Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Our wretched species is so made that those who walk on the well-trodden path always throw stones at those who are showing a new road." 
- Voltaire

"Power gradually extirpates from the mind every human and gentle virtue."
- Edmund Burke

"To be irrational gives you certain answers. Anyone would rather go to somebody who says 2+2=5 and there is no mistake about it than to go to someone who says, well, modern scientific research says that 2+2 is usually 4 but we cant always be certain of course. Of course they'll go for the certain thing even if it's wrong."
- Isaac Asimov




1. Yoon names ex-Vice FM Cho as ambassador to U.S.
2. Kim Jong-un Is Sacrificing a Sick Nation for His Ambitions
3. There’s One Reason Kim Jong Un Is Loving NK’s COVID Outbreak
4. N. Korea still unresponsive to S. Korea's outreach for talks on COVID-19: official
5. North Korea’s Covid explosion: a survivability test
6. U.S. warns against inadvertently hiring North Korean IT workers
7. Chinese FM meets ROK's new FM via video link
8. South Korea Can Do More in the Battle Against COVID-19
9. Regional Quagmire And Looming Fragility Of Deterrence Impact – Analysis
10. North Korea flies in supplies from China
11. Kyiv-based Magazine Interviews Ex-Navy Seal, South Korean Special Forces Officer
12. North won't accept Covid medicines from South or U.S., defector says
13. Biden to stress US security commitment at DMZ: experts
14. Honor May 18 spirit (Kwangju, Korea)
15. ‘Too late for vaccines to save North Korea’
16. Pyongyang criticizes Yoon for rehashing old-school North Korea policy
17. Could Moon act as special envoy to North Korea?
18. How to Mend the Rift Between Japan and South Korea




1. Yoon names ex-Vice FM Cho as ambassador to U.S.

(LEAD) Yoon names ex-Vice FM Cho as ambassador to U.S. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김덕현 · May 17, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details from para 2, photo)
SEOUL, May 17 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol on Tuesday named Rep. Cho Tae-yong, a former vice foreign minister, as South Korea's new ambassador to the United States, the presidential office said.
As a career diplomat, Cho of the ruling People Power Party had also served as South Korea's chief envoy for the North Korean nuclear issue and a deputy chief of the presidential office of national security.
A balanced strategist with expertise in U.S. and North Korean affairs, Cho joined the Foreign Ministry in 1980 and also served in various other posts, including as director-general of the North American affairs bureau.

Yoon also named Peck Kyong-ran, a professor of infectious diseases at Sungkyunkwan University, as new head of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency.
Peck joined Yoon's now-disbanded transition team and drew up new epidemic control plans against the COVID-19 pandemic.
Peck was recommended by Ahn Cheol-soo, a former presidential candidate who merged his campaign with Yoon ahead of the March 9 election.
kdh@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김덕현 · May 17, 2022


2. Kim Jong-un Is Sacrificing a Sick Nation for His Ambitions

Or said another way, Kim Jong-un is responsible for all the suffering as he deliberately prioritizes his nuclear and missile programs and development of advanced warfighting capabilities over the welfare of the Korean people in the north.

Kim Jong-un Is Sacrificing a Sick Nation for His Ambitions
North Korea reported 300,000 suspected coronavirus infection cases and 15 deaths on Saturday alone. There were officially around 18,000 "fevered persons," or people with symptoms, when the North finally admitted the coronavirus outbreak on Thursday, and the number surged 16 times in just two days. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un referred to the outbreak as a "great turmoil" in the country's history when he chaired a politburo meeting. That only hints just how serious the situation is in the North.
The biggest problem is North Korea's almost nonexistent medical treatment capacities. The North even refers to the infected as "fevered persons" because it has no test kits. No North Koreans have apparently been vaccinated against the virus, and it could be fatal even to people who would normally stand a good chance of recovery because they are already malnourished. Hospitals in the North lack even the most basic antipyretics like paracetamol.
The official Rodong Sinmun daily is already recommending quack medicines like infusions of willow leaves three times a day, honey for coughs, opening windows and taking a rest. Only if they cough blood or faint after four weeks should they go to a hospital. Yet at the same time the North Korean dictator instructed officials to copy China's demented quarantine methods. The difference is that China at least has the capacity to supply some food to its locked-down population, but the North has no food to supply. A humanitarian catastrophe looms.
All the while the North fired three more missiles into the sea right after announcing the outbreak and is blithely preparing for another nuclear test, continuing provocations against South Korea and the U.S. It is not at all certain that the North will accept humanitarian aid that the new South Korean government has offered. It boggles the mind with what recklessness the North Korean leader is driving his people to the brink of death.


3. There’s One Reason Kim Jong Un Is Loving NK’s COVID Outbreak

Blame in north Korea - ABK. - All or Any But Kim.

Commentary from Burce Bennett, David Straub, and me.


There’s One Reason Kim Jong Un Is Loving NK’s COVID Outbreak
EVERY CLOUD
But it could cost him control of North Korea.

Updated May. 17, 2022 4:59AM ET / Published May. 16, 2022 8:59PM ET 
The Daily Beast · May 17, 2022
Photo Illustration by Thomas Levinson/The Daily Beast/Getty
SEOUL—The spread of COVID-19 in North Korea is not all bad news for leader Kim Jong Un. By locking down the entire country, he can assert the power of his regime as never before. He has the authority to arrest anyone perceived to have broken the rules for any reason, whether in quest of food or the need to see a friend or to look for medicine.
He can also blame the scourge on a network of health officials. Their survival is now in jeopardy. Some of them, having been in contact with victims of the disease, may be ill, but all have to fear for their lives while Kim investigates how the disease broke out on a mass level. He’s calling for “correcting deviations revealed in the supply of medicines” when it’s well known North Korean medical facilities are largely bereft of medicine of any kind, much less any capable of curing COVID-19.
To show he means business, Kim fell back on a familiar wellspring of support—his 1.2-million-strong armed forces, over which he is the supreme commander. Pyongyang’s Korea Central News agency said he had issued an order for “immediately stabilizing the supply of medicines in Pyongyang City by involving the powerful forces of the military medical field of the People’s Army.”
Military people faced draconian punishment if they didn’t do something fast to stem a crisis over which they have no real control.
“If all leading officials do not exert themselves and display their strenuous and fighting spirit,” Kim was quoted as saying, “they cannot take the strategic initiative in the ongoing anti-epidemic war.” They “should not allow any slightest imperfection and vulnerable points by maintaining high tension and vigilance in the acute anti-epidemic war.”
The call for marshaling the armed forces behind the campaign showed the frustration in a struggle in which they have no expertise and no authority other than the ability to carry out a purge on Kim’s behalf. KCNA put out the dispatch in English as well as Korean, indicating the need to prove Kim’s fully in charge before an international audience.
“Kim is facing a lot of instability right now, being unable to feed his people, provide for their consumer needs, and deal with the COVID outbreak,” said Bruce Bennett, Korea watcher at the RAND Corporation.. “Kim tries to describe himself as a God-like figure—how could he let things like this happen? And so he must blame others… I expect that there are quite a few purges going on in North Korea to confirm the responsibility of others for the problems.”
Kim’s need to assert his absolute authority makes it impossible to believe the seemingly factual reports published by his propaganda machine, notably the party newspaper Rodong Sinmun and KCNA, that purport to state the number of deaths, the numbers stricken and the numbers cured.
There is no way to verify these figures, but we may assume the real numbers are far higher than the 56 deaths and 1.5 million reported by the North Korean media to have suffered from “fever.”
NK News, a website in Seoul, said “fever” was “a likely euphemism for the virus that reflects a probable inability for North Korea to clinically diagnose all positive COVID-19 infections due to limited testing capacity.” Kim “is only admitting to a very small number of COVID cases,” Bennett observed. “The rest are just ‘fevers.’ This is North Korean perception management at work.”
Kim Jong Un inspects a pharmacy in Pyongyang in an undated photo released on May 15.
KCNA via Reuters
It’s a simple blame game and Kim—who is known for ordering the executions of anyone he suspects of working against him or his interests—will not hesitate to imprison or kill those accused of failing to wipe out the disease. He’s not saying a word about vaccinations, which he has refused from potential foreign aid-givers throughout the pandemic, and he’s certainly not accepting assistance offered by South Korea’s newly inaugurated President Yoon Suk-yeol.
Never mind that the conservative Yoon is not tying medical aid to his demand for the North’s “complete denuclearization.” Kim also refused offers of vaccines, well before acknowledging the pandemic in his own country, from Yoon’s liberal predecessor, Moon Jae-in, who beseeched him for dialogue and reconciliation.
“Kim cannot accept any blame because he is party of a ‘deity,’ the Kim family regime, that is infallible,” said David Maxwell, with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “His deliberate policy decision-making has made the tragedy worse than it should be. He has prioritized the development of the nuclear and missile programs over the welfare of the Korean people living in the north.”
By passing on the blame, Kim avoids all responsibility for having failed to take any of the basic steps needed to halt the spread of the disease. He holds himself and his innermost circle above reproach while lower-ranking bureaucrats are guilty of betraying the country through their inability to prevent a disease that his regime had been claiming had not broken out anywhere within its borders.
That claim, of course, has never been credible. It’s always been impossible to imagine that Kim, by shutting down the border with China soon after the virus was reported in Wuhan in December 2019, had actually managed to keep it from getting into North Korea. He had been either in denial, refusing to believe what was happening all around him, or was carrying on a campaign of deliberate fabrication and disinformation.
Nor is it possible to believe the seemingly factual reports published by his propaganda machine, notably the party newspaper Rodong Sinmun and KCNA, that purport to state the number of deaths from the disease, the numbers stricken and the numbers cured.
Employees spray disinfectant and wipe surfaces as part of preventative measures against COVID at the Pyongyang Children’s Department Store in Pyongyang on March 18.
Kim Won Jin/AFP via Getty
There is no way to verify these figures, but we may assume that they are far higher than the 1.2 million who had suffered from “fever” and the 50 deaths reported by the North Korean media. NK News, a website in Seoul, said “fever” was “a likely euphemism for the virus that reflects a probable inability for North Korea to clinically diagnose all positive COVID-19 infections due to limited testing capacity.”
What’s certain is that North Korea is in the midst of a serious emergency that provides a terrific opportunity for Kim to crack down more harshly than ever before on his own people. The emergency, however, confronts him with enormous risks. It is possible that he will be unable to stifle widespread dissatisfaction with his rule and may have to combat open opposition. He may wind up finding his grip weakened or compromised.
“Kim is always profoundly worried about his grip on power.”
While “pointing out that the medicines provided by the state have not been supplied to inhabitants through pharmacies correctly in time,” said KCNA, Kim said “officials of the Cabinet and public health sector in charge of the supply have not rolled up their sleeves, not properly recognizing the present crisis but only talking about the spirit of devotedly serving the people.”
Stupidly, as if COVID might be cured by an aspirin or two, KCNA reported “the People’s Army urgently deployed its powerful forces to all pharmacies in Pyongyang City and began to supply medicines under the 24-hour service system.”
The North Korean media painted an image of medicines getting to those who needed it -- all at Kim’s behest. One KCNA dispatch went completely over the top, saying officers “expressed their will to convey the precious medicines, elixir of life, associated with the great love of Kim Jong Un….”
The dispatch, waxing ever more euphoric, said the officers “ardently called for dynamically defusing the public health crisis created in Pyongyang and becoming honorable victors by working heart and soul so that the revolutionary surgeons in the great era of Kim Jong Un can review with pride how they devotedly implement the combat order of the Party in the war against the malignant virus.”
Kim even “censured the director of the Central Public Prosecutors Office for the idleness and negligence of his duty not feeling any responsibility and compunction and playing any role.”
Such talk is a palpable cover-up for the simple fact that pharmacy shelves are virtually bare, there is no simple cure for COVID-19 anywhere on earth, and the North’s hospitals have none of the facilities needed for extreme cases.
The reason for this propaganda blitz is that Kim himself is to blame for diverting enormous funds to a nuclear-and-missile program that showcases his own power while his health system is known to be inadequate.
Presumably a small elite within Pyongyang has access to all the medical assistance they need, but the vast majority of North Korea’s 26 million people are without access to care. The reports published by the North Korean media give an optimistic, thoroughly false image of Kim’s concern for his people.
Now Kim faces the risk, much as he hates the idea, of having to accept foreign assistance in the form of vaccines and medical equipment needed to combat the disease. While saying not a word about vaccines, he may be forced to accept them on a mass scale. If that happens, foreign donors would insist on knowing who was getting the vaccines, where and how they were being administered.
“He fears the outbreak and implemented measures to try to prevent or contain it for the last two years,” said Maxwell, a retired army colonel who served five tours in South Korea with the special forces. “He implemented more draconian population and resources control measures in the name of COVID to further oppress the Korean people.”
Under the circumstances, however, Kim might have no choice but to permit the entry of foreign experts who, after they go home, would be telling the world just how badly North Korea is suffering under his rule.
For now Kim is doing everything possible to prevent exposure of what’s going on and the full extent of the disease. While squandering enormous sums on nuclear warheads and the missiles to carry them to distant targets, Kim has ruthlessly deprived his people of what’s needed in terms of medicine, food and much else for survival.
“Kim is always profoundly worried about his grip on power because the real threat to him comes not from the United States, as he claims, but from his own people,” said David Straub, a retired senior U.S. diplomat in Seoul. “He has conducted purges of the leadership beneath him, murdered his uncle and half-brother and used COVID as an excuse to close the entire country off from the rest of world for more than two years. COVID only adds to the domestic threat against him.”
By controlling “the flow of information,” said Straub, Kim “can accept international vaccines or not, all the while blaming others, inside and outside North Korea, for everything that goes wrong in the country.”
Right now, he’s fighting for his own life as North Korea’s leader. He knows, if he is unable to curb the disease, he and his regime may not survive.
The Daily Beast · May 17, 2022


4. N. Korea still unresponsive to S. Korea's outreach for talks on COVID-19: official

Excerpts:
The two Koreas held their routine phone call at 9 a.m. Tuesday, but Pyongyang has not expressed its intention to accept the message yet, according to the unification ministry official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
"As North Korea is aware of our stance on cooperation in disease prevention, our government will wait for the North's response without pressing it," he said, stressing that the North will need time to review whether to accept the message.

(LEAD) N. Korea still unresponsive to S. Korea's outreach for talks on COVID-19: official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · May 17, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with more info in paras 6-7)
SEOUL, May 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has remained unresponsive for the second day to South Korea's attempt to offer dialogue on COVID-19 medical supplies and health care cooperation, a ministry official here said Tuesday.
The Ministry of Unification had sought to deliver a related fax message to the North on Monday through their liaison office. It is seeking to hold working-level consultations on the ongoing epidemic in the impoverished neighbor and assistance in medical supplies, including vaccines, masks and test kits.
The two Koreas held their routine phone call at 9 a.m. Tuesday, but Pyongyang has not expressed its intention to accept the message yet, according to the unification ministry official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
"As North Korea is aware of our stance on cooperation in disease prevention, our government will wait for the North's response without pressing it," he said, stressing that the North will need time to review whether to accept the message.
If it receives a response from Pyongyang, the ministry will take a "practical and realistic" approach to review various ways to hold the working-level consultations, including an online videoconference, the official said.
During a plenary session of the diplomacy and unification committee at the National Assembly later in the day, Unification Minister Kwon Young-se said that providing the North with assistance through international agencies can be an option.
Now that "there are numerous political considerations as to why the North has not accepted the message yet, we need to think of ways to provide assistance through international organizations or nongovernmental aid in case we end up not providing it directly," he said.
North Korea reported a total of more than 1.48 million fever cases and 56 fatalities as of 6 p.m. Monday.


julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · May 17, 2022


5. North Korea’s Covid explosion: a survivability test

Yes the regime can survive as it has in the past. But even during the famine it had two "safety valves" that allowed it to survive - the ROK Sunshine policy which saved the regime and the growth of markets which saved the people. But due to sanctions and the political situation there will be no reprise of the Sunshine Policy and Kim's policy decisions are hampering market activity as he seeks great oppressive control of the population. I still think we are at a possible inflection point and we must be observing for the indications and warnings of instability.

North Korea’s Covid explosion: a survivability test
The regime retains the capacity to survive challenges and the lockdowns help impose strict internal controls
asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · May 17, 2022
After two years during which the Covid-19 pandemic had been held at bay, the deadly infection has exploded within North Korea with a speed and virulence that seems to have caught the regime by surprise.
Ground zero for the epidemic is the capital city of Pyongyang, according to official North Korean reports. Authorities are struggling to contain its spread, ordering country-wide lockdowns.
The epidemic hit in late April and by May 14 had infected 820,620 people, causing 42 deaths. On one day alone, from the evening of May 13 to the following day, almost 300,000 people came down with symptoms, and 15 reportedly died. At least one death, and likely many more, can be attributed to the highly infectious BA.2 Omicron variant, which is now sweeping the globe.

International public health experts treat the data with some caution as the North Koreans have very limited ability to test for Covid-19. The official reports refer only to outbreaks of “fever,” which are suspected cases of the virus.
“We cannot say it is confirmed,” Dr Nagi Shafik, an Egyptian public health specialist who has worked extensively in North Korea for the last two decades for the World Health Organization and UNICEF, told Toyo Keizai in an interview from Cairo.
Still, the infection hits a country that experienced humanitarian aid specialists describe as being in a “very fragile” condition. The health care system suffers from outdated equipment, a lack of supplies – including drugs – and an intermittent supply of electricity. “The health services are not equipped to meet such an urgent situation,” said Dr Shafik.
All of this takes place in a country with serious food shortages and chronic malnutrition, compounded by international sanctions and by the decision of the government to close its borders for the last two years due to Covid.
“People are already physically weak,” adds another international humanitarian aid worker, who preferred to remain anonymous due to ongoing work in the country. “It doesn’t take a lot until you are seriously ill.”

North Korea instituted a “zero-Covid-19 policy” in January 2020, following a Chinese model of severe border lockdowns and quarantine measures that allowed the regime to claim the country was Covid-free.
It is one of only two countries in the world not to have carried out any vaccinations, having turned down offers of assistance from China, South Korea and the global vaccination program Covax.
“They looked at China and they followed that model,” the humanitarian aid expert told Toyo Keizai. “And then it backfired.”
“North Korea’s population, with no immunity from infection or vaccination, is exceedingly vulnerable to the virus,” according to a panel of experts convened by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in a March 2022 report.
Anticipating the current explosion, the experts’ prediction is that “if a mass outbreak occurs, there will be no short-term solutions.” One expert estimates that a Covid-19 outbreak would cause about 160,000 deaths.

An emergency meeting of the leadership of the Korean Workers Party was held on May 14 to respond to the outbreak. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un called the pandemic a “great upheaval in our country” and doubled down on a strategy of trying to contain the spread through the lockdown of large areas and even of individual factories and farms.
Kim Jong Un. Photo: Korean Central News Agency
He pointed to “incompetence, irresponsibility, even in the role of the party,” and called for a display of national unity in facing the crisis. Kim urged the study of anti-epidemic experiences abroad, particularly in China, but made no move to seek international assistance or to carry out a rapid vaccination effort.
International experts point to the likely role of two super-spreader events in April held in Pyongyang – a massive celebration of the birthday of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung on April 15 and then, 10 days later, a large military parade.
“That is high risk,” the aid worker said. “There were huge crowds, with no masks. They took too big a risk with those big crowds gathered in Pyongyang, and in other parts of the country.”
The virus may have been spread also by the dispatch at this time of year of “volunteer” squads to help with rice planting across the country. These teams are essential to North Korea’s rice production.

Official media called for extra efforts to carry out anti-epidemic measures with these workers and Kim Jong Un called on the populace not to succumb to fear.
“Kim is telling them to keep working, but in some kind of bubble fashion, as in China,” observed William Brown, a former US intelligence officer and an economist specializing in Northeast Asia.
“So, in the industrial cities, seems like there will be pockets, bubbles of disaster, and falling production of things they really need, like fertilizer. Will there be street fights if the formal markets get too restricted and traders move to the streets? Seems likely.”
This is a moment of particular danger on the food front as it coincides with the beginning of seasonal shortages, when the fall harvest has been consumed and the spring plantings are not yet available.
Can North Korea survive?
The pandemic explosion comes at a time when North Korea has embarked on a new round of missile tests and there are visible preparations for an underground test of its nuclear warheads.
The testing comes with a shift in power in South Korea to a conservative government headed by Yoon Suk-yeol, which is taking a tougher stance toward the North than the previous progressive government. The new government in Seoul is planning to resume large-scale military exercises jointly with the United States, and tensions are likely to grow.
China and Russia, the principal backers of the Pyongyang regime, are unlikely to be paying much attention, given their own troubles. And the US is focused as well on Ukraine, though North Korea will undoubtedly be a major subject of President Joe Biden’s visit to South Korea and Japan later this month.
The pandemic may shift the situation, at least in the short term, if Kim Jong Un seeks international assistance to deal with the health crisis. “It doesn’t mean he won’t do a sudden provocation, like a nuclear test, and then immediately call for talks, pretending to do so from a position of strength,” suggests former intelligence officer Brown.
Speculation about the impact of the crisis on the stability of the regime, which is already whispered about in Seoul and Washington, is probably premature and exaggerated, some experts believe.
The North Korean regime retains an impressive capacity to respond and survive this kind of challenge. And the lockdowns may have actually aided the ability of the regime to impose strict internal controls on the populace.
“The vulnerability of their system is lessened dramatically by the fact they don’t move around much,” says Brown.
“Most people just stay put even in normal times. We see the big rallies, but those are actually very abnormal. And the country is quite wired – electricity and phones and intranet. And extremely organized, with their community cells that report to each other on everything. So, if Pyongyang orders something, it is usually done, quickly.”
A North Korean village seen from the Aegibong Observatory across the border in Gimpo, South Korea. Photo: SeongJoon Cho
Vaccine help coming?
This system, ironically, may also allow North Korea to carry out a rapid large-scale vaccination campaign. Despite its decision to turn down earlier offers of help, North Korea is not opposed in principle to this path, according to the experts’ report issued by CSIS.
North Korean officials indicated privately – but not publicly – that they would prefer the mRNA vaccines developed in the West rather than the less effective Chinese Sinovac vaccine or the AstraZeneca vaccines, which were offered by Covax but were reported to have troubling side effects.
The Covax offer also would have covered only 20% of the population, which would not have been sufficient.
North Korea has a long history of vaccination programs and a rather effective if low-technology system for delivering immunizations. Shafik recounts his experience in helping to manage the response to a measles outbreak in 2006 when, with international assistance, “millions were vaccinated in no time.”
He believes that if the WHO and UNICEF were to be allowed to operate more fully again inside North Korea – they maintain offices there but no foreigners are presently in the country – the entire population of about 26 million people could be vaccinated in 1-2 weeks.
UNICEF had been assisting with routine immunization for childhood diseases such as measles and polio, but these operations have been curbed in the last two years of self-imposed isolation.
According to a recent report from UNICEF, North Korea has a functioning “cold chain” management system which can deliver vaccines on refrigerated trucks and keep them sufficiently cool in clinics and hospitals.
But a large-scale campaign will require updating the equipment. “Maybe some people in North Korea will say, ‘We don’t want foreigners to be there right now,’” worries Shafik.
Still, experienced humanitarian aid workers are anticipating that North Korea may make a sudden decision to reopen the country to outside help, through established UN channels.
“They want to control it somehow and they are weighing their options,” says Shafik, who says there is ongoing contact by international aid organizations.
The pandemic may represent an opportunity to re-engage North Korea in the realm of humanitarian aid. “The situation now is more desperate than it ever has been before,” says the veteran humanitarian aid worker, noting the surprising decision of the government to admit to so many cases.
“I was really surprised that quite concrete figures were given, and day by day. That is a change.”
The aid experts attribute this partly to the need of the regime to alert its own population to the severity of the crisis. But, adds the aid worker, it is also “a message for help.”
Daniel Sneider is a lecturer on international policy at Stanford University and a former Christian Science Monitor foreign correspondent. This article originally appeared in Toyo Keizai (The Oriental Economist) and is republished with kind permission. Follow Daniel Sneider on Twitter at @DCSneider
asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · May 17, 2022


6. U.S. warns against inadvertently hiring North Korean IT workers

It is hard for non-Koreans to tell the difference between Koreans from the north and South. But like all hiring actions proper vetting is critical.


U.S. warns against inadvertently hiring North Korean IT workers
Reuters · by Reuters
WASHINGTON, May 16 (Reuters) - U.S. officials have warned businesses against inadvertently hiring IT staff from North Korea, saying that rogue freelancers were taking advantage of remote work opportunities to hide their true identities and earn money for Pyongyang.
In an advisory issued by the State and Treasury departments and the FBI, the United States said the effort was intended to circumvent U.S. and U.N. sanctions, and bring in money for North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.
"There are thousands of DPRK IT workers both dispatched overseas and located within the DPRK, generating revenue that is remitted back to the North Korean government," the advisory stated.
"These IT workers take advantage of existing demands for specific IT skills, such as software and mobile application development, to obtain freelance employment contracts from clients around the world, including in North America, Europe, and East Asia," the advisory said.
Many North Korean workers pretended to be from South Korea, Japan, or other Asian countries, the advisory said. It laid out a series of red flags that employers should watch for, including a refusal to participate in video calls and requests to receive payments in virtual currency.
U.S. officials said the North Koreans were mostly based in China and Russia, with smaller numbers operating out of Africa and Southeast Asia. Much of the money they earn is taken by the North Korean government, they said.
The officials also said that companies who hired and paid such workers may be exposing themselves to legal consequences for sanctions violations.

Reporting by Paul Grant and Raphael Satter; Editing by Tim Ahmann and Sandra Maler
Reuters · by Reuters


7. Chinese FM meets ROK's new FM via video link
From Xinhua.
Chinese FM meets ROK's new FM via video link

Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets with Park Jin, the new foreign minister of the Republic of Korea (ROK), via video link in Beijng, capital of China, May 16, 2022. (Xinhua/Gao Jie)
BEIJING, May 16 (Xinhua) -- Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Monday met with Park Jin, the new foreign minister of the Republic of Korea (ROK) via video link.
Noting China has always viewed the ROK and China-ROK relations from a strategic and overall perspective, Wang said their bilateral relations have experienced ups and downs and achieved leapfrog development, benefiting both peoples and promoting regional stability and prosperity.
China and the ROK have always respected each other's development paths, core interests and cultural traditions, Wang said, adding China-ROK trade has increased by more than 50 times and mutual investment has exceeded 100 billion U.S. dollars over the past 30 years.
"The two sides have achieved common development and prosperity through practical cooperation on an equal footing and of mutual benefit," he noted.
Thanks to the efforts of all parties, the Korean Peninsula has generally remained peaceful, providing a necessary environment for the development of the two countries and the region as a whole, Wang said.
Wang said the two countries got rid of the shackles of the Cold War and opened a new chapter of cooperation 30 years ago. "Today, it serves the fundamental interests of China and the ROK to keep the region open and inclusive, guard against the risks of the new Cold War and oppose camp confrontation," he stressed.
"Standing at a new starting point, we should grasp the right direction and create a new 30 years of greater development of China-ROK relations," Wang said.
He suggested the two sides make good use of dialogue mechanisms at all levels, maintain smooth and high-quality political and diplomatic communication, enhance understanding, promote cooperation and manage differences.
Both sides should proceed from their respective and common interests, oppose the negative tendency of "decoupling" and "cutting off chains", and maintain the stability and smoothness of the global industrial chain and supply chain, Wang said.
He also called for closer people-to-people exchanges between the two countries to promote mutual understanding between the peoples and reduce misunderstanding.
Wang said China is glad to see the ROK play a more constructive role in promoting world peace and prosperity, and stands ready to work with the ROK to safeguard the common interests of the two countries, Asia and emerging markets, and inject stability and certainty into the turbulent and changing times.
Park Jin said the ROK attaches great importance to developing relations with China and is willing to establish a more healthy and mature bilateral relationship with China based on the spirit of mutual respect and cooperation. He added that the ROK always adheres to the one-China principle.
The ROK hopes to take the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries as a new starting point to maintain high-level exchanges, deepen economic and trade cooperation, promote people-to-people exchanges and push bilateral relations to a new level, Park Jin said, adding the ROK appreciates and expects China to continue to play an important and constructive role on the Korean Peninsula issue.
The two sides also exchanged views on the new changes on the Korean Peninsula and international issues of common concern. ■



8. South Korea Can Do More in the Battle Against COVID-19

Excerpts:

In light of the recent reports of the first confirmed cases of COVID-19 in North Korea, better global coordination of supplies could be an important issue for South Korea. Pyongyang is unlikely to accept help directly from South Korea or the United States, but it might be more open to international support now that it has acknowledged the presence of COVID-19 domestically. Engaging more deeply in the international process could be one path to ensuring that North Korea receives the support it needs.

Three years into the pandemic many countries may view the situation as better or be facing donor fatigue, but as U.K. Health Secretary Sajid Javid has noted, “We still face the threat of new Covid variants that could be more severe, they could be more transmissible or they could even escape the protection of current vaccines.” If Yoon is looking to boost South Korea’s role on the global stage, there is no better place to do so then efforts to end the pandemic.
South Korea Can Do More in the Battle Against COVID-19
For all its success at home, South Korea has been less forthcoming with donations during the pandemic.
thediplomat.com · by Troy Stangarone · May 16, 2022
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Three years into the pandemic, the world continues to struggle to finance the production and distribution of vaccines, as well as the related supplies needed to administer those vaccines and deal with the pandemic, despite the relatively low amount of funds required. South Korea and the new Yoon administration could play an important role in helping to fill this gap.
For much of the pandemic, South Korea has been one of the success stories. During the first year of the pandemic, Seoul was praised for its handling of COVID-19 and its response was viewed as a model for other countries. Its approach of detect, contain, and treat allowed South Korea to quickly flatten the curve on COVID-19 infections and mostly prevent large outbreaks prior to the Omicron variant.
South Korea has also contributed internationally. Thanks to its early success in keeping COVID-19 at bay, there was significant interest in lessons from South Korea’s experience and Seoul quickly moved to share what it had learned with the rest of the world via the “K-Quarantine” model. It was also an important source of commercial sales of COVID-19 test kits during the early phase of the pandemic, and last year Seoul committed nearly $2 billion over five years to turn South Korea into a vaccine production hub.
However, South Korea has been less forthcoming with donations during the pandemic. Even though South Korea is the world’s 10th largest economy, it is currently only the world’s 27th largest donor of vaccines, donating a little over 3.1 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines, according to UNICEF’s COVID-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard.

For any government there is an obligation to ensure the protection of its own population. From that perspective, South Korea’s failure to be at the forefront of vaccine donations and funding for COVAX is not surprising. Despite handling the early stages of the pandemic better than most countries, it was slow to purchase vaccines for its own population and had only fully vaccinated about 15 percent of the South Korean population by August of last year. Those numbers, however, grew to over 80 percent in just four months. Vaccine access is no longer an issue.
In contrast, Spain, a smaller economy that has seen more COVID-19 infections and deaths than South Korea, has donated over 62.5 million COVID-19 vaccines. Japan, which was also slow to vaccinate its population, has donated nearly 42.7 million doses.
Seoul has also yet to contribute its fair share to funding COVAX to ensure that the world’s middle and low income countries have access to the vaccines they need to manage the pandemic. Prior to the recent 2nd Global COVID-19 Summit, South Korea had pledged $200 million toward COVAX. Based on data from the ACT-Accelerator (ACT-A) Facilitation Council’s Finance and Resource Mobilization Working Group, South Korea’s contribution only amounted 27 percent of its fair share to the last ACT-A budget, the umbrella facility (which includes COVAX) to support equitable access for low and middle income countries to tests, vaccines, and treatments.
At the 2nd Global COVID-19 Summit on May 12, South Korea pledged an additional $300 million over the three year period of 2023-2025, but did not pledge any additional funds for the current year.
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In contrast, Canada pledged 732 million Canadian dollars to fulfill its fair share contribution to the Access to COVID-19 Tools-Accelerator for the current 2022-2023 budget cycle. Japan pledged an additional $500 million for COVAX and additional funds for other COVID related initiatives to raise its total contributions during the pandemic from $3.9 billion to $5 billion.
South Korea is well placed to contribute more financially to ending the pandemic. Among the world’s 10 largest economies, South Korea has the lowest level of debt to GDP. It has also had a relatively strong economic recovery from the pandemic.
Contributing more to pandemic efforts also aligns with new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s own objectives for South Korean foreign policy. Yoon has called for South Korea to “step up” on issues such as the pandemic and to take on a global role more befitting of its status as one of the world’s 10 largest economies.
How can South Korea play a larger role in ending the pandemic? The first is to provide additional funding. Prior to the 2nd Global COVID-19 Summit, ACT-A faced a $15 billion funding gap. The summit only produced $2.5 billion in new commitments to fight COVID-19. A significant financial gap remains.
At this point in the pandemic, however, the world has made significant progress on vaccine production, but is short on funds to pay for building up storage and delivery capacity in countries, as well as for oxygen and the therapeutic drugs that have been developed to treat COVID-19. In addition to funding through ACT-A, South Korea could increase direct donations of oxygen, therapeutics, and other needed supplies to ensure that vaccines are turned into vaccinations and those with COVID receive the treatments they need.
Lastly, Seoul can look to build coalitions to deal with the pandemic. Joining the Quad working group on vaccines is one option, but more work is needed on a global level to identify how gaps in non-vaccine supplies can be filled and how those in remote and disconnected areas can be tested and vaccinated. South Korea could look to work with ACT-A to build coalitions of countries to address supply needs, while working with organizations such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria that have experience in expanding testing and treatment for those in hard-to-reach places to do the same for COVID-19 testing and vaccinations.
In light of the recent reports of the first confirmed cases of COVID-19 in North Korea, better global coordination of supplies could be an important issue for South Korea. Pyongyang is unlikely to accept help directly from South Korea or the United States, but it might be more open to international support now that it has acknowledged the presence of COVID-19 domestically. Engaging more deeply in the international process could be one path to ensuring that North Korea receives the support it needs.
Three years into the pandemic many countries may view the situation as better or be facing donor fatigue, but as U.K. Health Secretary Sajid Javid has noted, “We still face the threat of new Covid variants that could be more severe, they could be more transmissible or they could even escape the protection of current vaccines.” If Yoon is looking to boost South Korea’s role on the global stage, there is no better place to do so then efforts to end the pandemic.
thediplomat.com · by Troy Stangarone · May 16, 2022


9. Regional Quagmire And Looming Fragility Of Deterrence Impact – Analysis

How does deterrence work during instability and regime collapse?

Conclusion:

The saber-rattling and countermeasures in the escalating security dilemma in the region have long started even before the recent tensions, encapsulating the next chapter of contextualizing the potential risks and strategic maneuvers by the dominant regional players amidst the impact of the external aspiring parties who are keen and unrelenting to reverse the spectrum and to reassert the grip and the gap. Pandora’s box of security and survival has just been opened and the stakes have never been higher.

Regional Quagmire And Looming Fragility Of Deterrence Impact – Analysis
eurasiareview.com · by Collins Chong Yew Keat · May 16, 2022
Strategic maneuvering by different parties through differing and conflicting mechanisms with risky outcome will continue to shape the spectrum of regional conflicts and security projection, lacking long term effective clarity and confidence in a vacuum of dwindling new ideas and systemic policies. Unsolved security dilemma and fragility in confidence building measures and conflict prevention architecture will continue to herald a new phase of risky ambiguity and testing the limits of strategic patience and first line deterrence.
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Soaring tensions as a result of the surprising provocative moves by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un this year with a series of weapons tests and the impending nuclear test have caused expected countermeasures and defense postures aimed at giving a clear message to the Kim regime that deterrence and ability for pre-emptive action will still be counted upon as the prerogative measure by the region.
The U.S. 7th Fleet and Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force conducted a joint naval exercise at the Sea of Japan recently in an apparent attempt to deter North Korea’s provocation. Led by the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, the joint naval exercise in waters between Japan and the Korean Peninsula for the first time in five years portrays the emergence of a no holds barred clarity in the seriousness of survival concerns in the region. The same maneuver is reflected in the war games and military drills last month by Washington and Seoul, all with the Pyongyang threat in mind. This forms the precursor for a greater scale of exercises to come, with Japan weighing to host the largest ever joint drills with the US Marines later this year in Hokkaido, with eyes on Beijing, Pyongyang and increasingly, Moscow.
While analysts have argued that these countermeasures further reinforce the rock-solid commitment by Washington in the region regardless of the distractions in Ukraine, Beijing has been feeling the jitters and unrelenting in its concerns on the layered threats and messages posed by these maneuvers. Beijing is deeply apprehensive of the military drills and maneuvers by Tokyo and Seoul involving Washington, seeing these as a pretext for targeting Beijing ultimately and its potential move on Taiwan. The US THAAD missile defense installation in South Korea continues to be fiercely opposed by Beijing, with previous punitive sanctions imposed on Seoul in 2017 with wariness on its radar capacities and in tracking Beijing’s maneuvers.
The significant presence of US power projection in that country, whether defensively and deterring in nature or otherwise, will always remain a thorn in Xi Jinping’s bargaining, a point underscored by the reality that Washington will only continue to bolster its arming capacities and ally-support enhancement for Tokyo, Seoul and strategically Taipei. It is worth noting that Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek is America’s largest overseas military base with the most active airfield in the Pacific. As much as Beijing is hopeful for Kim to rein in his provocations and assertive moves, it would still very much rely on Pyongyang as a powerful bargaining tool with the West and will continue to extract the positives for now. Newly inaugurated President Suk-yeol has tried to adopt the same strategy by Putin in the early phases of the Ukrainian war with the escalate to de-escalate approach, hoping to rein in Kim with early forceful deterrence. He took the opening gambit in laying bare the futility of Kim in continuing the first strike option as espoused recently and in abandoning the policy of deterrence only with his nuclear capacities. In giving the ultimatum to Kim to give up his nuclear brinkmanship dependence in exchange for long term economic support and prosperity, Suk-yeol tries to shift to a different dimension in coercing and coaxing his northern neighbor to change course, while trying to distance himself from the failed approaches of his predecessors.
Notwithstanding this, he realizes that this is the only apparatus and approach that is suited in this context, lacking other measures that will distance his policies with old, failed mechanisms. Early hawkish pressures and stance will not reap the desired results and will only set back the tone in giving enough face-saving and incentivizing tools for Kim to at least return to the negotiating table. Military drills and exchanges in various scales with Washington have never failed to invite greater bellicose rhetoric from Kim with growing displeasure, with the recent exercises already opening the floodgates for further brinkmanship threats. The view by Kim that those are rehearsals for war and unnecessary provocations will continue to be used as the justifications for continuous similar counter responses by Pyongyang.
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With bigger eyes on Beijing in ultimate terms, Tokyo has long started a calculated response to the ongoing and worsening threats from both Pyongyang and Beijing. Defensive alliance with Canberra in bilateral structure as well as strengthening its QUAD commitment remain the central pillar for Tokyo, further backed by persistent and clear foreign policy of hard deterrence against Beijing, Pyongyang and Moscow by Prime Minister Kishida. Past courting with Moscow under his predecessor’s policies is practically put to bed with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, with Kishida keen to ensure that Tokyo remains aligned with the West’s push amidst ensuring its continuous support for Tokyo’s bigger threat from Beijing and Pyongyang. Increasing assertive postures by the Kremlin in the disputed regions in the Kuril Islands and its growing focus in its Eastern side further fueled the impetus for Kishida to maintain the hawkish pressure. The growing threat level has further pushed the talks for Japan to host American nukes to complete the strongest nuclear deterrence. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe argued for this, using the case of Ukraine for having failed to have a nuclear deterrence in allowing the Kremlin to undertake the invasion.
While the prospects remain slim for now, the Liberal Democratic Party has already initiated internal discussions on further bolstering nuclear deterrence. The recent 2+2 engagement with Manila involving foreign and defense overtures signals the overarching responses by Tokyo in intensifying resilience and capacity measures against both Pyongyang and Beijing. The same worry is channeled through another preparatory measure seen in the recent signing of the defense pact between Japan and Australia, the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) in strengthening seamless defense operations.
The regional tour to Southeast Asia by Kishida last month underscored another strategic maneuver by Tokyo in achieving the double-arrow aim of securing economic support and market and more importantly, getting the confidence and access in further boosting Japanese defensive agenda and posture in East Asia, primarily geared for Pyongyang but Beijing to a larger extent. Increasingly at the core of the security spectrum, Southeast Asia remains at the forefront and the first and final frontier in the decisive outcome of the potential all-out and high intensity conflict. Beijing continues to chart different mechanisms in dealing with apparent and concealed risks and threats both regionally and globally.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently lambasted America’s Indo Pacific agenda deemed as destabilizing, accusing Washington of pitting one against another through the 5-4-3-2 containment measures against Beijing. Strategic responses with the Five Eyes Intelligence Pact (UK, New Zealand, US, Australia & Canada), the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the AUKUS move and the bilateral arrangements with individual regional states. With warnings not to be used by pawns by Washington, Wang Yi has again repeated consistent messages to ASEAN and regional players that while Beijing will very much encourage an open and free stand by the regional players, increasing push by the West in its coercion to choose sides will be intolerable, at least in Beijing’s long term strategic grip. Existing long-established dominance in the region with even deeper chokehold in the region’s economic dependence and continuous security grip will not be easily jettisoned by Beijing, which will continue to preserve its early hold advantage in the region.
As much as the South China Sea and the region remain the paramount chokeholds and vital geostrategic concerns for Beijing, Taiwan remains the ultimate red line. The recent high-profile visits by US Senators to Taiwan again invited anger and harsh responses by Beijing, which resorted to military drills and provocative drive as the visit occurred to send a clear message to Washington that the visits are just another series of wrong signals sent which will not help improve progress in ties. The banking on the Liaoning aircraft carrier and strike group is another signal by Beijing that it has no intention to loosen its current momentum of regional military advantage closer to its border in both the First and Second Island Chains and in maintaining its edge in its increasing anti access/area denial (A2/AD) capacity in deterring any impactful and inflictive potential moves by the containing powers. For the past one week, the Liaoning strike capacity has further matured, as reflected in the execution of more 100 sorties in further enhancement of its combat readiness and effective seamlessness of operations, both in sending a powerful deterrent message to Taipei and Washington as well as in prepping up pressures on the aspirational parties in Taiwan keen to break the status quo.
The saber-rattling and countermeasures in the escalating security dilemma in the region have long started even before the recent tensions, encapsulating the next chapter of contextualizing the potential risks and strategic maneuvers by the dominant regional players amidst the impact of the external aspiring parties who are keen and unrelenting to reverse the spectrum and to reassert the grip and the gap. Pandora’s box of security and survival has just been opened and the stakes have never been higher.
*Collins Chong Yew Keat has been serving in University of Malaya for more than 9 years. His areas of focus include strategic and security studies, America’s foreign policy and power projection, regional conflicts and power parity analysis and has published various publications on numerous platforms including books and chapter articles. He is also a regular contributor in providing op-eds and analytical articles for both the local and international media on various contemporary global issues and regional affairs since 2007.
eurasiareview.com · by Collins Chong Yew Keat · May 16, 2022


10. North Korea flies in supplies from China
Excerpts:

Three large cargo aircraft belonging to Air Koryo, the North Korean state-run airline, arrived at Shenyang Taoxian Airport in Liaoning Province, northeastern China, on Tuesday morning and returned to North Korea the same afternoon, according to multiple sources in the region who spoke to the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity.
 
The aircraft were all Russian-made Ilyushin Il-76, the multi-purpose transport plane capable of carrying 50 tons of cargo and the largest plane in the North Korean air fleet. The North is known to have three Il-76s. 
 
The kind of cargo picked up has not been identified, but in light of the North’s unprecedented Covid-19 crisis and the fact that the country deployed all three of its Il-76s, there is a high probability that the supplies are meant to help the regime deal with its outbreak.

Tuesday
May 17, 2022

North Korea flies in supplies from China

In this photo by the state-run Rodong Sinmun, North Korea soldiers salute the flag. The Korean Central News Agency reported that the country's military would be deployed to ensure a stable and continuous distribution of medicine through pharmacies to combat the country's Covid-19 outbreak. [YONHAP]
 
North Korea is believed to have flown in emergency supplies from China Tuesday to deal with an outbreak of suspected Covid-19 cases.
 
Three large cargo aircraft belonging to Air Koryo, the North Korean state-run airline, arrived at Shenyang Taoxian Airport in Liaoning Province, northeastern China, on Tuesday morning and returned to North Korea the same afternoon, according to multiple sources in the region who spoke to the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity.
 
The aircraft were all Russian-made Ilyushin Il-76, the multi-purpose transport plane capable of carrying 50 tons of cargo and the largest plane in the North Korean air fleet. The North is known to have three Il-76s. 
 
The kind of cargo picked up has not been identified, but in light of the North’s unprecedented Covid-19 crisis and the fact that the country deployed all three of its Il-76s, there is a high probability that the supplies are meant to help the regime deal with its outbreak.
 
Another source said that it was possible the planes may make multiple trips to China. 
 
“There are many restrictions on transporting medical supplies to North Korea by land from China,” the sourced said, adding, “It seems that they chose aircraft to quickly transport large amounts of supplies.”
 
Due to the spread of the Omicron variant in China, overland trade between North Korea and Dandong was shut down on April 25, while rail shipments between North Korea and China were suspended four days later. 
 
Now, with the spread of Covid-19 in North Korea, Chinese border cities such as Ji’an in Jilin Province have strengthened their anti-disease measures and barred the entry of foreigners.
 
The arrival of North Korean aircraft in Shenyang marks the first time in over two years that flights have taken place between China and North Korea.
 
In January 2020, when the first outbreak of Covid-19 was reported in China, North Korea shut down all overland routes and suspended the few flights between the two countries.
 
At a regular press briefing in Beijing on Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin did not directly confirm that China had provided the North with emergency Covid-19 aid, but said, “Covid-19 control is a common challenge facing all mankind, and we have a great tradition of helping each other in times of crisis.”
 
Wang added that Beijing “wants to support and strengthen cooperation with the North through the process of fighting Covid-19.”
 
The Chinese lifeline to North Korea comes as Pyongyang issued a special order to the country’s military to ensure stable distribution of medicine throughout the country.
 
According to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Monday, the ruling Workers’ Party Politburo convened an emergency meeting on May 15 at which leader Kim Jong-un blasted officials for the lack of timely distribution of medicines through pharmacies.
 
Kim singled out the director of the Central Prosecutor's Office for neglecting his duties, blaming the official – who is roughly equivalent to an attorney general – for allowing drug hoarding and illegal sales of medicines during the outbreak.
 
According to the KCNA report, the Politburo decided to deploy the country’s military to ensure a stable distribution of medicines, which will be handed out to the public through pharmacies which are now to remain open around the clock.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]



11. Kyiv-based Magazine Interviews Ex-Navy Seal, South Korean Special Forces Officer


Kyiv-based Magazine Interviews Ex-Navy Seal, South Korean Special Forces Officer - KyivPost - Ukraine's Global Voice
kyivpost.com · by Russia's War Against Ukraine · May 16, 2022
Ken Ree, who is believed to be South Korea’s first volunteer in Ukraine’s International Legion of Territorial Defense, gave an interview to Kyiv-based NV (Novoye Vremya) magazine during which he spoke about his motivations to fight and his opinion of the combat prowess of Ukrainian soldiers.
The 38-year-old former U.S. Navy Seal and former lieutenant of South Korea’s Special Forces said he defied a government ban for citizens to volunteer for the international legion.
“If I come back alive, I will take responsibility for everything and take whatever punishment to be given. I’ll raise the status of South Korea as the country’s first volunteer soldier,” he told the Ukrainian publication on May 14.
In the interview, published by the online Russia versus the World publication, Ree said his choice to fight on Ukraine’s side was a question of “morality.”
Elaborating, he said: “I could not believe that Russia could just invade a sovereign state. In my head, I knew who the bad guys were and who the good guys were…As a former special forces operator, I have skills that can really help the military here. If I am just sitting, doing nothing and watching CNN, it will be wrong. It’s like walking down the street and seeing two guys raping a woman.”
After eight years of military service, Ree is back in combat.
He had taken part in counter-terrorist operations in Somalia in 2009-2011, and afterward, took part in combat operations in Iraq, for example.
In Ukraine, Ree said he participated in “successful missions in Irpin,” a northwestern suburb of Kyiv that has since been liberated following Russia’s all-out invasion on Feb. 24.
Subsequently, he went to fight in the southern part of the country where he was wounded during a combat mission.
The South Korean special forces soldier he found the climate “very cold” when he arrived in March.
Ree called the Ukrainian Special Forces with whom he has fought “exceptional professionals – very well-trained fighters.”
Yet he said the Ukrainian side “just go and fight, improvising,” instead of doing planning more planning for missions.
This conflict is a “world war,” he added, because “any neighboring country that opposes Russia or tries to join NATO will be in danger. Russia will continue to attack, and it will never end.”
Found a spelling error? Let us know – highlight it and press Ctrl + Enter.
kyivpost.com · by Russia's War Against Ukraine · May 16, 2022


12. North won't accept Covid medicines from South or U.S., defector says

This is most likely an accurate assessment unless Kim undergoes some kind of radical change to his thinking.

Tuesday
May 17, 2022

North won't accept Covid medicines from South or U.S., defector says

Ryu Hyun-woo speaks with the CNN during an interview aired in January 2021. [SCREEN CAPTURE]
 
Ryu Hyun-woo, a North Korean defector who formerly served as Pyongyang’s acting ambassador to Kuwait, said Tuesday that the North’s pride will get in the way of asking Seoul or Washington for help containing the Covid-19 outbreak.
 
In an exclusive phone interview with the JoongAng Ilbo, Ryu, who defected to the South in 2019 after working nearly 20 years in North Korea’s diplomatic service, said Pyongyang will probably receive assistance only from China, Russia and international organizations, no matter how grave the Covid situation becomes.
 
The only circumstance under which North Korean leader Kim Jong-un would receive help from the South or the United States, Ryu continued, is if he agreed to the North Korea policy of either the Yoon Suk-yeol or Joe Biden administration.
 
Ryu’s interview comes days after the North’s state media confirmed hundreds of thousands of people reporting Covid-related symptoms, a dramatic about-face from its repeated claims since January 2020 that the country had detected zero cases within its borders.
 
Sources in China told the JoongAng Ilbo earlier this week that Pyongyang has recently requested emergency medical supplies from Beijing, its closest ally. South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, which oversees inter-Korean ties, suggested working-level talks for Covid aid on Sunday, but Pyongyang has remained mum.
 
During the interview, Ryu offered his analysis on the current situation in North Korea and what he suspects the regime will do next. The following are edited excerpts from the conversation.
 
질의 :
What do you think is happening in North Korea right now?
응답 :
There were many tuberculosis patients when I lived in North Korea. People couldn’t eat well, and they all lived in dire circumstances, which led to the rapid spread. I think the same is happening with the coronavirus right now. [The North Korean government] advised its people to drink willow leaf tea if they come down with the virus, which is preposterous. Their hospitals are underequipped, and they don’t have much in the way of medical supplies. In light of the fact that the [country’s] borders have been closed for two years, North Korean people will probably be under immense stress by now.
 
질의 :
Where do you think the virus came from?
응답 :
China. The Omicron variant probably made way into the North as goods were shipped from the Chinese city of Dandong to the North Korean city of Sinuiju last month.
 
질의 :
Do you think the North will accept foreign aid?
응답 :
When we look back at how Pyongyang handled the 2004 explosion at the Ryongchon railway station and the 2016 floods, North Korean diplomats went out of their way to request help from various countries all over the world immediately after the regime publicized the events. Similarly, the North might have already asked China for help and ordered its diplomats stationed at the United Nations and other international organizations to secure medical supplies.
 
질의 :
Will the North accept aid from South Korea or the U.S.?
응답 :
The North will probably accept aid from only China, Russia and international organizations. Humanitarian aid isn’t subject to sanctions, so the regime may actively inform them about its Covid situation, as it is doing right now. But Pyongyang probably won’t want to directly receive aid from Seoul or Washington. When we consider Pyongyang’s pride, there’s a big chance that the regime will refuse any help from either country unless it agrees with the North Korea policy of the Yoon Suk-yeol or Biden administration.
 
질의 :
What medical support does the North need?
응답 :
The North will want treatments in the form of edible pills, not vaccines. Even the capital of Pyongyang gets only two to three hours of electricity each day. Even if [some other country or organization] supplies the North with freezing and refrigerating equipment, it won’t have the electricity to keep them running, so it’s no use giving them vaccines. It would be like plain water.
 
질의 :
The North seems to be going all out to source medicine.
응답 :
There are reports that North Korea is mobilizing the military to distribute medicines, which probably means they’re giving out the stockpile of drugs they kept for emergency use. [When I worked in the North,] most of the stock was generic drugs and cost about a tenth of the original drugs.
 
질의 :
Do you think the North will carry out a nuclear test?
응답 :
Kim Jong-un fears internal instability the most, so he may want to bring the country together with a nuclear test. External circumstances indicate a perfect timing. The United States is preoccupied with Ukraine, China and Taiwan, and is unable to spare any attention for the North. If I were the North Korean leadership, I would want to make my people proud by conducting a nuclear test and bragging that we’ve completed our nuclear [development program] despite the Covid-19 pandemic, reaching a feat that only big powers such as the United States and China have accomplished.

BY PARK HYUN-JOO, LEE SUNG-EUN [lee.sungeun@joongang.co.kr]


13. Biden to stress US security commitment at DMZ: experts



Biden to stress US security commitment at DMZ: experts
The Korea Times · May 17, 2022
Then-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and his granddaughter, Finnegan Biden, visit the DMZ in this Dec. 7, 2013 photo. Yonhap

US president considers visiting heavily armed border amid continued North Korean provocations

By Kang Seung-woo

U.S. President Joe Biden is expected to issue a message of Washington's commitment to defending South Korea from escalating North Korean nuclear and missile threats during a possible trip to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), according to diplomatic observers, Tuesday.

Biden is scheduled to arrive in South Korea, Friday, for a three-day visit that will include a summit with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol as well as a meeting with Yoon's predecessor, Moon Jae-in.

The allies are coordinating the American leader's third trip to the DMZ, according to government sources. Biden already traveled twice to the most heavily armed border in the world, which separates the two Koreas, in 2001 as the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and again in 2013 when he was the vice president.

Last week, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki also proposed Biden's DMZ visit, adding that the details of its schedule were being finalized.

His envisaged tour comes as North Korea is highly anticipated to carry out a seventh nuclear test as early as this month, after having conducted a flurry of missile launches so far this year (16 times).

"The DMZ has served as a venue by U.S. presidents to show off the allies' solid defense posture against North Korea's provocations, so this time Biden is expected to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors amid repeated North Korean aggressions when he visits there," said Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.

On the occasion of Biden's trip to Asia, which also includes a visit to Japan, it is being speculated that the Kim Jong-un regime could stage another provocative action so as to heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula in a way to draw the U.S.' attention.

Many believe that under the Biden administration, the North Korea nuclear issue has taken a back seat to other more urgent diplomatic matters, such as its strategic competition with China and Russia's war in Ukraine.

Cheong Seong-chang, the director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute, also said that the U.S. could send a tough message should Pyongyang launch a missile.

"If that happens, Biden's message may focus on its commitment to deterring North Korea's threats for South Korea," Cheong said.

In the event that North Korea fires a missile, Biden is highly likely to travel to the DMZ, according to the two experts.

"If the U.S. has internally decided on the DMZ trip, it will be made even if North Korea test-fires another missile. A possible cancellation due to a launch may be seen as a step back from the U.S. security commitment," Hong said.

Cheong also said Biden will make a trip to the DMZ regardless of a missile launch, saying that North Korea would fire a missile toward the East Sea, not toward the south.

However, there is also room for Biden to persuade North Korea to return to dialogue, stressing that the U.S. is prepared to hold constructive discussions with the North, Cheong added.

While in South Korea, Biden could also visit Camp Humphreys, a U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, to meet American service members and encourage them.


The Korea Times · May 17, 2022

14. Honor May 18 spirit (Kwangju, Korea)




Honor May 18 spirit
The Korea Times · May 17, 2022
Mass memorial should help promote national unity

Wednesday will mark the 42nd anniversary of the May 18, 1980, pro-democracy movement in Gwangju. This year's memorial ceremony carries significance as President Yoon Suk-yeol asked all his senior aides and lawmakers of the ruling People Power Party (PPP) to attend a state memorial ceremony to be held at the May 18th National Cemetery in the southwestern city.

It is unprecedented for a conservative president and his party to hold such a large-scale ceremony to pay tribute to pro-democracy protesters killed during the uprising against the military junta led by Chun Doo-hwan. The bloody suppression of the movement claimed the lives of more than 200 and wounded 1,800 others.

We welcome Yoon's move as it demonstrates his determination to honor the victims and hold dear the legacy of the pro-democracy movement. In his commemoration speech, Yoon is likely to reveal his plan to stipulate the spirit of the movement in the Constitution. If such a plan is put into action, the May 18 uprising will be enshrined in the Constitution, together with the March 1 Independence Movement in 1919 and the April 19 Student Revolution in 1960.

The May 18 anniversary should be a turning point in shedding light on the tragic incident by fully revealing the truth behind the massacre. Former members of the military junta have so far remained silent on who ordered troops to fire at pro-democracy protesters, although the late Presidents Chun and Roh Tae-woo were convicted of treason for the bloody crackdown.

True reconciliation is possible only when perpetrators acknowledge and apologize for their atrocities and victims forgive them. Yet it is regrettable that many surviving perpetrators have refused to admit their misdeeds while denying their involvement in the killings. Even some right-wing members of the PPP's predecessor party had tried to distort facts about the movement, describing protesters as "mobs" or "rioters." Some extreme rightists made groundless allegations that North Korean agents incited the uprising.

But the May 18 uprising has been firmly established as the pro-democracy movement against the military junta, which took power through a military coup following the assassination of then President Park Chung-hee in October 1979. Therefore the country should no longer delay including the uprising in the Constitution in order to defend our hard-won democracy.

Another good news is that the Yoon government has decided to allow all participants in the memorial ceremony to sing together "March for the Beloved," a protest song symbolizing the uprising. The decision will end conflicts over the song, which former conservative presidents banned memorial participants from singing along to, inviting criticism from bereaved families and progressives.

The Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) and other opposition parties should not try to diminish Yoon's move by arguing that the massive memorial ceremony is aimed at wooing voters in Gwangju and the Jeolla provinces ahead of the June 1 local election. We hope that the event will serve as an opportunity to overcome regional antagonism, go beyond ideological conflicts, forge bipartisanship and promote national unity.


The Korea Times · May 17, 2022
15. ‘Too late for vaccines to save North Korea’

You cannot know until you try. Will Kim try?

‘Too late for vaccines to save North Korea’
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · May 17, 2022
The ongoing wave of omicron infections in North Korea could cause tens of thousands of deaths in the unvaccinated country, according to Dr. Oh Myoung-don, who heads the National Medical Center’s committee for clinical management of emerging infectious diseases.

Speaking at a virtual forum organized by Seoul National University’s Institute for Health and Unification Studies on Monday, Oh estimated that the omicron death toll in North Korea could reach around 34,000 at the end of the current wave. He said he arrived at the numbers based on his analysis of an April 15 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report and other data out of Hong Kong.

The US CDC report, which looked at cases that occurred over Hong Kong’s omicron outbreak from Jan. 6 to March 21 this year, noted that the high overall mortality there was mainly driven by deaths among unvaccinated people aged 60 and up.

The report said the mortality rate was highest among people in their 80s and older who have never received a vaccine at 1.725 percent -- or 17,250 deaths per million population. Among unvaccinated people in their 60s and 70s, the rate was 0.278 percent and 0.584 percent, respectively.

North Korea has 2,409,986 people in their 60s and older who make up 9 percent of its entire population, according to the United Nations’ 2019 statistics, all of whom are probably unvaccinated, Oh pointed out.

“Considering that North Korea does not have the kind of advanced health care system that Hong Kong does, death rates could be even higher there,” he said.

The outbreak in North Korea is growing rapidly, with about 5 percent of its 26 million population reported having experienced a fever between late April and now. The cumulative estimated count has climbed to 1,483,060 cases and 56 deaths in less than a week since admission of domestic cases on May 12.

In the last 24 hours alone, 269,510 cases of “fever” and six associated deaths were newly registered, the North’s official Korean Central News Agency announced Monday.

South Korean public health authorities say the official estimates of cases and deaths across North Korea are likely to be vastly undercounted.

Lee Sang-won, who is leading the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency’s epidemiological analysis team, on Tuesday suggested a possible underreporting of deaths in North Korea.

Speaking to reporters, he said, “Based on announcements so far, North Korea’s rate of deaths per cases is lower than that observed in South Korea, or elsewhere in the world despite a widespread outbreak that appears to be taking place.”

Ministry of Health and Welfare spokesperson Son Young-rae pointed out that North Korea’s lack of diagnostics to confirm COVID-19 meant cases without symptoms were going unreported. Citing ministry data, he said “more than half of younger patients with omicron do not exhibit any symptoms.”

Son said North Korea’s reliance on the presence of a fever to sift out suspected cases also “leaves large loopholes.” “Only about 1 in 10 omicron patients develop a fever,” he said.

He said South Korea’s low case fatality rate of 0.13 percent was a result of “mass testing and high vaccine rate, without which even omicron can prove deadly.”

Oh of the National Medical Center said at this point, vaccines “unfortunately, would make a little difference to the situation facing North Korea.” He said the omicron outbreak in North Korea likely began around April 15, weeks before the official announcement.

“Even if the vaccines were to arrive now, it would take at least a month for both doses to get to the arms of people and for the full protective effects to kick in,” he said. “By that time, omicron will have already have peaked and done its damage.”

Rather, what was more urgently needed were treatments including antivirals and anti-inflammatory drugs to stop people from becoming very sick as well as basic over-the-counter medications like fever reducers, he said.

The lack of access to essential medicines may force North Koreans to resort to nonmedical alternatives.

North Korea’s state-operated daily Rodong Sinmun on Sunday ran a story about home remedies for COVID-19 symptoms, recommending honey for cough, willow tea leaf for other mild symptoms and ventilating the room for breathlessness.

Dr. Paik Soon-young, a virologist at Catholic University of Korea, agreed that the omicron outbreak in North Korea has grown past a size containable through vaccination.
“The 300,000-something cases a day now being reported in North Korea is comparable to the 600,000 daily cases logged at the peak of South Korea’s omicron surge in March, seeing that our population is roughly double theirs,” he told The Korea Herald.
Paik said North Korea would still need the vaccines to fend off possible second and third waves of infection coming their way. “Easily storable vaccines like Novavax might be better suited for use there than the mRNA types,” he said.

Throughout the pandemic North Korea has refused international offers of vaccines and other assistance.

In a phone call with The Korea Herald, North Korea-trained physician Dr. Choi Jung-hun said North Korea does not have the cold chain supply or the capacity to monitor adverse events that are necessary to carry out a population-wide vaccine campaign.

Similarly, the ruling People Power Party Rep. Tae Young-ho, a former North Korean senior ambassador to the United Kingdom, said in a series of Facebook posts that COVID-19 support to North Korea should be provided in the form of a “full package” to be of meaningful help.

“This means not only sufficient amount of vaccine doses to inoculate enough of the population, but the infrastructure to store and deliver them,” he said.

By Kim Arin (arin@heraldcorp.com)
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · May 17, 2022

16. Pyongyang criticizes Yoon for rehashing old-school North Korea policy

No surprise.

Pyongyang criticizes Yoon for rehashing old-school North Korea policy
koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · May 17, 2022
Propaganda website says Yoon’s North Korea policy reminiscent of Lee Myung-bak’s ‘Vision 3000’ policy
Published : May 17, 2022 - 18:53 Updated : May 17, 2022 - 18:57
President Yoon Suk-yeol (Yonhap)

North Korea criticized South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol as a person who likes to “show off,” and said Yoon is rehashing an old-school North Korea policy, Tuesday.

Uriminjokkiri, one of the North’s propaganda websites, called Yoon a “manspreading ship owner” who solely pursues his own authority and pleasure, and bothers his subordinates by ordering the relocation of the presidential office and the residence.

The website also pointed how Yoon has “impertinently” proposed to North Korea that he would open the door for dialogue and establish a “bold plan” to improve the North’s economy and that, he is “reboiling“ the policy of former President Lee Myung-bak.

“Yoon likes to bluff, so he wanted to exercise his authority, it seems,” it said. “There is nothing new about what the ‘bold plan’ is, however deep we observe it. (Yoon’s speech) was merely a rewrite of Lee Myung-bak administration’s ‘Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness.’”

The North Korean propaganda website added that Lee’s North Korea policy was “thrown into a cesspit for being unscientific and hollow.”

Former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness,” is a formula in which Seoul promised to offer comprehensive aid to Pyongyang, to bring North Korea’s per capita income to $3,000 within 10 years on the premise that North Korea gives up its nuclear program. Lee served as president from 2008 to 2013.

The policy was firm on the idea that denuclearization of North Korea should come before any economic incentives and a lifting of international sanctions.

The reclusive regime appears to have put up its guard against the new administration.

From the couple of speeches delivered to the public since his inauguration on May 10, Yoon has shown a shift to a more hard-line North Korea policy from the previous Moon Jae-in administration.

Under his “bold” plan, Yoon had pledged to work together with the international community to provide significant improvements to North Korea’s economy and the lives of its people -- only if North Korea first takes practical steps for denuclearization.

While the framework -- to demand for Pyongyang’s actions first before providing any kind of incentives in return -- may appear to be similar to that of Lee’s Vision 3000 policy, what sets Yoon apart is his willingness to provide humanitarian aid.

Yoon has offered to make “unsparing” effort to support the COVID-19 situation in North Korea, as it has seen over a million cases of infections.

“The incumbent government appears to be strategically taking a shifting stance from (the North Korea policy of) the previous Moon Jae-in administration, to appeal to its conservative supporters,” Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification’s North Korea research division told The Korea Herald.

“So it would be important that the government makes firm of its priority for denuclearization.”

At the same time, the framework requiring the North’s initial actions on denuclearization may not be efficient, as North Korea has been rejecting the idea, and has been demanding for all negotiating parties to “reduce their actions on parts that can pose as security threats to the other side,” Hong added.

Jun Bong-geun, a national security and unification studies professor at Korea National Diplomatic Academy, explained that there are four pillars in North Korea policy that all administrations, whether they are conservatives or liberals, should operate, though the priorities may be different.

According to Jun, the four pillars consist of dialogue and cooperation with North Korea; denuclearization negotiation; international sanctions; and military deterrence against the North.

Yoon’s policy appears to lean toward nuclear deterrence, as it reflects the political stance of the country’s conservative bloc. But that does not mean the incumbent government would disregard the opportunity for inter-Korean talks or negotiations, Jun said.

By Jo He-rim (herim@heraldcorp.com)



17. Could Moon act as special envoy to North Korea?


Would Kim give him the time of day? The last time he let Moon speak to the Korean people in the north they liked what he had to say and it undermined decades of north Korean propaganda. I do not think he would accept him.

Could Moon act as special envoy to North Korea?
koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · May 17, 2022
Former South Korean president’s ‘friendly ties’ with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may play positive in talks with Pyongyang
Published : May 17, 2022 - 18:53 Updated : May 17, 2022 - 19:05
Former South Korean President Moon Jae-in (far right) pose with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (center) and the then US President Donald Trump in the truce border village of Panmunjom on June 30, 2019. (Cheong Wa Dae)

US President Joe Biden’s plans to meet former South Korean President Moon Jae-in during his visit to Seoul this weekend, have raised eyebrows, as Moon no longer holds office.

The schedule has prompted observers to speculate on the purpose of the meeting, with the possibility that Seoul and Washington are considering asking Moon to serve as an intermediary to North Korea among the most widely held expectations.

Former Unification Minister Chung Se-hyun said Biden was meeting Moon for a reason, as Moon has a “special relationship” with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un.

“President Biden is busy and would not meet (former) President Moon simply out of their friendship from the few summits they’ve held before,” Chung said in a local radio interview Monday, asserting that the meeting was “useful” for Biden.

“There are two people who are in a special relationship with Kim Jong-un, and they are (former US President Donald) Trump and Moon Jae-in.”

Since Biden would not be able to send former President Trump to Pyongyang as a special envoy, he is likely to consider Moon as a possible figure, Chung said.

Former presidents as intermediaries

Former President Moon held three rounds of bilateral summit talks with the North Korean leader Kim, two of which were held at the truce border village of Panmunjom, and one in the North Korean capital Pyongyang.

Despite how inter-Korean dialogue came to a standstill since 2019 -- the Hanoi Summit between then-US President Trump and Kim Jong-un failed to bring out a deal -- Moon and Kim exchanged personal letters in Moon’s last months. Their exchange continued right up to less than three weeks before Moon’s retirement.

Unification Minister Kwon Young-se has also said he “could review the idea” of sending former President Moon to Pyongyang as a special envoy when asked about the matter during his parliamentary confirmation hearing earlier this month.

There have been instances in the past where former US presidents visited Pyongyang in part to encourage dialogue between North Korea and the United States.

Amid high tensions, the late North Korean leader Kim Il-sung invited former US President Jimmy Carter in 1993 to act as an intermediary. While Carter was only visiting as a citizen and not representing the US government at the time, the meeting ultimately led to the establishment of the US-North Korea Agreed Framework in October 1994. According to the Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to freeze its plutonium enrichment program, among other actions.

Former US President Bill Clinton also visited the North to meet the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in August 2009, as he sought to win freedom for two jailed American journalists.

Strategic or friendship?

Experts were divided on the possibility of Moon acting as an intermediary for the Yoon administration.

“I believe the Korean government could have former President Moon play a role when the timing is right. Moon seems to have built personal ties with Kim Jong-un, and this kind of relationship may be helpful (for inter-Korean talks),” Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification’s North Korea research division told The Korea Herald.

“President Yoon Suk-yeol has also said he would open doors for dialogue with North Korea. So the timing would be important.”

At the same time, Biden’s meeting with Moon may also signal the US’ concerns over the relatively hawkish North Korean policies the conservative Yoon administration is presenting, Hong explained.

Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies also echoed Hong’s view. The US is already has too much on its plate -- the COVID-19 crisis, its strategic competition with China and the Ukraine War -- and would not want nuclear threats rising on the Korean Peninsula.

So when meeting with Moon, Biden would likely discuss Moon’s North Korea Peace Process which highlighted engagement with the North, and the downsides of the hard-line North Korea policy pursued by Yoon.

On the other hand, Jun Bong-geun, National Security and Unification Studies professor at Korea National Diplomatic Academy, said Biden’s meeting with Moon was not about more than a friendship that stems from their last summit in last May.

“In the last summit, (the two leaders) agreed to cooperate on an expansive industrial fields. ... and it was hailed as successful from parties across the aisle,” Jun told The Korea Herald.

While the US’ Democratic Party and South Korea’s Democratic Party -- Biden and Moon are affiliated the respective parties -- share similar North Korea policies, Biden would not be meeting Moon as to express his support for the former president’s North Korea strategy, Jun added.

“Besides, it is now the duty of the Yoon administration, not the former government, to handle North Korean issues.”

Biden is set to arrive in Seoul on Friday and hold his first summit with Yoon the next day. He is also reportedly planning to meet with Moon during the two-night trip.

By Jo He-rim (herim@heraldcorp.com)

18. How to Mend the Rift Between Japan and South Korea

Excerpts:

Finally, both governments need to make incremental progress toward resolving their trade disputes and historical disagreements. This process must be slow and deliberate, with all sides making compromises where possible and striving to maintain their credibility. Any new agreements on historical issues must also involve key stakeholders outside the government, such as wartime victims and civil society groups. Without broad-based support, any future deal will likely collapse—just like the 2015 comfort women agreement. Still, these issues need not hold the overall bilateral relationship hostage.

Both Japan and South Korea have much to gain from resetting their relationship. Together, Seoul and Tokyo can defend their shared interests far more effectively than either could alone—combining their respective strengths to address security, economic, health, climate, and other challenges. By doing so, they will generate benefits for themselves and for the broader regional and international community. Although the route ahead is bumpy, the destination will be well worth the journey.
How to Mend the Rift Between Japan and South Korea
Finding Common Ground on the China Threat and the War in Ukraine
May 17, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Kristi Govella and Bonnie Glaser · May 17, 2022
Ties between Japan and South Korea have sunk to historic lows in recent years. Although Japan’s colonial legacy and its behavior during World War II have long been a source of tension, relations began deteriorating markedly in 2018. That year, South Korean President Moon Jae-in closed a foundation established in 2015 to support the victims of Japanese wartime sexual slavery, and the South Korean Supreme Court ordered Japanese firms to compensate Korean plaintiffs who were subjected to forced labor during the war. The Japanese government, for its part, protested Moon’s decision and rejected the court ruling as inconsistent with the two countries’ 1965 normalization treaty.
Trade disputes soon followed. In 2019, Japan restricted the exports of three chemicals used by South Korean companies to produce semiconductors and subsequently removed South Korea from its whitelist of trusted countries for trade in sensitive materials. Tokyo cited security concerns when it announced these moves, but Seoul argued that the decisions constituted economic retaliation against South Korea. Relations have remained chilly ever since, with limited bilateral cooperation and periodic diplomatic flare-ups.
This rancorous situation seems poised to change, however, after nearly four years of friction. Both countries face intensifying threats from China and North Korea and are increasingly alarmed by the wider implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. With a new South Korean government now in office, both sides have an opportunity to wipe the slate clean. Still, although conditions are ripe for Japan and South Korea to finally move past their current stalemate, rapprochement will not be easy.
RIPE FOR A RESET
Despite their fractious history, Japan and South Korea are natural partners in many ways. Both share democratic values, deep economic ties, and close alliances with the United States. And both harbor growing concerns about China. Negative public sentiment toward Beijing is at an all-time high—in part because both states have faced off against Chinese economic coercion. Beijing targeted Tokyo in the aftermath of a 2010 incident near the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands), and it did the same to Seoul after South Korea’s 2016 decision to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system. In both cases, China lashed out with export bans, product boycotts, and import and tourism restrictions. The subsequent economic fallout underscored the risk of relying too heavily on Beijing. Since then, Seoul and Tokyo have worked to diversify their economies, with both paying increased attention to areas such as critical and emerging technologies. Economic security is now at the top of their agendas.
Japan and South Korea also share similar security concerns. Neither state wants an Indo-Pacific under Chinese hegemony, and both governments are watching Beijing’s military modernization efforts and increasingly assertive behavior in the South and East China Seas with concern. For Japan, in particular, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also exacerbated long-standing fears about potential Chinese military action in the region. According to one poll, 77 percent of Japanese respondents feared that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempted land grab could encourage a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.


A common assessment of a problem does not mean agreement on a solution.
The war in Ukraine has also indirectly magnified Japan and South Korea’s shared concerns about North Korea. Since the Russian invasion, North Korea has conducted a barrage of missile tests, including short-range hypersonic missiles and an intermediate-range ballistic missile, and its first intercontinental ballistic missile test since 2017. Moscow’s attack on a country that gave up its nuclear weapons will only intensify Pyongyang’s belief in the necessity of these weapons to deter potential aggression, fueling the North’s commitment to expanding its atomic arsenal. Although much of the world may be distracted from the Korean Peninsula at the moment, leaders in Japan and South Korea are following these developments closely.
Under these circumstances, a new government in Seoul represents an opportunity for both sides to begin improving relations. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has sent strong signals that he wants to make this happen. Yoon and those in his inner circle have said they are open to working with Japan on economic security, expanding trilateral security coordination with Japan and the United States, and participating in working groups of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad—a coalition composed of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. During a March 11 phone call, Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pledged to work together to strengthen ties and coordinate on North Korea. They agreed to hold a face-to-face meeting soon. A South Korean delegation also met with Kishida on April 26 to discuss bilateral issues and deliver a personal letter from Yoon. Kishida told the group that cooperation between the two countries is needed now more than ever.
NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT
Such shifts are important, but they aren’t enough to build significantly stronger ties on their own. Although both sides have a long history of shared security concerns, a common assessment of a problem does not mean agreement on a solution. Seoul and Tokyo both worry about China’s military buildup and its economic bullying of its neighbors, for instance, but their responses and willingness to tolerate Chinese ire often differ. And on North Korea, both countries fear threats from missiles and nuclear weapons, but past negotiations revealed differences in their priorities and desired outcomes. Tokyo, for instance, has long prioritized the return of Japanese citizens abducted by Pyongyang in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas North-South reunification remains an important issue in Seoul.
The Yoon administration is likely to narrow some of these policy gaps, and its openness to working with Tokyo is vital. But many in Japan still remember the high hopes that were dashed by the previous attempt at reconciliation. In 2015, then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and then South Korean President Park Geun-hye struck a deal to “finally and irreversibly” resolve the fraught legacy of comfort women—Korean women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese army during World War II. Under the deal, Japan contributed one billion yen to the victim-support foundation that the Moon administration later closed in 2018. The agreement, however, was unpopular from the moment both governments announced it, and it unraveled after Park’s impeachment in 2017 on corruption charges. Japanese leaders are not eager to repeat that experience, and some still feel the effects of so-called Korea fatigue—a sense that South Korean leaders too often dredge up the past for political gain. Many in Tokyo welcome the Yoon administration’s positive approach, but there is also a strong sense that future agreements must involve credible commitments if they are to stand the test of time.
These problems have no easy solutions. They will continue to entangle Japanese and South Korean domestic politics and foreign policy. Although South Korea sees Japan as insufficiently apologetic for its past abuses, Japan is increasingly frustrated by demands for contrition and reparations that it feels are impossible to satisfy. For now, Tokyo and Seoul may be able to shelve historical disagreements to facilitate cooperation in other areas, but these issues are likely to come back to haunt the two countries if they remain unaddressed.
BETTER DAYS?
Despite these serious challenges, Seoul and Tokyo must seize this opportunity to improve relations. Greater cooperation with the United States and regional partners may be the most promising place to start. U.S. President Joe Biden’s May visits to Tokyo and Seoul provide an opportunity for Washington to help this process along. Biden is no stranger to the issue. As vice president, he rejected advice from his senior advisers and personally intervened in 2013 to begin laying the groundwork for a 2015 meeting between Abe and Park that was intended to repair bilateral ties. Beyond organizing a similar meeting between Kishida and Yoon, Biden should seek to convene a trilateral summit that would focus on areas of cooperation, including ways to address threats from China and North Korea. Japanese and South Korean leaders could also use their involvement in broader arrangements, such as the forthcoming Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and selective engagement with Quad working groups, to bolster cooperation.

Bilateral cooperation is likely to proceed more slowly, but shared concerns are a good place to begin. Both Japan and South Korea are working to reduce their dependence on China and bolster their economic security. As part of those efforts, they could promote cooperation on supply chain resilience, critical and emerging technologies, and post-pandemic economic revitalization while also coordinating to counter potential Chinese economic coercion. Recently concluded agreements with the United States and other countries on similar topics could act as useful templates. Both countries will also benefit from collaboration on a wide range of other issues such as pandemic preparedness, climate change, digital governance, infrastructure investment, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime security, cybersecurity, and outer space.
At home, Seoul and Tokyo should also begin building broad coalitions that support improving bilateral ties, including legislators, civil society organizations, and the general public. If rank-and-file politicians and citizens believe that the Japanese-Korean relationship is valuable, it will be easier for leaders to weather future trials and tribulations. Both sides have a lot of work to do, and negative sentiment remains prevalent. According to a 2021 poll, 63 percent of South Koreans had an unfavorable impression of Japan, while 49 percent of Japanese felt similarly about South Korea. The proportion of people who believe that relations with Korea are important has dropped from a peak of 74 percent in 2013 to 46 percent in 2021.

Japan and South Korea have much to gain from resetting their relationship.
But there are also reasons for hope. A majority of people in both countries feel that bilateral conflicts should be overcome or at least avoided. Although South Koreans tend to feel more negatively toward Japan than vice versa, 79 percent still believe that relations with Tokyo are important. Recent shifts may also make it easier for leaders to argue that the two countries share common interests. South Korean sentiment toward Japan has improved modestly over the last year, just as attitudes toward China have grown increasingly negative. As the pandemic recedes, the resumption of tourism and cultural exchanges may also play a role in warming relations. With these trends as a starting point, progress is possible if both sides make sincere efforts to engage civil society and communicate effectively. It will be difficult, but the two countries can find ways to repair damaged trust.
Finally, both governments need to make incremental progress toward resolving their trade disputes and historical disagreements. This process must be slow and deliberate, with all sides making compromises where possible and striving to maintain their credibility. Any new agreements on historical issues must also involve key stakeholders outside the government, such as wartime victims and civil society groups. Without broad-based support, any future deal will likely collapse—just like the 2015 comfort women agreement. Still, these issues need not hold the overall bilateral relationship hostage.
Both Japan and South Korea have much to gain from resetting their relationship. Together, Seoul and Tokyo can defend their shared interests far more effectively than either could alone—combining their respective strengths to address security, economic, health, climate, and other challenges. By doing so, they will generate benefits for themselves and for the broader regional and international community. Although the route ahead is bumpy, the destination will be well worth the journey.
Foreign Affairs · by Kristi Govella and Bonnie Glaser · May 17, 2022





V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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