Quotes of the Day:
“Government was rarely more than a choice between the disastrous and the unpalatable.”
- Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam
“But in any society, leaders who aren’t willing to make sacrifices aren’t leaders, they’re opportunists, and opportunists rarely have the common good in mind. They’re easy to spot, though: opportunists lie reflexively, blame others for failures, and are unapologetic cowards.”
- Sebastian Junger, Freedom
“Men, be kind to your fellow men; This is your first duty, kind to every age and station, kind to all that is not foreign to humanity. What wisdom can you find that is greater than kindness?”
- Jean Jacques Rousseau
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 27 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. We Are Now in a Global Cold War
3. Abu Sayyaf Under Rising Pressure in Asia’s Backwater
4. US kills ‘senior leader’ of al-Qaeda-linked group in Syria
5. Raptors, Lightning IIs ‘critically important’ deterrence factors, says INDOPACOM chief
6. Opinion | Hong Kong was not supposed to look like this
7. Putin's Only Strategy Is Self-Destruction in Ukraine
8. A deep look at the SIG Rattler, SOCOM's new personal defense weapon
9. The US Army Just Placed What Might Be Its Last Order for Black Hawk Helicopters
10. Without Maximum Pressure Biden Has Little Leverage Over Khamenei
11. The Key to Maximizing the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment Concept? The Army
12. U.S. strike targets senior Al Qaeda leader in Syria
13. Relocating or expanding? Islamic State Mozambique’s reaction to foreign intervention
14. Don’t Let Russia Dominate the Strategic Concept
15. The Biden Administration’s China Strategy
16. The Source of Ukraine’s Resilience
17. Last Best Hope – The West’s Final Chance to Build a Better World Order
18. Navy destroyer in South China Sea after Taiwan Strait flyover by recon plane
19. The Ukraine Situation Report: Cross-Border Sabotage Raids And CIA Operatives In Kyiv
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1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 27 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 27
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, George Barros and Grace Mappes
June 27, 4:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
A Russian missile strike hit a shopping mall in a residential area of Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast on June 27, likely killing many civilians.[1] Ukrainian sources stated that over 1,000 civilians were inside the mall at the time of the strike, and officials are still clarifying the number of casualties.[2] The Kremenchuk strike follows a wider intensification of Russian missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian targets in recent days. Advisor to the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs Vadym Denisenko stated on June 26 that Russian forces have begun a campaign of massive and largely indiscriminate missile strikes against Ukrainian cities, which echoes statements made by an unnamed US defense official on June 27 that Russian forces are increasingly relying on artillery and missile strikes to advance operations in Ukraine.[3] As Russian forces continue to burn through their supply of high-precision weaponry, such attacks that cause substantial collateral civilian damage will likely escalate.[4]
Russian military authorities continue to seek ways to replenish their increasingly exhausted force capabilities without announcing general mobilization. An unnamed senior US defense official stated on June 27 that Russian forces are likely running low on senior military leaders and are relying more heavily on retired officers and reserves to replace officer casualties.[5] The UK Ministry of Defense similarly reported that Russian forces will likely rely heavily on reserve echelons, namely the Combat Army Reserve (BARS) and Human Mobilization Resource, in order to galvanize volunteer support and fill out the third battalion tactical group (BTG) within regular (and depleted) brigades.[6] As ISW has previously assessed, such reserves are unlikely to provide Russian forces with meaningful regeneration of force capabilities.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces struck a shopping mall in Kremenchuk as part of a recent escalation in strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and cities.
- Russian forces made incremental advances southwest of Lysychansk near the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway but have not entirely severed Ukrainian lines of communication into Bakhmut.
- Russian forces made measured advances during offensive operations to the east of Bakhmut.
- Ukrainian forces repelled Russian offensives north of Slovyansk.
- Russian forces made limited and localized attacks along contested frontlines around Kharkiv City but did not make any advances on June 27.
- Ukrainian counteroffensives along the Southern Axis continue to force Russian troops to prioritize defensive operations along the line of contact.
- Russian occupation authorities are taking steps to strengthen economic control of occupied territories and force Ukrainian civilians to switch to the ruble.
Click here to enlarge the map.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
- Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Click here to enlarge the map.
Click here to enlarge the map.
Russian forces made marginal advances southwest of Lysychansk on June 27 but have not yet entirely severed Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the city. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a partially successful advance west of Vovchoyarivka towards the T1302 Lysychansk-Bakhmut highway (just 5 km south of Lysychansk) but are unlikely to have reached the T1302 in this area as of June 27 due to Ukrainian resistance in Verkhnokamyanka.[7] Russian forces are also securing positions in the southern territory of the Lysychansk Oil Refinery and maintained artillery fire against Ukrainian positions around the Lysychansk Gelatin Plant.[8] Ukrainian forces reportedly repelled Russian attacks north of Pidlisne, situated just south of the Lysychansk Gelatin Plant. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai called on Lysychansk residents to evacuate from the city, indicating Ukrainian forces retain control of at least some GLOCs to the city.[9] Russian Telegram channels continue to claim that Russian forces have established “fire control” (likely meaning successfully interdicting Ukrainian movement) along Ukrainian GLOCs to Lysychansk on the Siversk-Bilohorivka road, however.[10]
Ukrainian forces continued to resist Russian advances towards the T1302 to the east of Bakhmut on June 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force attempts around Yakovlivka, Spirne, and Berestove, all along the T1302 highway within 30 km northeast of Bakhmut.[11] Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions in Bilohorivka, also likely in an effort to sever the GLOC by forcing Ukrainian forces out of settlements along the T1302.[12] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported ongoing fighting in Klynove, where Russian forces are attempting to gain a foothold on the E40 highway to Slovyansk.[13] Ukrainian forces reportedly repulsed Russian assaults on Klynove but confirmed that Russian forces continued advancing in settlements just west of the E40.[14] Ukrainian forces also likely used recently US-provided HIMARS rocket artillery systems to strike a Russian ammunition depot approximately 60 km east in Russian-controlled territory in Luhansk Oblast.[15]
Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north of Slovyansk on June 27. Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleg Synegubov reported that Ukrainian forces resisted Russian attacks in Mazanivka and Dolyna along the E40.[16] Russian offensive operations have been largely stalled around the Izyum axis since Russian shifted their focus to secure the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area. The UK Defense Ministry noted that heavy shelling around Izyum may indicate Russian attempts to “regain momentum” along this axis, but Russian forces will likely need to deprioritize advances in Luhansk Oblast to resume offensive operations north of Slovyansk.[17] Russian forces did not attempt to launch a ground assault on settlements in the Slovyansk or Siversk areas from Lyman.[18]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Click here to enlarge the map.
Russian forces conducted localized but unsuccessful assaults on settlements northwest and southeast of Kharkiv City. Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleg Synegubov reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks against Pytomnyk and Dementiivka, both situated along the E105 Kharkiv-Belgorod City highway.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repulsed Russian attacks in Dovhalivka and Zalyman, approximately 90km southeast of Kharkiv City in the direction of Izyum.[20] Russian forces also reportedly continued remote mining, shelling, and radio-technical reconnaissance in settlements around Kharkiv City, likely in an effort to disrupt any attempted Ukrainian counterattacks.[21] Former Russian Federal Security Service officer and milblogger Igor Girkin (Strelkov) claimed that Russian forces presently lack the strength or motivation to launch offensive operations in northern and central Kharkiv Oblast but are likely to continue defending occupied positions as a “springboard” for potential future attacks against Kharkiv City.[22]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Click here to enlarge the map.
Russian forces continued to focus on defensive operations along the Southern Axis on June 27.[23] Ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives along the Kherson-Mykolaiv border are likely successfully pressuring Russian defenses. An unnamed US defense official stated that Ukrainian troops liberated “several” unidentified settlements in Kherson Oblast over the weekend, and the Head of Ukraine’s Southern Defense Force Joint Coordinating Press Center stated that Russian forces are continuing to prepare and strengthen second and third defensive lines in Kherson Oblast due to persistent Ukrainian counteroffensives in the area.[24] Russian forces once again unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions in Potomkyne, in northern Kherson Oblast.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces may carry out assault operations in unspecified areas to reach the Kherson Oblast border.[26] This statement indicates that Russian troops may hope to eventually counteract Ukrainian advances on the Southern Axis and regain more advantageous positions, although their prospects for successfully doing so are ultimately unclear considering their generally-degraded force capabilities.
Russian forces conducted air strikes against Ukrainian positions in Kherson Oblast, artillery strikes against various locations in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts, and a missile attack against residential infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[27] Ukrainian forces continued strikes on the Russian grouping in Snake Island, likely in order to complicate Russian attempts to consolidate their presence in and control of the northwestern Black Sea.[28]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian authorities continued to take measures to strengthen the economic integration of occupied areas into Russian systems on June 27. First Deputy Head of the Kherson Oblast Council Yury Sobolevskyi stated on June 26 that Russian authorities are opening the first branch of the Russian state-backed Promsvyazbank in Kherson Oblast.[29] Sobolevskyi added that Russian authorities are distributing one-time 10,000-ruble payments to ”almost everyone” to foster economic reliance on the ruble economy.[30] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command additionally reported that Russian authorities in Kherson City are seizing banking institutions and issuing Russian salary cards to those working in enterprises that have been co-opted by Russian occupation authorities.[31] Such actions are likely intended to force occupied areas to become increasingly reliant on the ruble, stimulating long term integration into the Russian economy.
2. We Are Now in a Global Cold War
Excerpts:
In contrast to the 40-year-long U.S.-Soviet confrontation, which pitted two great powers utterly isolated from each other into separate spheres, this struggle is marked by a multidimensional relationship where China and the West trade and invest with one another even as they compete and where Russia, China’s partner in authoritarianism and anti-Americanism alike, stays viable—though heavily sanctioned—by supplying oil, gas, and grain to the other side.
But neither should we deceive ourselves that the contours and stakes of a long-term confrontation aren’t coming plainly into view. A cold war is simply a raw struggle for power and the right to set the rules for global conduct; it occurs largely behind the scenes in private deal-making and covert action rather than on the battlefield. And that’s what we’re facing.
What caused this war? First, Washington has undergone a generation-long transformation from a bipartisan policy of eager engagement with China—seeking to turn Beijing into a fellow “stakeholder” in the global system, as former U.S. President George W. Bush’s deputy secretary of state, Robert Zoellick, once put it—to a bipartisan policy of unrelenting confrontation. And helped along by the shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Washington appears to be bringing a once-reluctant Europe along with it.
The new strategic concept for Washington grew out of a communique issued a year ago after the last NATO summit, which warned for the first time against China’s “systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to alliance security.”
We Are Now in a Global Cold War
With NATO expanding its focus to China, new battle lines are being drawn.
By Michael Hirsh, a senior correspondent at Foreign Policy. FP subscribers can now receive alerts when new stories written by this author are published. Subscribe now | Sign in
When former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill laid out the contours and stakes of the first Cold War at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, he didn’t just talk about Europe. What people remember, of course, is this famous line: “From Stettin in the Baltic, to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent.” But later on in the speech, Churchill also warned of the coming “shadow” of tyranny “alike in the West and in the East.”
The nascent Cold War, in other words, was already going global—even as it was being defined for the first time. That Cold War may have ended three decades ago, but another, very different sort of cold war is beginning. And this one is also about to go global. NATO’s leaders are convening this week with an eye on the Indo-Pacific, and they are preparing to confront China as well as Russia.
And as we will see at the NATO summit in Madrid—where the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand will join the gathering for the first time—new battle lines are being drawn that could last for generations.
In contrast to the 40-year-long U.S.-Soviet confrontation, which pitted two great powers utterly isolated from each other into separate spheres, this struggle is marked by a multidimensional relationship where China and the West trade and invest with one another even as they compete and where Russia, China’s partner in authoritarianism and anti-Americanism alike, stays viable—though heavily sanctioned—by supplying oil, gas, and grain to the other side.
But neither should we deceive ourselves that the contours and stakes of a long-term confrontation aren’t coming plainly into view. A cold war is simply a raw struggle for power and the right to set the rules for global conduct; it occurs largely behind the scenes in private deal-making and covert action rather than on the battlefield. And that’s what we’re facing.
What caused this war? First, Washington has undergone a generation-long transformation from a bipartisan policy of eager engagement with China—seeking to turn Beijing into a fellow “stakeholder” in the global system, as former U.S. President George W. Bush’s deputy secretary of state, Robert Zoellick, once put it—to a bipartisan policy of unrelenting confrontation. And helped along by the shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Washington appears to be bringing a once-reluctant Europe along with it.
The new strategic concept for Washington grew out of a communique issued a year ago after the last NATO summit, which warned for the first time against China’s “systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to alliance security.”
At the time, European leaders were still resisting U.S. pleas to address the strategic challenge from Beijing; former German Chancellor Angela Merkel spent much of her 16 years in power cultivating ties with China. Russia’s invasion, with China’s endorsement (if not yet military support), has dramatically changed that approach. On Sunday, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, along with U.S. President Joe Biden and other G-7 leaders, announced a new $600 billion global infrastructure initiative intended to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. And this week, NATO will launch a new “strategic concept”—a 10-year plan—that will address the threat from China for the first time.
The shift began to accelerate in the last few months when Biden and his NATO allies broadened their policy of helping to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression into a policy of undermining the power of Russia itself—or, as U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said, “to see Russia weakened.”
In a speech in late April, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss further raised the stakes when she declared that “NATO must have a global outlook” and “preempt threats in the Indo-Pacific,” ensuring “that democracies like Taiwan are able to defend themselves.”
The expansion of NATO beyond Europe has been happening for some time—first in the Middle East and then in Afghanistan, where the alliance shared miserably in the 20-year debacle of what became a U.S.-orchestrated withdrawal. But now, NATO is crossing a Rubicon in Asia.
In remarks last week at the White House on the eve of Biden’s Europe trip, U.S. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby was careful to say “this isn’t about creating some like version of NATO in the Pacific.” But Kirby also said the new strategic concept has been “building on what has been months and months of discussions and deliberations with the allies about the threat that China poses to international security well beyond just the Indo-Pacific region.”
Kirby added: “I think it’s a reflection of our allies’ equal concerns over the effect of Chinese economic practices, use of forced labor, intellectual theft, and coercive, aggressive behavior not just in the region but elsewhere around the world.” Or as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg put it last week in newly stark terms that echo the hardened rhetoric coming from the Biden administration: “For the first time, we will address China and the challenges it poses to our interests, security, and values.”
Meanwhile, Washington has been arming up Japan and South Korea (along with Australia) even as it invited Tokyo and Seoul to join the NATO summit as “observers.” It sure is beginning to resemble a “like version of NATO in the Pacific.”
Last week, again countering Beijing in a tit-for-tat way reminiscent of the Cold War, the Biden administration responded to China’s new military engagement in the Solomon Islands by launching Partners in the Blue Pacific. This is intended as an informal group consisting of the United States, Britain, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand aimed at reinvigorating economic and diplomatic ties with Pacific Island nations, the White House said—or to put it more bluntly, paying attention to them now that Beijing has.
Beijing, in turn, recently launched its Global Security Initiative (GSI) to oppose the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Washington-orchestrated grouping of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The as-yet-undefined GSI would “oppose the wanton use of unilateral sanctions,” Chinese President Xi Jinping said, as well as “hegemonism, power politics, and bloc confrontation.”
What does it all add up to? It’s as impossible to say now—exactly, anyway—as it was for Churchill at Westminster College in March 1946. Churchill spoke at a time when Moscow hadn’t yet gotten the bomb, the Chinese communists hadn’t yet taken over, and he still held out hope that the new UNO or “United Nations Organization,” as Churchill called it, could yet be “a true temple of peace in which the shields of many nations can someday be hung up, and not merely a cockpit in a Tower of Babel.”
But plainly, the major Western powers now believe that—from Mariupol, Ukraine, on the Black Sea to Taipei, Taiwan, on the Taiwan Strait and possibly all the way to Honiara, Solomon Islands, in the South Pacific—a new sort of iron curtain is descending around the world. In front of that line on the European continent lie the newly invigorated Western European and NATO countries as well as the former Soviet bloc states that have since joined NATO or want to, including the Baltic countries and now Ukraine. “Essentially, where NATO is going is sort of back to somewhat of a Cold War posture,” said Max Bergmann, director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, on June 21.
And when it comes to Asia, in front of this new curtain lies firm Western allies and democracies, such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea. On the other side are the unapologetic tyrannies of Russia, China, and a passel of states they’ve come to dominate or align with, from Belarus to Pakistan to North Korea.
More broadly, the United States and its allies may now face the formidable combination of two nuclear powers: “a resource-rich Russia partnered with a technologically and economically powerful China,” the CIA’s former chief Russia analyst, George Beebe, told FP in late April.
Again, the contours and stakes aren’t nearly as straightforward as they were during the first Cold War, even as the world has seen the rise of a new nonaligned bloc. During the Cold War period, the stark ideological clash between communism and democracy/capitalism was clear (though Washington tarnished itself by occasionally aligning with anti-communist autocrats). By contrast, most nations of the world, from the Middle East and South Asia to Latin America and Africa, aren’t buying into Biden’s attempt to frame the conflict as a global fight for freedom. A still-globalized economy—which wasn’t a factor during the Cold War—is playing a wild-card role, especially since a rising China depends so much on it for its prosperity while a weakened Russia depends so much on China for its own economic health.
As Stoltenberg put it last week: “We don’t regard China as an adversary, but we need to realize that the rise of China, the fact that they’re investing heavily in new modern military equipment—including scaling significantly their nuclear capabilities, investing in key technologies, and trying also to control critical infrastructure in Europe coming closer to us—makes it important for us also to address that.”
What we don’t know yet is how far NATO’s need to address the problem will go. Seen in retrospect, the first Cold War may have been inevitable. Churchill certainly had a presentiment of what was to come despite holding out hopes in his Fulton speech that the two “marauders” he was warning against—“war and tyranny”—could be blunted. “I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future that I feel the duty to speak out,” he said then.
What’s going on now may also be inevitable—in other words, Biden and his Western and Asian allies may be simply dealing with facts on the ground by accepting and confronting them. But the world could also be witnessing—as I suspect it is—a failure of imagination and political courage on the part of the U.S. president and major powers. What that would mean is a negotiated way out. This may not be possible with Russia right now, but after all, it is now the junior partner to China and depends on Beijing’s good graces. And the relationship between the West and China exists on so many different levels, including the common need to address climate change and open trade, that some sort of modus vivendi under the current international system should be possible.
By contrast, Washington is throwing up its hands. In a newly published essay in Foreign Affairs, “The Hollow Order: Rebuilding an International System That Works,” Philip Zelikow, a former senior official in the George W. Bush administration, writes: “The need for a new world order is apparent.”
This is frankly nonsense. The so-called old world order—that is, the one designed after World War II—didn’t work out the way Churchill envisioned, especially the United Nations. But on the whole, until recently, it was still working pretty well despite many near disasters. One was Korea. Another was Vietnam. But the biggest by far was the one orchestrated by Zelikow’s former boss (and endorsed by Zelikow himself along with most of Washington’s politicos and pundits): the 2003 Iraq invasion.
No greater foreign-policy catastrophe has occurred in U.S. history—in terms of the indirect effects it caused throughout the world, even in possibly helping to encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vicious aggression in Ukraine. In his Feb. 24 speech justifying the invasion, Putin cited alleged precedents set by Washington, saying “the example that stands apart from the above events is, of course, the invasion of Iraq without any legal grounds.”
It didn’t have to happen this way, however. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any president other than George W. Bush, Democrat or Republican, who would have addressed a challenge that mandated the most judicious use of the international system—al Qaeda-styled terrorism—by ignoring that system. Or that any other president, Democrat or Republican, would have committed the essentially irrational act of invading Iraq, a country that had nothing to do with 9/11, at a moment when the chief culprits of 9/11 were still at large and when he had won a 15-0 U.N. Security Council vote giving him complete inspection access to Iraq. When Bush invaded anyway, he opened a Pandora’s box of ills that are still tearing at the world right and left—and which directly contributed to the horrific disaster in Afghanistan.
No wars, even cold ones, are inevitable. Yes, China and Russia were probably always going to find a way to resist U.S. and Western dominance. With his murderous invasion, Putin is now beyond the pale. But that doesn’t mean that Beijing couldn’t be wooed to keep one foot in the international system. In Washington, however, the political risk of looking soft on China is almost as pervasive as the risk of looking soft on Iraq once was nearly 20 years ago. Biden, himself, succumbed to the first political temptation, ultimately backing the Iraq war to his regret. Now, hammered in the polls and facing likely setbacks at the U.S. midterm elections in November, Biden appears to be embracing the second temptation.
In his remarks in recent months, even China’s hard-line leader, Xi, has appeared to be looking for a way out. Speaking at the BRICS Business Forum, Xi declared, “We in the international community should reject zero-sum games and jointly oppose hegemonism and power politics.”
Although it comes from a dubious source, that’s still a pretty good idea on the whole. Is it naive to think that there is no way of achieving it?
3. Abu Sayyaf Under Rising Pressure in Asia’s Backwater
I am not going to get my hopes up too high but this is certainly welcome news. I hope the assessment is correct.
Abu Sayyaf Under Rising Pressure in Asia’s Backwater
By: Michael Hart
Five years ago, the notorious Philippine militant group Abu Sayyaf had aligned itself with the Islamic State and was in the midst of its most audacious assault. Led by Isnilon Hapilon, it battled Philippine forces alongside militants from the Maute Group and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters for five months in the southern city of Marawi.
This brazen attempt to seize territory and create a caliphate followed a decade in which Abu Sayyaf had ruled the Sulu and Celebes Seas off Mindanao’s western coast, where it regularly kidnapped seafarers and collected millions of dollars in ransom payments.
Yet the fortunes of Southeast Asia’s most feared jihadi group have altered dramatically. Abu Sayyaf is now in steep decline. Hapilon was killed during the final days of fighting in Marawi and each of his successors has since met the same bloody end. Its funding from the Islamic State has dried up—as have foreign recruits. Philippine forces now have the militants on the retreat and with support from Malaysian troops in Sabah have cut-off maritime corridors for jihadists hoping to travel from abroad. Local dynamics, too, on the islands where Abu Sayyaf still exists, suggest it is firmly on the back foot.
Basilan influence fading
It is on Basilan, where Hapilon’s faction used to reign supreme, that Abu Sayyaf’s losses have been most visible. His successor, Furuji Indama, was killed in September 2020 amid heavy clashes with the military in Zamboanga Sibugay province, where he was tracked down after escaping Basilan. Attacks on Basilan near ceased after Indama’s death, and Abu Sayyaf’s latest leader there, Radzmil Jannatul (alias Khubayb), was killed by soldiers in late March, prompting many of his followers to surrender.
The military is confident that the threat on Basilan has receded and recently declared 29 barangays free from Abu Sayyaf influence. This included areas of Isabela city and in the towns of Al-Barka, Hadji Muhtamad, Maluso, and Ungkaya Pukan, where once-frequent skirmishes are now rare. The military said its observations found no evidence of community support or resource generation for the group, and no sign of extremist teaching or radicalization in Islamic schools on the Muslim-majority island.
Sulu hideout under pressure
The neighboring island of Sulu saw a higher threat from Abu Sayyaf in recent years. Militants there killed scores in a string of suicide bombings from 2018 to 2020, targeting military installations and a Catholic church. Yet rather than signaling a permanent shift in tactics, the blasts appear an explosive last act by extremists aware they were on the run and keen to cause maximum damage before being caught. A month before the final blast, in July 2020, the military reported that Abu Sayyaf’s leader in Sulu, Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan, had been killed in an encounter near Patikul. His body was never found and the group never confirmed his death—but he has not been sighted since, and is presumed dead.
Hatib’s bomb-making nephew, Mundi Sawadjaan, is now the group’s leading figure in Sulu. Two of his brothers were killed by the military last year: Mujafal Sawadjaan died in Patikul in April, while Al-Al Sawadjaan was shot dead in Jolo last June. But despite rumors of his death, Mundi is likely to still be alive. According to local intelligence reports, he was sighted in January buying food supplies but is likely now in a safe house and reliant on relatives for support. Mundi’s uncle Hatib Majid Saeed (alias Amah Pattit) and veteran Radullan Sahiron remain key leaders in Sulu, though the latter’s faction has lain low for years and has not aligned with Islamic State like the Sawadjaan clan. The military reports that, as of 2021, Abu Sayyaf fighters in Sulu numbered 132, down from 300-400 in the last few years.
Links between the Islamic State and Sawadjaan’s cohort are now only symbolic, with financial ties severed after the group was defeated in Iraq and Syria. Profits from kidnappings have also reduced sharply. The last recorded Abu Sayyaf kidnapping-at-sea was in January 2020, when five Indonesian fishermen were seized from a vessel off Tambisan island, near the Malaysian sea border. They were rescued by the Philippine military last March, after a boat being used to transport them overturned on high seas. With commercial vessels avoiding the area, Abu Sayyaf now holds no known captives.
Philippine military build-up
The group’s demise on its island hideouts is mainly due to military pressure. The Philippine armed forces have gradually built up its troop numbers on Sulu in recent years, and by 2022 had a force of 4,500 soldiers—the entire 11th Infantry Division—deployed to the province. This cohort consists of experienced fighters that have been reassigned from other battalions. The division is based in Jolo and has operational responsibility for combating the threat from Abu Sayyaf across the entire Sulu archipelago—which also encompasses the island provinces of Basilan to the east and Tawi-Tawi to the west. Philippine forces carry out ground raids and have launched regular aerial bombardments which have killed scores of militants hiding out in Sulu’s mountainous and thickly-forested interior.
Malaysia’s supporting role
Malaysia’s Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) has also played its part, imposing a nightly curfew for civilian boats in the waters of the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZ) to deny Abu Sayyaf targets for kidnapping, while leaving any militant vessels that venture into the area after dusk clearly identifiable. The heavily-policed ESSZ stretches along 1,457km of coast and covers 58,420km2 of sea area and 32,158km2 of land area. Malaysian authorities have sought to prevent the jungles of Sabah from becoming a hiding place or a base for Abu Sayyaf militants to launch kidnappings-at-sea—with seven such plots thwarted since the start of 2020.
Last May, an Abu Sayyaf cell found to have set up camp in Sabah was dismantled—eight militants, all Filipino nationals, were captured by ESSCOM troops in the town of Beaufort, before another five wielding firearms and machetes were shot dead in a firefight when Malaysian troops discovered makeshift dwellings in a nearby mangrove swamp.
Malaysia plans to strengthen its defenses along the coast to prevent future incursions. Last year it announced plans for two new control posts in Kuala Meruap and Siguntur, and a maritime forward operations base on Tambisan island, which has seen several past kidnappings off its coast. ESSCOM commander Ahmad Faud Othman has also requested another six surveillance aircraft and 35 radar-equipped patrol boats from the Malaysian government. Joint trilateral naval and air patrols carried out in the Sulu Sea by Malaysian, Philippine, and Indonesian ships and planes will also be intensified after an agreement between the respective defense ministers at a recent meeting in Kuala Lumpur.
Peace in the Bangsamoro?
Military might aside, the local political context in Mindanao also helps explain Abu Sayyaf’s decline. The self-governed Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was inaugurated in 2019 and precipitated a sharp reduction in violence. The two oldest Moro separatist groups in the region—the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)—have both laid down arms and committed to politics, setting up political parties to contest local elections. The democratic governance structures of the BARMM, led by MILF chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, have brought stability, and retained the support of Muslims who voted en masse for the region’s formation.
As a result, Islamist militant groups allied with Abu Sayyaf on mainland Mindanao are also suffering. In Lanao, Faharudin Hadji Satar (alias Abu Zacaria), the supposed “emir” of the Islamic State in Southeast Asia, leads just 60-70 remaining fighters of the Maute Group, while the extreme Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters are hiding out in ever-smaller numbers in the marshlands of central Maguindanao. Having rapidly lost public support since the BARMM was inaugurated, these groups have been under constant aerial bombardment by the military and now operate only in small, geographically-isolated pockets of territory, unable to carry out bombings and sieges of major cities like they did previously.
Despite their near capitulation, these remaining Islamist fighters should not be written off just yet. Abu Sayyaf poses a particular threat. While foreign fighters are unable to join and overseas funding has been extinguished, the local element remains a problem due to the unique history of the islands the militants call home. A lower proportion of residents in Sulu—which was once the revered center of a pre-colonial Islamic sultanate existing from 1415 until the 1900s—voted for the BARMM than in any of its other four component provinces. The archipelago is also struggling to reap the rewards of the BARMM, with Sulu and Basilan remaining the poorest provinces in the Philippines—the poverty rate in Sulu is 71.9 percent compared to the BARMM average of 39.4 percent, giving separatism a lingering pull.
Yet Abu Sayyaf is at its lowest ebb since its formation as a radical splinter of the MNLF in the early-1990s. After 30 years of militancy, the Philippine military has its best opportunity yet to end the violence in the Sulu archipelago, and with the help of the BARMM, push Abu Sayyaf to the margins.
4. US kills ‘senior leader’ of al-Qaeda-linked group in Syria
US kills ‘senior leader’ of al-Qaeda-linked group in Syria
US military says it carried out a raid targeting Abu Hamzah al Yemeni, leader of the al-Qaeda-aligned group, Hurras al-Din.
28 Jun 2022
The United States military says it carried out a raid in Syria’s Idlib province that targeted a senior leader of an al-Qaeda-aligned group.
The attack on Monday targeted Abu Hamzah al Yemeni, a “senior leader” of al-Qaeda-aligned Hurras al-Din, while he was travelling alone on a motorcycle, the US Central Command said in a statement.
It added that an initial review did not indicate civilian casualties.
“The removal of this senior leader will disrupt al-Qaeda’s ability to carry out attacks against US citizens, our partners and innocent civilians around the world,” the statement added.
The Syrian Civil Defence, a humanitarian organisation, said in a tweet that a man was killed shortly before midnight after his motorcycle was targeted with two rockets, adding it has transferred the body to the forensic department in Idlib city.
Huras al-Din was founded in 2018 by al-Qaeda supporters.
In June 2020, the US military killed Khaled Aruri, a top Jordanian commander with Huras al-Din, also in Idlib. A drone attack in December 2019 killed a senior Huras al-Din commander, the Jordanian citizen Bilal Khuraisat, also known as Abu Khadija al-Urduni.
Separate US air attacks in Syria have also killed al-Qaeda’s then second-in-command, Abu Kheir al-Masri, in 2017, the first leader of ISIL (ISIS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in 2019, and his sucessor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, in February.
5. Raptors, Lightning IIs ‘critically important’ deterrence factors, says INDOPACOM chief
Excerpt:
“The key here, as we look at this pretty dangerous national security environment, is I don’t think we can operate under a ‘business-as-usual’ mindset,” Aquilino said Friday. “I think we have to understand the concern of, you know, what does the future look like based on the security environment and the objectives of some of our competitors? And I don’t think that future is something any of us would be happy with, right?”
Raptors, Lightning IIs ‘critically important’ deterrence factors, says INDOPACOM chief
Airmen conduct preflight inspection on three Air Force F-22 Raptors during Agile Combat Employment training at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, June 22, 2022. (Jose Miguel Tamond/U.S. Air Force)
A permanent contingent of Air Force fifth-generation fighters west of the International Date Line is a “desirable” option as the U.S. seeks to deter an increasingly assertive China, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said Friday.
China’s ongoing military buildup and February commitment to a “no-limits” partnership with Russia presents a serious threat to the Indo-Pacific region, Adm. John Aquilino said Friday. He was interviewed by Bradley Bowman of the Washington, D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
“That buildup encompasses all domains and all capabilities, whether it’s naval ships, whether it’s fifth-generation aircraft, whether it’s missile forces, whether it’s cyber capability or capability in space, to include strategic nuclear capability,” Aquilino said. “The concern for all Americans should be the pace, scale and scope that China is growing and what does that mean with regard to intent for a future peaceful globe.”
Adm. John Aquilino, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, speaks to Airmen at Andersen Air Force Base on Feb. 24, 2022. (Anthony Rivera/U.S. Navy)
Aquilino emphasized the importance of deterrence through the presence of U.S. troops in Guam, Japan and South Korea and through investment in new technologies such as fifth-generation aircraft like the F-22 Raptor or F-35 Lightning II.
The U.S. Marine Corps has established two squadrons of F-35Bs at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, and the Navy has deployed F-35Cs aboard aircraft carriers, starting with the USS Carl Vinson in August.
But the Air Force has thus far only deployed F-35s or F-22s into the region on a short-term basis, Aquilino said.
Aquilino said the two types of aircraft have a wider role to play, and the possibility exists for a permanent presence in the region.
“I would envision that that capability is certainly — well, it’s certainly desirable, but we would like to get to that,” he said. “That ability to, like I said, operate in contested space, fifth-generation capabilities, whether they be F-22, F-35, are critically important to the ability to deliver deterrence.”
Despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. believes China remains its “pacing threat” and the Indo-Pacific its “priority theater.” In addition, U.S.-China relations are strained over Taiwan.
China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province that must be reunified with the mainland at some point, possibly through force. The U.S. officially maintains a “One China policy” that acknowledges Beijing’s claim on the island but considers Taiwan’s status unresolved. The U.S. supports Taiwan through economic ties and weapons sales.
In May, during his first presidential visit to Japan, President Joe Biden said the U.S. would help defend Taiwan against an attack from China.
Similarly, China consistently rebukes freedom-of-navigation operations by U.S. Navy warships in the South China Sea, over which China claims large portions, and Navy transits through the Taiwan Strait.
“The key here, as we look at this pretty dangerous national security environment, is I don’t think we can operate under a ‘business-as-usual’ mindset,” Aquilino said Friday. “I think we have to understand the concern of, you know, what does the future look like based on the security environment and the objectives of some of our competitors? And I don’t think that future is something any of us would be happy with, right?”
6. Opinion | Hong Kong was not supposed to look like this
Excerpts:
The city’s location still makes it the most central hub for anyone doing business with China and a convenient connector between the Chinese mainland and Southeast Asia. That role has taken a hit during the pandemic, as the city has instituted some of the world’s most stringent anti-virus measures, but most expect it to resume once covid-19 restrictions are eased.
Unlike the mainland, Hong Kong has an internationally exchangeable currency pegged to the U.S. dollar. And while the national security law has weaponized the legal system against dissent, the parallel court system that handles routine commercial and contract law cases and business disputes continues to be highly respected.
China can always send in replacements for the people leaving in droves, a pressure valve for the growing number of mainland university graduates facing a bleak employment market.
Hong Kong will indeed survive by changing and adapting, as it always has. It will likely even prosper. It just might not be recognizable to anyone who knew it, and loved it, before.
Opinion | Hong Kong was not supposed to look like this
Opinion Hong Kong was not supposed to look like this
By
Global Opinions contributing columnist
June 28, 2022 at 7:00 a.m. EDT
Hong Kong was not supposed to look like this, 25 years after the end of British colonial rule and midway through China’s promised 50 years of autonomy and personal freedoms.
Civil society has been decimated, with more than 50 activist groups shuttered by the government or pressured to close. Campus student unions have been dissolved. The giant Confederation of Trade Unions, with at least 70 affiliate unions, disbanded in October. One of the largest affiliates, the 100,000-member Professional Teachers Union, closed down after being branded a “malignant tumor” in China’s state-run media. Popular media outlets have been shut or voluntarily closed, their online archives scrubbed clean.
Statues commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre have been removed. Books deemed too politically sensitive have been pulled from shelves in public libraries and bookstores. High school textbooks are being rewritten to emphasize protecting China’s national security and insist that Hong Kong was not actually a British colony. Hong Kong police officers have been taught to goose-step mainland-style during drills and parades, and children must participate in mandatory morning rituals raising the Chinese flag.
Now, career police officer John Lee Ka-chiu — dubbed Iron Man in the local media for his supposed toughness — has been appointed Hong Kong’s next chief executive. The United States has imposed sanctions on Lee “for being involved in coercing, arresting, detaining, or imprisoning individuals under the authority of the National Security Law.”
In 1997, many people here assumed that after 25 years, mainland China would look more like Hong Kong — more liberal and far less anchored by archaic-sounding Communist Party ideology. As China grew richer and more globally connected, the thinking went, so too would the country become more democratic and open to the world.
What happened instead has been the opposite. In 2022, Hong Kong looks more like China — repressive, intolerant of dissent, suspicious of foreigners and bent on indoctrinating the entire population with an enforced loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party and its whitewashed view of history.
Local officials now claim to see ubiquitous “foreign forces” seeking to overthrow the government behind all recent incidents of unrest. According to this paranoid worldview, the massive 2019 street protests against an unpopular extradition bill were all plots orchestrated by foreigners who manipulated or paid naive locals to march against the government.
Britain never brought full democracy. But Hongkongers did vote when given the chance and a choice, for the local Legislative Council and smaller neighborhood-based district councils.
Nearly 60 percent turned out for competitive Legislative Council elections in 2016, and more than 73 percent turned out in November 2019, in the wake of massive anti-government protests, to hand pro-democracy parties a landslide sweep of the district councils. Then 47 opposition politicians and activists were detained, and Beijing retooled the election system to ensure a pliant “patriotic” Legislative Council with no opposition. Turnout plummeted to around 30 percent, with many of those who bothered to show up casting spoiled or blank ballots.
Can Hong Kong survive as a more tightly controlled, authoritarian version of its former self? There is evidence it can.
The city’s location still makes it the most central hub for anyone doing business with China and a convenient connector between the Chinese mainland and Southeast Asia. That role has taken a hit during the pandemic, as the city has instituted some of the world’s most stringent anti-virus measures, but most expect it to resume once covid-19 restrictions are eased.
Unlike the mainland, Hong Kong has an internationally exchangeable currency pegged to the U.S. dollar. And while the national security law has weaponized the legal system against dissent, the parallel court system that handles routine commercial and contract law cases and business disputes continues to be highly respected.
China can always send in replacements for the people leaving in droves, a pressure valve for the growing number of mainland university graduates facing a bleak employment market.
Hong Kong will indeed survive by changing and adapting, as it always has. It will likely even prosper. It just might not be recognizable to anyone who knew it, and loved it, before.
7. Putin's Only Strategy Is Self-Destruction in Ukraine
Excerpts:
Although most Western attention is focused on the Donbas, where the chances of a protracted conflict seem high, events in the south actually suggest the opposite—that Ukraine is poised to seize the strategic initiative if and when it acquires the weapons that will give it the upper hand.
If that happens, Putin will have only his own genocidal barbarism to blame for his ignominious defeat.
Putin's Only Strategy Is Self-Destruction in Ukraine
How likely is a protracted war in Ukraine? Just as talk of a protracted Russo-Ukrainian war was increasingly making the rounds among analysts, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin—being true to form in his inability to resist self-destruction—demonstrated yet again why such an outcome is both unlikely and undesirable.
On Monday, June 27, a Russian missile struck and destroyed a shopping center in the city of Kremenchug, south of Kyiv. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, over 1,000 civilians were in the center at the time of the blast: “It’s impossible even to imagine the number of victims.”
If one needed more proof of Putin’s genocidal intentions and behavior in Ukraine, this barbaric act surely was it.
But if one also needed proof of the extreme unlikelihood of a protracted war, this was also it.
Putin is so predictable. Whenever the West appears to tire of or despair about Ukraine, Russia’s leading fascist can always be counted on to engage in an act of such wanton barbarism as to make continued indifference impossible. If it weren’t for the massacres in Irpen and Bucha, two towns north of Kyiv that were mercilessly raped by Russian troops, the West might not have committed to supporting Ukraine with the vigor that it has. If it weren’t for Putin’s strategically idiotic decision to invade Ukraine, the West would probably have countenanced its progressive transformation into a Russian vassal state.
Now, after the Kremenchug massacre, no self-respecting country that belongs to the Ramstein group devoted to supporting Ukraine and no member of the G-7 countries that just stated “We will continue to provide financial, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support and stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes” will be able to avoid arming Ukraine to the degree it needs in order to prevail.
Putin makes such decisions easy, as the choice before Ukraine’s friends is no longer that between protracted war and acceptance of the status quo, but that between the reign of barbarism or victory. States are never quite as committed to human decency as they insist, but there are times—such as this—when there is no alternative to converting outrage into action.
The reason that increased deliveries of heavy weaponry, ammunition, supplies, and finances to Ukraine matters is simple. At present, Ukraine isn’t losing, and Russia isn’t winning. Indeed, if the status quo were to continue, Russia’s victory or defeat would be hard to envision. On the one hand, Russia is running out of soldiers, tanks, and missiles and is barely able to make any kind of progress in the Donbas, where its artillery and manpower greatly outnumber that of the Ukrainians.
Such a Russia cannot win. On the other hand, Russia is too large to be defeated with Ukraine’s current weaponry, especially as Putin is utterly indifferent to the number of casualties his troops sustain in their ill-planned frontal attacks against Ukrainian positions in the east and south. Such a Russia cannot lose.
Other things being equal, a protracted war would be likely with Russia and Ukraine as they are.
But, thanks to the prodding of the United States and the United Kingdom, and thanks to the Kremenchug massacre, other things are not and will not be equal.
The heavy weapons the West has promised to deliver will now have to be delivered, and the timelines will probably be sped up.
These weapons—and especially U.S. lend-lease weaponry—should tilt the balance in favor of the Ukrainians. After all, Ukraine isn’t losing, but neither can it defeat the Russians with its current capabilities. Once the weapons arrive in significant numbers, it’s perfectly possible for Ukraine to push back the Russians from the territories seized after the start of the war on February 24.
To be sure, the planned Ukrainian counter-offensive, which is slated to start sometime in the late summer, will be no cakewalk. Casualties on both sides will be high. More civilians will die as part of Putin’s genocide. But the Ukrainians are likely to prevail in general and especially where it counts most.
And it counts most in the southern provinces of Kherson and Zaporizhzhya, which sit atop the Crimea and form an integral part of the coveted Russian land bridge to the occupied peninsula. Even with very minimal numbers of Western weapons, the Ukrainian armed forces have currently managed to overcome two lines of defense around Kherson and are now within sight of the city. If they capture the city before the general counter-offensive, they will be able to cut off water to the Crimea, destroy the land bridge, and be within range of striking the Black Sea fleet parked in Sevastopol. Losing Kherson would be a major strategic loss for Russia; gaining Luhansk or even Donetsk provinces would only tickle Putin’s need for self-affirmation as the great in-gatherer of lands.
Although most Western attention is focused on the Donbas, where the chances of a protracted conflict seem high, events in the south actually suggest the opposite—that Ukraine is poised to seize the strategic initiative if and when it acquires the weapons that will give it the upper hand.
If that happens, Putin will have only his own genocidal barbarism to blame for his ignominious defeat.
Dr. Alexander Motyl, now a 1945 Contributing Editor, is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”
8. A deep look at the SIG Rattler, SOCOM's new personal defense weapon
A deep look at the SIG Rattler, SOCOM's new personal defense weapon
SOCOM had been looking for a new personal defense weapon for the last five years, and now it has finally found one. SOCOM recently announced the adoption of the SIG Rattler as their Personal Defense Weapon (PDW) of choice.
Over time SOCOM has tested a number of platforms, but according to it, only SIG Sauer’s entry met all the standards.
“After years of continuous market research, USSOCOM HQ has concluded that Sig Sauer is the only vendor that can fulfill USSOCOM’s need for the Commercial PDW requirement,” SOCOM said.
The procurement contract will be for five years at a fixed price.
“USSOCOM HQ has been researching and reviewing different systems since 2017. We have meticulously reviewed each system for technical acceptance and whether it fits the commercial definition,” SOCOM’s Notice of Intent read.
“Except for Sig Sauer, the vendors did not meet the technical requirements, and/or the weapons do not meet the commercial definition. Due to the nature of this particular effort, USSOCOM cannot procure PDWs that are prototypes, under development, not in production, are in limited production, or will be in general production in 1-2 years from now,” SOCOM added.
Inside the SIG Rattler
The SIG Rattler premiered in 2017 and is a mini version of the SIG MCX. (The SIG MCX family also includes the Spear, which was adopted as the XM5 in the recent Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) contest.) The MCX system is a short-stroke gas piston gun that has become extremely popular in the last few years. The Rattler takes the MCX platform and shrinks it. They trimmed the barrel to 5.5 inches with a short M-LOK handguard and folding stock system.
The folding stock is a minimalist, fairly simple, rugged metal stock. SIG went above board to make the weapon incredibly compact. This includes the pistol grip, which is trimmed and rounded for easy concealment. Short-stroke gas piston systems tend to work exceptionally well with short barrels.
The weapon can be fired with the stock folded. Unlike the AR-15 design, the buffer system is kept inside the upper receiver, much like the AR-18. This allows for a very compact weapon which seemed to be the goal of the SOCOM PDW project. The Rattler comes in both 5.56 and 300 Blackout, and according to the Notice of Intent, SOCOM is purchasing both calibers.
The Rattler system and the SIG MCX, in general, are compatible with standard M4/M16/AR 15 lower receivers. Based on the project’s history, it seems like SOCOM was looking for an upper receiver group and buttstock kit to outfit M4A1 lowers. The Notice of Intent states they are purchasing complete weapons.
The package also includes suppressors, magazines, cleaning kits, quick barrel change kits, force-on-force training kits, and training and instruction on the weapon.
What’s a PDW
Personal Defense Weapon is a term that came around originally in the early 1990s. It came to describe a new class of SMG-sized weapons firing PDW calibers. The P90 and MP7 are the most famous examples of a classic PDW. The SIG Rattler doesn’t necessarily fall into that category, as it’s much more rifle-like, but still defines the more modern PDW.
The SOCOM project and the Rattler seem to be SOCOM’s attempt at finding an SMG-sized, concealable platform for troops pulling special missions. These won’t be the new service weapon of SOCOM by any means, but likely a niche weapon for roles where secrecy is necessary and maintaining a low profile is critical.
A PDW like this doesn’t offer you the same range, penetration, or capability of a rifle but outperforms a pistol or submachine gun by a large margin.
The 5.56 and .300 Blackout calibers
SOCOM will purchase both the 5.56 and the .300 Blackout for use with the SIG Rattler.
AAC developed .300 Blackout round from the ground up for use from short barrels. The round reaches its peak potential from barrels as short as nine inches. The use of a .30 caliber projectile also makes it easy for shooters to choose between a supersonic or subsonic projectile.
The lighter-weight supersonic projectiles offer greater range and penetration but are not as quiet when suppressed. The heavier subsonic rounds don’t offer the same range and penetration, yet, they are incredibly quiet when suppressed. So, the .300 Blackout makes a lot of sense with the SIG Rattler, especially when suppressed.
On the other hand, the 5.56 round doesn’t make a ton of sense. When Remington designed the .223 round that eventually became the 5.56 NATO load, they optimized it for a 20-inch barrel. Every inch you shave off creates rapidly declining performance. The Rattler’s barrel will be 5.5-inches long, so I wouldn’t be surprised to see keyholing and subpar performance as well as limited to no fragmentation due to the lower velocity of the round.
The round is also going to be very loud, with a lot of muzzle flash and concussion without the use of a suppressor. Although the 5.56 is much more common and available in the military pipeline than .300 Blackout, its inclusion is still peculiar. I’m curious to know how the 5.56 weapons will be used versus other options like the Mk-18.
What about the LVAW?
The SIG MCX is already in the pipeline for the LVAW project. The weapon has been used by Delta Force and is one of the smaller variants of the MCX. It’s quite similar to the SIG Rattler, but there are differences: The Rattler’s barrel is a bit shorter. The LVAW uses a 6.75-inch barrel compared to the 5.5-inch barrel of the Rattler. The LVAW also features a different handguard, stock, and pistol grip. The differences are minor but worth noting. Will the Rattler replace the LVAW? I’m not sure, but they seem to have the same mission.
SIG just keeps winning. First the NGSW, then the MHS, and now the PDW project. They don’t lie when they say they are a total systems provider.
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9. The US Army Just Placed What Might Be Its Last Order for Black Hawk Helicopters
Oh no.
The US Army Just Placed What Might Be Its Last Order for Black Hawk Helicopters
The deal with Sikorsky comes just months before the military is expected to choose a company to build a replacement.
In what could be its last purchase of Black Hawk helicopters, the U.S. Army on Monday placed a $2.3 billion order with Sikorsky for at least 120 aircraft.
The five-year deal comes just months before the Army is expected to choose a winner to build a replacement for the UH-60, which has been the military’s workhorse for more than four decades.
“This multi-year agreement allows the Army to meet current and future capability needs through upgrades, remanufacturing, replacement, and technology insertions,” Col. Calvin Lane, the Army’s utility helicopters project manager, said in an emailed statement. “The efficiencies of this contract make the best use of limited resources and result in direct savings to the Army and to taxpayers.”
It’s the 10th time the Army has placed what’s known as a multiyear procurement. If all of the options are exercised, the 120-helicopter order could more than double, resulting in 255 aircraft for the Army and allies.
“Sikorsky continues to modernize and enhance the Black Hawk to meet the Army’s challenging and evolving missions by continuously delivering aircraft, thanks to a hot production line, mature well-established supply chain, and digital factory,” the company said in a statement after the announcement was made.
The United States and 28 of its allies currently fly Black Hawks. The helicopter has been in the U.S. arsenal since the late 1970s. The Army uses the Black Hawk for troop transport and medevac missions, the Navy uses it for hunting submarines, the Marine Corps uses a small fleet to occasionally fly the president, and the Air Force uses them for combat search and rescue. U.S. Special Operations Command flies specially modified Black Hawks, including some that were used during the 2011 raid to kill Osama bin Laden. Domestically, the aircraft are used by the National Guard for search-and-rescue missions and disaster response.
Even if the Army doesn’t buy any new Black Hawks, the helicopters are expected to keep flying for decades to come. Sikorsky said it’s planning to up those remaining aircraft.
“Sikorsky continues to invest in the Black Hawk platform—from sustainment to digital transformation and modernization—in order to provide our customers with the competitive edge they require,” Nathalie Previte, Sikorsky’s vice president of Army and Air Force programs, said in the statement.
Ultimately, Congress will have the final say on when the Army buys more Black Hawks. In March, the Air Force announced plans to truncate its buy of new Black Hawks, saying the helicopters were not needed now that the U.S. has drastically scaled back its military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan, after more than two decades of a constant presence. Still, at least one Congressional panel disagreed, adding additional HH-60Ws to the Air Force’s fiscal 2023 budget request.
The Army is expected to choose a winner in September in the competition to replace the Black Hawk. Sikorsky, which is part of Lockheed Martin, has teamed up with Boeing to pitch a coaxial rotor helicopter called the Defiant-X in the Army contest. Its competition is the Bell V-280 Valor—a tiltrotor aircraft that takes off and lands vertically, but can rotate its propellers in flight to fly at fixed-wing aircraft speeds.
Congress has been reluctant to let a service retire aircraft or shut down active assembly lines until there is a proven successor.
10. Without Maximum Pressure Biden Has Little Leverage Over Khamenei
Conclusion:
If the Biden administration continues with the status quo, it can expect Tehran to continue stonewalling, eliminating any chance of reaching an acceptable nuclear deal. Conversely, reviving maximum pressure could force Khamenei to play ball. With the Islamic Republic edging closer and closer toward a nuclear weapon, Biden doesn’t have any time
Without Maximum Pressure Biden Has Little Leverage Over Khamenei
6/24/2022
4 minutes
The nuclear talks in Vienna without the presence of the US as Iran refuses to negotiate directly. December 17, 2021, as Ir
6/24/20224 minutes
Data released by Tehran show the economy has grown more than 4 percent over the last year, driven by high oil prices and loose enforcement of U.S. sanctions.
This relatively strong economic growth can partially explain Tehran’s current stonewalling of nuclear negotiations with the Biden administration, as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei likely does not feel massive pressure to secure sanctions relief by striking a deal. If Washington were to reinvigorate its sanctions enforcement, however, it could reverse the Islamic Republic’s economic fortunes, stoke political instability within Iran, and pressure Khamenei to surrender.
According to Iran’s Statistics Center, the country’s GDP grew by 4.3 percent during the Persian calendar year 1400 (April 2021 to March 2022). The growth rate in the previous year was one percent. Almost all major sectors of the economy grew. Oil and gas saw the fastest growth rate, at 9.7 percent. The service sector, the largest sector of Iran’s economy, grew by 4.5 percent after having shrunk by 1.3 percent the previous year. This growth, however, does not mean that the economy is doing well. The real GDP is still below its March 2018 level, the point-to-point inflation was 52.5 percent in June, and the country faces daily protests and strikes over low wages and high inflation.
Several factors explain this higher growth. First, since taking office in January 2021, President Joe Biden has abandoned his predecessor’s policy of “maximum pressure” against Iran, leading to loose enforcement of U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Iran exported $48 billion worth of non-oil goods during the Persian year of 1400, the most in the country’s history. This trend has continued throughout the first two months of 1401 (April and May 2022), during which time Tehran exported 40 percent more oil year-over-year.
The Ieranian delegation at the Vienna talks. November 29, 2021
Meanwhile, Iran’s economy has benefited from higher prices of commodities, particularly oil and oil-based goods such as petrochemicals. The Islamic Republic also managed to replace some imported goods by expanding domestic production, in turn boosting Iran’s manufacturing and mining sectors. Finally, the removal of pandemic-related restrictions, combined with public optimism about reaching a deal with the United States to end sanctions, contributed to the growth in the service sector.
Iran’s renewed economic growth likely helps explain why Khamenei is in no rush to reach a nuclear deal with Biden. Loose U.S. sanctions enforcement has allowed Khamenei to reap economic benefits while expanding his nuclear program and eroding Washington’s leverage over Tehran.
Fortunately for the United States, however, Iran’s economy — and thus Khamenei’s negotiating position — remains fragile. If oil prices remain high and U.S. sanctions enforcement remains lackluster, the Islamic Republic could probably achieve 3to 5 percent growth this year. But a U.S. return to “maximum pressure” would likely see Iran’s economy return to meager or negative growth rates.
One sign of this fragility is that Iranian economic growth decelerated toward the end of the year, with GDP growing by just 2.3 percent during the last quarter (spring of 2022) compared to 6.9 percent during the first quarter (winter of 2021). That trend held true across most economic sectors. For example, whereas the oil and gas sector grew by 27.4 percent in the first quarter, its growth rate dropped to 0.5 percent in the fourth quarter. Likewise, the real estate sector grew 15.3 percent in the first quarter but shrank by 3.4 percent in the last quarter.
A teachers' protest for higher wages amid high inflation. December 23, 2021
Moreover, the Islamic Republic has suffered from high inflation since late 2018, reducing purchasing power. This means that domestic consumption and demand are fragile. If the Biden administration tightens sanctions enforcement, consumer and investor pessimism will push down investment and consumption. The result will be a slowdown in economic activity and lower or negative GDP growth.
That economic downturn could exacerbate Iran’s ongoing socio-political instability, toppling his regime or increasing Khamenei’s incentive to reach a deal with Washington. Since 2017, the country has faced two waves of massive protests. In November 2019, the regime killed at least 1,500 protesters in less than a week to survive the most widespread protests of its history. Government restrictions and self-imposed isolation during COVID-19 slowed down the protests, but as those impediments faded, protests and worker strikes began again in 2021 and gained momentum in 2022. The protests and strikes now occurring daily across Iran reflect deep societal discontent, which can both signal and create economic troubles.
If the Biden administration continues with the status quo, it can expect Tehran to continue stonewalling, eliminating any chance of reaching an acceptable nuclear deal. Conversely, reviving maximum pressure could force Khamenei to play ball. With the Islamic Republic edging closer and closer toward a nuclear weapon, Biden doesn’t have any time
Saeed Ghasseminejad, who contributed this opinion article is a senior advisor on Iran and financial economics at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he contributes to FDD’s Iran Program (CEFP). Follow Saeed on Twitter @SGhasseminejad. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
The opinions expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of Iran International.
11. The Key to Maximizing the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment Concept? The Army
Excerpts:
As this war of attrition drags on into the summer, the effects of the Ukrainian airpower approach are making the Russian invaders pay for every inch of territory. As of the writing of this article, in the skies over Kherson and elsewhere, the air component has regenerated sufficient combat power to continue to support its ground forces effectively as they attempt to wrest the initiative from the Russians. This news, while heartening, should be taken with a measure of caution. Russia retains a large military and if its forces continue to press the conflict they may yet find a way to win a protracted war, especially if Russia fully mobilizes and institutes some significant reforms. History has shown that the Russians are a dogged and determined foe and are willing to sacrifice greatly to achieve victory. If the US military finds itself confronted by a similar enemy on the future battlefield, will that enemy perform with the same ineptitude that has dogged its operations in Ukraine? Unlikely.
To return to the boxing analogy, the Ukrainians’ tactics and employment techniques have thus far helped them to evade the Russian knockout blow, and are now allowing them to rise from the canvas like Rocky Balboa and go one more round. Learning from their experience is vital, not least because in the next fight the United States may find itself not as the salty, supportive corner man, providing sage advice and aid from outside the ring, but instead the man in the arena himself, facing a much larger, smarter, and more dangerous opponent. If we don’t collaborate as a joint force to learn from the Ukrainians, and make the material, doctrinal, and training modifications to perfect the ACE technique, we could find ourselves fighting for our lives with one arm tied behind our backs. The Chinese are already in the gym right now, learning from the mistakes of the Russians and getting stronger by the day. They will be better tomorrow. Will our own agile combat employment be ready?
The Key to Maximizing the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment Concept? The Army - Modern War Institute
When Ukraine’s military launched a campaign in May to retake territory seized by Russian forces after their February invasion, Ukrainian MiG-29s were overhead, flying low and supporting the ground forces’ attacks. Around the same time, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense announced the shootdown of a Russian Su-35 by a Ukrainian aircraft. In the four months since the war began, Russia has lost a staggering 171 total aircraft, including thirty-four fixed-wing combat aircraft, many of them to Russian ground-based air defense systems.
Among the many ways in which Ukraine’s military capabilities in the war have surprised analysts is the degree to which Ukrainian forces have continued to contest the air domain. From air-to-air combat to close air support for ground forces to effective air defenses, Ukraine has outperformed virtually all expectations. How it has done so is the source of important lessons for US airpower. In particular, examining the resilience of the Ukrainian air force, specifically within the context of the US Air Force’s emerging agile combat employment (ACE) concept, reveals ways to maximize that concept’s potential against a capable adversary on a highly lethal, hyperactive battlefield.
To be sure, many analysts have rightly pointed to Russian ineptitude across a variety of functions at all levels of war as a leading factor in both sides’ performances so far, and it would be fair to suggest that any lessons learned must be tempered with the realization that Russian capabilities were largely overestimated in the lead-up to war. There are aspects of Ukraine’s success, however, that deserve closer scrutiny and have far-reaching implications for the US military in other theaters. The war in the air is one of these.
The survival of the Ukrainian air force was not purely the result of a single-service endeavor but a function of a joint effort that would not have been achievable without ground-based air defense, distributed basing supported by ground troops, and a willingness to adopt the philosophy of mission command—which has important implications for the US joint force. Moreover, the war’s conduct offers a jumping-off point to explore opportunities ACE creates when employed by an even more technologically advanced air component like the US Air Force. Finally, the war provides a real-world conflict scenario that can act as a framework for a discussion on the ways the US Army can enable ACE as part of joint all-domain operations. Ultimately, understanding and acting on these lessons from Ukraine may be the key to mitigating any military threat—whether posed by Russia in Europe or China in the Indo-Pacific—and ensuring air component and, by extension, joint force survival should deterrence fail.
Agile Combat Employment in Application
In December 2021, the US Air Force’s Lemay Center released Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21, Agile Combat Employment. This document is an expression of the way the US Air Force intends to mitigate a peer adversary’s technological advancements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and all-domain long-range fires, a reduced global force footprint, and the increased risk to air bases with aircraft no longer able to operate from relative sanctuary. The concept is defined as “a proactive and reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability while generating combat power throughout the integrated deterrence continuum.” Applied as intended, it “complicates the enemy’s targeting process, creates political and operational dilemmas for the enemy, and creates flexibility for friendly forces.” It is a natural doctrinal reaction to a changing operational environment and the evolving character of war.
While tragic in most respects, the war in Ukraine provides the US Air Force with a rare opportunity to observe a near-peer threat in action and use the lessons learned to adapt the ACE concept. The Ukrainians—faced with extreme asymmetric challenges, difficult environmental conditions, and an obligation to support Ukrainian ground forces—have, by necessity, adopted many of ACE’s tenets into their concept of operations. Given the historic close cooperation between the US Air Force and Ukraine, the Ukrainian air force’s employment of ACE principles is unsurprising. It could be argued that ACE has both informed and been informed by the Ukrainian experience since 2014. While much of the Ukrainian air force’s activities since the invasion remain a closely guarded secret, what we do know from open sources is extremely illuminating.
In the days leading up to the February 24 invasion, Ukrainian aircraft dispersed from major operating bases and into alternate forward operating sites and contingency locations away from cities and toward the west. These alternate sites included short airstrips and highways. Russian forces’ initial air attacks were only moderately successful, owing to a lack of precision-guided munitions, poor air-ground integration, and a reluctance to leverage the full weight of their capabilities in the early days of the fighting. This failure allowed additional Ukrainian aircraft to escape in the first seventy-two hours. The Ukrainian air force, outclassed technologically, very quickly adapted its tactics, techniques, and procedures to pursue an aggressive defensive counterair campaign. Through detailed joint integration with Ukrainian ground-based air defense, along with residual and nonstandard ground-based sensors, which included a network of civilian spotters to support command and control, the Ukrainian military established a remarkably effective and resilient integrated air defense system.
Virtually overnight, the Ukrainian air force changed its approach to air operations to meet the situation. Using its aircraft as bait to lure unsuspecting Russians into surface-to-air missile engagement zones, the Ukrainian air force discouraged undertrained Russian pilots from entering Ukrainian-controlled airspace. Operating under the cover of their ground-based air defense, Ukrainian air crews surged sortie generation far beyond expectation and continued to provide close air support to ground forces as the defense of key political centers intensified. The Ukrainian air force further complicated Russian targeting by generally remaining at low altitude, below where Russian ground-based radars could detect the aircraft, and returning after missions to different airfields from where they started, keeping Russian intelligence guessing as to Ukrainian air force strength and bed-down locations.
On March 18, Russian frustration over the inability to penetrate Ukrainian-controlled airspace and growing international support for Ukraine boiled over and resulted in the first combat usage of a Kinzhal hypersonic weapon. This strike was delivered against a munitions warehouse in Delyatin and was notable for two reasons. First, it demonstrated the adversary’s reliance on strategic, expensive, low-density weapons, to achieve tactical effects against an operationally insignificant asset in the face of a difficult targeting environment. Second, it reaffirmed the continued and enhanced vulnerability of stationary targets to modern weapons. Despite this, the skies over Ukraine have remained, in the words of Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby, “contested”—a condition that can pretty much describe the state of the entire invasion at this point. The Ukrainian air force’s resilience in the defense bought time for the international community to assist Ukraine in generating combat power in the skies. During the week of April 19, Ukraine received both repair parts and complete airframes to bolster its beleaguered MiG-29 fleet. As a result, months into a conflict that many expected would last a week, the Ukrainian air force’s disciplined approach and adherence to the operational tenets of agile combat employment have ensured that it is not only still combat effective, but able to deliver airpower in support of Ukraine’s defense.
Two features of Ukraine’s performance in the war, particularly in the air domain, are important to point out here. First, the Ukrainians credit security force assistance and training with US and NATO partners as being the decisive factor in creating a professional, flexible, and disciplined force capable of the ingenuity and resilience required make this transition under stress. By adopting and implementing the mission command philosophy of command and control, which pursues the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders, the Ukrainian military had the basis for improvisation that their Russian adversaries did not.
Second, outcomes have varied considerably based on the extent to which Ukrainian forces have been able to operate jointly. In areas around Kyiv and in the north, the effective close air support the Ukrainian army received, even when it was limited, was reciprocated by sustainment and base-defense support from ground forces. Where Russia was successful, most notably in the southeast around Mariupol, Ukrainian high- to medium-altitude air defense, specifically S-300s, were absent. In these areas, the Ukrainian air force had significantly reduced freedom of maneuver and the other services were forced to largely fight independently with a subsequent negative effect on the military’s ability to retain ground.
Lessons Identified: Practical Requirements for ACE
To explore the implications of the lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine for the US military, it is useful to consider a scenario with several defining characteristics—certain conditions that exist at the onset of hostilities. First, US forces would initially be at a numerical disadvantage and would be forced to project power into the joint operations area. Second, political considerations and a desire to de-escalate would prevent US forces from taking preemptive actions against enemy forces that would obviate their advantages. Third, there would be some unambiguous warning of an impending attack from which prudent decisions could be made to mitigate the effects of the enemy’s first strike. Lastly, there is a strategic requirement that compels the military to fight from a position of tactical disadvantage. This requirement could be due to a treaty, limited access to a particular resource, or a position that must be retained to be successful over the long term.
This is a scenario for which ACE is optimized. If the United States is challenged to achieve and maintain air superiority, ACE offers a means of employment until sufficient freedom of action is achieved through force generation and the cumulative effects of convergence. Once freedom of action is achieved, however, the Air Force should revert to more traditional and efficient forms of employment. The virtue of the classic centrally controlled, decentrally executed approach to command and control for air operations will remain dominant in a minimally contested environment and from a planning and logistics perspective enables both simplicity and economies of force.
As in Ukraine, prudent planning would suggest that prior to and during the initial phases of the operation, when the capabilities, intent, and effectiveness of the enemy are not fully understood, ACE should be maximized to prioritize survivability while maintaining effectiveness. The agile combat employment doctrine note identifies some of the requirements to effectively accomplish this and highlights that this protection effort should employ both active and passive air and missile defense measures, enhance the ability to withstand attacks against logistics, and utilize an optimized command-and-control structure built for purpose—all of which we have been observed in Ukraine.
Despite this, there would obviously be differences in implementation. US application of ACE would be more effective than Ukraine’s in some respects, but more challenged in others. Of note, the technological advantages that our aircraft rely on in the skies become liabilities on the ground, requiring significant support in advanced facilities and maintenance areas. Additionally, the relatively short ranges of modern fifth-generation aircraft increase the requirements for fuel, which will be difficult to supply when operating in a distributed environment. This refueling problem will be exacerbated by the inability of the Air Force’s large, slow, airborne aerial refueling assets to operate inside an enemy’s surface-to-air missile engagement zone. Ammunition management will also be problematic, as the United States will continue to rely on precision-guided munitions to reduce collateral damage and improve lethality. The scarcity and handling of these munitions also require special equipment and training. For these reasons and others, ACE is predicated on the Air Force training what the concept calls “multi-capable Airmen,” who are expected to accomplish “tasks outside of their core Air Force Specialty.” This reduces the amount of ground support personnel but increases the burden on those that remain. On the upside, even with limited assets available, the qualitative overmatch of US training, approach to command and control, and equipment will create greater opportunities to put adversaries in positions of disadvantage and secure the initiative. This will enable earlier and more effective offensive operations following the adversary’s initiation of conflict.
In reviewing the requirements for ACE, it becomes evident that the capabilities needed for execution at scale—ground-based air defense, robust ground sustainment, and resilient and ubiquitous command and control—do not wholly reside in the US Air Force or exist in sufficient quantity to maximize the concept’s utility. Much like the Ukrainian military’s experience, the US Air Force’s employment concept will require joint interdependence. The service will need to rely on key capabilities from the joint force, particularly the Army—including air and missile defense as well as common-use capabilities such as engineering support, logistics, and transportation—to facilitate the continuous employment of the Air Force. These requirements may deepen if air lines of communication become frustrated due to overflight and basing concerns as they did in the early days of the Ukrainian conflict. Additionally, the joint force should also retain and expand the ability of its air traffic service arms to establish expeditionary dual-use airfields, which expand the menu of command-and-control options for basing fixed-wing aircraft. ACE will also increase the conventional base-defense requirements necessary to protect aircraft from ground attack in the rear areas. In truth, while ACE is presented as an Air Force employment concept, it is actually a joint employment concept, with the air component as the supported commander. Presented from this perspective, it is easy to see why other components may not be eager to expend energy that redirects combat power and resources from their own operations, while seemingly not providing a significant and immediate return on investment as the joint force struggles for air superiority. This, however, is a shortsighted view.
Joint Incentives for Cooperation
When we think about new concepts such as ACE, simple ideas tend to quickly get muddled in jargon and buzzwords. In cases like these, it helps to use an analogy to put things in perspective. Boxing provides us with a great analogy for agile combat employment, just as it does for joint warfare in general. Successful fighters cannot be one-dimensional. They must maintain the ability to dodge, weave, slip a punch, and play defense to ensure that they are still conscious to attack. Part of that defense includes establishing the jab to set up the knockout punch. In ACE, support between the joint services has a similar effect, creating opportunities for exploitation. This is essentially what the concept is all about, working together as one body to survive and succeed.
If the land component can support the retention and generation of air combat power closer to the point of need, those assets can enable combined arms maneuver more effectively. In the Ukrainian example, air component survivability in the forward areas correlated to increased sortie generation as the air force operated distributed within relative proximity of forward troops. With ACE, an air force is more responsive to ground alerts and can operate at greater depth when conducting interdiction and strategic attack missions. Additionally, ACE can provide greater strength to the defense by integrating more closely with ground-based air defense and providing more on-station persistence within the battle area. Once conditions allow the joint force to transition to the offense, ACE ensures that an air force still exists to do so, as the Ukrainians observed to great effect during their April counterattacks that retook Kharkiv. When the ground component truly considers the return on investment of ACE, it essentially equates to leverage, accelerating gains exponentially upon seizing the initiative.
In an all-domain operational context, the main effort might shift between domains as opportunities and threats arise. The Army multi-domain operations concept describes “windows of superiority” that will open and must be exploited—regardless of domain. Therefore, just as a joint force commander would direct the air component to support the land component with close air support if it enabled the ground force’s survival or was critical to maneuver, regardless of whether close air support is the most efficient use of aircraft, that commander might just as likely order other components to support ACE. The question at that point is simple: How well have the joint services postured themselves to take on this role?
Common Ground in the Skies: Mutually Beneficial Support
Importantly, there are investments the Army and Air Force should consider to enable Army support to ACE in a high-intensity, large-scale combat operation against a peer adversary—opportunities for partnership that will enhance joint force effectiveness in such a scenario. Among them, although this list is by no means exhaustive, are low-cost cross-domain fires, more versatile command and control that can rapidly create alternatives for destroyed, degraded, and denied major operating bases, and most importantly, joint training with the critical components of the ACE enterprise.
Fires are central to Army modernization efforts—air and missile defense and long-range precision fires account for two of the service’s six modernization priorities. This is directly relevant to ACE, particularly the ways in which cross-domain fires can support the concept. As observed in Ukraine, the presence of robust ground-based air defense is critical to the survival of the air component and control of the skies. Unfortunately, continuing to field sophisticated systems is both cost prohibitive and subject to long production lead times that won’t meet the demands of an environment that rapidly consumes resources. As an example, PAC-3 interceptors, at three million dollars each, are superb weapons but are in extremely short supply relative to the threat. An alternative is necessary to conserve valuable PAC-3s and other low-density munitions for appropriate targets in order to prevent the gap in mid-range coverage that the Ukrainians experienced in Mariupol.
One possible solution is the introduction of directed-energy weapons that could be used with vastly reduced costs and logistics requirements compared to traditional missiles. Another, more versatile option may be to enhance the fire control systems on cannon artillery to allow them to become dual-role fire-support solutions for air defense. The Army, with Air Force assistance and sensors, demonstrated this was possible in September 2020 at White Sands Missile Range when an M109A7 using a hypervelocity projectile achieved virtual intercept speeds of Mach 5. This capability would allow Army 155-millimeter howitzers to rapidly and inexpensively provide both air defense and ground defense and attack coverage in support of ACE or frontline maneuver. From a sensor standpoint, increased usage of highly mobile multimodal radars, like the Q-53, operating in an air defense role, can also create a more robust kill chain and thicken the integrated air defense structure necessary to support forward basing. This novel approach to integrated air defense needs to advance beyond the realm of one-off experiments and into an operational setting. This will require rethinking, replanning, and retraining with respect to how we use Army sensors and systems to reinforce the existing integrated air defense system by phase, location, and requirement.
Next, the land component will need to examine how it preserves and expands its ability to support forward basing and command and control for its air assets, which will also enhance support of ACE. The ability to rapidly establish short-duration air traffic services (ATS) under austere conditions is critical to the ability of all aviation to survive and support large-scale combat operations in a dynamic environment. This understanding has historically driven Army ATS to be distributed down to the lowest tactical level in the form of ATS companies in combat aviation brigades. These ATS companies currently retain sufficient capabilities—trained personnel; the Air Traffic Navigation, Integration, and Coordination System (ATNAVICS); and other equipment—to establish air traffic control for both rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets on an expeditionary basis for missions of short duration and limited scope. Retaining this structure provides the Army a great deal of flexibility and the potential to support the joint force, at the tactical level, through joint all-domain operations and ACE. Outside of the Army, the Marine Corps also has air traffic control capabilities that rely on the same ATNAVICS equipment used by the Army, creating the opportunity for even greater flexibility on the joint battlefield. Ultimately, the difference between the services in this regard rests largely in capacity and scale, not necessarily on capability. Increasing interservice ATS support would just need to be trained to proficiency to instill confidence in the joint force. As both the Army and the Air Force are seeing heightened demand for increasingly limited, tactically distributed air traffic services, it would seem mutually beneficial to collaborate on efforts to fill joint ATS requirements both in terms of manning and equipping. This would build redundancy and resiliency into an otherwise fragile basing system.
Finally, and arguably more important than the material and doctrinal aspects discussed previously, are the improvements in joint training and education that must be made to enable the success of ACE against a peer adversary. This was the lesson that the Ukrainians themselves drew from their first encounter with the Russians in 2014. That period, during which the Ukrainian air force was ineffective in the contested areas over Crimea and the Donbas, drove a sense of urgency in the subsequent eight years to increase trust in joint interdependence and saw extensive training between Ukrainian ground-based air defense and the air force. This enhanced efficiency and effectiveness within the Ukrainian military in those early critical days of the current fight.
As the United States continues to evolve the ACE concept it must learn from the Ukrainian example and look toward joint training at the tactical level to address the challenges and opportunities highlighted by this approach. As one might expect, to date, most of the training conducted on this concept has been executed by its originator, the US Air Force, through experimental exercises like the Agile Flag series, with limited involvement from the other services. While these exercises train the Air Force to be more flexible and expeditionary, Agile Flag doesn’t reflect what the Air Force can and should expect from joint interdependence because it doesn’t yet include the Army or Navy in any meaningful way.
One of the most significant leaps forward, from an ACE joint training perspective, was last year’s Northern Strike exercise, an Army and Air National Guard event that saw the first ever highway landing by modern military aircraft on US soil. This exercise also highlighted the value of the newly established National All-Domain Warfighting Center in Grayling, Michigan whose connection with local Air National Guard installations provides a unique series of Army and Air Force joint training venues. While still not perfect, Northern Strike provides a great example of the type of events the joint force should be doing and the type of training areas they should be developing.
Unfortunately, in the active force, where culture and risk aversion tend to inhibit our ability to train with the other services, we have yet to take full advantage of venues like this or replicate these experiences at our training centers. If we expect the future fight to be all-domain, then we need to train as we fight. That means joint training, which in turn requires greater risk acceptance and increased collaboration within the active component. Specifically with respect to ACE, we must develop joint training packages that deploy to combat training centers and work on specific aspects of the concept as a joint team. For example, Air Force wings can partner with Army air defense artillery brigades and combat aviation brigades to work on pieces of the ACE concept and conduct event-based training that supports the familiarity and trust necessary to operate in the inherently risky environment of large-scale combat. This type of activity should be prioritized, promoted, and actively resourced by the most likely combatant commands who will rely on ACE, US Indo-Pacific Command and US European Command.
The End of Round One
As this war of attrition drags on into the summer, the effects of the Ukrainian airpower approach are making the Russian invaders pay for every inch of territory. As of the writing of this article, in the skies over Kherson and elsewhere, the air component has regenerated sufficient combat power to continue to support its ground forces effectively as they attempt to wrest the initiative from the Russians. This news, while heartening, should be taken with a measure of caution. Russia retains a large military and if its forces continue to press the conflict they may yet find a way to win a protracted war, especially if Russia fully mobilizes and institutes some significant reforms. History has shown that the Russians are a dogged and determined foe and are willing to sacrifice greatly to achieve victory. If the US military finds itself confronted by a similar enemy on the future battlefield, will that enemy perform with the same ineptitude that has dogged its operations in Ukraine? Unlikely.
To return to the boxing analogy, the Ukrainians’ tactics and employment techniques have thus far helped them to evade the Russian knockout blow, and are now allowing them to rise from the canvas like Rocky Balboa and go one more round. Learning from their experience is vital, not least because in the next fight the United States may find itself not as the salty, supportive corner man, providing sage advice and aid from outside the ring, but instead the man in the arena himself, facing a much larger, smarter, and more dangerous opponent. If we don’t collaborate as a joint force to learn from the Ukrainians, and make the material, doctrinal, and training modifications to perfect the ACE technique, we could find ourselves fighting for our lives with one arm tied behind our backs. The Chinese are already in the gym right now, learning from the mistakes of the Russians and getting stronger by the day. They will be better tomorrow. Will our own agile combat employment be ready?
Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Arrol is currently serving as the commandant of the US Army Joint Support Team at Hurlburt Field, Florida. A career field artillery officer, he is a contributing member of NATO’s Integrated Capabilities Group on Indirect Fire and a graduate of the Command and General Staff College. His civil schooling includes a bachelor’s degree in history and political science from Michigan State University and an MBA from Eastern Michigan University. His most recent operational assignment was as the deputy commanding officer of the 19th Battlefield Coordination Detachment.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Master Sgt. Sean M. Worrell, US Air Force
12. U.S. strike targets senior Al Qaeda leader in Syria
Excerpts:
In its reward offer, State noted that Al Shami, Abu ‘Abd al-Karim al-Masri, and Sami al-Uraydi “been active in al Qaeda (AQ) for years and remain loyal to AQ leader Ayman al Zawahiri.”
The relationship between Hurras al-Din and Al Qaeda remains strong to this day, according to CENTCOM. In the June 27 press release announcing the strike that targeted al Yemeni, CENTCOM said that “Al Qaeda-aligned organizations such as Hurras al-Din … continue to present a threat to America and our allies.”
“Al Qaeda-aligned militants use Syria as a safe haven to coordinate with their external affiliates and plan operations outside of Syria,” CENTCOM concluded.
U.S. strike targets senior Al Qaeda leader in Syria | FDD's Long War Journal
The U.S. military claimed it killed Abu Hamzah al Yemeni, a senior leader of the Al Qaeda-linked Hurras al-Din, in “a kinetic strike in Idlib province” in Syria on June 27. The offensive is the first reported against the terror group since September 2021, in which al Yemeni may have been a target.
“Abu Hamzah al Yemeni was traveling alone on a motorcycle at the time of the strike,” U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, noted in its press release, and said there is no indication of civilian casualties from the attack.
Al Yemeni’s death has not been confirmed, and he has been reported to have been killed in a U.S. military air strike once in the recent the past.
Al Yemeni’s nom de guerre indicates he may be a Yemeni national, and he is known to be a military commander within Hurras al-Din.
Today’s attack is the first reported against Hurras al-Din’s leadership since Sept. 20, 2021, when CENTCOM targeted an unnamed senior Al Qaeda leader. Abu Al Bara al Tunisi, a Tunisian jihadist leader and ideologue who has proselytized on behalf of the group, is thought to have been the target of the strike.
Despite the defeat of the Islamic State and the loss of its physical caliphate in Iraq and Syria, terror groups are still rampant in Syria, particularly in Idlib province, where Al Qaeda-linked groups hold sway.
Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, an offshoot of Al Qaeda’s Al Nusrah Front which has distanced itself from the global terror group, dominates in Idlib. Hurras al-Din also is anchored in Idlib, and even top Islamic State leaders are known to shelter there. The two previous emirs of the Islamic State were killed during U.S. raids in Idlib.
Hurras al-Din is commanded by senior Al Qaeda veterans, including Abu Hammam al Shami (a.k.a. Faruq al Suri), who was listed as terrorist along with two other leaders, in Sept. 2019. Al Shami also has a $5 million reward from the State Department for information leading to his capture and conviction. Hurras al-Din was also listed as a terrorist organization in Sept. 2019.
In its reward offer, State noted that Al Shami, Abu ‘Abd al-Karim al-Masri, and Sami al-Uraydi “been active in al Qaeda (AQ) for years and remain loyal to AQ leader Ayman al Zawahiri.”
The relationship between Hurras al-Din and Al Qaeda remains strong to this day, according to CENTCOM. In the June 27 press release announcing the strike that targeted al Yemeni, CENTCOM said that “Al Qaeda-aligned organizations such as Hurras al-Din … continue to present a threat to America and our allies.”
“Al Qaeda-aligned militants use Syria as a safe haven to coordinate with their external affiliates and plan operations outside of Syria,” CENTCOM concluded.
Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.
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13. Relocating or expanding? Islamic State Mozambique’s reaction to foreign intervention
We cannot take our eye off the terrorist ball.
Excerpt:
While the group has suffered major losses and its area of operations is much reduced since the group’s zenith in late 2020, its ability to adapt, expand and relocate to more vulnerable areas belies its deep entrenchment after nearly five years of war. As has been the case throughout Cabo Delgado’s conflict, it is local civilians paying the highest price.
Relocating or expanding? Islamic State Mozambique’s reaction to foreign intervention | FDD's Long War Journal
Islamic State militants in northern Mozambique as seen in a recent photo released earlier this month
Despite notable successes following twin interventions by both the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) in July and August 2021, the Islamic State’s Mozambique Province, known locally as Al Shabaab (not to be confused with al Qaeda’s branch in East Africa) and its insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province has remained resilient and adaptable.
Having lost control over the city of Mocimboa da Praia in August 2021 after holding the town for a year – the largest urban center controlled by any Islamic State affiliate since the fall of the territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria in 2019 – Al Shabaab has managed to sustain a high tempo of activity and even expand its operations beyond its core territories in Cabo Delgado.
Following a failed attempt to establish itself in neighboring Niassa Province in late 2021, a series of attacks in southern Cabo Delgado and northern Nampula Province appear to be part of a sustained effort by the jihadists to establish themselves in areas that have not faced insurgent violence since the conflict began in 2017.
Successes without closure
Having begun in Oct. 2017 with assaults on police stations in Mocimboa da Praia, Al Shabaab has steadily expanded its operational reach throughout approximately one third of Cabo Delgado by 2019. In 2020, the group’s tactics shifted from small unit ambushes and raids into coordinated assaults on urban centers, culminating in its seizure of Mocimboa da Praia in August 2020.
French oil company Total reacted by suspending work on the project, a major setback for the Mozambican government, which had staked its entire economic policy on significant future revenues from gas export.
Al Shabaab’s capacity to threaten such important projects spurred twin interventions by both the Rwandan Defense Forces and SADC’s Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). Approximately 2500 RDF subsequently managed to secure the natural gas project on Afungi Peninsula near Palma, clear areas adjacent to Palma, and advance from two directions towards Mocimboa da Praia, ultimately seizing the town after Al Shabaab fighters withdrew.
Over 1000 SAMIM troops have deployed in other districts of Cabo Delgado, namely Macomia, Mueda and Nangade, similarly attempting to bolster Mozambican security forces. These deployments have concentrated in areas where local militia recruited and led by veterans of the ruling Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) party’s war of independence from Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s play a major role in maintaining security. The Mozambican government recently announced its intentions to regularize these militias, a decision which follows Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s April statement that Ugandan support to Mozambican security forces would be channeled to these veteran-led militias.
SAMIM’s areas of responsibility have remained insecure, however, as Al Shabaab has continued to consistently launch attacks in both Nangade and Macomia, where 350 Rwandan troops deployed alongside SAMIM for the first time on March 31.
Beyond the RDF’s successes in securing major transportation arteries and urban centers, the twin interventions have inflicted significant losses on Al Shabaab. As many as 200 Al Shabaab fighters had reportedly been killed in the six months between the beginning of foreign deployments in July and the end of 2021.
Al Shabaab’s Niassa strategy
Al Shabaab’s first attempt to react to its losses after the Rwandan and SADC interventions was through a campaign of attacks in the neighboring Niassa Province to the west of Cabo Delgado. Beginning in Nov. 2021 and lasting through most of December, Al Shabaab fighters launched at least 16 attacks against civilians and security forces in Niassa, resulting in at least 23 deaths.
These attacks were reportedly led by a senior Al Shabaab commander named Maulana Ali Cassimo, who had worked in Niassa’s Mecula district as a civil servant before joining Al Shabaab even before the violence officially broke out in Oct. 2017.
Cassimo reportedly returned to Mecula district in fall 2021, and led Al Shabaab’s offensive there before police claimed he was killed in clashes in Dec. 2021. Al Shabaab’s operations in Mecula quickly fizzled as a result, potentially bolstering claims of his death.
While unsuccessful at establishing Al Shabaab in Niassa, as captured documents indicated was the intention, the offensive suggested a potential new strategy whereby members recruited from outside the insurgency’s core areas in coastal Cabo Delgado would return to their home areas to launch new attacks.
With security forces concentrated in Cabo Delgado’s coastal districts, Al Shabaab appeared to be attempting to repurpose its expansive recruitment networks beyond those areas to stand up new operational cells. These cells outside the insurgency’s heartland could then expand its scope, creating new base areas with access to borders and supplies, and stretch Mozambican and foreign troops beyond what they could secure.
Expansion, replicated
Developments in 2022 suggest that Al Shabaab may be attempting to replicate the strategy attempted in Niassa in Cabo Delgado’s southernmost districts bordering Nampula Province. Nampula, to the south of Cabo Delgado, while the site of recruiting cells for Al Shabaab in the past has until this year avoided much of the bloodshed taking place to its north.
A string of 14 attacks in Cabo Delgado’s Meluco district in Jan. 2022 were followed by a resumption of attacks there in May. This was then followed in June by the rapid expansion of attacks southward into Cabo Delgado’s Quissange, Ancuabe, Chiure, and Mecufi districts and ultimately across the border into Nampula province itself on June 17.
Meluco district had frequently been the target of Al Shabaab attacks prior to foreign intervention, and Ancuabe had also suffered attacks prior to this new offensive. But the frequency of attacks in both districts is notable, as is the fact that Ancuabe had not faced Al Shabaab attacks in nearly three years and Quissanga had seen none since last September. Chiure and Mecufi districts in Cabo Delgado and Nampula Province had never before seen armed Al Shabaab activity.
All these areas, however, were home to extensive Al Shabaab recruitment efforts, and Ancuabe had seen episodes of mob violence by radical sects even before the insurgency began.
The size of units engaged in attacks in southern Cabo Delgado suggests that Al Shabaab’s southern push is less a military offensive in force than an expansion of its small-unit insurgency, enabled by the kinds of support networks that make small-unit insurgent tactics possible.
The geographic sequence of attacks does suggest the physical movement of fighters southwards, but the speed of this offensive – covering nearly 100km over the course of two weeks – likely also indicates the role of sleeper cells and sympathizers put in place across the region.
As had occurred in Niassa, demobilized fighters surreptitiously embedded back into the civilian communities from which they were recruited may be assisting active Al Shabaab units in this drive southward.
Simultaneously, the collapse of Cabo Delgado’s economy and the mass displacement of hundreds of thousands to the southern parts of the province may offer ample opportunities for insurgents to establish support networks in communities facing dire conditions and limited resources.
Islamic State and implications
The focus of the Islamic State’s claims has also shifted southwards, despite continued Al Shabaab activity in its core areas in northern and central Cabo Delgado. This suggests that the Islamic State intends to loudly publicize Al Shabaab’s expansion to new areas following its promotion to a stand-alone province of the Islamic State.
Elevating Al Shabaab to its own province and heavily publicizing its ability to expand in northern Mozambique – despite foreign interventions against it – may reflect an Al Shabaab on better footing, but also bears immense importance for the Islamic State’s central narratives.
More practically, the southern offensive also risks the kinds of operations that have proven critical to other Islamic State affiliates.
That Al Shabaab now has the capacity to launch repeated attacks nearby has raised fears of attempts to stage a prison break for the hundreds of known or alleged Al Shabaab members detained in the facility, a tactic repeatedly undertaken by Islamic State’s affiliates elsewhere around the world and one repeatedly encouraged by its leadership.
The Islamic State’s Central Africa Province, locally referred to as the Allied Democratic Forces, staged a massive prison break in Congo in October 2020, for instance, freeing hundreds of its members in addition to recruiting numerous other escapees. Such prison breaks have bolstered Islamic State affiliates by freeing fighters and commanders, as well as providing significant propaganda victories, an outcome that may prove attractive for a group under substantial military pressure like Al Shabaab.
Al Shabaab’s offensive southwards into Mozambique’s Nampula Province is the group’s most important operation since Rwandan and SADC troops intervened against it nearly a year ago.
While the group has suffered major losses and its area of operations is much reduced since the group’s zenith in late 2020, its ability to adapt, expand and relocate to more vulnerable areas belies its deep entrenchment after nearly five years of war. As has been the case throughout Cabo Delgado’s conflict, it is local civilians paying the highest price.
Ryan O'Farrell is a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation, where he focuses on the spread of the Islamic State in Central Africa.
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14. Don’t Let Russia Dominate the Strategic Concept
Conclusion:
While experts have long described NATO as perpetually in crisis, the current Russo-Ukrainian war presents a unique military, political, and strategic challenge that truly merits the use of the term. So far, it has helped create a clear consensus around collective defense. But allies’ strategic priorities continue to differ in secondary areas. Where these differences can lead to cacophony, the goal is to help create a symphony, or at least a coherent jam. Thus, the 2022 Strategic Concept offers an important opportunity. If approached wisely, this document can articulate a division of labor for competing with Russia and China, while also improving high-tech protection, general resiliency, burden-sharing, and counter-terrorism capacity.
Don’t Let Russia Dominate the Strategic Concept - War on the Rocks
What does this mean in practice? We contend that despite the current centrality of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Sino-American rivalry is likely to drive U.S. national security thinking in the coming decades. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept should address this reality. Among the many challenges in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific, China’s designs on Taiwan figure most prominently. China is watching the Russo-Ukrainian war closely, seeking to draw strategic lessons. This dynamic need not be catastrophic for European and trans-Atlantic security. It creates opportunities for E.U.-NATO cooperation and greater European strategic autonomy (or strategic responsibility) in the context of an enduring trans-Atlantic bond. Europe and Asia are increasingly linked as two theaters in a global system hinging on the United States and anchored in its alliances in both regions. The strategic concept should thus lay out a vision for how NATO can simultaneously compete with both China and Russia.
There are also several specific threats and challenges that the 2022 Strategic Concept should address. First, allies should tackle the effects of emerging and emerged disruptive technologies on strategic, defense, and force planning. Second, adversaries are increasingly using high- and low-tech approaches short of armed conflict to disrupt national politics and daily life in Western democracies. Enhancing and coordinating resilience across the alliance should be a goal of the strategic concept. Third, money remains the sinew of war. Whether it is investment in national and common-funded capabilities, or transfers to partners like Ukraine, ample and efficient spending is a requirement for a successful strategy. Fourth, NATO should continue to grapple with the distinct but related challenges of terrorism and irregular warfare.
While it seems clear that Russian aggression has mitigated some centrifugal tendencies in the alliance, NATO will remain more like an orchestra requiring a conductor to avoid strategic cacophony, rather than a self-organizing jazz band. The strategic concept represents an opportunity to better bring the members of the alliance into harmony. To do so, it should address the dual challenge posed by Russia and China, while better balancing NATO’s core commitments with a diverse set of new and growing threats.
Russia, China, NATO, and the World
Identifying a role for NATO in the Indo-Pacific is exceptionally challenging. Whether by Europeanizing NATO to enable the United States to focus on the Indo-Pacific, contending with Chinese commercial investment in European critical infrastructure, or encouraging allies to engage in Asia themselves (individually or collectively), the new strategic concept must address the relationship between the trans-Atlantic community and China. At an absolute minimum, the strategicconcept should position NATO to support the current global order and “demonstrate its commitment to security and democratic values as well as to the peaceful resolution of disputes.” Such a concerted approach to China is certainly attainable: Chinese behavior may even have “brought NATO together” in ways analogous to Russian behavior, and there may be more room for economic convergence between China and the West than sometimes imagined.
A significant strategic concern for NATO allies is to avoid precipitating a Russian-Chinese authoritarian alignment. While Russia and China face distinct strategic challenges of their own and their “unlimited partnership” has appeared to stumble upon some limits, their continued pursuit of emerging, disruptive technologies and their authoritarian models of governance present significant risks to NATO allies. These models, coupled with Russia and China’s shared willingness to undermine national and international institutions in the trans-Atlantic community, mean that the most daunting threat NATO faces may be to its foundational values. Incorporating these core values into strategy and policy will be a key task for the 2022 Strategic Concept.
New Domains
Whether in coordination or not, China and Russia will undoubtedly continue to challenge allies in domains like space and cyber using emerging and emerged technologies. Dealing with such challenges is core NATO business — grounded in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty and resting primarily with national authorities. The new Strategic Concept should aim to integrate these relatively new domains while responding to disruptive technologies as well. Allies must endeavor to reach a “pre-crisis” consensus on what space and cyber actions would constitute an “armed attack” in accordance with Article 5. This kind of crisis decision-making is a core function of NATO’s political and military headquarters. Such agreement, when paired with improved national capabilities, would contribute to deterrence by communicating resolve to adversaries. Improved capabilities themselves will only arise through public-private partnership to maintain a technological edge. A common strategic culture of innovation, much of which arises from the private sector, is a key advantage that NATO has — and should retain — over its adversaries. Such innovation has been on display in the Russo-Ukrainian war and will doubtless be essential in future conflicts.
National Resilience
Recently, however, national resilience has been challenged in additional areas, which should be reflected. Specifically, NATO should address democratic backsliding, election interference, and economic and information manipulation. Specifically, NATO’s requirements for national resilience should be upgraded to require national safeguards against democratic backsliding. Prior to taking up her position as the senior U.S. Department of Defense official in Europe, Rachel Ellehuus highlighted the vulnerabilities laid bare by such backsliding and argued that “the trans-Atlantic alliance will only remain strong if members genuinely abide by its founding principles.” By incorporating such safeguards into NATO’s systems for monitoring allies’ defense preparations, allies can shape one another’s political, economic, and security incentives in ways that reduce these vulnerabilities.
Allies should also agree to reduce dramatically their reliance on non-allied energy — the vulnerabilities inherent in German dependence on Russian gas have been exposed during the Russo-Ukrainian war. Progress toward independence cannot come fast enough. Finally, non-allied ownership of critical infrastructure, especially transportation and telecommunications, poses risks that have not yet materialized in the same way as energy dependency but are just as dangerous. The risks should be explicitly addressed in the strategic concept, and concrete steps toward mitigation should increase accordingly. Military mobility remains a critical infrastructural challenge that allies should also explicitly grapple with in coordination with the European Union. As in the cyber realm, the NATO Defence Planning Process may be an appropriate venue for these efforts.
The Sinews of War
Burden-sharing has been a primary challenge to NATO since its birth — mitigating collective action problems inherent in alliances is one of the key functions of the “O” (Organization) in NATO. Allies and analysts are often in search of new burden-sharing metrics to provide a more precise view of how the cost of collective defense is actually distributed across the alliance. But time and again the basic metrics that NATO tracks — such as share of GDP allocated to defense and the four components of defense budgets (equipment, personnel, operating and maintenance, and infrastructure) — have proved to capture the essence of this issue. The “inputs” NATO measures are highly predictive of virtually every measure of “outputs” that has been devised. This appears to hold true even in measures of aid to Ukraine. The simple pairwise correlation table below makes use of data provided by the newly developed Ukraine Support Tracker. The only factors that seem predictive of military support to Ukraine (at the 5 percent level of statistical significance) are previous spending on operating and maintenance and infrastructure as a share of GDP (column 1 in the pairwise correlation table below). The relatively large (.4173 and .4395, respectively) and statistically significant coefficients on these two variables suggest that allies that deploy and allies that invest in national infrastructure have also invested in supporting Ukraine militarily.
Table 1: Pairwise Correlations Between Defense Spending and Military Aid to Ukraine
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 Military Aid to UKR 2022 1 2 Milex/GDP 2018 0.1882 1 3 Equipment/GDP 2018 0.074 0.8256* 1 4 O&M/GDP 2018 0.4173* 0.8311* 0.7416* 1 5 Personnel/GDP 2018 -0.0735 0.8701* 0.6244* 0.5207* 1 6 Infrastructure/GDP 2018 0.4395* 0.5264* 0.4161* 0.5023* 0.3595* 1 7 Proximity to Russia -0.1763 -0.1758* 0.2824* 0.4041* 0.1743* -0.1029* 1 8 Atlanticism 2018 -0.1125 -0.0937* 0.0842* 0.2138* -0.1208* 0.0279 0.0158 1 Pairwise correlations, * = significant at .05 levelNonetheless, NATO can improve its burden-sharing arrangements by enabling allies to specialize in capabilities through the NATO Defence Planning Process and invest in high-return advisory missions such as supporting Ukrainian armed forces. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s balanced focus on “cash, capabilities, and contributions” is a common-sense approach at the strategic level and should be carried forward in the new strategic concept. Rather than jettison the Wales Pledge benchmarks, allies can continue to focus on their implementation. Increased investment creates new capabilities — integrating those capabilities into a strategy will produce better outcomes.
In practice, this means recognizing that there is a strong empirical link between spending today, the capabilities which that spending buys tomorrow, and the contributions to collective security those capabilities make the day after tomorrow. It is relatively clear that capability shortfalls result from the decisions not to invest in those capabilities. The NATO Defence Planning Process is an adequate model to address this. While efficiency is important, allies should not enable one another to use it as an excuse to avoid necessary spending. In short, if NATO is serious about fielding more capabilities and achieving more equal trans-Atlantic burden-sharing, European allies must invest more.
Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
Focusing on geopolitical competition with China and Russia will likely lead NATO allies to shift resources from the fight against terrorism. This structural situation requires NATO to develop a sustainable approach to mitigate terrorist threats. Fortunately, the key requirements for this complement the requirements of great power competition. Both involve improving defensive capabilities, maintaining crisis response capacity, and continuing to enhance intelligence sharing. For example, partnership structures like those used to support Ukraine since 2014 can be used to deepen cooperation in combatting terrorism globally. Similarly, many of the elements inherent in great power proxy warfare are compatible with combatting terrorism — for NATO this principally involves partner capacity building and information operations. The gains that NATO, and particularly NATO special operations forces, have made in coordinating the fight against non-state adversaries will help in great power competition, and their continued engagement will prevent basic counterterrorism capabilities from withering. The 2022 Strategic Concept can offer high-level political direction in support of incorporating irregular warfare into a broader approach to deterrence and defense.
Orchestrating a Cacophony of Cacophonies
While experts have long described NATO as perpetually in crisis, the current Russo-Ukrainian war presents a unique military, political, and strategic challenge that truly merits the use of the term. So far, it has helped create a clear consensus around collective defense. But allies’ strategic priorities continue to differ in secondary areas. Where these differences can lead to cacophony, the goal is to help create a symphony, or at least a coherent jam. Thus, the 2022 Strategic Concept offers an important opportunity. If approached wisely, this document can articulate a division of labor for competing with Russia and China, while also improving high-tech protection, general resiliency, burden-sharing, and counter-terrorism capacity.
Jordan Becker is an academy professor and director of the Social Science Research Lab at the United States Military Academy, West Point. He is also affiliated with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels, and IHEDN and IRSEM at the French École Militaire. Ambassador Douglas Lute is the former U.S. permanent representative to NATO and retired from the U.S. Army at the rank of lieutenant general. Simon Smith is an associate professor at Staffordshire University and is the editor-in-chief of Defence Studies. This article reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent the position of the U.S. government. It draws upon discussions at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar held at West Point on Feb. 3–4, 2022. Those discussions are captured in greater detail in a recently released special section of Defence Studies.
15. The Biden Administration’s China Strategy
Excerpts:
In that sense, the U.S. has a strong advantage that the GSI does little to offset. Its network of alliances and other security ties directly grapple with these hard tradeoffs. Even countries like Vietnam are seeking closer ties with the U.S. in response to coercive Chinese activities. Washington has been successful in using security bodies to institutionalize this regional momentum and broaden political and military discussions.
Assess the risks and rewards of the new China strategy for U.S. Indo-Pacific allies.
I’m not that worried about the GSI somehow displacing the U.S. alliance and security network or even directly undermining U.S. partners, for the reasons I articulated earlier. The GSI doesn’t commit China to any concrete security actions, nor even deeper policy alignment and discussions on difficult military and political problems.
It may serve to bolster goodwill among, say, African or Latin American countries that are keen to engage on COVID-19 or economic challenges. But there’s little reason to securitize this cooperation, especially when China has other vehicles that achieve the same objectives, like the BRI. I’m skeptical that Beijing could translate this engagement into actual military or security coordination, particularly since the PLA has limited power projection capabilities, especially beyond Asia.
The Biden Administration’s China Strategy
Insights from Raymond Kuo
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The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Raymond Kuo – Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and author of “Following the Leader” (2021) and “Contests of Initiative” (2021) – is the 324th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Analyze the Biden administration’s new China strategy core pillars of “invest, align, and compete.”
The strategy is overdue and patchy, but nevertheless a good start to a cohesive U.S. strategy toward China. It centers whole-of-nation competition with China but recognizes that there are still some issues upon which Washington and Beijing can cooperate (e.g., climate change, COVID-19). It also clarifies the overall policy goal: outcompeting China and preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Secretary Blinken also made clear that the U.S. is not interested in regime change in Beijing, which is helpful.
The “align” pillar is the most well-supported. Particularly compared to the previous administration, the Biden administration has done an effective job of galvanizing international cooperation and momentum against China’s threats to regional security. More still needs to be done, especially in getting Asian partners to increase their military preparations and capabilities. Also, as I’ll discuss later on, Asian countries view American economic engagement as a critical indication of Washington’s commitment to the region. The U.S. withdraw from the TPP hurt American credibility, and I’m not sure IPEF is enough to make up for that.
My biggest concern is whether the Biden administration can commit the resources to fulfill this strategy. The U.S. has been pivoting to Asia since at least the George W. Bush administration. It’s actually happening this time, at least rhetorically. But Washington still needs to devote more funding and personnel, not just to the military, but also to the U.S.’ diplomatic, aid, and investment arms.
There’s a danger of believing that the U.S. can compete with China on the cheap, that success does not require sometimes painful political and economic adjustment, in addition to military outlays. That’s simply not the case. The USSR never reached 60 percent of U.S. GDP. China has already surpassed that mark. In particular, the U.S. has a lot of rebuilding to do at home. Blinken highlighted innovation, democracy, and human capital among the strengths that the U.S. can and will draw upon in its competition with China. But all of those are eroding, and the U.S. needs a coherent and ambitious domestic strategy to bolster these elements and develop the necessary resources to outcompete Beijing.
How does this new strategy reflect U.S. foreign policy priorities?
The strategy shares some similarities with integrated deterrence, in that the U.S. is attempting to draw together its broad panoply of capabilities into a cohesive strategy for great power competition. Like much of U.S. foreign policy, the “invest, align, and compete” approach does not sufficiently emphasize or detail the non-military engagement that Asian states are often interested in. But it draws the various regional policy initiatives the U.S. has embarked upon under a clearly articulated statement of principles.
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Examine how the White House’s recently launched “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” (IPEF) advances its new China strategy.
I’m glad the U.S. is engaging on international economic policy once again, but there’s still a long way to go. Trump was a disaster on trade issues, hitting allies with tariffs even while simultaneously seeking their help against China. Unfortunately, the Biden administration has maintained many of its predecessor’s tariffs, despite the improvements to critical relationships that undoing them would produce.
Support for free trade is actually at an all-time high among Americans. But this issue has also been swept into American political polarization, with “Does my side win?” considerations substantially influencing attitudes toward trade. This makes inking comprehensive trade agreements politically difficult.
IPEF is structured to avoid these issues. Senate approval is not necessary, since these are Executive Orders that don’t discuss access to the U.S. economy. However, especially among advanced economies, states typically sign trade agreements so their companies can gain access to new markets. That’s not going to happen with IPEF. Moreover, IPEF can be easily reversed if a trade-skeptic enters the White House. I expect the Biden administration hopes that trade benefits “lock in” agreement even after they leave. But as seen with other trade deals or even the Iran nuclear agreement, partisanship incentivizes breaking even extremely well-crafted agreements for domestic political gain.
The Biden administration is ultimately correct that the U.S. should push for “high quality” trade agreements. But the U.S. had that with the TPP, and even joining its new form (i.e., the CPTPP) would entail greater economic engagement than IPEF.
Explain China’s “Global Security Initiative” and implications for U.S.-China rivalry.
Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the GSI in April, framing it as a counterpart to the Global Development Initiative. The speech itself didn’t offer much of substance. It was mostly the same message of win-win, global cooperation, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that we often see from Chinese foreign policy pronouncements. There was also the standard opposition to a Cold War mentality (i.e., U.S. efforts to contain China) and desire to lead Asian states to a common security future, but not necessarily reinforced or embedded within binding institutions.
Moreover, Xi and others have highlighted what we could call collective goods challenges in their discussions of the GSI: COVID-19, economic recovery, some environmental issues. These are low-hanging fruit. States largely have aligned interests on these issues, and China can unlock mutual gains relatively easily by coordinating among governments or providing those goods directly.
But the GSI says nothing about the more challenging problems where China and its neighbors have conflicting interests. If win-win isn’t possible, does China prioritize its own interests or take its neighbors’ interests into consideration? For example, would Beijing be willing to submit rival maritime territorial claims to UNCLOS arbitration? Or establish a military code of conduct and information-sharing procedures among regional states? Can it commit to delinking trade from political disputes?
Beijing has had a spotty record on all of these issues. In part, that reflects a general tendency within Chinese foreign policy to favor bilateral discussions on security issues over multilateral deliberations within highly institutionalized settings. But this is a liability in this instance, since China could definitely benefit from stronger commitment mechanisms to bolster its credibility, as well as regularized policy coordination fora to understand and consistently manage security disputes.
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In that sense, the U.S. has a strong advantage that the GSI does little to offset. Its network of alliances and other security ties directly grapple with these hard tradeoffs. Even countries like Vietnam are seeking closer ties with the U.S. in response to coercive Chinese activities. Washington has been successful in using security bodies to institutionalize this regional momentum and broaden political and military discussions.
Assess the risks and rewards of the new China strategy for U.S. Indo-Pacific allies.
I’m not that worried about the GSI somehow displacing the U.S. alliance and security network or even directly undermining U.S. partners, for the reasons I articulated earlier. The GSI doesn’t commit China to any concrete security actions, nor even deeper policy alignment and discussions on difficult military and political problems.
It may serve to bolster goodwill among, say, African or Latin American countries that are keen to engage on COVID-19 or economic challenges. But there’s little reason to securitize this cooperation, especially when China has other vehicles that achieve the same objectives, like the BRI. I’m skeptical that Beijing could translate this engagement into actual military or security coordination, particularly since the PLA has limited power projection capabilities, especially beyond Asia.
Mercy A. Kuo
Mercy Kuo is Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting.
16. The Source of Ukraine’s Resilience
Excerpts:
Ukraine strengthened its state by devolving power.
Local governments should be the focus of Ukraine’s reconstruction effort. Early evidence shows that action at the local level is more responsive on most issues than national or even international efforts. Local volunteers are much faster at securing local funding, waste little on overhead, and can operate much closer to the frontlines with better local knowledge than international organizations.
In many postconflict societies, large infusions of foreign aid have produced unwieldy donor-created projects that have more money and resources than local governments. This creates an opportunity for reconstruction projects to come in and undermine local governance institutions, not just by sweeping up the best talent from them but by giving foreigners a greater say in what happens in communities than the people who live there. This generates resentment among the residents who have no oversight over these foreign projects, an irony in a country that has fought a war to stop foreign domination. It is imperative that international donors learn from past reconstruction failures and work to support Ukraine’s hromadas and other local government structures as they help the country rebuild. Hromadas and other local authorities are not perfect, but by delivering on their promises, they have increased satisfaction and trust in local leadership by ensuring resources are spent on those who need it most.
Unlike donor projects that come and go, these authorities are accountable to Ukraine’s citizens and will be there for people when the smoke clears. These communities have mobilized citizens to defeat Russia’s assault; they can also help midwife Ukraine’s rebirth.
The Source of Ukraine’s Resilience
How Decentralized Government Brought the Country Together
June 28, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Tymofii Brik and Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili · June 28, 2022
In early March, the Ukrainian city of Melitopol fell to Russian forces. This largely Russian-speaking city was a place where the Kremlin had hoped its forces would be welcomed as liberators. After taking over, Russian troops abducted the city’s mayor, Ivan Fedorov, a Russian speaker. The Ukrainian government circulated a video showing a blindfolded Fedorov being dragged out of his office. This led to mass protests, with hundreds of people demanding the mayor’s release. He was eventually let go, hailed as a hero by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and transformed into a symbol of courage in the face of Russian aggression.
Not all mayors have been as fortunate as Fedorov. In the village of Motyzhyn, outside of Kyiv, Mayor Olga Sukhenko and her family were tortured and killed by Russian forces because they refused to cooperate. After a month-long occupation, Russia withdrew its forces from the village. Across Ukraine, Russian troops have faced fierce resistance as citizens rally not just in support of Zelensky in Kyiv but also to defend their local mayors and elected city councils. For this reason, the world has gotten to know the names of many Ukrainian cities, including Kharkiv, Kherson, Lviv, Mariupol, Bucha, Hostomel, and Irpin, which have witnessed unspeakable war crimes. In Kherson, which has been under Russian control for more than three months, a recent café bombing near Russian headquarters showed that a resistance movement is alive and well there. Ukrainian guerrilla attacks are taking place in other Russian-occupied areas, as well, particularly around Kherson.
A major source of Ukraine’s resilience is this strong sense of local civic identity. It is the backbone of the country’s self-defense, and it helps explain why so many Ukrainians—especially Russian speakers—are so willing to defend their communities against Russian invasion. And it’s no accident that local governments have so much authority. Decentralization reforms adopted after the Maidan revolution in 2014, which overthrew the Russian-backed government of Viktor Yanukovych and came to be known as the Revolution of Dignity, have played a pivotal role in building national unity. The devolution of power has facilitated greater social cohesion by transforming competing ethnic identities from zero-sum competition into positive-sum community pride. A more decentralized government has given Ukrainians the sense that they are building their own country.
Paradoxically, Ukraine strengthened its state by devolving power. Political legitimacy in Ukraine has been built by citizens from the bottom up, and Ukraine must keep its focus on the local level as it begins to consider rebuilding the country when the war is over.
IT WASN’T ALWAYS LIKE THIS
Although democracy has been a hallmark of Ukraine since it gained independence in 1991, power has often been concentrated in the hands of a few. By 2014, the country was mired in corruption. Oligarchs controlled political parties and the media. Two decades of independence made Ukraine one of the poorest countries in Europe. Many Ukrainians—especially young people—believed forging closer ties with Europe and moving away from Russia would generate prosperity and a break from the past.
At the time, the Yanukovych government represented all that was wrong with Ukraine. An ostrich farm and a golden toilet at the presidential palace symbolized the rot that had taken hold among the political elite. In 2014, Yanukovych pulled the plug on efforts to sign the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and instead sought to join the Russian-backed Eurasian Economic Union. This act triggered widespread protests, which eventually became the Maidan movement. Protests in Kyiv and around the country culminated in the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, which led to Yanukovych’s ouster from government and his escape to Moscow, where he still lives today.
The seeds of local collective action, which have proved pivotal in this current war, were planted in 2014. While it is common to assume that the Maidan revolution happened solely in the central square of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, the revolution played out in dozens of cities in all regions of Ukraine, with citizens challenging local governments and calling for a Ukraine that looked westward. That process accelerated after Russia invaded and later annexed Crimea. Communities and civil society developed new practices and organizations to help internally displaced Ukrainians, to combat Russian disinformation, and to organize logistical aid to the Ukrainian army.
In the aftermath of the Maidan movement, Ukrainians sought to reform their government, making it more responsive to the people. A new generation of politicians emerged, calling for an end to entrenched corruption. Reforms focused on the need for more transparent, decentralized, and accountable procurement processes. Citizens believed that more efficient use of resources and budgets at the local level would improve the standing of the country. Ukrainians felt powerless to eliminate the role of oligarchs, but they could take local government into their own hands.
COME TOGETHER
Ukraine’s path to decentralization was creative and unique. Rather than decentralization coming from above, a new law in 2015 allowed communities to self-organize voluntarily into new local units called hromadas. Although there were some hiccups in the beginning (not all towns and villages formed hromadas immediately), gradually more and more hromadas emerged across the country. Local hromada elections in 2015 and 2020 cemented this reform since people were electing their mayors and local leadership within the borders of new communities.
Before these reforms, most revenue collected went to the central government. Now, 60 percent of local revenue stays at the local level. Thus, decentralization in Ukraine transformed governance by allowing local authorities to retain more resources and spend them more productively on infrastructure and community welfare. Such activities were previously controlled by the central government, which was inefficient, if not corrupt.
Alongside the ability to control revenue, Ukraine introduced participatory budgeting processes that allowed citizens to have a greater say in how resources were spent. Analysis of these reforms by the Kyiv School of Economics showed that hromadas collected significantly more local taxes than they did before consolidation. This meant that local authorities were spending more on infrastructure and citizens had more control over what infrastructure was being built. Research has shown an increase in per capita income in communities that formed hromadas when compared with other territories in the same period. This effect was stronger for smaller hromadas despite the expectations of many politicians who typically prefer larger administrative units. This made people prouder and more satisfied with local services and generated greater support for the reform itself. Surveys showed that in 2020, 59 percent of respondents believed that this reform was very valuable. Moreover, while in 2015, only 19 percent of respondents said their lives improved because of the reform, this number increased to 59 percent by 2020. The bottom line is that local governance reform transformed how citizens see their state.
VOLUNTEER DEFENSE
The Maidan movement unleashed Ukraine’s vibrant civil society. The move toward decentralization grew stronger after the Russian invasion of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk in 2014, laying bare how corruption and state weakness had run down the Ukrainian military, which performed poorly because of its modest training and its lack of weapons and armor. Recognizing the weakness of the army, Ukrainians took things into their own hands and formed volunteer brigades. These local militias were able to defend territories because they consisted of volunteers fighting for their own communities. Recognizing their strength and the need to reform the military, then President Petro Poroshenko integrated these self-organized, decentralized units into the Ministry of Defense through a new branch called the Territorial Defense Force.
In January, with the whole world watching Russian troops amass on the borders of Ukraine, the new laws on national resistance went into effect. These laws, which were signed by Zelensky in the summer of 2021, introduced a system to prepare the population for national resistance. The country’s civilian resistance fighters were allowed to be trained and equipped for a possible war in advance of the Russian invasion. Under this reorganization, civilians with little or no military experience were encouraged to join these local forces that would be overseen by regular service members.
After the Russian invasion on February 24, Zelensky activated these units and began distributing weapons to volunteers around the country. Today, there are 110,000 people in these defense forces. With the ability to mobilize quickly and devise strategies locally, they have played an instrumental role in defending towns and cities from Russian forces.
SPEND LOCAL
Ukraine shows that a combination of democracy and decentralization can strengthen central government, even as power shifts away from it. This is especially important to acknowledge as Ukraine begins to think about the enormous task of rebuilding when the war is over.
Governments and multilateral donors, including the United States, the EU, and the World Bank, are developing ambitious reconstruction plans for Ukraine. It is vital that local governments have a seat at the table in designing and implementing these plans. The United States has failed in its postconflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years because it worked through its own organizational structures, such as provincial reconstruction teams. Such teams rarely involved local decision-makers in their activities. Too often, Washington relied on vast armies of contractors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to implement this work, generating weak, parallel, donor-created governing structures. These included district and provincial planning bodies as well as donor-directed community development councils whose presence undermined local resilience.
Ukraine strengthened its state by devolving power.
Local governments should be the focus of Ukraine’s reconstruction effort. Early evidence shows that action at the local level is more responsive on most issues than national or even international efforts. Local volunteers are much faster at securing local funding, waste little on overhead, and can operate much closer to the frontlines with better local knowledge than international organizations.
In many postconflict societies, large infusions of foreign aid have produced unwieldy donor-created projects that have more money and resources than local governments. This creates an opportunity for reconstruction projects to come in and undermine local governance institutions, not just by sweeping up the best talent from them but by giving foreigners a greater say in what happens in communities than the people who live there. This generates resentment among the residents who have no oversight over these foreign projects, an irony in a country that has fought a war to stop foreign domination. It is imperative that international donors learn from past reconstruction failures and work to support Ukraine’s hromadas and other local government structures as they help the country rebuild. Hromadas and other local authorities are not perfect, but by delivering on their promises, they have increased satisfaction and trust in local leadership by ensuring resources are spent on those who need it most.
Unlike donor projects that come and go, these authorities are accountable to Ukraine’s citizens and will be there for people when the smoke clears. These communities have mobilized citizens to defeat Russia’s assault; they can also help midwife Ukraine’s rebirth.
Foreign Affairs · by Tymofii Brik and Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili · June 28, 2022
17. Last Best Hope – The West’s Final Chance to Build a Better World Order
Excerpts:
The fear that Trump, or at least his “America first” tendencies, could derail a G-12 does give reason for it to proceed with caution, however. For one thing, the G-12 cannot be a return to Pax Americana. The group’s goal would be to share responsibilities and burdens among the most advanced Western democracies, not let Washington dictate its terms. For another thing, the G-12 would need to deepen economic cooperation just as much as it promotes coordination on security matters. The rise of populist nationalism reflects the consequences of unbridled globalization, which favored big business over workers and capital over labor, leaving far too many people behind. The success of the G-12 would ultimately rest on its ability to improve conditions in the home countries of its member states as well as abroad. This would mean reversing the race to the bottom on corporate taxes, avoiding trade deals that ship jobs overseas, and tackling growing income inequality.
The silver lining in the horror of the aggression against Ukraine is that it gives the United States and its Western allies a chance to do what they failed to accomplish after the end of the Cold War: reinvigorate international institutions and deepen cooperation on transnational threats. But this moment will not last forever. The West needs to resist the temptation to regard the aggression against Ukraine as an aberration rather than a trend. To that end, the United States should join with the 11 other prospective members of the G-12 to revitalize the rules-based order. Western democracies cannot afford to squander this second chance to get things right.
Last Best Hope
The West’s Final Chance to Build a Better World Order
Foreign Affairs · by The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership · June 27, 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirmed what has long been apparent: the rules-based order created after World War II is at risk of collapse. Russia is not content to be a responsible stakeholder in a system set up by others, and neither is China, which has supported Moscow’s aggression. Both countries want to remake the order to serve their autocratic interests. As U.S. President Joe Biden said in Warsaw in March, the West now faces “a battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.”
History was not supposed to play out this way. In the heady days after the Cold War, the order appeared both unchallenged and unchallengeable. Washington believed that its unquestioned primacy allowed it to determine the future of other countries as well as its own. U.S. allies believed they had escaped the tragedy of great-power politics and had entered an era of self-enforcing rules. As time went on, however, habits of collaboration eroded, and the sense of common purpose faded. Rather than using the unique moment of U.S. dominance to deepen and strengthen the rules-based order, the West let that system wither.
Washington and its allies now have a chance to correct that mistake. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s historic miscalculation to attack Ukraine has reminded them not just of their shared interests and values but also of the importance of acting collectively. The West responded to the invasion with a show of unity not seen since the height of the Cold War. The United States and its allies have levied unprecedented sanctions, begun weaning themselves off Russian energy, and shipped massive quantities of weapons to Ukraine. But this surprising unity may not last. As the economic pain of sanctions increases and the war settles into the prolonged battle of attrition that intelligence officials forecast, domestic and other concerns may start to sow divisions within the West.
Even as the West works to manage these differences, it should turn its newfound unity into a broader effort to save the rules-based order. The first step should be to create a new group, the G-12, that would bring together the United States and its leading allies in Asia, Europe, and North America. Every member of this group has a vital interest in preserving the order, and none of them can do it on their own. But formalized cooperation alone will not be enough. The United States and its allies will need to take the second step of learning from the mistakes they had made over the last three decades. Washington will need to curtail its penchant for unilateralism, to listen as well as talk, and to give as well as demand. Asian and European allies, for their part, will need to accept more responsibility and overcome their tendency to free-ride.
If the West sticks to its old ways, it will bungle something that is exceedingly rare in international politics: a second chance. Only by seizing the moment, learning from its errors, and acting collectively can the West rebuild an international order that promotes the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle.
WHAT A WASTE
Although it emerged triumphant from the Cold War, the United States quickly squandered the extraordinary opportunity to turn its unipolar moment into something more permanent. It had outlasted the Soviet Union, unified Europe, and propelled a historic expansion of the global economy. This victory, which was both strategic and ideological, paved the way for the West to broaden and deepen the rules-based order of collective security, open markets, and respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In the early 1990s, democracy was spreading, and free markets were emerging. Even old enemies, such as Russia, and possible future rivals, including China, appeared to have no choice but to embrace the free flow of capital, goods, ideas, and people—or be left behind. Cooperation and conciliation seemed set to replace competition and conflict as the defining features of world politics.
But events didn’t go as planned. The United States overplayed its hand, believing that its role as the world’s “indispensable power” allowed it to hurry history along. A series of military interventions launched in the name of stability and democracy often produced more chaos and misery than security and riches. It hardly helped that even as it trumpeted a rules-based order, Washington regularly ignored rules it disliked—as when it intervened in Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003 after failing to secure a UN mandate, and when it tortured detainees during its war on terrorism. The United States refused to join new cooperative arrangements on nuclear testing, arms control, prosecuting war crimes, and regularizing trade in the Asia-Pacific, fearing that such commitments would limit its freedom of maneuver. Washington felt justified because it had convinced itself that its own motives were pure. “We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future,” U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proclaimed in 1998. But friends and foes alike did not see strength and integrity; they saw hubris and hypocrisy.
Washington was hardly alone in its failure to make the most of the moment created by the Soviet Union’s collapse. Its allies in Europe suffered from delusions of their own, believing that the end of the continent’s Cold War divisions meant the end of conflict. They saw themselves as postmodern states that could rely on cooperation and multilateral institutions to maintain peace. Although they recognized that terrorism and nuclear proliferation remained threats, they were content to let Washington address such problems. They also assumed that economic engagement, arms control, and dialogue would transform Russia into a partner and that China’s need for access to their markets and technology would turn it into a stakeholder in the rules-based order. With great-power competition seemingly relegated to the dustbin of history, economic interests could now drive foreign policy.
American hubris and European wishful thinking ruled the day, and leaders in Western capitals ignored signs that great-power competition was far from dead. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, and then six years later, it annexed Crimea and fomented a separatist rebellion in Ukraine. These acts elicited mostly symbolic responses from the West. Rather than reducing its dependence on Russian oil and gas, much of Europe increased its reliance because, as the German chemical executive Martin Brudermüller put it, “cheap Russian energy has been the basis of our industry’s competitiveness.” China, for its part, conducted unprecedented acts of economic espionage, coerced its trading partners, laid claim to the South China Sea, imprisoned more than one million Uyghurs, and crushed democracy in Hong Kong—a string of outrages that earned Beijing little more than mild rebukes. Wall Street relied ever more on Chinese riches, and in 2020, the EU signed a new trade and investment deal with Beijing.
Establishing a G-12 is the last best hope to reinvigorate the rules-based order.
These developments gradually eroded the core features of the rules-based order. The ability of great powers to use force with impunity against smaller neighbors exposed the weaknesses of the UN Security Council and other collective security institutions. The proliferation of mercantilist trade practices highlighted the gaps in global trading rules. The economic disruptions caused by unfettered globalization fueled populist nationalism and claims by autocrats that liberal democracy was decadent and obsolete. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, countries responded not by acting collectively against a common threat but by pursuing “every country for itself” policies. The world order, in short, was unraveling.
The invasion of Ukraine roused the West from its slumber. The speed, scale, and scope of the U.S.-led response surprised Western leaders almost as much as they surprised Putin. Economic sanctions are pummeling the Russian economy. Europe is rapidly cutting imports of Russian energy, sharply reducing Moscow’s leverage. NATO is bolstering its presence from the Baltics to the Black Sea and is preparing to welcome Finland and Sweden as new members. And Ukraine, aided by new weapons shipments and Western intelligence, has successfully resisted a much larger Russian military.
Much of the West’s diplomatic energies will rightly go into sustaining its support for Ukraine. Equally important, however, is for Western leaders to think more ambitiously about restoring the crumbling rules-based order. By reminding Western democracies of their common interests and their strength when they work together, Putin’s strategic blunder has created an opportunity to heal three decades’ worth of self-inflicted wounds.
BETTER TOGETHER
The first step will be to institutionalize the cooperation that has emerged in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The best way to do this is for the United States and its advanced democratic allies in Asia, Europe, and North America to create a G-12 consisting of the current G-7 members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the EU. NATO would have a seat at the table for all security-related discussions.
Establishing a G-12 is the last best hope to reinvigorate the rules-based order. The prospective G-12 member states and institutions have the capacity, the interest, and the ability to work collectively to do so. They are home to nearly one billion people and account for more than 60 percent of global GDP and military spending. China and Russia together are more populous but constitute barely 20 percent of the world’s economic output and just 17 percent of its military spending. As their reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown, the potential members of the G-12 all recognize that their security and prosperity rest on finding ways to avoid returning to a world in which brute force replaces the rule of law. And they were able to react so quickly against Russia because they had a long history of working cooperatively on a wide variety of issues, whether in their bilateral relations or in multilateral forums.
What these countries have not done is work together intentionally as a group or for the specific purpose of strengthening the global order. The formation of a G-12 would remedy that failing. In contrast to a loose association such as the G-7, which has traditionally approached global issues in an ad hoc fashion, the G-12 states and institutions would commit to identifying global challenges, assessing available responses, and responding in a coordinated fashion. The arrangement would not require a formal treaty, structure, or secretariat. Instead, it would rest on a joint commitment among G-12 members to base their engagement abroad on the principle that cooperation and coordination among themselves is vital to achieving their objectives and maintaining the rules-based order. The G-12 heads of state should meet at least biannually, and their foreign, defense, economic, and other ministers should meet more frequently—much as the Council of the European Union conducts its business across a full range of issues.
Policy coordination would need to start in the foreign policy sphere. G-12 members would need to come together on foiling Russian revanchism, competing with China, halting nuclear arms proliferation, countering terrorism, fighting pandemics, and curbing climate change. The post-invasion coordination at the UN and within the G-7 and NATO needs to become the norm for the G-12 on all major issues. To facilitate common action, the G-12 countries should caucus with the UN, the World Trade Organization, the international financial institutions, and other international organizations to develop common positions and agree to concerted actions on critical issues.
Biden and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Tokyo, May 2022
Jonathan Ernst / Reuters
In the economic sphere, the G-12 would need to coordinate on trade, investments, export controls, digital commerce, and other critical economic issues. The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have reinforced economic nationalism and protectionism, disrupted trade, and upended supply chains, slowing growth and spurring inflation. Growing security concerns about intellectual property and critical technologies have further limited trade, especially with U.S. rivals such as China and Russia.
The G-12 should become an engine for economic cooperation and growth, pushing against the temptation to turn inward. A crucial first step would be for the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU to accede to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which already includes Canada and other potential G-12 nations in Asia. The United States and Europe should also revive negotiations on a trade and investment pact, thus complementing the EU’s existing bilateral pacts with Australia, Canada, and Japan. G-12 members would also need to coordinate their policies on export controls and foreign investment to ensure they maintain their competitive edge over China. And they would need to consolidate supply chains for critical goods—such as semiconductors, robotics, artificial intelligence, and rare-earth metals—within the Western world.
In the security field, the United States would remain first among equals within the G-12. It alone has a military with true global reach. Even so, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, other members of the prospective G-12 have finally made good on their promises to spend more on defense. Japan is considering possibly doubling its military expenditures over the next few years, and Germany’s decision after the invasion to increase its defense budget makes it the third-largest military spender in the world. These outlays will add as much as $150 billion to what the West now spends annually on defense, making Germany and Japan far more effective security partners for the United States. The principal channels for enhancing defense capabilities among G-12 members would remain the same—defense arrangements through nato and bilateral agreements with the United States—with the addition of greater coordination within the EU. But the G-12 would provide a useful forum for driving these efforts and ensuring that transatlantic and transpacific security policies were far more aligned than is currently the case. Increased military capabilities and enhanced coordination would greatly improve the chances of deterring and, if necessary, defeating any further aggression by Russia, China, or other countries.
As important as formalized cooperation will be, the success of the G-12 will depend on the United States and its allies abandoning the bad habits they have developed since the end of the Cold War. Washington has too often acted unilaterally, believing that leading means deciding what to do and commanding others to follow. Consultations have often taken the form of informing others of decisions already made rather than developing new positions together. This type of behavior was on display in the Trump administration’s decisions to walk away from the Paris agreement on climate change and the Iran nuclear deal and the Biden administration’s decision to hastily withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Conversely, U.S. allies have frequently shirked responsibility for tough decisions, free-riding off of U.S. security pledges while allowing their own hard power to atrophy. The G-12 would need to be a partnership of equals—in ways its members have long professed to want—with Asian and European members assuming more of the burden of acting and the United States sharing more of the decision-making. To be sure, as is the case in NATO and in the EU, forging agreement can take time, especially when interests clash. But just as in these other institutions, the source of the G-12’s strength will lie in its ability to act collectively—as Russia has now discovered at its own peril.
REALITY CHECK
The G-12 offers the best chance to mobilize the resources of the world’s most powerful and advanced democracies to defend the rules-based order. It is fair to ask, however, whether creating a G-12 would widen the divide between democracies and autocracies, inflame current tensions, and make it harder to forge the solutions needed to address the broad array of global challenges that the world, not just the West, faces. The G-12 will no doubt be seen as a means of explicitly countering Chinese and Russian power. Beijing and Moscow won’t respond by shrugging their shoulders. They will redouble their efforts to undermine the rules-based order and work hard to bring other countries into their orbit.
Concern about deepening divisions glosses over a critical point: Western democracies are already locked in a struggle with authoritarian governments over whose values will guide the world order. Neither China nor Russia is looking to improve existing international arrangements. Both are revisionist powers contesting the norms and institutions of the postwar order. They wish to return to an era of great-power politics in which they would be free to dominate their neighbors. Western democracies have been reluctant to recognize the challenges both countries pose, hoping that engagement would persuade Beijing and Moscow to work with rather than against them. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with China’s all-but-formal endorsement, has made clear that the Chinese-Russian partnership is headed toward confrontation over everything the West—and the rules-based order—stands for.
The formation of a G-12 would not prevent the West from ever working with China or Russia. Efforts to curb climate change and prevent pandemics would certainly benefit from more cooperation among all the major powers. But Chinese and Russian cooperation on these issues hasn’t been forthcoming, even as the West downplayed China’s economic intimidation and ignored Russian aggression. Beijing and Moscow have shown that they will make concessions only out of self-interest, not out of goodwill. By mobilizing the resources of the world’s strongest democracies, a G-12 would enable the West to conduct its diplomacy with both countries from a position of strength.
The G-12’s approach to China, Russia, and other autocracies should be similar to what U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has described as the Biden administration’s approach to China: “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.” To that end, the G-12 would need to make clear what it is for, not just what it is against. Its purpose would not be to hold down China or Russia or transform them or other countries into Western democracies. Its purpose would be to defend the core principles of the postwar order: respect for the sovereignty of large and small countries alike, adherence to the rule of law, support for democracy and human rights, and a commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes.
DEMOCRATIC DIVISION
Western democracies may share a commitment to liberal values, but they will always have their own interests. This fact has been reflected in the West’s response to the invasion of Ukraine, with the varying levels of enthusiasm among U.S. allies for cutting off Russian energy exports and supplying heavy weapons to Ukraine. The difficulty of forging common policies will only grow as the subject shifts from existential threats to more mundane choices over trade or technology policy.
Just as important, democracies outside the West have not united against Russia’s aggression. Brazil, India, South Africa, and other democracies in the Americas, Asia, and Africa have refused to condemn the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, declined to back sanctions against Russia, and, in a few cases, sought to exploit the war to their benefit. This resurfacing of Cold War–style nonalignment reflects a complex mix of self-interest, historical sympathies and resentments, and preoccupations with more immediate problems closer to home. None of this should be surprising. Democracies aren’t immune to being shortsighted, nursing grudges, or playing two sides against each other for their own benefit.
Even though democratic cooperation cannot be assumed, it can be forged. For all their failures and missteps, Western democracies have an established record of building successful collaborative arrangements and have generally fared far better than autocracies because their interactions go beyond the transactional. Their shared commitment to the rule of law makes it possible for them to trust one another, which is why the United States has formal security commitments with more than 50 allies. Russia has only five, and China has just one—North Korea.
To build on this success, the G-12 would ideally focus on building solidarity with democracies in the “global South” that stand to be the biggest losers if China and Russia remake the world order in their own image. Neither Beijing nor Moscow sees smaller powers as sovereign equals; rather, they see such countries as ripe for exploitation and manipulation. Recognition of that fact is why Kenya, Singapore, and other non-Western democracies have joined the West in condemning Russian aggression.
Russia’s assault on Ukraine has shaken Western publics out of their complacency.
Western democracies offer other democracies much more. To begin with, the joint economic output of the G-12 countries is triple that of China’s and Russia’s combined. And if the West worked more closely with non-Western democracies, it would likely find more willing partners for all its diplomatic endeavors.
But the G-12 would need to live by the rules it wishes others to follow, in ways that the United States and its allies have not always done themselves. Critics rightly point to plentiful instances of Western hypocrisy, with the U.S. invasion of Iraq chief among them. “Do as we say, not as we do” is a poor foundation for building cooperation. Just as important, the G-12 would need to view its interests broadly and recognize that trying to compel other democracies to follow its lead would be a losing strategy. Far better to demonstrate the real benefits, economic and otherwise, of active cooperation with the G-12 than to pressure other democracies to blindly follow along.
As the West works to overcome divisions among democracies, it will also need to overcome political divisions at home. Populist nationalism is a driving political force in the United States and elsewhere, fostering foreign policies that are skeptical of the intentions of others and encouraging unilateral action rather than compromise and cooperation. The good news is that for now, Russia’s assault on Ukraine has shaken Western publics out of their complacency. Germans have overwhelmingly embraced Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s interpretation of the war as a Zeitenwende—a “historic pivot”—through which Germany will take military security more seriously. Large majorities of Finns and Swedes now support NATO membership. Americans have supported the steps the Biden administration has taken to aid Ukraine; in a Pew Research Center poll conducted in March, five times as many respondents agreed that the United States should provide more aid to Kyiv as agreed that it was providing too much. Congress has followed suit and rallied behind Ukraine.
But worrying signs exist. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s resounding victory in his country’s March parliamentary elections and the politician Marine Le Pen’s strong performance in the French presidential race show that a fondness for Putin is not automatically disqualifying in European politics. More troubling is the possibility that former U.S. President Donald Trump—who said Putin was “a genius” and called him “savvy” and “smart” after Russia launched its invasion—or someone else who shares Trump’s fondness for autocrats could become U.S. president in January 2025. No G-12 could succeed without the active participation of the United States. When Trump was president, he did much to upend the very rules-based order the G-12 would seek to uphold.
And yet Orban’s effort to forge a coalition of EU discontents with the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia collapsed with the shelling of Kyiv. The response by NATO member countries to the Russian invasion has answered Trump’s complaint that other alliance members are not doing enough for defense. And a 2021 Chicago Council survey of Americans found that respondents preferred, by a ratio of three to one, for Washington to share leadership with others rather than dominate them.
ANOTHER CHANCE
The fear that Trump, or at least his “America first” tendencies, could derail a G-12 does give reason for it to proceed with caution, however. For one thing, the G-12 cannot be a return to Pax Americana. The group’s goal would be to share responsibilities and burdens among the most advanced Western democracies, not let Washington dictate its terms. For another thing, the G-12 would need to deepen economic cooperation just as much as it promotes coordination on security matters. The rise of populist nationalism reflects the consequences of unbridled globalization, which favored big business over workers and capital over labor, leaving far too many people behind. The success of the G-12 would ultimately rest on its ability to improve conditions in the home countries of its member states as well as abroad. This would mean reversing the race to the bottom on corporate taxes, avoiding trade deals that ship jobs overseas, and tackling growing income inequality.
The silver lining in the horror of the aggression against Ukraine is that it gives the United States and its Western allies a chance to do what they failed to accomplish after the end of the Cold War: reinvigorate international institutions and deepen cooperation on transnational threats. But this moment will not last forever. The West needs to resist the temptation to regard the aggression against Ukraine as an aberration rather than a trend. To that end, the United States should join with the 11 other prospective members of the G-12 to revitalize the rules-based order. Western democracies cannot afford to squander this second chance to get things right.
Foreign Affairs · by The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership · June 27, 2022
18. Navy destroyer in South China Sea after Taiwan Strait flyover by recon plane
Navy destroyer in South China Sea after Taiwan Strait flyover by recon plane
The guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold steams in formation with the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan in the Philippine Sea on June 4, 2022. (Ian Cotter/U.S. Navy)
YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE, Japan — A U.S. Navy warship entered the South China Sea over the weekend, one day after a Navy reconnaissance aircraft flew through the adjacent Taiwan Strait.
The guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold, homeported at Yokosuka, sailed west from the East China Sea to the South China Sea through the Verde Island Passage in the Philippines on Saturday, according to a tweet that day from Chinese think tank South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative. The passage separates the islands of Luzon and Mindoro.
The Benfold was still in the region Tuesday on routine operations, U.S. 7th Fleet spokeswoman Cmdr. Hayley Sims told Stars and Stripes by phone.
The Navy sometimes sends warships on freedom-of-navigation operations past islands claimed by China and other nations in the South China Sea, including Taiwan and Vietnam. Those missions are meant to challenge those maritime claims and maintain free passage, according to the Navy. China also claims a large portion of the sea itself as its maritime territory.
In January, the Benfold steamed past the Spratly and Paracel island chains on a freedom-of-navigation operation. However, Sims said the destroyer was not on such a mission Tuesday.
The Benfold arrived in the South China Sea one day after a Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft flew through the Taiwan Strait, a 110-mile-wide waterway that separates the island of Taiwan from mainland China.
“The aircraft was conducting a transit of the Taiwan Strait from the South China Sea to the East China Sea in accordance with international law,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command spokesman Maj. Jonathan Camire told Stars and Stripes by email Tuesday. “By operating within the Taiwan Strait in accordance with international law, the United States upholds the navigational rights and freedoms of all nations.”
China’s Eastern Theater Command spokesman Col. Yi Shi said Friday that the Poseidon’s transit was an intentional disruption of the “regional situation” that endangered “the peace and stability” of the Taiwan Strait, according to his statement on the Chinese Ministry of Defense website.
“We express our firm opposition to this,” he said. “The theater’s troops maintain high alert at all times and resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province that must be reunified with mainland at some point, possibly by force. Lately, Chinese authorities have emphasized their nation’s claim to the strait as its exclusive economic zone.
19. The Ukraine Situation Report: Cross-Border Sabotage Raids And CIA Operatives In Kyiv
The Ukraine Situation Report: Cross-Border Sabotage Raids And CIA Operatives In Kyiv
A clearer image is coming into view of the clandestine aspects of Ukraine’s defense as Russian missiles strike a crowded mall.
BY
JUN 27, 2022 8:25 PM
Though much of the attention on Russia’s war in Ukraine is focused on the battle for Donbas, and understandably so, there’s a shadow war taking place out of the public eye.
Over the weekend, The New York Times reported that “some C.I.A. personnel have continued to operate in the country secretly, mostly in the capital, Kyiv, directing much of the vast amounts of intelligence the United States is sharing with Ukrainian forces, according to current and former officials.”
Meanwhile, “a few dozen commandos from other NATO countries, including Britain, France, Canada and Lithuania, also have been working inside Ukraine.”
Ukraine is conducting its own shadow war as well, according to the Times of London, with troops from the Shaman battalion, a nickname given to Ukraine’s 10th Special Forces Detachment, taking part in cross-border sabotage missions.
“The exact targets are classified but the teams’ forays across the border help to explain how Russian oil refineries, ammunition depots and communications networks have been mysteriously sabotaged,” the paper reported.
We are just learning about these actions and while we are unable to independently confirm them, they do offer a glimpse, if true, about how Ukraine is taking matters into its own hands to defend itself by striking across the border.
We’ve written about the results of such potential sabotage several times, including here and here.
Before heading into the latest news from Ukraine, The War Zone readers can get caught up on our previous rolling coverage here.
The latest
“The mall is on fire, rescuers are fighting the fire, the number of victims is impossible to imagine,” Zelensky wrote. “No danger to the Russian army. No strategic value. Only the attempt of people to live a normal life, which so angers the occupiers."
“Russia continues to place its powerlessness on ordinary citizens. It is useless to hope for adequacy and humanity on her part.”
The Russians, however, claim that the intended target was the Kremenchuk road machine plant about 100 yards away where they say Ukrainian military equipment has been repaired since 2014
Ukraine officials say they've struck Snake Island, the strategically important Black Sea rock, yet again, once more eliminating a Russian Pantsir air defense system.
Russia, without offering any proof, denied any damage and said it was Ukraine that suffered losses. You can read more about that here.
The U.S. will soon announce it will supply Ukraine with the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, or NASAMS. This system is one that Kyiv has considered introducing itself in the past and Ukrainian Air Force pilots have also highlighted it as one of the best solutions to help overhaul the country’s surface-to-air missile inventory.
According to a report from CNN, citing an anonymous source, a U.S. announcement regarding the purchase of NASAMS systems for Ukraine is likely to come this week. It is expected to be part of the latest package of arms and other support for Kyiv, together with additional artillery ammunition and counter-battery radars. We have more details here.
The Pentagon says it continues to “work diligently” to get the additional four M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) into Ukraine that were announced last week as part of the latest Presidential Drawdown Authority, a senior U.S. defense official told reporters Monday morning. The official added that the second round of HIMARS training should coincide with that as well.
Ukraine has already used the systems, including an incident in which it says it struck a Russian command post in Donbas.
“We're conducting training out of Ukraine, in Germany and England,” said the official, adding that involves everything from maintaining to operating the donated HIMARS units.
There were more than 60 missile strikes across Ukraine over the weekend, including at Kyiv, Lviv, Chernihiv and Odesa, the official said. “They certainly could be a protest against the G7 [summit] or the arrival of the HIMARS.”
On Sunday, the Institute for the Study of War suggested the strikes were indeed a protest against the ongoing G7 summit.
“This is the first such major strike on Kyiv since late April and is likely a direct response to Western leaders discussing aid to Ukraine at the ongoing G7 summit, much like the previous strikes on April 29 during UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ visit to Kyiv,” ISW reported.
There were other explosions of note recently as well.
Russian military warehouses well behind the front lines apparently blew up, Euromaidan Press reported on Twitter.
"Locals have reported huge fire in the Russian-occupied Svatove following the explosions. The explosions happened in the Russian military warehouses, according to the Luhansk Oblast head. Svatove is more than 60 kilometers behind the frontline."
The Ukrainian pullout from Severodonestk over the weekend offers lasting lessons, the official told reporters.
“The small number of Ukrainians that held the Russians at Severodonetsk as long as they did is really something we'll probably all study in the future,” the official said. “And when they chose to leave Severodonetsk, they chose to do it of their own accord, and to give that up in order to move to better prepare locations for the continuing of that defense.”
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu may or may not have visited Ukraine to meet with Russian generals and hand out medals.
Many media outlets, like The Mirror, report that he was in Ukraine, citing the Russian Ministry of Defense. However, Reuters added a correction to its story "to show that Shoigu visited troops involved in the Ukraine operation, according to the defence ministry. It was not immediately clear whether or not he visited Ukraine."
Photos of a rotund Russian general taking command hit social media over the weekend, with that officer being called “the bottom of the barrel.”
The senior U.S. defense official said the Pentagon was aware of “several reliefs of Russian generals in Ukraine."
While the official deferred specifics to the Russian Ministry of Defense, “we do continue to see concerns with that leadership, and continued morale concerns with Russian forces.”
The increase includes:
- More prepositioned equipment, and stockpiles of military supplies.
- More forward-deployed capabilities, like air defense.
- Strengthened command and control.
- And upgraded defense plans, with forces pre-assigned to defend specific Allies.
“Together, this constitutes the biggest overhaul of our collective deterrence and defense since the Cold War,” he said.
The Panzerhaubitze, a German self-propelled 155 mm howitzer, was spotted in the wild in Ukraine.
"Expected for so long: the German #Panzerhaubitze safely camouflaged in the bushes, was already in action," said German TV reporter Katrin Eigendorf in a tweet. "Ruslan has just returned from Germany where he was trained. The question: will the howitzer be in time to stop the Russian advance?"
The arrival of the German howitzer in Ukraine was first announced six days ago by Ukraine Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov.
Russia continues to steal Ukraine's grain.
"They take grain to the annexed Crimea first, where they transport it to Kerch or Sevastopol [ports], then they load Ukrainian grain on Russian ships and go to the Kerch Strait," BBC quotes Andrii Klymenko, an expert at the Institute for Black Sea Strategic Studies in Kyiv, who regularly monitors movements of ships around Crimea.
"There, in the Kerch Strait [between Crimea and Russia], they transfer Ukrainian grain from small ships on to bulk carriers, where it is mixed with grain from Russia - or in some cases, they sail to this area just to give the appearance they are loading up with Russian grain."
We will continue to update this post with new information until we state otherwise.
Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
