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Quotes of the Day:
"A sign of intelligence is an awareness of one's own ignorance."
- Niccolo Machiavelli
"You can surmount the obstacles in your path if you are determined, courageous and hard-working. Never be faint-hearted. Be resolute, but never bitter."
- Ralph Bunche
"Because whatever has happened to humanity, whatever is currently happening to humanity, it is happening to all of us. No matter how hidden the cruelty, no matter how far off the screams of pain and terror, we live in one world."
-Alice Walker
1. KEI Announces Appointment of Scott Snyder as the New President & CEO - Korea Economic Institute of America
2. N. Korean defector talks about experience in holding center for forced returnees
3. U.N. voices opposition against forced repatriation of N. Korean defectors in China
4. A Japan court says North Korea is responsible for the abuses of people lured there by false promises
5. Victims lured to North Korea by lies welcome Japan court's ruling against regime
6. S. Korea's top nuclear envoy discusses N. Korea with US think tank officials
7. In Yo-han’s innovation demand creates a stir
8. The Republic of Korea-Australia Security Nexus -
9. Pyongyang's shutdown of overseas embassies sign of sluggish economy: unification ministry
10. North Korea–Russia alliance revives Cold War divisions
11. US stresses opposition to any arms provision to Hamas amid claimed use of N. Korean weapons
12. Kim Jong Un orders military food reserves restored ‘at all costs’
13. South Korea as a Nuclear State: Trade-offs and Choices
14. Defense minister instructs new military chiefs to build ‘overwhelming’ defense posture against enemy
15. Seoul slams N. Korea's money laundering, vows efforts to ban inflow of 'black money'
16. U.S., Chinese diplomats hold video talks on N. Korea-Russia military cooperation, defector repatriation
17. Don't suspend Sept. 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement
18. S. Korea's homegrown spacecraft to moon project on track: science ministry
1. KEI Announces Appointment of Scott Snyder as the New President & CEO - Korea Economic Institute of America
KEI Announces Appointment of Scott Snyder as the New President & CEO - Korea Economic Institute of America
keia.org · by Sang Kim · October 30, 2023
The Peninsula
KEI Announces Appointment of Scott Snyder as the New President & CEO
Published October 30, 2023
Author: Sang Kim
Category: Current Events
For Immediate Release
October 30, 2023
KEI Announces Appointment of Scott Snyder as the New President & CEO
WASHINGTON, DC — The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) is pleased to announce the appointment of Scott Snyder as the Institute’s new President & Chief Executive Officer. Mr. Snyder will assume the role on April 1, 2024. Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, who has been leading KEI for the past five years, will step down from the position in December 2023.
Mr. Snyder is joining from the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) where he served as the Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy for over a decade. Prior to CFR, Mr. Snyder was a Senior Associate in the international relations program of the Asia Foundation, where he founded and directed the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and served as the Foundation’s representative in Korea from 2000 to 2004.
With his extensive knowledge and expertise on the Korean Peninsula, Mr. Snyder has authored multiple books on South Korea, including, forthcoming U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Why It May Fail and Why It Must Not (December 2023), and South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers (January 2018).
Mr. Snyder received a BA from Rice University and an MA from the Regional Studies East Asia program at Harvard University. He was a Thomas G. Watson fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea.
“As the U.S.-Korea relationship deepens its scope and broadens its impact globally, the Korea Economic Institute is well-positioned to facilitate even deeper understanding and connections between our two countries than currently exists,” said Scott Snyder, President-elect of KEI. “I look forward to leading the institution at this moment of expanded opportunity for the U.S.-Korea relationship.”
Mark Fitzpatrick, Chair of the KEI President Search Committee, expressed his delight in welcoming Mr. Snyder to the institute. “With his keen insights on Korean affairs and strong commitment to maintaining close bonds, Scott is perfectly positioned to take the baton from Ambassador Kathleen Stephens in leading the KEI mission to ever-greater success,” said Fitzpatrick.
###
About the KEI
The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) is a not-for-profit policy and educational outreach organization focused on promoting dialogue and understanding between the United States and Korea. Established in 1982, KEI began by concentrating on economic issues, but over its forty-year history, it has come to cover all aspects of the alliance, including national security, broader regional affairs, and Korean American issues. KEI is funded by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), a public research institute in the Republic of Korea. For more information about the KEI, please visit its website http://www.keia.org.
For media inquiries, contact Sang Kim, Director of Communications, at sk@keia.org
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keia.org · by Sang Kim · October 30, 2023
2. N. Korean defector talks about experience in holding center for forced returnees
This cannot be ignored.
N. Korean defector talks about experience in holding center for forced returnees
"People are packed together like sardines standing up inside small cells," she told Daily NK
By Seulkee Jang -2023.10.31 2:40pm
dailynk.com
N. Korean defector talks about experience in holding center for forced returnees | Daily NK English
Recently, a large number of North Korean defectors in China were forcibly repatriated and are currently being detained in Ministry of State Security (MSS)-operated holding centers along the border. At these centers, Ministry of State Security officials investigate the details surrounding each defector’s escape, their whereabouts inside China, and whether or not they had intended to flee to South Korea. This process frequently involves serious human rights violations, including violence, torture, and sexual assault.
On Oct. 20, Daily NK met with Lee Young-joo, a North Korean defector who had personal experience being repatriated and detained in MSS-run holding centers in Onsong and Sinuiju. Lee’s interview provided insight into the dire human rights situation now facing the defectors detained in these holding centers.
Lee was repatriated twice and escaped the country three times, a harrowing journey which she has detailed in her book, “The True Face of North Korea that Even Kim Jong Un Needs to Know.” She first escaped from North Korea in March 1997, after which she married a Chinese man and had a daughter. However, the perpetual fear that she could be caught as an illegal resident and repatriated at any time continued to hang over her and ultimately motivated her to make an attempt to reach South Korea. However, she was caught in Inner Mongolia by Chinese border agents and detained at an immigration detention facility in Tumen, Jilin Province.
In September 2006, she was forcibly sent back to North Korea and detained for two weeks at a MSS holding center in Onsong. Thankfully, her crimes were deemed to be purely economic in nature, and she was sentenced to forced labor at a Ministry of Social Security-run labor camp in Onsong county.
Shortly after her release from the labor camp, she made a second attempt in November 2006 to cross into China to see her husband and daughter. She lived together in hiding with other defectors who shared a goal of reaching South Korea, but they were caught after someone alerted the Chinese police.
In March the following year, Lee departed the Chinese detention center in Dandong (Liaoning Province) and was repatriated to North Korea. She was held for 40 days in a MSS holding center in Sinuiju before eventually being sent to a forced labor camp. As she made her way back to her hometown after serving her sentence, Lee found herself contemplating another escape attempt, but ultimately turned herself in. She was punished again, this time by serving three years of reform through labor at the Chongori reeducation camp in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province.
In November 2010, she escaped North Korea for a third time and finally made it to South Korea in July 2011.
The following are excerpts from Daily NK’s interview with Lee.
Daily NK (DNK): We have learned that the defectors recently forcibly repatriated to North Korea are currently being held in MSS holding centers in Onsong and Sinuiju. As someone who has been detained at both of these places, what can you tell us about these holding centers?
“Just thinking about it now is overwhelming, that’s how awful the place is and how little human rights are protected there. You could say they treat people like animals. People are packed together like sardines standing up inside small cells. If you bend your legs to try to sit down, you can’t move at all, and people in the cells are stuck like that all day. You can’t lay down and sleep at night either. There’s a toilet in each cell, but it’s beyond unsanitary with rats covered in feces scurrying around all over the place.
For food, you receive corn-rice that’s half husks and doenjang [fermented soybean paste] soup made from just doenjang paste and water, but the food itself is so gritty that it’s hard to even swallow. Moreover, the plastic dishes the food is served on are made out of recycled flimsy plastic. If you put rice or soup in them that is even remotely hot, the dishes give off this disgusting plastic smell that makes the food even harder to eat.
With so many people crammed together and no way to wash, there are tons of fleas, bedbugs, and lice. It was so bad that sometimes there’d be this faint taste of blood in my food, and I’d realize that fleas must have gotten into the food. As a woman, one of the worst things was that when you had your period, there were no pads and obviously no toilet paper. So, you just had to use a single piece of thin cloth. But, come morning, there was nowhere to wash and dry it out, so you had to keep using the same blood-soaked piece of fabric.”
DNK: At the MSS holding centers, we’ve heard there are practically no female prison guards or supervisors. Were there any female supervisors in the Onsong or Sinuiju facilities when you were there?
“There wasn’t a single female supervisor at the Onsong facility, and there was just one female military medical officer at the center in Sinuiju. In Onsong, the male supervisors at the relocation center said they needed to search the female prisoners for any cash they had hidden on their bodies and made them strip off their clothes and jump around. That way, they said, any money a woman had hidden in her uterus would come out. When you needed to defecate, you had to do it in front of a male guard. When I was at the MSS relocation center in Sinuiju, they gathered all the women into one cell and the female military medical officer stuck her hand into each woman’s uterus to check whether we had hidden any money or valuables.”
DNK: What sort of interrogations did you undergo while you were at the MSS relocation center?
“For the first three days or so, there wasn’t any sort of interrogation and I was just waiting inside a cell. I just spent my time shaking in fear about what would come next. Then they started calling people out and taking them to the interrogation room one by one, where they asked things like where did you go in China, what broker did you go through, what did you do in China, etc. The most important question was whether you had intended to go to South Korea. If they found out you had planned to go to South Korea, they’d send you to a political prison camp for the rest of your life. A lot of the people who were there at the same time as me were dragged off to Yodok Prison Camp. So you cannot let them find out that you were trying to get to South Korea under any circumstances. If you’re planning to go to South Korea with a group of other people, it’s good to agree on a story in advance. But I never imagined getting caught and didn’t plan ahead, so getting our stories to line up was difficult. If they ask you a question, you only have one second to answer. Otherwise, they did things like hit you with a piece of wood so hard it could knock you out. The majority of people leaving the interrogation room had to be dragged out like corpses.”
Translated by Rose Adams. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
Seulkee Jang
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynk@uni-media.net.
dailynk.com
3. U.N. voices opposition against forced repatriation of N. Korean defectors in China
We all must have a human rights upfront approach and we must focus on the full spectrum of north Korean human rights abuses (and Chinese complicity) .
U.N. voices opposition against forced repatriation of N. Korean defectors in China | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · October 30, 2023
SEOUL, Oct. 30 (Yonhap) -- The U.N. deputy high commissioner for human rights called on countries Monday to uphold the principle of non-refoulement in thinly veiled diplomatic pressure on China not to repatriate North Korean defectors to their communist homeland.
Nada al-Nashif shared the view during her meeting with Kang Jong-suk, the South Korean official in charge of human rights and humanitarian affairs at the unification ministry, according to the ministry handling inter-Korean affairs.
The meeting came amid concerns over the fate of hundreds of North Koreans who were forcibly repatriated to North Korea earlier this month from Chinese northeastern border regions.
Kang Jong-suk (R), chief of the unification ministry's Office of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and Nada Al-Nashif, U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, pose for a photo ahead of their meeting in Seoul on Oct. 30, 2023 in this photo provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Human rights groups claimed earlier this month that China forcibly sent back to the North around 600 North Korean defectors detained in its northeastern regions. Seoul has confirmed the repatriation had taken place, without specifying the number of those who were repatriated.
Tens of thousands of North Korean defectors were believed to have hidden in China, with the hope of traveling to Thailand or other Southeast Asian countries before resettling in South Korea, which is home to more than 34,000 North Korean defectors.
Non-refoulement refers to the international principle of not forcing refugees back to countries where they face the risk of persecution.
However, as Pyongyang's key ally, China does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees and regularly repatriates them to their home country, where they can face harsh punishment.
Also Monday, Park Yong-min, deputy South Korean foreign minister for multilateral affairs, held a separate meeting with Al-Nashif and reiterated Seoul's deep concerns over North Korea's dire human rights situation, citing the recent forced repatriation of North Korean defectors in China.
Park Yong-min (R), deputy foreign minister for multilateral affairs, stands alongside Nada Al-Nashif, U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, during their meeting at the foreign ministry in Seoul on Oct. 30, 2023, as provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · October 30, 2023
4. A Japan court says North Korea is responsible for the abuses of people lured there by false promises
Good news here. Thanks to my good friend and colleague Kenji Sawai, I spent a good bit of time with Ms. Eiko Kawasaki and her daughter Lee So Ra in September during north Korean Human Rights week in Seoul. I learned a lot about this issue as well as about their time in north Korea.
A Japan court says North Korea is responsible for the abuses of people lured there by false promises
ABCNews.com · by ABC News
TOKYO -- A Japanese high court on Monday said the North Korean government was responsible for the human rights abuses of plaintiffs who said they were lured to the North by Pyongyang’s false promise of living in “paradise on Earth,” a decision praised as a victory by survivors and their supporters.
“The ruling showed that a Japanese court can rule on North Korea’s human rights violations, one that could have a significant impact,” said a lawyer for the plaintiffs, Kenji Fukuda.
The four plaintiffs, including ethnic Koreans and Japanese, moved to North Korea with thousands of others under a 1959-1984 program in which the North promised free health care, education, jobs and other benefits. But they said none of that was available and they were mostly assigned manual work at mines, forests or farms and forced to live in harsh conditions.
Originally, five plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in 2018 with the Tokyo District Court seeking 100 million yen ($900,000) each in compensation for “illegal solicitation and detainment.”
The district court acknowledged in a March 2022 ruling that the plaintiffs had moved to North Korea because of false information provided by the North and a pro-North Korean organization in Japan, Chongryon. But the ruling said the statute of limitations had expired and that Japanese courts do not have jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ suffering took place outside Japan.
Four plaintiffs appealed the decision, arguing that Japan has jurisdiction because their ordeal began when they boarded ships in a Japanese port.
On Monday, the Tokyo High Court ruled that the Japanese court had jurisdiction over the case and found that the North Korean government violated the rights of the plaintiffs by forcing them to live under miserable, harsh conditions that were completely different from the information provided before their trip.
The North infringed on the plaintiffs' freedom to choose a place to live, and they were virtually “robbed of their lives” as a result, the court said.
The case now returns to the Tokyo District Court, where it will review the extent of damages the North Korean government must pay to the plaintiffs, their lawyers said.
North Korea, however, has never responded to the lawsuit and likely will not pay damages.
One plaintiff, Eiko Kawasaki, now 81, was 17 when she boarded a ship to North Korea in 1960 and was stuck there until she was able to flee back to Japan in 2003, leaving behind her grown children.
Kawasaki wiped her tears and raised her fists in victory outside the court. She later told reporters that Monday's ruling is a full victory for the victims.
Kawasaki said she risked her life to flee North Korea to let the world know about the North Korean repatriation program and that “I'm so glad that I could return to Japan alive and see the ruling today," NHK television reported.
About half a million ethnic Koreans currently live in Japan and face discrimination in school, at work and in their daily lives. Many are descendants of Koreans who came to Japan, many forcibly, to work in mines and factories during Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula — a past that still strains relations between Japan and the Koreas.
In 1959, North Korea began a resettlement program to bring overseas Koreans to the North to make up for workers killed during the Korean War. The Japanese government, viewing ethnic Koreans as outsiders, welcomed the program and helped arrange for people to travel to North Korea. About 93,000 ethnic Korean residents of Japan and their family members moved to the North.
About 150 have made it back to Japan, according to a group supporting defectors from North Korea.
ABCNews.com · by ABC News
5. Victims lured to North Korea by lies welcome Japan court's ruling against regime
There was no real socialist workers paradise. Now to go after Kim Jong Un's money.
Some good news.
Excerpts:
Under the high court ruling, the district court must review the fraud in Japan and captivity in North Korea as a single case, which the judges in both courts have already acknowledged as a criminal offense, said Shin Hee-seok, a legal analyst at Transitional Justice Working Group, a Seoul-based NGO.
“It is welcome that the appeals court recognized North Korea’s false propaganda and captivity as a ‘continuous tort’ and remanded the case to the district court,” he said. “If the district court rules against North Korea on remand (as expected), it will be a victory for justice and accountability.”
Shin added that the plaintiffs’ tribunal win would be “a great vindication” for all victims of the North Korean crime and would preserve the relevant materials as court documents for posterity, even though impact litigations like that might not result in immediate changes or even compensation.
Victims lured to North Korea by lies welcome Japan court's ruling against regime
The Korea Times · October 31, 2023
People on ships bound for North Korea wave to a crowd gathered at Niigata port in Japan, in this Dec. 14, 1959, file photo. Victims and human rights groups on Tuesday welcomed the Japanese high court's ruling in favor of the victims. Courtesy of Kojima Hidenori
‘A great vindication’ for those who suffered from false promise of ‘paradise on Earth’
By Jung Min-ho
Victims, who were lured into North Korea by its false promises of a “paradise on Earth,” have welcomed the Japanese high court’s ruling against the regime and a pro-North Korean group.
“It is a great accomplishment,” Lee So-ra, a director of a group supporting the survivors and a daughter of one of the nearly 100,000 people who moved to North Korea under a 1959-84 resettlement program, told The Korea Times on Tuesday.
“This bears a symbolic meaning for the human rights violations committed in Japan by North Korea (and its agent) in terms of holding them accountable within the justice system.”
The Tokyo High Court ruled, Monday, that Japan’s judiciary has jurisdiction over the case and found that North Korea’s government violated the four plaintiffs’ rights by enticing them with disinformation and confining them in its territory where they suffered from a lack of food among many other miserable conditions.
The appeals court sent the case back to the Tokyo District Court, which ruled in March 2022 that their suffering occurred outside Japan and, therefore, was not under its jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision, saying they would not have gone through it all if it had not been for the lies from Chongryon, a Tokyo-based pro-North Korean organization.
“The verdict also opened a path for all victims of the settlement program and those of other North Korean crimes to file lawsuits in the future as it settled the dispute over jurisdiction,” Lee said.
Under the high court ruling, the district court must review the fraud in Japan and captivity in North Korea as a single case, which the judges in both courts have already acknowledged as a criminal offense, said Shin Hee-seok, a legal analyst at Transitional Justice Working Group, a Seoul-based NGO.
“It is welcome that the appeals court recognized North Korea’s false propaganda and captivity as a ‘continuous tort’ and remanded the case to the district court,” he said. “If the district court rules against North Korea on remand (as expected), it will be a victory for justice and accountability.”
Shin added that the plaintiffs’ tribunal win would be “a great vindication” for all victims of the North Korean crime and would preserve the relevant materials as court documents for posterity, even though impact litigations like that might not result in immediate changes or even compensation.
In 1959, North Korea launched a resettlement program to bring back ethnic Koreans located overseas as the regime was trying to make up for workers lost during the 1950-53 Korean War. Many in Japan, where they had suffered discrimination, found the message spread by Chongryon attractive; they were told there was no discrimination there and everything from education to food would be completely free.
Some 93,000 people left for the self-claimed utopia, but upon arrival they realized that they had been deceived. By then it was too late.
Kim Deog-young, a film director who is working on a new documentary about their suffering, also welcomed the ruling.
“I know countless cases in which people fled oppression under a communist or a totalitarian regime. But this was the only case in which nearly 100,000 people voluntarily moved to one based on false promises,” he said. “I hope the ruling would help the victims to recover from a long period of pain and suffering.
The Korea Times · October 31, 2023
6. S. Korea's top nuclear envoy discusses N. Korea with US think tank officials
S. Korea's top nuclear envoy discusses N. Korea with US think tank officials
The Korea Times · October 31, 2023
Kim Gunn, center, South Korea's special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, poses with a delegation from the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), an American non-partisan foreign policy think tank, Oct. 31, in this photo provided by the foreign ministry. Yonhap
South Korea's top nuclear envoy met with a delegation from a U.S. foreign policy think tank Tuesday to discuss North Korea's military cooperation with Russia and other North Korean issues, the foreign ministry said.
In the meeting with the delegation from the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Kim Gunn expressed Seoul's deep concerns over the growing military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow, calling it an overt violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, according to the ministry.
He also stressed the importance of showing North Korea that the international community's commitment toward the North's denuclearization is much stronger than the regime's commitment toward nuclear arms development, the ministry said.
Kim and the U.S. think tank officials shared their assessment of security in the region and discussed ways to step up cooperation against North Korean threats.
The delegation included Kathleen Stephens, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea; Susan Thornton, former U.S. acting assistant secretary of state for East Asia; and Allison Hooker, former senior director for Asian affairs at the White House National Security Council. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · October 31, 2023
7. In Yo-han’s innovation demand creates a stir
Will Dr. Linton's (In Yo-han) appointment backfire for the PPP and President Yoon.
In Yo-han’s innovation demand creates a stir
donga.com
Posted October. 30, 2023 08:16,
Updated October. 30, 2023 08:16
In Yo-han’s innovation demand creates a stir. October. 30, 2023 08:16. by Jun-Il Kim jikim@donga.com.
Internal turmoil persists within the party following a statement by In Yo-han, chairman of the People Power Party’s Innovation Committee. He urged senior Yeongnam lawmakers to contest elections in challenging areas within the metropolitan region, asserting that “the party has become a mere appendage to the Nakdong River.” With just five months until the upcoming general election, public demand for reform is mounting within the ruling party. While some criticize this move as an endeavor to eliminate certain members, others advocate it as “the initial stride towards enhancing the political party framework in the metropolitan area.”
On Sunday, a senior lawmaker from Yeongnam expressed skepticism, saying, “Success for candidates from the Yeongnam area in the Seoul metropolitan region isn’t assured, considering past unsuccessful attempts. Chairman In speaks of sacrifice while transforming the party into a group gathered for a private purpose, how can one follow along?” Another senior member from the Yeongnam region contested this view, asserting, “Frankly, there isn't anyone among the Yeongnam members who is well-prepared for the competitiveness in the metropolitan area. Running in challenging areas may lead to swift elimination.”
This constitutes a backlash against Chairman In’s push for running in challenging electoral districts. “Notable figures from Yeongnam should step into the demanding precincts of Seoul to assist during tough times,” Chairman In said in an interview with the Dong-A Ilbo on Friday. Senior lawmakers from Yeongnam perceive Chairman In as orchestrating a scenario where he pushes senior lawmakers.
Conversely, many support Chairman In. “This strategic move aligns with the vision to enhance the party’s overall structure, ultimately shaping it into a political entity with a metropolitan focus,” a member of the Supreme Council of the People Power Party remarked. “Historically, there’s been an approximate 40% turnover in personnel during general elections.” An official from the Innovation Committee further explained that the objective is to establish fundamental guidelines, particularly in areas that demand sacrifice within the party, adding that if members of the Innovation Committee share Chairman In’s perspectives, this can evolve into a guiding nomination principle.”
On Sunday, Chairman In participated in the rally commemorating the first anniversary of the Itaewon disaster and plans to advance his ‘integration’ initiative by visiting the Gwangju National May 18 Cemetery on Monday morning.
한국어
donga.com
8. The Republic of Korea-Australia Security Nexus -
Conclusion:
Overall, the Australia-ROK security nexus has recently commanded greater attention in both Australia and South Korea. Its potential benefits for both countries are increasingly recognised. To reap the full benefits of an upgraded bilateral security relationship, however, neither Australian nor South Korean policymakers can allow complacency to prevail over their mutual diligence in developing it.
The Republic of Korea-Australia Security Nexus - Australian Institute of International Affairs
By Emeritus Professor William Tow
internationalaffairs.org.au
Australia and the Republic of Korea (ROK) share many security interests, the least not being sustaining the rules based international order. More recent developments strengthening the bilateral relationship showcases its increased importance for regional security collaboration and cooperation.
In a turbulent and multipolar world, United States’ military commitments and resources are being highly stretched. Support for key allies in Europe (the Ukraine) and the Middle East (Israel), combined with a US Congress increasingly upset over its country’s multi-trillion dollar debt, means that traditional regional allies in Europe and Asia will be required to step up their contributions to democracies’ collective security.
In the Indo-Pacific, the recent intensification of Australia-ROK (Republic of Korea) defence ties exemplifies this reality. While perhaps less prominent than the long-standing Australia-Japan security relationship stretching over the past few decades, the Australia-ROK dyad has nevertheless assumed a distinct character of its own. Accelerated diplomatic security ties, more joint military exercises to develop greater force interoperability, and enhanced defense industrial relations underpin this trend. Driving such interaction is the imperative for democratic middle powers such as Australia and the ROK to apply their strategic collaboration and defense resources in ways that will maximise their ability to meet their mutual regional security interests.
What are those interests? At a September 2023 Australia-Korea Future Forum convened in Canberra, Australia’s Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tim Watt, offered an itinerary of common foreign policy and security interests shared by his country and the ROK. These included the preservation of a rules-based Indo-Pacific and global orders where sovereignty is respected; the promotion of free trade throughout the Indo-Pacific region and internationally; and a dedication to strengthening stability in the South Pacific region. More specifically, the Common Strategic Partnership document signed between the two countries in December 2021 during ROK President Moon Jae-in’s visit to Australia underscored the two countries’ common democratic values, their need to safeguard maritime sea lanes and domains, the imperative for collaborating in non-traditional security sectors such as cyber security and climate change; and balancing their support for effective multilateral cooperation and institutions with their respective bilateral security alliances with the United States. Peace and security on the Korean peninsula was also designated as a key objective by the signatories. This initiative followed an already strong foundation of Australia-ROK security diplomacy, including the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Development Cooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea (2009); the Blueprint for Defense and Security Cooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea (2015), and the advent of annual ROK-Australia Foreign and Defense Minsters “2+2” meetings (2017).
The election of conservative South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol in May 2022 intensified South Korea’s determination to become a significant player in Indo-Pacific geopolitics. The Yoon administration released its Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region (KIPS) in December 2022, a new Defence White Paper in February 2023, and a National Security Strategy in June 2023. Together, these documents heralded South Korea’s self-acclaimed status as a “Global Pivotal State.” Exemplifying this trend was the Yoon government’s announcement of an upgraded regional geopolitical posture including an accelerated New Southern Policy (NSP). The NSP, originally formulated in 2017, included more explicit ROK support for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the United States, Japan, Australia and India constitute that grouping’s formal membership). It marked a reduced South Korean deference to long-standing Chinese sensitivities towards the QSD and a greater ROK willingness to support more bilateral security policy coordination with its historic rival, Japan.
From Australia’s perspective, as noted by a recently released United States Studies Centre report, a more sharply demarcated NSP underscored a greater consistency in South Korean foreign and strategic policy which could be applied by both Australia and the ROK to yield issue-specific and sustained “collective solutions [by these two regional Indo-Pacific middle powers) to shared regional challenges.” It also signalled “Australia’s return as an actor of consequence and value in Korean strategic thinking” after a decade’s hiatus where Seoul’s major strategic attention was largely (if not exclusively) directed toward confronting and modifying South Korea’s tensions with North Korea. Seoul understands that Australia and South Korea, as two key middle powers in the Indo-Pacific, share mutual interests. The KIPS notes that the Yoon government will seek to supplement upgraded bilateral initiatives involving Canberra with opportunities for minilateral cooperation “to sustain regional order and focus on ‘spoke-to-spoke relationships’ with traditional U.S. regional allies like Australia and Japan.”
These mutual interests and objectives are already being pursued in various policy sectors. Defence and Foreign Ministers “2+2” consultations have been ongoing since 2013. An array of other bilateral strategic deliberations exists and is expanding. A Memorandum of Understanding on defence, research, development, testing, and evaluation was signed in 2019 but has yet to be operationalised to a truly viable extent. Individual defence industrial projects are ongoing with the Hanwha landing contracts for producing field artillery and howitzers near Geelong for use by the Australian Defence Force. Australia has provided some early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft to the South Korean navy. While defence industrial cooperation remains intermittent (with a history of cancelled contracts on the Australian side as force requirements change), the possibilities for intensified cooperation in this sector remain promising.
Challenges remain for both Australian and South Korean policymakers to overcome if their bilateral security relationship is to become more effective and comprehensive. One is for the two sides to reconcile their respective geographies more fully. South Korea has initiated moves along such lines, including launching a campaign to engage politically with South Pacific Island states (a Korea-Pacific Islands Summit was hosted by President Yoon in Seoul during late May 2023). Understandably, however, Seoul remains most preoccupied with the North Korean nuclear threat and with a China intent on undermining the US-ROK alliance. Australia shares South Korean concerns about South Pacific Island state instability. But while both Seoul and Canberra view growing Chinese military power with concern, the former is more relaxed than the latter about co-existing with an increasingly powerful Beijing. Moreover, while the Yoon government has made considerable inroads in repairing historically tense relations with Japan, there is little guarantee that future South Korean governments will be able or inclined to perpetuate or build upon this momentum. Australia, in contrast, continues to regard Japan as its major Indo-Pacific security partner apart from the United States.
The election of Donald Trump or another populist to the American presidency in November 2024 could also work to aggravate Australia-ROK security relations. The legacy of President Trump’s relations with South Korea was not a happy one as defence burden-sharing issues, and that president’s efforts to court North Korean president Kim Jong-un, dominated the Trump administration’s approach to the Korean peninsula during its term in office. The return of a more US populist foreign policy could prompt the South Koreans to consider developing indigenous nuclear force capabilities. This would contradict Australia’s official and long-standing support for nuclear arms control and disarmament, notwithstanding it’s AUKUS agreement with the US and UK to develop nuclear propelled submarines, albeit with conventional weapons systems.
Overall, the Australia-ROK security nexus has recently commanded greater attention in both Australia and South Korea. Its potential benefits for both countries are increasingly recognised. To reap the full benefits of an upgraded bilateral security relationship, however, neither Australian nor South Korean policymakers can allow complacency to prevail over their mutual diligence in developing it.
William T. Tow is Emeritus Professor at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University. He was previously a Professor of International Relations in the Coral Bell School’s Department of International Relations. His research interests include Indo-Pacific alliance politics, strategic studies and U.S. foreign policy.
This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.
internationalaffairs.org.au
9. Pyongyang's shutdown of overseas embassies sign of sluggish economy: unification ministry
Yes the regime is struggling. But it only has itself to blame.
Pyongyang's shutdown of overseas embassies sign of sluggish economy: unification ministry | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · October 31, 2023
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Oct. 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's recent move to close its diplomatic missions in Angola and Uganda is an apparent sign of its faltering economy worsened by global sanctions, the unification ministry said Tuesday.
The assessment followed reports by Pyongyang's state media and African media outlets that North Korea's ambassadors to Angola and Uganda respectively paid "farewell" courtesy calls to the leaders of the African countries, announcing the shutdown of the diplomatic missions.
Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun reported last week that the reclusive regime also plans to shut down its consulate in Hong Kong due largely to economic difficulties.
"The flurry of measures appear to show that it is no longer feasible for the North to maintain diplomatic missions as their efforts to obtain foreign currency have stumbled due to strengthened sanctions," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
Rather than receiving funds from Pyongyang, the North's diplomatic missions are known to secure funds for operations through illicit trade and commercial activities and send remittances to their home country, according to former North Korean diplomats who have defected to South Korea.
"They show how the North struggles to sustain the minimum diplomatic relationship with its traditional allies due to its difficult economic situation," the official said.
This image, provided by Yonhap News TV, shows North Korean workers dispatched abroad. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
North Korea established diplomatic ties with Angola in 1975, and re-opened its embassy in 2013 after withdrawing it in 1998 for an unknown reason. The two nations have maintained close ties, with Angola's former president Jose Eduardo dos Santos visiting Pyongyang three times.
Angola is known as one of the African countries that the North had dispatched its workers to for dollar earnings. The North is also known to have exported giant socialist-style statues to some African countries, including Senegal and Angola, in the past to win hard currency.
Angola terminated all of its contracts with Mansudae Angola, a North Korean construction firm, in November 2017 and asked its workers to leave the country in line with U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang, according to an implementation report submitted to the U.N. Security Council sanctions committee.
At a session of the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly held Friday, Uganda and Angola voted for a resolution condemning North Korea carrying out six nuclear tests.
As of October, North Korea operates 53 diplomatic missions -- including 47 embassies, three consulates and three representative offices among the 159 countries it has established diplomatic ties with, according to the ministry. The number is expected to fall to 50 should its shutdown of missions in Angola, Uganda and Hong Kong be finalized.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · October 31, 2023
10. North Korea–Russia alliance revives Cold War divisions
From today's perch, the Cold War looked pretty good.
Conclusion:
With Russia, China and North Korea united against a US-led world order, Cold War-era blocs are becoming increasingly solidified. The revival of these blocs is raising tensions across continents from Europe to Asia.
North Korea–Russia alliance revives Cold War divisions | East Asia Forum
eastasiaforum.org · by Gabriela Bernal · October 31, 2023
Author: Gabriela Bernal, UNKS
Isolated from the international community and in urgent need of weapons and ammunition to continue its fight in Ukraine, Russia has chosen to double down on its alliance with North Korea. Although Moscow and Pyongyang have been allies for decades, recent developments point to deepening military cooperation, which may prolong the war in Ukraine and increase provocations on the Korean peninsula.
Russia reaffirmed its intentions on 26 October 2023, when the Kremlin pledged to ‘continue to develop close relations in all areas’ with Pyongyang. Similarly, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui warned on 28 October that North Korea’s relations with Russia will act as a ‘powerful strategic’ element if security in the region is endangered as a result of US-led trilateral military alliance with South Korea and Japan.
The deepening of the North Korea–Russia alliance took off in July 2023 when North Korean leader Kim Jong-un welcomed a Russian delegation to Pyongyang, headed by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, to mark celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Agreement. The visit marked the first time North Korea had welcomed a foreign delegation since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Shoigu reportedly proposed trilateral naval exercises involving China and North Korea — a move that highlights just how far Moscow is willing to go to deepen cooperation with Pyongyang.
Although North Korea has yet to commit to such joint drills, Kim Jong-un expressed his interest in deepening ties with Moscow in a highly public manner by making a personal visit to Russia on 12 September 2023. The timing of the trip was bold given recent moves by the United States to strengthen trilateral deterrence efforts against the North with South Korea and Japan.
The United States has also been accusing North Korea of supplying arms to Russia for its war in Ukraine and threatened serious consequences if Kim strikes an arms deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin. But the North Korean and Russian leaders seem undeterred.
Putin expressed his intention to help North Korea build satellites and develop its space program. He also aims to discuss further cooperation on a broad range of topics with Kim Jong-un. Although no official agreement was made public, the two leaders likely concluded a win-win deal.
The fruits of the summit seem to already be materialising. An October 2023 report indicated ‘a dramatic and unprecedented level of freight railcar traffic at North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility located on the North Korea–Russia border’. According to the report, ‘the dramatic increase in rail traffic likely indicates North Korea’s supply of arms and munitions to Russia’.
In exchange for the weapons, Russia may offer advanced military technology to help North Korea develop and expand its military capabilities. For example, technology for the refinement of solid fuel missiles and nuclear-powered submarines could be included in a list of North Korean requests. Ordinary North Koreans are also hoping to receive food aid from Russia.
Besides the material goods Kim may receive from Putin, the North Korean leader’s visit to Russia also served to show the world that the ‘hermit kingdom’ is not as isolated as many may think. North Korea is part of its own trilateral ‘bloc’ including Russia and China in opposition to the US–South Korea–Japan trilateral alliance. Deepening ties with Moscow also serves Pyongyang’s interests in reducing its overwhelming dependence on China for aid and trade.
China is in a tricky position as it seeks to maintain North Korea as a buffer state to counter the United States while also wanting to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula and prevent the escalation of tensions. To this end, North Korea’s denuclearisation is also in Beijing’s interests as this would arguably call into question the need for US troops to remain in South Korea.
China faces a challenging balancing act. Russia providing North Korea with advanced military technologies would result in a more dangerous weapons program. This would likely lead to greater tensions close to China’s border. But North Korean support for Russia in Ukraine could prevent Moscow from suffering utter defeat, which would serve China’s interests by containing US power.
Given China’s strong influence, North Korea and Russia are unlikely to engage in actions that would directly hurt Chinese interests. Both North Korea and Russia will likely maintain close communication with China over the course of their deepening bilateral ties. Days after Kim left Russia, Putin hosted China’s top diplomat Wang Yi. Putin also visited China on 17 October 2023. The news comes amid the Kremlin calling for closer policy coordination between Moscow and Beijing to counter Western aims at the ‘double containment of Russia and China’.
With Russia, China and North Korea united against a US-led world order, Cold War-era blocs are becoming increasingly solidified. The revival of these blocs is raising tensions across continents from Europe to Asia.
Gabriela Bernal is a PhD candidate at the University of North Korean Studies, Seoul.
eastasiaforum.org · by Gabriela Bernal · October 31, 2023
11. US stresses opposition to any arms provision to Hamas amid claimed use of N. Korean weapons
US stresses opposition to any arms provision to Hamas amid claimed use of N. Korean weapons
Matthew Miller, State Department spokesperson, speaks during a press briefing at the department in Washington, Oct. 30. Yonhap
The United States opposes any country supplying Hamas with anything that the militant group can use for "terrorist activities," the State Department said Monday, amid a report that Hamas has been using North Korean weapons in its war against Israel.
Last week, the Voice of America cited Israeli Ambassador to South Korea Akiva Tor as saying that Israeli authorities know that North Korean-made weapons are in use by Hamas.
"Hamas is a brutal terrorist organization and we oppose anyone providing them with anything they can use to carry out their terrorist activities," Matthew Miller, the department's spokesperson, told a regular press briefing.
Meanwhile, Miller highlighted the increase in the flow of humanitarian aid to the besieged Gaza Strip as Washington is stepping up diplomacy to minimize civilian damage in the escalating war in the Middle East.
On Sunday, 45 trucks carrying food, water and other humanitarian aid moved into Gaza, marking the highest single-day shipment since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, Miller said. That brought the total number of trucks to Gaza to 150.
"We aim to surpass that number today, tomorrow and beyond," he said. "We recognize the needs are immense and we want to see sustained daily deliveries of food, water and medical supplies into Gaza." (Yonhap)
12. Kim Jong Un orders military food reserves restored ‘at all costs’
It will be hard to do of course. But does this signal Kim's intention? Is this an order to put the north on a war footing? A reach perhaps but we need to assess the potential indicators. On the other hand if they divert food to replace military stocks what will happen to the people? What effects will that have in terms of potential resistance?
Excerpts:
Some experts said the move was simply to restore reserves depleted over the past couple years because of the pandemic lockdown and drop in trade with China.
“This seems like a routine order to restore those wartime stockage levels now that trade with China has restarted,” a former U.S. defense official who served in South Korea said.
But others said it could indicate that Kim is preparing for military provocations in the coming months against the United States and South Korea.
Each corps of the People’s Army keeps a year’s worth of food for soldiers in case of war and another one month’s worth of food in case supplies are cut off during wartime. There is also rice that is stored for industrial use and another three-month wartime allotment for civilians, the Ryanggang Province source said.
Kim Jong Un orders military food reserves restored ‘at all costs’
North Korea released much of its rice reserves to keep people from starving during the pandemic.
By Moon Sung Hui, RFA Korean
2023.10.30
rfa.org
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has ordered the country’s Civil Defense Department and the military to prioritize the replenishment of military food reserves “at all costs by the end of November,” several local sources told Radio Free Asia.
Usually, the allotment for military provisions and other rations is determined at the end of December, once the autumn grain harvest has completely dried. But that deadline has been brought forward by a month, according to a source in Ryanggang Province.
Some experts said the move was simply to restore reserves depleted over the past couple years because of the pandemic lockdown and drop in trade with China.
“This seems like a routine order to restore those wartime stockage levels now that trade with China has restarted,” a former U.S. defense official who served in South Korea said.
But others said it could indicate that Kim is preparing for military provocations in the coming months against the United States and South Korea.
Each corps of the People’s Army keeps a year’s worth of food for soldiers in case of war and another one month’s worth of food in case supplies are cut off during wartime. There is also rice that is stored for industrial use and another three-month wartime allotment for civilians, the Ryanggang Province source said.
Wartime reserve food is largely divided between the national leaders’ share and the share that is stockpiled by the General Rear Services Bureau for soldiers in case of war, the source said.
North Korean soldiers unload foodstuffs on the banks of the Yalu River near the North Korean town of Sinuiju, June 5, 2009. Credit: Jacky Chen/Reuters
Kim’s instructions were delivered at an official lecture on Oct. 21 to Workers’ Party officials, he said.
“The instructions were to completely maintain the equipment and materiel of the regular army and civil defense forces,” he said. “They will be maintained so they can be mobilized at any time, and to fill the wartime food reserve as the top priority.”
Warehouses almost empty
Many North Koreans were unable to farm properly during COVID-19. In response, authorities released rice to keep people from starving.
People had expected that government food rations would be normalized in 2024 due to a good harvest this year, according to a source from Chagang Province who requested anonymity for personal safety.
“But now, if all the wartime food reserves have to be refilled, the residents won’t have enough food to eat,” she said. “The country hasn’t saved any food reserves for wartime in recent years.”
“We often hear news that Warehouse No. 2 – which stores city and county wartime food reserves – is empty,” she said. “The food storage warehouses for the General Rear Services Bureau of the People’s Army are also almost empty.”
The United States Department of Agriculture predicted in an Aug. 28 report that North Korea’s rice production in 2023 would be about 2.1 million tons, similar to 2022.
Kim is using North Korea’s military reserve system to try to reestablish central control over key materials before winter, according to Sydney Seiler, the national intelligence officer for North Korea at the U.S. National Intelligence Council.
He added that it’s also possible that Kim is planning provocations to embarrass the government of South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol.
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.
rfa.org
13. South Korea as a Nuclear State: Trade-offs and Choices
This will remain a timeless issue as long as the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime remains in power and seeks to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Conclusion
South Korea should not assume that nuclear parity will bring about greater stability on the Korean Peninsula or in the region. Although domestic proponents of acquiring nuclear weapons seem to expect that becoming a nuclear power could induce North Korea to denuclearize or make them more likely to engage in arms control talks, this seems like entirely wishful thinking. Rather, should Seoul possess nuclear weapons, Pyongyang would more likely use its nuclearized neighbor as further grounds for continued or even heightened buildup of its nuclear arsenal. In other words, South Korean nuclearization could massively impact the regional balance of power by intensifying rivalries and bloc politics in Asia, thereby exacerbating the nuclear risk and destabilizing the region.
It is also unlikely that this would reduce the probability of nuclear war. In the case of India and Pakistan, their nuclearization further fueled their rivalry rather than enhanced deterrence. According to former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, South Asia almost witnessed a “nuclear conflagration” in 2019.
On the contrary, one of the greatest costs of South Korean nuclearization would be the cessation of efforts toward North Korean denuclearization, which could potentially cost the US and the ROK their bilateral alliance. For example, the US may see South Korea having its own conventional and nuclear capabilities as a reason to withdraw its troops. This would, in turn, make South Korea even more vulnerable to North Korean and Chinese threats. There is also the question of loss of face on the international level, as South Korea’s going nuclear would certainly have negative ramifications with the ROK’s dreams of projecting itself as a responsible power suffering a serious setback.
Furthermore, the risk of an arms race that would undermine regional security and prompt countries like Japan, which also faces threats from North Korea and China, is critical. Undoubtedly, the more nuclear-armed states in the region, the higher the risk of miscalculation or accidents, which have the potential to trigger a nuclear disaster.
In this context, it is up to South Korea to consider the pros and cons of pursuing its own nuclear power, weigh the costs and trade-offs involved and decide whether it is willing to take a calculated risk of going nuclear.
South Korea as a Nuclear State: Trade-offs and Choices
https://www.38north.org/2023/10/south-korea-as-a-nuclear-state-trade-offs-and-choices/
This piece was co-published as part of a series with South Asian Voices (SAV), a publication of the Henry L. Stimson Center.
Weapons Used in Operation Vijay, kept at Kargil War Memorial, Drass.
South Korea’s launch of its Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2022 started the country’s ascent into “strategic clarity” for the US-led Indo-Pacific construct, winning favor with Washington for this policy shift. However, in January 2023, President Yoon Suk-yeol voiced the possibility of either building nuclear weapons indigenously or redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons in the face of an ever-growing nuclear threat from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). This reoriented the debate on South Korea’s own nuclear ambitions.
While Yoon rejected the notion of South Korea immediately becoming a nuclear-armed state, calling it “unrealistic,” his remarks seemed to give credence to domestic voices that increasingly doubt US commitment to the Republic of Korea’s (ROK or South Korea) security concerns and advocate a need for an indigenous nuclear deterrent capability. Although the government soon clarified that South Korea’s stance on nuclear nonproliferation remained unchanged and later reaffirmed Seoul’s commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in the Washington Declaration, the nuclear armament genie has been unleashed. Since then, there has been an onslaught of commentaries on the issue in the mainstream security discourse domestically and regionally.
As voices in South Korea increasingly call for the country to consider going nuclear, there are significant questions about what this would mean, not only about the security implications in and around the region, but also the economic and geopolitical costs and trade-offs involved. In South Asia, nuclear tests in the late 1990s by historical rivals India and Pakistan concretized mutual mistrust in an unstable neighborhood. With a nuclear China in the mix, the situation has remained highly volatile. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to draw implications from India’s nuclear test in Pokhran two and a half decades ago for South Korea. It contends that as it considers acquiring nuclear weapons, South Korea should not assume that nuclear parity will bring about greater stability on the Korean Peninsula but be prepared for heightening tensions in its neighborhood, potentially making Seoul more vulnerable to the Chinese and North Korean threats. While acquiring nuclear weapons has its benefits, it will involve certain trade-offs, which Seoul must be prepared to make.
The Case for South Korea’s (De)Nuclearization
In late April 2023, the release of the Washington Declaration sought to address South Korean concerns about US extended deterrence and to strengthen allied cooperation by engaging in: “deeper, cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence, including through enhanced dialogue and information sharing.” Yet, despite the assurances provided in this declaration, growing calls for nuclearization persist in South Korea. Prior to the Declaration, surveys (e.g., the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies) showed that more than 70 percent of South Koreans approve of the country going nuclear because of numerous external threats. While the Washington Declaration was meant to address this, it fails to adequately deal with South Korean anxieties vis-à-vis whether the US can credibly commit to its security in full, as the nuclear debate in the country remains robust.
Perceptions that South Korea should have its own nuclear weapons have only been strengthened by North Korea’s focus on “perfecting” its nuclear capabilities via intensified missile attacks on the ROK and its revised nuclear strategy. Beijing’s influence further complicates the nuclearization debate. Not only has China been instrumental in supporting the Kim regime and its nuclear pursuits, but it has also been generally supportive of Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine. The South Korean public also identifies China as a serious threat to their country in the coming decade, and more and more South Korean policy is conforming to the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy.
At the same time, supporters of the ROK’s nuclearization seem convinced that becoming a nuclear state would be a panacea against the persistent nuclear threat from North Korea. They believe it would give the South Korean government greater control over its nuclear policies. Simultaneously, they also hold an assumption that Seoul acquiring a nuclear arsenal would make North Korea less militarily adventurous and that it could even be used as a bargaining chip to motivate North Korean denuclearization. In this context, with debates focused only on reasons why the South would want nuclear weapons and not what kind of trade-offs it would require to achieve that goal, nuclearization has been gaining public support.
Drawing Parallels: Lessons from Pokhran
In testing these assumptions and thinking through some of the potential trade-offs South Korea may face if they should decide to go nuclear, India’s nuclearization is a well-suited parallel from which to draw lessons. Both India and South Korea share similarities in their geopolitical landscapes. Their immediate neighbors represent a dyad wherein they stand as status quo democracies in conflict with the revisionist powers of Pakistan and the DPRK—both of which follow a similar rhetoric of nuclear brinkmanship in their deterrence and security strategies.
Since the 1970s, Pakistan, largely courtesy of the A.Q. Khan network, has been central to nuclear proliferation in Asia. It transferred nuclear technology to North Korea along with other rogue states, such as Libya and Iran. Pakistan today has an “unknown” number of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons as a shield against India’s conventional force superiority. Similarly, in recent years, North Korea has been projecting its intentions for an “exponential increase” in its nuclear arsenal, including tactical nuclear weapons, which will greatly increase regional geopolitical instability. Both countries also must contend with China, which boasts an expanding and rapidly modernizing nuclear arsenal that has resulted in a region with a strong possibility of nuclear proliferation.
However, despite these similarities in their threat environments, India and the ROK have dealt with their security challenges in very different ways. South Korea has done so through its dependence on the US’ extended deterrence commitments, and India via its decision to establish its own nuclear program, which began with a round of nuclear tests in May 1998 in Pokhran. As South Korea faces heightened security challenges, including North Korea’s nuclear progress, China’s military (and nuclear) modernization campaign, and political unpredictability in the United States that could bring about potential shifts in its approach (and credibility) toward its allies, Seoul will have to weigh its choices carefully. As such, much can be gleaned from India’s nuclearization experiences and its decision to end its long-standing nuclear ambiguity with the Pokhran tests.
For India, the decision to go nuclear came with both consequences and benefits. In the beginning, India received severe international backlash. New Delhi had to pay heavy economic and political tolls, which added to uncertainty surrounding its financial stability and economic development. US sanctions on India involved cutting off all assistance (excluding humanitarian aid), banning exports of defense materials and technologies, and ending any credit/credit guarantees or other lending by multilateral financial institutions to India. Germany, Sweden and Denmark followed suit and were accompanied by strong responses from China, European countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. Even South Korea expressed that the tests were: “regrettable for coming at a time when international efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world had advanced with the adoption of the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty).”
However, ultimately, the immediate and direct economic impact of these sanctions on India was small and bearable. Within a year and a half, US civilian sanctions (imposed by the Glenn Amendment) were abolished, and by the end of 2001, all defense sanctions were removed for all practical purposes. Realizing India’s centrality in bringing stability to Central and South Asia, the United States sought to build strategic cooperation with the country—lifting the sanctions incrementally.
The immediate political costs of the tests were much more consequential. The Pokhran tests put India’s relationship with the US, as well as Pakistan, into a prolonged state of uncertainty. In fact, the US only really began recognizing India as a legitimate civilian nuclear power and a military nuclear power in 2008. Similarly, India’s relations with China also took a nosedive with Beijing’s rather vicious reaction to the tests. India’s biggest long-term cost was that its tests likely pushed Pakistan to follow suit. For Pakistan, its nuclear test explosions were a way of demonstrating its parity with India as a regional power as well as projecting itself as the first Islamic nuclear power. While this may have been a part of New Delhi’s calculus, it still impacted India’s negotiating power and the overall security and stability of the region. A key political consequence was that the tests and the backlash to them enabled Pakistan to draw international attention to the Kashmir issue (that is, the India-Pakistan dispute over the Jammu and Kashmir region since the dissolution of British India in 1947; both countries claim the disputed Himalayan territory of the region in full and administer separate portions of it divided by the Line of Control) when India was interested in framing it as a bilateral dispute.
Nevertheless, the post-1998 estrangement did not last forever, and a strategic partnership with the US was eventually restored. Interestingly, by comparison, Russia’s and France’s more moderate responses paved the way for a substantial expansion of India’s relationships with both countries, which still holds true to date. Furthermore, India’s actions were essential in terms of furthering its national security. By establishing itself as a nuclear power, India was able to project itself as a self-reliant nation capable of defending its sovereignty against potential threats.
For South Korea, the pursuit of its own nuclear armament would undoubtedly be met with similar political and economic costs as what India experienced. Seoul would be violating the NPT and undermining its bilateral agreement with the US that commits the American commitment to South Korea’s defense. Drawing from India’s experiences, if Seoul acquires nuclear weapons, it must be prepared to undergo a significant shift in its relationship with the great powers and a realignment of interests amongst them. Nevertheless, Seoul may be capable and willing to make these trade-offs to reap the benefits that come with being a nuclear power.
At the same time, South Korea’s degree of suffering should it choose to go nuclear is unlikely to be as severe as it was for North Korea. India’s “post-test diplomacy,” for instance, worked to mend international ties within just two years. As a major economic power in Asia and the world, South Korea can also effectively employ economic and commercial diplomacy to dilute potential sanctions. This approach will be challenging considering South Korea’s continued and immense economic dependence on China. Such diplomacy must be accompanied by a broad-based approach that can help it demonstrate to the world that Seoul would be a responsible nuclear power and that it would be willing and eager to engage with various multilateral forums and frameworks. A minimum nuclear deterrent doctrine based on the “no first use” principle could go a long way in this regard.
Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime
While India was able to quickly recover from international backlash for its decision to go nuclear, times have changed. In 2023, would granting the same latitude to a treaty ally that breaks ranks set a bad precedent, especially with countries like Iran also weighing their options? It does not seem impossible, given how integral South Korea is to the US security strategy in Northeast Asia to counter China. Moreover, were North Korea to continue with its nuclear tests and capability, South Korea’s diplomatic and NPT exit path would get easier on the grounds of “extraordinary events.” At the same time, today’s economic-diplomatic fallout might be harsher than it was for India because of the global economic slowdown following the pandemic and the Ukraine war. While it has yet to escalate into the nuclear dimension, the shadow of possibility remains.
Fortunately, Seoul’s reaffirmation of its nonproliferation commitments in the Washington Declaration appears to have, for the moment, put South Korea’s nuclear inclinations on the back burner. Nonetheless, the US and the international community must ensure that any ensuing dialogue focuses on deterrence with the aim of achieving long-term stability, which is the most important lesson from South Asia.
Conclusion
South Korea should not assume that nuclear parity will bring about greater stability on the Korean Peninsula or in the region. Although domestic proponents of acquiring nuclear weapons seem to expect that becoming a nuclear power could induce North Korea to denuclearize or make them more likely to engage in arms control talks, this seems like entirely wishful thinking. Rather, should Seoul possess nuclear weapons, Pyongyang would more likely use its nuclearized neighbor as further grounds for continued or even heightened buildup of its nuclear arsenal. In other words, South Korean nuclearization could massively impact the regional balance of power by intensifying rivalries and bloc politics in Asia, thereby exacerbating the nuclear risk and destabilizing the region.
It is also unlikely that this would reduce the probability of nuclear war. In the case of India and Pakistan, their nuclearization further fueled their rivalry rather than enhanced deterrence. According to former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, South Asia almost witnessed a “nuclear conflagration” in 2019.
On the contrary, one of the greatest costs of South Korean nuclearization would be the cessation of efforts toward North Korean denuclearization, which could potentially cost the US and the ROK their bilateral alliance. For example, the US may see South Korea having its own conventional and nuclear capabilities as a reason to withdraw its troops. This would, in turn, make South Korea even more vulnerable to North Korean and Chinese threats. There is also the question of loss of face on the international level, as South Korea’s going nuclear would certainly have negative ramifications with the ROK’s dreams of projecting itself as a responsible power suffering a serious setback.
Furthermore, the risk of an arms race that would undermine regional security and prompt countries like Japan, which also faces threats from North Korea and China, is critical. Undoubtedly, the more nuclear-armed states in the region, the higher the risk of miscalculation or accidents, which have the potential to trigger a nuclear disaster.
In this context, it is up to South Korea to consider the pros and cons of pursuing its own nuclear power, weigh the costs and trade-offs involved and decide whether it is willing to take a calculated risk of going nuclear.
14. Defense minister instructs new military chiefs to build ‘overwhelming’ defense posture against enemy
Defense minister instructs new military chiefs to build ‘overwhelming’ defense posture against enemy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr
Defense minister instructs new military chiefs to build ‘overwhelming’ defense posture against enemy
Chae Yun-hwan
All News 16:20 October 31, 2023
SEOUL, Oct. 31 (Yonhap) — South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik called on new top military officers Tuesday to establish a defense posture that “overwhelms” the enemy amid Seoul’s efforts to reinforce defense capabilities against North Korean military threats.
Shin made the call during the inauguration ceremonies for new Army Chief of Staff Gen. Park An-su, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Yang Yong-mo and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Lee Young-su at the Gyeryongdae military headquarters in Gyeryong, 142 kilometers south of Seoul.
“We must establish a defense posture that overwhelms the enemy,” Shin was quoted as saying during Park’s inauguration ceremony. “If the enemy carries out a provocation, punish them immediately, strongly and until the end.”
Defense Minister Shin Won-sik (L) hands over an Army flag to new Army Chief of Staff Gen. Park An-su during Park’s inauguration ceremony at the Gyeryongdae military headquarters in Gyeryong, 142 kilometers south of Seoul, on Oct. 31, 2023, in this photo provided by the Army. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Shin also noted the “grave” security situation faced by South Korea during the ceremonies, citing Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats, continued trespassing of the South’s air defense identification zone by Chinese and Russian aircraft, and tensions across the Taiwan Strait.
In his inauguration speech, Gen. Park pledged to acquire response capabilities that can overwhelm the enemy based on the “firm” South Korea-U.S. alliance.
Adm. Yang vowed to reinforce the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s mantra of “peace through strength” at sea by focusing efforts in employing combat systems that employ both unmanned assets and personnel.
Gen. Lee pledged to make all-out efforts to build a strong and advanced Air Force, while maintaining a “solid” readiness posture.
The inauguration ceremonies came after the defense ministry announced a major reshuffle of top military brass Sunday, which included the promotion and nomination of Adm. Kim Myung-soo as the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr
15. Seoul slams N. Korea's money laundering, vows efforts to ban inflow of 'black money'
Seoul slams N. Korea's money laundering, vows efforts to ban inflow of 'black money' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · October 30, 2023
SEOUL, Oct. 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification ministry handling inter-Korean affairs said Monday that it will cooperate with the international community to put a brake on Pyongyang's evolving money laundering schemes.
During its plenary meeting in Paris last week, the Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental anti-money laundering body, decided to maintain North Korea for the 13th consecutive year on the list of "high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action," defined as having significant deficiencies in countering money laundering, terrorist financing and financing of proliferation.
A separate report by the U.N. Panel of Experts on U.N. Security Council sanctions against Pyongyang showed that cryptocurrency theft by North Korea's state-sponsored hackers were estimated at nearly US$1.7 billion last year, growing three-fold from 2021.
"As shown, the North Korean regime's seizure of illicit funds to secure money for its rule and development of weapons of mass destruction is becoming bolder day by day, in means and scale," Koo Byoung-sam, the ministry spokesperson said in a regular press briefing.
"The shortcut to resolving all problems on the Korean Peninsula, such as the North's denuclearization and promotion of human rights, lies in blocking the inflow of black money to the regime of Kim Jong-un," Koo said.
He said South Korea will actively work with the international community to shut off such inflows, though he did not provide any further details.
Koo Byoung-sam, the spokesperson for South Korea's unification ministry, speaks at a press briefing at the government complex in Seoul on Oct. 30, 2023. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · October 30, 2023
16. U.S., Chinese diplomats hold video talks on N. Korea-Russia military cooperation, defector repatriation
Is it in Chinese interests to try to stop the nK-Russian arms trade? One the one hand experts assess China does not want north Korea to receive advanced technology and systems from Russia because it could impact its no war, no war collapse, and no nuclear strategy - e.g., maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, north Korea provides a convenient way for Russia to get lethal aid to sustain its war in Ukraine without China getting its hands dirty. It can focus on trade and non-lethal aid to Russia to make itself look good in the eyes of the international community. north Korea is useful to China (and Russia) in that respect.
U.S., Chinese diplomats hold video talks on N. Korea-Russia military cooperation, defector repatriation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · October 30, 2023
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Oct. 30 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. special representative for North Korea held video talks with his Chinese counterpart Monday to discuss military cooperation between the North and Russia, China's reported repatriation of North Korean escapees and other issues, the State Department said.
The talks between Ambassador Sung Kim and Liu Xiaoming, China's special representative on Korean Peninsula affairs, came as Washington has encouraged Beijing to play a constructive role in addressing North Korea-related issues.
Atop the agenda was burgeoning military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow. The United States has recently revealed that the North has shipped a large amount of military equipment and munitions to Russia for use in the war in Ukraine.
"He (Kim) noted that the DPRK's recent arms transfers to Russia threaten to undermine global non-proliferation and violate numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions that Russia, itself, supported," the State Department said in a readout. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
He stressed the need for all U.N. members to fulfill "all their obligations" and "fully" implement the U.N. sanctions regime on the North, according to the department.
Kim reiterated the U.S.' commitment to peace and stability on the peninsula and to diplomacy with the North, saying he looks forward to continued communication on North Korean issues "at all levels," the department said.
The two sides also discussed China's reported repatriation of North Korean escapees earlier this month. Washington has called for Beijing to abide by the international principle of non-refoulement.
The U.S. has recently been cranking up diplomacy with China as it strives to ensure security on the peninsula, prevent an escalation of the Israel-Hamas war and pave the way for a possible summit between President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in San Francisco next month.
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim speaks during a meeting with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts, Kim Gunn and Hiroyuki Namazu, respectively, in Jakarta on Oct. 17, 2023, in this file photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · October 30, 2023
17. Don't suspend Sept. 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement
Sigh.... A piece of paper does not provide security to the ROK. Upholding the agreement just to look good in the eyes of the international community because Korea is a middle power does not enhance the security of the ROK.
That said I think a compromise is do not abrogate the entire agreement but suspend those items that harm ROK/US alliance readiness and clla attention to all the north Korean violations. Explains to the people in Korea and the international community that the ROK fully implemented the agreement and the north did not. With the agreement still in place (yes a piece of paper) with the harmful areas to readiness suspended, the agreement can be used from a. information campaign perspective to continue to call out how the north violnets all agreement s it makes.
Excerpts:
Amid growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul’s Defense Minister Shin Won-sik repeatedly raised his voice over the necessity of suspending the 9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement made during then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s visit to Pyongyang on Sept. 19, 2018.
Based on this agreement, the two Koreas agreed to halt hostile acts in principle. They also agreed to suspend military drills near the inter-Korean border. Since the breakdown of the nuclear talks between then-U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2019, however, Pyongyang violated this agreement relentlessly including the invasion of its unmanned air vehicles to the South’s air space in December 2022. According to Shin’s remarks on Oct. 27 during a parliamentary audit session, North Korea has fired artillery shells in the western maritime buffer zone about 110 times ― which is a clear violation of the agreement. He also added that the estimated number of the North’s violations is close to 3,600 over the past five years.
In this context, Shin has strongly argued that the agreement has weakened the military readiness and capability of the military units stationed near the inter-Korean border, therefore, it needs to suspend the agreement.
From Seoul’s perspective, it seems reasonable to suspend the 9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement due to the violations of North Korea and its vehement remarks and actions against South Korea. However, what should be highlighted is the position of South Korea in the international community and the implications of the repeated flipping of its policy on North Korea.
....
Fully complying with the 9.19 Inter-Korean Agreement, Seoul should appeal to the international community that its approach to North Korea is based on diplomacy and is willing to resolve security conflicts on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue with Pyongyang.
Don't suspend Sept. 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement
The Korea Times · October 31, 2023
By Mitch Shin
Since South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol took office in May 2022, Seoul has prioritized strengthening its military alliance with the United States. In the wake of a series of meetings between Seoul and Washington, they agreed to deploy the U.S. strategic assets including its nuclear aircraft carrier and nuclear-capable bomber regularly on the Korean Peninsula as a demonstration of the U.S. extended deterrence to South Korea. With the reinvigorated joint military drills of the South and the U.S., those measures appear to have consolidated their joint military capabilities and readiness against the growing aggression of North Korea.
Notwithstanding Seoul and Washington’s appeal that their joint military drills are “defensive in nature,” Pyongyang has always deemed them as invasion rehearsal to justify its illicit ballistic missile launches and development.
Amid growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul’s Defense Minister Shin Won-sik repeatedly raised his voice over the necessity of suspending the 9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement made during then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s visit to Pyongyang on Sept. 19, 2018.
Based on this agreement, the two Koreas agreed to halt hostile acts in principle. They also agreed to suspend military drills near the inter-Korean border. Since the breakdown of the nuclear talks between then-U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2019, however, Pyongyang violated this agreement relentlessly including the invasion of its unmanned air vehicles to the South’s air space in December 2022. According to Shin’s remarks on Oct. 27 during a parliamentary audit session, North Korea has fired artillery shells in the western maritime buffer zone about 110 times ― which is a clear violation of the agreement. He also added that the estimated number of the North’s violations is close to 3,600 over the past five years.
In this context, Shin has strongly argued that the agreement has weakened the military readiness and capability of the military units stationed near the inter-Korean border, therefore, it needs to suspend the agreement.
From Seoul’s perspective, it seems reasonable to suspend the 9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement due to the violations of North Korea and its vehement remarks and actions against South Korea. However, what should be highlighted is the position of South Korea in the international community and the implications of the repeated flipping of its policy on North Korea.
Despite a slip in its status from G10 to G13 in world GDP rankings, South Korea is already a middle-power country that has made dramatic economic developments in the past seven decades after the 1950-53 Korean War.
In July 2021, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) raised South Korea’s status from a developing economy to a developed economy ― which is the first such case in history.
What this implies is that South Korea should be the one taking a concrete diplomatic approach to North Korea to construct permanent peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. And the way to achieve this is soft-ball diplomacy.
The 9.19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement encompasses the details that could prevent the two Koreas from clashing against each other on the inter-Korean border. Along with other agreements made between the two Koreas or those signed during the multilateral platforms such as the six-party talks, this agreement is clearly beneficial for South Korea in the security dimension considering the economic status between South Korea and North Korea. Simply speaking, the Korea risk generated by security conflicts and military tensions on the Korean Peninsula affects South Korea as the North’s economy is already crippled by devastating U.S. and U.N.-led economic sanctions.
Also, considering the dictatorship of the Kim regime in North Korea, the South’s flipping of its policy on North Korea after the election cycles, has snowballed the disadvantage of its leverage in inter-Korean talks and its role in the nuclear talks between the U.S. and North Korea. In the past decades, North Korea has explicitly shown its interest in direct negotiations with the U.S. while bypassing South Korea. In order to make its voice more effective and compelling, the policymakers and politicians in South Korea should craft what can be maintained in the long run. Just letting the U.S. reach a deal with Pyongyang without Seoul’s presence in the negotiations should not occur.
Lastly, as mentioned earlier, South Korea is a middle-power country whose policy in the international community affects other countries. Its diplomatic position in the international community has advanced in past decades. Thus, Seoul needs to be consistent with its policy on Pyongyang’s nuclear threats on the international diplomatic stage, meaning diplomacy centered on dialogue should be what Seoul always needs to prioritize as peace can be shaped by Seoul, not Pyongyang. Showing its devotion to enhancing peace, democracy and freedom, Seoul needs to make sure that its policy on North Korea is a diplomatic issue, not a political issue.
Without diplomacy and dialogue, no permanent peace and prosperity can be constructed on the Korean Peninsula. A “power for power” approach cannot bring peace in the region and cannot be an answer to creating a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
Fully complying with the 9.19 Inter-Korean Agreement, Seoul should appeal to the international community that its approach to North Korea is based on diplomacy and is willing to resolve security conflicts on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue with Pyongyang.
Mitch Shin is a young fellow at The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy. Shin was an assistant editor and chief Koreas correspondent for The Diplomat, and a non-resident research fellow at The Institute for Security & Development Policy, Stockholm Korea Center.
The Korea Times · October 31, 2023
18. S. Korea's homegrown spacecraft to moon project on track: science ministry
Slow and steady wins the race. the north cannot compete with the South.
S. Korea's homegrown spacecraft to moon project on track: science ministry | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · October 30, 2023
SEOUL, Oct. 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's science ministry said Monday its project to develop a homegrown spacecraft to the moon has passed through a preliminary feasibility study and will officially begin next year.
With the passage of the 530 billion won (US$392.9 million)-project, the Ministry of Science and ICT plans to develop a 1.8-ton spacecraft to land on the moon in 2032 as part of the country's plan to begin exploring lunar resources under its ambitious road map for a "future space economy."
The spacecraft is expected to be equipped with homegrown equipment to detect and avoid obstacles on the moon's surface for a successful landing.
The ministry said it will begin the project next year to complete the development of the spacecraft by 2028, test its soft landing in 2031 and officially launch the spacecraft in 2032 to land on the moon and explore its surface.
The spacecraft will be loaded on South Korea's homegrown next-generation space vehicle, the ministry added.
Last year, President Yoon Suk Yeol announced the country's plan to land a spacecraft on the moon in 2032 and on Mars in 2045.
This file photo provided by the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, unrelated to the article, shows South Korea's homegrown space rocket Nuri lifting off from Naro Space Center in Goheung, 328 kilometers south of Seoul, on May 25, 2023. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · October 30, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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