Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the U.S.

Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy, June 06, 1962

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day

"Change your life today. Don't gamble on the future, act now, without delay."

– Simone de Beauvoir

“What a wonderful thought it is that some of the best days of our lives haven't even happened yet.”

– Anne Frank

“If you don't know, the thing to do is not to get scared, but to learn.”

– Ayn Rand

1. West Point deletes ‘duty, honor, country’ from mission statement - Critics see 'woke' attitudes at work as MacArthur's words edited out

2. House Passes B to Ban TikTok or Force Sale of the Chinese Video App

3. Biden Shrinks the U.S. Military

4. The U.S. Military Is Running Short on Ammunition—and So Is Ukraine

5. Haiti Is Facing an Insurgency, Not a Gang Problem

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2024

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 13, 2024

8. TikTok’s Security Threats Go Beyond the Scope of House Legislation

9. On the Tripwire of a ‘Red Line,’ It’s Often Presidents Who Trip

10. Hamas has been shattered. Now it is fighting to survive

11. Haiti’s Chaos Shows How Far U.S. Stability Efforts Have to Go

12. Report to Congress on General and Flag Officers

13. JFK's Funeral Was the Only State Burial in US History to Feature a Foreign Military Unit

14. Shipbuilding: the new battleground in the US-China trade war

15. Army 4-star eyes new opportunities, exercises focused on sustainment, logistics in Indo-Pacific

16. Army should permanently station armor brigade in Poland, report argues

17. U.S. expected to impose new sanctions against settler outposts in occupied West Bank

18. Sweden Scrambles to Intercept Russian Aircraft Within Hours of NATO Flag Raising

19. Philippines, US Should Revisit Treaty To Include China’s ‘Gray-Zone’ Tactics – Analysis

1. West Point deletes ‘duty, honor, country’ from mission statement - Critics see 'woke' attitudes at work as MacArthur's words edited out

See a conclusion? Jump to it. Is this the Army being "woke?" I think not. Scroll down to read the article in the above title. I am inserting another article with some other details and perspective (and my comments) to balance with the one below.

Here is another story that provides a little more perspective. It is not like "duty, honor country" has always been in the mission statement (first time in 1998) and the mission statement has been changed some 9 times over the years (like any good learning organization the Academy periodically updates its mission statement)

It does not appear that they are "throwing" out "duty, honor, country." I am reminded that the mission of the USMA is to educate and train Army officers. The Army values are the core values for all soldiers. The cadets need to be exposed to them and internalize them before they go to lead soldiers.

For those who are not familiar with them here they are:

Army CORE Values

LOYALTY
Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit and other Soldiers. Bearing true faith and allegiance is a matter of believing in and devoting yourself to something or someone. A loyal Soldier is one who supports the leadership and stands up for fellow Soldiers. By wearing the uniform of the U.S. Army you are expressing your loyalty. And by doing your share, you show your loyalty to your unit.
DUTY
Fulfill your obligations. Doing your duty means more than carrying out your assigned tasks. Duty means being able to accomplish tasks as part of a team. The work of the U.S. Army is a complex combination of missions, tasks and responsibilities — all in constant motion. Our work entails building one assignment onto another. You fulfill your obligations as a part of your unit every time you resist the temptation to take “shortcuts” that might undermine the integrity of the final product.
RESPECT
Treat people as they should be treated. In the Soldier’s Code, we pledge to “treat others with dignity and respect while expecting others to do the same.” Respect is what allows us to appreciate the best in other people. Respect is trusting that all people have done their jobs and fulfilled their duty. And self-respect is a vital ingredient with the Army value of respect, which results from knowing you have put forth your best effort. The Army is one team and each of us has something to contribute.
SELFLESS SERVICE
Put the welfare of the nation, the Army and your subordinates before your own. Selfless service is larger than just one person. In serving your country, you are doing your duty loyally without thought of recognition or gain. The basic building block of selfless service is the commitment of each team member to go a little further, endure a little longer, and look a little closer to see how he or she can add to the effort.
HONOR
Live up to Army values. The nation’s highest military award is The Medal of Honor. This award goes to Soldiers who make honor a matter of daily living — Soldiers who develop the habit of being honorable, and solidify that habit with every value choice they make. Honor is a matter of carrying out, acting, and living the values of respect, duty, loyalty, selfless service, integrity and personal courage in everything you do.
INTEGRITY
Do what’s right, legally and morally. Integrity is a quality you develop by adhering to moral principles. It requires that you do and say nothing that deceives others. As your integrity grows, so does the trust others place in you. The more choices you make based on integrity, the more this highly prized value will affect your relationships with family and friends, and, finally, the fundamental acceptance of yourself.
PERSONAL COURAGE
Face fear, danger or adversity (physical or moral). Personal courage has long been associated with our Army. With physical courage, it is a matter of enduring physical duress and at times risking personal safety. Facing moral fear or adversity may be a long, slow process of continuing forward on the right path, especially if taking those actions is not popular with others. You can build your personal courage by daily standing up for and acting upon the things that you know are honorable.

What is wrong with the above values? They are not some "woke" construct as they have been around since well before "woke" became a popular term of derision.

Excerpts:

However, Gilland wrote, "Our responsibility to produce leaders to fight and win our nation's wars requires us to assess ourselves regularly."

Gilland went on to recount that the academy had engaged in an 18-month review of its purpose and strategy, working with West Point leaders and stakeholders. It then recommended the mission statement change to the Army's top leadership.

He noted that both Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George approved the change.

Gilland argued that Army values "include Duty and Honor and Country."

He pointed out that the academy's mission statement has changed nine times in the last century, and that Duty, Honor, Country was first added in 1998.

He concluded saying the school's "absolute focus" remains developing leaders of character for the Army.

As a 1989 graduate of West Point, I can confirm the mission statement did not include "Duty, Honor, Country" while I was there, and it certainly didn't change the value I place on those words.

...

"Duty, Honor, Country is foundational to the United States Military Academy's culture and will always remain our motto," he wrote. "It defines who we are as an institution and as graduates of West Point."

"These three hallowed words are the hallmark of the cadet experience and bind the Long Gray Line together across our great history."

https://www.westernjournal.com/west-point-changes-mission-statement-removing-values-duty-honor-country/

West Point Changes Mission Statement, Removing Values 'Duty, Honor, Country'

By Randy DeSoto March 13, 2024 at 4:13am

In a move sure to worry many that the venerable two-century-old West Point is going woke, Superintendent Lt. Gen. Steve Gilland announced Monday a change in the institution's mission statement.

The phrase "duty, honor, country" is out — exchanged for the more amorphous "Army values."

The United States Military Academy's previous mission statement was: "To educate, train and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the nation as an officer in the United States Army."

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The new mission statement, according to a news release from the academy, is: "To build, educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets to be commissioned leaders of character committed to the Army Values and ready for a lifetime of professional excellence and service to the Army and Nation."

In a message addressed to "West Point Teammates," Gilland addressed the reason for the change.

Trending: Man at Border Allegedly Racks Pistol and Levels It at Innocent's Head; Then Everyone Hears a Single Distant Shot, And the Punk Drops

"These three hallowed words are the hallmark of the cadet experience and bind the Long Gray Line together across our great history."

However, Gilland wrote, "Our responsibility to produce leaders to fight and win our nation's wars requires us to assess ourselves regularly."

He noted that both Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George approved the change.

Gilland argued that Army values "include Duty and Honor and Country."

He pointed out that the academy's mission statement has changed nine times in the last century, and that Duty, Honor, Country was first added in 1998.

Related: US Army Cutting Force By Thousands After Recruitment Failures, Leaving Biden in a Bad Spot

He concluded saying the school's "absolute focus" remains developing leaders of character for the Army.

As a 1989 graduate of West Point, I can confirm the mission statement did not include "Duty, Honor, Country" while I was there, and it certainly didn't change the value I place on those words.

My time at the academy happened to fall on the 25th anniversary of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's last speech to the Corps of Cadets, titled, "Duty, Honor, Country." He had been superintendent of the institution for three years after his return to the U.S. from service in World War I and chief of staff of the Army in the 1930s.

MacArthur went on to iconic World War II status, fulfilling his famous pledge, "I shall return," to the Philippines, given in the early dark days of the conflict when Japanese forces took the Pacific country.

At the end of the war, MacArthur was named supreme allied commander, overseeing the surrender of Japan in Tokyo Harbor and then the military occupation of the nation, which he helped shepherd to a constitutional democracy.

So the retired five-star general brought all this history and more when he spoke to West Point's cadets in May 1962 for the last time, exhorting them to live up to the academy's motto: Duty, Honor, Country.

On the speech's 25th anniversary in 1987, the entire Corps of Cadets, 4,000-strong, assembled in West Point's Eisenhower Hall to watch a movie of MacArthur's speech put to scenes from his legendary life. MacArthur died in 1980.

To my amazement, an announcement came over the public address system shortly before the movie began: "All rise as Mrs. General Douglas MacArthur enters the room."

His wife Jean MacArthur, 88 at the time, who served right alongside him in the Philippines in World War II, joined us! She would live to be 101, dying in January 2000.

Also on post in 1987 were members of the faculty who had been cadets when MacArthur delivered the speech. They later told me you could have heard a pin drop when the general spoke, because the audience was in such rapt attention.

As a new cadet during basic training at the academy, you had to memorize a portion of the speech, which goes, "Duty, Honor, Country: Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying points: to build courage when courage seems to fail; to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith; to create hope when hope becomes forlorn."

Later in the speech the general said: "Duty, Honor, Country. The code which those words perpetuate embraces the highest moral laws and will stand the test of any ethics or philosophies ever promulgated for the uplift of mankind. Its requirements are for the things that are right, and its restraints are from the things that are wrong.

"The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training — sacrifice.

"In battle and in the face of danger and death, he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when he created man in his own image. No physical courage and no brute instinct can take the place of the Divine help which alone can sustain him."

The general closed by telling the cadets, "In the evening of my memory, always I come back to West Point. Always there echoes and re-echoes: Duty, Honor, Country."

Hopefully, the same will be true for today's West Point cadets, even with "Duty, Honor, Country" no longer in the mission statement

West Point deletes ‘duty, honor, country’ from mission statement

Critics see 'woke' attitudes at work as MacArthur's words edited out

By Bill Gertz and Mike Glenn - The Washington Times - Wednesday, March 13, 2024

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

A cadet walks through campus at the United States Military Academy in West Point, N.Y., Wednesday, Nov. 29, 2023. (AP Photo/Peter K. Afriyie) A cadet walks through campus at … more >

By and Mike Glenn - The Washington Times - Wednesday, March 13, 2024

The U.S. Military Academy at West Point has removed the words “Duty, Honor, Country” from its mission statement in what some critics say reflects the deepening politicization within the military services under President Biden.

The mission statement until recently included the three words made famous in retired Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s 1962 farewell address to West Point cadets. The storied World War II and Korean War commander died two years later. MacArthur’s address gave new prominence to the motto adopted by West Point in 1898, five years before he graduated from the academy.

Lt. Gen. Steve W. Gilland, West Point superintendent, outlined the new mission statement this week. It says cadets will be grounded in “Army values,” including loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage.

The superintendent sent a letter Monday to the “Long Gray Line” and all academy supporters about the change. He noted that it had the approval of Army Secretary Christine E. Wormuth and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George. “Duty, Honor, Country” remains the service’s official motto.

“Duty, Honor, Country is foundational to the United States Military Academy’s culture and will always remain our motto,” Gen. George wrote. The change in the wording of the mission statement was prompted by a requirement to “assess ourselves regularly.”

“Thus, over the past year and a half, working with leaders from across West Point and external stakeholders, we reviewed our vision, mission and strategy to serve this purpose,” he wrote.

“As a result of this assessment, we recommended the following mission statement to our senior Army leadership: ‘To build, educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets to be commissioned leaders of character committed to the Army Values and ready for a lifetime of service to the Army and Nation.’”

The letter ended with “Go Army! Duty Honor Country!”

The change is likely to fan a controversy over the state of the military under Mr. Biden and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Republicans in Congress have accused them of imposing “woke” social ideas on the Army and other military services at the expense of patriotic traditions and traditional warfighting values.

Army Col. Terence M. Kelley, an academy spokesman, declined to specify why the three words were taken out of the mission statement other than to note that it was part of an effort for an “evolving” statement.

“Our mission statement has changed over the past century as our motto has remained constant; change does not have to mean woke politics,” Col. Kelley said in an email.

Mottos and ideology

The shift in statement was first disclosed by Armed Forces Press, which quoted information from the MacArthur Society of West Point Graduates, a patriotic group. The society criticized the change as a symptom of a larger problem for the Army and the military as a whole.

“Like in many great institutions in the United States of America, progressive ideology is eroding away at West Point and doing so in a slow but methodical march, co-opting our good intentions through the specter of cultural Marxism,” the group said. “Our adversaries are unscrupulous but sophisticated and very patient.”

Col. Dave Butler, a spokesman for Gen. George, said in a statement that the chief of staff “agreed that the [new] mission statement aligned with the actual mission of West Point” while noting that the phrase “Duty, Honor, Country” had been part of the West Point mission statement only since 1998.

Gen. George “did not see the revised mission statement as removing ‘Duty, Honor, Country’ from the soul of West Point,” Col. Butler said. “It still exists as their motto. It is still prominent in the culture of West Point, and that will never change.”

Meaghan Mobbs, a West Point graduate and former Army officer, called the new mission statement “a warning sign that should make everyone sit up and take notice.”

The statement is an example of the “watering down of the West Point experience,” said Ms. Mobbs, who has worked with veterans organizations and other nonprofits since leaving the military.

“They are saying the quiet part out loud. West Point is losing its comparative advantage,” she said. “The federal service academies must distinguish themselves from the senior military colleges and broader ROTC. I believe this is also indicative of the broader challenges facing recruitment and retention within our military.”

MacArthur said in his farewell address that duty, honor, country should be revered values for the Army’s future leaders.

“Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be,” he said. “They are your rallying point to build courage when courage seems to fail, to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith, to create hope when hope becomes forlorn.

“The unbelievers will say they are but words, but a slogan, but a flamboyant phrase,” MacArthur said. “Every pedant, every demagogue, every cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and, I am sorry to say, some others of an entirely different character, will try to downgrade them even to the extent of mockery and ridicule.”

The MacArthur Society posted briefing slides from a West Point board of visitors meeting on March 7, when Gen. Gilland revealed the plan to revise the mission statement.

The new mission statement is described in the slide as “Army Senior Leader Approved.” It states that the goal is “to build, educate, train and inspire the Corps of Cadets to be commissioned leaders of character committed to the Army Values and ready for a lifetime of service to the Army and Nation.”

The senior leader behind the change was not identified by name.

Retired Army Lt. Col. Joseph Myers, a 1981 West Point graduate, said the change in the mission statement reflects a larger problem of military recruiting and retaining valuable officers.

The problems are the result of emphasizing such policies of diversity, equity and inclusion and critical race theory, he said.

“No matter how the West Point mission statement is crafted, the real question, issue and problem is retention rates of Academy graduates for a lifetime career of service to the Army,” Col. Myers said. “I think the public expects more and better of their investment.”

The focus on nonmilitary values and policies “is likely seriously impacting retention rates and Army officer career inspiration and aspirations,” he said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

• Mike Glenn can be reached at mglenn@washingtontimes.com.

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washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

2. House Passes Bill to Ban TikTok or Force Sale of the Chinese Video App

While sitting around a campfire this evening with my Korean, Japanese, Chinese and American friends (on a retreat for 4 days in the Shenandoah Mountains working on a strategy for a free and unified Korea) we discussed this vote. One of my colleagues reminded us that TikTok (along with free speech) is banned in China. He suggested that we should tell TikTok (and China ) that if China lifts its ban on TikTok and all social media platforms and allows free speech then we will not ban TikTok. Of course that is really a pipe dream but he did make the point we ought to call out China for its ban and for its lack of free speech (and press, religion, etc) as a matter of routine every time these issues arise.

Another mentioned that when we ban it we will join the only other countries in the world tha ban, China, north Korea, and Iran.

Another point is that one of the reasons for the ban is that it is a national security threat. But when I talk to young people they ask how can we prove it is a national security threat? How do we convince some 180 million Ameiricans who use TikTok that it is both a national security threat and a personal threat to them because of their exposed data? They do not trust the word of the US government.

Which brings me to the ultimate irony (and the upside down world we live in). They would rather trust TikTok (and the Chinese Communist Party) with their data but they would not trust the US government with it. (I would be simply satisfied if they trusted no government).

House Passes Bill to Ban TikTok or Force Sale of the Chinese Video App

Lawmakers try to balance national-security and free-speech concerns, with Senate showdown ahead

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/tiktok-bill-ban-house-vote-af4d0800?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Natalie Andrews

and Kristina Peterson

Updated March 13, 2024 7:00 pm ET

TikTok Ban Bill Passes in House, Faces Uncertain Future in Senate

Biden Shrinks the U.S. Military

The President’s Pentagon budget reveals the armed forces in a state of managed decline.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-defense-budget-pentagon-u-s-military-china-russia-israel-ukraine-ba7fd46b?mod=hp_trending_now_opn_pos2

By The Editorial Board

March 12, 2024 6:33 pm ET

The Pentagon PHOTO: JOSHUA ROBERTS/REUTERS

President Biden opened his State of the Union address last week invoking Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941. This week he rolled out a military budget fit for 1991, the twilight of the Cold War. Will Congress step up to defend the country amid compounding threats?

The President’s $850 billion request for the Pentagon in 2025 is a mere 1% increase over 2024. That’s a cut after inflation, the fourth in a row Mr. Biden has proposed. What’s happened in the past year? Israel was brutally attacked and is now fighting a war for survival. Iranian proxies have fired drones and rockets at U.S. troops in the region more than 100 times, and its terrorists in Yemen have taken a global shipping lane hostage.

Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine is a bloody slog that he could still win. North Korea is ratcheting up its belligerence toward South Korea, which the U.S. is bound to defend. China announced recently a 7.2% increase in defense spending. One recent think-tank report estimates Beijing is fielding high-end equipment five to six times faster than the U.S.

Mr. Biden thinks this is an acceptable moment to put American defenses on a diet, and the Administration says it’s merely complying with budget caps negotiated last year with Congress. Yet few priorities escaped the axe.

The U.S. Army will contract, and not because America is relying less on land forces, which are in high demand in Europe and the Middle East. The Army is asking for 442,300 troops, though the Biden Administration requested 485,000 as recently as 2022. The healthier number for the missions required is 500,000. Shrinking the force is no substitute for fixing the underlying problem, which is a struggle to find recruits.

The U.S. Navy will purchase only six ships and retire 10 early, which would shrink the fleet to 287 ships in 2025 from 296 today. Perhaps the most egregious choice is the Administration’s decision to purchase only one Virginia-class attack submarine, instead of a planned two.

U.S. submarine technology is a crown jewel of American military power and a true advantage over a rapidly expanding Chinese naval fleet. The industrial base is struggling to produce two boats a year, and the Administration presents its decision as a concession to this incapacity.

Yet buying only one boat is a terrible signal for capital investment, and it tells adversaries that the U.S. isn’t serious about rearming. The U.S. needs to build 2.3 subs a year to meet the Navy’s needs while also supplying subs to Australia under the Aukus pact. A serious Commander in Chief would seek to expand that industrial base, not meekly succumb to it.

Remember the news only weeks ago that Russia is fielding anti-satellite weapons that threaten the U.S. homeland? The U.S. needs to diversify and harden its satellites in space, yet the Biden budget would cut the Space Force by $600 million over last year’s request. That is 2% of the force’s budget, even as the services will have to finance a proposed 4.5% pay increase for troops.

The larger picture presented by this budget is that the U.S. military is in a state of managed decline. U.S. defense spending falls to a projected 2.4% of the economy in 2034, down from an estimated 3.1% this year, which is half the nearly 6% spent during the 1980s when the U.S. was rearming to win the Cold War.

Interest on the national debt will cost more than the U.S. spends on defense this year, and the gap will continue to widen. The federal government gives more cash to state and local governments (e.g., Medicaid money) than it spends on its own defense. These are the priorities of a peacetime welfare state, not a nation serious about defending itself in a world of determined enemies and new technology that will put the U.S. at increasing risk.

Congress will have to deal with the budget deficiencies, perhaps in a supplemental bill later this year. Yet Congress has been mired in so much dysfunction that both chambers haven’t been able to pass an appropriation even for fiscal 2024 for the Pentagon. The political class in Washington is failing at its most important obligation, which is providing for the nation’s defense.

WSJ Opinion: Lessons on Low-Cost Deterrence and Drones From Ukraine

The U.S. Military Is Running Short on Ammunition—and So Is Ukraine

If Congress fails to pass a national security supplemental funding bill, Ukraine will be getting fewer bullets.

By Jack Detsch

Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch

United States
Jack Detsch

March 13, 2024, 4:21 PM

The U.S. Army will be forced to cut its artillery production target by more than a quarter if Congress fails to pass the national security supplemental that provides military aid to Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel as well as weapons to replenish U.S. stockpiles, military officials said on Tuesday.

“Bottom line is that short of the supplement that we will end up hitting a ceiling,” said Maj. Gen. Joe Hilbert, the Army’s director of force development, in a briefing on Tuesday. “Without the supplemental, we will cap out at about 72,000 [rounds] a month.”

A little more than $3 billion of the total $106 billion supplemental request bill—which has been debated over in Congress for nearly five months, although it passed in the Senate in mid-February—would go toward buying more 155 mm artillery shells and building new production facilities, including in California, Virginia, and Tennessee. General Dynamics is planning to open three artillery production lines in Mesquite, Texas, to provide for the growing demand.

In fighting the largest land war in Europe since World War II, Russia has expended between 12 to 17 million rounds of artillery ammunition since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago; the astronomical rates of fire have been used to dislodge entrenched defenses and spur advances on both sides.

The U.S. defense industrial base has more than doubled its output of 155 mm artillery ammunition since December 2022. U.S. companies are currently producing about 30,000 shells a month, and the Army hopes to increase that tally to 60,000 rounds per month by September 2024, and to 100,000 rounds per month by the end of 2025.

“We’ve got two issues in terms of defense budgets,” said Jeb Nadaner, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for industrial policy. “One is the orders you place, in a year’s budget. But the other one is, can the industrial base produce it? And the base is really creaky.”

Artillery is not the only major weapons capability that the Pentagon is hoping to build up. The supplemental also includes plans to boost production for U.S.-made Patriot air defense interceptors to 650 per year, about a 15 percent increase. Ukraine operates a handful of the U.S.-built air defense systems. The supplemental also provides funding for a TNT factory that would provide explosives for artillery rounds and other weapons systems, Gabe Camarillo, the undersecretary of the Army, told reporters earlier in March. The bill also includes $3.4 billion in funding for the flagging U.S. submarine industry.

With no U.S. artillery ammunition arriving in Ukraine since December, Kyiv has tried to build more weapons of its own. The U.S. Army has already awarded contracts to American companies to help assemble and fabricate every piece of a 155 mm round—which, at about 6 inches at the base, includes energetic explosives such as TNT, primers, fuses, artillery charges, propellants to ignite the cannons, and the projectile itself. Ukrainian officials have said that they can fabricate projectiles, and multiple U.S. companies have agreed to produce explosives and propellants on Ukrainian soil, but Ukrainian officials say that Kyiv can’t build charges on its own.

Ukraine has received about 300 artillery weapons capable of firing 155 mm rounds since the start of the war—nearly half of them coming from the United States—ranging from U.S.-made M777 howitzer cannons to French Caesar guns and self-propelled German Panzerhaubitze.

But with rounds supplied by U.S. producers dwindling, European countries are turning to ad hoc solutions to keep Ukrainian guns firing. NATO has signed a $1.2 billion artillery ammunition contract to procure rounds on behalf of Belgium, Lithuania, and Spain. The European Union—which is months late on its target of producing 1 million artillery shells by the start of this month—is hoping to get to 1.4 million shells produced by the end of the year. But short of that, a Czech-led initiative has sought to source 800,000 rounds of artillery ammo from outside the European Union for Ukraine.

And while European officials are confident that they can continue the upward trajectory for artillery ammunition production and other weapons needed to help the Ukrainians, such as air defense projectiles, they insist that they can’t do it without the United States, which has a larger overall defense industrial base.

“We physically don’t have the weapons that are needed at the front,” said Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, at a breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor in Washington on Tuesday. If the aid package doesn’t arrive, Sikorski said, NATO’s eastern flank will likely need to be reinforced with more U.S. troops, to head off a possible further westward assault from the Russians.

The United States has also had to turn to accounting tricks. On Tuesday, Pentagon officials said that they had cobbled together a new $300 military aid package for Ukraine using savings from Army contracts that had run under budget.

Ukraine is down to firing less than 2,000 rounds per day, down from around 6,000 per day last summer. Researchers estimate that Ukraine needs to fire at least 75,000 rounds a month—more than its current rates—to keep up a defensive war. Without enough rounds, U.S. defense officials say, Ukraine could be pushed back.

“Just look at what’s happening on the battlefield today around Avdiivka and other places,” a senior U.S. defense official told reporters on Tuesday, referring to a Ukrainian city that recently fell to Russian forces. “Ukrainians are struggling without ammunition.”

Still, Washington’s artillery shell production goal for the end of next year is less than half of what Russia is producing right now. And Russia’s economy, which has been converted to mobilize for war, is outproducing countries on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean all on its own. CNN reported on Monday that Russia was on track to produce three times more munitions than the United States and Europe combined this year.

And the Biden administration’s massive $850 billion defense budget plan would cut the amount of money that the Pentagon is pledging to build up training grounds and stage U.S. troops on NATO’s eastern flank. Those cuts are due to the U.S. military’s desire to focus on preparations for a future conflict with China, said Maj. Gen. Charles Lombardo, the director of training for the Army’s deputy chief of staff, during a press call on Tuesday.

“China, North Korea, Iran, Russia—they don’t have many problems producing things out of their defense industrial base. They are producing unbelievable quantities,” said Nadaner, the former U.S. defense official. “If you look at the United States and its allies, we can’t produce enough shells, we can’t produce enough ships, we can’t produce enough submarines. The system can’t produce much.”

Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch

5. Haiti Is Facing an Insurgency, Not a Gang Problem

The headline caught my eye. I am not informed well enough on Haiti to make a sound judgement but I fear for some that all instability is the result of an insurgency and all we need to do is conduct sound (or enlightened) COIN operations. Some people think COIN is the hammer for every nail of violence.

Of course it is probably not simply a gang problem either but is it an insurgency? What is really causing Haiti to be the long failed state that it is?

Excerpt:

These rapidly escalating developments should prompt the international community to speak about Haiti’s crisis in clearer terms. The country is experiencing not just an uptick in gang violence—as the U.N. mandate for the new security mission characterizes it—but a full-blown insurgency. Pretending otherwise will doom any intervention before it has begun. In framing Haiti’s situation as a mere gang problem, global actors risk committing to an ill-prepared and ill-fated intervention that will fail to secure the country and needlessly endanger those deployed—ultimately exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

If there is no Haitian led solution to the problem then COIN is not the answer. What the author is actually proposing is occupation and pacification. That is not COIN but that might take a nuanced understanding of the situation (note sarcasm).

Except:

It is undeniable that Haiti is a failed state. That means there is no Haitian-led solution to the country’s turmoil forthcoming. The Haitian government, and by extension its laws, has lost authority; armed groups have overrun Port-au-Prince and are expanding across the country. The only practical goal of an international intervention would be to reverse this situation and reassert control of the country through direct confrontation with armed groups—setting aside the fraught question of determining trustworthy local stakeholders to reconstitute a government. This is the work of soldiers, not police. Retaking territory and neutralizing enemy combatants are military actions.

Haiti Is Facing an Insurgency, Not a Gang Problem

Pretending otherwise will doom any intervention before it has begun.

By Alexander Causwell, a fellow at the Caribbean Policy Research Institute in Kingston, Jamaica.

Foreign Policy · by Alexander Causwell

Military
Security

March 13, 2024, 3:33 PM

For the past four and a half years, Haiti’s internal security has steadily deteriorated. In 2019, the United Nations concluded 15 years of peacekeeping operations in the country, which had been initiated to address growing instability in the wake of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s 2004 ouster. Under the U.N. mission, an estimated 10,000 international nongovernmental organizations channeled foreign aid into Haiti to help support its social services. But the U.N.’s departure forced many aid groups to withdraw, spiraling the country into social unrest once again.

The 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse was the most visible harbinger—and catalyst—of impending state collapse. That foreign mercenaries managed to kill the president, as both Haitian officials and U.S. prosecutors allege, was itself a signal of Haiti’s eroded internal security. De facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry then assumed control of the government without a roadmap to new elections. Henry’s lack of legitimacy made him unpopular and further compromised the country’s stability.

Now, the Haitian state has functionally disintegrated. Henry traveled to Nairobi in late February to secure Kenya’s leadership of a new U.N.-authorized Multinational Security Support mission for Haiti. But his absence from Port-au-Prince undermined the prospects of the planned intervention by emboldening gangs that already controlled most of the capital to make further advances.

Jimmy Chérizier, who leads the G9 Family and Allies gang and is known by his nom de guerre, “Barbecue,” apparently orchestrated a mass prison break in Port-au-Prince, freeing upward of 4,000 prisoners. This faction has claimed responsibility for attacks on government institutions, including Toussaint Louverture International Airport, the apparent aim of which was to prevent Henry’s return. Chérizier declared his intent to oust Henry, threatening “civil war” and “genocide” unless the leader resigned. The Haitian National Police, whose ranks have dwindled from around 9,000 to an estimated 5,000 over the past two years, is losing ground daily.

After an emergency Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) meeting in Jamaica on Monday, Henry announced his resignation and vowed to step down after the installation of a CARICOM-mandated transitional council. Henry was not present at the meeting and remains in Puerto Rico, where he diverted his plane after being unable to land in Haiti or the Dominican Republic.

These rapidly escalating developments should prompt the international community to speak about Haiti’s crisis in clearer terms. The country is experiencing not just an uptick in gang violence—as the U.N. mandate for the new security mission characterizes it—but a full-blown insurgency. Pretending otherwise will doom any intervention before it has begun. In framing Haiti’s situation as a mere gang problem, global actors risk committing to an ill-prepared and ill-fated intervention that will fail to secure the country and needlessly endanger those deployed—ultimately exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

The Kenyan-led U.N. mission to Haiti was predicated on the view that the country required assistance in suppressing gang violence to restore public order. As a result, the current U.N.-backed plan, largely financed by the United States, entails Kenya leading the force with a contingent of 1,000 Kenyan police officers. Several CARICOM states, as well as Bangladesh, Chad, and Benin, have pledged to send personnel to supplement the Kenyan police, but their numbers and composition have yet to be finalized.

As the core—and only deployment-ready—force, the Kenyan contingent is wholly insufficient to provide any meaningful reinforcement to the Haitian National Police. It is also inappropriate to center the U.N. mission on policing when Haiti’s situation clearly requires a military response.

Police officers enforce laws under governments that hold the monopoly on violence in their respective territories. When nonstate armed groups—whether one calls them gangs or insurgents—challenge that monopoly on violence by establishing control over territory claimed by the state, they nullify the law’s reach into that space. In these cases, a military intervention is necessary to reclaim lost territory and neutralize hostile forces.

The distinction between organized criminal groups and insurgency groups can be murky. Both employ violence to contest state control over territory. A growing body of strategic literature speaks to organized crime and insurgencies as variations of the singular phenomenon of organized violence. Narco-traffickers in Latin America, most recently in Ecuador, have so evidently confounded the distinction that analysts increasingly label them as “criminal insurgents.”

This nuance is often eschewed by academics, policymakers, and other stakeholders who remain hesitant to liken organized crime to insurgencies for both rhetorical and pragmatic reasons. Rhetorically, they concede the overlap in the modus operandi of gangs and insurgent groups but reserve the insurgency label for armed groups with stated political goals, as opposed to criminal groups, which are considered violent income-generating enterprises.

Regardless, Haiti’s most prominent and powerful gangs have issued political demands while also conducting operations against government officials, institutions, and infrastructure. These are the actions of insurgents carrying out urban warfare. Perhaps if a major gang donned fatigues and included the word “revolutionary” in its name, we would more readily acknowledge this reality.

States also hesitate to describe gangs as insurgent groups because doing so carries practical implications. Since gangs are conceived as criminal enterprises, countermeasures fall under the umbrella of justice and law enforcement; combating gangs, the argument goes, is the purview of the police and the courts. Declaring the existence of an insurgent group, by contrast, invokes the laws of war, a military response, and the concomitant resources and strategy.

It is undeniable that Haiti is a failed state. That means there is no Haitian-led solution to the country’s turmoil forthcoming. The Haitian government, and by extension its laws, has lost authority; armed groups have overrun Port-au-Prince and are expanding across the country. The only practical goal of an international intervention would be to reverse this situation and reassert control of the country through direct confrontation with armed groups—setting aside the fraught question of determining trustworthy local stakeholders to reconstitute a government. This is the work of soldiers, not police. Retaking territory and neutralizing enemy combatants are military actions.

For the moment, Kenya has paused its plan to deploy its police forces to Haiti until a transitional government has been established. This gives the international community an opportunity to rethink and reconfigure the requirements for the U.N.-backed security mission.

Unless CARICOM, the U.S. government, and all who have a say or stake in Haiti accept that we are facing an insurgency, not a gang problem, the prospects of resolving Haiti’s crisis remain dim. Haiti can only be brought under control by a military deployment operating under rules of engagement that recognize armed groups as combatants. Otherwise, anarchy will prevail, with attendant consequences for the people of Haiti and the security of the Caribbean Basin.

Foreign Policy · by Alexander Causwell

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2024

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian shortages of ammunition and other war materiel resulting from delays in the provision of US military assistance may be making the current Ukrainian front line more fragile than the relatively slow Russian advances in various sectors would indicate.
The rate of Russian advance west of Avdiivka has recently slowed, although Russian forces likely retain the capability to intensify offensive operations in the area at a moment of their choosing.
Ukrainian actors conducted large-scale drone strikes against energy infrastructure and military assets within Russia on the night of March 12 to 13.
The governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, claimed on March 13 that her recent meetings with Russian officials in Russia led to deepening economic ties between Gagauzia and Russia, which the Kremlin likely hopes to exploit as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova from joining the EU.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled another limited cross-border incursion by the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), and Siberian Battalion in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts on the night of March 12 and the morning of March 13.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline on March 13.
Russian authorities continue efforts to censor protests of wives and mothers of mobilized soldiers ahead of the Russian presidential election.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 13, 2024

Mar 13, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2024

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 13, 2024, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on March 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian shortages of ammunition and other war materiel resulting from delays in the provision of US military assistance may be making the current Ukrainian front line more fragile than the relatively slow Russian advances in various sectors would indicate. Ukrainian prioritization of the sectors most threatened by intensive Russian offensive operations could create vulnerabilities elsewhere that Russian forces may be able to exploit to make sudden and surprising advances if Ukrainian supplies continue to dwindle. Russia’s retention of the theater-wide initiative increases the risks of such developments by letting the Russian military command choose to increase or decrease operations anywhere along the line almost at will.

German outlet Der Spiegel published interviews with unnamed Ukrainian commanders on March 12 who stated that almost all Ukrainian units and formations have to husband ammunition and materiel because of the overall ammunition shortage and that some Ukrainian units with limited ammunition and materiel can only hold their current positions if Russian forces do not “attack with full force.”[1] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi warned that there is a threat of Russian units advancing deep into Ukrainian formations in unspecified areas of the frontline.[2]

Ukrainian forces are likely attempting to mitigate problems caused by ammunition shortages by prioritizing the allocation of ammunition to sectors of the front facing larger-scale Russian offensive operations. The lower intensity of Russian offensive efforts against currently de-prioritized sectors likely obscures the risks to Ukrainian forces in those areas resulting from ammunition shortages. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have the theater-wide initiative and will be able to determine the time, location, and scale of offensive operations so long as they retain the initiative.[3] Syrskyi’s and the Ukrainian commanders' statements suggest that an intensification of Russian offensive operations in an area where Ukrainian forces have not prioritized allocating already limited ammunition supplies could lead to a Russian breakthrough and destabilization along a previously stable sector of the frontline in a short period of time. The current frontline is likely thus not stable, and timely Western resourcing of Ukrainian troops is essential to prevent Russia from identifying and exploiting an opportunity for a breakthrough on a vulnerable sector of the front.

The rate of Russian advance west of Avdiivka has recently slowed, although Russian forces likely retain the capability to intensify offensive operations in the area at a moment of their choosing. Russian forces seized Avdiivka on February 17 after roughly four months of attritional offensive efforts to take the settlement and proceeded to maintain a relatively high tempo of offensive operations in the area to exploit tactical opportunities initially offered by the Russian seizure of the settlement.[4] Russian forces made relatively quick tactical gains west of Avdiivka in late February and aimed to push as far west as possible before Ukrainian forces could establish more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines.[5] Ukrainian forces appear to have slowed Russian advances along positions near the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke line in early March, however, despite speculation that these positions would be insufficient to receive oncoming Russian offensive operations.[6] Russian forces likely sought to make the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (comprised of mainly Central Military District [CMD] and Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] elements) the exploitation force to take advantage of the seizure of Avdiivka.[7] The Russian military command likely intends for CMD elements to continue offensive efforts in the Avdiivka area in the near and medium term.[8]

The Central Grouping of Forces notably has yet to commit elements of select formations in the area to offensive operations west of Avdiivka as far as ISW has been able to observe.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously credited the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], CMD); 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 41st CAA, CMD); 1st, 9th, and 114th motorized rifle brigades and 1454th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 10th Tank Regiment (all of the 1st DNR Army Corps [AC]); and the 6th, 80th, and 239th tank regiments (all of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) with capturing Avdiivka.[10] Elements of the 2nd CAA’s 15th and 21st motorized rifle brigades, the DNR 1st AC’s 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the Russian “Veterany” private military company (PMC) also heavily participated in Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka beginning in October 2023.[11] ISW has observed reports of elements of all three of the 2nd CAA’s brigades; elements of the 41st CAA’s 55th and 35th motorized rifle brigades, and elements of the DNR’s 1st, 9th, 110th, and 114th motorized rifle brigades attacking northwest, west, or southwest of Avdiivka since February 17.[12] ISW has not observed reports of any elements of the 90th Tank Division committed to fighting following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka, however, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 2 that elements of the 90th Tank Division were reconstituting and resting in Horlivka (northeast of Avdiivka).[13] Mashovets stated on March 2 that the Russian military command committed elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade from reserve to offensive operations west of Avdiivka, although ISW has not observed wider subsequent reporting about the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade fighting in the area.[14]

Elements of the 90th Tank Division, the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the DNR’s 1454th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 10th Tank Regiment, and the “Veterany” PMC likely represent a sizeable uncommitted operational reserve that the Russian command can commit to continue and intensify efforts to push west of Avdiivka. These elements likely suffered heavy casualties in offensive operations between October 2023 and mid-February 2024, but a month or more of rest will likely allow Russian forces to replenish these elements and restore their degraded combat capabilities to the low-quality levels that Russian commanders appear willing to accept. ISW previously assessed that the Russian offensive effort in the Avdiivka area would eventually temporarily culminate at least until or unless Russian forces reinforced their attacking elements.[15] The Russian forces apparently reconstituting in the Avdiivka area can serve as operational reserves and let Russian forces prevent the culmination of their offensive operation and intensify efforts to push further west of Avdiivka, if or when the Russian command chooses to do so.

Russia’s theater-wide initiative in Ukraine will likely allow the Russian military command to dynamically reprioritize offensive operations throughout the frontline. The theater-wide initiative allows Russia to determine the location, time, intensity, and requirements of fighting along the frontline, and the flexibility this opportunity provides will allow the Russian military command to reprioritize efforts dynamically to take advantage of perceived opportunities occasioned by Ukrainian materiel shortages or other factors.[16] The reprioritization of offensive efforts and the commensurate transfer of materiel and manpower to various areas of the front can result in decreased offensive activity, operational pauses, or the temporary culmination of offensive operations in the area from which attacking forces are drawn. Substantial decreases in the tempo of offensive operations, operational pauses, or outright culmination are typically risky as they relieve pressure on defending forces and offer them opportunities to counterattack to regain the initiative in that sector of the frontline. The Russian military command may believe that delays in Western security assistance and growing Ukrainian materiel shortages will reduce these risks and allow Russian forces to reweight efforts without significant risk anywhere in the theater. Russian forces will continue to leverage the advantages of the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine, and ISW assesses that it would be unwise for Ukraine to cede this advantage to Russia for longer than is necessary, although continuing and increasing shortages of materiel will likely leave Ukraine with few choices.[17]

Ukrainian actors conducted large-scale drone strikes against energy infrastructure and military assets within Russia on the night of March 12 to 13. Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and RBC-Ukraine reported on March 13 that their Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources stated that SBU agents conducted drone strikes against oil refineries in Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, and Leningrad oblasts and military airfields in Buturlinovka and Voronezh City, Voronezh Oblast.[18] Ryazan Oblast Head Pavel Malkov confirmed that a drone struck the Ryazan oil refinery, starting a fire, and footage shows a plume of smoke rising from the oil refinery area.[19] At least three Ukrainian drones also targeted the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in Rostov Oblast, reportedly causing the refinery to temporarily stop operations.[20] Some Russian sources additionally claimed that one drone struck a Federal Security Service (FSB) regional building in Belgorod City, but Russian opposition media noted that Russian state media later deleted reports of this particular strike.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed 58 drones on the night of March 12 to 13: 11 over Belgorod Oblast; eight over Bryansk Oblast; 29 over Voronezh Oblast; eight over Kursk Oblast; one over Leningrad Oblast; and one over Ryazan Oblast.[22] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger reported that Ukrainian drones specifically targeted the Ryazannefteprodukt Rosneft refinery in Ryazan Oblast, the Kirishi Petroleum Organic Synthesis (KINEF) refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, and the Novoshakhtinsk refinery in Rostov Oblast, but claimed that Russian air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems destroyed and neutralized all the drones.[23] A Russian aviation-focused milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones mostly targeted military airfields in Voronezh Oblast.[24]

SBU sources told Suspilne that these strikes are intended to reduce Russia’s economic output and reduce oil revenue and fuel supplies that Russia uses directly for its war effort in Ukraine.[25] Ukrainian actors have continually conducted similar drone strikes against several major Russian oil refineries in 2024 thus far and successfully struck oil refineries in Krasnodar Krai and Volgograd Oblast in January and February.[26] Russian outlet Kommersant reported in February that Russian refineries reduced their output by 4 percent in January 2024 compared to the same period in 2024, and by 1.4 percent compared to December 2023.[27] Kommersant stated that this reduction was partially a result of increased drone attacks on refinery infrastructure. This reported decline in refinery production is not large, but it shows the potential for Ukraine to generate asymmetrical effects against critical Russian energy and military infrastructure by targeting high-value assets with a few relatively inexpensive drones.

The governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, claimed on March 13 that her recent meetings with Russian officials in Russia led to deepening economic ties between Gagauzia and Russia, which the Kremlin likely hopes to exploit as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova from joining the European Union (EU). Gutsul gave a briefing on her meetings in Russia during her visit from March 1 to 8.[28] Gutsul claimed that her meetings focused on three “key” topics that are of the “most concern” to the Gagauz people — a “special gas tariff” for Gagauzia, opening accounts for Gagauzian businesses and individuals remotely in the Russian “MIR” payment system, and the details about excise taxes and duties so Russia can open its markets to Gagauzian companies. Gutsul claimed that Gagauzian businesses exporting goods to Russia “will most likely receive very serious advantages compared to other regions of Moldova.” Moldova’s other pro-Russian region, the breakaway republic of Transnistria, has long enjoyed free supplies of Russian gas from Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom to an electricity plant in Transnistria.[29] Moldova is still heavily reliant on Transnistrian-produced electricity, despite Moldovan efforts to limit its dependence on Russian energy since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[30] Russian gas supplies to Gagauzia would likely hamper the Moldovan government’s efforts to move away from its decades-long dependence on Russian energy as it turns instead to European suppliers and would create another avenue through which Moldova is vulnerable to Russian “energy blackmail” schemes, which the Kremlin has already employed against Moldova in the past.[31] Russia could also use reduced gas prices for Gagauzia to stoke domestic discontent against the backdrop of higher gas prices in Moldova as compared to previous years when Moldova imported Russian gas.[32] Sergei Ibrishim, the Head of the Main Directorate of the Agro-Industrial Complex of Gagauzia, sent an appeal to Kremlin officials in January 2024 claiming that Gagauzian businesses have been unable to sell their products to Russia since Moldova's July 2023 decision to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Interparliamentary Assembly and asked Russian officials to abolish excise taxes and customs duties for Gagauzian exports to Russia.[33] The opening of Russian markets to Gagauzian products and the likely tax benefits that would accompany this opening are likely meant to dissuade Moldova from leaving the CIS, which Moldova plans to do by the end of 2024, and create inconsistencies in Moldova’s economic relations that would complicate or derail its progress towards accession into the EU.[34]

The Kremlin is likely trying to use cooperation between Gutsul and other pro-Russian actors and parties in Moldova as part of wider Kremlin hybrid warfare operations in Moldova ahead of upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. Gutsul claimed that she will soon meet with Igor Dodon, Vladimir Voronin, Ilan Shor, and the leadership of the Moldovan Revival Party to discuss “possible cooperation.”[35] Dodon is the former pro-Russian president of Moldova who preceded the current president, Maia Sandu.[36] Voronin is also a former Moldovan president and current member of parliament. Dodon, as the leader of the Moldovan Socialist Party, and Voronin, as the leader of the Moldovan Communist Party and a current member of Parliament, formed an electoral alliance in parliament in 2021.[37] Ilan Shor is a US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician who recently met with Kremlin officials in Russia and is currently living in Israel after Moldovan authorities sentenced him in absentia for fraud and money laundering in April 2023.[38] The Revival Party is affiliated with Shor’s now-banned Moldovan political party, the Shor Party, and multiple parliamentary deputies from Dodon’s Socialist party have recently joined the Revival Party.[39]

Gutsul, who ran as a candidate for the Shor Party in Gagauzia’s 2023 gubernatorial election, does not have an extensive political background. Gutsul is a lawyer by training, reportedly worked as a telephone operator from 2012–2014 and then as a telecommunications operator, commercial representative, and archivist.[40] Gutsul reportedly started working as a secretary for the Shor Party from 2018-2022. Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) leader Leonid Slutsky and Russian cultural figures supported her gubernatorial campaign.[41] Gutsul’s plans to meet with multiple Kremlin-linked politicians and parties, despite the fact that these actors are not directly involved in Gagauzian politics and do not have previous ties to Gutsul, suggests that these meetings are Kremlin-orchestrated and aimed at furthering wider Kremlin, not Gagauzian, objectives. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to use both Gagauzia and Transnistria as part of its hybrid operations aimed at sabotaging Moldova’s EU accession process and keeping Moldova within Russia’s sphere of influence.[42] The Kremlin may hope to create and exploit a coalition between Dodon’s Socialist Party, Voronin’s Communist Party, and various Shor-linked parties, such as the Revival party, to counter Sandu’s pro-Western Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) party ahead of the upcoming Moldovan presidential elections in late 2024 and parliamentary elections in 2025.

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled another limited cross-border incursion by the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), and Siberian Battalion in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts on the night of March 12 and the morning of March 13. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled all-Russian pro-Ukrainian forces that attempted to conduct a limited incursion near Kozinka and Mokraya Orlovka, Belgorod Oblast and unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast.[43] The LSR posted footage on March 13 and claimed that it seized part of Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, although the footage was geolocated to Ryzhivka, Sumy Oblast.[44] The RDK, LSR, and Siberian Battalion issued a joint statement on March 13 stating that they are targeting Russian military positions in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and calling on civilians to leave.[45] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov acknowledged the joint statement.[46]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian shortages of ammunition and other war materiel resulting from delays in the provision of US military assistance may be making the current Ukrainian front line more fragile than the relatively slow Russian advances in various sectors would indicate.
The rate of Russian advance west of Avdiivka has recently slowed, although Russian forces likely retain the capability to intensify offensive operations in the area at a moment of their choosing.
Ukrainian actors conducted large-scale drone strikes against energy infrastructure and military assets within Russia on the night of March 12 to 13.
The governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, claimed on March 13 that her recent meetings with Russian officials in Russia led to deepening economic ties between Gagauzia and Russia, which the Kremlin likely hopes to exploit as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova from joining the EU.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled another limited cross-border incursion by the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), and Siberian Battalion in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts on the night of March 12 and the morning of March 13.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline on March 13.
Russian authorities continue efforts to censor protests of wives and mothers of mobilized soldiers ahead of the Russian presidential election.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 13. Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Tabaivka and Stelmakhivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued in the Bakhmut direction on March 13 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have captured unspecified tactical positions near the railway station in Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian gains.[48] Milbloggers also claimed that there is heavy fighting ongoing in Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[49] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional engagements northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and east of Chasiv Yar; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[50] Elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division are continuing to operate northwest of Bakhmut.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced northwest and southwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces advanced on the eastern outskirts of Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka).[52] Additional geolocated footage published on March 12 shows that Russian forces recently advanced along Pershotravneva Street in Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to make gradual tactical advances towards central Pervomaiske.[54] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed on March 12 that Russian forces expanded their control in Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) and captured new positions in forest areas between Orlivka (west of Avdiivka) and Tonenke.[55] One milblogger noted on March 13 that the most intense fighting is ongoing between Berdychi and Tonenke (northwest of Avdiivka), but another Russian source noted that fighting overall has slowed down in this area.[56] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and Novobakhmutivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske.[57] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly fighting in Pervomaiske.[58]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are continuing to make gains south of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) but that the terrain north of Novomykhailivka is making it more difficult for Russian forces to advance.[59] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued positional fighting west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[60] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[61]

Limited positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported fighting southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Novodonetske and Shevchenko and south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske.[62] Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (11th Army Corps, Baltic Fleet) are operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[63]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[64] Elements of the Russian 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade and 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Territorial Troops [TRV]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[65] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[66]

The Russian government responded to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) March 7 resolution calling for the urgent withdrawal of all unauthorized Russian military and other personnel from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and the return of the ZNPP to full Ukrainian control.[67] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on March 13 that any resolutions or statements from officials and international organizations that call for the return of the ZNPP to Ukraine or the establishment of international control over the ZNPP are “attempt[s] to encroach on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia.”[68] The Russian MFA also claimed that Russian forces are taking all possible measures to protect the plant and that Ukrainian forces threaten the plant‘s safety. ISW previously assessed that the IAEA’s resolution undermined ongoing Russian efforts to use the IAEA and other international organizations to legitimize its occupation of the ZNPP.[69]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a limited raid in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast on the night of March 12–13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian sources, including Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo, claimed on March 13 that Russian naval infantry, airborne (VDV) troops, and volunteer servicemen conducted a limited raid on Ukrainian positions on the west bank of the Dnipro River near the base of the Antonivsky Bridge.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 45th Spetsnaz Brigade participated in the raid.[71] ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of Russian activity on the west bank and there are no confirmed changes to the frontline in west bank Kherson Oblast. Saldo claimed that all Russian personnel involved in the raid returned to their east (left) bank positions, indicating that Russian forces did not seek to establish an enduring presence in west bank Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that positional engagements continued near Krynky.[72] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and elements of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps, reportedly part of the forming 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[73]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian rear areas on March 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian Kh-31 missile over an unspecified location.[74] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with an unspecified missile; Novyi Korotych, Kharkiv Oblast with an unspecified number of S-300 missiles; and a residential building in Sumy Oblast with Shahed-136/131 drones.[75] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched unspecified missiles from tactical aircraft towards Odesa Oblast in the morning and afternoon and that Ukrainian forces shot down the first missile over the Black Sea and that the second missile malfunctioned and fell on an open area.[76]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue efforts to censor protests of wives and mothers of mobilized soldiers ahead of the Russian presidential election. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on March 13 that Russian police visited “Way Home” movement leader Maria Andreeva’s home to issue a warning that she could be participating in “extremist activities.”[77] The “Way Home” movement’s participants recently claimed that they would not vote for Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Russian presidential election and accused him of not caring about them or their mobilized relatives.[78] The “Way Home” movement nevertheless called for people to vote on March 17, suggesting that the movement is encouraging Russians to vote for a candidate other than Putin.[79] ISW has observed continued Kremlin attempts to censor and discredit the ”Way Home” movement since December 2023.[80]

A Russian insider source claimed on March 13 that the Kremlin intends to transfer powers away from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and remove MVD Head Vladimir Kolokoltsev at an unspecified date in 2024.[81] The source claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) will be involved in rotating personnel out of the MVD, but that the new MVD head may be one of Kolokoltsev’s current deputies. ISW cannot independently verify any of the insider source’s claims.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin officials continue to feign interest in negotiations to prompt Western concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Putin stated in an interview published on March 13 that Russia has never refused negotiations and reiterated accusations that Western officials previously coerced Ukraine to reject an agreement favorable to Russia.[82] Putin asserted that it would be “ridiculous” for Russia to negotiate when Ukraine is ”running out of ammunition” and that Russia will proceed with negotiations if the negotiations take into account Russian security guarantees and forbid Ukrainian rearmament.[83] Putin’s focus on Ukrainian ”rearmament” is a refence to his call for the “demilitarization” of Ukraine, which he hopes will allow him to enforce his will upon Ukraine without any substantial military resistance.[84] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on March 13 that Russia will not participate in the Ukrainian Peace Formula Summit in Switzerland in 2024, even if Russia was invited, and denounced the summit and Switzerland as biased.[85] Zakharova similarly stated that Russia is open to negotiations that take into account "legitimate” Russian interests.[86] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations with Ukraine and has no interest in ending the war on anything but Russia’s articulated maximalist terms of destroying Ukraine’s sovereignty and eradicating the notion of a unique Ukrainian national identity.[87]

Putin also reiterated boilerplate nuclear rhetoric that aims to deter Western support to Ukraine over fears of Russia potentially using nuclear weapons. Putin stated that Russia is always in a state of nuclear readiness and that Russia will only use nuclear weapons to protect the existence of the Russian state.[88] Putin’s continued appeals to Russian nuclear capabilities do not reflect any changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, and Putin likely refers to these capabilities to try to raise Western fears of nuclear escalation. ISW continues to assess that Russian use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine remains highly unlikely.[89]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned that the Kremlin intends to intensify an information operation called “Perun” ahead of the Russian presidential election on March 17 that aims to discredit Ukraine among Russians and the West.[90] The GUR stated on March 13 that Russian special services, including Rosgvardia and the Russian Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), have received instructions to discredit Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian politicians in the West while continuing efforts to portray Ukrainians as “Nazis“ among Russian and Western audiences.[91] The GUR reported that the Kremlin information operation will peak around the Russian presidential election and culminate by the end of June 2024.[92] The Kremlin is reportedly conducting a parallel information campaign called “Maidan-3” that aims to sow panic and discontent in the Ukrainian population and drive a wedge between civilians and military and political leadership in Ukraine.[93] Russian actors will reportedly intensify the “Maidan-3” information operation in May 2024.[94]

A Kremlin-affiliated prominent milblogger continues to accuse the West of bribing and blackmailing Armenian officials to pursue anti-Russian positions.[95] ISW assesses that the Kremlin is likely preparing a harsher and more concerted response as Armenia continues to take measures to distance itself from Russia and signal interest in strengthening relations with the West.[96]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Union State Secretary Dmitry Mezentsev, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk, Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov, and Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin participated in a meeting of the Union State’s Council of Ministers High-Level Group on March 13.[97] Overchuk stated that Russian companies from 72 Russian federal subjects entered 5,236 trade contracts with Belarusian companies from March 2022 to February 2024. ISW continues to assess that Belarusian companies assist Russian businesses in sanctions evasions schemes.[98]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

7. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 13, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2024

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli media reported that the IDF Navy fired at two suspected Palestinian fighters in scuba gear approaching the border between the northern Gaza Strip and Israel.
Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF 98th Division expanded clearing operations in the northern and eastern Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Saudi state-affiliated media claimed that Hamas agreed to a modified US ceasefire proposal on March 12, which Hamas later denied.
Iran: Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani claimed on March 13 that Iranian defense exports have increased by five times since 2022.
Yemen: The Houthi movement launched a close-range ballistic missile targeting the USS Laboon in the Red Sea.
West Bank: IDF Army Radio reported that the IDF completed a brigade-sized operation in Jenin.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting an official in Hamas’ military wing, Hadi Ali Mustafa, near Tyre, Lebanon.

IRAN UPDATE, MARCH 13, 2024

Mar 13, 2024 - ISW Press

Iran Update, March 13, 2024

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Ashka Jhaveri, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli media reported that the IDF Navy fired at two suspected Palestinian fighters in scuba gear approaching the border between the northern Gaza Strip and Israel.
Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF 98th Division expanded clearing operations in the northern and eastern Khan Younis.
Political Negotiations: Saudi state-affiliated media claimed that Hamas agreed to a modified US ceasefire proposal on March 12, which Hamas later denied.
Iran: Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani claimed on March 13 that Iranian defense exports have increased by five times since 2022.
Yemen: The Houthi movement launched a close-range ballistic missile targeting the USS Laboon in the Red Sea.
West Bank: IDF Army Radio reported that the IDF completed a brigade-sized operation in Jenin.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting an official in Hamas’ military wing, Hadi Ali Mustafa, near Tyre, Lebanon.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli media reported on March 13 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Navy fired at two suspected Palestinian fighters in scuba gear approaching the border between the northern Gaza Strip and Israel.[1] CTP-ISW has not recorded Palestinian fighters attempting to infiltrate into Israel from the Gaza Strip since early November 2023.[2] An IDF Navy helicopter destroyed an unspecified Palestinian vessel near Gaza City on March 11.[3]

The presence of Palestinian fighters and infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip demonstrates that Palestinian militias retain some capacity to operate there, despite Israeli clearing operations. Israeli forces began clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip in late October 2023 and began withdrawing from the area in early 2024.[4] International governments and non-government organizations are beginning to build temporary infrastructure on the coast of the northern Gaza Strip to enable the distribution of aid from the sea.[5]

Israeli forces continued to operate in the central and northern Gaza Strip on March 13. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) directed airstrikes targeting a Palestinian fighter entering a Hamas-affiliated building in the central Gaza Strip.[6] The IDF 143rd Division conducted several airstrikes targeting Palestinian militia infrastructure in Deir al Balah, including tunnel shafts and anti-tank guided missile positions.[7] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and is aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed the only attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on March 13. Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters mortared Israeli forces in southern Zaytoun in this attack.[8]

The IDF killed a Hamas commander in the Hamas “operations department” at a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) food distribution center in Rafah on March 13. The IDF assessed that the commanders’ death will “significantly harm the functioning” of Hamas’ forces in Rafah.[9] The IDF said that the commander, Muhammad Abu Hasna, directed Hamas forces engaged with Israeli forces elsewhere in the Strip from an intelligence command center in Rafah.[10] The IDF reported that Abu Hasna had seized humanitarian aid equipment and distributing it to Hamas fighters.[11]

The IDF 98th Division expanded clearing operations in the northern and eastern Khan Younis on March 13.[12] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade detained several Palestinian militia fighters, including a Hamas Nukhba commander in Hamad.[13] The IDF Egoz Unit (89th Commando Brigade) airstrikes and indirect fire targeting seven Palestinian fighters barricaded in a building in Hamad.[14] The IDF Maglan Unit (89th Commando Brigade) seized weapons in Hamad.[15] Palestinian militias did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis on March 13.

Saudi state-affiliated media claimed that Hamas agreed to a modified US ceasefire proposal on March 12, which Hamas later denied..[16] Saudi state-affiliated media cited an unspecified ”senior Hamas official” who said that Hamas representatives would travel to Cairo in the coming days to discuss final details and the modified proposal’s implementation.[17] Hamas denied the report and implored the media to “ensure accuracy and credibility in reporting the news and not to manipulate the feelings of [the Palestinian] people.”[18] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh issued five maximalist demands for a hostage-for-prisoner exchange on March 10 and stated that the Hamas leadership would reject any agreement that called for a temporary ceasefire.[19] The United States' proposal directly conflicts with Haniyeh’s recent demands because it does not explicitly call for a path to a lasting ceasefire.[20]

The IDF announced that it conducted a pilot shipment to supply aid directly to the northern Gaza Strip.[21] Israel inspected six World Food Program aid trucks at the Kerem Shalom crossing before allowing the trucks to enter the northern Gaza Strip via "Crossing 96.“[22] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson said that the Israeli political establishment would decide whether to open ”Crossing 96” based on the results of the pilot shipment.[23] The trucks reached southern Gaza City without incident.[24] Israeli officials have expressed concern that Hamas is seizing aid from convoys in the Gaza Strip.[25] CTP-ISW reported that the Israeli War Cabinet approved a measure allowing the direct flow of humanitarian aid into northern Gaza Strip on February 25.[26]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 13.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least 14 times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 12.[27] Nine of the clashes occurred in Jenin.[28] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PIJ separately claimed small arms fire targeting IDF positions near Tulkarm on March 13.[29]

IDF Army Radio reported that the IDF completed a brigade-sized operation in Jenin on March 13.[30] The IDF killed two Palestinian fighters and destroyed planted IEDs during the operation.[31] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PIJ detonated IEDs and fired small arms at Israeli forces conducting operations in Jenin on March 12.[32]

An individual stabbed and wounded an IDF soldier and an Israeli guard near Bethlehem on March 13.[33] No group has claimed the attack, and the IDF did not specify whether the attacker was affiliated with an armed group. Hamas celebrated the stabbing attack and reiterated its call for Palestinians march towards the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.[34]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 12.[35] Hezbollah claimed that it fired unspecified weapons targeting an Israeli drone and "forced it to retreat” to Israeli territory on March 13.[36] The IDF has not commented on the incident at the time of writing. Hezbollah has claimed three attacks targeting Israeli drones since March 11.[37] Hezbollah shot down an Israeli drone on February 26.[38]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting an official in Hamas’ military wing, Hadi Ali Mustafa, near Tyre, Lebanon, on March 13.[39] Mustafa reported to a close aide to Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh Arouri, who Israel killed in Beirut on January 2.[40] The IDF stated that Mustafa was involved in “directing terror cells in Lebanon” and that Mustafa supported terror attacks targeting Israelis and Jews around the world.[41] Hamas’ military wing acknowledged Mustafa’s death on March 13.[42]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting two Syrian Arab Army (SAA) military sites operated by Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Syria on March 12.[43] The IDF stated that it will not allow Hezbollah to establish itself along Syria’s border with the Israel-controlled Golan Heights and that the IDF will hold the SAA responsible for Hezbollah activity in Syria.[44] Local Syrian sources reported that the Israeli strikes targeted Hezbollah positions in Tal Ahmar and Ain al Nouriyah, Quneitra Province, Syria, near the Israel-controlled Golan Heights.[45] Israeli media reported in 2020 that the SAA’s 1st Corps, which is responsible for areas of southern Syria near the Golan Heights, is closely affiliated with Hezbollah.[46]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani claimed on March 13 that Iranian defense exports have increased by five times since 2022.[47] Iran uses its defense exports to expand its military influence abroad and to generate revenue for the Iranian economy.[48] Ashtiani separately stated that Iran seeks to develop greater defense cooperation with Armenia, Qatar, Russia, and Turkey.[49] Ashtiani recently held separate meetings with the Qatari and Armenian defense ministers in Doha on March 4 and in Tehran on March 6, respectively.[50] Ashtiani attended the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference during his visit to Qatar.[51] Iran displayed its drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and air defense systems, among other military equipment, in the exhibition. Iran has also reportedly supplied drones to Armenia since at least July 2023.[52]

The Houthi movement launched a close-range ballistic missile targeting the USS Laboon in the Red Sea on March 12 .[53] US CENTCOM reported that the missile did not impact the ship or cause any damage or injuries.

CENTCOM reported on March 12 that a US and coalition vessel intercepted two drones launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.[54]

Houthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted three airstrikes targeting Hudaydah International Airport on March 13.[55]

8. TikTok’s Security Threats Go Beyond the Scope of House Legislation

But is any of this information convincing to the 170 million TikTok users in the US?

Excerpts:

But that glosses over the deeper TikTok security problem, which the legislation does not fully address. In the four years this battle has gone on, it has become clear that the security threat posed by TikTok has far less to do with who owns it than it does with who writes the code and algorithms that make TikTok tick.

Those algorithms, which guide how TikTok watches its users and feeds them more of what they want, are the magic sauce of an app that 170 million Americans now have on their phones. That’s half the country.

But TikTok doesn’t own those algorithms; they are developed by engineers who work for its Chinese parent company, ByteDance, which assembles the code in great secrecy in its software labs, in Beijing, Singapore and Mountain View, Calif. But China has issued regulations that appear designed to require government review before any of ByteDance’s algorithms could be licensed to outsiders. Few expect those licenses to be issued — meaning that selling TikTok to an American owner without the underlying code might be like selling a Ferrari without its famed engine.

...

“Foreign adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party pose the greatest national threat of our time,” said Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers, the Washington Republican who leads the Energy and Commerce Committee, during the Wednesday House debate over the bill. She called TikTok a “valuable propaganda tool for the C.C.P. to exploit.”

TikTok may not have eased that concern in how it lobbied to defeat the House bill. Ms. McMorris Rodgers noted that TikTok had used an alert in its app to push users to contact Congress and urge a “no” vote. Congressional offices were overwhelmed by the calls, some of which staff members believed came from teenagers. To TikTok’s executives, this was democracy in action. To some in Congress, it proved their point.

This is just a small taste of how the C.C.P. weaponizes applications it controls to manipulate tens of millions of people to further its agenda,” she said.

TikTok’s Security Threats Go Beyond the Scope of House Legislation

The risks have less to do with who owns the app than who writes the code and algorithms that make TikTok tick.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/us/politics/tiktok-ban-house-bill.html

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142

TikTok supporters protesting outside the Capitol on Wednesday. More than half of Americans now have the app on their phones.Credit...Kent Nishimura for The New York Times

By David E. Sanger

Reporting from Washington

March 13, 2024

Updated 10:14 p.m. ET

In a capital where Republicans and Democrats agree on virtually nothing, it was notable when the House overwhelmingly declared on Wednesday that TikTok poses such a grave risk to national security that it must be forced to sell its U.S. operations to a non-Chinese owner.

But that glosses over the deeper TikTok security problem, which the legislation does not fully address. In the four years this battle has gone on, it has become clear that the security threat posed by TikTok has far less to do with who owns it than it does with who writes the code and algorithms that make TikTok tick.

Those algorithms, which guide how TikTok watches its users and feeds them more of what they want, are the magic sauce of an app that 170 million Americans now have on their phones. That’s half the country.

But TikTok doesn’t own those algorithms; they are developed by engineers who work for its Chinese parent company, ByteDance, which assembles the code in great secrecy in its software labs, in Beijing, Singapore and Mountain View, Calif. But China has issued regulations that appear designed to require government review before any of ByteDance’s algorithms could be licensed to outsiders. Few expect those licenses to be issued — meaning that selling TikTok to an American owner without the underlying code might be like selling a Ferrari without its famed engine.

The bill would require a new, Western-owned TikTok to be cut off from any “operational relationship” with ByteDance, “including any cooperation with respect to the operation of a content recommendation algorithm.” So the new, American-based company would have to develop its own, made-in-America algorithm. Maybe that would work, or maybe it would flop. But a version of TikTok without its classic algorithm might quickly become useless to users and worthless to investors.

And right now, China has no incentive to relent.

The House vote “was a nice symbolic gesture,” James A. Lewis, who leads the cyber research program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said on Wednesday. “But the Chinese get a vote, too.”

It is all part of a broader standoff between the world’s two most powerful technology superpowers. The sparring plays out every day, including in President Biden’s refusal to sell China the most advanced computer chips and in China’s objections to a forced sale of one of the most successful consumer apps in history. A spokesman for China’s foreign ministry said on Wednesday that Washington was “resorting to hegemonic moves when one could not succeed in fair competition.”

It is a remarkable problem, one not envisioned when TikTok first released its app in 2016. At that time, Washington was focused on other problems from Beijing. It accused China’s intelligence agencies of cleaning out the Office of Personnel Management, stealing the security clearance files of more than 22 million American government officials and contractors. It was still smarting from the cyber-enabled theft of American chip designs, jet engine technology and the F-35 fighter.

No one was contemplating the possibility that Chinese engineers could design code that seemed to understand the mind-set of American consumers better than Americans did themselves. By the millions, Americans began to put Chinese-designed software, whose innards no one really understood, on their iPhones and Androids, first for dance videos, then for the memes and now for news

It was the first piece of Chinese-designed consumer software to go wildly viral across the United States. No American firm seemed capable of displacing it. And so it wasn’t long before its ubiquity raised worries about whether the Chinese government could use the data TikTok collected to track the habits and tastes of American citizens. Panicked, state governments across the United States started banning the app from state-owned phones. So did the military.

But officials know they cannot wrest it from ordinary users — which is why the threat of banning TikTok, especially in an election year, is faintly ridiculous. In a fit of remarkable candor, Gina Raimondo, the commerce secretary, told Bloomberg last year that if any democracy thinks it can outright ban the app, “the politician in me thinks you’re going to literally lose every voter under 35, forever.”

The House bill passed on Wednesday holds open the threat of such a ban. But that is probably not its real intent. Rather, it seeks to give the United States leverage to force a sale. And for two years now, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, a secretive body that reviews corporate deals that could jeopardize national security, has quietly been trying to work out an arrangement that would avert a true showdown. So far it has failed — one reason that the bill passed.

In the course of those negotiations, TikTok has proposed to continue U.S. operations — while still fully owned by ByteDance — and have its algorithm inspected and dissected in the United States. It is part of a broader plan TikTok calls Project Texas.

Under Project Texas, all U.S.-origin user data from TikTok would be stored on domestic servers operated by Oracle, the cloud computing company. To build confidence in the independence of its algorithm, TikTok has also proposed that Oracle and a third party will review its source code to make sure it has not been manipulated.

TikTok says much of this plan is already being implemented. But government officials insist that it is hard to know how such inspections would actually work — even for the most experienced experts, reviewing minor changes in code, at high speed, is a complicated proposition. Biden administration officials say it is not like inspecting agricultural goods or counting weapons under an arms treaty. Very subtle changes could alter the news that is delivered, whether it was about a presidential election or Chinese action against Taiwan.

TikTok has tried to enshrine that arrangement into a formal agreement to resolve the government’s national security concerns. But that idea met resistance from senior Biden administration officials, starting with Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco, who felt it was not tight enough to resolve their concerns.

Instead, the Biden administration and lawmakers have pushed for ByteDance to sell TikTok. Senator Mark Warner, the tech-savvy Virginia Democrat who leads the Senate Intelligence Committee and supports the new bill, said that any sale of the app needed to ensure that the “algorithm doesn’t continue to reside in Beijing or it’s replaced by an algorithm that’s totally independent of the algorithm that is in Beijing.” It also needed to protect the security of TikTok’s data, he said.

But in the House, it was hard to figure out what lawmakers were most concerned about: privacy, the potential for disinformation or just the idea that Chinese-developed code was inside Americans’ (largely Chinese-produced) iPhones. All those worries were often jumbled together.

“Foreign adversaries like the Chinese Communist Party pose the greatest national threat of our time,” said Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers, the Washington Republican who leads the Energy and Commerce Committee, during the Wednesday House debate over the bill. She called TikTok a “valuable propaganda tool for the C.C.P. to exploit.”

TikTok may not have eased that concern in how it lobbied to defeat the House bill. Ms. McMorris Rodgers noted that TikTok had used an alert in its app to push users to contact Congress and urge a “no” vote. Congressional offices were overwhelmed by the calls, some of which staff members believed came from teenagers. To TikTok’s executives, this was democracy in action. To some in Congress, it proved their point.

“This is just a small taste of how the C.C.P. weaponizes applications it controls to manipulate tens of millions of people to further its agenda,” she said.

David McCabe contributed reporting from New York.

David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger

A version of this article appears in print on March 14, 2024, Section A, Page 13 of the New York edition with the headline: TikTok’s Security Threats Go Beyond the Scope of Legislation. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

9. On the Tripwire of a ‘Red Line,’ It’s Often Presidents Who Trip

Do red lines ever work?

On the Tripwire of a ‘Red Line,’ It’s Often Presidents Who Trip

Barack Obama drew one for Syria. George W. Bush drew several, for North Korea and Iran. Now President Biden has drawn one for Israel. The hard part is figuring out what to do when they are crossed.

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178

President Biden, without being specific, has warned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel about invading Rafah, in southern Gaza.Credit...Pete Marovich for The New York Times

By David E. Sanger

David E. Sanger, who has covered five presidencies and written on national security challenges for four decades, reported from Washington.

March 12, 2024

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When President Biden declared over the weekend that he was drawing a “red line” for Israel’s military action in Gaza, he appeared to be trying to raise the potential cost for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as their relationship plummets to new depths.

But he never said what would happen, exactly, if Mr. Netanyahu ignored him and continued Israel’s military operation by invading the southern city Rafah, a step that Mr. Biden has said — repeatedly — would be a major mistake. It is unclear whether he hesitated because he did not want to signal what response he might be preparing, or because he did not want to be criticized if he backed away from whatever action he is contemplating.

Or perhaps, given his long experience in the Senate and the White House, he remembered that drawing red lines turned out badly for Barack Obama when it came to Syria, and for George W. Bush when it came to North Korea and Iran. American allies in the Middle East were stunned by Mr. Obama’s reversal. Mr. Bush was later judged to have invaded a country that had no nuclear weapons — Iraq — while the North tested its first nuclear weapon on his watch.

Mr. Biden’s line-drawing was immediately dismissed — and matched — by Mr. Netanyahu, who shot back: “You know, I have a red line. You know what the red line is? That Oct. 7 doesn’t happen again.” The prime minister was referring, of course, to the Hamas attack that killed 1,200 people in Israel, left scores more as hostages and precipitated a war now in its sixth month.

Such talk of red lines is hardly new: Leaders of all stripes, from heads of democracies to vicious autocrats, often invoke the phrase to describe moves that another country should not even contemplate, because the consequences would be more painful than they could imagine. The odd thing in this case is that the lines are being drawn by two allies who regularly celebrate how close they are but whose dialogue has begun to turn somewhat poisonous.

The seemingly obvious implication of Mr. Biden’s threat was that if the Israelis went ahead with their plans and conducted another military operation with high civilian casualties, Mr. Biden would for the first time place restrictions on how Israel could make use of the arms the United States is supplying. Until now, Mr. Biden has rejected any such move — even though Washington places conditions on almost every arms sale, including requiring a commitment from Ukraine that it will not fire American missiles, artillery or drones into Russia.

But Mr. Biden appears to be slowly reconsidering his aversion to limits on how Israel could use the weaponry it buys, some American officials say. He has made no decisions, and still seems to be debating the question in his own mind, according to officials who have spoken with him.

As reporters tried to shake loose from the White House what exactly the president meant, Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, dismissed the notion on Tuesday that Mr. Biden had set any “red lines” at all, calling it a “national security parlor game” and a distortion of what the president said.

“The president didn’t make any declarations or pronouncements or announcements,” he said.

Mr. Sullivan, who met earlier in the day with Israel’s ambassador, likewise would not discuss reports that Mr. Biden might impose restrictions on arms if Israel proceeded with the Rafah operation. “We’re not going to engage in hypotheticals about what comes down the line, and the reports that purport to describe the president’s thinking are uninformed speculation,” he said.

Israel-Hamas War: Live Updates

Updated

March 13, 2024, 5:26 p.m. ET5 hours ago

5 hours ago

But Mr. Biden himself has ruled out cutting off any defensive weapons, like Iron Dome, the U.S.-Israeli missile defense project that has intercepted short-range missiles shot into Israel by Hamas.

“It is a red line, but I am never going to leave Israel,” he said in an interview with MSNBC last week. “The defense of Israel is still critical. So there is no red line I am going to cut off all weapons, so they don’t have the Iron Dome to protect them.”

“But there’s red lines that if he crosses,” he added, drifting off from completing the sentence — or the threat. “You cannot have 30,000 more Palestinians dead.”

In using the red-line wording, with its vivid suggestion of some kind of tripwire, Mr. Biden was also wading into dangerous territory for American presidents. Time and again in the past few decades, Mr. Biden’s predecessors have described limits that America’s adversaries or allies could not step over without invoking the most severe consequences.

And time and again, they have come to regret it.

Take Mr. Obama’s declaration in August 2012 when intelligence reports suggested that President Bashar al-Assad of Syria might be preparing to use chemical weapons against his own people. Mr. Obama had steered clear of Syria’s internal upheavals, but one day in the White House press room he told reporters that if Mr. Assad moved or used large quantities of chemical weapons, he would cross a “red line” and “change my calculus.”

By the spring of 2013, it was clear that Mr. Assad was doing exactly that, and when a senior Israeli intelligence official declared as much, the Israeli government had to back away from the comments, for fear that the intelligence finding would box Mr. Obama in. By the early summer, it was becoming clear that the weapons were in active use, but Mr. Obama called off a planned strike on Mr. Assad’s facilities, worried that it could prompt even more chemical attacks — and suck the United States into another major conflict in the Middle East.

Mr. Bush found himself in a similar situation in 2003 when he declared that he would not “tolerate” a nuclear-armed North Korea. That summer he used the same word to say he would not put up with Iran’s obtaining the capability to build a nuclear weapon.

During his presidency, the North Koreans tested a nuclear weapon — they have since tested five more — and the Iranians made progress toward that capability. And while the United States has ratcheted up sanctions and threatened military action with both, the North has such a substantial arsenal now that American officials have all but given up the idea that it will ever disarm.

Iran’s capability — which seemed neutered, at least for a while, after Mr. Obama struck a nuclear deal in 2015 — has surged back since President Donald J. Trump abandoned that deal three years later. Today, it has a stockpile of enriched uranium that could be converted into weapons-grade fuel in days or weeks, and a weapon within a year or so.

Audio produced by Tally Abecassis.

A version of this article appears in print on March 13, 2024, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: A ‘Red Line’ Can Be More Of a Smudge. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

10. Hamas has been shattered. Now it is fighting to survive

Hamas has been shattered. Now it is fighting to survive

With its fighting ranks decimated and Gaza in ruins, the militant group’s goal is to avoid elimination

Neri Zilber in Tel Aviv and Andrew England in London A DAY AGO

Financial Times · by Neri Zilber · March 13, 2024

On the 14th floor of Israeli military headquarters in Tel Aviv, high up in the defence minister’s office, a large pyramid adorns the wall made up of images of Hamas’s top ranks. The title: “Status of leadership assassinations.”

After five months of ferocious conflict in Gaza, those still alive greatly outnumber the mostly mid-ranking commanders whose fate is illustrated by a giant red X across their faces.

At the top — and still decidedly active — are Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif and the handful of other leaders responsible for Hamas’s devastating October 7 attack that killed 1,200 people and triggered the war.

But the Xs on the pyramid are gradually spreading, just as Hamas’s fighting options appear to be dwindling. Israel is trying to confirm reports that Marwan Issa, the Hamas number-three in Gaza known as “the shadow man”, was killed in an air strike over the weekend.

Moreover, the quasi-state in Gaza that Hamas used to rule is wrecked, its forces are decimated, and the strip’s population is enduring a deepening humanitarian catastrophe.

Israel has yet to achieve all its wartime goals. But for Hamas, an Islamist militant group founded to destroy the Jewish state, victory now has largely narrowed to one thing: survival.

“Let’s assume that all of Gaza lies in ruins, and someone will stand there left from Hamas, a wounded soldier, and will raise a Hamas flag — they’ve won the war,” said Micha Kobi, a retired former senior official in Israel’s Shin Bet security agency. “That’s what they believe.”

That too is the challenge for Benjamin Netanyahu, who has repeatedly vowed to “eliminate” Hamas. As long as the group’s top leadership and fighters remain at large, the Israeli premier will fall short of his call for “total victory” — and risk being viewed as a failure by many in Israel.

It underscores the challenge the US, Qatar and Egypt face as they struggle to negotiate a deal to halt the fighting and secure the release of over 130 Israeli hostages still held in Gaza.

Senior Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar shakes hands with a masked fighter of the Qassam Brigades in 2022 © Mohammed Abed/AFP/Getty Images

Hamas insists that any arrangement end with a permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the strip — moves that could provide the battered group with a lifeline as it faces its gravest threat.

Yet Netanyahu has repeatedly rejected such demands, insisting that Israel would only pause its offensive to free the hostages. After that it would renew its relentless pursuit of Sinwar and the Hamas leadership, whatever it takes in Gaza.

“It feels like a game of chicken and the question is who swerves first,” said an Arab diplomat.

From its humble roots in the slums and mosques of Gaza in the 1980s, Hamas had been on a steady rise in power and prominence — in the 1990s as a militant group violently opposed to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, then more recently as the undisputed ruler of the coastal enclave.

There is little doubt, however, that after months of bombardment by air, land and sea, the overall picture for Hamas is grim, say Palestinian analysts, Israeli security officials and regional diplomats.

Estimates of Hamas’s strength are notoriously difficult. But according to Israeli intelligence assessments, more than 18 of the Islamist militant group’s 24 battalions have been dismantled as organised fighting forces, and about half of its 40,000 fighters have either been killed or wounded. Active Hamas fighters have melted away into small guerrilla cells, emerging to fire rocket-propelled grenades or place explosive devices.

‘Does Hamas still exist militarily? Yes,’ said one senior Israeli military official. ‘Is it organised? No’ © Chris McGrath/Getty Images

Hamas, meanwhile, has publicly said it has only lost 6,000 fighters. Whatever its numbers, US intelligence analysts foresee Hamas being able to continue a “lingering armed resistance for years to come”, using its underground tunnel network to “hide, regain strength and surprise Israeli forces”.

“Does Hamas still exist militarily? Yes,” said one senior Israeli military official. “Is it organised? No. The path to completely dismantling them goes on.”

The group’s civil control over northern Gaza and large parts of the south has certainly been eroded. Armed gangs are growing in number, while law and order has broken down across the devastated enclave, where 31,000 have been killed and 80 per cent of Gaza’s 2.3mn residents have been forced from their homes since Israel launched its offensive, according to Palestinian health authorities.

The bulk of the remaining Hamas battalions, according to the senior Israeli military official, have retreated to the southern city of Rafah and the refugee camps of Deir al Balah and Nusseirat in central Gaza.

Israel has repeatedly said that it plans to expand its offensive to Rafah, despite international warnings that it would have a disastrous impact on the 1.5mn people who have sought sanctuary in the city.

And yet, despite all the devastation, Hamas officials continue to strike a defiant tone in public, speaking about Israel’s “impotence” and the “steadfastness”, or sumud, of its fighters.

Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s Doha-based political leader, said in a televised speech last month that Israel had achieved nothing but “killing children and women and old people and causing destruction”. “This is what will await it in Rafah militarily,” he warned.

Palestinians salvage items from the rubble after an Israeli air strike on Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on March 9 © Said Khatib/AFP/Getty Images

Hamas’s fighters on the ground think “they are doing well militarily”, said the Arab diplomat, simply by holding out against one of the world’s most sophisticated armies in what has already been the longest Arab-Israeli war in decades.

Even so, with “their families and friends suffering”, he said there was no doubt pressure was growing to reach a ceasefire and alleviate the dire conditions for civilians.

“The key is how they react to pressure,” said the diplomat. “With groups like Hamas, in general, if you push too hard you will not get the reaction you want.”

Some analysts believe Hamas’s insistence on a permanent ceasefire as part of a hostage deal is a sign of the desperate situation the group finds itself.

“This isn’t about helping civilians [in Gaza] but about making the resumption of the war [by Israel] more difficult,” said Ibrahim Dalalsha, head of the Ramallah-based Horizon Center think-tank.

For this reason, say regional diplomats and analysts, Hamas is holding out for nothing less than a full Israeli withdrawal, the return of over 1mn displaced people to north Gaza, and the mass entry into the enclave of aid and semi-permanent shelters.

With both sides playing hardball, Hamas leaders in Gaza are aware their only “insurance policy” and leverage in the talks are the hostages, said Dalalsha.

This is why they have “become almost suicidal vis-à-vis the negotiations, with this maximalist position,” he said. “They know that if the war resumes and they’ve released the hostages they’ll be finished,” he added.

Yezid Sayigh, a Beirut-based fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of a book on the Palestinian armed struggle, said the group’s predicament stemmed from its catastrophic miscalculation over the real balance of military power.

Hamas releases an Israeli hostage in the wake of the October 7 attack © AFP/Getty Images

The bloody October 7 attacks struck deep inside Israel on a scale even Hamas did not think possible. But it also laid bare what Sayigh called the group’s “delusion” that the cross-border raid would trigger uprisings against Israel across the Middle East — and thereby limit the war or tip the balance.

“There’s a certain kind of nihilism [in the Hamas leadership] — that whether civilians died or not . . . was not something they seem to have actually thought mattered,” Sayigh added.

Even Hamas may be realising its 17-year run as Gaza’s ruling power may be over. Already, according to multiple people familiar with regional diplomacy, Hamas officials have engaged in talks to allow the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority to reassert control over Gaza through an “ad hoc leadership committee” or newly formed technocratic government.

Survival, according to analysts, may ultimately only be possible for Hamas by reverting to its early roots: a resistance movement with an underground militant wing and religious social services network.

“Hamas has lost governance in Gaza but they’re still looking for political survival as an organisation,” said Dalalsha. “They’re not idiots. They see the needs of Gaza and realise the public and international community won’t accept them again.”

Financial Times · by Neri Zilber · March 13, 2024

11. Haiti’s Chaos Shows How Far U.S. Stability Efforts Have to Go

Here is State's implementation of the Global Fragility Act:

2022 Prologue to the United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability

BUREAU OF CONFLICT AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

https://www.state.gov/2022-prologue-to-the-united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/

Haiti’s Chaos Shows How Far U.S. Stability Efforts Have to Go

The Global Fragility Act could aid unstable regions—if funded properly.

By Imran Bayoumi, an assistant director with the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Foreign Policy · by Imran Bayoumi

United States

March 11, 2024, 4:30 PM

Acting Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry flew to Kenya late last month to ensure the deployment of 1,000 police officers to Haiti, part of a multinational force, after a Kenyan court blocked the arrangement. But during Henry’s trip, Port-au-Prince descended into chaos, coming under the near-total control of armed gangs who released thousands of inmates from two prisons, one within the capital and the other on its outskirts. As Haiti continues its yearslong spiral into chaos, the United States has condemned the violence, imposed sanctions on gang leaders, and called to hasten the transition to elections.

The United States released a comprehensive plan to combat fragility in Haiti as part of the Global Fragility Strategy. That approach came out of the Global Fragility Act, a bill passed with bipartisan support in 2019 that has potential to reshape how the United States approaches conflicts around the world.

But with the strategy only set to last for 10 years and funding so far only authorized for the first five, the strategy faces real challenges to ensure it remains viable for years to come and can be successful in combating violence in Haiti and elsewhere.

The Global Fragility Act was supposed to redefine America’s approach to stabilization, including developing the Global Fragility Strategy and encouraging a whole-of-government approach that would bring together the State Department, Defense Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) alongside other agencies to tackle persistent instances of conflict worldwide.

In April 2022, the Biden administration released a prologue to the strategy that laid out the areas of geographic focus: Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and coastal West Africa, which comprises Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo. A little under a year later, in March 2023, the administration released detailed plans to combat fragility in each area. These plans were developed in coordination with local stakeholders and representatives from relevant U.S. government agencies and aim to be tailored and adaptable to the local context.

A year after the announcement of the region-specific plans, violence is still spreading in the areas it targets. In Libya, the 2020 brokered peace agreement has largely held, but the country remains divided between different factions in the east and west, with little prospect of a long-term peace deal. In Mozambique, violence is ticking back up, after falling in 2023, and there is concern that violence could spill into Nampula province. This comes as Mozambique moves toward October elections where tensions are likely to run high.

In Papua New Guinea, tribal violence has spiked in the nation’s north, with worries it could spread after at least 64 people were killed in February. This comes after the capital, Port Moresby, was put under a two-week state of emergency following deadly riots in January. The countries of coastal West Africa, where some states like Ghana are much more stable, also face a variety of challenges, with Guinea expected to transition to civilian rule this year following a 2021 coup, though the ruling military junta has dissolved the interim government and sealed the country’s borders, leaving its democratic future in question.

U.S. adversaries such as China and Russia are working to exploit the instability in these regions to their advantage. Documents have leaked that show Russia’s Wagner Group—which is trying to find a new role after the dramatic loss of its leader last year—has been interested in Haiti for some time. In Mozambique, the government initially turned to the Wagner Group to provide security services, though it failed spectacularly in its mission.

In Libya, Russia reportedly delivered tanks to troops loyal to Gen. Khalifa Haftar, in power in the east, and helped to support a military exercise. Officials in Port Moresby are exploring a potential security pact with China in an effort to bring stability to Papua New Guinea. Finally, in Guinea, the junta leader addressed the United Nations in September, stating that Western democracy does not work for Africa, in a seeming endorsement of the autocratic style of governance that China has sought to promote.

Working toward peace in these regions can help to turn these nations into future trade and security partners of the United States and serve to help counter the strategic threat posed by China. To do so, policymakers across the relevant agencies and the executive branch must ensure the Global Fragility Strategy has the backing it needs.

That means, first of all, making sure the Prevention and Stabilization Fund is fully funded at the levels authorized. In passing the act, Congress authorized that up to $200 million for each of the first five years could be appropriated for the fund. Congress also created the Complex Crises Fund, which was designed to respond to unforeseen challenges overseas.

In the 2024 Congressional Budget Justification, only $114.5 million was requested for the Prevention and Stabilization Fund. Though the Complex Crises Fund was well-funded, its purview is wider than supporting just the strategy. Moving forward, the Prevention and Stabilization Fund needs to be funded at the $200 million level to fully support the implementation of the strategy while recognizing that this is still a relatively small amount for this type of work.

Second, relevant agencies should ensure that documents related to the strategy are released promptly, as the act mandates. Initial attempts to adhere to this timeline have not been encouraging. After the signing of the act, the strategy was supposed to be released within 180 days but was not until around a year later, in December 2020. The five country- and region-specific plans were supposed to be released within one year of the passing of the act but were not released until March 2023, three years later. With the strategy only having a 10-year time frame, policymakers should work toward meeting that future deadline promptly to give the strategy the best chance at success.

Finally, policymakers should ensure that the country-specific plans are responsive and up to date to the situation on the ground. The act mandates a report to Congress every two years that details progress as well as any changes to the region-specific strategies, but in locations where the situation on the ground is rapidly changing, like Haiti, action can’t be bound purely to a bureaucratic timetable. That needs local partners—and adaptable plans.

The Global Fragility Act is a landmark piece of legislation that, when combined with the strategy, offers Washington a chance to redefine how it approaches stabilization missions. As Haiti illustrates, there is a clear and urgent need for smartly targeted U.S. moves to protect ordinary people from violence. U.S. policymakers should ensure that the benefits of the strategy are maximized over the remaining time frame, as doing so will bring stability while helping Washington to achieve its strategic interests.

Foreign Policy · by Imran Bayoumi

12. Report to Congress on General and Flag Officers

The full report (22 pages) can be downloaded here: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24478175/r44389-1.pdf

Excerpt:

This report provides an overview of active-duty GFOs in the U.S. Armed Forces—including duties, authorizations, and compensation—historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force, criticisms and justifications of GFO to total force proportions, and statutory controls. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, unless they are serving on active duty in a manner that counts against the active-duty caps on GFOs.

Report to Congress on General and Flag Officers - USNI News

news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · March 12, 2024

The following is the March 8, 2024, Congressional Research Service report General and Flag Officers in the U.S. Armed Forces: Background and Considerations for Congress.

From the report

In the exercise of its constitutional authority over the Armed Forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws that govern important aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. Some of these laws are directed specifically at the most senior military officers, known as general and flag officers (GFOs). Congress periodically reviews these laws and considers changes as it deems appropriate. Areas of congressional interest have included duties and grades of certain GFO positions, the number of GFOs, the proportion of GFOs to the total force, and compensation levels of GFOs.

As of September 30, 2023, there were 809 active-duty GFOs subject to statutory caps, 48 less than the maximum of 857 authorized by law. The current number is low for the post-Cold War era and substantially lower than the number of GFOs in the 1960s-1980s, when the Armed Forces were much larger in size than they are today. However, while always very small in comparison to the total force, the GFO corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force in 1965, while they made up about one-sixteenth of one percent (0.063%) of the total force in 2023, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs is now increased by 31%. This historical trend is more pronounced with respect to four-star officers (which grew from 0.0014% of the total force to 0.0029%, a 107% increase) and three-star officers (which grew from 0.0045% of the total force to 0.0103%, a 129% increase). One- and two-star officers increased less rapidly (from 0.0425% of the total force to 0.0500%, a 17.6% increase).

Some argue that this increased proportion of GFOs is wasteful and contributes to more bureaucratic decisionmaking processes. Others counter that the increased proportion is linked to the military’s greater emphasis on joint and coalition operations; core organizational requirements; management, budgeting, and program requirements; and the employment of automated, highly lethal, and destructive weapons systems that may require fewer personnel.

Congress has used its authority to specify the grade and duties of certain GFO positions. For example, Congress increased the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) from Lieutenant General to General in 2008. Congress also has added the Chief of Space Operations, Commander of Space Command, and, most recently, the Deputy Chief of the NGB as four-star officers. In 2016, Congress removed the statutory grade requirement from 54 GFO positions.

Compensation for GFOs varies. One commonly used measure of compensation, known as regular military compensation (RMC), includes basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and the federal tax advantage associated with allowances, which are exempt from federal income tax. In 2024, the lowest-ranking GFOs make about $251,058 per year in RMC, while the highest-ranking GFOs make about $285,097 per year.

This report provides an overview of active-duty GFOs in the U.S. Armed Forces—including duties, authorizations, and compensation—historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force, criticisms and justifications of GFO to total force proportions, and statutory controls. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, unless they are serving on active duty in a manner that counts against the active-duty caps on GFOs.

Download the document here.

news.usni.org · by U.S. Naval Institute Staff · March 12, 2024

13. JFK's Funeral Was the Only State Burial in US History to Feature a Foreign Military Unit

More fascinating history.

Excerpts:

American military personnel protected Kennedy's remains from the moment he arrived in Washington from Dallas until his coffin was lowered into the ground. But when the funeral procession arrived at Arlington, it was also greeted by a unit of the Irish Defence Forces, which was conducting a silent drill, standing closer to the grave than any other military personnel, except the honor guard.

It would be the only state funeral in American history to feature a foreign military unit.

...

Kennedy's road to his final resting place was paved with martial support. When his body was returned to Washington to lay in repose in the East Room of the White House, it was guarded first by the Old Guard, the members of the 3rd Infantry Regiment responsible for protecting the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Because of Kennedy's interest and admiration for U.S. Special Forces, his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, had Special Forces soldiers from Fort Bragg flown to the capital for the president's honor guard at the White House. U.S. military installations around the world fired a salute every half-hour of daylight on Nov. 23, 1963 -- the day after the assassination.

JFK's Funeral Was the Only State Burial in US History to Feature a Foreign Military Unit

military.com · by Blake Stilwell · March 13, 2024

On Nov. 25, 1963, President John F. Kennedy's flag-draped coffin was removed from where it lay in state at the Capitol rotunda. First, it stopped at the White House to join Kennedy's funeral procession on its way to St. Matthew's Cathedral for the funeral service. From there, a horse-drawn caisson carried the coffin to the president's final resting place in Arlington National Cemetery.

More than 250,000 people paid their respects to the fallen president before he was laid to rest. Among the mourners were former first lady Jacqueline Kennedy and other members of the Kennedy family, former Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, and representatives of some 90 countries.

American military personnel protected Kennedy's remains from the moment he arrived in Washington from Dallas until his coffin was lowered into the ground. But when the funeral procession arrived at Arlington, it was also greeted by a unit of the Irish Defence Forces, which was conducting a silent drill, standing closer to the grave than any other military personnel, except the honor guard.

It would be the only state funeral in American history to feature a foreign military unit.

Irish Cadets stand at parade rest at Arlington National Cemetery for John F. Kennedy’s Funeral, 1963. (Irish Defence Forces Military Archives)

The reason why an Irish Army unit drilled as mourners walked to the gravesite starts in June of that year, when Kennedy became the first sitting American president to visit Ireland. He spent four days there, visiting Dublin, Cork, Galway, Limerick and his family's ancestral home in Wexford. While in Dublin, he stopped at Arbour Hill Prison, which features a memorial to the 14 Irish leaders of the 1916 Easter Uprising, an armed Irish revolt against British rule, who were executed by the British Army.

Placing a wreath on the memorial, Kennedy became the first foreign head of state to honor those executed in the aftermath of the uprising. The memorial ceremony included an Irish Army band and Irish Army Cadets performing the Queen Anne Drill, a complex maneuver that requires discipline and precision. Kennedy would later remark that the cadets' performance at Arbour Hill was the highlight of his entire trip, declaring it "the finest honor guard I have ever seen."

After Kennedy's assassination in Dallas, the cadets had accompanied Irish President Éamon de Valera at the request of former first lady Jacqueline Kennedy to represent the late president's Irish ancestry at his funeral and perform the drill that impressed him so much.

Kennedy's road to his final resting place was paved with martial support. When his body was returned to Washington to lay in repose in the East Room of the White House, it was guarded first by the Old Guard, the members of the 3rd Infantry Regiment responsible for protecting the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Because of Kennedy's interest and admiration for U.S. Special Forces, his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, had Special Forces soldiers from Fort Bragg flown to the capital for the president's honor guard at the White House. U.S. military installations around the world fired a salute every half-hour of daylight on Nov. 23, 1963 -- the day after the assassination.

From the time the president's body was moved from the White House to the Capitol Rotunda until his coffin was interred at Arlington National Cemetery, American military forces from all four branches of service accompanied him. Two hundred and forty members from each branch formed the honor cordon as Kennedy's coffin moved along Pennsylvania Avenue, the only sound being one drummer from each branch and the hooves of the caisson, the same one that carried President Franklin Roosevelt and the Unknown Soldier.

Navy enlisted troops served as pallbearers for Kennedy's coffin. The ceremonial riderless horse following the caisson was the 3rd Infantry's famous Black Jack, which performed the function at more than 1,000 funerals, including those of former Presidents Herbert Hoover and Lyndon B. Johnson, as well as Douglas MacArthur. When Black Jack was retired, Jacqueline Kennedy purchased him from the Army and cared for him until he died in 1976.

Because of the number of people and cars attending the funeral at Arlington National Cemetery, most of the military personnel only followed the funeral procession to the Potomac River. When the mourners arrived at Kennedy's grave, the 26 cadets from the Irish Defence Forces were already there, performing the Queen Anne's Drill. Standing before the grave and closer than any American unit, they weren't the same cadets Kennedy had seen earlier in the year, but they were as sharp and precise as Kennedy had seen them.

No one complained about the Irish soldiers' special position at the funeral. As a matter of fact, letters from Americans began to pour in not long after the cadets returned to Ireland.

"Your honor guard made me feel proud to tears," wrote Frank Gulland, a salesman from Ohio, The Associated Press reported ahead of the 50th anniversary of Kennedy's funeral.

"It was a huge honor; we were very conscious that we weren't representing our country," recalled now-Col. William Mott of the Irish Defence Forces, who performed with the cadets that day. "We are representing the Defence Forces in Ireland, and Ireland wasn't a big player in the world then. And we were determined to do a good performance and I think, I think in the end, we probably did that."

Upon returning to Ireland, the cadets received a gift from the Old Guard at Fort Myer, a framed photograph of their honor guard standing at attention at Kennedy's grave. It still hangs in the cadet mess hall to this day.

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military.com · by Blake Stilwell · March 13, 2024

14. Shipbuilding: the new battleground in the US-China trade war

Shipbuilding: the new battleground in the US-China trade war

Financial Times · by Rana Foroohar · March 12, 2024

Shipping has been at the centre of the global economy for over 5,000 years, and it is no less important now than it was for our seafaring ancestors.

For all our technological advances, it is still the most effective means of importing and exporting goods and raw materials. It remains crucial to national security, not just for the long-standing role it has played in the defence of nations and of trade but also because today’s port software and logistics platforms hold crucial data about which countries and companies are moving goods around the world.

Even Adam Smith, the father of modern capitalism, believed that shipbuilding was one of the very few industries that deserved national support and should not be left to market forces alone.

That’s a key part of the argument being made in a new petition for trade relief and state support of the US shipbuilding industry under a so-called section 301 case filed by the United Steelworkers union and other labour organisations on March 12.

The petitioners accuse China of distorting global markets in the maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors through “unreasonable and discriminatory acts, policies, and practices”.

The petition, which the US government now has 45 days to respond to, seeks a variety of penalties and remedies to level the global playing field in shipbuilding and stimulate demand for commercial vessels built in the US. These include port fees on Chinese-built ships docking at US ports, and the creation of a Shipbuilding Revitalisation Fund to help the domestic industry and its workers.

A case that might appear focused on one industry in fact has dramatic global implications. Not only does it have the potential to reignite the US-China trade conflict, but it will also increase the focus on China’s growing military might and the massive commercial shipping industry that underpins it. At the same time, it raises questions about America’s ability and even willingness to reindustrialise in strategic sectors, which may bleed into the 2024 presidential election.

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Finally, it’s a window into whether the US has the ability to continue to play its traditional post-second world war security role, which includes policing global shipping lanes and securing the South China Seas for commercial transport, at a time when it no longer has the industrial capacity and workforce to build its own ships. The direction that the Biden administration takes on the case, and how China responds, will say much about the future economic and political shape of the world.

As the secretary of the navy, Carlos del Toro, put it in a speech at the Harvard Kennedy School last September, “History proves that, in the long run, there has never been a great naval power that wasn’t also a maritime power — a commercial shipbuilding and global shipping power.”

Over the past few decades, America has essentially stopped building its own ships.

In 1975, the US shipbuilding industry was ranked number one in terms of global capacity, with more than 70 commercial ships on order for production domestically. Nearly 50 years later, the US now produces less than 1 per cent of the world’s commercial vessels, falling to 19th place globally. China meanwhile has tripled its production relative to the US over the past two decades, producing over 1,000 ocean-going vessels last year, versus America’s 10.

The resulting asymmetry comes with both commercial and military concerns for the US, but also for any country that depends on it for security. More than 90 per cent of military equipment, supplies and fuel travels by sea, according to the 301 complaint, the vast majority on contracted commercial cargo vessels. All of these are made overseas, including some in China.

What’s more, the complaint says, “Chinese companies — primarily state-owned companies — have become leaders in financing, building, operating and owning port terminals around the world.”

According to research by Isaac B Kardon, an assistant professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, and Wendy Leutert, an assistant professor at Indiana University, Chinese firms own or operate one or more terminals at 96 foreign ports, 36 of which are among the world’s top one hundred by container throughput.

Shipping cranes made by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company (ZPMC) dot the Port of Oakland in California. The company provides 70 per cent of the world’s cargo cranes © Getty Images

“Another 25 of these top 100 are on the Chinese mainland, establishing a PRC nexus for some 61 per cent of the world’s leading container ports,” they wrote in a 2022 article in International Security. China also makes much of the equipment used in the industry. A Chinese state-owned company, ZPMC, provides 70 per cent of the world’s cargo cranes.

This level of control over global logistics and supply chains offers clear economic and security advantages, and reflect decades of policy decisions taken by both the US and China.

The shrinkage in the US shipbuilding industry is a result of several factors, say US shipbuilding experts, starting in the 1980s, when most government subsidies for shipbuilding were pulled, given that they were antithetical to the free market economics embraced by the Reagan administration.

While the 1920 Jones Act still requires ships that go between US ports to be built, owned and operated by the US, that traffic represents a small portion of overall maritime commerce. Reagan officials, many of whom were security hawks as well as free-marketeers, had initially thought that shipbuilding for the military during the cold war would create enough demand to sustain the US shipbuilding industry.

Much of the raw materials and components needed to produce new ships are no longer available in the US, thanks to the shrinking and outsourcing of the American manufacturing base, according to defence officials and unions. That’s a problem common in many industries, not just shipbuilding.

Meanwhile, as a “just in time” production approach was employed over the past few decades, US contractors were discouraged from having excess capacity that might be needed in the event of a supply chain disruption, natural disaster, or security emergency.

This, along with consolidation in the industry and the rise of cheaper ships produced in Japan, South Korea and most recently China, has led to lowered investment in things like technology, factory equipment and training for US workers. The result has been an overall decline in competitiveness and capacity in US shipbuilding yards, according to navy and union officials, as well as some labour economists.

The decline is of major concern not only to trade groups such as the Shipbuilders Council of America, says its president Matthew Paxton, but also to the industries that support shipbuilding.

USW president David McCall, who represents workers making everything from steel and engines to paints, cables and other products used in ships, notes that US steel mills are running at about 70 per cent capacity around the country. “If we could run capacity for more ships and the infrastructure to support them, it would create many more jobs which in turn would create more profitable facilities,” he says.

A worker at a US shipyard in 1940. Much of the raw materials and components needed to produce new ships are no longer available, thanks to the shrinking and outsourcing of the American manufacturing base © Keystone/Getty Images

Indeed, it’s telling that the steelworkers’ union actually negotiates things like capital investment into the factories that support industries like shipbuilding as part of their own collective bargaining efforts.

In a globalised market, the workers have more incentive to seek investment in their industries than large public corporations that can place jobs or investments anywhere, according to McCall. “The CEOs that run these companies may leave after a few years, with golden parachutes, but we work in our communities for decades. We have to think about long-term security for workers,” says McCall.

This is a complaint that many on the labour left, and increasingly some on the political right too in the US, have made, particularly as it relates to industries in crucial or strategic sectors. With the breakdown of the US-led system of free market policies and institutions known as the Washington consensus, the supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by Covid-19 and wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the increase in economic and political tensions between China and the West, business as usual is increasingly challenged.

The Biden administration has made the reshoring of several crucial industries, including chipmaking and battery production, an explicit pillar of its economic strategy, though implementation of the new industrial policies has been mixed.

Rebuilding a workforce and factories from scratch takes time, and achieving the scale and high-speed iteration crucial to the cost-effectiveness and productivity of operations can take further years or decades of investment.

While there has been a hollowing out of shipyards and construction capacity, there are also problems higher up the value chain. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts “little or no change” in the number of marine engineers and architects in the US between 2022 and 2032, while the job market for such careers in places like South Korea and China is booming.

Workers at a shipyard in Jiangyin, Jiangsu province. The massive geopolitical power shift in shipping is due in large part to China’s aspiration to dominate global shipbuilding © Aleksandar Plaveski/EPA

To fill the gap, US officials have been turning to allies for help. Del Toro, the naval secretary, who has been concerned about the economic and security implications of the decline of shipbuilding in the US for some time, recently met officials in South Korea and Japan to encourage them to consider doing more production in the US, for the American market, in order to make up for their own loss of global market share to China.

This makes sense in theory, but the shortage of skilled US workers and capacity is a clear concern for allies, which brings home the point that a viable commercial shipping industry and national security aren’t discrete problems, but are intricately connected.

Shipbuilding is about steel and workers, but it’s also about technology. The digital component of transport and logistics is arguably as crucial to security and commerce as what gets made in shipyards.

China has, over the past several years, rolled out the pre-eminent global logistical supply chain platform, Logink, which it is giving for free to various ports around the world. The worry on the part of the US administration, as well as many in the labour and defence communities, is that this could give Beijing a window into global supply chains — both commercial and military — that would be both a competitive issue and a national security concern.

As a recent Department of Transportation Maritime Administration warning put it, “Logink is a single-window logistics management platform that aggregates logistics data from various sources, including domestic and foreign ports, foreign logistics networks, shippers, shipping companies, other public databases, and hundreds of thousands of users in the PRC.”

The warning further states that “the PRC government is promoting logistics data standards that support Logink’s widespread use, and Logink’s installation and utilisation in critical port infrastructure very likely provides the PRC access to and/or collection of sensitive logistics data”.

Michael Wessel, a commissioner on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, calls it “a serious self-inflicted economic and national intelligence wound”.

Last month, President Biden signed an executive order designed to strengthen cyber security at US ports, and directed billions of dollars into new infrastructure amid concerns that hackers from China could exploit these facilities to create havoc with supply chains.

The massive geopolitical power shift in shipping is due in large part to China’s aspiration, starting in 2001 (the same year it entered the WTO), to dominate global shipbuilding. Beijing had at that point designated the industry as “strategic”, which meant massive WTO non-compliant subsidies, limits on foreign partnerships, and other anti-competitive policies.

In 2006, it became one of the seven strategic industries over which state-owned enterprises should maintain control. In 2015, as part of the Made in China 2025 plan, Beijing identified shipbuilding as one of the ten priority sectors in which China would seek to dominate global commerce by 2025.

A Cosco ship sits in San Francisco Bay awaiting access to the Port of Oakland. China has tripled its production relative to the US over the past two decades, producing over 1,000 ocean-going vessels last year, versus America’s 10 © David Paul Morris/Bloomberg

Since then, the Chinese shipbuilding industry has enjoyed policy loans from state-owned banks, equity infusions and debt-for-equity swaps, below market rate steel inputs, tax preferences and grants from export agencies, as well as protection from foreign ownership.

All of this is outlined in the 301 petition, which puts forward a case that China simply isn’t playing by free market rules, and that US law allows the president to act to remedy the situation since it poses a threat to American commerce.

The petition also notes that a more traditional trade remedy adjudicated at the WTO wouldn’t address the issue, since the majority of ships produced in China are used in international commerce rather than being imported to the US. “You simply can’t compete with subsidised Chinese products [in the global marketplace],” says McCall. “We need to reinvent industrial policy in America.”

The big question now is whether the Biden administration, which has tried hard in recent months to stabilise US relations with China, will take up the petition, and if so, how quickly they will do it.

In this, election politics may have a role to play. The proposals would have strong appeal to a Trump administration, particularly one with China hawk Robert Lighthizer as the US trade rep. If Biden doesn’t quickly accede to them, he risks losing labour support, and/or looking weak on China.

Some on the left have floated the idea that the reshoring of shipbuilding jobs might help make up for the labour that will be lost in the electric vehicle transition, which is estimated to require roughly 40 per cent as many workers as cars made with traditional combustion engines.

The case also has major international stakes. Missile attacks in the Red Sea and worries over Taiwanese sovereignty have brought the importance of naval power back into the global discussion.

Meanwhile, the disruptions of the past few years have highlighted the risks of a “just in time” approach to commerce, pushing policymakers and business leaders to think more about resiliency and redundancy in the most strategic industries.

The subsequent move towards more industrial strategy has also led to complaints about the subsidies being offered in the US in areas like chips or clean technology, which some consider protectionist. And yet, concern about Chinese dumping in areas such as electric vehicles is growing too, in Europe as well as in the US.

However the Biden administration responds, the case calls into question the role of industrial policy in fair and secure market crafting, as well as the need for a new global trading paradigm — one that accounts for state-run systems, and acknowledges the challenges that free market economies and public corporations governed by short-term, shareholder concerns have competing with them.

In the meantime, the Americans and Chinese are each brushing up on the thinking of Alfred Mahan, the 19th-century military strategist and author of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History.

As he put it, “The necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs . . . from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment.” Then, as now, merchant shipping and military might are intertwined, not only as potential instruments of war, but of peace.

Financial Times · by Rana Foroohar · March 12, 2024

15. Army 4-star eyes new opportunities, exercises focused on sustainment, logistics in Indo-Pacific

Excerpts:

Needless to say, there’s an enhanced focus on logistics and sustainment questions, especially at a time when wars inside Ukraine and Gaza rage on and the US military is eyeing the potential for large-scale combat operation in he waters of the Indo-Pacific region.

“We have gotten a lot better over time. We used to just throw the green flag down,” Hamilton said. “Now, we’ll make the planners and the commander’s think at echelon [about] how they will react in a sustaining situation.”

Army 4-star eyes new opportunities, exercises focused on sustainment, logistics in Indo-Pacific - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · March 13, 2024

Army 4-star eyes new opportunities, exercises focused on sustainment, logistics in Indo-Pacific

on March 13, 2024 at 3:09 PM

Army mariners discharge vehicles on the beach via the causeway ferry as part of the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore operation during Talisman Sabre 2023 in Bowen, Australia. (US Army/Maj. Jonathon Daniell)

WASHINGTON — Although the US military plans to participate in a variety of Indo-Pacific-centered exercises in the coming years, a four-star Army general is eyeing one in particular that will let the joint force to test how well it can keep itself supplied in a fight — both across the vast waters of the Pacific and further from the front back home.

Speaking at an Association of the US Army breakfast today, Army Materiel Command head Gen. Charles Hamilton broadly detailed a multi-pronged plan designed, in part, to shore up military sustainment contingency blueprints.

First, in August, he is gathering together senior military leaders — including commanding generals from Air Mobility Command, US Transportation Command, Air Force Materiel Command — and industry for a “seminar” at the Army’s Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Ala. Once there, the group will focus on the first 30 to 60 days of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

“That’s a congested space. There’s a lot of moving pieces and what we’ve got to do is detangle it … and integrate better in this time,” said Hamilton. Part of that discussion, he added, will include contested logistics inside the theater, but also explore the nuts and bolts of how the services work together inside the United States.

“There’s no way we go into a large-scale fight without relying on allies and partners for supply chain airfields [and ports]. … We’ve identified [those], you know, down to every airfield and port there is,” he said.

“Have we done the same thing here in the United States? If I’m moving something out of Fort Cavazos, and I get bogged down, am I going to go all the way to Fort Sam [Houston] or Fort Bliss to continue that Army movement?” Hamilton later added, referring to three spread out Army bases in Texas. “Or am I going to coordinate with two Air Force bases that are in between those two areas? We’re probably not there yet. That’s part of that joint conversation we’ve got to have.”

The aim is to have the Alabama discussions lead to an exercise in the Indo-Pacific focused on US military sustainment there, rather than focusing on maneuvers like most exercises. Lessons and observations from that event, and others, could then be used to help Pentagon leaders decide on a host of logistics questions like how to handle prepositioned stock plans across the region.

When it comes to Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), for example, the list currently includes APS-1 designated for the US, APS-2 for Europe, the ocean-roaming APS-3 afloat, APS-4 for Northeast Asia, APS-5 for Southwest Asia, APS-6 for Army South and APS-7 for Army Africa.

During a December 2023 interview with Breaking Defense, AMC deputy Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan explained that military leaders are grappling with an array of stockpile questions after watching Ukraine burn through munitions provided by US and other nations. Mohan said he is in favor of expanding land-based equipment numbers in the Indo-Pacific region to reduce transit times and avoid hurdles like agricultural inspections. But, he said, it has to be done very “carefully,” with the necessary bilateral deals and decisions about what’s critical and what’s not.

“When that APS is floating around on a ship that says, ‘US Navy’ on the side of it, we have a lot of decision space, [but] when put it in other countries, the complexity from a geopolitical standpoint, goes up,” Mohan said at the time.

In addition to evolving APS plans, the service is looking for new ways to deliver equipment to supplies and equipment to the joint force (i.e., autonomous watercraft and drones). It stood up a contested logistics cross-functional team inside its future command last year to look at just that.

Army leaders have also been using exercises like Talisman Sabre 23, a biennial exercise between the US and Australia, to practice things like joint petroleum over-the-shore and joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS), which the Pentagon will draw on for the new plan to build a pier into Gaza to deliver food and other aid to trapped Palestinians.

Needless to say, there’s an enhanced focus on logistics and sustainment questions, especially at a time when wars inside Ukraine and Gaza rage on and the US military is eyeing the potential for large-scale combat operation in he waters of the Indo-Pacific region.

“We have gotten a lot better over time. We used to just throw the green flag down,” Hamilton said. “Now, we’ll make the planners and the commander’s think at echelon [about] how they will react in a sustaining situation.”

Army should permanently station armor brigade in Poland, report argues

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · March 13, 2024

The U.S. military should reassess its force posture in Europe and reduce its reliance on revolving door-style unit rotations, a major think tank’s analysts concluded in a Monday report.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ transnational threat team based their study on official documents, open-source materials and interviews with subject-matter experts.

The report’s authors recommend that the Army abandon the rotational armor brigade deployment model that “eats up ... the Army’s force structure and long-term readiness.” Currently, two armor brigades are deployed to Europe. Instead, the report said, the service should permanently station an Armored Brigade Combat Team in Poland to replace one rotational unit and eliminate the remaining rotation altogether.

An Army Times investigation found that tank brigades and enlisted tank crew members were at higher risk of suicide than other soldiers in recent years, due in part to a decade of high operational tempo fueled by such non-combat deployments. The service once had armor brigades in Europe, but they were removed in the early 2010s.

BROKEN TRACK: Suicides & suffering in Army’s exhausted armor community

An Army Times data analysis found that armor brigades and tankers experienced higher suicide rates than the rest of the Army.

Currently, the Army maintains a large presence of rotational forces in Europe. V Corps’ forward headquarters in Poznan, Poland oversees the three temporarily deployed brigade combat teams, which includes one light infantry brigade in addition to the two armor brigades. Other rotational forces include division headquarters, a combat aviation brigade, fires assets and sustainment units.

But the short-tour model has consequences, the report’s authors argued. They cost more money in the long-term compared to permanent bases, and they are less integrated into the continent’s culture and defense network. The deployment-based model negatively impacts soldiers, too — the authors said evidence suggests they “separate military personnel from their families,” causing “low morale” that can spawn “discipline issues and increased divorce rates.”

Army spokesperson Col. Roger Cabiness II told Army Times, however, that “forward basing of an ABCT is not a simple task.” Doing so would require diplomatic and legislative approvals both at home and abroad.

Despite efforts to reduce their operational tempo, the Army’s armor units continue to deploy at a high rate to fulfill the Europe requirements. The 4th Infantry Division’s 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team cased its colors Monday, signifying its departure for an eight- or nine-month Europe rotation. The Iron Brigade’s new mission is beginning roughly 16 months after returning to Fort Carson, Colorado from another Europe deployment that wrapped in December 2022.

The report’s authors also recommended that the Air Force station an additional F-16 squadron in Germany; increase anti-submarine warfare capability and air defense forces; bolster stockpiles of prepositioned equipment and ammunition; and continue modernization, cyber, space and security cooperation efforts.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie covers the Army for Military Times. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill, and served five years in the Army Guard. His investigations earned the Society of Professional Journalists' 2023 Sunshine Award and consecutive Military Reporters and Editors honors, among others. Davis was also a 2022 Livingston Awards finalist.

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · March 13, 2024

17. U.S. expected to impose new sanctions against settler outposts in occupied West Bank

Sanctioning friends, partners, and allies?

U.S. expected to impose new sanctions against settler outposts in occupied West Bank

Axios · by Barak Ravid · March 14, 2024

The Biden administration is expected to impose new sanctions as soon as Thursday on two illegal outposts in the occupied West Bank that were used as a base for attacks by extremist Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians, three U.S. officials told Axios.

Why it matters: It would be first time U.S. sanctions are imposed against entire outposts and not just against individuals.

The move comes as the Biden administration ratchets up pressure on the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over a range of issues, including settler violence against Palestinians and the war in Gaza.
There were nearly 500 Israeli settler attacks against Palestinians between Oct. 7 and Jan. 31 of this year, according to the UN humanitarian office (OCHA).

Driving the news: The second round of sanctions by the Biden administration to counter settler violence will also include sanctions against three Israeli settlers, the U.S. officials said.

A U.S. official said the sanctions against the two outposts are meant to send the message that the U.S. is targeting not only individuals but also entities that are involved in giving logistical and financial support to attacks against Palestinian civilians.
The sanctions would freeze assets the three settlers and two outposts might have in the U.S., ban them from getting a visa to enter the U.S. and block them from using the U.S. financial system.
The State Department didn't immediately respond to questions about the new sanctions.

Flashback: On Feb. 1, President Biden signed an executive order allowing the U.S. to impose new sanctions on Israeli settlers — and potentially Israeli politicians and government officials — involved in violent attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank.

The unprecedented executive order was the most significant step any U.S. administration had taken in response to the violence.
The first round of sanctions under the new executive order included four Israeli settlers who the U.S. said were directly involved in attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank and systematic acts that led to the forced displacement of Palestinian communities.
Since then the U.K., France and Canada announced similar sanctions.

Between the lines: The initial response of the Israeli government and the settler movement to Biden's executive order was very mild because they saw it as a largely symbolic move.

But within days three Israeli banks announced they were suspending the settlers' bank accounts to comply with the new sanctions.
Israel's ultranationalist Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called on Israeli banks to not implement the new U.S. sanctions and asked the Ministry of Finance to look for ways to circumvent them.
Under pressure from the settler lobby, Netanyahu protested the move in a phone call with Biden in February, suggesting the prime minister was concerned the order could have unprecedented implications for the entire settlements enterprise in the West Bank.
Biden pushed back on Netanyahu's complaint and told the Israeli prime minister the U.S. will continue sanctioning violent extremist settlers, a senior U.S. official said.

Axios · by Barak Ravid · March 14, 2024

18. Sweden Scrambles to Intercept Russian Aircraft Within Hours of NATO Flag Raising

Putin's way of "celebrating" Sweden joining NATO?

Sweden Scrambles to Intercept Russian Aircraft Within Hours of NATO Flag Raising

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · March 14, 2024

Swedish JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft were scrambled alongside Belgian and German aircraft to investigate an unidentified track over the Baltic Sea emanating from Kaliningrad.

by Kyiv Post | March 14, 2024, 8:14 am

A Swedish JAS-39 Gripen and German Eurofighter conduct visual identification of Antonov An-26 over the Baltic Sea on March 11. Photo: NATO Public Relations.

As Sweden’s flag was being raised outside NATO Headquarters on Monday to mark its accession as the Alliance’s 32nd member, its aircraft were being scrambled as part of the quick reaction alert system over the Baltic Sea.

On the morning of March 11, Allied radar operators detected an unidentified, undeclared aircraft track over the Baltic Sea traveling from Kaliningrad towards mainland Russia. The controllers at NATO’s Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Uedem, Germany coordinated the launch of Swedish JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft assigned to NATO, as well as Belgian F-16AM fighter aircraft from Šiauliai Air Base, Lithuania. The aircraft made a visual identification of a Russian Tupolev Tu-134 “Crusty” military airliner.

Later that day, NATO’s CAOC alerted the German Quick Reaction Alert base at Lielvarde, Latvia after another track was spotted over the Baltic. Germany launched Luftwaffe Eurofighters and Sweden again sent its JAS-39 Gripens in support.

On this occasion, the track was from Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Antonov An-26 “Cash” transport aircraft.

This first real-world mission of Swedish aircraft occurred only days after the nation had become a NATO member.

NATO’s Allied Air Command described the mission as “an impressive demonstration of the deep integration the Swedish Air Force has achieved with NATO Air Policing forces and the close and smooth interoperability in support of safeguarding NATO over the Baltic Sea.”

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Allied fighter jets are regularly scrambled to intercept, identify and track Russian planes flying in international airspace near NATO territory over the Baltic Sea and other sensitive areas. For the Germans, this operation was the second such mission since taking over the Air Policing mission at Lielvarde on March 1, while Belgian jets have been scrambled around a dozen times since beginning their mission at Šiauliai on Dec. 1.

On Tuesday, Russia again “exercised its right” to perform scheduled flights over the international waters of the Baltic and Caspian seas. On this occasion it used a more aggressive mix of aircraft: Tu-22M3 long-range bombers and a MiG-31 fighter armed with the Kinzhal ballistic system by Su-30SM and Su-35S escort fighters, according to a statement by the Russian Defense Ministry.

The statement said that “long-range aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces have performed scheduled flights over the international waters of the Baltic and Caspian seas.”

It added that the mission “involved Tu-22M3 long-range bombers and MiG-31 fighters armed with the Kinzhal air-launched system” and that “the crews of MiG-31 aircraft practiced in-flight refueling.”

The commander of Russia’s long-range aviation division, Lieutenant-General Sergey Kobylash, said: “All flights were carried out in strict compliance with international rules of using airspace. Long-range aviation pilots regularly fly over the international waters of the Arctic, North Atlantic, Black and Baltic seas, and the Pacific Ocean.”.

Commenting on the fact that, once again, NATO aircraft including Swedish Gripens had observed the Russian aircraft, Kobylash said: “At some stages of the route our airplanes were accompanied by fighter jets from other countries.”

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · March 14, 2024

19. Philippines, US Should Revisit Treaty To Include China’s ‘Gray-Zone’ Tactics – Analysis

Philippines, US Should Revisit Treaty To Include China’s ‘Gray-Zone’ Tactics – Analysis

https://www.eurasiareview.com/14032024-philippines-us-should-revisit-treaty-to-include-chinas-gray-zone-tactics-analysis/

March 14, 2024 0 Comments

By BenarNews

By Camille Elemia

The Philippines and United States need to revisit their longtime mutual defense pact to address Beijing’s increasing use of “gray-zone” activities – or acts of aggression short of an armed attack – in the disputed South China Sea, experts said.

Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the two allies are compelled to come to each other’s defense in the event of “an armed external attack,” but the term is ambiguous and needs to be more clearly defined, according to analysts interviewed by BenarNews.

Article V of the treaty “needs to be more clearly discussed and interpreted” by both countries, said Don McLain Gill, a geopolitical analyst based in Manila.

The article states that the MDT covers “an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.”

In recent years, China has intensified its harassment and intimidation of Philippine government ships and other vessels in the West Philippine Sea, Manila’s name for waters of the South China Sea that lie within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

“There needs to be a firmer operational definition of an ‘armed attack,’ because without doing so, China will continue to exploit such terminological ambiguities,” Gill told BenarNews.

“It’s still an ambiguous term. Should firearms be used to trigger the MDT? If so, it does not address the casualties on our side.”

He was responding to questions about a March 5 incident where four Philippine Navy sailors sustained minor injuries while aboard a military-contracted civilian vessel, when blasts from Chinese water cannons shattered their boat’s windshield.

The dramatic moment, which was caught on video, occurred as China Coast Guard (CCG) ships tried to block the Philippine boat, the Unaizah May 4, from carrying out a resupply mission to Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal).

“The focus must also be on the potential harm to human life China’s unfriendly acts may cause,” Gill said.

The incident last week marked the first time that injuries were reported in any of the tense incidents at sea that have become more frequent lately, as Chinese ships try to block Philippine ships and boats from delivering supplies to the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusty World War II-era ship that serves as Manila’s outpost in Ayungin Shoal.

While such close encounters at sea between Philippine and Chinese coast guard ships increased in 2023, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin cited the MDT in warning that Washington would help defend Manila in case of an armed attack “anywhere in the South China Sea,” including on Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessels.

In the immediate aftermath of the March 5 incident, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. dismissed calls that Manila move to have the treaty invoked over it.

While “his administration viewed the incident and such “dangerous maneuvers” by China with “great alarm,” there was no need at this time to take that step on the MDT, he said.

Five months after he took office in 2022, as he talked about the possibility of a stronger U.S. military presence in the Philippines, Marcos said that the mutual defense treaty with the United States was “continuously under negotiations and under evolution.”

In 2023, as tensions also simmered between China and the U.S. over Taiwan, the Marcos administration agreed to give American forces greater access to military bases in his country. Late last year, the U.S. and the Philippines also launched joint patrols around the archipelago.

Sherwin Ona, a political science professor at De La Salle University in Manila, said he agreed with Marcos and noted that the boat that came under attack was a civilian vessel.

In his view, Beijing is aware of the language in the treaty that does not clearly define a red line, and is exploiting that by carrying out gray-zone tactics in the contested waterway.

“The framing of conflict is so far within the gray-zone approach of the People’s Republic of China. I think Beijing is conscious of this and will avoid a full-scale naval confrontation with the Philippines and the U.S.,” Ona told BenarNews.

Wider definition of ‘armed attack’

Analyst Gill, however, said that if the definition of armed attack is merely limited to military confrontation, this allows China to carry on with its aggressive actions at sea.

“If armed attack will only mean a direct military confrontation, then that opens up more pathways for China to inflict harm on Filipinos at sea,” Gill said.

“Given last week’s incident, one may ask that if China’s belligerent activities in the Philippines’ EEZ may eventually critically injure or kill members of the Philippine crew, should Article V be implemented?” he said.

Antonio Carpio, a South China Sea analyst and a former Supreme Court justice, said the Philippines could approach the U.S. to talk about a possible expansion of definitions of wording in the treaty.

“‘Armed attack’ means use of lethal weapons like cannon, missiles or guns. We can discuss with the U.S. to define ‘armed attack’ to include use of laser beams that are permanently blind since such use is already outlawed by an international convention,” Carpio said in a message to BenarNews.

Last year, a CCG vessel pointed a military-grade laser at a Philippine Coast Guard ship, temporarily blinding the Filipino crew.

‘Option of last resort’

But Rommel Ong, a retired Philippine Navy rear admiral, believes the two countries will not include such acts of aggression in the MDT.

“I don’t think that’s going to happen. The Philippines and the U.S. are both trying to avoid invoking the MDT for minor incidents,” Ong told BenarNews.

“That’s the option of last resort. The actions of China are still within the bounds of non-kinetic. It’s just that we’re not used to conflicts at sea,” he said.

He mentioned the cod wars between the United Kingdom and Iceland during the 1950s to 1970s over rights to fish in Icelandic waters. Both European countries engaged in gray-zone tactics by ramming and blocking each other’s ships.

“MDT is like a nuclear bomb. Its effectiveness is in its deterrent value. But once you use it, it loses its value.”

With these limitations, the Philippines appears to have no option but to resort to joint patrols with the U.S. and other like-minded allies, analyst Ona said.

He added that the Philippines must fast-track military and coast guard modernization programs and continue its transparency program, whereby they publicize cases of Chinese intimidation and incursions in the West Philippine Sea.

Marcos has repeatedly called on foreign nations to support the landmark international arbitration ruling in 2016 that sided with Manila and invalidated Beijing’s sweeping claims in the South China Sea.

During an official visit to Germany this week, Marcos noted that 60% of world trade passed through the vital waterway.

“It’s not solely the interest of the Philippines, or of ASEAN, or of the Indo-Pacific region but the entire world. That is why it’s in all our interest to keep it as a safe passage for all international commerce that goes on in the South China Sea,” Marcos said during a joint press conference on Tuesday with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

Marcos has relied on international allies and partners, striking deals on defense cooperation even with non-traditional allies to counter Chinese aggression. Aside from the U.S. and Germany, Japan, Australia, France, the United Kingdom, and India have expressed support for Manila over the South China Sea dispute.

BenarNews

BenarNews’ mission is to provide readers with accurate news and information that reflects the complex and ever-changing world around them. With homepages in Bengali, Thai, Bahasa Malaysia, Bahasa Indonesia and English, BenarNews brings timely news to its diverse audience. Copyright BenarNews. Used with the permission of BenarNews

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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