the previous day, Yoon unveiled details of the plan to improve the North's economy, such as a large-scale food program, power generation assistance, and modernization of its ports and airports.
"The unification ministry urges and hopes for North Korea to respond to our government's sincere proposal for peace on the Korean Peninsula and the common prosperity of the South and the North," the official told reporters on background when asked about the issue.
The official added the ministry has no plans to request working-level contact with the North on the matter but it is open to considering such a move by reviewing inter-Korean relations and the security situation on the peninsula.
The foreign ministry also said that South Korea has been in consultations with the United States regarding the direction of related plans.
"Throughout the entire process of forming the audacious initiative, our government has closely coordinated with the United States and has also communicated in advance with major countries, such as China and Japan," the ministry's spokesperson Choi Young-sam told reporters.
Washington has expressed support for Seoul's road map initiative during recent bilateral discussions, such as the meeting between their top diplomats on Aug. 5, he added.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 16, 2022
2. Chinese ambassador says no Beijing-Seoul 'decoupling,' warns of impact from U.S.-led groups
Is China preparing for (and telegraphing that it will) conduct) renewed economic warfare against the ROK?\
(Yonhap Interview) Chinese ambassador says no Beijing-Seoul 'decoupling,' warns of impact from U.S.-led groups | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · August 16, 2022
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Aug. 16 (Yonhap) -- The top Chinese envoy in South Korea dismissed concerns about Seoul being "artificially decoupled" from Beijing under the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration that is openly seeking to bolster economic security on the basis of stronger ties with Washington.
Ambassador Xing Haiming rather voiced worries about the negative impact from the U.S.-led "small groups," such as the Chip 4 alliance in the semiconductor industry.
He expressed the view, looking back on the South Korea-China relationship over the past three decades and presenting his outlook for its future, in a special written interview to mark the 30th anniversary of their official ties. The neighboring countries, which fought against each other in the 1950-53 Korean War. established formal diplomatic relations on Aug. 24, 1992.
"Having gone through 30 years of ordeals, Sino-South Korean relations have entered a more mature and stable stage. In the meantime, internal and external environments we face have changed significantly, while opportunities and challenges at hand are increasing," he said.
The anniversary comes as the two sides are at a crucial juncture amid the growing rivalry between Beijing and Washington, the problem of resiliency in global supply chains and continued stand-offs over the advanced U.S. missile defense system positioned in South Korea. Many observers are concerned about the rise of anti-China or anti-South Korea sentiments among their peoples.
South Korea has long struggled to strike a balance between its time-honored alliance with the U.S. and close economic partnerships with China. China is still South Korea's largest trading partner. Exports to China account for around 25 percent of South Korea's total exports.
In the chip trade sector alone, China accounted for 60 percent of South Korea's exports last year, the ambassador pointed out.
But there are growing indications that Seoul is leaning further toward Washington even on the economic front. It has participated in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), initiated by the Joe Biden administration.
South Korea is moving to join the Chip 4 alliance also involving Japan and Taiwan, which China regards as aimed at countering its clout in the region.
Xing emphasized the need for Seoul and Beijing to maintain the principle of respecting "each other's core concern," and promoting mutual cooperation and prosperity.
"It is necessary to ensure that Sino-Korean relations constantly develop in the right direction at all times," he added. "Artificial 'decoupling' does not suit the interests of the two nations and public sentiment, and it can never be realized,"
He accused the U.S. of creating "small groupings" designed to intentionally get China ostracized and warned that other countries will only see themselves damaged by helping Washington's "political purpose."
Regarding the issue of the missile defense system, called THAAD, the veteran diplomat admitted that it has already dealt a serious blow to the Beijing-Seoul relations and remains unresolved.
He urged both sides to make joint efforts together to prevent the matter from "resurfacing" and posing a stumbling block in their ties.
Asked about the possibility of President Xi Jinping meeting bilaterally with his South Korean counterpart in case they attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation or Group of 20 summits together, both slated for November, Xing avoided a direct answer.
He just reiterated that China is willing to push proactively for "high-level exchanges" with South Korea.
Touching on the anniversary, he recalled the historic moment of the opening of the Chinese Embassy in Seoul on Aug. 27, 1992, which he witnessed as a working-level diplomat.
"As China's ambassador to South Korea, I feel a heavy sense of responsibility."
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · August 16, 2022
3. Yoon, Bill Gates discuss vaccine development, cooperation
(LEAD) Yoon, Bill Gates discuss vaccine development, cooperation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 황장진 · August 16, 2022
(ATTN: ADDS info in last 3 paras)
SEOUL, Aug. 16 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol met with Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates on Tuesday and discussed cooperation on vaccine development and other health issues.
During the meeting at the presidential office, Yoon praised Gates for his contributions to modern industrial technology and infrastructure and for his efforts to increase access to vaccines and treatments in developing countries.
He also thanked Gates, who co-chairs the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, for helping South Korea's SK Bioscience Co. develop the country's first homegrown COVID-19 vaccine in June.
"On behalf of the government of the Republic of Korea, I too would like to establish substantive cooperative relations with your foundation so that our country can contribute to promoting the health of the world's citizens while continuing to build advanced bio health technologies," he said.
Gates said South Korea is a "strong match" with the goals of his foundation, both in terms of its growing aid budget and its development of new capabilities through universities, non-profits and companies.
"There's so much capability in Korea," he said, adding that he hopes the two sides can do more together.
"I've been very pleased to see the priority you put on biological innovation," he told Yoon. "The opportunity to both create good jobs and to improve health not just in the rich countries but also the developing countries is very, very exciting."
Meanwhile, the government and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation signed a memorandum of understanding to expand international health partnerships and enhance biotechnology manpower in low- and middle-income countries.
Under the arrangement, they will also jointly develop vaccines, diagnostic devices, and treatment for infectious diseases and work together to reduce global health inequality, the government said.
The MOU was signed by Gates, Foreign Minister Park Jin and Vice Health Minister Lee Ki-il.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 황장진 · August 16, 2022
4. North Korea lifts COVID restrictions after ‘maximum emergency’ ends
Koreans in the north want an improved economy? This really means they want a return to their market economy which Kim assesses is a threat to his rule. And he is surely not going to accept President Yoon's offer for economic assistance.
North Korea lifts COVID restrictions after ‘maximum emergency’ ends
In a speech, Kim Jong Un’s sister blamed South Korea for an outbreak, but North Koreans want an improved economy.
By Hyemin Son for RFA Korean
2022.08.15
rfa.org
North Korea lifted COVID-19 restrictions at bathhouses and restaurants nationwide after declaring victory over the virus and ending its “maximum emergency” order that had been in place since May.
The country’s leader, Kim Jong Un, said last week during a speech at a nationally televised COVID review meeting that the country had stopped the spread of the disease, while adding that it had to maintain a “steel-strong anti-epidemic barrier and intensifying the anti-epidemic work until the end of the global health crisis,” state media reported.
At the same meeting, Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, the vice department director in the Central Committee of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party, revealed in her own speech that her brother had contracted the disease. She vowed “deadly retaliation” against South Korea, which she accused of causing the outbreak.
The lift on restrictions for restaurants and bathhouses began on Sunday, a resident in South Pyongan province, north of the capital Pyongyang, told RFA’s Korean Service on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“Starting today, large and small restaurants … in [the city of] Pyongsong have begun operating normally. This is because the maximum emergency epidemic prevention system has been officially lifted,” the source said.
Prior to the pandemic, restaurants were open daily from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m., according to the source. The National Emergency Quarantine Command mandated that restaurants close at 6 p.m. in 2020 as a preventative measure against the spread of the virus.
North Korea claimed to be virus free throughout all of 2020 and 2021, but finally acknowledged publicly that a major outbreak occurred as the result of a massive military parade in April 2022, and declared the national maximum emergency the following month.
During the maximum emergency, restaurants were open only from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. They are now fully open, according to the source.
“The authorities ordered each restaurant to dedicate a portion of its profit to the state from the end of this month,” the source said.
In nearby Songchon county, bathhouses and swimming pools had all been ordered closed during the emergency, another South Pyongan source told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
“However, with the end of the maximum emergency epidemic prevention system, the operating restrictions of the public bathhouses and swimming pools were also lifted,” the second source said, adding that a facility affiliated with the provincial government began 24-hour operations.
She said that the 24-hour operation is not nationwide, however.
But even though restaurants and bathhouses are open again, they will likely see fewer customers because few people can afford the expense due to the country’s poor economy, the second source said.
In the city of Sinuiju, across the Yalu River border from China, normal business operations in restaurants resumed, a source there told RFA, but tables had to be 3 meters (9.8 feet) apart, and citizens with a high fever are barred from eating or drinking in restaurants.
“In addition, there must be disinfectant liquid at the entrance to the restaurant, and restaurant staff must wear a mask to serve customers. Restaurants caught by the quarantine command for not following quarantine regulations will be fined 100,000 to 300,000 won ($12~36),” the third source said.
This picture taken on August 10, 2022 and released from North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on August 14, 2022 shows Kim Yo Jong, the sister of North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un, speaking at the National Emergency Prevention General Meeting in Pyongyang. Credit: KCNA via KNS/AFP
Rare glimpses
Last week’s national emergency quarantine review meeting was a nationally televised event, and citizens tuned in to catch a rare look at Kim Yo Jong as she accused South Korea of causing the coronavirus to spread in the North, a resident in the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA shortly after it was aired.
“What matters is the fact that the South Korean puppets are still thrusting leaflets and dirty objects into our territory,” Kim Yo Jong said during her speech, referring to the practice of South Korean activist organizations flying anti-regime leaflets by hot air balloon into North Korean territory.
South Korea passed a controversial anti-leaflet law in December 2020 that severely punishes offenders with steep fines and multiyear jail sentences. Even so, one activist group released millions of leaflets as recently as April.
Kim implied during her speech that leaflets contaminated with COVID-19 caused the most recent outbreak.
“We have already considered various counteraction plans but our countermeasure must be a deadly retaliatory one,” she said.
South Korea’s Ministry of Unification dismissed North Korea’s claim that Seoul was the cause of the coronavirus in North Korea.
“North Korea is repeating baseless and deterrent claims related to the source of the coronavirus at the national emergency quarantine review meeting. We express our deep regrets at the rude and threatening remarks about South Korea,” a ministry official told reporters last week.
The North Pyongan source said people she knew who had watched the speech were disappointed that Kim did not mention any effort to improve the financial condition of North Koreans.
“Her speech was full of words that only worsened the situation on the Korean peninsula. … Residents are complaining that if they have declared victory in the fight against the coronavirus, they should now discuss ways to solve the worsening living situation,” the second North Pyongan source said. “They are only concerned with instigating hostility to eradicate the South Korean authorities.”
A group of viewers in South Pyongan were unimpressed by Kim Yo Jong, a third source there told RFA.
“They were saying that Kim Yo Jong seemed to have low dignity, because she couldn’t take her eyes off of her written speech and read it in a trembling voice like a student.”
Translated by Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
rfa.org
5. Homes of ex-top security officials raided in probe into N. Korea's killing of fisheries official
(LEAD) Homes of ex-top security officials raided in probe into N. Korea's killing of fisheries official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 박보람 · August 16, 2022
(ATTN: RECASTS headline; UPDATES paras 1-3, 6-8 with latest info; REPLACES photos)
SEOUL, Aug. 16 (Yonhap) -- Prosecutors raided the houses of three former top national security officials Tuesday as part of an investigation into the previous administration's handling of the death of a fisheries official at the hands of North Korea in 2020.
The Seoul Central District Prosecutors Office sent a team of prosecutors and investigators each to the homes of former National Intelligence Service Director Park Jie-won, former National Security Adviser Suh Hoon and former Defense Minister Suh Wook to seize evidence, according to legal sources.
Prosecutors also searched several other places, including military units under the defense ministry and the Korea Coast Guard.
The searches are part of a probe into suspicions that the previous Moon Jae-in administration mishandled the death of the 47-year-old official, Lee Dae-jun, in September 2020, including concluding without concrete evidence that he was killed while attempting to defect to the North.
The case was looked into again since President Yoon Suk-yeol took office in May, and the Coast Guard overturned the earlier conclusion and said it found no concrete evidence backing allegations that the official attempted to defect.
Park is under suspicion of ordering the deletion of internal intelligence reports suggesting the possibility that Lee went adrift and ended up in North Korean waters by accident, while the former national security adviser allegedly instructed officials to frame Lee's death as a "voluntary defection" case.
Former Defense Minister Suh also allegedly instructed officials to delete related classified military information, such as those gleaned through wiretapping.
Prosecutors are expected to summon the officials for questioning after analyzing the seized materials.
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 박보람 · August 16, 2022
6. U.S., South Korea, Japan hold missile defense exercise with eye on North Korea, China
A baby step toward integrated missile defense which is one of China's "Three No's" demands of the ROK (no more THAAD deployments, no participation in integrated missile defense, and no trilateral ROK-Japan-US alliance).
U.S., South Korea, Japan hold missile defense exercise with eye on North Korea, China
Reuters · by Reuters
SEOUL/WASHINGTON, Aug 16 (Reuters) - The United States, South Korea and Japan participated in a ballistic missile defense exercise off Hawaii's coast last week, the Pentagon said on Tuesday, reviving combined drills with an eye on North Korea as well as China.
It was the first time the three countries have held such drills since 2017, after relations between Seoul and Tokyo hit their lowest in years in 2019 amid renewed historical disputes dating to Japan's 1910-1945 occupation of the Korean peninsula.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, a conservative who took office in May, has vowed to improve relations with Japan and deepen the U.S. alliance to better deter North Korea, including by expanding or resuming joint drills.
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The missile warning and ballistic missile search and tracking exercise took place Aug. 8-14 during the multinational Pacific Dragon drills, and demonstrated the three countries' commitment to respond to challenges posed by North Korea, protect shared security and bolster the rules-based international order, the Pentagon said in a statement.
The participants shared tactical data link information in accordance with a trilateral information sharing agreement, the statement said.
U.S.-led joint missile defence measures have been a sore point with China, which retaliated economically against South Korea's 2016 decision to host a U.S. military Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery.
Beijing says the THAAD radar can penetrate its territory and has called on Yoon to honour assurances made by his predecessor to not to increase THAAD deployments, participate in a U.S.-led global missile shield or create a trilateral military alliance involving Japan.
Yoon has said those do not represent formal agreements and that Seoul is not bound by them.
South Korea's ministry of defense also confirmed on Tuesday that its troops would resume long-suspended live field training during their joint military drills with the United States to be held from Aug. 22 to Sept. 1.
The two sides have scaled back combined military drills in recent years due to COVID-19 and efforts to lower tensions with the North, which has accused the exercises of being a rehearsal for invasion.
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Reporting by Josh Smith in Seoul and Idrees Ali in Washington; Editing by Sandra Maler and Sam Holmes
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Reuters
7. Shunned by the West, Putin turns to Kim Jong Un as an ally
Now this is the north Korean version of "Stepping up" on the global stage (which is President Yoon's vision for South Korea)
Shunned by the West, Putin turns to Kim Jong Un as an ally
Fortune
Friends are running thin for Vladimir Putin, and the Russian president is now seeking to solidify ties with another pariah of the West, state media reports.
Putin and North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un have been drawn increasingly close to each other ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the end of February, and their two countries are now poised to strengthen their relationship in the face of rival “hostile military forces.”
The two leaders reportedly exchanged messages with each other on Monday, Aug. 15—a holiday observed in both North and South Korea celebrating the 1945 date when the Korean peninsula was liberated from 35 years of imperial Japanese rule—according to KCNA, North Korea’s state-sponsored media channel.
Both messages suggested that the two countries are aligned on important geopolitical issues, and will strengthen diplomatic ties with each other in the near future.
In Putin’s message to Kim, the Russian president wrote that North Korea and Russia should strengthen their relationship and diplomatic ties, signaling that the two countries will expand on “comprehensive and constructive bilateral relations” to help support shared interests on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
And in Kim’s message to Putin, the North Korean leader lauded the long history of strong North Korea–Russia relations, suggesting that the relationship was set to take on more importance in the face of renewed global threats.
“The strategic and tactical cooperation, support, and solidarity between the two countries have put on a new high stage in the common front for frustrating the hostile forces’ military threat and provocation, and high-handed and arbitrary practices,” Kim wrote, according to KCNA.
The state media outlet did not specify whom the “hostile forces” referred to, although KCNA has on multiple occasions attributed the same phrase to the U.S. and its allies attempting to persuade North Korea to enter a military denuclearization agreement.
Kim has become an increasingly close ally to Putin ever since the first summit between the two leaders took place in 2019, when each pledged to boost diplomatic ties between their respective nations. The relationship has taken on a higher importance this year, as Kim has stood by Putin despite most of the world shunning the Russian president after Putin’s widely condemned invasion of Ukraine.
In previous statements by Kim reported by KCNA, the North Korean leader described Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the “just cause of defending the dignity and security of their country.”
North Korea was one of only 24 Russian-allied states to reject the UN’s movement to remove Russia from the international Human Rights Council last April, a resolution that eventually passed in response to accusations of war crimes and mass killings leveled at the Russian army in Ukraine.
Last month, North Korea recognized the independence of eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk region, a breakaway state occupied by Russian forces and Russia-backed separatist leaders. The incident caused Ukraine’s foreign ministry to announce the country would be breaking off diplomatic relations with North Korea.
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Fortune
8. South Korea’s President Offers ‘Audacious Initiative’ for North Korea’s Denuclearization
Excerpts:
For the past few months, the “audacious initiative,” the Yoon administration’s first approach to entice Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table, has remained vague with gray areas. During his speech Monday, Yoon revealed slightly more about this economic package with preconditions.
The initiative includes economic exchanges of North Korean resources, such as minerals and rare earths, for South Korea’s food supplies. Seoul said it will plan to kick off the inter-Korean joint economic development committee for cooperation when both countries make a comprehensive agreement on the denuclearization process.
As North Korea’s economy has plummeted due to the sanctions of the United States and the United Nations, Seoul has implied that it could coordinate with them to partially lift the sanctions if North Korea makes steps toward denuclearization. In this context, outside experts believe that Yoon may have consulted with Washington before revealing details of his “audacious initiative” on Monday.
...
Despite Kim’s rare admission of the failure of his five-year economic plan, the North’s supreme leader still believes he can revive his country’s devastated economy. Most important, the “audacious” plan will never be carried out unless Kim publicly declares his willingness to give up his nuclear weapons – something that he has repeatedly signaled will never happen.
As of writing, North Korea’s state-controlled media has not published any response to or report on Yoon’s address. Considering Pyongyang’s responses to Seoul’s friendly gestures in the past, North Korea would either keep silent or release a harsh statement from Kim Yo Jong or other officials to justify missile tests as a response.
South Korea’s President Offers ‘Audacious Initiative’ for North Korea’s Denuclearization
Amid the stalled nuclear and inter-Korean dialogue, President Yoon Suk-yeol again repeated his pledge of economic rewards for denuclearization.
thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · August 15, 2022
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In his speech to mark the 77th Liberation Day on Monday, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol offered Pyongyang his “audacious initiative” to support reviving its crippling economy once it takes steps toward denuclearization.
“Denuclearization of North Korea is essential for sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia and around the world,” Yoon said.
Avoiding Washington’s preferred term, “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” Yoon again reiterated that Pyongyang is the main actor who should be responsible for the denuclearization of the peninsula.
During his speech on the date marking South Korea’s liberation from Japanese occupation, Yoon offered few details of his “audacious” economic offer for the North if it shows substantive progress toward denuclearization. He first raised the idea in his inauguration address back in May.
“The audacious initiative that I envision will significantly improve North Korea’s economy and its people’s livelihoods in stages if the North ceases the development of its nuclear program and embarks on a genuine and substantive process for denuclearization,” Yoon said on Monday.
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“We will implement a large-scale food program; provide assistance for power generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure; and carry out projects to modernize ports and airports for international trade. We will also help enhance North Korea’s agricultural productivity, offer assistance to modernize hospitals and medical infrastructure, and implement international investment and financial support initiatives.”
For the past few months, the “audacious initiative,” the Yoon administration’s first approach to entice Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table, has remained vague with gray areas. During his speech Monday, Yoon revealed slightly more about this economic package with preconditions.
The initiative includes economic exchanges of North Korean resources, such as minerals and rare earths, for South Korea’s food supplies. Seoul said it will plan to kick off the inter-Korean joint economic development committee for cooperation when both countries make a comprehensive agreement on the denuclearization process.
As North Korea’s economy has plummeted due to the sanctions of the United States and the United Nations, Seoul has implied that it could coordinate with them to partially lift the sanctions if North Korea makes steps toward denuclearization. In this context, outside experts believe that Yoon may have consulted with Washington before revealing details of his “audacious initiative” on Monday.
Following up on Yoon’s address, Kim Tae-hyo, a deputy presidential national security adviser, called the audacious initiative a “bold proposal” and implied that the initiative can be implemented “in the early stage of negotiations” if North Korea shows a sincere attitude toward denuclearization.
Similar proposals toward Pyongyang had already been made by Yoon’s predecessors since the late 1990s. Progressive governments have usually offered humanitarian aid preemptively, even before Pyongyang made any moves toward denuclearization, in an attempt to rebuild and improve inter-Korean ties.
However, North Korea demonstrated that it has no interest in giving up its nuclear weapons by conducting its first nuclear test in 2006. Since then, successive South Korean conservative governments halted support to the North and beefed up defense capabilities to cope with the North’s rising nuclear and missile power. Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, two previous conservative presidents, each sought room for dialogue over Pyongyang’s nuclear programs, but failed to entice the North to dismantle its nuclear arsenals.
Now, after five years of former South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s peace process, Yoon, another conservative president, seems to be sticking with his initiative as the primary option to tackle the North’s nuclear and missile threats.
Considering leader Kim Jong Un and his powerful sister Kim Yo Jong’s recent remarks, however, Pyongyang might not even consider the initiative.
Despite Kim’s rare admission of the failure of his five-year economic plan, the North’s supreme leader still believes he can revive his country’s devastated economy. Most important, the “audacious” plan will never be carried out unless Kim publicly declares his willingness to give up his nuclear weapons – something that he has repeatedly signaled will never happen.
As of writing, North Korea’s state-controlled media has not published any response to or report on Yoon’s address. Considering Pyongyang’s responses to Seoul’s friendly gestures in the past, North Korea would either keep silent or release a harsh statement from Kim Yo Jong or other officials to justify missile tests as a response.
Mitch Shin
Mitch Shin is Chief Koreas Correspondent for The Diplomat and a non-resident Research Fellow of the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm Korea Center.
thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · August 15, 2022
9. U.S. supports S. Korean initiative to engage N. Korea: State Dept.
I am sure there has been thorough coordination between the ROK and US diplomats.
U.S. supports S. Korean initiative to engage N. Korea: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · August 16, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Aug. 15 (Yonhap) -- The United States strongly supports South Korea's efforts to restart dialogue with North Korea and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, a state department spokesperson said Monday.
Department Press Secretary Ned Price also said the U.S. will continue to closely work with Seoul to that end.
"We strongly support the ROK's aim to open a path for serious and sustained diplomacy with Pyongyang," Price said in a press briefing, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
The remarks came after South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol offered to help "significantly improve" North Korea's economy if and when Pyongyang takes denuclearization steps.
"Our shared goal -- shared with the ROK, as well as our other allies and partners -- is the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and we will continue to coordinate closely with the Yoon administration to this end," the department spokesperson said.
North Korea has stayed away from denuclearization talks since late 2019.
Price urged Pyongyang to return to dialogue, saying the country has "not demonstrated any indication that they are interested in diplomacy or dialogue."
"We believe that diplomacy can bring practical, pragmatic steps that the United States could take, the DPRK could take, that our allies and partners around the world could take towards that ultimate goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," he said.
DPRK stands for North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · August 16, 2022
10. US, South Korea to begin expanded military drills next week
Do not be swayed by north Korean rhetoric. The regime is not afraid of the exercises. The regime uses the exercises as a tool to try to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance and force an end to the exercises to make the US troop presence untenable if they cannot train. Their propaganda is aimed at those who think we should make concessions in exercises in the hope that cancelling exercises will provide the conditions for negotiations. Unfortunately cancelling exercises will not cause Kim to negotiate and act as a responsible member of the international community. It does not comport with the nature of the regime or its objectives and strategy.
It is good to read the statement from the ROK spokesman -exercises are normalized. If you want to maintain a deterrent and defense capability you must train the force as a matter of routine.
Excerpts:
“The biggest meaning of (Ulchi Freedom Shield) is that it normalizes the South Korea-U.S. combined exercises and field training, (contributing) to the rebuilding of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the combined defense posture,” Moon Hong-sik, a Defense Ministry spokesperson, said during a briefing.
Some experts say North Korea may use the drills as an excuse to increase tensions.
North Korea has already warned of “deadly” retaliation against South Korea over its own COVID-19 outbreak, which it dubiously claims was caused by anti-North Korean propaganda leaflets and other objects flown across the border by balloons launched by southern activists. There are concerns that the North Korean threat, issued last week by the powerful sister of leader Kim Jong Un, portends a provocation which might include a nuclear or missile test or even border skirmishes.
US, South Korea to begin expanded military drills next week
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · August 16, 2022
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — The United States and South Korea will begin their biggest combined military training in years next week in the face of an increasingly aggressive North Korea, which has been ramping up weapons tests and threats of nuclear conflict against Seoul and Washington, the South Korean military said Tuesday.
The allies’ summertime drills, named Ulchi Freedom Shield, will take place from Aug. 22 to Sept. 1 in South Korea and include field exercises involving aircraft, warships, tanks and potentially tens of thousands of troops.
The drills underscore Washington and Seoul’s commitment to restore large-scale training after they canceled some of their regular drills and downsized others to computer simulations in recent years to create space for diplomacy with North Korea and because of COVID-19 concerns.
The U.S. Department of Defense also said the U.S., South Korean and Japanese navies took part in missile warning and ballistic missile search and tracking exercises off the coast of Hawaii from Aug. 8 to 14, which it said were aimed at furthering three-way cooperation in the face of North Korean challenges.
While the United States and South Korea describe their exercises as defensive, Ulchi Freedom Shield will almost surely draw an angry reaction from North Korea, which describes all allied training as invasion rehearsals and has used them to justify its nuclear weapons and missiles development.
China, North Korea’s main ally, expressed concern over the expansion of U.S. military exercises with its Asian allies, saying they could worsen tensions with the North. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin didn’t offer a specific answer when asked whether Beijing believes the trilateral drills in Hawaii were in some way directed at China.
“North Korea has repeatedly expressed its concern” over the joint drills, Wang said in a briefing in Beijing on Tuesday.
“The negative impact of the military exercises on the situation on the Korean Peninsula is worth paying attention to. All parties should act prudently and stop any actions that may increase tension and confrontation and damage the mutual trust,” he said.
Before being shelved or downsized, the U.S. and South Korea held major joint exercises every spring and summer in South Korea. The spring ones had been highlighted by live-fire drills involving a broad range of land, air and sea assets and usually involved around 10,000 American and 200,000 Korean troops.
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Tens of thousands of allied troops participated in the summertime drills, which mainly consisted of computer simulations to hone joint decision making and planning, although South Korea’s military has emphasized the revival of large-scale field training this time.
Officials at Seoul’s Defense Ministry and its Joint Chiefs of Staff did not comment on the number of U.S. and South Korean troops that will participate in Ulchi Freedom Shield.
The drills, which will kick off along with a four-day South Korean civil defense training program led by government employees, will reportedly include exercises simulating joint attacks, front-line reinforcements of arms and fuel, and removals of weapons of mass destruction.
The allies will also train for drone attacks and other new developments in warfare shown during Russia’s war on Ukraine and practice joint military-civilian responses to attacks on seaports, airports and major industrial facilities such as semiconductor factories.
“The biggest meaning of (Ulchi Freedom Shield) is that it normalizes the South Korea-U.S. combined exercises and field training, (contributing) to the rebuilding of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the combined defense posture,” Moon Hong-sik, a Defense Ministry spokesperson, said during a briefing.
Some experts say North Korea may use the drills as an excuse to increase tensions.
North Korea has already warned of “deadly” retaliation against South Korea over its own COVID-19 outbreak, which it dubiously claims was caused by anti-North Korean propaganda leaflets and other objects flown across the border by balloons launched by southern activists. There are concerns that the North Korean threat, issued last week by the powerful sister of leader Kim Jong Un, portends a provocation which might include a nuclear or missile test or even border skirmishes.
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In an interview with Associated Press Television last month, Choe Jin, deputy director of a think tank run by North Korea’s Foreign Ministry, said the United States and South Korea would face “unprecedented” security challenges if they don’t drop their hostile military pressure campaign against North Korea, including joint military drills.
Kim Jun-rak, spokesperson of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the South Korean and U.S. militaries are maintaining a close watch on North Korean military activities and facilities.
Animosity has increased on the Korean Peninsula since U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations derailed in early 2019 because of differences over a relaxation of crippling U.S.-led sanctions on North Korea in exchange for disarmament steps.
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Kim Jong Un has since declared North Korea will bolster its nuclear deterrent in the face of “gangster-like” U.S. pressure and halted all cooperation with South Korea. Exploiting a division in the U.N. Security Council over Russia’s war on Ukraine, North Korea has dialed up its weapons testing to a record pace this year, conducting more than 30 ballistic launches. They included the country’s first intercontinental ballistic missiles since 2017 and tests of tactical systems designed to be armed with small battlefield nuclear weapons.
Kim has punctuated the testing binge with repeated warnings that North Korea will proactively use its nuclear weapons in conflicts with South Korea and the United States, which experts say indicate an escalation in its nuclear doctrine that could cause greater concern for its neighbors.
South Korea and U.S. officials say North Korea has been gearing up for its first nuclear test since September 2017, when it claimed to have developed a thermonuclear warhead to fit on its ICBMs.
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · August 16, 2022
11. Kim Jong Un says he is ready to use his nuclear weapons
We must never forget that it is the Kim family regime that is executing a hostile policy toward the ROK, the US, and the international community.
Kim Jong Un says he is ready to use his nuclear weapons
Kim Jong Un says North Korea is ready for any potential military conflicts with the United States and South Korea after criticising the country's new president Yoon Suk-yeol for the first time and warning Seoul is pushing towards the brink of war.
Monday 15 August 2022 00:36, UK
Sky News
North Korea is ready to mobilise its nuclear war deterrent "accurately and promptly", leader Kim Jong Un has claimed.
He said the country was ready for any potential military conflicts with the United States as well as South Korea, criticising its new president Yoon Suk-yeol for the first time and warning Seoul was pushing towards the brink of war.
In a speech on the 69th anniversary of the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, he said: "Our armed forces are thoroughly prepared to respond to any crisis, and our nation's nuclear war deterrence is also fully ready to mobilise its absolute strength faithfully, accurately and promptly to its mission."
The North Korean leader accused the US of "demonising" North Korea to justify its "dangerous, illegal hostile acts" towards Pyongyang.
He said US-South Korea military drills show the US "double standards" because it brands North Korea's routine military activities - an apparent reference to its missile tests - as provocations or threats.
"That is driving bilateral relations to the point where it is difficult to turn back, into a state of conflict," he said.
He also called his counterpart in South Korea "a confrontation maniac" and accused him of threatening Pyongyang's right to self defence and security, by moving to strengthen Seoul's military alliance with the US and bolster its capacity to neutralise North Korean nuclear threats including a pre-emptive strike capability.
'Yoon Suk-yeol's government and military will be annihilated'
"Talking about military action against our nation, which possess absolute weapons that they fear the most, is preposterous and is very dangerous suicidal action," he said.
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"Such a dangerous attempt will be immediately punished by our powerful strength and the Yoon Suk-yeol government and his military will be annihilated."
The speech came after Seoul and Washington officials said Pyongyang has completed preparations to conduct its first nuclear test since 2017.
It follows a warning from the North Korean leader earlier this year in April, when he said his country's nuclear weapons would "never be confined to the single mission of war deterrent".
His military has also test-launched nuclear-capable missiles that place both the US mainland and South Korea within striking distance.
His latest remarks also come as he seeks greater public support with his country facing an economic crisis due to pandemic-related border shutdowns, US-led sanctions and his own mismanagement.
Sky News
12. South Korea’s “Decapitation” Strategy Against North Korea Has More Risks Than Benefits
I think this is an example of rhetoric outpacing military strategy. We should never forget that Kim Jong Un as the Marshall in command of the nKPA is a legitimate military target in war.
But the concluding two paragraphs are the most important. There is a lot of work to be done.
The U.S.–South Korea alliance, including the Combined Forces Command, should additionally take joint measures to adapt to the new challenges posed by North Korea. Some of this is already underway with the ongoing rewrite of wartime operational plans. With the slated return of joint field training exercises later this summer, the two sides should maintain and enhance readiness to deter and respond to limited attacks by North Korea. These efforts should be paired with joint proposals on possible arms control measures with North Korea that may limit the most acute drivers of instability, such as tactical nuclear weapons, when the conditions for negotiations once again emerge.
Finally, upcoming alliance dialogues on extended deterrence should examine these issues directly. If an overemphasis on punishment-oriented deterrence strategies has revealed gaps in allied or South Korean defense posture, the alliance should respond to mitigate and plug these shortfalls. As the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear forces shifts, South Korea and the United States will need to adapt in tandem.
South Korea’s “Decapitation” Strategy Against North Korea Has More Risks Than Benefits
ANKIT PANDA
- AUGUST 15, 2022
- COMMENTARY
Source: Getty
Summary: Seoul’s renewed emphasis on targeting Pyongyang leadership is especially dangerous given recent developments in North Korean nuclear capability and strategy.
carnegieendowment.org · by Ankit Panda
Speaking last month, South Korea’s new military chief offered a warning to North Korea. Touting the efficacy and precision of his country’s missile capabilities, General Kim Seung-kyum said that South Korea was capable of “sending a fatal blow to the enemy.” Meanwhile, the new South Korean administration under President Yoon Suk-yeol has reinvigorated military planning for preemptive and retaliatory strikes against the North Korean leadership under the so-called Kill Chain and Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) strategies, respectively.
Ankit Panda
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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Under the latter concept, South Korea would use conventional missiles to target, among other things, North Korea’s leadership—including Kim Jong Un. These strategies were conceived during a time when North Korea’s nuclear capabilities were relatively more modest and the logic of deterrence by punishment more compelling. However, as North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile capabilities, the escalation risks of the KMPR strategy and its overt threats to Kim’s life now significantly outweigh the benefits.
The KMPR strategy was first disclosed to South Korean lawmakers during the Park Geun-hye administration after North Korea’s fifth nuclear test in September 2016. Though the specifics of the plan remain classified and have evolved over the years, the basic contours of what the plan sought to accomplish were described to South Korean media by anonymous military sources, who were likely speaking with authorization, in sufficient detail to outline its strategic purpose:
Every Pyongyang district, particularly where the North Korean leadership is possibly hidden, will be completely destroyed by ballistic missiles and high-explosive shells as soon as the North shows any signs of using a nuclear weapon. In other words, the North’s capital city will be reduced to ashes and removed from the map.
Another source at the time noted the creation of a special military unit dedicated to targeting and killing North Korea’s leadership had been stood up. The strategy is also credible insofar as strike capabilities are concerned: South Korea has no shortage of precision missiles. The Moon administration, seeking to downplay South Korea’s defense capabilities as it pursued diplomacy with Kim, rebranded the strategy as Overwhelming Response (a decision that has since been reversed under Yoon). This basic military strategy is often described as “decapitation,” as it seeks to deter or terminate conflict by removing the head of the adversary’s national leadership.
KMPR is premised on deterrence-by-punishment of Kim. Seoul sought to communicate to the North Korean leader that he could not hope to use his nuclear weapons and live to see another day. This idea has also underpinned U.S. declaratory policy toward North Korea. The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review notes that “there is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive,” and the unreleased but complete Biden administration version may repeat this formulation.
The appeal of this logic of punishment is understandable. As a personalistic dictatorship whose nuclear forces and military are under the control of one person, North Korea may be undeterred from nuclear escalation in the course of a limited conflict by threats of damage against military or economically valuable targets. Accordingly, it must be deterred by threatening to punish its leadership directly. And because North Korea could use its nuclear weapons first to deter and repel a conventional war effort by Seoul and Washington, quickly—and possibly preemptively—killing Kim could avert a nuclear war and limit damage to South Korea.
Unfortunately, this logic runs up against significant qualitative and quantitative changes in North Korean nuclear capability. Continued signaling around decapitation intentions invites North Korea to take especially dangerous steps as it modernizes its nuclear forces and posture. And by continuing to adhere to this approach, South Korea could further increase the risks of rapid and uncontrolled escalation by North Korea in the course of a conflict, defeating the very intent behind this plan.
First, North Korea’s nuclear forces have experienced substantial qualitative refinement and quantitative growth since KMPR was conceived. Between 2017 and 2020, North Korea crossed significant qualitative milestones and began mass production of missile launchers and nuclear warheads. Last year, Kim announced a wide-ranging military and nuclear modernization plan that includes the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Together, these developments have given North Korea a more responsive and survivable nuclear force—and one capable of inflicting significant damage against South Korea and the United States.
KMPR is meant to be a response to North Korean nuclear use, but North Korea’s expansive nuclear capabilities—and particularly its own development of relatively precise missiles—offer it options that weren’t available at the time the South Korean strategy was conceived. Pyongyang’s plans for nuclear first use can credibly expand to a cover a wider range of South Korean targets as its nuclear force continues to grow. These could include South Korean missile launch facilities, command and control nodes, and other support infrastructure. Seoul can cope by expanding and dispersing its missile forces, and posturing more of them for rapid-response, but the deterrence benefits of these approaches may only be temporary as North Korea expands its arsenal to keep up—the vicious cycle of arms racing.
Second, in a major crisis or a time of all-out war, it is far from assured that South Korean military forces will have sufficient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to reliably track Kim’s position and target him with high confidence. A failed decapitation attempt in the course of a conflict—for instance, on one of Kim’s many homes around North Korea—could raise the stakes of what might otherwise have been a conflict with limited aims for Kim and prompt him to opt for significant nuclear use to seek coercive leverage. (Failures to target leadership on faulty intelligence aren’t merely a theoretical concern: the United States tried and failed to kill Saddam Hussein in the early days of the 2003 Iraq invasion.)
Third, given South Korea’s publicly signaled intentions to kill Kim, North Korea’s leadership could be primed to misinterpret wartime strikes by South Korea that do not have the intention of killing the leadership. For instance, various North Korean underground facilities are likely to be targeted by South Korea with precision ballistic and cruise missiles in the course of any major conflict on the Korean Peninsula. If Kim’s position is unknown at the time of the conflict’s start and a facility near his actual location is struck without the intention of actually killing him, Kim could see sufficient cause to escalate to nuclear use to degrade South Korea’s warfighting capabilities.
Even if KMPR has mostly—but not always—been communicated as a retaliatory strategy, Kim may fear preemptive decapitation prior to his use of nuclear weapons. Last month, he used the occasion of the sixth-ninth anniversary of the Korean War armistice to convey that Seoul was “grossly mistaken” if it thought it could preemptively destroy Pyongyang’s ability to use nuclear weapons. Mentioning South Korea’s new president by name for the first time, Kim noted that the “Yoon Suk Yeol regime and its army will be annihilated” if it attempts preemption.
Fourth, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons may indicate that Kim intends to address his KMPR problem with a somewhat traditional solution. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States, starting with the Eisenhower administration, delegated the authority to release nuclear weapons to military units deployed in the field. The basic justification for this practice was that the president’s incapacitation or unavailability in the course of a crisis or war would not preclude the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. leaders believed that delegating authority in this way strengthened deterrence of Soviet threats to Europe.
Kim, like the U.S. president today, retains the sole authority in North Korea to release nuclear weapons. North Korea communicated this to the world when its legislature self-codified the country’s status as a nuclear weapons state. However, at a meeting of the country’s Central Military Commission in June, Kim offered indicators that delegation may be a possibility in the future. In a political system like North Korea’s, delegation of the authority to use nuclear weapons could have negative political implications for Kim’s consolidated political leadership. Nevertheless, it is plausible that Kim may try to strike a balance by only delegating authority in the course of a crisis.
As North Korea moves toward testing and deploying tactical nuclear weapons, more clarity on this issue is likely to emerge. Continued emphasis on decapitation—and especially preemptive decapitation—by Seoul will give Kim ample incentive to consider delegating nuclear use authority, despite the political risks. Nuclear command and control requires trade-offs, and Kim may opt to maximize what he feels is best for deterrence versus political control. Regardless, South Korea should not hope to solve the problem of deterring North Korean nuclear use by threatening to kill Kim.
Given the many risks associated with continued signaling around leadership targeting and sustaining the KMPR strategy, Seoul should refocus its efforts elsewhere. For instance, the ISR and strike capabilities designed to underpin KMPR can be easily repurposed to support a damage-limiting counter-battery mission against North Korean missile launchers. While targeting mobile launchers will pose challenges commensurate to, if not more difficult than, targeting Kim himself, prompt counter-battery fire may see greater effectiveness.
Above all, the overall shifts in North Korea’s nuclear forces, including its substantial expansion, should prompt a rethink of the utility of deterrence by punishment against North Korea. Threats of punishment can continue to play a role in deterring massive and unlimited nuclear use by North Korea, but Pyongyang’s capability advances since 2016 have opened substantial space for Kim to seek limited nuclear use—including use of tactical nuclear weapons for discrete military objectives. Opting instead for deterrence by denial—conveying to North Korea that even the limited use of nuclear weapons is unlikely to aid in its pursuit of various political aims—may bear more fruit. Seoul has laid the groundwork for denial with its investments in missile defense, but North Korea’s improved nuclear capabilities should prompt a greater emphasis on passive defenses as well, including hardening, concealment, deception, and civil defense.
The U.S.–South Korea alliance, including the Combined Forces Command, should additionally take joint measures to adapt to the new challenges posed by North Korea. Some of this is already underway with the ongoing rewrite of wartime operational plans. With the slated return of joint field training exercises later this summer, the two sides should maintain and enhance readiness to deter and respond to limited attacks by North Korea. These efforts should be paired with joint proposals on possible arms control measures with North Korea that may limit the most acute drivers of instability, such as tactical nuclear weapons, when the conditions for negotiations once again emerge.
Finally, upcoming alliance dialogues on extended deterrence should examine these issues directly. If an overemphasis on punishment-oriented deterrence strategies has revealed gaps in allied or South Korean defense posture, the alliance should respond to mitigate and plug these shortfalls. As the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear forces shifts, South Korea and the United States will need to adapt in tandem.
carnegieendowment.org · by Ankit Panda
13. Can South Korea chart a path between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific?
Video from Andrew at the link. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/08/15/can-south-korea-chart-a-path-between-the-us-and-china-in-the-indo-pacific/?utm_source=pocket_mylist
Excerpts:
Given its geostrategic position in Northeast Asia, South Korea will continue to be pressed between Beijing and Washington, regardless of whether a conservative or progressive government holds power. China’s response to South Korea’s actions in the Indo-Pacific will for sure weigh on the conservative Yoon government, as indicated by Seoul’s response to Pelosi’s visit to South Korea earlier this month.
However, as Seoul’s sharp rebuttal of Beijing’s claim that South Korea agreed to limit the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system on its territory suggests, South Korea will continue to lean toward Washington as it carves out its strategic path in the Indo-Pacific.
Can South Korea chart a path between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific?
The Brookings Institution · by Andrew Yeo · August 15, 2022
U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to Taipei earlier this month carried political ripple effects beyond the Taiwan Strait into South Korea. Traveling directly from Taipei to Seoul, Pelosi was allegedly “snubbed” at the airport when no official delegation arrived to greet her. Moreover, the presidential office informed Pelosi that South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol was on vacation and would not be able to meet in person (although he did hold a 40 minute phone call with her).
A few days later, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin traveled to Beijing to meet his Chinese counterpart, leading to speculation that Seoul was placating Beijing to avoid confrontation with China. Yet, despite the optics of reverting to a “balanced” approach toward Beijing and Washington, the Yoon government will likely stay on course to increase its engagement with U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Regional perceptions of South Korean foreign policy
Among U.S. treaty allies, South Korea until recently had been relatively quiet on the Indo-Pacific front. There are still lingering doubts about South Korea’s role as a regional partner, even though the Yoon government has repeatedly stated its intent to engage more deeply with other Indo-Pacific countries and become a “global pivotal state”.
Perceptions of South Korea’s strategic marginalization in the Indo-Pacific area exist beyond anecdotes. For instance, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not include South Korea in its 2021 Diplomatic Blue Book in the section discussing Indo-Pacific cooperation, even though countries outside of Asia such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands were included. In Southeast Asia, a survey conducted by the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (a research institute in Singapore) revealed South Korea’s low standing among Southeast Asian thought leaders. When asked which countries had the “strongest confidence to provide leadership and uphold a rules-based order” South Korea ranked ninth out of 10, below Australia and New Zealand.
Such perceptions are not unwarranted. Seoul was slow to embrace the Indo-Pacific concept after the Trump administration released its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in 2017. This contrasted with other U.S. allies which had adopted or were in the midst of drafting their own version of an Indo-Pacific strategy. Allies such as Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and regional actors such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) tended to interpret South Korean regional strategy as focused more on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Seoul also kept a healthy distance from U.S.-led regional coalitions such as the Quad and avoided criticizing China on human rights issues because of ongoing economic coercion.
Recent events — including Yoon’s misstep with Pelosi’s visit, Park Jin’s meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Seoul’s deeper reservations in joining the Biden administration’s “Chip 4” semiconductor supply chain alliance — have raised questions whether South Korea will press on with raising its Indo-Pacific profile. Yoon’s low domestic approval ratings may also hinder Seoul’s ability to implement key foreign policy goals, such as improving relations with Japan.
South Korea’s Indo-Pacific path
Yet, domestic hurdles and Chinese pressure notwithstanding, South Korea still appears on course to expand its strategic role in the Indo-Pacific.
First, South Korea is currently drafting its own version of an Indo-Pacific strategy to be released by the end of this year. The strategy will likely include a strong Southeast Asia component, incorporating elements of the previous government’s New Southern Policy (NSP), which was aimed at advancing ties with India and ASEAN. It will also address issues related to economic security, which are confronting like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. It may also incorporate language evoking norms and values to strengthen a rules-based international order.
Second, moving beyond rhetoric, South Korea and Japan have taken early steps to improve bilateral relations and strengthen their trilateral relationship with the United States. At the bilateral level, the two countries’ foreign ministers have met three times in a span of three months. In their most recent meeting on July 18, Foreign Ministers Yoshimasa Hayashi and Park Jin agreed to work together in response to North Korea’s nuclear threat and find a solution to address Japan’s use of forced Korean wartime labor. Several trilateral level meetings with the United States at all levels have also taken place, including a brief meeting between Yoon, U.S. President Joe Biden, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida briefly on the sidelines of the NATO summit in late June.
Third, South Korea agreed to join the U.S. Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and is likely to join the Chip 4 despite objections from China. The Yoon government is treading lightly on the Chip 4, referring to the grouping as a “supply chain consultative body” rather than an “alliance” to suggest it is not excluding Beijing. Nevertheless, in pursuit of its own economic security, South Korea indicated it will join a preliminary meeting of the Chip 4.
Given its geostrategic position in Northeast Asia, South Korea will continue to be pressed between Beijing and Washington, regardless of whether a conservative or progressive government holds power. China’s response to South Korea’s actions in the Indo-Pacific will for sure weigh on the conservative Yoon government, as indicated by Seoul’s response to Pelosi’s visit to South Korea earlier this month.
However, as Seoul’s sharp rebuttal of Beijing’s claim that South Korea agreed to limit the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system on its territory suggests, South Korea will continue to lean toward Washington as it carves out its strategic path in the Indo-Pacific.
The Brookings Institution · by Andrew Yeo · August 15, 2022
14. The Door Opened by “Gangnam Style”
A critique of South Korea culture and social issues.
Excerpts:
In its eight years, Korea Exposé has gone through several different models. An early slogan, “Showing Korea as It Really Is,” positioned the site as a corrective to the propagandistic positivity of hallyu—a mission of debatable necessity, given the grim impressions of Korea already served to readers in the English-speaking world. This goes some way to explaining the surprising Western enthusiasm, in the decade since “Gangnam Style,” for not just Korean popular culture but Korean popular culture that attacks its own society. As little as Western audiences may know about the place, if they’ve been primed to see it as a dystopia, they’ll respond favorably to even its most grotesquely heightened dystopian portrayals. This, too, is satirized in “Squid Game,” with its room of decadent foreign “V.I.P.s” who thrill to the spectacle of Korean-against-Korean mass slaughter.
The Western viewer may feel relieved that, however intractable her own homeland’s problems are, at least she doesn’t live in Korea. This perception is unlikely to survive one ride on the Seoul Metro, which may well convince her that Korea is the more developed country. Its rise from shambolic postwar poverty, the so-called Miracle on the Han River, was accomplished in large part by making things to be sold to richer parts of the world. Textiles, ships, cars, and semiconductors enriched Korea in the twentieth century; in the twenty-first, expressions of dissatisfaction with that enrichment have become viable exports in themselves. “Parasite,” “Squid Game,” and even “Gangnam Style” are works sensitive to the injustice, venality, superficiality, and violence of Korean society—the very qualities, in an irony perhaps too stark for satire, that have motivated so many Koreans to immigrate to the United States.
The Door Opened by “Gangnam Style”
The global hit primed Western audiences for films and shows about South Korea as a dystopia.
By
August 15, 2022
The New Yorker · by Colin Marshall · August 15, 2022
The capital of South Korea makes a good first impression, not least with its infrastructure. This May, Seoul’s ever-expanding subway system opened another addition, an extension of the Shinbundang Line that connects four existing stations. The northernmost, Sinsa, lies in an area popularly associated with South Korea’s world-renowned cosmetic-surgery industry. (In search of coffee there one morning, I passed up the three or four closest cafés, intimidated by their location inside the clinics themselves.) The southernmost, Gangnam, needs no introduction. On one platform wall, a large and somewhat amateurish mural pays homage to the pop star Park Jae-sang, better known as Psy, whose viral hit “Gangnam Style” introduced the eponymous section of Seoul to the world ten years ago.
Psy was not an obvious pop-cultural ambassador. At the time of the release of “Gangnam Style,” he was a thirty-four-year-old Berklee College of Music dropout unknown outside Korea and censured more than once in Korea for both his musical content and personal conduct. The singer-rapper-jokester seemed to exist in a reality apart from K-pop, with its impeccably turned-out young performers, organized into boy bands and girl groups precision-engineered for international appeal. Yet it was he—not 2NE1, not SHINee, not Wonder Girls, not Big Bang—who finally cracked the West. (The global phenomenon that is BTS wouldn’t officially début until the following year.) Even more surprisingly, Psy did it with what amounted to a Korean inside joke: his big hit lampoons the garish and culturally incongruous pretensions of Seoul’s nouveau riche, a class in evidence nowhere more so than Gangnam.
Psy once likened Gangnam to “the Beverly Hills of Korea,” which conveys the area’s associations with wealth and fame but downplays its size. In the most literal sense, Gangnam constitutes half of Seoul: the word means “south of the river”—that is, the Han River that runs through the city in the manner of the Seine or the Thames. Below the Han is a ward of the city, called Gangnam, which is nearly three times the size of Beverly Hills. Korean television dramas make near-perpetual use of its high-society signifiers: skyscrapers, luxury boutiques, night clubs, streets full of imported cars. But, as recently as the early nineteen-seventies, the place was nothing but farmland. Gangnam’s urbanization rushed down lines laid out by South Korea’s military government in the late nineteen-sixties, a process that enriched the owners of the former agricultural expanse. “Gangnam Style” shows a keen awareness of the chonsereoum (a rustic dowdiness, literally “village likeness”) beneath the quasi-cosmopolitan flash.
Soon after the song and video became an international phenomenon, the poet Yang Byung-ho published a newspaper piece characterizing Psy’s combined project as “a cheerful and unreserved provocation against the older generation’s authoritarianism and puritanism,” one meant to subvert familiar concepts, lyrics, and dance moves. “Such an attitude runs counter to the existing music put forth as ‘hallyu,’ ” he wrote, using the term that refers to the “Korean wave” of pop-culture exports that washed over Asia in the early years of the twenty-first century, bolstering Korea’s regional soft power. After praising “Gangnam Style” ’s almost supernaturally catchy rhythm, as well as its power to “succinctly summarize complex modernity through paradox and satire,” Yang suggested that his countrymen simply get all the enjoyment out of it they can: “Don’t ask questions and don’t quibble.”
However many Koreans followed that advice, they could hardly have made “Gangnam Style” the first YouTube video to reach a billion views by themselves. A study conducted by researchers at Eötvös Loránd University, in Hungary, determined that it spread across the world not directly from Korea but outward from the Philippines, where there already existed an avid fan base for things Korean. In Manila, one finds everything from Korean cosmetics on its shelves to Korean dramas on its televisions. The intensity of the product placement on these shows can at times reduce them to what Youjeong Oh, in her study “Pop City: Korean Popular Culture and the Selling of Place,” calls “a collage of commercial advertisements without a solid narrative.” In the early years of this century, hallyu hits showcased Korea’s new affluence in a more or less uncomplicated fashion. Yet this was also the heyday of the movement known as New Korean Cinema, and the discomfiting-to-harrowing work of its auteurs—Kim Ki-duk’s “The Isle,” Lee Chang-dong’s “Oasis,” Park Chan-wook’s “Oldboy”—suggested that all was not well in the land of the morning calm.
The “Gangnam Style” video makes similar intimations, albeit in a much more lighthearted manner. It opens with Psy reclining, drink in hand, on a chaise longue in the sand. The shot then pulls back to reveal the actual setting: not a beach but a neighborhood playground, one of several mundane backdrops on which the four-minute spectacle proceeds to play out. It takes some effort, ten years on, to recall how bizarre “Gangnam Style” seemed to many Westerners when first they saw it. (As I once heard a prominent Canadian writer recall, “I felt like I was high.”) The little boy with the uncannily Michael Jacksonian moves, the cut to the horse stables, the sudden explosion, the chorus of “Hey, sexy ladies,” the disco-balled bus—these and other seemingly inexplicable elements, along with the placeless catchiness of the music itself, led to mesmerized repeat viewings.
Those unable to grasp the video’s satirical project could nevertheless sense something deeper going on. “Gangnam Style” wasn’t a run-of-the-mill Asian pop-culture oddity, such as the decontextualized Japanese commercials and game-show clips presented for the amusement of Western audiences in decades past. It displays self-awareness and even irony (neither, refreshingly, present at deadening American levels), and, even if non-Koreans couldn’t tell what Psy was making fun of, they could tell that he possessed a sense of humor. His boastful lyrics and strenuous posturing are further undercut by the incongruity of his harshly utilitarian environments: a muddy, neglected-looking riverbank dominated by elevated freeways; a parking garage through which blows a debris-filled windstorm; a public toilet stall. In true Gangnam style, Psy’s character insists on his own magnetism in blind defiance of the void of glamour around him.
The satiric project of “Gangnam Style” has, in the years since, been taken up by many Korean artists. Bong Joon-ho managed to strike a highly compelling balance between social criticism and cinema in “Parasite,” from 2019. Bong stages a collision of three families, each one both representative of and imprisoned by its class. The Park family, headed by a successful tech-executive father, lives a Westernized life in an architecturally distinguished hillside house. The Kims, who make what little money they have assembling pizza boxes, occupy a dank apartment built halfway below ground. Driven by a mixture of pragmatism and resentment, the Kims scheme to usurp the jobs of all the Parks’ hired hands, including that of the longtime housekeeper, whose husband has spent years hiding from creditors in the house’s basement.
The obviousness of the spatial metaphor at the center of “Parasite” seems not to have hurt the film’s success, and may indeed have facilitated it. When the housekeeper’s knife-brandishing husband emerges from his bunker, he turns the lavish birthday party being thrown for the Parks’ young son into a bloodbath. In the ensuing melee, the father of the Kims (played by Song Kang-ho, a popular actor known for working-class-hero roles) impulsively stabs the father of the Parks. This catharsis is triggered by the latter’s visible disgust at the smell of the man who’d been secretly living in his basement. This is the smell, as suggested again and again in previous scenes, of the underclass—the stench of its futile labor, of its mountainous debt, of its predestined failure.
This same smell, if it existed, would surely emanate from most of the characters in “Squid Game,” the Korean Netflix series binge-watched around the world last fall. Described by its creator, Hwang Dong-hyuk, as “a story about losers,” it imagines a sequence of traditional children’s games with life-or-death stakes, played by participants desperate to escape their financial troubles by winning the enormous cash prize granted to the survivor. “Squid Game” ’s unrelenting violence and critical heavy-handedness make “Parasite” look subtle by comparison. It was the former quality that made the show a spectacle, and the latter that inspired countless articles about what the series reflected about Korean society: its unfairness, its inequality, its inhumanity, its brutality. Yet, despite the apparent novelty of its subject, the English-language coverage of “Squid Game” was of a piece with English-language coverage of the country in general.
Western reportage on Korea tends to returns to the same dreary wells: the declining birth rate, the high suicide rate, the economic domination by conglomerates, the unceasingly pressured students, the menacing northern neighbor, the addiction to plastic surgery. (Even the 1988 Seoul Olympics have since come in for a revisionist portrayal as, in the words of The Nation’s Dave Zirin, “a horror show of torture, rape, slavery, and death.”) Foreign media have also caught on to the expression “Hell Joseon,” which, according to Se-woong Koo, the editor of the English-language news site Korea Exposé, ridicules Korea as “an infernal feudal kingdom stuck in the nineteenth century.” Its adoption by young South Koreans reflects their belief that “being born in South Korea is tantamount to entering hell, where one is immediately enslaved by a highly regulated system”—maintained by corrupt politicians and out-of-touch élites—“that dictates an entire course of life.”
In its eight years, Korea Exposé has gone through several different models. An early slogan, “Showing Korea as It Really Is,” positioned the site as a corrective to the propagandistic positivity of hallyu—a mission of debatable necessity, given the grim impressions of Korea already served to readers in the English-speaking world. This goes some way to explaining the surprising Western enthusiasm, in the decade since “Gangnam Style,” for not just Korean popular culture but Korean popular culture that attacks its own society. As little as Western audiences may know about the place, if they’ve been primed to see it as a dystopia, they’ll respond favorably to even its most grotesquely heightened dystopian portrayals. This, too, is satirized in “Squid Game,” with its room of decadent foreign “V.I.P.s” who thrill to the spectacle of Korean-against-Korean mass slaughter.
The Western viewer may feel relieved that, however intractable her own homeland’s problems are, at least she doesn’t live in Korea. This perception is unlikely to survive one ride on the Seoul Metro, which may well convince her that Korea is the more developed country. Its rise from shambolic postwar poverty, the so-called Miracle on the Han River, was accomplished in large part by making things to be sold to richer parts of the world. Textiles, ships, cars, and semiconductors enriched Korea in the twentieth century; in the twenty-first, expressions of dissatisfaction with that enrichment have become viable exports in themselves. “Parasite,” “Squid Game,” and even “Gangnam Style” are works sensitive to the injustice, venality, superficiality, and violence of Korean society—the very qualities, in an irony perhaps too stark for satire, that have motivated so many Koreans to immigrate to the United States.
The New Yorker · by Colin Marshall · August 15, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
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Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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