Quotes of the Day:
"In war--a country's hopes stagnate,
In war--her strong are slain.
In war--dark evils desecrate
Her council hall and fane.
In war--with wings of omen dark
Her wrongs and debts increase,
Prosperity and progress mark
The golden realm of Peace."
- Martha Lavinia Hoffman
“government is a dangerous servant and a terrible master. You now have freedom—if you can keep it. But do remember that you can lose this freedom more quickly to yourselves than to any other tyrant.”
- Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress
“It is of infinite moment, that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national Union to your collective and individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as of the Palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion, that it can in any event be abandoned; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts.”
- George Washington, George Washington's Farewell Address
1. South Korea arrests two for passing military secrets to North
2. North Korea's Kim calls for stronger military as nuclear test work 'well underway'
3. South Korea to reopen embassy in Kyiv
4. Continued restoration work spotted at N. Korea's nuclear test site: report
5. Punggye-ri Update: Construction and Volleyball - Beyond Parallel
6. N. Korea-China trade fair resumes after 7-yr halt over U.N. sanctions
7. 25% of Yongsan Garrison to be returned before Biden’s Seoul visit
8. Yoon to hold summit with Biden on May 21
9. Moon says there are not only cons but also pros to pardoning ex-President Lee
10. First summit between Yoon and Biden should show strength of alliance
11. New York Times keeps growing its Seoul news hub
12. Army captain leaks military secrets to North Korean spy for cryptocurrency
13. US guided-missile destroyer docks in South Korea after transiting Taiwan Strait: source
14. FM nominee vows to push for Chinese leader's visit to S. Korea
15. Strengthen alliance (ROK/US)
16. Japanese PM unlikely to attend Yoon’s inauguration ceremony: reports
17. North Korea’s Missile Message
18. Otto Warmbier’s parents return to University of Virginia for first time since son’s death
19. The Australian factor in South Korea’s security strategy
20. USFK Practice Seizing Underground Nuclear Facility
21. Korea’s Yoon angling for a Japan reset
1. South Korea arrests two for passing military secrets to North
One of our worst nightmares.
Probably not as bad as the Walker family spies or Aldrich Ames or the other traitors who have compromised US systems but still bad nonetheless.
South Korea arrests two for passing military secrets to North
By Zubaidah Abdul Jalil & Frances Mao
BBC News
Published
41 minutes ago
An active South Korean army officer was recruited as part of the alleged spy operation
Police in South Korea have arrested two people suspected of leaking military secrets to a person believed to be a North Korean agent.
The chief executive of a cryptocurrency exchange and an army officer divulged login details for South Korea's joint military command, police say.
They are accused of receiving large sums of money in exchange.
North and South Korea have been locked in a tense relationship ever since fighting a war between 1950-1953.
"This is the first case in which an active-duty officer and a civilian under orders of a North Korean agent colluded and spying on military secrets is discovered," police said.
A camera watch and USB device were used to give the agent access to data between January and March, it is alleged.
The two men were arrested earlier this month. The whereabouts and identity of the presumed North Korean agent are unclear.
Image source, Seoul Central District prosecutor's office
Image caption,
The watch and USB device allegedly used in the operation
South Korean prosecutors and police announced the arrests of the head of the virtual currency firm, named only as Lee, and the army officer, Captain B, on Thursday. Both are charged with violating the country's National Security Act.
Authorities allege the businessman was first approached in July 2021 to try to "recruit an active-duty officer in order to investigate military secrets".
The following month, he is alleged to have approached Captain B, promising to compensate him with Bitcoin in exchange for military secrets on the orders of the alleged North Korean agent. The army officer subsequently agreed to take part in the operation and divulge the information, police say.
In January Lee bought "a watch-type hidden camera" and sent it to Captain B by courier, who then managed to bring the camera to his base, Yonhap news agency reported.
Lee then purchased parts of a USB-type hacking device known as a poison tap, which gave the agent remote access to data on his laptop. This included the login credentials to the South Korean military's joint command and control system, police say.
It is not clear what other information might have been accessed.
The officer was paid 48 million Korean won ($37,938; £30,203) worth of bitcoin for his role in the operation, while Lee was paid 700 million won in virtual currency, prosecutors said.
Police said they were tipped off about the operation in February. Authorities arrested Lee on 2 April and the army officer on 15 April.
Police officials said the identity of the spy operation's mastermind was presumed to be North Korean, based on statements made by the suspects and Telegram communication threads.
They added the leak was blocked by arresting Lee and the army officer.
Police also said the cryptocurrency trader had attempted to approach another military officer, who had rebuffed his advance. Investigations are still under way in relation to another suspect who it is alleged acted as an intermediary between Lee and the army officer.
You may also be interested in:
Media caption,
The North Korean spy who wants to go home
More on this story
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2. North Korea's Kim calls for stronger military as nuclear test work 'well underway'
Political warfare and blackmail diplomacy combined with developing advanced warfighting capabilities with one single objective - to dominate the Korean peninsula.
North Korea's Kim calls for stronger military as nuclear test work 'well underway'
SEOUL, April 29 (Reuters) - North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called on the country's military to "bolster up their strength in every way to annihilate the enemy", state media reported on Friday, as new satellite imagery showed increased preparations for a possible nuclear test.
Kim made the remarks during photo sessions with troops, state media broadcasters, and others involved in a massive military parade staged on Monday, which marked the 90th anniversary of the army's founding.
Photos released by state media showed Kim perched on a white horse and wearing a white, military-style tunic with gold trim as he reviewed the troops.
Monday's parade had featured several of the North's latest missiles, including its largest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Hwasong-17, and a recently tested hypersonic missile.
The display demonstrated the "modernity, heroism and radical development of the armed forces of the Republic and their matchless military and technological superiority," Kim told troops at the photo session, state news agency KCNA reported.
North Korea says it opposes war and that its weapons are for self-defence, but at Monday's parade Kim said the mission of its nuclear force goes beyond deterring war to also include defending the nation's "fundamental interests."
Last month North Korea resumed testing its largest ICBMs, and there are signs it could soon test a nuclear weapon for the first time since 2017.
"Current satellite imagery indicates that preparations are well underway and should not be discounted as insignificant activity," the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said in a report on Thursday.
Analysts and South Korean and U.S. officials have said that the North appears to be restoring Tunnel No. 3 at its Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, used for underground nuclear blasts before it was closed in 2018 amid denuclearisation talks with Washington and Seoul.
Kim has since said the country is no longer bound by that self-imposed moratorium on tests, but North Korea has not commented on the work or confirmed its purpose.
Commercial satellite imagery from Monday shows construction of new buildings, movement of lumber, and an increase in equipment and supplies immediately outside the new entrance to Tunnel No. 3, CSIS said.
"The date of a seventh nuclear test will undoubtedly depend exclusively upon the personal decision of Kim Jong Un," the report said.
Reporting by Josh Smith; Editing by Sandra Maler
3. South Korea to reopen embassy in Kyiv
Good news here. I hope it will include a Security Assistance team who will start to coordinate for lethal aid once the new administration takes office on May 10th.
South Korea to reopen embassy in Kyiv | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will reopen its embassy in Kyiv shortly amid stabilizing situations in the Ukrainian capital, the foreign ministry said Friday.
South Korean embassy officials were evacuated from Kyiv in mid-February and operated temporary offices in the Ukrainian cities of Lviv and Chernivtsi, and Romania. The Lviv mission was closed on March 18.
The ministry said embassy officials will return to Kyiv for smoother cooperation with the Ukrainian government and the protection of South Korean nationals, as security conditions are stabilizing.
The chief of the mission will determine the timing of the return while giving top priority to staff safety, it added.
Seoul, meanwhile, plans to make an additional donation of US$50 million to the war-ravaged country through a trust fund of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and is currently making related consultations, it added.
The fund will be used to provide non-lethal military supplies, including fuel, medical goods and protective gear.
The help will raise South Korea's total support since Russia's invasion to around $100 million, including the defense ministry's direct shipment of non-lethal aid in March.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. Continued restoration work spotted at N. Korea's nuclear test site: report
Let's call out the north Korea strategy.
Continued restoration work spotted at N. Korea's nuclear test site: report | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) --- North Korea appears to be continuing its work to restore the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, which it ostensibly demolished in 2018 ahead of a historic summit with the United States, according to a North Korea information provider that cited satellite photos.
Commercial satellite imagery taken on April 26 of the site in Kilju, North Hamgyong Province, indicates ongoing work to restore access to the site's Tunnel No. 3 complex, with the construction of a new portal, or entrance, and support structures, read a note by 38 North.
"It is unclear if the portal has been completed yet, given the small amount of spoil that has been observed so far," it added. "The area outside the new portal has been leveled and stabilized. At the east end of the leveled area, the construction of a small support building has been completed."
In 2018, the North announced the complete closure of the Punggye-ri site, known to have four tunnels, with its demolition carried out in front of a small group of invited foreign journalists. Speculation has been widespread that the North may be preparing for its first nuclear test since September 2017.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Punggye-ri Update: Construction and Volleyball - Beyond Parallel
But volleyball is an indicator. Maybe during the next nuclear negotiations we could schedule a volleyball game between the nuclear experts from both countries.
Punggye-ri Update: Construction and Volleyball - Beyond Parallel
Punggye-ri Update: Construction and Volleyball
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Key Findings
- Satellite image collected on April 25, 2022, provides one of the most detailed and current views of continued activity at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility.
- Construction of new buildings, movement of lumber, and an increase in equipment and supplies immediately outside the new entrance to Tunnel No. 3 indicates that construction work is ongoing both inside Tunnel No. 3 and outside in the nearby areas.
- Personnel can also be seen playing volleyball in the courtyard of the main administrative and support area, as has happened in the past during 2017.
- The date of a seventh nuclear test will undoubtedly depend exclusively upon the personal decision of Kim Jong-un. Current satellite imagery indicates that preparations are well underway and should not be discounted as insignificant activity.
Overview of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility showing all four test tunnels and the main administration and support area. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2022)
Analysis of satellite imagery of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility since late 2021 shows that North Korea has undertaken a project to reactivate Tunnel No. 3 (South Portal). A recent image collected on April 25, 2022, provides one of the most detailed and current views of this continuing activity. Construction of new buildings and renovations of existing buildings near Tunnel No. 3 and the main administrative and support area has continued over the past few weeks. While there were no notable increases in the spoil piles near Tunnel No. 3, an increase in activity (e.g., equipment, supplies, etc.) immediately outside the new entrance to the tunnel and changes to the size of the piles of stored lumber suggest construction work is ongoing inside Tunnel No. 3 and the main administrative and support area.
Tunnel No. 3
In late March, anonymous South Korean government sources revealed that North Korea seemed to be creating a “shortcut” path to Tunnel No. 3, also known as the South Portal, at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. Sources assessed that North Korea initially worked to restore the original entrance to Tunnel No. 3, but abruptly halted the effort to instead dig another entrance to the side, creating a new entrance to the tunnel. Consistent to these statements, several sources have previously reported the increase in activities near Tunnel No. 3 starting in early March. As assessed by these sources, satellite image from March 4, 2022, showed the construction of new buildings, renovations of existing buildings, and log piles. Analysis of previous satellite images suggests that activities in the area started in February. Images show that the preparation and construction of the first new building near the entrance to Tunnel No. 3 were initiated in late February and completed by early March.
Recent satellite image from April 25, 2022, shows indications of continued activity at the entrance of Tunnel No. 3. Notably, a new building was constructed sometime during the third week of April.
Overview of the entrance to Tunnel No. 3 and support buildings. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2022)
While the size of the spoil pile outside Tunnel No. 3 has not changed over the past few weeks, satellite image shows continued activity, such as the increased presence of equipment and supplies immediately outside the new entrance. These changes, along with the movement of lumber in the area, suggest that work is ongoing inside Tunnel No. 3.
Close-up view of the entrance to Tunnel No. 3 showing increased activity. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2022)
Main Administration and Support Area
Located approximately 150-meters north of the entrances to Tunnel No. 3 is the main administration and support area. Additional indications of continued and increased activity are observable in the area. Lumber piles are visible both by the entrance to the main administration and support area and within the former greenhouse currently being used for storage. Compared to an image earlier in April, changes to the size of the piles of stored lumber suggest ongoing construction of Tunnel No. 3 and the main administrative and support area. A new building is under construction in the northeast corner of the courtyard, while a volleyball game is underway in the lower courtyard.
Overview of the main administration and support area. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2022)
Close-up view of the main administration and support area showing the workers playing volleyball and the presence of two lumber piles. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2022)
Tunnels No. 1, 2, and 4
Satellite images show minimal activity at Tunnel No. 2 (North Portal) and no activity (e.g., excavation, vehicles present, etc.) at Tunnel No. 4 (West Portal). Its portal and the hillside above it have been collapsed and blocked by rubble from the disabling in 2018. The extent of any actual damage inside these tunnels is unclear. Tunnel No. 1 (East Portal) has remained abandoned, with its portal collapsed, since shortly after its use for North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006.
Close-up view of Tunnel No. 2 and Tunnel No. 4. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2022)
Close-up view of Tunnel No. 1. Click to enlarge. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2022)
Although some sources suggest the seventh nuclear test could occur between May and September of this year, the date of a seventh nuclear test will undoubtedly depend exclusively upon the personal decision of Kim Jong-un. Current satellite imagery indicates that preparations are well underway and should not be discounted as insignificant activity.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS); senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); author for IHS Markit (formerly the Jane’s Information Group); and publisher and editor of KPA Journal. Formerly, he has served as founder and CEO of KPA Associates, LLC, senior imagery analyst for 38 North at Johns Hopkins SAIS, chief analytics officer and co-founder of AllSource Analysis, Inc., and senior all-source analyst for DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center.
Victor Cha is senior vice president and the inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Jennifer Jun is a program coordinator and research assistant with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Headline image credit: Copyright © Airbus DS 2022
References
-
“N. Korea will likely conduct new nuke test between May and September: gov’t expert,” Yonhap, April 28, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220428007700325?section=national/defense.
-
Furukawa, Katsuhisa, “Developments at the DPRK’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Weapon Test Site since December 2021,” Open Nuclear Network, March 20, 2022, https://opennuclear.org/publication/developments-dprks-punggye-ri-nuclear-weapon-test-site-december-2021; and Schmerler, Dave and Jeffery Lewis, “Changes at Punggye-ri,” Arms Control Wonk, March 7, 2022, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1215261/changes-at-punggye-ri/; and Heinonen, Olli, Peter Makowsky, Jack Liu, and Jenny Town, “Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Work Continues Around South Portal,” 38 North, April 14, 2022, https://www.38north.org/2022/04/punggye-ri-nuclear-test-site-work-continues-around-south-portal/.
- Volleyball is popular in North Korea and games have been imaged at Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site on several occasions, dating back to 2006. In 2017, 137 days before the sixth and latest nuclear test, three concurrent volleyball games were imaged in the area.
-
“N. Korea will likely conduct new nuke test between May and September: gov’t expert,” Yonhap, April 28, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220428007700325?section=national/defense.
6.N. Korea-China trade fair resumes after 7-yr halt over U.N. sanctions
A lifeline. More opportunities for China to be complicit in north Korean sanctions evasion.
(LEAD) N. Korea-China trade fair resumes after 7-yr halt over U.N. sanctions | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS image, more info in last 3 paras)
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- An international trade fair co-hosted by North Korea and China opened for the first time in seven years, according to Pyongyang's state media Friday.
It had been suspended since 2016 after China, the North's traditional ally and biggest trade partner, voted in favor of United Nations sanctions against Pyongyang.
Showcased online during the two-month event that kicked off on Thursday are products ranging from agriculture, light industry, construction, fisheries and medicine, the official Korean Central News Agency reported.
"The trade fair will contribute in boosting cooperation between North Korea and China in the field of economics and science and technology," the Korean Central Broadcasting Station also said.
Pyongyang and Beijing have jointly held the trade fair every year from 2012 to 2015 in the Chinese city of Dandong on the border with the North. It was cancelled in 2016 amid strained bilateral ties over China's endorsement of U.N. sanctions against the North for its nuclear testing.
The trade fair to end on June 28 marks the North's first international trade event since the COVID-19 outbreak, as the reclusive country seeks to shore up its economy amid crippling sanctions and the prolonged pandemic.
Meanwhile, freight train operations on a route connecting Dandong to the North Korean border city of Sinuiju were suspended Friday at the request of Pyongyang amid the spread of COVID-19 in the Chinese city, according to sources.
The North has told China that it does not intend to halt the route completely, the sources said, raising expectations that train operations could resume when the COVID-19 situation and other conditions improve.
Cargo train operations on that route resumed in January, 1 1/2 years after the North closed its borders to ward off the pandemic.
(END)
7. 25% of Yongsan Garrison to be returned before Biden’s Seoul visit
Excerpts:
According to several sources of the South Korean government and the U.S. Forces in Korea on Wednesday, South Korea and the U.S. are discussing details to return the U.S. base in Yongsan. It has been known that the two countries are trying to achieve an agreement to have 25 percent of the entire site returned by the third week of May, which is right before President Biden’s visit to South Korea.
At the moment, only 10 percent of the total site has been returned. The two countries agreed in July last year on the return of 500,000 square meters of land in the first half of this year but there has been no known progress. If the two countries reach an agreement to have additional 290,000 square meters of land returned by the end of May, the target to return 25 percent in the first half of this year will be achieved.
25% of Yongsan Garrison to be returned before Biden’s Seoul visit
Posted April. 28, 2022 07:47,
Updated April. 28, 2022 07:47
25% of Yongsan Garrison to be returned before Biden’s Seoul visit. April. 28, 2022 07:47. by Ji-Sun Choi aurinko@donga.com.
South Korea and the U.S. are expected to agree on the return of the western site of South Post located near the new office of the Ministry of National Defense in Yongsan, Seoul before U.S. President Joe Biden visits South Korea next month. If the agreement is reached, about 500,000 square meters of land, equivalent to 25 percent of the U.S. base in Yongsan, will be returned. The site to be returned includes the No. 13 gate of the U.S. base near Ichon station, a road leading to the new office, and several plots nearby. President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol will begin his work in the temporary office on the fifth floor of the new office from the first day of his inauguration on May 10.
According to several sources of the South Korean government and the U.S. Forces in Korea on Wednesday, South Korea and the U.S. are discussing details to return the U.S. base in Yongsan. It has been known that the two countries are trying to achieve an agreement to have 25 percent of the entire site returned by the third week of May, which is right before President Biden’s visit to South Korea.
At the moment, only 10 percent of the total site has been returned. The two countries agreed in July last year on the return of 500,000 square meters of land in the first half of this year but there has been no known progress. If the two countries reach an agreement to have additional 290,000 square meters of land returned by the end of May, the target to return 25 percent in the first half of this year will be achieved.
It was reported that the land to be returned through the recent discussion includes multiple plots of the U.S. base in the southwest of the new office. The No. 13 gate of the U.S. base near Ichon station and the road leading to the new office will also be returned. The No. 13 gate is about 900 meters away in lineal distance from the new office.
Once multiple plots in the southwest of the new office are returned, the foundation for the president-elect to communicate freely with the public near his office will be created. President-elect Yoon previously announced a plan to move the presidential office and said that he would create a park by connecting the site of the Ministry of National Defense and the site of the U.S. base to be returned.
8. Yoon to hold summit with Biden on May 21
I think the main agenda item will be:
1. north Korea - alignment of assumptions on the nature, objectives of the regime and a (hopefully) decision to take a long term focus on the Korean security situation (e.g., seek to resolve the "Korea question")
2. China and how the alliance will address threats to the ROK (e.g, economic warfare) when the ROK announces its plans to "step up" in the alliance, in the region, and around the world and commit to protecting the rules based international order - e.g., strategic clarity to end strategic ambiguity.
3. ROK-Japan-US trilateral cooperation. (a key action item in the US INDOPACIFIC strategy)
I also think the May 2021 ROK-US presidential summit statement (and fact sheet)will be reviewed, updated, and validated. The ROK/US alliance long term vision expressed in the statement was a sound one and should not be completely jettisoned just because there is a new ROK administration. It should be revised and tweaked for the new administration but the foundational principles remain good ones and are very much in line with the president elect's vision for South Korea to step up.
The above are the most important issues to be discussed and in the context of those three there could be discussions and possibly guidance given on the following
- cyber cooperation against north Korea and malign actors
- readiness, deterrence, and defense
- strategic influence campaign toward nK
- strategic flexibility (employ of peninsula forces for contingencies outside the KTO).
- strategic assets deployed to the region for integrated deterrence
- support to Ukraine
- trade issues
- COVID cooperation
Yoon to hold summit with Biden on May 21
Posted April. 29, 2022 07:38,
Updated April. 29, 2022 07:38
Yoon to hold summit with Biden on May 21. April. 29, 2022 07:38. by Ji-Sun Choi aurinko@donga.com.
A summit meeting between South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden is slated for May 21 in Seoul. It is an extremely swift high-level meeting, taking place only 11 days after Yoon will have been sworn in on May 10.
It is reported that President Joe Biden is preparing to give a speech on Asia in Seoul, which the first destination of his first Asian tour before Tokyo. Pundits say his move is designed to rally his allies by declaring Washington’s Indo-Pacific vision and strategy while visiting the Korean Peninsula, which closely adjoins China.
White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki, the,said on Wednesday that President Biden wil visit South Kore and Japan from May 20 to May 24. “President Biden will hold bilateral meetings with his counterparts: newly elected President Yoon Seok-youl of the Republic of Korea and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan,” the White House announced, adding, “His trip will advance the Biden-Harris Administration’s rock-solid commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific and to U.S. treaty alliances with the Republic of Korea and Japan.”
Psaki added that it will build on more than a year of intensive diplomacy with the Indo-Pacific, including the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit on May 12-13 in Washington, D.C. This means Mr. Biden’s Asian tour is part of America’s Indo-Pacific strategies aimed at uniting his Asian allies against China.
Reportedly, President Biden is preparing to give a public speech during his visit to Korea, speaking towards his Asian allies. Last week, an advance party from Washington visited Seoul to explore potential venues for President Biden’s public speech, including major colleges in Seoul.
Considering the summit will take place right after Yoon’s inauguration, it is expected to produce cooperative messages on the alliance of the two nations, North Korea’s nuclear program, the economy, and national security. It is also likely that the two heads of state will discuss how to engage in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which will be driven by the Biden administration, and on how to improve Korea-Japan relations and strengthen the tripartite military cooperation among Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo. After the announcement by the White House, Bae Hyun-jin, the president-elect’s mouthpiece, said Mr. Yoon “welcomes President Biden’s plan to visit South Korea,” adding that the meeting will discuss a vast range of agenda such as advancement of ROK-U.S. alliance and their policy coordination towards Pyongyang, economic security, and other major regional and border-crossing issues.
9. Moon says there are not only cons but also pros to pardoning ex-President Lee
Would he pardon him so he can attend the inauguration? It would be a tense stage to have Park and Lee sitting there with Moon as they watch Yoon take the oath of office.
(2nd LD) Moon says there are not only cons but also pros to pardoning ex-President Lee | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with transition team's response)
By Kim Deok-hyun
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- Outgoing President Moon Jae-in said Friday he will determine whether to pardon former President Lee Myung-bak after taking judicial justice and public consensus into consideration, noting there are not only cons but also pros to the proposed pardon.
The remark, made in response to online petitions opposing Lee's pardon, could suggest a higher likelihood of a pardon because Moon talked about those in favor of it, though presidential aides said the remark was no more than an expression of principle.
Speculation has grown recently that Moon may grant a pardon to Lee on the occasion of Buddha's Birthday on May 8, a day before his five-year term ends. Lee has been serving a 17-year prison term for embezzlement and bribery.
"There are many people who have the same opinion as petitioners. On the other hand, there are many opinions in favor of amnesty for national harmony and integration," Moon said of petitions opposing a pardon. "I will make a judgment by carefully reviewing judicial justice and public consensus."
Moon plans to hold his final Cabinet meeting Tuesday, and political observers said he must make a decision on the pardon before the final Cabinet meeting.
In another answer to petitions opposing incoming President Yoon Suk-yeol's push to relocate the presidential office, Moon said he is also opposed to the relocation due to its possible impact on national security amid heightened tensions with North Korea.
"I personally agree with the petition," Moon said.
Yoon's transition team is moving the presidential office from Cheong Wa Dae to the defense ministry compound in Seoul's central district of Yongsan in an effort to move out of a "symbol of imperial power" and get closer to the people.
Moon said it is questionable whether the presidential office should be relocated because it forced the defense ministry to move its headquarters amid rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Under the relocation push, the defense ministry is being relocated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff building at the compound and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is being moved to the outskirts of Seoul.
Moon also questioned whether the defense ministry compound is the most appropriate place for the presidential office but said the outgoing government has no choice but to accept the incoming government's relocation push.
"If the next government insists, the reality is that the outgoing government cannot intensify the confusion," Moon said.
The transition team issued a strongly worded statement in response, calling on Moon to "mind his manners with the people" in his last days in office.
"By saying he does not think it is appropriate to move the presidential office and open Cheong Wa Dae to the public, he once again contradicted the promise he made to the people over two presidential elections," the transition team said, referring to Moon's own campaign pledges to relocate the presidential office during the 2012 and 2017 elections.
The team listed a litany of promises Moon made in his inauguration speech, including a promise to frequently communicate with the people, conduct personal press briefings on important issues and chat casually with citizens at traditional markets on his way home from work.
"Which of these was kept?" it asked. "These last five years, our people have watched in frustration and anger a president who has been more authoritarian than ever."
The transition team hopes the president will find whatever he can to serve the people's interests and do his best at it, it added.
Yoon will start working from his new office in what is now the defense ministry building as soon as he is inaugurated on May 10, Yoon's officials said.
kdh@yna.co.kr
(END)
10. First summit between Yoon and Biden should show strength of alliance
Especially if KIm Jong-un decides to welcome President Biden and the new President Yoon with a provocation.
I think an overflight of US strategic aircraft escorted by ROK KF-15s and F-35s at the start of the summit in Seoul would add a nice visual to illustrate the strength of the alliance. And then maybe a time on target (TOT) artillery demonstration of all the indirect fire systems of the Combined 2d Infantry on Santa Barbara range. The north would surely hear (and feel) that. (I observed a 2d ID TOT on Santa Barbara range back in the 1980s - my company's 4.2 inch mortars participated).
First summit between Yoon and Biden should show strength of alliance
Posted April. 29, 2022 07:37,
Updated April. 29, 2022 07:37
First summit between Yoon and Biden should show strength of alliance. April. 29, 2022 07:37. .
Bae Hyun-jin, the spokesperson of South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, announced on Thursday that the president-elect and U.S. President Joe Biden will hold their first summit on May 21. The White House also made an official announcement that President Biden will visit South Korea and Japan from May 20 to May 24. It is a very speedy development as the summit will be held just 11 days after the launch of the Yoon administration. “It will be a historical turning point for the comprehensive strategic alliance between the two countries to further develop,” said Bae.
While the summit was moved forward due to President Biden’s plan to attend the Quad summit, a meeting among the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India, it has an excellent timing given the urgency on the Korean Peninsula caused by North Korea’s recent nuclear and missiles provocations. This must be why the U.S. president will start his first trip to Asia with South Korea, rather than Japan, where the Quad summit will be held.
North Korea made it a lot easier for the country to use nuclear weapons, raising the level of its threats to other countries. The country may engage in large-scale provocations, such as the seventh nuclear test, targeting the new administration’s launch in South Korea and President Biden’s visit. The leaders of South Korea and the U.S. should show the strength of the alliance, which can be demonstrated as stronger extended deterrence and the normalization of joint drills, by standing side by side and send a warning that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s nuclear threats will not work.
The agenda that the two leaders should tackle is not limited to responses to North Korea. It is an opportunity to show the united determination of the key countries of the Free World sharing the values of democracy and human rights as the New Cold War began to take hold due to intensifying strategic conflicts between the U.S. and China and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The summit could also be a way to upgrade the two countries’ relationship to a comprehensive strategic alliance by expanding humanitarian assistance to Ukraine beyond cooperation for the global supply chain, stronger trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, and South Korea’s gradual joining of Quad.
The U.S. has high expectations for the new South Korean administration to be led by Yoon. In particular, it is asking South Korea to play an active role by participating in the Indo-Pacific Strategy to keep China in check. It fits well with the new administration’s vision to become a global hub country. However, diplomatic frictions may be experienced during the process of pursuing it. Therefore, a sophisticated approach to control the speed while maximizing national interests is desperately needed. While President Biden is an experienced diplomatic expert, President-elect Yoon lacks expertise in diplomacy. Rigorous preparation is needed for the next three weeks.
11. New York Times keeps growing its Seoul news hub
The center of Northeast Asia continues to shift to Seoul.
Thursday
April 28, 2022
New York Times keeps growing its Seoul news hub
Stephen Dunbar-Johnson, international president of The New York Times Company, sits for an interview with the Korea JoongAng Daily Monday at the Grant Hyatt Hotel in central Seoul. [PARK SANG-MOON]
Stephen Dunbar-Johnson, international president of The New York Times Company, stressed that international growth is an important part of the newspaper's new target goal of reaching 15 million subscribers by 2027.
Dunbar-Johnson sat for an interview with the Korea JoongAng Daily Monday at the Grant Hyatt Hotel in central Seoul, returning to the country around one year after the launch of the Times' new Asia hub in Korea. The newspaper decided in 2020 to relocate its news operation from Hong Kong — which has served for decades as headquarters for many English-language media outlets in Asia — to Seoul.
"We didn't want to be in a position where we were encumbered by the Chinese national security law, which gets in the way of us doing what we need to do, which is report without fear or favor," he said. "The core reason why we moved to South Korea was because we felt this could be a place where we could report without fear or favor."
Dunbar-Johnson stressed that Seoul is "much more than a bureau, it's our Asia newsroom," and a part of the paper's strategy of "being on 24 hours."
He said, "We have a live team here in Seoul. They pass the baton to London, and that goes onto New York, and it allows us to be on whilst the sun is rising here and moves from east to west. Seoul is an absolutely fundamental part of the New York Times operation, and the staffing level and the speed of our hiring and moving people here is actually ahead of schedule despite the pandemic."
In February, the Times reached its goal of 10 million paid subscriptions ahead of its 2025 target and now aims to reach 15 million subscribers by the end of 2027.
The company's $550 million purchase of The Athletic online sports news outlet in January brought in 1.2 million more subscribers, helping to accelerate this process. But Dunbar-Johnson pointed out that the Times had been "on track" to get to its target ahead of 2025 even before the acquisition.
"International growth is a really important part of getting to 15 million by 2027," said Dunbar-Johnson. "We now have over a million digital subscribers outside the United States, which has been pretty significant growth from where we started. We aspire to have 20 percent of the total."
Currently, over a million of the newspaper's 10 million subscribers, or 10 percent, are international.
"We still have a long way to go," said Dunbar-Johnson. "We think that there is a lot of potential in Asia. We haven't really tapped the Asian marketplace as much as we would have liked."
He estimates that the Asian portion of the targeted 20 percent international subscribers "should be at least 30 percent of the total."
He described the New York Times' strategy of attracting subscribers with a "bundle," which includes the core news product, and digital offerings such as Games, recipe app Cooking, The Athletic, the Wirecutter product-recommendation site and audio app Audm.
The idea, he said, is to get people to "spend time within our ecosystem" through such a bundle service by finding people's "obsessions."
The New York Times Company also purchased the popular Wordle puzzle game in January, which Dunbar-Johnson said is "driving very significant audience to Games."
He added there isn't "any danger" of Wordle going behind a paywall "anytime soon," noting that "once people are in the environment, then they begin to search for other things."
He continued, "It validates the whole idea of creating an ecosystem of interests. Once you are in the door, you want to open another door, and go into another room, and you begin to see that there's lots of other things of interest there."
Dunbar-Johnson especially wants to reach out to young readers and "internationally-curious people who are proficient in English who and also work for multinational organizations."
He pointed to the New York Times' three-year agreement with the state-run Korea Education and Research Information Service (Keris) at the beginning of the year which will allow all students in four-year universities in Korea to receive free digital subscriptions to the paper and its news app.
"We are very pleased to have an arrangement with Keris, which allows us to access students in Korean universities, which I think is a very important deal for us," he said. "It allows us to hopefully start a relationship with young Koreans, and we are very keen to find ways to engage with them further."
He noted Korea has "very smart young people who speak English to a very high standard" who aspire to do higher education in the United States and eventually come back to do business here or work in a multinational corporation.
The company reported an operating profit of $109.3 million for the fourth quarter of 2021, or a 12 percent increase from a year earlier, and revenue of $594.2 million, a 16.7 percent rise.
The size of the Asia hub in Korea, located in an office building in central Seoul, has also grown faster than expected over the past year.
"We are almost at capacity here already in spite of the pandemic," said Dunbar-Johnson. "We will be over 40 people in the coming months. It's actually gone faster than I had anticipated." This is nearly double the number of staffers compared to when the Seoul office officially launched in May last year.
He said "one very difficult hiccup" in the process was the death of Carlos Tejada, a deputy Asia editor for the Times, who died of a heart attack last December.
The death was "a big blow to us," he said, recalling Tejada, who contributed to the Times' Pulitzer-winning coverage of the Covid-19 crisis in China, as a "great journalist and part of the heartbeat of the Seoul office."
One of the Times' long-term goals internationally is to "continue to grow our Asia coverage," Dunbar-Johnson said.
"Certainly you will see more coverage of Korean issues than you probably would have a few years ago, simply because we have a lot of people here."
He added, "Korea is a very interesting story in itself; its culture is very rich, and the music scene, film scene, food scene, socioeconomic scenes very interesting. Korea was always a very interesting story for us before we had a news hub here, but the coverage will deepen, that's the main difference."
Dunbar-Johnson said the Times is especially focused on developing a series about women in leadership positions in Korea, and prioritizes climate response coverage globally.
He stressed the newspaper's mission to protect "independent, high-quality journalism" amid the rise in autocracies, noting the Russian state media's coverage of the Ukrainian crisis and the national security law in Hong Kong.
"Sometimes you'll take business hits because of that, but short-term, middle-term, long-term, that will always be our position," he said. "We will never self-censor. We will always try to seek the truth."
Dunbar-Johnson said, "What I believe in my soul is that a vibrant democracy has to have a vibrant free press. The two things go hand in hand. And what we've been seeing with the rise of autocracies, and what we've been seeing in the last few weeks in Russia is very, very sad."
On the situation in Hong Kong, where reporters and some business staff remain, he said, "It is clear that the situation has deteriorated."
He continued, "We hope that we will be able to continue to report the truth in Hong Kong as well. But it's likely that will become increasingly difficult over the coming months and years. When we report from China, often the Chinese administration doesn't like what we report, and they put pressure on us to make it difficult for us to do that. So I expect the same thing to happen in Hong Kong."
Dunbar-Johnson said, "You need media to keep businesses and governments in power honest. If you don't have a free press, it leads to autocracy, corruption and abuse of power."
He said, "South Korea is a young, vibrant liberal democracy, and in order for it to continue to being successful, it needs a strong vibrant press." There is no fear of "censorship" in Seoul, he added.
With such considerations he said, "We're very pleased with the fact that we made the decision we made" to move to Seoul.
"We are a global media organization, and Asia is a big part of the world," he said. "Our ears and eyes for Asia are here. So, it will continue to be incredibly important to us as we grow our ambitions internationally. It's where we decided to base ourselves for Asia, and that's a big decision made three years ago. And our experience so far has been very good."
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
12. Army captain leaks military secrets to North Korean spy for cryptocurrency
Very troubling.
This is very interesting. How will the ROK military and government react to this? A ban on social media and cell phones and electronic devices in the military? Not very practical and will not be effective.
This is the first time that a military person was won over by a North Korean spy remotely via social media and revealed the country's secret information.
In return for the secret information, Lee and the lieutenant each received 700 million won and 48 million won of cryptocurrency, the police and military said.
Army captain leaks military secrets to North Korean spy for cryptocurrency
Military personnel carry out military drills in the border area between the two Koreas in Paju, northern Gyeonggi Province, March 8. Newsis By Lee Hae-rin
An Army captain and a virtual assets service CEO have been arrested and charged with leaking military secrets to a suspected North Korean hacker.
According to the military, police and prosecution authorities, the cryptocurrency service owner identified by the surname of Lee received a total of 700 million won ($555,000) worth of cryptocurrency on two separate occasions from February to April of last year, in return for winning over personnel from the country's military.
Lee and the captain were introduced to the North Korean spy through their acquaintances and communicated through Telegram, an instant messaging app.
Lee then bought a digital watch with a hidden camera and sent it to the officer in January via the mail, which he smuggled into the military, the investigation team said. Lee also bought a Poison Tap ― a USB hacking tool that exploits data from locked computers ― and used it in an attempt to program military computers remotely with the lieutenant's help.
The investigation revealed that the military officer provided the Korean Joint Command and Control System (KJCCS) login information to the North Korean spy but the hack was not successful.
The military's digital network was not hacked as it blocked any external access in advance, according to the police.
"If the KJCCS had been hacked, a large number of military secrets would have been leaked and led to a serious threat to national security," a military official said.
However, the captain was able to share some military secrets such as filmed computer screens showing security regulations and sent them multiple times to the North Korean hacker via Telegram.
This is the first time that a military person was won over by a North Korean spy remotely via social media and revealed the country's secret information.
In return for the secret information, Lee and the lieutenant each received 700 million won and 48 million won of cryptocurrency, the police and military said.
13. US guided-missile destroyer docks in South Korea after transiting Taiwan Strait: source
Excerpts:
On Tuesday, the warship conducted what the U.S. Navy dubbed a "routine" Taiwan Strait transit through international waters ― a move seen as part of the U.S.' operation to keep an increasingly assertive China in check.
This visit comes as Seoul and Washington are stepping up coordination to rein in North Korea's provocative behavior amid speculation that it may soon conduct a seventh nuclear test or launch another ICBM.
US guided-missile destroyer docks in South Korea after transiting Taiwan Strait: source
The destroyer USS Sampson is seen in this undated file photo. Yonhap A U.S. guided-missile destroyer arrived at South Korea's southeastern port city of Busan, Friday, for replenishment and other purposes, an informed source said Friday, following its transit through the Taiwan Strait earlier this week.
Docked at a naval command in the city, the USS Sampson is set to stay through May 3, the source said, amid lingering tensions caused by North Korea's recent missile launches, including its test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
On Tuesday, the warship conducted what the U.S. Navy dubbed a "routine" Taiwan Strait transit through international waters ― a move seen as part of the U.S.' operation to keep an increasingly assertive China in check.
This visit comes as Seoul and Washington are stepping up coordination to rein in North Korea's provocative behavior amid speculation that it may soon conduct a seventh nuclear test or launch another ICBM. (Yonhap)
14. FM nominee vows to push for Chinese leader's visit to S. Korea
Strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity.
FM nominee vows to push for Chinese leader's visit to S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, April 29 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister nominee Park Jin affirmed his commitment Friday to revitalizing high-level "strategic communication" with China, including through reciprocal visits by South Korean and Chinese leaders.
Park made the remarks in his written answers to lawmakers' questions ahead of his confirmation hearing scheduled for Monday, as the incoming administration of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol faces a series of foreign policy challenges, including an intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry.
"I will make efforts to better deal with pending issues between South Korea and China by realizing reciprocal visits by the two nations' leaders and reinvigorating high-level strategic communication," Park said.
He also recalled last month's phone call between Yoon and Chinese President Xi Jinping, during which they agreed to develop bilateral relations based on the spirit of "mutual respect and cooperation."
The outgoing Moon Jae-in administration had consistently pushed for Xi's visit to Seoul. But the visit has yet to materialize due largely to the COVID-19 pandemic. Moon visited China in 2017 and 2019.
The nominee gave a negative answer to a question of whether he subscribes to the idea of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea or crafting a nuclear weapons sharing arrangement with the U.S.
"Even after the launch of the new government (in Seoul), the consistent stance on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will remain unchanged," Park wrote.
Instead, he vowed to reinforce the credibility of America's extended deterrence to South Korea by reactivating the allies' dialogue channel, called the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG).
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S.' stated commitment to mobilizing the full range of its military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, to defend its Asian ally against possible North Korean aggression.
The EDSCG was launched in 2016 to ramp up discussions between the allies over various extended deterrence measures, but it has not been held since 2018.
Park also underscored the growing importance of three-way cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, saying he will seek "practical and effective" ways to bolster their security ties.
To improve soured relations with Tokyo, Park vowed to promptly open consultations on wartime sexual slavery and forced labor issues to explore reasonable solutions that are compatible with the interests of both countries.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
15. Strengthen alliance (ROK/US)
One thing seems certain is that both Biden and Yoon seem completely aligned on how important alliances are to national security.
Strengthen alliance
Summit could mark milestone in bilateral ties
Incoming President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden are scheduled to hold their first summit in Seoul on May 21 to discuss how to strengthen the alliance and deepen the partnership between the two countries. The summit will come only 11 days after Yoon is sworn in as president May 10. This will mark the earliest-ever meeting between the leaders of the allies following a South Korean president's inauguration.
Both Seoul and Washington certainly feel the urgent need for better ties and enhanced cooperation amid growing North Korean military threats, the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine and the escalating rivalry between the U.S. and China. Thus, Yoon and Biden are expected to work together closely to open a new era in bilateral relations.
It is worth noting that Yoon has already promised to further develop the two countries' comprehensive strategic alliance not only in defense and security but also in other areas such as the economy, trade, technology and climate change. Biden also needs South Korea's cooperation in bilateral, regional and international issues as he is vying to regain the U.S.' global leadership and restoring its alliance and partnership with like-minded democracies.
Most of all, the two leaders should take advantage of their scheduled summit to upgrade the bilateral alliance to better cope with mounting tensions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has conducted 13 launches of different types of missiles, including a hypersonic ballistic missile, so far this year. It even test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile, scrapping its self-imposed moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests. More seriously, its leader Kim Jong-un recently threatened to use nuclear weapons. There are also concerns that Pyongyang may conduct a seventh nuclear test as early as next month.
Against the backdrop, Yoon and Biden need to work out a new strategy to prevent the recalcitrant North from making further provocations. They are likely to discuss ways of deploying U.S. strategic assets to South Korea to enhance deterrence against possible nuclear attacks from North Korea. Beefing up the bilateral security alliance is, no doubt, crucial to ensure peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region. It is also necessary for the two presidents to hammer out measures to lure the North back to dialogue and prod it to move toward denuclearization.
Yoon and Biden are also predicted to accelerate the economic partnership between the two allies. Bilateral technology cooperation is necessary for the U.S. to establish its own supply chain for semiconductors and other strategic goods. They are likely to discuss cooperation in the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific to counter China's growing influence in the region. In addition, Biden is expected to ask Yoon to mend ties with Japan in order to push for trilateral cooperation, while calling for Korea's active participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a U.S.-led security partnership involving Australia, Japan and India.
We hope that Seoul and Washington will make successful results in the May 21 summit to open a new chapter in bilateral ties and upgrade their alliance to a more comprehensive strategic partnership based on mutual respect, trust and cooperation.
16. Japanese PM unlikely to attend Yoon’s inauguration ceremony: reports
If not for the inauguration then hopefully a summit soon after. Maybe following the Biden trip to Korea and Japan to put a bow on a new era of trilateral cooperation
Japanese PM unlikely to attend Yoon’s inauguration ceremony: reports
South Korea will welcome Japanese delegation if they come to Yoon’s inauguration, says FM nominee
Published : Apr 29, 2022 - 15:15 Updated : Apr 29, 2022 - 15:15
South Korean Foreign Minister nominee Park Jin (Yonhap)
South Korea’s Foreign Minister nominee Park Jin said Friday that the incoming government will welcome a Japanese delegation if they come to the presidential inauguration of Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol.
Park, however, said he did not hear whether Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida would travel to Seoul for the ceremony that is scheduled on May 10, and Japanese media outlets reported Kishida will not attend due to unresolved conflicts between the two countries.
Citing several government sources, Sankei Shimbun reported that the Japanese prime minister will not attend the ceremony because the governments of Japan and South Korea exchanged “no solutions” on several conflicting issues.
Instead, Japanese government is considering to send its Foreign Minister Yoshimaya Hayashi and other officials, the report said.
Ties between the neighboring countries remain at their worst in recent history as the two are at odds over several issues that stem from their shared history -- Japan’s forcing Koreans into labor and sexual slavery during its colonization of the Peninsula.
As a Korean court ordered assets seized from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries be sold off so that the money can be used to compensate Korean victims of wartime forced labor, the Japanese company made another appeal to the Supreme Court on the case this month.
Rep. Chung Jin-suk (center left) of the conservative People Power Party leading President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s policy consultation delegation to Japan, delivers a personal letter from Yoon to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (center right) during their meeting held at the prime minister’s official residence in Tokyo on Tuesday. (Yonhap)
As opinions are divided on Kishida’s visit, observers say that it would pose a risk for the prime minister, especially if he makes his trip to Seoul and the Korean court still pushes on to order the asset liquidation.
At the same time, the Japanese prime minister’s participation in the Korean president’s inauguration ceremony would be an “opportunity to normalize the bilateral relations,” an editorial from Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun said.
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol sent a policy consultation delegation to Japan earlier this week, a move aimed at improving bilateral relations, to coordinate policies before he officially comes into office on May 10.
The delegation met with Kishida and exchanged opinions on current affairs during the trip.
The chief of the Korean delegation, National Assembly Deputy Speaker Rep. Chung Jin-suk of the People Power Party, said his team delivered the message that joint efforts are needed to resolve the relationship.
On the idea of holding an early summit of leaders of South Korea and Japan, Chung said they have rehashed the basic points of how the two sides have to come up with plans that can build bilateral trust first.
The last time a Japanese prime minister attended a Korean presidential inauguration ceremony was in 2008, when Yasuo Fukuda traveled to Seoul for the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak. At that time, the two leaders also held a summit here.
For former South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s inauguration, Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso and former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori were in attendance.
17. North Korea’s Missile Message
Concur on pragmatism. I would add not overreacting and sustaining a long term focus beyond missiles and nuclear weapons. Many of us have offered comprehensive and tailored responses (and we will continue to do so).
Excerpts:
Taking on the North Korean missile threat will require a strong dose of pragmatism. Even a proactive and coordinated campaign in concert with U.S. allies in the region will not stop North Korea’s nuclear and missile efforts in their tracks—in fact, it is doubtful that anything could. Nor will these measures fix the long-standing technological and strategic challenges that plague legacy U.S. national missile defenses, including the difficulties associated with mid-course intercepts, overnight. Critics may even argue that a U.S. effort to ramp up its own missile defenses and that of its allies could create the worst of two worlds: a new arms race with China that does not solve Washington’s North Korea problem.
Beijing and Moscow will argue, as they have in the past, that any upgrades to the U.S. national missile defense system designed to address missile threats from North Korea will make their countries less secure by upsetting the great-power balance. They will point to U.S. missile defense enhancements as excuses to continue expanding their own nuclear and missile capabilities, as they have since the system was first developed as a response to the North Korean ICBM threat in the early 2000s.
Washington needs to focus on this smaller power, which is determined to achieve great-power-level nuclear status.
These are not adequate reasons, however, for the United States and its allies to allow North Korea’s dangerous missile program to go unchecked. Washington needs to muster all of the resources at its disposal to fortify its position vis-à-vis a country that is resolved to threaten the United States’ homeland and weaken its alliances in Asia. The effects of a revised North Korean missile defense policy on relations with China and Russia should be considered, but they should not exclusively drive decision-making in Washington. The current infrastructure of the U.S. national missile defense system is no match for arsenals the size of Russia’s and China’s: the United States has and should continue to provide assurances that the system is not designed to destroy Chinese or Russian strategic deterrents, and there is no need to respond in kind.
Addressing Pyongyang’s advanced missile program is a unique challenge that will require a comprehensive and tailored response from Washington. If U.S. policymakers and defense planners remain absorbed by great-power conflict in Europe, they could find themselves witnessing the rapid emergence of the greatest nuclear threat that the United States has faced in generations. Even as the Biden administration deals with Russia’s war in Ukraine and China’s growing rivalry, it needs to sharpen its focus on this smaller power, which is increasingly determined to achieve great-power-level nuclear status—and which gets closer to that goal with each passing day.
North Korea’s Missile Message
How Kim’s New Nuclear Capabilities Up the Ante
April 29, 2022
In the early months of 2022, as the world was transfixed by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un seemed to sense an opportunity. Since the invasion began, he has tested a slew of ballistic missiles, including hypersonic and long-range weapons, with relatively little international scrutiny. Kim’s objective is clear: he aims to develop weapons capable of overwhelming U.S. national missile defense systems. U.S. President Joe Biden’s national security team has been understandably preoccupied with Ukraine, but North Korea’s nuclear missile technology is rapidly advancing and demands urgent attention. Absent a change in U.S. strategy or an unexpected diplomatic breakthrough, Kim could eventually achieve his goal of being able to strike the United States with a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile, with grave implications for U.S. and international security.
But Washington’s attention currently lies elsewhere. Biden’s 2022 National Defense Strategy, which has so far been released in its entirety only in classified form, singles out China as “the pacing challenge” and designates Russia as an additional, though secondary, priority. Concentrating minds and resources on these great-power rivals makes plausible sense, given the capacity of these countries to threaten the security and interests of the United States and its allies as well as broader global stability. The economic and security consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine across Europe and throughout the world have only made this threat more apparent. But the United States must also make room in its top national security priorities to address an enormous—and mounting—security problem that is emerging elsewhere: North Korea is on the cusp of achieving the capability to hit the U.S. homeland with nuclear-tipped missiles. This development not only endangers the United States but could also imperil the U.S.-led alliance system in Asia by stirring doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence—a central element of long-standing U.S. security guarantees to its regional allies involving Washington’s promise to defend them from external attacks using, as U.S.-South Korea policy documents describe it, the “full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities.” It also gives Pyongyang new means to intimidate and coerce South Korea and Japan directly. If Washington hopes to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, much less the world, it must confront North Korea’s ballistic missile program, and take immediate steps to contain it, before it is too late.
CHEAP MISSILES, COSTLY DEFENSES
For more than two decades, the world has known about North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear-tipped missiles that could target the U.S. homeland. As long ago as 1998, Pyongyang conducted its first test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile known as Taepodong-1; and in 2006, it conducted its first nuclear test. But for U.S. residents, this news was generally accompanied by some comforting realities: North Korea had many difficult technical hurdles to clear before people in Los Angeles, New York, or other major U.S. cities needed to worry about Pyongyang potentially targeting them with nuclear warheads. For a time, these hurdles seemed potentially insurmountable, and the Western media frequently mocked North Korea’s seemingly blundering missile ambitions. Over time, however, Pyongyang has managed to clear one technical hurdle after another. With China’s and Russia’s help, it has been able to evade sanctions and gain access to international markets, attaining the resources and missile technologies it needs—many of which are now decades old and commercially available. It has designed a nuclear weapon small enough to fit inside the nose of a missile; it has built missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland; and it is believed to have developed reentry vehicles that can survive the intense heat and pressure of reentering the earth’s atmosphere when a ballistic missile is in its terminal phase, in order to carry nuclear warheads to their target. All these innovations bring North Korea ominously close to posing a direct nuclear threat to the United States.
At present, Pyongyang may be only a few more missile launchers away from having the capacity to defeat U.S. national missile defenses. As the international security expert Ankit Panda testified in June 2021 before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Pyongyang is estimated to have 10 ICBM launchers, while the United States has 44 ground-based interceptors capable of obstructing them before they reach their targets. The U.S. system is currently designed to use four interceptors to target each North Korean reentry vehicle, meaning that Pyongyang will require only a couple of additional launchers to theoretically overwhelm current U.S. missile defense capabilities. Although North Korea is building its ICBM threat using cheap technology dating back to the 1970s, the United States must invest in expensive, cutting-edge missile defenses if it hopes to provide an effective shield against these weapons. This is a numbers game that is stacked against the United States: even if Washington carries out its plan to deploy 20 more interceptors by the end of the decade, these additional defenses can be met with further North Korean launchers and countermeasures.
Washington could conceivably improve this equation by allocating three interceptors per reentry vehicle rather than four, which would allow U.S. defense systems to attempt to intercept more incoming reentry vehicles. But North Korea’s current efforts aim to wipe away even this potential advantage. Specifically, North Korea’s new Hwasong-17 ICBM, which many believe was tested in a failed launch near Pyongyang on March 16, may be large enough to carry multiple reentry vehicles that could include three or four nuclear warheads or a combination of real warheads and decoys. If North Korea were to launch multiple Hwasong-17 ICBMs, the technical challenges posed for U.S. missile defenses in intercepting the higher number of incoming warheads—and discerning actual warheads from decoys—would increase significantly. Development of other legs of the nuclear triad—which would include nuclear-missile-armed submarines and aircraft with nuclear weapons, in addition to land-launched nuclear missiles—would likewise shift the advantage back to Pyongyang before long.
A CREDIBLE THREAT
Putin’s war in Ukraine, in addition to destabilizing European security and upending the global economic order, has heightened the nuclear threat from North Korea in three significant ways. First, Moscow’s unprovoked attack on a sovereign European country—specifically one that renounced the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War—has, in Pyongyang’s view, underscored the necessity of nuclear weapons to deter any potential aggression. As the regime sees it, if North Korea were to renounce its nuclear program, it would, like Ukraine, be significantly more vulnerable to invasion. Second, Putin’s nuclear saber rattling and threats of an atomic confrontation with any NATO country that seeks to make a military intervention in Ukraine may give Kim Jong Un the idea that a first-use declaration, or reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first in battle, could deter U.S. intervention in the event of an armed conflict with South Korea. And third, if Putin actually uses tactical nuclear weapons in the war to create new advantages in specific battlegrounds in Ukraine, this could bolster Kim’s own stated desire to develop a battlefield nuclear weapons capability that could be launched over shorter distances and used on smaller targets like facilities or troops in South Korea, providing greater flexibility than larger nuclear weapons and greater destructive power than conventional weapons.
Kim aims to develop weapons capable of overwhelming U.S. national missile defense systems.
North Korea’s recent flurry of missile tests indicates that it is inching closer to being able to credibly threaten U.S. cities with nuclear weapons. Since the start of 2022, North Korea has carried out 13 missile tests, ranging from short-range hypersonic missiles to an intermediate-range ballistic missile to an intercontinental ballistic missile. This dramatic increase in testing has advanced the goals that Kim laid out for North Korean weapons development in unusual detail during the state’s Eighth Party Congress in January 2021. As he stated at the time, these aims include research focused on “perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket [sic],” efforts to attain “an advanced capability for making a preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike by further raising the rate of precision good enough to strike and annihilate any strategic targets within a range of 15,000 kilometres [sic] with pinpoint accuracy,” and developing “solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-continental underwater and ground ballistic rockets.” These aims—and North Korea’s advancement toward them—should raise major alarm in Washington, as their attainment would spell a major threat to U.S. and regional security.
In the weeks ahead, the world should expect to see further missile testing in North Korea, and perhaps even the first nuclear detonation since 2017. The war in Ukraine has provided a convenient cover for Pyongyang, as the United States remains consumed by Russia’s aggression. Even if Washington were to turn its attention toward North Korea, the close alignment of Beijing and Moscow and their unwillingness to condemn Pyongyang through the United Nations Security Council has stymied any collective international action to curb Kim’s nuclear program. Indeed, North Korea’s last ICBM test in March should have triggered further petroleum export sanctions under an existing UNSC resolution, but Chinese and Russian opposition prevented the UNSC from imposing sanctions or taking any other punitive actions. Meanwhile, the deterioration of relations between Seoul and Tokyo, driven by issues ranging from trade disputes to troubled historical dynamics, have hurt Washington’s ability to conduct trilateral military exercises and coordinate policy with its two key allies in the region. And internally, North Korea is dealing with challenging economic and health crises that also provide new incentives for the regime to glorify its military program, which can help to increase loyalty and morale among the population during periods of material hardship.
MORE IRON DOMES
North Korea may seek to develop specific capabilities in upcoming tests, including the successful deployment of multiple reentry vehicles which are key to frustrating U.S. and allied missile defenses; lighter and smaller nuclear warheads, which could be loaded individually on smaller missiles or in clusters on single ICBMs; submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which would build the second leg of a potential North Korean nuclear triad; and, potentially, air launched nuclear cruise missiles, which would complete said triad. Pyongyang has already demonstrated a resolute determination to pursue these advancements: despite the regime’s dire economic straits, North Korea has scoured markets to acquire technology to test an SLBM, first from a submerged platform, and then later from a ballistic missile submarine.
There is no silver bullet to stop further North Korean advances in these areas. Diplomacy has reached a dead end, as Pyongyang has failed to respond to the Biden administration’s repeated offer to meet “without preconditions.” Kim will likely continue to avoid negotiations for at least the remainder of 2022, as the country progresses toward the technical milestones that he laid out at the Eighth Party Congress.
Yet some steps could put the United States and its allies in a significantly stronger position to address the growing North Korea security challenge. For instance, the United States could accelerate its planned deployment of 20 additional interceptors using Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) technology—currently slated for 2028—which would potentially enable single interceptors to target multiple objects and discriminate between warheads and decoys. Although, as noted, concentrating efforts on this interceptor-to-launcher one-upmanship is not a sound long-term strategy, it is essential amid North Korea’s current acceleration of its missile program, as it would strengthen U.S. national missile defenses while enhancing the credibility of U.S. security pledges to provide extended deterrence to its allies in the region. The United States should also increase its investment in other new technologies such as boost-phase defense systems, which target missiles in their earliest stage of flight. These systems are still in a nascent stage of development and involve a number of operational challenges, but their development would help Washington move away from its legacy national missile defense system, which is built around outdated assessments of North Korea’s missile threat from the 1990s, and which assume defending only against a handful of North Korean missiles based on rudimentary technology.
The war in Ukraine has provided a convenient cover for Pyongyang.
Within the region, the United States and South Korea should revitalize a comprehensive counter-missile strategy that would entail detecting and defending against North Korea’s missiles and launchers, disrupting the capabilities that allow North Korea to repeatedly fire its missiles, and destroying the missiles and launchers themselves. This would require new investments in sensors, intelligence and surveillance technology, advanced command and control infrastructure, and other weapons systems that would significantly enhance regional allies’ ability to stay ahead of North Korea’s technological advances.
Washington should also invest in equipping allies in the region with additional defense weapons and systems. Biden should support Seoul’s enhancement of its own capabilities to counter missiles from North Korea, consistent with incoming South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s plans to deploy a new missile defense battery known as Terminal High Altitude Air Defense to cover Seoul and to accelerate work on South Korea’s interceptor systems, including SM-3 ship-based defenses and an artillery interception modeled after Israel’s Iron Dome, designed to protect the country’s population and critical infrastructure. Increasing U.S.-Japanese-South Korean coordination on missile defense is another critical step, albeit one that will require Yoon to abandon South Korea’s pledge to China under his predecessor, Moon Jae-in, not to integrate South Korea into a regional missile defense with the United States and Japan.
Lastly, despite Pyongyang’s unresponsiveness, the United States should continue to seek avenues of diplomacy with North Korea to achieve a permanent ban on missile tests. This shift in focus from North Korea’s nuclear weapons to its missile program is becoming more urgent as Pyongyang edges closer to being able to penetrate U.S. national missile defenses.
NOT-SO-GREAT POWERS
Taking on the North Korean missile threat will require a strong dose of pragmatism. Even a proactive and coordinated campaign in concert with U.S. allies in the region will not stop North Korea’s nuclear and missile efforts in their tracks—in fact, it is doubtful that anything could. Nor will these measures fix the long-standing technological and strategic challenges that plague legacy U.S. national missile defenses, including the difficulties associated with mid-course intercepts, overnight. Critics may even argue that a U.S. effort to ramp up its own missile defenses and that of its allies could create the worst of two worlds: a new arms race with China that does not solve Washington’s North Korea problem.
Beijing and Moscow will argue, as they have in the past, that any upgrades to the U.S. national missile defense system designed to address missile threats from North Korea will make their countries less secure by upsetting the great-power balance. They will point to U.S. missile defense enhancements as excuses to continue expanding their own nuclear and missile capabilities, as they have since the system was first developed as a response to the North Korean ICBM threat in the early 2000s.
Washington needs to focus on this smaller power, which is determined to achieve great-power-level nuclear status.
These are not adequate reasons, however, for the United States and its allies to allow North Korea’s dangerous missile program to go unchecked. Washington needs to muster all of the resources at its disposal to fortify its position vis-à-vis a country that is resolved to threaten the United States’ homeland and weaken its alliances in Asia. The effects of a revised North Korean missile defense policy on relations with China and Russia should be considered, but they should not exclusively drive decision-making in Washington. The current infrastructure of the U.S. national missile defense system is no match for arsenals the size of Russia’s and China’s: the United States has and should continue to provide assurances that the system is not designed to destroy Chinese or Russian strategic deterrents, and there is no need to respond in kind.
Addressing Pyongyang’s advanced missile program is a unique challenge that will require a comprehensive and tailored response from Washington. If U.S. policymakers and defense planners remain absorbed by great-power conflict in Europe, they could find themselves witnessing the rapid emergence of the greatest nuclear threat that the United States has faced in generations. Even as the Biden administration deals with Russia’s war in Ukraine and China’s growing rivalry, it needs to sharpen its focus on this smaller power, which is increasingly determined to achieve great-power-level nuclear status—and which gets closer to that goal with each passing day.
18. Otto Warmbier’s parents return to University of Virginia for first time since son’s death
Remember Otto Warmbiaer and heed these words from his mother:
She continued: “If you’re silent, nothing will change. It may not feel like things will change, but the more we talk about this and take little steps in the right direction, it’s the only way for change to happen.”
Otto Warmbier’s parents return to University of Virginia for first time since son’s death
CHARLOTTESVILLE, Va. (WVIR) - The family of the University of Virginia student who was captured in North Korea and left in a coma returned to the place he called home before his death nearly five years ago.
Thursday marked the first time Otto Warmbier’s parents, Cindy and Fred, came back to UVA grounds since their son’s death. It started as a way for them to listen to stories, as Think Again, a faculty-led organization at UVA, hosted a panel. But the event ended with the parents sharing stories of their own.
The panel included Billy Burgess, one of Otto’s fraternity brothers, Yeonmi Park, a North Korean defector, and UVA Law Professor Sai Prakash.
In an interview with NBC29, Cindy Warmbier remembered her late son.
“He was super charismatic,” she said. “I mean, people just gravitated towards him and he gravitated towards people.”
That charisma is why people like Burgess came back to welcome the Warmbiers to Charlottesville.
“He was incredibly loving and caring. It was apparent to people he had never met and apparent to people who had known him forever,” Burgess said.
It’s also why people who never knew him personally, like current members of the Theta Chi fraternity, attended.
Cindy Warmbier told them to call their parents and tell them they love them. They offered that love back.
“I thought [returning to UVA] would be harder than it was. The support really just makes you feel very grateful to this community,” she said.
During the Warmbiers’ return, they met with UVA President Jim Ryan to discuss ways the university could help.
“Enough time has passed, the pain is gone now, that as a community they can move forward too,” she said.
She continued: “If you’re silent, nothing will change. It may not feel like things will change, but the more we talk about this and take little steps in the right direction, it’s the only way for change to happen.”
Cindy Warmbier said that can be done by tapping into UVA’s finest minds to aid grassroots efforts. The motivation was there, especially after harrowing stories were shared about North Korea by Park.
She also said that if Otto was there, he’d be upset his mother had to go through what she did.
“He’d do anything to make my life easier, and he’d be proud of me,” she said. “Because I’m a fighter.”
Copyright 2022 WVIR. All rights reserved.
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19. The Australian factor in South Korea’s security strategy
This is good.
Conclusion:
South Korean and Australian strategies are already moving in similar directions as both countries seek to reduce their economic reliance on China and broaden and deepen their security relationships with multiple partners. With Yoon’s expressed interest in attending the next Quad summit as an observer, the incoming administration would be well served to take the opportunity to strengthen the Australia – South Korea security relationship. During their phone call after the South Korean election, Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed his interest to Yoon in visiting Seoul to further discussions on deepening cooperation. The Yoon team should build off the momentum of the forthcoming Quad leaders’ summit, set to take place in Japan in the next couple of months, and arrange for a South Korea – Australia summit to take place soon after.
The Australian factor in South Korea’s security strategy | The Strategist
The US ‘hub and spoke’ bilateral alliance system is no longer fit for purpose and America, Australia and Japan are actively seeking to network security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific. A recognition of the advantage of networked security relationships can be seen in the growing number of these arrangements throughout the region: the Quad, AUKUS, the Japan–Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement, the Japan–India Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, and India’s invitation to Australia to join the Malabar naval exercise are all excellent examples. But, while South Korea is one of the most important US treaty allies in Asia, its modest approach to expanding defence ties has left it noticeably absent from many of these arrangements.
Outgoing President Moon Jae-in’s signature New Southern Policy seeks to diversify and strengthen the country’s diplomatic, economic and security relations. It includes a ‘peace pillar’ that prioritises broadening and strengthening South Korea’s security relationships with South and Southeast Asian countries. Yet this pillar is often criticised as the weakest and least fleshed-out element of the policy. South Korea – Southeast Asia security cooperation thus far has avoided ‘sensitive’ areas of hard security cooperation. The focus is on non-traditional security issues such as disaster response and maritime pollution, which, while important in their own rights, do little to directly contribute to South Korea’s national security.
Caught in a geopolitical tug-of-war between the US and China and heavily reliant on both, South Korea must weigh the consequences of more robust efforts to network security relationships in the region.
As president-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration prepares to enter the Blue House on 10 May, his foreign policy team has articulated a more forward-leaning strategic direction based on ‘confident diplomacy and strong national security’. Throughout his campaign, Yoon stated his intentions to end Moon’s policies of ‘strategic ambiguity’ vis-à-vis US–China competition and scrap the ‘three nos’ by, among other things, purchasing additional THAAD air defence batteries from the US. That Yoon’s first five post-election phone calls were with the leaders of the Quad countries and the UK underscores the incoming administration’s intent to elevate South Korea’s regional leadership role through increased cooperation with like-minded democracies.
South Korea and Australia, as two militarily capable US allies with shared interests in maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific and protecting the rules-based international order, should cooperate in pursuing a stronger defence relationship. Expanding security ties will enhance both countries’ security and contribute to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific as a whole.
As the new Yoon administration considers reformulating South Korea’s foreign policy, expanding security cooperation with Australia should be a high priority. Moon’s administration oversaw significant growth in the security relationship. Last year, Seoul and Canberra inked a $1 billion deal for 30 self-propelled howitzers and 15 armoured supply vehicles—Australia’s first major defence deal with an Asian country—and upgraded their relationship to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’.
While the administration was publicly adamant that these developments and Moon’s related visit to Australia were not pointed at China, the political signalling inherent in the timing of the deal was undeniably significant. The announcement came not long after Australia joined AUKUS, a development that antagonised China and deepened tensions in the China–Australia relationship. The visit was planned before the AUKUS announcement, yet it remains relevant that South Korea proceeded even in light of this potentially complicating strategic development.
Another promising sign of increasing defence ties, Hanwha Defense’s Redback infantry fighting vehicle is moving into the next phase of competition as one of two final candidates to become the Australian Army’s first dedicated IFV. After undergoing nine months of testing and evaluation by the Australian Defence Force, Hanwha is set to deliver the Redback to the Republic of Korea Army for two months of trials. These developments show that while South Korea remains dependent on China economically, it is placing greater trust in the US and its allies for its security, and is actively seeking to take on a greater regional role, even at the risk of angering China.
South Korea’s need for economic diversification away from China was the strongest motivation behind the New Southern Policy. South Korea and Australia share experiences of Chinese economic coercion and both governments are similarly elevating the importance of economic security. Alongside their defence deal, the two countries concluded an agreement for Australia to boost exports of rare earths to South Korea. China currently dominates the rare-earth industry, refining 80–90% of the world’s supply. South Korea is not alone in seeking to reduce its dependence on China for rare earths; the US and Japan are also striving to do the same. South Korea and Australia should build upon the rare-earths deal and pursue further cooperation in supply-chain resilience through their participation in the US’s proposed Indo-Pacific economic framework.
South Korean and Australian strategies are already moving in similar directions as both countries seek to reduce their economic reliance on China and broaden and deepen their security relationships with multiple partners. With Yoon’s expressed interest in attending the next Quad summit as an observer, the incoming administration would be well served to take the opportunity to strengthen the Australia – South Korea security relationship. During their phone call after the South Korean election, Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed his interest to Yoon in visiting Seoul to further discussions on deepening cooperation. The Yoon team should build off the momentum of the forthcoming Quad leaders’ summit, set to take place in Japan in the next couple of months, and arrange for a South Korea – Australia summit to take place soon after.
20. USFK Practice Seizing Underground Nuclear Facility
I recall other forces practicing to do this two decades ago.
I do hope this was the Combined 2d Infantry Division.
USFK Practice Seizing Underground Nuclear Facility
April 29, 2022 13:24
The U.S. Forces Korea conducted special training last weekend to practice seizing a North Korean nuclear facility buried deep underground.
The USFK publicized the drill on Twitter to send a warning to Pyongyang, just before North Korea staged a massive military parade on Monday where it showed off new nuclear-capable missiles.
The U.S. 2nd Infantry Division tweeted four photos on April 23 showing U.S. troops in protective suits equipped with gas masks, portable oxygen tanks and rifles conducting a search mission in a tunnel. One photo shows them guarding the entrance to the tunnel. The soldiers' chemical, biological and radiological protective gear is presumed to be new.
This undated photo from the Twitter account of U.S. Forces Korea's 2nd Infantry Division shows troops training in a tunnel in an unidentified location. /Yonhap
The drill was aimed either at searching for enemy leaders hiding in an underground bunker or seizing an underground command post and a nuclear missile facility.
The tweet did not specify the location, timing and purpose of the training but identified the personnel as "Ready First soldiers," i.e. members of the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team. They were assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division on rotation.
"The North has fired intercontinental ballistic missiles and is also preparing more intensive provocations, including a fresh nuclear test," a South Korean military officer said, "The USFK's disclosure of the photos itself is a warning message to the North."
21. Korea’s Yoon angling for a Japan reset
This should be a top priority for all three countries.
Korea’s Yoon angling for a Japan reset
South Korean delegation received by Japan PM Kishida but the road to healthy relations will be rough and bumpy
SEOUL – Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on Tuesday received a high-powered delegation dispatched by South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, who has vowed to improve dire bilateral relations.
Unusual for a South Korean politician, Yoon has pledged to upgrade relations with Japan, a nation widely despised in Korea for its colonial rule of the peninsula between 1910 and 1945.
Tuesday’s meeting at the Japanese prime minister’s official residence reportedly lasted 25 minutes, according to South Korean media reports. A South Korean delegation comprised of politicians, diplomats and academics handed over a letter from Yoon to Kishida at the meeting. The delegation is currently on a five-day trip to Japan.
Kishida voiced hopes, “… for a new starting point in which our two countries would build a future-oriented relationship while also squarely facing the past,” the delegation’s leader, National Assembly Deputy Speaker Chung Jin-suk, told South Korean media.
In a phrase that could prick up ears in Beijing, Kishida also said: “Strategic cooperation between Japan and Korea, and between Japan, the US and Korea has never been as necessary as the rules-based international order is under threat. We cannot delay improving relations with Korea.”
“Most important is restoring trust between our two countries,” Chung, the delegation head said, according to the reports. “We shared our opinion that restoring trust will require reactivating person-to-person exchange, which has been interrupted because of Covid-19, and making institutional improvements toward that end.”
President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol speaks to foreign reporters in Seoul after winning a bitterly fought election. Photo: Asia Times / Andrew Salmon
Those baby steps would mean restarting regular flights, halted due to the pandemic.
However, Kishida also raised a critical issue that has long-poisoned bilateral relations.
In 2018, South Korean courts seized assets held there by Japanese companies as compensation for colonial-era forced laborers. That infuriated Japan, which insisted the issue had long ago been solved via a 1965 diplomatic normalization treaty accompanied by a compensation package totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.
A fog of opacity hangs over why the 2018 assets have not, four years later, been liquidated and handed over to the victims. One possibility is that political pressure has been bought to bear on the courts not to finalize, for fear of sparking massive Japanese retaliation.
Asia Times has learned from a high-level business source close to both governments that Japan would respond massively if the South Korean courts take that step, with Tokyo likely deploying both commercial and financial leverage.
The divide between 21st century Japan and South Korea is deep and wide.
The two Northeast Asian nations share similar cultures and lifestyles. They are both democratic polities overseeing highly successful capitalist economies that boast world-class brands and manufacturers. Both have separate security alliances with the US.
Despite all this, it would be difficult to point to two neighboring democracies which have such strained relations.
In modern history, Japan colonized Korea in 1910 – an era that ended with Japan’s defeat at the hands of the World War II Allies in 1945. The two opened diplomatic relations in 1965, but are divided over interpretations of colonial-era history and the possession of a duo of tiny islets in the Sea of Japan – which South Korea calls the East Sea.
These various issues have always simmered. But they flared to white heat under two leaders – conservative revisionist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Japan and liberal populist President Moon Jae-in in South Korea.
Under the two, disputes that had largely been confined within the spheres of street or online politics, academia and diplomacy crossed into the political, security and economic spaces.
Abe left office in 2020. Moon exits on May 9, paving the way for Yoon. So, the chance for a reset beckons.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida spent time with the delegation from South Korea. Photo: AFP
Sunnier days ahead?
Yoon is a conservative of the People Power Party. Kishida hails from the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party, but is widely seen as more middle-of-the-road and less nationalistic than either Abe or Abe’s short-lived successor, Yoshihide Suga.
This may be encouraging, for the two sides have much to paper over. Seen through a cold, hard lens, South Korea arguably has more to gain.
According to South Korean trade officials, Seoul seeks to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) free trade zone. Ever since Donald Trump-era Washington backed out of the trade deal, Tokyo has taken the lead as the biggest economy in the bloc. Seoul will need Tokyo’s nod to join.
While the two countries’ economies are both competitive and complimentary, Japan has the upper hand in trade.
According to World Bank data, Japan is South Korea’s fifth-largest trade partner and South Korea is Japan’s third-largest trade partner. However, Japan enjoys a trade surplus. In 2020, statistics show it exported US$42 billion worth of products to South Korea, while South Korea exported $25 billion to Japan. This trend continues through 2022.
Beyond trade, Seoul and Tokyo have mission-critical shared interests. While both are US allies, both also do the bulk of their trade with China.
In this area, a shared voice would be of mutual benefit, one expert told Asia Times.
“Both countries do not want to choose sides,” said Haruko Satoh, a Japanese scholar of international relations at the Osaka School of International Public Policy. “If they could coordinate a bit more they could offer a more balanced voice toward the US, as they approach China.”
Satoh added that there are regional infrastructure and public health issues where Japan and South Korea should cooperate. The two sides should “unite in order to jointly navigate the post-Ukraine Biden administration’s clumsy way of handling affairs in Asia.”
Satoh, who oversees the Japanese side of the Korea Foundation project “Peace and Security in Asia: Toward a Meaningful Japan-Korea Partnership,” added that there are regional infrastructure and public health issues where Japan and South Korea could feasibly cooperate.
The influential liberal Japanese newspaper the Asahi editorialized: “Kishida can break the deadlock by attending Yoon’s inauguration.” The paper said that previous Japanese prime ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Yasuo Fukuda had taken that very step.
However, according to the South Korean delegation in Tokyo, there are no plans for that.
Certainly, a reset is not going to be easy. The Asahi noted that bilateral shuttle diplomacy has been dormant for a decade.
It also pointed to what looked like a Japanese snub. Seoul’s ambassador to Japan, who arrived in the post more than one year ago, has yet to meet the Japanese prime minister or foreign minister.
Meanwhile, in South Korea, there is particularly high emotion invested, which Yoon may not be able to combat.
“If Yoon becomes too soft on Japan, a public outcry will arise,” Moon Chung-in, a former South Korean presidential adviser who now heads the Asan Institute think tank, told Asia Times.
Weakening Yoon’s position is the narrowness of his electoral win – less than 1% of the total vote.
“Campaign rhetoric is one thing, implementation of policies is another,” Moon warned. “He cannot retain his pro-Japanese stance, as he stated in the campaign.”
It is not only public opinion. Yoon faces a hostile National Assembly and may not enjoy full-hearted support from South Korea’s civil service as the administrative city of Sejong voted against him.
The Dokdo Islands, the easternmost islets of the Korean Peninsula. Photo: WikiCommons
The battlegrounds
There are several issues dividing the nations. The two dispute the ownership of the Dokdo (Korean) and Takeshima (Japanese) islets that lie between them. South Korea makes its occupation of the two tiny possessions a massive national issue, and ministries boast models of them in their lobbies and military drills are held to ensure their defensibility.
Japan consistently and officially disputes South Korea’s position.
But the bigger issue is historical remembrance and contrition – or lack thereof. The Japanese believe they have apologized scores of times and paid repeated reparations to Korean victims of the colonial era, notably “comfort women” and forced laborers.
But, this thinking goes, Seoul is never satisfied and continues to demand more and more, while purposely embarrassing Japan in the international arena. There were also allegations that some details of Korea’s colonial-era victimhood are either false or exaggerated.
Koreans believe that Tokyo’s various payments and apologies are either insufficient or insincere and point to a two-faced side to Japanese politics. On the one hand, expressing remorse, while on the other editing atrocities out of history textbooks and signage while also honoring both war dead and war criminals.
They vigorously protest against Japanese revisionism of what they consider historical facts. But under Abe and Moon, these issues moved across their customary firewalls to impact the political, economic and security spheres.
In 2017, Moon unilaterally overturned a 2015 pact on comfort women agreed to between Abe and the South Korean administration that preceded Moon’s.
In 2018, South Korean courts seized Japanese assets to pay wartime forced Korean laborers, which Tokyo insisted breached the 1965 agreement.
The comfort woman statue outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. Photo: Asia Times / Andrew Salmon
Tokyo responded, slowing the export of key components needed by South Korea’s flagship chip sector and removing the country’s preferential trade status. Seoul retaliated with the latter step, while furious citizens boycotted Japanese businesses and products.
A Japanese warship was banned from a South Korean naval review for flying an ensign that Koreans said harkened back to World War II. And a South Korean destroyer illuminated a Japanese aircraft with its target radar.
Moon also sought to end an intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan, but made a last-minute U-turn, almost certainly after US intervention.
In practice, the Japanese raw material “sanctions” proved to be a damp squib and South Korea’s chip sector was not impacted as shipments were slowed, not stopped, while Seoul diversified its sources of the materials.
Amid this poisoned atmosphere, Washington, which seeks to build a united front in the region against Beijing, was hugely frustrated.
So who was responsible for the dire bilateral relations: Abe or Moon?
“Both,” said Satoh. “It takes two to tango.”
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
