Quotes of the Day:

“If someone constantly pays attention to what others say about them, they will never be able to find inner peace.” 

-  Leo Tolstoy.

"We don't see things as they are, we see them as we are." 

- Anais Nin

"[One] disadvantage of digital media is that people are not digital: they are physical objects who live and work in three spatial dimensions. This situation is not expected to change. People prefer to work and play with objects arranged around them, and their memories depend on cues provided by spatial location. Until homes can have dozens of digital displays and eBooks, paper is therefore likely to keep a place within them. Some technologies do their job perfectly and tend to stick around. The spoon is one example, the lawn-roller another. Paper may well be a third." 

- "Bad News for Trees," The Economist, Dec. 19, 1998

1. Biden elevates CIA director Burns to Cabinet member

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2023

3. Inside Biden’s decision to tap the first female Joint Chief

4. As recruitment flounders, this small change to GI Bill would make kids 'flock to the military,' teen says

5. How China Overreached (book review)

6. America’s Reactive Foreign Policy: How U.S. Organizational Culture and Behavior Advantages China

7. 84 Years Ago, Einstein Wrote an Urgent Letter that Altered History Forever

8. How Xi Jinping Thinks

9. America Requires a Real Foreign Policy Debate

10. Pentagon watchdog: U.S. struggled to track military aid to Ukraine

11.  Interview: Dan Rice, former Special Advisor to CinC Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, President American University Kyiv

12. Navy Retires Its Last Special Operations Helicopter Squadron - Seapower

13. The U.S. Navy Needs Diesel-Electric Submarines Now

14. Ukraine could win but still become a failed state

15. History Is Better Than Doctrine

16. White House adviser calls on China to hold nuclear arms talks

17. Army Special Operations in the “Forgotten War”: Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the Korean Armistice

18. CIA rebuilding spy networks in China a decade after losing agents, director reveals

19. Frustrated by Biden, China Courts ‘Old Friends’ Like Kissinger

20. Disrupting Moscow’s Invasion Playbook: Lessons from Prague to Kyiv

21. Gearbox problem caused fatal Osprey crash, Marines say

1. Biden elevates CIA director Burns to Cabinet member

Biden elevates CIA director Burns to Cabinet member

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · July 21, 2023

ASPEN, Colo. — President Biden has asked CIA Director William J. Burns to become a member of his Cabinet, reflecting the central role the veteran diplomat has taken carrying out the administration’s foreign policy and his key role as a messenger to Russia.

The move, which is largely symbolic, will not give Burns any new authorities. But it underscores the influence Burns has in the administration and will be read as a victory for the CIA, which was among the agencies in the U.S. intelligence community that accurately forecast the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

“Bill has always given me clear, straightforward analysis that prioritizes the safety and security of the American people, reflecting the integral role the CIA plays in our national security decision-making at this critical time,” Biden said in a statement.

“Under his leadership,” Biden added, “the CIA is delivering a clear-eyed, long-term approach to our nation’s top national security challenges — from tackling Russia’s brutal aggression against Ukraine, to managing responsible competition with the People’s Republic of China, to addressing the opportunities and risks of emerging technology.”

Burns, who repeatedly stresses that he is not engaged in diplomacy, has nevertheless emerged as a sort of “secretary of hard problems,” U.S. officials have said. Since well before Russia invaded Ukraine, Burns has been the White House’s key interlocutor to Moscow, having had the most direct interactions with Russian President Vladimir Putin of anyone in the administration.

Biden dispatched him to Moscow in November 2021 to warn the Russian leader that if he attacked Ukraine there would be significant consequences. Burns has also met with his Russian intelligence counterpart to warn the country against using nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and to lay out the consequences for doing so. And he has made several trips to Kyiv to meet with Ukrainian leaders, who regard him as a trusted ally.

Burns will now join Cabinet meetings, alongside the secretaries of state and defense, as well as Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, with whom he works closely. But he is not expected to assume any responsibilities for making policy.

Nevertheless, the CIA has played a critical role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Burns personally delivered the warnings of a Russian invasion of Ukraine to senior U.S. officials, European allies and to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who had been skeptical that Putin would be bold enough to attack his country.

A month before the war began, Burns told Zelensky that Russia intended to make a lightning strike on Kyiv and decapitate the central government. Putin’s goal failed, thanks in part to the advance warning on Russian planning that the CIA and other intelligence agencies gave the Ukrainians, which helped them defend the capital, according to officials in Washington and Kyiv familiar with the matter.

Biden’s decision to elevate the CIA director to Cabinet status is something of an about-face. President Donald Trump made the director — then Mike Pompeo, followed by Gina Haspel — part of his Cabinet, but Biden initially chose not to, in part because the director of national intelligence already was a member and is the overall leader of the intelligence community.

“Most CIA directors have not been named to the Cabinet because most presidents have understood that the intelligence role is not a policy one,” said David Priess, a former CIA officer and author of “The President’s Book of Secrets,” a history of presidents and intelligence analysis. “Not that it matters much; modern presidents have not used Cabinets to seriously debate and formulate crucial policies.”

“That said, Bill Burns — as one of the most respected Foreign Service officers of his generation before becoming CIA director, and as one of the administration’s most important international messengers during this Russia-Ukraine war — seems better suited than previous CIA directors to join the Cabinet,” Priess added.

Burns, who served as U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2005 to 2008, has been one of the sharpest public critics of Putin, drawing on his experience with the Russian leader to analyze his motivations and occasionally needle him.

Speaking Thursday at the Aspen Security Forum, Burns said that Putin and the Russian leadership “appeared to be adrift” last month as mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin took over a military headquarters in southern Russia and then led an armed convoy toward Moscow.

Prigozhin’s “mutiny,” as Burns called it, exposed vulnerabilities in the top of Russian leadership and has left Putin weakened.

“For a lot of Russians watching this, used to this image of Putin as the arbiter of order, the question was, ‘Does the emperor have no clothes?’ or at least ‘Why is it taking so long for him to get dressed?’” Burns said.

The Washington Post · by Shane Harris · July 21, 2023

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2023

Key Takeaways:

• The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
• Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24.
• Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin.
• Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power.
• Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
• The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets.
• Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas.
• Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear.
• French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21.
• A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut areas, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka Donetsk City lines, and advanced in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area, and south of Orikhiv, and reportedly advanced south of Orikhiv.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made gains in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area.
• Russian officials announced that they will amend a Russian State Duma bill originally aimed at incrementally raising the conscription age so that there is an immediate increase of the upper age limit for the spring 2024 conscription cycle.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
• A Wagner-linked source reported that Wagner temporarily relocated its headquarters from Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Belarus and that Wagner’s work to transfer combat experience to the Belarusian military is in full swing.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 21, 2023

Jul 21, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 21, 2023, 8:00pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served. The Russian Investigative Committee arrested Girkin on July 21, and Girkin will be held until September 18 on extremism changes.[1] Girkin’s wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, reported that representatives from the Russian Investigative Committee detained Girkin at his home in Moscow, and noted later that the Moscow’s Meshansky Court arrested Girkin and that he will be held until September 18 on extremism charges.[2] Girkin unsuccessfully attempted to argue in the court that he is not a high flight risk due to his sentence at the Hague Tribunal, but the court cited Girkin’s notoriety and “connections in law enforcement” as the reasons for his immediate incarceration.[3] Girkin’s lawyer, Alexander Molokhov, argued that Russian law enforcement is prosecuting Girkin for his May 25, 2023 Telegram posts, which reportedly discussed the lack of payments to servicemen of the 105thand 107th airborne (VDV) regiments.[4] Court documents, however, indicate that Russian authorities opened a case against Girkin on July 18 - the day on which Girkin published several harsh critiques of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[5] Girkin had been consistently criticizing Putin prior to July 18, however, but his past criticisms had not triggered an arrest.[6] Members of the Girkin-led “Angry Patriots Club” gathered for a small protest outside of the court demanding Girkin’s release.[7] Some sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest followed his conflict with a fellow Angry Patriots Club member about the Wagner Group.[8] Other sources speculated that Wagner complaints about Girkin may have triggered his arrest.[9] One source claimed that the arrest is related to Russian authorities targeting Russian “patriots” deemed disloyal to Putin.[10]

Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24. A Russian source affiliated with the Russian security services leaked a document – approved after the Wagner rebellion – in which the Russian Presidential Administration purportedly ordered the Russian authorities to “take repressive measures against those who are insane, including Strelkov-Girkin.”[11] The document additionally targeted several high-profile propagandists including Margarita Simonyan, prominent milbloggers, Russian State Duma deputies with extensive online presence, and Prigozhin. Russian insider sources have previously claimed that Kremlin factions have begun a struggle for control over the Russian information space and that First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko has been attempting to undermine Simonyan.[12] The Russian Investigative Committee – the government organization that reportedly arrested Girkin – is a structure subordinated to Putin. ISW previously reported that Kiriyenko has been notably expanding his control over Russian social media outlets and increasing his reach in the Russian federal government since Prigozhin’s rebellion.[13]

Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin. ISW has consistently assessed that Girkin likely has the backing of an unknown silovik – possibly within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) – who promoted their interests by using Girkin as a conduit to reveal select information to Russia’s online ultranationalist community.[14] Russian authorities arrested on July 14 former FSB officer Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, who reportedly ran several popular insider Telegram channels that speculated on internal Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) dynamics between different factions.[15] Russian authorities also initiated a criminal case against Girkin’s affiliate, former Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, on charges of discrediting the Russian Armed Forces on July 18 – the same day on which Girkin’s criminal charge was opened.[16] Girkin himself was an FSB officer and had been consistently using passports under fictitious names that he received from the FSB.[17] Girkin recently accused the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS) of deliberately censoring him by interfering with his presentations at a St. Petersburg bookstore on July 9.[18] The court publicized Girkin’s court proceedings, and the Russian media had been consistently televising Polyakov’s arrest and raids of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s property – and it is possible that select Russian officials are trying to undermine the reputation of a security structure or of an affiliated silovik who protected Girkin.[19] One milblogger observed that the media attention around Polyakov’s arrest suggests that some unnamed figure is attempting to ruin the FSB’s reputation.[20]

Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power. Girkin claimed on July 12 that Prigozhin’s rebellion shifted the balance of power within the Kremlin in favor of the group that reportedly includes Kiriyenko.[21] Girkin claimed that members of the “Ozero Cooperative” – an association unifying the dachas of Putin and several members of his inner circle in Leningrad Oblast – want to oust Putin in favor of one of its own members, such as Prigozhin or Kiriyenko. Girkin warned that the “Ozero Cooperative” members will target the Ministry of Defense, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, the FSB, and other structures outside the control of the presidential administration. While Girkin’s specific affiliations remain unknown, the recent crackdowns on ultranationalist figures in connection with the Russian security services are likely a public manifestation of a significant change within the Kremlin’s power politics.

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two of three Kaliber missiles, three of four Iskander missiles, and 13 of 19 Shahed UAVs launched at areas in southern Ukraine and that Russian forces also launched one Kh-22, one S-300 surface-to-air, and six Onyx missiles.[22] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that seven of the missiles damaged an unspecified infrastructure facility in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Raion just southwest of Odesa City.[23] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian forces began targeting agricultural infrastructure including destroying 100 tons of peas and 20 tons of barely in strikes on a granary after three consecutive nights of targeting port infrastructure.[24] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk and Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces are targeting Ukraine with specific missiles and tactics to complicate Ukraine’s ability to detect and intercept the missiles.[25]

The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets. Russian Deputy Foreign Ministry Sergei Vershinin stated on July 21 that the Russian MoD’s July 19 announcement that the Russian military will consider all ships en route to Ukrainian ports as potential military cargo vessels meant that Russian forces will inspect the ships.[26] The Russian MoD’s announcement, however, still indicates that Russian forces intend to treat civilian ships as legitimate military targets, and even Vershinin’s interpretation of the announcement states that Russian forces will board and possibly seize foreign civilian vessels.

Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West. Vershinin also argued that the July 22, 2022 memorandum underpinning the Black Sea Grain Initiative remains valid because neither Russia nor the United Nations (UN) gave notification about the termination of the memorandum that the UN, Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine signed.[27] Vershinin justified Russia’s exit from the grain deal by accusing Ukrainian forces of using grain corridors to conduct “terrorist attacks” against Russia, which is consistent with prior Russian official and milblogger narratives to justify Russia’s exit from the deal during periods of its renewal.[28]

The Russian MFA is likely trying to assert that Russia is still a de jure participant in the agreement despite its exit from the grain deal in an effort to leave open a channel for Russia to renegotiate the grain deal on conditions more favorable to Russia rather than negotiating an entirely new one. Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey Vasyl Bondar reported on July 21 that the Joint Coordination Center in Istanbul, which monitors the grain corridors in the Black Sea, has stopped operating and that all Russian personnel at the center have left.[29] The Joint Coordination Center’s halted operations indicate that Russia is engaging in efforts to further remove itself from the grain deal, although in ways that it could easily reverse.

Putin delivered an array of demands for Russia’s return to the agreement on July 19, notably including the lifting of sanctions on Russian grain and fertilizer deliveries and the reconnection of Russian banks servicing food supplies to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) banking system.[30] The Russian military’s intensifying strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure and threats of maritime escalation in the Black Sea likely aim to pressure the West to acquiesce to these demands among other things.[31] The Kremlin routinely engages in escalatory rhetoric aimed at prompting Western concessions and often will have some officials promote that rhetoric while having other officials feign willingness to engage in negotiations.[32]

Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.[33] Putin’s rhetoric heavily drew upon historical parallels meant to evoke fear and distrust between European countries and the United States as well as between Ukraine and Poland. Putin’s rhetoric is consistent with prior rhetoric from Russian senior officials meant to sow distrust between Ukraine and its allies, undermine ongoing Western security assistance to Ukraine, and encourage Western states to push Ukraine prematurely into negotiations with Russia.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and closer to Pryyutne (12km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut, where heavy fighting continues in the Orikhovo-Vasylivka-Paraskoviivka (up to 8km north of Bakhmut) and the Klischiivka-Andriivka (7km to 10km southwest of Bakhmut) directions.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces achieved success in the Novodarivka-Pryyutne (13km to 16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) direction in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area as well as the Novodanylivka-Verbove (up to 16km southeast of Orikhiv) and Novodanylvika-Robotyne (up to 12km south of Orikhiv) directions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[36] US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on July 20 that Ukrainian forces have started to use US-provided cluster munitions and are using them effectively against Russian defensive formations.[37] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns stated on July 21 during a speech at the Aspen Institute that Russian defenses in Ukraine have a number of structural flaws, including low morale and disorder among Russia’s political and military leadership.[38]

Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger released an interview with an alleged unnamed Wagner platoon commander on July 21. The platoon commander claimed that none of the Wagner personnel he knows signed contracts with the Russian MoD except for fighters whom Wagner fired for drunkenness and looting and a Wagner commander with the surname Troshev (callsign “Seda”).[39] Putin notably claimed that he offered Wagner fighters the option to serve under a Wagner commander with the callsign “Seda” at the June 29 meeting with Prigozhin and Wagner commanders.[40] The platoon commander claimed that the goal of the Wagner armed rebellion on July 24 was to protest the “lawlessness” of the Russian military command who attempted to disband Wagner by forcing all volunteers to sign MoD contracts by July 1. The platoon commander expressed his dedication to Wagner by stating that he would not care if the MoD killed him, but he would not “disgrace [his] name or the name of Wagner PMC.”[41] He also claimed that Wagner would not have existed without Prigozhin, that all Wagner fighters took an oath to Prigozhin and to an unnamed Wagner commander (likely Wagner Group co-founder and commander Dmitry Utkin), and therefore, that they would remain with them.[42] ISW has consistently observed Wagner-affiliated sources voicing their support for Prigozhin despite Kremlin efforts to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation.[43] ISW has notably not observed Wagner-affiliated sources refusing to support Prigozhin or attempting to separate Wagner from Prigozhin.

French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21. Bonn told a CNN journalist at the Aspen Security Forum on July 21 that China is supplying “massively [sic] military capabilities to Russia.”[44] CNN later quoted unspecified French officials as clarifying Bonne’s intent to speak of non-lethal aid, however.[45]

A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.[46] The milblogger amplified footage of alleged personnel of the 7th VDV division denying Kornev’s dismissal as well as speculations that Russian authorities may intend to arrest VDV commander Mikhail Teplinsky.[47] ISW cannot confirm Kornev’s dismissal.

Key Takeaways:

• The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
• Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24.
• Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin.
• Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power.
• Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
• The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets.
• Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas.
• Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear.
• French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21.
• A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut areas, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka Donetsk City lines, and advanced in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area, and south of Orikhiv, and reportedly advanced south of Orikhiv.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made gains in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area.
• Russian officials announced that they will amend a Russian State Duma bill originally aimed at incrementally raising the conscription age so that there is an immediate increase of the upper age limit for the spring 2024 conscription cycle.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
• A Wagner-linked source reported that Wagner temporarily relocated its headquarters from Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Belarus and that Wagner’s work to transfer combat experience to the Belarusian military is in full swing.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk area and reportedly advanced on July 21. The Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson Sergei Zybinsky claimed that Russian forces captured five Ukrainian strongholds and four observation points during fighting near the Senkivka rail station and Masyutivka (both 12-14km northeast of Kupyansk).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced three kilometers in an unspecified area in the Kupyansk direction, captured the Movchanove rail station (just north of the Senkivka rail station), and attacked Ukrainian positions west and south of Lyman Pershyi (11km northwest of Kupyansk).[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to unspecified positions at the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction.[50] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of any of these claims. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks southwest of Masyutivka.[51] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces are attempting to seize the battlefield initiative in the Kupyansk direction.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kreminna area and reportedly made marginal advances on July 21. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna) from the northwest.[53] Another Russian milblogger posted footage of unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) assault detachments capturing Ukrainian trench positions reportedly in a forest near Kreminna.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Nadiya (15km southwest of Svatove), Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Dibrova (7m southwest of Kreminna), and in the Serebryanske forest area.[55]

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and did not advance on July 21. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk area near Lyman Pershyi and Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and attacks in the Kreminna area near Dibrova, Kovalivka (10km southwest of Svatove), Karmazynivka (12km southwest of Svatove), and Zolotarivka (12km south of Kreminna).[56] Russian milbloggers largely corroborated the MoD’s claims and additionally claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian armored assault near Torske (15km west of Kreminna).[57]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the northern and southern flanks of Bakhmut and made limited gains on July 21. Geolocated footage published on July 21 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced along the E40 (Bakhmut to Slovyansk) highway northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[58]The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut where Russian forces deployed reinforcements.[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that heavy fighting continues in the Orikhovo-Vasylivka-Paraskoviivka (up to 8km north of Bakhmut) and the Klischiivka-Andriivka (7km to 10km southwest of Bakhmut) directions.[60] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold the initiative in the Bakhmut direction, where Ukrainian offensives are making steady progress.[61] Cherevaty reported that Ukrainian forces are engaging in maneuver actions in the Bakhmut direction to avoid heavy losses.[62] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and near Mayorske (17km south of Bakhmut).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces gained a foothold on the heights north of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[64]

Russian forces conducted attacks in the Bakhmut area and made no confirmed gains on July 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions on the southwest outskirts of Klishchiivka and near Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut).[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian forces from the direction of Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[66] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz and “Sever-Akhmat” units, as well as elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) and 346th Special Forces Brigade, are operating near Klishchiivka.[67]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not make any confirmed gains on July 21. Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash reported that Ukrainian forces have achieved unspecified success in the area of Avdiivka in the past two to three weeks.[68] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces near Vesele (5km northeast of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made no confirmed advances on July 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiikva), Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (23km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka, and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[70] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions near Vesele and Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions near Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Nevelske.[72] Barabash reported that Russian forces are continuing attempts to encircle Avdivika and have been deploying reinforcements to the area, including unspecified naval infantry elements that were previously in Nikolske near Mariupol.[73]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast but did not advance on July 21. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) repelled Ukrainian assaults with armored vehicles north of Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City).[74]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts on July 21 and made gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced closer to Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[75] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved success in the Novodarivka-Pryyutne (13km to 16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) direction.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[77]

Russian forces counterattacked in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area on July 21 and made no confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks to recapture previously lost positions north of Pryyutne.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 20 that Russian forces counterattacked near Pryyutne and pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions north of the settlement.[79] The geolocated footage of Ukrainian advances in the area published on July 21 indicates that these Russian counterattacks were likely unsuccessful.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 21 and made no confirmed gains in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved success in the Novodanylivka-Verbove (up to 16km southeast of Orikhiv) and Novodanylvika-Robotyne (up to 12km south of Orikhiv) directions.[80] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault near Mala Tokmachka (6km southeast of Orikhiv).[81] Russian sources claimed that small Ukrainian groups conducted ground attacks towards Verbove as well as along the Pyatykhakty-Zherebyanky line (up to 26km southwest of Orikhiv).[82]

Russian forces reportedly counterattacked south of Orikhiv and advanced in the area on July 21. Russian sources amplified footage on July 21 purporting to show elements of the Russian 291st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) at recaptured positions following successful counterattacks near Robotyne.[83] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of recent Russian advances near Robotyne.

Russian sources claim that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and that fighting continues near the Antonivsky Bridge as of July 21. A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing near Ukrainian positions close to the Antonivsky Bridge and that Russian forces repelled a small Ukrainian group that attempted to land near Hola Prystan (12km southwest of Kherson City).[84] Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on July 20 that small Ukrainian groups continue attempts to land on the left bank of Kherson Oblast.[85]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials announced that they will amend a Russian State Duma bill originally aimed at incrementally raising the conscription age so that there is an immediate increase in the upper age limit for the spring 2024 conscription cycle. Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov announced that the new amendment will increase the upper limit of the conscription age range from 27 years old to 30 years old but will not change the lower limit of 18 years old.[86] Kartapolov stated that the change in the conscription age range will take effect in the spring 2024 conscription cycle and will not affect the autumn conscription cycle this year.[87] The original bill proposed an incremental increase of the draft age of 19 to 30 years old in 2024, 20 to 30 years old in 2025, and 21 to 30 years old in 2026.[88] Russia State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov allegedly stated that the lower limit will remain at 18 years old and will not increase to 21 years old as the bill previously proposed because many young men want to join the army.[89]

Russian schools will teach children how to operate combat drones starting on September 1, 2023. Russian Federation Council Deputy Chair for Digital Economy Development Council Senator Artem Sheikin announced on July 21 that the Digital Economic Development Council worked with the Ministry of Education to develop this proposal.[90] Sheikin claimed that the Russian MoD stated that the program will allow students to study drone types, purpose, performance characteristics, general structure, reconnaissance of an area, and methods of countering enemy UAVs.[91] Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his support for this initiative on April 28, 2023.[92] ISW previously reported that Russian officials in St. Petersburg allocated one million rubles (about $11,000) to buy 15 training drones for drone education programs in St. Petersburg schools and that prominent Russian milbloggers have previously advocated for schools to offer educational drone programs to support long-term drone production and training efforts.[93]

The Kremlin continues to pull forces originally stationed at Russian bases in former Soviet states to serve in Ukraine, further weakening Russia’s military influence in Central Asia. A Russian news aggregator posted footage on July 20 claiming to show Russian soldiers departing the 201st Military base (Central Military District) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan for the frontlines in Ukraine.[94] The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies, a Ukrainian national security think tank, reported on January 1, 2023, that unspecified elements from the 201st Military Base were operating in the Kharkiv direction.[95] Radio Free Europe/Radio Library (RFE/RL) reported on September 14, 2022, that Russia deployed approximately 1,500 Russian personnel from the 201st Military base to Ukraine and planned to deploy 600 more personnel from facilities in Dushanbe and Bokhatar, a southern Tajik city, in the future.[96] Russia’s removal of troops from Tajikistan in September 2022 possibly contributed to Tajik President Emomali Rahmon publicly demanding respect from President Putin during the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit on October 14, 2022.[97] Rahmon even went so far as to note that he was present in the meetings prior to the fall of the Soviet Union and that Russia is not paying attention to Central Asia now as the Soviet Union did not back then.[98] The Kremlin’s decision to pull more forces from Tajikistan could indicate that the Kremlin has chosen to prioritize the war in Ukraine over Russia’s long-term relations with Central Asian countries.

Russian sources claimed that the Russian military is relying on Soviet-era equipment to make up for battlefield losses in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger posted satellite imagery on July 20 claiming to show that Russian forces recently moved unspecified Soviet-era artillery systems from storage facilities.[99] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces removed 100 152mm “Hyacinth,” 200 203mm “Peony,” and 100 240mm “Tulip” self-propelled guns from an undisclosed military location, presumably to be used in Ukraine.[100] The milblogger claimed that this will allow Russian forces to make up for the equipment that Ukrainian counterbattery fire has destroyed but questioned the long-term feasibility of using Soviet equipment to replace battlefield losses.[101]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia. Kherson Oblast occupation administration government chairman Andrei Alekseenko announced on July 21 that the Kherson Oblast occupation administration sent nearly 2,000 children to “children’s camps” in Yevpatoriia in occupied Crimea, Kabardinka in Krasnodar Krai, Adygea Republic, and Yaroslavl Oblast since the beginning of summer.[102] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced that 84 children from the Henichesk, Kalanchak, and Oleshky raions in occupied Kherson Oblast are currently at a summer camp in Kabardinka.[103] Alekseenko reported that the Kherson Oblast occupation administration plans to send an additional 1,000 children to camps in the Kuban region of Russia, Adygea Republic, Voronezh, Kaliningrad, and Pskov oblasts.[104]

Russian occupation officials reportedly will conduct door-to-door voting in occupied Ukraine in order to fabricate voter turnout in the September 10 regional elections. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities intend to hide the lack of local participation in the regional elections by opening early voting on August 31 and going door-to-door to collect residents’ votes on September 8 and 9.[105] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities will likely claim that Ukrainian civilians voted early or at home when Ukrainian civilians fail to appear at polling stations on September 10.

The Kremlin is reportedly planning to create a new “unified information agency” to increase media control in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the “unified information agency” will operate in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and employ foreign FSB recruits.[106] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Kremlin plans to present the agency as the creation of French journalist Christelle Neant, who has been cooperating with the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Ministry of State Security for years.[107] Russian occupation authorities have already established Kremlin-controlled media outlets in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[108]

Russian occupation authorities may be coercing Ukrainians into joining the Russian military and moving Russian citizens into occupied Ukraine. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian military personnel operating near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) are “local residents.”[109] The Russian MoD may be referring to Russian citizens who moved to occupied Ukraine as “local residents” or may be suggesting that local Ukrainian citizens are serving in the Russian military. ISW has previously reported on Russian efforts to increase the population of Russian citizens living in occupied Ukraine and attempts to coerce Ukrainians in occupied territory into joining the Russian military.[110]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

A Wagner-linked source reported that Wagner temporarily relocated its headquarters from Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Belarus and that Wagner’s work to transfer combat experience to the Belarusian military is in full swing.[111] The source provided no details on how long Wagner’s “temporary” headquarters would remain in Belarus or to where the headquarters will be relocated in the future.

The same Wagner-linked source reported that Wagner personnel are training elements of the Belarusian 38th Air Assault Brigade at the Brest Training Ground.[112] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported on July 21 that elements of the Belarusian 38th Air Assault Brigade conducted parachute drops at the Brest Training Ground but did not mention any Wagner participation.[113] Wagner Group personnel may have participated in this airborne exercise to refresh Wagner personnel’s airborne skills; The Wagner Group recruits extensively from Russian airborne and special forces personnel who should have been previously airborne-qualified. Wagner forces may seek to compete against Russian forces as Belarusian training partners. The Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade historically trains with the Russian 76th VDV Division and Russian and Belarusian airborne forces regularly conduct joint exercises with sister units.[114] The Wagner Group may seek to supplant some of those Russian-Belarusian unit relationships.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. Inside Biden’s decision to tap the first female Joint Chief

As an aside, the Admiral also was the former Commander of US Naval Forces Korea.

But here is the buried lede. Would the SECDEF really recommend an Army officer to command INDOPACOM? (of course now that Senator McCain has passed away some say it could be possible). I think he should wait and first review the Unified Command Plan and establish a Far East Command of a Northeast Asia Command and appoint an Army officer to command that new geographic combatant command. It will be even more important to sustain a Naval officer as INDOPACOM commander because with a revised UCP INDOPACOM will be able to sustain its main effort for maritime defense.

Excerpts;

But the news of Austin’s recommendation leaked to the press within days, putting the Defense secretary in an awkward spot. Some senior naval officers criticized the decision internally, with some speculating that Austin put Paparo’s name forward so that he could nominate an Army officer to lead Indo-Pacific Command instead, according to two former Defense officials with knowledge of the debate.

Inside Biden’s decision to tap the first female Joint Chief

By LARA SELIGMAN, ALEXANDER WARD and PAUL MCLEARY

07/21/2023 09:46 PM EDT

Politico

Here’s how the president ended up choosing Adm. Lisa Franchetti even though she wasn’t Lloyd Austin’s first choice.

The president ultimately decided to go with Adm. Lisa Franchetti as the Navy’s next top officer due to her qualifications and background, said a U.S. official familiar with the discussions. | Jim Cleveland/U.S. Navy via AP

07/21/2023 09:46 PM EDT

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin presented President Joe Biden with a series of options for who should next serve as the Navy’s top officer in a meeting early this week.

One set had Adm. Samuel Paparo, who leads the U.S. Pacific Fleet, named as chief of naval operations. Both the president and the Pentagon chief were aware Paparo was Austin’s recommendation for the post.

Another slew of options put Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the Navy’s current No. 2, in the top job. If she were nominated and later confirmed, Franchetti would make history as the first woman in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Biden debated those and other iterations with Austin, national security adviser Jake Sullivan and Chief of Staff Jeff Zients in the Oval Office sometime in the last 48 hours. In the end, Biden went with a version that named Franchetti as the CNO and Paparo as the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

Austin “was good with it,” said one U.S. official familiar with the meeting, and the secretary didn’t make a renewed case in White House for his top choice.

The White House officially announced those moves Friday, along with two other personnel changes within the Navy’s leadership structure.

The president doesn’t normally hand-pick the Navy’s top officer, so Biden’s decision to tap Franchetti for the job could be seen as a rebuke of Austin. But the move has not caused tension in the relationship, national security adviser Jake Sullivan said on the sidelines of the Aspen Security Forum.

“The president had the chance to sit with the secretary of Defense, and they worked this slate together, and this is the slate, and that’s a good thing,” he said.

Asked if there was any daylight between Biden and Austin, Sullivan said, “I don’t believe there is.” Both men ended the discussion “feeling very good about where we are,” he said.

Seven Biden administration officials detailed how the president made the historic decision, most on the condition of anonymity to detail a sensitive internal process.

Nominating the first female member of the joint chiefs is a historic move for a president that has prioritized diversity since the beginning of his administration. At the Pentagon alone, Biden has nominated the first black Defense secretary (Austin), the first female deputy Defense secretary (Kathleen Hicks) and the first black officer to lead a military service (Air Force Gen. C.Q. Brown).

But the decision was not an easy one. Although Franchetti, who currently serves as the Navy’s No. 2 officer, was an early frontrunner for the top Navy job, Austin earlier this year recommended Paparo for the role instead. As commander of the Navy’s Pacific Fleet, Paparo has focused on the Pentagon’s most pressing challenge: China’s growing naval power.

At the time, experts said Austin’s decision to recommend Paparo, who was on a glide path to lead Indo-Pacific Command, reflected more serious thinking about how to address the growing naval imbalance in the Pacific.

But the news of Austin’s recommendation leaked to the press within days, putting the Defense secretary in an awkward spot. Some senior naval officers criticized the decision internally, with some speculating that Austin put Paparo’s name forward so that he could nominate an Army officer to lead Indo-Pacific Command instead, according to two former Defense officials with knowledge of the debate.

Two Defense Department officials said that the decision to announce the nominations of Fanchetti, Paparo, Vice Adm. Jim Kilby to serve as vice chief of the Navy and Vice Adm. Stephen Koehler to replace Paparo as commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the same time Friday may also place some pressure on the Senate, where Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) has placed a blanket hold on all military nominees over his objection to the Pentagon’s abortion policy.

Adm. John Aquilino, the current Indo-Pacom chief, isn’t slated to step down until April, giving the Senate months to hold a hearing and confirm Paparo and Koehler. It also allows the Navy to work all the subsequent promotions down the chain of command.

One of the DOD officials also said that naming Paparo at the same time as Franchetti cuts short suggestions from some in Washington that an Army general could land the Indo-Pacom job, something the Navy has vehemently opposed as it has been a Navy billet for over 75 years.

The president ultimately decided to go with Franchetti due to her qualifications and background, said a second U.S. official familiar with the discussions.

Franchetti was a “strong fit for the role, and she wanted it,” the official said, noting that Paparo “is very happy to be going to Indo-Pacom.”

From Austin’s perspective, there are no “hard feelings,” said a third DOD official with knowledge of the discussions.

POLITICO

Politico

4. As recruitment flounders, this small change to GI Bill would make kids 'flock to the military,' teen says

We have to get creative. Sounds like a very innovative plan.  I wonder why we have not heard more about this.

Excerpts:

"In the past, the GI Bill college tuition grants was the military's big recruiting magnet. But it didn't really appeal to me," 18-year-old Aden Gilbert told Fox News. "My acquaintances and peers, we think that college is very much overrated, and it can really just impede or delay an entrepreneur like myself."

Gilbert is the son of a Marine Corps veteran and considered following in his father's footsteps until recently. He said the proliferation of "woke" ideology in the military prompted his decision as well as his own finances — he started a social media marketing business during his senior year of high school that he says has taken off.

"Why would I be taking classes on why America sucks, which is what's taught in a lot of these colleges now, while my business competition is getting a four-year head start on me? It just doesn't really make any sense," Gilbert said.

Bipartisan legislation introduced this year would create a pilot program allowing 250 GI Bill-eligible veterans to receive a grant to open their own business or purchase a franchise. The grant would be equivalent to the maximum amount under the GI Bill. The veteran would also be required to participate in an entrepreneurial training program.

As recruitment flounders, this small change to GI Bill would make kids 'flock to the military,' teen says

foxnews.com · by Hannah Ray Lambert | Fox News

Video

Free college no longer drives military service says teen pushing GI Bill tweak

Supporters of a bipartisan bill say allowing veterans to use GI Bill benefits to start a business instead of attend college could alleviate the military recruiting crisis. Here's why.

As university enrollment and Americans' confidence in higher education decline, there's growing support for allowing veterans to use their GI Bill benefits to start a business rather than attend college. Proponents say the policy change could also alleviate the military's recruiting crisis.

"In the past, the GI Bill college tuition grants was the military's big recruiting magnet. But it didn't really appeal to me," 18-year-old Aden Gilbert told Fox News. "My acquaintances and peers, we think that college is very much overrated, and it can really just impede or delay an entrepreneur like myself."

‘ERODED PATRIOTISM’: TEEN SHARES WHY HE NOW WON’T FOLLOW IN FATHER’S FOOTSTEPS AS MILITARY RECRUITING LAGS

Gilbert is the son of a Marine Corps veteran and considered following in his father's footsteps until recently. He said the proliferation of "woke" ideology in the military prompted his decision as well as his own finances — he started a social media marketing business during his senior year of high school that he says has taken off.

"Why would I be taking classes on why America sucks, which is what's taught in a lot of these colleges now, while my business competition is getting a four-year head start on me? It just doesn't really make any sense," Gilbert said.

Bipartisan legislation introduced this year would create a pilot program allowing 250 GI Bill-eligible veterans to receive a grant to open their own business or purchase a franchise. The grant would be equivalent to the maximum amount under the GI Bill. The veteran would also be required to participate in an entrepreneurial training program.

"Veterans moving into civilian life face a daunting mission in determining the next chapter of their life. Many of them want to pursue higher education, but others want to pursue a different path," Rep. Ben Cline, R-Va., who sponsored the bill, told Fox News in an email.

FREE COLLEGE NO LONGER DRIVES MILITARY SERVICE, TEEN SAYS:

Video

WATCH MORE FOX NEWS DIGITAL ORIGINALS HERE

"I know a ton of other entrepreneurs and like-minded kids who would flock to the military if that were to pass," Gilbert said, calling the legislation a "no-brainer way to end the recruiting crisis."

The military is struggling to fill its ranks as young people like Gilbert forgo service. Military officials blame a competitive job market and a dwindling pool of qualified applicants. Only 9% of young Americans are interested in serving their country, according to the Department of Defense.

College enrollment has also suffered a decline since 2012, and recent polling by Gallup shows Americans' confidence in higher education is waning.

"The youth of this era is not as interested in college," Jason Gilbert, Aden's dad, told Fox News. "They don't see the benefit that we have in past generations. The return on investment isn't there. It costs more and they get less, and the youth today are far more entrepreneurial than generations past."

THE ARMY GAVE THIS OFFICER A FALSE CRIMINAL RECORD, STUNTING HIS CAREER. NOW HE’S GETTING BACKPAY

Marine Corps veteran and business owner Kate Monroe told Fox News many young people want to be CEOs.

"They don't necessarily want to do all the work to get there," Monroe added with a laugh, "but certainly the entrepreneurship is in their heart. So if they could start a business with those funds, that could be another major player in the recruitment crisis."

The pilot program would last three years under the bill. After that, Jason Gilbert hopes legislators pursue a permanent change to the GI Bill. But he expects that will come with pushback from colleges.

"After this pilot program is proven successful, I anticipate the university industrial complex will fight like hell to protect their billions in free gravy train money," he said.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

Similar bills have been introduced in recent years — including by Cline in 2021 — but all failed to pass both chambers of the legislature.

Cline was joined by fellow Republican Rep. Byron Donalds of Florida and Democratic Reps. Lou Correa of California and Chris Pappas of New Hampshire in sponsoring the legislation. Cline said he is continuing to "garner support behind the bill, so veterans have more options to achieve their American dream."

Hannah Ray Lambert is an associate producer/writer with Fox News Digital Originals.

foxnews.com · by Hannah Ray Lambert | Fox News

5. How China Overreached (book review)

How China Overreached

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew Latham and Shweta Shankar · July 21, 2023

In the last three decades, China has become the focus of intense debate within U.S. foreign policy circles. Beijing’s peaceful rise to power has turned into an aggressive overreach of power over the last few years, sparking concerns about China’s future behavior as a great power. A deeper look into the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the United States reveals a number of dynamics that could be detrimental to global peace.

In her newly released book, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, Susan L. Shirk, founding chair of the 21st Century China Center, wades into the debate, writing that “China’s aggressive posture in world affairs and its relentlessly tight grip on domestic society are leading to what it most fears — a return to the politics of containment.”

Specifically, Shirk argues that Chinese President Xi Jinping “is quite comfortable using China’s huge market power and deep pockets to suck up advanced technologies from abroad and into China. The aim of achieving self-reliance in semiconductors, batteries, and other crucially important technologies has become increasingly overt. With the hands of the state so obviously orchestrating this massive effort, it is no wonder that China is provoking a backlash in the United States and Europe.”. This and similar political realities, Shirk concludes, exert a considerable burden on China’s power, limiting its potential to display itself as a peaceful actor.

How China Has Evolved as a Power

This is good as far as it goes, but it is with respect to the tumultuous history of China’s rise that Shirk’s book really shines. On this theme, the author’s main argument is that the ease with which Xi reversed 30 years of institutionalization reveals the opacity of the Chinese political system.

Throughout the book, Shirk develops her thesis along many lines. She first argues that the Xi government has overreached, and in doing so it has weighed down China’s economy and generated worldwide turbulence. Its aggressive methods have harmed China’s global public image, resulting in an international backlash from numerous countries. Nations such as Australia, she argues, have been especially antagonized by China’s aggressive policies. “When the Australian government called for a full international inquiry of the origins of the [COVID-19] virus, the Chinese leaders punished it by cutting imports of Australian coal, wine, barley, lobsters, beef, and cotton.”

Moreover, Shirk illuminates the black box that is the CCP. “The leaders in China resist American calls for greater transparency in the belief that keeping Washington guessing about its capabilities and intentions makes China look stronger. Yet by refusing to share information, Beijing endangers itself because its signals may be misread.”

None of this bodes well for what she believes is China’s aspiration to become the world’s predominant power. In fact, China’s increasing aggressiveness and insensitivity, she concludes, is having the perverse effect of disrupting the support that China needs to maintain its role as a peaceful power.

A Challenging View of China

This is an ambitious book with much to commend. Shirk does an excellent job using anecdotes of her experiences to illustrate her thesis that China is reverting to the Mao era. Her description of the pushback generated by Beijing’s domestic and international policies is noteworthy. In Chapter 1 (Origins of Overreach), Shirk clearly outlines China’s mistakes. “Overreach began on three fronts: The economy, social control, and foreign policy,” she writes. In Chapter 2 (Deng’s Ghost), Shirk goes into details about the core issues of former Chinese President Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. Although he dismantled a lot of Soviet-style planning, “Deng was reluctant to bury Mao entirely. And he stopped short of establishing the independent courts, legislature, business firms, media, or civil society that could have checked the overwhelming power of the CCP.” The details emphasized throughout Shirk’s book highlight how the very policies China has adopted to advance its vision have generated precisely the kind of hostility they were afraid of.

Like every ambitious book, however, this one rests on a number of assumptions, assertions and arguments that are open to empirical challenge. To begin with, while the book is analytically rich, it is riddled with contradictions. It paints a very detailed picture of a totalitarian China that stays silent on the topics of human rights, democracy, and foreign policy. But Shirk contradicts herself on how the U.S. should proceed its relationship with China — specifically, what aspects of Chinese politics and economics should be the focus for those seeking to repair the relationship. “Although we must speak out against Chinese government abuses — to do otherwise would be antithetical to our identity as Americans — we should face up to the fact that we are unlikely to gain much traction on them,” she writes. Shirk’s suggestion of speaking out is contradicted by her own assertion that, “Political reform in China will not be realized through outside pressure. Domestic demand, not foreign prodding, brings out political transformations.” The belief seems to be that the world should speak out even knowing there will be little to no change, all the while remaining complacent about human rights violations in China. Domestic demand for change in China has not accomplished much in the last century. Indeed, the Tiananmen Square Massacre was a direct reaction to the domestic demands of Chinese citizens. The primary shortcoming of Overreach is thus Shirk’s contradictory statements regarding the future of U.S. policy towards China.

These shortcomings, however, are far from fatal. Shirk’s book is bursting with anecdotes, interviews, and analytical data that illuminate the black box that is the CCP. Overreach is a valuable contribution to international relations and foreign policy literature, spelling out an analytical framework that promises to demystify Chinese actions on the world stage.

Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN; a Senior Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Ottawa, Canada; and a regular opinion contributor with The Hill, also in Washington, DC. Shweta Shankar is a researcher in the Political Science department at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN.

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew Latham and Shweta Shankar · July 21, 2023

6. America’s Reactive Foreign Policy: How U.S. Organizational Culture and Behavior Advantages China

The 28 page paper can be downloaded here: https://www.andrewwmarshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/AWMF_Reactive-Foreign-Policy_July2023.pdf

America’s Reactive Foreign Policy: How U.S. Organizational Culture and Behavior Advantages China

Elliot M. Seckler and Travis Zahnow

July 2023

The Andrew W. Marshall Foundation

https://www.andrewwmarshallfoundation.org/library/americas-reactive-foreign-policy-how-u-s-organizational-culture-and-behavior-advantages-china/?

This paper critiques the U.S. foreign policy community’s approach to strategic competition with China and raises a crucial question: Is the U.S. government basing strategic competition with China on U.S. interests, or is it reacting in ways that advance the strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?

This paper argues that, because of its organizational culture, the U.S. foreign policy community approaches strategic competition in ways that disadvantage the United States. Through an analysis of the political, military, economic, and psychological condition of U.S. foreign policy, this paper posits that the United States has formed a reactive strategy toward China that leaves it vulnerable to China’s own competitive strategies. Through exploring historical examples and contemporary issues such as Taiwan and integrated deterrence, an underlying pattern emerges. Because it has ill-defined objectives and definitions of success, brought about largely by organizational factors, the United States is developing a reactionary foreign policy that is susceptible to CCP strategies, interests, and advantages. While this paper does not provide a definitive answer, it diagnoses American susceptibility to Chinese strategic manipulation and highlights the need for the United States to develop a more proactive and well-defined strategy to counter China’s competitive strategies effectively.

7. 84 Years Ago, Einstein Wrote an Urgent Letter that Altered History Forever

In preparation for those going to see the new film Oppenheimer:

84 Years Ago, Einstein Wrote an Urgent Letter that Altered History Forever

While Einstein didn’t work directly on the Manhattan Project, he was responsible for its inception.

BY

ELANA SPIVACK

JULY 21, 2023

inverse.com

On August 2, 1939, German physicist Albert Einstein penned a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was one month before Germany invaded Poland, and two years before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

This letter, mentioned in the newly released Christopher Nolan movie Oppenheimer, set off its own chain reaction that resulted in the Manhattan Project, which began in August 1942 and ended three years later with the devastating atomic bomb drops.

Einstein wrote to Roosevelt that “it may be possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium-like elements would be generated.” This achievement, which would almost certainly come about “in the immediate future,” could lead to the creation of “extremely powerful bombs.”

Einstein then urged the President to keep Government Departments abreast of further developments, especially about securing a supply of uranium ore for the U.S., and hasten experimental work. While the letter was written in August, it wouldn’t reach Roosevelt’s hands until October of that year.

“Immediately after getting the letter, [Roosevelt] put a scientific committee to work looking into the possibility of making use of atomic power in the war,” Jeffrey Urbin, an education specialist at the Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, writes to Inverse in an email. The weapons were coded “tube alloys” going forward.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum

Behind the Letter

Einstein mentions three other renowned physicists: Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and Jean Frédéric Joliot. Each one independently contributed to the science behind the atomic bomb, building on decades of prior nuclear research that set the stage for this historic inflection point.

Hungarian-Jewish Szilard conceived of the nuclear chain reaction in 1933. In light of the neutron’s discovery by James Chadwick in 1932, Szilard contemplated that when an atom’s nucleus is split, vast energy stores are released, including neutrons that could instigate another split producing more neutrons, and so on, but he couldn’t procure research funding.

It wasn’t until December 1938, after Szilard had emigrated to America, that Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman discovered fission in uranium, impelling him to conduct experiments on neutron emission in the fission process. In March 1939, during a three-month research tenure at Columbia University, he proved that for every neutron absorbed about two neutrons were released during fission. "That night," Szilard wrote, "there was very little doubt in my mind that the world was headed for grief."

All the while, Italian Fermi also investigated nuclear fission and chain reactions, also at Columbia. He had received the 1938 Nobel Prize in Physics for his work on neutron artificial radioactivity and nuclear reactions from slow neutrons. After the discovery of nuclear fission in December 1938, Fermi and his team probed chain reactions in uranium.

French Joliot conducted elaborate research on atomic structure with his wife, Iréne Joliot-Curie (daughter of Marie Curie, whom he assisted in the lab at age 25). Joliot and Curie jointly received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1935 for their discovery of artificial radioactivity, which occurs when neutrons swarm stable isotopes.

As Einstein intimates, the methodology for building atomic bombs was all but set, and the Nazis had taken over the uranium ore mines in Czechoslovakia. Urbin also writes that Hitler and his regime would build a super weapon without a second thought. “It was imperative that the Allies prevent them from being the first to do so. Einstein understood as well as anyone given he had fled Germany.”

The question became: Who could build a bomb first?

Enter: Oppenheimer

Oppenheimer’s Los Alamos badge photo.

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Meanwhile, American theoretical physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer had been working in Ernest Lawrence’s Radiation Lab at the University of California, Berkeley since 1927. There, he developed a fast neutron theoretical physics in 1942. Later that year he began investigating bomb design and then combined the two disciplines with a fast neutron lab to develop an atomic weapon. In the fall of that year, General Leslie R. Groves asked the 38-year-old Oppenheimer to spearhead Project Y, at the secret Los Alamos Laboratory in rural New Mexico.

However, Oppenheimer hadn’t always been entrenched in nuclear warfare research. Before 1940, he had sunk his teeth into quantum field theory, astrophysics, black holes, and more. Berkeley also served as fertile ground for Oppenheimer’s stake in political activism. Partially because of Lawrence, he became interested in the physics of the atomic bomb in 1941. A brilliant physicist who received his Ph.D. at age 22, Oppenheimer proved a tireless researcher and “excellent director” of Los Alamos

In August 1939, Oppenheimer likely wasn’t even writing out equations for building an atomic bomb. Neither Einstein nor Roosevelt could’ve known at that point who he would become. Still, in retrospect, it seems almost inevitable that he became the momentous figure we know now.

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8. How Xi Jinping Thinks

Excerpts:

If you look closely, you can see Mozi’s teachings in Xi’s thought and action. Take, for example, Xi’s social credit system, which uses various data inputs to effectively bestow upon each Chinese person a “social credit score” to rate his or her behavior. Charmingly, what Xi is doing through this system (keeping people on the straight and narrow as the government defines the straight and narrow), Mozi endeavored to accomplish through what he called “ghosts.” Again, this may sound absurd to the Western reader, but bear with me. Mozi believed that “ghosts” rewarded virtue and punished vice. If Chinese people really and truly believed in ghosts, then the people would naturally avoid vice and behave virtuously, leading in turn to a peaceful and prosperous society. Mozi blamed the social and political chaos of his time on the ignorance of Chinese regarding ghosts. If people were better informed, Mozi said, then “it would really be a source of orderliness in the country and blessing to the people.”

And so, to protect our values and engage productively with Xi’s China, we need to study ancient Chinese writers. All of them can be read in excellent English translations. I recommend starting with the Classics of History and Poetry, followed by Mozi and the Legalist thinkers – Shang Yang, Guanzi, and Han Feizi. If you make it through those volumes, then study the writers who devised the organizational and belief formulas for the imperial system: Xunxi and the Annals of Lu Buwei. The spiritual roots of Xi Jinping’s vision are much deeper and broader than we realize. This study will help lay the groundwork for us to deal seriously with Xi’s theocracy.

How Xi Jinping Thinks

By Stephen B. Young

July 22, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/07/22/how_xi_jinping_thinks_967931.html

Xi Jinping’s China is not a normal country.

Since he became Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, and President of the People’s Republic of China in 2013, Xi Jinping has been turning back the clock – way, way back.

Xi has been transforming China from a normal modern country back into a Bronze Age theocracy.

Though he has been boasting of this reformation for years, our best and brightest in foreign affairs, politics, and business have been too clueless to grasp the scope of his agenda. Xi speaks of “Chinese Characteristics” as the warp and woof of his nation-building project. If we open our eyes and suspend our Western rationalism for just long enough to investigate Xi’s “Chinese Characteristics” from his point of view, we can almost read his mind and predict his decisions.

You see, Xi’s “Chinese Characteristics” is not merely a slogan. It signifies something grand and transcendent—a theological mythology propounded by the Shang and early Zhou Dynasties (1,700 – 500 BCE), long before the Chinese people had made themselves into a great empire. I’ll summarize the ancient myth as such: it characterizes a sentient and purposeful Heaven above and around us; our world as the All-Under-Heaven, planned and directed in everything by Heaven; and Heaven acting in our world through its loyal servant, the Son of Heaven.

Now, this may sound archaic, even crazy, to a modern Western audience. But I guarantee these myths are as real and credible to Xi (and many Chinese people) as anything contained in the Old Testament.

Roughly speaking, Xi proposes that Heaven has chosen him to be the Son of Heaven in our time. Xi believes he has been given authority to guide the All-Under-Heaven according to his instructions. And, China’s destiny today is to bring our world into conformity with Heaven’s plans and aspirations.

By my reading, Xi’s China is therefore a theocracy. Only a leap of faith permits belief in the truth of Shang and Zhou Dynasty myths. No doubt, there is a deep irrationality hidden behind the words of so-called “Xi Jinping Thought” as secular catechism, along with his promotion of certain “Chinese Characteristics.” 

To extend the analogy a bit further: Xi is the Pope; the Politburo is the Curia; the Central Committee is the College of Cardinals; and Communist Party cadres are the priests tasked to shepherd the believers and provide them with truth, sustenance, and salvation.

In Xi’s China, rival faiths cannot be tolerated. There is only one true faith: his. To paraphrase John 14:6, Xi is “the way, the truth, and the life. No one comes to the father [Heaven] except through [him].” Xi’s state must control and sideline all rival theologies – Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Taoist, Fa Lun Gong, Western Enlightenment rationality, etc.

Fortunately for those of us raised and educated exclusively within the myth structure of the West, a handbook for management of such a theocracy was written by a competent political activist named Mozi (470 -391 BCE).

Mozi rejected the humanism of Confucius on the grounds that Heaven had created a human race of selfish and untrustworthy creatures. Mozi had no confidence that any normal human person could be moral and upright, wise and responsible. So, he announced that humans needed a state to keep us in order, that this was Heaven’s chosen way for us to live. According to Mozi, we must give up our egos and live according to the Will of Heaven as devoted acolytes of a grand master planner. And, wrote Mozi, we are fortunate that Heaven demonstrated compassion by giving us a Son of Heaven to rule and keep all of us in order. Our duty? To faithfully follow his instructions.

Mozi wrote: “The will of Heaven is like the compass to the wheelwright and the square to the carpenter. The wheelwright tests the circularity of every object in the world with his compasses saying ‘That which satisfies my compasses is circular; that which does not is not circular.’”

If you look closely, you can see Mozi’s teachings in Xi’s thought and action. Take, for example, Xi’s social credit system, which uses various data inputs to effectively bestow upon each Chinese person a “social credit score” to rate his or her behavior. Charmingly, what Xi is doing through this system (keeping people on the straight and narrow as the government defines the straight and narrow), Mozi endeavored to accomplish through what he called “ghosts.” Again, this may sound absurd to the Western reader, but bear with me. Mozi believed that “ghosts” rewarded virtue and punished vice. If Chinese people really and truly believed in ghosts, then the people would naturally avoid vice and behave virtuously, leading in turn to a peaceful and prosperous society. Mozi blamed the social and political chaos of his time on the ignorance of Chinese regarding ghosts. If people were better informed, Mozi said, then “it would really be a source of orderliness in the country and blessing to the people.”

And so, to protect our values and engage productively with Xi’s China, we need to study ancient Chinese writers. All of them can be read in excellent English translations. I recommend starting with the Classics of History and Poetry, followed by Mozi and the Legalist thinkers – Shang Yang, Guanzi, and Han Feizi. If you make it through those volumes, then study the writers who devised the organizational and belief formulas for the imperial system: Xunxi and the Annals of Lu Buwei. The spiritual roots of Xi Jinping’s vision are much deeper and broader than we realize. This study will help lay the groundwork for us to deal seriously with Xi’s theocracy.

Stephen B. Young is the Global Executive Director of the Caux Round Table for Moral Capitalism (CRT). Young was educated at Harvard College and Harvard Law School. He served as an Assistant Dean at the Harvard Law School and as the third Dean of the Hamline University School of Law. His new book is Kissinger's Betrayal: How America Lost the Vietnam War. 

9. America Requires a Real Foreign Policy Debate

Excerpts:

Despite its endless failures of late, Washington never changes. True, President Donald Trump made some effort to challenge the status quo, but he allowed the generals to beat him into submission when it came to questioning the NATO alliance and South Korean “mutual” defense treaty. He was equally weak in overcoming resistance to withdrawing from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq.

Now the Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction. After criticizing the murderous Saudi tyranny, President Joe Biden submissively begged Riyadh to increase oil production—only to be dramatically snubbed. Yet he apparently is pressing the Kingdom to allow American military personnel to act as bodyguards for the licentious, dissolute royals. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put unusual pressure on the Europeans to do more in defense, but the administration has rushed more troops to the continent, even calling up reserves, and spent far more money than the Europeans to aid Kiev. Today the United Kingdom, one of the most hawkish European governments, is reducing the size of its army because, well, it can with America on station. Biden is begging the South Korean government to let Americans risk nuclear strikes on their homeland in order to defend Seoul.

...

Americans tend not to vote on foreign policy. The issues seem so far away. No longer. Thousands of Americans died and tens of thousands were wounded, many grievously, as a result of Washington’s bloody hubris. With the U.S. moving to confront China and Russia simultaneously, the future could prove far more dangerous, even disastrous.

Donald Trump offered a glimpse of how a tough-minded but better-prepared president could reorient U.S. policy back to a focus on the American people. The blob’s shock at his election was enormous and salutary. Today those benefiting from Washington’s imperial policies, both domestic and foreign, tremble at the thought that Trump might return.

Although repeating the past is no solution, a more serious leader with a policy that truly placed America first could break today’s coalition of warmongers, social engineers, and political profiteers. It is time to design a foreign policy as if the American people mattered.

America Requires a Real Foreign Policy Debate - The American Conservative

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · July 20, 2023

The collapse of the Soviet Union freed the world of a horrid tyranny and global menace. However, it also unleashed an orgy of hubris in Washington. Convinced that America won—with little consideration of the contribution of the USSR’s Mikhail Gorbachev, who kept the Red Army in its barracks—members of America’s foreign policy elite viewed Moscow’s collapse as only the first step. They considered themselves custodians of the globe’s unipower, with the mandate of heaven to remake the entire world, regardless of the cost to Americans and other peoples.

The first Gulf War reinforced Washington’s illusion of omnipotence. “What we say goes,” intoned President George H.W. Bush, acting as the proverbial master of the universe. Alas, Uncle Sam’s arrogance only grew. The Clinton administration’s secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, declared: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”

At the time her comment looked like comedic bluster, what you would expect from a wannabe generalissima who had been denied the presumed pleasure of sending masses of people into battle to their deaths. But in three short years, the endless wars initiated by President George W. Bush in response to 9/11 turned the outburst into deadly policy. Two decades later who on earth, other than an Albright-wannabe, could believe that American policymakers see further into the future?

Unfortunately, this unbridled hubris, which suffuses those who command the world’s most powerful military, has had catastrophic results. In the world imagined by members of the blob, Ben Rhodes’s inelegant label for the foreign policy establishment, U.S. policymakers are entitled, indeed, required to kill and destroy to create a better world.

Again, Albright led the way. As she infamously asked Colin Powell: “What’s the use of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” It evidently didn’t occur to her that the lives of military personnel, few of whom joined to be gambit pawns in her global chess game, deserved consideration. Perhaps even worse was her answer to the question of whether the deaths of half a million Iraqi children from U.N. sanctions were worth the price. Of course, she insisted: “We think the price is worth it.” Yes, American policymakers, anointed by God, or whatever is the modern, secular equivalent, are entitled to decide who lives and dies halfway around the globe. Indeed, these otherwise unimportant foreigners presumably should feel honored to die in Washington’s service.

What else to make of the invasion of Iraq, based on a lie, that killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis? What about two decades of war in Afghanistan, which turned the countryside into a rural abattoir? How else to defend aiding the overthrow of Libya’s dictator, while ignoring the decade of intermittent warfare that followed? Even more grotesque was helping Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed “Slice ‘n Dice” bin Salman impoverish, starve, and kill hundreds of thousands of Yemenis. Current U.S. policy is to punish the suffering masses in Syria and Venezuela, since nothing else has succeeded in overthrowing the dictators who, unlike the Saudi crown prince, Washington dislikes. As Madeleine Albright explained, we think the price is “worth it”—at least when others bear the cost.

Despite its endless failures of late, Washington never changes. True, President Donald Trump made some effort to challenge the status quo, but he allowed the generals to beat him into submission when it came to questioning the NATO alliance and South Korean “mutual” defense treaty. He was equally weak in overcoming resistance to withdrawing from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq.

Now the Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction. After criticizing the murderous Saudi tyranny, President Joe Biden submissively begged Riyadh to increase oil production—only to be dramatically snubbed. Yet he apparently is pressing the Kingdom to allow American military personnel to act as bodyguards for the licentious, dissolute royals. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put unusual pressure on the Europeans to do more in defense, but the administration has rushed more troops to the continent, even calling up reserves, and spent far more money than the Europeans to aid Kiev. Today the United Kingdom, one of the most hawkish European governments, is reducing the size of its army because, well, it can with America on station. Biden is begging the South Korean government to let Americans risk nuclear strikes on their homeland in order to defend Seoul.

All these policies put the interests of foreign governments before those of the American people.

Recognizing that Washington’s duty is first and foremost to this nation does not mean a policy of “isolationism,” as crudely caricatured by critics. Trade, investment, immigration, and travel all offer enormous benefits to Americans. The U.S. should be a commercial and cultural giant.

Today’s members of the blob, however, evince little concern for those to whom they are supposedly responsible, instead designing policies that serve foreign interests and the latter’s domestic allies. Businesses back foreign aid, think tanks crave foreign attention, bankers want foreign deals, arms makers need foreign wars, lobbyists serve foreign clients. While gorging themselves through their Washington influence, they gird themselves in sanctimony. Yes, Uncle Sam may be enriching them while sacrificing the interests of the American people, but it really is for the good of humanity, just trust them!

The Democratic Party, which once worried about the ferocity of the Cold War, battled President Richard Nixon over Vietnam, and fueled protests against Dubya’s disastrous misadventure in Iraq, has taken the lead in waging a proxy war against Russia and matching GOP hostility toward China. Although Republicans have become more skeptical of global social engineering, the GOP leadership in Washington is even more militaristic and belligerent than the Democratic Party. The bipartisan War Party has been busy campaigning for conflict with Russia, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea, Venezuela, and China. Now Mexico also is on their list. For such dubious crusades they have sacrificed American lives and wealth—and are prepared to do so again and again.

The American people can no longer afford to leave decisions over war and peace to the president. They should insist that Congress fulfill its constitutional role in voting whether to declare war, which allows them to make their voices known on Capitol Hill. Indeed, they are the last, best bulwark for peace. For instance, when President Barack Obama tossed to Congress the question of bombing Syria over its alleged use of chemical weapons, the American people resoundingly told legislators no.

More fundamentally, Americans should insist that all policymakers treat war as a last resort, rather than just another policy tool. Today, Albright acolytes think nothing about loosing death and destruction on a massive scale for essentially frivolous reasons. To answer her question, what’s the use of having the nation’s superb military? To meet existential threats and protect vital interests, not remake the globe in the image desired by the arrogant elite filling America’s imperial city. The nation’s founders recognized the seriousness of war, not only to combatants but to civilians and domestic institutions. That is why the constitutional scheme was designed to discourage war.

Resisting the military temptation is even more important when facing significant military powers. Analysts who didn’t expect Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine insist that he would never use nuclear weapons, no matter how hot our involvement in the ongoing proxy war might become. The same people claim that China can be deterred from attacking Taiwan by simply warning the former off, with nary a thought as to how hard it would be to prevent a serious conventional clash from escalating. And the same people propose doing more of the same with North Korea, even as it expands its nuclear arsenal and builds ICBMs capable of targeting America.

What could possibly go wrong in any of these cases? Nothing, insists the War Party.

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Americans tend not to vote on foreign policy. The issues seem so far away. No longer. Thousands of Americans died and tens of thousands were wounded, many grievously, as a result of Washington’s bloody hubris. With the U.S. moving to confront China and Russia simultaneously, the future could prove far more dangerous, even disastrous.

Donald Trump offered a glimpse of how a tough-minded but better-prepared president could reorient U.S. policy back to a focus on the American people. The blob’s shock at his election was enormous and salutary. Today those benefiting from Washington’s imperial policies, both domestic and foreign, tremble at the thought that Trump might return.

Although repeating the past is no solution, a more serious leader with a policy that truly placed America first could break today’s coalition of warmongers, social engineers, and political profiteers. It is time to design a foreign policy as if the American people mattered.

The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · July 20, 2023

10. Pentagon watchdog: U.S. struggled to track military aid to Ukraine

Pentagon watchdog: U.S. struggled to track military aid to Ukraine

• Jacob Knutson

https://www.axios.com/2023/07/21/ukraine-military-aid-stolen-us-tracking

People unloading weapons and other military equipment donated to Ukraine by the U.S. at an airport in the city of Boryspil in January 2022. Photo: Sean Gallup/Getty Images

Dozens of rifles, thousands of rounds of ammunition and other military equipment donated to Ukraine in the early months of Russia's invasion were stolen last year, according to a Pentagon report.

Why it matters: The thefts by crime groups and volunteer fighters were ultimately disrupted by Ukraine's security service and the military hardware was recovered, the Defense Department initially struggled to track and monitor all the equipment it donated to Ukraine, as required by law.

The inspector general's report does not specify whether the stolen weapons were donated to Ukraine by the U.S.

• However, it did find that the U.S.' ability to ensure that its donated weapons and equipment were ultimately being used for Ukraine's self-defense was hamstrung by a lack of personnel in the country from the start of the invasion up to September 2022.
• Tracking that information is required by the Arms Export Control Act.
• "The inability of [Defense Department] personnel to visit areas where equipment provided to Ukraine was being used or stored significantly hampered [Kyiv's Office of Defense Cooperation]'s ability to execute [end-use monitoring]," the report reads.
• By October, U.S. military personnel had entered Ukraine to begin inspecting and tracking the donated weaponry.

By the numbers: The report said a criminal organization led by an "unspecified Russian official" intent on destabilizing Ukraine was able to obtain weapons, including at least one grenade launcher, a machine gun and over 1,000 rounds of ammunition.

• In another instance, members of a volunteer Ukrainian battalion stole over 60 rifles and nearly 1,000 rounds of ammunition and likely intended to sell them on the black market, the report said.
• Ukrainian criminals were able to steal $17,000 worth of bulletproof vests by posing as a humanitarian organization, according to CNN, which also obtained the watchdog report.

What they're saying: A Defense Department spokesperson told CNN on Friday that the U.S. "remains keenly aware of the risk of possible illicit diversion and is proactively taking steps to mitigate this risk in close cooperation with the government of Ukraine."

• "We are realistic that we are sending weapons to help Ukraine defend itself in an active conflict, and there is a risk these weapons could be captured if territory changes hands – which happens in any war," the spokesperson added.

The big picture: The report will likely lead to renewed criticism from members of Congress who have previously backed plans to oppose future military aid to Ukraine.

• The Pentagon said last month that an accounting error had overestimated U.S. military aid to Ukraine by $6.2 billion, allowing it to send additional equipment.
• On Wednesday, the Biden administration announced a military aid package to Ukraine worth $1.3 billion that included four surface-to-air missile systems, mine-clearing equipment, artillery rounds, tactical vehicles and trucks.
• The U.S. has sent $42.6 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the start of the invasion.

Go deeper: What Russia's withdrawal from the grain deal means for the world

11. Interview: Dan Rice, former Special Advisor to CinC Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, President American University Kyiv

Dan Rice, former Special Advisor to CinC Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, President American University Kyiv

ukrinform.net

In the wake of the recent move by the United States to provide Ukraine with cluster munitions to support the nation’s counteroffensive against Russia’s occupation forces, Ukrinform sat down with Dan Rice, former Special Advisor to CinC Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, who has been President American University Kyiv since March this year. He spoke of his elaborate path of convincing the U.S. political establishment of Ukraine’s critical need in this kind of munitions on the battlefield.

THERE WERE NO LOBBYISTS TO HELP

Since summer last year, you’ve been vocally speaking out in favor of the U.S. sending Ukraine dual purpose improved conventional munitions while the issue was not even publicly discussed or brought up in media. Now we finally saw Biden’s administration approve the move. Did you actually believe back then that the U.S. top officials would change their stance on the issue?

Unfortunately I faced a tremendous backlash, from many people, when I started speaking out about the need for cluster munitions. There was much confusion on the subject, intentionally caused by the Cluster Munitions Convention (CMC), and in my opinion by Russian disinformation, that even military professionals, members of Congress, and the press were confused. “Are they legal?” “Are they banned?” “Are they moral?”

In July 2022, I saw combat in the Donbas, and as I looked across the battlefield and saw Russian entrenched in a tree line, I knew it was the perfect weapon, DPICM artillery (Cluster) to beat the Russian army. But this wasn’t a novel thought, it was just as we planned for 50 years. I knew to beat Russia, to dislodge them from occupied Ukrainian land that they were now defending, we would need to win support for cluster munitions, so I took it as my cause for over a year, publishing, speaking on CNN, speaking with retired and active Generals, speaking with members of Congress and their staffs, and speaking with the press. These are old, outdated weapons (but they work great), so there were no lobbyists to help, no one was going to make any money sending in 1 million rounds of DPICM that were made in the 1990s. I was the only one speaking about this for the first six months until it gained momentum and that only happened in around March 2023.

Could you tell us a bit more about the shift that happened in Washington? What contributed to the positive decision to send DPICMs to Ukraine?

I think it’s all about leadership. I co-founded a leadership company at West Point called “Thayer Leadership” that teaches corporate leadership. I’ve spent a lifetime studying, learning, teaching and practicing leadership. When I was appointed Special Advisor to the Commander in Chief General Zaluzhnyi, Dr. Liudmyla Dolhonovska, the Strategic Communications Advisor, told me “if we lose U.S. support we are dead. You need to help us keep US Support.” So she gave me my mission. To lead. So that’s nearly all I’ve been doing since May 2022. Focused on leading the effort to keep U.S. support. Unofficially, as a volunteer. And specifically I chose to focus on getting cluster munitions.

Influencing one person at a time. There’s a saying “the trend is your friend”. Get one person to agree. The second is twice as many. Get the “key” people to agree and the rest will follow, We did this with the key generals, Senators, Members of Congress, key defense industry leaders, and members of the press. Come across a major opponent, ignore and move on. Rally the base, gain a majority and it gets approved.

I’ve been very fortunate in life and through West Point, have developed a significant network of friends in the military, congress, the press, defense industry, and was able to weaponize and mobilize that network to get Ukraine cluster munitions.

Also, we fortunately never planned to fight a major war with High Explosive artillery rounds, so we didn’t have that many. So we started to run out… of the inferior rounds. Which forced politicians to have to approve- if we run out of High Explosive (HE) and won’t give DPICM (dual purpose improved conventional munitions), then Ukraine is out of artillery ammo and is dead. So it forced politicians to say “yes” to cluster munitions. Thank God we didn’t produce more HE in the past or we would be stuck using it!

Chairman McCaul of the House Foreign Relations Committee really helped when he led the letter to the President in March. The biggest change, in my opinion, was when General David Petraeus came and spoke to the students at the American University Kyiv (where I was appointed President 1 March 2023).

General Petraeus is one of our most respected Generals - he commanded two wars, and the CIA. And when he started promoting the need for cluster munitions, on film, from the American University Kyiv, it helped get middle of the road politicians in the US on board, and very soon after him speaking, cluster munitions were approved by both parties and by the President.

It was a life experience to be a part of the process and I hope it helps Ukraine. I wish it was a year earlier, but nonetheless glad we approved it.

TOPIC OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS IS VERY MISUNDERSTOOD

Give us a little background and context to the cluster munitions issue. Many tend to believe that it is a totally banned weapon and that its use implies potential massive collateral damage, endangering civilian lives, including when the war is over.

It’s a very misunderstood topic. And Russian misinformation helps create confusion, hoping the West will not use our primary weapon against numerically superior Russian artillery. A group of well meaning, but naïve country leaders came together in Oslo in 2008. They might as well have been conducting a Russian operation. There is a Russian saying (this isn’t me saying it) that they were “useful idiots”. Their “pitch” was compelling and passionate- cluster munitions can kill children and woman, long after a war is over. Who wants that? It’s horrible! So that alone was able to get a lot of non-professional, non-military leaders on board. Mostly, from countries far from Russia. What they didn’t say was that without cluster munitions, most countries would be conquered by Russia, and they would be not only conquered, but would also have unexploded ordnance all over their conquered country for the next 100 years…..killing innocent women and children. That is why countries that border Russia, the aggressor everyone has feared, the reason a defensive pact called NATO, was formed, did not sign this ridiculous convention. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Ukraine and the United States didn’t sign it. The West’s #1 weapon against Russian aggression has always been artillery-delivered cluster munitions. And this asinine Cluster Munitions Convention took that weapon away from the defense of Ukraine, or Poland, or Estonia, or Finland. Why should Belize, Fiji, St Kitts, the Philippines, Iceland, decide what weapons Europe uses to defend herself from a Russian invasion?

Finally we are sending the Cluster Munitions we should have sent years ago to prevent a Russian invasion, never mind, defend against it. Keep in mind, China and North Korea will watch how effective DPICM is. And it already has been. In my opinion it is 50 times more lethal than high explosive. And that is a game-changer.

Russians dropping cluster munitions on civilians indiscriminately should be seen as a war crime. And it should be prosecuted, and there are thousands of cases. The US or Ukraine using precision artillery cluster munitions against known enemy targets, with drone ‘eyes’ on the target, is not a war crime. It is how Ukraine will win.

IF THE US WAS FIGHTING RUSSIA, WE WOULD IMMEDIATELY FIRE CLUSTER MUNITIONS

If the U.S. ever needed to engage in a conflict in the European war theater, would U.S. generals employ DPICMs? Would they need any particular approval from top command or government to use these munitions on the battlefield?

Cluster munitions have always been the US and NATO planned defense against numerically superior artillery (whether it was a Russian, Chinese or North Korean invader- all of them have doctrine with superior artillery). If the US was fighting the Russian Army, I have 100% confidence we would immediately fire cluster munitions. It is a legal weapon within our arsenal. It is moral. It is not against the Geneva Convention. The use of cluster munitions is delegated to the Combatant Commander, usually a three- or four-star general, as per the guidance provided as recently as March 2022. That is our policy and our doctrine if US soldiers were fighting Russians directly. Why it was different for Ukrainian soldiers fighting an invading force of Russians has been my concern and position all along: it shouldn’t be any different! Ukrainian soldiers deserve to have DPICM cluster munitions. And I’m glad we got them- look forward to seeing them soon as our Ukrainian big guns roar with DPICM!

General Mark Milley at his recent press conference reminded journalists that war in real life is different from war on paper. That’s how he commented on the slower-than-expected pace of the counteroffensive. How do you think DPICMs could change its course?

The two main artillery platforms supplied to Ukraine starting last summer were 155mm Howitzers (US, French, German and other) and HIMARS M140 launcher/M270 launchers. Both have conventional shells/rockets, and both have cluster munitions. The 155mm howitzers have cluster artillery shells with 88 submunitions with a range of 25km. The rocket launchers have 518 submunitions and 45km range (M26A1). Unfortunately, neither platform last summer was provided with the most lethal munitions- they weren’t provided with the cluster munitions.

If both systems had been provided with cluster munitions from the beginning, I believe the war would already have been won. They are that powerful.

What is your assessment of the outcome of the latest Ramstein meeting on July 18?

In my opinion, Putin’s primary aim is not to conquer Ukraine. It’s to fragment NATO support. The latest Ramstein summit shows he is not accomplishing what he is trying to do. NATO is stronger than ever.

A major portion of the recent Ramstein meeting focused on de-mining. There is no English or Ukrainian word that fully encompasses the enormous problem that exists- not just for Ukraine – but for the world. Russia has intentionally destroyed a huge portion of the world’s most arable land. The old techniques of manual demining won’t work for 2.5 million hectares.

Within the next year, we will see the evolution of a century's worth of technological innovation, development and deployment in large-scale identification of mined areas, as well as clearing un-mined areas of land, rivers and seas (which is equally important), and clearly techniques that the world has never seen before, on a massive scale.

My two biggest passions in this war are getting Ukraine cluster munitions, and getting a massive international effort to support de-mining. Those might seem like diametrically opposed ideas. One creates unexploded ordnance and the other clears them. Many people oppose cluster munitions because of ‘duds’, or unexploded ordnance (UXOs). The two are tied together. 1/3 of Ukraine has a massive, unexploded ordnance/demining issue. 100% of the fault of this is due to the Russians. We cannot clear the areas of Russians without cluster munitions. So we need Cluster munitions to De-Russian. Then we can de-mine. For Ukraine Armed Forces on the offensive, they need to both use Cluster Munitions to clear Russians, but also need to demine simultaneously to clear territory for follow-on troops.

NEXT STEP SHOULD BE CLUSTER MUNITIONS FOR HIMARS AND M270

Now that the ice has broken on DPICMs, what about the much-sought F16s? Dou you believe we are at the final stretch toward actually receiving them following pilot training? Could any other obstacles further delay the handover of these powerful fighter jets to Ukraine?

I’m an Army guy, and this is mostly a land war. With today’s UAVs, electronic warfare, precision guided SAMS, I don’t see F-16s as being a “game changer”. Certainly “nice to have”, but not “need to have”. I’d put more emphasis on artillery. Now that we are getting the cluster munitions for the 155mm howitzers, next we should get the cluster munitions for the HIMARS and M270 launchers. With their increased range, and with 518 submunitions vs 88 submunitions, they become a major strategic weapon- against front line Russian battalions.

We need drones, artificial intelligence, industry, government and NGOs to come together on a scale never seen.

Russia has fired at least 30 million shells, 20% of which did not detonate. All the land on which they are on is contaminated. And some in the West think it is irresponsible to liberate the land firing a small number of cluster munitions that have a 3% failure rate. The moral dilemma is the Cluster Munitions Convention doesn’t understand munitions, nor math. We need to liberate the occupied land. That requires cluster munitions. Then we need to clear the land. All of the contaminated areas are the fault of one country: Russia.

WHO CARES WHAT PUTIN THINKS?

How would you comment on CinC Zaluzhnyi’s recent statement that no one would stop him from liberating Crimea once he has the means to this end – that’s given concerns privately expressed by some Western about how Putin might react once Ukrainian forces enter the peninsula?

My initial thought is “who cares what Putin thinks?” The answer is simple: Kill or capture every Russian, or force them out, until Ukraine regains its 1991 borders. Otherwise, what are Ukrainian forces fighting for?

If some politician in the West is overly worried about what Putin will do if Putin loses a war that Putin initiated, then those politicians need to reconsider their profession. Leaders cannot be intimidated by an aggressor with nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the future is certain: oppression. The West has been overly concerned with Putin’s reaction to every decision, and worried about “escalation”. He was the aggressor. All aggressors should fear the West’s reactions will be extremely powerful, until expelling the invader.

Ievgen Matiushenko

ukrinform.net

12. Navy Retires Its Last Special Operations Helicopter Squadron - Seapower

​A sad day. I have worked with these helicopters in the Pacific and they were very good.

Navy Retires Its Last Special Operations Helicopter Squadron - Seapower

seapowermagazine.org · by Richard R. Burgess, Senior Editor · July 19, 2023

SAN DIEGO, California (June 30, 2023) MH-60S Seahawks assigned to the “Firehawks” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 85 fly near San Diego during the squadron’s final flight prior to its deactivation ceremony. Navy Reserve squadron HSC-85 is the Navy’s last helicopter squadron dedicated to Naval Special Warfare (NSW) and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ryan LeCompte)

*****

ARLINGTON, Va. — The U.S. Navy’s only helicopter squadron dedicated to support of special operations forces has made its final flight.

Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 85 (HSC-85), a reserve squadron based at Naval Air Station North Island, California, made its final flight on June 30, 2023, prior to its deactivation ceremony, according to a release from Commander, Naval Air Force Reserve.

HSC-85 was equipped with MH-60S Seahawk helicopters to support “Naval Special Warfare forces and other special operations forces training and readiness,” according to the Department of the Navy’s 2023 budget highlights book. The Navy proposed retirement of the squadron with the service’s 2023 budget request. The Navy estimates the program savings would amount to $312.5 million over the Future Years Defense Plan.

HSC-85 originally was established as Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 85 (HS-85) in 1970 at NAS Alameda, California, and equipped with the SH-3A Sea King helicopter, later upgrading to the SH-3D and SH-3H versions. The squadron moved to NAS North Island in 1993 and in October 1994 was redesignated Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 85 (HC-85), shifting to the roles of search and rescue, logistics and range support.

The squadron was redesignated HSC-85 in February 2006 and equipped with MH-60S helicopters. In 2011, special operations support became its primary role, and it was equipped with an older version of the Seahawk, the HH-60H. The Navy planned in 2016 to deactivate HSC-85 and its East Coast counterpart, HSC-84, but HSC-85 survived. The squadron in 2018 upgraded to the Block III version of the MH-60S.

Richard R. Burgess, Senior Editor

Senior Editor of Seapower Magazine at Seapower

Richard R. Burgess, is senior editor for Seapower magazine. He is a retired naval flight officer and author of several books on naval aviation.

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seapowermagazine.org · by Richard R. Burgess, Senior Editor · July 19, 2023

13. The U.S. Navy Needs Diesel-Electric Submarines Now

Excerpts:

Would I like a submarine force made up entirely of SSNs?

Sure, in a perfect world.

But that’s not the world we dwell in. Such a fleet will not take to the sea within an operationally relevant timeframe, while lawmakers will almost assuredly balk at the expense of building it. I would like a plentiful force more. We need numbers, and we need them fast. SSK acquisitions would promise not just capable and affordable platforms but a diplomatic boon. Indivisible alliances stand the best chance of weathering peacetime strategic competition as well as hot war.

So let’s dive into the Pacific depths . . . in conventional submarines.

The U.S. Navy Needs Diesel-Electric Submarines Now

SSK acquisitions would promise not just capable and affordable platforms but a diplomatic boon. Indivisible alliances stand the best chance of weathering peacetime strategic competition as well as hot war.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · July 21, 2023

Navy news has been a mixed bag of late; is it ever otherwise?

The U.S. Navy delivered a classified shipbuilding plan to Congress this week espousing a 381-ship fleet, not counting uncrewed vessels, of which it wants 150 or so. That’s up from 299 in service today, and it would exceed the 355-ship fleet mandated by U.S. law by 26 hulls.

This is good news. Or it’s good news provided the shipbuilding complex can handle the extra load. And provided Congress levies enough taxpayer money at last to construct, operate, and maintain such a fleet.

Whether lawmakers will follow through remains a nettlesome question. After all, it’s pushing seven years since they imposed the 355-ship mandate. Yet the ship count dawdles around where it was back in 2016, even as Chinese shipyards mass-produce new surface combatants like sausages enroute to a 500-ship People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy fleet.

Submarine maintenance woes have also been much in the news, and in a doubleplus-ungood way. Navy leaders have pegged the target percentage of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) in upkeep and overhaul at any given time at 20 percent of the fleet, which currently stands at 49 SSNs.

At present, though, nearly 40 percent of the attack-boat fleet sits idle. That includes USS Connecticut, one of three of the navy’s baddest-*** (badass-est?) Seawolf-class subs, and USS Boise, a Los Angeles-class SSN sidelined since 2015. That leaves just 31 boats to cover U.S. undersea commitments spanning the seven seas.

Clearly the republic’s shipyards are struggling to maintain a submarine inventory the navy considers too small by 17 subs. (Last year’s unclassified shipbuilding program called for a 66-boat fleet.)

And, also in submarine news, the navy released the first images of its Orca extra-large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV) at sea. At first the 80-foot Orca will serve as a covert minelayer while defense manufacturers and the navy work to add new missions to its operational repertoire.

The Orca constitutes promising tech as the U.S. Navy tries to make good on its plan to disperse combat power among a much more numerous fleet rather than concentrate it in a few large, pricey, multi-mission hulls. Sinking a guided-missile cruiser or destroyer or knocking it out of action deducts a major share of the fleet’s overall battle strength across multiple missions, meaning anti-surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air warfare along with ballistic-missile defense. By contrast, dispersing firepower, sensors, and command-and-control functions imparts resilience. The fleet fights on despite losing individual units.

And fighting on in the face of adversity is what it’s all about in battle.

This roundup of the latest news adds up to a compelling brief on behalf of acquiring conventionally powered attack submarines (SSKs). Fleet numbers are stagnant, the silent service needs at least 17 more attack boats according to last year’s shipbuilding plan, and no one pretends an 80-foot XLUUV, no matter how capable, can replace a manned sub displacing thousands of tons.

If the navy needs boats on the cheap and it needs them quick, why not procure diesel-electric SSKs in bulk?

We should. Think about the advantages that would accompany an SSK flotilla:

It would fit the mission

U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and joint concepts for future maritime warfare envision using the fleet in concert with ground and air forces to deny an aggressor access to vital waters and skies, chiefly those around and between the islands comprising Asia’s first island chain.

Subs constitute a major part of the scheme. Seal the first island chain and you bottle up the PLA Navy and Air Force, not to mention the Chinese merchant fleet, within the near seas and deny them maneuver space. Patrol duty is fairly static duty, an assignment well-suited to diesel subs. And submarine services operated by the likes of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Republic of Korea Navy, which rely on SSKs, have long excelled at it. The U.S. Navy could follow suit—and it should.

Proven designs exist, and so do builders

Japan’s Soryu– and Taigei-class subs are acclaimed the finest large conventional attack boats in the world.

If the U.S. shipbuilding sector is under severe strain, and it is, it makes sense to turn to major shipbuilding nations that happen to be longstanding and loyal allies.

China may be the world’s largest shipbuilder, but the next two largest are Japan and South Korea. Together they slightly eclipse China’s shipbuilding capacity. One imagines, say, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which produced the Soryu and produces the Taigei, would be receptive to the idea of laying keels for the U.S. Navy.

Construction could take place either in Japanese yards or under some arrangement to manufacture them in North America. It’s worth at least making the inquiry to probe interest. Let’s buy foreign!

SSKs are cheap compared to SSNs

The Japanese Diet budgeted a reported $602.3 million for the latest copy of the JMSDF’s Taigei-class boats, which come equipped with lithium-ion batteries to enhance their on-station staying power. Contrast that with the whopping $3.45 billion per hull that the next “block” of Virginia-class SSNs will apparently cost the U.S. Navy.

Looks like five-plus SSKs for the price of one SSN by my tally. Making up that 17-sub deficit between the current fleet and navy aspirations would run the taxpayers about $10.24 billion as opposed to the forbidding $58.65 billion price tag for 17 Block V Virginias. That figure should please frugal budgeteers in Congress, returning adequate bang for a fraction of the bucks.

An SSK buy would enhance AUKUS

Under the AUKUS accord, the United States will reportedly furnish the Royal Australian Navy with three to five Virginia-class SSNs, tiding over Australia’s navy until such time as Australian shipbuilders manage to construct the infrastructure and amass the expertise to build SSNs of their own. If the U.S. shipbuilding industry is struggling to keep up the current U.S. submarine fleet, let alone expand it, let alone supply Australia with nuclear boats, it makes eminent sense to turn elsewhere to advance the U.S. silent service’s quest for numbers. Doing so would meet the navy’s needs while letting America keep faith with arguably its closest ally.

Parting Thoughts

And lastly, buying Japanese would refortify the U.S.-Japan alliance, radiating a powerful deterrent signal to Chinese Communist Party leaders. If the U.S. Navy permanently forward-deployed its SSK contingent to the Western Pacific, the boats would be based close to potential battlegrounds along the first island chain as well as to yards capable of maintaining and refitting them. And if Washington agreed to place U.S. SSKs under the command of a truly combined U.S.-Japanese fleet, giving Tokyo a say in what they do, it would become plain to China and Japan that the United States has skin in the game of the common defense. No amount of bombast out of Beijing or bullying out of the PLA would loosen or break the alliance. U.S. sailors will be in harm’s way, and thus the U.S. armed forces will be there when the chips are down. Knowing that, and cowed by adverse geostrategic circumstances, communist chieftains ought to desist from aggression.

Would I like a submarine force made up entirely of SSNs?

Sure, in a perfect world.

But that’s not the world we dwell in. Such a fleet will not take to the sea within an operationally relevant timeframe, while lawmakers will almost assuredly balk at the expense of building it. I would like a plentiful force more. We need numbers, and we need them fast. SSK acquisitions would promise not just capable and affordable platforms but a diplomatic boon. Indivisible alliances stand the best chance of weathering peacetime strategic competition as well as hot war.

So let’s dive into the Pacific depths . . . in conventional submarines.

Author Expertise

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone. Dr. Holmes is also a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · July 21, 2023

14. Ukraine could win but still become a failed state

 Despite the author's negative assessment, Ukraine may be the first nation since post-World War II that would be able to postively exploit a modern Marshall plan. But the author is right to look at the history, economy, politics, etc of a country to assess this. But I also think he undermines his own argument because it is how Ukraine has responded after February 22 that will determine whether it becomes a failed state. I think it has most of the characteristics of West European countries that made the Marshall Plan a success. It was not the Marshall plan that made it a success. It was the country itself that received the assistance that made it successful. I think Ukraine would not become of failed state.

Ukraine could win but still become a failed state

BY AUSTIN WU, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 07/21/23 2:30 PM ET

The Hill · · July 21, 2023

Much ink has been spilled on how Putin’s war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s economy, military and international standing. Less attention has been paid to the future of Ukraine as a nation. Even if Ukraine is able to expel all of the Russian invasion, it could still become a failed state.

It is worth remembering that Ukraine was not thriving before February 2022. After his 2019 election, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took over a state suffering from economic malaise, low birth rates and high rates of corruption. Ukraine’s population, after peaking at 52 million in 1993, had already fallen to 45.5 million by 2013, before the annexation of Crimea, with UN estimates concluding that it would fall by a further 20% by 2050.

Widespread emigration has plagued Ukraine, which was suffering from extensive brain drain well before the war. Emigration and population decline are parts of a vicious cycle — citizens leave countries due to political instability or low economic prospects, which tends to worsen the very problems that immigrants are fleeing from.

In addition to a declining birthrate and negative net migration, Ukraine’s economy has floundered since the nation achieved independence in 1991. Ukraine is one of the poorest countries in Europe — before the war, its GDP per capita was comparable to that of Iraq, and unemployment was about 10 percent. Ukraine’s economy is the second-most corrupt in Europe, behind only Russia. This corruption and lack of opportunity fueled Ukraine’s pre-war emigration and poverty.

The invasion and subsequent Russian military strikes have wreaked havoc on this already weak economy. Infrastructure has been devastated, with an estimated $138 billion in damage. Power systems, roads and other critical assets have been left in ruins. Ukrainian agricultural production, which made up 40 percent of Ukraine’s exports, has fallen by a third, which will only be exacerbated by recent Russian attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Finally, Russian minefields and artillery attacks have also left much of eastern Ukraine inundated with unexploded ordinance, the effects of which will continue to be felt for decades.

Moreover, many of the 15 million refugees and internally displaced persons are either unable to contribute to the country’s war effort or dependent on state resources for survival. Those who have fled may be gone for good. Ukrainian refugees have been able to effectively integrate with host communities, and many have built lives in other countries. The experience of refugees from Syria, who have suffered far worse treatment in their host countries and have much more difficulty integrating, shows that refugees are unlikely to return even once the war ends. Those least likely to return are individuals with high education and key skills, further exacerbating the flight of valuable human resources.

Ultimately, no matter the result of the war, the damage has already been done. Ukraine’s infrastructure is in ruins, its economy in shambles, and its ongoing decline into failed statehood has been terminally accelerated. The people of Ukraine are still fleeing the country in search of better lives, and those who remain are dependent on foreign aid. The pill will be even more bitter to swallow if Ukraine’s counteroffensive continues to stall and it must accept territorial losses — which could lead to a coup against Zelenskyy, or perhaps even the onset of civil war.

Generative AI bots will change how we write forever — and that’s a good thing Is Zelenskyy’s ‘ungrateful’ act causing him to lose his luster?

Even if Ukraine achieves the total liberation of the territories currently occupied by Russia, its difficulties will only increase. First, winning such a campaign might take years, and would further damage and depopulate eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Ukraine’s economy would continue to be strangled by the displacement of workers, infrastructure damage and investor uncertainty. Protracted warfare may achieve political and moral objectives, but any recaptured territories will become a significant economic and humanitarian burden on Kyiv. At the same time, the loss of wartime unity and foreign aid, combined with the high cost of rebuilding and resettling, is likely to create further political instability. Even in victory, Ukraine’s future is bleak.

American leaders should be well aware of the consequences that protracted warfare can have on a state — our experiences in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan all resulted in massive human costs and the destruction of economic and governmental institutions. Regardless of whether or not Ukraine “wins” the war, Europe and the U.S. will be forced to reckon with both a failed state dependent on foreign aid and a protracted migrant crisis that rivals the one that Europe already faces with the Middle East and North Africa. Only this time, the crisis will sit on the West’s doorstep.

Austin Wu is a researcher at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn. His work focuses on American foreign policy and Sino-Indian affairs.

The Hill · · July 21, 2023

15. History Is Better Than Doctrine

I think this could stir a useful debate.

I think Cushman has a useful description of doctrine:

“A 1950 definition called doctrine ‘the compilation of principles and theories applicable to a subject, which have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice.’” 

“Doctrine is basically a truth, a fact, or a theory that can be defended by reason.” 

“Doctrine cannot replace clear thinking…under the circumstances prevailing.”  LTG (RET) John H. Cushman, “Thoughts for Joint Commanders,” (1993 Copyright John H. Cushman)  

Excerpts:

This curious absence stems directly from the experience that had been abstracted, a war in which the champions of Comrades Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il Sung were poorly supplied with ordnance of the larger sort. However, rather than making this simple point in a footnote, led alone the body of the text, the makers of manuals and the givers of lectures turned a specific adaptation to peculiar conditions into a theory so general as to warm the heart of John Maynard Keynes.

Reflection on this experience has led me to think that, rather than attempting to distill lessons from specific cases, the writers of officially approved works on tactics ought to limit themselves to providing detailed accounts of the events in question. In this way, the reader can evaluate the methods in question in the light of some of the specific situations in which they were used.

In1989, United States Marine Corps departed from this practice by adopting a policy that reserved the term “doctrine” for the philosophies expressed in “little white books,” the progenitor and paragon of which was FMFM-1 Warfighting. In practice, however, many Marines continued to use “doctrine” to describe the contents of pedestrian manuals, which, strictly speaking, were known as “reference publications.” In 2018, Headquarters Marine Corps abandoned this distinction, replacing it with the following crime against logic, language, and the legacy of the Quantico Renaissance: “Marine Corps doctrine is the institutional vetting and compilation of fundamental principles including tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and terms and symbols by which Marine Corps forces guide their actions through training, education, and operations.”

History Is Better Than Doctrine

It's time to cut out the middleman.

BRUCE IVAR GUDMUNDSSON

JUL 20, 2023

tacticalnotebook.substack.com · by Bruce Ivar Gudmundsson

Welcome to the Tactical Notebook, where you will find more than four hundred tales of armies that are, armies that were, and armies that might have been. If you like what you see, please share it with your friends. If you find it useless, tiresome, or just plain wrong, please share it with your enemies.

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Soldiers of the Commonwealth Division employ the Vickers machine guns on the forward slope of a ridge (November 1951)

For the last century or so, soldiers have applied the word “doctrine” to officially approved guidebooks that describe the sorts of things that they expect to do on active service.

1

Such works define terms of art, lay down rules, and explain techniques. Most of all, however, they depict ideal versions of various warlike activities, whether the defense of a piece of ground, the crossing of a river, or the seizure of a hill.

In composing these stories, the writers of doctrine draw upon two very different sources. One of these is experience, the other imagination. At times of great change in the tools of the soldier’s trade, speculation trumps experience. Conversely, in the aftermath of war, writers of manuals seek to capture lessons learned, of late, on the battlefield.

In 1940, on the eve of open American participation in the Second World War, the US Army adopted such novelties as portable radio sets, semi-automatic rifles, anti-tank guns, and motor vehicles with all-wheel drive. As American soldiers had little experience with any of these items, let alone formations provided with all of them, the authors of the doctrinal documents found themselves in the shoes of Jules Verne, spinning speculative yarns about the use of unfamiliar devices.

A few years later, soldiers rich in experience wrote doctrine of a different sort. Free of any need to depend upon imagination, they codified the lessons that they learned on the battlefield, reducing to rules the cases most familiar to them. The same thing happened in the wake of Korean War, or, to be more precise, the phase of the Korean that, thanks to the stability of fronts, proved conducive to the keeping of records.

Manuals of the last-named sort played a big role in a course I attended in 1982, when I was a young (and, if I say so myself, terribly dashing) lieutenant of Marines. From lectures based on such works, I learned to place machine guns on forward slopes of hills and ridges, thereby providing them with fields of fire worthy of their ballistic qualities. Alas, neither the authors of manuals nor the performers of the lectures bothered to mention the ease with which hostile cannoneers could drop shells atop the aforementioned machine guns.

This curious absence stems directly from the experience that had been abstracted, a war in which the champions of Comrades Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il Sung were poorly supplied with ordnance of the larger sort. However, rather than making this simple point in a footnote, led alone the body of the text, the makers of manuals and the givers of lectures turned a specific adaptation to peculiar conditions into a theory so general as to warm the heart of John Maynard Keynes.

Reflection on this experience has led me to think that, rather than attempting to distill lessons from specific cases, the writers of officially approved works on tactics ought to limit themselves to providing detailed accounts of the events in question. In this way, the reader can evaluate the methods in question in the light of some of the specific situations in which they were used.

In1989, United States Marine Corps departed from this practice by adopting a policy that reserved the term “doctrine” for the philosophies expressed in “little white books,” the progenitor and paragon of which was FMFM-1 Warfighting. In practice, however, many Marines continued to use “doctrine” to describe the contents of pedestrian manuals, which, strictly speaking, were known as “reference publications.” In 2018, Headquarters Marine Corps abandoned this distinction, replacing it with the following crime against logic, language, and the legacy of the Quantico Renaissance: “Marine Corps doctrine is the institutional vetting and compilation of fundamental principles including tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and terms and symbols by which Marine Corps forces guide their actions through training, education, and operations.”

tacticalnotebook.substack.com · by Bruce Ivar Gudmundsson

16. White House adviser calls on China to hold nuclear arms talks

White House adviser calls on China to hold nuclear arms talks

Jake Sullivan says Russia's Wagner Group no longer fighting in Ukraine

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

By - The Washington Times - Friday, July 21, 2023

China‘s buildup of nuclear missiles and other strategic weapons requires that Beijing begin nuclear talks with the United States, White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said on Friday.

Mr. Sullivan, speaking at a security conference, also said the Wagner Group mercenary force is no longer fighting in Ukraine after an aborted mutiny against the Russian military was crushed last month.

Mr. Sullivan said President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed on a recent phone call to hold strategic stability talks on nuclear weapons, something he said is vital based on China‘s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal.

The Strategic Command has described Beijing’s program as a nuclear “breakout,” with up to 320 new land-based long-range nuclear missiles being built in three fields in western China. China‘s military also tested a unique hypersonic missile in 2021 that orbited in space before reentering the atmosphere to strike a ground target.

“If you look right now at what China is doing with respect to the buildup of its nuclear capabilities, as well as a series of quite exotic forms of weaponry that have themselves nuclear capabilities, the need for basic risk reduction, for an understanding of one another’s doctrines, intentions, modes of operation is acute,” Mr. Sullivan told the annual Aspen Security Forum in the Colorado ski resort town.

Mr. Sullivan said he warned his Chinese counterparts over the last two years that Russian nuclear saber rattling over Ukraine has been reduced by communications.

“We do not have that with China, and that is inherently destabilizing,” he said. “That is something that we need to generate, through intensive dialogue between the U.S. and China.”

The Trump administration sought to include China in its nuclear arms limitation talks with Russia. But Beijing refused, saying its force was far smaller than those of Washington and Moscow, and continued to turn down requests to discuss its nuclear forces.

Chinese officials say any discussion of its nuclear forces would undermine their deterrent value.

China is also refusing calls to resume military-to-military communications with the Pentagon. communications that the Biden administration wants to avoid “mistake, miscalculation, escalation,” Mr. Sullivan confirmed.

“We’re prepared to step up to our responsibility. We believe the PRC should do the same,” he told the forum. “The fact that they haven’t, I think it’s something that they need to answer for.”

Mr. Sullivan dismissed Chinese claims that U.S. sanctions on Chinas’s defense minister, Gen. Li Shangfu, should be lifted as a way to jump-start direct talks.

Mr. Sullivan said the administration is planning other steps to prevent advanced U.S. computer chips from going to China, over concerns they could be used to strengthen the People’s Liberation Army. Less advanced chips will not be embargoed, he added.

Beijing fears setting what the Biden administration calls “guardrails” in the bilateral relationship, arguing it is akin to the idea that fastening seat belts in a car will facilitate a future crash and allow the United States to act in riskier ways, he said.

“And what we have tried to explain is actually the seat belt is a great analogy because wearing seat belts has dramatically lowered the costs and consequences of car accidents and is an inherently good thing in international relations as it is on the highway down the street,” he said.

The national security adviser defended the administration’s new diplomatic offensive toward China, including his lengthy closed-door meetings with senior Chinese diplomat Wang Yi in Vienna.

So far, the two sides have had limited success in bridging differences despite recent visits to Beijing by three Cabinet-level officials.

The talks in Vienna sought to resolve differences between what Mr. Sullivan said were perceptions and reality regarding mutual intentions in U.S.-China relations.

The talks in May opened the door to recent visits to China by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and John Kerry, the presidential climate envoy.

The new diplomatic approach to Beijing is aimed at pairing competition with direct talks to prevent relations from veering into conflict, he said.

“I actually think being clear, straightforward, and setting the emotions, the rhetoric and some of these larger, philosophical framings aside and just getting down to the core practicalities, there is, I think, a genuine possibility for a stable relationship,” he said, “even though that relationship is inherently competitive and will involve us doing things that Beijing doesn’t like and will involve Beijing doing things that we don’t like.”

Mr. Sullivan said the U.S. government has no information on the recent disappearance of Foreign Minister Qin Gang. Speculation has arisen that Mr. Gang may have made some political mistake and ran afoul of Mr. Xi, who has been known to purge Chinese officials for minor offenses.

On Russia, Mr. Sullivan said the United States is not seeking the ouster of Vladimir Putin and that the solution to Moscow’s leadership is for “elements of Russian society and Russian politics to work out.”

“It’s not for us to sit around and plot how to change the regime in Moscow. We’ve made clear that that’s not where our efforts lie,” he said.

Yevgeni Prigozhin, the Wagner Group mercenary chief, attempted to oust two senior Russian defense and military leaders in a failed mutiny last month.

After driving toward Moscow, Wagner forces withdrew and some went to neighboring Belarus.

Mr. Sullivan said the operation was destabilizing for Mr. Putin and put the longtime Kremlin leader on the defensive.

“I don’t think anybody knows whither Prigozhin, whither Wagner, whither the Russian Ministry of Defense, whither any particular general, any particular commander,” Mr. Sullivan said in his talk. “This is all so unsettled and uncertain and the full implications of what happened with Prigozhin’s mutiny have yet to play out. We will see it play out over days, weeks, months.”

Mr. Putin and his top security advisers are attempting to determine if other forces were involved in the failed uprising.

The loss of Wagner mercenaries in Ukraine signals that one of Russia’s more effective fighting forces that contributed to advances in Ukraine is “off the board,” Mr. Sullivan said.

Ukraine’s military counteroffensive against the Russians is facing resistance. But Kyiv’s forces also have a large amount of combat power that still has not been committed to the offensive, Mr. Sullivan said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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17. Army Special Operations in the “Forgotten War”: Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the Korean Armistice

The forgotten contributions of some forgotten forces in the The Forgotten War.

Army Special Operations in the “Forgotten War”: Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the Korean Armistice

By Christopher E. HowardJuly 20, 2023

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Brig Gen Robert A. McClure cements his reputation as the “Father of U.S. Army Special Warfare” during the Korean War. From his position as the Chief of psywar for the Army, he establishes the psywar Center and promoted the activation of the 10th Special Forces Group. (Photo Credit: U.S Army Photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

During the Korean War, Brig Gen Crawford F. Sams serves as Chief, Health and Welfare, United Nations Command, Korea, and commanded the United Nations Public Health and Welfare Detachment. (Photo Credit: U.S Army Photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

Col. (Ret.) Ralph Puckett, Jr. earns the Medal of Honor while serving as a 1st Lt. with the Eighth U.S. Army Rangers in Korea in Nov. 1950. (Photo Credit: U.S Army Photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

American advisors in the 8240th Army Unit (AU) wore this unofficial shoulder patch of two designs. One of those patches, that of the United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea, is pictured here. (Photo Credit: U,S Army Photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Liberty, NC, was first established in April 1952 as the Psychological Warfare Center. Its distinctive unit insignia, pictured here, was approved on Nov. 28, 1952. (Photo Credit: U.S Army Photo) VIEW ORIGINAL

War unexpectedly erupted on the Korean Peninsula from 1950 to 1953. Fortunately, the spirit of innovation and adaptability that characterized Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in WWII lived on through the veterans of that war and was harnessed to great effect during the Korean War. By the end of that conflict, seventy years ago this month, numerous ARSOF units, institutions, and capabilities had been added to the Army’s arsenal, many of which persist to this day.

The Korean War unfolded in five distinct phases, the first of which began when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) military, seeking to unite Korea under communist rule, invaded its southern neighbor, the Republic of Korea, on June 25, 1950. U.S.-led United Nations (UN) forces rushed to the defense of South Korea, forming a defensive perimeter in the southeast corner of the peninsula, around the port city of Pusan (now Busan). This critical location allowed the outnumbered U.S. forces and their partners to funnel reinforcements and materiel into the fight.

During the chaotic early days of the war, Army leaders, both in Washington, D.C. and in Korea, began rebuilding special operations capabilities that had been neglected since the end of WWII. In early July 1950, the General Headquarters (GHQ), U.S. Far East Command (FECOM), formed a provisional Raider Company to conduct commando-type operations behind enemy lines. The following month, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) followed suit, establishing a Ranger Training Center at Kijang, near Pusan, to prepare a Ranger Company for missions similar to those carried out by the GHQ Raiders.

Meanwhile, FECOM faced a major humanitarian crisis among Korean civilians who had fled to Pusan to escape advancing North Korean forces. In Sept. 1950, Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur, FECOM Commander, ordered his chief of Public Health and Welfare, Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams, to organize a 60-man Civil Affairs (CA) unit to address the immediate problem of disease within the refugee population. This was among the first CA efforts during the war. Many more would follow.

Stateside, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, initiated an effort that led to the creation of the Ranger Training Center (RTC) at Fort Benning, Georgia (known as Fort Moore since 2023), in Sept. 1950. The RTC immediately set about training Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne), or RICAs, six of which deployed to Korea, beginning in Dec. 1950. Gen. Collins also created the psywar Division under the Army G-3, placing Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, a WWII psywar veteran, in charge of rebuilding the Army’s neglected Psywar capability. The only active Army psywar unit in the interwar period, the Tactical Information Detachment, arrived in Korea in Oct. 1950, and was soon redesignated as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company.

By that point, the war in Korea had entered its second phase, the UN counteroffensive, which began with a daring amphibious assault at Inchon, near the South Korean capital of Seoul, on Sept. 15, 1950. After liberating the capital, UN forces moved north of the 38th parallel, seizing Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. Continuing northward, UN forces neared the Yalu River, which separated North Korea from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), within a month of the Inchon landings. A UN victory seemed within reach and, with it, unification of the Korean peninsula under a non-communist government.

However, hopes for an early end to the war were dashed in late Oct. 1950, when the Communist Chinese People’s Liberation Army crossed the Yalu River into North Korea. With this, the war entered its third phase. The unanticipated Chinese Communist intervention prompted outnumbered UN forces to retreat below the 38th parallel and communist forces recaptured Seoul in early January 1951, bringing the war’s third phase to an end.

Aided by newly arrived RICAs from Fort Benning, UN forces went back on the offensive in early 1951 with the goal of regaining control of Seoul and driving the combined communist forces of China and North Korea north of the 38th parallel. This constituted the fourth phase of the war, during which UN forces successfully reclaimed Seoul in April 1951.

Several key ARSOF milestones occurred during this period. First, the EUSA established a Guerrilla Command to train and coordinate the activities of North Korean anti-communist partisans. Second, Brig. Gen. McClure, took charge of the newly established Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). Third, the Army established a Military Government School at Fort Gordon, Georgia (known as Fort Eisenhower since 2023), to train Civil Affairs soldiers. Then, in March 1951, the 2nd and 4th RICAs participated in the first-ever combat airborne assault by an Army Ranger unit (Operation TOMAHAWK).

As the front lines stabilized in the late spring of 1951, the war entered its fifth and final phase, which could best be characterized as a stalemate along the prewar border between North and South Korea, with limited territorial gains made by either side. This remained the case until July 27, 1953, when the UN Command, DPRK, and PRC signed an armistice at Panmunjom, South Korea, after two years of negotiation.

Army Special Operations continued to evolve during the final two years of the war. The small CA element created by Brig. Gen. Sams in 1950 grew into the Korea Civil Assistance Command. The tactically focused 1st L&L Company was joined in late 1951 by the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, a strategic psywar unit headquartered in Tokyo, Japan, that directly supported broadcasting operations on the peninsula. Back in the States, Brig. Gen. McClure and his OCPW staff took actions that led to the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (known as Fort Liberty since 2023), in April 1952 as the Army’s proponent for psywar and unconventional warfare (UW). Two months later, OCPW efforts to establish a permanent UW capability bore fruit with the activation of 10th Special Forces Group, commanded by Col. Aaron Bank. The first of 99 Special Forces-trained soldiers deployed to Korea in February 1953 as individual augmentees to the 8240th Army Unit (one of the various names for Eighth Army’s longstanding guerrilla command).

The Korean War has been called the “Forgotten War,” falling as it did between World War II and the Vietnam War. However, it was truly a foundational period for ARSOF. Starting with almost nothing, the Army rebuilt effective Ranger, unconventional warfare, psywar, and Civil Affairs capabilities over the course of the three-year conflict, adapting and evolving them as the situation demanded.

By the time the armistice was signed, the Army had its first man, train, and equip headquarters for unconventional warfare and psywar. Now known as the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, it has been in continuous operation since its founding in 1952. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs School that first opened at Fort Gordon in early 1951 was brought under the Special Warfare Center and School in 1971. Army Special Forces, first chartered in 1952, recently celebrated seventy-one years of uninterrupted service to the nation. Although all Korean War Ranger Companies were disbanded by war’s end, the Ranger Training Center founded in 1950 continued on, first as the Ranger Training Command, and now as the Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade at Fort Moore, Georgia.

Visit ARSOF in the Korean War: 25 June 1950 -- 27 July 1953 (arsof-history.org) to learn more about this pivotal period in Army Special Operations history.

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18. CIA rebuilding spy networks in China a decade after losing agents, director reveals

CIA rebuilding spy networks in China a decade after losing agents, director reveals

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

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By - The Washington Times - Thursday, July 20, 2023

The Central Intelligence Agency is working to rebuild spy networks in China after a devastating counterintelligence loss of its recruited-agent networks there more than a decade ago, CIA Director William Burns disclosed Thursday.

Mr. Burns, speaking at a security conference in Colorado, was asked about the loss of the recruited Chinese and other agents that U.S. officials say began in 2010 and was caused by a combination of betrayal by a CIA officer and a breakdown in a clandestine communication system.

“We’ve made progress and we’re working very hard to make sure we have a very strong human intelligence capability to complement what we can acquire through other methods,” Mr. Burns said.

It was the first time the CIA, the lead U.S. intelligence service for conducting human spying, has acknowledged publicly what officials have called an intelligence disaster at a time when there was renewed U.S. government focus on China.

The director made the comments during an appearance at the Aspen Security Forum about what steps have been taken after most of the CIA’s recruited agents in China were arrested or executed.

On Taiwan, Mr. Burns also repeated the Biden administration position that a war with China over Taiwan is neither imminent nor inevitable.

But he said Chinese President Xi Jinping is determined to take control of the island at some point in the future, while adding that the Chinese leader likely has not decided whether to try to seize Taiwan by force.

Russian military shortcomings in Ukraine also have affected Chinese leaders’ thinking on an invasion of Taiwan, he said.

“I think what it means is that today, President Xi and the PLA, the People’s Liberation Army leadership, have doubts about whether they could pull off a successful, full-scale invasion of Taiwan at an acceptable cost to them,” he said.

On the recent hacking of U.S. government email accounts announced by Microsoft, Mr. Burns said the U.S. government first detected the Chinese hacking and alerted the software company.

Regarding the agent losses a decade ago, U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence officials said the arrests of the spy network were carried out by the Ministry of State Security, the primary intelligence and counterespionage service in China.

Between 2010 and 2012, as many as 30 CIA recruits in China were detained by MSS inside China and at other locations.

The intelligence loss hampered the U.S. government’s ability to monitor what has recently been described as the largest buildup of conventional and nuclear military forces in history by China’s People’s Liberation Army.

Most of the compromised agents were imprisoned, but U.S. intelligence knows of at least one case of the CIA agent being executed in front of a gathering of security personnel in the courtyard of a government building in Beijing.

Intelligence sources said in 2019 that while the MSS counterspy operation used traditional recruitment of persons with knowledge of agent networks, a secure communications system used to communicate with recruited agents also may have been penetrated by the Chinese.

Mark Kelton, a former deputy CIA director for counterintelligence, declined to comment on the agent losses in China.

However, Mr. Kelton, who was involved in investigating the agent losses, said Chinese intelligence operations represent “a secret assault on America that is without parallel since that mounted by Moscow in the 1930s and ’40s.”

“The PRC has launched a covert assault on the United States across the full spectrum of intelligence activities,” he said. “That campaign, which has inflicted considerable damage on us, to include theft of sensitive government, trade, and industrial secrets.”

Chinese intelligence operations against the United States have been successful for decades, beginning with the recruitment of nuclear scientists that resulted in the loss of secrets on every deployed warhead in the nuclear arsenal.

The Chinese military is currently engaged in what the commander of the Strategic Command called a “breathtaking” nuclear breakout – a three-fold expansion of its nuclear warhead and missile arsenal.

Other intelligence sources said the agent losses began in mid-2010 when a drop off of the quality of intelligence from the agent network was noticed by CIA.

Many of the agents were disillusioned officials who had agreed to spy for the CIA and reveal some of the inner workings of the communist system.

Initial fears about the agents in China were confirmed by the end of 2010 when the flow of intelligence dried up and agents began providing information that was suspect in reliability. The damage continued through 2013.

A special intelligence task force worked on two theories behind the losses: One was the result of a mole inside the CIA who was working for the Chinese. The other was a technology compromise.

Eventually, the FBI and CIA identified a former CIA operative who is a likely source in the loss: Jerry Chun Shing Lee, a naturalized U.S. citizen also known as Zen Cheng Li.

Lee was a former CIA operations officer in Hong Kong who was recruited by several MSS officers. He had access to the identities of numerous CIA officers and the identities of their human sources, along with details of sensitive intelligence collection operations and methods.

Lee pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage in April 2019. He was sentenced to 19 years in prison.

Other counterintelligence officials who believed the agent losses were the result of a communications breakdown said Lee’s treachery could not account for the speed with which the agents were arrested.

They theorized that an internet-based communications system used in handling new agents was improperly connected to an ultra-secure system for contacting agents.

The agent network had been built up over many years by CIA officers working undercover.

The CIA‘s record for protecting agents has been spotty. The agency’s network of Soviet and Russian agents was compromised by spies in the 1980s and 1990s.

Critics blame the restructuring of CIA counterintelligence after the firing of CIA master counterspy James Angleton in 1975 for the security breaches.

After Angleton, counterintelligence at CIA was downgraded by removing the function from an independent section and making it a component of several agency departments.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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19. Frustrated by Biden, China Courts ‘Old Friends’ Like Kissinger

Frustrated by Biden, China Courts ‘Old Friends’ Like Kissinger

The New York Times · by Edward Wong · July 20, 2023

In meeting with Henry Kissinger, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, is turning to American contacts outside the Biden administration to try to influence Washington’s thinking on China.

Xi Welcomes Kissinger, Celebrating His Long Relationship With China

The Chinese president and former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger met in the symbolic Villa No. 5, where Mr. Kissinger first met with a Chinese leader, Premier Zhou Enlai, 52 years ago.

It is a great privilege to be able to visit China. The relations between our two countries would be central to the peace in the world and to the progress of our societies.

The Chinese president and former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger met in the symbolic Villa No. 5, where Mr. Kissinger first met with a Chinese leader, Premier Zhou Enlai, 52 years ago.

July 20, 2023

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The red carpet welcome in Beijing for Henry A. Kissinger, the 100-year-old former secretary of state, included China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, telling him that “the Chinese people will always remember you.” It featured praise from China’s top diplomat for his wisdom. And it involved a meeting with the Chinese defense minister, who has rebuffed multiple requests to engage with his American counterpart.

China’s enthusiastic reception for Mr. Kissinger this week is the latest example of how Beijing is reaching outside official diplomatic channels to broaden the reach of its message and try to influence Washington’s thinking. Beijing has turned to those it deems more aligned with its position as it has become more skeptical toward, and at times openly frustrated with, the Biden administration.

With the visit by Mr. Kissinger, whom Mr. Xi and other officials called an “old friend,” Beijing has sought to emphasize cooperation and mutual respect between the powers. With visits by business leaders like Bill Gates — also dubbed an old friend by Mr. Xi — and Elon Musk, China has tried to highlight the longstanding economic relationship and the perils of untangling global supply chains.

Such efforts may become increasingly significant as Beijing pushes back against what it sees as the Biden administration’s efforts to contain China geopolitically, militarily and technologically. China is also watching as Republicans and Democrats unite in wanting to remain tough on Beijing, and a U.S. presidential election approaches in which candidates will likely be more critical of China.

“This looks very much like a deliberate Chinese strategy” to court individuals who might help change opinions in Washington, said Dennis Wilder, former head of China analysis at the Central Intelligence Agency. “The Chinese are energizing those with a vested interest in the Chinese economy and the overall relationship.”

Xi Jinping with Bill Gates. China is turning to visits from high-profile figures to try to broaden the reach of it message.Credit...Yin Bogu/Xinhua, via Associated Press

After several months of a deep chill, the two countries have started re-engaging on issues like trade and climate change. But progress has been limited, with President Biden’s climate envoy, John Kerry, coming out of talks this week in China with no new agreements, and Beijing arguing that troubles in the relationship hinder its cooperation with Washington on fighting global warming.

While the meetings may have succeeded in building a “floor” in the relationship, tensions remain high. China wants the United States to lift restrictions on technology, curb its support for Taiwan, and stop what Beijing sees as a containment strategy centered on building security ties with U.S. allies and partners around Asia. Ties could fray further if the Biden administration imposes new restrictions on American investments in Chinese companies involved in quantum computing, artificial intelligence and semiconductors.

Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University, said Mr. Kissinger’s visit pointed to “Beijing’s anxiety about how to influence and persuade American policy elites to reduce their strategic suppression of China,” at a time when voices like his were increasingly rare in Washington.

Beijing often evokes the time when Mr. Kissinger served as secretary of state and helped pave the way for a historic visit to China in 1972 by President Nixon, as an example of a golden era in bilateral relations. That trip led to the establishment of diplomatic ties between Washington and Communist-ruled China seven years later.

Mao Zedong, President Richard Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, meeting in Beijing in 1972.

As relations have soured in recent years, Chinese officials have said that U.S. officials should learn from Mr. Kissinger and his pro-engagement stance.

To drive that point again, China highlighted the historical significance of the venue for Mr. Xi’s meeting with Mr. Kissinger on Thursday. Chinese officials chose Villa No. 5 of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, the same building where half a century earlier Mr. Kissinger had met Zhou Enlai, China’s premier at the time.

“China and the United States’ relations will forever be linked to the name ‘Kissinger,’” Mr. Xi said, in a video released by CCTV, the state broadcaster, as the two men sat side by side in plush cream-colored armchairs. “I express my deep respect to you.”

In an official summary of the meeting, released by Chinese state media, Mr. Xi was quoted as saying: “I hope you and people of insight in the United States will continue to play a constructive role in bringing China-U.S. relations back to the right track.”

Wang Yi, China’s top foreign affairs official, a day earlier had told Mr. Kissinger that American policy needed “Kissinger-style diplomatic wisdom, and Nixon-style political bravery,” according to China’s foreign ministry.

China has also been courting American business leaders. Aside from Mr. Gates and Mr. Musk, Tim Cook and Jamie Dimon have visited China this year — some given the kind of high-level meetings with Chinese officials that senior officials from foreign nations also get. The visits by business leaders are also an opportunity for China to send a message domestically about foreign confidence in the economy, which has faced an uncertain recovery.

During his trip to Beijing in March, Mr. Cook took selfies with admirers at an Apple store and attended a government development forum — then seen as an important signal as China was just emerging from three years of strict coronavirus restrictions.

Two months later, Mr. Musk traveled to China and met with senior ministers and Shanghai’s top leader. In Chinese media reports, Mr. Musk, the head of Tesla and Twitter, was hailed as a proponent of open trade between the United States and China.

“Musk’s trip to China showed U.S. businesses’ firm confidence in the Chinese market despite ‘decoupling’ noises from some Western politicians,” said the Global Times, a Communist Party tabloid.

Elon Musk, Tesla’s chief executive, during his visit in Beijing, in May.Credit...Tingshu Wang/Reuters

John F. Kirby, a spokesman for the U.S. National Security Council, said the Biden administration had been aware of Mr. Kissinger’s trip ahead of time. But he expressed frustration that the government had less access to the Chinese than a private citizen.

“It’s unfortunate that a private citizen can meet with the defense minister and have a communication and the United States can’t,” Mr. Kirby said on Thursday. “That is something that we want to solve.”

Mr. Kirby said that the administration looked forward to hearing from Mr. Kissinger about his trip. And he said efforts to restart regular communications between military officials in the United States and China were continuing.

With these meetings, Mr. Xi appears to be trying to highlight the importance of business ties between the two nations, and signal that growing tensions in the relationship could jeopardize those links.

That messaging has become even more important for Beijing to emphasize after Chinese officials raided the offices or interrogated the staff of American consulting firms such as Bain & Company, spooking many foreign businesses, said Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.

“China overall wants to retain foreign investors, and the ones they have been appealing to are large high-tech companies that may still see the appeal of the Chinese market,” Ms. Sun said.

“The Chinese do believe these business leaders enjoy more freedom to act outside the political correctness,” she said. “But another piece of it is that China wants to showcase that cooperation with China, and following Beijing’s rules, will be rewarding.”

Michael D. Shear contributed reporting. Olivia Wang contributed research.

David Pierson covers Chinese foreign policy and China’s economic and cultural engagement with the world. More about David Pierson

Vivian Wang is a China correspondent based in Beijing, where she writes about how the country's global rise and ambitions are shaping the daily lives of its people. More about Vivian Wang

Edward Wong is a diplomatic correspondent who has reported for The Times for more than 24 years from New York, Baghdad, Beijing and Washington. He was on a team of Pulitzer Prize finalists for Iraq War coverage. More about Edward Wong

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 7 of the New York edition with the headline: Wary of Biden, China Courts ‘Old Friends’ Like Kissinger Instead

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The New York Times · by Edward Wong · July 20, 2023

20. Disrupting Moscow’s Invasion Playbook: Lessons from Prague to Kyiv

Conclusion:

Ultimately, at-risk states and the countries that advise and support them should aim to increase the costs for Russia to execute its invasion playbook. Understanding and delineating the sequence of events Russia has historically used to initiate a coup and devising countermeasures to thwart these actions may prove critical in defending against the next Russian invasion.

Disrupting Moscow’s Invasion Playbook: Lessons from Prague to Kyiv - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Kevin D. Stringer, Heather S. Gregg · July 21, 2023

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When Russian forces invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, they did so according to a well-established playbook. Beginning with the air assault operation to capture Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government, Russia’s moves followed the same model as those of past foreign interventions by both the Russian Federation and its Soviet predecessor, including Prague in 1968, Kabul in 1979, and Sevastopol in 2014. An appreciation of this playbook is key for states who might find themselves in the crosshairs of future Russian aggression.

Russia’s invasion playbook generally proceeds as follows: positioning conventional forces on the borders of the targeted country to amplify political pressure and organize for invasion; infiltrating special operations () units to prepare and spearhead the incursion; seizing a strategic airport through airborne units; and airlanding additional assault troops to secure the battlespace and decapitate the national government in conjunction with the already inserted special operations units. Understanding and delineating Russia’s sequence of events for regime decapitation allows for the creation of specific countermeasures that at-risk countries and their allied advisors can take to protect vulnerable national capitals.

Russia’s Invasion Playbook

One of the first examples of Russia’s playbook comes from the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to counter the Prague Spring. Czechoslovak First Secretary Alexander Dubček’s attempts to introduce economic and political reforms, along with efforts to decentralize power, prompted a Soviet-led invasion with the aim of restoring pro-Kremlin authority in the country. On August 20, 1968, a Spetsnaz element along with KGB personnel secured Prague’s Ruzyně International Airport. The rest of the assault force, consisting of a Spetsnaz brigade and an airborne division then airlanded, and the former proceeded to seize locations in Prague—the presidential palace, radio stations, and other key terrain. Simultaneously, Warsaw Pact mechanized troops crossed the border for the occupation. The Soviets arrested the Czechoslovak leadership and flew them to Moscow. Ultimately, the Warsaw Pact invasion, led by Russian forces, took eight months to successfully suppress the popular uprising that followed the invasion.

In 1979, Soviet forces replicated the 1968 attack by decapitating the existing Afghan regime and replacing it with a compliant proxy. Following the assassination of pro-Soviet leader Nur Muhammad Taraki on October 9, 1979, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin seized power and initiated political reforms not aligned with Soviet policies. In response, the STAVKA (Soviet high command) made the decision in early December 1979 to invade the country and remove Amin. With the Soviet 40th Army poised at the Afghan-Soviet border by mid-December, elements of the 105th Guards Airborne Division and a Spetsnaz unit airlanded at Kabul Airport on December 25 to initiate Operation Storm 333. A joint Spetsnaz and KGB commando detachment proceeded from the airport and assaulted the presidential palace, killing Amin and installing Babrak Karmal as Afghanistan’s new Soviet-aligned leader. The 40th Army crossed the border to pacify the rest of the country. This invasion plunged the country into a civil war that ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the creation of the nine-country Commonwealth of Independent States with the Russian Federation at the helm, drastically changed the political landscape in Eastern Europe. NATO enlargement brought fifteen former Soviet and satellite countries into Western Europe’s security architecture, beginning with East Germany’s reunification with NATO member West Germany and continuing through, most recently, Montenegro’s entrance into the alliance in 2017 and North Macedonia’s in 2020. Despite these allegiance changes by neighboring states, Russia has continued to maintain its sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe and has taken direct and indirect actions aimed at preventing governments that are antithetical to its political, economic, and security interests from assuming power.

Almost immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine became a key battleground state in Russia’s efforts to maintain its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Ukraine’s intentions to align itself more closely with the European Union led to a series of acknowledgements, including a 2010 resolution acknowledging Ukraine’s right to join the EU. A November 2013 decision by Russian-leaning President Viktor Yanukovych to not sign a political association and trade agreement with the EU sparked what became known as the Maidan Revolution, or the Revolution of Dignity. On February 21, 2014, in response to sustained protests, the Ukrainian parliament voted unanimously to remove the Yanukovych government from power and restore its 2004 constitution.

At the same time as the political turmoil in Kyiv was reaching its climax in February, Russian forces began invading Crimea, claiming to protect Russian nationals in the region and to defend its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Russia’s invasion of Crimea followed a similar pattern to Soviet-era coups, including inserting Spetsnaz, airborne forces, and other “little green men” in the capital prior to the invasion, surrounding the local parliament building on February 27 and ousting its leader, Anatolii Mohyliov, and installing a pro-Russia leader, Sergey Aksyonov, in his place. On February 28, Russian Spetsnaz seized two airstrips, and, along with landing several ships, began to rapidly move troops and materiel onto the peninsula. Simultaneously, Russian forces began a “snap inspection” exercise that, according to a RAND report on the annexation, was designed as “a diversion and cover for troop movements.” After occupying the peninsula with Russian troops, along with unmarked Russian and local “defense forces,” a referendum on March 16 allegedly gave the population the opportunity to vote on joining Russia. On March 18, Russia formally annexed Crimea, allowing Russia to maintain its naval presence in the Black Sea and to expand operations aimed at controlling portions of eastern Ukraine, particularly Luhansk and Donetsk.

Despite its 2014 success in Crimea, Russia’s efforts to draw once again on its playbook to invade Ukraine in February 2022 did not go according to plan. Beginning in March 2021, Russia started amassing forces on Ukraine’s borders, placing over one hundred thousand troops on three sides of the country by January 2022 and claiming that the buildup was for training exercises and not an invasion. Simultaneously, Putin began to make demands that Ukraine not be allowed to join NATO, while claiming that Ukraine was persecuting ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine. On February 21, 2022, Putin announced in a speech that Russia recognized Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, also announcing the end of the Minsk Protocol the following day. And on February 24, Putin commenced the beginning of a “special military operation,” designed to counter what he claimed to be the rise of Nazi forces in Ukraine and to protect Russian subjects within Ukraine’s borders.

Simultaneous to ground forces advancing into Ukraine, a battle broke out at the Antonov Airport in Hostomel on the outskirts of Kyiv. The fight began with Russian airborne forces attempting an air assault on the airport, which was repelled by elements of the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard along with Ukrainian special operations forces. A second air assault the next day, reinforced by Russian ground forces moving south from Belarus, succeeded in capturing the airport. However, the Ukrainian National Guard troops had intentionally damaged the runways, preventing Russian forces from landing aircraft. Fighting for control of the airport continued for a week until Ukrainian forces succeeded in taking it back completely by March 3, ultimately foiling efforts for Russia to use its playbook as means of rapidly deploying troops and materiel to seize the capital.

Countering Russia’s Invasion Playbook

Ukraine’s ability to disrupt Russia’s invasion playbook and the ongoing war it is fighting should make clear to other countries that are vulnerable to Russian aggression how important it is to understand the invasion playbook. Among these are Moldova, whose pro-Western president warned earlier this year of a possible Russian-led coup, and Georgia, which has been subject to Russian disinformation and other hybrid tactics for years. Russia may have its hands full in Ukraine right now, but adequately preparing for Russia’s invasion playbook takes time. This, combined with Russia’s pattern of invading a country and deposing its leadership, makes it critical for vulnerable countries to take measures to counter the threat. For countries like Moldova and Georgia, this preparation is no small feat, given that both have Russian troops already in their country, are relatively small, and are faced with a range of resource constraints.

Four broad countermeasures aimed at thwarting Russia’s invasion playbook can be gleaned from the above cases. First, at-risk countries should create some sort of military unit dedicated to defending their key airports. The Ukrainians left elements of the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade of the National Guard at the Antonov Airport, despite the overwhelming need for Ukrainian troops to confront the Russian invasion at its borders. This unit of around three hundred troops succeeded in frustrating the Russian forces’ seizure of the airport and rendered the airstrip unusable, foiling subsequent Russian efforts to land forces and seize the capital. Alongside the recent Ukrainian experience, examples from the Cold War, specifically Switzerland’s creation of an airport defense regiment to safeguard Zurich Airport from Soviet airborne troops, illustrate possible countermeasures for securing critical airfields and preventing a Russian coup de main.

Second, US and European allies have an important role to play in training and advising airport defense forces. The United States military has several units dedicated to seizing or securing airstrips, particularly within the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment and Air Force special operations forces. These units could provide valuable training on how to plan for and disrupt a Russian assault on critical airports. Similar capabilities exist within European special operations and conventional forces, including countries with total defense plans, such as Finland and Sweden.

Third, sharing strategic intelligence is another means through which US and European countries could aid states vulnerable to a Russian military coup. Reporting from the Wall Street Journal claims that the CIA was instrumental in warning Ukraine of Russia’s planned air assault on the Antonov Airport, including a visit from the agency’s director weeks before the attack. This intelligence sharing may have resulted in the retention of a force capable of defending the airport and thwarting Russian forces’ use of the airport to launch a coup.

Finally, President Zelenskyy’s decision to remain in the country and not flee during the invasion was critical for foiling Russia’s information warfare aimed at delegitimizing his administration and justifying the need to install a new government. President Zelenskyy’s frequent social media posts showing him and his entourage walking through the streets of Kyiv in the first hours and days of the invasion provided a powerful counternarrative to Russian propaganda and became a visible sign of resistance to the invasion.

Ultimately, at-risk states and the countries that advise and support them should aim to increase the costs for Russia to execute its invasion playbook. Understanding and delineating the sequence of events Russia has historically used to initiate a coup and devising countermeasures to thwart these actions may prove critical in defending against the next Russian invasion.

Dr. Kevin D. Stringer is a retired US Army colonel, the chair of education for the US Irregular Warfare Center, and visiting associate professor at the General Jonas Zemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania. With thirty years of commissioned military service, he was a Eurasian foreign area officer and strategist assigned to US Special Operations Command–Europe and US Special Operations Command.

Dr. Heather S. Gregg is professor of irregular warfare at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany. She is also a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Prior to joining the Marshall Center, Dr. Gregg was a professor at the US Army War College and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where she worked primarily with special operations forces.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: mil.ru, via Wikimedia Commons (adapted by MWI)

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Kevin D. Stringer, Heather S. Gregg · July 21, 2023

21. Gearbox problem caused fatal Osprey crash, Marines say

Gearbox problem caused fatal Osprey crash, Marines say​

The incident was the 16th hard clutch engagement since 2010, but the first that resulted in deaths.

defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney

The MV-22B Osprey crash that killed five Marines in California last June was caused by a gear problem the service has known about for years, according to a 436-page redacted command investigation released Friday.

A “dual hard clutch engagement” caused an engine and the interconnect drive system to fail, which led to the “catastrophic loss of thrust” on the right proprotor, the Marine Corps said in a statement. “The degraded drivetrain caused by the dual HCE event and subsequent single engine/ICDS failure created an unrecoverable departure from controlled flight, resulting in the tragic crash that occurred on June 8, 2022.”

The pilots, crew, and maintenance of the aircraft were not to blame in the crash, the V-22 Joint Program Office said in their statement.

“It was determined the pilots and aircrew were conducting routine flight operations in accordance with applicable regulations when a catastrophic, unpreventable and unanticipated mechanical failure occurred,” the office said.

The Marine Corps has known about the hard clutch engagement problem in the V-22 aircraft since 2010, and changed its protocols to mitigate it when it happens. Air Force Special Operations Command in 2022 grounded its fleet of the tiltrotor aircraft for a few weeks because of what it called “an increased number of safety incidents,” all involving hard clutch engagements. The Marine Corps did not ground its Ospreys.

Officials have said they’re working with manufacturer Bell Boeing in a redesign of the proprotor gearbox input quill assembly, which includes the clutch, to try to eliminate the problem.

This was the 16th time a hard clutch engagement has happened since 2010, the V-22 Joint Program Office confirmed to Defense One.

The MV-22B was participating in “tail gunnery practice” alongside another Osprey at a California training range when it radioed that it had “hot boxes,” meaning the oil temperature in at least one gearbox was too high, according to the redacted investigation report. The pilots said they would need to transition to airplane mode and fly the aircraft higher to cool it. According to a witness statement from an officer in the other Osprey, it was the second time during the flight that the Osprey had to address a “hot box” indicator.

The dual hard clutch engagement happened during that ascent. The Marines on the other aircraft did not see the Osprey go down, but noticed smoke and fire coming from the crash site a few minutes later. The fire was so intense that it destroyed the aircraft’s flight data recorder.

The June 8 crash was the first known mishap involving both an engine and the interconnect drive system—which synchronizes the aircraft’s proprotors—failing in a V-22, according to the report. Additionally, no Marines had ever died as a result of a hard clutch engagement or related emergency, the report said, and the crash was only the third time a dual hard clutch engagement happened in the program’s history, the V-22 Joint Program Office said.

Most hard clutch engagement incidents happen within seconds of takeoff, so Marine Corps pilots are trained to do a “hover check” to make sure there are no problems before proceeding on with the flight.

In February, the JPO set a flight hour limit for the aircraft’s input quill assembly.. A defense official at the time refused to provide the flight hour limit, but the report notes that aircraft with more than 800 flight hours were grounded.

The Osprey in the fatal June 2022 crash had input quill assemblies that had flown more than twice that number of hours. Before the crash, the aircraft’s left hand proprotor gearbox input quill assembly had 2,437 flight hours and the right hand proprotor gearbox input quill assembly had 2,007.

The program office said its recent work to stop the incidents, including the input quill assembly replacement, has reduced hard clutch engagements “by greater than 99 percent.”

The investigators recommended a new input quill assembly and improvements to the aircraft’s “drivetrain and flight control system software, drivetrain component material strength, and inspection requirements.” They also recommended that a “crash survivable, high-temperature, fire-resistant flight data recorder” be added to all MV-22Bs.

The Marine Corps has already taken action on all three with the manufacturer, it said Friday in a press release.

defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com