Quotes of the Day:

"Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all these evils."

- Thucydides

“Stop being offended

by a Facebook post,

by a piece of art,

by people displaying affection,

or by what someone said to you.

Be offended by war, poverty, greed, and injustice.” 

- Sue Fitzmaurice

“The brave die never, though they sleep in dust, their courage nerves a thousand living men.”

- Minot J. Savage

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 10, 2023

2. Ukraine strikes back

3. China has been operating military and spy facilities in Cuba for years, US officials say

4. Spying, both at home and abroad, has been essential to CCP power

5. Prospect of Chinese spy base in Cuba unsettles Washington

6. Kherson Flood Waters Begin to Recede, As Evidence of Russian Sabotage Mounts.

7. Developing Guardrails for Regional Stability: A View from the Philippines

8. 2 ASG bandits killed in Basilan skirmish

9. Elite Army unit chief named AFP Special Ops commander

10. Shadow Men: Inside Wagner, Russia’s Secret War Company

11. How Putin’s War Became Russia’s War

12. I’m an AI expert: Here’s my worst-case scenario

13. Why Not a Pacific NATO?

14. Russia’s defence chief signs order, forcing all mercenary companies to sign contract with ministry by 1 July

15. US Army’s new combat vehicle named for soldiers killed in Iraq, WWII

16. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons Explained: How Do They Work?

17. How the U.S. Patriot Missile Became a Hero of Ukraine War

18. U.S. Tech Giants Are Slowly Cutting Off Hong Kong Internet Users

19. Unofficial military accounts claim Ukraine has made gains in the east and south this weekend

20. The Noise Bottleneck: When More Information is Harmful

21. China has had spy base on Cuba for at least FOUR YEARS

22. Opinion | Why Secrets Lost Their Sizzle

23. Join the military, become a US citizen: Uncle Sam wants you and vous and tu

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 10, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 10.
• Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are continuing to defend against Ukrainian attacks in accord with sound tactical defensive doctrine.
• Russian milbloggers continue to highlight reported superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities as key to disrupting Ukrainian attacks.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have tactical advantages in conducting assaults at night due to Western-provided equipment with superior night optics systems.
• Russian sources continue to highlight the role of scarce military district-level Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems in defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, though Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two of these key systems in recent days.
• Ukrainian forces are currently attempting an extraordinarily difficult tactical operation – a frontal assault against prepared defensive positions, further complicated by a lack of air superiority – and these initial assaults should not be extrapolated to predict all Ukrainian operations.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov established a clear rhetorical line between criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian operational airfield during another missile and drone strike on Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10.
• Russian forces made marginal advances northeast of Kupyansk and continued ground attacks near Kreminna.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces both continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and have made marginal gains in the area as of June 10.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 10 that it plans to formalize the organization of volunteer formations.
• Russia is further consolidating a centralized media apparatus in occupied areas.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 10, 2023

Jun 10, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 10, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark

 June 10, 2023, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 10. Russian sources reported Ukrainian activity in Luhansk Oblast near Bilohorivka.[1] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 1,400m in unspecified areas of the Bakhmut front, and Russian milbloggers reported Ukrainian advances northwest and northeast of Bakhmut.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted localized attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, particularly in the Velyka Novosilka area.[3] Geolocated footage posted on June 10 additionally indicates that Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast made localized gains during counterattacks southwest and southeast of Orikhiv, and Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces in this area are successfully defending against attempted Ukrainian advances.[4]

Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are continuing to defend against Ukrainian attacks in accord with sound tactical defensive doctrine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine are relying on three main components: early detection and destruction of Ukrainian assault formations, massive use of anti-tank weapons, and mining of territories near Russian defensive positions.[5] The milblogger claimed that minefields have a twofold effect by initially damaging Ukrainian armored vehicles when they attempt to breakthrough the minefield and then again when they retreat from the area.[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces responded to the start of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast following established Russian doctrine, which calls for a first echelon of troops to repel or slow attacking forces with minefields, fortifications, and strongpoints, and a second echelon of forces to counterattack against any enemy breakthrough.[7] Russian reporting of Ukrainian assaults in southern Ukraine in recent days suggests a pattern in which Ukrainian forces conduct limited breakthroughs and temporarily occupy new positions before Russian forces later recapture or push Ukrainian forces out of those positions.[8] This tactical pattern indicates that Russian forces have likely maintained doctrinally sound defensive operations in southern Ukraine, though as ISW previously reported, defending units of the 58th CAA are likely some of the most effective Russian units currently deployed in Ukraine.[9]

Russian milbloggers continue to highlight reported superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities as key to disrupting Ukrainian attacks. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian EW units are disrupting Ukrainian communications as well as aviation units and alleged that some Ukrainian mechanized groups were not prepared to fight without communications or with suppressed GPS.[10] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted their own “electronic counter measures” against Russian reconnaissance and control capabilities in areas where there are Ukrainian assaults but that these attempts were unsuccessful.[11] Russian forces have reportedly successfully improved their EW use throughout the invasion of Ukraine.[12]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have tactical advantages in conducting assaults at night due to Western-provided equipment with superior night optics systems. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are launching assaults at night because Western-provided equipment provides Ukrainian forces with “excellent” night vision optics.[13] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov also claimed that night assaults allow Ukrainian forces to more effectively use Western-provided equipment.[14] Russian sources have widely claimed that Ukrainian forces have started or intensified assaults at night in recent days, and Ukrainian forces may be increasingly leveraging the advantages provided by Western systems.[15]

Russian sources continue to highlight the role of scarce military district-level Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems against Ukrainian attacks, though Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two of these key systems in recent days. Geolocated footage published on June 8 and 9 confirms that Ukrainian forces have used Western precision munitions (reportedly the Paladin 155mm artillery system) to destroy at least two Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems – highly destructive but scarce artillery assets controlled at the Russian military district level – in western and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) highlighted the role of Russian thermobaric artillery systems in striking Ukrainian positions on the western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian thermobaric artillery units have consistently fired on Ukrainian forces on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border and in western Zaporizhia Oblast for the past several days and characterized the units as essential to repelling Ukrainian frontal assaults.[18] Russian forces’ apparent reliance on specific artillery assets is noteworthy, as precision Ukrainian strikes on these systems could potentially complicate Russian defensive capabilities and Russian forces are unlikely to possess enough TOS-1A systems to provide the same level of fire support all along the front line.

Ukrainian forces are currently attempting an extraordinarily difficult tactical operation – a frontal assault against prepared defensive positions, further complicated by a lack of air superiority – and these initial assaults should not be extrapolated to predict all Ukrainian operations. Ukrainian forces are unsurprisingly taking casualties in initial attacks against some of the best-prepared Russian forces in Ukraine. However, initial attacks – and particularly selected footage that Russian sources are intentionally disseminating and highlighting – are not representative of all Ukrainian operations. The Russian military remains dangerous and Ukrainian forces certainly face a hard fight, but Ukraine has not yet committed the vast majority of its counteroffensive forces and Russian defenses are not uniformly strong along all sectors of the front line.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov established a clear rhetorical line between criticizing the Russian MoD and criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin in a statement on June 9. Kadyrov published a post to Telegram on June 9 outlining the details of a private phone call that occurred between Kadyrov and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in late May after Kadyrov and Prigozhin reportedly reached an agreement for Chechen forces to replace Wagner in Bakhmut.[19] The interactions between Kadyrov and Prigozhin rapidly deteriorated in subsequent days, but Prigozhin claimed that he personally called Kadyrov on June 1 to resolve their dispute.[20] Kadyrov claimed on June 9 that he genuinely believed he was doing his best to help Prigozhin by offering for Chechen troops to replace Wagner fighters but that Prigozhin’s tone towards Kadyrov and the Chechen troops changed suddenly, and Kadyrov felt as though he had to personally mitigate.[21] Kadyrov also noted that he himself has occasionally criticized the Russian MoD but rhetorically drew a line against criticizing Putin directly, claiming he has always understood that Putin’s position as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces means that Putin has the best understanding of battlefield realities.[22] Kadyrov then criticized Wagner for being a weak and ineffective force when faced with the same operational restraints as Chechen forces in previous phases of the war.[23] Kadyrov’s message likely sought to signal his loyalty to Putin and portray Prigozhin as further at odds with the overall Russian military leadership.

Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian operational airfield during another missile and drone strike on Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10. Ukrainian Air Force Command reported on June 10 that Russian forces launched eight ground-based missiles of various types and 35 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine from the northern and southern directions and hit an operational airfield in Poltava Oblast with Iskander ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and Iranian-made drones.[24] Poltava Oblast Head Dmytro Lunin noted that the strike damaged airfield infrastructure and other unspecified equipment.[25] Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) spokesperson Eduard Basurin praised the strike for “finally” targeting Ukrainian airfields.[26] ISW recently assessed that Russia is conducting a new air campaign to target Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities, and Russian sources will likely use reporting of such strikes to frame the current air campaign as proactive and effective over the backdrop of Ukrainian counterattacks throughout the theater.[27]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 10.
• Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are continuing to defend against Ukrainian attacks in accord with sound tactical defensive doctrine.
• Russian milbloggers continue to highlight reported superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities as key to disrupting Ukrainian attacks.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have tactical advantages in conducting assaults at night due to Western-provided equipment with superior night optics systems.
• Russian sources continue to highlight the role of scarce military district-level Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems in defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, though Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two of these key systems in recent days.
• Ukrainian forces are currently attempting an extraordinarily difficult tactical operation – a frontal assault against prepared defensive positions, further complicated by a lack of air superiority – and these initial assaults should not be extrapolated to predict all Ukrainian operations.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov established a clear rhetorical line between criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian operational airfield during another missile and drone strike on Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10.
• Russian forces made marginal advances northeast of Kupyansk and continued ground attacks near Kreminna.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces both continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and have made marginal gains in the area as of June 10.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 10 that it plans to formalize the organization of volunteer formations.
• Russia is further consolidating a centralized media apparatus in occupied areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces made marginal advances northeast of Kupyansk on June 10. Geolocated footage published on June 10 indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances northwest of Vilshana (14km northeast of Kupyansk).[28] The Russian MoD reported that Russian forces suppressed four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Novomlynsk (20km northeast of Kupyansk), Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), and Orlianka (22km east of Kupyansk) in Kharkiv Oblast and Stelmakhivka, Luhansk Oblast (16km northwest of Svatove).[29]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna on June 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Vesele (30km south of Kreminna).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that combat engagements continue near Bilohorivka and that a Russian artillery unit repelled a small Ukrainian mechanized group that attempted to break through Russian defenses in the area.[31]

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian rear areas in Luhansk Oblast. Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official Rodion Miroshnik claimed on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions near Lysychansk (15km southwest of Kreminna) 15 times over the past week.[32] Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted a Ukrainian missile targeting administrative buildings in Luhansk City on June 9.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Russian and Ukrainian forces both continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on June 10. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian troops advanced up to 1,400m in different unspecified areas of the Bakhmut front.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks and advanced northwest of Bakhmut, particularly near Berkhikvka (2km northwest of Bakhmut) and Yahidne (on the western outskirts of Bakhmut), and northeast of Bakhmut near Krasnopolivka (10km northeast).[35] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) are defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Bakhmut area.[36] The Russian MoD claimed that troops of the Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks southwest and northwest of Bakhmut.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut) and Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[38]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north of Donetsk City near Sieverne and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City in Marinka.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued unsuccessful assaults on Sieverne from the south, near Opytne.[40] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) posted footage reportedly showing the DNR’s 110th Brigade striking a Ukrainian infantry fighting vehicle near Pervomaiske, on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and have made marginal gains in the area as of June 10. Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows Russian forces retreating from positions west of Storozheve (3km south of Velyka Novosilka), though it is unclear if Ukrainian forces captured these positions.[42] The Russian MoD claimed on June 10 that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian ground attacks near south and southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[43] Battle maps from Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Rivnopil (9km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances south of Neskuchne (immediately south of Velyka Novosilka).[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), and a battalion of the 5th Motorized Infantry Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) are defending against Ukrainian forces in the area.[46]

Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on June 9 to 10 and made gains in the area. Geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces advanced west and south of Lobkove (24km southwest of Orikhiv) and west of Novopokrovka (14km southeast of Orikhiv).[47] Battle maps from Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces captured Lobkove.[48] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks and that Russian forces struck Ukrainian armored vehicles south and southeast of Orikhiv.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, chiefly elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army, repelled Ukrainian ground attacks south of Orikhiv) overnight on June 9 to 10.[50] Russian milbloggers praised the 70th and 291st Motorized Rifle regiments (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) for conducting successful defensive operations south of Orikhiv.[51] Russian sources also claimed that the 22nd and 45th Separate Guards Spetsnaz brigades (both of the GRU) also destroyed Ukrainian armored vehicles southeast of Orikhiv.[52]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian rear areas of Kherson Oblast and Crimea on June 10. Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows the aftermath of reported Ukrainian strikes against Zalizhnyi Port (45km west of Skadovsk on the Black Sea coast) overnight.[53] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian Hrim-2 ballistic missiles over occupied Crimea.[54] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have fired the missiles using modified S-200 systems, however.[55]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD announced on June 10 that it plans to formalize the organization of volunteer formations. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu signed an order on June 10 defining the procedure for organizing the official activities of volunteer formations.[56] The Russian MoD claims that the order stipulates that volunteers need to sign individual contracts with the MoD or their respective volunteer formations by July 1.[57] The MoD stated that these contracts will give volunteer formations necessary legal status and extend social protection and support measures to volunteers and their family members.[58] The order suggests that some volunteers may be serving without contracts or under contracts that the MoD does not recognize as fully legitimate. The MoD asserted that the formalization of volunteer formations will allow Russian officials to increase contract recruitment. State Secretary and Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov added at a MoD meeting about contract recruitment on June 10 that there are currently more than 40 volunteer formations serving alongside the Russian Armed Forces.[59] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev previously claimed that the Russian military has recruited more than 117,400 contract personnel in volunteer formations since January 1, 2023.[60] The formalization of irregular volunteer formations is likely to generate tensions within the MoD’s organizational apparatus, particularly as it continues to rely on volunteer formations for ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

The Russian MoD also claimed that the number of contract recruits has increased in recent months. Pankov claimed that 13,500 recruits signed contracts in the first ten days of June, claiming that to be 2.1 times the number of recruits in the first ten days of May and 3.1 times the number of recruits in the first ten days of April.[61] Pankov specifically highlighted Moscow and Sevastopol cities; Altai, Ingushetia, Bashkortostan, Karachay-Cherkess, Komi, Chechnya, and Tuva republics; Astrakhan, Voronezh, Murmansk, Penza, Sakhalin, and Tyumen oblasts, and the Jewish Autonomous Okrug as successfully implementing contract service recruitment plans.[62]

Chechen Human Rights organization North Caucasus SOS (SK SOS) published an investigation on June 10 detailing how Chechen authorities have used coercive measures to support recruitment campaigns since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. SK SOS reported that each Chechen official, imam, and commander received quotas for the number of Chechen residents they had to recruit into volunteer units.[63] SK SOS reported that Chechen authorities began detaining residents under false pretexts and using threats and blackmail to impress Chechens into military service when Chechen officials started to fail to meet these quotas.[64] SK SOS reported that Chechen authorities also held residents in detention centers without documentation or legal proceedings and only allowed residents to leave if they agreed to fight in Ukraine.[65]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russia is further consolidating a centralized media apparatus in occupied areas. Russian outlet Vedemosti reported on June 10 that the occupation authorities of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts are “systematizing” information resources on the basis of centralized Russian-controlled news agencies operating in each oblast.[66] Vedemosti interviewed a Russian political scientist who noted that this measure aims to crackdown on the rise of military correspondents, private media sources, and Telegram channels in occupied regions.[67] The centralization of the media apparatus in occupied Ukraine will likely further restrict the information environment in these areas and allow occupation authorities greater oversight of the predominant propaganda lines in occupied territories.

A Ukrainian report claimed that Crimea is suffering with water supply issues following the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam. The Ukrainian Resistance Center claimed that the Kremlin instructed the Crimean occupation administration to solve the issue of water supply to Crimea and that the Crimean occupation administration is avoiding wide coverage of the water supply issue.[68] A Russian source amplified a footage reportedly showing that the North Crimean Canal, which has supplied water to occupied Crimea from the Dnipro River during the Russian occupation of Kherson Oblast, has become dry.[69] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov has previously claimed that Crimea faces no water supply issues.[70] Russia notably was able to maintain water supplies to occupied Crimea prior to the 2022 full scale invasion and the capture of parts of Kherson Oblast, as ISW has previously reported.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting, and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Ukraine strikes back

Excerpts:

Short of an explicit treaty that will be hard, but not impossible. America, for instance, has legal commitments that oblige it to provide Israel and Taiwan with the arms they need to defend themselves. The guarantees should cover weapons systems, ammunition, training and support to beef up Ukraine’s own defence industries. The more countries that sign up to them, the more convincing they would become—and the harder they would be to overturn if a Ukraine-sceptic like Donald Trump were elected. After the fighting stops, Western “tripwire” forces could be stationed on Ukrainian soil.

Ukraine’s fear, and Mr Putin’s hope, is that the West will lose focus. Only a successful counter-offensive and credible security pledges can get Russians to realise that Mr Putin’s war is futile—that he will never succeed, but can only fail, or fall. 

Ukraine strikes back​

The counter-offensive is getting under way. The next few weeks will be critical

​Jun 8th 2023

The Economist

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine war

Trailed ten days early with a blood-stirring video in which Ukrainian troops asked God to bless their “sacred revenge”, Ukraine’s counter-offensive is under way. For weeks its armed forces have conducted probing and shaping operations along the 1,000km front line, looking for weaknesses and confusing the Russians. Now Ukraine is testing enemy defences with an intensity not seen for months, with attacks against the occupiers in a series of positions in the east and south. The apparent demolition of the Kakhovka dam on June 6th, if it was indeed Russian sabotage as Western military sources believe, would be clear evidence that they are already feeling the pressure.

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More will come in the days ahead. The main force has yet to be sent into battle. The operation will last well into the summer. However, what happens in these next weeks will shape the future not just of Ukraine itself, but of the whole security order in Europe. The point of decision has arrived.

The task for Ukraine, bluntly, is to show Vladimir Putin, his henchmen, his compatriots and the wider watching world that Russia cannot win; that this invasion has been misconceived from the outset; that Russia cannot outlast Ukraine and its Western backers; and that the Kremlin’s best option is to give up before Russia suffers yet more losses and humiliation.

That is no easy task, and the risk of failure is real. But thanks to Ukraine’s astonishing determination, and the strong and unexpectedly united backing of the West, success is possible. It requires, right now, the strongest diplomatic and military support, and the clearest commitment from the West that it will stand by Ukraine for many years to come. Mr Putin must no longer be able to lie to himself or his people about the foolishness of the direction he has chosen.

This is why this moment is so critical. The Russians are well dug in and reinforced after months of a mobilisation drive that has replenished the supply of cannon-fodder. Imagine the worst case: that Ukraine’s counter-offensive peters out, its troops spread too thin, or used too sparingly, to make an impact.

If that happens, it would be a damaging failure. Despite the Russian army’s woeful performance in the months-long fight to take the city of Bakhmut, it would nonetheless start to seem well matched against Ukraine’s. The voices urging Ukraine to stop fighting and start talking would grow louder, even though a ceasefire would leave Russia in possession of almost 20% of Ukraine and Russian promises of peace would be worthless.

This would be a win for Mr Putin—not the total victory he once dreamed of, but success in his backup objective, to cripple Ukraine if it cannot be returned to the Russian imperium. There would be recriminations within NATO and the European Union. In America, as it heads towards a divisive presidential election, the pressure to cut back funds that Republican critics already claim are being wasted would grow. In Europe the backsliders would slide further.

But the fighting may also go differently. Imagine that the invaders break, their troops running back to Mother Russia in fear of encirclement, as they did from Kharkiv last September. That would be a grave setback for Mr Putin. He has lost more than 100,000 dead and wounded, expended tens of billions of dollars’-worth of military hardware, and shattered his economic relationships with Europe and America: and it would be all for nothing. He would struggle to survive the humiliation. Although Russia might suffer deep and dangerous instability, many in the West would be glad to see the back of him.

The most likely outcome lies in between. As the summer wears on, Ukraine is likely to push back the Russians in two main areas, gaining territory but not precipitating a full-scale collapse. The first, and the one where most of the new activity is so far going on, is in Donbas. One clear Ukrainian objective is to reverse Russian gains there. If Mr Putin starts losing even the territory he has held since his first incursion, in 2014, as well as what he has seized since last February, it will be apparent to him, his generals and the Russian people what a blunder he has made.

The other objective will surely be a push south. Ukraine will seek to break the “land bridge” that connects Russia to Crimea. If it can do that, everything changes. Crimea would become isolated, hard to resupply and protect. The collapse of the dam has already threatened its water supply. Large numbers of Russian troops might be cut off and captured. Ukraine would get back some of its coast on the Sea of Azov. Even if it cannot reach the coast, advancing far enough to put the east-west roads and railways that supply Crimea in range of its guns would be an important step.

Yet neither Ukraine nor Europe will be safe while Mr Putin believes he can launch another invasion later. So the West should understand its commitment must last for years. While Russia remains a threat, Ukraine will need enough weaponry to hold the line, wherever it settles.

What that means in practice needs to be agreed on now—as a further signal to Russia of the folly of dreaming that this war could one day turn out well. NATO members are split on whether Ukraine should become a member, and in any case it cannot happen while the war still rages. So willing Western powers must immediately craft a set of security guarantees for Ukraine that will have credibility, unlike the empty words of the past.

Make Ukraine Putin-proof—and Trump-proof

Short of an explicit treaty that will be hard, but not impossible. America, for instance, has legal commitments that oblige it to provide Israel and Taiwan with the arms they need to defend themselves. The guarantees should cover weapons systems, ammunition, training and support to beef up Ukraine’s own defence industries. The more countries that sign up to them, the more convincing they would become—and the harder they would be to overturn if a Ukraine-sceptic like Donald Trump were elected. After the fighting stops, Western “tripwire” forces could be stationed on Ukrainian soil.

Ukraine’s fear, and Mr Putin’s hope, is that the West will lose focus. Only a successful counter-offensive and credible security pledges can get Russians to realise that Mr Putin’s war is futile—that he will never succeed, but can only fail, or fall. ■

For subscribers only: to see how we design each week’s cover, sign up to our weekly Cover Story newsletter.

The Economist

3. China has been operating military and spy facilities in Cuba for years, US officials say

Excerpts:

The Chinese military and intelligence sites monitor maritime traffic, the US Guantanamo naval base and communications, the source familiar with the intelligence said. With so many communications moving from physical lines and cables to wireless, the People’s Republic of China will move to try to monitor those as well, the source added.

“It was our assessment that, despite awareness of the basing efforts and some attempts to address this challenge in the past Administration, we were not making enough progress and needed a more direct approach,” the Biden administration official said on Saturday.

“The President directed his team to come up with an approach to address this challenge,” the official added. “Our experts assess that our diplomatic efforts have slowed the PRC down. We think the PRC isn’t quite where they had hoped to be. There are still challenges, and we continue to be concerned about the PRC’s longstanding activities with Cuba. The PRC will keep trying to enhance its presence in Cuba, and we will keep working to disrupt it.”

China has been operating military and spy facilities in Cuba for years, US officials say | CNN Politics

CNN · by Alex Marquardt,Jasmine Wright,Zachary Cohen · June 11, 2023

Washington CNN —

China has been operating military and intelligence facilities in Cuba since at least 2019 and is continuing to expand its intelligence gathering capabilities around the world, a Biden administration official and two other sources told CNN Saturday.

The administration official said China “conducted an upgrade of its intelligence collection facilities in Cuba in 2019” under the Trump administration and described the challenge as “inherited.”

“This is well-documented in the intelligence record,” the official said.

The sources acknowledged that China has been spying on the US from various sites based in Cuba for years after the White House denied reports earlier this week that China was planning to build a new signals intelligence facility on the island.

Earlier this week, CNN confirmed a report by the Wall Street Journal that Cuba agreed to allow China to build a new spying facility on the island that could allow the Chinese to eavesdrop on electronic communications across the southeastern US.

That deal is in principle, one of the sources familiar with the intelligence said, and the facility is not believed to have been built.

John Kirby, a spokesman for the National Security Council, called the Journal’s report “not accurate” and on Saturday the administration official further explained “this is an ongoing issue, and not a new development, and the arrangement as characterized in the reporting does not comport with our understanding.”

One of the sources described the discrepancy as “semantic quibbling.”

But the revelations about expanding Chinese intelligence operations in Cuba comes as US-China relations have reached a low point, following the spy balloon incident in February and several aggressive maneuvers by Chinese aircraft and ships against US assets in the South China Sea more recently.

CUBA, HAVANA - AUGUST 02 : Aerial view of the city of Havana on August 02, 2017 in Havana, Cuba. (Photo by Frédéric Soltan/Corbis via Getty Images)

Frédéric Soltan/Corbis News/Getty Images

The US has been trying to mend the relationship, and dispatched CIA Director Bill Burns to Beijing last month for talks with Chinese officials. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is also expected to visit China in the coming weeks.

But last week, China’s defense chief refused a meeting request by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and warned the US to stop operating near Chinese waters and airspace.

Former US Ambassador to China Max Baucus said Saturday he was “surprised” the Biden administration initially denied reporting that China has operated intelligence and military facilities in Cuba and acknowledged China has long had a “presence” in Cuba.

Baucus, who served as the top US diplomat in China for nearly three years during the Obama administration, described the Chinese intelligence capabilities during an interview on CNN as “not quite as strong as some fear,” but added, “I think China would like to make it much stronger.”

The source familiar with the intelligence told CNN that the various military and intelligence sites that China maintains in Cuba are part of the “long history” of cooperation between the two countries and part of China’s strategy to align itself with other autocratic countries from which it can advance its national security interests.

The Chinese military and intelligence sites monitor maritime traffic, the US Guantanamo naval base and communications, the source familiar with the intelligence said. With so many communications moving from physical lines and cables to wireless, the People’s Republic of China will move to try to monitor those as well, the source added.

“It was our assessment that, despite awareness of the basing efforts and some attempts to address this challenge in the past Administration, we were not making enough progress and needed a more direct approach,” the Biden administration official said on Saturday.

“The President directed his team to come up with an approach to address this challenge,” the official added. “Our experts assess that our diplomatic efforts have slowed the PRC down. We think the PRC isn’t quite where they had hoped to be. There are still challenges, and we continue to be concerned about the PRC’s longstanding activities with Cuba. The PRC will keep trying to enhance its presence in Cuba, and we will keep working to disrupt it.”

CNN · by Alex Marquardt,Jasmine Wright,Zachary Cohen · June 11, 2023

4. Spying, both at home and abroad, has been essential to CCP power

Not only from the gun: "But political power also flows from knowledge."

A good bit of history in this piece.

Excerpts:

It is inarguable that the U.S. has been blind to the threat posed by Chinese intelligence and influence operations. Indeed, the existence of the secret police stations was first revealed by Safeguard Defenders. In 2022, the group released several reports highlighting the PRC’s “illicit methods to harass, threaten, intimidate and force targets to return to China for persecution.” Many of the stations, the reports noted, were established in 2016, a fact that rebutted Beijing’s claims that they were created as a response to the coronavirus pandemic that began in 2020.

...

But Beijing’s skills extend beyond conventional spying. As Joske convincingly argued in his new book, Spies and Lies, “Influence and espionage are inextricable in the Chinese Communist Party’s intelligence operations.” An Australian-based intelligence analyst, Joske has documented the CCP’s extensive efforts to influence Western policy- and opinion-makers, including using Western think tanks to construct the intentionally disarming narrative of China’s “peaceful rise.” The CCP, its interlocutors argued, didn’t intend to threaten or supplant the U.S.-led international order. Rather, it just needed to be accommodated.

But this was just a ruse: another deception by the descendants of Gu and Kang. And Beijing has more tricks up its sleeve. A recent U.S. national intelligence assessment warned of China’s “growing efforts to actively exploit perceived U.S. societal divisions” and “become more aggressive with their influence campaigns.”

The CCP has had a century to practice and perfect its spy craft, often catching the West flat-footed. But with a new Cold War heating up between an empowered China and the U.S., the stakes are much higher. In this new war, the West is facing a formidable foe.

Spying, both at home and abroad, has been essential to CCP power

by Sean Durns

 June 09, 2023 06:15 AM

Washington Examiner · June 9, 2023

“Political power,” Mao Zedong famously declared in 1938, “grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Mao’s actions matched his words. The communist theoretician founded the People’s Republic of China — and murdered millions. But political power also flows from knowledge. Spies played a key role in the rise of the PRC, from Mao’s era to our own. And their reach extends far beyond China’s shores.

On April 17, 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it was charging two defendants in connection with “opening and operating an undeclared overseas police station in lower Manhattan.”

US AND CHINA ENGAGE IN WAR OF WORDS AT SINGAPORE SUMMIT

The two people accused, Lu Jianwang and Chen Jinping, allegedly helped the PRC spy on and intimidate Chinese dissidents living on American soil. The two are charged with acting at the behest of the Fuzhou branch of China’s Ministry of Public Security and with establishing a police station that occupied an entire floor in an office building in Manhattan’s Chinatown.

The revelation that a foreign power was operating with seeming impunity inside the United States sparked both outrage and curiosity. There are more than 100 illegal police stations operating throughout the world — including at least two more in the U.S., one in Los Angeles and another at an undisclosed location, according to Safeguard Defenders, a nonprofit organization focused on pan-Asian human rights.

Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) held a bipartisan press conference in Manhattan, in which the chairman of the newly established U.S. House select committee on China asked, “How have we allowed this to happen on American soil? The answer, in my opinion, is that we have been blind, while the CCP has been very cunning.” The U.S., Gallagher warned, risks “becoming a hunting ground for dictators.”

It is inarguable that the U.S. has been blind to the threat posed by Chinese intelligence and influence operations. Indeed, the existence of the secret police stations was first revealed by Safeguard Defenders. In 2022, the group released several reports highlighting the PRC’s “illicit methods to harass, threaten, intimidate and force targets to return to China for persecution.” Many of the stations, the reports noted, were established in 2016, a fact that rebutted Beijing’s claims that they were created as a response to the coronavirus pandemic that began in 2020.

The exterior of 107 East Broadway in New York’s Chinatown, where Lu Jianwang (with his attorney, on April 17, 2023) and Chen Jinping allegedly ran a secret Chinese police station above a ramen shop.

(Luiz C. Ribeiro / NY Daily News / Getty; center, Bebeto Matthews / AP)

The recent indictments offer the latest evidence of China’s intelligence gathering. Earlier this year, a Chinese spy balloon traversed the U.S. before eventually being shot down on Feb. 4, 2023. American officials later revealed that the balloon possessed the capability to geolocate electronic communications, rejecting China’s claim that it was simply a weather balloon that had blown off course. The Pentagon later acknowledged that there have been other instances of Chinese spy balloons violating the sovereignty of the U.S., as well as more than 40 countries, including American allies.

Both the spy balloon incident and the revelations of secret police stations bring welcome attention to China’s intelligence gathering. Yet Chinese communist spies are hardly new. The history of China’s spy services stretches back a hundred years and is inseparable from the founding of the Chinese communist state.

The story begins not in China but in the nascent Soviet Union.

In December 1917, a month after the overthrow of the provisional government in Russia, the founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, called to “set the East ablaze.” With his eye on the capitalist West, Lenin advocated exporting communism to Central Asia and eventually, he hoped, British-ruled India. But his ambitions didn’t stop with the Raj.

“Let us turn our faces towards Asia,” he declared. In 1919, Lenin established the Communist International, or Comintern, to achieve world communism.

Lenin believed that capitalism would be weakened if it were cut off from the markets and resources that its colonial and semi-colonial territories provided. Lenin’s successor, Josef Stalin, held the same beliefs. And like Lenin, Stalin thought that chaos and division were essential ingredients to a communist revolution. China offered a compelling model.

In 1911, the emperor had been overthrown and a republic declared. Peking was internationally recognized as the capital, and a quasi-government was established. Yet China was rife with internal divisions, descending into a period in which regions were ruled by competing warlords, several with foreign sponsors.

In January 1920, the Bolsheviks took Central Siberia, establishing an overland link to China. Within four months, the Comintern sent a representative, Grigori Voitinsky, to China. By May, it had established a center in Shanghai. When budding Chinese Communist Party officials held their first congress a year later, two Comintern apparatchiks were in attendance, and so, too, was a young, albeit still undistinguished, delegate from the interior province of Hunan named Mao Zedong.

By 1926, the CCP had perhaps 20,000 members, and within a year, it would triple in membership. Yet this was but a fraction of a population estimated to be around 500 million. In keeping with communist doctrine, the Soviets would aid and support their brethren in China. Yet the Soviet Union would also arm and supply other parties in China, notably the Kuomintang, an umbrella nationalist movement.

“Comintern policy,” the historian Stephen Kotkin noted, “compelled the Chinese communists to become the junior partner in a coalition with the Kuomintang in order to strengthen the latter’s role as a bulwark against imperialism.” Spying would be a key element in the communist advance.

In 1927, the first Chinese communist spy service was established, the Central Committee Special Branch, or Zhongyang Teke. The Special Branch was created by Zhou Enlai, whose connections with the Comintern seem to date back to his time as a student in Germany in the early 1920s. Zhou would go on to become a founding father of the PRC and would later serve as Communist China’s premier from 1954 until his death in 1976.

The enemies of the CCP’s spy service were legion. Chinese communists had to contend with nationalists, the Japanese, and myriad foreigners who inhabited China, many of them in Shanghai, the birthplace of the CCP. The city had been carved up by foreign powers. By the time of the CCP’s founding, a mere seven of its 20 square miles were under direct Chinese rule.

Clockwise from top left: spymaster Gu Shunzhang; U.S.-born Larry Wu-tai Chin; and ‘China’s Beria’ Kang Sheng (at far right) with Mao, at left, in 1963.

(KEYSTONE-FRANCE / Gamma-Rapho / Getty Images)

In Shanghai, the British author J.G. Ballard recalled, “anything was possible, and everything could be bought and sold.” The city was a den of intrigue, replete with opium dens, cabarets, brothels, and spies. Shanghai, the author Ben Macintyre observed, “was the espionage capital of the East.” Foreigners didn’t need a passport or visa and were constrained only by the residence permits of their native countries, enabling spies to slip anonymously from one foreign-controlled jurisdiction to the other.

Shanghai would be the first proving ground for CCP spies.

By 1927, Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-Shek turned on the communists burrowed within his ranks, launching what became known as the “White Terror.” The purge ended cooperation between the CCP and the Kuomintang and resulted in thousands of deaths. “The bloodletting,” Macintyre observed, “was particularly horrendous in Shanghai.” The war between the two would continue intermittently for two decades.

Tellingly, internal enemies would be the priority for the CCP’s spies. “China’s intelligence agencies,” analyst Alex Joske wrote, “are bastions of ideological conservatism eager to see the black hand of foreign enemies” behind domestic unrest. That paranoia was ingrained from its earliest days. Intelligence operatives, with their time abroad and foreign contacts, would often fall victim to internal squabbles.

The man who could be considered the organization’s first spymaster, Gu Shunzhang, had been “born on [the] wrong side of the tracks in Shanghai” and spent his “adolescence hanging around bars, smoking opium, having affairs with women, learning the ways of the underworld,” journalist Roger Faligot noted in his book Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping.

Gu was literally a magician, working as an illusionist and performing in the numerous nightclubs and casinos that dotted the Shanghai landscape. But Gu also worked in a tobacco plant, and it was there that he began his association with the CCP. The magician was sent to the Soviet Union for training, where he learned new parlor tricks before returning to China and linking up with Zhou.

Gu was soon named head of the CCP Politburo’s security service, where he was active in the conflict with the Kuomintang. But Gu’s magic tricks proved to have a short shelf life. It was while performing at a show in 1931 that Kuomintang's spy service identified him from a photograph and flipped him into a double agent. Information provided by Gu reportedly led to the roundup and execution of countless communists. In 1934, the Kuomintang killed him.

Another early CCP spymaster would prove to have a much longer, and even more infamous, career. Kang Sheng would go down in history as “China’s Beria,” an allusion to Lavrentiy Beria, who served as Stalin’s spymaster. But Kang would outlive both Beria and Stalin, his days as a feared intelligence chief lasting well into the 1970s, when he continued to orchestrate purges for his longtime master, Mao. Indeed, when current CCP President Xi Jinping’s father, a founding father of the Chinese communist state, was excommunicated in the 1960s, Xi’s family blamed Kang.

Like Gu, Kang had been trained in the Soviet Union. Kang had originally been a supporter of Wang Ming, a rival of Mao. And like Gu, Kang had been a labor organizer before ascending the ranks of the CCP’s security architecture. Kang “could freeze you with a stare,” a Soviet liaison observed. “Everyone was afraid of him. You could see at first glance that he was a very evil and ruthless person.”

Suffering from both mental illness and severe myopia — his extra thick glasses, the New York Times wrote at his death, added to his “sinister appearance” — Kang spent the late 1930s and early 1940s rooting out accused spies in the CCP’s ranks, solidifying Mao’s grip on power.

Kang set up an intelligence school and headquarters at the “Date Garden,” which, Faligot noted, “soon came to be feared by CCP cadres as a horrific, nightmarish lair,” with interrogation rooms and prisons built into a clay hillside.

Kang’s job, the intelligence historian Christopher Andrew observed, “was to depose and destroy his fellow party members, and his continuing ‘investigations’ in the early 1960s laid the groundwork for the attacks of the Cultural Revolution to come.”

Kang’s own influence would ebb and flow, bolstered at times by having introduced Mao to his third wife, the former actress Jiang Qing, later known as the infamous “Madame Mao.” Kang, Faligot argued, was “the inventor of Maoism,” persecuting what he called “deviationist elements.” He would later play a key role in the Sino-Soviet split during the late 1950s, pushing for Beijing to be more independent from its onetime patron.

While the Kuomintang and the West battled the Japanese in World War II, the CCP largely stayed on the sidelines, saving its forces and energy for the renewed civil war that would follow. When the CCP won that conflict, proclaiming the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Mao’s spies had done their part. And they would play an even larger role in ensuring the survival of the Chinese communist state against enemies both foreign and domestic.

The CCP had spies abroad almost from its inception. This included Japan and other Asian nations, but the West wasn’t immune. France in the 1920s, with its many Chinese students and dissidents, was replete with budding communist agents. As the Cold War heated up, many of them would make their way to the U.S., Britain, Canada, and elsewhere. Perhaps their greatest success would be securing a mole inside the U.S. government for nearly four decades.

Larry Wu-tai Chin, a Chinese-born American, was recruited by CCP spies in 1944. He obtained employment in the U.S. Army as a translator and served in consulates in Shanghai and Hong Kong, passing state secrets the entire time. During the Korean War, he supplied Mao with the names of captured Chinese soldiers who were cooperating with American interrogators.

Next, Chin worked for the CIA, spending decades passing documents to his handlers and assisting CCP counterintelligence in catching “traitors.” His treason resulted in the murder of an untold number of CIA agents in China. Regrettably, it wouldn’t be the first time that U.S. assets in the Middle Kingdom would be compromised and extinguished.

U.S. sailors recover the wreckage of China’s high-altitude surveillance balloon off the coast of South Carolina, Feb. 5, 2023.

(U.S. Navy via AP)

Chin’s greatest coup, however, would be in alerting CCP leadership to President Richard Nixon’s planned overture years before it took place. When Nixon “went to China,” opening relations with the communist government more than 20 years after they were severed, the CCP was well prepared.

Mao and his premier, Zhou, were able to negotiate from a position of strength, extracting concession after concession from Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger — even though China’s own domestic situation was dire, its economy and society wrecked from Maoist initiatives.

Chin wouldn’t be caught until 1985 after a defector from the CCP revealed his treachery. He committed suicide in a Virginia jail cell while awaiting trial. Around the same time, then-CCP head Deng Xiaoping embarked on reforming and professionalizing China’s numerous spy services, even enlisting Xi Zhongxun, the father of Xi Jinping, to help.

CCP spies would have other notable successes in the U.S., famously penetrating the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories. They also proved adept at laying “honey traps,” in which an agent uses sex or romance to obtain information or favors, to ensnare American businessmen, politicians, and even, in one famous instance, FBI counterintelligence agents themselves.

Industrial espionage would prove to be another field that China’s spies excel at, pirating key intellectual property from the U.S. and its allies. According to FBI Director Christopher Wray, the scope and scale of Beijing’s efforts “blew me away.” The bureau, he noted in 2022, is opening a new counterintelligence investigation every 12 hours. China’s economic espionage, he warned, has grown “more brazen, more damaging than ever before.”

But Beijing’s skills extend beyond conventional spying. As Joske convincingly argued in his new book, Spies and Lies, “Influence and espionage are inextricable in the Chinese Communist Party’s intelligence operations.” An Australian-based intelligence analyst, Joske has documented the CCP’s extensive efforts to influence Western policy- and opinion-makers, including using Western think tanks to construct the intentionally disarming narrative of China’s “peaceful rise.” The CCP, its interlocutors argued, didn’t intend to threaten or supplant the U.S.-led international order. Rather, it just needed to be accommodated.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

But this was just a ruse: another deception by the descendants of Gu and Kang. And Beijing has more tricks up its sleeve. A recent U.S. national intelligence assessment warned of China’s “growing efforts to actively exploit perceived U.S. societal divisions” and “become more aggressive with their influence campaigns.”

The CCP has had a century to practice and perfect its spy craft, often catching the West flat-footed. But with a new Cold War heating up between an empowered China and the U.S., the stakes are much higher. In this new war, the West is facing a formidable foe.

Sean Durns is a Washington, D.C.-based foreign affairs analyst.

Washington Examiner · June 9, 2023

5. Prospect of Chinese spy base in Cuba unsettles Washington

It is the nature of the game.

Excerpts:

U.S. lawmakers on Thursday called on the administration to intervene.

"We are deeply disturbed by reports that Havana and Beijing are working together to target the United States and our people. The United States must respond to China's ongoing and brazen attacks on our nation's security," Sens. Mark Warner and Marco Rubio, the chair and vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in a joint statement. "We must be clear that it would be unacceptable for China to establish an intelligence facility within 100 miles of Florida and the United States, in an area also populated with key military installations and extensive maritime traffic."

"We urge the Biden administration to take steps to prevent this serious threat to our national security and sovereignty," their statement said.

Prospect of Chinese spy base in Cuba unsettles Washington

CBS News · by Olivia Gazis, Eleanor Watson, Sara Cook

Washington — Cuba may allow China to establish a facility on its territory capable of conducting electronic surveillance on the United States, CBS News has confirmed, a plan that would add notable strain to already tense relations between Washington and Beijing.

While China and the U.S. routinely surveil each other — and others — using satellites, overhead flights and other means, a Chinese outpost positioned roughly 100 miles from the Florida coast would undoubtedly inflame sensitivities that were already stoked by the U.S. military shootdown of a Chinese surveillance balloon that traversed American territory in February.

The Wall Street Journal reported earlier Thursday that Havana and Beijing had arrived at a secret agreement in which Beijing would pay "several billion dollars" for permission to build the facility. Sources who spoke with CBS News said intelligence indicated the arrangement had been discussed in principle, but they were not aware of a final deal being reached.

The Cuban government strongly denied any agreement to house a spy base had been reached with China. Carlos Fernández de Cossio, a vice minister of foreign affairs, issued a statement calling the Wall Street Journal story "totally false and unfounded." He accused U.S. officials of fabricating the allegation to justify the continued blockade of the island.

National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said reports of an agreement between the two countries were "not accurate." A senior administration official added that the Biden administration has had "real concerns" about China's relationship with Cuba, and had been "concerned since day one of the Administration" about China's activities worldwide.

"We are closely monitoring it and taking steps to counter it. We remain confident that we are able to meet all our security commitments at home and in the region," the official said.

U.S. lawmakers on Thursday called on the administration to intervene.

"We are deeply disturbed by reports that Havana and Beijing are working together to target the United States and our people. The United States must respond to China's ongoing and brazen attacks on our nation's security," Sens. Mark Warner and Marco Rubio, the chair and vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in a joint statement. "We must be clear that it would be unacceptable for China to establish an intelligence facility within 100 miles of Florida and the United States, in an area also populated with key military installations and extensive maritime traffic."

"We urge the Biden administration to take steps to prevent this serious threat to our national security and sovereignty," their statement said.

U.S. officials have long warned that China would seek to expand its influence abroad, including by offering material incentives to developing or impoverished countries.

This year's annual threat assessment prepared by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said the Chinese military "will continue to pursue the establishment of overseas military installations and access agreements in an attempt to project power and protect China's interests abroad."

"While the [People's Liberation Army] is making uneven progress toward establishing overseas military facilities, the PLA probably will continue to use tailored approaches to address local concerns as it seeks to improve relations with amenable countries and advance its overseas basing goals," the assessment said.

It noted China has reportedly been pursuing deals to build military bases in Cambodia and the United Arab Emirates. Beijing's only existing overseas military base is in Djibouti.

The Chinese Embassy did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Thursday.

The public revelation of the potential plan comes at a highly sensitive moment in U.S.-China relations. Weeks ago, at the G-7 summit in Japan, President Biden predicted a "thaw" in what had been frosty relations since the surveillance balloon incident. It later came to light that a series of high-level meetings had taken place between senior U.S. and Chinese officials, including an in-person visit to Beijing in May by CIA Director William Burns.

Two other U.S. officials — Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink and Sarah Beran, senior director for China and Taiwan at the National Security Council — held meetings in Beijing this week, the latest in a series of engagements that were building up to a trip by Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

But tensions spiked again last week after a a Chinese warship carried out what the U.S. called an "unsafe" maneuver in the Taiwan Strait, cutting sharply across the path of an American destroyer. The U.S. also accused a Chinese fighter jet of performing an "unnecessarily aggressive maneuver" by flying directly in front of an American spy plane over the South China Sea in late May.

Still, plans for Blinken to travel to Beijing this month have been underway. His previously planned trip, which was to include a meeting with President Xi Jinping, was canceled in February following the spy balloon incident.

"We cannot speak to this specific report," a State Department spokesperson said of the plan for China to establish a presence in Cuba, adding, "we are well aware of — and have spoken many times to — the People's Republic of China's efforts to invest in infrastructure around the world that may have military purposes, including in this hemisphere."

The CIA declined to comment. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Margaret Brennan contributed reporting.

CBS News · by Olivia Gazis, Eleanor Watson, Sara Cook​

6. Kherson Flood Waters Begin to Recede, As Evidence of Russian Sabotage Mounts

Excerpts:

The full ecological impact of the destruction of the dam won’t be known for some time, but there is no doubt it will be immense.

Ukraine has already warned of a potential "ecocide" after 150 tonnes of engine oil spilled into the river, from the dam’s machinery, as a result of the attack.

One very visible consequence of the disaster is the current situation at the Kakhovka reservoir in place, which can hold 18 cubic kilometers of water – approximately the same capacity as Utah's Great Salt Lake.

Before-and-after video posted on social media shows how just how far the water levels have dropped in the reservoir.

Ukrainian ecologist, Maksym Soroka, said: “The water will not disappear. However, now this place will become a temporary swamp. And only then will nature figure out what to do with this territory.”

Griffiths warned the ravages of flooding will almost inevitably lead to lower grain exports, higher food prices around the world, and less to eat for millions in need.

Kherson Flood Waters Begin to Recede, As Evidence of Russian Sabotage Mounts

kyivpost.com

Five days after the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in Ukraine’s Kherson region, the scale of the disaster is still difficult to comprehend – thousands forced to flee, disrupted water supplies and an unfolding environmental and humanitarian catastrophe.

The latest on the ground

According to authorities, the flood waters are now beginning to recede. Oleksandr Prokudin, the head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration, said water levels had decreased on average by 27cm overnight.

"Compared to the morning [of June 10], the average level of flooding has decreased by 27 cm and is now 4.45 m. The area of the flooded territories has decreased by almost half.

“The water has receded from Mykolaivka, Lvove and Olhivka of Beryslav district. 32 settlements on the right bank are still flooded. 3,784 residential buildings are under flood water,” he said.

As of Saturday evening, 2,699 people, including 178 children and 67 people with reduced mobility, were evacuated from dangerous settlements in Ukrainian-held territories.

Prokudin's counterpart in the Mykolaiv region, Vitaly Kim, also said "the water level began to fall" there.

Ukraine has said five people are known to have died while Russian-installed authorities in occupied areas affected by the flooding have said eight people have died in areas they currently control.

The death toll is likely to rise with Ukrainian authorities saying on Saturday that 29 people were missing.

A local resident looks at a flooded street in the town of Kherson on June 10, 2023. Genya SAVILOV / AFP

The evidence against Russia

While Ukraine has not hesitated in blaming Russia for deliberately blowing up the dam, the international community has held back from making any concrete accusations so far, but according to the growing body of evidence, this may not be too far off.

Norway's seismological institute said on Friday it had detected “an explosion” at the site and time the dam was breached, heavily suggesting it did not burst as a result of damage incurred during months of heavy bombing.

"We are confident that there was an explosion," Ben Dando, a senior Norsar official, told AFP.

According to the institute, the blast occurred at 2:54 am local time, at a site whose coordinates correspond to the Kakhovka dam.

The magnitude of the blast was “between 1 and 2”, said Norsar, which had yet to calculate its equivalent in tonnes of TNT.

“It's not a weak explosion,” Dando added.

Any terrorist counts on only a few forms of results for himself: the suffering of people, the intimidation of people, and the ruins that terror leaves behind. This is exactly how Russia acts in this case.

We will do everything to guarantee people a basis for life even after this… pic.twitter.com/iIKLQRGlSm

— Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) June 11, 2023

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In a separate announcement later on Friday afternoon, The New York Times reported that a U.S. official said American spy satellites equipped with infrared sensors also detected an explosion.

Also on Friday, Ukraine’s security services released a recording of an intercepted phone call between two Russian men in which one of them appears to admit that Moscow’s forces blew up the dam in a botched operation.

During the call, one of the men says: “[Ukraine] didn’t blow it up. Our sabotage team is there. They wanted to cause fear with this dam. It did not go according to the plan.”

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrel has come closest to a direct accusation so far, saying on Friday “everything indicates” Russia is behind the Kakhovka dam breach.

“The dam was not bombed. It was destroyed by explosives installed in the areas where the turbines are located. This area is under Russian control,” Borrell told Spanish public television.

“I wasn’t there to find out who did it. But everything seems to indicate that if it took place in an area under Russian control, it is difficult to believe it could have been someone else,” he added.

“In any case, the consequences for Ukraine are terrible, from the humanitarian point of view for the displaced people, and from the environmental point of view because the (dam’s) destruction will cause an ecological disaster.”

The Geneva Conventions prohibit attacks on dams unless "it is used for other than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support," an exemption that did not apply to the Nova Kakhovk dam.

A local resident sails on a sup board during an evacuation from a flooded area in Kherson on June 8, 2023. ALEKSEY FILIPPOV / AFP

Houses are flooded in the town of Kherson on June 8, 2023. Genya SAVILOV / AFP

The humanitarian situation

According to the UN, 700,000 people do not have proper access to drinking water on both the Ukrainian-controlled and Russian-controlled sides of the river.

The UN sent humanitarian convoys to the region on Friday, but the scale of the clean-up task and the range of consequences is on a massive scale.

Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Martin Griffiths, told AP that one of the immediate threats is that posed by the flood waters digging up and moving land mines “and what we are bound to be seeing are those mines floating in places where people don’t expect them,” threatening adults and especially children.

“So it’s a cascade of problems, starting with allowing people to survive today, and then giving them some kind of prospects for tomorrow,” he said.

Ukrainian servicemen help residents unload a cow evacuation from the flooded village of Afanasiivka, Mykolaiv region on June 9, 2023. Genya SAVILOV / AFP

A volunteer carries a dog during an evacuation from a flooded area in Kherson on June 8, 2023. Genya SAVILOV / AFP

Ukrainian servicemen and volunteers sail on boats during an evacuation from a flooded area in Kherson on June 8, 2023. Genya SAVILOV / AFP

A rescuer of the State Emergency Service (R) helps local resident Tetyana (C), 75, during an evacuation of local residents from the flooded village of Afanasiivka, Mykolaiv region on June 9, 2023. Genya SAVILOV / AFP

The ecological situation

The full ecological impact of the destruction of the dam won’t be known for some time, but there is no doubt it will be immense.

Ukraine has already warned of a potential "ecocide" after 150 tonnes of engine oil spilled into the river, from the dam’s machinery, as a result of the attack.

One very visible consequence of the disaster is the current situation at the Kakhovka reservoir in place, which can hold 18 cubic kilometers of water – approximately the same capacity as Utah's Great Salt Lake.

Before-and-after video posted on social media shows how just how far the water levels have dropped in the reservoir.

Ukrainian ecologist, Maksym Soroka, said: “The water will not disappear. However, now this place will become a temporary swamp. And only then will nature figure out what to do with this territory.”

Griffiths warned the ravages of flooding will almost inevitably lead to lower grain exports, higher food prices around the world, and less to eat for millions in need.

kyivpost.com

7. Developing Guardrails for Regional Stability: A View from the Philippines

Excerpts:

The inability of ASEAN to effectively address this principal regional political-security issue point​s​ to the need to bring efforts to address problems back to only those directly involved: the SCS disputes should be discussed between China and ASEAN claimant countries only, not all 11 ASEAN members. This would be logical and historically consistent, since the original COC concept was introduced into the ASEAN agenda in the 1990s when it was predominantly an association of claimants (minus Thailand). Having only the parties directly interested in participating in the talks would probably stand a better chance of progress and also enable a more consistent and unified response to China’s incessant expansion. ASEAN has never posed an obstacle to bilateral, trilateral, or subregional groupings and solutions to distinct problems involving less than the full ASEAN membership.

If ASEAN claimants all find that the ASEAN institutional mechanisms for dialogue no longer serve to protect their respective interests, they should consider addressing the SCS disputes outside of the association’s restrictive framework. Progress on the resolution of the SCS disputes is urgent and important not only for Southeast Asia and its common maritime interests; it is also of great significance to external powers that have an interest in stable and open Southeast Asian seas governed by international rules of the road. For ASEAN and the international community at large, the system of navigational rights and freedoms in accordance with UNCLOS remains the best way of responding to China’s expanding might and increasing assertiveness.

Developing Guardrails for Regional Stability: A View from the Philippines

Manila sees a variety of different threats to its maritime security. Each requires a different tool or approach.

thediplomat.com · by Jay Batongbacal · June 9, 2023

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Southeast Asia’s economic progress largely depends on a network of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) protected by an international legal system, largely codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other maritime conventions, as well as customary international law. For this reason, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) repeatedly underscores that freedom of navigation is a key common interest. However, the security of this SLOC network is exposed to varied potential threats in certain key nodes, both localized and regional.

Experience suggests that the differences in the characteristics of the threats to SLOC security demand different approaches. Managing and addressing threats to SLOC security requires customized solutions involving nations directly adjacent to and affected by them. Guardrails must therefore be thought of as relatively specialized, addressed to specific participants, and not necessarily requiring the involvement of all members of the entire region.

The Philippines’ Assessment on Threats to SLOC Security

The Philippines views two threats to SLOC security: localized and regional.

Some threats are highly localized but immediate and continuing. Piracy and armed robbery at sea usually occur in confined sea areas with undefined maritime boundaries, such as in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) region and the Sulu-Celebes Sea tri-border area between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Pending boundary disputes hinder the delimitation of firm jurisdictional zones, creating gaps that are exploited by malign actors preying on maritime traffic or using the areas for illegal transnational movement of goods and people. In addition to this, coastal human settlements are the sources of many kinds of land-based pollution that affect the health of the waterways and their resources.

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Other localized threats are contingent and occasional, like natural and man-made disasters, particularly in populated coastal and nearshore areas. The region’s complex geography, active geology, and volatile weather and oceanographic patterns combine with climate change to create enormous natural hazards and disaster risks. Accidents can occur among numerous vessels, ports, and coastal infrastructure, causing damage and disruption of marine traffic, hazards to the safety of persons, property, and marine environment, and adverse socio-economic impacts.

More widely distributed regional threats pose greater challenges. These include illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime believes is also often integrally linked with other forms of transnational organized crime. Cybersecurity threats are thought to be on the horizon, with cyber-attacks on the maritime industry (e.g., hacking of ports, navigational, or cargo systems) possibly disrupting ship operations and risking the safety of crew and passengers.

The most generalized and perhaps unpredictable threat to SLOC security arise from territorial and jurisdictional disputes, particularly in the South China Sea (SCS) which lies at the heart of Southeast Asia. While bilateral and trilateral maritime disputes between ASEAN members have been more or less effectively managed, in contrast, the disputes between some of them and China have recently become more intense.

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China’s economic, political, and military demands as a major power fuel the need to expand its security footprint, which unfortunately means dominating and controlling maritime activities within the so-called First and Second Island Chains, which essentially encompass Southeast Asia. Its excessive claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction in the SCS are integral to its broader anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) security strategy that envisions the SCS, East China Sea, Philippine Sea, and the fragmented insular and peninsular territories within them as security buffer zones to protect the Chinese coastline and keep potential adversaries from approaching by sea. Artificial island bases in the SCS act as forward operating bases for its maritime forces, including the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard, and Peoples’ Armed Forces Maritime Militia, as well as housing surveillance arrays and missile batteries. These guard the southwestern approaches to China’s coast through Southeast Asia. To the east, PLAN and the PLA Air Force are developing operational assets and capabilities to cover the northeastern approaches. On top of this, PLA rocket forces envelop much of the region within the range of short, intermediate, and long-range missiles.

Implicit in these developments is China’s increasing control and dominance of all maritime activities, and the potential for disruption and re-ordering of the maritime trade networks supported by the SLOCs in case of any conflict, whether limited or widespread. Despite China’s occasional insistence that there is no problem with freedom of navigation in the SCS, it has demonstrated both the capability and willingness to set aside international norms when it is in China’s interests to do so.

Vietnam and the Philippines have borne the brunt of numerous maritime coercion activities as a result of China’s maritime expansion. Strategic uncertainties largely arise in connection with these disputes, because China’s excessive claims not only endanger Southeast Asia’s free and equal access to the sea and resources, but also that of external powers such as the U.S., Japan, and Australia, which China sees and considers as the potential adversaries against whom its security buffer must be established.

Guardrails for SLOC Security

Localized threats such as piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism, and illegal maritime traffic have been effectively addressed by the affected ASEAN member states through practical bilateral and trilateral cooperation arrangements for coordinated patrols and information exchange. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore Cooperation Mechanism and the Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement in the Sulu-Celebes are among the best two examples of international maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia. These are supplemented by broader trans-regional cooperation mechanisms such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, and support for capacity and capability building from external partners.

These experiences suggest that highly focused, problem-based, and practical trilateral arrangements revolving around maritime surveillance, transparency, and law enforcement are the most feasible and attractive means of addressing SLOC security threats because they enable ASEAN members to better manage their own respective areas and exercise their responsibilities under international law. International law provides ASEAN with the tools and mechanisms with which to secure SLOCs within their maritime jurisdictional spaces; this remains the most feasible and sensible approach for both regional and extra-regional powers. Similar kinds of arrangements may be explored for less politically-charged challenges such as marine pollution (e.g., plastics and oil spills) and disaster risk reduction and management in particularly vulnerable areas hosting major nodes of maritime traffic.

Potentially, such approaches could also address broader threats such as maritime cybersecurity, IUU fishing, and transnational organized crime by sea, although national sensitivities are likely to be more challenging. Southeast Asian countries zealously guard their sovereignty and exclusive authority over their own citizens and communities, so arrangements which are perceived to undermine their sovereign prerogatives are often difficult to advance. But solutions enable them to enhance self-governance and have a better chance of acceptance and success; this may be particularly applicable to problems such as disaster risk reduction and management.

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Maritime cybersecurity threats against shipping could probably be best dealt with through national implementation of international standards and practices, since shipping is governed by agreed rules set by international maritime conventions and the International Maritime Organization. Reinforcement of regional infrastructure to provide cyber-services, development of maritime cyber-capabilities, the establishment of information exchange and data management protocols, and regional maritime cybersecurity cooperation should be explored. The draft ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy 2021-2025 provides a good basis for this effort, but lacks a particular maritime focus.

Dealing with China

Insulating SLOCs from the territorial and maritime disputes between ASEAN claimants and China remains the most difficult challenge. In the past decade, China has demonstrated an unmitigated and unrelenting intent to establish mare clausum over the SCS with or without the consent of her smaller neighbors, and to the exclusion of those it perceives to be rival powers or potential threats. China’s increasingly overt and coercive interactions at sea against Southeast Asian littoral States contrast sharply with diplomatic engagements in the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct (COC) negotiations, creating an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion among Southeast Asian claimants, which fear being trapped by China’s overwhelming and overbearing power.

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The inability of ASEAN to effectively address this principal regional political-security issue point​s​ to the need to bring efforts to address problems back to only those directly involved: the SCS disputes should be discussed between China and ASEAN claimant countries only, not all 11 ASEAN members. This would be logical and historically consistent, since the original COC concept was introduced into the ASEAN agenda in the 1990s when it was predominantly an association of claimants (minus Thailand). Having only the parties directly interested in participating in the talks would probably stand a better chance of progress and also enable a more consistent and unified response to China’s incessant expansion. ASEAN has never posed an obstacle to bilateral, trilateral, or subregional groupings and solutions to distinct problems involving less than the full ASEAN membership.

If ASEAN claimants all find that the ASEAN institutional mechanisms for dialogue no longer serve to protect their respective interests, they should consider addressing the SCS disputes outside of the association’s restrictive framework. Progress on the resolution of the SCS disputes is urgent and important not only for Southeast Asia and its common maritime interests; it is also of great significance to external powers that have an interest in stable and open Southeast Asian seas governed by international rules of the road. For ASEAN and the international community at large, the system of navigational rights and freedoms in accordance with UNCLOS remains the best way of responding to China’s expanding might and increasing assertiveness.

This article is based on the author’s presentation at the Southeast Asia Regional Geopolitical Update at the Australian National University, Canberra, on May 1, 2023.

GUEST AUTHOR

Jay Batongbacal

Professor Jay Batongbacal is the Director of the University of the Philippines’ Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea.

thediplomat.com · by Jay Batongbacal · June 9, 2023

8. 2 ASG bandits killed in Basilan skirmish

2 ASG bandits killed in Basilan skirmish

mb.com.ph · by Bonita Ermac

ILIGAN CITY – Two members of the Abu Sayyaf Group were killed in an encounter in Sumisip, Basilan on Tuesday, June 6.

Joint Task Force Basilan acting commander Col. Frederick Sales identified them as “Dodong,” a member of the Sulu-based Daulah Islamiyah-ASG under sub-leader Mudzrimar Sawadjaan, alias “Mundi,” and “Boy” under Basilan-based ASG under sub-leader Pasil Bayali, alias “Kera.”

Sales said a focused military operation was conducted by the Joint Task Force Basilan in Sitio Talisay, Barangay Upper Benembengan, Sumisip targeting Swadjaan and Bayali.

A clash broke out and the bodies of Dodong and Boy were recovered in a clearing operation in Barangay Pamatsaken, Sumisip.

Their bodies were turned over to the chairman of Barangay Upper Benembengan and Sumisip police for proper disposition.

The military said there is no letup in the campaign against the ASG.

“Your Armed Forces will not stop its military operations until the terror groups are completely crushed. We have highly motivated and committed forces currently deployed to eliminate the threats and secure the communities in Basilan,” Lt. Gen. Roy Galido, commander of the Western Mindanao Command, said.

Over the weekend, the military rescued an Indonesian teenager identified as the son of Jolo Cathedral suicide bomber, Abbang Rullie, from the clutches of Mundi in Sumisip.

mb.com.ph · by Bonita Ermac

9. Elite Army unit chief named AFP Special Ops commander

Elite Army unit chief named AFP Special Ops commander

malaya.com.ph · June 8, 2023

PRESIDENT Marcos Jr. has designated the head of an elite Army unit as the new commander of the AFP Special Operations Command.

Brig. Gen. Freddie Dela Cruz will succeed Maj. Gen. Arturo Rojas, who assumed command of the Philippine Marine Corps last month.

Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine Military Academy class of 1992, is the current commander of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR).

Before assuming his post as FSRR commander in October 2020, Dela Cruz was the deputy commander of the Presidential Security Group during the time of President Duterte.

Dela Cruz held various positions in the FSRR, including being the commander of the 4th Scout Ranger Battalion deployed in Mindanao and the 3rd Scout Ranger Company in Visayas.

After finishing a Scout Ranger course in the country during the early part of his military career, Dela Cruz passed the US Army Ranger Course in Fort Benning, Georgia.

He also holds a master’s degree in national security administration from the National Defense College of the Philippines.

The military has yet to announce Dela Cruz’s replacement as FSRR commander.

malaya.com.ph · June 8, 2023

10. Shadow Men: Inside Wagner, Russia’s Secret War Company

A 60 minute video at the link that is a fairly in depth look at Wagner.

https://www.wsj.com/video/series/shadow-men/shadow-men-inside-wagner-russias-secret-war-company/29735C37-0B4E-4E70-8E8C-C46FB711370C?mod=hp_lead_pos7

Shadow Men: Inside Wagner, Russia’s Secret War Company

WSJ reveals how the Russian private military company hides the flow of riches and resources that ultimately connect to the Kremlin

By Wall Street Journal

Jun 09, 2023 12:01 am

The Wagner Group began as a small clandestine force but has grown in recent years into a global war cartel run by Yevgeny Prigozhin, plundering gold and diamonds while advancing the Kremlin’s strategic interests and becoming the face of the Russian assault in Ukraine. Photo illustration: Xingpei Shen

11. How Putin’s War Became Russia’s War

Excerpts:

Putin’s brave liberal opponents are unlikely to rid Russia of its dark legacy.

Putin’s successors may attempt another détente with the West, but it is hard to imagine how they could succeed without the normalization of Russian-Ukrainian relations. This in turn must entail restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, reparations, and meaningful steps toward reconciliation, including admission of and punishment for war crimes—a tall order indeed.

Putin’s brave liberal opponents are unlikely to rid Russia of its dark legacy. They are few in number and mostly in exile; even if they somehow came to power, they would have to struggle against public inertia and an entrenched elite complicit in Putin’s crimes. The average Russian is unlikely to support such a painful reckoning: By the time Putin leaves the scene, many Russians will have participated in one way or another in this war. At best, soldiers who fought against Ukraine will likely assert that they were only following orders. Moreover, a surprisingly large swathe of Russian society accepts the regime’s justification that the war is necessary to push back against Western encirclement.

Rumors of Putin’s imminent departure from the political stage have been circulating for a long time. Those betting on his ill health have been disappointed many times. With a captive—or loyal—elite, a docile public, and a competent economic team managing the country’s vast resources, he may remain at the helm for another 10, 15, or even 20 years. The question is then how to deal with Putin’s rogue Russia. It will remain dangerous, waging war against Ukraine, using nerve agents to go after those the Kremlin considers its opponents, selling advanced technologies to other rogue regimes like those in Iran and North Korea, and deploying its cyberweapons indiscriminately. Protected by its nuclear shield and seat at the UN Security Council, it is immune to international condemnation or sanctions.

How to deal with this Russia will be a headache for the United States and its allies for years, possibly decades, to come. As to whether Putin’s heirs will be able or willing to fundamentally change course and begin to atone for his crimes—it is, at best, an open question.

How Putin’s War Became Russia’s War

The Country Will Struggle to Reckon With Its Crimes in Ukraine

By Eugene Rumer

June 9, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Eugene Rumer · June 9, 2023

Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine has become the defining event of his years in power. Even if he rules for another quarter century, Russia’s president will forever be considered a war criminal. But the consequences of the war are even more far-reaching: It promises to leave a stain on Russian society and politics that will remain even after Putin is gone.

The changes wrought by Putin over his decades in power have ensured that Russia will not suddenly emerge from his reign a changed country. He has co-opted the country’s elite, even its supposedly liberal wing, implicating them in Russia’s crimes in Ukraine. He has won the public’s support for the war, exploiting both society’s indifference and its nostalgia for Russia’s imperial history. And he has poisoned Russia’s relationship with the West in ways that any successor will struggle to reverse.

By making Russian society complicit in the war, Putin has forestalled the possibility of a dramatic break with his rule—even after he exits the political stage. And he has created a vexing problem for the United States and its allies, one that is no less challenging than the issue of how to contend with China.

THE ELITE

It is hard to see past Putin when thinking about Russia. Responsibility lies directly on his shoulders for both the brutal war against Ukraine and a reign of terror at home, the likes of which Russia has not seen since the days of Joseph Stalin. Who could disagree with U.S. President Joe Biden when he exclaimed during a visit to Poland shortly after the start of the Russian onslaught against Ukraine, “for God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power”?

But the problem is not just Putin. His rule has shaped the country’s elite and its public in ways that are bound to influence Russia’s course even after his rule ends.

Many of the elite who surround and support Putin belong to a cohort of so-called syslibs, as they are known in Russia, short for system liberals. Many of them got their start working on economic reforms during the country’s liberal phase in the 1990s. They are competent managers who have been co-opted by the Kremlin; they understand the nature of Putin’s system but do not challenge it. Instead, they apply their impressive professional skills to guide the Russian economy, making it possible for the regime to survive and continue on its destructive course.

Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina, for instance, played a central role in steering Russia through the economic turbulence in 2014. During that period, the price of oil collapsed, the West imposed sanctions on Russia for the annexation of Crimea, and the ruble lost more than half its value against the dollar. In 2018, she was invited to Washington to give a major address at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where she was introduced by then IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde and shared insights about taming inflation. Now, she enables Putin’s war by trying to insulate Russia from the effects of Western sanctions. In the future, she will probably be likened to Albert Speer, Hitler’s favorite architect, who helped keep the Nazi war machine humming.

Some members of Putin’s elite remain at their posts because they fear being arrested.

A handful of these figures, like the 1990s “privatization tsar” Anatoly Chubais, have managed to go abroad. But the overwhelming majority remain on the job. Former finance and deputy prime minister Alexei Kudrin, honored by Euromoney magazine as “finance minister of the year” at the 2010 IMF/World Bank meeting, stepped down from a senior government post only late last year. But this was no protest resignation: Kudrin then took charge of restructuring Russian tech giant Yandex, with Putin’s blessing, after it was hit by Western sanctions.

Other figures have moved beyond economic issues to become eager enforcers of Putin’s imperial vision. The story of Sergey Kiriyenko, Putin’s deputy chief of staff, is particularly instructive: Kiriyenko briefly served as Russia’s prime minister in 1998 and is a one-time close associate of liberal opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, who was killed within sight of the Kremlin in 2015. But starting in 2000, he allied himself with Putin and is now one of the most influential officials in the Kremlin. He holds a seemingly ever-expanding range of responsibilities, including overseeing much of the Kremlin’s propaganda and messaging, and helps lead the mass brainwashing of the Russian people to support the Ukraine war and the ongoing crackdown on what little remains of liberal civil society. Dubbed “the Viceroy” of the occupied parts of Ukraine, he travels there on Putin’s behalf to oversee their integration into Russia.

Some members of Putin’s elite remain at their posts because they fear being arrested and branded a traitor, or claim that they are standing in the way of even more destructive policies. Some even see themselves as victims of Western sanctions unfairly targeting them. They may even despise Putin—but whatever their private justifications, they serve him.

Why does this Russian elite cling ever more tightly to Putin, even if few believe in his cause? These well-traveled, highly educated professionals probably realize that they have tied their fortunes to a sinking ship but they cannot jump. The scale of Putin’s crimes has exceeded anything they could have imagined. They must know that, in the eyes of the world, Putin is not the sole perpetrator of these crimes. They are directly implicated in them, too.

THE PUBLIC

The Russian public also has acquiesced to Putin’s war. According to the Levada Center, the only surviving independent Russian polling firm, 43 percent of those surveyed in May “definitely” supported and 33 percent “supported rather than not” the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine. Furthermore, 48 percent favored continuing the war, while slightly fewer—45 percent—were in favor of negotiations with Ukraine. Putin’s approval rating was 82 percent.

Although there are questions about the reliability of opinion surveys in Putin’s Russia, this data has been largely consistent over the course of the war. Most Russians have not experienced drastic economic setbacks because of the conflict, and even the partial mobilization announced in September 2022 has had little effect on public attitudes.

While it is true that all antiwar protests have been put down swiftly and brutally, there have been few attempts to even organize demonstrations in Russia since the war began. Some of the protests that have occurred were driven not by anger at the invasion itself but to express frustration at inadequate training, lack of equipment, and poor treatment of conscripts.

Phantom pains of the old empire help explain Russians’ enthusiasm for the “return” of Crimea in 2014.

This reaction represents a vivid reminder that the imperial legacy lives on in Russian society. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, Russian leaders never made a principled case for relinquishing the country’s empire. Instead, they exploited the notion of Russia as a victim of its imperial holdings for their own political goals. This ploy was the surest path to power for Boris Yeltsin, the leader of Russia, in his contest with Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union.

But after Yeltsin’s supporters won that contest, they once again embraced the idea of empire. The same politicians adopted neoimperialist slogans and claimed special rights for Russia in the former Soviet Union, especially with respect to Crimea. Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow who for much of the 1990s was considered a likely successor to Yeltsin, was one of the early supporters of returning Crimea to Russia; his inflammatory comments on the subject repeatedly triggered crises in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Luzhkov, along with other Russian politicians, appealed to the peninsula’s large Russian-speaking population and exploited its legacy as the site of some of the bloodiest battles in the Crimean War and World War II.

These phantom pains of the old empire help explain Russians’ enthusiasm for the “return” of Crimea in 2014, their continuing support for Putin, and their acquiescence to his war. Yeltsin’s failure to denounce Russia’s imperial legacy once and for all left the idea of imperial restoration lingering in the chaotic 1990s. And when Russia regained some of its strength on Putin’s watch, the neoimperial project acquired new momentum. The national security establishment, like Putin, is drawn from the ranks of the old Soviet security apparatus and resented what it saw as the West’s encroachment on its “privileged” sphere of influence in the old empire.

THE SHADOW OF HISTORY

When Putin does leave power, it is unlikely that Russia’s elites and the general public will wake up and face the legacy of his rule. There are two twentieth-century precedents in Russian history for a de-Putinization campaign, and neither is encouraging. First, the Soviet Union attempted a de-Stalinization process after the dictator’s death in 1953. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev debunked Stalin’s “personality cult” in a 1956 speech to the leadership of the Communist Party and released millions who were lucky to survive Stalin’s labor camps. But Stalin’s reputation was partially restored as early as the 1960s in official Soviet propaganda, which praised him as the great leader who led the Soviet Union to victory in World War II.

Second, as the Soviet Union was nearing its collapse in 1991, Yeltsin banned the Communist Party. Gorbachev’s glasnost campaign had already exposed the legacy of its misrule—including the brutal collectivization of Russian peasantry, the millions who died from starvation in Ukraine, the suppression of basic freedoms—and it seemed its reputation could never be restored. Yet the party soon returned as a political force: it reconstituted itself in 1993 as the Communist Party of Russia, formed a powerful opposition faction in the Duma in the 1990s, fielded a candidate who won over 40 percent of the vote running against Yeltsin in the 1996 election, and survives to the present day. The party’s long-time leader, Gennady Zyuganov, endorsed Putin’s war against Ukraine, calling for the “demilitarization and denazification” of the country.

Putin’s war has become the war of all Russians. His legacy will remain part of their legacy, and it will continue to weigh heavily on their domestic affairs and the country’s relationship with the rest of the world.

Putin’s heirs may blame him for his failure, but that is not the same as admitting guilt and facing up to the responsibility that comes with it. If the past is any indication, they will probably follow in his footsteps. In the future, Putin may be likened to Tsar Nicholas I—a cruel autocrat who spent 30 years on the throne and died in 1855 during the Crimean War, which ended a year later with Russia suffering a humiliating defeat. His son, Alexander II, nicknamed the Liberator because he abolished serfdom, liberalized the press and rebuilt the military. But a few years later, he reimposed restrictions on the press. Then in 1870, he renounced the terms of the settlement that had ended the Crimean War and in 1878, fought a war with Turkey that secured Bulgaria’s independence, and installed his nephew as its king.

Putin’s brave liberal opponents are unlikely to rid Russia of its dark legacy.

Putin’s successors may attempt another détente with the West, but it is hard to imagine how they could succeed without the normalization of Russian-Ukrainian relations. This in turn must entail restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, reparations, and meaningful steps toward reconciliation, including admission of and punishment for war crimes—a tall order indeed.

Putin’s brave liberal opponents are unlikely to rid Russia of its dark legacy. They are few in number and mostly in exile; even if they somehow came to power, they would have to struggle against public inertia and an entrenched elite complicit in Putin’s crimes. The average Russian is unlikely to support such a painful reckoning: By the time Putin leaves the scene, many Russians will have participated in one way or another in this war. At best, soldiers who fought against Ukraine will likely assert that they were only following orders. Moreover, a surprisingly large swathe of Russian society accepts the regime’s justification that the war is necessary to push back against Western encirclement.

Rumors of Putin’s imminent departure from the political stage have been circulating for a long time. Those betting on his ill health have been disappointed many times. With a captive—or loyal—elite, a docile public, and a competent economic team managing the country’s vast resources, he may remain at the helm for another 10, 15, or even 20 years. The question is then how to deal with Putin’s rogue Russia. It will remain dangerous, waging war against Ukraine, using nerve agents to go after those the Kremlin considers its opponents, selling advanced technologies to other rogue regimes like those in Iran and North Korea, and deploying its cyberweapons indiscriminately. Protected by its nuclear shield and seat at the UN Security Council, it is immune to international condemnation or sanctions.

How to deal with this Russia will be a headache for the United States and its allies for years, possibly decades, to come. As to whether Putin’s heirs will be able or willing to fundamentally change course and begin to atone for his crimes—it is, at best, an open question.

• EUGENE RUMER is the Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia.
• MORE BY EUGENE RUMER

Foreign Affairs · by Eugene Rumer · June 9, 2023

12. I’m an AI expert: Here’s my worst-case scenario

Excerpts:

There seems to be a lack of published evidence to conclude that a less intelligent agent can indefinitely maintain control over a more intelligent agent. As we develop intelligent systems that are less intelligent than we are, we can maintain control, but once such systems become more intelligent than we are, we lose that ability.

Moreover, the problem of controlling such more capable intelligences only becomes more challenging and more obviously impossible for agents with only a static level of intelligence. Currently, it appears that our ability to produce intelligent software far outstrips our ability to control or even verify it.

Instead of asking “What can AI do for us?” we should be asking “What can AI do to us?”

I’m an AI expert: Here’s my worst-case scenario

BY ROMAN V. YAMPOLSKIY, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 06/11/23 8:00 AM ET

The Hill · · June 11, 2023

Rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) over the past decade have been accompanied by several high-profile failures, highlighting the importance of ensuring that intelligent machines are beneficial to humanity. This realization has given rise to the new subfield of research known as AI safety and security, which encompasses a wide range of research areas and has seen a steady growth in publications in recent years.

The underlying assumption in this research is that the problem of controlling highly capable intelligent machines is solvable. But no rigorous mathematical proof or argumentation has been presented to demonstrate that the AI control problem is solvable in principle, let alone in practice. In computer science, it is standard to first determine whether a problem belongs to a class of “unsolvable” problems before investing resources in trying to solve it.

Despite the recognition that the problem of AI control may be one of the most important problems facing humanity, it remains poorly understood, poorly defined and poorly researched. A computer science problem could be either solvable, unsolvable, undecidable or partially solvable. But we don’t know the actual status of the AI control problem. It is possible that some forms of control may be possible in certain situations, but it is also possible that partial control may be insufficient in many cases. Without a better understanding of the nature and feasibility of the AI control problem, it is difficult to determine an appropriate course of action.

The AI control problem

We define the problem of AI control as: How can humanity remain safely in control while benefiting from a superior form of intelligence? This is the fundamental problem in the field of AI safety and security, which aims to make intelligent systems safe from tampering and secure for all stakeholders involved.

Value alignment is the most studied approach to achieve security in AI. However, concepts such as “safety” and “security” are notoriously difficult to test or measure accurately, even for non-AI software, despite years of research. At best, we can probably distinguish between “perfectly safe” and “as safe as an average person performing a similar task.”

However, society is unlikely to tolerate machine errors, even if they occur with a frequency typical of human performance or less frequently. We expect machines to perform better and will not accept partial safety when dealing with such highly capable systems. The impact of AI (both positive and negative) is strongly related to its capability. With respect to possible existential impacts, there is no such thing as partial safety.

An initial understanding of the control problem may suggest designing a machine that accurately follows human commands. However, because of possible conflicting or paradoxical commands, ambiguity of human languages and perverse instantiation problems, this is not a desirable form of control (although some ability to integrate human feedback may be desirable). The solution is thought to require AI to act in the capacity of an ideal advisor, avoiding the problems of misinterpretation of direct commands and the possibility of malevolent commands.

Some argue that the consequences of an uncontrolled AI could be so severe (everyone is killed, or worse, everyone lives forever but is tortured) that even if there is a very small chance of a hostile AI emerging, it is still worthwhile to conduct AI safety research because the negative utility of such an AI would be astronomical. The common logic is that an extremely high (negative) utility multiplied by a small chance of the event still results in a large disutility and should be taken very seriously. But the chances of a misaligned AI are not small. In fact, in the absence of an effective safety program, that is the only outcome we will get.

The statistics therefore look very compelling in support of a major AI safety effort. We are looking at an almost guaranteed event with the potential to cause an existential catastrophe. This is not a low-risk, high-reward scenario, but a high-risk, negative-reward situation. No wonder many consider this to be the most important problem humanity has ever faced!

The outcome could be prosperity or extinction, and the fate of the universe hangs in the balance. A proof of the solvability or non-solvability of the AI control problem would be the most important proof ever.

Obstacles to controlling AI

Controlling an artificial general intelligence (AGI) is likely to require a toolbox with certain capabilities, such as explainability, predictability and model verifiability. But it is likely that many of the desired tools are not available to us.

• The concept of “unexplainability” in AI refers to the impossibility of providing an explanation for certain decisions made by an intelligent system that is 100 percent accurate and understandable. A complementary concept to unexplainability, incomprehensibility of AI, addresses the inability of people to fully understand an explanation provided by an AI.
• “Unpredictability” of AI, one of the many impossibility outcomes in AI safety, also known as unknowability, is defined as our inability to accurately and consistently predict what specific actions an intelligent system will take to achieve its goals, even if we know the ultimate goals of the system.
• “Non-verifiability” is a fundamental limitation in the verification of mathematical proofs, computer software, intelligent agent behavior and all formal systems. It is becoming increasingly obvious that just as we can only have probabilistic confidence in the correctness of mathematical proofs and software implementations, our ability to verify intelligent agents is at best limited.

Trump and DeSantis race to the bottom The debt ceiling deal ignored the real problem

Many researchers assume that the problem of AI control can be solved despite the absence of any evidence or proof. Before embarking on a quest to build controlled AI, it is important to demonstrate that the problem can be solved so as not to waste valuable resources.

The burden of proof is on those who claim that the problem is solvable, and the current absence of such proof speaks loudly about the inherent dangers of the proposal to develop AGI. In fact, uncontrollability of AI is very likely to be the case, as can be demonstrated by reduction to the problem of human control.

There are many open questions to consider regarding the issue of controllability, such as: Can the control problem be solved? Can it be done in principle? Can it be done in practice? Can it be done with a sufficient level of accuracy? How long would it take to do it? Can it be done in time? What are the energy and computational requirements to do it?

There seems to be a lack of published evidence to conclude that a less intelligent agent can indefinitely maintain control over a more intelligent agent. As we develop intelligent systems that are less intelligent than we are, we can maintain control, but once such systems become more intelligent than we are, we lose that ability.

Moreover, the problem of controlling such more capable intelligences only becomes more challenging and more obviously impossible for agents with only a static level of intelligence. Currently, it appears that our ability to produce intelligent software far outstrips our ability to control or even verify it.

Instead of asking “What can AI do for us?” we should be asking “What can AI do to us?”

Dr. Roman V. Yampolskiy is a tenured faculty member in the department of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Louisville. He is the founding and current director of the Cyber Security Lab and an author of many books, including “Artificial Superintelligence: A Futuristic Approach.”

The Hill · b· June 11, 2023

13. Why Not a Pacific NATO?

I was going to start off with the snarky comment of southern charm and say to this young student, "Well bless his heart" because we all know Asia is not the same as Europe at that we have proposed various treaty organizations, not only SEATO as mentioned in the article, but also CENTO and the Northeast Asia Treaty Organization (NEATO) and none became significantly viable organizations. But he is right that circumstances have changed. It has long been conventional wisdom that due to the vast security, cultural, and historical differences in Asia the same level of unity could never be achieved as in Europe. Not only have security conditions changed with the rise of China, we are seeing more and more international arrangements being established not only in Asia: QUAD, AUKUS, And other Quads being considered (e.g., US, Australia, Japan, and Philippines) and the speculation about "QUINTs," as well as NATO Asia cooperation (e.g., with Japan and the ROK). Maybe Asian nations are becoming more amenable to new security arrangements that could be turned into treaty organizations. But while we have always thought it would be Asian nations who would not agree to such treaty organizations, I doubt we could get Senate approval for the uS to be a member of another treaty organization. It is the US that will likely be the roadblock to such an organization. I would personally like to see us try again with NEATO - The Northeast Asia Treaty Organization (NEATO) was a proposed international organization for collective defense in Northeast Asia. It would have comprised the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Instead we went with the San Francisco system or the hub and spoke system of bilateral alliances.

But to close with a snarky comment I would like to see NEATO established so we could pronounce NEATO as "neat o" (as in the 60s hip term of "neato" meaning nice or sharp) and have a" neato" NATO in Northeast Asia.

Why Not a Pacific NATO?

https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/06/why-not-a-pacific-nato/

By SCOTT HOWARD

   June 11, 2023 6:30 AM

If the U.S. is to maintain its position as defender of the free world, resurrecting some version of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization could provide it.

In this pact, we hope to create a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression — a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens.

On April 4, 1949, President Harry Truman addressed a crowd of foreign dignitaries in the Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium in Washington, D.C. The subject of his speech was momentous: the founding of NATO in the face of the USSR. The nations of a region wracked with conflict and the long shadow of the communist threat banded together (under the American security umbrella) to stave off the possibility of yet another continent-wide war. Seventy-four years later, the Soviet threat is gone, but the preeminence of NATO has not subsided. As Russia attempts to actualize its imperial fantasies in eastern Ukraine, the NATO bulwark continues to guarantee the safety of 29 European countries. Truman’s bold vision and resolve to forge an alliance between states that had historically been adversaries guaranteed peace in a region of the world that had only ever known war.

Today, a similar threat faces a region with a history just as rich in conflict. Despite the pronouncements of the current administration, a vision just as bold and far-reaching as Truman’s is needed to stave off the threat.

Last Friday, Defense secretary Lloyd Austin spoke to the media in Singapore as part of the Shangri-La Dialogue, a yearly intergovernmental security summit. Responding to a question from one of the reporters regarding European involvement in the region, he opined that the United States is “not trying to create a NATO in the Indo-Pacific.” In response to the next question, regarding tension between ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Nations) and the Quad (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) about regional defenses, he stated once again that a Pacific NATO was not in the cards for the current administration. At the Shangri-La Dialogue conference last year he made the same claim, declaring that the U.S. does not seek an “Asian NATO.” The latest statements come as Chinese officials warn against the formation of such an organization. The thought process of the current administration seems to be that forming a NATO-like alliance in the Indo-Pacific would affront the People’s Republic of China and so should be taken off the table.

If that sounds similar to the Vladimir Putin argument that “NATO made me do it,” it should. The argument that Chinese warnings should deter the United States from forging a regional military alliance in the Pacific underestimates the Chinese threat and places American security second to our adversary’s desires. The question that policy-makers in Washington should ask is not what the Chinese would think but what the benefits of such an alliance would be. The answer is the same today as it was in Europe post–World War II. So why not a Pacific NATO?

Though it has been lost to the average history book, such an organization once existed. Founded in 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (colloquially called SEATO) was constructed on the same premises as was its Atlantic counterpart. The lack of a clear regional threat and internal conflict related to the Vietnam War tore the organization apart, and in 1977 it dissolved. Circumstances have changed since then. China represents a greater threat than it once did, and the internal conflicts that once plagued its member states have subsided. The existence of ASEAN shows that a framework for cooperation between the smaller states of the southeast Pacific is possible. The United States already maintains a number of bilateral and trilateral treaty alliances in the region. The foundations for a region-encompassing defense treaty exist; what is missing is the initiative to craft one with the express purpose of hedging against Chinese aggression.

Recent events in Europe also suggest that the United States should look toward a broader alliance for defending the Indo-Pacific. The war in Ukraine has been discussed and covered in great detail elsewhere in National Review. So, too, have the attitudes of Emmanuel Macron and other European leaders when it comes to the Chinese question. A recent survey suggests that the average European may be more inclined to follow Macron’s lead on China than not. If that is the case, the United States will by necessity need to look elsewhere for support.

And we will need to look for support. A flurry of reports over the past two years indicates that U.S. military capabilities may not be up to the challenge of confronting China alone. Private analysis of arsenal reserves indicates serious problems with American munition-replacement capabilities. An article in December in the magazine National Defense had this to say:

According to the Defense Department, in the six months from March to September, the United States supplied Ukraine with more than 800,000 155mm artillery rounds. From Sept. 28 to Oct. 28, it donated another 100,000 rounds. The September production capacity, meanwhile, was only 14,400 rounds per month. While the exact number of 155mm artillery rounds the United States possesses is unknown, this gap between utilization and production will significantly deplete its reserves over time.

This is just one example of the problem. In March, Foreign Affairs wrote in great detail about a potential munitions crisis in a conflict with China. An essay published by the Naval Institute last August suggests similar issues. In its 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, the Heritage Foundation predicted that the United States military “would probably not be able to do more and is certainly ill-equipped to handle two nearly simultaneous MRCs,” or major regional contingencies, such as the war in Ukraine alongside a potential conflict in Taiwan. The same report makes note of our lack of a unified defense organization in the Indo-Pacific region: “The complicated nature of intra-Asian relations and the lack of an integrated, regional security architecture along the lines of NATO make defense of U.S. security interests more challenging than many Americans appreciate.”

All of this comes before mentioning that, without changes, the recent budget agreement would amount to slight defense-spending cuts in real dollars due to inflationary pressures. As the United States sorts out its domestic position, it will need cover, and resurrecting some version of SEATO could provide it. If the United States wishes to maintain its position as leader and defender of the free world over the coming decades, it will need to act decisively in the face of current threats. Like the Soviet Union in 1949, China today is an existential threat to peace, both in the Indo-Pacific region and across the globe. The enemy has changed, but the circumstances are very similar.

SCOTT HOWARD, a student at the University of Florida, is a summer intern at National Review.

14. Russia’s defence chief signs order, forcing all mercenary companies to sign contract with ministry by 1 July

​I defer to the Russian experts to assess the implications of this action. (or even if this is an accurate report). Since it says "all' mercenary companies, it makes me wonder how many there are in Russia?

Russia’s defence chief signs order, forcing all mercenary companies to sign contract with ministry by 1 July

novayagazeta.eu

Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu has approved an order that forces all “volunteer units” to sign contracts with the Defence Ministry by 1 July, the ministry announced on its website.

The formations in question are not specified in the statement but the defence agency has repeatedly referred to private military company mercenaries as “volunteers”.

According to Russia’s Deputy Defence Minister Nikolay Pankov, the move will give them “the necessary legal status, create unified approaches to organising comprehensive provisions and fulfilment of tasks”.

At the same time, the “volunteers” can choose between signing direct contracts with these units or the Defence Ministry.

“The order grants the right to all volunteers to sign individual contracts with volunteer formations or the Defence Ministry as contract service members,” Pankov said.

He added that “these measures will make it possible to boost combat capabilities and effectiveness of the [Russian] armed forces and volunteer units included in them”.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the mercenary Wagner Group, rejected the order, saying that his company won’t sign it.

“The orders that Shoigu gives are mandatory for the Defence Ministry staffers and service members. The Wagner Group will not sign any contracts with Shoigu. The fact that he drafts orders is only relevant for the Defence Ministry and all those in its framework,” Prigozhin noted.

At the same time, he stressed that his “private military company is fully compliant with interests of Russia and the commander-in-chief” and “coordinates all its actions with Army General [Sergey] Surovikin and completes the tasks he sets out”.

novayagazeta.eu​

15. US Army’s new combat vehicle named for soldiers killed in Iraq, WWII

The M10 Booker combat vehicle. I like it. It sounds good and it is pretty cool that it honors two soldiers from different eras.

US Army’s new combat vehicle named for soldiers killed in Iraq, WWII

Defense News · by Jen Judson · June 10, 2023

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army has named its first new combat vehicle in nearly four decades the M10 Booker after two soldiers killed in action, one in the Iraq War and the other in World War II.

Staff Sgt. Stevon A. Booker was killed April 5, 2003, during the so-called thunder run in Baghdad, Iraq. Pvt. Robert D. Booker was killed under heavy machine gunfire in Tunisia on April 9, 1943, during WWII.

Stevon Booker was a tanker and Robert Booker was in the infantry. Robert was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, and Stevon was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

The M10, now formerly known as the Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle, is the first combat vehicle named after someone who served in post-9/11 combat.

The stories of the two soldiers “articulate the Army’s exact needs for the M10 Booker combat vehicle,” service acquisition chief Doug Bush said June 8. “Our soldiers will now have an infantry assault vehicle that brings a new level of lethality to our ground forces and allows our men and women in uniform to move at a faster pace under greater protection.”

Stevon, a tank commander serving under Task Force 1-64 company commander Capt. Andrew Hilmes, was killed by enemy machine gun fire during the first thunder run up Highway 8 leading to the Baghdad International airport.

When both of the tank’s machine guns failed, Stevon laid down on top of the tank’s turret and fired at enemy forces with his own weapon, destroying an enemy troop carrier as it attempted to pass the tank. He continued to fire his weapon along an 8-kilometer route until he was mortally wounded.

Robert was killed as he advanced through mortar and artillery fire with a machine gun, suppressing fire and destroying other machine gun positions before he was fatally wounded, Maj. Gen. Glenn Dean, the service’s program executive officer for Ground Combat Systems, said on June 8.

“That is the mission that the M10 Booker is designed to fulfill on behalf of and in support of the infantry,” Dean said. “So having an armored and infantry is a particularly compelling name.”

While it might seem unusual to name the vehicle after two people, Dean noted, the Stryker combat vehicle was named for two soldiers — both Medal of Honor recipients — serving in the Vietnam War and WWII.

The vehicle

The M10 Booker is “an armored vehicle that is intended to support our infantry brigade combat teams by suppressing and destroying fortifications, gun systems, entrenchments and secondarily then providing protection against enemy armored vehicles,” Dean added.

General Dynamics Land Systems, which won the competition to provide the M10 to the Army in June 2022, will deliver the first of the vehicles in November this year.

The system features a new chassis design, while drawing from other GDLS programs to reduce risk, Kevin Vernagus, company program director for the Mobile Protected Firepower system, told Defense News in October 2022.

The turret is also “largely new and with different materials than normal” he added, but “we still retain the interior look, feel and controls similar to an Abrams” main battle tank.

The Army has named its new Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle the M10 Booker after two soldiers of the same name. (Courtesy of the U.S. Army)

GDLS will initially deliver 26 vehicles, but the contract allows the Army to buy 70 more over the course of low-rate initial production for a total of $1.14 billion. At least eight of the 12 prototypes used during competitive evaluation will be retrofitted for fielding to the force.

The Army will create a new battalion for the first unit of M10s — 42 vehicles — by the fourth quarter of fiscal 2025, Dean said. The Army plans to enter full-rate production in calendar 2025.

Prior to fielding, the Army will perform initial operational tests for the vehicle in late 2024 or early 2025, Dean said.

The Army expects to spend about $6 billion on Mobile Protected Firepower vehicles through the procurement phase, including what it has already spent on research, development and prototyping efforts. The total life-cycle cost of the program, including sustainment, military construction and personnel, is estimated at $17 billion.

The Army plans to buy 504 vehicles, which are projected to be in the inventory for at least 30 years. The bulk of procurement should conclude by 2035, Dean has said. The procurement unit cost is estimated to be around $12.9 million, which includes spares, training and fielding.

To win the M10 contract over competitor BAE Systems, GDLS had to deliver 12 prototypes to the service for routine evaluation as well as to soldiers in the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, now called Fort Liberty. The soldiers extensively assessed the operational qualities and characteristics of both offerings, then provided feedback to Army decision-makers.

The vehicle experienced issues in testing and evaluation, including toxic fumes generated when firing the main gun and overheating. Dean said both of those issues are resolved.

The company also improved sealing around hatches and enhanced armor coverage, GDLS told Defense News last year.

The M10 turrets will be manufactured at the Joint Systems Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio, where M1 Abrams tanks are made. The hulls will be made in Michigan, the gun tubes at Watervliet Arsenal, New York, and vehicle assembly in Anniston Army Depot, Alabama.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

16. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons Explained: How Do They Work?

The threat most of us in the public rarely think about.

Rather than blast effects (heat and force) and radiation effects as the big killer from nuclear us, when EMP takes away all the electricity we need to survive we are going to see societies disintegrate as we shift back to the concept of the survival of the fittest. More deaths may occur over time by human "competition" for food and other essential resources etc as human beings resort to fighting each other if essential services cannot be restored in short order after an EMP attack. I know the jury is still out for some on the feasibility of an EMP attack and the lasting effects and the resilience of civil society. But others are trying to warn us of the catastrophic effects. And the costs of hardening against such attacks are prohibitive (until one happens and then we would wish we would have invested in protection).

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons Explained: How Do They Work? - SlashGear

slashgear.com · by David Rossiaky · June 10, 2023

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons Explained: How Do They Work?

Dima Zel/Shutterstock

By /June 10, 2023 12:00 pm EST

Today, not many people may be familiar with a U.S. military operation from the early 1960's called "Starfish Prime." The details are fascinating, but here's the short version: over a remote National Wildlife Refuge in the Pacific Ocean, they launched a 1.4 megaton thermonuclear warhead and detonated it at roughly the altitude where today the ISS orbits the Earth (of course, the ISS wasn't built yet, but many early satellites sustained damage).

Close to 1,000 miles away, people in Hawaii experienced telephone disruptions as hundreds of street lights went out and other electrical systems behaved erratically. The U.S. had inadvertently attacked itself with an electromagnetic pulse, or "EMP."

It was an important learning moment. Nuclear weapons create an EMP, but with conventional use, the area affected by the pulse would also be immediately destroyed by the explosive blast. Starfish Prime demonstrated that a high-altitude nuclear device could create an EMP with a tremendous area of affect, and — crucially — without decimating a populated area in the process.

Two significant things have happened in the decades since: First, the world has become increasingly reliant on electronic devices. Second, researchers have figured out how to create an EMP without using a nuclear weapon at all. So how does it all work?

The breakdown of an EMP

Mmac72/Getty Images

Electromagnetism is a single force responsible for phenomena including electric charge and the push-and-pull of magnets. In simple terms, the flow of electricity can generate a magnetic field, and a changing magnetic field can generate an electric current. An EMP is essentially a very powerful and directed magnetic field that passes over an area. As it passes, it interacts with conductive materials and causes short-circuits and power surges.

Many things can be included under the umbrella of "conductive materials." Semiconductors are an obvious example. These chips — which are critical for controlling everything from phones and cars, to guided missiles and the power grid — have grown ever smaller, relying on thinner and more delicate precision components to function. An EMP can overwhelm these components, destroying them outright.

Other conductive materials of import may be less obvious. Buried critical infrastructure like power lines, pipes, and conduit can all become charged from an EMP. This charge will then flow down the path of least resistance until its fully discharged, which could mean overloading things like generators that weren't even within the range of the EMP blast radius.

While there are ways to shield against an EMP blast, these methods are generally expensive, impractical, or both for most everyday applications. Even though EMP weapons are sometimes touted as non-destructive and non-lethal alternatives, the reality is that the chaos they would unleash — hospitals without electricity, no traffic lights, midflight loss of airplane controls — would be devastating.

How is an EMP generated?

Song_about_summer/Shutterstock

The first EMP weapons were nuclear weapons, with the pulse being more of a side effect than the main purpose. When a nuclear device detonates, it generates — among other things — an incredible amount of high-energy radiation called gamma rays. These energetic waves fly outward from the blast and start knocking the electrons off of the air molecules in the surrounding atmosphere. This ionized bubble of air then generates a powerful magnetic pulse that shoots away at lightspeed, causing havoc on electronics.

A non-nuclear EMP can be a much smaller device, as it does away with the gamma radiation and the ionizing of the atmosphere. Instead, picture a closed metal tube with a stick of dynamite inside. Wrapped around the tube, but not touching it, are coiled wires with a constant electric current provided by capacitors. When the dynamite explodes, the pieces of the metal tube come into contact with the wires, interrupting the current.

Of course, the reality of a larger EMP is slightly more complicated, but when this detonation can be properly controlled and directed, it will result in an EMP blast. EMPs might sound like action blockbuster fare — they did appear in "GoldenEye" and "Ocean's Eleven" — but the science behind them is sound. Just like truck-mounted lasers, these sci-fi weapons are real, and they're devastating.

slashgear.com · by David Rossiaky · June 10, 2023

17. How the U.S. Patriot Missile Became a Hero of Ukraine War

Graphic sketches explaining the system are at the link below.

How the U.S. Patriot Missile Became a Hero of Ukraine War

Air-defense system is finally doing what it was designed for, 40 years later

By James MarsonFollow

, Doug CameronFollow

 and Ievgeniia Sivorka

June 11, 2023 9:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-patriot-missile-is-an-unsung-hero-of-ukraine-war-db6053a0?mod=hp_lead_pos9

KYIV, Ukraine—Around 3:30 a.m. one recent morning, more than a dozen Russian missiles flashed on the radar screens of the Ukrainian air-defense crew defending this capital city.

The missiles were coursing toward Kyiv, some as fast as six times the speed of sound and many heading directly for the crew’s missile battery.

The Ukrainians didn’t panic, their commander said in an interview. They didn’t have time.

But they did have a U.S.-made Patriot surface-to-air missile system, which days earlier had, for the first time, knocked down an ultrafast Kinzhal ballistic missile. Also known as the Kh-47, the Kinzhal is one of Russia’s most advanced weapons.

Early that morning, May 16, the Patriot’s radar detected the missiles, including six Kinzhals, at a distance of about 125 miles. The system’s computer tracked the missiles and launched interceptors, destroying all of them, the last at a distance of about 9 miles—seconds before impact.

“No one was 100% sure that the Patriot was capable of destroying a Kh-47 hypersonic missile,” said Col. Serhiy Yaremenko, commander of the 96th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, which defends Kyiv. “Ukrainians proved it.”

Forty years after it was brought into service, the Patriot air-defense system is finally doing what it was designed for. It is destroying incoming missiles and other aerial threats in Europe and proving indispensable to the Ukrainian forces defending their ground troops, cities and critical infrastructure. 

Ukraine’s political and military leadership have lauded the system as the only one capable of tackling the threat from Russian ballistic missiles, which the Kremlin had boasted couldn’t be stopped. Combining the Patriot with other Western air-defense systems as well as Ukraine’s Soviet-era weapons, Ukraine is now fending off most aerial threats against Kyiv, from ballistic and cruise missiles to drones.

How the Patriot System Tracks and Intercepts Targets

RADAR

Radar detects and tracks missiles and other targets.

Radar sends data to remote Engagement Control Station.

ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION

1

2

Engagement Control Station (ECS) receives the data and sends it to the Patriot Launching Station.

Interceptor missile canister

Antenna

INTERCEPTOR

Interceptors are fired either manually or remotely from the ECS.

4

LAUNCHING STATION

Launching Station houses remote operating module, launcher and up to 16 interceptor missiles.

Launching Station receives targets’ location from ECS through the station’s antenna.

3

Note: Diagram isn’t to scale

Source: Army Recognition

Jemal R. Brinson and Peter Champelli/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The Ukraine conflict has proven a test bed for new weapons ranging from suicide drones to cyber jamming. But the Patriot and other veteran weapons such as antitank Javelin missiles and Stinger antiaircraft missiles have become must-haves for Ukraine. All are due to be replaced in the U.S. arsenal with new, more sophisticated versions now undergoing development and testing, easing the way for Washington to hand them off to Ukraine.

“We are the best promoter of the Patriot,” said Andriy Yermak, chief of staff to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Ukraine has two full Patriot systems, which include a launcher, radar and a control station. Zelensky recently told The Wall Street Journal that he wants more to protect critical infrastructure and civilians in cities across the country, as well as front-line troops vulnerable to Russia’s superior air power. 

Raytheon Technologies, the Patriot’s main contractor, is increasing production to 12 a year and plans to deliver five more to Ukraine by the end of next year, said Chief Executive Greg Hayes.

Col. Serhiy Yaremenko, commander of the 96th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, protecting Kyiv. PHOTO: OLEH ROHIV FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“We have been very surprised at its effectiveness,” said Hayes of the Patriot, which he said alongside other air-defense systems has intercepted as many as 90% of incoming threats in Ukraine. He said Ukraine has tweaked the Patriot’s software to enable it to track and destroy hypersonic missiles flying twice as fast as it was designed for. Yaremenko said officers in Ukraine’s partner countries have told him, “We are learning from you right now.”

Work on what became the Patriot began in earnest in the 1960s, when the Pentagon first awarded a contract to build an advanced air-defense system for the Army to use against Soviet attack. The program was almost canceled several times because of cost overruns and the technical challenge of, in essence, hitting a bullet with a bullet. It received its name—an acronym for Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept of Target—in the U.S. bicentennial year of 1976, and the U.S. military began using it in 1984 during the Cold War. 

In testing and combat, the Patriot has hit more targets than it missed, though it had a patchy record against Iraqi Scud missiles when deployed in combat during the Gulf War in 1991. The Patriot has been upgraded over the past 40 years, and Raytheon said the current iteration bears little resemblance to the original. 

The improvements boosted demand, especially among Gulf states including Qatar and Kuwait, and 18 countries operate the system or have them on order. New customers have to wait more than two years, Raytheon said. The U.S. deploys the system widely to protect its own forces overseas. 

Raytheon builds the Patriot’s core radar and targeting system in Andover, Mass. Lockheed Martin makes the interceptors fired by the Patriot at its plant in Camden, Ark. Aerojet Rocketdyne makes the interceptors’ engines.

Raytheon and Lockheed Martin are expanding their plants, part of a broader Pentagon effort to restock U.S. munitions stockpiles depleted by the war in Ukraine and meet fresh orders from other countries. Lockheed Martin is also turning to Patriot customers and users such as Poland to produce parts, said Brenda Davidson, vice president of the PAC-3 program. “Demand continues to increase,” she said.

The interceptors have been upgraded. Ukraine has both the PAC-2, which uses an explosive charge to down targets, and the PAC-3, which smashes the missile or aircraft at high speed.

M901 Launching Station

PAC-3 interceptors

Capacity: Four interceptor missiles to one canister

Length: 17 feet

Range: 25 miles

Altitude of fire: 12 miles

Launching station

Length: 34 feet

Width: 9 feet

Height: 5 feet

4 canisters

PAC-2 interceptor

Capacity: One interceptor missile to one canister

Length: 17 feet

Range: 99 miles

Altitude of fire: 16 miles

Launcher Electronics Module

Control and power center of the launcher

Datalink Terminal Module

Connects the launch station to remote Engagement Control Station

Note: Diagram is not to scale; PAC-3 specifications are for the CRI model

Sources: Center for Strategic and International Studies (station components); Army Recognition (station specifications); Military Today (interceptor specifications)

Jemal R. Brinson and Peter Champelli/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Raytheon has made around 240 Patriots, and Lockheed Martin has produced more than 4,500 PAC-3 interceptors.

A Patriot battery includes three main parts, sited on truck platforms: radars and their power generators, launchers carrying up to 16 missiles, and the engagement-control station that monitors the radar and provides target data. A Patriot battery is run by as many as 90 soldiers, but the control station can be operated in the field by as few as three.

The radar can monitor 120 degrees of sky and detect incoming threats more than 100 miles away at heights up to 30,000 feet. In a virtual instant, the computer calculates the incoming threat’s trajectory and aims and fires the interceptors, which can be steered in flight to the target.

AN/MSQ-104 Engagement Control Station

Only part of the Patriot system that

is staffed in the field

Computer, radio and data reception

and relay systems are inside the

truck

Speed: 40 mph

Length: 34 feet

Width: 9 feet

Height: 11 feet

Crew number

Source: Army Recognition

Jemal R. Brinson and Peter Champelli/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Each Patriot system costs about $1 billion and takes two years to build, while the interceptors run as high as $4 million apiece, according to Pentagon budget documents.

The interceptors’ cost and limited availability requires Ukraine’s operators to make careful choices. “What are you trying to shoot down?” said a former Patriot operator now working in the defense sector. 

While air-defense systems including Nasams and Hawk can take care of Russia’s low-flying cruise missiles and relatively inexpensive Iranian drones, Ukraine has struggled to counter ballistic missiles, which are initially powered by a rocket, then arc toward their target. The Kinzhal, or Dagger in Russian, is launched from an aircraft, making it harder to track.

AN/MPQ-65 Radar

Can relay tracking data on more than 100 targets to the Patriot system’s Engagement Control Station

Can detect aircraft up to 62 miles away and ballistic missiles more than 100 miles away

Source: Army Recognition

Jemal R. Brinson and Peter Champelli/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

To help tackle that threat, the U.S. and Germany pledged to send one Patriot system each, and the Netherlands promised to send two additional launchers.

Ukraine sent around 90 soldiers to the U.S. to train on the Patriot, in an accelerated 10-week program that the Army said was completed ahead of schedule. Typically training courses stretch from 16 weeks for fire-control operators and up to nine months for maintenance staff, defense executives said.

The Ukrainians immediately saw the advantage over their Soviet-era systems, said Yaremenko, including the Patriot’s greater level of automation and integration.

“If you buy a car from 1989 and then move to a car from 2020, you will probably feel a difference,” he said. “It’s a spaceship.”

Russian officials criticized the U.S. and allies on the decision to send Patriots, but said they wouldn’t be able to stop Russian missiles.

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed the Patriot in December as “quite an old system.”

“Fine, let them deliver it,” he told reporters. “We’ll smack the Patriot as well.”

The Patriots arrived in Ukraine in April, a few weeks after Russia launched a barrage of dozens of missiles, including six Kinzhals, at Ukraine. On May 4, the Ukrainians used a Patriot system to down a Kinzhal.

Yaremenko said his troops didn’t have time to celebrate, as Russia was launching almost nightly strikes aimed, in part, at exhausting Ukraine’s stocks of interceptor missiles.

Russia’s efforts are expensive, he said, as the cost of its missiles can run to millions of dollars each, and they are being intercepted before they hit their targets.

On Friday, the Biden administration announced a new, $2.1 billion arms package for Ukraine. At the top of the list: additional munitions for Ukraine’s Patriots.

Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com and Doug Cameron at Doug.Cameron@wsj.com

18. U.S. Tech Giants Are Slowly Cutting Off Hong Kong Internet Users

Excerpts:

Google, OpenAI and Microsoft declined to comment on why they restricted use in Hong Kong, but said they are working to bring their services to new locations in the future.  

A Monday hearing is scheduled for a court order sought by Hong Kong authorities to block the dissemination online of a popular pro-democracy anthem, “Glory to Hong Kong.” The order cites 32 videos on YouTube of the song, which has lyrics that the government says contain a slogan that amounts to advocating secession. It is the first major legal challenge to U.S. tech companies over politically sensitive content on their platforms in the city. 

The moves add to a slow creep of tech giants treating Hong Kong more like a city in mainland China. Apple AAPL 0.22%increase; green up pointing triangle has joined with China’s Tencent to filter suspicious websites, with users complaining it temporarily blocked access to legitimate sites such as Twitter rival Mastodon. Disney has declined to offer on its streaming service two episodes of “The Simpsons” that it worried could run afoul of the national-security law, according to a person familiar with the matter.

U.S. Tech Giants Are Slowly Cutting Off Hong Kong Internet Users

Google and OpenAI haven’t rolled out AI chatbots to city, putting it alongside mainland China and North Korea

By Newley PurnellFollow

June 11, 2023 8:30 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-tech-giants-are-slowly-cutting-off-hong-kong-internet-users-bd50cd8?

HONG KONG—Bit by bit, American tech giants are shutting out users in Hong Kong, where moves by authorities to thwart online dissent are shifting the target from individuals to platforms such as Google’s YouTube.

Alphabet GOOG 0.16%increase; green up pointing triangle-owned Google, San Francisco-based OpenAI and Microsoft MSFT 0.47%increase; green up pointing triangle have limited access to their artificial-intelligence chatbots in recent months in the global finance and business hub. In OpenAI’s case, the restriction puts Hong Kong and mainland China alongside North Korea, Syria and Iran.

While none of the companies have given reasons, observers say they could be exposed to risk if the chatbots spew out content that violates a national-security law imposed by China nearly three years ago. The law criminalizes many types of criticism of the government and Beijing. 

Google, OpenAI and Microsoft declined to comment on why they restricted use in Hong Kong, but said they are working to bring their services to new locations in the future.  

A Monday hearing is scheduled for a court order sought by Hong Kong authorities to block the dissemination online of a popular pro-democracy anthem, “Glory to Hong Kong.” The order cites 32 videos on YouTube of the song, which has lyrics that the government says contain a slogan that amounts to advocating secession. It is the first major legal challenge to U.S. tech companies over politically sensitive content on their platforms in the city. 

The moves add to a slow creep of tech giants treating Hong Kong more like a city in mainland China. Apple AAPL 0.22%increase; green up pointing triangle has joined with China’s Tencent to filter suspicious websites, with users complaining it temporarily blocked access to legitimate sites such as Twitter rival Mastodon. Disney has declined to offer on its streaming service two episodes of “The Simpsons” that it worried could run afoul of the national-security law, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Some fear that Hong Kong’s largely unfettered internet is being nudged closer to China’s, which is strictly censored by a system known as the Great Firewall and has had no access to foreign social-media services such as Twitter and Facebook since 2009. 

“We don’t have the Great Firewall yet, but companies aren’t offering their services,” said Heatherm Huang, co-founder of Hong Kong-based tech company Measurable AI, which analyzes online shopping data for financial firms. “Overall, it’s a sad story,” he said.

Some Hong Kong residents have been able to access the chatbots using special third-party apps or by using virtual private networks, known as VPNs, which allow consumers to shield their location and identity online.

A Hong Kong government spokeswoman said the government respects companies’ strategies for launching products and noted the chatbots could be accessed through alternative means, such as VPNs. 

While Hong Kong’s population of about 7.5 million means it isn’t a major market in terms of its user base for U.S. tech companies, foreign companies and workers often cite the free flow of information as one reason they are based here. Tens of thousands of workers have left the city over the past three years, in part because of the crackdown on free expression. 

A survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong released in March found that just 38% of respondents were optimistic or very optimistic about Hong Kong maintaining free access to the global internet and information platforms in the next three years.

iPhone maker Apple’s updated Safari privacy policy says it may use a tool by China’s Tencent to filter suspicious websites in Hong Kong. PHOTO: CANG HAI / CFOTO/ZUMA PRESS

The court injunction to block the pro-democracy anthem, if granted at the Monday hearing, could amount to the “opening of floodgates” of legal action against U.S. tech giants, said George Chen, former head of public policy for Greater China at Facebook parent Meta Platforms.

Google could be forced to comply with Hong Kong’s court order regarding the song, which would complicate its content moderation, said Chen, who is now managing director for Hong Kong and Taiwan at the Asia Group, a business advisory firm in Washington. 

Complying might risk angering Washington lawmakers who could accuse the company of bowing to censorship demands, he said. 

Google in 2010 withdrew its search-engine business in mainland China after refusing to agree to censor its search results in the country. 

AI companies may be concerned about their chatbots violating the national-security law, said Charles Mok, a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Cyber Policy Center and former Hong Kong lawmaker. That could happen if the chatbots give unexpected answers to questions, in ways that breach the rules, he said. 

Apple—which is reliant on China for iPhone manufacturing—has for years used a service from Google to show a warning to Safari browser users in Hong Kong and elsewhere when they clicked on links that could be malicious, such as those that might be designed for phishing scams.

The Cupertino, Calif., company updated its Safari privacy policy late last year to say it may also use Tencent’s tool to do the job in Hong Kong, as it does in the mainland. 

Users in Hong Kong in recent months have shared screenshots showing that Tencent’s service was flagging and blocking access to legitimate websites from the West. They included U.S. coding website GitLab, U.S. cryptocurrency exchange Coinbase and social-media service Mastodon. The sites were later made accessible.

“It is hard to imagine that this was a mistake and that the list will not grow in time,” said Benjamin Ismail from online censorship watchdog GreatFire.org. 

Apple didn’t respond to requests for comment. A Tencent spokeswoman said its system follows best practices for blocking malicious websites.

The two episodes of “The Simpsons” that Disney declined to air in Hong Kong on Disney+ touched on topics sensitive to Beijing. One episode referred to “forced labor camps” in China and the other referenced the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. 

Hong Kong’s move to censor the pro-democracy song on YouTube signals that U.S. tech companies should anticipate further challenges over sensitive content, Chen said.

“This time it is about the song, next time it could be something else,” he said.

Write to Newley Purnell at newley.purnell@wsj.com

19. Unofficial military accounts claim Ukraine has made gains in the east and south this weekend

Unofficial military accounts claim Ukraine has made gains in the east and south this weekend

CNN · June 11, 2023

1 hr 17 min ago

From CNN's Maria Kostenko and Andrew Carey

Ukrainian soldiers stand in front of a building with a Ukrainian flag, during an operation that claims to liberate the village of Blahodatne, in this screengrab taken from a handout video released on June 11. 68th Separate Hunting Brigade 'Oleksy Dovbusha'/Handout/Reuters

There are few reports from the battlefields between the southern Zaporizhzhia region and Donetsk in the east Sunday morning, but snippets from Russian journalists and propagandists suggest further Ukrainian advances.

The Rybar Telegram channel — one in a network of Russian pro-war military blogs that publish updates on Moscow's invasion — reports Ukrainian forces regained control of two villages south of the town of Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk, “almost without a fight.”

In the same area, the Wargonzo Telegram channel reports “certain tactical successes” for Ukraine’s forces in the same area. A couple miles further south, Rybar reports fighting around the village of Urozhaine.

Further west, there were consistent reports of very heavy Ukrainian artillery fire Saturday toward Russian positions south of Orikhiv, a battered southern town where Ukrainian forces have also stepped up activities over the last week.

Keep in mind: CNN is unable to independently verify battlefield reports.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense had not issued any detailed statements Sunday on the latest fighting, while Ukraine’s latest General Staff report said only that Russian forces in the area were carrying out defensive operations.

More background: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave his clearest indication yet on Saturday that Ukraine’s long-awaited push to liberate territory still held by Russia’s occupying forces is underway, saying “relevant counteroffensive defensive actions are taking place in Ukraine.”

Pushes along the front between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk are consistent with what is seen as a primary objective for Ukraine, which is to break the Russian "land bridge" to Crimea, by regaining control of the coastline of the Sea of Azov.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and has held it since.

2 hr 9 min ago

2 drones discovered in Russian region of Kaluga

From CNN’s Uliana Pavlova

Two drones crashed in the Russian region of Kaluga, which borders the Moscow region to the north, local governor Vladislav Shapsha said, adding there were no casualties.

Two drones fell in the same region earlier in the week, crashing onto a highway.

Officials in western Russia have reported more Ukrainian drone attacks and shelling in recent weeks as the war spreads beyond Ukraine's borders.

Kyiv has not commented on the claims.

Late last month, Russia blamed Ukraine for launching a drone attack on Moscow which left two people injured and several buildings damaged.

3 hr 25 min ago

Kakhovka dam collapse has made Black Sea a "garbage dump and animal cemetery," Ukraine warns

From CNN's Mariya Knight

An aerial view shows a flooded area in Kherson on Saturday. Inna Varenytsia/Reuters

Floodwaters are receding following the collapse of the Kakhovka dam, but debris washed along the Dnipro river is turning Odesa’s Black Sea coastline into “a garbage dump and animal cemetery,” according to Ukrainian authorities.

“A lot of mines, ammunition and other explosive objects are being carried into the sea and thrown onto the shoreline,” Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs said on its website at the weekend, adding that border guards had observed a “plague of fish” in the area.

“The Dnipro river flows into the Black Sea, bearing many signs of the devastation caused by Russians,” the ministry said.

“The consequences of ecocide are terrible,” it added.

The collapse of the dam in southern Ukraine on June 6 is one of the biggest industrial and ecological disasters in Europe for decades.

The catastrophe has destroyed entire villages, flooded farmland, deprived tens of thousands of people of power and clean water, and caused massive environmental damage.

But it’s still impossible to say whether it collapsed because it was deliberately targeted as part of Russia’s war in Ukraine or whether the breach could have been caused by structural failure.

Several Western officials have blamed the collapse of the Russian-occupied dam on Moscow.

Read the full story here.

2 hr 7 min ago

Day of mourning in Odesa after 3 killed and 26 injured in Russian aerial attack

From CNN's Maria Kostenko

A view shows an apartment building damaged during a Russian drone strike in Odesa on Saturday. Serhii Smolientsev/Reuters

Three people were killed and 26 injured in an aerial attack Friday in southern Ukrainian region of Odesa, according to the regional military administration there.

Oleh Kiper, the head of the regional military administration said on Sunday that overnight "the enemy attacked Odesa region with Shahed-136/131 attack UAVs. Air defense forces destroyed all the UAVs."

Kiper added that "Unfortunately, there were civilian casualties -- three people were killed and 26 others were injured, including 3 children. All were provided with medical aid; three remain in serious condition."

The wreckage of one of the drones hit a nine-storey apartment, causing a fire.

The aerial strikes caused damage in the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi district at night. The blast wave damaged residential buildings and injured 10 people.

Odesa's city municipality said in a statement that "A total of 290 apartments in 11 buildings were damaged by a blast wave as a result of a drone attack on Odesa on the night of June 10."

Odesa's Mayor Hennadii Trukhanov declared June 11 a day of mourning in the city of Odesa.

6 hr 27 min ago

Canada’s Trudeau announces his country will join efforts to train Ukrainian fighter pilots

From CNN's Mariya Knight

Zelensky and Trudeau attend a in Kyiv on Saturday. Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Reuters

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced during a visit to Kyiv Saturday that Canada will be part of multinational efforts to train Ukraine’s fighter pilots.

During a joint news conference with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky, Trudeau said the country will help "maintain and support Ukraine's fighter jet program, leveraging Canadian expertise in these areas."

Trudeau also announced that Canada will contribute to an initiative for the maintenance of Leopard battle tanks that Ukraine’s allies have provided to Kyiv.

“We will provide an additional 287 AIM-7 missiles, which will support Ukraine in its efforts to defend Ukrainian skies,” he added, referring to a type of medium-range air-to-air missile. “And from existing funds, we will provide 10,000 rounds of 105-millimeter ammunition to the Ukraine security forces."

Trudeau said an additional $500 million is being allocated as military funding.

On the dam collapse: The Canadian prime minister also commented on the disastrous flooding following a break in southern Ukraine’s Nova Kakhovka dam.

"There is absolutely no doubt in our mind, that the destruction of the dam was the direct consequence of Russia's decision to invade a peaceful neighbor,” he said.

As CNN has previously reported, it’s not currently possible to say whether the dam collapsed because it was deliberately targeted or if the breach could have been caused by structural failure. Kyiv and Moscow have each accused the other of causing the collapse.

“Russia's war in Ukraine has devastated infrastructure, has destroyed families and taken lives, and is causing economic, food, energy shortages around the world. Russia is responsible and will be held to account,” Trudeau said.

He also announced the provision of $10 million Canadian (around $7.46 million USD) to help flooding victims.

On NATO: During their meeting in Kyiv on Saturday, the two leaders also adopted a declaration in which Canada supports Ukraine's accession to NATO as soon as circumstances allow.

"Canada supports Ukraine to become a NATO member as soon as conditions allow for it. Ukraine and Canada look forward to addressing these issues at the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July 2023," according to the text of the declaration.

Zelensky has previously said he understands his country cannot become a member of NATO while it is still at war.

6 hr 35 min ago

Residents of frontline town in Zaporizhzhia region rely on deliveries from aid agencies to survive

From CNN's Vasco Cotovio, Frederik Pleitgen, William Bonnett and Darya Tarasova

Vasco Cotovio/CNN

Deep inside a makeshift bunker, residents of Orikhiv await an aid delivery while artillery shakes the ground above.

“It’s comfortable here,” 72-year-old Olga Shumska says, unfazed by the commotion outside. The town in the southern Zaporizhzhia region sits just 5 kilometers (about 3 miles) away from a front line where Ukrainian forces have been making a recent push.

“I’m not afraid, I’m used to it and I don’t want to go anywhere from here. I tell myself that soon the war will end and we will live normally,” she said.

But this is far from normal. Months of shelling have destroyed most of the town’s infrastructure, leaving Orikhiv without electricity, gas or water.

“It is very dangerous. We had people killed and wounded and there is a lot of destruction,” Shumska explains. “In August last year, my house was also destroyed.”

Most of the town’s 1,400 remaining residents, down from a pre-war population of 14,000, now live in basements, and these bunkers — so-called "invisibility centers" — are the only place they are able to shower, do laundry, charge their phones or eat a warm meal.

“We’re here almost every day, because it is safe here, our friends are here,” Shumska’s neighbor Nina Sokol says. “Tomorrow there will be a church service until noon. So we’ll be here for 3 to 4 hours and after the service, we will have dinner and go home.”

An unfathomable existence for most, but not for Sokol.

��What is there to be afraid of?” the 71-year-old asks. “There are no two deaths. There is only one death.”

The trick, she says, is to try and delay it, an increasingly difficult task for the residents of Orikhiv, who rely on deliveries from aid agencies to survive.

Today they’re getting a box of food with a long shelf life that should last them for a week or two. But deliveries like these are not easy.

“Orikhiv is one of the most dangerous places in Zaporizhzhia region,” says Vitaliy Kubushka from the Global Empowerment Mission (GEM) and the Howard Buffet Foundation, the organization behind the aid. “The town is shelled every 24 hours.”

And with the Zaporizhzhia front line becoming more active, aid deliveries may become more rare.

Read more.

6 hr 35 min ago

​20. The Noise Bottleneck: When More Information is Harmful

Ponder this:

The noise bottleneck is really a paradox. We think the more information we consume the more signal we’ll consume. Only the mind doesn’t work like that. When the volume of information increases, our ability to comprehend the relevant from the irrelevant becomes compromised. We place too much emphasis on irrelevant data and lose sight of what’s really important.

Decision Making

|

Reading Time: 6 minutes

The Noise Bottleneck: When More Information is Harmful

https://fs.blog/noise-and-signal-nassim-taleb/?fbclid=IwAR27O216KvWeBXKLH-5q53dQ9AWOZsaiCx2mvrbrcstEcAX9sppBmkJXKRc

When consuming information, we strive for more signal and less noise. The problem is a cognitive illusion: we feel like the more information we consume the more signal we receive.

While this is probably true on an absolute basis, Nassim Taleb argues in this excerpt from Antifragile, that it is not true on a relative basis. He calls is the noise bottleneck.

Taleb argues that as you consume more data and the ratio of noise to signal increases, the less you know about what’s going on and the more inadvertent trouble you are likely to cause.

***

The Institutionalization Of Neuroticism

Imagine someone of the type we call neurotic in common parlance. He is wiry, looks contorted, and speaks with an uneven voice. His necks moves around when he tries to express himself. When he has a small pimple his first reaction is to assume that it is cancerous, that the cancer is of the lethal type, and that it has already spread. His hypochondria is not just in the medical department: he incurs a small setback in business and reacts as if bankruptcy were both near and certain. In the office, he is tuned to every single possible detail, systematically transforming every molehill into a mountain. The last thing you want in life is to be in the same car with him when stuck in traffic on your way to an important appointment. The expression overreact was designed with him in mind: he does not have reactions, just overreactions.

Compare him to someone with the opposite temperament, imperturbable, with the calm under fire that is considered necessary to become a leader, military commander or a mafia godfather. Usually unruffled and immune to small information —they can impress you with their self-control in difficult circumstances. For a sample of a composed, call and pondered voice, listen to interview of “Sammy the Bull” Salvatore Gravano who was involved in the murder of nineteen people (all competing mobsters). He speaks with minimal effort. In the rare situations when he is angry, unlike with the neurotic fellow, everyone knows it and takes it seriously.

The supply of information to which we are exposed under modernity is transforming humans from the equable second fellow to the neurotic first. For the purpose of our discussion, the second fellow only reacts to real information, the first largely to noise. The difference between the two fellows will show us the difference between noise and signal. Noise is what you are supposed to ignore; signal what you need to heed.

Indeed, we have been loosely mentioning “noise” earlier in the book; time to be precise about it. In science, noise is a generalization beyond the actual sound to describe random information that is totally useless for any purpose, and that you need to clean up to make sense of what you are listening to. Consider, for examples, elements in an encrypted message that have absolutely no meaning, just randomized letters to confuse the spies, or the hiss you hear on a telephone line and that you try to ignore in order to just focus on the voice of your interlocutor.

Noise and Signal

If you want to accelerate someone’s death, give him a personal doctor.

One can see from the tonsillectomy story that access to data increases intervention —as with neuroticism. Rory Sutherland signaled to me that those with a personal doctor on staff should be particularly vulnerable to naive interventionism, hence iatrogenics; doctors need to justify their salaries and prove to themselves that they have some work ethics, something “doing nothing” doesn’t satisfy (Editor’s note: the same forces apply to leaders, managers, etc.). Indeed at the time of writing the personal doctor or the late singer Michael Jackson is being sued for something that is equivalent to overintervention-to-stifle-antifragility (but it will take the law courts a while before they become familiar with the concept). Conceivably, the same happened to Elvis Prestley. So with overmedicated politicians and heads of state.

Likewise those in corporations or in policymaking (like Fragilista Greenspan) endowed with a sophisticated statistics department and therefore getting a lot of “timely” data are capable of overreacting and mistaking noise for information —Greenspan kept an eye on such fluctuations as the sales of vacuum cleaners in Cleveland “to get a precise idea about where the economy is going”, and, of course micromanaged us into chaos.

In business and economic decision-making, data causes severe side effects —data is now plentiful thanks to connectivity; and the share of spuriousness in the data increases as one gets more immersed into it. A not well discussed property of data: it is toxic in large quantities —even in moderate quantities.

The previous two chapters showed how you can use and take advantage of noise and randomness; but noise and randomness can also use and take advantage of you, particularly when totally unnatural —the data you get on the web or thanks to the media.

The more frequently you look at data, the more noise you are disproportionally likely to get (rather than the valuable part called the signal); hence the higher the noise to signal ratio. And there is a confusion, that is not psychological at all, but inherent in the data itself. Say you look at information on a yearly basis, for stock prices or the fertilizer sales of your father-in-law’s factory, or inflation numbers in Vladivostock. Assume further that for what you are observing, at the yearly frequency the ratio of signal to noise is about one to one (say half noise, half signal) —it means that about half of changes are real improvements or degradations, the other half comes from randomness. This ratio is what you get from yearly observations. But if you look at the very same data on a daily basis, the composition would change to 95% noise, 5% signal. And if you observe data on an hourly basis, as people immersed in the news and markets price variations do, the split becomes 99.5% noise to .5% signal. That is two hundred times more noise than signal —which is why anyone who listens to news (except when very, very significant events take place) is one step below sucker.

There is a biological story with information. I have been repeating that in a natural environment, a stressor is information. So too much information would be too much stress, exceeding the threshold of antifragility. In medicine, we are discovering the healing powers of fasting, as the avoidance of too much hormonal rushes that come with the ingestion of food. Hormones convey information to the different parts of our system and too much of it confuses our biology. Here again, as with the story of the news received at too high a frequency, too much information becomes harmful. And in Chapter x (on ethics) I will show how too much data (particularly when sterile) causes statistics to be completely meaningless.

Now let’s add the psychological to this: we are not made to understand the point, so we overreact emotionally to noise. The best solution is to only look at very large changes in data or conditions, never small ones.

Just as we are not likely to mistake a bear for a stone (but likely to mistake a stone for a bear), it is almost impossible for someone rational with a clear, uninfected mind, one who is not drowning in data, to mistake a vital signal, one that matters for his survival, for noise. Significant signals have a way to reach you. In the tonsillectomies, the best filter would have been to only consider the children who are very ill, those with periodically recurring throat inflammation.

There was even more noise coming from the media and its glorification of the anecdote. Thanks to it, we are living more and more in virtual reality, separated from the real world, a little bit more every day, while realizing it less and less. Consider that every day, 6,200 persons die in the United States, many of preventable causes. But the media only reports the most anecdotal and sensational cases (hurricanes, freak incidents, small plane crashes) giving us a more and more distorted map of real risks. In an ancestral environment, the anecdote, the “interesting” is information; no longer today. Likewise, by presenting us with explanations and theories the media induces an illusion of understanding the world.

And the understanding of events (and risks) on the part of members of the press is so retrospective that they would put the security checks after the plane ride, or what the ancients call post bellum auxilium, send troops after the battle. Owing to domain dependence, we forget the need to check our map of the world against reality. So we are living in a more and more fragile world, while thinking it is more and more understandable.

To conclude, the best way to mitigate interventionism is to ration the supply of information, as naturalistically as possible. This is hard to accept in the age of the internet. It has been very hard for me to explain that the more data you get, the less you know what’s going on, and the more iatrogenics you will cause.

***

The noise bottleneck is really a paradox. We think the more information we consume the more signal we’ll consume. Only the mind doesn’t work like that. When the volume of information increases, our ability to comprehend the relevant from the irrelevant becomes compromised. We place too much emphasis on irrelevant data and lose sight of what’s really important.

Still Curious? Read The Pot Belly of Ignorance.

Source (image via)

21. China has had spy base on Cuba for at least FOUR YEARS

China has had spy base on Cuba for at least FOUR YEARS, US intelligence officials say, days after it was reported Xi Jinping was hoping to set up first surveillance station on Caribbean island

• U.S. intelligence experts say China has had a spy base in Cuba since 2019
• The existence of the base was confirmed by the Wall Street Journal on Thursday
• The White House initially denied the report, calling it inaccurate 

By HOPE SLOOP and ASSOCATED PRESS

PUBLISHED: 17:25 EDT, 10 June 2023 | UPDATED: 04:47 EDT, 11 June 2023

Daily Mail · by Hope Sloop · June 10, 2023

China has been secretly operating a spy base in Cuba for four years, a White House official said, confirming that the communist country is increasing its surveillance capabilities right on the United States' doorstep.

A Biden Administration official recently spoke on the condition of anonymity and confirmed the news that China has been in Havana since 2019.

The confirmation comes just days after White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby denied that China had a base in the Caribbean, amid reports President Xi Jinping was plotting to build a base.

'I've seen that press report, it's not accurate,' Kirby said in an MSNBC interview regarding the Wall Street Journal's original story.

And while Kirby was technically correct, a more disturbing truth has since emerged - China already has a listening station on the communist Caribbean island.

Additionally, China appears to be looking to expand their number of bases around the world and has been quite some time.

China has been secretly operating a spy base in Cuba for four years, a White House official said, confirming that the communist country is increasing its surveillance capabilities on the other side of the globe. Pictured: Chinese President Xi Jinping

A Biden Administration official recently spoke on the condition of anonymity and confirmed the news that China has been in Havana since 2019

The Biden Administration official who spoke out said they have long been worried about China's eagerness to expand their spying operations.

'What I can tell you is that we have been concerned since day one of this administration about China's influence activities around the world; certainly in this hemisphere and in this region, we're watching this very, very closely,' he continued.

Chinese officials at one point looked at sites spanning the Atlantic Ocean, Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and the Indo-Pacific.

The original Wall Street Journal report on Thursday shared that China and Cuba had reached an agreement to build an electronic eavesdropping station on the island.

The Journal reported China planned to pay a Cuba billions of dollars as part of the negotiations, however the U.S. intel official said the base was 'not a new development.'

Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío also refuted the report in a Twitter post Saturday.

'The slanderous speculation continues, evidently promoted by certain media to cause harm and alarm without observing minimum patterns of communication and without providing data or evidence to support what they disseminate,' he wrote.

The news of the base comes at a time when the relationship between China and the U.S. has been increasingly unsettling.

In 2022, former-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited democratically governed Taiwan which led to China launching military exercises in the area.

The original Wall Street Journal report on Thursday shared that China and Cuba had reached an agreement to build an electronic eavesdropping station on the island. The US Embassy in Havana is pictured in this August 2021 photograph

Chinese officials at one point looked at sites spanning the Atlantic Ocean, Latin America, the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and the Indo-Pacific

The Biden Administration official who spoke out said they have long been worried about China's eagerness to expand their spying operations

Earlier this year, the U.S. shot down a Chinese spy balloon that had crossed into the United States.

It was reported in the weeks after that the balloon gathered intelligence from several American military sites before it was shot down.

The sources said China could have gathered more intelligence if not for the Biden administration's efforts to block it.

The balloon entered US airspace on 28 January and was shot down on 4 February after passing over US nuclear missile sites, including the Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken is planning to travel to China next week, a trip that was canceled as the balloon was flying over the U.S.

Blinken expects to be in Beijing on June 18 for meetings with senior Chinese officials, according to U.S. officials.

CIA Director William Burns met in Beijing with his counterpart last month. White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with his Chinese counterpart in Vienna over two days in May and made clear that the administration wanted to improve high-level communications with the Chinese side.

Daily Mail · by Hope Sloop · June 10, 2023

22. Opinion | Why Secrets Lost Their Sizzle

Excerpts:

“So far there are no bombshells about bad government behavior,” said Tom Blanton, director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University. “Nothing akin to the revelation of massive spying on Americans in Mr. Snowden’s cache, or even the camera footage of the death of the Reuters cameraman revealed by Chelsea Manning.”

Nor do the documents reveal much, if any operational information that could compromise secret missions. Much of the material made public is raw reporting, neither confirmed nor yet analyzed. There is no indication, for example, that the information about Mr. Putin’s chemotherapy is anything but a long-circulating rumor, and no proof that top officials are scheming against him. It’s presented simply as something that’s out there.

And for all the dire warnings from Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Obama and others a decade ago, the far more voluminous and potentially harmful information leaked by Ms. Manning and Mr. Snowden did not wreck America’s ability to function in the world. Most foreign governments probably assume the United States and its major allies are keeping an electronic eye on them, and in any case America’s clout leaves them little choice but to carry on. The Discord files do not change that.

On balance, the public’s reaction may have it right. It’s worrisome that a low-level racist gun-lover can so easily copy information that needs to be secret. But it’s good to learn that American spy services are doing such a good job of having eyes and ears on a war that’s costing Americans a small fortune.

Opinion | Why Secrets Lost Their Sizzle

The New York Times · by Serge Schmemann · June 11, 2023

Serge Schmemann

Why Secrets Lost Their Sizzle

June 11, 2023, 6:00 a.m. ET

Credit...Landon Nordeman/Trunk Archive

By

Mr. Schmemann is a member of the editorial board.

In April, secret documents allegedly photographed by a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard began making their way into the mainstream media. Many were briefings prepared by military intelligence services, and much of it dealt with the Russia-Ukraine war. They offered Americans a rare window into the government’s most valuable intelligence on one of Europe’s deadliest conflicts since World War II.

We’ve been here before. In 2010, WikiLeaks began churning out hundreds of thousands of secret documents about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that had been leaked by an Army private, prompting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to declare that such disclosures “tear at the fabric of the proper function of responsible government.” Three years later, Edward Snowden, a National Security Agency contractor, leaked another batch of highly classified documents. President Barack Obama warned then that if anybody who disagreed with the government could choose to reveal its secrets, “we will not be able to keep our people safe, or conduct foreign policy.”

This time the reaction has been quite different. The Pentagon did say that the latest disclosures — widely known as the “Discord Leaks” — present a “very serious risk to national security.” But there has been curiously little public interest in the spilled secrets. News coverage has focused mostly on the banality of the person charged in connection with the leak and his motives: Jack Teixeira, a low-ranking 21-year-old in the Massachusetts Air National Guard with a penchant for far-right racist gibberish and guns, who allegedly printed out secret documents from his work to impress his online chat group on the social platform Discord.

Reaction to the indictment of Donald Trump has followed a similar pattern, though the case revolves around a former president’s handling of classified files, not leaked secrets. So far, attention has mostly focused on the political repercussions of the indictment, even though the charges include alleged violations of the Espionage Act suggest the government regards the documents as secrets whose disclosure could harm the United States or aid a foreign adversary.

On the Discord front, investigations underway by the government and military will presumably address the obvious questions: How much damage did the leaks do? Why did a low-ranking tech once again have access to so much secret stuff, and how did he get the clearance for it? For that matter, why does the Massachusetts Air National Guard have that kind of access? How did Mr. Teixeira so easily print this stuff out, when there should be all sorts of safeguards against that?

There’s nothing especially surprising in the public fascination with Mr. Teixeira, nor with earlier lead actors in major security leaks such as Mr. Snowden, Chelsea Manning or Julian Assange. But why so little interest in the secrets themselves? Given the huge American investment in defending Ukraine against an equally huge Russian determination to crush it, the “Discord Leaks” seemed like they would be a natural sensation. A small sampling of the purported intelligence, as reported by various news organizations:

● U.S. intelligence assessments have expressed serious doubts that the Ukrainian spring counteroffensive would achieve more than “modest territorial gains,” especially given the problems with training and ammunition.

● Earlier in the war, the United States tried to dissuade Ukraine from defending Bakhmut, which Russia eventually seized.

● Russia’s special forces have been decimated by the conflict, according to American assessments, and could take years to rebuild.

● What appeared to be American electronic intercepts captured the Russian spy agency accusing the Russian defense ministry of concealing the true toll of the war, in part by excluding the dead and wounded in national guard and mercenary forces.

● An unnamed source said that President Vladimir Putin of Russia was scheduled to undergo chemotherapy, and that the Russian chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov, and security council secretary, Nikolai Patrushev, were suspected to have “devised” a plan to “sabotage” the president while he was under treatment.

Some of the documents deal with other countries, too, including discussions within the South Korean leadership on whether or not the artillery shells the country agreed to sell to the United States would end up in Ukraine; efforts by Wagner, a Russian mercenary group, to buy arms from Turkey through Mali; purported plans by Egypt to supply rockets to Russia; and suggestions that Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency backed protests against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s attempt to downgrade the powers of the country’s judiciary.

Why has this trove of information generated less excitement than previous leaks?

One reason cited by intelligence experts is that the Ukraine war is already being reported in minute detail, and the batch of raw intelligence does not substantially change the overall perception of the state of affairs. While the leaked documents testify to the extraordinary intelligence-gathering abilities of the United States and provide some granular details of the fight, this might no longer impress an American public that’s saturated with information and immured to the notion of ubiquitous data mining. It’s hard to get excited by information purportedly intercepted from Russian military leaders when selfies by their troops circulate openly.

The White House, moreover, has wisely shared considerable intelligence about the war. Its intelligence-gathering prowess was on early public display when it accurately predicted the Russian invasion at a time when many experts dismissed the possibility.

Another factor in the lackluster public reception may be that the leaks aren’t politically scandalous. Though their disclosure is worrisome to intelligence agencies, embarrassing to American diplomats and irritating to foreign leaders, there are no revelations of gross dereliction or covert iniquities, as have dropped in past leaks.

“So far there are no bombshells about bad government behavior,” said Tom Blanton, director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University. “Nothing akin to the revelation of massive spying on Americans in Mr. Snowden’s cache, or even the camera footage of the death of the Reuters cameraman revealed by Chelsea Manning.”

Nor do the documents reveal much, if any operational information that could compromise secret missions. Much of the material made public is raw reporting, neither confirmed nor yet analyzed. There is no indication, for example, that the information about Mr. Putin’s chemotherapy is anything but a long-circulating rumor, and no proof that top officials are scheming against him. It’s presented simply as something that’s out there.

And for all the dire warnings from Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Obama and others a decade ago, the far more voluminous and potentially harmful information leaked by Ms. Manning and Mr. Snowden did not wreck America’s ability to function in the world. Most foreign governments probably assume the United States and its major allies are keeping an electronic eye on them, and in any case America’s clout leaves them little choice but to carry on. The Discord files do not change that.

On balance, the public’s reaction may have it right. It’s worrisome that a low-level racist gun-lover can so easily copy information that needs to be secret. But it’s good to learn that American spy services are doing such a good job of having eyes and ears on a war that’s costing Americans a small fortune.

Serge Schmemann is a member of the editorial board.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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Serge Schmemann joined The Times in 1980 and worked as the bureau chief in Moscow, Bonn and Jerusalem and at the United Nations. He was editorial page editor of The International Herald Tribune in Paris from 2003 to 2013.

Serge Schmemann joined The Times in 1980 and worked as the bureau chief in Moscow, Bonn and Jerusalem and at the United Nations. He was editorial page editor of The International Herald Tribune in Paris from 2003 to 2013.

The New York Times · by Serge Schmemann · June 11, 2023

23. Join the military, become a US citizen: Uncle Sam wants you and vous and tu

Join the military, become a US citizen: Uncle Sam wants you and vous and tu

AP · by LOLITA C. BALDOR · June 11, 2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — When Esmita Spudes Bidari was a young girl in Nepal, she dreamed of being in the military, but that wasn’t a real option in her country.

Last week, she raised her right hand and took the oath to join the U.S. Army Reserves, thanks in part to a recruiter in Dallas who also is Nepalese and reached out to her through an online group.

Bidari, who heads to basic training in August, is just the latest in a growing number of legal migrants enlisting in the U.S. military as it more aggressively seeks out immigrants, offering a fast track to citizenship to those who sign up.

Struggling to overcome recruiting shortfalls, the Army and the Air Force have bolstered their marketing to entice legal residents to enlist, putting out pamphlets, working social media and broadening their outreach, particularly in inner cities. One key element is the use of recruiters with similar backgrounds to these potential recruits.

“It is one thing to hear about the military from locals here, but it is something else when it’s from your fellow brother, from the country you’re from,” said Bidari, who was contacted by Army Staff Sgt. Kalden Lama, the Dallas recruiter, on a Facebook group that helps Nepalese people in America connect with one another. “That brother was in the group and he was recruiting and he told me about the military.”

The military has had success in recruiting legal immigrants, particularly among those seeking a job, education benefits and training as well as a quick route to becoming an American citizen. But they also require additional security screening and more help filling out forms, particularly those who are less proficient in English.

Both the Army and the Air Force say they will not meet their recruiting goals this year, and the Navy also expects to fall short. Pulling more from the legal immigrant population may not provide large numbers, but any small boosts will help. The Marine Corp is the only service on pace to meet its goal.

The shortfalls have led to a wide range of new recruiting programs, ad campaigns and other incentives to help the services compete with often higher-paying, less risky jobs in the private sector. Defense leaders say young people are less familiar with the military, are drawn more to corporate jobs that provide similar education and other benefits, and want to avoid the risk of injury and death that service in defense of the United States could bring. In addition, they say that little more than 20% meet the physical, mental and character requirements to join.

“We have large populations of legal U.S. residents who are exceptionally patriotic, they’re exceptionally grateful for the opportunities that this country has provided,” said Air Force Maj. Gen. Ed Thomas, head of the service’s recruiting command.

The biggest challenges have been identifying geographic pockets of immigrant populations, finding ways to reach them and helping any of those interested navigate the complex military recruiting applications and procedures.

Last October, the Army reestablished a program for legal permanent residents to apply for accelerated naturalization once they get to basic training. Recruiters began to reach out on social media, using short videos in various languages to target the top 10 countries that recruits had come from during the previous year.

The Air Force effort began this year, and the first group of 14 graduated from basic training and were sworn in as new citizens in April. They included recruits from Cameroon, Jamaica, Kenya, the Philippines, Russia and South Africa. As of mid-May there were about 100 in basic training who had begun the citizenship process and about 40 who had completed it.

Thomas said the program required changes to Air Force policy, coordination with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and a careful screening process to ensure there are no security risks.

“We have to take exceptional measures to be able to thoroughly vet and go through the security clearance investigation,” he said, adding that in many cases the immigrants are not immediately put in jobs that require top secret clearance.

Under the new program, recruits are quickly enrolled in the citizenship system and when they start basic training, an expedited process kicks off, including all required paperwork and testing. By the time Air Force recruits finish their seven weeks of training, the process is complete and they are sworn in as American citizens.

The first group of 14 included several who are seeking various medical jobs, while another wants to be an air transportation specialist. Thomas said Airman 1st Class Natalia Laziuk, 31, emigrated from Russia nine years ago, has dreamed of being a U.S. citizen since she was 11, and learned about the military by watching American movies and television.

“Talking to this young airman, she essentially said, ‘I just wanted to be useful to my country,’” he said. “And that’s a story that we see played over and over and over again. I’ve talked to a number of these folks around the country. They’re hungry to serve.”

For Bidari, who arrived in the U.S. in 2016 to attend college, the fast track to citizenship was important because it will make it easier for her to travel and bring her parents to the United States to visit. Speaking in a call from Chicago just a day after she was sworn in, she said she enlisted for six years and hopes that her future citizenship will help her become an officer.

In Chicago earlier this year, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth heard from a number of recruiters about the increased outreach to immigrant communities and how it helped them meet their numbers. In the 2022 budget year, they said, the Chicago recruiting battalion enlisted 70 legal permanent residents and already this year they have enlisted 62.

More broadly across the Army, close to 2,900 enlisted during the first half of this budget year, compared with about 2,200 during the same period the previous year. The largest numbers are from Jamaica, with 384, followed by Mexico, the Philippines and Haiti, but many are from Nepal, Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Colombia and the Dominican Republic.

“As a little girl, looking at the soldiers, I always had admiration for them,” said Bidari, recalling British troops in Nepal. “Yesterday, when I was able to take that oath ... I don’t think I have words to really explain how I was feeling. When they said, ‘Welcome future soldier,’ I was like, ‘Oh my goodness, this is happening.’”

AP · by LOLITA C. BALDOR · June 11, 2023

​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com