Quotes of the Day:
“When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.”
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War
“The American generals could only think in terms of large armies and huge battles. They believed or hoped that an enemy who chose to hide in jungles and tunnels would quickly be flushed out by American fire-power and then die in open battle.”
- Michael G. Kramer, A Gracious Enemy
“Most of my time is spent in doing as well as I can the work immediately at hand. One hopes that by doing quietly and without parade as solid work as one can when one is occupied, one makes the best contribution possible to one's state.”
- Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,
1. No More Delays: Why It's Time to Move Forward With Wartime OPCON Transition
2. N. Korea holds anti-U.S. rally to mark war anniversary
3. Analysis | North Korean Hackers Have Crypto In Their Crosshairs
4. Beefing Up: North Korea Wants a Stronger Military
5. Yoon departs for Spain to attend NATO summit
6. N. Korea all set for nuke test, timing to come as 'no surprise,' S. Korean minister says
7. S. Korea's nuclear envoy meets U.S. Treasury official handling N. Korea sanctions
8. S. Korea, U.S. to hold in joint cyber drill for first time in October
9. President Yoon joins NATO summit
10. Seoul offered to repatriate North Koreans against their will before Pyongyang demanded it, lawmaker says
11. Ex-NSO chief denies allegation he 'fled' to US
12. North Korea says U.S. is setting up Asian NATO; vows stronger defence
13. North Korea issues nationwide heavy rain alert for this week
14. Yoon's strategic and tactical dilemmas
15. Diplomatic test for Yoon
16. Can Nuclear Energy Power South Korea’s Future?
17. South Korea’s 4.5-gen Falcon fighter set to soar
18. N. Korea is cremating bodies of people who died of suspected COVID-19 infections
19. N. Korea's border patrol kills two people trying to defect across border
1. No More Delays: Why It's Time to Move Forward With Wartime OPCON Transition
There are two major issues for me on OPCON transition. I agree that we need to move forward. First it is my strong belief that any operation in north Korea, whether to defeat the nKPA and the regime or to conduct various contingency operations due to internal instability and regime collapse must be conducted by an a combined alliance force (the Future ROK/US CFC) led by a ROK General Officer. This is for multiple reasons. First and foremost the outcome of war or regime collapse must be a united Republic of Korea. It is the only acceptable durable political arrangement that will ensure an outcome that brings peace and stability to the peninsula dn service, protects, and advances both ROK and US strategic interests. Since the force will have to provide military support to the political unification process the force must be led by a Korean general officer. Furthermore, we need a Korean general in command to reduce the chances of the perception that US forces in the north as part of the combined alliance force are conducting US occupation duties. We have to prevent the perception that operations will be another Iraq or Afghanistan. Lastly, Korean unification must be conducted by Koreans and the military complement of the process must be led by a Korean. US forces can be in support but if a US general is in command it will undermine the long term legrimact of the government of the United Republic of Korea.
However, the second issue that I have is that some in the US will look at the change of Command of the ROK/US CFC as an opportunity to reduce the US commitment to the alliance. This has long been a fear of the conservatives and former military officers in Korea. To use this as an excuse to undermine our commitment because of the perception the US is no longer in charge (a misconception due to the lack of understanding of the command relationships) will cause significant damage to the alliance and harm US strategic interests in the region. There must be no change in the US military commitment to the alliance when a Korean general takes command.
No More Delays: Why It's Time to Move Forward With Wartime OPCON Transition - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
Executive Summary
The history and evolution of the military command architecture between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) offer remarkable insight into core relationship dynamics within the US-ROK alliance that exist even today. At the start of the alliance, US policymakers conceived the command architecture as a means to institutionalize a starkly patron-client relationship with its smaller South Korean ally, including the nearly unilateral US operational control (OPCON) over the ROK military. However, it was not intended to remain this way. Both US and ROK officials saw the command architecture as following a specific evolutionary trajectory. What began as a unilateral, US-led arrangement evolved into a bilateral combined architecture that eventually moved toward the ROK taking the lead in its own defense.
Following the end of the Cold War, the last stage in this aforementioned evolution began. US policy at the time called for the United States to move from a leading role to a supporting one in the alliance. However, since then, the evolution has been beset by multiple complications, including: the politically motivated separation of OPCON into peacetime or armistice OPCON and wartime OPCON; conceptual shifts from a combined command toward a parallel command and then back again to a combined command arrangement; multiple delays in the process driven by electoral politics, North Korea’s nuclear and missile advancements, and concerns about a rising China; and growing misunderstanding and policy drift surrounding the issue of wartime OPCON transition. The alliance must redouble its effort to move forward and transition wartime OPCON to a ROK-led combined command architecture.
Contrary to previous thinking on this issue, this transition would position the alliance to better address the evolving North Korean threat and shifting strategic environment characterized by worsening US-China relations. Undertaking wartime OPCON transition will require Washington to deepen alliance consultation around the details of the US extended deterrence commitment and tighten cooperation around what Seoul brings to the deterrence equation. Furthermore, Seoul would be compelled to grapple much more concretely with its broader regional responsibilities, including improving its relations with Tokyo and strengthening cooperation with various United Nations Command (UNC) Sending States. Leading the alliance’s command architecture on the peninsula means that Seoul would have to embrace regional and multinational planning and operations in a much more serious manner.
Alternatively, if this transition is no longer a feasible scenario, the US and ROK need to negotiate and communicate another way forward to both the South Korean and American publics. Wartime OPCON transition is an officially agreed upon alliance policy that has been affirmed by successive ROK and US presidents and their highest civilian defense officials. The alliance should finally either move forward with the policy or be clear and decisive about changing course.
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Download "No More Delays: Why It's Time to Move Forward With Wartime OPCON Transition," by Clint Work
2. N. Korea holds anti-U.S. rally to mark war anniversary
First in 5 years.
N. Korea holds anti-U.S. rally to mark war anniversary | Yonhap News Agency
N. Korea holds anti-U.S. rally to mark war anniversary
This footage, released by the North's state Korean Central Television on June 26, 2022, shows an anti-American rally at a garden in front of the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum, held in Pyongyang the previous day, to mark the anniversary of the outbreak of the 1950-53 Korean War. The rally was the first to have taken place in five years as Pyongyang did not hold such rallies in 2018 amid a thaw in relations with the Untied States and did not resume them amid the COVID-19 pandemic. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
(END)
3. Analysis | North Korean Hackers Have Crypto In Their Crosshairs
The all purpose sword is a key tool for survival of the Kim family regime (and more).
Analysis | North Korean Hackers Have Crypto In Their Crosshairs
The world of crypto isn’t just suffering from a market malaise that has seen the price of Bitcoin drop from $69,000 to around $20,000 today — it also faces a troubling number of security risks.
There have been dozens of breaches in the past few years showing that cybercriminals are gravitating toward the world of cryptocurrencies. In many cases, we don’t know who the attackers are, but one culprit that keeps coming up is the band of state-backed hackers from North Korea known as the Lazarus Group.
According to a new book by Geoff White, “The Lazarus Heist,” the regime’s hackers have been become increasingly sophisticated over the past decade, managing to steal an estimated $2 billion worth of cryptocurrency to date. Crypto investors should expect the gang to continue exploiting blockchain targets, or the “the soft underbelly of the financial system,” according to White, who believes the $2 billion figure is a “vast underestimate.”
It stands to reason the hacker group would target crypto networks: Lazarus’s modus operandi for years has been to generate as much cash as it could to help prop up the North Korean regime and its nuclear weapons program. In the past decade, its schemes have included sophisticated ATM hacks and ransomware, including the infamous WannaCry cyber attack.
Now decentralized finance, or DeFi, has become a more lucrative target than banks, thanks to the billions of dollars locked up in its various applications. But the move-fast-and-break-things culture still prevalent in web3 development hasn’t helped the security of those networks. Neither does the fact that building web3 apps is unusually hard for programmers, who can create gaping financial vulnerabilities with simple coding errors.
Across the board, the amount of money lost through hacks of DeFi projects more than doubled in 2021, with security website CrytpoSec listing 102 reported breaches between Jan. 2020 and June 2022, totaling $3.4 billion lost.
Lazarus has gone after several crypto networks, including a Slovakian crypto exchange in 2020 from which it stole virtual currency worth $5.4 million. The hackers went on to launder the funds through the cryptocurrency exchange Binance, according a Reuters investigation. They were also behind the more-than-$600 million hack on play-to-earn-game Axie Infinity, which when measured by money stolen could be one of the biggest single hacks of all time. (The U.S. Treasury Department blamed Lazarus as being behind the attack.)
I spoke to White in a Twitter Spaces discussion this past week about the group, and some of its strategies for targeting DeFi networks in the future. Below is an edited excerpt from that discussion:
Parmy: Do we have any idea of how many people are in the Lazarus group? How are its members selected and trained?
Geoff: In terms of how many there are, there’s a publicly quoted figure, which is 6,000, which has come from analysis of testimony from defectors who’ve come out of North Korea. To train these people, the North Korean government can’t rely on hackers in hoodies in bedrooms, kids who just go on YouTube, because in North Korea you can’t just pick up a laptop and go on the Internet. All the computer hackers in North Korea have come up through the school system. They’ve been spotted and groomed by the regime to go into elite universities, to hone their skills. A lot will go into either the nuclear program or government hacking.
Parmy: North Korean hackers went after Axie Infinity in March. It seems that unlike other state-backed hackers they’re not targeting any particular country. Who or what do you expect them to go after in the future?
Geoff: Cryptocurrency is absolutely the direction of travel. If you’re looking at how much was stolen in one fell swoop, I think the $625 million stolen from Axie Infinity may be the biggest single hack of any amount of money from one company, in one hit, ever … If you look at the banks that they’ve hacked into, you’re talking Vietnam, the Philippines, Chile, Bangladesh. They will go anywhere where the security is weakest.
Parmy: They seem opportunistic in terms of scope. Given that blockchain networks have experienced a number of breaches and vulnerabilities, thanks in part to their difficult coding environment, do you expect blockchain to become an attractive target to North Korean hackers in the next few years?
Geoff: I think so. There have been reports coming out from alleged North Korean hackers advertising jobs and targeting cryptocurrency workers and saying, “Hey, I’ve got a great job for you. A perfect job.” And then tricking cryptocurrency workers into downloading malware and getting into the cryptocurrencies that way.
Bizarrely, it also seems that North Korea’s hackers are trying to get jobs at cryptocurrency companies. There’s been an alert put out by the US Treasury warning cryptocurrency firms about North Korean hackers turning up and applying for jobs. We’ve interviewed somebody who claims he actually interviewed a North Korean hacker who applied for a job at his company and realized halfway through the interview what was afoot. But when you think about it, it makes a lot of sense. If you’re inside a cryptocurrency company, you might be able to steal money from them directly.
You might be able to get the passwords, and even if you don’t, you might be able to introduce a flaw or vulnerability into that company’s code, which allows you to extricate money later on. And even if none of that works, if you’ve got a company email address, you can email other people in the crypto industry and say, “Hey, I just started work for company X. Have you seen this exciting news? See attachment to the email.” And that’s how you get your viruses out.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Parmy Olson is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering technology. A former reporter for the Wall Street Journal and Forbes, she is author of “We Are Anonymous.”
©2022 Bloomberg L.P.
4. Beefing Up: North Korea Wants a Stronger Military
There is nothing else as important for the Kim family regime as a strong military.
We should keep in mind that according to the Korean Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA) the regime spent some $650 million on missile tests this year alone. Just imagine how that money could have been spent to take care of the suffering of the Korean people.
This is why we say that the suffering of the Korean people in the north is the result of deliberate policy decisions by Kim Jong-un - he prioritizes military and nuclear development and missile tests over the welfare of the Korean people in the north. Kim Jong-un is solely responsible for their suffering.
Beefing Up: North Korea Wants a Stronger Military
North Korean state media reported on Friday that Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un requested a strengthening of the country’s military following a regular meeting of North Korea’s Central Military Commission.
Kim’s call to action came at the three-day “Enlarged Meeting of the Eighth Central Military Commission,” which ended on Thursday. Although a similar meeting takes place each year and rarely results in significant policy changes for Pyongyang, the current iteration faced renewed interest worldwide due mainly to speculation that Kim intends to test a nuclear weapon in the coming weeks. U.S. and South Korean officials suggested earlier in the week that such a test could take place at “any time,” according to Reuters.
North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) claimed that the officials present had “examined and approved an important issue of providing a military guarantee for further strengthening the country’s war deterrent”—either referring to a military buildup or a nuclear weapon. Although the KCNA report made no direct mention of North Korea’s nuclear program, it noted that Ri Pyong-chol, the director of the country’s ballistic missile program, had been elected as vice-chairman of the Party Central Military Commission, which guides its defense policy.
During the meeting, Kim “stressed the need for the entire army to … consolidate [North Korea’s] powerful self-defense capabilities for overwhelming any hostile forces,” according to the KCNA report. The news agency also announced that North Korean officials had examined the country’s overarching war plan and discussed revisions, a rare admission from the country’s normally-secretive defense sector.
Although militarism is a crucial aspect of juche, North Korea’s state ideology prioritizing economic and military self-sufficiency, the country has grown steadily more bellicose over the past eighteen months. Pyongyang has tested a variety of new missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), short-range nuclear-capable missiles, and a new hypersonic missile. In April, Kim publicly called on the Korean People’s Army to “bolster up their strength in every way to annihilate the enemy.”
The North Korean government’s expansion on tests could be related to the election of Yoon Suk-yeol, a South Korean hardliner who has pledged to take a hard line against Pyongyang, to the South Korean presidency. In marked contrast to his liberal predecessor in office, Moon Jae-in, Yoon has publicly criticized negotiations with the North as a wasted effort and has vowed that South Korea would respond in kind to North Korean provocations, including through reciprocal missile tests.
Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.
Image: Reuters.
5. Yoon departs for Spain to attend NATO summit
Another opportunity for President Yoon to implement his vision of Korea "stepping up" on the global stage.
(LEAD) Yoon departs for Spain to attend NATO summit | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with Yoon's departure in lead; CHANGES headline)
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, June 27 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol departed for Spain on Monday to attend a NATO summit and meet with world leaders to discuss security and economic issues on his first overseas trip as president.
South Korea is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but has been invited as a partner nation, along with Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Yoon will be the first South Korean president to attend a NATO summit.
On the sidelines, Yoon plans to hold a three-way summit Wednesday with U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, the first such gathering in four years and nine months since the last meeting was held in September 2017.
However, an anticipated one-on-one meeting with Kishida will not take place, officials said, as protracted rows over historical disputes, such as wartime forced labor and sexual slavery, still weigh on relations between the two countries.
Other events Yoon plans to attend in Madrid include bilateral summits with the leaders of Finland, NATO, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Denmark, the Czech Republic and Britain; a gala dinner hosted by Spanish King Felipe and Queen Letizia on Tuesday; a dinner with South Korean residents in Spain on Wednesday; and a lunch meeting with Spanish businesspeople on Thursday.
First lady Kim Keon-hee will travel together with Yoon.
Yoon's attendance at the NATO summit will achieve three purposes, including strengthening the "value alliance" based on a liberal democracy with the 30 NATO member states and partner nations, according to National Security Adviser Kim Sung-han.
The president will also build the foundation for a "comprehensive security network" with NATO states and explore ways to effectively respond to emerging security threats, such as cyber and aerospace threats, and climate change, Kim told reporters last week.
On the occasion of the NATO summit, South Korea has announced plans to establish a mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium, where the organization is headquartered.
During the series of bilateral summits, Yoon will discuss economic issues, such as nuclear power, semiconductors and renewable energy; seek international support for South Korea's bid to host the 2030 World Expo in Busan; and strengthen cooperation over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, presidential officials said.
In addition, Yoon is expected to have pull-aside meetings with the president of the European Commission, and the leaders of Canada and Romania.
No bilateral meeting, including a pull-aside, is planned between Yoon and Kishida, as it is unlikely to produce results, presidential officials said, noting the two countries have yet to hold detailed talks on their historical disputes since the Yoon administration took office on May 10.
The possibility of a bilateral summit was a focus of media attention as it would have been the first between the two countries in 2 1/2 years.
In his speech to NATO members and partner nations on Wednesday, Yoon will recall the history of cooperation between South Korea and NATO since the two sides established a partnership in 2006, presidential officials said.
He will also talk about Europe's evolving security goals and areas for cooperation between South Korea and NATO states on emerging security issues, and call for NATO's interest and cooperation with regard to North Korea's nuclear issue.
First lady Kim will take part in an official program for spouses, including visits to the Royal Palace of La Granja de San Ildefonso, a glass factory and the Reina Sofia Museum.
National Security Adviser Kim will stay behind in Seoul, given the security situation amid concern about a possible North Korean nuclear test.
In the event North Korea carries out such a provocation while Yoon is out of the country, the government has prepared immediate to mid- to long-term response measures under every scenario, including who will preside over a National Security Council meeting in Seoul and how the president will connect virtually, presidential officials said.
The president will return to Seoul on Friday.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. N. Korea all set for nuke test, timing to come as 'no surprise,' S. Korean minister says
I guess the Yoon administration has decided to use the Ministry of UNification for statements on all things related to north Korea. That is really too bad. Who is planning for Korean unification? They need to change the name to the Ministry of Inter-Korean affairs and create another organization that can do the heavy lifting for planning for unification.
(LEAD) N. Korea all set for nuke test, timing to come as 'no surprise,' S. Korean minister says | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with minister's remarks in paras 5-12; RECONSTRUCTS)
SEOUL, June 27 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Kwon Young-se said Monday it would be "no surprise" to see North Korea carry out a nuclear test anytime soon.
His remarks came amid reports the secretive nation has completed related preparations and is waiting for leader Kim Jong-un's call.
Speaking to members of the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club in Seoul, Kwon cited the North's emphasis on taking a hard-line approach of "power for power and head-on contest" it placed during a plenary session of the Workers' Party earlier this month.
"It will not come as a surprise, even if North Korea conducts a nuclear test at any time," he said, raising the need to closely monitor Pyongyang's activities in comprehensive consideration of the situations, including its COVID-19 handling and response to an "acute enteric epidemic" outbreak.
The minister reiterated that "to recap in a sentence, only a political decision remains," as the North has finished all preparations.
"But the North itself may be gauging domestic and external situations (to determine the timing) so as to maximize the effect of a nuclear test," he said.
Kwon stressed the need for China and other countries to advise the North to refrain from conducting a nuclear test and warned the North would face "tremendous" criticism should it carry out the test.
Touching on the recent trend of the North's nuclear arms development, Kwon said the regime appears to be hoping to have offensive capabilities against both the South and the United States.
He was referring to the North's recent push to develop more advanced short-range ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear arms in an apparent shift from its earlier focus on long-range missiles and strategic nuclear arms that are seen as targeting the U.S.
"Having said that, I would like to point out that those who have said the North's nuclear arms do not target the South are wrong," he said.
Kwon also addressed a question about whether the recent decision by the North's ruling Workers' Party's Central Military Commission to add operational duties of frontline units could lead to a breach of the 2018 inter-Korean military tension reduction agreement.
"I believe the decisions at the committee run counter to the spirit of the Sept. 19 military agreement," he said.
In addition, the minister said the North is seeking to exploit the growing rivalry between the U.S. and China, as well as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in an attempt to alter "the status quo" in regional security via its nuclear development.
"Such a change poses a very serious and fundamental challenge for us in our path toward achieving peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula through North Korea's denuclearization and normalization of inter-Korean relations," he said.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. S. Korea's nuclear envoy meets U.S. Treasury official handling N. Korea sanctions
Sustained high level engagement with our allies.
Yes we can do more to enforce sanctions but the key is that there can be no sanctions relief in the face of the regime's political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy. Every day that sanctions remain in effect is a continued failure of the Kim family regime strategy.
S. Korea's nuclear envoy meets U.S. Treasury official handling N. Korea sanctions | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, June 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top nuclear envoy met Monday with a senior U.S. Treasury Department official in charge of sanctioning North Korea and supporters of its weapons of mass destruction programs.
Consultations between Kim Gunn, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs at the foreign ministry, and Brian Nelson, undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, in Seoul came amid speculation that Pyongyang may soon carry out a nuclear test. Nelson heads the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, which administers and enforces many U.S. sanctions programs.
"The two sides shared the same view that North Korea's development of nuclear and missile program will only lead to stronger deterrence by South Korea and the U.S. and its deeper isolation from the international community," Kim's ministry said in a press release.
They agreed the North will face tougher international sanctions if it refuses to accept dialogue offers and continues provocative acts, it added.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
8. S. Korea, U.S. to hold in joint cyber drill for first time in October
Excellent.
S. Korea, U.S. to hold in joint cyber drill for first time in October
Posted June. 27, 2022 08:01,
Updated June. 27, 2022 08:01
S. Korea, U.S. to hold in joint cyber drill for first time in October. June. 27, 2022 08:01. by Kyu-Jin Shin newjin@donga.com.
The South Korean military will be participating in a U.S.-led joint cyber military drill for the first time in October as a follow-up measure to the Seoul-Washington summit in May. Starting next year, the military will also take part in the world’s largest joint cyber military drill, which is coordinated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
According to Rep. Kang Dae-shik of the ruling People Power Party, at Washington’s request, the South Korean military will participate in the ‘Cyber Flag’ military drill coordinated by the U.S. Cyber Command, which will take place in Virginia, the U.S. in October. The South Korean military will deploy some 20 soldiers to the drill, which is train participants from Japan, the U.K., Canada and Australia on capabilities to jointly respond to attacks on networks and major infrastructure facilities.
In a joint statement following their summit last month, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden said, “South Korea and the U.S. will significantly expand cooperation to cope with cyber threats from North Korea, including state-backed cyberattacks.” The joint statement included the term ‘cyber’ as many as 10 times. As the two leaders shared the consensus that response to cyberattacks and related technology cooperation is increasingly important, the South Korean military has started to significantly broaden cyber security cooperation with allies.
The South Korean military is also set to regularly participate in the world’s largest joint cyber military drill coordinated by the NATO joint defense center. After partaking as an observer in ‘Cyber Coalition’ in November, which will involve participants from NATO member states and partner countries including the U.S. and Japan, the South Korean military plans to officially participate in the drill from next year. South Korea has taken part as an observer only twice (2017 and 2019) in the drill, which is designed for participants to share cyber strategy, tactics and related information.
In order to galvanize information sharing and threat assessment between South Korea and the U.S. the two countries agreed to form a regular consultative meeting on cyber military operation. The two sides also agreed to push for a joint drill on cybercrime response between the U.S. Air Force special investigation bureau and the South Korean Defense Ministry’s defense investigation headquarters in December as part of efforts to strengthen cooperation between military investigation agencies.
“To cope with cyber threats that continue to increase every year, South Korea needs to proactively promote and expand cooperation with allies including the U.S.,” Rep. Kang said. “We also should establish an environment where talented military cyber personnel can demonstrate their full capabilities without reservation at most appropriate positions.”
9. President Yoon joins NATO summit
Interesting OpEd.
Conclusion:
In an era defined by a series of great shift where the international community is divided by values and ideologies while even the trends of an economic decoupling are taking place, it is not the right way to go to stay vague and indecisive diplomatically. The Yoon administration put its relationship with the West at the center of its diplomatic strategy. However, it cannot guarantee national interests merely by following the liberal international order. Each participating state in the upcoming summit will strive for their own national interests although they are part of the meeting based on common values shared across the alliance in the West. The NATO summit is hoped to give President Yoon, who is still new to the diplomatic arena, a great opportunity to build a hands-on experience with a lesson to be learned.
President Yoon joins NATO summit
Posted June. 27, 2022 07:59,
Updated June. 27, 2022 07:59
President Yoon joins NATO summit. June. 27, 2022 07:59. .
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol is scheduled to leave for Madrid in Spain on Monday to join the 2022 NATO Summit from Wednesday to Thursday. He will become the first South Korean president to attend a NATO summit as the organization has sent an invitation to four Asia-Pacific countries – South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. His itinerary includes a trilateral meeting with the United States and Japan and bilateral talks with many global leaders. President Yoon is unlikely to have a bilateral meeting with his Japanese counterpart and a multilateral talk with the leaders from the Asia-Pacific Region, according to South Korea’s presidential office.
President Yoon’s joining of the forthcoming NATO summit holds great significance in that it is his first presidential visit overseas to communicate and interact with multiple international leaders. The summit is line with the Yoon administration’s diplomatic basis of laying the foundation as a “global pivotal state” by expanding diplomatic power that is commensurate with its 10th largest economy in the world. Equally importantly, it also serves as an extended global platform of “value alliance” that has been strengthened since the KORUS summit right after President Yoon’s inauguration.
Nevertheless, opportunities come with risks. The summit of the military alliance among Western nations opens at a time when Russia’s invasion into Ukraine has lasted more than four months while the power struggle between the United States and China is escalating to have an all-encompassing impact across the globe. Added to this, the NATO leaders in Madrid plan to discuss a new version of the Strategic Concept that is updated for every 10 years, which is expected to include initiatives to respond to the challenges arising from Russia and China. Beijing already seems displeased with such a move, saying, “We firmly oppose any act that instigate division and confrontation.”
The South Korean government may automatically feel a diplomatic burden on its shoulders as it attends a meeting of the alliance among the Western countries in the new era of Cold War. However, the presidential office made it clear that President Yoon’s participation in the NATO summit is irrelevant to the nation’s likelihood of leaning toward policies against Russia and China. This may also explain why the administration focuses on a higher level of integrity based on values and liberal democracy while making a pragmatic effort to build a comprehensive security network for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and enhance bilateral diplomatic relationships in semiconductors and nuclear technology.
In an era defined by a series of great shift where the international community is divided by values and ideologies while even the trends of an economic decoupling are taking place, it is not the right way to go to stay vague and indecisive diplomatically. The Yoon administration put its relationship with the West at the center of its diplomatic strategy. However, it cannot guarantee national interests merely by following the liberal international order. Each participating state in the upcoming summit will strive for their own national interests although they are part of the meeting based on common values shared across the alliance in the West. The NATO summit is hoped to give President Yoon, who is still new to the diplomatic arena, a great opportunity to build a hands-on experience with a lesson to be learned.
10. Seoul offered to repatriate North Koreans against their will before Pyongyang demanded it, lawmaker says
This is terrible. A shame. It should not have happened.
Seoul offered to repatriate North Koreans against their will before Pyongyang demanded it, lawmaker says
In this Nov. 8, 2019, file photo, South Korea's Navy tows a boat used by two North Korean fishermen before handing it over to North Korean authorities. Courtesy of Unification Ministry
By Jung Min-ho
The previous Moon Jae-in administration offered to repatriate two North Korean fishermen in 2019 even before Pyongyang made such a request, because "their intention to defect (to the South) was not sincere," according to intelligence documents.
The information was revealed Monday by Rep. Tae Yong-ho of the ruling People Power Party (PPP).
After the deportation decision ― the first such case since the end of the Korean War (1950-53) ― the fishermen were probably executed soon afterward, and the previous administration knew that would be the consequence, Tae claimed.
On Nov. 2, 2019, South Korea's Navy captured the men in their 20s in waters off the nation's east coast. After just three days of investigation, the South Korean government proposed sending them and their boat back to the North, which Pyongyang accepted the next day (Nov. 6). The deportation was completed in the two days that followed.
The National Security Office (NSO) at the time claimed that the decision was necessary as the two fishermen were "brutal criminals on the run," citing the investigation results that they conspired with a third man to kill the boat's "abusive" captain and 15 others at sea before arriving in the South's waters.
Rep. Tae Yong-ho of the ruling People Power Party / Newsis
Some critics cast doubt on the claims that the two were able to kill that many people on the small boat. In another move that fostered such doubts, the intelligence agency asked health authorities to disinfect the boat ― the most critical evidence of their alleged crimes. The authorities said it was part of government measures to prevent the spread of the African swine fever virus. But former PPP lawmaker Kim Jin-tae said that such disinfection amounted to blatant destruction of evidence, which would be needed in the event of a trial.
Rep. An Byung-gil of the PPP said it was the only disinfection request made by the intelligence agency between June 2019 and December 2020 and that the claim that it was necessary to disinfect the vessel is not credible.
"Facts are emerging over the relations between the five-year Moon administration and the North Korean elite," An said in a statement.
Even if the fishermen's crimes are in fact true ― which cannot be determined without a fair trial ― the Constitution requires the government to treat North Korean defectors as citizens. Critics say there are no legal grounds for sending North Koreans to a place it de facto has no control over.
When the news broke out about the decision, human rights organizations including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International criticized the South Korean government, accusing it of violating international human rights treaties.
The story could have been kept a secret if a photographer had not captured the phone message sent by an Army officer to a senior official at the National Security Office.
Last week, President Yoon Suk-yeol suggested that his administration may reinvestigate the case, saying many people wondered what really happened.
11. Ex-NSO chief denies allegation he 'fled' to US
Excerpts:
"At the time of the incident, I did everything to take necessary measures in accordance with the principles… I hope that the facts will be revealed clearly," he wrote.
His remarks come amid allegations from Rep. Ha Tae-keung of the ruling People Power Party that he had hurriedly gone to the United States on a tourist visa to avoid investigation. Suh denied the claim, saying that he went there upon the previously arranged invitation of a U.S. think tank.
Ha, the head of the party's special committee on the issue, called Suh Hoon, who served as director of the NSO and was an official on the National Security Council (NSC) during the previous administration, "a key person" behind the Defense Ministry's abrupt shift in its position on the death.
Ex-NSO chief denies allegation he 'fled' to US
In this Feb. 1, 2021, file photo, then National Security Adviser Suh Hoon attends a meeting at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul. Suh has been accused of having played a role in pressuring the Ministry of Defense to change its official position on the killing of a South Korean official by the North Korean military in North Korean waters two years ago. Korea Times photo by Wang Tae-suk
Family of official killed by North Korea demands disclosure of classified documents, threatens legal action against Moon
By Jung Min-ho
Suh Hoon, the former chief of the National Security Office (NSO) accused of having pressured the Ministry of Defense to obfuscate the facts behind the killing of a fisheries official in North Korea's waters two years ago, said Monday that he will cooperate with investigators if necessary.
In a statement he sent to Yonhap News Agency, Suh said that he had no intention of avoiding an investigation to find out the truth behind the case, claiming he had followed government principles in handling it.
"At the time of the incident, I did everything to take necessary measures in accordance with the principles… I hope that the facts will be revealed clearly," he wrote.
His remarks come amid allegations from Rep. Ha Tae-keung of the ruling People Power Party that he had hurriedly gone to the United States on a tourist visa to avoid investigation. Suh denied the claim, saying that he went there upon the previously arranged invitation of a U.S. think tank.
Ha, the head of the party's special committee on the issue, called Suh Hoon, who served as director of the NSO and was an official on the National Security Council (NSC) during the previous administration, "a key person" behind the Defense Ministry's abrupt shift in its position on the death.
According to the ministry's documents disclosed Saturday, the ministry changed its position from "(North Korea's) brutality of burning the body confirmed," to, "a joint probe needed for what is speculated as the burning of the body," after the NSC's request to review the material on Sept. 27, 2020. It was seen as a significant turn of events in the description of the incident, which the ministry had said just three days before was committed by North Korean soldiers.
"I believe Suh and former NSC Deputy Director Suh Choo-suk are the key people behind it," Ha said during an MBC radio interview.
The lawmaker argued that it was strange that Suh went to the U.S. on a tourist visa instead of on a J-1 visa ― which is issued to visitors of foreign nationality for participation in exchange visitor programs ― given that it is the type of visa former high-ranking government officials often obtain. Ha said Suh might have been in a hurry.
Ha urged Suh Hoon to explain what really happened during the incident on Sept. 22, 2020, and in the days that followed, including why the ministry accepted North Korea's unilateral claims despite what it found via surveillance equipment and if there was any pressure from a higher authority such as the NSC.
"There was no evidence provided by the North … Yet, its words were accepted and the ministry was told to change its position," he said. "It was a serious disturbance of national discipline."
Meanwhile, Lee Rae-jin, the elder brother of the late fisheries official, Dae-joon, and his lawyer met Rep. Woo Sang-ho, the interim leader of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) on Monday.
During the meeting, Lee demanded that Woo cooperate with the disclosure of the sealed documents that have information about the death of his brother. Lee urged the DPK leader to cooperate with the ruling party to pass the motion to disclose the information, specifically about the details of the NSC meeting held on Sept. 23, 2020, a day after his brother was killed, while giving specific deadlines for the parliamentary action. First, Lee said that the DPK must adopt the motion by July 4 and then it must work with other parties to pass it no later than July 13.
If these deadlines are not met, Lee said he would take legal action against former President Moon Jae-in. In the closed-door meeting between Lee and DPK leaders, the two sides are known to have failed to reach an agreement.
12. North Korea says U.S. is setting up Asian NATO; vows stronger defence
Privately north Korean officials at the Propaganda and Agitation Department applaud this so they can use this as another line of propaganda attack.
North Korea says U.S. is setting up Asian NATO; vows stronger defence
© Reuters/Denis Balibouse FILE PHOTO - A North Korean flag flies on a mast at the Permanent Mission of North Korea in Geneva
By Hyonhee Shin
SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea has accused the United States of setting up a military alliance like NATO in Asia, saying the unwavering U.S. aim to oust North Korea's government compelled it to develop stronger defences.
The North Korean criticism comes amid concern it could be preparing its first nuclear test in five years and after a recent agreement between South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden to deploy more U.S. weapons if deemed necessary to deter the North.
"While blatantly holding joint military exercises with Japan and South Korea, the United States is making a full-fledged move to establish an Asia-style NATO," North Korea's foreign ministry said in a statement on its website on Sunday.
It was referring to recent military exercises conducted by U.S., South Korean and Japanese forces. The United States also held exercises with South Korean forces that involved a U.S. aircraft carrier, for the first time in more than four years.
North Korea, which has been conducting regular missile tests this year, repeated its assertion that such drills were preparation for war aimed at overthrowing it.
"This proves the hypocrisy of the U.S. rhetoric of 'diplomatic engagement' and 'dialogue without preconditions', while at the same time revealing again that there is no change in the U.S. ambition to overthrow our system by force," the North Korean ministry said.
It did not refer explicitly to its nuclear or missile programmes but said U.S. hostility compelled it to develop its defences.
"The reality ... makes us feel the need to make all-out efforts to develop even stronger power to be able to subdue all kinds of hostile acts by the United States," it said.
The United States is insisting that North Korea give up its nuclear weapons and has repeatedly offered to meet North Korean officials "at any time without preconditions" to discuss the issue. North Korea has rebuffed the offers.
The North Korean criticism came a day before South Korea's president left to attend a NATO summit in Spain, the first South Korean leader to do so.
South Korea, aiming to strengthen its partnership with NATO and play a bigger global security role, plans to set up a delegation to NATO at its Brussels headquarters, South Korea's national security adviser said last week.
(Reporting by Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Robert Birsel)
13. North Korea issues nationwide heavy rain alert for this week
Another natural disaster contributes to the suffering of the Korean people in the north.
North Korea issues nationwide heavy rain alert for this week
A truck drives on a flooded road, as North Korean state media reports heavy rains pounding the country's western regions, including Sariwon and Nampo cities, June 26. Yonhap North Korea's state weather agency issued a heavy rain alert Monday for most regions this week, and state-controlled media called for thorough measures to prevent damage from summer downpours.
The State Hydro-Meteorological Administration issued the warning, effective from Monday afternoon through Thursday, for all areas nationwide, except for the northeastern provinces of Ryanggang and North Hamgyong and the northern border city of Rason, according to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station.
It added the western provinces of South and North Hwanghae and the city of Gaeseong near the inter-Korean border are forecast to see up to 300 millimeters of rain until Thursday.
The previous day, the North's media reported that heavy rains and strong winds had pounded Pyongyang and other western parts of the nation. Heavy rains in impoverished North Korea often cause huge damage to its agricultural and other sectors largely due to poor drainage, deforestation and dilapidated infrastructure.
This year's summer rainy season is expected to begin this week in the country amid speculation that it may also affect the secretive regime's schedule for another underground nuclear weapon test in the northeastern mountainous area of Punggye-ri.
"(We) need to prevent damages from floods and heavy rain in all sectors of the people's economy and take thorough measures to normalize production," the country's main newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun stressed in a front-page editorial. (Yonhap)
14. Yoon's strategic and tactical dilemmas
I fail to see how the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula will prevent north Korean blackmail diplomacy.
Excerpts:
Against this backdrop of a changed security context on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea would find it difficult to escape becoming North Korea's virtual security hostage, finding itself subject to all kinds of demands and blackmail from the North.
While the above scenario may fortunately be unlikely, it is not however inconceivable. National security matters should always assume the worst-case scenario. In order to prevent this nightmare from becoming a reality, South Korea and the U.S. need to further materialize a substantial deterrence strategy with detailed action plans in preparation for the North's military provocations in the form of localized warfare.
It is thus difficult to comprehend why Yoon has drawn a clear line ruling out the possible redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. His refusal to consider this option appears to be strategically and diplomatically short-sighted and foolish.
Yoon's strategic and tactical dilemmas
By Park Jung-won
At the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 5, which stipulates that if one member state is invaded, all other member states should automatically intervene for its protection. It is this clause that led some Eastern European countries to join NATO, having felt threatened by Russia's military revival under President Vladimir Putin, a leader obsessed with nostalgia for the former Soviet Union.
It is also the power of Article 5 that has left Ukraine regretful for not having joined NATO, and that has now made Sweden and Finland eager to join NATO as soon as possible. For South Korea, however, there is no such automatic intervention clause in its military alliance treaty with the United States.
President Yoon Suk-yeol's participation, albeit only as leader of a partner country, in the NATO Summit to be held in Madrid on June 29 and 30 is undoubtedly a sign of South Korea's growing diplomatic status. As the confrontation between "dictatorial countries" and "democratic countries" intensifies at the same time as military and political ties among dictatorial countries are consolidating, South Korea can benefit from deterring immediate threats from North Korea and future threats from China by strengthening its alliances through the resumption of trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan and enhancing its relationship with NATO.
North Korea has declared by implication that it could preemptively use nuclear weapons against South Korea in serious security situations. Considering that South Korea is unable to retaliate proportionately to the graveness of the North's nuclear threat, it is necessary to open and utilize a channel of dialogue with NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to secure a consensus on the possible redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.
North Korea's indiscriminate advancement of its nuclear arsenal and continued missile-test provocations have been proceeding without any institutional constraint of further sanctions, as the U.N. Security Council has become virtually incapacitated due to the non-cooperation of China and Russia since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un presided over a Workers' Party session recently and reaffirmed the principle of "power for power and head-on contest." North Korea's seventh nuclear test will only be a matter of time, with a high likelihood that the test will be for a tactical rather than strategic nuclear weapon that is mainly aimed at South Korea, instead of the U.S.
In particular, after the North's seventh nuclear test demonstrates its level of sophistication, if South Korea and the U.S. do not provide any carrot to engage Pyongyang substantially, North Korea will most likely begin limited local provocations against South Korea's territory to attract their attention. This could take the extreme form of occupying one of the five islands in the West Sea in a surprise invasion.
If South Korea and the U.S. did not react appropriately to such military aggression (amid the North's implied threat that it could use tactical nuclear weapons), then just as when the Lee Myung-bak administration failed to retaliate proportionately against the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, what further moves the North might make if it perceives no credible deterrence is an open question.
South Korea could end up facing a very similar situation to that of Ukraine, which is currently being pressured by some of its allies to negotiate peace with Russia against its will. Such negotiations would likely feature some South Korean allies taking sympathetic positions toward the North in order to avoid an all-out military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.
In this process, Choe Son-hui, North Korea's foreign minister who is familiar with the U.S., would play a crucial role in dealing with Washington, and Ri Son-gwon, the head of the North's ruling party's united front department, who is described as having a very aggressive temperament, would deal with South Korea.
Ri would likely treat his Southern counterpart with a very combative attitude. South Korea's stock market could plummet as a state of total panic ensues. China would also pretend to lull North Korea at this stage, while U.S. forces stationed in the South would be reluctant to retaliate against the North. North Korea would then publicize that the U.S. had no choice but to continue its passive stance under the circumstances because of the threat of tactical nuclear weapons wielded by the North.
Even if North Korean special forces withdrew from the occupied island after peace negotiations, it would represent a tremendous victory for the North by proving its substantial military superiority over the South. In other words, if this scenario were to actually happen, the nature of any negotiations with the North would change, such that the focus would be on deterring the North's immediate further provocation rather than its eventual complete denuclearization.
Against this backdrop of a changed security context on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea would find it difficult to escape becoming North Korea's virtual security hostage, finding itself subject to all kinds of demands and blackmail from the North.
While the above scenario may fortunately be unlikely, it is not however inconceivable. National security matters should always assume the worst-case scenario. In order to prevent this nightmare from becoming a reality, South Korea and the U.S. need to further materialize a substantial deterrence strategy with detailed action plans in preparation for the North's military provocations in the form of localized warfare.
It is thus difficult to comprehend why Yoon has drawn a clear line ruling out the possible redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. His refusal to consider this option appears to be strategically and diplomatically short-sighted and foolish.
Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.
15. Diplomatic test for Yoon
The subtitle of this OpEd is the problem. For some the kowtowing to China is baked into their DNA.
Now is the time for South Korea to step up and not try to walk the tightrope between the PRC and the US. It must stand up for its interests and values and kowtowing to China is not one of them.
Diplomatic test for Yoon
Be careful not to take anti-China stance
President Yoon Suk-yeol will make his multilateral diplomatic debut when he attends a NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, June 29 and 30. Yet he needs to take a pragmatic, but careful approach toward security cooperation with NATO as the summit offers both opportunities and challenges for Korea.
National Security Office (NSO) Director Kim Sung-han said that Yoon's attendance at the summit will achieve three purposes. The first is to strengthen the "value-based solidarity" with the 30 NATO member nations to promote common values such as democracy and human rights. The second is to lay the groundwork for a "comprehensive security network" with the transatlantic alliance. The third is to find ways to better cope with emerging security threats, including cyber and aerospace threats as well as climate change. Korea plans to set up a mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium.
More importantly, Yoon is expected to call for NATO's help in dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons program. It is necessary for Seoul to work more closely with the United States and other NATO members in prodding Pyongyang to move toward denuclearization, peace and stability. He will also discuss how to step up economic collaboration with the organization in such fields as nuclear energy, semiconductors and renewable energy. In addition, he plans to make a pitch for South Korea's bid to host the 2030 World Expo in Busan.
There are high hopes that Yoon will expand the country's diplomatic horizons by actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy during the summit. He is scheduled to have a three-way summit with U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. The meeting, if held, will be the first of its kind in four years and nine months. However, a much-anticipated bilateral meeting between Yoon and Kishida will not be held due to the continuing conflicts over thorny historical issues such as wartime forced labor and sex slavery. This could have negative implications over Yoon's efforts to mend ties with Japan.
We hope Yoon will produce successful results from the NATO summit to ensure our country's security and ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. But we cannot be all optimistic because the summit will take place against the backdrop of a new Cold War between Western democracies and their rivals ― China and Russia. The NATO members are likely to adopt a new strategic concept to expand its role beyond the North Atlantic region to respond to threats from China in the Asia-Pacific. This concept is in keeping with Biden's efforts to expand the international coalition against Beijing.
Last week, Beijing and Washington exchanged barbs over the NATO summit. China's foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin expressed Beijing's objection to four Asia-Pacific countries ― South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand ― taking part in the summit as partner nations. He said the Asia-Pacific is beyond the geographical scope of the North Atlantic. In response, U.S. National Security Council coordinator John Kirby said that China does not have the authority to veto which international meetings Korea should attend, adding that the summit is not about creating an "Asian version of NATO."
The Korean presidential office said Yoon's attendance at the summit has nothing to do with any anti-China policy, dismissing Beijing's objection. Seoul needs to do more to make sure that Yoon's diplomatic debut at the NATO gathering does not represent an anti-China stance. Now Yoon faces a daunting task of strengthening Korea's alliance with the U.S. and partnership with NATO without drawing a backlash from China amid the escalating superpower rivalry.
16. Can Nuclear Energy Power South Korea’s Future?
South Korea is a nuclear (energy) power.
Can Nuclear Energy Power South Korea’s Future?
President Yoon wants nuclear energy to catapult South Korea to carbon neutrality and international prestige. But a rough road lies ahead.
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Nuclear energy has a checkered history in South Korea. Along with gender parity, housing solutions, and COVID-19 relief, support for nuclear power plants has defined political fault lines. While over 70 percent of conservatives favor expansion of nuclear energy, almost 70 percent of progressives do not. In fact, one popular survey uses responders’ stance on a nuclear question as one of the barometers for determining their political and ideological affiliations.
Conservatives regard nuclear energy as showcasing the nation’s technological prowess, pointing to boosted exports and a quicker path to carbon neutrality. Former President Lee Myung-bak touted Korean nuclear technology as “our future breadwinner” and secured a deal in 2009 to deploy four reactors to the United Arab Emirates. Back then, his ambition was to pave the way for exporting 80 nuclear reactors abroad by 2030.
Progressives, on the other hand, have laid their eyes on the seamier sides of nuclear power. Poor environmental records, safety fraud, and racketeering have long plagued South Korea’s nuclear industry. Former President Moon Jae-in, a liberal elected in 2017, launched his signature nuclear phase-out policy.
Shortly after his induction, Moon put a moratorium on the ongoing expansion of Kori, the country’s largest nuclear complex, only to accede later to a decision by a civil jury to revive the construction of two more plants. Still, he scrapped the scheduled addition of two reactors at Hanul, the country’s second largest nuclear plant. Under his administration, Kori 1 went into belated retirement after 40 years of operation, and Wolseong 1 met a premature closure. During the five years of Moon’s presidency, the proportion of electricity derived from nuclear energy dropped from almost 30 percent to 26.5 percent. If that trajectory continued, the figure was expected to crater to 6 percent by 2050.
But now, the nuclear sector is experiencing a surge of optimism as President Yoon Suk Yeol, Moon’s successor as of May, pledged to turn the country into a “nuclear reactor superpower.” Yoon’s energy proposal plans for the expansion of Shin Hanul and extension of the operating life of 18 nuclear power plants. Should everything go as planned, nuclear power would cover up to 35 percent of South Korea’s energy consumption by 2030. The incremental transition to nuclear energy, Yoon expects, would alleviate South Korea’s dependence on fossil fuels for almost two-thirds of its energy consumption. Besides its role in helping achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, his energy policy is further driven by volatile oil prices, disruption of natural gas supplies, and the concomitant need for energy independence.
Yoon is keeping tabs on foreign markets, too. The Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) will soon initiate a “Project for Building Nuclear Export Foundation,” which includes funding nuclear energy conferences and exhibitions as well as facilitating export processes. Narrowing its focus, the ministry also plans to set up a state-civilian “prep task force” for country-specific packages that would help clinch foreign contracts.
In late May, U.S. President Joe Biden and Yoon affirmed their commitment to “greater nuclear energy collaboration and accelerating the development and global deployment of advanced reactors and small modular reactors by jointly using export promotion and capacity building tools.” Nuclear technology constitutes an important part of Yoon’s desire for South Korea to become a “global pivotal state” based on a stronger stance against regional rivals. Specifically, Yoon enrolled in the U.S.-led Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology program and the Indo-Pacific Framework for Prosperity, designed to better secure supply chains among allies. They are largely meant to contain and compete against China, Russia, and North Korea, all of whom have vested interests in nuclear technology.
South Korea’s nuclear industry welcomed the recent development as “a renaissance” for the struggling sector. As Europe copes with energy scarcity due to the Russo-Ukrainian war and looks for alternatives to Russian gas, nuclear experts expect South Korea-U.S. collaboration to give Korea a regional foothold. The head of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power visited Finland in mid-June to convince the Nordic country to adopt South Korean reactors as the latter strives to wean itself off Russian energy and raise nuclear power from 34 percent to 60 percent of its total energy output. The Yoon administration also hopes to woo Saudi Arabia, which has been keeping its eyes open for foreign reactors. In the meantime, the UAE’s praise of the Korean-built Barakah power plants as “a crucial project that fostered the UAE into a major producer of clean energy” promotes South Korea’s nuclear stature.
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Despite high hopes, a bumpy road lies ahead for Yoon and his favorite industry. Of immediate concern is finding sites to handle and dispose of spent fuel. Inside a nuclear reactor, uranium undergoes a fission process, the splitting energy of which transforms into electricity. A portion of the byproducts and the remaining uranium end up as high-level radioactive waste. This infernally hot and penetrating radiation requires sophisticated handling and shielding to prevent radioactive contamination.
MOTIE notes, however, that indigenous nuclear plants currently store their spent fuel in temporary on-site facilities due to repeated failures to find suitable locations for disposal. Starting from 2031, the reactors will reach their temporary storage capacity one by one. Even if the Yoon administration manages to convince any towns to host waste sites, there are more hurdles. Since the authorities are accustomed only to makeshift on-site handling, the ministry report continues, there is a pressing need to procure transportation, storage, and disposal techniques, and extra technicians.
Yet wherever government agencies propose to build a permanent waste disposal site, the attempts have failed either because of residents’ angry (and at times violent) resistance or environmental inspections. This way in the past, the government spent 19 years settling on a location for South Korea’s one and only disposal site near Gyeongju. Even this is a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste facility; opposition to what the industry requires, a storage site for high-level radioactive waste, would be fiercer. MOTIE estimates that the installation and initial operation of a permanent high-level waste complex could take up to 37 years. Well before that, South Korea’s nuclear plants would already be neck-deep in on-site waste.
Meanwhile, South Korea’s small territory and high population density exacerbate not only the public perception but also the consequences of potential accidents. With the average east-west width of the country standing at approximately 300 km, any radioactive disasters technically would affect the entire population. Plus, due to its proximity to a juncture of four tectonic plates, South Korea sustains around 70 earthquakes on a yearly basis.
Geographic constraints and residents’ aversion to nuclear projects forced the government to concentrate its reactors into the southeastern corner of the peninsula. The region already exhibits the world’s highest concentration of nuclear plants per area, which makes it more susceptible to collective nuclear melting. Its two largest quakes in history have already rattled the region, but luckily neither was in the vicinity of the nuclear power plants.
In March, a wildfire blazed near Hanul’s switchyard, which controls electricity generation and transmission, paralyzing some power lines. A blackout disaster was averted only by dispatching most of the local fire trucks to the nuclear plants at the expense of wildlife and civilian residences. Nationally televised footage of the calamity hurt the nuclear energy sector’s public image. As wildfires and storms are likely to be more frequent due to climate change, and since most of the plants nestle in mountainous terrains along the eastern shoreline, some voice concerns that South Korea may become the next Fukushima.
During the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, a megaquake demolished power lines and the ensuing tsunami flooded backup generators. In the absence of electricity to cool all three reactors, the nuclear cores began to melt – to this day, it remains unclear just how bad the damage was. Just as the incident turned global opinion against nuclear energy at the time, South Korea’s worsening natural disasters could easily sway more people to oppose the government’s nuclear endeavors.
Other problems arise from within. The industry is still riddled with lack of transparency, corruption, and racketeering, which raises the question of safety. For instance, Uljin, a coastal town in the eastern part of the peninsula and home to eight reactors, has experienced around a hundred accidents since 1988. Confronted by a local civilian observing body over spiking radiation, authorities used to belittle such phenomena as fallout from Chernobyl. In 2013, when a technician pinpointed a structural defect that halved the intended operating life of Hanul’s steam generators, the company in charge sued him for false accusations. The flaw persists today.
Domestic suppliers have forged safety certificates to install counterfeit or inferior components. Government officials are involved in racketeering as well. In exchange for cash, they often overlook or even allow suppliers to omit some parts still tallied up in the contracts. The fact that expensive independent performance tests are hardly carried out and that nobody would catch faults unless there are disasters has enabled such collusion.
Dr Lee Byeong-ryeong, a member of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission with almost 40 years of industrial experience, said that the root cause of the industry’s woes is “the nuclear mafia.” Formed around Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, and the highest authority, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, a small group of people apply lax regulations and monopolize nuclear research and policymaking.
From the “nuclear mafia” to waste disposal, Yoon has a lot to overcome if he wants to secure South Korea’s nuclear future.
Eunwoo Lee
Eunwoo Lee writes on international security and social issues of East Asia.
17. South Korea’s 4.5-gen Falcon fighter set to soar
South Korea’s 4.5-gen Falcon fighter set to soar
KF-21 Boramae’s launch will trim Seoul’s reliance on US and foreign arms while pumping up its own weaponry exports
Having successfully launched a satellite delivery vehicle earlier last week, South Korea’s indigenous aerospace and arms industry is on a surge. Next on the runway: The KF-21 Boramae (”Falcon”) 4.5-generation fighter is gearing up for take-off.
According to Asia Military Review, citing Kookang Ilbo, the official newspaper of South Korea’s Ministry of Defense, the jet has completed 50% of its overall test program and 95% of all ground testing requirements ahead of its maiden flight, scheduled for July.
The US government defines 4.5-generation aircraft as having advanced capabilities, including active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, high-capacity data links, enhanced avionics and the capability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments.
A 4.5-generation fighter is thus not quite up to the standards of fifth-generation stealth fighters like the F-22 and the F-35. Examples of 4.5-generation warbirds include the US F-15E/EX Strike Eagle, the Chinese Chengdu J-10C and Russia’s Sukhoi Su-35.
With the US sensitive about sharing advanced technologies, the KF-21 may be part of Seoul’s efforts to reduce its reliance on foreign arms while also positioning itself as a major manufacturer and exporter of high-end weaponry.
In the latter sense, the KF-21 is a flagship project. Potential buyers are likely to be those nations that seek leading-edge fighters at more reasonable costs than top-tier Western models.
South Korea’s Falcon fighter will soon be ready for flight testing. Image: KAI
South Korea co-produces the KF-21 with Indonesia, with Yonhap reporting that Indonesia has promised to shoulder 20% of the project’s cost of US$7.6 billion.
Earlier, payment issues on Indonesia’s part threatened to derail its participation in the project. However, The Korea Herald reports that South Korea and Indonesia finalized payment terms last November.
“Indonesia will make payments over the next five years until 2026, and 30% of that would be in-kind transfers,” according to South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration.
At the same time, there is a possibility that South Korea’s longtime ally the US may become reluctant to share critical military technologies as Seoul pushes ever-more aggressively into export markets.
In a striking 2013 article, Foreign Policy asked whether South Korea may be secretly stealing US military technology, alleging that Korean manufacturers are known for making upgraded knockoffs of US military equipment.
With regards to technology-sharing agreements, the article quoted an unnamed retired former government official who worked in Seoul as saying, “They are very good at taking full advantage of any loopholes with any type of agreement.”
Foreign Policy also noted that these practices could undercut US arms sales and leak sensitive US technologies. Perhaps. But even a cursory visual examination makes clear that the KF-21 is strikingly similar to the US-made F-35.
South Korea may be positioning the KF-21 as an affordable alternative to Western 4.5- generation fighters on the international market.
According to The National Interest, the KF-21’s $65 million estimated per-unit price puts it above cut-rate light fighters such as the FA-50 – the fighter version of the T-50 jet trainer developed by Korea Aerospace Industries with Lockheed Martin – but two-thirds below the price of advanced Western fighters like the Rafale and Typhoon.
The 19fortyfive military publication notes that the KF-21 will cost half as much to operate as the F-35 that South Korea currently uses. That makes it a potential option for states wishing to acquire advanced air superiority aircraft at a fraction of the cost of Western models.
Then-president Moon Jae-in attends the 2021 roll-out of the KF-21. Image: KAI
Operationally, South Korea envisages its KF-21 flying alongside its existing fleet of F-15Ks, F-35As and allied US assets.
In an article by the Korea Institute of Defense Analysis quoted by the Royal Aeronautical Society, Brigadier-General (Retired) Kwang Sun-jung said that ROKAF doctrine is based on combined ROK-US operations, with the integration of communications systems, combined tactical data communications and weapons commonality.
It is possible that South Korea is building an indigenous high-low fighter configuration for its air force.
If so, the KF-21 is the high-end component that will operate in defended airspace over North Korea. The FA-50 light combat aircraft is the low-end component that will operate in contested airspace over South Korean territory.
The KF-21 represents a serious qualitative overmatch to North Korea’s obsolete and underfunded air force.
“Our government will strengthen capabilities to better implement the US extended deterrence and will dramatically enhance response capabilities of the Republic of Korea military to deter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats,” said South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup, as quoted in the National Interest.
According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), North Korea operates a sizable inventory of more than 400 fighters, 80 light bombers, and more than 200 transports.
However, the fighter force consists of obsolete Soviet-era designs and Chinese copies such as the MiG-17/J-5, MiG 19/J-6, and multiple variants of the MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-29. In addition, IISS states that North Korea cannot pay for fuel and maintenance, while its pilots receive less than 30 hours of flight time annually.
As noted by Asia Military Review, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) is currently conducting ground testing with six KF-21 prototypes and two spares. Low-rate production is aimed to start in 2026 and full-rate production in 2028.
Seoul plans to deploy 40 KF-21s by 2028, with 120 by 2032, which if accomplished would make South Korea the world’s eighth nation to develop an advanced supersonic fighter with its own technology, the Korea Times said in an article.
KAI, the main contractor for the KF-21, mentions that the type will replace the Republic of Korea Air Force’s (ROKAF) aging F-4 and F-5 third-generation fighters.
It describes the KF-21 Boramae as “a fighter aircraft developed to maintain the operational capability of the ROKAF and satisfy the future operation concept … as a multi-role fighter jet which features enhanced survivability, combined/joint operations, sustainment and logistics support system, air superiority, and ground precision strike.”
According to the Korea Times, 719 South Korean businesses are involved in the project, with 65% of the KF-21’s 30,000 parts made in South Korea, with plans to increase this percentage.
Some of these critical parts were identified by Defense News, which include the KF-21’s AESA radar, infrared (IR) search-and-track pod, electronic warfare suite and electro-optical targeting pod.
KAI says the KF-21 has a maximum thrust of 19,950 kilograms, 2,850-kilometer ferry range, 2,250km/h top speed, a 7,700kg maximum payload and a 25,580kg maximum takeoff weight. Defense News reports that two US-made General Electric F414 engines power the jet.
The KF-21 is designed to be compatible with Western and South Korean-made armaments. It can carry 7.6 tons of missiles, bombs, and external fuel tanks distributed between the fuselage and wings, according to an Aviacionline report.
The KF-21 is designed to be compatible with Western and South Korean-made armaments. Image: Twitter
The Royal Aeronautical Society notes that the KF-21 does not have an internal weapons bay; instead, it will carry four MBDA Meteor beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles in semi-recessed fuselage stations.
It will also carry Diehl Defense IRIS-T IR-guided missiles for close range strikes. The KF-21 also features a M61A2 20mm General Dynamics gatling gun with 480 rounds and a 6,000 shot-per-minute rate of fire.
Defense website 19fortyfive specifies the KF-21’s possible air-to-ground armaments, which include the GBU-12 Paveway III and GBU-54 laser-guided bombs, the GPS-guided JDAM and small diameter bomb, and CBU-105 cluster bomb.
For standoff attacks, the KF-21 may employ the HARM anti-radiation missile against enemy radars, the bunker-busting Swedish-German Taurus KEPD-350 cruise missile or an indigenous cruise missile.
Last April, Janes reported that South Korea will open a “smart factory” to ramp up production of the KF-21, investing $88 million over the next five years to establish a “smart manufacturing system based on Fourth Industrial Revolution digital technologies including artificial intelligence and big data analytics.”
18. N. Korea is cremating bodies of people who died of suspected COVID-19 infections
Everything belongs to the party in north Korea to include bodies. The party needs no permission to do what it wishes - to include with human beings, dead or alive.
N. Korea is cremating bodies of people who died of suspected COVID-19 infections - Daily NK
North Korean authorities are not obtaining consent from bereaved families before conducting the cremations, a source told Daily NK
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at an emergency consultative meeting of the politburo earlier this year. (Rodong Sinmun - News1)
A source recently told Daily NK that North Korea is forcibly cremating the bodies of people who have died of suspected COVID-19 infections. Moreover, the country’s authorities are threatening bereaved families with heavy punishments if they bury the bodies of their loved ones in the ground.
A source in North Pyongan Province told Daily NK on Thursday that the authorities are preventing bereaved families from burying family members who died of COVID-19.
“The disease control people swarm in and cremate the bodies of people who died of suspected COVID-19 infections. The government is intimidating families, threatening them with heavy punishments if they go ahead and bury the bodies [themselves],” he said.
Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, many nations cremated bodies of COVID-19 victims as part of efforts to prevent the spread of the disease, but were sure to receive consent from the families before doing so.
In South Korea, the government advised people to “cremate first and hold funerals later” to reduce the risk of COVID-19 spreading. Only in January 2022 did the government amend its directives to allow people to hold funerals before cremating the bodies. The government explained the cremation process to the families and obtained their permission before moving foward.
In contrast, North Korea has provided no explanations to bereaved families about funerary arrangements, and has obtained no consent from families who lost loved ones. Instead, it is forcibly cremating the bodies, providing the bereaved no time to mourn.
“The bereaved are fighting with disease control officials, accusing them of preventing families from doing what they wish with their dead loved ones,” said the source. “In my district, too, many people have died, and the way of dealing with the bodies is entirely the same.
“Few young people have died. It’s mostly malnourished children, old people and families who have been dying,” he continued, adding, “They never tell us the exact numbers because they’re worried of frightening us.”
Meanwhile, the source said some North Koreans are suffering from the “aftereffects” of COVID-19 infections.
“Many people suffer severe aftereffects after being released from COVID-19 quarantine,” he said. “They complain that though they have no fever during the day, their temperature rises above 37 degrees Celsius after 5 PM, and they feel the chills and their body hurts. They also suffer from memory loss.”
According to the World Health Organization, most people infected with COVID-19 completely recover, but about 10% to 20% experience one or more of some 200 medium-to-long term symptoms. These symptoms include fatigue, breathing difficulties, depression, anxiousness and cognitive decline.
Interestingly, the source also said somebody in Sinuiju “caught it [COVID-19] three times and recovered three times since late April.”
This is noteworthy as few people suffer reinfections of COVID-19 due to the fact that their bodies develop antibodies after the first infection. Without access to medical institutions that can provide precise diagnoses, some North Koreans apparently believe they have been “reinfected” when they display just a few lingering symptoms.
That being said, there is the possibility that these people have been reinfected due to malnutrition or COVID-19 variants.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
19. N. Korea's border patrol kills two people trying to defect across border
Again, another example of the evil nature of the Kim family regime.
N. Korea's border patrol kills two people trying to defect across border - Daily NK
“Their bodies were left where they fell for 10 days, ostensibly to prevent COVID-19 infections,” a source told Daily NK
FILE PHOTO: A sentry post on the Sino-North Korean border in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. (Daily NK)
North Korean border patrol forces shot dead two individuals who were trying to defect cross the China-North Korea border in early June, Daily NK has learned.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Wednesday that a couple in their 20s were shot dead by the border patrol as they tried to cross the river into China from Hoeryong in the early morning hours of June 3.
“Their bodies were left where they fell for 10 days, ostensibly to prevent COVID-19 infections,” he said. “Only recently were the bodies processed, and we came to know of the incident.”
According to the source, North Korea began intensifying its controls and crackdowns along the China-North Korea border to previously unseen levels from early June. Ahead of the Fifth Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee, the authorities reportedly issued a special order to border security units to bolster their patrols, which had grown lax amid the protracted COVID-19 pandemic.
The border patrol’s 27th Regiment, stationed in North Hamgyong Province, responded to the order by going into crisis mode, fully mobilizing all personnel to patrol the border.
According to the source, residents of North Hamgyong Province’s border region have so little contact with one another due to COVID-19-related controls and lockdowns that nobody would know if their neighbors dropped dead. Among other things, locals are banned from approaching the border and going out at night.
The source said the young couple “lost their lives when the border patrol caught them trying to cross the river on Dano [a traditional holiday that falls on the fifth day of the fifth lunar month].
“People interact less because of the protracted lockdown, so locals belatedly learned about this incident,” he continued.
“Rumors are going around not only in Hoeryong, but also Musan County and Onsong County that the border patrol shot dead people who entered the border area,” he further reported, adding, “We don’t know the exact reason why because people don’t interact much due to the lockdowns, but rumors are going around everywhere that people were shot.”
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
