|
Quotes of the Day:
"Do not anticipate trouble, or worry about what may never happen. Keep in the sunlight."
- Benjamin Franklin
"The greater the ignorance the greater the dogmatism."
- Sir William Osler
"He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper."
- Edmund Burke
1. Analysis: North Korea is Aiding the Russia-Ukraine War via Arms Trade
2. Secretary Antony J. Blinken At the 8th Annual CSIS Republic of Korea-United States Strategic Forum
3. S. Korea, U.S. hold joint anti-terrorism exercise
4. North Korea Has a Problem: Monster Missile Revealed to 'Take Out' Kim Jong Un’s Bunker
5. Unification ministry uses metaverse to recreate hometowns of elderly S. Koreans hailing from North
6. N. Korean FM slams UNSC meeting over Pyongyang's force-building policy in constitution
7. What to know and what's next for Travis King, the American soldier who ran into North Korea
8. Poll shows 79% of young Koreans agree on need to improve ties with Japan
9. Korea sees record-low births in July
10. S. Korea to extend $5 mil worth of fertilizer aid to Ukraine via U.S. agency
11. N.Korea could use nuclear weapons at any stage of conflict: Pentagon
12. ‘Absurd how Korea treats its people’: English signage fad alienates older Koreans
13. The Worrying Democratic Erosions in South Korea
14. Does Kim’s Visit to Russia Signal an End to North Korea’s Strategic Solitude?
1. Analysis: North Korea is Aiding the Russia-Ukraine War via Arms Trade
Photos at the link: https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherrussia/analysis-north-korea-is-aiding-the-russia-ukraine-war-via-arms-trade/
Conclusion:
These reports’ methodologies consist of utilizing the lot numbers of the ammunition, distinctive national marks, features, and serial numbers. With these methods, the tracing and documentation of North Korean firearms in Ukraine should be possible. Furthermore, a characteristic of these weapon exports that has been outlined throughout the UNSC reports and was seen in the Libyan Civil War of 2011 is the fact that North Korea disguises these shipments as construction materials or engineering machinery. Therefore, customs services around the world need to pay close attention to shipments that are labeled as “construction materials” from North Korea.
Analysis: North Korea is Aiding the Russia-Ukraine War via Arms Trade
September 30, 2023 Jong Min Lee
By Jong Min Lee, MALD 2024 Candidate, The Fletcher School
https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherrussia/analysis-north-korea-is-aiding-the-russia-ukraine-war-via-arms-trade/
Overview of the Situation
In March 2023, the U.S. Department of Treasury put the Slovakian arms dealer named Ashot Mkrtychev and three of his corporate entities located in Kazakhstan and Russia on the list of the Office of Foreign Asset Control for violation of North Korea sanctions regulations. According to U.S. government reports, Mkrtychev orchestrated arms deals between Russia and North Korea. In January 2023, the White House presented imagery evidence in which Russian cargo trains traveled between Russia and North Korea.
From the White House press briefing by NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby on January 20, 2023.
In July, the Financial Times reported that the Ukrainian military utilized seized North Korean 122mm rocket ammunition that was intended to be transported to Russia for their BM-21s Grads to target the Russian troops. They were similar types of ammunition to those that North Korea had allegedly exported to Sudan in late April. With these multiple reports, it has become an open secret that North Korea has some logistical presence in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Although it may seem like a surprise that Russia has been procuring weapons and ammunition from North Korea, this was actually foreseeable considering the long history of North Korea’s state-led illicit arms trade and Russia’s need for Soviet-styled weaponry.
As a hermit kingdom in East Asia, North Korea is notorious for its involvement in the international illicit arms trafficking networks that bypass UN Security Council sanctions. According to the United Nations Security Council Report on the Korea Mining and Development Trading Company (KOMID) and its subsidiary proxy cells, North Korean state-owned enterprises have been known to play a major role in North Korea’s arms sales in global conflicts. Given the murky nature of Sino-North Korean relations, current developments make it evident that the Kim regime wants to take advantage of the present geopolitical conditions for its own interest.
North Korea’s Geopolitical Synopsis & North Korea-Russia Relations
“Never Trust China.” – Kim Il Sung
Contrary to the general misconception that North Korea is a satellite state of China, North Korea has historically been deeply concerned about the increasing economic influence of China. North Korea’s founder and dictator Kim Il Sung emphasized the importance of independence from Chinese influence, and his perspective has been passed down through the past three generations. The mistrust between China and North Korea was most evident during Kim Jong-un’s rise to power in 2011. He executed his pro-China uncle, Jang Song-thaek, and other pro-China political figures in 2013, which in turn allegedly resulted in the purge of the Former Senior Chinese Ministry of Public Safety official, Zhou Yongkang, on charges of violating national security and corruption.
Given the high-risk geopolitical landscape of the region and the recent rise of ethnic nationalism in China, North Korea wants to utilize Russia to its advantage. The recent tensions in the South China Sea have probably also demonstrated the technological capabilities of the Chinese military. North Korea’s profound interest and trust in Russian military technology is also shown by the 1995 incident in which Russian intelligence apprehended 27-year-old North Korean operative, Han Chang-Gil, over his attempt to procure Russian APS rifles in Vladivostok.
Keeping these factors in mind, the mention of highly advanced missile and satellite technologies during the recent Kim-Putin summit was predictable. However, as shown in the previous patterns of North Korean arms exports, the procurement of such technologies could also endanger international security. Like the North Korean missiles, these technologies could also spill over to Iran and the Middle East.
Background on North Korea’s Arms Trafficking
Throughout the Cold War, North Korea consistently involved itself in major conflicts as a pivotal ally of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In most of those cases, its engagement took the form of sending unofficial military advisors and pilots to various proxy wars, like the Vietnam War, along with spreading anti-colonialism rhetoric in the post-colonial Middle East and African countries. However, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1991, its arms sales increased during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980. It has been reported that when North Korea’s arms sales peaked in 1982, 37% of its total exports were from selling weapons. The North Korean regime has used illicit arms trafficking as a business model to strengthen its diplomatic relations and to secure hard currency.
KPA officers meet a man injured during the Syrian Civil War at a hospital in Syria in 2012 (Photo: SANA/NKLW file photo)
According to data from the United Nations, the total worth of exports of firearms from North Korea from 2015-2021 is estimated to be around $1.7 million. North Korea’s major clients involve countries and non-state actors ranging from Syria, Iran, Libya, Hezbollah, and Egypt. Throughout the mid-2010s, the country carried out small arms trade and offered military training to African countries such as Uganda, Namibia, and Tanzania. As a result, after the success of the military coup in 2022, Burkina Faso normalized its relations with North Korea in 2023 and outlined its willingness to purchase North Korean weaponry.
Apart from general weaponry support, the country’s arms trade also involved providing military consultancy and engineering corps to assist in the maintenance of military machinery and jets. In the case of Syria, it has been reported that North Korea deployed two military advisory units named Chalma I and Chalma VII in 2016 for its military operational assistance to the Syrian Armed Forces. North Korea also received roughly $6 million worth of narcotics from Hezbollah in Thailand and China in exchange for providing military consultancy on the utilization of underground tunnels to target the Israeli Defense Forces in 2014.
The COVID-19 pandemic may have contributed to further reinforcing the opaqueness of the arms trade, as North Korea expanded its cyber operations to procure foreign hard currencies. One of the major reasons why the detection and documentation of North Korean arms sales and the presence of its operatives is difficult is that North Korean authorities have explicitly prohibited any photographic coverage by client states. However, their presence can still be inferred from the exported weapons, and from the client states’ official government statements and propaganda sources.
How to Trace North Korean Weapons
As small arms and other munitions from North Korea have continued to appear in the Middle East and Africa, there has been an effort by non-governmental organizations to track down the exported weaponry. In particular, the Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research group have published a field manual and guide on how to track down small arms from North Korea.
These reports’ methodologies consist of utilizing the lot numbers of the ammunition, distinctive national marks, features, and serial numbers. With these methods, the tracing and documentation of North Korean firearms in Ukraine should be possible. Furthermore, a characteristic of these weapon exports that has been outlined throughout the UNSC reports and was seen in the Libyan Civil War of 2011 is the fact that North Korea disguises these shipments as construction materials or engineering machinery. Therefore, customs services around the world need to pay close attention to shipments that are labeled as “construction materials” from North Korea.
2. Secretary Antony J. Blinken At the 8th Annual CSIS Republic of Korea-United States Strategic Forum
Excerpts:
All across the world stage, Korea is taking on increasing global leadership. As a partner in reforming multilateral development banks so that they meet the needs of people in low- and middle-income countries; as the next host of the Summit for Democracy; as a participant, along with Japan, at the U.S.-hosted Trilateral Conference on Women’s Economic Empowerment: a critical pillar of development – in democracies and non-democracies, low and middle-income countries alike. And when Korea takes its seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council next year, we look forward to its strong voice, the voice that will – it will bring in defense of the UN Charter.
And of course, all of you know this is an extraordinary moment for brand Korea around the world. If you look at the Netflix list of top shows, inevitably you will find Korean programming at the top of that list. A few months ago, I had the opportunity to be on one of our late-night TV shows based in New York, and as we drove up to the stage door, I saw a huge crowd of young people gathered. And I thought, well, that’s pretty nice – a lot of people waiting here for me. Turned out there was another guest on the show that night, the leading Korean K-pop band. Needless to say, the young people gathered at the door had no idea who I was, but were extremely excited about the K-pop band that followed in my wake.
But I think what you’re seeing is an extraordinary ambition between and shared by Korea and the United States for the next generation of our partnership. Just over the last couple of years, we’ve made great strides in beginning to realize that vision. And we’re prioritizing steps to institutionalize our cooperation across so many areas, so that it endures for many years and many governments to come – to the benefit of our people and, we believe, to people around the world.
Secretary Antony J. Blinken At the 8th Annual CSIS Republic of Korea-United States Strategic Forum - United States Department of State
state.gov · by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thank you very, very much, and good morning. John, wonderful to be back here. And so good to be with all of you this morning. I want to thank John Hamre, I want to thank Ambassador Kim for the invitation to be here.
As I was walking in, I heard the voice of my good friend and colleague Jin Park. And I just want you to know that he is an exceptional colleague, and I’m so gratified to be able to work with him virtually every day.
And yes, this is something, as Victor said, of a homecoming for me, having been here nearly 20 years ago. I have to admit to feeling a little bit jealous, because I’m a veteran of the building on K Street. (Laughter.) So every time I walk into this building, it’s – what happened? Timing is everything.
But thanks to John Hamre, thanks to other colleagues, I had a couple of extremely rewarding years here at CSIS. And in particular, I had an opportunity firsthand to watch John grow it into the tremendous intellectual force that it is today, and I benefitted from the expertise of an extraordinary community of scholars. The only reason I left is I was – I had my arm twisted by a certain senator from the state of Delaware who had just taken over the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
And it’s especially good to be with my friend, Dr. Cha. He is quite literally one of the first calls that we make whenever we need cool counsel on regional crises and developments. We were talking just a few minutes ago, and that levelheaded response, the thoughtfulness that he brings to everything, is a tremendous source of strength. The only place he doesn’t bring that equanimity is when it comes to his and my beloved New York Giants. (Laughter.) This is starting out to be a little bit of a tough year.
But this forum comes at a moment of remarkable dynamism and importance for the U.S.-Korea relationship. As you all know, in just a few days we will celebrate 70 years since our countries signed the Mutual Defense Treaty – 70 years of relationship that has grown from a key security alliance into a vital global partnership, one that’s broadening in scope and significance seemingly every day.
Now, first and foremost, that’s a testament to the extraordinary close ties between our people and between our economies, to the democratic values and the vision for the world that we share, but also, I believe, to the leadership of President Biden and President Yoon.
And it’s a testament to the power and purpose of our diplomacy. Since day one of this administration, we have worked to re-engage, to revitalize, to reimagine our core alliances and partnerships.
Our intensified engagement with the Republic of Korea is maybe one of the most striking examples of how we’re not only deepening our alliances, but also how we’re weaving them together in innovative and mutually reinforcing ways across issues and across continents and into new, fit-for-purpose coalitions. Simply put, on so many consequential priorities for our people, for the Indo-Pacific, for the world, we are working in partnership with the Republic of Korea.
And I think if you look at it, we have been strengthening all aspects of our partnership, starting with our security. If you go back seven decades, our two nations joined in an alliance, as we say, “forged in blood.” A pact sealed by the shared sacrifice of thousands of our servicemembers who stood together, who fought together, who died together to defend Korea’s freedom and democracy. Ever since, our Alliance has been fortified by our enduring cooperation – by the shared spirit of “Katchi kapshida” – “we go together.”
Today, that commitment to mutual defense is ironclad. And that starts with extended deterrence, particularly in the face of the DPRK’s provocative actions, including its missile launches, which as everyone here knows, violate multiple UN Security Council resolutions and undermine stability on the peninsula and beyond.
Beyond the launches themselves, the DPRK’s threats to broader security were demonstrated clearly by Kim Jong-un’s visit to Moscow this month. Now, we’re seeing this a two-way street that is increasingly dangerous, with on the one hand a Russia desperate to find equipment, supplies, technology for its ongoing aggression against Ukraine, but also a DPRK that is looking for help to strengthen and advance its own missile programs. We’re working hand-in-hand with other partners and allies to highlight the dangerous ways Russian and North Korea’s military cooperation threaten global peace and security.
In April, President Biden and President Yoon pledged to significantly strengthen U.S.-ROK coordination through the Washington Declaration, committing to engage in deeper cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence, including through enhanced dialogue and enhanced information sharing; discussing nuclear and strategic planning, enhancing the visibility of U.S. strategic asset deployments to the Korean Peninsula, including by restarting port visits of nuclear capable missile submarines; and expanding the cooperation and coordination between our militaries.
Already, in just the space of a few months, we’re translating the declaration into concrete action. Earlier this summer, for the first time in four decades, a nuclear-capable submarine made port in Busan. The Nuclear Consultative Group, created by the Washington Declaration, had its first meeting in July. And this month, the U.S.-ROK Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group held its second meeting already in Seoul.
Last month – I think as you all saw – President Biden hosted President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida for a historic Camp David summit. Now, we all tend to throw around the word “historic” a little bit loosely, but I think this one genuinely meets the definition. It really did mark the start of a new era in trilateral cooperation among our countries. Just over the last year, Korea and Japan have continued to address difficult and sensitive issues of history while pursuing an increasingly ambitious and affirmative agenda. And this starts with the political courage and personal commitment of their leaders.
At the summit, our leaders discussed how to strengthen cooperation on a range of shared priorities. We committed to consult with one another expeditiously to coordinate our responses to threats to our collective security and interests. On the North Korean nuclear front, our countries agreed on practical ways to improve our joint responses through the real-time sharing of DPRK missile warning data, trilateral defense exercises, and efforts to counter the DPRK’s malicious cyber activities, a growing challenge, which fund its WMD and ballistic missile programs.
We’ve already had the opportunity to demonstrate that enhanced trilateral cooperation, in response to the DPRK’s second failed attempt to deploy a satellite launch vehicle earlier this month, can make a difference.
At Camp David, the leaders emphasized our shared commitment to a rules-based order. That includes freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution of disputes. They also reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the entire international community.
Our security alliance is essential; it’s at the foundation of our partnership. But it’s not the only element that makes our relationship so consequential. We’re also intensifying our economic partnership.
Since the KORUS Free Trade Agreement was approved, bilateral trade has surged dramatically. And over the last two years alone, Korean companies have invested more than $100 billion in the United States, driving innovation, creating good jobs for Americans and Korean workers alike.
In Bay City, Michigan, at the SK Siltron CSS – CS – excuse me – CSS facility, which provides key inputs for semiconductors, we’ve brought Korean and American innovation together to drive even greater growth for our countries. In Whitfield County, Georgia, thanks to the Inflation Reduction Act, Hanwha Qcells is setting up a $2.5 billion plant to make solar panels. That will support thousands of local jobs and the global transition to a green economy.
Investments like these in each other’s countries and workers are critical for strengthening our supply chains and reducing our reliance on unreliable suppliers.
We’re also working together to power inclusive, sustainable, shared economic growth across the entire Indo-Pacific region. Together, through the 14-country Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, we’re supporting a race to the top on issues that are shaping the 21st century economy, including supply chain resilience, the clean energy transition, digital connectivity. At APEC, we’re teamed up to advance a more “resilient and sustainable future for all” – focused on greater trade and investment in the region, innovation, digitalization, and strong and inclusive growth.
And we’re also partnering together on a range of development initiatives – sustainable management of river systems in the Mekong subregion, climate resilience in the Pacific Islands, marine protection throughout Southeast Asia.
The United States and our partners are committed to making and demonstrating a stronger offer to countries in the region and to developing countries around the world, working to deliver on the issues that actually matter in their lives, from high-quality infrastructure to inclusive economic growth, to climate resilience and adaptation solutions. The strength of that offer is directly tied to the strength of the partnerships working to deliver it.
Technology and innovation have long been the foundation of both our countries’ economic strength, and we’re broadening our cooperation there to take on global challenges. For example, we are collaborating on potential green shipping corridors between our countries, which will require all ships to use low- or zero-emissions fuels, and all ports to reduce emissions so that we can put the shipping sector on the path to full decarbonization by 2050. We’re launching a next-generation critical and emerging technologies partnership to enhance collaboration on everything from biotechnology to batteries, semiconductors to digital and quantum technologies. We’re even taking our technological partnership all the way to space, with new cooperation on space science and lunar exploration. All of these efforts, all these initiatives designed to enhance the global good.
Finally, we’re putting our partnership to work in driving peace and security around the world.
That includes in Ukraine, where Korea under President Yoon has been a valued partner in supporting Kyiv in the face of Russia’s brutal war – and in its defense of principles at the heart of the international order and the United Nations Charter: sovereignty, territorial independence, freedom. President Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has been a monumental strategic failure for Putin, but it has succeeded in one thing: bringing the Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific closer than ever before. When Russia cut off oil and gas supplies to Europe to try to freeze countries out of supporting Ukraine, Korea – along with Japan – joined America’s liquified natural gas producers to ensure that European countries would have enough energy to keep their homes warm throughout the winter.
Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand are now regular and active participants in NATO meetings. As President Yoon has said, European and Indo-Pacific security are now truly indivisible.
All across the world stage, Korea is taking on increasing global leadership. As a partner in reforming multilateral development banks so that they meet the needs of people in low- and middle-income countries; as the next host of the Summit for Democracy; as a participant, along with Japan, at the U.S.-hosted Trilateral Conference on Women’s Economic Empowerment: a critical pillar of development – in democracies and non-democracies, low and middle-income countries alike. And when Korea takes its seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council next year, we look forward to its strong voice, the voice that will – it will bring in defense of the UN Charter.
And of course, all of you know this is an extraordinary moment for brand Korea around the world. If you look at the Netflix list of top shows, inevitably you will find Korean programming at the top of that list. A few months ago, I had the opportunity to be on one of our late-night TV shows based in New York, and as we drove up to the stage door, I saw a huge crowd of young people gathered. And I thought, well, that’s pretty nice – a lot of people waiting here for me. Turned out there was another guest on the show that night, the leading Korean K-pop band. Needless to say, the young people gathered at the door had no idea who I was, but were extremely excited about the K-pop band that followed in my wake.
But I think what you’re seeing is an extraordinary ambition between and shared by Korea and the United States for the next generation of our partnership. Just over the last couple of years, we’ve made great strides in beginning to realize that vision. And we’re prioritizing steps to institutionalize our cooperation across so many areas, so that it endures for many years and many governments to come – to the benefit of our people and, we believe, to people around the world.
CSIS, the Korea Foundation, so many people in this room today, who are joining us by video, are absolutely critical to these efforts. And what I look forward to is the opportunity to make sure that the ongoing dialogue that we have continues, so that we together can continue to take the U.S.-Korea partnership into the future.
Thank you so much. (Applause.) Thank you.
state.gov · by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
3. S. Korea, U.S. hold joint anti-terrorism exercise
Excerpts:
During the training, the two sides worked together to search and clear buildings, rescue hostages, and locate and overpower terrorists, according to the Army.
It said the drills took place with a focus on enhancing the troops' capabilities in anti-terrorism operations in urban environments through team-level close-quarters combat training.
S. Korea, U.S. hold joint anti-terrorism exercise | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · September 30, 2023
SEOUL, Sept. 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korean and U.S. soldiers staged a combined anti-terrorism exercise near the inter-Korean border earlier this week, the Army said Saturday, amid joint efforts to strengthen operational capabilities.
The exercise, involving some 80 military police personnel from the Army's 6th Infantry Division and the Eighth U.S. Army, took place Monday at Rodriguez Training Center in Pocheon, about 30 kilometers south of the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.
During the training, the two sides worked together to search and clear buildings, rescue hostages, and locate and overpower terrorists, according to the Army.
It said the drills took place with a focus on enhancing the troops' capabilities in anti-terrorism operations in urban environments through team-level close-quarters combat training.
"Based on the practical knowledge shared by the U.S. military police unit through this combined exercise, we will take the lead in protecting lives without hesitation in a terror situation," a South Korean Army officer, who took part in the exercise, was quoted as saying.
South Korean and U.S. troops take part in an anti-terrorism exercise at Rodriguez Training Center in Pocheon, about 30 kilometers south of the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, on Sept. 25, 2023, in this photo provided the Army. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · September 30, 2023
4. North Korea Has a Problem: Monster Missile Revealed to 'Take Out' Kim Jong Un’s Bunker
:-)
Conclusion:
The Hyunmoo-4 isn’t the only piece of highfalutin ordnance that the ROK’s armed forces are making known to friends and foes alike. According to the Gang-Nam Times article, in that same parade that commemorated the 75th anniversary of South Korea’s Armed Forces Day, the military also showcased the Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM) to the public for the first time; this weapons system is described as “the core of the Korean-style 3-axis system (Kill Chain, Korean-style missile defense, Korean-style massive retaliation).” Reportedly this missile will have a range of 150 kilometers (93.2057 miles) and be capable of intercepting missiles at altitudes between 40-60 km (~24.85-37.28 miles).
North Korea Has a Problem: Monster Missile Revealed to 'Take Out' Kim Jong Un’s Bunker
The Hyunmoo-4 isn’t the only piece of highfalutin ordnance that the ROK’s armed forces are making known to friends and foes alike.
19fortyfive.com · by Christian Orr · September 29, 2023
For those of you who care about international security – which I presume is pretty much everybody who either writes for and/or reads 19FortyFive – it seems that every time we turn around, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) aka North Korea has attained yet another milestone in the progression of its ballistic missile program. Their ever-increasing unholy alliance with a revanchist Russia that has been doing its own share of nuclear saber-rattling makes the DPRK’s ballistic developments just that much more disturbing.
However, there’s a flipside to that. Evidently, the Republic of Korea (ROK) aka South Korea, is cognizant of the saying “Two can play at that game,” or as the late WWE professional wrestler-turned-commentator Gorilla Monsoon was fond of saying, “What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.” You see, the ROK’s military isn’t sitting idly by when it comes to ballistic missile development (though granted, in a non-nuclear manner).
The Basics
The news comes to us from a decidedly non-mainstream South Korean media outlet by the name of Gang-Nam Times aka kangnamtimes, which is presumably named for the song by South Korea rapper Psy and describes itself as “the origin of the K-pop community and delivers the hot trend news of Korean entertainment.”
The relevant article, titled “Monster Missile Revealed to Take Down Kim Jong Un’s Bunker,” penned on September 27, 2023, by a staff writer beating the pseudonym “moneytoday.” The most relevant snippet of the article reads as follows:
“President Yoon Suk Yeol stated, ‘If North Korea uses nuclear weapons, the North Korean regime will be terminated through the overwhelming response of the U.S.-South Korea alliance’ … In addition, the military is also planning to reveal the ‘high-powered ballistic missile’ to the public through the parade. The high-powered ballistic missile displayed is known as ‘Hyunmoo-4’. The Hyunmoo-4, whose specifications have not been revealed, was created after the request to lift the missile warhead weight limit in Korea was accepted through a phone call between the U.S. and South Korean presidents following North Korea’s 6th nuclear test on September 3, 2017. The Hyunmoo-4 is estimated to have 2-3 times the destructive power and underground penetration capability of the GBU-28, a laser-guided air bomb of our Air Force, and the ‘GBU-57’ (also known as the bunker buster).”
According to Masao Dahlgren, associate fellow with the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defense Project, the Hyunmoo-4 reportedly packs a payload of 2 tons and possesses a range of 800 kilometers (497.07 miles).
Historical Comparison with Other “Bunker Busters”
For a sense of perspective, it’ll be interesting to see how the L-SAM’s specifications compare to other bunker-busting weapons.
Those of us who are from Generation X and later generations, when hearing or reading the terms “bunker busters,” will think of the “Daisy Cutter,” and might be inclined to assume that it was first used against the Taliban and Al Qaeda cave networks in Afghanistan during the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001.
But a perusal of the National Museum of the United States Air Force info page reveals that the Daily Cutter – official designation Bomb Live Unit (BLU-82/B) – was actually first used during the Vietnam War, more specifically on March 23, 1970, as part of a U.S. Air Force operation known as “Commando Vault.” They were used again during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, with the 8th Special Operations Squadron dropping 11 BLU-82/Bs, primarily for psychological effects. As the Daisy Cutters were too large to fit in the bomb bay of any actual heavy bombers in the USAF arsenal – even the mighty B-52 – they were instead dropped from C-130s.
The Daisy Cutter weighs 15,000 lbs. (2.5 tons).
Going farther back in history, namely to WWII, you have the 22,000-lb. (11-ton) Grand Slam Earthquake bombs, which remain to this day the heaviest bomb in the world. These were used in the final year of the war – 1945 – and were dropped by Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command Avro Lancaster warbirds against strategic targets such as bridges and viaducts, railways, and U-boat pens.
So, in short, both the Daisy Cutter and Grand Slam alike are heavier in terms of payload than the Hyunmoo-4. However, the Korean missile has the advantages of being unmanned and having precision-guided standoff attack capability. By contrast, those two older Western-made pieces of ordnance are unguided gravity bombs aka “Dumb Bombs” that require risking the lives of human aircrews in order to get close enough to drop the payload on target.
Concurrently Developing ROK Military Capabilities
The Hyunmoo-4 isn’t the only piece of highfalutin ordnance that the ROK’s armed forces are making known to friends and foes alike. According to the Gang-Nam Times article, in that same parade that commemorated the 75th anniversary of South Korea’s Armed Forces Day, the military also showcased the Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM) to the public for the first time; this weapons system is described as “the core of the Korean-style 3-axis system (Kill Chain, Korean-style missile defense, Korean-style massive retaliation).” Reportedly this missile will have a range of 150 kilometers (93.2057 miles) and be capable of intercepting missiles at altitudes between 40-60 km (~24.85-37.28 miles).
Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).
19fortyfive.com · by Christian Orr · September 29, 2023
5. Unification ministry uses metaverse to recreate hometowns of elderly S. Koreans hailing from North
Very interesting concept. How else could this be used?
Excerpt:
Based on the memories of three members of separated families -- respectively hailing from Jinnampo, Pyongyang and Hamhung in North Korea -- and available documents and photos, the National Institute for Unification Education created a metaverse world resembling the North Korean cities.
Unification ministry uses metaverse to recreate hometowns of elderly S. Koreans hailing from North | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · September 30, 2023
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Sept. 30 (Yonhap) -- Kim Byung-mo, 81, a native of what is now North Korea, has yearned to visit his hometown of Jinnampo on the west coast to reunite with his mother and younger sister he has not seen since he fled to the South in 1950.
It is a dream unlikely to come true anytime soon amid frosty inter-Korean relations. But in a virtual world, Kim can visit there and see blooming flowers, clear water and the beautiful scenery deeply ingrained in his memory, thanks to a metaverse project by the unification ministry.
Based on the memories of three members of separated families -- respectively hailing from Jinnampo, Pyongyang and Hamhung in North Korea -- and available documents and photos, the National Institute for Unification Education created a metaverse world resembling the North Korean cities.
This screenshot from a video provided by the National Institute for Unification Education shows Kim Byung-mo visiting his hometown in North Korea in a metaverse world. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The recreated venues range from the most mundane places, like a hill nestled behind a childhood home, town church and dancing school, to historic places, such as the Taedong River railway bridge that had been destroyed during the 1950-53 Korean War.
Users who access the virtual world via the online platform Roblox can visit the virtual venues as well as chat with other users.
To engage younger users and raise their awareness on reunification, the team who oversaw the project built mini games that can be played in the virtual world -- such as collecting food for rabbits and crossing the Taedong River by a wooden boat.
"Creating a metaverse world for separated families is in a way an attempt to overcome the current deadlock through technology at a time when North Korea remains unresponsive to requests for reunions," an official at the National Institute for Unification Education, affiliated with the unification ministry, said.
Inter-Korean reunion events have been suspended amid frosty inter-Korean relations following the no-deal summit between the North and the United States in Hanoi in early 2019.
Approximately 16,000 elderly South Koreans are presumed to have died over the past five years while awaiting reunions with family members in North Korea, according to ministry data.
This composite image, provided by the unification ministry, shows screenshots of a metaverse world created based on the memories of separated families. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · September 30, 2023
6. N. Korean FM slams UNSC meeting over Pyongyang's force-building policy in constitution
The regime loves to play the hostile policy card as in this excerpt:
She said the North strongly condemns the "unlawful and reckless actions of hostile forces, including the U.S., which label our country's legitimate exercise of sovereignty as 'provocation' and 'threat.'"
But it is the regime that really has the hostile policy and no one should forget that.
• The regime accuses the US and ROK/US Alliance of a “hostile policy”
• Repeated in nearly every verbal attack on the ROK and US
• Pro-regime useful idiots repeat this talking point and use it to justify recommending sanctions relief (even US withdrawal)
• The truth is the north’s revolutionary ideology is the real hostile policy
• The regime seeks to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State and rid it of all foreign influence
• The alliance must call out the regime for its actual hostile policy – an integral theme and message for a comprehensive information and influence activities campaign
N. Korean FM slams UNSC meeting over Pyongyang's force-building policy in constitution | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · September 30, 2023
SEOUL, Sept. 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's top diplomat on Saturday criticized a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting convened this week in response to Pyongyang's latest measure to bolster the policy of nuclear force in its constitution, according to the country's state media.
In a statement released through the North's official Korean Central News Agency, Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui slammed the United States and its follower nations for convening the closed-door UNSC meeting Friday to condemn the actions of North Korea in violation of the country's "sacrosanct constitutional activities and measures to enhance self-defense capabilities."
She said the North strongly condemns the "unlawful and reckless actions of hostile forces, including the U.S., which label our country's legitimate exercise of sovereignty as 'provocation' and 'threat.'"
This undated file photo provided by Yonhap News TV shows North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Choe added that Pyongyang considers such measures as a "direct challenge" to the sovereignty of North Korea.
The minister characterized the North's measures to strengthen the policy of nuclear force-building in the constitution as a means of establishing a "powerful legal instrument to safeguard nuclear sovereignty."
Under the attendance of leader Kim Jong-un earlier this week, the North held a session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) and unanimously decided to "supplement Article 58 of Chapter 4 of the Socialist Constitution" to ensure the country's right to existence and development, deter war and protect regional and global peace by rapidly developing nuclear weapons to a higher level.
At an SPA meeting in September last year, North Korea enacted a new nuclear law authorizing the preemptive use of nuclear arms, calling its status as a nuclear state "irreversible."
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · September 30, 2023
7. What to know and what's next for Travis King, the American soldier who ran into North Korea
What to know and what's next for Travis King, the American soldier who ran into North Korea
AP · by JAKE BLEIBERG · September 28, 2023
DALLAS (AP) — An American soldier who sprinted into North Korea and was held there for two months before being returned to the U.S. is set to undergo medical testing and extensive questioning about his time in the isolated country before potentially facing charges under the military justice system.
Pvt. Travis King ran across the heavily fortified border from South Korea in July and became the first American detained in North Korea in nearly five years.
Pyongyang abruptly announced Wednesday that it would expel King, and he was flown to an Air Force base in Texas on Thursday.
Here’s what we know about King, his mysterious entry into North Korea and what’s happened in similar cases.
WHO IS HE, AND WHAT HAPPENED?
King, 23, joined the Army in January 2021 and was in South Korea as a cavalry scout with the 1st Armored Division, according to military officials.
On July 10 he was released from a South Korean prison after serving nearly two months on assault charges. He was set to be sent to Fort Bliss, Texas, where he could have faced potential additional disciplinary actions and discharge.
Officials said King was taken to the airport and escorted as far as customs. But instead of getting on the plane, he left and later joined a civilian tour of the Korean border village of Panmunjom. He bolted across the border, which is lined with guards and often crowded with tourists, in the afternoon.
North Korea’s state news agency said King, who is Black, had said he entered the country because he “harbored ill feelings against inhuman mistreatment and racial discrimination within the U.S. Army.”
U.S. officials have cast doubt on the authenticity of those statements, and King’s mother, Claudine Gates of Racine, Wisconsin, told The Associated Press she never heard him express such views.
It remains unclear why King crossed the border and why Pyongyang — which has tense relations with Washington over its nuclear program, its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and other issues — agreed to release him.
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
The coming weeks are likely to hold a battery of medical and phycological examinations as well as intelligence debriefings about his time in North Korea, a country few Americans enter.
King arrived early Thursday at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio and was taken to Brooke Army Medical Center, according to the Pentagon. Along with the testing and questioning, he will also get a chance to see family.
King’s movements will likely be controlled while commanders learn what they can from him and decide what to do next, said Rachel VanLandingham, a national security law expert and professor at Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles. She said the probable next steps are formal charges under the military justice system, but they could take months.
“Based on their track record, I think they’re going to court-martial him,” said VanLandingham, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel, adding that the evidence against King appears “overwhelming” but he could also be discharged without charges.
King was declared AWOL but not considered a deserter. Punishment for going AWOL or desertion vary based on a number of factors that are complicated by King’s two-month absence and ultimate handover by North Korean.
The fact that he spent weeks in the secretive country would be unlikely to give him any leverage with the U.S. military over his punishment, said Gary Solis, a former Marine Corps. prosecutor and military judge.
“I don’t think that he would have been allowed to have seen anything of strategic or even tactical value that he might use as a bargaining chip,” Solis said. “I think he’s out of luck.”
WHAT HAS HAPPENED BEFORE IN SIMILAR CASES?
The last active-duty soldier returned to the U.S. by an adversary was Bowe Bergdahl, VanLandingham said.
Bergdahl was 23 when he left his Army post in Afghanistan in 2009, was abducted by the Taliban and was held captive and tortured for nearly five years. He later said he left to report what he saw as poor leadership within his unit.
Several U.S. servicemembers were wounded while searching for Bergdahl. After his return in a prisoner swap, he was charged in military court with desertion and misbehavior before the enemy. Bergdahl pleaded guilty to both charges in 2017, but a judge vacated his conviction this year.
VanLandingham said that while the two cases are not identical, the fact that the Army pursued a court-martial against Bergdahl suggests it will against King as well.
Officials said King was released in good health, unlike Otto Warmbier, another American recently held in North Korea.
Warmbier, a 22-year-old University of Virginia student, was seized by North Korean authorities from a tour group in January 2016, convicted of trying to steal a propaganda poster and sentenced to 15 years of hard labor.
He spent 17 months in captivity before he was released and flown home in a coma, dying shortly afterward in June 2017.
While not providing a clear reason for Warmbier’s brain damage, North Korea denied accusations by Warmbier’s family that he was tortured.
___
Associated Press writer Paul J. Weber in Austin contributed to this report.
AP · by JAKE BLEIBERG · September 28, 2023
8. Poll shows 79% of young Koreans agree on need to improve ties with Japan
Poll shows 79% of young Koreans agree on need to improve ties with Japan
The Korea Times · September 30, 2023
President Yoon Suk Yeol shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during their summit at a hotel in Vilnius, Lithuania, Wednesday (local time). The leaders met on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit. Yonhap
Nearly 8 out of 10 South Koreans in their 20s and 30s agree on the need for Seoul to improve relations with Japan, a survey showed Saturday.
The online poll ― conducted by the Korea Youth Foundation ― found 22 percent of the respondents said they "strongly agree" with the need for South Korea to improve or strengthen relations with Japan, while 56.8 percent said they agreed to some extent.
Among them, 47.3 percent cited economic advancement through trade with Japan as the biggest reason for their support toward improving ties with the neighboring country, followed by 20.2 percent who called for the need to step up defense cooperation with Tokyo to better counter North Korea's nuclear threats.
South Korea and Japan are key allies of the United States, though they have long been in conflict over territory and other historical disputes stemming from Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.
President Yoon Suk Yeol held summit talks with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on several occasions as they pushed to improve bilateral ties.
In the same survey, 31.7 percent positively viewed Japan, while 28.7 percent had unfavorable views toward the country, among which over 84 percent of the respondents cited Tokyo's "distorted history perception."
The Korea Youth Foundation did not provide a margin of error for the poll, which was conducted on 5,176 people aged between 19 and 39 from Aug. 16 to 23. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · September 30, 2023
9. Korea sees record-low births in July
A serious national security issue for Korea.
Korea sees record-low births in July
The Korea Times · September 27, 2023
Mothers with babies look around at strollers displayed during an exhibtion of baby products at COEX in southern Seoul, Sept. 14. Yonhap
By Yi Whan-woo
The number of babies born in Korea in July sank to an all-time low, data showed on Wednesday, accelerating the looming demographic crisis and further consolidating the country's transformation into an aging society.
According to Statistics Korea, a total of 19,102 births were reported in July, down 6.7 percent from a year earlier.
It marked the lowest number of births for any July since 1981 when the statistics agency began compiling related data. It was also the first time that the figure sank below 20,000.
The July figure extends a year-on-year decline in the number of newborns for 10 straight months.
In particular, record-low births have been reported for each month this year ― 23,179 in January, 19,939 in February, 21,138 in March, 18,484 in April, 18,988 in May, and 18,615 in June.
By region, all major cities and provinces saw a year-on-year fall in births in July except for North Chungcheong Province, where the number of newborn babies increased from 598 to 635 over the cited period.
The number of newborn babies decreased from 3,530 to 3,298 in Seoul, from 1,145 to 1,030 in Busan, from 820 to 795 in Daegu, from 1,147 to 1,142 in Incheon, and from 6,281 to 5,707 in Gyeonggi Province.
이미지 캡션을 입력해주세요.
In contrast, the number of deaths in the country went up 8.3 percent year-on-year to 28,238 in July.
The figure results from a natural decrease in population by 9,137 and continues the trend of deaths surpassing births for the 45th straight month.
“The higher number of deaths than births is apparently behind the dwindling population and it is clear that a higher fertility rate is crucial,” said Cho Yooung-tae, a demography professor at Seoul National University.
The country’s population, after peaking at 51.84 million in 2020, started to decline in 2021 and is anticipated to fall to 50.19 million in 2040, according to Statistics Korea.
The country’s total fertility rate, the average number of children a woman bears in her lifetime, dipped to a record low of 0.78 in 2022. The rate is far below 2.1, which experts believe is crucial to keep the country’s population stable at 52 million.
A rapidly aging society is another demographic trend in Korea, with the total number of people aged 65 or older having surpassed 9 million in 2022 for the first time ever. The number is expected to increase at a faster rate in the years ahead.
Senior citizens account for 18.4 percent or 9.5 million of the entire population this year. The country is set to become a super-aged society by 2025, when the age group will represent 20 percent of the population.
To encourage births and tackle the demographic crisis, Cho said “excessive competition” for higher education, jobs and other forms of social ladders need to be resolved.
The Korea Times · September 27, 2023
10. S. Korea to extend $5 mil worth of fertilizer aid to Ukraine via U.S. agency
S. Korea to extend $5 mil worth of fertilizer aid to Ukraine via U.S. agency
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · September 30, 2023
By Yonhap
Published : Sept. 30, 2023 - 14:58
This photo shows a man standing near a shell crater on a farm near the front-line town of Orikhiv, the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine, on Sept. 14, 2023. (EPA)
South Korea will deliver US$5 million worth of fertilizer to support Ukrainian farmers in partnership with the United States' international development agency, officials said Saturday.
South Korea's foreign ministry will send fertilizers to support Ukraine's agricultural sector affected by the ongoing war with Russia through the partnership with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), according to the Seoul government officials.
"This generous contribution underscores the Republic of Korea's support for the Ukrainian people and our continuing commitment to helping Ukraine withstand Putin's aggression," the U.S. agency said in a release on Friday.
The Republic of Korea is South Korea's official name. (Yonhap)
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · September 30, 2023
11. N.Korea could use nuclear weapons at any stage of conflict: Pentagon
N.Korea could use nuclear weapons at any stage of conflict: Pentagon
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · September 29, 2023
By Ji Da-gyum
Published : Sept. 29, 2023 - 11:41
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency Septemer 3, shows what North Korea called a drill for a "tactical nuclear attack." (Yonhap)
North Korea's advancements in nuclear and missile capabilities have enabled the country to deploy its nuclear weapons "at any stage of conflict," the US Defense Department said in a new defense strategy revealed Thursday.
The Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction has been updated for the first time since 2014. This update reflects the current and emerging challenges and threats associated with WMD, including the trend of actors that pose a threat to the US.
The Pentagon defined North Korea as a "persistent threat" in the strategy, emphasizing that the country has prioritized its nuclear weapons arsenal and ballistic missile force as delivery means.
"The DPRK is developing and fielding mobile short-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range nuclear capabilities that place the US homeland and regional allies and partners at risk," the Pentagon said, referring to North Korea by the acronym of its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"Capability developments provide the DPRK with options for nuclear weapons use at any stage of conflict."
The new CWMD strategy highlighted that in 2022, North Korea enacted a law detailing its intention to preemptively use nuclear weapons in specific situations. The circumstances include responding to the perceived threat of an imminent nuclear attack, threats against the Kim Jong-un regime, the population, the state's existence, or as an option for offensive warfare.
The US Defense Department also said that North Korea's "longstanding chemical and biological weapons capabilities remain a threat," as the country "may use such weapons during a conflict."
North Korea's chemical employment methods encompass artillery, ballistic missiles, and unconventional forces. North Korea maintains an inventory of "up to several thousand metric tons of chemical warfare agents" and possesses the capability to produce nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents.
Tension has been building in the region as South Korea, the US and Japan tout their stronger defense cooperation against North Korea, which has begun to publicly display stronger military ties with Russia.
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · September 29, 2023
12. ‘Absurd how Korea treats its people’: English signage fad alienates older Koreans
I noticed this on the train to Pyonengtaek this week. It has been a long time since I used the Seoul subway. The electronic siangie was in Korean and English as were the announcements. There does seem to be a lot more English now that I am thinking about it.
This also must affect escapees (defectors) from the north as well.
Saturday
September 30, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Published: 30 Sep. 2023, 07:00
‘Absurd how Korea treats its people’: English signage fad alienates older Koreans
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-09-30/business/economy/Absurd-how-Korea-treats-its-people-English-signage-fad-alienates-older-Koreans/1875039
Floor guide signs at a building in Apgujeong, southern Seoul, written only in English. [KIM MIN-SANG]
Stroll into a populous street or a shopping complex in Seoul, and chances are there will be a lost elderly person eagerly looking for a sign written in hangul, the Korean alphabet.
Such chance increases as closer as one gets to the "hip" areas of the city where replacing hangul with English has become chic.
“May I ask you for directions?” a 69-year-old surnamed Bang asked the JoongAng Ilbo reporter in a lobby of a building in Apgujeong, southern Seoul, recently. He was looking for a restaurant on the basement floor of the building.
Bang said he was a Gangnam District native who had lived in the area for more than 40 years but was completely lost that day because there were no signs written in hangul.
“Hangul is even found in public institutions abroad — it’s absurd how Korea treats its people,” said the 69-year-old.
He claimed his acquaintances, including professors and corporate executives, sometimes have a hard time ordering food because the menu is all written in English.
Most signs in the building were written in English when the JoongAng Ilbo revisited the venue and browsed through the area on Sept. 18.
A floor guide sign for the first basement floor was written “Retail,” presumably indicating a retail shopping area on the floor. Next to “Retail” was a symbol of a subway train, hinting the basement floor connects to Apgujeong Station in subway line No. 3.
The sign also read “Drinking & Dining,” “Event Hall,” “Fitness” and “Parking.”
Signboards written in English are installed at a building in Seodaemun Distrcit, western Seoul, on Oct. 9, 2022. [YONHAP]
Outside the building was a different sign showing directions to restaurants “Buvette” and “Texas de Brazil,” only in English.
Another restaurant nearby had its main menu written in English. The only obvious hangul notice said, “Use a spoon and fork instead of chopsticks to enjoy the food with proper formality.”
The hangul phase out presumably began in the “hip” areas of Seoul, such as Gangnam District in southern Seoul, Seongsu-dong in eastern Seoul and Yeonnam-dong in western Seoul, where cafes and restaurants popular on social media line the streets.
“Indiscriminate English signs may have sprouted from a misleading perception that sees foreign languages are ‘more in style’ than hangul,” said Kwon Jae-il, president of the Korean Language Society.
“Signs on first and second floors of a building should be in hangul, even if it requires a change in related laws.”
The current law on outdoor advertisements requires signs bigger than 5 square meters (53.8 square feet) or located above the third floor to be written in hangul. An enforcement fine under 5 million won ($3,700) is imposed on businesses.
A popular U.K.-themed cafe near the Apgujeong building wrote “Open 7 days” for its business hours and “Hiring” for employee recruiting. The job requirements on the notice were all in English.
Out of eight other cafes in the same alley, seven put up English-only signs. Of the 62 retail shops located on the ground floor around the vicinity, only 18 stores had hangul-only signs.
“Some restaurants [in Korea] replace ‘mixed rice’ with ‘pilaf,’ a more commonly-used term in Europe,” said Seo Hyun-jung, senior researcher at Sejong Institute of Korean Language and Culture.
Misugaru, or traditional Korean beverage made of powdered grains, is written as ″MSGR″ on the menu at a cafe in Bundang, Gyeonggi. [KIM MIN-SANG]
At another popular cafe in Bundang, Gyeonggi, misugaru — a traditional Korean beverage made from multiple powdered grains — was listed merely as “MSGR” on the menu, with no hangul details provided.
The coffee shop gave out number cards with a “Please wait” English notice to customers who made orders.
“It seems like a silent gesture to fend off people who cannot read English well — similar to the ‘No Kids’ zone,” said a 43-year-old customer.
The staff at the cafe said they wrote notices in English because many foreigners lived in the vicinity and cramming both English and hangul in a limited space may confuse customers.
“Please consider it as a marketing move that pinpoints target customers and differentiates us from other cafes,” they said.
But some argue forcing people to use hangul may harm individuality.
“Cafe owners are running their business with their own brand identity, focusing on a specific consumer group,” said a 38-year-old surnamed Choo. “Such originality needs to be respected.”
In July, a Korean language bill was drafted to have district governments advise businesses to properly use hangul at their establishments.
“The national and district governments shall recommend the operator of a public entertainment business such as a theater or restaurant to write notices and menus provided at the facility in hangul or write hangul on the side,” read the proposed amendment to the Korean Language Act.
The review of the bill by the National Assembly’s Culture, Sports and Tourism Committee began Sept. 20.
BY KIM MIN-SANG, SOHN DONG-JOO [sohn.dongjoo@joongang.co.kr]
13. The Worrying Democratic Erosions in South Korea
Troubling yes and I wish the Yoon administration would not take such actions against the press. However, the author makes no mention of the extreme anti-democratic actions by the current majority party in the General Assembly as well as by the previous administration.
And fortunately the Korea court just struck the very undemocratic anti-leaflet law that was passed by the majority party in the General Assembly and the previous administration in response to the threats from Kim Yo Jong and to appease Kim Jong Un.
The Worrying Democratic Erosions in South Korea
In recent months, authorities have raided offices of press outlets publishing critical reports on President Yoon Suk-yeol.
The New Yorker · by E. Tammy Kim · September 30, 2023
Americans may not know much about the South Korean President, Yoon Suk-yeol, but some will have noticed that he’s not a bad singer. In April, when Joe and Jill Biden hosted Yoon and his wife, Kim Keon-hee, for a state dinner in Washington, D.C., Yoon ingratiated himself, East Asian-style, by performing a nostalgic ballad. During a round of musical performances, he brought a microphone to his lips, at Biden’s invitation, and launched into an a-cappella version of one of his favorite tunes, “American Pie,” by Don McLean: “A long, long time ago, I can still remember / How that music used to make me smile.” Biden beamed and pumped his fists. Yoon looked the part of jovial statesman and ultimate U.S. ally.
South Korea is widely seen as an American-made democracy that, along with Japan, supports U.S. efforts to counter China in East Asia—and around the world. This trilateral unity was exhibited publicly, in August, when Biden met with Yoon and Fumio Kishida, the Prime Minister of Japan, at Camp David. But, since taking office last year, after being elected by a margin of less than one per cent, Yoon, a career prosecutor with no previous experience in politics, has started to scrape away protections for women, the right to associate and organize, and, most strikingly, freedom of the press.
The trouble started about a year ago, just a few months into Yoon’s term, when he was caught swearing into a hot mike in New York, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. “Biden will be fucking humiliated if those pricks in Congress don’t pass this,” he said, in Korean, apparently referring to legislation that would fund a global health program. (Yoon’s detractors had already nicknamed him Gaffe a Day.) The South Korean TV broadcaster MBC was the first to report the incident. Yoon’s spokesperson went into denial mode, stating that the President had used a word that loosely rhymes with “Biden” (nallimyeon, meaning to cast out) and that the comment was directed at the Korean legislature, not the U.S. Congress. An ally of Yoon’s filed a criminal-defamation complaint against MBC and affiliated journalists. (MBC said it was a “retaliatory investigation.”) Two months later, Yoon banned MBC from joining the media pool on his flights to meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the G-20.
Yoon has since intensified his attacks on the press. In May, police raided the home of Im Hyeon-ju, the MBC journalist who reported the hot-mike comment. (Her alleged offense, this time, was forwarding personal information about South Korea’s justice minister to another journalist.) Earlier this month, prosecutors searched and confiscated materials from the offices of the investigative outlet Newstapa and the TV network JTBC, and from the homes of several journalists. The stated reason was again criminal defamation of Yoon. In early 2022, Newstapa had reported on the existence of a recorded interview in which a source alleges that Yoon, then a high-ranking prosecutor, covered up a banking and real-estate scheme. Yoon called this interview fake news—claiming the tape may have been manipulated—and accused Newstapa and JTBC of circulating it just before the Presidential election to undermine his campaign. The Journalists Association of Korea and other media groups compared the recent raids to a “military operation” and condemned the ruling party’s disregard for “the rule of law.”
The Yoon administration doesn’t always approach the media with such hostility. South Korea’s newspapers and television channels are expressly political, and Yoon has shown favor to outlets aligned with his conservative People Power Party. In one instance, his government oversaw the indictment and firing of Han Sang-hyuk, a broadcast regulator who had scrutinized the license of TV Chosun, a network whose reports tend toward right-wing propaganda. (Han has denied the charges.) The man who replaced Han is now promising to scrub the Korean Internet of everything he deems “fake news.”
Yoon has also engaged in petty forms of reputation management. Last year, his culture ministry denounced a local cartoon contest for awarding a prize to a teen-ager who had drawn Yoon as a train steered by his wife, a businesswoman and socialite. (During the Presidential campaign, she vowed to have any reporter who spoke poorly of her husband put in jail; her mother is currently in prison for forging a financial document in a real-estate deal.) The government celebrated the recent opening of a “children’s garden”—at the defense-ministry compound, in central Seoul, where Yoon relocated the President’s office—by distributing coloring sheets that depicted Yoon and his wife being fawned over by various segments of the population, including puppies.
For many, Yoon’s self-absorption and eagerness to target the media are reminiscent of the country’s mid-century military dictatorship, which lasted until the nineteen-eighties. Local and national prosecutors went after reporters, publishers, student activists, labor organizers, and ordinary people as part of a vast anti-Communist dragnet. Many of those prosecutors facilitated arrests and torture by the police, the scope of which is still being catalogued. Prosecutors working for Yoon’s government have used their investigatory powers to intimidate and threaten to arrest politicians in the liberal opposition party, including Lee Jae-myung, who ran against Yoon last year. Lee came under investigation for bribery and corruption shortly after the election; he has denied all charges and staged a twenty-four-day hunger strike, calling the new government a “dictatorship by prosecutors.” Recently, the South Korean legislature voted to override Lee’s sovereign immunity, allowing for his arrest. (A court later rejected the warrant.) Yoon’s prosecutors have also gone after the leaders of progressive trade unions. Early this year, police raided dozens of union offices and private homes, accusing labor officials of violating South Korea’s National Security Act and coercing construction firms to use union workers.
When Yoon became President, many South Koreans who had participated in the minjung, or “people’s,” democracy movement of the nineteen-seventies and eighties could not believe that the nation was willing to elect a prosecutor. Early in his career, Yoon had worked on important corruption cases in the southern city of Daegu; later, he rose through the prestigious Seoul prosecutors’ office and, in 2019, the liberal President Moon Jae-in made him the country’s prosecutor general. Yoon soon began to pursue cases that benefitted the People Power Party. He cast himself as Moon’s chief antagonist and seized on an opening in the 2022 Presidential race. (South Korean Presidents are limited to a single five-year term.) During the campaign, Yoon capitalized on a backlash against women, blaming feminism for the nation’s frustrations with rising housing costs and dwindling upward mobility. He promised to eliminate the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (a move that is now pending) and did away with a gender quota established by Moon that called for thirty per cent of the President’s cabinet to be women. In addition to Yoon’s attacks on trade unions, his labor ministry will soon close dozens of support centers for immigrants, a growing and necessary part of the workforce in South Korea, whose birth rate is the lowest in the world.
Publicly, Biden has not betrayed any concern about Yoon’s autocratic tendencies. “So much of the foreign-policy establishment was gleeful when Yoon was elected,” Jake Werner, of the Quincy Institute, told me. The strategy of all-or-nothing competition with China has meant abiding the growth of other illiberal governments in the region. The White House, Werner said, has not dealt with the fact “that it’s authoritarians who are welcoming the direction we’re taking in foreign policy.” Narendra Modi, of India, has been fêted by Washington, despite abetting Hindu-nationalist violence, revoking Kashmir’s autonomous status, and censoring the media. Vietnam’s President, Vo Van Thuong, was untouched by criticism over crackdowns on press and civil society during Biden’s recent visit; police in Hanoi arrested an environmental campaigner a few days later. Yoon, too, is pushing South Korea in a repressive direction, back to the bad old days of the dictatorship, with no protest from his American partners.
The New Yorker · by E. Tammy Kim · September 30, 2023
14. Does Kim’s Visit to Russia Signal an End to North Korea’s Strategic Solitude?
Strategic solitude? "Solitude". I do not think solitude describes the Kim family regime.
But the author's point is correct to ask if this is a signal that the regime may be coming out of its self imposed isolation.
Excerpts:
Conclusion
While the Kim visit to the Russian Far East did not result in any publicized agreements or joint statements, the fact that Russia and the DPRK are engaging in such diplomatic maneuvers is significant in and of itself. In the next few months, we will likely see at least some results from the agreements and/or understandings that Putin and Kim achieved during their talks.
One possible interpretation of Kim’s pilgrimage to Russia is Pyongyang’s quest for security under the circumstances when the balance of military power in and around the peninsula is getting more precarious for North Korea. Given Pyongyang’s extremely constrained domestic resources and inherent limitations of nuclear weapons, it can only rely on external balancing. In a sense, it is going to be a reversal of the Cold War era, when Moscow and Beijing acted as guarantors of military security for Pyongyang. Yet, this time, the division of roles will be somewhat different. China will stay on as Pyongyang’s primary economic benefactor and diplomatic protector, while Russia could play the part of the North’s main military partner. Moscow will be happy with such a role if only because it already has little to lose with Washington, Seoul and Tokyo.
Does Kim’s Visit to Russia Signal an End to North Korea’s Strategic Solitude?
https://www.38north.org/2023/09/does-kims-visit-to-russia-signal-an-end-to-north-koreas-strategic-solitude/?utm_source=pocket_saves
From September 12-17, Kim Jong Un made an official visit to the Russian Federation. The Democratic Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) supreme leader’s voyage to Russia was not unexpected. The stage had already been set by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s high-profile trip to Pyongyang in July. Shoigu’s visit made clear that Moscow and Pyongyang were engaged in a lively diplomatic-strategic dance. It was an American outlet, the New York Times, that correctly forecasted a Russian-DPRK summit a week before it was announced.
Kim’s visit was clearly intended to be high-profile and spectacular. However, beyond all the theatrics, the real-life effects of the Kim-Putin summit remain to be seen. We still have more questions than answers.
Rockets, Bombers, Ballet and a Walrus Show
This was Kim’s second official visit to Russia. Compared to the first trip, which took place April 24-26, 2019, the voyage was both longer (six days) and more extensive in geographic coverage: in 2019, Kim just went to Vladivostok, whereas this time, his armored train traveled all the way to the Amur Region where Russia’s space center Vostochny is located. Kim’s itinerary, as well as the composition of his entourage—heavy with military and military-industrial chiefs—left little doubt that a major focus of his visit was to promote military and technological links with Russia.
At Vostochny, Kim held a one-day summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian host gave his North Korean guest a tour of the spaceport, highlighting Russia’s main space rockets, Soyuz and Angara. Then Kim proceeded to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, a major center of the defense industry. In Komsomolsk, Kim toured an aircraft plant that manufactures Russia’s Sukhoi fighters and SJ 100 passenger planes. The final leg of his tour across the Russian Far East was Vladivostok and the city’s environs, where Kim spent two full days. He visited an airbase where he was shown an array of Russia’s fighter jets and strategic bombers. The North Korean leader was also hosted aboard a guided-missile frigate. The civilian part of his stay in Vladivostok featured Kim’s attendance of “The Sleeping Beauty” ballet performance, a visit to an aquarium where Kim was treated to the show of a trained walrus, a tour of a biotechnology plant, and a visit to Far Eastern Federal University (the venue of Kim’s 2019 summit with Putin), where he met with a group of North Korean youths studying at the university.
Not much is known about the substance of the Putin-Kim talks at Vostochny, and no joint statement or agreements were signed. However, in their public comments, Putin himself and other Russian officials made it abundantly clear that “all issues,” including possibilities for bilateral military cooperation, were discussed. The list of top Russian officials at the Vostochny summit may give some idea about the broad agenda of the talks.
Russia’s delegation included Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Deputy Prime Minister (in charge of Russia’s defense industries) Denis Manturov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Deputy Prime Minister (in charge of international trade) Alexey Overchuk, Deputy Prime Minister (in charge of the Russian Far East) Yuri (Yury) Trutnev, Deputy Prime Minister (in charge of Russia’s construction industry) Marat Khusnullin, Minister of Natural Resources and Co-chairman of the Russian-DPRK Intergovernmental Commission for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology Alexandr Kozlov, Minister of Transport Vitaly Saveliev (Savelyev), and the Chief of Russia’s space agency, Yuri Borisov. Kim was accompanied by Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, Korean People’s Army Marshal Pak Jong Chon, Defense Minister Kang Sun Nam, secretaries of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s Central Committee, O Su Yong and Pak Thae Song, and Vice Foreign Minister Im Chon Il. Apart from the summit at Vostochny, Kim also held separate talks in Vladivostok—with Sergey Shoigu and then with Primorsky Region Governor Oleg Kozhemyako.
There were subtle differences in Moscow’s and Pyongyang’s public messaging during the visit worth noting. North Korea presented it as a milestone in “strengthening strategic and tactical cooperation between the two countries and extending strong support to and solidarity with each other on the common front to frustrate the imperialists’ military threat and provocation.” Kim called relations with Russia Pyongyang’s “top priority.” The North Korean leader gave eloquent support to Russia’s “sacred struggle to punish the evil crowd, which claims the right to hegemony based on the illusion of expansionism.” He also expressed confidence that Russia will succeed in its “special military operation” in Ukraine and “when building a powerful state.” Putin was more reserved in his public statements at the summit. In contrast to Kim, he refrained from lashing out at the West’s US-led “imperialism” and “hegemonism.” Also, he never used the word “strategic” when talking about Russia-DPRK ties. Instead, Putin characterized the bilateral relationship as one of “camaraderie and good-neighborliness.”
Russia’s Rationale
North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) may not be off the mark stating that “the historic meeting and talks between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin…put the traditional and strategic DPRK-Russia friendship, cooperation and good neighborly relations on a new higher level.” What, then, are the motivations of the sides to upgrade the relationship? There are several reasons Moscow is interested in resuscitating strategic ties with the DPRK.
First, it should be kept in mind that North Korea is fully aligned with Russia on the Ukraine issue. Apart from Syria, Pyongyang is the only United Nations member that recognizes Crimea, as well as Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia (Zaporozhye) and Kherson as Russian territories. The visit of a prominent foreign leader who is willing to openly defy the West and speak in support of Russia has its own value for Moscow.
There is little doubt that Moscow’s embrace of Pyongyang is partly a response to Seoul’s position on Ukraine. The Republic of Korea (ROK) has joined the US and European Union-led sanctions regime against Russia. Furthermore, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has emerged as one of the major international backers of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, complete with Yoon’s visit to Kyiv in July. Despite the ROK’s assertions that it only provides non-lethal aid to Ukraine, it is an open secret that South Korean artillery shells, officially sent to backfill US weapons depots, are highly likely to end up killing Russian troops on the Ukrainian frontlines.
Finally, Moscow cannot but watch with alarm the formation of an axis between Seoul and Warsaw. In particular, the ROK has become a major military-industrial partner for Poland, making huge arms and military technology deals with Warsaw. One wonders if Seoul had not been aware in advance that its growing involvement in fraught Eastern European geopolitics would trigger an inevitable payback from Moscow. Last October, Putin went on record, warning Seoul that South Korea’s military support to Ukraine could “ruin” its relations with Russia.
There are also economic calculations behind the Moscow-Pyongyang reengagement. North Korean labor in exchange for Russia’s cash and commodities like oil, grain and fertilizer is the most obvious area for commercial partnership. Russia has always been short of workers, especially in industries such as construction and agriculture—deals between Moscow and Pyongyang on supplying North Korean labor to Russia date back to the 1960s. North Korean labor exports to Russia halted in the late 2010s due to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and then the COVID-19 pandemic. Now is a logical moment for North Korean workers to come back.
Another economic project the two sides may try to revive is the Khasan-Rajin rail-and-port joint venture. A decade ago, Russia completed a rail link connecting the Trans-Siberian Railway via the Russian border township of Khasan with the North Korean port of Rajin. Back then, there were hopes that Khasan-Rajin would serve as a pilot for connecting the envisioned Trans-Korean Railway with the Trans-Siberian. Those expectations didn’t come to pass. Even though Russia had sunk $300 million to construct the link and upgrade the port facilities in Rajin, the project has mostly remained idle due to South Korea’s withdrawal, tightening North Korea sanctions, and COVID-19.
The possibility of North Korean arms deliveries to Russia was perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Kim’s summit with Putin. On the surface of it, the proposition that the DPRK could send arms to Russia looks perfectly logical. The Ukraine war is, after all, a conflict where Russia is pitted against the combined capabilities of “the collective West.” Any military assistance would certainly be of help. Russian military bloggers are especially enthusiastic about North Korean multiple-launch rocket systems KN-09 and KN-25.
Since last year, US officials have been asserting North Korea was sending munitions to Russia. However, no credible evidence has been provided to back those claims except for satellite photos of a few railcars crossing from North Korea into Russia. Russian sources say the train cars in question were, in reality, empty cars returning to Russia after transporting hay to the DPRK.[1]
If North Korean weapons made it to the frontline, it would be impossible to hide them for long, especially taking into account that the Ukraine war is probably the most closely watched and well-documented military conflict in history. If Putin and Kim made an arms deal, we should know soon. In any case, North Korean weapons, even if they do arrive in Russia, can, at best, play an auxiliary role. What matters is Russia’s own ability to maintain and ramp up domestic arms production.
In the same vein, despite showcasing some of Russia’s best weapons to Kim, Moscow providing arms and military or dual-use technology to the DPRK is not a foregone conclusion. It remains to be seen how quickly, how far, and on what terms Moscow is ready to proceed in military-technical cooperation with the DPRK.
Any substantial cooperation with the DPRK, be it in civilian or military areas, would inevitably clash with the UNSC-mandated sanctions imposed on North Korea, for which Russia itself voted as a permanent member of the Security Council. Commenting on his summit with Kim, Putin said Russia continues to comply with the UN-imposed restrictions and is “not going to violate anything.” That said, a creative re-interpretation by Russia of the North Korea sanctions regime may be in order. Many in Moscow are quite explicit Russia should no longer feel bound by sanctions in dealings with North Korea. Sergey Lavrov may have hinted that much when he said that the sanctions against North Korea “had been adopted in an absolutely different geopolitical situation.” As the Director of the Institute of Chinese and Asian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Kirill Babayev, points out, Russia’s support of sanctions on North Korea “used to be part of a grand bargain with the West. This bargain is now over.”
Kim’s Calculus
What is Kim’s game with Moscow? Pyongyang may have short-term commercial considerations, such as receiving from Russia cash, oil and food in exchange for potential supplies of labor and munitions. However, it is a long-term balance-of-power logic that may be the main driver behind Kim’s push for a closer relationship with Russia.
For a long time, the DPRK has basically been on its own in political-military terms. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s rapprochement with South Korea in the early 1990s, North Korea had no allies. The attainment of nuclear weapons made it possible for the DPRK to feel secure—and indeed comfortable—in the situation of strategic solitude. Yet this period of assured security may be coming to an end. North Korea’s nuclear deterrent is not the eternal Ring of Power. Like all weapons, nukes are susceptible to technological change. And Pyongyang’s nuclear missiles, at best, correspond to the technological level the United States and the Soviet Union had achieved half a century ago. The DPRK faces the grave risk that its nukes may, at some future point, be trumped by new emerging weapons. There are assessments, of which Pyongyang is certainly aware, that we may be entering a new military-strategic era of counterforce where highly accurate weapons, coupled with remote sensing and powerful artificial intelligence (AI), make nuclear arsenals extremely vulnerable to disarming strikes.
North Korea’s conventional forces are no match for the combined might of the US-ROK alliance. Nukes may, for now, provide Pyongyang with a deterrent against head-on aggression, but they are useless in most other crisis scenarios. You can’t fight wars, not to mention limited conflicts, with nuclear weapons. This partly explains why Pyongyang, despite its militant rhetoric and spectacular missile launches, has been careful not to cross the line that triggers a kinetic clash with the ROK-US forces. The last major military incident on the Korean Peninsula happened in November 2010, when the North and South exchanged artillery fire. According to US officials, “The North Koreans…are not doing anything that moves toward conventional military confrontation.” The formation of the US-ROK-Japan coalition, epitomized by the recent trilateral summit at Camp David, makes the situation even more worrying for North Korea.
There is no realistic way for North Korea to close the widening gap in modern warfighting capabilities with its opponents on its own. It has neither financial nor technological resources to catch up even to ROK’s conventional capabilities, let alone those of the US and Japan. The only way to redress the increasingly precarious balance of military power is to look for strategic allies, ending the three decades of strategic solitude. That’s where Russia comes in. Moscow may become a source of some critical weapons and technologies, such as reconnaissance satellites and fighter jets, where North Korea’s gap with the South is especially glaring. Furthermore, Russia and North Korea could stage joint military drills, a possibility that Sergey Shoigu hinted at even prior to Kim’s visit.
Conclusion
While the Kim visit to the Russian Far East did not result in any publicized agreements or joint statements, the fact that Russia and the DPRK are engaging in such diplomatic maneuvers is significant in and of itself. In the next few months, we will likely see at least some results from the agreements and/or understandings that Putin and Kim achieved during their talks.
One possible interpretation of Kim’s pilgrimage to Russia is Pyongyang’s quest for security under the circumstances when the balance of military power in and around the peninsula is getting more precarious for North Korea. Given Pyongyang’s extremely constrained domestic resources and inherent limitations of nuclear weapons, it can only rely on external balancing. In a sense, it is going to be a reversal of the Cold War era, when Moscow and Beijing acted as guarantors of military security for Pyongyang. Yet, this time, the division of roles will be somewhat different. China will stay on as Pyongyang’s primary economic benefactor and diplomatic protector, while Russia could play the part of the North’s main military partner. Moscow will be happy with such a role if only because it already has little to lose with Washington, Seoul and Tokyo.
- [1]
- Information provided by an anonymous source.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
