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Quotes of the Day:
"The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity has its own reason for existence. One cannot help but be in awe when he contemplates the mysteries of eternity, of life, of the marvelous structure of reality. It is enough if one tries merely to comprehend a little of this mystery each day. Never lose a holy curiosity. ... Don't stop to marvel."
- Albert Einstein from Life May 2, 1955, p.64.
"Originality does not consist in saying what no one has has ever said before, but in saying exactly what you think yourself."
- James Stephen
"The most important function of education at any level is to develop the personality of the individual and the significance of his life to himself and to others. This is the basic architecture of a life; the rest is ornamentation and decoration of the structure."
- Grayson Kirk
1. N. Korea fires ICBM, raises tensions after U.S. spy plane accusations
2. S. Korea, NATO establish new partnership for cooperation in 11 areas
3. N. Korea, China vow stronger ties on treaty-signing anniversary
4. Yoon, Kishida to hold summit in Vilnius on Wednesday
5. Daewoo Investor Eyes Purchase Of US Navy Shipbuilder
6. North Korea Condemns US Plan to Send Cluster Munitions to Ukraine as 'Criminal'
7. S. Korea to urge united response to N. Korea's nuclear threat at regional security forum
8. North Korea fires ballistic missile into the East Sea
9. Hey, Boomer: What Happened to North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Subs?
10. Yoon pitches tighter security cooperation between AP4 and NATO
11. Hidden 'treasure' helps NIS crack spy's cache of secrets
12. Yoon says North will face consequences for missile launches
13. In Search of the Ordinary: Everyday Life in North Korea
14. North Korean police complain to Pyongyang about uncooperative state security agents
15. Book Review | Korea: A New History of South and North
1. N. Korea fires ICBM, raises tensions after U.S. spy plane accusations
Kim is getting desperate. His active strategy is failing to achieve any of his objectives. The Rok keeps getting stronger: the ROK/US alliance, trilateral ROK/Japan//US corporation, ROK cooperation with ASEAN/ARF and of course the growing relationship with NATO. All Kim can count on is Russia, the failed state who is losing a war, and China whose strategy is also failing as the alliance relationships in support of the rules based international order grow stronger around the world.
And as we have long known, Kim also must externalize the threats to justify the sacrifice and suffering of the Korean people in the north who are required to contribute to the defense of the Kim family regime through their sacrifices.
And in another failure Kim is giving President Yoon justification for asking for international support in multiple forums from NATO to ASEAN to counter the north Korean threat. Kim Just keeps pushing his failed strategy.
(5th LD) N. Korea fires ICBM, raises tensions after U.S. spy plane accusations | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 12, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS more info in 10th para)
By Song Sang-ho and Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, July 12 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the East Sea on Wednesday, the South Korean military said, after the recalcitrant regime warned of military action over U.S. spy aircraft operations earlier this week.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launch from an area in or around Pyongyang at about 10 a.m., and the missile, fired at a lofted angle, flew around 1,000 kilometers before splashing into the water.
The North's first ICBM launch in about three months came amid tensions heightened by Pyongyang's tough rhetoric against the United States, a move seen as aimed at firming up internal unity and building a rationale for provocations.
"The intelligence authorities of South Korea and the U.S. are conducting a comprehensive assessment regarding (the missile's) specifics," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.
This file photo, released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on April 14, 2023, shows a Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile being fired. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
President Yoon Suk Yeol, who is in Lithuania to attend a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, presided over an emergency meeting of the National Security Council and vowed to strengthen deterrence in cooperation with the U.S., according to his office.
Yoon is expected to use his attendance at the summit to elicit international support to counter evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats.
The South Korean and U.S. militaries held a coordination meeting right after the launch, and affirmed they will further solidify their combined defense posture against "any North Korean threats and provocations," the JCS said.
The JCS strongly condemned the launch and urged the North to immediately stop such launches, calling the latest launch an "act of significant provocation" that not only harms peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula but also in the international community.
It said the military will maintain a "firm" readiness posture based on "overwhelming" capabilities to respond to any provocations by North Korea.
The latest launch coincided with a three-way meeting between the top military officers of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan in Hawaii, where they were expected to highlight their solidarity against the North's military threats.
The North's last long-range missile launch took place April 13, involving a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel ICBM. Just last month, the North fired two short-range ballistic missiles in an apparent protest over a series of massive South Korea-U.S. live-fire drills.
On Monday and Tuesday, Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, issued sharp-tongued statements claiming that U.S. military spy aircraft "intruded" into the area over the North's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Kim warned that the North will take "clear and resolute" actions against U.S. surveillance flights within the North's "economic water zone," claiming a "shocking" incident could occur.
The South Korean military has dismissed Kim's remarks, saying freedom of navigation and overflight are ensured in the EEZ.
Kim's statements came after the North's defense ministry on Monday denounced a U.S. plan to send a strategic nuclear submarine to the Korean Peninsula in the near future for the first time since 1981, warning the move could "incite the worst crisis of nuclear conflict in practice."
Washington had pledged to send a nuclear ballistic missile submarine to the peninsula in a joint declaration issued by Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden during their summit in April as part of efforts to deter Pyongyang's military threats.
This file photo, taken July 10, 2023, shows a U.S. U-2S reconnaissance aircraft landing at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, 60 kilometers south of Seoul. (Yonhap)
This week's ICBM launch is expected to add impetus to the efforts by Seoul and Washington to reinforce the credibility of America's extended deterrence commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend its ally.
As part of their deterrence efforts, the allies are set to hold the inaugural session of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in Seoul on Tuesday. The creation of the NCG was announced in the summit declaration in April.
The missile provocation may also help accelerate three-way cooperation efforts among the allies and Japan, including an ongoing push for the trilateral sharing of North Korean missile warning data in real time, according to observers.
The North's latest saber-rattling followed its failed launch of a space rocket carrying its first military reconnaissance satellite in late May. The rocket crashed into the Yellow Sea after an "abnormal starting" of the second-stage engine, according to the North's state media.
Observers said the latest launch could be intended to drum up internal unity after the failed launch and ahead of the 70th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War on July 27, celebrated as Victory Day in North Korea.
"After the failed spy satellite launch, the North Korean regime appears to be trying to turn the situation around by firing an ICBM, a card to pressure the U.S.," said Shin Jong-woo, a senior analyst at the Korea Defense Security Forum.
This file photo, captured from the homepage of North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 11, 2022, shows Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister and vice department director of the ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · July 12, 2023
2. S. Korea, NATO establish new partnership for cooperation in 11 areas
A lot of good news here.
Excerpts;
Yoon and Stoltenberg adopted the Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP) during a meeting on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, elevating the bilateral relationship from the Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP) established in 2012, according to the office.
...
The IPCP outlined cooperation in seven areas, including political-military connectivity, cyber defense, nonproliferation and antiterrorism, while the new ITPP increases the number of areas to 11 to include dialogue and consultations to promote mutual understanding on common security threats, among other things.
...
Under the ITPP, the two sides agreed to hold regular working-level and senior-level talks on political and military affairs while pushing for South Korea's participation in NATO discussions on emerging technologies and cyber defense.
The partnership also calls for establishing a consultation body to strengthen antiterrorism capabilities between South Korea and NATO, and pushing for South Korea's participation in NATO antiterrorism exercises and working groups.
...
The other areas of cooperation fall under the themes of practical cooperation for interoperability between South Korea's military and NATO-led exercises, cooperation in science and technology, the response to climate change in the security realm, women's participation for international peace and stability, and public diplomacy to enhance awareness of the South Korea-NATO partnership.
S. Korea, NATO establish new partnership for cooperation in 11 areas | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · July 11, 2023
By Lee Haye-ah
VILNIUS, July 11 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Tuesday established a new bilateral partnership for cooperation in 11 areas ranging from antiterrorism and nonproliferation to emerging technologies and cyber defense, the presidential office said.
Yoon and Stoltenberg adopted the Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP) during a meeting on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, elevating the bilateral relationship from the Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP) established in 2012, according to the office.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg pose for a photo after signing the Individually Tailored Partnership Program during their meeting at the venue of a NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11, 2023. (Yonhap)
The IPCP outlined cooperation in seven areas, including political-military connectivity, cyber defense, nonproliferation and antiterrorism, while the new ITPP increases the number of areas to 11 to include dialogue and consultations to promote mutual understanding on common security threats, among other things.
"I came to institutionalize a framework for cooperation by establishing the ITPP and to carry out consultations on cooperation with NATO in the military information and cyber spheres," Yoon said at the outset of the meeting.
"At a time when security in the Atlantic and security in the Indo-Pacific region cannot be separated, it is more important than ever to have close cooperation between Indo-Pacific nations, such as the Republic of Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and NATO," he said, referring to the four countries invited to the summit as NATO partner nations.
Stoltenberg echoed Yoon's remarks, saying South Korea is a highly valued partner of NATO.
"We value the partnership with you because security is not regional, security is global," he said. "What happens in the Indo-Pacific matters for Europe and what happens in Europe matters for the Indo-Pacific."
Under the ITPP, the two sides agreed to hold regular working-level and senior-level talks on political and military affairs while pushing for South Korea's participation in NATO discussions on emerging technologies and cyber defense.
The partnership also calls for establishing a consultation body to strengthen antiterrorism capabilities between South Korea and NATO, and pushing for South Korea's participation in NATO antiterrorism exercises and working groups.
The other areas of cooperation fall under the themes of practical cooperation for interoperability between South Korea's military and NATO-led exercises, cooperation in science and technology, the response to climate change in the security realm, women's participation for international peace and stability, and public diplomacy to enhance awareness of the South Korea-NATO partnership.
During his meeting with Stoltenberg, Yoon explained South Korea's plans to establish an international cyber exercise center by 2027, saying he hopes for close cooperation between the new center and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, according to his office.
Yoon reaffirmed South Korea's unwavering support for Ukraine in its war against Russia, and the NATO chief thanked the South Korean government for its assistance to the Ukrainian people.
The two also discussed North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
"President Yoon stressed that the international community must send a firm message in response to North Korea's illegal nuclear and missile provocations, and asked for NATO's continued support," the presidential office said.
"Secretary General Stoltenberg reaffirmed his position that he supports the South Korean government's efforts for North Korea's complete denuclearization and sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula," it added.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (2nd from R) talks with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (3rd from L) during their meeting at the venue of a NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11, 2023. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · July 11, 2023
3. N. Korea, China vow stronger ties on treaty-signing anniversary
China dn north Korea may be feeling the pressure of South Korea (and Japan) and NATO.
N. Korea, China vow stronger ties on treaty-signing anniversary | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · July 12, 2023
SEOUL, July 12 (Yonhap) -- North Korea and China have vowed to strengthen their relationship on the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of the two nations signing a friendship treaty, Pyongyang's state media said Wednesday.
China's embassy in the North held a feast to mark the anniversary Tuesday, attended by ranking officials from both sides, including China's top envoy in Pyongyang, Wang Yajun, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The two countries signed the treaty on July 11, 1961, under which they are obliged to provide military and other assistance to each other, a deal seen as the bedrock of their strong alliance for decades.
Kang Yun-sok, vice chairman of the North's standing committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, highlighted the "invincibility" of their bilateral relations, citing five summits between the North's leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
"It is our steadfast stance to further develop the friendly ties between the two countries to a higher level in line with people's aspirations," Kang said in a speech.
Wang said the two nations will maintain their strategic communication and strengthen cooperation, the KCNA said.
North Korea has been strengthening its close ties with China, the North's traditional ally and economic benefactor, amid the intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing and the long-stalled denuclearization talks with the United States.
This file photo, captured from a photo book on summit diplomacy by North Korea's publishing house on foreign culture on May 12, 2021, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from R) and his wife, Ri Sol-ju (R), meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (2nd from L) and his wife in Pyongyang in June 2019. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · July 12, 2023
4. Yoon, Kishida to hold summit in Vilnius on Wednesday
Yoon, Kishida to hold summit in Vilnius on Wednesday | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · July 12, 2023
By Lee Haye-ah
VILNIUS, July 11 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will meet Wednesday on the sidelines of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Vilnius, a presidential official said, following controversy over Japan's plan to release treated radioactive water into the sea.
The Yoon-Kishida meeting will come days after the International Atomic Energy Agency approved the water discharge from the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant, triggering angry protests from many in South Korea and other neighboring countries fearful of the water's potential harmful effect on people and the environment.
"The issue of the Fukushima contaminated water could come up," the presidential official told reporters here Tuesday, noting the summit agenda has not been coordinated in advance.
Earlier, a presidential official told reporters that if the issue is raised, Yoon will deliver the government's position that it will place top priority on the health and well-being of South Korean people.
Meanwhile, South Korea's main opposition Democratic Party has urged Yoon to use the planned summit to demand Tokyo withhold the water discharge plan.
The presidential official who spoke to reporters in Vilnius said the two leaders are also likely to discuss joint safety measures against the foreign exchange crisis, cutting-edge technology research, measures to contribute and cooperate for the stabilization of supply chains, and security cooperation involving the United States.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida shake hands during a summit in Hiroshima, Japan, on May 21, 2023. (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · July 12, 2023
5. Daewoo Investor Eyes Purchase Of US Navy Shipbuilder
Maybe this will improve shipbuilding for the US Navy.
Daewoo Investor Eyes Purchase Of US Navy Shipbuilder
gcaptain.com · by John Konrad · July 11, 2023
150224-N-EW716-002 MOBILE, Ala. (Feb. 24, 2015) An aerial view of the future littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) during its launch sequence at the Austal USA shipyard. The launch of the Gabrielle Giffords marks an important production milestone for the littoral combat ship program. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)
John Konrad
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by John Konrad (gCaptain) South Korean conglomerate Hanwha, valued at $42 billion, is considering a strategic acquisition of Austal, a pivotal player in the global shipbuilding industry, according to the Financial Review. Hanwha, keen to enhance its recent expansion into shipbuilding following the acquisition and renaming of Daewoo Shipbuilding to Hanwha Ocean, is particularly interested in Austal’s US operations.
Hanwha, a publicly-traded Korean conglomerate, has made significant strides in the shipbuilding sector this year. In a strategic move this May, it acquired a controlling stake of 49.3% in Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, one of South Korea’s top three shipbuilders, for an investment of $1.49 billion. Following the acquisition, Daewoo Shipbuilding underwent a rebranding, emerging under the new name of Hanwha Ocean.
Austal, an Australian company with shipyards in Western Australia and Alabama, USA, presents a compelling investment opportunity. Its anticipated contract for surveillance ship construction, valued at $3.2 billion, and its paltry market capitalization (under $1 billion) compared to other defense industry companies, make it an attractive prospect for investors. The intensifying competition with China has led to the US Navy’s desire to expand its shipbuilding efforts, further augmenting Austal’s appeal. Additionally, Austal USA’s recent strategic investment in enhancing its manufacturing capabilities by adding steel production lines to its existing aluminum manufacturing further bolsters its value proposition in the sector.
However, Austal’s US operations have recently grappled with substantial challenges. Following an extended investigation, the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged three of its maritime executives with accounting fraud. These allegations sent shockwaves through the industry.
Austal, recognized as the builder of the Independence Class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – which have faced harsh criticism for failing to meet expectations – is implicated in systemic accounting fraud allegations. Among those charged by the Securities and Exchange Commission is Austal USA’s former Chief Executive, Craig Perciavalle. These legal actions, coupled with an unsettling insight into the daily operations at Austal’s US shipyard, could hamper its capacity to attract critical executive hires and secure future financing.
Amid these turbulent times, Hanwha’s interest in Austal surfaces when the latter is on the cusp of significant defense contracts, thanks to the AUKUS pact. This agreement commits Australia to a massive $368 billion investment over the next three decades for the procurement of eight nuclear-powered submarines. Austal does not build submarines directly but has contracts to provide production work on the US Navy’s Virginia-class and future Columbia-class nuclear-powered submarine for General Dynamics’ Electric Boat.
The Financial Review also points out that this potential move has sparked interest among other financial behemoths. New York-based JF Lehman & Company, enjoying the backing of Morgan Stanley, is preparing to lodge a bid. Cerberus Capital Management and Washington’s Arlington Capital Partners are also interested.
Should Hanwha proceed with the acquisition, it could signal a remarkable shift in the US shipbuilding industry. This could usher in greater collaboration with Korean shipbuilders who, despite losing market share to China, still reign supreme in efficiently constructing large, highly complex ships. According to several experts interviewed by gCaptain, a symbiotic partnership combining Korea’s commercial shipbuilding efficiencies with American warship funding and expertise could revitalise Naval shipbuilding, as long as it can circumvent US government red tape.
Industry Consolidation
Austal USA’s strategic location holds one more significant appeal to private equity firms. Its close proximity to the newly revitalized Alabama Shipyards could offer potential investors a significant advantage in the shipbuilding industry. Merging the operations of the two yards would provide a combined capability to construct steel and aluminum ships and would also facilitate the much-needed upgrade and repair services for the US Navy’s aging fleet. Given Alabama Shipyards’ remarkable turnaround story — from having less than a dozen employees in 2018 to a workforce of around 250 with the ability to surge to 600 as needed — the company offers not only an ample supply of skilled labor but also the capacity to undertake substantial projects. Its extensive waterfront real estate and deep-water access further bolster its potential.
By strategically capitalizing on these existing opportunities, and other promising prospects in the commercial sector — such as supplying the burgeoning workboat market through the construction of aluminum vessels, or acquiring a primary provider of Jones Act tankers to the US Navy, Overseas Shipping Group (currently undervalued with a paltry market-cap of just $322 million, which is at or below the replacement cost of a single Jones Act crude tanker) and launching a newbuild project — savvy private equity investors could forge a robust shipbuilding conglomerate that meets several of the Pentagon’s most presssing needs. This well-positioned entity would be capable of effectively addressing the rising demand in both the defense and commercial sectors.
Conclusion
The potential acquisition of Austal by Hanwha could be a transformative event in the shipbuilding industry. Despite Austal’s current challenges, its significant growth potential, marked by robust U.S. Navy and Australian submarine contracts, make it an appealing prospect. Hanwha’s acquisition could not only solidify its position in the U.S. shipbuilding sector but also ignite greater collaboration between South Korean shipbuilders – which have been loosing market share to China – and American shipbuilders – which would benefit from the technologies and processes that make Korean yards among the world’s most profitable and efficient.
Yet, the intricacies of the political, legal, and competitive environment cast a shroud of uncertainty over the outcome. This potential acquisition highlights the volatile interplay between international business and defense strategy, underscoring the challenging reality faced by the U.S. Navy. Like VT Halter before it – which also had billions in contracts and invested hundreds of millions in expansion yet sold for an astonishing low $15 million – Austal is confronted with the stark truth that new facilities, substantial U.S. Navy contracts and promising opportunities do not guarantee financial security.
6. North Korea Condemns US Plan to Send Cluster Munitions to Ukraine as 'Criminal'
Of course the regime could not miss an opportunity to make counter accusations and divert attraction from its real criminal activity.
I did not know DPICM or "cluster munitions" were classified as WMD.
Excerpt:
"I, on behalf of the DPRK government, vehemently denounce the U.S. decision to offer WMD (weapons of mass destruction) to Ukraine as a dangerous criminal act to bring a new calamity to the world, and strongly demand the U.S. withdraw the decision immediately," she said.
North Korea Condemns US Plan to Send Cluster Munitions to Ukraine as 'Criminal'
By Reuters
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July 11, 2023, at 6:53 a.m.
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-07-11/north-korea-says-us-plan-to-send-cluster-munitions-to-ukraine-is-criminal
SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea on Tuesday condemned U.S. President Joe Biden's decision to send cluster munitions to Ukraine as a "criminal act" and demanded an immediate withdrawal of the plan.
The fact that Biden had admitted it was a difficult decision showed he was aware of the disastrous consequences of the use of cluster munitions, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui said in a statement carried by the official KCNA news agency.
"I, on behalf of the DPRK government, vehemently denounce the U.S. decision to offer WMD (weapons of mass destruction) to Ukraine as a dangerous criminal act to bring a new calamity to the world, and strongly demand the U.S. withdraw the decision immediately," she said.
DPRK refers to the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Reclusive North Korea has forged closer ties with the Kremlin and backed Moscow after it invaded Ukraine in February last year.
"The U.S. has made a very dangerous choice ... which brings to light once again its true colours as destroyer of peace regarding aggression and massacre as its national policy and mode of existence," Choe said.
The United States announced last week it would send Ukraine the weapons controversial for the danger they pose to civilians long after fighting ends as part of an $800 million security package.
Many U.S. allies and partners helping aid Ukraine are among the 111 state parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions and came into force in 2010.
North Korea is not a party to the convention. Russia, Ukraine and the United States have also not signed the convention
Ukraine said the U.S. decision would help to liberate Ukrainian territory but promised the munitions would not be used in Russia.
(Reporting by Jack Kim, editing by Ed Osmond and Nick Macfie)
Copyright 2023 Thomson Reuters.
7. S. Korea to urge united response to N. Korea's nuclear threat at regional security forum
S. Korea to urge united response to N. Korea's nuclear threat at regional security forum | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · July 12, 2023
By Chang Dong-woo
SEOUL, July 12 (Yonhap) -- South Korea plans to call for the international community to take a united response to deal with North Korea's nuclear and missile threats at this week's regional security forum, according to Seoul officials Wednesday.
Top diplomats from 27 Asia-Pacific countries and the European Union are scheduled to meet in Jakarta for a series of talks led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) this week. South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin will also attend the event.
In particular, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the region's largest security meeting, will be held later this week in Jakarta. The forum is a rare international occasion that North Korea attends, along with all the other countries involved in the long-suspended talks aimed at ending the North's nuclear ambitions.
It remains unclear whether North Korea will send its foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, to the forum.
Park is also expected to raise issues of North Korea's illicit cyber activities and concerns about the North's human rights during the forum, officials said.
On Thursday, Park is scheduled to participate in the South Korea-ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting and the ASEAN plus three meeting, which also includes China and Japan.
The following day, Park will take part in the East Asia Summit meeting, which involves ASEAN member states, South Korea, China and Japan, as well as the United States, Russia, India, Australia and New Zealand. He will then participate in the ARF.
Foreign Minister Park Jin delivers a keynote address during a forum at a Seoul hotel, in this file photo taken June 29, 2023, to discuss the geopolitical situation on the Korean Peninsula. (Yonhap)
During the ARF, South Korea will emphasize its resolve to implement its Indo-Pacific strategy introduced in November of last year and make efforts to earn an official endorsement of the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative, a core component of the Indo-Pacific strategy, from members of ASEAN, a senior foreign ministry official said.
The official added that South Korea will emphasize the importance of a united response to the unprecedented missile provocations and nuclear threats by North Korea that have been ongoing since last year while underscoring the need for international cooperation in blocking Pyongyang's illegal financing of nuclear and missile programs through illicit cyber activities.
According to the official, Park is also expected to express the government's opposition to any unilateral attempt to change the status quo in the region, and clarify Seoul's stance on issues involving the South China Sea, Myanmar and Ukraine.
In between sessions, Park could hold separate bilateral talks with his counterparts from Japan, Australia, the EU and Britain. Observers also say that a three-way meeting among the top diplomats of Seoul, Washington and Tokyo could take place on the sidelines of the meetings.
odissy@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · July 12, 2023
8. North Korea fires ballistic missile into the East Sea
Kim Says, "International community: Please do not forget me." To the Korean people in the north: "I am defending you from the threats from America and the ROK. You must contribute to the defense by sacrificing for the Kim family regime."
This is another expenditure of money that is diverting food from the mouths of the Korean people.
The tragic irony is that Kim must act out because conditions are getting bad internally. He must create the external threat to justify the sacrifice and suffering of the Korean people in the north. This is just another human rights abuse – the prioritization of missiles and nuclear weapons over the welfare of the people.
The most important point is that this action is an indication of the failure of Kim's strategy and policies. We need to call him out on this.
An escapee from north Korea recently reminded us that Kim Jong Il promised the Korean people that when the north became a nuclear power that they would be completely self reliant and "free." Kim Jong Un has made the same promise. They have tested six nuclear weapons and claim to have dozens of weapons. Yet no one's lives have gotten better. The Korean people in the north are "frustrated." But sadly they are more than frustrated. Again, as an escapee reminded us that there are some in the north who say they wish for war because war would be better than living in the current conditions. We should think hard about that.
Wednesday
July 12, 2023
dictionary + A - A
North Korea fires ballistic missile into the East Sea
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/12/national/northKorea/North-Korea-Missile-South-Korea/20230712101900990.htmlNorth Korea fired a ballistic missile into the East Sea Tuesday, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
North Korea fired a ballistic missile into the East Sea Tuesday, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
The firing of the missile came a day after North Korea escalated its warning against the United States for sending spy jets into its air space, which both the U.S. and the South Korean military has denied.
The U.S. and the South Korean militaries stressed that the flights were routine and followed accordingly to the international law.
This is the first time in 27 days that North Korea launched a ballistic missile.
The rhetoric from North Korea came at a time when President Yoon Suk Yeol is attending the NATO summit in Lithuania.
President Yoon and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg agreed on upgrading the partnership between South Korea and the North Atlantic alliance including disarmament and nonproliferation.
BY LEE HO-JEONG [lee.hojeong@joongang.co.kr]
9. Hey, Boomer: What Happened to North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Subs?
Biding time? Reveal more when necessary. Or is this still in the too hard to do box?
Although I agree with the author, I also say: But never say never.
Conclusion:
Whatever happens with the new SSB, a several-boat SSB force that could truly serve as a consequential and credible “leg” of a nuclear dyad or triad does not appear to be in the cards anytime soon. Pyongyang’s land-based missiles, which are much more survivable and cost-effective than an SSB force, are highly likely to remain the mainstay of its nuclear and missile forces.
Hey, Boomer: What Happened to North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Subs?
In July 2019, North Korea revealed a conventionally powered ballistic missile submarine (SSB) in the late stages of construction and announced that it would be deployed in the near future. However, since then, there has been no evidence of the SSB’s launch, despite numerous occasions when that was expected. It is unclear what is holding up this process, although there are likely three key factors at play.
- SSB efforts are much lower in priority than the North’s land-mobile missiles.
- The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program is in flux, with three increasingly larger missiles having been unveiled since July 2019, but not yet flight tested—one of which may be too big for the new SSB to carry.
- Problems may have been encountered in the construction of the new SSB that Pyongyang has still not overcome, or that may not be cost-effective to rectify, or the SSB may no longer meet the North’s operational needs.
It remains to be seen when or if the new SSB ever sees the light of day. It is possible that the sub will be reconfigured once a suitably sized SLBM completes development or that it will be reconfigured for use in another role, such as supporting minisubs or special operational forces. Pyongyang may decide to dismantle the new SSB altogether in favor of building a larger sub. The SSB may just be left in the construction hall until a course of action is decided or even indefinitely.
Whatever happens with the new SSB, a several-boat SSB force that could truly serve as a consequential and credible “leg” of a nuclear dyad or triad does not seem to be in the cards anytime soon. Pyongyang’s land-based missiles, which are much more survivable and cost-effective than an SSB force, are highly likely to remain the mainstay of its nuclear and missile forces.
A Long Time Coming
In July 2019, North Korean media reported that Kim Jong Un had “inspected a newly built submarine” and that the sub’s “operational deployment is near at hand.” Associated photos showed the presence of what appeared to be a substantially externally complete SSB inside a covered construction hall at the Sinpho South Shipyard. The sub seemed to be based on North Korea’s ROMEO-class submarine, which uses old Soviet technology, and apparently had room for three missile launch tubes in the sail.
North Korea began work on the infrastructure to build a new type of submarine in June 2014, according to analysis of commercial imagery, and by September 2016, construction of the SSB appeared to be underway.
Since mid-2019, there have been several instances where experts and analysts have predicted the imminent rollout of the new SSB based on various shipyard activities, upcoming North Korean ceremonial days, or trends in the North’s missile activities. These include:
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In September 2019, based on the erection of a concealment structure at the shipyard.
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In October 2019, based on the first flight test of the Pukguksong-3 (PKS-3) SLBM from a submersible test platform.
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In December 2019, given “growing speculation concerning a North Korean end-of-year ‘surprise.’”
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In May 2020, given speculation, triggered by Pyongyang’s touting of “new policies for further increasing the nuclear war deterrence,” that an SSB rollout would be “the most probable step North Korea may take” to make good on December 2019 warnings of a “new strategic weapon.”
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In October 2020, based on the belief by some of an “increasing” probability of an SSB rollout, reinforced by the upcoming October 10 Korean Workers’ Party Foundation Day celebration.
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In March 2021, based on the opportunity presented by the end of the North’s annual winter training cycle or presented by the upcoming July-September summer cycle.
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In April 2021, based on repositioning of the SLBM submersible test barge at the Sinpho South Shipyard.
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Also in April, based on “mounting speculation” of an SSB rollout given the additional impetus of the impending celebration of Kim Il Sung’s birthday.
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Yet again in April 2021, based on the imminence of the mid-month “Day of the Sun” anniversary, used in the past for tests of missile technology.
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In September 2021, based on the “considerable pressure” that was “likely” placed on North Korea to roll out the SSB by “South Korean reports during the past month describing their development and launching of a new class of ballistic missile submarine and reported testing of a submarine-launched ballistic missile.”
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In May 2022, based on the “increasing probability” of an SSB rollout, “considering the North’s accelerated testing rate of various ballistic missile systems during the past seven months.”
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Most recently, in October 2022, based on an atypical level of activity at the shipyard.
North Korea could have rolled the SSB out of the construction hall at any time since at least the summer of 2020, when the parts yard apparently used to stage components flowing into the construction hall has been empty, suggesting the end of major construction, or July 2021, when the South Korean press claimed the Republic of Korea (ROK) and US intelligence assessed construction of the SSB was complete. As of June 10, 2023, there was still no open source evidence the SSB has been launched, although it is and will remain the case that the sub could be rolled out at any time in the future.
What’s Taking So Long?
The long period of time since Pyongyang publically reported the SSB’s “operational deployment is near at hand” strongly suggests there are some compelling reasons why the sub has remained in the construction hall.[1] Based on analysis of the available information, one or more of the following three key factors probably explains why the new SSB has been a no-show for almost four years.
Missile subs are not a high priority. When the new SSB was revealed, the US media often claimed that Kim Jong Un was “determined to deploy it as soon as he can” and had a “full steam ahead program to perfect his submarines.” Such commentary was bolstered by assessments that North Korea was seeking to develop a “second leg of the nuclear triad,” even “undeniably” so.
Clearly, the SSB program has not actually proceeded in this fashion and has not taken any central role in North Korea’s nuclear force. Pyongyang thus does not appear to have put much priority on ballistic missile submarines, and so there seems to be little pressure to finalize the new sub. (This lack of priority also is reflected in the associated SLBM program, discussed below.) A contrary example of what the North can do when it decides to ramp up the priority of a program is the recent attempt to place a reconnaissance satellite into orbit: a new satellite and space-launch vehicle—the Chollima-1—were developed, and in just over a month a new launch pad was erected from scratch and used to conduct the first (albeit unsuccessful) launch on May 31, 2023.
There are good operational and cost-effective reasons for the SSB not being a priority for North Korea, although we do not know the extent to which those reasons have influenced its decisions. The North’s large, longstanding force of road-mobile, land-based ballistic missiles offers substantially more survivability than noisy ROMEO-based SSBs that would be at substantial risk of acoustic detection and operate under conditions of allied air and naval superiority. SSBs will not expand the target coverage of land-mobile missiles or add meaningfully to the number of warheads North Korea can deliver—which can be done more cost-effectively by adding more truck- or railcar-based land-mobile missile launchers than by adding more resource-intensive, slow-to-build SSBs that only carry three SLBMs each.
The SLBM program is in flux. When the SSB was first unveiled, it was widely assumed that the sub would carry the Pukguksong-3 SLBM (about 8 meters long and 1.6 meters in diameter), a missile revealed by the North in 2017 and flight tested for the first and only time in October 2019. Since then, the North has displayed—but has not yet flight tested—three progressively larger (and thus longer-ranged) SLBMs:
- The Pukguksong-4 (about 2 meters longer than the PKS-3 and about 2.05 meters in diameter), paraded in October 2020;
- The Pukguksong-5 (about 1.7 meters longer than the PKS-4, but the same diameter), paraded in January 2021; and
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A new large SLBM (presumably Pukguksong-6, about 1.6 meters longer than the PKS-5 and about 2.21 meters in diameter), paraded in April 2022.
This lack of SLBM developmental flight testing also suggests lower priority for SSBs. In stark contrast, North Korea has flight tested six new types of land-based ballistic missiles since the only Pukguksong-3 SLBM test in October 2019: two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), two “hypersonic” medium-range ballistic missiles, and two intercontinental ballistic missiles. It also tested two new types of land-attack cruise missiles (LACM).
Having the longest-ranged SLBMs possible makes the most military and operational sense for Pyongyang. This allows the associated missile sub to strike targets that are farther away while staying in waters closer to North Korea (and thus farther from allied anti-submarine assets, and closer to North Korean air and naval assets that can help protect the SSB). The delays in flight testing any of the new SLBMs (reinforced by the lack of any known ejection testing[2]) may well have contributed to the delay in rolling out the new SSB, which would need to have its sail section modified to accept progressively larger launch tubes for the series of new SLBMs.
Moreover, if the new large SLBM is now the missile of choice, it is possible that the new SSB is simply too small to accommodate that missile. This might mean that the SSB has become obsolete even before seeing the light of day.
Further confusing the picture, North Korea launched a KN-23 SRBM from its single-tube GORAE (or SINPO)-class ballistic missile test submarine in October 2021. The test sub apparently is still configured to launch that much smaller, shorter-range missile (about 7.5 meters long and 0.9 meters in diameter) and would need to be reconfigured if it was going to be used in the flight testing of one of the larger SLBMs for ultimate deployment on the new SSB. Moreover, the GORAE’s missile hatch appears to be only 1.8 meters in diameter, which is too small to accommodate the new large SLBM. In any case, a deployed sub-launched KN-23 makes very little military sense, given the North’s large existing force of more survivable land-based SRBMs.
The SSB itself has problems. It is possible that the North encountered problems in the construction of the new SSB (or its conversion from a preexisting ROMEO) that it has still not overcome, that any such problems were somehow insurmountable or not cost-effective to rectify, or that the North came to realize the SSB would not meet its operational needs.[3] An example of the latter reason could be that, as noted above, the sub may be too small to accommodate the new large SLBM.
All that can be said at this point is that there has been no evidence that the SSB has been moved from the construction hall, and given the lack of activity in the construction hall’s parts yard since the summer of 2020, it does not appear that the SSB has thus far been dismantled or subjected to major reconstruction, or that a replacement submarine is being built alongside it.
Future Prospects Uncertain
It remains to be seen when or if the new SSB will ever be launched. There are four main possibilities for its future, listed in descending order of likelihood:
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North Korea may decide to configure it for a suitably sized missile, such as the KN-23 SRBM; the Pukguksong-3, -4, or -5 SLBMs if any of them complete development; or even a vertically launched version of the “Hwasal” LACM.[4]
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It may decide to reconfigure the sub for use in another role, such as supporting minisubs or special operations forces—or even the “Haeil” nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) if that system truly is intended for deployment.
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It may decide to dismantle the SSB, perhaps in favor of a larger sub able to carry the new large SLBM. Although likely aspirational in the near term, Kim Jong Un, in his January 2021 report to the Eighth Party Congress, set a task to “possess a nuclear-powered submarine.”
- Or it may allow the sub to lie fallow in the construction hall, either for another several years until it decides upon one of the above courses of action, or perhaps even indefinitely.
Whatever happens with the new SSB, a several-boat SSB force that could truly serve as a consequential and credible “leg” of a nuclear dyad or triad does not appear to be in the cards anytime soon. Pyongyang’s land-based missiles, which are much more survivable and cost-effective than an SSB force, are highly likely to remain the mainstay of its nuclear and missile forces.
- [1]
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It should be noted, however, that true “operational deployment” probably would take a year or more after rollout due to the highly likely need for fitting-out, acceptance trials, commissioning, and shake-down cruises as with other North Korean submarines. See Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha, “Sinpo South Shipyard: Construction of a New Ballistic Missile Submarine?,” Beyond Parallel, August 28, 2019, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/sinpo-south-shipyard-construction-of-a-new-ballistic-missile-submarine.
- [2]
- Before conducting flight tests, SLBM programs usually conduct “ejection tests” or “pop-up tests,” in which the system used to eject the missile from the submerged submarine prior to ignition is tested using a dummy missile and a land-based rig or submersible platform.
- [3]
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See Tianran Xu, “Constraints and Outlook: Future Deployment of DPRK Ballistic Missile Submarines,” Open Nuclear Network, January 5, 2022, https://opennuclear.org/publication/constraints-and-outlook-future-deployment-dprk-ballistic-missile-submarines; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun, “Sinpo South Shipyard Update: Vessel Movements and New Construction,” Beyond Parallel, September 15, 2022, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/sinpo-south-shipyard-update-vessel-movements-and-new-construction.
- [4]
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See Vann H. Van Diepen, “Initial Analysis of North Korea’s “New Type Long-Range Cruise Missile,” 38 North, September 15, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/09/initial-analysis-of-north-koreas-new-type-long-range-cruise-missile; and Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea Launches Four “Hwasal-2” LACMs to Show Strong Deterrence and Rapid Response,” 38 North, March 1, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/03/north-korea-launches-four-hwasal-2-lacms-to-show-strong-deterrence-and-rapid-response.
10. Yoon pitches tighter security cooperation between AP4 and NATO
AP4 = Asia Pacific Four. We need to start using that term.
Wednesday
July 12, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Yoon pitches tighter security cooperation between AP4 and NATO
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/12/national/diplomacy/Korea-NATO-Summit-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230712174236341.html
President Yoon Suk Yeol, second from left, poses for a commemorative photo with the leaders of NATO’s Asia-Pacific Partners, or AP4, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania on Wednesday. From left are Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Yoon, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
President Yoon Suk Yeol called on NATO's Indo-Pacific partners to establish a "strong collective security posture" in solidarity with the Atlantic alliance to respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.
The remarks came as Yoon moderated a meeting of leaders of the AP4, or Asia-Pacific Partners, countries, involving Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania on Wednesday.
Yoon noted that North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which fell in waters north of Japan's Aomori Prefecture earlier Wednesday morning, in the midst of the security dialogue taking place at the NATO summit.
"This shows once again that security in the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans can never be separated," Yoon said. "The AP4 countries believe that we must establish a strong collective security posture in solidarity with NATO.
"The AP4 will use this as an opportunity to institutionalize our cooperation framework with NATO and take a leading role in regional security in the Indo-Pacific region," he added, standing alongside Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins.
Kishida said Japan "strongly condemns" the North's latest ICBM launch for "threatening the peace and stability of the international community."
Albanese and Hipkins both called for solidarity with Ukraine.
Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine "continues to have a devastating impact on the people of Ukraine, but it also has an impact on the economies around the world," Albanese said, saying it serves as a "reminder of why we need to be engaged and to shape the future, rather than allow it to shape us."
The four countries' leaders in their meeting agreed to "sternly respond to provocations that threaten regional peace and global security" after jointly condemning North Korea's ICBM launch and to provide "continued unwavering support for Ukraine," the presidential office said in a statement later.
This marks the second year that the AP4 leaders met following the NATO summit in Madrid in late June 2022.
The Indo-Pacific leaders later Wednesday took part in the NATO summit meeting open to partner countries in Vilnius with issues including Ukraine, global security and other emerging threats high on the agenda.
Korea was invited to attend the NATO summit as an Indo-Pacific partner country for a second consecutive year.
"The North Korean regime is concentrating on advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities while ignoring the people's increasingly difficult livelihood," Yoon said in his address to the NATO leaders' meeting.
He said the North's missiles are "a real threat that can strike Paris, Berlin, and London, as well as here in Vilnius," calling to expand military information-sharing with NATO.
The military information sharing is seen to be referring to the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System, or BICES, a multinational network which enables NATO allies and some partner countries to share intelligence.
Yoon further stressed that South Korea has actively participated in efforts to support Ukraine in solidarity with the international community and provided humanitarian aid such as mine-clearing equipment and ambulances.
"South Korea and I promise to stand with the Ukrainian people until the day their freedom is fully regained," Yoon said.
South Korea will also take part in a NATO trust fund for Ukraine, he added.
Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, left, chats with Sweden's Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson before the start of a NATO summit meeting Indo-Pacific partners in Vilnius, Lithuania on Wednesday. [AFP/YONHAP]
This year's NATO summit was attended by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and the 31 alliance members agreed in a joint statement that Ukraine "will become a member of NATO," without specifying concrete details.
The NATO leaders in a joint communiqué Tuesday stated that Russia "must be held fully accountable" for its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has "gravely undermined" global security.
The leaders also stated that they "condemn in the strongest terms" North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile program for the first time in five years. They called on the North to abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a "complete, verifiable and irreversible manner."
The communiqué also stressed that the Indo-Pacific region "is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security," and welcomed their "commitment to supporting Ukraine."
Yoon continued to take part in a relay of bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the NATO summit Wednesday.
Yoon was scheduled to have a separate bilateral summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, where they were expected to discuss Tokyo's plan to release treated wastewater from its crippled nuclear power plant in Fukushima into the sea, among other issues.
Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report that backs Japan's plan to release the water stored in tanks at the site after a massive earthquake and tsunami struck Japan on March 11, 2011, crippled the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
A presidential official told reporters Tuesday that the two leaders are also likely to discuss joint safety measures against the foreign exchange crisis, advance technology research, cooperation for the stabilization of supply chains and mutual security cooperation also involving the United States.
The meeting comes as the two sides have resumed shuttle diplomacy between the two countries since March after the Yoon government proposed a plan to resolve the issue of compensation for Japan's wartime forced labor victims through a Seoul-backed fund. It would mark the sixth meeting between the two leaders since they took office.
"The contaminated water issue is a natural disaster that occurred 12 to 13 years ago, and Asia-Pacific countries are suffering as a result," said the senior presidential official.
On Tuesday, Yoon held bilateral talks with the leaders of Norway, Portugal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Hungary, Romania, and Sweden.
He was also scheduled to meet with the leaders of Britain, Slovakia, Estonia, Finland and Lithuania on the sidelines of the NATO summit.
On Tuesday, Korea and NATO upgraded relations to an Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP), expanding cooperation to 11 areas including antiterrorism, cyber defense, nonproliferation and emerging technologies.
Yoon in a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg discussed South Korea-NATO cooperation, the war in Ukraine and North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, according to the presidential office Tuesday.
They assessed that adopting the ITPP laid the foundation for more institutionalized cooperation between South Korea and NATO and discussed ways to drastically strengthen information-sharing with their militaries, said Lee Do-woon, the presidential spokesman, in a briefing.
Yoon shared Korea's plan to establish an international cyber defense training center to hold cyber defense training and expressed hopes for close cooperation with NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, a military training facility headquartered in Estonia.
Lee elaborated that emerging technologies include data, artificial intelligence, space, missiles and quantum technologies, "which can dramatically improve lives, but also could bring fatal results if abused for security matters."
On Tuesday evening, Yoon and first lady Kim Keon-hee took part in a dinner event hosted for leaders invited to the NATO summit by Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda at the presidential palace in Vilnius.
Stoltenberg said at the dinner that one of the reasons why NATO was successful was cooperation with partner countries such as South Korea, and toasted to partner countries, said presidential spokesman Lee in a statement.
Yoon briefly chatted with Czech, Dutch, Australian, Danish, Spanish and Greek leaders. The presidential couple also took the opportunity to promote Busan's 2030 World Expo bid.
First lady Kim Keon-hee separately visited the King Sejong Institute in Vilnius, a Korean language school, to expand student exchange with Lithuania, the presidential office said.
On Thursday, Yoon and Kim will begin an official visit to Poland, the second leg of their two-country, six-day tour which runs to Saturday.
11. Hidden 'treasure' helps NIS crack spy's cache of secrets
For those who are skeptical about the north Korean political warfare strategy to subvert the ROK government and society, I think this is one piece of evidence that exposes their strategy.
Excerpts:
The activist, identified by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) only by the surname Seok, was one of four activists from Changwon, South Gyeongsang, accused of operating an underground, pro-Pyongyang organization since 2016.
...
But without the correct cipher, “it could take 10,000 years even for a supercomputer to land on the correct passwords to the document file and the USB stick,” said a NIS official who spoke to the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity.
The solution to this dilemma was randomly discovered by a NIS agent, who stumbled upon a string of gibberish written in the Latin alphabet that read, “rntmfdltjakfdlfkehRnpdjdiqhqoek,” in another data storage device owned by Seok.
When the NIS agent typed out Korean letters in the same locations on a computer keyboard as these Latin letters in the same order, they spelled out, “Even three sacks of pearls only turn into treasure if you weave them together.”
The Korean proverb proved key to uncovering the cipher officials needed to crack the USB and the word document inside it.
...
According to the NIS, the decrypted document contained approximately 114 directives from the North to Seok and the other suspects, including orders to gather diagrams of communication networks undergirding major government institutions, as well as classified information on power plants and port facilities near the U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi.
The NIS also said the North ordered the activists to stir up anti-Japanese sentiment by burning a Rising Sun flag at a rally and by organizing protests against Japan’s plan to release radioactive water from the ruined Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
Tuesday
July 11, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Hidden 'treasure' helps NIS crack spy's cache of secrets
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/11/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-steganography/20230711184516695.html
One of four South Gyeongsang-based activists suspected of spying for North Korea arrives at the Seoul Central District Court in southern Seoul to attend his arrest warrant hearing on Jan. 31. [YONHAP]
For weeks, counterintelligence officials at South Korea's spy agency struggled to crack a tiny adversary — a locked USB stick that they believed was the key to proving that a South Korean labor activist followed orders from the North to foment unrest in the South.
The activist, identified by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) only by the surname Seok, was one of four activists from Changwon, South Gyeongsang, accused of operating an underground, pro-Pyongyang organization since 2016.
But he and the other accused activists refused to cooperate with investigators, who suspected they had taken their cues from the North when organizing protests against the South Korean government and the U.S. military presence in the South.
Although the NIS had confiscated Seok’s computer and other materials during a raid on his house in May, they initially failed to uncover the cipher typically used by the North to encrypt its orders abroad.
Such directives are usually embedded via steganography into images inside password-locked document files on USB sticks, which themselves also require a password to open.
But without the correct cipher, “it could take 10,000 years even for a supercomputer to land on the correct passwords to the document file and the USB stick,” said a NIS official who spoke to the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity.
The solution to this dilemma was randomly discovered by a NIS agent, who stumbled upon a string of gibberish written in the Latin alphabet that read, “rntmfdltjakfdlfkehRnpdjdiqhqoek,” in another data storage device owned by Seok.
When the NIS agent typed out Korean letters in the same locations on a computer keyboard as these Latin letters in the same order, they spelled out, “Even three sacks of pearls only turn into treasure if you weave them together.”
The Korean proverb proved key to uncovering the cipher officials needed to crack the USB and the word document inside it.
According to the NIS, the decrypted document contained approximately 114 directives from the North to Seok and the other suspects, including orders to gather diagrams of communication networks undergirding major government institutions, as well as classified information on power plants and port facilities near the U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi.
The NIS also said the North ordered the activists to stir up anti-Japanese sentiment by burning a Rising Sun flag at a rally and by organizing protests against Japan’s plan to release radioactive water from the ruined Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
Their alleged espionage activities were discovered after six years of monitoring by the NIS, which tracked the suspects’ overseas movements and contacts.
The four were arrested in late January.
According to the NIS and the state prosecution service, the four contacted the North’s intelligence agents in Cambodia and other Southeast Asian countries to receive directives and money from them.
During their meetings with North Korean agents, the South Korean activists allegedly discussed how to destroy data storage devices, such as USBs, in case they were caught, including swallowing them whole.
The activists are also accused of infiltrating civic groups or labor unions involving farmers and students to recruit new members.
The state prosecution service has described the group as a criminal spy ring dedicated to helping North Korean leader Kim Jong-un achieve a revolution within South Korea to overthrow the government in Seoul.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
12. Yoon says North will face consequences for missile launches
We need to not make idle threats or threats we cannot enforce. If we want to really respond to the regime's provocations we need to do what President Yoon said last winter. That is to respond with information. We need to embark on a massive information campaign to expose and attack the regime's strategies. provide information to the Korean people in the north (massive quantities of information from news to entertainment, practical information for collective action and change, the truth about north Korea, the regime, and the outside world , e.g., provide copies of the north Korean constitution to all people to expose the contradictions of the regime, and understanding - to ensure the Korean people in the north understand their unalienable rights).
Most importantly, inform the Korean people in the north about Kim Jong Un's failure. Expose the lie that north Korea would be "free" once it became a nuclear power and "self reliant" for defense and that Kim Jong Un must deny the human rights of the korean people to remain in power.
If you want to "punish" or pressure Kim Jong Un, send in information overtly on a massive scale.
Wednesday
July 12, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Yoon says North will face consequences for missile launches
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/12/national/northKorea/North-Korea-Yoon-Suk-Yeol-Nuclear-consultative-group/20230712131903243.html
President Yoon Suk Yeol holds an emergency NSC meeting in Lithuania on Wednsedsay after North Korea launched an intercontinental missile the same day. [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE]
President Yoon Suk Yeol warned North Korea that there will be consequences for its provocations.
During an emergency meeting Yoon held in Lithuania on Wednesday, Yoon said the extended deterrence will be further reinforced through the Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).
Yoon is attending the NATO summit in Lithuania as an observer.
In May, during Yoon's visit to Washington, South Korea and the United States agreed to establish the NCG to upgrade the alliance to "nuclear-based."
The NCG, announced through the Washington Declaration, aims to "strengthen extended deterrence, discuss nuclear and strategic planning, and manage the threat to the nonproliferation regime posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."
The NCG's first meeting will take place on Tuesday in Seoul.
North Korea fired a ballistic missile into the East Sea Wednesday, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
The missile was fired at around 10 a.m. from Pyongyang, JCS said.
The missile flew 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) upward before landing in the sea.
The JCS said in a statement that the launch is a threat to the Korean Peninsula and the international community's peace and stability.
It also said that the firing violates United National Security Council resolutions.
The launch came a day after North Korea warned the United States against sending spy jets into its air space, which the U.S. and the South Korean military denied.
The U.S. and the South Korean militaries said that the flights were routine and were in accordance with international law.
This is the first time in 27 days that North Korea launched a ballistic missile.
The rhetoric from North Korea came at a time when President Yoon is attending the NATO summit.
Yoon and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg agreed on upgrading the partnership between South Korea and the North Atlantic alliance in areas including disarmament and nonproliferation.
BY LEE HO-JEONG [lee.hojeong@joongang.co.kr]
13. In Search of the Ordinary: Everyday Life in North Korea
Let us think about the Korean people in the north as well as understand the root cause of their suffering.
Conclusion:
To improve the quality of life for ordinary North Koreans, there must be a more equitable distribution of the country’s resources, especially to the country’s rural areas. The kleptocratic nature of the Kim regime will, however, make this difficult. The international community must seek creative ways to ensure the North Korean people’s fundamental human rights, and to improve the human security situation for the ordinary people of North Korea.
In Search of the Ordinary: Everyday Life in North Korea
nkhiddengulag.org
By Daniel McDowall, former HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research
July 11, 2023
Understanding what ordinary life—or what may be considered ordinary—in North Korea is a challenge. A major difficulty in investigating “normality” is identifying the groups that can be considered ordinary. One North Korean escapee explains that 10% of the population can be considered upper-class, a further 10% middle-class, and the remaining 80% poor. However, there are groups outside of this 80% that may also be considered relatively “ordinary.” This includes those who do not live the luxurious lifestyle of the top elites, but do not experience the serious poverty that is common in the rural areas of the country’s northern provinces.
This article aims to explain what “ordinary life” is like in North Korea. It also seeks to identify the features of North Korean life that are arguably unique to the country—features that are so routine they make up a significant part of day-to-day life. Lastly, it also discusses how North Koreans navigate areas of ordinary life, such as family, relationships, and leisure.
Poverty and Famine as Ordinary Life
North Korea has long faced severe food shortages. In December 2021, the World Food Programme estimated that around 40% of the population was undernourished and 18% of children suffered from impaired growth and development due to chronic malnutrition. Noland, Robinson, and Wang blame North Korea’s food difficulties on the “overcentralization of decision making and an emphasis on large state farms.” Additionally, the prioritization of Pyongyang’s food supplies has implications for rural provinces. For example, in August 2011, Russia sent North Korea 50,000 tons of food aid, 80% of which went to Pyongyang.
Mismanagement, as well as badly conceived priorities, led to disaster in North Korea in the 1990s. The consequence for North Koreans was staggeringly harsh. In 1998, surveys revealed that 15.6% of children aged 6-84 months had acute malnutrition. Additionally, although the regime’s estimate of the death toll during the “Arduous March” of the 1990s was 220,000, external estimates put it as high as 2.5 million. Jae-Young Yoon discusses the role of everyday language in referring to this famine. He explains how “if someone died of hunger you couldn’t say that they were so hungry they died. You would say they were in so much pain they died,” and that all manner of references to “hunger” should be replaced by “pain.” This is indicative of not only the harsh experiences of North Koreans during the famine, but also the regime’s attempts to prevent people from directly discussing the food situation.
Some individuals were not exposed to the worst consequences of the famine. Young-mi Park discusses how she “never tried the so-called maize” that most North Koreans ate. As the head (inminbanjang) of a neighborhood watch unit (inminban), Park had a more privileged position and better access to food. This differential provision of food is intended to foster loyalty and compliance. The regime leverages food to stabilize itself at the expense of ordinary North Koreans. Political loyalty leads to greater food privileges, and ultimately a greater chance of survival. The report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korean human rights discusses how the regime prioritized food toward people it saw as most useful for its own survival, at the expense of those that it perceived as expendable. For example, an agent in the KPA Escort Command--responsible for guarding Kim Jong-un and his family--recalled how people within this organization received good rations, even during periods of famine.
Since the famine, food shortages have continued to be prevalent in North Korea. The food situation has worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which the regime has used as an excuse to tighten border controls and increase repression. After the regime shut its borders in response to the pandemic, China’s food exports to North Korea fell by 80%. The weather also compounded difficulties in producing enough food, with typhoons destroying 100,000 acres of cropland in 2021, and 2022 being far too dry with months like April and May receiving only 70% of the average expected rainfall. The current food crisis is reportedly the worst the country has experienced since the ”Arduous March” of the 1990s. Testimonies from a recent BBC report include harrowing images of people starving--even in Pyongyang--and that beggars can often be found dead on the street.
Because of the widespread food shortages experienced by a large proportion of North Koreans, hunger, poverty, and significant food shortages can be considered features of “ordinary” life in North Korea. The regime deliberately uses food as a means of control and compliance.
Work, Self-Criticism, and Policing: "Ordinary" Features Exclusive to North Korea
There are several characteristics of life in North Korea that can be considered ordinary to its residents. They may be extraordinary to people from other countries, but these features are embedded in everyday life in North Korea. This includes work assignments, self-criticism sessions, policing methods, and strict controls on information.
Work assignments and the way in which they are distributed are critical aspects of everyday life. North Koreans work long, arduous days. For the most part, men join the military for ten years or so after secondary school, while most women are assigned to clerical or blue-collar work. Women who do not gain employment are expected to join the Korea Democratic Women’s Union.
Work assignments are almost always arbitrary. They are not just strenuous, but often dangerous. Kyung-hee Kim recalls how “no matter how capable we might have been, we had to work the mine. It was a wretched life. Even with no modern facilities or equipment useful for health and safety, we were told to work […] when they set dynamite they don’t wait until the risk is clear. One day dozens of people died that way in a rockslide.” Many North Koreans work in dangerous conditions. There is virtually no chance of social mobility because of the centrality of one’s songbun (socio-political classification). Those with a higher songbun may have alternatives. Jung-go Park explains that “the Party in North Korea is the best organization to work for.”
Outside the workplace, North Koreans are expected to attend regular self-criticism sessions in which citizens are expected to “evaluate how well they had complied with directions from the party and state.” Not only do North Koreans evaluate their own performance, but also those of their fellow citizens. This practice begins at a young age. For the most part, the offense that North Koreans admit to is a small one, such as “not trying hard enough when carrying out their communal neighborhood duties.” Personnel from the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) of the Korean Workers’ Party record these confessions and prepare reports that are sent up the chain of command. For wrongdoings, individuals may be given a “warning, severe warning, or even Party disqualification. They could be punished with labour with no pay for a month or several months. They may even receive revolutionary re-education.” These regular self-criticism sessions likely have psychological impacts on the population, in a way that strengthens the regime’s control over the population.
Similarly, the internal security agencies are a major element of everyday life. According to a 2012 study, the Ministry of State Security (previously known as the State Security Department or SSD) and the Ministry of Social Security (previously known as the Ministry of People’s Security or MPS) employ a total of 260,000 people in a country of 25 million. The Ministry of State Security searches out those accused of disloyalty and other anti-state crimes and runs North Korea’s political prison camps (kwanliso), while the Ministry of Social Security acts as a national police force and operates the long-term prison labor facilities (kyohwaso). Contact with these security services is a part of daily life, and North Koreans have to cooperate with “on-the-spot street inspections where security officials search for anything suspicious.”
These searches can be intrusive. One escapee notes how officials would search phones to look for South Korean colloquialisms in text messages as evidence of using foreign media. Furthermore, security services often conduct unannounced raids and searches of people’s homes. These searches do not require warrants and can happen at any time. Officials sometimes cut the electricity supply to a city block and then conduct raids, as the lack of electricity means that VHS tapes would be stuck inside the player. Naturally, as technology has progressed, catching “offenders” is no longer this simple.
This is all part of the regime’s efforts to strictly control access to information. Hassig and Oh note that “during the Cold War, citizens of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had more information available to them about life outside their country than North Koreans do today.” Limited knowledge of the outside world solidifies the regime’s hold on power. As technology has developed, it has become easier for North Koreans to access outside information, especially if they have relatives or friends outside of the country. Jung-ok Choi explains how “since we heard from our relatives in China a lot, we knew how China was and how South Korea was all from stories.”
Family, Schooling, and Alcohol: "Ordinary" Features of North Korean Life
While North Korea is a totalitarian dictatorship, there are aspects of life that are recognizable elsewhere. This may manifest itself in the shape of family life, going to school, and even how regular people find entertainment despite the difficult circumstances they are in.
Naturally, these tasks can be much more difficult in North Korea due to a lack of investment by the regime in basic infrastructure. For example, washing and maintaining hygiene are not always straightforward. People wash themselves at home using a tank of hot water or visit a public bathhouse. Most North Koreans opt for the public bathhouse, though typically wash once every two weeks. These bathhouses are generally large rooms with a pool of heated water, with people using small buckets to rinse themselves. Clothes are mostly washed by hand using soap, rather than detergent.
Attending school in North Korea is also unusual, especially terms of the curriculum and activities. According to Hassig and Oh, the school year begins in April, and the first half hour of school is devoted to political messages. Classes begin at 8am. Students are taught to be “good communists and loyal supporters of the regime” and are instructed in “academic skills necessary to make North Korea a kangsong taeguk [strong and prosperous country].” Interestingly, some students are “exposed to capitalist ideas to prepare them to do business with foreigners,” despite the regime’s hostility toward such ideas. Students engage in community services after school, and they attend self-criticism sessions once or twice a week. These children are also a part of official organizations, such as the Korea Children’s Union for children aged 9 to 13.
Family life can be a challenge in North Korea. Before 1988, upon having a baby, mothers were given 10kg of rice and other benefits to help feed the baby, such as powders and formulas. This has now been phased out, making it harder for mothers to feed their young children. Additionally, John Everard, the former British Ambassador to North Korea, describes how “all the homes described to me seemed to be very crowded. Several of my friends talked about the intricacies of getting out in the morning – carefully sequenced breakfasts and use of space to dress to ensure that nobody was late for work or for school.” Multiple families sometimes share the same unit.
The difficulties of starting a family because of restrictions on space and state help are likely compounded by extremely conservative social attitudes. Ji-min Kang speaks of the North Korean education system’s failure to teach sex education, and how sex is the “forbidden fruit that can destroy one’s wealth and power.” The absence of sex education and lack of information about contraceptives means that there are great social difficulties when unexpected pregnancies happen outside of marriage. Sex before marriage is frowned upon, especially so in rural provinces, where even holding hands in public is not deemed socially acceptable.
Nonetheless, North Koreans are much more liberal when it comes to alcohol and leisure. Even children have been known to partake in beer drinking, according to North Korean escapees like Je-son Lee. Tudor explains how “Eumjugamu--drinking, singing, and dancing--are part of Korea’s heritage, and have been for centuries. So when North Koreans drink, music will never be far away.” For young North Koreans, this may come in the shape of using abandoned buildings and dancing to South Korean music, an activity that is strictly forbidden by the regime. Purchasing alcohol is relatively simple. Lee explains that one can obtain alcohol by going to the factory and paying in cash, or by going to a local market where you can find domestic, imported, and home-brewed alcohol. While this is illegal, Lee explains that “the authorities cannot control it.”
Criminal Activity and Law-Breaking as "Ordinary"
Lee’s description of illegally purchasing alcohol is one of several prohibited activities that happen regularly. Law-breaking is extremely common. According to Changyong Choi’s “Everyday Politics” in North Korea, “every interviewee, regardless of occupation, age, and gender, answered that he or she had participated in a legal or illegal market activity and testified that ‘it was impossible to live without the market, and all the necessities were purchased from the market.’”
As a result of the failure of the Public Distribution System, North Koreans engage in private market activity to survive. Residents of urban areas trade with China, and some people are able to make money, especially in Pyongyang, by selling imported shoes and famous brands. One North Korean escapee explains that he would pay to take leave from his work and earn up to 300,000 won in a month, a much higher figure than he would otherwise have received. Private enterprise and market activity also extend to food. People may try to plant their own fields, though these are stifled upon discovery by officials.
Consumption of foreign media is a similarly prevalent illegal activity that ordinary North Koreans enjoy. Chinese and South Korean dramas are the most popular, and they make up the bulk of the foreign content consumed in North Korea. Williams states that “the lowest-risk material includes movies from countries such as China, India, and Russia. These pose a low threat as their story lines are rarely political and the countries are not judged to be hostile to North Korea […] the riskiest content includes anything that is anti-regime, religious, explores or attacks the Kim family, and all pornography.”
The regime has recently intensified measures to restrict and punish the consumption of outside information. In December 2020, the regime passed a law designed to reject “reactionary ideology and culture.” This involved harsher punishments for “offenders” such as fines or even sentences in prison camps for distributing or consuming foreign media. The new anti-reactionary law is particularly notable for its application of the death penalty, unlike other existing laws, demonstrating how the regime’s policy has escalated in response to the influx of foreign media. In May 2022, an individual was accused by authorities of distributing South Korean media and executed. Similarly, in April 2023, a military officer was executed in public in Pyongyang for distributing information about world news.
In tandem with these illegal activities is the high prevalence of bribes. Williams notes that “local officials are most likely to accept bribes, especially when the alleged crimes involve relatively common illicit content such as Chinese television dramas,” although things become more complicated if provincial or national level officers get involved and if the content is of a seriously illegal background. Similarly, it is common for illegal private business owners to make connections with people within the military and bribe them to use officially registered vehicles for their business.
On the other hand, there is some debate as to whether bribery can be considered ordinary. While it is certainly widespread, the typical cost of bribes raises the question of who can afford to pay them. For example, one North Korean escapee notes that a bribe should be at least $2 to $3, but it would be much better to offer between $10 and $50. This is much higher than the 40-50 U.S. cents that the average worker earns per month. Another North Korean says that “if you’re not rich then it’s really hard for you to even dare to watch” illegal content, as the bribe to avoid punishment would be too high.
Life in Pyongyang as a "Lesser Elite"
Robert Collins’ Pyongyang Republic offers great insight to life in the capital city. One of the groups he discusses are the "lesser elite" of North Korea. These individuals experience neither the luxury of the top elite nor the poverty that is common in the northern provinces. From this perspective, the lesser elite can be considered “ordinary” in a broader sense.
The lesser elite are usually Party members who hold low positions in government, though they may also work at factories or in agriculture. While these positions are poorly renumerated, it is still much more wealth than can be observed in the rural areas of North Korea. Collins highlights that the lesser elite still feel “fortunate” to live in Pyongyang, and residency here is “paramount to their calculus of survival, because of access to some food, healthcare, and higher quality education for their children.” Life can still be difficult for these people, and the difference between the lesser elite and the upper elite is considerable.
Despite the relative wealth that the lesser elite experience in Pyongyang, they also face challenges. Access to food can be problematic. As Collins explains, “even in Pyongyang, there is not enough food for every resident,” and they do not have steady running water, electricity, or heating. When Dong-hyun Lee was living in Pyongyang, he found a woman and a child outside the entrance of his home who had died of hunger. After reporting the deaths, he was shocked by how blasé the response from the authorities was. He also had already found out that morning that there had been multiple reports of dead people on the street. Securing food is not always an easy task, even for the relatively wealthy in Pyongyang.
Housing is another area where the lesser elite experience some challenges. While their housing is often better than housing in rural areas, it is still by no means particularly good. Housing is in short supply in Pyongyang, and families live in two-room apartments. Those who have just married may wait years before they have their own apartment. The buildings that the lesser elite live in are often poorly constructed and older. Access to higher quality housing is based on one's songbun, as is the case with all aspects of life in North Korea.
There are unique features to ordinary life in Pyongyang as a lesser elite. For example, residents are required to take part in political events, such as observing military parades and carrying out chores like street cleaning. This takes place far more frequently than in the provinces. Additionally, political control and surveillance is much stronger in Pyongyang, making it harder for those in the city to engage in illicit market activity or consume foreign media. Interestingly, when purchasing things in Pyongyang, very rarely is the price asked for in the local currency. The upper elite will ask for the price in U.S. dollars, while those at the middle level will request the price in Chinese currency. Only the poor in Pyongyang ask for prices in North Korean won.
Concluding Remarks
Identifying what is “ordinary” in North Korea is difficult, given the unusual nature of the Kim regime. Nevertheless, there are some themes and experiences that can be understood as “ordinary.” Ordinary life in North Korea is difficult, often characterized by hardship and lack of essentials. Lack of food and adequate housing, as well as extremely high levels of political coercion, constitute the central features of life in North Korea.
In these circumstances, there is still space to observe what may be considered “ordinary” parts of life in other countries, including finding time for family and relationships, for example. Activities that are outlawed by the regime, including the consumption of foreign media, are also a part of ordinary life in North Korea.
To improve the quality of life for ordinary North Koreans, there must be a more equitable distribution of the country’s resources, especially to the country’s rural areas. The kleptocratic nature of the Kim regime will, however, make this difficult. The international community must seek creative ways to ensure the North Korean people’s fundamental human rights, and to improve the human security situation for the ordinary people of North Korea.
Daniel McDowall is a Master of Global Affairs student at the University of Toronto with a concentration in global security issues and international diplomacy.
Robert Collins, South Africa’s Apartheid and North Korea’s Songbun: Parallels in Crimes Against Humanity (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2021), 74.
World Food Programme, DPR Korea Country Brief, December 2021. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000135453/download/?_ga=2.237313792.1492437778.1687791406-1580620096.1687791406.
Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang, “Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49, no. 4 (2001): 743.
Robert Collins, Pyongyang Republic: North Korea’s Capital of Human Rights Denial (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2016), 66.
Rita Bhatia, “Food Shortages and Nutrition in North Korea,” The Lancet 360 (2002): 27.
Ibid.
Sandra Fahy, Marching Through Suffering: Loss and Survival in North Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 86–87.
Ibid., 25. Young-mi Park was 65 years old at the time of the interview.
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 7, 2014, 172–73.
Jack Goodman and Alistair Coleman, “North Korea: Why Doesn’t it Have Enough Food This Year?,” BBC News, June 23, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/57524614.
Ibid.; “North Korea’s Dire Food Shortage May Become More Acute,” The Economist, July 6, 2022. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/07/06/north-koreas-dire-food-shortage-may-become-more-acute.
“North Koreans Tell BBC They are Stuck and Waiting to Die,” BBC News, June 15, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SiviOdWDl9o.
Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 95.
Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 31.
Ibid., 32.
Changyong Choi, “‘Everyday Politics’ in North Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 3 (2013): 661.
Martyn Williams, Digital Trenches: North Korea’s Information Counter-Offensive (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2019), 22.
Robert Collins, North Korea’s Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2019), 112.
Ken Gause, Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of the North Korean Police State (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012), 17, 27.
Ibid, 17–18, 26.
Williams, Digital Trenches, 12.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Hassig and Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, 134.
Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 62.
Andrei Lankov, North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea (London: McFarland and Company, 2007), 97.
Ibid., 98.
Hassig and Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, 257.
Ibid., 154.
Ibid., 156.
Ibid., 98.
Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 22.
John Everard, Only Beautiful, Please: A British Diplomat in North Korea (Stanford: The Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Centre, 2012), 4–5.
Daniel Tudor, Ask a North Korean: Defectors Talk About Their Lives Inside the World’s Most Secretive Nation (Tokyo: Tuttle, 2017), 205.
Ibid., 201–3.
Ibid., 220.
Ibid., 218.
Ibid.
Ibid., 219.
Choi, “‘Everyday Politics’ in North Korea,” 659.
Ibid.
Ibid., 665.
Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 46.
Williams, Digital Trenches, 8.
Josh Smith, “North Korea Cracks Down on Foreign Media, Speaking Styles,” Reuters, January 19, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-media/north-korea-cracks-down-on-foreign-media-speaking-styles-idUSKBN29P0C4.
Sang Yong Lee, “North Korea’s War Against Outside Information and Culture,” 38 North, May 25, 2023. https://www.38north.org/2023/05/north-koreas-war-against-outside-information-and-culture/.
Ibid.
Williams, Digital Trenches, 6.
Choi, “‘Everyday Politics’ in North Korea,” 659.
Williams, Digital Trenches, 7.
Collins, Pyongyang Republic, 33.
Ibid.
Ibid., 37.
Ibid., 37, 43.
Fahy, Marching Through Suffering, 109.
Collins, Pyongyang Republic, 59–60; Hassig and Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, 128.
Collins, Pyongyang Republic, 74.
Ibid., 72.
14. North Korean police complain to Pyongyang about uncooperative state security agents
North Korean police complain to Pyongyang about uncooperative state security agents
Agents refused to share case data with local police prompting official letter to Central Committee.
By Ahn Chang Gyu for RFA Korean
2023.07.10
rfa.org
Police in North Korea’s Ryanggang province have sent a formal complaint to the central government after their coworkers, agents of the ministry of state security, refused to share data on criminal cases, officials in the province told Radio Free Asia.
Stationed in every North Korean police station are local police officers under the social security department and state security agents under the ministry of state security. They often butt heads with each other due to the similarity of their mandates.
The police are charged with keeping public order, including by eradicating crime. Meanwhile, the state security agents are like a secret police force that must protect the country’s leader and the regime, as well as enforcing punishment for general crimes. The agents enjoy special privileges and powers that ordinary officers do not.
After the police in Ryanggang province requested data from the agents regarding data from previous cases involving people currently under police investigation, the province’s social security bureau submitted an official letter to the Central Committee over the impasse, a Ryanggang official, who requested anonymity for security reasons, told RFA’s Korean Service.
“[The letter] said the state security department is marking its territory and is not being cooperative,” he said.
Although the conflict between the state security department and social security department is nothing new, it is extremely rare that either group files official complaints about the other.
The police claimed in the letter that state security agents did not transfer data on a group of people it had previously detained. The police caught these people making phone calls outside the country, but were not given access to data for their previous cases that were handled by the agents.
“The police ordered [the agents] to hand over … all materials and subjects of cases,” he said. “But many state security agents think that the police are incompetent and act with jealousy toward them.”
Despite their internal conflict, the agents and the police appear to be outwardly friendly with each other, a resident from the province, who requested to remain anonymous for personal safety, told RFA.
“They are actually enemies to each other,” he said. “A few days ago, I personally saw an argument between a state security agent and a police officer.”
The cause of the spat, which happened inside a police station, was because the state security agent tried to get information from an informant working in a case handled by the police, the resident said.
“That day, several residents who happened to be in the police station witnessed the quarrel,” he said. “They mocked both of them afterward. Residents have very negative feelings of police officers and state security agents who give up nothing when it comes to monitoring and oppressing residents.”
Residents fear that the conflict between the two law enforcement factions could lead to competition between each other in how well they can oppress the people, he said.
Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee and Leejin J. Chung. Edited by Eugene Whong.
rfa.org
15. Book Review | Korea: A New History of South and North
I have not read this book yet. I am pleased to see a focus on unification.
Book Review | Korea: A New History of South and North
porchlightbooks.com · by Learn More
Editor's Choice
Korea: A New History of South and North
Jasmine Gonzalez
June 22, 2023
Victor Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo offer readers a solid foundation on the histories of North and South Korea that will add much-needed context to any conversation on Korean politics and culture.
Korea: A New History of South and North by Victor D. Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Yale University Press
In the introduction of Korea, co-author Victor D. Cha recalls his first visit to Pyongyang in North Korea and the helicopter ride back to Seoul in South Korea where, seeing empty roads and barren fields on one side of the Korean Demilitarized Zone and glittering metropolises and industrial complexes on the other, it became apparent how vast the division between the two nations truly was. “What circumstances,” Cha writes, “led the same people to live in such starkly different conditions?”
There is no simple answer to that question, and facts alone don’t always reveal the complex throughlines of how something came to be. Understanding history requires the ability to find patterns in past events and contextualization through firsthand experiences or expert guidance. This is what Cha and his co-author, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, set out to do with their new book. They write:
[We] believe that there is a need for a book grounded in academic research that is accessible to the general public. The modern history of Korea, pre- and post-division, has gone through many twists and turns. This can make it difficult to follow. With this book, we hope to provide the readers with a detailed and analytical introduction to Korean history, so that they can gain deeper knowledge about where North and South Korea currently are and why they are there today. Both Koreas have become well known globally, albeit for very different reasons. Our hope is that with this book the reader will be able to understand why this is the case.
My limited understanding of North Korea and South Korea has always been one made up of dichotomies: authoritarian/democratic, closed/open, unfamiliar/familiar. Beyond brief mentions of the Korean War and the infamous 38th parallel in history classes, I had never really learned about the previous events that ultimately led to a split Korean peninsula. I accepted the division as the status quo—the way things had long been and the way they surely would remain.
While watching the TV adaptation of Min Jin Lee’s novel Pachinko, I realized how lacking my knowledge of Korean history truly was. The show's first season reaches back into the early twentieth century when the Korean peninsula was still united, albeit under Japanese control. Though a work of fiction, its historical roots contextualized how recent these eras in Korean history are. There are still living witnesses to recall a time before the peninsula’s split. To further emphasize this, the show’s creators featured interviews with real Korean women who, like the story’s protagonist, had lived under Japanese occupation. “We are reminded,” writes reviewer Nina Li Coomes, “that this story isn’t just entertainment but a political act of remembering. The struggles and joys we’ve seen on screen are not hypotheticals but realities.” That a unified Korea existed within living memory makes it even more staggering to see how North Korea and South Korea have become such opposites.
Korea begins its recounting of Korean history in the late 1800s. “Korea’s history,” write Cha and Pacheco Pardo, “is its geography.” For centuries, China, Russia, and Japan had all angled for control of the Korean peninsula, whether as a buffer from enemy invasion or a strategic location for commerce. After a period of isolation, the Korean “hermit kingdom” grappled with whether to remain closed off to outsiders or follow in neighboring Japan’s footsteps towards modernization and adoption of Western technologies. Sensing an opportunity, Japan encouraged Korea to open its borders with the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876, sparking tensions with China and Russia and creating an international power struggle. After driving out China and Russia from the Korean peninsula, Japan’s control was cemented in 1905 by the Taft-Katsura agreement, in which the United States agreed to leave Korea in Japan’s hands in exchange for Japan allowing the United States unchallenged control over the Philippines. By 1910, Korea had been fully annexed by Japan, leading to a period of increased industrialization and improved infrastructure, but also of cultural and political repression of the Korean people.
Cha and Pacheco Pardo argue that this series of events “highlights one of the most enduring themes with regard to Korea,” in which three external factors repeatedly determine Korea’s fate. The first is its geostrategic location at the intersection of multiple, much larger powers. The second is what Cha and Pacheco Pardo call Korea’s relative power—internal clashes between varying political factions left Korea vulnerable to external forces. Finally, there are the intentions of larger powers to make Korea their own, whether to bolster their defenses or to claim Korea away from a rival nation. “Even today,” the authors write, “these geopolitical impulses, however muted by modernity and development, will always be a part of Korea’s story.”
The Japanese occupation of Korea lasted thirty-five years, ending virtually overnight with Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II. The same power struggle over who would control the peninsula arose, but this time, with the United States taking Japan’s place. Although several Korean grassroots groups had resisted Japanese control and sought independence for their country, and although Koreans had successfully organized local governing units in the aftermath of Japan’s surrender, the Korean people were left out of the decision-making process. The authors write:
Even though Korea had been an independent sovereign country for thousands of years before the Japanese occupation, US policymakers completely unfamiliar with Korea’s history assumed that the country could not govern itself after Japan’s departure.
With the onset of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both looked to take control of the peninsula—not, the authors note, because they saw any intrinsic value in Korea as a nation, but to keep the country out of each other’s hands. “Concerned that Moscow would take the entire peninsula,” the authors write, “the US proposed a division of Korea into two occupation zones, to which the Soviets agreed.” This decision was left to a junior colonel to figure out in just 30 minutes. With little understanding of Korean geography, the official looked at a National Geographic magazine map of Korea, saw the 38th parallel marked, and suggested that be the new border between Soviet-occupied and US-occupied Korea. This border bisecting the 38th parallel has remained ever since.
How the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north and the Republic of Korea diverged so dramatically in their economics and politics stems, paradoxically, from their shared history. For centuries, Korea “has navigated balance-of-power politics […] and demonstrated an uncanny resilience,” the authors write. What follows for the remainder of the book is an analysis of how these two countries have drawn from that resilience to move their new countries forward given the circumstances they find themselves in. North Korea, left with a scarcity of farmland but a wealth of mineral resources, moved towards heavy industrialization and adopted Songun, a national policy that placed the military at the heart of all political and economic decisions, and Juche, an ideology of self-reliance and political independence. South Korea, in contrast, adopted a more capitalist route and invested in its chaebol, the major family-owned corporations that include now-familiar brands like Hyundai, LG, and Samsung, to drive its economy forward and establish relationships with the broader world.
What has played out over the past seven decades between North and South harks back to the late 1800s once again, when the declining Korean dynasty considered whether to open to the world or remain closed off. In a way, we’re seeing the outcomes of both options, albeit under several geopolitical conditions set by external forces. Neither solution has been perfect—both sides of the peninsula have struggled, like many other nations worldwide, with authoritarianism, repression of political dissidents, economic precarity, and so on, in their attempts to find their footing. And over time, the gulf between the two nations has only increased. In opting for isolation, North Korea has become a brutally repressive regime that has placed greater emphasis on symbolic displays of prosperity than on the actual well-being of its population—and ironically, despite an ideology of self-reliance, North Korea remains heavily dependent on foreign aid to survive. In seeking a place in the global community, South Korea has fostered greater international goodwill and a thriving economic engine. And yet, there is still a thread of unity to be found in this story. Both sides have made these decisions—however successful or misguided, good or bad—driven by a common desire to see Korea thrive.
The end of the book leads to what the authors say is the most common question they receive: “When will unification happen?” There is, of course, no single concrete answer. Cha and Pacheco Pardo analyze the current state of inter-Korean affairs and are pragmatic about the economic, social, and political challenges that North and South Korea—and the rest of the world—would face should unification occur. But it might not be as impossible as it seems. The authors note:
For thirteen centuries Korea was a unified country. From when the country was organized into three warring kingdoms (Baekje, Silla, Goguryeo) until its colonial occupation by Imperial Japan from 1910 to 1945, Korea and Koreans remained a single, unified entity. Only in the last century has Korea been robbed of its unity.
Though every path toward Korean unification would be undeniably difficult, the authors remain hopeful:
If, and when, the time for (re)unification comes, we suspect that most Koreans will rally behind the cause. And they will succeed, as they have done throughout history.
Cha and Pacheco Pardo sought to create an accessible primer on modern Korean history, and after reading this book, I feel they’ve succeeded. In just 232 pages, Korea offers readers a solid foundation on the histories of North and South Korea that will add much-needed context to any conversation on Korean politics and culture.
About Jasmine Gonzalez
Jasmine Gonzalez has been a part of the Porchlight marketing and editorial team since 2022. The youngest daughter of a high school history teacher and a local business leader, one of her earliest memories involves toddling over to the living room bookshelf and reading aloud all of the titles on the book spines. She’s been voraciously reading and writing in English and Spanish ever since. Outside of work, you can find her cooking intricate recipes, playing video games on vintage consoles, and fulfilling her role as the very cool aunt that gives books and Rolling Stones vinyls as gifts. Yes, she would like to befriend your dog.
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De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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