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Quotes of the Day:
"The belief that there is only one truth and that oneself is in possession of it seems to me the deepest root of all evil that is in the world."
– Max Born
“Competition is the law of the jungle, but cooperation is the law of civilization.”
– Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921)
“The highest result of education is tolerance.”
– Helen Keller
1. USASOC’s Role in Advancing Civil Resistance Movements during Irregular Warfare
2. Sneaky Wars in the Indo-Pacific
3. After U.S.-China Prisoner Swap, Scores of Americans Are Still Trapped in China
4. And the Fair Land
5. Russia's evolving information war poses a growing threat to the West
6. In the 19th Century Disinformation Started Wars. Today, It Sways Elections
7. Philippines, China clashes trigger money-making disinformation
8. The Pacific disinformation playbook
9. Moving Toward Defense as a Service
10. Russia may collapse under Putin’s rule, paving way for China to focus on Far East - American political scientist
11. The Great Pokémon Go Spy Panic
12. Operation Undercut: Russian Influence Campaign Targets Western Support for Ukraine
13. How Trump Could Remake the CIA
14. The Army’s Discourse Problem
15. Governed & Ungoverned Spaces: What They Have Taught Us About Counterterror Strategy
16. US-Philippines alliance: on shaky ground under Trump 2.0?
17. China backing wrong side in Myanmar's civil war
18. What the Top 1% Really Pays the IRS
1. USASOC’s Role in Advancing Civil Resistance Movements during Irregular Warfare
The author missed an opportunity to explain the importance and relevance of civil resistance movements specifically in large-scale combat operations because irregular warfare is conducted before, DURING, and after LSCO as part of multi-domain operations. Yes he explains resistance in multi-domain operations (MDO) but I think there is a need to specifically connect resistance and IW to LSCO. As SOF seeks to explain its relevance in LSCO there is a tendency to focus on the high tech (SOF-Cyber-Space Triad) and lethal capabilities that are demonstrated in direct action and special reconnaissance rather than the critical capabilities of military and special operations in the human domain.
The two SOF trinities apply across the spectrum of conflict, in peacetime, the strategic competition of the gray zone and before, during, and after large scale combat operations.
The 3 SOF missions:
1) irregular warfare
2) unconventional warfare
3) support to the national level effort of political warfare
The comparative of advantage of SOF that applies across the spectrum of contact:
1) influence
2) governance
3) support to indigenous forces and populations
The Two Special Operations Trinities
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2021/01/06/two-special-operations-trinities/
Excerpts.
As USASOC works to establish itself as a vital component of MDO, it must close the capability gap within civil resistance movements. The USASOC Central Idea and Contributions to MDO construct describes expanding the global special operations forces network and participating in irregular warfare as assets for penetrating and disintegrating great power standoff systems.80 If USASOC hopes to expand strategic options, it must close capability gaps and expand the capability of its force to integrate civil resistance tactics and progress foreign audiences toward mechanisms for change. While incorporating the Spectrum of Allies helps visualize the cognitive domain, the Army must go further and formalize the doctrinal change within the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) construct.
By understanding the scope and effectiveness of civil resistance movements, USASOC can appropriately prioritize their execution while integrating them as part of mission planning. Developing special operations soldiers with a complete understanding of the mechanisms for change, civil resistance planning process, civil resistance tactics, and the Spectrum of Allies will enable unconventional warfare and irregular warfare planners with the tools necessary for improving the likelihood of mission success. Formalizing the doctrinal mission of civil resistance advisory and support as civil affairs and PSYOP battalions transfer under the Special Forces groups is the most effective method of developing a nested, mutually supportive mission set while taking full advantage of specialized skills. USASOC lives by the special operations forces imperative of understanding the operational environment and, therefore, must recognize that the information-centric interconnected world creates opportunities for cascading information flows that disrupt governments. It is incumbent upon the special operations enterprise to seize the opportunity and become experts in civil resistance movements rather than observing on the sidelines during ordinary citizens’ attempts to liberate themselves from oppression.
USASOC’s Role in Advancing Civil Resistance Movements during Irregular Warfare
By Adam Roberts armyupress.army.mil17 min
View Original
http://armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Nov-Dec-2024/The-Strategic-Imperative?utm
Maj. Daniel Eerhart, U.S. Army
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Download the PDF
I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical.
As the Army transitions toward prioritizing large-scale combat operations and multidomain operations (MDO), the threshold for entering conventional military conflict rises and calls into question the efficacy of conventional military approaches, particularly in addressing nonstate actors and asymmetric threats. U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has emerged as the Army’s most pivotal actor in countering complex threats in a dynamic operational environment.
By leveraging USASOC’s unique skills and capabilities, the Army can impose costs upon adversaries below the threshold of armed conflict. However, as USASOC trains to remain proficient in its core activities, a capability gap exists within the unconventional warfare enterprise. While Special Forces soldiers are experts in advising guerilla military forces to conduct armed resistance movements, the persistent rise in civil resistance movements to challenge oppressive authority is a domain USASOC cannot ignore. This article advocates for USASOC to integrate a mission to advise civil resistance movements as part of the unconventional warfare strategy.
As part of the irregular warfare mission set, unconventional warfare requires high flexibility and ingenuity to achieve mission success. Following the Arab Spring uprisings in the early 2010s, the ubiquitous nature of technology has lowered the bar for entry to challenge authoritarian regimes. Resistance movements no longer require guerilla militias to operate as the decisive force for overthrowing regimes. On the contrary, according to academic researchers, civil resistance movements are four times more effective than armed resistance movements and create a more sustainable replacement government.1 This article first contextualizes the problem by demonstrating the capability gap. Then, it explains civil resistance movements and crucial operating concepts such as the mechanisms for change, civil resistance planning structures, tactics, and the Spectrum of Allies. Finally, it identifies the organizations best suited for developing expertise in civil resistance movements, thereby providing a framework to assume the mission set in a manner that supports and enables unconventional warfare.
Contextualizing the Problem
USASOC has two main challenges to overcome. First, it has trained elite soldiers who are experts in a mission with less than an 8 percent chance of success, and this chance is decreasing yearly.2 Second, it has no units or experts specializing in civil resistance movements, even though such movements are four times more effective in bringing about regime change.3
Special Forces soldiers receive training to help guerilla forces overthrow established governments tactically.4 The Special Forces Qualification Course includes a culminating exercise called “Robin Sage,” in which candidates must evaluate the combat effectiveness of guerilla forces, train them in unconventional warfare doctrine and techniques, and demonstrate their expertise.5 This model has been successful in the past, particularly in 2001, when Special Forces soldiers worked with the Afghan Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban.6 However, such successful operations are rare. Only 8 percent of attempted armed resistance movements have been successful as of 2019, and even when they succeed, the new regimes often face continued violence, civil war, and challenges to their authority.7
Furthermore, no organization within USASOC specializes in developing expertise in civil resistance movements and training to support foreign populations in their efforts. Since the Arab Spring, citizens have noticed that civil resistance allows them to oppose their oppressive governments and mobilize publicly. Protests have even occurred in countries participating in the great power competition like Russia, Iran, and China.12 In February 2024, even North Koreans working in China staged protests.13
As the U.S. military seeks to achieve an information advantage and effectively coordinate MDO, civil resistance movements remain a capability gap. The military expertise in unconventional warfare is valuable. However, as occurrences of civil resistance increase, the ability to compete in a global battlefield dominated by information-centric resistance becomes more important. The Army must adapt its approach to understand civil resistance and commit organizations to harness its power. USASOC must invest in developing expertise in all aspects of irregular warfare, and civil resistance movements are the most significant area for investment.
Civil Resistance Movements Explained
On 25 February 1986, the former president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, fled the country due to peaceful protests demanding his resignation.14 Despite Marcos leading his government to perpetrate numerous human rights violations such as torture and extrajudicial killings, it was the citizens, including women, children, and the elderly, who brought an end to his rule.15 The People Power Revolution of 1986 in the Philippines is one of the case studies examined in Harvard University professor Erica Chenoweth’s 2012 book titled Why Civil Resistance Works.16
Chenoweth studied 323 mass actions worldwide between 1900 and 2006 in her book, analyzing 160 variables related to success criteria, participant categories, and state capacity.17 Her dataset included every known resistance movement with at least one thousand participants.18 Her research produced an astounding result: nonviolent civil resistance was twice as likely to succeed in producing change as violent resistance movements, even in situations dealing with violent authoritarian regimes.19 By 2019, civil resistance movements grew to four times more likely to succeed than armed resistance movements.20
Chenoweth’s research further indicates that mobilizing 3.5 percent of a population is a threshold sufficient to overthrow a government regime.21 Despite USASOC’s expertise in waging unconventional warfare and mobilizing insurgencies, there has never been an armed resistance movement that surpassed the 3.5 percent rule.22 The lack of armed resistance movements reaching the 3.5 percent threshold indicates that while Army Special Forces are proficient in their assigned tasks at the tactical level, USASOC must make adjustments to achieve continued mission success at the operational and strategic levels.
Attempting to fight a violent oppressor through coordinated civil resistance may seem counterintuitive. However, as Gene Sharp stated in his influential book From Dictator to Democracy, “By placing confidence in violent means, one has chosen the very type of struggle with which oppressors nearly always have superiority.”23 Not only do the oppressive regimes have the tactical advantage, but armed resistance movements also have a greater reliance on secrecy, which is increasingly becoming difficult to achieve with the ubiquity of technology.24 While illegal underground radio stations, publications, and social media content will benefit from a degree of secrecy, integrating tactics that rely primarily upon openness will reduce fear and generate an advantage for authentic content generation.
Mechanisms for Change
Sharp’s book outlines four mechanisms by which civil resistance movements can produce change.25 These mechanisms are conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration.26
Conversion occurs when nonviolent resisters subjected to suffering and repression emotionally move members of the oppressive regime.27 In 1989, during the fall of the Berlin Wall, border guards became emotionally moved by the protestors and hesitated to follow orders.28 Eventually, the guards allowed people to cross, leading to the wall’s collapse.29
Accommodation occurs when the issues brought about by resistance are limited, and the perception of giving in to the demands is a better solution than continuing to deal with resisters.30 Mahatma Gandhi’s 1930 salt march is an example of accommodation. Gandhi led a march to the Arabian Sea to collect salt, an essential human mineral, in protest of salt taxation.31 The act did not result in regime change but led to government concessions negotiated with Gandhi and increased support for the Indian independence movement.32
Nonviolent coercion occurs when mass noncooperation and defiance change the social and political situations so that the oppressive government can no longer control the economic, social, and political processes.33 The 2007 Saffron Revolution in Myanmar was an example of nonviolent coercion when Buddhist monks led a movement of public defiance. While the movement didn’t achieve all its goals, there was a reduction in the military junta’s hold on power, and the government implemented reforms.34
Disintegration occurs when noncooperation becomes so severe that the oppressor’s bureaucracy refuses to obey.35 Military and police refuse orders, and assistance from former supporters fades away. The Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, which dissolved the Tunisian government and ousted President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali from his twenty-three-year rule, exemplifies disintegration.36 Following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit stand vendor, protests erupted throughout the country, resulting in a harsh government response.37 The government was fully dissolved by 14 January 2011, and elections occurred within six months.38
Civil Resistance Planning
Army doctrine currently outlines USASOC’s efforts during unconventional warfare through eight phases.39 The phases start with the steady state status quo of Phase 0 and escalate through the entire unconventional warfare operation until Phase 7, where unconventional warfare forces revert to national control and shift to regular forces.40 Civil resistance movements plan through a concept called the “Movement Action Plan (MAP)” developed by Bill Moyer in 1987.41 The MAP has eight stages for the movement to progress through:
1. Stage one (normal times). In normal times, there may be politically quiet periods where citizens feel frustrated with the systemic oppressor, but there is no organized movement to confront it.42 Even though the conditions may be against the best interests of society, they are not in the public spotlight or on society’s agenda.43
2. Stage two (prove the failure of institutions). Civil resistance movements inherently must elicit a strong emotional response from the public. During stage two, the movement seeks to expose the government’s hypocrisy and increase outrage at violations of public trust.44
3. Stage three (ripening conditions). Discontent among victims and allies, along with historical developments, set the stage for civil resistance movements. During stage three, the movement matures, creating conditions for significant future events.45
4. Stage four (social movement take-off). A highly publicized and shocking trigger event brings a previously unrecognized social problem to the forefront of the public spotlight. During stage four, the civil resistance movement begins to participate in dramatic civil disobedience, creating opportunities for various communities to repeat their public displays of opposition.46
5. Stage five (identity crisis of powerlessness). After enduring long periods of effort and making many sacrifices, members of a civil resistance movement may start to lose faith in the success of their cause. The perception that those in power hold too much influence can create a feeling of futility. This stage may require focusing on past victories and gathering new members to replenish the movement’s energy.47
6. Stage six (majority public support). The civil resistance movement needs to gain the support of neutral individuals and expand its base by winning a larger majority of the population to actively support the cause. The sixth stage requires a long and gradual process of utilizing information to influence mainstream and nonpolitical actors to agree with the movement’s position.48
7. Stage seven (success). Once the new social consensus has shifted against those in power, the success of a movement can be indicated in three ways. First, a dramatic shutdown can occur when a spark among the population suddenly creates an overwhelming coercive force that leads to change.49 Second, a quiet shutdown can occur when the governing regime makes a face-saving effort to proclaim victory while subtly changing policies.50 And third, attrition occurs when success is achieved seemingly invisibly through a gradual political process.51
8. Stage eight (continuing the struggle). After achieving its goals, the civil resistance movement should continue working toward new demands and building social consensus on various issues.52
A unique aspect of the civil resistance planning process is that it accounts for the likelihood of disillusionment. It forces organizers to recognize that, at some point, the movement will not achieve its stated goals and must reorganize and try again. Special operations soldiers assessed for their ability to deal with ambiguity will be able to handle the civil resistance movement planning process and rapidly guide an indigenous force through the steps to overcome adversity. Once the movement has reached the sixth stage and seeks to gain the majority public support, special operations soldiers with expertise in performing influence operations can assist in building the population that opposes the oppressive government.
Civil Resistance Tactics
Effective nonviolent resistance movements integrate a variety of disruptive tactics that rarely find themselves as part of military discourse. However, techniques such as leafleting, banner hanging, hashtag hijacking, and media-jacking might find themselves at home within the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Training pipeline.
Just as it would be irrational to assume soldiers with no training or experience could lead a Special Forces operation advising a tactical guerilla movement, it would be imprudent to assume soldiers can support civil resistance movements without developing the expertise. While civil resistance movements incorporate a wide variety of tactics and military planning, five civil resistance tactics follow that are relevant and easy to immediately integrate into special operations training exercises while building the capability.
App flooding. Appropriation of a politically neutral phone application to the civil resistance by overwhelming it with campaign messages.53 In 2020, Russian citizens, amid COVID-19 lockdowns, implemented this tactic using the Yandex.Navigator app.54 Protestors manually reported their locations on the app to show severe congestion in areas under strict lockdown.55 The protest disrupted police situational awareness and forced the concentration of resources toward content removal.56
Clandestine leafleting. The delivery of messages without putting the individual at risk through alternative methods such as floating lanterns.57 In October 2011, protestors in Damascus, Syria, changed the color of the water in public fountains to blood red and later unleashed hundreds of ping pong balls with messages written on them through the streets.58
Hashtag hijack. Using someone else’s hashtag to rapidly spread the resistance movement’s message to a larger audience.59 In 2012, protestors in the Maldives coopted the government hashtag “#SunnySideofLife” to disseminate images of the government arresting protestors and using tear gas.60
Currency hacking. Stamping resistance messages on local currency, turning money into widely distributed leaflets.61 In 2011, a Palestinian resistance movement began writing “Free Palestine” on shekel paper notes, causing the Central Bank of Israel to make a formal statement that marked notes would not be accepted.62 The Central Bank’s public statement further increased the reach of the resistance movement to individuals who had yet to see a marked note.63
Mass street action. A large public protest in an area likely to disrupt public activities.64 During the Arab Spring, millions of Egyptians demonstrated mass street action when they occupied Tahrir Square and confronted security forces, resulting in eighteen bloody days of protest.65
All civil resistance tactics are part of efforts to pursue the decisive point of public support of 3.5 percent. A large public protest in which a government force uses tear gas and violence to quell public action is a resounding success from the perspective of a civil resistance movement’s influence efforts. Violent suppression draws in media attention, viral social media content, and a public consensus that the authoritarian regime has gone too far. The goal of each nonviolent action is to bait the ruling government to respond and overreact, forcing them to invest time and resources while simultaneously functioning as a loudspeaker for the movement’s narratives. Large-scale military training exercises such as Robin Sage and combat training center rotations provide resources and opportunities to practice advising civil resistance while coordinating with the tactical elements that engage in armed resistance. A tool called the Spectrum of Allies should be integrated into the civil resistance advisor’s vernacular to ensure they understand the scope and progress of their role.
Understanding the Spectrum of Allies
The Spectrum of Allies tool was developed by activist George Lakey to strategically align strategies among different social groups based on their level of support for the cause.66 The tool aims to categorize target audiences into one of five categories:
1. Active support. These individuals are taking active steps to support the resistance movement, such as participating in protests, handing out leaflets, or operating an underground radio station.67
2. Passive support. These individuals ideologically align with the resistance movement but have yet to cross the threshold into active participation.68 The resistance movement’s goal should be to lower the threshold for participation and influence this group into active support.
3. Neutral. This group supports neither the resistance movement nor the oppressive regime.69 They either need to be more informed or are unaffected by the status quo. The goal of the resistance movement is to move this group into passive support by exposing them to the brutality of the oppressive regime. Exposing these individuals to social media content, such as the government abuse of civilians, is a priority for influence.
4. Passive opposition. These individuals ideologically support the oppressive government but do not take active steps to demonstrate that support.70 The civil resistance movement’s goal for these individuals is to force them to question their ideological loyalty. Civil resisters can disrupt their perceptions of support by exposing them to instances where the government oppressed its loyalists.
5. Active opposition. These individuals take active steps to support the government regime and are frequently government members, military, or police.71 The civil resistance movement’s goal for these individuals is to generate an emotional response that creates hesitation in their actions. One example is showing active opposition members their children or family who are in protest crowds.
While utilizing the tool, the primary goal is to tailor narratives, messages, and tactics so that individuals move one category group closer to actively supporting the nonviolent resistance group. The model indicates that even for security forces strongly ideologically aligned with the authoritarian government, the goal is to integrate tactics that move them into the passive resistance category and reinforce an unwillingness to enforce government policies. An example of a transition between active and passive opposition occurred in Serbia during the Bulldozer Revolution to overthrow Slobodan Milošević. Police officers were ordered to shoot into the crowd of protestors but refused.72 Later, one officer indicated that he had refused because he knew his kids were among the protestors.73 The nonviolent resistance movement did not need to convince the police officers to join their protests actively; they needed the police officers to transition to a passive state and refuse to persecute their orders actively. Terrorist organizations have placed this principle into practice repeatedly by placing their operations inside hospitals, schools, and religious structures, forcing military forces from an active state into a passive one.
Building the Expertise
As USASOC eliminates one of its PSYOP group headquarters and transitions the PSYOP and civil affairs battalions under the Special Forces groups, a unified mission set must accompany them.74 The primary mission of Army Special Forces groups is to lead and train unconventional warfare forces in an occupied nation.75 Accordingly, the civil affairs and PSYOP battalions must adopt a nested mission to accompany its new position in the table of organization and equipment. A mission that outlines leading and training civil resistance movements in support of unconventional warfare operations is appropriately nested and utilizes the specialized skills within the organization.
The civil affairs branch has civil reconnaissance experts who specialize in assessing, engaging, and influencing civil components and are well-suited to engage with civil resistance movements.76 Civil affairs medical sergeants are likewise prepared to operate in an irregular warfare environment and generate opportunities to establish rapport and reinforce relationships among nonviolent resisters. While Special Forces soldiers are responsible for developing relationships with guerilla forces, the civil affairs elements within the Special Forces groups should perform simultaneous and parallel operations to embed with the nonviolent resistance movement. Civil affairs soldiers routinely train to bridge the civil-military divide and build rapport, a skill that will enable linking up and coordinating resistance.
PSYOP soldiers have the expertise and resources required to produce resistance products and enable the execution of nonviolent tactics. Many nonviolent resistance tactics require producing and disseminating leaflets, movies, audio, or internet content, and PSYOP soldiers are well-suited to execute those tasks. Their ability to perform expert-level target audience analysis and ensure the products reflect local customs make them well-suited for support operations. Some civil resistance tactics require advanced technical knowledge that PSYOP soldiers have integrated into their training; they only need to develop the ability to apply this knowledge in a civil resistance context. The civil resistance mission set also enables PSYOP soldiers to utilize the indirect-MISO (military information support operations) series construct, speeding up the bureaucratic processes for mission and product approval.77 As Army Reserve and active duty PSYOP forces start to train under the newly established psychological warfare school, there is an opportunity to contextualize the training within a civil resistance framework and build out techniques for mission support.78 While adding a mission set at a time when the Department of Defense inspector general has determined that the Army does not have enough PSYOP personnel to meet the Department of Defense’s growing demand might seem counterintuitive, it is a move for greater efficiency.79 Developing relationships with civil resistance members creates opportunities to establish mechanisms for product dissemination and methods for determining measures of effectiveness. Rather than linear influence operations, PSYOP soldiers can develop influence networks reinforcing themes and narratives in relevant MISO programs.
Conclusion
As USASOC works to establish itself as a vital component of MDO, it must close the capability gap within civil resistance movements. The USASOC Central Idea and Contributions to MDO construct describes expanding the global special operations forces network and participating in irregular warfare as assets for penetrating and disintegrating great power standoff systems.80 If USASOC hopes to expand strategic options, it must close capability gaps and expand the capability of its force to integrate civil resistance tactics and progress foreign audiences toward mechanisms for change. While incorporating the Spectrum of Allies helps visualize the cognitive domain, the Army must go further and formalize the doctrinal change within the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) construct.
By understanding the scope and effectiveness of civil resistance movements, USASOC can appropriately prioritize their execution while integrating them as part of mission planning. Developing special operations soldiers with a complete understanding of the mechanisms for change, civil resistance planning process, civil resistance tactics, and the Spectrum of Allies will enable unconventional warfare and irregular warfare planners with the tools necessary for improving the likelihood of mission success. Formalizing the doctrinal mission of civil resistance advisory and support as civil affairs and PSYOP battalions transfer under the Special Forces groups is the most effective method of developing a nested, mutually supportive mission set while taking full advantage of specialized skills. USASOC lives by the special operations forces imperative of understanding the operational environment and, therefore, must recognize that the information-centric interconnected world creates opportunities for cascading information flows that disrupt governments. It is incumbent upon the special operations enterprise to seize the opportunity and become experts in civil resistance movements rather than observing on the sidelines during ordinary citizens’ attempts to liberate themselves from oppression.
2. Sneaky Wars in the Indo-Pacific
A 52 minute podcast for a weekend listen.
"Conflict is conflict. It is not conventional versus unconventional or regular versus irregular. "
https://irregularwarfare.org/podcasts/sneaky-wars-in-the-indo-pacific/
Sneaky Wars in the Indo-Pacific
November 29, 2024 by Matthew Moellering, Don Edwards Leave a Comment
Episode 119 discusses irregular warfare in the Indo-Pacific with Dr. Sean McFate, and COL Ed Croot.
Our guests discuss the evolving landscape of irregular warfare. They critique the conventional vs. irregular warfare paradigm, introduce the concept of ‘sneaky war,’ and explore the importance of unconventional strategies in countering global adversaries like China. Finally the conversation delves into the interplay between conventional and irregular tactics, the rise of mercenaries like the Wagner Group, and strategies to counter disinformation.
Dr. Sean McFate is an author, novelist, and national security expert. He holds three professorships: Georgetown University, National Defense University, and Syracuse University. His diverse career includes roles as a U.S. Army paratrooper, private military contractor, and international business executive, with extensive experience in conflict zones and political risk consulting. McFate has written critically acclaimed non-fiction, including The New Rules of War.
COL Ed Croot is an active-duty army officer currently serving in Ft Liberty. Ed has years of experience serving the special operations and intelligence communities across the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. Ed has served from the tactical to the strategic levels of command and most recently as the Operations Director for the Special Operations Command – Pacific.
Matthew Moellering and Don Edwards are the hosts for Episode 119. Please reach out to them with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.
Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.
3. After U.S.-China Prisoner Swap, Scores of Americans Are Still Trapped in China
After U.S.-China Prisoner Swap, Scores of Americans Are Still Trapped in China
U.S. is limited in its ability to help Americans facing exit bans from China. Some are hoping for a breakthrough.
https://www.wsj.com/world/china/after-u-s-china-prisoner-swap-scores-of-americans-are-still-trapped-in-china-11fcf09c?mod=latest_headlines
By Brian Spegele
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Updated Nov. 30, 2024 12:01 am ET
Henry Cai, an American businessman from Southern California, is approaching seven years of being stuck in China. Photo: Gilles Sabrie for WSJ
BEIJING—A rare prisoner swap between China and the U.S. this week that secured the release of three Americans points to Beijing’s willingness to negotiate with Washington on high-profile cases, including ones involving charges of espionage.
But dozens of Americans remain trapped in China under exit bans, often for more mundane causes such as business disputes. These cases show the enduring risks of getting caught in China’s murky legal system—ones that the U.S. government cannot easily solve.
More than 200 Americans are believed to be detained or subject to other coercive measures by Chinese authorities, according to the Dui Hua Foundation, a San Francisco-based human rights group. Additionally, more than 30 U.S. citizens face exit bans from China, under which they are generally free to move around the country but are barred from leaving.
To prevent Beijing from targeting more Americans in the future as bargaining chips, President-elect Donald Trump should get ahead of the issue by sending a clear warning to China, Dui Hua’s founder John Kamm said.
“What he should do is lay down a marker: ‘If you detain Americans like this arbitrarily, I will do X, Y, Z.’ ” Kamm said. “Don’t be reactive, be proactive.”
At the same time, the deal also reflects continuing efforts by the U.S. and China to stabilize their volatile relationship, one increasingly defined by competition rather than compromise.
President Biden has pursued prisoner swaps globally while in office. Bringing home Americans stuck in China has been a key goal of the administration and senior officials have raised the issue in meetings with their Chinese counterparts.
With the recent prisoner swaps, the highest-profile cases involving people that the U.S. formally labeled as unjustly detained are now over. Whether and how the White House will win the release of other Americans facing exit bans remains unknown.
Unlike the espionage allegations at the heart of much of the latest prisoner trading with China, most exit bans have more mundane causes. The bans can be imposed broadly, against both Chinese and foreign nationals, and typically have little to do with politics.
They often arise from civil disputes such as a personal loan that hasn’t been paid back. China’s legal system allows the plaintiff in a civil dispute to ask the court to impose an exit ban on the defendant. A verdict doesn’t have to be reached before the ban is enacted. Once an exit ban—which usually ranges from three to six months—is imposed, it can be automatically renewed as long as the case is outstanding.
Exit bans can be abused by Chinese companies or individuals against foreigners who have little recourse to hit back. Once enacted, the bans are typically lifted only after foreigners accede to the demands of their Chinese counterparties, giving the latter more leverage in negotiations, scholars have said.
Security personnel outside the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. More than 200 Americans are believed to be detained or subject to other coercive measures by Chinese authorities. Photo: Mark R. Cristino/Shutterstock
Some foreign nationals who have left a company before it got involved in a business dispute and who aren’t personally liable have also been subject to exit bans, according to documents from a Chinese online court database. They can also be levied against people under, or assisting, government investigations.
From China’s point of view, allowing foreign citizens facing debts or business disputes to leave the country with no guarantee that they’ll repay what they owe risks drawing ire from its own citizens or financial institutions. Part of the problem is that China lacks a comprehensive bankruptcy system that allows bad debts to be reorganized or written off through the courts.
Dealing with the bans is complicated for the U.S., in part because the Americans involved often haven’t been charged with crimes and aren’t held in custody. While officials can advocate for them to be allowed to return home, they are not formally labeled by the U.S. as “wrongfully detained,” a designation that commits the U.S. government to work toward their release.
One American citizen who has been banned from leaving China described recently seeking help at a U.S. consulate. The person, who is normally based in the U.S., said she was involved in a civil lawsuit involving debt accrued by her former employer, a company based in China that has subsidiaries in the U.S. She said she was told by the consulate that cases like hers weren’t unusual and the best that the consulate could do was send a diplomatic note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and potentially accompany her to future court hearings.
She said she understood that the U.S. was constrained by Chinese law in how it could help.
A spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in Beijing said the American ambassador in China frequently raises the issue of exit bans with senior Chinese officials.
“The opaque nature of certain exit bans is a significant concern of the United States,” the spokesperson said in a written response to questions.
The State Department this week met a longtime request of China and lowered a travel warning about the country, though it still flags the risk of exit bans. Previously, the agency warned Americans to reconsider travel to China. Now, it calls on Americans to increase caution when traveling there “due to arbitrary enforcement of local laws, including in relation to exit bans.”
This week’s prisoner swap has lifted the spirits of some Americans blocked from leaving.
“Right now I have a lot of hope,” said Henry Cai, an American businessman from Southern California, who is approaching seven years of being stuck in China and cut off from family.
Cai’s troubles stem from an investment he made in a printed-circuit board maker in China around a decade ago. When the company ran into financial troubles and couldn’t pay back millions of dollars in debt, Cai was blocked from leaving the country.
Cai said he hoped now that China’s government had made the decision to swap some prisoners with the U.S., it would follow up by releasing Americans subject to exit bans to clean its plate before the Trump administration takes office in January.
Still, he said he and his family were trying not to get too excited, having had his expectations of going home raised and dashed many times since he was blocked from leaving China in 2017.
The prisoner swap this week means that the U.S. has now secured the release of all Americans deemed “wrongfully detained” in China. Mark Swidan from Texas was held behind bars from 2012 and convicted in a drug case, though he maintained his innocence. Two others, Kai Li, a businessman from Long Island, and John Shing-wan Leung, were convicted on espionage charges.
In September, China released David Lin, a pastor who had been detained since 2006 on accusation of fraud that his supporters rejected as retribution for his preaching.
China’s Foreign Ministry said Thursday three Chinese citizens had been released by the U.S. and returned to China. “This once again proves that China will not abandon its compatriots at any time,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said at a daily press briefing.
Mao said a fourth person, whom she described as a fugitive, had also been repatriated to China from the U.S.
The Foreign Ministry hasn’t identified the Chinese citizens involved. On Wednesday, a U.S. federal prisons database showed that Yanjun Xu, a Chinese intelligence officer serving a 20-year sentence, and Chaoqun Ji, a man Xu had worked with, were no longer in U.S. custody.
The ministry said in a written response to questions about exit bans that China manages issues related to entering and leaving the country in accordance with its laws.
Dui Hua, the human rights group, considers two other Americans, Nelson Wells Jr. and Dawn Michelle Hunt, still to be wrongfully imprisoned in China. Their cases both involve drug charges they deny.
Write to Brian Spegele at Brian.Spegele@wsj.com and Rebecca Feng at rebecca.feng@wsj.com
4. And the Fair Land
An important reminder.
Excerpts:
But we can all remind ourselves that the richness of this country was not born in the resources of the earth, though they be plentiful, but in the men that took its measure. For that reminder is everywhere—in the cities, towns, farms, roads, factories, homes, hospitals, schools that spread everywhere over that wilderness.
We can remind ourselves that for all our social discord we yet remain the longest enduring society of free men governing themselves without benefit of kings or dictators. Being so, we are the marvel and the mystery of the world, for that enduring liberty is no less a blessing than the abundance of the earth.
And we might remind ourselves also, that if those men setting out from Delftshaven had been daunted by the troubles they saw around them, then we could not this autumn be thankful for a fair land.
And the Fair Land
This editorial has appeared annually since 1961.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304011304579219802274846352
Nov. 26, 2013 7:32 pm ET
Any one whose labors take him into the far reaches of the country, as ours lately have done, is bound to mark how the years have made the land grow fruitful.
This is indeed a big country, a rich country, in a way no array of figures can measure and so in a way past belief of those who have not seen it. Even those who journey through its Northeastern complex, into the Southern lands, across the central plains and to its Western slopes can only glimpse a measure of the bounty of America.
ILLUSTRATION: Getty Images
And a traveler cannot but be struck on his journey by the thought that this country, one day, can be even greater. America, though many know it not, is one of the great underdeveloped countries of the world; what it reaches for exceeds by far what it has grasped.
So the visitor returns thankful for much of what he has seen, and, in spite of everything, an optimist about what his country might be. Yet the visitor, if he is to make an honest report, must also note the air of unease that hangs everywhere.
For the traveler, as travelers have been always, is as much questioned as questioning. And for all the abundance he sees, he finds the questions put to him ask where men may repair for succor from the troubles that beset them.
His countrymen cannot forget the savage face of war. Too often they have been asked to fight in strange and distant places, for no clear purpose they could see and for no accomplishment they can measure. Their spirits are not quieted by the thought that the good and pleasant bounty that surrounds them can be destroyed in an instant by a single bomb. Yet they find no escape, for their survival and comfort now depend on unpredictable strangers in far-off corners of the globe.
How can they turn from melancholy when at home they see young arrayed against old, black against white, neighbor against neighbor, so that they stand in peril of social discord. Or not despair when they see that the cities and countryside are in need of repair, yet find themselves threatened by scarcities of the resources that sustain their way of life. Or when, in the face of these challenges, they turn for leadership to men in high places—only to find those men as frail as any others.
So sometimes the traveler is asked whence will come their succor. What is to preserve their abundance, or even their civility? How can they pass on to their children a nation as strong and free as the one they inherited from their forefathers? How is their country to endure these cruel storms that beset it from without and from within?
Of course the stranger cannot quiet their spirits. For it is true that everywhere men turn their eyes today much of the world has a truly wild and savage hue. No man, if he be truthful, can say that the specter of war is banished. Nor can he say that when men or communities are put upon their own resources they are sure of solace; nor be sure that men of diverse kinds and diverse views can live peaceably together in a time of troubles.
But we can all remind ourselves that the richness of this country was not born in the resources of the earth, though they be plentiful, but in the men that took its measure. For that reminder is everywhere—in the cities, towns, farms, roads, factories, homes, hospitals, schools that spread everywhere over that wilderness.
We can remind ourselves that for all our social discord we yet remain the longest enduring society of free men governing themselves without benefit of kings or dictators. Being so, we are the marvel and the mystery of the world, for that enduring liberty is no less a blessing than the abundance of the earth.
And we might remind ourselves also, that if those men setting out from Delftshaven had been daunted by the troubles they saw around them, then we could not this autumn be thankful for a fair land.
5. Russia's evolving information war poses a growing threat to the West
Excerpts:
The West must trend carefully when attempting to confront Russian disinformation. Crucially, any efforts to moderate content on social media or impose restrictions on even the most openly propagandistic of platforms invites accusations of censorship. With this in mind, Western governments must walk a fine line as they seek to protect themselves against the Kremlin’s information warfare while safeguarding freedom of expression.
Given the transnational nature of the modern information landscape, international cooperation is essential when attempting to combat Russian disinformation. Looking ahead, the Western response should include the creation of collaborative task forces, real-time intelligence sharing, and coordinated efforts to sanction state and private actors. Western policymakers must also match the Kremlin in terms of versatility and innovation if they wish to keep their countries safe in an increasingly complex and interconnected information environment. Putin’s Russia has demonstrated the importance of the information front in modern warfare. It is time for the West to catch up.
Russia's evolving information war poses a growing threat to the West
By Kateryna Odarchenko, Elena Davlikanova
atlanticcouncil.org · by Peter Dickinson · November 26, 2024
A number of Western officials and security agencies have recently warned of the growing challenges posed by Russian hybrid warfare. This threat is not new, of course. The Kremlin has long been engaged in acts of hybrid aggression against the West, with information warfare playing a central role in Moscow’s efforts to destabilize its democratic adversaries. With geopolitical tension now rising amid a jockeying for position ahead of anticipated Ukraine peace talks in early 2025, Russian information attacks look set to intensify.
It is important to acknowledge that Russian information warfare is highly innovative and continues to evolve at a rapid pace. Russia’s information offensives initially focused on the Kremlin’s own media platforms such as RT and Sputnik, but these outlets have proven relatively easy to identify, discredit, and restrict. In recent years, Russia has increasingly sought to promote its narratives via partners and proxies, as the recent scandal involving prominent US podcasters highlighted.
The pioneering use of social media troll farms to fuel divisions and distort public opinion remains a major component of Russian information warfare. In addition, the Kremlin engages in the large-scale creation of fake websites mimicking prominent news outlets, adding a veneer of credibility to Russian disinformation.
Russian narratives are also evolving. In 2022, the Kremlin’s attempts to depict Ukraine as a Nazi state largely failed to connect with international audiences, who struggled to understand how a country with a popularly elected Jewish president and no far-right presence in government could be in need of “de-Nazification.” Instead, Moscow has turned its attention to promoting the decline of the West and the need for a new multipolar world order.
Through a wide variety of traditional and digital media initiatives, the Kremlin has sought to highlight economic problems in Europe and North America, while pushing the idea of growing Western public dissatisfaction over issues such as identity politics and minority rights. Meanwhile, Russia positions itself as a bastion of traditional family values, social stability, and conservatism. This has struck a chord with alienated segments of society throughout the West.
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The Global South is currently a priority front in Russia’s information war. With the invasion of Ukraine leaving Russia isolated from the West, the Kremlin has reoriented its foreign policy toward the non-Western world. In its messaging to audiences across the Global South, Russia plays on historical resentment at centuries of Western colonialism and portrays itself as a fellow victim of the West. Despite Russia’s long history of imperial aggression and openly imperialistic ambitions in Ukraine, Putin has sought to win over audiences in Africa, Asia, and South America by posing as a defender against Western imperialism.
It would be foolish to dismiss Russia’s anti-imperial messaging as absurd. Older generations across the Global South are often aware of the role played by the Soviet Union in the decolonization movement that followed World War II. Others have little knowledge of the imperial ambitions underpinning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and tend base their opinions on Putin primarily on his opposition to the West. This is helping to shape the geopolitical outlook throughout the Global South and is creating a range of foreign policy challenges for the West that expand far beyond the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Another key element of the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign is the claim that NATO enlargement represents a direct security threat to the Russian Federation and is the real cause of the war in Ukraine. This argument resonates loudly with international audiences suspicious of the West’s dominant role in world affairs. While other Russian attempts to justify the invasion of Ukraine have fallen flat, attempts to blame NATO have proved highly effective.
In reality, Putin seems well aware that NATO doesn’t pose a threat to Russia. Tellingly, he raised no serious objections in 2022 when neighboring Finland and Sweden announced their intention to join the alliance, despite the fact that this would more than double Russia’s NATO borders and transform the strategically crucial Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Indeed, he has since withdrawn most Russian troops from the country’s Finnish frontier. Evidently, Putin’s expansionist foreign policy reflects his opposition to Ukrainian independence rather than any artificial fears over NATO expansion.
Putin’s NATO narrative may not stand up to scrutiny, but it is likely to play an important role in any upcoming peace talks, with Russia currently pushing for an end to NATO enlargement and a firm commitment to permanent Ukrainian neutrality. This would be potentially disastrous for international security. A neutral Ukraine would be highly vulnerable to further Russian aggression and eventual occupation. Meanwhile, rising anti-NATO sentiment in the US and elsewhere risks undermining transatlantic cooperation and fostering isolationism.
The West must trend carefully when attempting to confront Russian disinformation. Crucially, any efforts to moderate content on social media or impose restrictions on even the most openly propagandistic of platforms invites accusations of censorship. With this in mind, Western governments must walk a fine line as they seek to protect themselves against the Kremlin’s information warfare while safeguarding freedom of expression.
Given the transnational nature of the modern information landscape, international cooperation is essential when attempting to combat Russian disinformation. Looking ahead, the Western response should include the creation of collaborative task forces, real-time intelligence sharing, and coordinated efforts to sanction state and private actors. Western policymakers must also match the Kremlin in terms of versatility and innovation if they wish to keep their countries safe in an increasingly complex and interconnected information environment. Putin’s Russia has demonstrated the importance of the information front in modern warfare. It is time for the West to catch up.
Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine. Elena Davlikanova is a fellow at CEPA.
6. In the 19th Century Disinformation Started Wars. Today, It Sways Elections
Excerpts:
Finland's anti-fake-news program, launched in 2014, is an excellent model for the U.S. to emulate. It teaches students, citizens, politicians, and journalists how to spot disinformation, furnishing a checklist of methods of deception to help citizens discern truth from lies. According to The New York Times, Finland ranked No. 1 in 41 European countries in resilience against disinformation. Such educational efforts implemented in the U.S. would not immediately bring everybody the politicians they want. But treating disinformation as the crisis it has become would be, at least, a proactive step in the right direction.
In the 19th Century Disinformation Started Wars. Today, It Sways Elections
Newsweek · by Kristina Foltz Rotary Scholar · November 27, 2024
In 1896, Adolph Ochs purchased The New York Times and transformed it into the country's first serious newspaper. His slogan, "All the News That's Fit to Print," emphasized the Times' focus on serious journalism, differentiating the paper from the likes of William Randolph Hearst's San Francisco Examiner, whose yellow journalism, or more sensationalist ethos, dominated the press. The pinnacle of Hearst's yellow journalism was the headline, "Destruction of the War Ship Maine Was the Work of an Enemy!" referring to a sunk warship off the coast of Cuba. The unsubstantiated claim that Spain had buried a bomb in the U.S.S. Maine became the pretext for the Spanish-American War.
The Times' emphasis on facts and evidence became the gold standard for 20th century American journalism and a cornerstone of American democracy. It wasn't until the emergence of social media, little more than a decade ago, that fake news came back with a vengeance.
But today's disinformation ecosystem is different from the early days of yellow journalism. With more powerful and virulent tools, fake news can travel at near two thirds the speed of light, often without human regulation. Victims of disinformation can be sucked unwittingly into propaganda vortexes based on demographics and browsing histories. Trained artificial intelligence (AI) bots can invent infinite variations on lies. Fake news started wars in the late 19th century. Today, it sways elections.
A sign indicates where to vote at the Ventura County Government Center. A sign indicates where to vote at the Ventura County Government Center. Getty Images
I watched an election hijacking unfold while living in Bogotá, Colombia, where I was writing about the social unrest that exploded throughout Colombia during the pandemic. The turbulent 2021 Colombian protests lasted four months and set the stage for the 2022 election of a fringe party candidate and former guerrilla. Through my research and interviews with Colombian military, citizens, and politicians, I learned that Colombia's adversaries (Russia, Venezuela, and a narco-friendly political party) had organized and financed the protests in order to discredit the administration of former President Iván Duque. Slander of the established political apparatus boosted a fringe party candidate, in what was at the time one of the oldest and most established democracies in Latin America.
In 2023, I interviewed Diego Molano, who was Colombia's defense minister during the 2021 protests. According to Molano, Duque's government created a task force to identify and understand the protesters' complaints. They found that roughly, "Ninety percent of the complaints were based on false information, with the remaining 10 percent legitimate grievances and pandemic-related economic woes," Molano said. The false claims ranged from police brutality to complaints about government elites excluding the poor from education—ignoring the fact that Duque had launched an educational assistance program called Matrícula Zero, which aimed to leave no poor person behind.
Colombian intelligence found that much of the disinformation in 2021, and the election period of 2022, originated from Russian and Venezuelan bot farms. According to Ryan Berg of the Council on Strategic and International Studies, "Gustavo Petro's presidential campaign received a strong boost from Russia with fake accounts, orchestrated hashtags and mentions that sought to position the then candidate of the Historical Pact."
The social upheaval paved the way for the election of Gustavo Petro, an anti-establishment, Venezuela-friendly president. Just one year into the former guerrilla's presidency, I interviewed Petro voters for CNN and learned many of them felt they had been duped. Petro's approval rating today hovers around 20 percent. He has been accused of destroying Colombia's exemplary health care system, expropriating pension funds, paying off delinquent youth with government funds, and ordering the military to cease capturing crime gang leaders.
To be sure, the U.S. is not in danger of cartel rule anytime soon. But Americans are so accustomed to our many democratic freedoms that it's hard to wrap our heads around the subtle signs of democratic decline. Freedom of the press and access to reliable information are pillars of democracy—freedoms which aspiring despots can manipulate to manufacture convenient new narratives, and rise to power.
It's impossible to prove conclusively that disinformation swayed the 2024 U.S. presidential election. But former President Donald Trump's well-understood penchant for mendacity was supercharged leading up to the election. A recent CNN article called his campaign "relentlessly dishonest." From slanderous claims of Haitian immigrants eating pets, to litanies of untruths about pervasive election fraud, Trump has lied more than any U.S. president on record. His disinformation campaign heavily targeted Hispanics; it's no surprise then that a record percentage of Latinos voted for Trump.
Russia amped up its support of Trump too, hiring Americans to spread disinformation online. As with all successful propaganda, they bury in it a kernel of truth, stoking preexisting fears with exaggerated claims and polarizing rhetoric. AP found exaggerated reports about murders committed by illegal immigrants.
Finland's anti-fake-news program, launched in 2014, is an excellent model for the U.S. to emulate. It teaches students, citizens, politicians, and journalists how to spot disinformation, furnishing a checklist of methods of deception to help citizens discern truth from lies. According to The New York Times, Finland ranked No. 1 in 41 European countries in resilience against disinformation. Such educational efforts implemented in the U.S. would not immediately bring everybody the politicians they want. But treating disinformation as the crisis it has become would be, at least, a proactive step in the right direction.
Kristina Foltz is a journalist and frequent contributor to Newsweek. She lives in South America.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
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Newsweek · by Kristina Foltz Rotary Scholar · November 27, 2024
7. Philippines, China clashes trigger money-making disinformation
Philippines, China clashes trigger money-making disinformation
Manila (AFP) – Violent confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea are being manipulated online by disinformation networks for profit, posing risks to regional security, an AFP investigation has found.
France 24 · November 26, 2024
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241126-philippines-china-clashes-trigger-money-making-disinformation
A Facebook military interest page that claims that Washington is helping its ally Manila prepare for war © JAM STA ROSA / AFP
Since Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos took office in 2022 and began standing up to China over its territorial claims, social media has been awash with posts that often exaggerate the country's defence capabilities or allude to an imminent war in the region.
AFP uncovered a coordinated network of dozens of Facebook and YouTube channels that direct users to a bogus news website that appears to use artificial intelligence (AI) to rapidly churn out unfounded claims for advertising revenue.
Analysts say it is unclear if the network is directly linked to state actors, but the content often mirrors China's position on the dispute.
Together, the network's associated pages and channels have a combined following of more than 10 million people.
Elise Thomas, a senior analyst at London's Institute for Strategic Dialogue think tank, said revenue-making disinformation campaigns have emerged as a "big industry" in Southeast Asia, where labour is relatively cheap.
"It is a horrific business; a lot of it is built around preying on people," she said.
Some of the social media pages and websites claim to be American, but are in fact managed in Asian countries including Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.
- 'Bogus news sites' -
Violent confrontations between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea are being manipulated by online disinformation networks for profit © JAM STA ROSA / AFP
AFP found at least 25 Facebook "military interest" pages that misrepresented old photos and videos of army operations to falsely claim that Washington was helping its ally Manila prepare for war.
The posts take users to a bogus news site with a history of publishing fabricated articles and YouTube videos on the South China Sea dispute and the war in Ukraine.
In one, a digitally altered picture of Ukraine soldiers transporting crates falsely suggested that the US was sending Javelin anti-tank missiles to the archipelago.
Some were accidentally published with the headline: "I am a language model AI and cannot perform tasks that require real-time information".
One post debunked by AFP has been shared more than 25,000 times.
It falsely claimed "thousands of American troops" were coming to the aid of the Philippines using a photo of British troops leaving Afghanistan in 2021.
All 25 Facebook pages shared similar posts that linked to the same news website that appeared to be American -- with most of its followers in the US -- but was actually based in the Thai capital Bangkok.
The website, which was flooded with sponsored advertisements, was further linked to dozens of other Facebook sites with a combined following of 7.1 million users.
These other pages promote topics ranging from home design to US celebrities and Catholicism.
Earn through ads
AFP tracked down the manager of the Thailand-based network by scouring the registrations of web domains.
Speaking to AFP on condition of anonymity, he said he does "not get paid by an individual" for sharing the posts but earns through ad placements on click-bait content created by a "group of friends".
"We focus on the potential virality that the posts can attract," he told AFP, explaining that each article can generate between $20 and $70, depending on the number of views.
He said the network can rake in as much as $1,100 a month, with about 10 percent of the content related to the South China Sea dispute.
His team does "not have a deep understanding of these issues" and often looks to other news sites for prompts.
"Sometimes it's as simple as copy pasting," he said.
AFP found that each page from the bogus news site carried dozens of ad trackers used to measure views.
Meta, which owns Facebook, declined to comment on the spread of such posts.
AFP, along with more than 90 other fact-checking organisations, is paid by Meta to verify posts that potentially contain false information.
'Alarming surge'
China has for years sought to expand its presence in contested areas of the South China Sea, brushing aside an international ruling that its claim to most of the waterway has no legal basis.
It has built artificial islands armed with missile systems and runways for fighter jets, and deployed vessels that the Philippines says harass its ships and block its fishers.
Philippine military chief General Romeo Brawner issued a warning in June about an "alarming surge in disinformation campaigns" he said were designed to erode public trust "in our institutions and the government".
Brawner did not identify the perpetrators, but he has previously warned of Chinese efforts to influence the Philippine media and local governments.
Experts said that while there is no evidence directly linking the offshore network to Beijing or other state actors, its content mirrors "official Chinese talking points".
"China's longstanding counter-narrative has been that it's actually the US that is destabilising the Asia-Pacific and pushing everyone closer to conflict," said Kenton Thibaut, a senior fellow at Washington's Digital Forensic Research Lab.
Albert Zhang, an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, told AFP the behaviour of the network behind the misinformation appears "consistent" with state-sponsored disinformation campaigns outsourced to commercial entities.
"It doesn't really matter whether it's a state actor or someone in their bedroom spreading misinformation to make money," said analyst Thomas. "The impact is the same."
Some Filipinos engaging with the disinformation expressed fear over the possibility of war breaking out.
Facebook user Edison Labasan Tejuco, who shared a false post, told AFP: "The US is fooling the Philippines into going to war with China on its behalf".
8. The Pacific disinformation playbook
Excerpts:
The Pacific response is necessarily different from Europe. There is a thriving counter-disinformation and fact-checking ecosystem in Europe capable of addressing the structural roots of the problem. In the Pacific, social media content moderation systems are ineffective as they rely on algorithms and human reviewers that do not cater to the region’s unique languages or cultural contexts. The lack of dedicated local fact-checking teams and under-investment in language-specific tools leaves Pacific Island nations exposed and in need of uniquely Pacific responses.
While the Pacific region may be at a different stage in its journey than Europe, Disinfo Pacific highlighted that there is a small but committed community working against the backsliding of truth and trust. But as generative artificial intelligence and evolving technologies undoubtedly amplify threats, passion to counter disinformation may not be enough. The Pacific's opportunity lies in its human-centered approach to capacity and resilience building – an approach partner countries and international agencies, including Australia, can better support and fund.
Combining the region’s unique cultural strengths with international cooperation and support might mean that paradise isn't so easily lost to disinformation after all.
The Pacific disinformation playbook | Lowy Institute
Meg Tapia
A surge in connectivity has exacerbated the region’s
challenges, undermining trust in science and government.
lowyinstitute.org · by Meg Tapia
At the first Disinfo Pacific Conference in Brisbane this month, a striking contrast emerged between European and Pacific approaches to combating disinformation. While Europe has moved towards regulatory frameworks focusing on behavioural patterns and social media platform accountability, the Pacific region is largely focused on hyper-local resilience building.
That disinformation is a problem in paradise might come as a surprise to many. But the reality is that disinformation is just as prevalent across the Pacific as elsewhere in the world.
The Pacific Islands Forum has said that political instability, governance challenges, and limited resources continue to undermine democratic systems in the Pacific. Misinformation, disinformation, and foreign interference are making matters worse, further threatening regional sovereignty, social cohesion, and the stability of electoral systems.
Suddenly, everything was happening online. From live election results to government announcements, Facebook was the place to be.
This wasn’t always the case. Prior to 2017, social media uptake was sluggish. But the completion of submarine cable projects and telecommunication infrastructure investment by regional and international organisations drove a surge in social media uptake between 2017 and 2020. Cheap smartphone penetration alongside more affordable data plans meant countries such as Fiji, Nauru, Tuvalu, Samoa, and Marshall Islands experienced a rapid uptake in internet connectivity. Today, about 80 per cent of these countries’ populations are online – well above the global average.
Suddenly, everything was happening online. From live election results to government announcements, Facebook was the place to be. Despite virtuous efforts to improve digital connectivity – to lessen inequality and promote economic development – the dangers posed to the Pacific way of life became evident during the Covid-19 pandemic. Misinformation from outside the region, home-grown created or reconfigured information reflecting local traditions, biases, and beliefs, conspiracy theories, and harassment undermined information integrity and online safety.
By 2022, Facebook had amassed more than 22 million daily active users across Oceania, and the Pacific Islands had become a hotbed of online misinformation.
By 2022, Facebook had amassed more than 22 million daily active users across Oceania, and the Pacific Islands had become a hotbed of online misinformation (Kelly Sikkema/Unsplash)
The problem in the Pacific is that it’s not just about online deception; it's the speed with which disinformation seeps into offline community conversations. Island cultures rely heavily on close-knit social networks and interpersonal accounts – often referred to as the "coconut wireless" – where rumours can spread rapidly. In this environment, online disinformation quickly transitions to offline chatter, influencing real-world perceptions.
Challenges are popping up across the Pacific Islands. Viral online rumours about organ harvesting in Papua New Guinea led to the temporary closure of schools, while WhatsApp rumours about kidnappings in Solomon Islands triggered roadblocks and at least two non-fatal attacks on foreigners. In Fiji, disinformation fuelling racial tension prompted the #fijiisunited campaign.
Political disinformation aside, the Pacific region also faces significant challenges in climate change disinformation and health infodemics, which undermine trust in science, government, and environmental stewardship. This issue is particularly acute in remote and isolated island communities, where varying levels of internet access complicate the flow of reliable information and affect health-seeking behaviours such as vaccine uptake.
Similarly, while the impacts of climate change – rising sea levels and extreme weather – in the Pacific are widely accepted, disinformation about resource exploitation, greenwashing, environmental deregulation, and climate levies continue to create confusion.
Action to counter online disinformation and build information integrity in the Pacific is already underway – through a uniquely Pacific approach.
This is why King Charles III recently warned Commonwealth leaders about the growing impact of misinformation and extremism spreading both online and offline, and why the United Nations Development Program Pacific Office has launched a new study examining information pollution and hate speech in the Pacific region.
Action to counter online disinformation and build information integrity in the Pacific is already underway – through a uniquely Pacific approach.
In the Pacific, people are everything. Values such as family, community, and respect are central to the way of life. In Fiji, these cultural concepts are expressed in words such as “sautu” – the aspiration for harmony, prosperity, and stability – and “vakarokoroko” – emphasising the importance of respect and care in villages. This sense of community resilience, collective action, and deep connection to people and nature is what lies at the heart of the Pacific’s response to disinformation.
Many countries have adopted a multi-sectoral approach. There were stories abound at the Disinfo Pacific Conference about hyper-local responses that combine social listening, training, and engaging trusted voices. Elders, religious leaders, and health professionals are uniting to counter the spread of false information and promote accurate messaging.
In Tonga, the Ministry of Health has been engaging communities through a multi-hazard approach to infodemic management, involving house-to-house visits, community sessions, and one-on-one discussions, with input from local figures such as teachers, parents, and community leaders.
Digital and media literacy initiatives are tailored to each island community to help build trust and foster cooperation, mitigating the effect of disinformation on vulnerable communities.
The Pacific response is necessarily different from Europe. There is a thriving counter-disinformation and fact-checking ecosystem in Europe capable of addressing the structural roots of the problem. In the Pacific, social media content moderation systems are ineffective as they rely on algorithms and human reviewers that do not cater to the region’s unique languages or cultural contexts. The lack of dedicated local fact-checking teams and under-investment in language-specific tools leaves Pacific Island nations exposed and in need of uniquely Pacific responses.
While the Pacific region may be at a different stage in its journey than Europe, Disinfo Pacific highlighted that there is a small but committed community working against the backsliding of truth and trust. But as generative artificial intelligence and evolving technologies undoubtedly amplify threats, passion to counter disinformation may not be enough. The Pacific's opportunity lies in its human-centered approach to capacity and resilience building – an approach partner countries and international agencies, including Australia, can better support and fund.
Combining the region’s unique cultural strengths with international cooperation and support might mean that paradise isn't so easily lost to disinformation after all.
lowyinstitute.org · by Meg Tapia
9. Moving Toward Defense as a Service
Excerpt:
Conclusion
The rapid pace of change on the modern battlefield demands a shift in how military capabilities are developed, deployed, and adapted. Moving from a focus on acquiring static products to acquiring desired end states, embedding engineers on the battlefield for real-time feedback, and positioning manufacturing capabilities closer to the frontlines can all significantly enhance the military’s ability to respond to evolving threats. This approach allows for quicker adjustments, more relevant solutions, and tactical advantage over adversaries who are slower to adapt. The future force can’t be a static hammer we take out of the toolbox whenever we need to pound a nail — it must become a mutagenic blob, a Swiss army knife with adaptive tools that looks different each time an adversary sees it.
Moving Toward Defense as a Service - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Jake Chapman · November 29, 2024
History and pre-history are littered with the corpses of competitors who failed to adapt as quickly as their adversaries. From animals to nation-states, victory rarely depends on strength alone but comes down to survival and adaptation. This lesson is being driven home on the battlefields of Ukraine. The United States must take heed, or it risks being rendered irrelevant on the world stage. U.S.-provided Excalibur precision artillery shells were devastatingly effective when they first entered service in Ukraine, but within a couple of months, Russian adaptation had rendered those precision munitions dumb. In war, concepts of operations change hourly, software is revised daily, and hardware is iterated on weekly — this is ever truer as technology cycles accelerate.
The traditional defense acquisition model, often slow, inflexible, and designed to be largely top-down, will struggle to keep up with these shifts. What this means for the United States in practice is that in a major shooting war against a modern adversary, we may very quickly find that adversarial adaptation renders U.S. technology obsolete as soon as the dust settles on the opening weeks of a conflict. If the United States hopes to keep pace with the capabilities of its adversaries, particularly in its adversaries’ backyards, it should consider a trio of policies including moving from product-based contracts to outcome-oriented service contracts, embedding engineers at the frontline, and developing expeditionary manufacturing capacity.
As a venture investor operating in the national security space, I know that some may be tempted to disregard my suggestions as self-interested. However, as the suggestions that follow would all increase the operational complexity of building startups in defense, I am not asking for an easy button. For example, distributing manufacturing all over the globe is harder to finance and almost certainly less efficient than a giant centrally located factory, and forward-deploying engineers almost certainly increases employee overhead. The reason I make these suggestions isn’t to change the Department of Defense to suit the demands of industry — it’s about changing industry to suit the demands of modern war and offering the Department of Defense an opportunity to facilitate that much-needed transition. We’ve looked at thousands of companies over the last few years and no matter how cool their technology or great their teams, vanishingly few are capable today of adapting at the pace of the modern battlefield. We must change that.
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The Changing Pace of Adaptation
Advances in commercially available technologies — such as drones, 3-D printing, and space imaging —enable adversaries to quickly adapt their strategies and capabilities using commercial off-the-shelf technologies. The air-to-air drone war in Ukraine is illustrative. Initially, Ukrainian forces used first-person-view drones to ram Russian drones. In response, Russian drone operators adjusted their tactics, forcing Ukrainians to equip drones with munitions and begin work on AI targeting systems. The Russians, in turn, experimented with dazzle paint schemes to evade visual or AI detection. This weekly cycle of innovation underscores the rapid pace of modern battlefield adaptation. There are similar cat and mouse games taking place across the entire spectrum of capabilities.
Consider this scenario playing out between the United States and one of its primary adversaries. They adopt a new technology and begin seeing major battlefield success. As American casualties mount, how long would it take the United States to adapt? An instructive historical example is the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle program, which was launched during the deadliest phases of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflict. The requirements process for this program took 20 months, at the conclusion of which the program needed to select winners, scale manufacturing, and deliver units. This program was driven by a life-and-death emergency and was a priority of the secretary of defense, yet the United States still took over three years to field a technology adapted to adversary action. While the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle program was largely considered a success, in a future conflict the United States will be in trouble if its adaptation cycle is measured in years but that of its adversary can be measured in weeks or months. Critics will argue that the United States does a good job of adapting in the field. I agree that U.S. forces are great at one-off field adaptation, but the challenge is that building a great custom solution in a barn is not something the United States can rely on in a conflict against a major adversary where adaptive solutions by the hundreds of thousands are required. As of October, Ukraine has the capacity to produce up to four million drones annually. These are being assembled by over 200 different companies and untold numbers of private citizens. This scale and diversity allow for incredible adaptive capacity. Traditional defense acquisition models, characterized by lengthy development cycles and bureaucratic processes, fail to address this reality and by the time evolved technology is deployed, it may be obsolete, resulting in missed opportunities to outmaneuver adversaries.
Acquiring Services over Products and Outcomes over Solutions
One of the challenges highlighted above is that the way the U.S. military acquires new solutions runs through a rigid requirements process. The process begins when someone recognizes that there is a problem in the world that needs to be solved either through a new operation or through the acquisition of a new widget. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, for example, takes, on average, 2 years. If it is determined that a new widget is required, a process is run to determine the exact specifications for the solution. The U.S. Army (in)famously spent over 9 years and wrote over 350 pages of specifications for a new sidearm rather than just purchasing a workable weapon off the shelf. While a rigorous requirements process is intended to ensure troops receive something they actually need, the rigidity of the resulting product (the solution specification) becomes problematic in a world where the solution specified is likely to be out of date before the ink has time to dry on the requirement.
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System isn’t the only way requirements can be generated. There are more agile processes such as working through Urgent Operational Needs, Section 804 Rapid Acquisition Authority, Middle Tier Acquisition Authorities, or the various Rapid Capabilities Offices, all of which can accelerate the fielding of new or adapted technology. However, many of these processes remain too slow for current technology cycles — Middle Tier Acquisition Authority, for example, takes two to five years to field a solution. That said, an Urgent Operational Need can lead to a solution in weeks to months, which begins to align with the modern battlefield reality. The problem is that keeping up with today’s adversaries will require almost exclusive usage of these exceptions. Once exceptions subsume the rule, we should ask ourselves if the rule still makes sense, or if we should reimagine it from the ground up.
The way forward must be to adapt the requirements process itself by changing the product it generates into something that is responsive to changing conditions. Rather than describing solutions to problems, the requirements process should describe desired end states. Using the air-to-air drone example above, rather than specifying an aerial drone type capable of targeting another aerial drone type over a specific distance carrying a specific payload, and utilizing specific sensors, the requirement should be for an outcome. In this case, the outcome could be the ability to clear friendly airspace of adversarial drones. These more general requirements can then be awarded to prime contractors who can both serve as direct performers or subcontract mixing and matching thousands of possible solutions. Essentially, this moves from a product-focused model toward a more service-based model, which allows for capabilities that can be adjusted and updated as needed — much like software updates — rather than fixed products that take years to develop. A service-based approach allows for the continuous improvement of capabilities, enabling the military to respond to changing conditions quickly.
Product capabilities delivered as a service may seem like a new idea to some, but the model is one that goes in and out of favor in government contracting. For example, during the Global War on Terror, Predator drones were operated by General Atomics contractors. More recently, the U.S. Coast Guard awarded Shield AI almost $200 million on an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract to provide surveillance and reconnaissance as a service, for which the company will use its V-BAT platform. And Metrea, which describes itself as providing “effects as a service,” has “as a service” contract with U.S. Naval Air Systems Command that has it conducting aerial refueling operations for aircraft from multiple U.S. services as well as allies.
New processes like Replicator or programs like TITAN are great steps in the right direction. The genius of TITAN is in fielding hardware that is inherently software-defined, and therefore primed for rapid battlefield adaptation. To the extent feasible, more programs should look like TITAN. However, even there, the Department of Defense is still a little too solution-oriented for the future fight. The requirements and contract structure for TITAN should have laid the groundwork for replacing it with a battlefield-adapted system for a date, hopefully far in the future, when TITAN itself has outlived its usefulness. Only an outcomes orientation lays the foundation for infinite adaptation.
Engineers on the Battlefield: Real-Time Adaptation
While adaptive requirements and service-oriented contracts can be part of the solution, rapid adaptation also requires a real-time understanding for how an adversary has adapted their technology. The United States must embed engineers on the frontlines and not just combat engineers. This isn’t about bridges and minefields but is about placing the architects of adaptation in the thick of it so that they can help modify equipment in real time as battlefield conditions adapt. Contractors placing their engineers forward isn’t a completely novel concept. Palantir famously relies on forward-deployed engineers to help end users get the most out of their intelligence platform. Similarly, companies tasked with keeping American forward operating bases safe from adversarial unmanned systems should be on hand to witness how their systems perform, how end users interact with their systems, and how adversaries are adapting in real-time. As any product manager can tell you, end users — in this case, warfighters — rarely use a product in the way originally envisioned. The only way to really get this sort of feedback is for engineers to work plate carrier to plate carrier with the warfighter. Traditionally, engineers and developers work from secure facilities far removed from the frontlines, relying on feedback loops that can be slow and filtered through multiple layers of reporting. This model results in delays and a disconnect between those designing solutions and those using them in combat. As an example, while many of our founders are actively tracking developments out of Ukraine, when they return from trips to the frontline, they have a completely different understanding of the situation. Founders developing new battlefield technology view Ukraine as an irreplicable lab for learning.
Detractors of this idea may object to the risk this would impose on private engineers. While I don’t want to completely discount this risk, Palantir’s engineers have bravely shouldered it for decades, as have war correspondents. A future conflict with a peer adversary will require an all-of-nation effort, and that means the time when only 1 percent of Americans fought America’s battles must come to an end. This approach transforms engineers from distant, disconnected developers into integral parts of the tactical team, enabling a level of responsiveness that aligns with the unpredictable nature of modern warfare. It ensures that the technology evolves alongside the conditions of the battlefield, offering a significant strategic advantage.
Proximal Manufacturing: Closing the Gap Between Innovation and Implementation
To further enhance responsiveness, the manufacturing process must be moved closer to the frontlines. Traditional manufacturing, which often takes place far from combat zones, is slow and inflexible, lacking necessary feedback loops. Moving manufacturing capabilities closer to conflict areas allows for rapid prototyping, testing, and production of adapted technologies and shortens supply lines. This shift can dramatically reduce the time needed to get new solutions into the hands of the warfighter.
Forward-deployed manufacturing hubs can leverage advanced techniques like 3-D printing and modular production to manufacture customized solutions on demand. For example, if a new type of drone or sensor is needed to address a specific threat, a nearby manufacturing facility could assemble the necessary components and deliver them to the front within days instead of months. This proximity allows for quicker iterations, testing, and refinement, ensuring that adaptations can be implemented swiftly and effectively. The United States might consider outfitting something like decommissioned amphibious assault ships or similar vessels as dedicated expeditionary manufacturing facilities and logistics hubs, as the U.S. Navy is already testing 3-D manufacturing on ships. Similarly, the U.S. Air Force could test mini-manufacturing hubs on C5s. The specific platform could be flexible and will probably be theater-dependent, but the point is that moving these distributed hubs toward the point of greatest need could dramatically shrink the feedback loop from battlefield observation to adapted fielded equipment.
A related example is Firestorm (I am an investor in Firestorm and have a financial interest in the company’s success). Firestorm makes modular small unmanned aerial systems capable of being adapted on the fly like a Lego set for different mission parameters. What sets them apart, however, is that their systems are produced out of factories that are embedded in shipping containers, which can be prepositioned anywhere a need is anticipated. This allows for hardware and software modifications to be designed from anywhere in the world and pushed to an expeditionary manufacturing facility at the point of need. The future U.S. military must have similar adaptive capabilities across almost all platforms and mission sets because the force that wins is going to be the one that is most adaptable.
Conclusion
The rapid pace of change on the modern battlefield demands a shift in how military capabilities are developed, deployed, and adapted. Moving from a focus on acquiring static products to acquiring desired end states, embedding engineers on the battlefield for real-time feedback, and positioning manufacturing capabilities closer to the frontlines can all significantly enhance the military’s ability to respond to evolving threats. This approach allows for quicker adjustments, more relevant solutions, and tactical advantage over adversaries who are slower to adapt. The future force can’t be a static hammer we take out of the toolbox whenever we need to pound a nail — it must become a mutagenic blob, a Swiss army knife with adaptive tools that looks different each time an adversary sees it.
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Jake Chapman has been in and around the venture industry for almost 20 years as a lawyer, three-time founder, and venture capitalist, including as managing director of the Army Venture Capital Corporation. Jake is an adjunct at the Rand Corporation, where he works on commercialization and national security. He is the managing director of Marque Ventures, a venture capital firm focused on national security technology. He writes all too frequently on Twitter as @vc and somewhat less frequently on LinkedIn.
Image: Lance Corporal Richard Perez Garcia via DVIDS.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Jake Chapman · November 29, 2024
10. Russia may collapse under Putin’s rule, paving way for China to focus on Far East - American political scientist
Russia may collapse under Putin’s rule, paving way for China to focus on Far East - American political scientist
https://global.espreso.tv/russia-ukraine-war-russia-may-collapse-under-putin-and-china-may-focus-on-far-east-american-political-scientist-bugajski?utm
30 November, 2024 Saturday
11:52
Vladimir Putin
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If the Russian Federation begins to weaken, China will not risk a war with the United States, exposing itself
Janusz Bugajski, an analyst, historian, and expert at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, D.C., told Espreso.
“The Chinese can be called imperialistic pragmatists. If the Russian Federation is strong enough, they can divert attention from China's imperialistic views, because everyone will focus on Russia. Russia is a source of cheap energy, oil and gas. But if Russia starts to fall apart, China will focus more on resources and territories in the Far East. Then the PRC will have the capacity and ability to strengthen itself and its economy. This could be a miscalculation by Beijing. We have to keep a close eye on the regions that may break away from the Russian Federation and do not want to become part of China's dominion. In other words, they will trade Moscow for Beijing. They may aspire to Western or Eastern democracy, as in Japan and other countries in the east,” he said.
We need a strategy that will not strengthen China, but will lead to the collapse of Russia. The world is already watching Russia begin to collapse even under Putin. Bugajski believes that the Russian Federation will collapse even during his term.
Bugajski concluded that Putin represents the entire Russian regime, which has lasted for centuries and continues Russia's imperialist policies. It is neither a communist nor tsarist system, but a centralized autocracy that feeds off its neighbors. This is the foundation of Putinism, along with corruption and other so-called advantages that create the illusion of Russia's power. Russia may cease to exist in its current form even with Putin, as he is struggling with his last breath, similar to Chernenko, Andropov, and other Soviet officials. He may have only a few years left, but that doesn't mean Russia will survive with him. The Russian Federation will begin to collapse even under Putin. Economic problems are already evident in Russia, particularly before the new year, and this is already a crack.
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China responded to the U.S. decision to let Ukraine use long-range ATACMS missiles for strikes inside Russia, emphasizing that a "political resolution" to the war is in everyone's best interest.
11. The Great Pokémon Go Spy Panic
Excerpts:
If some malignant actor, like a spy service, were able to successfully nominate sites of intelligence interest as PokéStops, or pay for pokémon to appear near them, or otherwise access user data from individuals playing the game at sensitive locations where pokémon materialized—or where PokéStops were placed, albeit even innocently—it could represent a new sort of espionage opportunity.
Then, in theory, a bad actor—like, say, a foreign spy service—could collect geolocated intelligence from these devices, like audio or video data, or even simply gather information on the phones themselves (thus identifying U.S. intelligence agency employees, or the specific digital signatures of their phones) to facilitate some later compromise.
This was precisely the fear at NSA: that enemy spy services might place Pokémon Go-related infrastructure “at targets of national interest, to lure Pokémon Go-playing intelligence officers to those places so they could collect on their devices,” said a former NSA official. However, the official added, this was “completely not grounded in reality.”
Could adversarial intelligence services “build a 3D model of the world using the camera photos you take when you catch a Pokémon on base? Technically feasible, yes,” said the former NSA official. “Are they going to spend all the computon [computing power] on it? Absolutely not.”
Still, most U.S. spy agency employees recognized that using your personal phone —let alone playing a game like Pokémon Go—at sensitive facilities was inadvisable at best, said the former officials.
Many NSA employees at the agency’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, greeted the NSA’s Pokémon counterintelligence directive with disbelief. “Who’s dumb enough to be doing this near NSA anywhere?” was the prevalent reaction, recalled a second former NSA official. “Most savvy people put their phone on airplane mode or turned it off when they got to campus.”
The problem wasn’t unique to the NSA. At the CIA, employees received a “very long ‘stop playing Pokémon Go’ email,” recalled a former agency official—though, in typically oblique CIA fashion, the message refrained from overtly naming the game.
The Great Pokémon Go Spy Panic
How a global hit sparked digital paranoia inside U.S. intelligence.
November 29, 2024, 11:49 AM
By Zach Dorfman, an intelligence and national security journalist.
Foreign Policy · by Zach Dorfman
In 2016, as Hillary Clinton was imploring her supporters to “Pokémon Go to the polls,” America’s spy agencies had a different message for their employees: Your hunt for Pikachu, they warned, might be endangering national security—and Beijing’s prying eyes could be behind that Bulbasaur.
That summer, the Pokémon Go craze was in full bloom. Every day, tens of millions of Americans took to the streets, phones held aloft, impelled by the urge to “catch ’em all.” Hundreds of millions of users were playing the game worldwide.
In 2016, as Hillary Clinton was imploring her supporters to “Pokémon Go to the polls,” America’s spy agencies had a different message for their employees: Your hunt for Pikachu, they warned, might be endangering national security—and Beijing’s prying eyes could be behind that Bulbasaur.
That summer, the Pokémon Go craze was in full bloom. Every day, tens of millions of Americans took to the streets, phones held aloft, impelled by the urge to “catch ’em all.” Hundreds of millions of users were playing the game worldwide.
The game’s rise dovetailed with a new era of digital spying. The information users were freely surrendering to private companies to play digital games, or to use cool new apps or other online platforms, was making intelligence services drool. Spy services dove headlong into stealing, hacking, or buying data from the private sector that they could not somehow procure elsewhere—even if they didn’t really yet understand the value of that information.
But in the summer of 2016, Pokémon Go’s creators had worries other than snooping spy services—like overseeing the rollout of the game, which was an unprecedented global phenomenon.
Those responsible for the game were blindsided by its popularity. “We were all idiots,” recalled Don McGowan, the Pokémon Company’s former chief legal counsel. “You know those movies where someone is sitting on a beach when the tidal wave hits?” he asked. Before the launch, “That was me.”
The game was a huge hit for its parent company, Niantic, a San Francisco-based firm that launched as a start-up within Google before spinning off as an independent entity in 2015. (Niantic was granted the rights to develop Pokémon Go from The Pokémon Company, which manages the lucrative franchise.) But there was a steep learning curve. Neither Niantic nor The Pokémon Company had any dedicated “trust and safety” personnel thinking through some of the potential geopolitical pitfalls of the game prior to its launch, recalled McGowan. He had previously worked on cybersecurity issues in Microsoft’s government affairs division and found himself thrust into the role. “Niantic was completely unprepared for how big the game was,” he said.
McGowan found himself dealing with problems nobody had anticipated, such as the day he saw a news report that players were hunting for pokémon in Bosnian minefields. McGowan hightailed it to Washington for meetings at the State Department. They “gave me a piece of paper that had the GPS coordinates of every non-classified location of landmines in the world,” he recalled. McGowan immediately passed the information to Niantic, which disabled the game in those areas.
A woman holds up her cell phone as she plays Pokemon Go game near the White House in Washington on July 12, 2016.
A woman holds up her cellphone as she plays Pokémon Go near the White House in Washington on July 12, 2016.Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images
The game itself was stumbling into more figurative minefields. National security concerns over it also began to proliferate worldwide. Indonesian and Egyptian security officials decried it as a spy front. Influential public figures in Russia called it a CIA tool—or agent of Satanism. Iran banned the game altogether. China justified its own ban by describing it as a “threat to geographical information security.”
“That summer I was a very pretty girl to every government around the world,” recalls McGowan. “I did what I called my world Pokémon Go tour, talking to every government that raised a concern around privacy.”
In the United States, however, there were no limits on playing the game. Pokémon were being found everywhere—even, reportedly, within the White House and Pentagon. And the game’s ubiquity, it turned out, was a potentially big problem for the country’s intelligence and defense establishment.
To the dismay of U.S. counterspies, a veritable horde of pokémon were also loitering near other highly sensitive national security and intelligence facilities around the nation.
“People were doing dumb shit with Pokémon Go, like playing in the parking lot at Fort Meade,” the headquarters of the National Security Agency (NSA), recalled a former agency official. “Because there were apparently like some super-rare shiny pokémons or something, so people were wandering campus with their phones up.”
In the Venn diagram of nerdery, there was a considerable crossover between technically inclined intelligence personnel at the NSA, CIA, and other national security agencies, and Pokémon fans. And that worried their superiors.
A woman plays Pokemon Go in Yogyakarta, Indonesia on July 24, 2016.
A woman plays Pokémon Go in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on July 24, 2016.Ulet Ifansasti/Getty Images)
“There was major concern about Pokémon Go,” a former senior Energy Department official said.
Energy Department and NSA officials even worried—baselessly—that the game might be some sort of covert Chinese espionage tool, recalled former intelligence officials. (Foreign Policy spoke to seven former NSA, CIA, and Energy Department officials familiar with Pokémon Go-related security memoranda and discussions surrounding the game.) The Pentagon implored Defense Department personnel to refrain from downloading Pokémon Go on their government-issued phones, to use sound judgment about where and when they played the game, and to forego chasing pokémon near sensitive installations.
But officials denied there were department-wide security restrictions on playing the game at military or Defense Department facilities. “There is no Poké-ban at the Pentagon,” spokesperson Lt. Cmdr. Patrick Evans told reporters in August 2016. Behind closed doors, however, there were bigger fears. As the game’s popularity exploded, pokémon materialized at NSA headquarters; near America’s top-secret nuclear weapons laboratories in New Mexico; and at covert CIA facilities in northern Virginia, thanks to ardent devotees of the game working there.
This set off alarm bells for U.S. counterintelligence officials. Why were pokémon appearing at such sensitive locations? Could this conspicuous placement be evidence of some sort of malicious intent? Could the app be functioning as a targeted spying tool, as part of a “Pokémon Go hack me” scheme? Security experts from the CIA, NSA, and Energy Department (which manages the country’s nuclear arsenal) subsequently sent memos instructing colleagues to stop playing Pokémon Go at their workplaces—and perhaps entirely.
Foreign Policy’s reporting on worries within the Energy Department, or DOE, about the potential national security-related threats of Pokémon Go is “slightly overstated,” a spokesperson said. “DOE’s major concerns were public safety and potential operational disruption.” The NSA declined to comment, while a CIA spokesperson noted the agency took “responsible measures” for “digital best practices.”
Niantic CEO John Hanke signs autographs for attendees during the Pokemon Go Fest in Chicago on July 22, 2017.
Niantic CEO John Hanke signs autographs for attendees during the Pokémon Go Fest in Chicago on July 22, 2017. Daniel Boczarski/Getty Images
Let’s be extra clear here. There’s zero evidence that Pokémon Go was ever connected to a foreign intelligence agency, or used for spying by any intelligence agency, foreign or domestic.
Niantic, the creator of Pokémon Go, is an American company, based in San Francisco. Early investors to the company, which has raised $770 million, include Nintendo and The Pokémon Company, both Japanese firms, and Google (again, Niantic’s former parent company). Chinese tech giant NetEase is also an investor, as is South Korean-industrial powerhouse Samsung. Many of Niantic’s financial backers are U.S.-based venture capital firms.
If anything, Niantic springs from the high-tech establishment, where U.S. government connections are common. Niantic’s CEO, John Hanke, previously co-founded the geospatial mapping firm Keyhole, which was acquired by Google in 2004 and eventually became Google Earth and Google Maps. In 2003, Keyhole received funding from In-Q-Tel, the CIA-founded venture capital fund. The company’s technology was promptly used to assist U.S. troops in Iraq.
Gilman Louie, In-Q-Tel’s founding CEO, has sat on Niantic’s board. (Louie’s venture capital fund, Alsop Louie Partners, is also a Niantic investor.) And Hanke is himself no stranger to government work, having served as a State Department official in Myanmar.
Dozens of people dressed up as Pikachu dance with fans during the "Pikachu Outbreak" event in suburban Tokyo on Aug. 16, 2015.
Dozens of people dressed up as Pikachu dance with fans during the “Pikachu Outbreak” event in suburban Tokyo on Aug. 16, 2015.Toru Yamanaka/AFP via Getty Images
Somehow, these pristine bona fides didn’t allay the dyspepsia among U.S. counterintelligence officials. But some of their confusion may have just sprung from basic lack of understanding about the mechanics of the game.
A primer: Pokémon Go requires simultaneous access to a phone’s GPS and camera. Smartphone in hand, peering through the camera into an augmented version of reality, players must wander around seeking to locate—and catch—geocached Pokémon at real-life locations.
The game tracks players’ GPS coordinates and Wi-Fi and cell tower data—even, sometimes, when users are not actively playing Pokémon Go their phones.
Most pokémon in Pokémon Go are “procedurally generated,” said McGowan—meaning that, when the game senses phones with the app on it, it materializes pokémon nearby for players to nab.
Pokémon Go players also search for “PokéStops” or “Gyms.” Unlike the largely ephemeral Pokémon, PokéStop and Gym locations are permanent. PokéStop locations are selected in a variety of ways. Many are based on places of public interest, like museums and monuments, identified by online mapping services. (Clearly, some major national security-related facilities, like the Pentagon, would be prime candidates as sites of interest.)
Still others are generated from geotagged photos of popular sites. Finally, some potential PokéStops are crowdsourced—that is, players can nominate potential locations for them.
Fixated Pokemon Go players pass the Washington Monument on July 30, 2016.
Fixated Pokémon Go players pass the Washington Monument on July 30, 2016. Michael S. Williamson/The Washington Post via Getty Images
And here’s where some U.S. counterintelligence officials got worried.
If some malignant actor, like a spy service, were able to successfully nominate sites of intelligence interest as PokéStops, or pay for pokémon to appear near them, or otherwise access user data from individuals playing the game at sensitive locations where pokémon materialized—or where PokéStops were placed, albeit even innocently—it could represent a new sort of espionage opportunity.
Then, in theory, a bad actor—like, say, a foreign spy service—could collect geolocated intelligence from these devices, like audio or video data, or even simply gather information on the phones themselves (thus identifying U.S. intelligence agency employees, or the specific digital signatures of their phones) to facilitate some later compromise.
This was precisely the fear at NSA: that enemy spy services might place Pokémon Go-related infrastructure “at targets of national interest, to lure Pokémon Go-playing intelligence officers to those places so they could collect on their devices,” said a former NSA official. However, the official added, this was “completely not grounded in reality.”
Could adversarial intelligence services “build a 3D model of the world using the camera photos you take when you catch a Pokémon on base? Technically feasible, yes,” said the former NSA official. “Are they going to spend all the computon [computing power] on it? Absolutely not.”
Still, most U.S. spy agency employees recognized that using your personal phone —let alone playing a game like Pokémon Go—at sensitive facilities was inadvisable at best, said the former officials.
Many NSA employees at the agency’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, greeted the NSA’s Pokémon counterintelligence directive with disbelief. “Who’s dumb enough to be doing this near NSA anywhere?” was the prevalent reaction, recalled a second former NSA official. “Most savvy people put their phone on airplane mode or turned it off when they got to campus.”
The problem wasn’t unique to the NSA. At the CIA, employees received a “very long ‘stop playing Pokémon Go’ email,” recalled a former agency official—though, in typically oblique CIA fashion, the message refrained from overtly naming the game.
A composite photo illustration showing Pikachu and spyware near a nuclear bomb.
Foreign Policy Illustration/Getty Images
But many U.S. officials viewed the dire warnings about Pokémon Go skeptically. At Los Alamos, one of America’s premier nuclear weapons laboratories, U.S. officials thought the memo from the Department of Energy’s counterintelligence specialists was “hilarious,” a former Energy Department employee recalled. “We almost all played the game.”
At the NSA, too, many intelligence officials believed that the worries about Pokémon Go were seriously overblown. “The logical non-boomer thing to do would be to put out an email that says, ‘Do not use Pokémon Go on base because it’s just not good opsec [operational security],’” the first former NSA official said.
But that was far from the tone of the communique, recalled the same former NSA official.
The memo was this “boomer thing” that “they put out … in like Comic Sans, size 36 font, a two-page, poorly formatted” document from the NSA’s counterintelligence division “that said, ‘Hey everyone, Pokémon Go is a Chinese spy app that is from this company called Niantic, and we don’t know anything about them, and it uses your camera to build a 3D model of the world that you’re walking in and [collects intelligence on your] pattern of life, and it’s banned,’” the former official said.
But “none of that was true,” said the former NSA employee. Niantic is “a completely normal company” and “the ridiculousness of that email turned a lot of people off.” So, in response, many NSA employees “were like, ‘No, fuck off, I’ll play Pokémon Go all over base.’”
McGowan didn’t hear directly from the CIA or the NSA during this brouhaha. But he did receive a flurry of calls from the Department of Energy about Pokémon Go-related concerns, he recalled. And they were spooked.
They said, “‘Listen, there are PokéStops inside top-secret nuclear facilities,’” recalled McGowan. “And I was like, ‘Well, OK, I’ll talk to Niantic and get those removed, but you have a way bigger fucking problem. Because this means somebody took a photograph of a location inside your top-secret facility and uploaded it to a third-party server with GPS coordinates attached. So if you got a PokéStop in there, that’s how it got there.’”
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It seems that the Energy Department counterintelligence chiefs had conflated PokéStops—the permanent locations—and the pokémon themselves, which could materialize anywhere phones with Pokémon Go on them were nearby.
And at some department facilities, pokémon started appearing in the darnedest places.
The Energy Department’s counterintelligence probe focused on a profusion of rare pokémon near Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, or SCIFs—secure rooms specially designed to prevent electronic eavesdropping that are used by U.S. officials to discuss classified information.
Before you enter a SCIF, you deposit your phone in a storage container outside to prevent potential digital snooping. Energy Department security personnel “found that the SCIF thing was simply because everybody’s phones [with Pokémon Go on them] clustering in a box caused the algorithm to think these were cafes, or similarly trafficked spots where Pokémon Go players hang out,” the former senior Energy Department official said.
In the end, the department’s investigation into Pokémon Go turned up nothing improper. But officials were sufficiently unnerved about the game to ask McGowan to disable it from being played at its facilities, the former top Pokémon lawyer recalled.
“And we’re like, ‘We need GPS coordinates because GPS coordinates will take care of it.’ And we gave those over to Niantic and Niantic did whatever magic Niantic did,” he recalled. A Energy Department spokesperson confirmed his account.
Children from Switzerland look at their phones during the Pokemon Go Festival in Dortmund, Germany on July 4, 2019.
Children from Switzerland look at their phones during the Pokémon Go Festival in Dortmund, Germany, on July 4, 2019.Ina Fassbender/AFP via Getty Images
Though the buzz around the game has dwindled since 2016, Pokémon Go remains very popular worldwide, with an estimated 62 million players in 2022.
The national security worries around the game have faded, too, with U.S. officials focused on the alleged counterintelligence threats posed by other sorts of digital platforms, like the Chinese-owned social media app TikTok.
But as unsubstantiated as those fears over Pokémon Go now appear—and no matter how comedic the jaw-gnashing seems in hindsight—the alarm over the game was nonetheless evidence of a deep worry in the age of surveillance capitalism, a sort of Charizard in the coal mine.
As silly as it may sound, the brouhaha over Pokémon Go was also, in a way, historic. It “was the very first time you saw a broadly used augmented reality game” that relied on geolocation, video camera usage, and individual user data that “had mass appeal and had CI [counterintelligence] risk,” a former CIA official said.
If the game presented novel sorts of counterintelligence challenges for U.S. national security, that wasn’t on the game’s designers. For better or worse, our phones are our reality now. And, at least for a bit, for hundreds of millions of people across the globe, Pokémon Go enlivened and enchanted that reality.
Foreign Policy · by Zach Dorfman
12. Operation Undercut: Russian Influence Campaign Targets Western Support for Ukraine
Operation Undercut: Russian Influence Campaign Targets Western Support for Ukraine
Posted: 26th November 2024
By: Insikt Group®
https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/operation-undercut-shows-multifaceted-nature-sdas-influence-operations?utm
recordedfuture.com · by RecordedFuture
Summary
Operation Undercut is a covert influence operation conducted by Russia’s Social Design Agency (SDA) to sway public opinion against Ukraine and weaken Western support. Leveraging AI-enhanced videos and impersonating reputable news sources, Operation Undercut disseminates disinformation targeting audiences across the US, Ukraine, and Europe. This operation, running in tandem with other campaigns like Doppelgänger, is designed to discredit Ukraine’s leadership, question the effectiveness of Western aid, and stir socio-political tensions. The campaign also seeks to shape narratives around the 2024 US elections and geopolitical conflicts, such as the Israel-Gaza situation, to deepen divisions.
"Operation Undercut" Shows Multifaceted Nature of SDA’s Influence Operations
Russia's Social Design Agency (SDA) has been running an influence operation known as "Operation Undercut" since late 2023, aiming to erode Western support for Ukraine. Using a mix of AI-enhanced media and impersonation tactics, Operation Undercut employs advanced methods to manipulate public opinion.
Objectives
Operation Undercut is part of Russia's broader strategy to destabilize Western alliances and portray Ukraine’s leadership as ineffective and corrupt. By targeting audiences in Europe and the US, the SDA seeks to amplify anti-Ukraine sentiment, hoping to reduce the flow of Western military aid to Ukraine. The operation also spreads narratives that suggest US and EU involvement in Ukraine is misguided, costly, and largely ineffective.
In addition to undermining support for Ukraine, Operation Undercut seeks to widen existing divisions within Western societies. The campaign addresses several geopolitical issues, such as the Israel-Gaza conflict, the EU's internal politics, and the 2024 US elections. By connecting Ukraine's fate to these contentious topics, Operation Undercut attempts to stoke anxieties and polarize public opinion.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
AI-Enhanced Videos and Impersonation of News Outlets
Operation Undercut uses AI-enhanced videos and images, many of which mimic trusted media sources, to make disinformation appear credible. AI-generated voiceovers and realistic images amplify these narratives, creating content that is difficult to distinguish from legitimate news. By adopting branding elements from respected outlets, the operation enhances its content’s believability, misleading audiences and eroding trust in genuine media sources.
Targeted Social Media Campaigns
SDA's accounts post highly tailored content on multiple platforms, often using trending hashtags to reach target audiences. The content varies by region and language, including posts in English, German, French, Polish, and Turkish, ensuring that messages resonate across diverse audiences. By focusing on real-time issues, the operation maximizes its reach, though most posts have shown limited engagement.
Amplification of CopyCop Content
Operation Undercut has amplified content from CopyCop (also known as Storm-1516), a Russian influence network linked to John Mark Dougan and allegedly backed by Alexander Dugin's Centre for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) and the GRU's Unit 29155. Examples include a deepfake video featuring a supposed Hamas member threatening the 2024 Paris Olympics and an image accusing Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky of buying an Italian villa during the 2024 G7 summit.
Key Narratives
Discrediting Ukraine and Western Aid
One of Operation Undercut’s primary themes is discrediting Ukraine’s leadership and questioning the effectiveness of Western aid. The campaign accuses Ukrainian leaders of corruption, claiming they misuse foreign aid to fund luxurious lifestyles. This narrative aims to undermine public support for continued financial and military assistance to Ukraine, particularly among European audiences.
Exploiting the Israel-Gaza Conflict
The operation also attempts to manipulate public opinion regarding the Israel-Gaza conflict, alleging Western bias and intelligence manipulation. By highlighting divisive issues in global politics, Operation Undercut creates distractions and deepens divides, weakening Western alliances and distracting from Russia's involvement in Ukraine.
Tensions Within the EU and US Election Influence
Operation Undercut amplifies existing political tensions within the European Union by supporting far-right narratives and criticizing EU leaders. Similarly, it seeks to influence the 2024 US elections by framing military aid to Ukraine as a contentious political issue. By presenting Ukraine’s future as contingent on US election outcomes, the operation fosters anxiety over the West's political stability.
Mitigations
- News organizations should track content from known influence actors who are likely abusing their brand. Such abuse increases reputational risks and erodes consumer trust, potentially deterring advertisers and inflicting financial harm on the impersonated organizations.
- Political leaders and government officials from countries providing support to Ukraine should continue monitoring for content attempting to discredit them to identify and counter emerging narratives.
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Public and news organizations can use Recorded Future® Brand Intelligence to track and combat typosquatting domains and infringing content on similar domains, which can harm a news organization’s reputation.
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Clients can use the Recorded Future Intelligence Cloud to track Operation Undercut activity and Recorded Future AI to summarize and track emerging narratives.
Outlook
The SDA is expected to continue running influence operations, including Operation Undercut, while likely rebuilding infrastructure for Doppelgänger and using established content and amplification tactics. Tasked by Russia’s Presidential Administration, these operations aim to shape global opinions on Ukraine and exploit major events to undermine support for Ukraine. The investigation, which uses data from Recorded Future, government sources, and other reports, underscores the value of a collaborative approach across sectors to expose and disrupt these destabilizing activities.
To read the entire analysis, click here to download the report as a PDF.
recordedfuture.com · by RecordedFuture
13. How Trump Could Remake the CIA
A 21st century OSS?
We should start a pool. Will the Trump administration remake SOF and CIA covert action and influence and paramilitary activities into a new OSS? Perhaps Musk and Ramaswamy will see a way to gain efficiency there. It would be a bold move that they would like to make to enhance their reputations a disruptors and innovators.
Excerpts:
Additionally, Carmack argues for a return to a warrior, “OSS-like culture” at the CIA, a reference to World War II Office of Strategic Services, which served as the wartime precursor to the CIA. Like the OSS, Carmack suggests senior intelligence officers should be promoted from the ranks of those who have risked their lives in high stakes operations.
“Certain elements in the State Department, IC, and DOD [Department of Defense] trade on risk aversion or political bureaucracy to delay execution of the president’s foreign policy goals” Carmack writes. “A future conservative president should therefore identify individuals on the transition team who are familiar with the implementation of covert action with a view to placing them in key [intelligence] and DOD positions.”
How Trump Could Remake the CIA
Trump’s top intel picks, John Ratcliffe and Tulsi Gabbard, are on a collision course as Republicans plot a political takeover of U.S. intelligence agencies
By Daniel Boguslaw
November 29, 2024
Rolling Stone · by Daniel Boguslaw · November 29, 2024
Political interference, mind control, domestic spying, and generally speaking, making America worse (again). These are just some of the many grievances Donald Trump and his allies have leveled against the intelligence community in recent months. They have been repeated on podcasts, on YouTube shows, and at rallies since Trump began a vendetta against spy agencies he says colluded to destroy his 2016 campaign and presidency.
Now, the full scope of Trump’s planned war on the deep state is coming into focus thanks to the president-elect’s nomination of John Ratcliffe and Tulsi Gabbard to top intelligence posts.
Taken together, interviews with current and former intelligence officers, a close read of the Project 2025 intelligence playbook, and the biographies of Trump’s top two intel picks reveal a radical, if confused, agenda for member agencies of the U.S. intelligence community. Among the proposals likely to be attempted inside the Central Intelligence Agency are a centralization of control over other agencies, an expansion of covert operations, and a shift from the War on Terror to competition with China.
Intelligence officers who spoke with Rolling Stone say that proposals like centralizing control of intelligence agencies known for infighting, scaling back zombie programs operating with little effect since the Cold War, and tamping down the War on Terror are all logical policies that would streamline agencies’ ability to advance national security.
But given Trump’s steadfast demand for total loyalty over all else, reforms that appear sound on their face have already provoked and enraged agencies bristling at the prospect of the incoming president yanking tight on their leash. “Everyone just wants to be left alone to keep running their operations without interference,” one intelligence officer said.
One way or another, interference looms on the horizon.
During the 2024 campaign, Trump sought to distance himself from Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation-led policy and personnel program, after its highly detailed agenda drew scrutiny for its extreme proposals. Now that he’s won the presidency again, Trump has had no problem hiring several people involved with Project 2025 to serve senior roles. That includes his choice for CIA director, Ratcliffe, who was listed as a contributor to Project 2025’s right-wing policy guidebook.
The Project 2025 chapter on the intelligence community was authored by Dustin Carmack, who served as chief of staff to Ratcliffe when he held the title of director of National Intelligence during Trump’s first term. As with the Project 2025 plan for many agencies, a central pillar of Carmack’s vision for the CIA is an effort to exert political control over the agency by removing and replacing personnel.
This is proposed via several mechanisms including “requiring senior officers to sign mobility agreements that allow CIA leadership to move them within the IC [intelligence community] every two years if necessary,” and implementing an “up and out” policy, similar to military service branches that require promotion to higher ranks or retirement.
Already, CIA sources say, some senior officers plan to tender their resignations rather than be forced out the hard way. But the Project 2025 plan is not focused on personnel alone. It is also intent on digging into and gaining control over the most secretive and volatile of CIA operations: covert action. Unlike clandestine efforts in the military, which operate in secrecy but are still guided by the broad provisions that regulate armed combat, the CIA’s covert action authorities allow it to conduct influence campaigns and paramilitary operations far outside the conventional rules governing most military operations.
Project 2025 proposes that on day one, the CIA director and deputy director should be read into every special access program and covert action finding without exception. While this may seem standard fare for incoming leadership, the size and scope of the CIA enterprise means that the highest ranking positions of director and deputy director are rarely briefed with this kind of granularity.
Once political appointees and the scope of CIA operations are in the viewfinder of the new director, the plan recommends ramping up covert action in the areas prioritized by the president, and slashing operations outside this purview. By both Carmack and Trump’s account, this would result in a major shift from counterterrorism to China.
Additionally, Carmack argues for a return to a warrior, “OSS-like culture” at the CIA, a reference to World War II Office of Strategic Services, which served as the wartime precursor to the CIA. Like the OSS, Carmack suggests senior intelligence officers should be promoted from the ranks of those who have risked their lives in high stakes operations.
“Certain elements in the State Department, IC, and DOD [Department of Defense] trade on risk aversion or political bureaucracy to delay execution of the president’s foreign policy goals” Carmack writes. “A future conservative president should therefore identify individuals on the transition team who are familiar with the implementation of covert action with a view to placing them in key [intelligence] and DOD positions.”
In service of this mission, Carmack also recommends increasing availability of Pentagon assets to the CIA, writing that “many DOD capabilities, including those in the space and cyber domains, can be employed only after the initiation of armed conflict,” and that those assets should also be considered for use in the furtherance of covert action.
But there is a major hitch to Carmack’s plan, and by extension, Ratcliffe’s mandate for remaking American intelligence agencies. In the Project 2025 manifesto, centralized control lies not with the director of the CIA, but instead, with the director of National Intelligence, who, if confirmed, will be former Hawaii representative Tulsi Gabbard. Gabbard’s unpredictable foreign policy commitments and outright hostility to the intelligence community is hard to overstate.
Thanks to her dovish stance toward Russia and high-profile meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the former politician and National Guard veteran has already drawn scrutiny from senators on the Intelligence Committee who she will need to support her confirmation. Gabbard’s support for National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden and WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange have also failed to win her allies in the Senate, and positioned her in direct opposition to Project 2025’s proposed crackdown on unauthorized leaks.
Thanks to Carmack elevating the role his boss once held but holds no longer, Ratcliffe could soon be playing second fiddle to Gabbard. Not only does Project 2025 suggest that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence should be the only agency that crafts the president’s daily intelligence brief, Carmack also recommends giving the ODNI full budget authority, which would ultimately allow it to force other intelligence agencies into monetary submission.
Initially created in the wake of 9/11 in an effort to prevent the glaring intelligence-sharing failures that occurred in the run up to the attacks, ODNI has by most accounts devolved into an intelligence backwater, with little oversight and control over the dozen-plus intelligence agencies, and a directorship so powerless that more than one nominee has rebuffed the offer to become its director.
“People on both sides of the political fence hate ODNI,” says a former high ranking CIA chief. “Do I really think that another 9/11 would be stopped thanks to ODNI? Of course not. People back home would suffer through their directives, but to a large extent people in the field ignore them completely. Now if ODNI was really directing national intelligence by controlling the budget, that’s a different story. But the IC community is great at playing hide the ball, whether it’s out in the field, or with the bureaucrats in Washington.”
If the DNI was authorized to control the intelligence flow to the president, the budgets of all other agencies, and held a mandate to actualize the role that it was once intended to serve, things could change quickly. But Trump’s nomination pageant has subordinated Ratcliffe under the directorship of Gabbard, whose outlook stands in sharp contrast with Ratcliffe’s.
Project 2025 proposals like increasing surveillance of Chinese American academics, pouring gas on risky covert action, and juicing the CIA arsenal with big-ticket items from the DOD all sound like proposals Gabbard is likely to sour on. On the other hand, controlling the CIA, NSA, FBI, and a dozen other agencies could be more appealing to Gabbard. As one former CIA officer tells Rolling Stone, “It sure looks like Ratcliffe wrote the playbook and then had his balls cut off and handed to Tulsi.”
An opinion shared by all the sources who spoke with Rolling Stone is that without a coherent foreign policy, a truly radical overhaul of the intelligence community is hard to imagine. Pete Hegseth, nominated to run the Department of Defense, does not believe that women like former National Guard soldier Tulsi Gabbard should serve in combat roles. Meanwhile, Gabbard has opposed the mass surveillance programs that Ratcliffe says are essential to national defense. Ratcliffe has signaled that China should be centered as the number one threat to America, while counterterrorism czar Sebastian Gorka is frothing at the mouth to supercharge the War on Terror. Somewhere off in the Senate, Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, is furiously trying to keep up.
In 1975, it was Sen. Frank Church, who first attempted to knock the intelligence agencies down to size and into the oversight of Congress. “If this government ever became a tyranny, if a dictator ever took charge in this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of the government to know,” Church said.
Fortunately for American democracy, so far, the fears raised by Church have wavered in the face of a clown car Cabinet and an administration with the keys to the city but no clue how to walk through the door. Fights will be waged, senior officers purged, and changes to covert action, personnel hiring, and firing enacted.
But whether the intelligence agencies can be dragged into the light and forced to heel at the president’s table remains to be seen. As a former intelligence officer tells Rolling Stone, “If there’s one place the CIA thrives, it’s in chaos.”
Rolling Stone · by Daniel Boguslaw · November 29, 2024
14. The Army’s Discourse Problem
Conclusion:
None of these changes are earth shattering, but they will require a culture change in organizations. That change must start with commanders. There’s an adage that says if you want to know if you are an approachable leader, keep track if people are approaching you. An honest assessment of how healthy discourse is in Army units works the same way. Army leaders must fight against the good feeling of awed silence and hollow praise after they speak. If the commander’s ideas are not challenged, then the unit is likely operating under the dangerous assumption that those ideas are always best. This belief will not get the best out of the collective talents of our teams or solve the hardest problems facing our Army. We must do better.
The Army’s Discourse Problem - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Kareem P. Montague · November 29, 2024
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Stop me if you’ve heard this one before. Picture it—the commander and staff are assembled in the conference room. At some point during the meeting, the commander expresses an idea to the group of twenty-odd staff and noncommissioned officers. It’s not a particularly good idea, but it isn’t exactly terrible either. Think of all the times you’ve been in this exact situation. What happens next? In my experience two things normally happen. First, there is an awkwardly long silence before anyone says anything. Then, when someone finally speaks up, the comments often begin with something to the effect of “Sir, you’re exactly right” or “Ma’am, that’s a great idea,” which is then followed by further glowingly supportive remarks. Be honest: How often have you seen this before?
The level of the command doesn’t matter—it could be battalion, brigade, division—nor does the relative experience of the rest of the participants. There is something about the culture of the US Army that elicits this sort of interaction too often. I think back to when I was a young officer, and this exact scenario played out during a discussion of the relatively mundane subject of the party favor at the upcoming unit ball. We decided on a beer glass as a table gift for everyone who attended. The commander assessed that at least two thirds of the unit would attend and at least half of them would bring dates. Both of those assumptions were shockingly inaccurate, and if there were people in the meeting who thought they might be, they didn’t voice that opinion. The unit ended up buying twice as many glasses as we needed, offering the leftovers for sale at the staff duty desk for the next three years. I think four of them were sold before the boxes were moved into a storage closet. They might still be there.
The Deference Pause and Well-Meaning Sycophancy
Let’s address both initial responses. But to do that, we must talk about the elephant in the room. The Army is a rigidly hierarchical organization. The reason is simple: a foundational truth about combat is that there will come a time when a superior gives an order to a subordinate that will put that individual in harm’s way. Self-preservation is fundamental to human nature, so countering this potent survival urge and replacing it with compliance without question requires conditioning and training. This starts at initial entry training for all soldiers and continues in their units. We are taught to recognize the importance of rank and the necessities of obedience.
The problem is that this critical combat skill has bled into other aspects of military interaction. The most potentially damning effect is the negative impact on discourse. Which brings us back to the commander and the conference room. The deference pause seems harmless at first. Who wouldn’t want to ensure that the commander is done speaking before providing a follow-on comment? The problem is that the pause adds gravity and weight to the commander’s remarks, making it more difficult to be critical of them. Silence builds tension, in movies, in music, and especially in conversation. Tension rarely works in favor of the subordinate. A natural offshoot of that tension is a desire for release. Which is how we come to those sycophantic follow-on comments. “You’re exactly right,” “We never considered that,” “This will really help the staff”—these do not add value to any substantive discourse, but they too often dominate senior/subordinate interaction. There is a leadership truism—that if two of us agree on everything, one of us is unnecessary—which is apt here. I think we can agree that we want productive discourse to allow for the best decisions through the collective consideration of hard problems, and that strict adherence to hierarchy runs counter to that aim. What remains is a consideration of how we can get better.
Another Way: An Allied Case Study
I’ve spent the last six months assigned to French Land Forces Command as a deputy commanding general. This has allowed me to participate in high-level military engagements on all manner of topics affecting French forces, from future force design to personnel and recruiting. The obvious challenge is that these discussions all take place in French. As a result, I must really pay attention and, though I often miss some of the nuance, I also need to stay attuned to the group dynamics. While the French military has all the pre- and post-meeting pomp and circumstance (we stand at attention prior to the entrance and exit of the commander), a funny thing happens during the meeting. While every topic starts as a presentation, they all end up feeling more like the Thanksgiving dinner table. Participants lean in, various members have back-and-forth engagements with the commander and with each other. There are even times when (gasp!) someone starts speaking before the last person is finished, even if that last person is the commander. There are no pauses, no wasted platitudes; it’s a free exchange of ideas. None of this takes away from the authority of the commander and when a decision is required, his is often the final voice, but not always. Time will tell if this ultimately leads to better decisions, but the richness of the dialogue is admirable. The question, though, is if it’s replicable—particularly in an organization, with a deep-seated culture of deference.
What Do We Do About It?
Army culture is difficult to change, and it is not often a quick process. The good news is that commanders may be at the heart of the problem, which positions them to lead change on the solution. It may be slow, but I would posit three recommendations for Army leaders.
First, commanders must set a tone that encourages discourse. This must be an overcorrection. The Army’s cultural tendency toward deference cannot be countered with minor adjustments. For example, saying that you are open-minded and encourage open discussion is insufficient. It will require both strong words and strong actions. Privately counsel staff members who are too supportive of your positions. Recognize that your ideas can be bad and reward pushback. Be wary of superficial changes, which will likely have the opposite effect on your people.
Second, pick smart, confident people. Your people might be your problem, and chances are you were involved in selecting them. Look for a balance between those you have worked with before and those you haven’t—and if there is a bias, make it in favor of the latter. Studying, reading, and writing can be markers for quick and agile minds. Seek those minds in your organization. Fight the tendency to favor experience over characteristics. In the words of Frederick the Great, “the faculty of combining ideas, is what distinguishes man from beasts of burden. A mule, though he should have made ten campaigns under prince Eugene, would not have improved in his tactics.”
Finally, build structures in your organization to foster healthy cynicism. Is your unit a learning organization? Popularized in Peter Senge’s The Fifth Discipline, the idea of learning organizations centers on constructing the types of groups required for the complex problems of the modern world. Commanders must develop systems that get the best out of their people, collectively, to drive better results. How a unit treats skepticism—and more importantly, whether it recognizes and encourages it—is part of the answer. Think about clarifying to your organization the times and events where discourse is critical to outcomes. Those meetings should be frequent and feel different, and your behavior should be different, freeing your subordinates to unleash their creativity and critical thinking.
None of these changes are earth shattering, but they will require a culture change in organizations. That change must start with commanders. There’s an adage that says if you want to know if you are an approachable leader, keep track if people are approaching you. An honest assessment of how healthy discourse is in Army units works the same way. Army leaders must fight against the good feeling of awed silence and hollow praise after they speak. If the commander’s ideas are not challenged, then the unit is likely operating under the dangerous assumption that those ideas are always best. This belief will not get the best out of the collective talents of our teams or solve the hardest problems facing our Army. We must do better.
Brigadier General Kareem P. “Monty” Montague currently serves as the deputy commanding general for interoperability of the French Army’s Land Forces and Operations Command.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Capt. Steven L. Wesolowski, US Army
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Kareem P. Montague · November 29, 2024
15. Governed & Ungoverned Spaces: What They Have Taught Us About Counterterror Strategy
Excerpts:
The desire for self-determination has fueled political uprisings, secessionist movements, and conflicts across the globe. Various groups, often marginalized and dispossessed, have sought independence or greater autonomy through a range of means, including violent insurgencies, peaceful protest, and diplomatic negotiation. Among these are the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque separatists in Spain, the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Palestinians, and the Hong Kong independence movement. Although their contexts differ widely, their struggles share a common thread: an enduring pursuit of self-rule against what they perceive as oppressive governance. This article examines why various groups have pursued independence, the strategies they have employed, the successes of these efforts, and the lessons that can be learned in both independence movements and counterterrorism. Additionally, insights from the relationship between governance and independence suggest what is possible and what is not achievable in ungoverned spaces.
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This is a wicked lessons-learned problem. USSOCOM should be working hard to address this issue as the U.S. military lead for countering terror. But it is not. Perhaps it is an unnoticed problem just waiting for a general officer to discover it and demand a solution. Until then, “mowing the grass” will be the modus operandi of special operational forces. Despite over twenty years of effort at both, no lessons or improved theories regarding governed and ungoverned spaces are being developed. History will likely repeat itself in future CT operations in ungoverned spaces while USSOCOM shrugs at this "hidden" problem.
Governed & Ungoverned Spaces: What They Have Taught Us About Counterterror Strategy
Strategy Central
For And By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth - November 30, 2024
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/governed-ungoverned-spaces-what-they-have-taught-us-about-counterterror-strategy?postId=27320418-281e-4923-8d65-785dcf4df8d4&utm
Introduction
The desire for self-determination has fueled political uprisings, secessionist movements, and conflicts across the globe. Various groups, often marginalized and dispossessed, have sought independence or greater autonomy through a range of means, including violent insurgencies, peaceful protest, and diplomatic negotiation. Among these are the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque separatists in Spain, the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Palestinians, and the Hong Kong independence movement. Although their contexts differ widely, their struggles share a common thread: an enduring pursuit of self-rule against what they perceive as oppressive governance. This article examines why various groups have pursued independence, the strategies they have employed, the successes of these efforts, and the lessons that can be learned in both independence movements and counterterrorism. Additionally, insights from the relationship between governance and independence suggest what is possible and what is not achievable in ungoverned spaces.
Historical Context and Motivation for Independence
For the IRA, Basque separatists, Kurds, Palestinians, and Hong Kong activists, a sense of historical grievance, perceived oppression, cultural identity, and marginalization under centralized authorities have driven their pursuit of independence or autonomy.
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) sought to end British control in Northern Ireland and establish a united Ireland. This cause was driven by centuries of British colonial control, discrimination against the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, and the desire to unify Ireland. The partition of Ireland in 1921 left many Irish nationalists dissatisfied, leading to a violent struggle that escalated into the Troubles of 1969-1998. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 ultimately resulted in significant political autonomy for Northern Ireland but did not accomplish full reunification, leaving some factions of the IRA unsatisfied.
The Basque separatist movement in Spain, notably represented by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), aimed to create an independent Basque homeland across the regions of Spain and France. Basques, with their unique language and culture, felt marginalized by the Spanish state. Under Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975), regional identities and languages, including Basque culture, were harshly repressed, fueling a desire for secession. Despite Spain’s transition to democracy and a level of regional autonomy granted to the Basque Country, ETA continued its violent campaign until formally declaring an end to its armed activities in 2011.
The Kurdish people, an ethnic minority spread across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, have long sought a homeland of their own—referred to as Kurdistan. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I initially presented the possibility of an independent Kurdistan, but those aspirations were quickly thwarted as the region was divided among new national borders. In Turkey, Kurdish identity was forcibly assimilated, with language and culture heavily suppressed. In Iraq, Kurdish regions faced violent repression, most notably during Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign in the late 1980s, which included chemical attacks. The Kurds have used different strategies across each country, ranging from armed insurgency to political integration.
The Palestinian struggle is deeply tied to the establishment of Israel in 1948, which led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. The Palestinian leadership has repeatedly rejected an independent state and sought a violent means of destroying Israel. While some groups have pressed for the establishment of an independent state comprising the West Bank and Gaza Strip and equal rights within Israelis, the issue remains contentious. Organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and Hezbollah have pursued a mixture of armed resistance, negotiations, and international advocacy with limited success.
In recent years, the Hong Kong Independence movement has emerged in response to Beijing's increasing control over the semi-autonomous territory, undermining freedoms promised under the "one country, two systems" framework established at the handover from British rule in 1997. The 2019 protests against the proposed extradition bill highlighted the growing frustration of Hongkongers with the perceived erosion of their rights. Unlike the other movements, the Hong Kong struggle is characterized by non-violent mass protests and civil disobedience, yet it faces a formidable adversary in the Chinese Communist Party.
Strategies Employed by Independence Movements
The tactics of these movements vary widely, but most have utilized a blend of irregular warfare, political mobilization, and diplomatic engagement. Irregular warfare, which includes terrorism, guerrilla tactics, and insurgency, has often been deployed to force concessions, attract attention, and disrupt government control.
The IRA, through its Provisional branch, conducted bombings, assassinations, and ambushes, targeting British forces, police, and economic infrastructure in Northern Ireland and on the British mainland. The Basque ETA similarly used car bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations to terrorize the Spanish state and draw attention to their cause.
Kurdish groups employed different strategies depending on their location. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Turkish military, while the Kurds in Iraq oscillated between armed uprisings and cooperation with foreign powers, such as the United States, which supported them against Saddam Hussein.
For the Palestinians, irregular warfare and armed resistance have been integral since the formation of militant groups like the PLO’s Fatah and Hamas. These groups engaged in guerrilla attacks, suicide bombings, and rocket fire against Israeli targets. The First Intifada (1987-1993) relied more on civil disobedience, whereas an armed insurgency characterized the Second Intifada (2000-2005).
The Hong Kong independence movement did not employ irregular warfare. Instead, it relied on mass protests, strikes, and international advocacy. Protesters employed creative tactics such as the “be water” strategy to outmaneuver police and adopted decentralized leadership to reduce vulnerability.
Successes and Failures of Irregular Warfare
The effectiveness of irregular warfare, or terrorism, to achieve political goals is a subject of much debate. Historically, these campaigns have had mixed results, often garnering international attention but falling short of achieving their ultimate political objectives.
The IRA had some success in pressuring the British government to enter negotiations, culminating in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which granted significant political representation for nationalists. However, this came at the cost of a decades-long conflict that claimed over 3,500 lives. The use of violence alienated many potential supporters and led to a protracted stalemate until both sides were exhausted.
The Basque ETA ended its violent campaign in 2011 without achieving independence, though it succeeded in raising awareness of the Basque cause. The Spanish government granted the Basque region a high degree of autonomy in the 1979 Statute of Autonomy, but violence ultimately hardened the Spanish state’s resolve against full independence.
The Kurds have seen varying degrees of success. In Iraq, armed struggle combined with opportunistic alliances with foreign powers eventually led to establishing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a semi-autonomous region. Conversely, in Turkey, the PKK's violent insurgency has largely resulted in a brutal crackdown by Turkish authorities, leaving little political progress toward Kurdish autonomy.
For the Palestinians, irregular warfare has not succeeded in securing an independent state. The use of violence, particularly by Hamas, has often invited heavy retaliation from Israel and led to a cycle of violence that has significantly harmed civilian populations, damaged infrastructure, and hardened international perception of Palestinian militancy.
The absence of violent tactics in Hong Kong has not translated to political success. Despite garnering significant international attention, the movement has been met with severe repression, including mass arrests, the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, and the disqualification of pro-democracy candidates. The non-violent strategy has been morally commendable but has had limited success in achieving its goals of autonomy or independence.
Most and Least Successful Tactics
The most successful tactics across these movements have often been political negotiations and international advocacy rather than violence. The Good Friday Agreement is a rare example of an insurgent group (IRA) achieving a negotiated outcome addressing some of its core grievances. Similarly, the Kurdish regional autonomy in Iraq was achieved largely due to international alliances and diplomatic engagement rather than insurgency alone.
Violence against civilians has consistently been counterproductive. The IRA’s bombing campaign alienated segments of the public in Northern Ireland and the broader UK, hindering the movement’s legitimacy. The PKK’s insurgency in Turkey invited brutal state crackdowns, leaving the Kurds in Turkey with fewer rights than they had before their campaign. The Second Intifada damaged the Palestinian cause by increasing international skepticism of Palestinian statehood and justifying heavy Israeli countermeasures. While the Palestinian cause gained support after the October 7, 2023, attack, Israel’s campaign to crush Hamas and Hezbollah as functional entities has been shockingly effective and left the Palestinian cause and people in a precarious position.
The Hong Kong movement’s use of mass protest was initially successful in pressuring the government to withdraw the extradition bill. Still, the subsequent national crackdown demonstrated the limits of non-violent protest against an authoritarian state with a high tolerance for repression.
Effectiveness of Political Movements
Political efforts have been crucial in gaining legitimacy and limited autonomy for these groups. In Northern Ireland, political mobilization through Sinn Féin complemented the IRA’s armed struggle, eventually leading to a peace process that resulted in greater nationalist representation and power-sharing. For the Basques, political parties advocating independence within the Spanish democratic framework have won a significant amount of regional power.
The KRG in Iraq succeeded in achieving semi-autonomy largely through political maneuvering and alliances with the U.S., especially during the Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and subsequent support to counter ISIS. The Palestinian Authority was a product of negotiations during the Oslo Accords, offering a limited form of self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. However, the ultimate aim of statehood remains elusive. In Hong Kong, political mobilization has faced the challenge of a rapidly shrinking space for dissent. Many of its leaders have been arrested or forced into exile, and Beijing’s political intervention has neutered the once-vibrant democratic process.
Lessons for Counterterrorism
The common lesson across these movements is that irregular warfare alone is insufficient to achieve political independence and often invites severe repression. Counter-terrorism strategies must recognize the underlying grievances driving these movements. Heavy-handed tactics can often exacerbate tensions and increase popular support for insurgents. Conversely, successful counter-insurgency efforts have often involved addressing legitimate grievances through political compromise and reform.
States facing separatist movements that employ terrorism must strike a careful balance between maintaining security and addressing the underlying causes of the unrest. Counter-terrorism operations should aim to minimize harm to civilians and avoid alienating the broader population, as heavy-handed responses often play into the insurgents' narrative and increase support for their cause. Successful strategies often involve a dual approach of security measures to curb violence and political engagement to address legitimate grievances.
Engaging in dialogue with moderate factions, offering pathways for peaceful political participation, and providing incentives for disarmament can help to isolate hardline elements and reduce violence. The success of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland and the partial autonomy granted to the Basques in Spain underscore the importance of political solutions in resolving conflicts rooted in identity and self-determination. At the same time, states must remain vigilant against acts of terrorism and ensure that security operations are conducted to respect human rights and build public trust.
The future of these independence movements appears to rest on their ability to adapt to changing conditions, embrace political engagement, and maintain international support. Without addressing core grievances, independence movements are unlikely to fade away, and repressive measures will only temporarily contain them.
Separation and Governance Challenges
The examples of autonomy discussed in this analysis all share a common theme: they are movements opposed to a strong central government. Since 2001, the U.S. has focused its efforts on combating terrorism in areas governed by weak or no states. This situation requires a different approach, as there is often no established authority to resist acts of terrorism or counteract propaganda. The Western strategy has been to develop a force capable of containing or defeating terrorists while simultaneously building governance capabilities in ungoverned spaces. Unfortunately, this approach has largely failed.
The concept of "ungoverned space" led to the development of the "no safe havens" theory that coexists with Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine. COIN doctrine and the “no safe havens” theory serve as the foundation for creating forces and governance structures that deny terrorist areas free from government control. This approach has been implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, and various areas across the Middle East and Africa. Even when there is a weak local government to build from, creating a “shake and bake” security force and accompanying governance capability is almost impossible. The notable failures of this theory raise important questions about what we can learn from regions where effective governance has successfully addressed autonomy movements.
As we learned from the examples in this analysis, political redress is the most effective method of resolving autonomous groups' desire for independence. If a given group establishes a presence in and control over a given area and operates with impunity, the “safe haven” approach seems logical. This is even more complicated as there may be no grievance to resolve. However, addressing “safe havens” cannot be done on a global scale or even limited to the Middle East and North Africa. Governance is a solution, but building a government from scratch is not a workable solution unless the local populous wants it and will strive to build it. This is a rarity. The alternative U.S. strategy has been attrition, but this approach cannot adequately resolve underlying grievances or prevent a group from operating in an ungoverned space.
Attrition is likely to perpetuate grievances, and with little chance for a negotiated settlement—especially in regions dominated by powerful terrorist groups—we are left without good answers. If the terrorist group is driven by an ideology, religion, or simple lust for power and control, the “grievance” is likely not something to be solved. Perhaps this reflects the human condition, suggesting that no effective solutions exist in areas devoid of governing authority other than applying the “mow the grass” theory of attrition. If we must accept that no other workable options are available, then we may have to resign ourselves to loss, pain, and suffering as the cost of maintaining the current Global Liberal Internationalist System established and upheld by the United States after World War II. This conclusion is highly unsatisfactory. Nonetheless, the United States, particularly its special operations forces, has embraced the “no safe havens” theory and the attrition it demands as a fundamental principle. With no alternatives, this approach is simply accepted and not questioned.
This is a wicked lessons-learned problem. USSOCOM should be working hard to address this issue as the U.S. military lead for countering terror. But it is not. Perhaps it is an unnoticed problem just waiting for a general officer to discover it and demand a solution. Until then, “mowing the grass” will be the modus operandi of special operational forces. Despite over twenty years of effort at both, no lessons or improved theories regarding governed and ungoverned spaces are being developed. History will likely repeat itself in future CT operations in ungoverned spaces while USSOCOM shrugs at this "hidden" problem.
Bibliography
- Coogan, Tim Pat. The IRA: A History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- Conversi, Daniele. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997.
- Gunter, Michael M. The Kurds: A Modern History. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2016.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond. The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East. New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Milton-Edwards, Beverley, and Peter Hinchcliffe. Conflicts in the Middle East Since 1945. New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Ruan, Qingzhi. Hong Kong and China: A Fragile Relationship. London: Routledge, 2021.
16. US-Philippines alliance: on shaky ground under Trump 2.0?
I hope the President-elect's advisors can articulate the geostrategic importance of the Philippines and the alliance to the defense of US interests and for achieving victory in strategic competition and war.
US-Philippines alliance: on shaky ground under Trump 2.0?
The US president-elect’s interest in containing China militarily and supporting the Philippines’ defence remains an open question
Alan RoblesandRaissa Robles
Published: 8:00am, 30 Nov 2024
For the past eight decades, the Philippines has anchored its foreign policy in a steadfast alliance with the United States, based on mutual security interests and deep historical ties. But as Donald Trump prepares to reclaim the White House, this partnership now faces a formidable test.
Observers warn that Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy and unpredictable leadership style could strain cooperation between the two treaty allies, at a time when unified action looks ever more essential amid rising tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea.
Given Trump’s reputation “for squeezing allies or resources in order to offer some sort of promise for their defence”, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr’s administration is likely concerned about the future, according to Walden Bello, an economist and former Philippine congressman.
“My sense is Malacanang Palace probably knows that the close relationship … is not going to persist under Trump,” he told This Week in Asia, referring to the Philippine president’s official residence.
Beyond their mutual defence obligations, the Philippines relies heavily on the US for aid packages, military modernisation support, intelligence sharing and joint training exercises.
Donald Trump hugs and kisses the American flag during an event in February. His return to the White House will put US-Philippine ties to the test. Photo: AP
For Washington, this long-standing alliance – nurtured under outgoing President Joe Biden – provides strategic access to Philippine military bases and a key partner in countering Beijing’s expansionism, particularly regarding Taiwan.
Trump’s return to the White House could herald a reduction in US military engagement with the region, however, leaving the Philippines more exposed to China’s growing encroachment of its maritime territory.
“Will the Trump administration follow Biden’s foreign policy of militarily containing China? I have doubts about that,” said Bello, co-chair of the Focus on the Global South think tank and an honorary research fellow at The State University of New York at Binghamton.
Bello, who previously stirred controversy by predicting Trump’s re-election, told This Week in Asia that the appeal of the returning president lies not in any compelling vision for the future but in his ability to “capitalise on people’s fears” about the economy, immigration and conflict.
“Trump is mainly interested in economic stuff and walling off the US from Chinese imports. He’s not really that much into containing China militarily,” he said.
US soldiers alight from a helicopter during a joint military exercise held in the Philippines in May. Photo: AP
A diminished US military focus could affect “not only the Philippines”, but also South Korea and Japan, said the former congressman, who has long advocated the withdrawal of American forces from all three countries.
Meanwhile, the inclusion of Elon Musk in Trump’s new administration has also drawn scrutiny of the Tesla and SpaceX CEO’s business ties with China, the potential impact on Washington’s relations with Beijing and how this might affect Manila.
But Trump’s straightforward political style may ultimately benefit the US-Philippine alliance, according to defence and security analyst Renato Cruz De Castro, a distinguished professor of international studies at De La Salle University in Manila.
“His foreign policy is simple: make America great again. Making sure that the US maintains its leadership role on the basis of power,” he told This Week in Asia.
Trump “initiated the strategic competition against China” and intensified freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, De Castro pointed out, with US Navy ships sailing through waters claimed by Beijing – a move guaranteed to provoke China.
It was also under Trump that the White House started using the term “Indo-Pacific”, he said – signalling a commitment to countering China and reaffirming US engagement with the region.
Business as usual?
What the media has dubbed “Trump 2.0” is expected to “continue strategic competition with China and build up American forces here in the Indo-Pacific”, De Castro predicted. “In fact, the first thing that he will do is increase the defence budget.”
According to De Castro, the motivation for supporting Manila will stem from the US’ broader strategic rivalry with Beijing rather than genuine concern for the Philippines’ maritime sovereignty.
Other observers shared this view that the Philippine-US alliance will remain “business as usual” under the new administration.
“I don’t want to get out ahead of what the Trump administration will do,” said US Ambassador to the Philippines Marykay Carlson during the Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea on November 8. “But I think it’s very clear that there is strong bipartisan support for the US-Philippine alliance.”
She added that she was “very confident” Trump would emphasise the importance of the two countries’ ties.
Mike Pompeo (right) shakes hands with the Philippines’ then-president Rodrigo Duterte during a visit to Manila in February 2019. Photo: AP
Mike Pompeo, Trump’s previous secretary of state, confirmed in March 2019 that any armed attack on Philippine forces or vessels in the South China Sea would trigger their 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty.
“It was under the Trump administration when the United States finally stated once and for all that the Mutual Defence Treaty applies to the South China Sea,” said Jeffrey Ordaniel, convenor of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Expert Working Group, at the Manila Dialogue.
Trump’s previous administration also took steps to shore up defence ties with Manila, initiating donations of surveillance drones to the Philippine military in 2020 as a gesture to mend relations after Duterte repeatedly threatened to scrap the Visiting Forces Agreement that allows for US troop presence in the Philippines.
So how committed is Trump to the region? “We have no idea. In four years in office, he never said the words ‘South China Sea’,” said Gregory Poling, director of the Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and author of On Dangerous Ground: America’s Century in the South China Sea.
“But there is a strong consensus among Republican members of the Congress and probably among those who he’ll put in his cabinet. So I would be cautiously optimistic that we see policy remain stable.”
Trump embraces Marco Rubio during a campaign rally in North Carolina on November 4. Photo: AFP/Getty Images/TNS
Trump has already made nominations for cabinet positions that will influence US-Philippines relations. Marco Rubio, his pick for secretary of state, is “very much familiar with the Philippines and is very anti-communist”, De Castro said.
Rubio has previously stressed the strategic importance of the Philippines to US interests, particularly in countering Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, and has emphasised the need for US support to deter China’s ambitions in the region – citing its refusal to accept the 2016 ruling that rejected its claims over Philippine territory.
Meanwhile, Pete Hegseth, Trump’s nominee for defence secretary, remains more of an unknown. De Castro said he had “no idea” what Hegseth knew about the Philippines, noting that many had expected Pompeo to be chosen instead.
As for Trump himself, Bello said the US president-elect is “very personalistic in terms of relationships with heads of state”, which could have implications for Marcos.
“I think he will not like the fact that Biden and [vice-president Kamala] Harris and Marcos had a very good relationship. Marcos will have to exert some effort to win him over.”
The Philippines has, under Marcos, practically outsourced its foreign and military policy to the United States
Walden Bello, ex-Philippine congressman
Marcos said he called Trump on November 19 to congratulate him on his victory but shared few details about their conversation, noting only that Trump asked, “How’s Imelda?” – a reference to Marcos’s mother, now 95 and rarely seen in public. Known for her wealth and alleged corruption, Imelda Marcos last encountered Trump socially in the early 1990s.
When asked about future relations between Marcos and Trump, Poling said he did not think the US president-elect had “any particular personal attachment to the Philippines or to the Marcoses”, adding that “the alliance is not dependent on who’s in the White House and who’s in Malacanang”.
“You will have a whole lot of people around him telling him that the Philippine alliance is important,” he said.
“I think that President Marcos is the kind of savvy politician who knows how to work a man like Donald Trump. I’m sure he’ll be able to get along just fine.”
‘Waltzing with a Dictator’
In contrast to the steady relationship Marcos enjoyed with Biden, analysts warn that he will need to adapt to Trump’s unpredictable style.
Elected in 2022 during Biden’s term, Marcos has sought to replicate the kind of arrangement his father had with the US from 1965 to 1986. During that era, five US presidents overlooked allegations of human rights abuses and corruption by Ferdinand Marcos Snr in exchange for access to military bases in the Philippines – a dynamic American investigative reporter Raymond Bonner called Waltzing with a Dictator in his 1987 book of the same name.
So far, Marcos Jnr has mirrored this waltz with a US administration under Biden that’s been eager to collaborate against Chinese expansionism and overlook his family’s past crimes.
“Look at it this way: when Marcos came in there were five EDCA (Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement) sites; there are now nine. And basically, whatever happens at those bases, the Philippine government doesn’t know about,” said Bello, the former Philippine congressman.
“The Philippines has, under Marcos, practically outsourced its foreign and military policy to the United States.”
American soldiers conduct battle drills with their Filipino counterparts during the annual joint Exercise Balikatan in April. Photo: US Army
However, this arrangement could deteriorate under Trump, warned Roland Simbulan, a former University of the Philippines professor who is now vice chair of the Centre for People Empowerment in Governance and has written multiple books on Philippine-US security ties.
Based on his past actions and campaign promises, “Trump’s position is that if allies are going to get support from the US, they’re going to have to buy it,” Simbulan said. “[He believes] it should not just be the responsibility of the US to bankroll or finance the defence of these countries.”
Bello agreed that when dealing with governments, Trump asks, “what’s in it for me? In terms of what the US can gain”.
“He looks at military and security relationships as transactional,” he said. “If you can pay, great. If you can’t pay, then we can’t guarantee your security.”
Unlike South Korea and Japan, the Philippines may lack the financial means to secure increased US support, which could lead to cuts instead, Bello said.
He speculated that Trump might leverage the Marcos family’s estimated “US$5 billion to US$10 billion” in plundered assets stashed abroad during negotiations. “I don’t think Trump is stupid,” Bello said. “Don’t think he will not make an effort to use that as a negotiating leverage.” He noted that with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US “essentially froze the assets of Russian oligarchs” – an approach that Trump could consider repeating.
“I wouldn’t be surprised if Malacanang is worried about that,” Bello added.
Global reaction to Trump's win in the US presidential election
Ultimately, the Philippines may feel forced to seek out other partners and allies, De Castro said. “Not because of Trump, but simply because the United States is an external power,” he said. “We need to rely on security partners who are also in the region … the best candidates are Japan, South Korea and even Australia.”
Poling, however, expressed scepticism that such drastic adjustments to Manila’s foreign policy would be needed, emphasising the relative stability of the US-Philippines alliance.
“I think the Philippines should stay the course,” he said, noting that the absence of permanent US military bases in the Southeast Asian nation means “no issue of cost sharing”.
“Trump will go after the Europeans, and then maybe he’ll go after the Koreans. But he has no animus towards the Philippines.”
This could present an opportunity for Manila to chart a new foreign policy direction, Bello said, although he remained pessimistic about Marcos’ ability to navigate these complexities.
“I served with Marcos in Congress, back around 2009, 2010, and let me tell you, the guy has no sense of what a national interest is,” Bello said.
“He spent most of the time outside Congress and really hardly delivered a speech or anything. Not a person known for having foreign policy savvy.”
Alan Robles
FOLLOW
Alan Robles has been a journalist for more than 30 years and has written for the SCMP since 2002. A freelance foreign correspondent specialising in politics, development, foreign affairs, science, environment and IT, he has a humour column at abs-cbnnews.com and runs the political satire site hotmanila.ph. He lectured for 12 years on digital media at the Internationales Institut fuer Journalismus in Berlin.
Raissa Robles
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Raissa Robles has written for the SCMP since 1996. A freelance journalist specialising in politics, international relations, business and Muslim rebellion, she has contributed to Reuters, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Daily Mail, Times of London, Radio Netherlands and Asiaweek.
17. China backing wrong side in Myanmar's civil war
Will China cultivate alliances to counter the Trump administration?
Excerpts:
With the prospect of a hawkish US administration under Donald Trump, China would benefit from cultivating broader international alliances. Aligning with the NUG, which possesses greater legitimacy than the SAC, could enhance China’s global image and reputation.
China’s ambition for national rejuvenation and modernization by its centenary in 2049 demands long-term strategies over short term solutions. History demonstrates that regimes like the SAC, which lack popular support, are ultimately unsustainable.
China would do well to heed the adage, “He that lies down with dogs rises with fleas.” By recalibrating its stance on Myanmar, however, China has a rare opportunity to earn the goodwill of the Myanmar people at a pivotal moment—and at a bargain price.
Now is the time for China to act decisively. By distancing itself from the failing junta and embracing the NUG, China can secure its better global standing as well as a more stable and prosperous future for both itself and Myanmar.
For China, to borrow Voltaire’s timeless wisdom: “With great power comes great responsibility.”
China backing wrong side in Myanmar's civil war - Asia Times
China’s lean toward junta forces won’t be forgotten by the Myanmar people but it’s not too late to get on the right side of history
asiatimes.com · by Than N Oo · November 29, 2024
China’s rapid economic growth, accompanied by an equally swift expansion of its military over the past 30 years, has elevated it from a regional power to a global powerhouse.
The 2023 US Department of Defense Annual Report titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” acknowledged China as the only competitor with the capacity to reshape the international order, cementing its status as a superpower.
At the heart of China’s strategy for national rejuvenation lies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to expand global transportation and trade linkages essential for its sustained growth and development. This strategy is intertwined with China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) concept, ensuring that economic advancements can simultaneously bolster its military capacity, creating dual-purpose applications.
Among the six economic corridors under the BRI, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor—later rebranded as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)—is pivotal. CMEC links China’s Yunnan province to the Chinese-built Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, providing direct access to the Bay of Bengal.
This corridor is a cornerstone of China’s efforts to overcome the “Malacca Dilemma,” ensuring secure energy supplies and the steady flow of natural resources vital for its economic stability. CMEC also aligns with China’s “String of Pearls” strategy—a network of logistic support points in the Indian Ocean—and complements its “Two-Ocean” strategy.
Given this, it is imperative for China to maintain Myanmar within its sphere of influence to keep CMEC operational, regardless of who governs the country. However, recent developments suggest that China may be placing its bets on the wrong horse.
History of hedging
Historically, China has hedged its influence in Myanmar by simultaneously supporting the Myanmar military (MM) and various ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) along its border.
For decades these EROs have fought MM for greater autonomy and at times China has brokered ceasefire agreements between them all just to maintain a stable trading environment and to safeguard its investments in the region.
Initially, following the Myanmar military’s coup in 2021, China refrained from openly backing the junta (State Administrative Council – SAC). However, as Myanmar’s Spring Revolution gained momentum and battlefield dynamics shifted, China’s position evolved.
The emergence of People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) across the country forced Myanmar’s military to stretch its troops thin, simultaneously battling multiple EROs and PDFs.
The turning point came during Operation 1027, where the military lost significant territory in northern Shan state to the EROs. Simultaneously, the Arakan Army (AA) gained substantial ground in Rakhine state, surrounding the strategic Kyaukphyu port. In Kachin state, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) achieved unprecedented success against the military.
Faced with these developments, China adjusted its approach and began openly supporting the military regime. This shift was marked by Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyidaw in August 2024 and culminated in junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to China in November 2024—his first since the coup.
China has also pressured border-sharing EROs, such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), by closing border gates and disrupting trade, urging them to avoid collaborating with PDFs or National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel exile government.
Additionally, China agreed to deploy private security forces to protect its economic investments in Myanmar, akin to other mercenary groups like the Wagner Group.
Risks of backing the junta
China’s support for the SAC could backfire in the long run. The Myanmar military regime is teetering on collapse—it’s only a matter of time. EROs that don’t share borders with China, such as the AA, Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), and Chin groups, remain beyond China’s direct influence.
Even border-sharing EROs like the TNLA and MNDAA have continued fighting the military despite ceasefire agreements. This persistence stems from the military’s repeated failure to honor agreements, eroding trust.
Furthermore, EROs recognize that true autonomy and security are unattainable under any Myanmar military regime. Many see their best chance in a federal democratic Myanmar.
Unofficial reports suggest that EROs and the NUG may have reached a consensus on this vision, even if geopolitical sensitivities have delayed a formal announcement.
The SAC is deeply unpopular among Myanmar’s citizens. Beyond its illegitimacy, life under its rule has become increasingly unbearable due to economic hardships. For the first time in 60 years, the Myanmar military is despised even by the Bamar ethnic majority in central Myanmar.
NUG a better bet
In contrast, the NUG has taken a pragmatic approach to China, publicly committing to safeguard Chinese investments through its 10-point “Position on China” released on January 1, 2024.
Aligning with the NUG, which enjoys widespread domestic support, would not only stabilize Myanmar but also create a conducive environment for trade and investment, bolstering China’s BRI objectives. Moreover, such a move would earn China goodwill from ASEAN countries, which largely shun the SAC.
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Min Aung Hlaing is an unreliable ally for China. He has previously courted Russia to counterbalance China’s influence, only to return to Beijing when Moscow couldn’t meet his needs. He has also covertly encouraged ultranationalists to stage anti-China protests in Myanmar, highlighting his duplicitous nature.
The Myanmar military, as an institution, harbors historical animosity toward China due to its battles against Chinese-backed Burmese Communist Party troops in the 1970s and 1980s.
Strategic opportunity
With the prospect of a hawkish US administration under Donald Trump, China would benefit from cultivating broader international alliances. Aligning with the NUG, which possesses greater legitimacy than the SAC, could enhance China’s global image and reputation.
China’s ambition for national rejuvenation and modernization by its centenary in 2049 demands long-term strategies over short term solutions. History demonstrates that regimes like the SAC, which lack popular support, are ultimately unsustainable.
China would do well to heed the adage, “He that lies down with dogs rises with fleas.” By recalibrating its stance on Myanmar, however, China has a rare opportunity to earn the goodwill of the Myanmar people at a pivotal moment—and at a bargain price.
Now is the time for China to act decisively. By distancing itself from the failing junta and embracing the NUG, China can secure its better global standing as well as a more stable and prosperous future for both itself and Myanmar.
For China, to borrow Voltaire’s timeless wisdom: “With great power comes great responsibility.”
Than N Oo is a Myanmar analyst and activist
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asiatimes.com · by Than N Oo · November 29, 2024
18. What the Top 1% Really Pays the IRS
Graphics are at the link: https://www.wsj.com/opinion/what-the-top-1-really-pays-the-irs-57c4ad58?st=CuQLFN&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
But when America was great before in the 1950s and the highest tax rate was 91% the richest only paid slightly more in taxes of about 42%.
Another view in this article.
Taxes on the Rich Were Not That Much Higher in the 1950s
https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/federal/taxes-on-the-rich-1950s-not-high/
What the Top 1% Really Pays the IRS
They kick in 40.4% of income taxes, nearly double their income share.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/what-the-top-1-really-pays-the-irs-57c4ad58?st=CuQLFN&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
By The Editorial Board
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Nov. 29, 2024 5:41 pm ET
Photo: Michael Nagle/Bloomberg News
Here’s a statistic to remember next year, as Congress debates extending President Trump’s 2017 tax cuts: The top 1% of income-tax filers provided 40.4% of the revenue in 2022, according to recently released IRS data. The top 10% of filers carried 72% of the tax burden. Self-styled progressives will never admit it, but U.S. income taxes are already highly progressive.
These figures are from the Tax Foundation’s analysis of the IRS data, which is worth a read. But allow us to highlight a few points, starting with why this matters for the political debate. The GOP’s 2017 law lowered tax rates on people across the income spectrum, and those changes expire at the end of 2025. Extending today’s top marginal rate on high earners, 37%, will be contentious. Democrats will want to let it revert to the old 39.6%. Mr. Trump, scrounging to pay for other priorities, might go along.
The Democratic refrain will be that keeping the current 37% top rate would be a giveaway to millionaires and billionaires who don’t pay their “fair share,” as Bernie Sanders likes to say. That’s when readers can whip out the IRS data and point out that more than 40% of income-tax revenue is already coming from one filer out of every 100. To understand the 2022 numbers in greater detail, let’s break them out by cohort.
The top 1%: This group includes 1.5 million tax returns with adjusted gross incomes (AGI) above $663,000. These people made up 22.4% of the country’s total reported earnings, yet their share of income taxes paid was nearly double that at 40.4%. (See the nearby chart.) Their average federal tax rate was 26.1%.
To put this in Bernie’s terms, is paying two times more in taxes than your share of income “fair”? We’d say it’s closer to punitive, especially since many of these taxpayers are “rich” for only a narrow window of their highest-earning years.
Between the top 1% and 5%: About 6.2 million returns above $262,000 but below $663,000. These people had 15.9% of total earnings, while contributing 20.6% of income-tax revenue. Average tax rate: 18.8%.
Between the top 5% and 10%: About 7.7 million returns above at least $179,000 but below the previous the top 5%. Their share of earnings, 11.1%, almost matched their share of taxes paid, also 11%. Average tax rate: 14.3%.
Between the top 10% and 25%: About 23.1 million returns above at least $100,000. Share of income: 20.5%. Share of tax: 15.2% Average tax rate: 10.7%.
Between the top 25% and 50%: About 38.5 million returns above at least $50,000. Share of income: 18.6%. Share of tax: 9.9%. Average tax rate: 7.7%.
The bottom 50%: About 76.9 million returns with earnings under $50,000. Share of income: 11.5%. Share of tax: 3%. Average tax rate: 3.7%.
Add all this up, and the top quarter of earners reported 69.9% of all income in 2022 but paid 87.2% of all income taxes. Despite the 2017 reform’s modest cuts in individual tax rates, the tax code continues to soak the upper middle class as well as the rich. And this doesn’t include state and local tax rates.
***
Two other notes on the data: First, these figures overstate the actual income-tax burden shouldered by the bottom 50%, because “refundable” credits paid to those with no tax liability are treated as spending and aren’t reflected in the IRS numbers. This means tens of millions of Americans have income-tax rates that are effectively negative—that is, they get what amounts to a welfare check from the government.
Second, these numbers only cover the income tax. The IRS figures don’t include payroll taxes on workers with lower earnings, including to support Medicare and Social Security. But other analyses show that although including payroll taxes somewhat modifies the progressivity of the tax code overall, the basic picture doesn’t change.
Given the data, it ought to be impossible to pretend that the top 1% is somehow getting a free ride. The exact share of income taxes paid by the 1% moves somewhat from year to year and with changing economic conditions. During the pandemic year of 2021 it hit 45.8%. That’s an outlier, but the trend over recent decades is clearly up. (See the nearby chart.)
One reason Democrats love the “fair share” language is that they can use the phrase without ever defining it. Democrats who know anything about the tax system understand this, but they don’t care because taxing the rich polls well. They’d gladly tax the rich at 100% if they could get away with it. Republicans were once willing to tell this truth, but these days too many of them want to play the same game.
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Appeared in the November 30, 2024, print edition as 'What the Top 1% Really Pays the IRS'.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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