Quotes of the Day:

"One could even ask: Are we already at war with Russia and/or China, and don’t know it? As T. E. Lawrence said: “Irregular war [is] far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.”

Irregular warfare is the armed conflict of our lifetime, and the Pentagon’s strategy to confront it is long overdue."

- Sean McFate

“It’s frightful that people who are so ignorant should have so much influence.” 

- George Orwell

"Certain things catch your eye, but pursue only those that capture the heart." 

- Ancient Indian Proverb

1. On This Day - T.E. Lawrence Died

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, 2023

3. G7 leaders gather on China's doorstep to seek unified response to Beijing's threat

4. Unmanned Weapons Will Save Innocent Lives in War, Former SOCOM Chief Says

5. Exclusive: Pentagon accounting error overvalued Ukraine weapons aid by $3 billion

6. Accounting error means Pentagon can send more weapons to Ukraine

7. The Decade That Cannot Be Deleted (Mao and the Cultural Revolution)

8. Why Is the Chinese Communist Party Educating Children in American Classrooms?

9. Russia's military has adapted and is now a more formidable enemy for Ukraine, defense analysts say

10. G7 steps up Russia sanctions in bid to slow war effort

11. Russia fires cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets

12. Ghosts of war haunt G7 as leaders face up to Chinese menace

13. US Medics Must Learn from Ukraine’s Harsher War, Report Says

14. US signals to allies it won't block their export of F-16 jets to Ukraine

15. The Week In Russia: At Daggers Drawn

16. IG Report for OES - Afghanistan (May 2023) | SOF News

17. The Perfect Tool for Scaling U.S. Defense Investment

18. China Is Bailing Out Its Bad Bets, and Handing the West a Geopolitical Opening

19. Taiwan: One China Principle or Just a Policy?

20. Opinion | Why the U.S. should prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine

21. China's economy is growing again. So why are investors getting out?

22. U.S. officials walk back claim drone strike killed senior al-Qaeda leader

23. China’s Status Anxiety

24. The New Meaning of Hiroshima

25. Russia’s New Nuclear Normal

1. On This Day - T.E. Lawrence Died

On This Day - T.E. Lawrence Died

​On irregular Warfare​: https://www.britannica.com/topic/T-E-Lawrence-on-guerrilla-warfare-1984900

10 Things You May Not Know About 'Lawrence of Arabia'

history.com · by Christopher Klein

1. Born out of wedlock, Lawrence only learned his true identity after his father’s death.

In 1879, 18-year-old Sarah Lawrence arrived at the opulent Irish estate of Sir Thomas Chapman to begin work as a governess for his four daughters. The Victorian aristocrat and his domestic servant began an affair, and she secretly gave birth to their illegitimate son in 1888. When the scandal was discovered, Chapman left his wife and moved to Britain with his new love. Although the couple never wed, they adopted the last name Lawrence and pretended to be man and wife. T.E., who was the second of the couple’s five children, only learned the true identities of his parents after his father’s 1919 death.

2. The real “Lawrence of Arabia” was a man of short stature.

While six-foot, three-inch Peter O’Toole cut a towering figure as the lead in the 1962 epic biopic “Lawrence of Arabia,” the real Lawrence was only five feet, five inches tall. Lawrence remained self-conscious about his height, which may have been caused by a childhood case of mumps.

3. He first traveled to the Middle East as an Oxford archaeology student.

Lawrence spent the summer of 1909 traveling solo through Syria and Palestine to survey the castles of the Crusaders for his thesis. He walked nearly 1,000 miles and was shot at, robbed and badly beaten. In spite of the arduous journey, the new graduate returned to Syria the following year as part of an archaeological expedition sponsored by the British Museum. His years in the region deepened his knowledge of Arabic and his affinity for the Arabs.

4. He never had a single day of battlefield training.

In 1914, the British military employed Lawrence on an archaeological expedition of the Sinai Peninsula and Negev Desert, a research trip that was actually a cover for a secret military survey of territory possessed by the Ottoman Turks. Once World War I began, Lawrence joined the British military as an intelligence officer in Cairo. He worked a desk job for nearly two years before being sent to Arabia in 1916 where, in spite of his nonexistent military training, he helped to lead battlefield expeditions and dangerous missions behind enemy lines during the two-year Arab Revolt against the Turks.

5. Lawrence lost two brothers who also served in World War I.

Within months of each other in 1915, two of Lawrence’s younger brothers, Frank and Will, were killed fighting on the Western Front. The guilt Lawrence felt about his safe desk job in Cairo as millions died on the front lines spurred him to the field at the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1916.

6. Lawrence’s fame did not come until after the war.

Overshadowed by the millions of lives lost on the Western Front, Lawrence’s exploits were largely unheralded by the end of World War I in 1918. He was such an unknown figure that even the Turks, who had a bounty on his head, did not know what he looked like. However, when the American war correspondent Lowell Thomas launched a 1919 lecture tour recounting his assignment in the Middle East, his photographs and films of “Lawrence of Arabia” transfixed the public and transformed the British colonel into both a war hero and an international celebrity.

7. He refused a knighthood.

King George V summoned Lawrence to Buckingham Palace on October 30, 1918. Lawrence hoped that the private audience was to discuss borders for an independent Arabia, but instead, the king wished to bestow a knighthood on his 30-year-old subject. Believing that the British government had betrayed the Arabs by reneging on a promise of independence, Lawrence quietly told the befuddled monarch that he was refusing the honor before turning and walking out of the palace.

8. Lawrence worked for Winston Churchill.

In 1921, the future prime minister became Colonial Secretary and employed Lawrence as an advisor on Arab affairs. The two men grew to admire each other and became lifelong friends.

9. After World War I, he re-enlisted under assumed names.

After completing his diplomatic service under Churchill, Lawrence returned to the military in 1922 by enlisting in the Royal Air Force. But in an attempt to avoid the glare of celebrity, he did so under a pseudonym: John Hume Ross. Months later, the press revealed his secret, and he was discharged. Lawrence subsequently enlisted as a private in the Royal Tank Corps, but under the assumed name Thomas Edward Shaw, a nod to his friend, the famed Irish writer George Bernard Shaw. Lawrence subsequently published an English translation of Homer’s Odyssey under the pen name of T.E. Shaw and maintained the assumed name until his death.

10. Lawrence died in a motorcycle crash.

Lawrence was an avid motorcyclist; he owned seven different Brough Superiors, dubbed the “Rolls-Royces of Motorcycles.” On the morning of May 13, 1935, Lawrence sped through the English countryside on his Brough Superior SS100 motorbike. He suddenly saw two boys on bicycles on the narrow country road and swerved to avoid them. However, he clipped one of the bikes and was thrown forward over the handlebars. Lawrence never recovered from his massive brain injuries and died at the age of 46 on May 19.

history.com · by Christopher Klein

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces have seized the tactical initiative and made tactically significant gains around Bakhmut in counter-attack operations on May 18.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces have seized the battlefield initiative in the Bakhmut area.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin admitted on May 18 that Wagner mercenaries are unable to encircle the Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut due to the loss of stable flanks north and south of Bakhmut.
• Prigozhin and Wagner-affiliated milbloggers are blaming Russian conventional forces for military failures in and around Bakhmut.
• Prigozhin’s efforts to blame the Russian military for failures around Bakhmut are causing some ultranationalists to accuse him of using the Battle for Bakhmut to satisfy his personal ambitions.
• Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike across Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18, targeting Kyiv for the ninth time since the beginning of May.
• The Kremlin continues to strengthen domestic repression measures likely to encourage self-censorship and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war.
• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO may discuss the possible provision of Western fighter jets to Ukraine at the June Defense Ministers meeting.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Unknown actors, possibly Ukrainian partisans, attacked a Russian rail line in Crimea.
• The Russian Supreme Court ruled on May 18 that Russian military personnel who voluntarily surrender on the battlefield will be prosecuted under treason charges.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to announce patronage programs with Russian federal subjects to support infrastructure projects in occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 18, 2023

May 18, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, 2023

Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 18, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on May 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces have seized the tactical initiative and made tactically significant gains around Bakhmut in counter-attack operations on May 18. These operations are a continuation of the localized counter-attacks Ukrainian forces have been conducting for some days and do not reflect the start of a major new operation. Multiple Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces drove through the Russian defensive lines south and southwest of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and northwest of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut) from the northwest.[1] The milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces retreated from positions north of Sakko i Vantsetti (15km north of Bakhmut) to positions south of the settlement, but that Ukrainian forces have not yet entered the settlement. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Russian forces yielded 570 meters of territory north of Bakhmut, which is consistent with Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar’s statement that Ukrainian forces had advanced 500 meters north of Bakhmut and 1,000 meters south of Bakhmut.[2] Ukrainian Eastern Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 1,700 meters in the past day, and the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade stated that the brigade’s counterattacks expanded the Ukrainian salient in the Bakhmut area to 2,000 meters wide by 700 meters deep.[3]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces have seized the battlefield initiative in the Bakhmut area. Cherevaty stated on May 18 that Ukrainian forces regained the battlefield initiative and are forcing Russian forces to respond to Ukrainian actions, including by transferring Russian Airborne (VDV) elements to Bakhmut’s flanks to defend against the Ukrainian advances.[4] Malyar stated that Russian forces have deployed most of their reserves to the Bakhmut area, very likely to the detriment of other areas of the frontline.[5] ISW recently assessed that the Russian military command is reallocating military assets to the Bakhmut area in order to augment Wagner’s offensive capabilities and to gain a tactical victory ahead of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[6] The limited nature of Wagner’s offensive operations in Bakhmut compared to the localized Ukrainian counterattacks underscores the loss of Russian initiative in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner forces began assaulting one of the final Ukrainian fortified areas in western Bakhmut.[7] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official and prominent Russian information space voice Vladimir Rogov claimed that Wagner forces cut the Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar road in western Bakhmut on May 17, although ISW is unable to confirm this claim.[8] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces advanced 260 meters in Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces only control 1.28 square kilometers of the city.[9] One milblogger optimistically claimed that Wagner forces increased their pace of advance following Russian ammunition deliveries to Wagner, though Prigozhin’s claimed daily rate of advance has remained largely consistent.[10]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin admitted on May 18 that Wagner mercenaries are unable to encircle the Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut due to the loss of stable flanks north and south of Bakhmut. Prigozhin accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of losing advantageous positions after MoD-subordinated units retreated from their positions on Bakhmut’s flanks necessary for an encirclement.[11] Prigozhin and Wagner sources have long indicated Wagner’s intent to encircle Bakhmut and trap Ukrainian forces but proved unable to do so after the Ukrainian military command decided to defend the city. ISW had previously assessed that Russian forces were unlikely to encircle Bakhmut after Wagner forces made several rapid breakthroughs north, south, and east of the city in winter-spring 2023.[12] Prigozhin likely anticipated that Ukrainian forces would entirely withdraw from Bakhmut out of fear of imminent encirclement and even offered to allow President Volodymyr Zelensky to withdraw Ukrainian forces from the city on March 3.[13] The Ukrainian defensive operation, however, prioritized the defense of the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) west of Bakhmut, which forced Wagner forces into urban warfare and grinding directly through the city itself. Prigozhin’s admission further supports Ukrainian officials’ statements that Wagner is losing the initiative on the battlefield.

Prigozhin and Wagner-affiliated milbloggers are blaming Russian conventional forces for military failures in and around Bakhmut. Prigozhin directly appealed to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to hold Sakko i Vantsetti for at least few more days.[14] Prigozhin also blamed Gerasimov for the retreats of Russian conventional forces from Bakhmut‘s flanks.[15] A prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger stated on May 18 that Russian forces lack the organization, fire support, coordination, and training necessary to defend the Bakhmut’s flanks.[16] The milblogger complained that Russian forces allow Ukrainian forces to “drive a BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] for 15 minutes” into the Russian rear without destroying it, with the Ukrainian assault lasting only 16 minutes.[17] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces would not be able to drive an infantry fighting vehicle into the Ukrainian rear without Ukrainian forces destroying it.[18] The milblogger also claimed that Russian airborne forces attempted to occupy territory in the “grey zone” and Ukrainian forces immediately interdicted their efforts with artillery fire, making it impossible for Russian forces to move and gain a foothold in the targeted location.[19] A non-Wagner-affiliated milblogger noted the lack of coordination between Wagner and conventional Russian forces and claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) needs ”competent command and control” to strengthen interactions between Russian forces and Wagner fighters for operations after Bakhmut.[20]

Prigozhin’s efforts to blame the Russian military for failures around Bakhmut are causing some ultranationalists to accuse him of using the Battle for Bakhmut to satisfy his personal ambitions. Russian serviceman and prominent ultranationalist Andrey Morozov (known under the alias Murz) criticized a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel for wrongfully attributing successful artillery fire of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Army Corps to Wagner mercenaries.[21] Morozov argued that Prigozhin’s claims that Russian conventional forces are abandoning the flanks is another part of Prigozhin’s narratives aimed at saving his forces at the expense of other units that deployed to reinforce Wagner forces. Morozov accused Prigozhin of improving his financial standing at the expense of the war while setting up reinforcement units for failure and claimed that elements of 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade nearly all died when attempting to secure the flanks southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka. Morozov also claimed that Prigozhin is blaming conventional units in order to promote himself. ISW assessed on May 17 that Russian strongmen (siloviki) are attempting to discredit Prigozhin by accusing him of attempting to use victory in Bakhmut to further his political aspirations in Russia.[22] Morozov’s criticism is notable as it may indicate a shift in ultranationalists’ perception of Prigozhin.

Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike across Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18, targeting Kyiv for the ninth time since the beginning of May.[23] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched 22 Kh-101/555 air-launched cruise missiles, six Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles from Black Sea vessels, and two Iskander-K ground-launched cruise missiles at Kyiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities.[24] Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 29 cruise missiles, two Shahed-136/131 drones, and two reconnaissance drones.[25] Russian forces are likely attempting to use reconnaissance drones after launching missile strikes to locate Patriot air defense systems.

The Kremlin continues to strengthen domestic repression measures likely to encourage self-censorship and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 17 amending the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Regulations to expand the responsibility and reach of the FSB.[26] The amendment explicitly states that the FSB is responsible for state security issues within its powers, strengthens the FSB and its director’s powers in matters of information security. This allows the FSB head to determine the conditions for FSB personnel combining FSB work and military service. These amendments are likely part of a prolonged effort to expand the FSB’s domestic power, and ISW has previously reported on the FSB expanding its powers and involvement in the war in Ukraine.[27] Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on May 18 that Russian authorities conducted mass searches of residences of individuals allegedly associated with the Congress of People’s Deputies and former Russian State Duma Deputy Ilya Ponomarev under the accusation of spreading false information about the Russian military.[28] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 18 that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Russian State Duma deputies are preparing a bill to punish “Russophobia” with fines of 100,000 to 300,000 rubles (about $1,250 to $3,730), and up to five years in prison, or service in a forced labor colony.[29] ISW previously reported on Russian efforts to criminalize “Russophobia” as another method of domestic repression and censorship.[30]

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO may discuss the possible provision of Western fighter jets to Ukraine at the June Defense Ministers meeting.[31] Stoltenberg told German outlet Der Spiegel on May 18 that NATO members are “constantly discussing whether modern Western fighters are needed in both Europe and Ukraine,” adding that the provision of fighter jets to Ukraine will also require ammunition, spare parts, and “round-the-clock" aircraft maintenance.[32]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces have seized the tactical initiative and made tactically significant gains around Bakhmut in counter-attack operations on May 18.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces have seized the battlefield initiative in the Bakhmut area.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin admitted on May 18 that Wagner mercenaries are unable to encircle the Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut due to the loss of stable flanks north and south of Bakhmut.
• Prigozhin and Wagner-affiliated milbloggers are blaming Russian conventional forces for military failures in and around Bakhmut.
• Prigozhin’s efforts to blame the Russian military for failures around Bakhmut are causing some ultranationalists to accuse him of using the Battle for Bakhmut to satisfy his personal ambitions.
• Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike across Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18, targeting Kyiv for the ninth time since the beginning of May.
• The Kremlin continues to strengthen domestic repression measures likely to encourage self-censorship and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war.
• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO may discuss the possible provision of Western fighter jets to Ukraine at the June Defense Ministers meeting.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Unknown actors, possibly Ukrainian partisans, attacked a Russian rail line in Crimea.
• The Russian Supreme Court ruled on May 18 that Russian military personnel who voluntarily surrender on the battlefield will be prosecuted under treason charges.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to announce patronage programs with Russian federal subjects to support infrastructure projects in occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), and Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia forces attacked near Masyutivka and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and failed to advance near Novoselivske.[34] The Ukrainian National Guard’s Main Administration Department of Application Planning Deputy Director Colonel Mykola Urshalovych reported that Russian forces are recruiting additional BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) and “Storm-Z” formations composed of criminals to operate in the Lyman direction and that this recruitment signals that Russian forces are critically exhausted.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) and 138th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) repelled two Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the Kupyansk direction. The MoD also claimed that elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division repelled two sabotage and reconnaissance groups southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

See topline text on Bakhmut.

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka) and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[37] A Russian milblogger complained that Marinka is the only area of the front where Russian forces advance, and another source claimed that Ukrainian forces control less than one square kilometer of territory in Marinka.[38] Footage published on May 18 purportedly shows artillery elements of the 114th Brigade and 2nd Infantry Battalion of the 87th Regiment (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Avdiivka, and elements of the 110th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Nevelske (15km southwest of Avdiivka).[39]

Russian forces did not conduct confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 18.[40] Video footage published on May 17 purportedly shows artillery elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet operating near Vuhledar.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a failed raid across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on May 17. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces prevented Ukrainian forces from landing but that Ukrainian activity near the Dnipro River delta islands has increased recently.[42] Ukrainian forces have routinely conducted raids across the Dnipro River for some time.

A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces artificially raised the water level in the Kakhovka Reservoir, hindering Russian defensive operations. Ukrainian Southern Forces Joint Press Center Head Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces flooded their own positions on the reservoir banks, sustaining losses and igniting scandal.[43] Humenyuk also stated that Russian forces rely on stolen boats for logistics to the Dnipro delta islands.

Unknown actors, possibly Ukrainian partisans, attacked a Russian rail line in Crimea on May 18.[44] Crimean occupation officials claimed that unspecified “unauthorized persons” detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) along a railway on the southwestern outskirts of Simferopol near Chystenke, derailing eight train cars.[45] Geolocated imagery shows the aftermath of the derailment.[46] No Ukrainian sources, Ukrainian partisan groups, but Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov attributed the attack to saboteurs.[47] Aksyonov announced later on May 18 that authorities completed repairs to the track and the railway will resume freight and passenger traffic on May 19.[48]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Supreme Court ruled on May 18 that Russian military personnel who voluntarily surrender on the battlefield will be prosecuted under treason charges.[49] The Supreme Court clarified that Russian military personnel are committing a crime if they voluntarily and knowingly surrender to enemy forces when it was possible to resist capture. The Supreme Court ruled that a Russian serviceman may be released from criminal responsibility only if he did not previously voluntarily surrender, undertook all possible measures to ensure his release, returned to his location of service, and did not commit other crimes while in detention. Wounded servicemen or personnel who are unable to resist due to a physical condition are not criminally liable for treason. The Russian judicial system is likely establishing conditions for the persecution and punishment of captured Russian prisoners of war given its previous mistreatment of wrongfully mobilized personnel.[50]

The Russian State Duma is considering several bills incentivizing recruitment efforts and financial support for the war effort. Russian State Duma officials submitted a draft law that will grant indefinite academic leave to college students who decide to participate in the war.[51] Russian students currently can take an academic leave for up to two years, and the bill is likely an attempt to incentivize enlistment among students. Russian State Duma officials also introduced a draft law that will establish a one percent tax from purchases at restaurants, night clubs, and bars to support the war effort.[52]

Russia reportedly continues to suffer shortages of combat-ready military personnel and is attempting to exploit all sources of recruitment to sustain the war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russians are committing remaining Wagner personnel, criminals, BARS (combat army reserve), territorial troops, and conventional units mostly staffed with mobilized servicemen to unspecified frontlines in Ukraine.[53] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian forces are coercing Russian veterans of the Afghanistan war to undergo military training in occupied Kerch Raion, Crimea.[54] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger published footage showing a Russian veteran who served in Afghanistan in the Avdiivka area.[55] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are coercing Ukrainian men into military service and noted that Russians are training Russian prisoners in training camps in Rohove and Mozhnikivka, Luhansk Oblast.[56] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that personnel of Rosgvardia’s 96th Operational Regiment deployed to Ukraine.[57]

The Russian military command is reportedly reactivating the Soviet-era 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to integrate Russian recruits from the Far East. The 25th CAA participated in Soviet-Japanese War in 1945 and was ultimately disbanded in 1957. Russian independent outlet MobilizationNews reported that residents of the Russian Far East began receiving messages recruiting men to join the 25th CAA.[58]

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu visited a training ground on May 18 where Western Military District’s contract servicemen train before deploying to Ukraine.[59] Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Army General Oleg Salyukov claimed that officers who participated in the Russian war in Ukraine are training new recruits. Shoigu’s meeting is likely part of an ongoing attempt to promote military enlistment.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to announce patronage programs with Russian federal subjects to support infrastructure projects in occupied territories. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated on May 18 that Volgograd Oblast will support 59 infrastructure projects in Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast, of which Volgograd Oblast is a formal patron.[60] Pasechnik stated that specialists from Chelyabinsk Oblast repaired two electric trains belonging to the “Luhansk Railway” on May 17, and that builders from Krasnoyarsk Krai are helping restore social infrastructure in Sverdlovsk Raion in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[61] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated that he and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug Governor Vladislav Kuznetsov discussed on May 18 areas for possible economic cooperation, as well as plans to restore Debaltseve, of which Chukotka is a formal patron.[62]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Independent Belarusian monitoring organization the Hajun Project reported on May 18 that satellite imagery shows a line of dragon’s teeth anti-tank structures in the vicinity of Gomel near the M8 highway 20km from the border with Ukraine.[63] The Hajun Project also reported that satellite imagery shows construction, likely of fortifications, taking place near the dragon’s teeth.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense published footage on May 18 showing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko addressing the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Parliamentary assembly and calling the Ukrainian counteroffensive “misinformation.”[64]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. G7 leaders gather on China's doorstep to seek unified response to Beijing's threat

​Can a unified response to China be realized?

G7 leaders gather on China's doorstep to seek unified response to Beijing's threat | CNN

CNN · by Nectar Gan · May 19, 2023

Hong Kong CNN —

As leaders of seven of the world’s most powerful democracies gather in Japan on Friday, it will be the authoritarian powers of China and Russia that dominate the agenda.

The annual Group of Seven (G7) summit, convening this year in Hiroshima, will seek to project a unified response to an increasingly assertive China – and the perceived threat it poses to the stability and economic security of a world already shaken by Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine.

While much of the attention will be focused on Ukraine – including how to further tighten the screws on Russia and defuse rising nuclear tensions – the three-day summit also provides an opportunity for G7 leaders to recalibrate and coordinate their approach toward China, which has refused to condemn the invasion and instead bolstered ties with Moscow.

“Basically this is going to be a meeting for them to talk about how to deal with China and Russia,” said Yasuhiro Matsuda, an international relations professor at the University of Tokyo.

But agreeing on a common approach to the world’s second largest economy will not be an easy task.

China, a global manufacturing hub and a huge consumer market, is an important trade partner to the G7 countries, which is comprised of the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Italy.

“It is difficult to have one single position on China across seven countries considering their different concerns and relationships with Beijing,” said Sun Yun, director of the China Program at the Washington-based Stimson Center think tank.

“But to the extent that a position with the largest common denominator can be developed, the G7 offers a great opportunity.”

Security in Asia

Projecting unity on China comes at a crucial moment for the US and its allies, as Beijing ramps up diplomatic efforts to repair ties with Europe and drive a wedge in the transatlantic alliance.

Last month, French President Emmanuel Macron caused consternation in Western capitals after he said, following a warm visit to Beijing, that Europe must not become “just America’s followers” and get “caught up in crises that are not ours” when asked about the prospect of China invading Taiwan.

Days later, in an effort to present a united front on Taiwan, the G7 foreign ministers said in a preparatory meeting for the summit that there was “no change” in the bloc’s position on the self-ruled democratic island, which the Chinese Communist Party claims sovereignty over despite never having controlled.

U.S. and Japan conduct joint air exercise after North Korea fires an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Japan's Joint Staff

Ukraine war has made it easier for US to isolate China in the Pacific

The top diplomats called on China to “abstain from threats, coercion, intimidation, or the use of force” and “reaffirmed” the importance of “peace and stability” across the Taiwan Strait as an “indispensable element in security and prosperity in the international community.”

Japan, the host of this year’s G7 summit and its only Asian member, will position regional security on the summit’s main agenda, said Matsuda at the University of Tokyo.

Deeply concerned about Beijing’s military posturing in the region, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has warned publicly that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”

In response to growing threats from China, Japan has moved to double its military spending and is in talks to open a NATO liaison office – the first of its kind in Asia and a sign of deepening ties between Western and Asian democracies.

In a move that highlighted Tokyo’s concerns, China sent a naval flotilla – led by one of its most powerful destroyers – on a 12-day circumnavigation of Japan’s main islands in a display of military power in the lead-up to the G7 summit.

‘Economic coercion’

Another important theme of the summit will be economic security, including how to counter China’s economic pressure tactics.

At a meeting of G7 finance ministers in Japan last week, US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen called for “coordinated action” by G7 nations against Beijing’s use of “economic coercion.”

The tough rhetoric was echoed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen this week before she departed for Hiroshima.

“We’ve seen attempts of economic coercion, for example China towards Lithuania; we’ve seen similar practices vis-a-vis Japan and Australia,” von der Leyen said in Brussels Monday, citing Beijing’s recent punishment of the Baltic state for opening a new trade office with Taiwan.

“We are most vulnerable to coercion in general where dependencies built up,” she said, calling for the “de-risking, not decoupling” of economic relationship with China.

French President Emmanuel Macron arrives at Beijing Capital International Airport on April 5, 2023.

Gonzalo Fuentes/Reuters

European leaders head to Beijing with hope of driving peace in Ukraine, while balancing business ties

The summit will seek to diversify supply chains and reduce heavy reliance on China.

At the front of the push for economic “de-risking” is the US, which has curbed Beijing’s access to advanced semiconductors and the equipment used to make them. It is also seeking to impose new restrictions on outbound investment in China.

But there is the question of how far other countries are willing to follow through.

Japan and the Netherlands have joined the US in the chip curbs, but most countries remain skeptical about the investment controls.

“The problem is all the countries are competing with each other over China’s market, so Beijing’s divide and rule strategy has been working very well,” Matsuda said.

“The G7 is trying to facilitate some norms and rules among themselves first, which can then be enlarged to other like-minded countries in Europe and beyond,” he said.

China closely watching

In an effort to expand the G7’s influence beyond the club of rich democracies, Japan has invited leaders from a long list of developing countries, including India, Brazil, Vietnam and Indonesia, to attend the summit as observers.

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol will also join the gathering. Following years of disputes and a long history of acrimony with Japan, the two neighbors are now mending their ties due to growing threats from North Korea and rising concerns about China.

In a sign of a growing trilateral alliance, the US, Japan and South Korea will meet on the sidelines of the summit to discuss plans for the real-time sharing of intelligence – which will further deepen China’s fears of encirclement by the US and its allies.

And with US President Joe Biden cutting short of his Asia trip to address a debt limit crisis, a summit of Quad leaders from the US, India, Australia and Japan could now take also place in Hiroshima instead. The informal security dialogue is widely seen as a counter to China’s aggressive posture in the region.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping attends a signing ceremony with Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (not pictured), ahead of the China-Central Asia Summit in China's Xi'an on May 17, 2023.

Florence Lo/AFP/Getty Images

China woos Central Asia as Ukraine war weakens Russian influence

As the G7 summit gets underway, Chinese officials will be closely watching from Beijing and will not hide their displeasure, experts say.

“The Chinese will not like it and will criticize the ‘cold war mentality’ and ‘bloc politics’ played by the West,” said Sun, the expert with the Stimson Center.

In the lead-up to the summit, Beijing has already berated a statement by G7 foreign ministers.

“It was full of arrogance, prejudice against China and we have made a strong demarche to the host Japan,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said.

Similarly, Beijing also lashed out at accusations of its “economic coercion,” claiming it is the “victim of US economic coercion” rather than a perpetrator.

And while China is not invited to Hiroshima, it is hosting its own summit with Central Asia countries, experts noted.

“Although the timing were not coordinated, it does present the world with China’s effort to build a coalition with its own like-minded countries,” Sun said.

“China still commands a lot of influence.”

CNN · by Nectar Gan · May 19, 2023

4. Unmanned Weapons Will Save Innocent Lives in War, Former SOCOM Chief Says

Excerpt:

Thomas recalled the 1988 downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the U.S. guided missile cruiser Vincennes, which mistook a radar blip for a hostile jet fighter. Its captain “made the fateful decision to shoot down an airliner,” he said. “But put an unmanned capability out there in the Strait of Hormuz, doing what your gray hulls are required to do in terms of monitoring transit and freedom of navigation, that sort of thing. An unmanned capability doesn't have that duress. [It] doesn't have the fear and then the bias. It can offer itself up, get blown out of water. We'll replace it with another one out there.

Unmanned Weapons Will Save Innocent Lives in War, Former SOCOM Chief Says

But how? We’ll have to wait and see, Tony Thomas said.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Unflappable and expendable, unmanned weapons could reduce collateral damage in war, if only U.S. leaders realized it, says a former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.

But the United States is “unfortunately…dawdling along” in deploying artificial intelligence and unmanned systems in high-stakes scenarios, Tony Thomas said Thursday at the National Press Club.

Thomas recalled the 1988 downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the U.S. guided missile cruiser Vincennes, which mistook a radar blip for a hostile jet fighter. Its captain “made the fateful decision to shoot down an airliner,” he said. “But put an unmanned capability out there in the Strait of Hormuz, doing what your gray hulls are required to do in terms of monitoring transit and freedom of navigation, that sort of thing. An unmanned capability doesn't have that duress. [It] doesn't have the fear and then the bias. It can offer itself up, get blown out of water. We'll replace it with another one out there.

“Think of that opportunity and flash forward it to any other number of places right now where we have humans in harm's way under a lot of fatigue, a lot of pressure,” he said. A person in such a situation is “potentially bound to make a fatal decision.”

The U.S. Navy is experimenting with unmanned systems in the Central Command region but not in the South China Sea, where many believe a conflict with China could emerge in the next few years.

Thomas’ argument echoed pitches by robot makers who say American police forces would kill fewer people if robots took the place of human officers in some dangerous situations.

Thomas led Special Operations Command when it began to experiment with Maven, an artificial-intelligence tool that helped human analysts with targeting decisions. When Google engineers discovered their company was helping with Maven, some quit in protest and company leaders eventually left the program.

Thomas said that what too many people in companies like Google don’t understand is that the U.S. military wants to use AI not simply to accelerate operations but also to reduce collateral damage and make operations more precise. He recalled sitting with other commanders making decisions about how and when to undertake operations. They “sat for days, months, weeks in joint operation centers, pondering whether or not to take a shot. And the criteria was always, without exception, zero collateral damage. Did we get it right every time? No. It was war and we got it wrong. There was fog and friction. There were malfunctions of weapons systems. But our U.S. way of war was zero collateral. And [with Maven] we were trying to progress, to pursue that at scale, you know, with modern technology.”

Andrew Moore, who currently advises CENTCOM, was working on Maven at Google when company leaders decided to step away. “I expected to arrive in an environment where like 50% of the engineers were very sophisticated-thinking about the need for national security and 50% would be super-naive and just sort of thought that all kinds of security-related stuff was bad,” he said during the recent Global SOF event in Tampa, Florida. “Turned out I was wrong. 98% were extremely supportive. 2% probably” were not.

Moore laid the decision to turn away from Maven squarely at the feet of the company’s former leaders who did not clearly or consistently explain to employees just what they were doing with the United States U.S. military or why. “If in an attempt to appease all of your employees, by listening to all of them on and kind of saying yes to all of them, you can actually cause a catastrophic failure of a place to have a real sense of mission,” he said.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

5. Exclusive: Pentagon accounting error overvalued Ukraine weapons aid by $3 billion

Oh no. 

Exclusive: Pentagon accounting error overvalued Ukraine weapons aid by $3 billion

Reuters · by Mike Stone

WASHINGTON, May 18 (Reuters) - The Pentagon overestimated the value of the ammunition, missiles and other equipment it sent to Ukraine by around $3 billion, a Senate aide and a defense official said on Thursday, an error that may lead the way for more weapons being sent to Kyiv for its defense against Russian forces.

The error was the result of assigning a higher than warranted value on weaponry that was taken from U.S. stocks and then shipped to Ukraine, two senior defense officials said on Thursday.

"We've discovered inconsistencies in how we value the equipment that we've given" to Ukraine one of the senior defense officials told Reuters. The officials and the Senate aide spoke on the condition of anonymity. Congress is being notified of the accounting adjustment on Thursday, the sources said.

The defense official said it is possible the amount of overvalued weaponry could grow beyond $3 billion as the Pentagon examines the situation more thoroughly.

In its accounting, the Pentagon used replacement cost to value the weapons aid, instead of the weaponry's value when it was purchased and depreciated, the senior defense officials said.

Since August 2021, the United States has sent weapons valued at about $21.1 billion to Ukraine from its stockpiles.

Changing the valuation of the equipment could delay the Biden administrations' need to ask Congress to authorize more funds for Ukraine as the debt ceiling fight intensifies.

"The Department of Defense's change in evaluating the costs of arms sent to Ukraine is a major mistake," U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said. "Its effect would be to underestimate future needs for our European allies. Our priority should be a Ukrainian victory over Putin. Unilaterally altering military aid calculations is an attempt at deception and undermines this goal."

The U.S. has sent a wide variety of equipment to Ukraine in 37 Presidential Drawdown Authority packages including High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers, Javelin anti-tank weapons and a Patriot surface-to-air missile system.

"The services - the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines - were using, the current replacement cost of the item," one of the senior defense officials said.

A March 31 memo, seen by Reuters, clarified to the top accountants in each branch of service which method should be used, citing existing regulation.

It will take time to work through the accounting for billions of dollars worth of equipment sent to Ukraine, the senior defense officials said.

In the case of 155 millimeter ammunition for Howitzer cannons, of which more than 1.5 million have been sent to Ukraine, each cost about $800 today. But the actual cost of each shell, which have been delivered to the U.S. military each year for several decades, can be averaged out for a much lower price, one of the senior defense officials said.

Reporting by Mike Stone in Washington; Editing by Anna Driver

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Mike Stone

6. Accounting error means Pentagon can send more weapons to Ukraine

Interesting how Reuters and the Associated Press characterize this.

Accounting error means Pentagon can send more weapons to Ukraine

militarytimes.com · by Tara Copp · May 19, 2023

The Pentagon has overestimated the value of the weapons it has sent to Ukraine by at least $3 billion — an accounting error that could be a boon for the war effort because it will allow the Defense Department to send more weapons now without asking Congress for more money.

The acknowledgment Thursday comes at a time when Pentagon is under increased pressure by Congress to show accountability for the billions of dollars it has sent in weapons, ammunition and equipment to Ukraine and as some lawmakers question whether that level of support should continue.

It also could free up more money for critical weapons as Ukraine is on the verge of a much anticipated counteroffensive — which will require as much military aid as they can get. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has previously said the offensive was delayed because they did not yet have everything they needed.

The error was caused when officials overvalued some of the systems sent to Ukraine, using the value of money it would cost to replace an item completely rather than the current value of the weapon. In many of the military aid packages, the Pentagon has opted to draw from its stockpiles of older, existing gear because it can get those items to Ukraine faster.

“During our regular oversight process of presidential drawdown packages, the Department discovered inconsistencies in equipment valuation for Ukraine. In some cases, ‘replacement cost’ rather than ‘net book value’ was used, therefore overestimating the value of the equipment drawn down from U.S. stocks,” said Pentagon spokeswoman Sabrina Singh.

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First were the helmets, then the Leopard tanks. The evolving approach of sending aid to Ukraine fits a conflict as fluid as it is unpredictable.

She added that the mistake hasn’t constrained U.S. support to Ukraine or hampered the ability to send aid to the battlefield.

A defense official said the Pentagon is still trying to determine exactly how much the total surplus will be. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, said the comptroller has asked the military services to review all previous Ukraine aid packages using the proper cost figures. The result, said the official, will be that the department will have more available funding authority to use as the Ukraine offensive nears.

The aid surplus was first reported by The Wall Street Journal.

To date the U.S. has provided Ukraine nearly $37 billion in military aid since Russia invaded in February 2022. The bulk of that has been in weapons systems, millions of munitions and ammunition rounds, and an array of trucks, sensors, radars and other equipment pulled from Pentagon stockpiles and sent quickly to Ukraine.

Members of Congress have repeatedly pressed Defense Department leaders on how closely the U.S. is tracking its aid to Ukraine to ensure that it is not subject to fraud or ending up in the wrong hands. The Pentagon has said it has a “robust program” to track the aid as it crosses the border into Ukraine and to keep tabs on it once it is there, depending on the sensitivity of each weapons system.

There also is a small team of Americans in Ukraine working with Ukrainians to do physical inspections when possible, but also virtual inspections when needed, since those teams are not going to the front lines.

In late February, the Pentagon’s inspector general said his office has found no evidence yet that any of the billions of dollars in weapons and aid to Ukraine has been lost to corruption or diverted into the wrong hands. He cautioned that those investigations are only in their early stages.

7. The Decade That Cannot Be Deleted (Mao and the Cultural Revolution)

Cultural revolution (or culture war?)

Opinion | The Decade That Cannot Be Deleted

The New York Times · by Pamela Paul · May 18, 2023

Pamela Paul

The Decade That Cannot Be Deleted

May 18, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

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Opinion Columnist

It would seem impossible to forget or minimize the Cultural Revolution in China, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, resulted in an estimated 1.6 million to two million deaths and scarred a generation and its descendants. The movement, which under Mao Zedong’s leadership sought to purge Chinese society of all remaining non-Communist elements, upended nearly every hallowed institution and custom. Teachers and schools long held in esteem were denounced. Books were burned and banned, museums ransacked, private art collections destroyed. Intellectuals were tortured.

But in China, a country where information is often suppressed and history is constantly rewritten — witness recent government censorship of Covid research and the obscuring of Hong Kong’s British colonial past in new school textbooks — the memory of the Cultural Revolution risks being forgotten, sanitized and abused, to the detriment of the nation’s future.

The Chinese government has never been particularly eager to preserve the memory of that sordid decade. When I spent six weeks traveling in China in 1994 — a slightly more open time in the country — I encountered few public acknowledgments of the Cultural Revolution. Museum placards and catalogs often simply skipped a decade in their timelines or provided brief references in the passive voice along the lines of “historical events that took place.”

But in her new book, “Red Memory: The Afterlives of China’s Cultural Revolution,” the journalist Tania Branigan notes that under Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, efforts to suppress this history have intensified — with troubling implications for the political health of the country at a time when it looms larger than ever on the world stage. “When you’ve had a collective trauma, you really need a collective response,” Branigan told me recently. “I can see why the Communist Party wants to avoid the rancor and bitterness, but when you don’t have that kind of acknowledgment, you can move on — but you can’t really recover.”

Though Xi himself was a victim of the Cultural Revolution — reportedly betrayed by his own mother, exiled into rural poverty — he “is more conscious of the uses and disadvantages of history than any leader before him, bar perhaps Mao himself,” Branigan writes in the book. In 2021, Xi warned the Communist Party against “historical nihilism” — any unflattering portrayal of the party’s past — an existential threat as great, in his estimation, as Western democracy.

High school textbooks in China now reduce the Cultural Revolution to just a few short paragraphs. The only national heritage spot devoted to it was closed to visitors when Branigan, who reported from Beijing for The Guardian from 2008 to 2015, tried to enter. Those who had lived through the Cultural Revolution were often reluctant to speak with her. Some of her excursions to research the movement were monitored, and relevant sites were closed off. “The party and those it rules have conspired in amnesia,” she writes. “A decade has disappeared.”

In the absence of real history, a small nostalgia industry has arisen in China around the Cultural Revolution, which includes themed restaurants, re-enactments, costumes and associated kitsch that bear a distinct resemblance to our own country’s Civil War re-enactments, Confederate statues and wedding-venue Southern plantations. The United States has in recent years reconsidered some but far from all of this disturbing nostalgia, as Clint Smith powerfully documented in his 2021 book, “How the Word Is Passed: A Reckoning With the History of Slavery Across America.”

But whether in China or in America, when a country avoids a full reckoning with its darkest periods, such nostalgic impulses tend to foster wishful thinking and facilitate propaganda. In China, many young people who never experienced the horrors of Maoism now yearn for its “idealism” and clarity; former Red Guards recall the unity and purpose missing in today’s materialist society. Such distortions can also lead to what Branigan refers to as “a tragic fatalism” — what the Chinese call “eating bitterness” — renouncing the power to enact personal, societal or political change.

Another term Branigan uses when accounting for the price of enforced forgetting is “the hum of shame.” Even those who were otherwise patriotic described their fellow Chinese to Branigan as “ethically hollow.” They lamented a kind of numb passivity, an absence of conscience, a “sickness of the soul.” According to Branigan, the Chinese consider “moral decline” to be the country’s most pressing threat, ahead of both poverty and crime.

Such is the inevitable legacy of a political trauma as totalizing in scope as the Cultural Revolution. “No workplace remained untouched,” Branigan writes. “No household remained innocent. ‘Complicity’ is too small a word — comrade turned on comrade, friend upon friend, husband upon wife and child upon parent. You could build a career on such betrayals, until the currents shifted once more and the victims turned upon you. Such intimate treacheries and abrupt reversals rent the very fabric of China, Confucian ideals of family obedience and newer Communist pledges of fraternity.”

When the Cultural Revolution comes up in American conversation, it’s generally in debates over the rise of group think and mob mentalities, performative outrage on Twitter and on college campuses. Parallels certainly exist: Political leaders fomenting cultural wars, polarization reducing differences of opinion to signifiers of ally and heretic, and the media resorting to shouty sloganeering over considered debate.

But Branigan’s book offers an equally important cautionary lesson: the perils of ignoring or distorting history. What a country downplays in its historical record continues to reverberate, whether it’s the Cultural Revolution in China or the treatment of Native Americans and the legacy of slavery in the United States. And just as Xi Jinping can censor China’s recent Covid record, so can America attempt to whitewash events — the results of the 2020 election, the insurrection at the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021 — in its own recent past.

Near the end of Smith’s “How the Word Is Passed,” the author describes his grandparents’ experiences of segregation in the South, which took place just a decade before China’s Cultural Revolution. “Black-and-white photographs and film footage can convince us that these episodes transpired in a distant past,” he writes, “untouched by our contemporary world.” But as his grandmother tells him, “It was for real, and I had lived it.”

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The New York Times · by Pamela Paul · May 18, 2023

8. Why Is the Chinese Communist Party Educating Children in American Classrooms?

Why Is the Chinese Communist Party Educating Children in American Classrooms? 

By Antonette Bowman

May 18, 2023

https://www.realcleareducation.com/articles/2023/05/18/why_is_the_chinese_communist_party_educating_children_in_american_classrooms_110864.html

On May 8th, Florida governor Ron DeSantis signed into law “three bills to counteract the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party in the state of Florida.” One of the bills, he said, would help “stop CCP influence in our education system from grade school to grad school.”

Such efforts cannot come soon enough.

Like Mao masquerading as Mr. Rogers, the Chinese Communist Party quietly continues to use Confucius Classrooms to influence American kids that it is neighborly and normal. But the CCP is no Mr. Rogers. The authoritarian regime operating Uygher concentration camps in Xinjiang and facilitating the flow of fentanyl into the United States has sent Communist-trained and funded teachers to a neighborhood school near you.

Beijing aims to shape the minds of American kids through hundreds of Confucius Classrooms – part of a personalized teacher-to-student influence campaign focused on shaping how children view the Chinese government, under the benevolent guise of providing cultural, historical, and Chinese-language programming. Confucius Classrooms represent the lesser-known K-12 affiliates of the now widely (and rightly) stigmatized Confucius Institutes.

Both programs are associated with China’s United Front Work Department, responsible for ideological influence and monitoring operations abroad. Liu Yandong, former vice premier of the PRC and once head of the UFWD, oversaw the Confucius program and later served as chair of “Hanban,” a bureau of Beijing’s Ministry of Education now rebranded as the Center for Language Exchange and Cooperation. CLEC oversees the Classrooms, administering funding and deploying trained teachers. By 2019, the CCP had established 518 Confucius Classrooms in the United States, according to a staff report by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 

Confucius Classrooms operate in public and private schools across the U.S., such as Simpson County Public Schools in Kentucky, St. Mary’s School in Oregon, Chicago Public Schools, and the Garrison Forest School in Maryland. The Yu Ying School, located in the nation’s capital, still proudly features its designation as “Confucius Classroom of the Year” on its website. 

Believe it or not, the United States lacks a full grasp of how many of its thousands of elementary, middle, and high schools currently house Confucius Classrooms.

“In the last century, the U.S. did not allow the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or Imperial Japan a foothold in the [American] educational system,” testified the National Association of Scholars’ Ian Oxnevad before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission in March. Why would we permit the Chinese Communist Party to gain such influence?

The U.S. finds itself in the midst of a generational conflict with China – a new Cold War characterized by a protracted ideological clash of democratic and communist worldviews. 

The United States has given its adversary in this competition direct access to children and has allowed it to infiltrate the education system in ways that undermine American sovereignty. “The Chinese government controls nearly every aspect of Confucius Institutes [and affiliated Confucius Classrooms] at U.S. Schools,” according to the Senate staff report.

The CCP lures schools with funding, staffing, and materials – then seizes control with contracts stipulating that schools comply with Chinese as well as U.S. law and limit public disclosure. School officials often interview teaching candidates culled from CCP-curated pools of applicants whom the CCP demands “‘conscientiously safeguard national interests’ and report to the Chinese Embassy within one month of arrival in the United States,” according to the Senate report. 

This subversion and relinquishment of American sovereignty in K-12 Confucius Classrooms plays a key role in China’s soft-power influence campaign and has ongoing national security implications. “China’s authoritarian government works hard to dampen any criticism of the CCP,” Mick Zais, former Deputy Secretary of Education, and Dan Currell, former Deputy Under Secretary of Education, wrote in a 2021 article. “Reaching children with colorful, positive messages about China is a well-worn propaganda tactic.”

So what’s to be done? 

Studying Chinese language, culture, and history can be accomplished without having Chinese Communist instructors teaching in our classrooms. Education officials can increase investments in Chinese language and cultural programming. Communities should recruit teachers from Taiwan – an American partner and thriving democracy – and replace and expand language instruction and cultural exchange opportunities.

The State Department could expand audits of J-1 visa holders associated with Confucius Classrooms. In past years, after auditing only two schools, State revoked 32 visas for Confucius Institute instructors who lied about conducting research while actually teaching K-12 students. 

The Department of Education should require states to submit lists of schools that have signed contracts with foreign entities or received CCP funding, directly or via proxy. State governments should require school leaders to inform parents which schools have Confucius Classrooms.

Finally, U.S. schools should consider shuttering Confucius Classrooms altogether, replacing them with similar programs that have no affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party. 

Beijing wants to shape global thinking as part of Xi Jinping’s Global Civilization Initiative, dubbed “Xivilization” by the Chinese propaganda outlet Global Times.

Let’s not help the CCP propagandize our kids. America doesn’t need Confucius Classrooms.

Antonette Bowman writes the Raising Americans Substack. She served as a public and private school teacher for eight years. She is a graduate of Stanford University and earned an M.A. in teaching from Johns Hopkins University.

9. Russia's military has adapted and is now a more formidable enemy for Ukraine, defense analysts say

Excerpts:

"The components in the Russian military system, particularly some of the ground combat units, are outperformed certainly by NATO military standards, I'd say they also are out-performed by the Ukrainians. And I think, in particular, sort of a lack of a clear rationale for why they're fighting and very poor morale are impediments to the Russians achieving their goal — but they're still in operations and they're still holding ground."

What does this mean for Ukraine's much-anticipated counteroffensive? Reynolds said it was hard and unwise to make predictions but did not underestimate the challenge Ukraine faces, with an expectation of more deadly attritional warfare with steep personnel losses for both sides and slow, grinding gains, or losses, of territory.

"Even if the Ukrainians perform very, very well, they will have to initially breach through Russian defensive lines and they will have to mop up Russian defensive positions. So there'll be attritional fighting, there'll be assaults on fixed defensive positions on some level. So it'll be difficult."

Russia's military has adapted and is now a more formidable enemy for Ukraine, defense analysts say

msn.com · by Holly Ellyatt 5 hrs ago

• Russia's military has been widely discredited and disparaged the Western media since the start of its invasion of Ukraine.
• Russia was seen to have bungled the early phase of the war, suffering a series of setbacks and retreats.
• Defense analysts say Russia has adapted its tactics during the war, however, and a more structured, coordinated and reactive armed force has emerged.
• Russia's defensive operations could prove hard for Ukraine to crack as it prepares to mount a counteroffensive.

© Provided by CNBC An armored convoy of pro-Russian troops moves along a road during the Ukraine-Russia conflict in the southern port city of Mariupol, Ukraine, on April 21, 2022.

Russia's military has been widely discredited and disparaged by the Western media since the start of its invasion of Ukraine, seen to have bungled the early phase of the war after suffering a series of setbacks and retreats.

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But defense analysts at a top London-based military thinktank have investigated Russia's tactical adaptations during the war and have noted that a more structured, coordinated and reactive armed force has emerged — and one that's particularly strong on the defensive.

As such, Russia's military now represents a much more formidable opponent for Ukraine as it prepares to launch a much-anticipated counteroffensive to reclaim occupied territory.

"As Ukraine prepares for offensive operations its armed forces face major tactical challenges," Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, specialists in land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said in their latest report, entitled "Russian Tactics in the Second Year of its Invasion of Ukraine."

"The depth of [Russian] defences mean that Ukraine must generate serious combat power in order to penetrate the Russian lines, with the extent of Russian defensive fortifications across the front making bypassing them near-impossible," the report, published Friday, noted.

RUSI's Nick Reynolds told CNBC that while Russia "put themselves in a very bad position at the start of last year," conducting what he described as massive strategic and operational blunders that deprived them of some of their best units and equipment, "since then, the Russian state and the Russian military have put themselves on more of a war footing and have been adapting."

"In particular, a lot of systems and the way they work together are working much better than they were last year. The fact that they're on the defensive now allows them to combine arms in a way that's a little bit easier than coordinating offensive operations. They're also performing [in a way that was] much closer to how they were, pre-war, expected to perform."

"Basically, Ukrainians have a hard challenge out of them," Reynolds said Thursday, saying RUSI expected Russia to employ a large amount of artillery fire to defend its units and "very capable" electronic warfare systems aimed at defeating UAVs, or drones.

These are already proving devastatingly effective, with Ukraine losing as many as 10,000 UAVs a month "due to the effectiveness of Russian Electronic Warfare and extensive use of navigational interference," RUSI said.

Steep learning curve

There's no doubt among Western defense experts that Russia's military campaign in Ukraine in 2022 generally went badly.

Russia bit off far more than it could chew when it tried to invade its neighbor from the north, east and south early last year and was forced to make several humiliating retreats, most notably from the Ukrainian capital Kyiv.

Then later on in the year there were successes for Ukraine as its forces launched counteroffensives to recapture swathes of occupied territory around Kharkiv in the northeast of the country. In October, Russian troops withdrew from part of the Kherson region in the south.

The Russian military's poor performance was widely blamed on poor planning, equipment and logistics and ill-equipped and inadequately trained troops, in insufficient numbers to sustain wide-scale combat operations.

Russia also made a fundamental mistake in underestimating both the resistance Ukraine would mount against Russia and the strength of international support for Kyiv, particularly in terms of the billions of dollars' worth of military hardware.

© Provided by CNBC Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a concert marking the eighth anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine at the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow on March 18, 2022.

Despite Russia's setbacks, President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin have dug their heels in, ramping up the anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western rhetoric and pitching the war, or "special military operation" as an existential question for Russia and a matter of its survival.

On the battlefield, meanwhile, neither Russia nor Ukraine have been able to claim any significant territorial gains over winter and into spring, with Ukrainian hopes now riding on a counteroffensive to be launched soon, though no one knows when or where it will begin.

RUSI's analysts say Russia's military still has deficiencies and weaknesses — the foremost being low morale across Russian infantry units — but they warned that it would be foolish to ridicule or write-off Russia's armed forces, or to become complacent about their imminent defeat at the hands of Ukraine.

"There's no smoke without fire and parts of the Russian military, particularly their line ground combat formations have performed very poorly, but at the same time they're not useless, they pack a lot of firepower and the Russian military is still in the fight," Reynolds said.

"The components in the Russian military system, particularly some of the ground combat units, are outperformed certainly by NATO military standards, I'd say they also are out-performed by the Ukrainians. And I think, in particular, sort of a lack of a clear rationale for why they're fighting and very poor morale are impediments to the Russians achieving their goal — but they're still in operations and they're still holding ground."

What does this mean for Ukraine's much-anticipated counteroffensive? Reynolds said it was hard and unwise to make predictions but did not underestimate the challenge Ukraine faces, with an expectation of more deadly attritional warfare with steep personnel losses for both sides and slow, grinding gains, or losses, of territory.

"Even if the Ukrainians perform very, very well, they will have to initially breach through Russian defensive lines and they will have to mop up Russian defensive positions. So there'll be attritional fighting, there'll be assaults on fixed defensive positions on some level. So it'll be difficult."

msn.com · by Holly Ellyatt 5 hrs ago

10. G7 steps up Russia sanctions in bid to slow war effort

G7 steps up Russia sanctions in bid to slow war effort

Reuters · by Katya Golubkova

• Summary
• Companies
• Zelenskiy expected to arrive on Saturday evening
• G7 members agree to step up sanctions on Russia
• Talks also to address tensions with China

HIROSHIMA, Japan, May 19 (Reuters) - Leaders of the world richest democracies agreed on Friday to stiffen sanctions against Russia and pledged financial support for Ukraine as its president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, prepared to join them in the Japanese city of Hiroshima.

The Group of Seven leaders are also expected to address growing tension between their economies and China during their summit that runs until Sunday. Officials said Zelenskiy would attend in person over the weekend.

The leaders said in a joint statement existing measures against Russia would be broadened and any exports that could help it in its 15-month war against Ukraine would be restricted across the G7 countries.

"This includes exports of industrial machinery, tools, and other technology that Russia uses to rebuild its war machine," they said in a joint statement, adding that efforts would continue to restrict Russian revenues from its trade in metals and diamonds.

Amid evidence that existing sanctions were being weakened by circumvention, they said the group was "engaging" with countries through which any restricted G7 goods, services or technology could transit through to Russia.

"We note and encourage commitments made by these countries to ensure our measures are not circumvented and have the intended effect," they said, without naming any territories.

Breakdowns of German trade data show that its exports to countries bordering Russia have risen sharply, fuelling concerns that about the re-exportation of goods from those neighbouring states.

The group of rich democracies reaffirmed their condemnation of what they called Russia's aggression and promised further support for Ukraine, in terms of military help and financial aid for its war-shattered economy this year and next.

[1/27] U.S. President Joe Biden, Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Britain's Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Council Charles Michel, Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, France's President Emmanuel Macron and Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida attend a working lunch meeting at G7 leaders' summit in Hiroshima, western Japan May 19, 2023, in this handout photo released by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan/HANDOUT via REUTERS

The members of the G7 - the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Canada and Italy - are also expected to debate strategy on the Ukraine conflict that shows no sign of easing.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who represents Hiroshima in Japan's lower house of parliament, said he chose the city for the summit to focus attention on arms control.

Hiroshima, and another Japanese city, Nagasaki, were destroyed by U.S. nuclear attacks 78 years ago that ended World War Two.

Zelenskiy will attend on Sunday, two officials involved in the G7 summit said, declining to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.

Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council, told state television that Zelenskiy's attendance was "absolutely essential in order to defend our interests".

Having emerged as the world's richest nations after World War Two, the G7 democracies have become increasingly challenged by an ascendant China and unpredictable Russia.

Leaders are expected to issue a statement with a "a section specific to China", listing issues that include "economic coercion and other behaviour", a U.S. official said.

They are focusing on how to warn the world's second biggest economy against what they see as its threat to global supply chains and economic security without alienating a powerful and important trade partner.

Reporting by Trevor Hunnicutt; Additional reporting by Jeff Mason, Susan Heavey, John Irish and Andreas Rinke; Editing by David Dolan and Alistair Bell

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Katya Golubkova

11. Russia fires cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets

Russia fires cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets

militarytimes.com · by Susie Blann · May 18, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine — Russia fired 30 cruise missiles against different parts of Ukraine early Thursday in the latest nighttime test of Ukrainian air defenses, which shot down 29 of them, officials said.

One person was killed and two were wounded by a Russian missile that got through and struck an industrial building in the southern region of Odesa, according to Serhiy Bratchuk, a spokesperson for the region’s military administration.

Amid the recently intensified Russian air assaults, China said its special envoy met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during talks in Kyiv earlier this week with Ukraine’s chief diplomat.

Beijing’s peace proposal has so far yielded no apparent breakthrough in the war. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said Thursday that the warring parties needed to “accumulate mutual trust” for progress to be made.

Ukrainian officials sought during the talks to recruit China’s support for Kyiv’s own peace plan, according to Ukraine’s presidential office. Zelenskyy’s proposal includes the restoration of his country’s territorial integrity, the withdrawal of Russian forces and holding Russian President Vladimir Putin legally accountable for the invasion in February 2022.

Leaders of the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations gathering in Japan on Thursday were expected to denounce Russia’s war and vow to keep helping Ukraine fight Moscow. They were to hold “discussions about the battlefield” in Ukraine, according to Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser.

A Western official said Russia had built “potentially formidable” defensive lines on Ukrainian territory, including extensive minefields, and had more than 200,000 troops along the 1,000-kilometer (600-mile) front line, though it is unlikely to possess credible reserves.

As Ukraine receives sophisticated weapons systems from its Western allies, the Kremlin has started losing warplanes in areas previously deemed as safe, the official said, while Kyiv has proven able to shoot down Russia’s hypersonic ballistic missiles — the most advanced weapons in Moscow’s arsenal.

The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss military intelligence.

Meanwhile, Kremlin-installed authorities in occupied Crimea reported the derailment of eight train cars Thursday because of an explosion, prompting renewed suspicions about possible Ukrainian saboteur activity behind Russian lines. Russian state media reported that the train was carrying grain.

The state news agency RIA Novosti, quoting a source within the emergency services, said the incident occurred not far from the city of Simferopol. The Crimean Railway company said the derailment was caused by “the interference of unauthorized persons” and that there were no casualties.

Ukraine officials refuse to comment on possible acts of sabotage. Ukraine’s military intelligence spokesperson, Andriy Yusov, noted on Ukrainian television that Russian train lines “are also used to transport weapons, ammunition, armored vehicles.”

Overnight, loud explosions were heard in Kyiv as the Kremlin’s forces targeted the capital for the ninth time this month. It was a clear escalation after weeks of lull and before a much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive using newly supplied advanced Western weapons.

Debris fell on two Kyiv districts, starting a fire at a garage complex. There was no immediate word about any victims, Serhii Popko, head of the Kyiv military administration, said in a Telegram post.

Ukraine also shot down two Russian exploding drones and two reconnaissance drones, according to the authorities.

The missiles were launched from Russian sea, air and ground bases, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the Ukrainian commander in chief, wrote on Telegram.

Several waves of missiles were aimed at areas of Ukraine between 9 p.m. Wednesday and 5:30 a.m. Thursday, he said.

Russian forces used strategic bombers from the Caspian region and apparently fired X-101 and X-55-type missiles developed during Soviet times, Kyiv authorities said. Russia then deployed reconnaissance drones over the capital.

In the last major air attack on Kyiv, on Tuesday, Ukrainian air defenses bolstered by sophisticated Western-supplied systems shot down all the incoming missiles, officials said.

That attack used hypersonic missiles, which repeatedly have been touted by Putin as providing a key strategic advantage. The missiles, which are among the most advanced weapons in Russia’s arsenal, are difficult to detect and intercept because of their hypersonic speed and maneuverability.

But sophisticated Western air defense systems, including American-made Patriot missiles, have helped spare Kyiv from the kind of destruction witnessed along the main front line in the country’s east and south.

While the ground fighting is largely deadlocked along that front line, both sides are targeting each other’s territory with long-range weapons.

The most intense fighting has focused on the battle for the city of Bakhmut and the surrounding area, in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk province, with a Ukrainian military official claiming Thursday that the army advanced up to 1.7 kilometers (more than a mile) there over the previous day.

At the same time, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the millionaire owner of Russia’s private military contractor Wagner whose troops have spearheaded the battle, claimed that Russian army units had retreated from their positions north of the city. Prigozhin is a frequent critic of the Russian military.

At least seven Ukrainian civilians were killed, including a 5-year-old boy, and 18 people were wounded over the previous 24 hours, the presidential office said.

Also, two people were wounded in a drone attack in Russia’s southern Kursk region, which borders Ukraine, the regional governor reported Thursday.

In a Telegram post, Roman Starovoit claimed Ukrainian forces dropped an explosive device from a drone on a sports and recreation complex.

In Russia’s Belgorod region, two people were killed in Ukrainian shelling of the village of Nizhnee Berezovo, about 10 kilometers (six miles) from the border, according to Gov. Vyacheslav Gladkov.

Jill Lawless in London and Yuras Karmanau in Tallinn, Estonia contributed to this report.

12. Ghosts of war haunt G7 as leaders face up to Chinese menace

Perhaps we should not try so hard for a meeting with Xi.

Excerpts:

The Biden administration has for months been seeking to secure a visit to China for top Cabinet members, such as Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, held eight hours of talks with the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign policy chief, Wang Yi, this month.

Just before he left for Japan on Wednesday, U.S. President Joe Biden was asked whether his last-minute decision to truncate his trip abroad could be seen as “almost a win for China.” Instead of staying in the region for a summit of the Quad — Japan, India, the U.S. and Australia — Biden plans to return to Washington Sunday to deal with domestic issues.

The president downplayed the move as something China could use to its advantage, noting he will still meet with Quad nation leaders in Japan. “We get a chance to talk separately at the meeting,” he said

Then, Biden was asked whether he has plans to speak with the Chinese president soon.

“Whether it’s soon or not, we will be meeting,” he said, before leaving the room.

Ghosts of war haunt G7 as leaders face up to Chinese menace

The threat of China invading Taiwan is dividing allies at Hiroshima summit.

Politico · by Sonya Angelica Diehn · May 18, 2023

Press play to listen to this article

Voiced by artificial intelligence.

HIROSHIMA, Japan — As the leaders of the Group of Seven gather for their annual summit in Japan this week, three world-changing conflicts — past, present and potential — will converge.

The atomic bomb that ended World War II destroyed much of the city of Hiroshima, where the leaders will meet. Today, Russia’s war in Ukraine is costing thousands of lives and billions of dollars as it drags on. And then there’s the risk of another horrifying catastrophe to come, as China threatens Taiwan.

And it’s over China where the alliance may come unstuck.

For hawks like the U.S. and Japan, the summit beginning Friday offers a timely opportunity to make the case to Europe’s leaders directly that it’s time to get off the fence when it comes to confronting China.

“This G7 Summit will be an appropriate venue to also discuss security issues and our security cooperation not only in Europe, but also in the Indo-Pacific region,” Noriyuki Shikata, cabinet secretary at the Japanese prime minister’s office, told POLITICO.

The U.S. is betting on at least the appearance of common ground with allies about the People’s Republic of China. Ahead of the summit, U.S. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters: “You can expect to hear at the end of those discussions that all the G7 leaders are of a common mind about how to deal with the challenges that the PRC presents.”

But — beyond the inevitably bland diplomatic lines of a summit communique — getting consensus on meaningful security measures for the Indo-Pacific region will be hard, even in the symbolic setting of Hiroshima.

East Asia is again descending into a state of growing security risks and military imbalance, this time due to China’s aggressive moves against Taiwan and the South China Sea.

“There’s a feeling that there’s a little bit of a gap, perhaps, between where the Europeans are on some China issues and where the U.S. is,” said Zack Cooper, former aide to the U.S. National Security Council and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Chief among the points of tension is how far to go in trying to stop a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which could trigger world war and wreck the global economy. The self-governing island, which Beijing claims as its own, provides most of the world’s advanced computer chips that are vital to the tech and defense industries. Not all European governments are convinced it’s something they need to prioritize. “It’s going to be a continuing challenge,” Cooper said.

Picking friends

NATO is set to extend its footprint in Asia and set up a new liaison office in Tokyo to better coordinate with regional partners, such as Australia, South Korea and New Zealand.

However, French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly called on NATO to focus only on the Euro-Atlantic theater, saying Asia — China — is not covered geographically. He also triggered an outcry with recent comments to POLITICO, suggesting that Taiwan’s security was not Europe’s fight, and that the EU should not automatically follow America’s lead.

Justin Trudeau comes to the G7 following months of intelligence leaks that have painted his government as weak on foreign interference | Yuchi Yamazaki/AFP via Getty Images

Macron’s stance sets France — which is the EU’s biggest military power — apart from the U.S. and Japan, and also from the U.K., where Prime Minister Rishi Sunak is expected to announce a new security deal with Japan during his visit.

“Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow,” Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said last year, not long after Russia’s full-scale invasion began. Last week, Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi made an even more explicit warning in a speech made to his 27 EU counterparts in Sweden.

“China is continuing and intensifying its unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas. China is also increasing its military activities around Taiwan,” Hayashi said. “In addition, China and Russia are strengthening their military collaboration, including joint flights of their bombers and joint naval exercises in the vicinity of Japan.”

The Chinese-Russian ties will be part of the G7 leaders’ discussions, according to two officials involved in the process, who spoke on condition of anonymity because summit preparations are not public. While the Chinese authorities stop short of openly arming Russia in its war against Ukraine, a long-term strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow is unshakable for President Xi Jinping.

G7 countries such as the U.S. and Japan are expected to raise the need to sanction countries that work around Western trade restrictions on Russia, according to the officials. Chinese companies found to be selling dual use goods to Russia would be a top focus.

Bully tactics

China’s willingness to throw around its economic weight is one area where there’s likely to be more unity between G7 allies.

The need to fight back against economic coercion will take center stage at the summit. The EU, U.S., Canada and Japan are going to rally around calls to combat China’s use of its economic power to bully smaller economies that act against its political interests.

“The sense of urgency and unity is a force factor in and of itself. For example, never before has the G7 addressed economic coercion,” Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, told POLITICO.

“When measured against the recent past, the G7 and EU are more strategically aligned in key economic and military matters,” added Emanuel, who served as chief of staff to former U.S. President Barack Obama.

When it comes to the European view, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is clear that the bloc is “competing with China” and will need to up its game. “We will reduce strategic dependencies — we have learned the lessons of the last year,” she said in a press conference ahead of the trip.

Justin Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister, comes to the G7 following months of intelligence leaks that have painted his government as weak on foreign interference, specifically from China. He’ll be carrying Canada’s message that it can be a safe, non-authoritarian alternative to Russia and China for supplying critical minerals and energy, including nuclear power.

Despite the toughening rhetoric on China, what still unites the G7 countries is an eagerness not to shut the door on talks with Beijing.

US President Joe Biden arrives to attend the G7 Summit in Hiroshima on May 18, 2023 | Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

The Biden administration has for months been seeking to secure a visit to China for top Cabinet members, such as Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, held eight hours of talks with the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign policy chief, Wang Yi, this month.

Just before he left for Japan on Wednesday, U.S. President Joe Biden was asked whether his last-minute decision to truncate his trip abroad could be seen as “almost a win for China.” Instead of staying in the region for a summit of the Quad — Japan, India, the U.S. and Australia — Biden plans to return to Washington Sunday to deal with domestic issues.

The president downplayed the move as something China could use to its advantage, noting he will still meet with Quad nation leaders in Japan. “We get a chance to talk separately at the meeting,” he said

Then, Biden was asked whether he has plans to speak with the Chinese president soon.

“Whether it’s soon or not, we will be meeting,” he said, before leaving the room.

Cristina Gallardo in London and Zi-Ann Lum in Ottawa contributed reporting.

Politico · by Sonya Angelica Diehn · May 18, 2023

13. US Medics Must Learn from Ukraine’s Harsher War, Report Says

Excerpts:

“If you look at what the next war is gonna be, every incident is going to be a mass-casualty incident,” Aaron Epstein, a doctor and president of the group that produced the report, said in an interview.

The U.S. military’s medical community needs to figure out, among other things, how to treat casualties amid ever-more-accurate artillery strikes, how to deal with electronic jamming, and how to ward off attacks on medical vehicles, the report said.

The organization behind the report, Global Surgical and Medical Support Group, has worked in Ukraine since the beginning of the war, training Ukrainian soldiers and providing medical support. It is primarily staffed by former U.S. military medical personnel, including many former U.S. special operations forces combat medics.

The organization coordinates with both Ukrainian special forces and U.S. Special Operations Command in Europe, Epstein said, although they do not carry out Defense Department tasks. The report’s authors interviewed Ukrainian special forces surgeons and those working for Ukrainian military intelligence, who, despite their specialty, treat all branches of the Ukrainian land forces.

US Medics Must Learn from Ukraine’s Harsher War, Report Says

Russia’s artillery and jammers make battlefield medicine harder and more dangerous than in Afghanistan and Iraq.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

Dima, a Ukrainian mortician-turned-medic, knows all too well how dangerous medical evacuations can be. Speaking to Defense One near Kherson last November, he described how Russian tanks once fired on his ambulance, sending shrapnel through its thin sides.

Dima’s experience is far from unusual, according to a new report that describes the experience of frontline Ukrainian special forces surgeons. Published in the Journal of the American College of Surgeons, it says the U.S. should get ready for wars defined by artillery, not the homemade bombs seen in Afghanistan.

“If you look at what the next war is gonna be, every incident is going to be a mass-casualty incident,” Aaron Epstein, a doctor and president of the group that produced the report, said in an interview.

The U.S. military’s medical community needs to figure out, among other things, how to treat casualties amid ever-more-accurate artillery strikes, how to deal with electronic jamming, and how to ward off attacks on medical vehicles, the report said.

The organization behind the report, Global Surgical and Medical Support Group, has worked in Ukraine since the beginning of the war, training Ukrainian soldiers and providing medical support. It is primarily staffed by former U.S. military medical personnel, including many former U.S. special operations forces combat medics.

The organization coordinates with both Ukrainian special forces and U.S. Special Operations Command in Europe, Epstein said, although they do not carry out Defense Department tasks. The report’s authors interviewed Ukrainian special forces surgeons and those working for Ukrainian military intelligence, who, despite their specialty, treat all branches of the Ukrainian land forces.

Ukrainian surgeons who contributed to the report said artillery and rockets caused 70 percent of wounds and deaths. Anti-tank guided missiles are also a major threat; the report cites a Ukrainian source as saying that strikes on unarmored or lightly armored vehicles typically killed 70 percent of those inside.

Compared to the improvised explosive devices the U.S. faced in Afghanistan and Iraq, these weapons can also be radically more deadly. One Russian thermobaric weapon killed 12 people immediately within 65 feet of the impact point, while another person 200 feet away suffered burns over 80 percent of their body and subsequently died.

The high numbers of wounded means that Ukrainian surgeons must work round the clock to help them, the report said. One surgeon interviewed said they treated 200 patients in a week while under bombardment, or around 28 patients a day.

Ukrainian body armor and helmets appeared helpful in preventing injuries, but the lack of full-torso protection was a problem. Around 60 percent of wounds occurred in soldiers’ sides, between their front and rear body armor plates; and 30 percent occurred below them, the report said. Ten percent of those injured either had projectiles pierce their armor or were not wearing armor.

Surgeons found it challenging to treat soldiers hit by artillery fire because they often suffer multiple types of injuries, such as life-threatening wounds, blunt-force trauma from being thrown, and traumatic brain injuries.

Russia’s targeting of medical personnel and facilities further complicates the task. Surgeons typically have no warning about incoming patients, as neither frontline units nor the surgeons have encrypted communications that can withstand jamming or elude surveillance.

For months, Epstein said, his organization had been telling the U.S. military about Ukrainian surgeons’ requests for more communications equipment. He was told that the communications equipment recently sent in U.S. military aid packages in April may go to the surgeons his organization supports.

Medical centers are so fearful of being targeted by Russia that they may not use electrical generators, whose warmth Russia can see through the use of thermal vision. That means that, despite the high need for blood transfusions, Ukrainian surgeons cannot store supplies of blood in refrigerators or warm up freeze-dried blood.

Another alternative, the “walking blood bank,” in which soldiers with universally-usable blood provide their own blood, isn’t feasible in Ukraine, the surgeons added, due to the high rate of casualties.

Russian targeting of medical staff on the road, meanwhile, means that surgeons can’t immediately evacuate wounded patients. Medical evacuation by air is too risky, and roads out of combat may be under fire for days at time.

These conditions, the report argues, suggest that U.S. medical personnel must prepare to treat more casualties closer to the frontline and protect them for longer periods of time, potentially even buying rapid tunneling machines that could help protect medical points.

Epstein said the U.S. government had yet to formally reach out to his organization about the report, although he has heard from U.S. special operations forces surgeons that they are widely sharing it.

“We need to learn the lessons now, because this is a new form of warfare,” Epstein said. “There’s no time for that learning curve in the next war.”

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

14.  US signals to allies it won't block their export of F-16 jets to Ukraine

US signals to allies it won't block their export of F-16 jets to Ukraine | CNN Politics

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand,Kylie Atwood,Oren Liebermann · May 18, 2023

CNN —

The Biden administration has signaled to European allies in recent weeks that the US would allow them to export F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, sources familiar with the discussions said, as the White House comes under increasing pressure from members of Congress and allies to help Ukraine procure the planes amid intensifying Russian aerial attacks.

Administration officials are not aware, however, of any formal requests by any allies to export F-16s, and State Department officials who would normally be tasked with the paperwork to approve such third-party transfers have not been told to get to work, officials said.

A handful of European countries have a supply of the US-made F-16s, including the Netherlands, which has signaled a willingness to export some of them to Ukraine. But the US would have to approve that third party transfer because of the jets’ sensitive US technology.

While the US remains reluctant to send any of its own F-16s to Kyiv, US officials told CNN that the administration is prepared to approve the export of the jets to Ukraine if that is what allies decide to do with their supply.

File photo of a F-16C Fighting Falcon fighter jet

Larry MacDougal/MCDOL/AP/FILE

National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications John Kirby declined to comment specifically on the possibility of the US sending F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, but said broadly that the US has been forward-looking about “future capabilities” and needs. F-16s are “not on the agenda” at the G7, he said, though the aircraft could certainly come up on the sidelines of the summit.

A picture shows F-16 fighter jets during the NATO international air force exercise Frisian Flag, at Leeuwarden Air Base on March 28, 2022.

Jeffrey Groeneweg/ANP/AFP/Getty Images

UK, Netherlands are working to procure F-16 fighters for Ukraine, Downing Street says

US lawmakers and congressional staffers have joined in the F-16 lobbying campaign, urging the administration to provide the jets so that Ukraine can establish control over its skies.

“As a bipartisan group of lawmakers, we view the transfer of F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine as essential for providing Kyiv with the air support capability required to fully defend their nation against Russia’s unprovoked, illegal, and brutal invasion, and to make the territorial gains necessary to reclaim their country,” a group of Republican and Democratic lawmakers wrote in a letter to President Joe Biden on Wednesday that was obtained by CNN.

The issue is expected to be a subject of debate at the next NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July, officials said.

Another open question is where Ukrainian pilots would train on these F-16s. A spokesperson for UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said earlier this week that the UK and the Netherlands were looking to form an “international coalition” not only to procure the jets for Ukraine but also to train Ukrainian pilots on the 4th generation fighters, which are more advanced than the Ukrainian fighter fleet.

In March, the US hosted two Ukrainian pilots at a military base in Tucson, Arizona to evaluate their skills using flight simulators and to assess how much time they would need to learn to fly various US military aircraft, including F-16s. But US has no plans as of now to expand that training, a defense official told CNN, despite Congress setting aside money in the 2023 budget for such training.

US allies with F-16s could conduct training for Ukrainian fighter pilots, or the aircraft’s manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, could carry out training as a private contractor. But the defense official said such an arrangement would likely need some level of US participation, even if it doesn’t require an official US sign off like the transfer of US weaponry overseas.

Ukrainians upping their lobbying campaign

Top Ukrainian officials have escalated their public lobbying campaign for US-made F-16s in recent months, arguing they need them urgently to defend against Russian missile and drone attacks.

Russia launched an “unprecedented” series of missile attacks on Kyiv on Thursday morning, a Ukrainian official said, just days after Russia launched a barrage of six hypersonic missiles near the capital aimed at destroying Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems.

“A series of air attacks on Kyiv, unprecedented in their power, intensity and variety, continues,” said Serhii Popko, head of Kyiv’s civil and military administration.

Without the jets, Ukraine is having to improvise, officials say. Defense officials and congressional staffers told CNN that Ukrainian troops have in recent weeks used the US-made Patriot air defense system to shoot down at least one faraway Russian fighter jet. The Russian jets have largely been staying behind Russian defensive lines, making them difficult for Ukraine to target with shorter-range systems like NASAMs.

The Russian planes the Patriot targeted were on a bombing run to fire missiles against Ukrainian targets, US officials said, which Russia has been doing throughout the past year to maximize civilian casualties.

The officials said the Ukrainians were responsible for making their own firing decisions once the west provided the Patriot systems, noting it is up to the Ukrainians when and how to engage the Patriots to protect their people.

Sophisticated fighter jets would make it easier for Ukraine to target the Russian planes, some congressional staffers argue, without having to expend expensive Patriot munitions that were made to intercept ballistic missiles.

Some US officials are skeptical of that argument, however, and note that Russia has extensive anti-aircraft systems that could easily shoot down the F-16s. Ukraine has not been conducting many air missions with the fighter planes it already has for precisely that reason, officials have said.

Still, there is a belief in Kyiv that with enough public pressure, the Ukrainians can eventually secure weapons systems that were once deemed a red line by the west. HIMARS, battle tanks, and the Patriot battery were all once considered off-limits – all are now either in country or heading there soon.

While the UK does not have any F-16s of its own, the British government appears to have done a U-turn on the issue over the last several months. In January, a British government spokesperson told reporters that the UK believes that the jets “are extremely sophisticated and take months to learn how to fly. Given that, we believe it is not practical to send those jets into Ukraine.”

On Monday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Kyiv and London were “actively moving forward” on a plan to procure them.

“We need F-16s,” Andriy Yermak, head of the office of the Ukrainian president. “And I am grateful to our allies for their decision to work in this direction, including training our pilots.”

CNN’s Zachary Cohen and Jennifer Hansler contributed reporting.

CNN · by Natasha Bertrand,Kylie Atwood,Oren Liebermann · May 18, 2023

15. The Week In Russia: At Daggers Drawn

The Week In Russia: At Daggers Drawn

May 19, 2023

• By Steve Gutterman

rferl.org

I'm Steve Gutterman, the editor of RFE/RL's Russia/Ukraine/Belarus Desk.

Welcome to The Week In Russia, in which I dissect the key developments in Russian politics and society over the previous week and look at what's ahead. To receive The Week In Russia newsletter in your inbox, click here.

Russia tries hypersonic missile attacks in Ukraine and treason accusations at home. And in the battle for Bakhmut, the "culture of mutual suspicion, cannibalistic competition, and opportunistic self-interest" President Vladimir Putin has created to maintain power is backfiring, an analyst says.

Here are some of the key developments in Russia over the past week and some of the takeaways going forward.

Missile Offense

For the past 15 years or more, Putin has repeatedly warned the West about missiles Russia had built or was developing, frequently saying they could penetrate any missile defense system, and urging the United States and NATO to hear his grievances and heed his stated security concerns.

One of the missiles Putin has frequently mentioned is the Kinzhal, whose name means dagger. In an annual state-of-the-nation speech in March 2018, shortly before he secured his current term, Putin boasted about that system and others and said the West must "listen to us now."

In the annual address a year later, he rattled off the names of at least five missile systems, including the Kinzhal, and asked whether U.S. policymakers could count -- then answered his own question.

"I'm sure they can," he said. "Let them count the speed and the range of the weapons systems we are developing."

Despite rising tension between Russia and the West and Russia's involvement in the wars in Syria and in Ukraine's Donbas region, such warnings had a strange dissonance to them, ringing wrong to some ears. The Cold War was over, after all, and the United States had no designs on Russia despite Putin's insistence that it was out to "hold Russia back" from successful development, at the very least.

Fast-forward to 2023, and Russia is using missiles including the Kinzhal in its war on Ukraine -- a war of aggression that Putin, who massively escalated the Donbas conflict by launching the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, has nonetheless tried to cast as a defensive war against Western countries that he baselessly asserts are bent on tearing Russia apart.

And in the event, the Kinzhal may not be living up to the hype.

Ukraine said its air defenses intercepted six Kinzhal missiles fired by Russian aircraft during one of the biggest aerial assaults in months early on May 16. And while Moscow dismissed that claim and asserted that a Kinzhal had hit a Patriot missile battery -- one of at least two provided by the United States and Germany, according to reports -- the Pentagon said on May 18 that it "has now been fixed and is fully back and operational."

The conflicting claims left questions, but Russia has fired Kinzhal missiles before and the hypersonic weapon does not appear to be a game-changer. It may end up being an example of the way Russia's offensive -- from the first few weeks of the invasion, when Moscow's forces were stopped outside Kyiv and failed to push President Volodymyr Zelenskiy from power, subjugate Ukraine, or win any concessions from its government -- has fallen short of expectations in the Kremlin.

Battle For Bakhmut

The Kinzhal strike this week was part of a series of major aerial attacks on Kyiv and other cities -- part of a Russian campaign that has killed thousands or tens of thousands of Ukrainians, including many in areas where Putin claims to be trying to protect the lives of Russian-speakers, as heavy fighting persisted on the ground along front lines in the east and south -- particularly in and around Bakhmut, a once-thriving city in the Donetsk region that has been virtually destroyed in many months of fierce fighting.

The Russian forces' failure to take Bakhmut so far is almost certainly another example of the offensive not living up to Putin's expectations, and it has brought tension between rivals close to the Kremlin bubbling up to the surface -- mostly in the form of diatribes from Wagner mercenary group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and the top military brass.

Once nearly silent but now wildly outspoken, Prigozhin has also come close to criticizing Putin -- but has used wording that enables him to deny it.

And now, indications that Prigozhin may have offered Kyiv information about regular Russian Army positions in exchange for a Ukrainian retreat from Bakhmut shows how "Putin's style of managing the elite has proven dangerously dysfunctional when transplanted to the battlefield," author and analyst Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russia's military and security agencies, wrote in The Spectator on May 15.

"A culture of mutual suspicion, cannibalistic competition, and opportunistic self-interest has kept Putin in power for more than two decades. It has allowed him to play individuals and interests against each other and forced the members of his court constantly to seek his ear and favor," Galeotti wrote. "In war, though, the need is for unity, discipline, and mutual support -- something the Ukrainians are displaying and the Russians clearly lack."

'Become Russian Or Suffer'

While most of the attention is focused on the fighting, reports from Russian-occupied territory behind the front lines are chilling.

Ukrainian officials displaced from Russian-occupied parts of the Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions say Russia is forcibly removing civilians from towns and settlements close to the front as Ukraine gears up for a long-anticipated counteroffensive.

And in Russian-held parts of those two regions as well as Donetsk and Luhansk, in the east, the occupation authorities are using threats and pressure to persuade residents to accept Russian ID documents, Human Rights Watch said -- meaning Russian citizenship.

Those who do not do so by July 2024 "will be considered foreign nationals in their own country," the New York-based organization said in an article titled Become Russian Or Suffer. "This means they could be forced from their homes and deported -- an egregious violation of international law."

Additionally, the Russian State Duma approved legislation paving the way for Moscow to stage elections later this year in the Russian-occupied portions of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions -- votes that would have no legitimacy internationally and are sure to be condemned by Kyiv and the West if they take place.

In Crimea, 79 years after Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's government forced the Crimean Tatars out of their homeland in 1944, persecution that began after Russia occupied and seized control over the Ukrainian Black Sea peninsula persisted.

And in Russia, meanwhile, the state's clampdown on its own citizens continues.

Scapegoating Science?

In an open letter published on May 15, scholars at a scientific institute in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk said that three leading physicists there had been arrested on treason charges in the past year.

The signatories said they were certain their colleagues are innocent and suggested that if the state treats scholars who participate in conferences, deliver reports, and share open-source information abroad, Russian science is headed for "catastrophe."

Separately but relatedly, the chairman of the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences said on May 18 that Russia had "lost 50,000 people" in the sciences in the last five years.

"Now, when everyone is talking about technological sovereignty and the future depends on science-intensive technology, the issue is that Russia as a state is missing those who can do this," said Valentin Parmon, who is also vice president of the academy.

The letter also mentioned Dmitry Kolker, who was arrested last summer at a Novosibirsk clinic where he was being treated for late-stage pancreatic cancer and died two days later, after being transferred to the Lefortovo prison in Moscow and then to a hospital. Kolker, 54, was being investigated on suspicion of treason for purportedly sharing state secrets with China.

Attorneys and activists say the number of treason cases opened so far this year by the Federal Security Service (FSB) is unprecedented in modern Russian history.

But the clampdown has focused heavily on Russians who have criticized the war on Ukraine.

On May 17, a Moscow court sentenced activist Mikhail Kriger, who was arrested in November 2022 over Internet posts condemning the invasion, to seven years in prison after convicting him of justifying terrorism and inciting hatred.

In a statement in court ahead of the verdict, Kriger said that he had been accused of "allowing myself to dream publicly of Putin's hanging," and that he did indeed hope to live to see that happen.

"With Putin there are rivers of blood, without Putin there is no bloodshed," he said.

After the judge pronounced the sentence, Kriger, a native of the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, sang a song in Ukrainian and voiced confidence that Putin, a KGB officer in the Soviet era, would be out of the Kremlin before his prison term is over.

"I think that rotten KGB louse won't last in power for seven years," he said.

That's it from me this week.

NOTE: The Week In Russia will next appear on June 2.

If you want to know more, catch up on my podcast The Week Ahead In Russia, out every Monday, here on our site or wherever you get your podcasts ().

Yours,

Steve Gutterman

rferl.org

16. IG Report for OES - Afghanistan (May 2023) | SOF News                  

I missed that we still have a named operation taking place regarding Afghanistan. 

IG Report for OES - Afghanistan (May 2023) | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · May 19, 2023

The Lead Inspector General report to the U.S. Congress on Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES) Afghanistan has been published (May 2023). The report provides an update on significant events in Afghanistan covering the period from January 1st to March 31st 2023.

Major Topics of Report

Intelligence Shortfalls. The commander of Unites States Central Command says that the Department of Defense lacks the ability to see the full picture of terrorist threats that could come from Afghanistan. He indicated that there is a need for new airborne intelligence platforms capable of remaining aloft in the region for extended periods of time. He also said that there is a need for increased intelligence collection – both signals and human intelligence.

ISKP. The Islamic State Khorsan Provice (ISKP) continues to mount attacks against Taliban officials and civilians in Afghanistan. The high-profile attacks include assassinations and bombings. ISKP could also strike U.S. or Western interests abroad within six months if they prioritized such attacks.

Diplomacy. U.S. diplomats continue to engage with the Taliban to promote U.S. interests. Issues under discussion include the safety of U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, relocation of U.S. Afghan allies, economy, terrorism, and human rights.

Assisting Afghan Allies (SIVs). The State Department is reported to have provided permanent consular staffing in Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan to improve Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) and refugee processing. The Department of State issued 5,616 SIVs this quarter. Afghan resettlement agencies in the United States are facing challenges due to the rapid pace of arrivals (from Afghanistan and elsewhere), difficulty in obtaining documentation, and limited staffing.

Humanitarian Situtation. The number of Afghans needed assistance in Afghanistan has doubled since 2020; more than 2/3s of the population is in need of assistance. The U.S. is providing $541 million in aid to Afghanistan in FY2023 focused on food, health, shelter, livelihoods, and education.

*********

Operation Enduring Sentinel, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2023 – March 31, 2023, published May 18, 2023, PDF, 54 pages.

https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/q2fy2023_leadig_oes_508.pdf

Photo: U.S. Marines assigned to the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response – Central Command provide security at Hamid Karzai International Airport during the Kabul non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Afghanistan on August 18, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by 1st Lt. Mark Andries).

sof.news · by SOF News · May 19, 2023

17.  The Perfect Tool for Scaling U.S. Defense Investment

Conclusion:

U.S. venture capitalists look to minimize risk while still identifying unicorns – startups that cross the billion-dollar valuation metric – and market opportunities. OSC will provide patient capital that other emerging technology companies need to transform themselves into attractive investment opportunities. The OSC is primed to facilitate, encourage, and support investment into technologies that will protect America and build for the future. Congress must ensure that they are given the funding, authorities, and support to fully do so.

The Perfect Tool for Scaling U.S. Defense Investment

thecipherbrief.com

May 18th, 2023 by Bryce Mitchell, Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, |

Captain Bryce Mitchell is a U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officer and member of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ (FDD) National Security Network. Previously, he completed the DoD’s Defense Ventures Fellowship with Marque Ventures, an early-stage defense-focused venture fund and the AFWERX Fellowship. The views expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or the Air Force.

View all articles by Bryce Mitchell

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior director at the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He directs CSC 2.0, which works to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, where he previously served as executive director. Follow him on Twitter @MarkCMontgomery

View all articles by Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

OPINION — In the global techno-competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) has finally fielded a tool to incentivize America’s capital markets to invest in the kinds of emerging technologies Washington will need to maintain its advantage in this growing technology fight. In early December, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin established the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), and shortly thereafter, the OSC team unveiled their first program: the Small Business Investment Company Critical Technologies (SBICCT) Initiative—a critical technology investment fund building on a long established and historically successful program run by the Small Business Administration. The SBICCT Initiative will provide critical, early-stage investments into vital technologies that have a slower return on investment than venture capital is usually seeking. Responsibilities now lie with Congress to provide further funding and enhanced authorities and with DoD to support the office’s planned development of additional program authorities to ensure that OSC matures into a true weapon within the Pentagon’s innovation arsenal.

For decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has directed national resources into focused 5-year plans to modernize the People’s Liberation Army. This effort has developed a myriad of capabilities, the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-17 hypersonic missile, and various surface-to-air-missile systems, all designed to defeat America’s primary weapons systems and prevent our operations in the Western Pacific. Its military-civil fusion investment funds, estimated at $700 billion dollars, assist in steering this modernization effort. CCP actors have sought to capture top western-produced technology through equity-controlling venture investments and the outright acquisition of foreign critical technology companies. This barrage of adversarial capital, although often tempting to cash-strapped startups, is a death-wish for companies hoping to eventually market products to the DoD or protect the market viability of their intellectual property. This directed strategy, combined with constant cyberattacks pilfering hundreds of billions in American intellectual property, has elevate Beijing into a global leaders in dozens of critical technologies.

Looking for a way to get ahead of the week in cyber and tech? Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter to quickly get up to speed on the biggest cyber and tech headlines and be ready for the week ahead. Sign up today.

In contrast to China’s top-down model, the United States private capital market is one of the country’s greatest strengths, but in recent decades venture capital and private equity firms have not focused investments on capital-intensive critical technologies. Investors bet on software start-ups, mobile applications, and business-to-business software-as-a-service companies with high margins. For example, last year investors directed only $9 billion dollars into hardware startups, while $124 billion into software. OSC’s new SBICCT Initiative aims to change this dynamic by building on the decades-old Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program.

In 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower signed the Small Business Investment Act to direct additional capital towards small business financing. This decision early during the Cold War served as the foundation for today’s thriving venture ecosystem. Catalysed by the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the SBIC program jumpstarted America’s Cold War dynamism. Throughout the program’s lifetime, SBICs provided initial funding to hundreds of successful companies, including FedEx, Apple, Costco, and Hewlett-Packard. Even the world’s first supercomputer, Cray-1, was funded in part by a government-backed SBIC. Announcing the new partnership with OSC, Bailey DeVries, an associate administrator at the Small Business Administration, noted that over the past 65 years, SBIC “has seeded and scaled some of the most innovative and successful businesses in the world.” Many of the technologies these businesses developed underpin U.S. national security.

It’s not just for the President anymore. Are you getting your daily national security briefing? Subscriber+Members have exclusive access to the Open Source Collection Daily Brief, keeping you up to date on global events impacting national security. It pays to be a Subscriber+Member.

The SBICCT Initiative will help address gaps in other U.S. government efforts to fund critical technology development. Silicon Valley has argued, for example, that U.S. grants fail provide recurring the kind of annual revenue companies need to scale production. Two other planned programs at OSC, the Transition Acceleration Program and Federal Loan Program Initiative, will also help tackle this challenge. The Transition Acceleration Program will help provide capital to companies bridging from start-ups to equipment providers for DoD’s programs of record. Through the Federal Loan Program, DoD will be able – like a myriad of other federal agencies – to provide direct loans or guarantees to high potential critical technology companies. These follow-on initiatives will need champions on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in the acquisition and research and development offices within the Pentagon to truly provide the Secretary of Defense a “Swiss Army knife” of financing tools for gaps in private sector critical technology financing. Increased funding and enhanced authorities will be vital if the office is able to scale investment and ensure increased competition within the defense industrial base.

U.S. venture capitalists look to minimize risk while still identifying unicorns – startups that cross the billion-dollar valuation metric – and market opportunities. OSC will provide patient capital that other emerging technology companies need to transform themselves into attractive investment opportunities. The OSC is primed to facilitate, encourage, and support investment into technologies that will protect America and build for the future. Congress must ensure that they are given the funding, authorities, and support to fully do so.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to [email protected] for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

18. China Is Bailing Out Its Bad Bets, and Handing the West a Geopolitical Opening

Can we exploit failure and weakness?

Excerpts:

The failures of the BRI have provided an opportunity for the West to step up and offer a productive, well-built, and competitive alternative to the BRI. China skipped a comprehensive derisking strategy, to its detriment.The U.S. and its allies need to make a case that when transparency, conditionality, and sustainable debt are key pillars of development infrastructure and financing, the outcomes are better, and citizens gain.

It’s hard to counter Beijing’s offers of fast cash, but it’s not impossible. If the U.S. and its allies step up their infrastructure game, they will likely find receptive audiences of leaders and citizens ready to step out of China’s debt-fueled shadow.

China Is Bailing Out Its Bad Bets, and Handing the West a Geopolitical Opening

Barron's · by Elaine Dezenski

About the author: Elaine Dezenski is the senior director and head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Issuing what have frequently amounted to junk bonds, China’s BRI made high-risk, often-unneeded billion-dollar infrastructure loans, with no conditionality, poor risk planning, shrouded in opacity and secrecy. Cash-poor developing countries that lacked the ability to pay and had long track records of corruption were particularly vulnerable. A recent report by researchers at the World Bank and several other institutions shows that China has funded $240 billion in bailouts for many of these subprime loans.

It’s not surprising that so many of the countries that borrowed what looked like cheap Chinese cash for these global megaprojects are now at risk of defaulting on their loans. The seeds of project failure were sown from the outset by a lack of transparency, risk management, and viable controls to check corruption and incompetence.

So why are these self-salvaging bailouts happening now? International rescue lending is risky. But as one of the authors of the new report explains, “Beijing is ultimately trying to rescue its own banks.” Beijing’s wild investments caused problems that it’s now trying to fix.

The rescue loans are also piling even greater indebtedness onto the target country. While International Monetary Fund rescue loans generally average around 2% interest, the Chinese “bailout” loans generally carry a rate around 5%—a substantial burden for countries that are already having difficulty making payments. This bilateral debt, in turn, increases dependencies upon China throughout the global south.

This turn of events was predictable. China lent tens and even hundreds of billions of dollars to countries that it should have known had no realistic chance of paying the loans back. It selected countries that couldn’t afford major infrastructure projects and signed them up for massive, debt-loaded projects that were designed to play well for domestic politics. This is evident in the nations receiving rescue loans, such as Pakistan, Ecuador, Oman, Egypt, Venezuela, Kenya, and Sri Lanka—countries in debt distress in large part because of overly ambitious Belt and Road projects.

Moreover, China encouraged these enormous loans to countries with massive corruption and kleptocracy problems. Beijing and Chinese companies often were accused of being involved in corruption, bribes, kickbacks, and embezzlement as core aspects of the arrangements. Corruption allegations have been a key feature of the BRI in many countries, such as Malaysia and Kenya, where Chinese officials have played central roles in high-profile scandals.

To call the $240 billion in losses on these loans a “bailout,” therefore, misses the mark. As a centralized, planned economy, China cannot point to another actor to blame for these subprime loans. This is Beijing’s own doing.

Indeed, China has used its debt position to ensure access to critical raw materials from dependent nations as a means to pay back massive BRI loans. In Guinea, for instance, China extended loans valued at 200% of Guinea’s total GDP, backed by bauxite production. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, China is taking vast portions of the country’s critical cobalt and copper production to pay off billions in infrastructure loans, despite China having built very little actual infrastructure.

BRI’s results have been middling. For every successful port, powerplant, and highway, there have been crumbling dams, empty airports, railways to nowhere, and crippling debt. Projects often failed to meet wildly optimistic revenue projections. And woven throughout the BRI has been a lack of transparency and widespread corruption, which China has tacitly fostered.

Dependency on Beijing—and, therefore, geopolitical support for China’s global policies—is another central driver of the BRI. Leverage from BRI and similar development funding has allowed China to turn virtually all of Africa and Latin America against an independent Taiwan.

However, the BRI, while dangerous in design and faulty in execution, does identify a real and urgent requirement. The developing world is in desperate need of reliable, well-constructed, and modernized infrastructure. This helps explain why countless countries were willing to sign up to onerous financing terms.

The failures of the BRI have provided an opportunity for the West to step up and offer a productive, well-built, and competitive alternative to the BRI. China skipped a comprehensive derisking strategy, to its detriment.The U.S. and its allies need to make a case that when transparency, conditionality, and sustainable debt are key pillars of development infrastructure and financing, the outcomes are better, and citizens gain.

It’s hard to counter Beijing’s offers of fast cash, but it’s not impossible. If the U.S. and its allies step up their infrastructure game, they will likely find receptive audiences of leaders and citizens ready to step out of China’s debt-fueled shadow.

Guest commentaries like this one are written by authors outside the Barron’s and MarketWatch newsroom. They reflect the perspective and opinions of the authors. Submit commentary proposals and other feedback to ideas@barrons.com.

Barron's · by Elaine Dezenski

19. Taiwan: One China Principle or Just a Policy?

Conclusion:

The Taiwan question remains unresolved. The United States and Taiwanese authorities seem content to maintain the status quo and not provoke the PRC. The Kuomintang party that ruled Taiwan for decades held on to the idea of One China, but the democratization of Taiwan led to the emergence of the Democratic People’s Party (DPP). It remains to be seen whether the DPP will push for independence or continue the status quo. Cross-strait economic and cultural ties have increased. As the decades pass and former mainlanders are replaced with younger generations who have their own ideas on Taiwan’s relations with the mainland, one wonders if the One China Principle may one day replace the One China Policy.

Taiwan: One China Principle or Just a Policy?

The Taiwan question remains unresolved. The United States and Taiwanese authorities seem content to maintain the status quo and not provoke the PRC

19fortyfive.com · by Brent Stricker · May 18, 2023

In March 2005, the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China passed an anti-secession law reaffirming Beijing’s One China Principle: that Taiwan is a fundamental part of China and that if the “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In August 2022, the PRC released a white paper stating a preference for peaceful reunification with Taiwan under a “One Country, Two Systems” principle, but it refused to renounce the use of force against “external interference and all separatist activities.”

Taiwan’s official response was to claim the anti-secession measure violated international laws guaranteeing a state’s sovereign rights and its right to self-determination, as well as the prohibition on the threat or use of force in international relations. The United States has consistently called for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question, affirming that wish in its three joint communiques with the PRC. At the same time, Washington has pursued a One China Policy that is ambiguous on the nature of Taiwan and whether the U.S. will defend it. Is this merely policy, and thus fungible, or is there a principle in Washington’s stance?

Buffer or Bridgehead?

In addition to its aboriginal population, the island of Formosa, now known as Taiwan, has hosted a Dutch trading outpost, a pirate kingdom, an imperial prefecture and later province, a Japanese colony, and the former government of mainland China. At some point during this history, Taiwan is said to have become part of China. While more than 95% of Taiwan’s population identifies as Han Chinese, the question remains of how, exactly, Taiwan became Chinese.

Alan M. Wachman, in his book Why Taiwan?, tells the history of Formosa and describes the island as alternatively a buffer or bridgehead. Dutch traders wanted to establish a trading port similar to what the Portuguese had in mainland China. Ming Dynasty officials were not comfortable with this and directed them to Formosa, an island populated by aborigines. Wachman argues that the Ming Dynasty did not view Formosa as an integral part of China. This would change with the defeat of the Ming Dynasty by the Manchu and the establishment of the Qing Dynasty.

The Dutch were forced to leave Formosa in the mid-17th century due to the pirate fleet of Zheng Chenggong. Zheng established his own kingdom on Formosa in defiance of the Qing Dynasty. This kingdom would last 20 years before the island was conquered and absorbed into China.

Image: Creative Commons.

Shi Lang, the admiral who conquered Formosa, argued that China should settle the island. Wachman describes the “Shi Lang doctrine,” according to which if China does not hold Formosa, another power could occupy the island and use it as a bridgehead to threaten southern China — just as the pirates did. If China occupied the island, however, it could flip that dynamic, using Formosa as a buffer to defend southern China.

War in Korea, Japanese Colony, and World War II

Japan eventually challenged imperial China’s control over Korea, defeating them in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The resulting Treaty of Shimonoseki transferred the present-day territory of Taiwan to Japan, who administered it as a colony until 1945.

The concept of Taiwan as an integral part of China seemed to leave public consciousness during this time. As Wachman noted, “No Chinese government — Qing Empire, Nationalist Republic, or Communist Soviet — had a realistic chance of restoring sovereignty over the island.”

This would change with World War II, when the Republic of China’s leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, made it a war aim to reverse the Treaty of Shimonoseki and other unequal treaties. The Communist Party of China did the same with its Declaration on the War in the Pacific, issued on Dec. 9, 1941.

On Nov. 26, 1943, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt joined Chiang Kai-Shek and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to issue a statement known as the Cairo Declaration. The Declaration reversed all Japanese territorial gains since the First World War and confirmed “that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” After the conclusion of the war in Europe, the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union repeated this aim with the Potsdam Declaration, noting “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”

Suspended Civil War

The current debate over Taiwan is the result of a suspended civil war. Republic of China forces fled the mainland after the Communists proclaimed the PRC in December 1949. The United States viewed ROC forces as merely occupying Taiwan after the Japanese surrender at the end of the Second World War. With the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, the United States immediately changed its policy of not defending Taiwan. The Truman administration feared the spread of Communism and sent the U.S. 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent the PRC from invading Taiwan or ROC forces from attempting to retake the mainland. This intervention created the status quo that exists today of two governments claiming to represent the island’s people. Taiwan remains a bridgehead to the Chinese mainland, threatening lines of communication in the strait and possibly southern China.

The United States ensured that Taiwan’s status would remain ambiguous with the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which formally ended the war with Japan. The PRC and ROC did not participate in treaty negotiations. Japan renounced its “right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores islands.” This territory was not ceded to any other country. ROC forces have been occupying the territory since Japan’s surrender in 1945.

One China Principle

It took nearly 25 years for the PRC to receive international recognition as the legitimate government of China. This occurred amid the decolonization period following the Second World War and the admission of new countries to the United Nations. The liberated Global South would provide the PRC with the diplomatic support it required to emerge on the world stage. The PRC successfully raised the One China Principle to the international community with the passage of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, which recognized the PRC as the “only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations” and expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occup[ied] at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.”

Image: Creative Commons.

The road to the One China policy began, from the American perspective, with the administration of President Richard Nixon in 1969. Secret visits to China by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger led to President Nixon’s visit to the PRC in February 1972. This visit resulted in the Shanghai communique, with the United States acknowledging that “there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” The United States called for a “peaceful settlement to the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves” and declared that the United States would “progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.”

Thus was formed the core of Strategic Ambiguity. The United States would lessen its support to Taiwan, leaving the issue for the Chinese people to resolve.

A key feature for countries establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC is expressly stated support for the One China Principle. The promise for peaceful reunification that was present in the United States-PRC joint communique is not necessarily included in these diplomatic agreements — for instance, the United Kingdom-PRC joint communique did not include this requirement. In 1972, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas Home, stated, “We held the view both at Cairo and at Potsdam that Taiwan should be restored to China. That view has not changed. We think that the Taiwan question is China’s internal affair, to be settled by the Chinese people themselves.” Similarly, the Australian-PRC joint communique establishing diplomatic relations did not mention the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with China. The PRC’s One China Principle has successfully isolated Taiwan, with Honduras being the most recent country to sign on.

The argument for Taiwan’s sovereignty or independence from the PRC was weakened when Japan established diplomatic relations with the PRC in September 1972. The Japanese-PRC joint communique recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China and declared Taiwan “an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.” The Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the ROC would have no further effect.

One China Policy and Strategic Ambiguity

The United States’ One China Policy differs from the PRC’s One China Principle. A careful reading of the three joint communiques reveals subtle differences. In the first communique, the United States “reaffirm[ed] its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves” and promised only a gradual withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Taiwan. The second communique was more in line with the PRC’s One China principle, but the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) passed in its wake committed the United States to selling weapons to Taiwan. In the third communique, the United States clarified that it did not have a “long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan.”

The third communique caused President Ronald Reagan to issue the Six Assurances to Taiwan. The United States would continue arms sales without consulting with the PRC and would not change the TRA. It is interesting to note that there were different public and classified versions of the Six Assurances. The United States’ One China Policy is to disclaim any role in mediating the Taiwan question, while providing “defensive weapons” to Taiwan to help it resist forceful reunification.

Image: Screenshot from CCTV/Chinese State TV.

The United States has maintained strategic ambiguity in its commitments to Taiwan. The TRA is a policy statement, not a commitment to defend Taiwan. It was the policy of the United States to “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”

The “arms of a defensive character” must be approved by Congress and the president. There is no open shopping list for Taiwan to access at will. The Act’s definition of Taiwan is also limited to Taiwan and the “Pescadores islands” excluding other islands such as Matsu and Kinmen that are close to China’s mainland. These islands may be difficult to defend if invaded and could be considered sovereign territory of China long before Formosa was settled.

Maintaining the Status Quo

The Taiwan question remains unresolved. The United States and Taiwanese authorities seem content to maintain the status quo and not provoke the PRC. The Kuomintang party that ruled Taiwan for decades held on to the idea of One China, but the democratization of Taiwan led to the emergence of the Democratic People’s Party (DPP). It remains to be seen whether the DPP will push for independence or continue the status quo. Cross-strait economic and cultural ties have increased. As the decades pass and former mainlanders are replaced with younger generations who have their own ideas on Taiwan’s relations with the mainland, one wonders if the One China Principle may one day replace the One China Policy.

Lt. Col. Brent Stricker, U.S. Marine Corps, serves as a military professor of international law at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy, the Naval War College, or the Department of Defense.

19fortyfive.com · by Brent Stricker · May 18, 2023

20. Opinion | Why the U.S. should prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine

Elbridge Colby is the loudest voice on prioritizing Taiwan.

Opinion | Why the U.S. should prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine

By Elbridge A. Colby and Alex Velez-Green

May 18, 2023 at 7:47 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Elbridge A. Colby · May 18, 2023

Elbridge A. Colby served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development from 2017 to 2018, and is the author of “The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict.” Alexander Velez-Green served as national security adviser to Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo).

Many argue that the United States does not need to choose between aiding Ukraine and deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. This is a comforting but dangerous delusion. The sad truth: It does.

The main question is how to do so. The answer is by focusing U.S. resources on Taiwan’s defense against China, by far the United States’ strongest rival, while relying primarily on European allies to defend against a weakened Russia.

The Pentagon regularly says that preparing for conflict with China over Taiwan is its top priority. And rightly so. If Taiwan falls to a Chinese assault, the United States’ military position in the region, and Asian states’ confidence in Washington’s ability and resolve to confront Beijing, will both be gravely weakened. The result would be a major step toward Chinese hegemony over the world’s largest and most important market. If China can establish such dominance, it will be able to supplant the United States as the world’s premier economy and use that leverage to diminish our prosperity and interfere in our national life — with dire implications for Americans’ everyday lives.

But the United States’ ability to prevent China from conquering Taiwan has been severely eroded in recent years. China’s navy already dwarfs our own; its air and space forces are rapidly improving; and its missile forces threaten to prevent the U.S. military from intervening effectively to defend Taiwan. Even the normally confident commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command recently testified that trends in the Pacific are going “in the wrong direction.” As a result, it is now a very serious question whether the United States can defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Restoring deterrence is still possible — if we get Taiwan and U.S. forces in Asia what they need as quickly as possible. But we cannot expect to do that while delivering so much aid to Ukraine. The fact is that both Ukraine and Taiwan need many of the same weapons, the United States only has limited quantities of those weapons in its available stockpiles, and our defense industry will not be able to produce enough of these critical capabilities for years. These trade-offs will only worsen as China’s historic military buildup continues and the war in Ukraine goes on.

So how do we ensure Taiwan can be defended while still securing important but secondary U.S. interests in Europe?

First, the United States must accelerate delivery of critical weapons to Taiwan, including strike capabilities such as HIMARS, ATACMS, GMLRS and drones, as well as defensive systems such as NASAMS, Patriots, Harpoons, Stingers and Javelins. Americans have grown familiar with the names of several of these military systems because the United States has sent many of them to Ukraine. But Taiwan also desperately needs them — including weapons for its ground forces that would confront an amphibious invasion.

To accomplish this, the Biden administration should use presidential drawdown authority to rapidly send weapons to Taiwan from U.S. stockpiles, as the administration has announced it will do. But it must favor Taiwan over Ukraine for any weapons that both need.

Unfortunately, U.S. stockpiles are depleted as a result of aid to Ukraine, so Taiwan will be forced to rely more heavily on the slower foreign military sales process. To help it do so as quickly as possible, the administration should put Taiwan at the front of the line for foreign military sales as well — ahead of Ukraine but also ahead of partners in the Middle East and beyond.

At the same time, Washington should ramp up security assistance to Taiwan. Such assistance can facilitate both drawdowns and new sales. But it should not be a blank check. Instead, U.S. aid to Taiwan should be strictly conditioned on Taiwan increasing defense spending and embracing an asymmetric defense strategy.

Second, the administration and Congress need to urgently expand U.S. defense production by reinvigorating our anemic defense industrial base — and fast. As they do so, it is imperative to focus on boosting inventories for the Pacific ahead of Europe or elsewhere. Where trade-offs arise because of limited funds, suppliers, labor, components or other constraints, Taiwan’s defense must take precedence.

Finally, for all its talk about deterring China, the administration has made Ukraine’s defense its clear priority with regular high-level engagement, congressional briefings and requests for funds. By contrast, the administration left U.S. Indo-Pacific Command with almost $3.5 billion in unfunded priorities this year. The administration must treat Taiwan’s defense with far greater urgency, including by ensuring U.S. forces in Asia receive essential intelligence resources and that the United States’ political capital is laser-focused on bolstering our defensive perimeter in Asia.

None of this means we should abandon Europe. Instead, our allies must take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense, relying on the United States mainly for its extended nuclear deterrent and select conventional capabilities that do not detract from our ability to deter China. Our European allies must also take the lead in helping Ukraine.

This redistribution of labor within NATO is not just a matter of fairness. It is also imperative if Europe is to be able to deter and defend itself against Russia while the United States focuses on the much bigger challenge from China. The Russia threat is not going away. We and Europe should prepare accordingly.

Prioritization is never easy — but it is long overdue. The administration and Congress have rightly described China as the preeminent threat to the United States, but they have not acted with the focus, scale and urgency needed to address it. The window for facing the Chinese threat to Taiwan, with all that entails for Americans’ concrete interests, is fast closing. Failing to do so could lead to the most consequential conflict since World War II.

The Washington Post · by Elbridge A. Colby · May 18, 2023

21. China's economy is growing again. So why are investors getting out?

China's economy is growing again. So why are investors getting out? | CNN Business

CNN · by Laura He · May 19, 2023

Hong Kong CNN —

Until a few weeks ago, Chinese shares were among the best-performing in the world over the previous six months as investors bet on the country’s economic recovery after the lifting of pandemic restrictions.

But since April 18, when China released figures on its first-quarter economic output, stocks of Chinese companies around the world have lost about $540 billion in value, according to CNN calculations. Investors trimmed their exposure to China amid economic uncertainty in the country, rising geopolitical tensions and Beijing’s crackdown on international consulting firms.

The Nasdaq Golden Dragon China Index has lost more than 5% since April 18. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng (HSI) Index has also shed 5%. And the Shanghai Composite Index and the Shenzhen Component Index have fallen 3% and 6.5% respectively. During the same period, the Nasdaq Composite jumped 4%.

The selling is not limited to equities. The Chinese yuan, a barometer of investor sentiment, has tumbled over 2% in the past month. On Wednesday, the yuan sank below 7 to the US dollar in offshore trading, breached that key level for the first time this year. The currency weakened further on Friday, hitting its lowest level in nearly six months.

The sun sets over Shanghai's Lujiazui Financial District on May 8, 2023

VCG/Visual China Group/Getty Images

“Investors remain skeptical [about China] for two primary reasons. First, the recovery has not been robust,” said Brock Silvers, chief investment officer for Hong Kong-based Kaiyuan Capital.

Another concern for global investors is the country’s “fundamental investability,” he said, referring to geopolitical and Chinese policy risks.

Relations between the United States and China have become increasingly tense over the past few months. Washington has ramped up sanctions against key Chinese industries, including chipmaking. Beijing has displayed a growing distrust of foreign companies, cracking down on international consultancies and expanding the country’s counter-espionage law last month.

“Unfortunately after two decades of mutual benefit, global tensions have risen between China and the US,” said Michael Kelly, global head of multi-asset at PineBridge Investments, a New York-based asset management firm.

Patchy recovery

Chinese stocks began a sharp rally in late October on hopes that the country would exit its costly zero-Covid policy. In early December, Beijing ditched the stringent restrictions, which resulted in a quick rebound in economic activity.

But despite solid consumption-led growth of 4.5% in the first quarter, recent economic data point to an uneven recovery in the world’s second largest economy.

On Tuesday, China released a batch of economic data for April, which largely disappointed investors. Nomura and Barclay lowered their forecasts to 5.5% and 5.3%, respectively, after the data release. But UBS and Goldman Sachs maintained their growth projections, which are 5.7% and 6% for the year.

The consumer price index rose by just 0.1% in April, the slowest pace in more than two years. The producer price index, which measures factory-gate prices, declined by 3.6%, marking the biggest contraction in three years, and underscoring the risk of deflation.

People attend a job fair in China's southwestern city of Chongqing on April 11, 2023.

AFP/Getty Images

One in 5 young people in Chinese cities are out of work. Beijing wants them to work in the fields

Imports plunged 7.9% in April, reinforcing signs of feeble domestic demand. As for employment, the jobless rate for 16- to 24-year-olds hit a record high of 20.4% in April.

China’s “faltering” real estate sector, formerly the economy’s main driver, remains a major worry, said Silvers. Over the past few decades, the sector has accounted for as much as 30% of China’s GDP.

On Wednesday, the National Bureau of Statistics reported that new home prices rose by just 0.3% in April, after 0.4% in March, suggesting that the pent-up demand may be fading after the end of pandemic restrictions. Before February, home prices had been in a historical decline for about 18 months.

Anti-spy crackdown

Even as leaders have sought to woo back foreign investment, a campaign against consulting and due diligence firms has unnerved business people.

Last month, Beijing updated its counter-espionage law, which expanded the list of activities that could be considered spying. Over the past few months, officials have launched a series of raids on consultancies, including Capvision, Bain & Company and Mintz Group.

They accused Capvision, which is based in Shanghai and New York, of helping to leak sensitive military information to foreign forces. The authorities have also announced a nationwide investigation into whether the consultancy industry has been used for espionage.

The view from the observation deck at Shanghai Tower, April 9, 2023.

Qilai Shen/Bloomberg/Getty Images

'Everybody is worried': China raids offices of consultancy firm Capvision in widening industry crackdown

“Beijing’s moves to reduce foreign access to domestic information and business intelligence make equity investment in China more challenging,” said Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

“The enhanced focus on national security in economic policymaking is a typical example of how Xi’s leadership is creating political risks that are making it harder for foreign firms to do business in China.”

Fund managers and analysts say the crackdown makes it much tougher for foreign investor to get routine information about Chinese companies that would normally factor into their decision making.

At the same time, Beijing has restricted overseas access to some Chinese data sources, such as Wind, a database that provides key financial data.

Closing shop

Some funds and research firms are shutting up shop.

Forrester Research, a US tech-focused research and advisory firm, plans to cut the majority of its China analysts, according to media reports. In a response to CNN, Forrester said that it was shutting its China office as part of a global restructuring.

“The unsteady economy, along with our ongoing product transformation, are the key drivers for the change,” a spokesperson said. The size of the company’s China business is “not material” in relation to its global revenue and it would service its clients in China through its global research team, the spokesperson said.

Australian Trade Minister Don Farrell (left) speaks to China's Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao during a meeting via teleconference at Parliament House in Canberra, Monday, February 6, 2023. (AAP Image/Lukas Coch/POOL) NO ARCHIVING

Lukas Coch/Pool/AFP/Getty Images

Australia's trade minister visits China to lobby for 'full' restoration of trade

Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, one of the world’s largest pension funds, has closed its Hong Kong-based China equity investment team.

“We will no longer have country-focused stock-picking teams based in Asia, resulting in the departure of five of our colleagues in our Hong Kong office,” said Dan Madge, a spokesperson for the pension fund, in a statement to CNN.

Some investors, however, are convinced Chinese will bounce back.

“While there is no doubt that a large correction has taken place in China’s stock market … one also needs to keep in mind that this follows China previously leading most major stock markets off the October lows,” said Kelly at PineBridge Investments.

“The more cracks appear in Western economies,” the more global investors will need to put money into Chinese assets, he added.

CNN · by Laura He · May 19, 2023

22. U.S. officials walk back claim drone strike killed senior al-Qaeda leader

U.S. officials walk back claim drone strike killed senior al-Qaeda leader

Terrorism experts and the dead man’s family have cast doubt on a Pentagon statement indicating the operation targeted a high-ranking militant in Syria

By Omar Nezhat, Meg Kelly, Alex Horton and Imogen Piper

May 18, 2023 at 7:25 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Omar Nezhat · May 18, 2023

Exclusive

The acknowledgement comes as terrorism experts and the dead man’s family have cast doubt on a Pentagon statement indicating the operation targeted a high-ranking militant in Syria

May 18, 2023 at 7:25 p.m. EDT

QORQANYA, Syria — U.S. military officials are walking back claims that a recent strike in Syria killed an influential al-Qaeda figure, following assertions by the dead man’s family that he had no ties to terrorists but was a father of 10 tending to his sheep when he was slain by an American missile.

Lotfi Hassan Misto, 56, whose family identified him as the victim of a Hellfire missile attack on May 3, was a former bricklayer who lived quietly in this town in northwest Syria, according to interviews with his brother, son and six others who knew him. They described a kind, hard-working man whose “whole life was spent poor.”

The operation was overseen by U.S. Central Command, which claimed hours after the strike, without citing evidence or naming a suspect, that the Predator drone strike had targeted a “senior Al Qaeda leader.” But now there is doubt inside the Pentagon about who was killed, two U.S. defense officials told The Washington Post.

“We are no longer confident we killed a senior AQ official,” one official said. The other, offering a slightly different view, said “though we believe the strike did not kill the original target, we believe the person to be al-Qaeda.” Both spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss preliminary determinations of an ongoing investigation into the incident.

In the weeks since the attack, U.S. military officials have refused to identify publicly who their target was, how the apparent error occurred, whether a legitimate terrorist leader escaped and why some in the Pentagon maintain Misto was a member of al-Qaeda despite his family’s denials.

In a statement, Michael Lawhorn, a spokesman for Central Command, said officials are aware of reports of a civilian casualty and continue to assess the outcome.

“Centcom takes all such allegations seriously and is investigating to determine whether or not the action may have unintentionally resulted in harm to civilians,” Lawhorn said Thursday.

Typically the Pentagon will widen such investigations if enough credible evidence of civilian harm emerges, raising questions in this case about whether the information used to authorize the attack has held up to scrutiny.

Last year, facing accusations the military had covered up past instances of errant airstrikes that killed innocent people, the Biden administration vowed to take steps it said would reduce such risks while promising greater transparency when unintended killings do occur. Investigations conducted by multiple media outlets, including The Post, have revealed how flawed intelligence and what the military calls “confirmation bias” have led to disaster, including a 2021 strike during the U.S. evacuation of Afghanistan that officials initially declared had resulted in the death of a suicide bomber but instead killed 10 Afghan civilians, including 7 children.

The Post provided four terrorism experts with details about Misto and where he lived, and asked them to survey online discussions among jihadists after the strike for any talk about the attack in Qorqanya. None found references indicating Misto was affiliated with a terrorist group. And each said it would be very unusual for al-Qaeda — particularly a senior leader — to operate in any meaningful way near the area, which is controlled by a rival group that split from the organization years ago and now considers al-Qaeda an adversary.

The drone strike occurred near Misto’s home and chicken farm. The Post shared those coordinates with one of the U.S. defense officials, who said the location is near a “known area of interest” to al-Qaeda but declined to specify which building or buildings were of concern to the United States. Misto’s neighbors told The Post that terrorists do not live or operate near the home.

Lotfi Hassan Misto’s home

Qorqanya

Damascus

Chicken farm

Strike location

100 FEET

Satellite image © 2023 Maxar Technologies via Google Earth

Qorqanya

Lotfi Hassan Misto’s home

Damascus

Chicken farm

Strike location

100 FEET

Satellite image © 2023 Maxar Technologies via Google Earth

Qorqanya

Lotfi Hassan Misto’s home

SYRIA

Damascus

Chicken farm

Strike location

100 FEET

Satellite image © 2023 Maxar Technologies via Google Earth

THE WASHINGTON POST

It is unclear whether American commanders overseeing the strike realized Misto lived close by, and whether his home’s proximity to the “known area of interest” to al-Qaeda was a factor in their belief that he was a militant.

The Post obtained images showing Misto’s face before and after his death and provided those to Central Command. Officials there have not said whether they believe he is the man killed in the strike. Two facial recognition experts who reviewed the imagery said they were confident it showed the same person, with one expert’s analysis reaching 90 percent certainty. A third found inconclusive results.

The strike

Details about what transpired before and after the U.S. attack were gathered from interviews with Misto’s family and neighbors and images provided by the Syrian Civil Defense, a humanitarian response group often referred to as the “White Helmets” which responded to the strike location within minutes.

Misto’s neighbors described his routines of drinking tea with family and friends, tending to his animals and leaving home mostly to pray at his mosque. He was a traditional Muslim, they said, and did not own a phone.

The morning of May 3 was unremarkable, his son Hassan said. Misto gathered with family at about 7:30 a.m. “We had breakfast that morning like there was nothing wrong. We had breakfast and everything was fine, and then he went to herd his sheep,” the son recalled.

Misto took a break after a few hours outside near his home to have tea with his brother. They parted ways around 11:30 a.m., and he returned to his animals as they grazed in a rolling field of shrubs, twisting trees and rock outcroppings.

An MQ-9 Predator drone soared overhead, tracking Misto’s footsteps through the field. Such aircraft had been surveilling the area for nearly two weeks, neighbors said. The Hellfire missile hit him not far from where he had tea with his brother just 20 minutes earlier.

The explosion sent a pillar of smoke into the bright blue sky, raising alarm in the town.

A local resident contacted the White Helmets through an emergency number, and a team of first responders arrived within 10 minutes. At least one wore a video camera on his helmet.

The previously unpublished video, which was provided to The Post, shows a dozen people standing nearby as the aid workers arrive. Most stare in shock. Some cry.

The video shows two men attempting to pull one of Misto’s sons, Muhammed Misto, away from his father’s severely disfigured body as another man covers it with a shirt. Misto’s wife identified her husband’s remains to the White Helmets, a spokesperson said, who then took the body to a hospital in town.

Video and images published online show sheep’s corpses intermixed with fragments from the missile.

Terror experts skeptical

Typically, when al-Qaeda leaders are killed, sympathizers announce their deaths online as a celebration of martyrdom, said Jerome Drevon, a senior analyst on jihad and modern conflict with the International Crisis Group. If the victim was a lower level member of the organization, groups may not announce their death, he said, but people close to them will, often saying how they were connected to the group. In this case, Drevon said “there was nothing.”

Rita Katz, executive director of SITE Intelligence Group, which closely tracks online activity of jihadist organizations, did not find anything online that suggested Misto was active with or tied to al-Qaeda. None of the posts Katz reviewed cast doubt on Misto’s civilian status, she said.

“Very quickly after this strike, the White Helmets came out and identified the individual with his name and his profession. Locals came forward to say, this guy’s always been a farmer. He’s never had any political activities; he’s never had any affiliation with armed groups,” said Charles Lister, the director of Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism at the Middle East Institute. “The pace and breadth of such push-back was actually quite unusual.”

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a militant group that controls the de facto local government and military force in Syria’s Idlib Province, visited the site later in the day and removed missile components. A spokesperson for the group, also known as HTS, told The Post the victim was a civilian. The group did not respond to additional questions or requests for comment.

HTS, a U.S. designated terror group, was affiliated with al-Qaeda but broke ties in 2016 and has since removed anyone from the area who does not agree with their viewpoints, the experts said.

Even if a few al-Qaeda leaders are still on the ground in Idlib province, Drevon said, “they literally can’t act since HTS has forbidden them from conducting any military activities. All of them are surviving underground or living on the run. They know well that HTS can arrest them at any time.”

In interviews, Misto’s family and longtime neighbors said the accusation of an al-Qaeda affiliation struck them as bizarre.

“He was born here and died here,” said a neighbor who called himself Abu Zaid.

Misto’s brother was more pointed. “If they claim that he’s a terrorist, or that they got someone from al-Qaeda,” he said, “they’re all liars.”

Kelly and Horton reported from Washington and Piper reported from London. Sarah Dadouch in Beirut, Cate Brown in Washington and Nilo Tabrizy in New York contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Omar Nezhat · May 18, 2023

23. China’s Status Anxiety

What a conclusion!

But I have heard criticisms stated more diplomatically from friends from other countries, including those allied with the US.

Excerpts:

The United States should take these lessons to heart if it wants the fundamentals of the current order to endure. In institutions in which China’s status is secure, the United States should ask more of Beijing. China should be called upon to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the UN Security Council; to support the expansion of the council to include new permanent members that may be friendlier to the United States, such as Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan; to work harder to maintain its WTO commitments and avoid unfair trade practices; and to collaborate with the West to pressure North Korea into acting as a responsible nuclear power. Washington is better positioned to make these demands because China values its status within these institutions and is more likely to shoulder the burdens necessary to preserve it. Washington may also find that its requests are more likely to be successful if they are made in return for Beijing’s desired improvements in its status in the international order.

Accordingly, in institutions in which China experiences status inequality, the United States should assent to reforms. At the IMF and the World Bank, the United States could cede some control of voting rights to give China a greater say in these institutions. Washington could also work to open up top leadership positions at international financial institutions and within the UN system to Chinese nationals. On climate change, instead of causing global economic imbalances through the Inflation Reduction Act’s vast domestic subsidy regime, the United States could unilaterally play a much greater role in the global financing and implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation. All of these actions would enhance the openness and fairness of the international order, creating incentives for China to cooperate on a wider range of issues.

The divide between China and the United States over some issues, such as human rights and Taiwan’s future, is bound to remain intractable. Overall, however, the current international order can be adjusted to mitigate bilateral frictions between the two countries.

In international politics, order sits uncomfortably alongside the violence it takes to impose it. When the global distribution of power shifts substantially, the question is not only who gets to make the rules of the road but also who gets to break them with impunity. Rule-making and hypocrisy, after all, go hand in hand when it comes to managing international conflict and cooperation. China’s quest is ultimately for the right to be as hypocritical as the United States in the international order. By accommodating China’s desire for greater status and demanding more of it as a beneficiary of international cooperation, the United States can both avoid alienating a rising power and endangering the future of international order.

China’s Status Anxiety

Beijing Fights to Be Treated as America’s Equal on the World Stage

By Rohan Mukherjee

May 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Rohan Mukherjee · May 19, 2023

In early February, the United States shot down a Chinese surveillance balloon off the coast of South Carolina. China’s response was angry and defiant: an official spokesperson accused Washington of frequently flying its own spy balloons over Chinese territory and said the United States should “reflect on itself and change course, rather than smear and instigate a confrontation.”

This kind of tit-for-tat response is becoming increasingly commonplace as China’s power grows. In domains as diverse as international trade, human rights, maritime law, and military surveillance, Beijing has accused the United States of hypocrisy and double standards—while responding in kind to Washington’s moves. The allegation in each case is broadly the same: the United States does not adhere to the rules of its own so-called rules-based, liberal international order and therefore cannot legitimately criticize China for acting similarly.

China’s belligerence is risky for a country with a much weaker military and far fewer allies than the United States. Why then does Beijing persist in behaving this way? The answer can be found in a central yet often overlooked dynamic in great-power politics. Aside from the usual objectives of security and prosperity, rising powers value their status in the international order—the rules and institutions that regulate relations among states. The pursuit of status can motivate states to do striking things, such as pour billions into space programs, nuclear weapons, and grand sporting events.

For a rising power such as China, an intolerable sense of inequality is created when an established great power bends or breaks international rules without allowing Beijing the same privilege. China wants to be recognized as an equal of the world’s preeminent great power, the United States. Under some conditions, persistent inequality of this sort can lead a state to turn hostile toward those it sees as its oppressors.

China’s approach to the international order depends on the extent to which the order’s rules and institutions recognize its desire for status. Beijing is more likely to cooperate with institutions that place it on an equal footing with Washington and has typically challenged or sought to reform institutions that do not. The durability of the international order, therefore, depends on whether or not its core institutions—and their architect, the United States—can create sufficient status-based incentives for China to cooperate with them.

THE REAL TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS

When the balance of power in geopolitics begins to shift, rising and established powers often find themselves on a collision course known colloquially as the “Thucydides trap.” By this logic, great powers rig the international order for their own benefit; rising powers seek a growing share of those benefits, which great powers are unwilling to provide. This sets the stage for large-scale conflict over the international order itself.

This view is correct, but it typically omits a key driver of conflict. If material benefits were all that mattered, a rising power would hardly challenge an order that has enabled its rise. Overturning an international order through war and conflict is extremely costly and risky—countries sometimes fail spectacularly, as Russia has recently proved in Ukraine. A state will take the risk not because an order fails to enrich it but because an order consistently denies it something more intangible: its rightful place in the sun.

The Peloponnesian War—from which the notion of the Thucydides trap is derived—shows how a rising power’s status anxiety can cause or exacerbate conflict. The standard reading of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides’s account of the war holds that Sparta’s fear of a rising Athens led to hostilities. This reading, however, overlooks the other side’s grievances: for its part, Athens resented the criticism it received from Sparta about its imperialist expansion. This was, after all, what all great powers did, and the Spartan position smacked of hypocrisy. According to the Athenians, “None of our critics enquires why this charge is not laid against other imperial powers elsewhere whose treatment of their subjects is less moderate than ours.” The rise of Athens may have provoked fear in Sparta, but Athens’s refusal to back down was driven by status anxiety and the sense of being treated unfairly.

It is true that great powers rig the international order in their favor. But their focus is as much on maintaining their privileged position as rule-makers in world politics as it is on securing material benefits. The purpose of the exclusive clubs that great powers have formed throughout history—such as the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations Executive Council, and the UN Security Council—has been to entrench their privileges while regulating the conduct of other states.

Status is a scarce commodity—its value declines as more states possess it.

Rising states, having tasted the prestige of growing power, seek to join their era’s great-power clubs. The real tragedy of great-power politics is not that rising powers strive to overthrow a materially disadvantageous order that great powers are unwilling to change. It is that rising powers seek membership in clubs whose very exclusivity would be diluted by their admission. Status is a scarce commodity—its value declines as more states possess it. The international order, therefore, is often not positioned to accommodate the rise of new powers.

This is not to say that cooperation and peaceful change are impossible. As the shift in the late nineteenth century from British to U.S. hegemony shows, great powers can and do accommodate rising powers. After decades of contentious relations following the War of 1812 and British interference in the American Civil War, London made significant concessions in the 1871 Treaty of Washington that marked the beginning of what is known today as the “special relationship” between the two countries. Rising powers are also not fundamentally prone to conflict—they frequently cooperate with or try to reform the international order. Japan, for example, accepted significant restraints on its capabilities and interests in relation to Britain and the United States at the Washington Naval Conference in the early 1920s.

As it turns out, the factors influencing a rising power’s decision to cooperate often lie within the order itself. A wealth of social psychology research shows that social groups are more cooperative in a hierarchy that is sufficiently open to upward mobility in the ranks and whose procedures are fair and transparent. The international order operates in a similar manner. The membership rules of its core institutions determine who gets to be part of a club, and its procedures determine how institutional privileges are distributed among its members. Rising powers assess these institutions’ openness and fairness when measuring their own standing within the international order.

The openness of an institution can be understood in terms of the ease with which new aspirants can become leaders in that organization. For example, the International Monetary Fund is a more open institution than the UN Security Council because the IMF’s rules tie voting rights to economic power, and the council is closed to new permanent members. Procedurally fair institutions are likely to be more consultative in their decision-making, to not arbitrarily favor the great powers, and to not single out a rising power as being inferior to others. The UN General Assembly’s “one country, one vote” system is fairer by this measure than the Security Council’s veto system. Taken together, institutional openness and fairness signal that the existing order is able to accommodate a rising power’s status aspirations and treat it as an equal within the great-power club.

CHINA’S PLACE IN THE CLUB

Beijing does not simply embrace or reject the current international order. It has been more cooperative in institutions it judges to be open and procedurally fair, it has challenged institutions that it judges to be closed and unfair, and it has sought to reform institutions that it deems only partially open or fair. It bases these assessments on whether an institution recognizes China’s claim to status equality with the United States and its great-power allies, such as France and the United Kingdom—or whether it does not.

The UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, the World Trade Organization, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the G-20 are institutions that have been both open to Chinese leadership and procedurally fair with regard to Chinese participation. China is one of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council; these same five countries also constitute the club of official nuclear powers in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. China’s economic heft makes it a highly valued member of the WTO and the G-20. The Security Council’s veto provisions and the General Assembly’s voting procedures, the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism, and the rotating leadership and consensual decision-making of the G-20 make these institutions procedurally fair from China’s perspective. Consequently, China has been mostly cooperative within them, even though it has placed its own interests above institutional goals at times. In this tendency, China resembles the United States, which has at times flouted the very rules it seeks to uphold.

At the other end of the spectrum, China has challenged the United Nations’ human rights regime—most prominently the erstwhile UN Commission on Human Rights and its successor, the UN Human Rights Council. The United States and its allies have repeatedly used this aspect of the international order to single out Beijing for its human rights record, and China has limited leadership prospects in these institutions within an order dominated by liberal democracies. Beijing views this situation as a denial of China’s rightful status, particularly given the United States’ own global human rights record. As a result, China has challenged this regime by trying to delegitimize the Western claim to universal human rights. Beijing, for example, has supported the Universal Periodic Review of the human rights practices of every member, including the United States, in the UN Human Rights Council, and China’s State Council Information Office issues annual reports on U.S. human rights violations.

In institutions that are only partially open or fair from China’s perspective, Beijing has sought reforms to enhance its status. These include the IMF and the World Bank, where China has pushed for greater openness in terms of voting rights and executive leadership positions. Beijing has been frustrated by the slow pace of reform, and in response it has created and supported new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, where it can be top dog. Similarly, within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, it has advocated for a fairer allocation of responsibility in tackling global warming such that advanced Western economies account for their historical contributions to the problem.

MAKING ROOM FOR CHINA

China’s approach shows that in times of power shifts in global politics, much depends on the extent to which the international order can allow rising powers to see themselves as equal to established powers. This phenomenon is neither uniquely Chinese nor uniquely contemporary. Historically, rising powers—including the United States itself in the nineteenth century—have been more cooperative in international systems that make room for them at the global high table. By contrast, exclusion and inequality have been powerful sources of conflict.

The United States should take these lessons to heart if it wants the fundamentals of the current order to endure. In institutions in which China’s status is secure, the United States should ask more of Beijing. China should be called upon to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the UN Security Council; to support the expansion of the council to include new permanent members that may be friendlier to the United States, such as Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan; to work harder to maintain its WTO commitments and avoid unfair trade practices; and to collaborate with the West to pressure North Korea into acting as a responsible nuclear power. Washington is better positioned to make these demands because China values its status within these institutions and is more likely to shoulder the burdens necessary to preserve it. Washington may also find that its requests are more likely to be successful if they are made in return for Beijing’s desired improvements in its status in the international order.

Accordingly, in institutions in which China experiences status inequality, the United States should assent to reforms. At the IMF and the World Bank, the United States could cede some control of voting rights to give China a greater say in these institutions. Washington could also work to open up top leadership positions at international financial institutions and within the UN system to Chinese nationals. On climate change, instead of causing global economic imbalances through the Inflation Reduction Act’s vast domestic subsidy regime, the United States could unilaterally play a much greater role in the global financing and implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation. All of these actions would enhance the openness and fairness of the international order, creating incentives for China to cooperate on a wider range of issues.

The divide between China and the United States over some issues, such as human rights and Taiwan’s future, is bound to remain intractable. Overall, however, the current international order can be adjusted to mitigate bilateral frictions between the two countries.

In international politics, order sits uncomfortably alongside the violence it takes to impose it. When the global distribution of power shifts substantially, the question is not only who gets to make the rules of the road but also who gets to break them with impunity. Rule-making and hypocrisy, after all, go hand in hand when it comes to managing international conflict and cooperation. China’s quest is ultimately for the right to be as hypocritical as the United States in the international order. By accommodating China’s desire for greater status and demanding more of it as a beneficiary of international cooperation, the United States can both avoid alienating a rising power and endangering the future of international order.

• ROHAN MUKHERJEE is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of Ascending Order: Rising Powers and the Politics of Status in International Institutions.

Foreign Affairs · by Rohan Mukherjee · May 19, 2023

24. The New Meaning of Hiroshima

Conclusion:

The G-7 Hiroshima summit comes at a moment that, one way or another, will prove to be a turning point for the world. It is a unique opportunity to express our determination to reinforce a free and open international order while proactively addressing the needs of people across the globe, including those in the global South. As chair of the G-7 Hiroshima summit, I am committed to exerting leadership in that effort.

The New Meaning of Hiroshima

At Japan’s G-7 Summit, We Must Both Defend Global Order and Address Global Crises

By Fumio Kishida

May 18, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Fumio Kishida · May 18, 2023

From May 19 to 21, I am hosting the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union in Hiroshima for the 2023 summit of the G-7. The symbolism of the location is both powerful and deliberate. Hiroshima, the city I have represented throughout my political career, was destroyed by an atomic bomb in 1945, the first time nuclear weapons were used. That terrible history led me to make nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation my life’s work, animated by the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons. Today, Hiroshima’s past should serve as a reminder of what can happen when peace and order break down and give way to instability and conflict—a reminder that is needed more than at any other time in recent decades.

The world is at a historic crossroads. It is facing a complex of crises, from climate change and pandemics to food and energy insecurity to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which has shaken the very foundations of the international order. At the G-7 Hiroshima summit, held against this backdrop, we must powerfully demonstrate our determination to uphold a free and open international order based on the rule of law. At the same time, we must also strengthen our outreach to the countries of the so-called global South. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has had a devastating impact on people's livelihoods across the world, but especially in the global South. Unless we listen to and address the concerns related to that impact, we will fail to build the trust necessary to uphold a free and open order.

GLOBAL STAKES

In March, I visited Ukraine. In the city of Bucha, I saw with my own eyes the consequences of Russia’s atrocities, and I heard the stories of those who survived these brutal acts. While there, I invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to participate in discussions at the summit, a testament to the G-7 members’ common commitment to continue supporting Ukraine and maintaining severe sanctions against Russia. In Hiroshima, we will once again call on Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all forces and equipment from Ukraine, and reiterate that forcible acquisition of territory and unilateral attempts to change internationally recognized borders by force cannot be allowed.

As the only Asian country in the G-7, Japan is in a unique position to make clear to the world that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is not just a problem for Ukraine or Europe but also a threat to the security and prosperity of people everywhere. Russia's actions challenge the very foundation of an international order based on the rule of law, violating the basic principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. If Moscow succeeds in Ukraine, the repercussions will undermine peace and stability not only in Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

We must also show that irresponsible nuclear rhetoric by Russia is unacceptable. I chose Hiroshima to host the G-7 summit because there is no better place to send an urgent message, spoken in one voice by the seven leaders: that we must do everything we can to continue the 77-year-old record of the nonuse of nuclear weapons since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To that end, I have made it a priority to focus on practical and realistic efforts to move toward a world without nuclear weapons, enshrined in the Hiroshima Action Plan. The plan calls for a shared recognition of the importance of continuing the record of nonuse of nuclear weapons; enhancing transparency; further reducing the global nuclear stockpile; securing nuclear nonproliferation and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on that basis; and promoting an accurate understanding of the realities of nuclear weapons use by encouraging visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki by international leaders and others.

Japan is also in a unique position to explain why a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” is essential not just to countries in our region. Just as the fate of Ukraine is inseparable from the fate of the global order, so is the future of our region—one where we must ensure that cooperation triumphs over confrontation and division. The Indo-Pacific drives global economic growth but also faces a number of security and economic challenges.

During my recent visit to India, I laid out Japan’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, a vision underpinned by “rule-making through dialogue,” which respects historical and cultural diversity while ensuring equality among nations. In Hiroshima, G-7 leaders will deepen our discussions of the Indo-Pacific so that the G-7 is aligned in responding to regional challenges. China’s current external stance and military activities are a matter of serious concern to both Japan and the international community and present an unprecedented strategic challenge to peace and stability. This challenge must be addressed through robust national defense and cooperation among allies and like-minded partners, as well as through regular dialogue with China aimed at building constructive and stable relations.

FRIENDS IN NEED

Japan has made it a priority to help address the region’s urgent needs, mobilizing more than $75 billion in public and private financing for infrastructure projects; introducing new tools for official development assistance; launching a form of cooperation that will enable us to develop and propose attractive plans tailored to development demands while taking advantage of Japan's strengths; and enabling the Japan Bank for International Cooperation to more effectively use public-private partnerships to promote private investment. Showing that we are committed to helping solve the biggest economic and social problems is essential if we are to unite countries everywhere in defense of a free and open order.

But with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine exacerbating many shared challenges, the countries of the G-7 must do more to mitigate the impact on people’s lives, especially in the global South. The Hiroshima summit will be an opportunity to discuss, for example, how countries can work together to leverage public-private partnerships in service of sustainable development, secure stable energy supplies, and enhance economic resilience and security. We can address risks to our economic security and vulnerabilities in supply chains through diversification, including investments in emerging economies—particularly when it comes to giving them a greater role in the supply chain for clean energy technology.

We can do so without sacrificing progress in the fight against climate change. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has reminded the international community of the importance of energy security, but we can’t give up on the Paris agreement’s goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. I believe that it is essential to show various pathways toward a resilient energy transition while taking into account national circumstances. That requires doing more to support those who are vulnerable to climate change as well as those who need assistance in meeting emission-reduction targets. Japan has driven this agenda in our own region through its proposal of an Asia Zero Emission Community, which would support energy transitions by taking advantage of Japanese technologies and systems.

• FUMIO KISHIDA is the Prime Minister of Japan.

Foreign Affairs · by Fumio Kishida · May 18, 2023

25. Russia’s New Nuclear Normal

Excerpts:

The growing prominence of nuclear weapons within and outside of the establishment could also stimulate the Russian Orthodox Church to develop a just war theory (currently nonexistent in Eastern Christianity) and nuclear-religious jurisprudence: a theological explanation for when, how, and for what purpose it is appropriate to use nuclear weapons.

Although Putin has endorsed Russia’s nuclear orthodoxy, he is a symptom and not a source of the phenomenon. Whatever happens to him, the national security elite is likely to continue merging messianic rhetoric and escalatory signaling to maintain ambiguity and increase Western confusion.

The current relatively relaxed state of mind among Western analysts about the prospects of Russian nuclear brandishing makes it more difficult for them to decipher the genuineness of the escalatory and eschatological intents of Russia’s leadership and of the country’s nuclear operators. But the new nuclear normal in Russia is likely to increase the obedience of operators in response to escalatory nuclear orders from Russia’s leadership. And if Russia experiences civilian-military instability, the chances of unsanctioned use could go up.

Russia’s New Nuclear Normal

How the Country Has Grown Dangerously Comfortable Brandishing Its Arsenal

By Dmitry Adamsky

May 19, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by DMITRY ADAMSKY · May 19, 2023

For decades, nuclear weapons have been central to Russian national security and to the population’s collective mentality. The country’s arsenal is the world’s largest, and it has long been the best-maintained part of the Russian armed forces. It is diverse, with thousands of large nuclear weapons designed to level cities and thousands of smaller tactical ones theoretically built for the battlefield. The Kremlin proudly points to this stockpile as a source of national pride, including by marching ballistic missiles and flying nuclear bombers during its annual World War II victory parade. Russian nuclear orthodoxy—a political myth, which Russian President Vladimir Putin himself endorses, that nuclear weapons and traditional values are the two pillars of Russia’s statehood and the main guarantors of its physical and moral security—became a widespread public belief before the war.

When Russia carries out foreign operations, it conducts nuclear drills and issues threatening statements to curtail West’s responsiveness. The invasion of Ukraine was no exception; the “special military operation” had a nuclear component from the start. When Russia launched its attack, it did so shortly after testing its nuclear systems in the exercise. Putin made nuclear threats in his war speech on the morning of the invasion. A week into the war, Moscow announced that it was putting its nuclear forces “on a special mode of combat duty.” And in the months since, it has repeatedly threatened to use its weapons if the West crosses various redlines. Western policymakers have shrugged off the Kremlin’s threats as bluffs, but they have been deterred from intervening in certain ways and forms.

Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons has evolved since the invasion began—and not in comforting ways. The war further nuclearized the Russian establishment’s strategic thought and normalized nuclear weapons in the public’s consciousness. These mutually reinforcing trends have implications for Russia’s prospective behavior. Evidence from primary sources indicate that over the last year and a half Russia’s military has doubled down on its conceptualization of deterrence strategy, and that it is starting to rely even more on the country’s nuclear arsenal in strategic planning.

Apparently, the Russian defense establishment is developing a new concept called “operation of the strategic deterrence forces.” It is considering setting up a new organization that can carry out the planning, execution, and evaluation of deterrence operations, and it may expand the number of coercive options on the escalation ladder for conventional contingencies.

Meanwhile, the Russian public appears to have become more comfortable with the idea of using atomic weapons. The scale and sources of the public erosion of the nuclear taboo are unclear. They may be a natural reflection of wartime radicalization and a general perception of the war in existential-messianic terms. Alternatively, this nuclear normalization may have been authorized by the Kremlin as an attempt to enhance its saber rattling and restore Moscow’s coercive reputation, especially as the Kremlin has grown increasingly distressed by the West’s tendency to dismiss its nuclear signaling.

But whatever its cause, this new nuclear normal may result in a vicious cycle. It could pave an easier path for the Russian supreme command to engage in more nuclear muscle flexing, and it could make the public tolerate, and perhaps even encourage, the Kremlin’s assertive nuclear gambits.

DOUBLING DOWN

During the past year, Russian military and foreign affairs periodicals, conferences, and statements by the country’s defense intellectuals have indicated that two themes preoccupy the Russian nuclear establishment: adjusting the country’s deterrence posture to repulse perceived threats and restoring the deterrence creditability devaluaed by the war. The former topic is explicit; the latter is implicit but still easy to detect.

In a year, the Russian military has elevated the role of the nuclear arsenal and doubled down on its conceptualization of strategic deterrence—a Russian euphemism for nuclear and nonnuclear coercion. These themes are evident in an extraordinary splash of publications in Military Thought, the flagship journal of the Russian General Staff. Over the last year, about a dozen authors in its pages, including the commander of the Strategic Nuclear Missile Forces, his deputies, and other senior officers, have examined the future of Russian deterrence and nuclear warfighting. In terms of the authorship, themes, numbers, and level of detail, this wave of articles is unprecedented. This burst of nuclear writing is at once a coercive disclosure to buy time for rebuilding Russia’s conventional might and a statement of intent that reflects how Moscow plans to allocate its resources and attention.

The articles show that the Russian nuclear establishment’s main concern is a U.S. “prompt global strike” that decapitates the Russian military’s supreme command and nullifies its nuclear retaliation capacity. Russian sources assume that to achieve these aims, the United States will employ nonnuclear offensive and defensive means, as Washington seeks to—according to the Russian perception—“de-militarize” and “de-sovereign Russia” and then exploit the country’s “territorial, natural, industrial, and human resources.” The Russian military plans to deter this imagined blitzkrieg by demonstrating to Washington its capacity to repulse U.S. airspace strikes, suppress U.S. missile defense systems, and deliver unacceptable nuclear damage to the American homeland.

Russia’s nuclear brass has urged the Kremlin to modernize each leg of the nuclear triad, to enhance the survivability of command-and-control, warning, and weapons systems, and to develop novel employment patterns that demonstrate resolve and capability. The biggest disclosure from the publications is the revelation that the General Staff is formulating its “operation of the strategic deterrence forces”- a concept, which will probably encapsulate the innovations designed to deter the United States. Also, sources reveal that the Russian defense establishment is seeking to set up a national-level organization charged with planning and executing strategic deterrence.

Next to this official discourse, several Russian security experts have even promoted the idea of launching a preemptive strike to repulse a knockout of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. This destabilizing inclination predated the war. Leading Russian defense intellectuals believed then, as they do now, that the United States was lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use and that Washington asserts that a limited nuclear war would be manageable. They also believe that U.S. policymakers have an “escalate to de-escalate” approach—in which Washington would use a nuclear weapon in order to coerce other states to its political will—even as the U.S. accuses Moscow of adopting this same framework.

The most urgent problem that the Kremlin apparently expects the Russian nuclear establishment to solve, however, relates to conventional battlefields. Moscow believes that its nuclear coercion has deterred direct Western intervention in Ukraine and somewhat limited indirect interference. But it has been completely unable to compel Kiev to surrender and end the war. In the Kremlin’s view, the West does not doubt Russia’s nuclear might, but Washington and its allies do question Moscow’s resolve. The Kremlin’s conclusion is understandable: Russia’s repeated nuclear intimidations have not been followed by Russian actions. Coupled with Moscow’s caution during escalation management, this inaction has devalued the credibility of the country’s nuclear coercion.

The military realizes that the Kremlin is looking for more returns from Russia’s nuclear saber rattling, especially in conventional contingencies. To meet this expectation, the military should contemplate new intermediate rungs on the escalation ladder, create fresh ways to manipulate nuclear alert levels, and carry out “strategic gestures”: a Russian euphemism for demonstrative activities with nuclear forces to deter Moscow’s adversaries and compel them to bow to Russia’s will. In sum, as the Kremlin seeks to coerce without a major nuclear exchange, it expects the military to expand its repertoire of nuclear muscle-flexing options. These are likely to be the near-term goals that Russia pursues as it refines its coercion mechanism.

THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE

Against the backdrop of these formal innovations, within the Russian public an extraordinary ideational climate has emerged. In the past year, nuclear weapons have become a popular topic of conversation. Only lazy Russian media commentators have not offered their take on nuclear use. The notion that using nuclear weapons should be a last resort but not an unthinkable option has become routine in Russian media and has framed common thinking about escalation in war. This recurring belligerent nuclear rhetoric—official and unofficial alike—has somewhat eroded the nuclear taboo, even if unintentionally.

The sources of nuclear normalization are unclear. It may be a naturally emerging, bottom-up phenomenon that reflects the zeitgeist. The war, after all, has routinized violence and brutality in the country’s public consciousness, and the bellicose environment has radicalized much of the population.

But the messianic-existential aura that the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church have given to the war has also contributed to nuclear normalization. Both institutions are framing the conflict in almost transcendental terms—as a clash of civilizations and a civil war within the “Russian world.” The Kremlin and the church present Ukraine as a “prodigal daughter” that has become a proxy for the forces of darkness, specifically a collective West that is seeking to dismantle Russia spiritually and geopolitically. In their wartime speeches, both Putin and Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, have embraced the language of martyrdom, of purifying sacrifice, and of repentance—all for the sake of winning the war. This language is most obviously applicable to Russian soldiers, many of whom face death on the battlefield, and many of whom are blessed by priests before being deployed. But the rhetoric may also prime Russians at home to accept the highest possible costs as necessary in this clash of civilizations.

Wartime folklore—militaristic songs, clips, performances, and military heraldry—also bears religious symbols and apocalyptic motives, further eroding the nuclear taboo. This folklore venerates Russia’s nuclear might, painlessly threatens nuclear use, and glorifies Russian combat, past and present. A popular Russian rock singer, close to the Kremlin and sanctioned by Ukraine, produced a hymn to Sarmat- the country’s newest class of intercontinental ballistic missiles, for example. A video clip of the song, with the military orchestra of the Strategic Nuclear Missile Forces performing the music, highlights Putin’s eschatological figures of speech in relation to nuclear weapons and the fate of world, threatens the United States and NATO, and concludes with the words: “God and Sarmat are with us.”

The civil role of religion matters, too. The legitimization of the war by the Russian Orthodox Church is an extension of the years of ecclesiastical support for the Kremlin’s foreign policy gambits and nuclear assertiveness. The patriarch’s wartime sermons have transformed him into something like a national spiritual commissar. Prior to the war, the Kremlin actively portrayed itself as a faith-driven actor to enhance its coercive bargaining. Now, in war, the patriarch’s messianic and apocalyptic rhetoric, occasionally in unison with nuclear threats from the Kremlin, apparently assists Moscow in sending signals that line up with the “madman theory”—persuading adversaries that it is crazy enough to go to nuclear extremes to achieve its aims. The Russian public is not the target audience for this messaging. But inadvertently, the religious-military rhetoric has made nuclear employment more conceivable in the public’s consciousness.

The Kremlin could also be deliberately authorizing this public nuclear normalization to enhance its saber rattling. Russia’s nuclear threats, after all, might seem more credible if the country’s people appear willing to risk Armageddon. But even if Moscow worked to get Russians to embrace nuclear use, the tail might now be wagging the dog. Nuclear public discourse appears to have acquired a life of its own and may be detrimental to its master. Several Russian defense intellectuals and nuclear experts have been shocked by the unbearable nuclear lightness among the Russian public. These experts have said that public sentiment inaccurately represents the Kremlin’s position, and that it is irresponsible because of its dangerous implications.

And irrespective of the source, the public’s nuclear normalization could corrode the norm against using atomic weapons—especially when coupled with the military leadership’s conceptual innovations and strategic concerns. The Russian sources reveal an anxiety that the West perceives Moscow to be weaker and less determined than it really is, and that Western states will seek to exploit this faintness. It is unclear how the Russian supreme command intends to address this concern. But within this self-reinforcing climate, there is simply now an easier path to escalatory conduct. Russia’s increased nuclear muscle flexing, designed to recharge the batteries of deterrence and restore Russia’s coercive reputation, should therefore come as no surprise. Moscow’s decision to build infrastructure in Belarus that can host its nuclear arsenal, the hints that the Kremlin could deploy its nuclear weapons in even more countries, the government’s reluctance to engage in arms control negotiations, and the experts’ suggestions that Russia might carry out a nuclear test all illustrate steps in this direction.

VICIOUS CYCLE

The merging of military’s embrace of nuclear operations with the normalization of nuclear weapons in the public consciousness is an unprecedented nexus, one that may have long-term implications for various segments of the Russian strategic community.

For the political leadership, this nexus preserves the centrality of Russia’s nuclear arsenal in national security, justifies the allocation of resources for the arsenal’s modernization, and turns nuclear coercion into a morally acceptable tool. It also affords an easier path to assertive muscle flexing, if the Kremlin and the military brass, already frustrated with the West’s neglect of their nuclear saber rattling, sense that Russian coercive potential needs a recharge. This nexus further enhances Russian nuclear orthodoxy, strengthens the members of Russia’s security elite calling to intertwine spiritual and physical deterrence, and nurtures an ideology that mixes nationalism, messianism, militarism, religious conservatism, and the veneration of nuclear might.

The growing prominence of nuclear weapons within and outside of the establishment could also stimulate the Russian Orthodox Church to develop a just war theory (currently nonexistent in Eastern Christianity) and nuclear-religious jurisprudence: a theological explanation for when, how, and for what purpose it is appropriate to use nuclear weapons.

Although Putin has endorsed Russia’s nuclear orthodoxy, he is a symptom and not a source of the phenomenon. Whatever happens to him, the national security elite is likely to continue merging messianic rhetoric and escalatory signaling to maintain ambiguity and increase Western confusion.

The current relatively relaxed state of mind among Western analysts about the prospects of Russian nuclear brandishing makes it more difficult for them to decipher the genuineness of the escalatory and eschatological intents of Russia’s leadership and of the country’s nuclear operators. But the new nuclear normal in Russia is likely to increase the obedience of operators in response to escalatory nuclear orders from Russia’s leadership. And if Russia experiences civilian-military instability, the chances of unsanctioned use could go up.

• DMIITRY (DIMA) ADAMSKY is a Professor at Reichman University, Israel. He is the author of Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy.

Foreign Affairs · by DMITRY ADAMSKY · May 19, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com