Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"I would rather quit public life at seventy, and quit it forever, than to retain public life at a sacrifice to my own self-respect. I will not vote for any law which will make fair for me and foul for another. The blacklist is the most cruel form of oppression ever devised by man for the infliction of suffering upon his weaker fellows."

- Joseph Gurney Cannon

"Man, unlike any other thing organic or inorganic in the universe, grows beyond his work, walks up the stairs of his concepts, emerges ahead of his accomplishments."

- John Steinbeck

"Elections are won by men and women chiefly because most people vote against somebody rather than for somebody."

- Franklin P. Adams

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2023

2. China’s Options for Retaliation Are Few After U.S. Investment Ban

3. Global Warfighting Simulation Puts the Pressure on Navy, Marine Corps

4. Japan to set up cyberdefense network that includes Pacific islands

5. Ukrainian troops left 'underprepared' by NATO training as instructors don't understand the type of warfare or the enemy, report says

6. Does China Want to Start a War in the South China Sea?

7. America’s 911 call and global response to Ukraine war

8. The Clean Energy Future Is Arriving Faster Than You Think

9. Would F-16s Have Made the Difference in Ukraine’s Counteroffensive?

10. Examining Disaster Aid as Cover for a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwan

11. China driving Marcos deeper into American arms

12. The Biden-Iran Hostage Deal

13. The latest Iran deal is a win-win

14. Two years after fall of Kabul, tens of thousands of Afghans languish in limbo waiting for US visas

15. Extend the Pentagon’s ban on China’s consumer drones

16. Special Operations News Update - August 14, 2023 | SOF News

17. The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism (CTC and JSOU)

18. The Pentagon plans to shake up DC’s National Guard

19. Blame Biden’s Hesitancy for Stalling Ukraine’s Offensive By John Bolton

20. Russia to equip new nuclear submarines with hypersonic missiles

21. Getting Serious About Security Cooperation

22. Arm but Verify: A Blueprint for Rigorous Oversight of Future Ukraine Aid

23. How to Prevent an AI Catastrophe

24. US Saw More Mass Shooting Deaths in First Half of 2023 Than All of 2018’s Year of ‘Never Again’

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2023

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 13 and reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from Urozhaine and Russian forces likely currently maintain positions in at least the southern part of the settlement.
The Russian information space is seizing on Ukrainian gains in Urozhaine (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) to highlight poor Russian morale and command challenges in the area.
A Russian warship forcibly stopped and searched a civilian cargo ship en route to the Izmail port in Odesa Oblast, likely as part of a Kremlin effort to curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports without committing naval assets to fully enforce a blockade.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and attempted to regain lost positions near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and reportedly advanced in some areas.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Kreminna, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and reportedly advanced in several areas.
The Wagner Group is likely downsizing and reconfiguring to adapt to financial pressure following the June 24 Wagner rebellion.
Ukrainian partisans claimed to have attacked a Russian military base in occupied Mariupol on August 13.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 13, 2023

Aug 13, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2023

Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark

August 13, 2023, 3:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 13 and reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions and achieved partial success near Robotyne (western Zaporizhia Oblast, 13km south of Orikhiv).[1] Several Russian sources claimed on August 12 that Russian forces withdrew from Urozhaine (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area), although many Russian sources refuted those claims on August 13 and claimed instead that Russian forces still occupy the southern part of Urozhaine, that fighting is ongoing, and that areas of Urozhaine are contested.[2] ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from Urozhaine and Russian forces likely currently maintain positions in at least the southern part of the settlement.

The Russian information space is seizing on Ukrainian gains in Urozhaine (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) to highlight poor Russian morale and command challenges in the area. A Russian milblogger complained on August 12 that the Russian 37th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) failed to dedicate tank units to support its infantry in Urozhaine and prematurely withdrew from Urozhaine on August 10, claiming they lacked reinforcements when in reality the unit’s personnel were drunk in the rear areas.[3] The milblogger complained that the entire 36th Combined Arms Army (CAA) is unwilling to defend the settlement while the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” Operational Tactical Combat Formation and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) defend Urozhaine.[4] These complaints generated a multitude of responses in the Russian information space, including attempts to deescalate tensions between the implicated Russian formations, doubling down on complaints against the 37th Brigade and 36th CAA, and accusing the initial milblogger who reported a Russian withdrawal from Urozhaine of attempting to inflate the reputation of other defending units at the expense of the 36th CAA’s reputation.[5] One milblogger blamed the current situation on the front on the Russian military command’s removal of Major General Ivan Popov as commander of the 58th CAA in early July 2023.[6] The milbloggers notably targeted their complaints at the personnel of these units rather than the unit or theater commanders, suggesting that Popov’s removal and other rumored command purges may have removed mid-level Russian military commanders as a readily available scapegoat for Russian military failures.[7] Alexander Khodakovsky, commander of the “Vostok” battalion defending near Urozhaine, referenced Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky as saying that Russia cannot win in defense, and Khodakovsky complained that Russia expended its resources too early in the war and now needs to pause to accumulate resources for a new operation, indicating recognition that the Russian elastic defense in this area has its limitations.[8] Teplinsky is reportedly responsible for planning the Russian defense of the Velyka Novosilka area.[9]

A Russian warship forcibly stopped and searched a civilian cargo ship en route to the Izmail port in Odesa Oblast, likely as part of a Kremlin effort to curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports without committing naval assets to fully enforce a blockade. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Russian Vasily Bykov patrol ship forcibly stopped and searched a dry cargo ship sailing under the flag of Palau after it did not respond to the Vasily Bykov’s demand for inspection.[10] The Russian MoD stated that the Russian forces conducted small arms warning fire near the civilian ship before a Ka-29 helicopter landed on the vessel with a group of Russian personnel.[11] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian personnel conducted an inspection and then allowed the civilian vessel to continue along its route to the Izmail port.[12]

The Russian MoD announced on July 19 that it would consider all ships en route to Ukrainian ports as potential military cargo carriers and the flag countries of such vessels as “involved in the Ukrainian conflict on the side of the Kyiv regime.”[13] Russian forces did not stop three civilian ships which openly advertised their destination as Ukraine over their ships‘ automatic identification system (AIS) on July 30.[14] The reports of the three civilian ships sailing to Ukraine unhindered suggested that Russian forces may be unable or unwilling to forcibly stop and search neutral vessels, and Russian forces likely conducted their first forced inspection to reimpose the threat of escalation against civilian vessels en route to Ukraine.[15] Russian forces also likely conducted the forced stop and inspection to undermine confidence in temporary trading corridors through the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports, which Ukrainian officials announced on August 10.[16] The Russian naval posturing in the Black Sea is likely intentionally ambiguous and seeks to create a chilling effect on civilian maritime traffic to Ukraine without requiring Russian forces to commit Black Sea Fleet assets to the enforcement of a naval blockade.[17] The Russian military is likely less willing to commit the Black Sea Fleet to such a blockade than it was in July following notable Ukrainian strikes on Russian naval targets in the Black Sea and the Novorossiysk naval base in Krasnodar Krai in early August.[18]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 13 and reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from Urozhaine and Russian forces likely currently maintain positions in at least the southern part of the settlement.
The Russian information space is seizing on Ukrainian gains in Urozhaine (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) to highlight poor Russian morale and command challenges in the area.
A Russian warship forcibly stopped and searched a civilian cargo ship en route to the Izmail port in Odesa Oblast, likely as part of a Kremlin effort to curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports without committing naval assets to fully enforce a blockade.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and attempted to regain lost positions near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and reportedly advanced in some areas.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Kreminna, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and reportedly advanced in several areas.
The Wagner Group is likely downsizing and reconfiguring to adapt to financial pressure following the June 24 Wagner rebellion.
Ukrainian partisans claimed to have attacked a Russian military base in occupied Mariupol on August 13.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on August 13 and reportedly advanced. Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that assault groups of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) advanced near Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk).[19] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselyov claimed that Russian forces are advancing in unspecified areas on the left (east) bank of the Oskil River and are no more than five kilometers from the outskirts of Kupyansk in some unspecified areas.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are slowly advancing in the Kupyansk direction but would require reinforcements to break through Ukrainian defenses, which Russian command does not have available to commit to the Kupyansk direction.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks northeast of Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), north of Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and southeast of Andriivka (15km west of Svatove).[22] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[23]

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and near Kreminna on August 13. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, the Mankivka tract (roughly 15km east of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (15km north of Svatove), Novoyehorivka (14km southwest of Svatove), and in the Serebryanske forest area south of Kreminna.[24]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Bakhmut area but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on August 13. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions north and west of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[25] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces heavily shelled Russian positions at the Kurdyumivka-Ozaryanivka line (13-15km southwest of Bakhmut) but did not conduct a ground attack.[26]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut area and reportedly advanced on August 13. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russia’s 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade recaptured parts of southern Klishchiivka during a counterattack, but that Ukrainian forces still hold southwestern Klishchiivka.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), near Klishchiivka, south of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and near Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also counterattacked near Berkhivka and Kurdyumivka.[29] Another Russian milblogger posted footage of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) firing on Ukrainian positions near Klishchiivka.[30]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not advance on August 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control roughly 30 percent of Marinka and that Chechen Akhmat special forces elements reinforced Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces in the area.[32] The milblogger complained that it is pointless for Russian forces to continue attacking Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka direction due to the strength of Ukrainian defenses and counterbattery combat in the area.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 13 and advanced south of Velyka Novosilka. Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and captured Russian positions in the northern part of the settlement, but Russian forces likely retain some positions in southern Urozhaine.[33] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces withdrew from Urozhaine on August 12, but the preponderance of milbloggers refuted those claims on August 13 and claimed that Russian forces maintain positions in southern Urozhaine while the rest of the settlement is a contested grey zone, and the August 12 reports were likely incorrect or referred to limited withdrawals by individual units, rather than Russian forces as a whole.[34] Geolocated footage posted on August 13 confirms that some Russian troops left the village and shows Russian infantry retreating from Urozhaine towards Zavitzne Bazhannya (less than 3km south of Urozhaine).[35] A Russian milblogger also reported that Ukrainian troops attacked Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[36]

Russian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful attempts to restore lost positions in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful attacks west of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and near Urozhaine.[37] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces counterattacked from positions near Urozhaine.[38] Russian sources indicated that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” operational-tactical formation, “Vostok” battalion, 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) are fighting in the area.[39]

Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 13. Russian sources claimed that two Ukrainian assault groups totaling between 40 to 60 personnel launched an attack on Russian positions near Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv).[40] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured some positions 3km east and northwest of Robotyne, and other Russian sources reported that heavy fighting is ongoing east of Robotyne.[41] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces ultimately repelled the attack and inflicted high personnel and equipment losses on Ukrainian troops.[42]

Russian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful attempts to restore lost positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attempts to restore lost positions east of Robotyne.[43] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from the eastern outskirts of Robotyne on August 12.[44]

Russian milbloggers continued to discuss Ukrainian activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on August 13. One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence west of Kozachi Laheri and attacked Russian forces near the settlement, but that Russian forces repelled the attack.[45] Russian sources additionally claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing on the east bank near the Antonivsky Bridge, where Russian Spetsnaz elements are working to clear the dacha area of Ukrainian troops.[46]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Wagner Group is likely downsizing and reconfiguring to adapt to financial pressure following the June 24 Wagner rebellion. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on August 12 that the Kremlin may no longer fund the Wagner Group, causing Wagner to downsize and save on salary expenses.[47] The UK MoD reported that Belarusian authorities may be funding Wagner but that this would likely strain limited Belarusian resources.[48] A Russian insider source speculated on August 9 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko refused to finance Wagner after learning that Russia would not be paying for Wagner as he initially expected.[49]

Russian forces have recruited foreign citizens in Russian prisons to fight in Ukraine. The Tajik Minister of Internal Affairs Ramazon Rakhimzoda reported on August 11 that about 100 Tajik citizens from Russian prisons went to fight in Ukraine.[50] Rakhimzoda stated that Russian officials do not provide Tajik authorities with information on how many of their citizens are fighting in Ukraine.[51] Rakhimzoda did not report who recruited the convicts, and a Russian insider source speculated that the Tajik citizens signed contracts with Wagner.[52]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans claimed to have attacked a Russian military base in occupied Mariupol on August 13. A Ukrainian partisan group in Mariupol claimed that it set fire to a Russian military base in occupied Mariupol, injuring at least 12 personnel and destroying three vehicles.[53]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

Nothing significant to report.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. China’s Options for Retaliation Are Few After U.S. Investment Ban

Excerpts:

While the new rules have already provoked Beijing’s ire, “there is a conscious effort by Biden to lower the U.S.-China temperature,” Edison Lee, a technology analyst at investment bank Jefferies, wrote in a research note Thursday.

More broadly, others argue that there is a limit to China’s willingness to follow through on its threats, given its economic woes. Data released this week showed the Chinese economy may be mired in a deflationary cycle, with consumer prices in July having fallen for the first time since 2021. This adds to other signs of economic distress including falling exports, high youth unemployment and a prolonged real estate slump.

“Given the precarious macroeconomic conditions in China at the moment, they can’t really risk additional retaliation that would deter third-country investment in China,” said Emily Benson, a senior fellow focused on trade and technology at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In addition, she said the Biden administration rules are still in a draft stage. Given the back and forth between industry and government that typically precedes the final implementation of any such regulations, it could be as long as a year before the final rules take shape and are implemented, she said.

“Nothing is set in stone,” she said, describing the proposed rules as the White House’s “wishlist.”

China’s Options for Retaliation Are Few After U.S. Investment Ban

Beijing is unlikely to match U.S. restrictions given asymmetrical money flows and a weak economy at home, analysts say

https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-options-for-retaliation-are-few-after-u-s-investment-ban-f539102e

By Liza Lin and Dan Strumpf

Updated Aug. 11, 2023 8:40 am ET

Beijing is seeking to sustain a diplomatic thaw with Washington. PHOTO: THOMAS PETER/REUTERS

China is unlikely to hit back at the U.S. blow for blow over the Biden administration’s new investment ban on certain Chinese tech companies. That’s because Beijing is limited both in its ability and desire to fire a big salvo, analysts say.

American tech companies aren’t as reliant on Chinese investments as their Chinese counterparts are on U.S. capital. China is also grappling with worsening macroeconomic conditions and falling investor confidence, which makes it less inclined to escalate an economic standoff, they say. On the political front, Beijing is also seeking to sustain a diplomatic thaw with Washington.

This week, the U.S. issued an executive order banning Americans from investing in Chinese companies developing advanced semiconductors and quantum computers and requires American investors to notify Washington about investments in other types of semiconductors and artificial intelligence. The limits, which come into place next year, amp up the race between the two major rivals over who controls the next generation of critical technology.

On Thursday, China’s Commerce Ministry said America’s actions had deviated from market norms, and the U.S. was disrupting global supply chains and trade. Its Foreign Ministry blasted the moves as “blatant economic coercion and tech bullying” by the U.S., adding that the country would move to protect its rights.

Despite the rhetoric, analysts and businessmen believe the outbound investment measures aren’t enough to change the calculus in a strained bilateral relationship that both sides are trying to improve. China has known such measures were coming for a long time, and some say the new rules are less strict and more narrowly targeted than many feared—at least in their current form.

Global Warfighting Simulation Puts the Pressure on Navy, Marine Corps

military.com · by 12 Aug 2023 The Virginian-Pilot | By Caitlyn Burchett · August 12, 2023

The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower was in a battle in the Mediterranean Sea without ever leaving the pier at Naval Station Norfolk.

The carrier had been teleported into the 6th Fleet area of responsibility as part of the Navy and Marine Corps’ “Large Scale Exercise 2023.” The live, virtual, constructive exercise uses real-world intelligence as part of a simulated scenario, putting 25,000 sailors and Marines on a “road to war” in which they interact with each other and adversaries in a cyber battlespace -- little different than a multiplayer video game.

“We would execute this much akin to if we were underway in the 6th Fleet AOR today, and as a matter of fact, the Gerald R. Ford is underway right now in the 6th Fleet AOR and we can literally see their tracks as we are in the virtual environment next to them,” said Rear Adm. Marc Miguez, commander of Carrier Strike Group Two, while aboard the Eisenhower on Friday.

The goal of the exercise, which began Aug. 9 and will run through the 18th, is to improve the services’ cohesiveness, test new technology, identify gaps in capabilities and put pressure on military members from the deck plate to the highest level of leadership.

“We have a responsibility to duty to be able to respond globally to threats and vulnerabilities, to peer adversaries and competitors,” Adm. Daryl Caudle, commander of Fleet Forces, said in a media roundtable Friday. “And the only way you get great at that is by practicing that and you have got to practice it at the highest levels.”

The exercise is following “a very aggressive percolating event that will eventually turn into kinetic warfare,” Caudle said. Simultaneously, opportunistic second and third parties will try to take advantage “with the hope that the U.S. has its eye off the ball a bit and doesn’t have the capacity to deter those other opportunistic events going on.

“Large Scale Exercise is a demonstrative way to let put the world on notice that we’re watching it all. And we are able to, with our global force, operate anywhere in the world, and be a force for good there.”

This is only the second Large Scale Exercise; the first was in 2021. It spans 50 commands across the Atlantic, Pacific and Mediterranean, including six carrier strike groups, three amphibious readiness groups, 25 submarines and ships live and 50 virtually. Three Hampton Roads-based carrier strike groups are participating: the Eisenhower, George H.W. Bush and Harry S. Truman.

The Naval Warfare Development Center at Naval Station Norfolk is serving as the hub of the exercise, controlling the scenario and simulated adversaries, and replicating decisions that would be made by higher headquarters and combatant commands, such as the secretary of Defense. More than a dozen retired flag or general officers are representing combatant commands to simulate decisions the most senior of defense leadership might make during a time of war.

Adm. James Foggo III and Adm. Scott Swift are among them.

“Obviously, we have a limited number of things -- ships, aircraft, people -- and there’s going to be tugging and pulling as the scenario progresses,” Foggo said. “Somebody’s got to sit back in Washington and balance that out and say, ‘Well I can’t give you more of that.’”

This, Foggo explained, creates “healthy tension.”

“We are stressing the force,” Foggo said. “There’s just not enough stuff to go around. So, somebody’s going to get what they need here. Somebody else here may have to wait a little bit. But where are the priorities? Where is today’s battle?”

Roughly 150 miles from Norfolk, dozens of Marines from Combat Logistics Regiment 2 were feeling the stress. They have been camped out in Oak Grove, North Carolina, since Aug. 6, reacting to simulated challenges, as well as realities of the real world while acting as an arming and refueling point.

“The fuel tanks haven’t been used, so when we tried to fill them with fuel, we noticed something like leaks, either from dry-rotted hoses or cracked pipes -- stuff that we are not able to identify unless there’s fuel in the tank itself,” said Sgt. Nicolas Casson, a bulk fuel specialist, serving as the forward arming and refueling point officer in charge.

Capt. Jason Motycka, a pilot training officer acting as site lead for Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464, said the austere environment has also presented challenges in operating and maintaining the aircraft.

“We have had some some maintenance challenges, but the Marines responded extremely well. We have integrated with other units to get the support we needed to fix our aircraft to continue to operate. So overall, we’ve responded the way we wanted to,” Motycka said.

Meanwhile, back at Fleet Forces headquarters in Norfolk, Caudle meets with Adm. Stuart Munsch, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, daily to synchronize operations across the globe, discussing their challenges, what can and can’t be solve independently and what resources require more coordination.

For the first time, the three four-star generals, with Caudle in person and Munsch and Paparo appearing via video conference, met with media Friday to discuss how they are being stressed.

“The scenario is already stressing that our unified command plan carves up the world into areas of responsibility for our combatant commanders to operate forces to conduct warfare if called upon in certain geographic areas,” Caudle said. “Of course, our adversaries and competitors understand this perfectly well. And so it is in their best interest to see if there’s a soft underbelly there and work those seams to understand whether or not we are well coordinated to handle cross flow and coordination.”

On a global scale, coordinating forces across operational areas during even a simulated war is “the most challenging part.”

“We are very cutting edge out here and watching what’s going on in the world and very quickly adopting the behaviors we see and the performance we see in technology,” Munsch said. “I can’t go into the specifics there. But it’s something as recent as what I was briefed on this morning is folded in to the exercise this afternoon.”

In a watch room lined aboard the Eisenhower, crew are standing by 24 hours a day, seven days a week to participate in Large Scale Exercise 2023 virtually -- about a dozen screens hang from the steel walls, showing a map of the 6th Fleet area of responsibility.

“It’s probably one of the most dynamic and most stressing situations that we put our watchstanders through and our air crew through, where we actually simulate in the training environment, us being shot at by threat aircraft, threat ships, and threat of land based -- we call them cruise missile defense threats -- that we could incur if we go into a combat operation once we deploy,” Miguez said.

The Large Scale Exercise, he said, gives the crew more opportunities to hone their “reps and sets” prior to their next deployment. The Eisenhower is scheduled to deploy later this year.

“My mantra with all my worker commanders is nothing is stable,” Miguez said. “Every time we go into an environment, the weather could be different, the adversary could change, we could have a bad intel that we think we’re rock solid on. And then all of a sudden, we’re in a crisis situation.

“We do prudent planning all the time. But there are occasions where we get thrown a curveball, and it is how we deal with it. That’s why we that’s why we are in here doing this right now, so we are prepared for the unknowns.”

military.com · by 12 Aug 2023 The Virginian-Pilot | By Caitlyn Burchett · August 12, 2023

4. Japan to set up cyberdefense network that includes Pacific islands

Excerpts:

Japan is already expanding cyber capabilities within the Quad framework, which also includes the U.S., Australia and India as members, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Incorporating Pacific island nations is seen as a way to strengthen the information sharing system.

It will also look at extending the so-called joint principles of cyberdefense in the Quad to other areas of the Indo-Pacific where the approach can be shared.

Japan has begun considering legislation that will allow it to engage in an active cyberdefense that would access an opponent's systems to prevent cyberattacks in advance. It expects that strengthening cooperation in Indo-Pacific will broaden the range of coping strategies.

Japan to set up cyberdefense network that includes Pacific islands

Information-sharing to be used to fend off attacks with eye on Russia and China

RIEKO MIKI, Nikkei staff writer

August 13, 2023 02:00 JST

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-to-set-up-cyberdefense-network-that-includes-Pacific-islands?utm

TOKYO -- The Japanese government plans to build an information network spanning the Indo-Pacific region to counter cyberattacks from such places as Russia and China, with a focus on providing support to Pacific island countries that have weak countermeasures, Nikkei has learned.

Signs of attacks and their methods would be shared on the network. Japan envisions being a bridge between the U.S., Australia, and other advanced regional countries on one side and emerging and developing countries on the other.

The Foreign Ministry has earmarked strengthening cyber capabilities overseas in the fiscal 2024 draft budget that will be presented this summer. The Indo-Pacific region, where China is building up its military presence, is positioned as a priority region. Southeast Asia and Pacific island nations will be supported through development assistance and other means.

In addition to equipment installation, Japan aims to build know-how through joint training sessions. Tokyo will also contribute to a World Bank fund for human resources.

Cyberspace is often referred to as the fifth battleground, and attacks are becoming more complex and diverse. There are rising cases of hybrid warfare, in which infrastructure like power plants are hit with cyberattacks and missiles, as Russia is doing in Ukraine.

There is a belief in Tokyo that Russia, China and North Korea are launching cyberattacks against government agencies and other organizations. China is suspected of an attack that targeted 200 organizations in Japan, including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, that was revealed in April 2021.

There have also been U.S. media reports that Chinese military hackers gained access to Japanese defense secrets. Consequently, countermeasures are seen as an urgent issue.

Japan revised its National Security Strategy guidelines at the end of last year, saying it will deepen cooperation with "friendly" and "like-minded countries" that share diplomatic and security objectives, in addition to Washington, its main ally.

The Indo-Pacific region is of growing security importance for Japan in regards to China. In particular, the U.S. and China are competing to expand influence over developing Pacific island countries by offering investment and financial assistance.

China signed a security agreement with Solomon Islands last year and is encouraging other countries to sign similar agreements. To prevent the strategically important region from being dominated by China, Japan plans to offer support and cooperation for building infrastructure such as cyber countermeasures.

Japan is already expanding cyber capabilities within the Quad framework, which also includes the U.S., Australia and India as members, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Incorporating Pacific island nations is seen as a way to strengthen the information sharing system.

It will also look at extending the so-called joint principles of cyberdefense in the Quad to other areas of the Indo-Pacific where the approach can be shared.

Japan has begun considering legislation that will allow it to engage in an active cyberdefense that would access an opponent's systems to prevent cyberattacks in advance. It expects that strengthening cooperation in Indo-Pacific will broaden the range of coping strategies.

5. Ukrainian troops left 'underprepared' by NATO training as instructors don't understand the type of warfare or the enemy, report says

As I have often written:

Understand the indigenous way of war and adapt to it. Do not force the US way of war upon indigenous forces if it is counter to their history, customs, traditions, and abilities.

https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2018/07/eight-points-of-special-warfare.html

Ukrainian troops left 'underprepared' by NATO training as instructors don't understand the type of warfare or the enemy, report says

Business Insider · by Alia Shoaib

An instructor briefs Ukrainian soldiers during grenade training at a training center near Yavoriv, Ukraine, on April 29, 2017.

Oklahoma Army National Guard/Sgt. Anthony Jones

Ukrainian troops trained by NATO say they are left underprepared for the war with Russia.
They said their Western instructors don't have experience in fighting this kind of war.
Western armies have been focused on fighting insurgencies in the Middle East in recent years.

Get the inside scoop on today’s biggest stories in business, from Wall Street to Silicon Valley — delivered daily.

Thanks for signing up!

Access your favorite topics in a personalized feed while you're on the go.

Ukrainian troops trained by NATO are being left underprepared for the realities of the war with Russia, a report says.

Western training is often limited because instructors have never fought a war like the Russia's invasion of Ukraine, media platform openDemocracy reported.

"I don't want to say anything against our partners, but they don't quite understand our situation and how we are fighting," a senior intelligence sergeant in the 41st Mechanised Brigade, who goes by the name "Dutchman," told openDemocracy.

About 63,000 Ukrainian troops have been trained in the West — mostly in the UK and Germany, per the report.

All of them go through a 35-day "crash course" of basic soldier training, a UK source told the outlet.

Nick Reynolds, a land warfare expert at the UK-based defense think tank the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said that the training provided by the West was safer but less comparable to actual warfare.

"We do have a lot of health and safety regulation. Yet this means they are going on to the battlefield less prepared," Reynolds told openDemocracy.

He noted that this strategy may increase the risk of things going wrong during live operations.

"Dutchman" said that while NATO training can be useful for things like shooting and learning to use equipment, most major combat training occurred in Ukraine.

One limitation is that Western armies have been focused on fighting insurgencies in the Middle East in recent years.

Members of Ukraine's 41st Brigade said that NATO instructors often used examples from the conflict in the Middle East, which largely involved clearing houses and identifying insurgents among the locals, which they said was "not really relevant to us."

Scott Peterson/Getty Images

"Dutchman" said that Western instructors have experience in urban warfare, fighting in cities and towns — but in Ukraine, much of the fighting is on flat ground.

"We need people to understand how to effectively clear trenches, enter them, how to throw grenades effectively, how not to trip on booby traps, to understand what grenades the [Russians] throw — essentially to understand the enemy," he said.

Western instructors also typically planned "with a weaker enemy in mind," Dutchman said, as NATO forces sought to overwhelm their enemies with the type of firepower that Ukraine does not possess.

Another limitation is that NATO health and safety regulations require troops to undergo basic training before moving on to more advanced levels.

But due to time constraints, Ukrainian troops often don't reach those levels, Reynolds said.

"From a legal, regulatory, safety, and permissions perspective, we can't do [the type of training Ukrainians want] unless we make some fairly serious policy changes," he said.

One significant upside of the Western training is that Ukrainian troops take home expensive equipment, including body armor and medical supplies, a source involved in the UK training process told openDemocracy.

Business Insider · by Alia Shoaib

6. Does China Want to Start a War in the South China Sea?

Conclusion:

The manpower of these elite units remains classified, but, along with the conventional AFP forces previously mentioned, they stand ready to deal Chinese forces a bloody nose should Xi Jinping ever decide to escalate from “non-kinetic” operations – such as this latest water cannon incident – to the kinetic level, i.e. a shooting war.

Does China Want to Start a War in the South China Sea?

One might reasonably ask the question as to why the Chinese government continues to resort to such heavy-handed tactics in the South China Sea.

19fortyfive.com · by Christian Orr · August 13, 2023

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) campaigns of intimidation against its own subjects – especially the Uyghurs – as well as Tibet and Taiwan (AKA the Republic of China [ROC]) are all too well known.

Meanwhile, for the sake of big picture perspective, it should be recalled that these aren’t the only freedom-loving peoples of the Asia-Pacific region that Beijing is attempting to bully. The Republic of the Philippines is also on that list.

A South China Sea Showdown?

The latest round of Sino-Filipino tensions occurred two days ago, as reported by Reuters and republished in MSN.

To wit:

“Tensions have soared between the two neighbours over the South China Sea under Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, with Manila pivoting back to the United States, which supports the Southeast Asian nation in its maritime disputes with China … The Second Thomas Shoal, locally known as Ayungin, is home to a handful of troops living aboard the former warship Sierra Madre, which Manila grounded there in 1999 to reinforce its sovereignty claims …

Manila has repeatedly accused the Chinese coast guard of impeding its ability to supply its troops there by blocking resupply missions, as it did on Aug. 5 when it sprayed a Philippine vessel with a water cannon … The Philippine military described the actions of the Chinese coast guard as ‘excessive and offensive.’ China said the incident was a ‘warning’ and that it has exercised ‘rational restraint’ at all times.”

Thankfully, no casualties occurred, but the incident is just the latest in a long line of usurpations by Xi Jinping and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against Manila. Fortunately for the Philippines, the countries’ allies are taking notice: France and Japan, via their embassies in Manila, have expressed concern over such actions and repeated their support for a July 2016 arbitral ruling that invalidated Beijing’s expansionist South China Sea claims. Meanwhile, as reported by David R. Sands for The Washington Times this past Sunday, the U.S. State Department unequivocally condemned the Xi regime’s actions

“The United States stands with our Philippine allies in the face of dangerous actions by the Coast Guard and maritime militia of the People’s Republic of China to obstruct an August 5 Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea … Firing water cannons and employing unsafe blocking maneuvers, PRC ships interfered with the Philippines’ lawful exercise of high seas freedom of navigation and jeopardized the safety of the Philippine vessels and crew.”

The U.S. government also reaffirmed its mutual defense agreements with Manila and that the former would come to the latter nation’s aid in case of an armed attack on the Philippines’ vessels, aircraft, or troops.

The Australian government also lodged a formal protest against the Chinese Coast Guard’s blocking maneuver.

Beijing’s Motivations

One might reasonably ask the question as to why the Chinese government continues to resort to such heavy-handed tactics. The short answer to that question can be garnered from the title of an August 8, 2023 article for Time Magazine penned by Chad de Guzman titled “China Is Testing How Hard It Can Push in the South China Sea Before Someone Pushes Back.” In other words, continually upping the ante and pushing the proverbial envelope but carefully keeping short of an outright act of shooting war. In other words, to use words tossed about when I was a Strategy & Policy Analyst for OPNAV N5I6/Navy Warfare Group at the Pentagon back in 2019, it’s a form of “non-kinetic warfare,” aka “Grey Zone” conflict.

Philippine Military Capabilities

Unsurprisingly, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP; Sandatahang Lakas ng Pilipinas) pale in size compared to that of the PLA. However, that does not equate to a lack of motivation, training, or technical capabilities on the part of the Filipinos.

As noted in the article “KAI T-50 Golden Eagle: South Korea’s Homegrown Fighter Plane,” the Philippine Air Force has already acquired 12 of South Korea’s sophisticated lightweight multirole fighter planes to its arsenal and plans to add more. As noted by a June 2022 Philippines News Agency press release: “It has a top speed of Mach 1.5 or one and a half times the speed of sound and is capable of being fitted with air-to-air missiles, including the AIM-9 ‘Sidewinder’ air-to-air and heat-seeking missiles aside from light automatic cannons, and bombs.”

Meanwhile, the World Directory of Modern Military Warships (WDMMW) reports that the Philippine Navy counts 59 total units in its active naval inventory, including two frigates, one corvette, 42 offshore patrol vessels, and 14 amphibious assault vehicles. And under the overall rubric of Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Command (AFPSOCOM), each branch of the service has its own special forces-type units: Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Command (AFPSOCOM): the Army’s Special Forces Regiment (Airborne), First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR), and Light Reaction Regiment (LRR); the Navy’s Naval Special Warfare Group; the Air Force’s 710th Special Operations Wing (SOW); and the Marine Corps Marine Special Operations Group (MARSOG) aka the Force Reconnaissance Battalion (presumably modeled after U.S. Marine Corps Force Recon).

Last but not least, though not falling under the AFPSOCOM umbrella of command, the Philippine Coast Guard Special Operations Force (CGSOF) certainly merits mention here as well.

The manpower of these elite units remains classified, but, along with the conventional AFP forces previously mentioned, they stand ready to deal Chinese forces a bloody nose should Xi Jinping ever decide to escalate from “non-kinetic” operations – such as this latest water cannon incident – to the kinetic level, i.e. a shooting war.

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

From the Vault

‘You Really Oughta Go Home’: F-22 Raptor Stealth Fighter Flew Under F-4 From Iran

A Second American Civil War?

Something Is Terribly Wrong With Former President Trump

19fortyfive.com · by Christian Orr · August 13, 2023

7. America’s 911 call and global response to Ukraine war

Excerpts:

If the first American assumption of isolating Russia by non-military means has not worked, the second wrong US assumption didn’t either help the US formulate the right policy in Ukraine. The second wrong US assumption was an operational assumption that as the Russian forces will invade on multiple fronts, they will overrun their logistics and will be cut off from their base and thus interdicted as they lay exposed. But last year Russian forces withdrew to the western bank of Dnieper River and executed further mobilisation and drafting of new soldiers. Russian forces are now deeply entrenched and Ukrainian counter-offensive initiated three months earlier has little gains to show and has almost completely stalled. Ukraine doesn’t have the army of a great power to undo the land acquisition by the army of another great power. Russia will continue to fight to retain the Donbas region in the Eastern Ukraine and without strong army Ukraine will find it extremely difficult to challenge Russian military gains.

So, the world should be ready to witness a long-protracted war in Ukraine where Ukrainian soldiers may have to fight long protracted battles to regain what they have already lost. In the end the Ukrainian politicians must consider the cost Ukraine’s people and armed forces are paying for acting as expandable commodity for implementing the US policy based on wrong assumptions. You can coerce a great power but can never defeat it without confronting it directly. That may be the one great lesson that the world will learn from the war in Ukraine.

America’s 911 call and global response to Ukraine war | The Express Tribune

tribune.com.pk · August 13, 2023

Twenty-four months later one can say employment of non-military means has not been as effective as the US desired

Dr Muhammad Ali Ehsan August 13, 2023

The writer is associated with International Relations Department of DHA Suffa University, Karachi. He tweets @Dr M Ali Ehsan

America’s policy options in Ukraine are influenced by many strategic assumptions but two wrong assumptions are already leading to bad decisions, poor planning and unwanted outcomes for the US in the war in Ukraine. The first assumption was related to the use of non-military means and was based on the premise that using non-military means such as implementing economic sanctions, imposing economic blockades, forming coalitions, breaking off diplomatic relations and conducting information and legal warfare, including President Vladimir Putin’s arrest warrants by International Criminal Court, will weaken Russia and subject it to international isolation. It was assumed that as the war drags on, Russia will grow weak and so will Putin’s hold on power.

Twenty-four months later one can say that the employment of non-military means has not been as effective as the US desired. Neither has Russia buckled under pressure nor has Putin’s hold on power weakened. At the outbreak of war, the US dialed 911 and hoped that the entire world will take its call. The calls were taken but the global response was a clear split and countries, specially from Africa, Asia and even Latin America, employed hedging as their preferred diplomatic and alignment strategy to simultaneously keep good relations with both the US and Russia.

One would not like to blame these states, as taking clear sides in these uncertain times means maximising your risks and minimising your future opportunities because both the US and Russia are great powers and this war, like all wars, will eventually end but the status of these countries is likely to remain the same. What cannot end for the small and weak states is an enduring relationship that will like to continue with both the great powers. The assumption of using non-military means also has a political component that contributes not to unifying but dividing the world.

The coalition against Russia is built under the banner of ‘Democratic Peace Theory’. This theory states that democracies are more certain of each other’s intentions and not so about undemocratic countries. So, all democratic countries must stand up together to fight the forces that are undemocratic and a threat to a peaceful world. This is political warfare and a direct attack on the political systems of not only Russia but China also, both of which are not only great powers but two strong pillars that are likely to hold and sustain the foreseeable multipolar world. Will the US continue waging wars against autocracies after every few years? Is this serving democracy or its Military Industrial Complex (MIC)?

Two decades earlier, President Bush had built a coalition and carried out an invasion of Iraq on the wrong pretext of seeking out and destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in an illegal war. Removal of Saddam Hussein from power and liberating a nation held hostage by an autocratic leader was another war aim. But many analysts have argued that the control of oil resources in Iraq was the main rationale of the US invasion. One big lesson that the world learnt from the Iraq war was that the strategy of causing ruptures in autocratic settings through military campaigns is inherently fraught with huge risks, but the US hasn’t stopped doing this.

Dividing the world in democratic and non-democratic blocs is a big mistake and the US has actively pushed this global division for past two decades by employing its militarised foreign policy. This is reflective in the US attempts to democratise the non-democratic countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and the greater Middle East during the time of Arab Spring. Today, democracies all over the world are backsliding and nobody is sure when some other democracy will also become an authoritarian state. US double standards have also opened up the gap between its principled polices and its unprincipled implementation. Military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are wrong because they overthrew democratically elected governments but military coup in Egypt was right because it served the US interests regardless of the fact that it installed a brutal dictatorship under Gen Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who together with his military dragged his country back to a repressive and authoritarian rule. The US is not only alright with authoritarian rule in Egypt for the past one decade but also continues to support Sisi’s authoritarian rule with annual security aid of $1.3 billion. So, if some countries in the global south no longer take America’s 911 call, it is because they no more relate to the US double standards and the people in these countries actively support the leadership that not only promises to fight against the western neoliberal colonialism but demonstrates a clear political resolve not to work under American watch, pressure, influence and interference.

If the first American assumption of isolating Russia by non-military means has not worked, the second wrong US assumption didn’t either help the US formulate the right policy in Ukraine. The second wrong US assumption was an operational assumption that as the Russian forces will invade on multiple fronts, they will overrun their logistics and will be cut off from their base and thus interdicted as they lay exposed. But last year Russian forces withdrew to the western bank of Dnieper River and executed further mobilisation and drafting of new soldiers. Russian forces are now deeply entrenched and Ukrainian counter-offensive initiated three months earlier has little gains to show and has almost completely stalled. Ukraine doesn’t have the army of a great power to undo the land acquisition by the army of another great power. Russia will continue to fight to retain the Donbas region in the Eastern Ukraine and without strong army Ukraine will find it extremely difficult to challenge Russian military gains.

So, the world should be ready to witness a long-protracted war in Ukraine where Ukrainian soldiers may have to fight long protracted battles to regain what they have already lost. In the end the Ukrainian politicians must consider the cost Ukraine’s people and armed forces are paying for acting as expandable commodity for implementing the US policy based on wrong assumptions. You can coerce a great power but can never defeat it without confronting it directly. That may be the one great lesson that the world will learn from the war in Ukraine.

Published in The Express Tribune, August 13th, 2023.

Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.

tribune.com.pk · August 13, 2023

8. The Clean Energy Future Is Arriving Faster Than You Think

The Clean Energy Future Is Arriving Faster Than You Think

David Gelles reported from Tulsa, Okla.; Brad Plumer and Jim Tankersley from Washington; and Jack Ewing from New York to see how an accelerated energy transition is playing out. Photographs by Mason Trinca.

This is the first article in a three-part series examining the speed, challenges and politics of the American economy moving toward clean energy.

Aug 13, 2023

The New York Times · August 13, 2023

This is the first article in a three-part series examining the speed, challenges and politics of the American economy moving toward clean energy.

Aug 13, 2023

Delivery vans in Pittsburgh. Buses in Milwaukee. Cranes loading freight at the Port of Los Angeles. Every municipal building in Houston. All are powered by electricity derived from the sun, wind or other sources of clean energy.

Across the country, a profound shift is taking place that is nearly invisible to most Americans. The nation that burned coal, oil and gas for more than a century to become the richest economy on the planet, as well as historically the most polluting, is rapidly shifting away from fossil fuels.

A similar energy transition is already well underway in Europe and elsewhere. But the United States is catching up, and globally, change is happening at a pace that is surprising even the experts who track it closely.

Wind and solar power are breaking records, and renewables are now expected to overtake coal by 2025 as the world’s largest source of electricity. Automakers have made electric vehicles central to their business strategies and are openly talking about an expiration date on the internal combustion engine. Heating, cooling, cooking and some manufacturing are going electric.

As the planet registers the highest temperatures on record, rising in some places to levels incompatible with human life, governments around the world are pouring trillions of dollars into clean energy to cut the carbon pollution that is broiling the planet.

A big shift in the way America produces energy is already underway.

Continue scrolling

The cost of generating electricity from the sun and wind is falling fast and in many areas is now cheaper than gas, oil or coal. Private investment is flooding into companies that are jockeying for advantage in emerging green industries.

“We look at energy data on a daily basis, and it’s astonishing what’s happening,” said Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy Agency. “Clean energy is moving faster than many people think, and it’s become turbocharged lately.”

More than $1.7 trillion worldwide is expected to be invested in technologies such as wind, solar power, electric vehicles and batteries globally this year, according to the I.E.A., compared with just over $1 trillion in fossil fuels. That is by far the most ever spent on clean energy in a year.

Those investments are driving explosive growth. China, which already leads the world in the sheer amount of electricity produced by wind and solar power, is expected to double its capacity by 2025, five years ahead of schedule. In Britain, roughly one-third of electricity is generated by wind, solar and hydropower. And in the United States, 23 percent of electricity is expected to come from renewable sources this year, up 10 percentage points from a decade ago.

Solar and Wind Power Have Taken Off

Electricity generation per year, in terawatt hours

Source: The Energy Institute’s 2023 Statistical Review of World Energy

Note: Data reflects generation within country borders.

By The New York Times

“The nature of these exponential curves sometimes causes us to underestimate how quickly changes occur once they reach these inflection points and begin accelerating,” said former Vice President Al Gore, who called attention to what he termed a “planetary crisis” 17 years ago in his film “An Inconvenient Truth.” “The trend is definitely in favor of more and more renewable energy and less fossil energy.”

Even as the pace of change in the United States is surprising everyone from energy experts to automobile executives, fossil fuels still dominate energy production at home and abroad.

Corporations are building new coal mines, oil rigs and gas pipelines. The government continues to award leases for drilling projects on public lands and in federal waters and still subsidizes the industries. After posting record profits last year, leading oil companies are backing away from recent promises to invest more heavily in renewable energy.

The scale of change required to remake the systems that power the United States — all the infrastructure that needs to be removed, re-engineered and replaced — is mind-boggling. There are major challenges involved in adding large amounts of renewable energy to antiquated electric grids and mining enough minerals for clean technologies. Some politicians, including most Republicans, want the country to continue burning fossil fuels, even in the face of overwhelming scientific consensus that their use is endangering life on the planet. Dozens of conservative groups organized by the Heritage Foundation have created a policy playbook, should a Republican win the 2024 presidential election, that would reverse course on lowering emissions. It would shred regulations designed to curb greenhouse gases, dismantle nearly every federal clean energy program and boost the production of fossil fuels.

And while energy systems are changing fast, so is the climate. It is far from certain whether the United States and other polluting countries will do what scientists say is required to avert catastrophe: stop adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere by 2050. All of the investment so far has slowed the pace at which emissions are growing worldwide, but the amount of carbon dioxide pumped into the atmosphere is at record levels.

And yet, from Beijing to London, Tokyo to Washington, Oslo to Dubai, the energy transition is undeniably racing ahead. Change is here, even in oil country.

‘Energy Is Energy’

As the workday begins in Tulsa, Okla., the assembly line at the electric school bus factory rattles to life. Crews fan out across the city to install solar panels on century-old Tudor homes. Teslas and Ford F-150 Lightnings pull up to charging stations powered in part by the country’s second-largest wind farm. And at the University of Tulsa’s School of Petroleum Engineering, faculty are working on ways to use hydrogen as a clean energy source.

Tulsa, a former boomtown once known as the “Oil Capital of the World” where the minor league baseball team is the Drillers, is immersed in a new energy revolution.

At the port, an Italian company, Enel, is building a $1 billion solar panel factory. The bus factory is operated by Navistar, one of the biggest commercial vehicle makers in the world. And the city’s main electric utility, Public Service Company of Oklahoma, now harvests more than 28 percent of its power from wind.

Even Tulsa, with its strong links to oil and gas, is embracing clean energy.

Continue scrolling

Clean energy entrepreneurs are flocking to Oklahoma, too. Francis Energy, a fast-growing maker of electric vehicle charging stations, is based in Tulsa. Canoo, an electric vehicle start-up, is building a 100,000-square-foot battery factory at a nearby industrial park and a manufacturing plant for its trucks in Oklahoma City, though there are questions about whether the company will have enough funding to realize its plans. And teams from Solar Power of Oklahoma are busy fastening photovoltaic panels to the roofs of homes and businesses around Tulsa.

The city is embracing its shifting identity.

“We have a tremendous sense of pride in our history,” said Dewey F. Bartlett Jr., the Republican former mayor of Tulsa who was an oil and gas executive but now helps recruit clean energy companies to the region. “But we also understand that energy is energy, whether it is generated by wind, steam or whatever it might be.”

Around the country, clean energy is taking root in unlikely locales.

Houston, home to more than 500 oil and gas companies, also has more than 130 solar- and wind-related companies. Some of the country’s largest wind and solar farms are in the Texas flatlands outside the city, and a huge wind farm has been proposed off the coast of Galveston.

In Arkansas, a planned solar farm — the state’s biggest — is expected to help power a nearby U.S. Steel factory that is undergoing a $3 billion upgrade. When complete, the plant will use electric furnaces to mold scrap steel into new products. That will result in about 80 percent less greenhouse gases, the company says, and set the pace for an industry that has been a major polluter.

About two-thirds of the new investment in clean energy is in Republican-controlled states, where policymakers have historically resisted renewables. But with each passing month, the politics seem to matter less than the economics.

“We’re the reddest state in the country, and we’re an oil and gas state,” said J.W. Peters, president of Solar Power of Oklahoma. “So it took a lot of time to convince people that this wasn’t snake oil.”

Mr. Peters was broke six years ago, with less than $400 in his checking account after his contracting business slowed down. Then he responded to a help-wanted ad looking for workers to install solar panels, which were becoming more popular in Tulsa. He now employs 61 workers and has $18 million in annual sales. “The environmental benefits are nice,” he said, “but most people are doing this for the financial opportunity.”

‘Something Very Dramatic’

Fifteen years ago, solar panels, wind turbines and battery-powered vehicles were widely viewed as niche technologies, too expensive and unreliable for mainstream use.

But clean energy became cheap far faster than anyone expected. Since 2009, the cost of solar power has plunged by 83 percent, while the cost of producing wind power has fallen by more than half. The price of lithium-ion battery cells fell 97 percent over the past three decades.

Today, solar and wind power are the least expensive new sources of electricity in many markets, generating 12 percent of global electricity and rising. This year, for the first time, global investors are expected to pour more money into solar power — some $380 billion — than into drilling for oil.

The Cost of Renewable Energy Has Plummeted

Cost of building and running new power plants, in dollars per megawatt hour

Source: Lazard

Notes: Charts reflect the mean levelized cost of energy, which captures the price of building and running new power plants but excludes other electrical system costs. Lazard did not release data for 2022. In 2023, costs rose because of supply-chain problems, inflation and other issues.

By The New York Times

The rapid drop in costs for solar energy, wind power and batteries can be traced to early government investment and steady improvements over time by hundreds of researchers, engineers and entrepreneurs around the world.

“The world has produced nearly three billion solar panels at this point, and every one of those has been an opportunity for people to try to improve the process,” said Gregory Nemet, a solar power expert at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. “And all of those incremental improvements add up to something very dramatic.”

An equally potent force, along with the technological advances, has been an influx of money — in particular, a gusher since 2020 of government subsidies.

In the United States, President Biden signed a trio of laws during his first two years in office that allocated unprecedented funds for clean energy: A $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure law provided money to enhance the power grid, buy electric buses for schools and build a national network of electric vehicle chargers. The bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act set aside billions of dollars for semiconductors vital to car manufacturing. And the Inflation Reduction Act, which marks its first anniversary on Aug. 16, is by far the most ambitious attempt to fight climate change in American history.

The United States is ramping up its capacity to produce electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels and wind turbines.

Continue scrolling

That landmark law provided tax breaks related to electric vehicles, heat pumps and energy efficiency upgrades, solar panel and wind turbine manufacturing and clean hydrogen production. The government is also investing in efforts to capture carbon emissions and store them before they can reach the atmosphere, as well as technology that can remove them directly from the air.

Originally estimated to cost roughly $391 billion between 2022 and 2031, the tax breaks are proving so popular with manufacturers and consumers that estimates now put the cost as high as $1.2 trillion over the next decade.

Combined, the three laws have prompted companies to announce at least $230 billion in manufacturing investments so far. In Georgia, a Korean solar manufacturer, Qcells, is building a $2.5 billion plant. In Nevada, Tesla is building a new $3.6 billion electric truck factory. And in Oklahoma, the Enel and Canoo facilities are primed to benefit from the Inflation Reduction Act, as is a new $4.4 billion battery factory being considered by Panasonic, the Japanese conglomerate.

“There’s a lot of appetite to invest in the United States thanks to that law,” said Giovanni Bertolino, an executive at Enel, adding that the plant his company is building in Tulsa would not exist without the Inflation Reduction Act.

Regulations are also hastening the energy transition. Mr. Biden has proposed tough new federal pollution limits on tailpipes and smokestacks, but several states are acting on their own. California, with market muscle that influences the entire auto industry, plans to halt sales of new gas-powered cars by 2035 and new diesel-powered trucks by 2036 — and a handful of states are following suit. In May, New York became the first state to ban gas hookups in most new buildings, requiring all-electric heating and cooking starting in 2026. Several cities, including New York and San Francisco, have similar prohibitions, although some Republican-controlled states have blocked their municipalities from banning gas.

Heavy investment by the United States has spurred a spirited reaction from other wealthy nations. Countries that initially complained that the United States was unfairly subsidizing clean energy manufacturers have since engaged in a sort of friendly subsidy race.

Clean energy investments are generating thousands of new jobs.

Continue scrolling

Canada, South Korea and others have pushed for their companies to have better access to the American incentives, while offering similar subsidies to their domestic manufacturers. After Russia invaded Ukraine last year, the European Union moved to lessen its dependence on Russian oil and gas. In May, for the first time ever, wind and solar power in the E.U. generated more electricity than fossil fuels.

And in China, which is currently both the world’s top polluter and the global leader for renewable power, the government continues to invest in every stage of clean energy production, from solar cells to batteries, wind turbines and more. Like the United States, China provides subsidies to buyers of electric vehicles. Last year it spent $546 billion on clean energy, far more than any other country in the world.

With costs falling fast, manufacturing has picked up and installations of solar and wind projects have increased. The U.S. solar industry installed a record 6.1 gigawatts of capacity in the first quarter of 2023, a 47 percent increase over the same period last year.

And those low costs have led many of the United States’ biggest corporations, such as Alphabet, Amazon and General Motors, to purchase large amounts of wind and solar power, because it burnishes their reputations and because it makes good economic sense.

“We’re seeing the nonlinear change happen before us,” said Jon Creyts, chief executive of RMI, a nonprofit organization that promotes the energy transition. “And that’s important, because we’re facing a climate crisis right now.”

‘A National Phenomenon’

Steve Uerling’s Tulsa home is a model of energy efficiency. He replaced all his incandescent light bulbs with LEDs. He installed a heat pump and rooftop solar panels this year. And he drives a plug-in hybrid Ford Fusion and a Tesla Model 3.

Mr. Uerling, a mechanical engineer, said he wanted to see renewable power take off in Oklahoma and was trying to do his part. But he was also driven by his wallet.

“My fuel cost is equivalent to getting 200 miles a gallon on gasoline,” he said. “We charge at night, when we get a much cheaper rate on our electricity.”

Electric Cars Are Gaining Momentum

Electric models as percentage of total passenger vehicle sales

Source: International Energy Agency

Note: Sales share of battery electric vehicles excludes plug-in hybrids.

By The New York Times

Millions of people around the country are making similar calculations. Electric vehicles are by far the fastest-growing segment of the auto industry, with record sales of 300,000 in the second quarter of 2023, a 48 percent increase from a year earlier. Teslas are now among the best-selling cars in the country, and Ford has expanded its production of the F-150 Lightning, the electric version of its popular pickup truck, after a surge of initial demand created a waiting list.

Concerns among consumers about the availability of charging stations as well as the cost of some models have helped to cool sales somewhat, leading some automakers to slash prices. Still, federal tax credits of up to $7,500 have made the least expensive electric vehicles competitive with gas-powered cars. And about two dozen states offer additional tax credits, rebates or reduced fees, further pushing down their cost.

Government action is also helping heavier vehicles go electric. Sales of electric school buses are soaring, largely because of $5 billion in federal grants that can cover 100 percent of the cost for low-income communities. The Postal Service plans to spend nearly $10 billion to purchase 66,000 electric mail trucks — roughly 30 percent of its fleet — over the next five years.

Electric vehicles sales are growing quickly, but consumers are still concerned about high upfront costs and charging availability.

Continue scrolling

In the private sector, Amazon has ordered 100,000 electric delivery trucks from Rivian. Tesla has an electric semitruck, as do several other manufacturers, including Peterbilt.

Companies that provide charging stations are springing up to meet the demand. Francis Energy has more than 400 chargers across Oklahoma and is expanding nationwide. EVgo, which has one of the largest fast-charging networks in the United States, plans to more than double the 3,000 charging stalls it operates.

“It is not a red-state, blue-state thing,” said Cathy Zoi, EVgo’s chief executive. “It is a national phenomenon.”

In an unusual move, seven carmakers — BMW Group, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Mercedes-Benz Group and Stellantis — are spending $1 billion in a joint venture to build 30,000 charging ports on major highways and other locations in the United States and Canada.

The shift is happening so quickly that some of America’s most iconic automakers are preparing for a world beyond gasoline-powered cars and trucks.

General Motors, which has the largest market share of any carmaker in the United States, has committed to selling only zero-emissions vehicles by 2035. It’s a “once-in-a-generation inflection point” for the 114-year-old automaker, according to Mary Barra, G.M.’s chief executive.

In an interview, Ms. Barra said her company began to consider an all-electric future in 2020. “We started to see this happening with the consumer research we did,” said Ms. Barra, who has subsequently bet billions on G.M.’s efforts to reorient its engineering, overhaul its manufacturing facilities and processes and build new battery plants.

As the cost of batteries comes down, and the number of charging stations nationwide goes up, Ms. Barra expects exponential growth. “I think it’s going to be definitely an upward trajectory,” she said. “It’ll be a little bumpy, but bumpy growing.”

The New York Times · August 13, 2023

9. Would F-16s Have Made the Difference in Ukraine’s Counteroffensive?

I still think to effectively execute the maneuver doctrine that NATO is apparently reaching to the Ukrainian military, they need the capabilities to apiece air superiority. How can we help them achieve that?

Would F-16s Have Made the Difference in Ukraine’s Counteroffensive?

By Lara Jakes

Reporting from Rome

The New York Times · by Lara Jakes · August 13, 2023

Most military experts doubt that they would have, and say that Kyiv can still prevail without them.

Dutch Air Force F-16 fighter jets over the Netherlands in July. The Biden administration waited over a year before agreeing to have NATO countries send F-16s to Ukraine.Credit...Piroschka Van De Wouw/Reuters

Aug. 13, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

Ukraine’s counteroffensive began two months ago, but in many ways its forces have been preparing for it for years by learning how to fight like NATO militaries, with a mix of infantry, artillery, armored vehicles and air power.

But the Biden administration waited more than a year before letting NATO countries send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. By the time pilots are trained on the advanced aircraft, it will be too late for them to assist and protect ground forces slogging through this phase of fighting.

All of which has raised a question: Without significant air power — a pillar of the warfare tactics that the West has urged Ukraine to adopt — can the counteroffensive prevail?

The answer appears to be yes, as current and former officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe, as well as Western defense analysts, said in interviews last week as the counteroffensive ground on, with volleys of artillery fire and drone strikes but no major breakthroughs.

But it is likely to be far more difficult without the jets.

“It will have to happen without the F-16,” said Philip M. Breedlove, a retired United States Air Force general and former NATO commander, “but I believe they can.”

A former F-16 pilot, Mr. Breedlove said there was “great benefit” for Ukraine’s forces to learn and deploy the so-called combined arms tactics that are the backbone of modern ground warfare, given that they “are going to be applicable in many different phases of what you do, no matter what.”

Nevertheless, he added, “If you expect Ukraine to fight like we fight, then they have to have the tools that we have, and we have not given them those tools.”

Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, the top Ukrainian commander, has made the same point with considerable frustration.

A destroyed Ukrainian military vehicle in Pravdyne, Ukraine, in January. Russian attack helicopters have had significant success picking off Kyiv’s tanks and armored vehicles.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Some experts said the dearth of air power had put Ukraine at a disadvantage this summer against Russian attack helicopters that have picked off Ukrainian tanks and armored vehicles. At least some of the helicopters are equipped with anti-tank missiles that are shot either too far or too low to be intercepted by Ukraine’s air defenses, according to Britain’s Defense Ministry.

Col. Markus Reisner, who oversees force development at Austria’s main military training academy, said that with more warplanes, Ukraine could better defend its ground troops from those attacks.

“This is what it is actually intended for,” said Colonel Reisner, a trained intelligence officer. “Military logic tells you, you have to have air superiority to conduct successful land operations.”

He added: “Some American generals, they say, ‘Well, it’s not what the Ukrainians need at the moment.’ I think this is a political statement, it’s not a military logical statement.”

Neither Ukraine nor Russia — despite its seemingly overwhelming advantage — has managed to achieve air superiority since the war began in February 2022.

Back then, Russia had 10 times as many fighter aircraft as Ukraine — 772 to 69 — including some that were far more technologically advanced, according to the Global Firepower Index, which ranks conventional war-making capabilities. Yet in the 18 months since, both sides have relied on artillery, drones and long-range missiles to attack.

That is because both Ukraine, with Patriot missiles, among other weapons, and Russia with its S-400 air defense systems, have formidable air defenses that have largely deterred each other from launching airstrikes near or behind the front lines with piloted warplanes.

For the most part, Ukrainian pilots currently flying their Soviet-era MiG and Sukhoi fighter jets take care not to get too close to their targets or to stay in the air for too long, to avoid becoming targets themselves. They get as close as they dare and then fire missiles, including long-range missiles recently provided by Britain and France, at fuel and ammunition depots and other military targets before darting away.

A member of Ukraine’s 93rd Mechanized Brigade piloting a drone from a basement shelter in Bakhmut in May.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

In view of those limitations, a Biden administration official said in an interview last week that it was unclear whether Ukraine’s forces would be able to provide support to ground troops even if they had the F-16s. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss an issue that has become a sore point to the Ukrainians.

After Ukraine suffered heavy losses early in the counteroffensive by trying to follow the combined-arms approach, some commanders decided to abandon the effort and return to the tactics they know best — firing artillery and missiles to degrade Russia’s fighting capability in a war of attrition.

That was not a complete surprise to military experts, who said the problems went well beyond the absence of air power. Retired Col. Steve Boylan, a trained U.S. Army aviator and a former spokesman for the Army’s Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kan., said it had taken years for American forces to learn “how to do it effectively — and not in the middle of a fight.”

As its name suggests, the modern fighting method combines infantry troops, armored tanks, artillery ground fire and air power in an effort to dominate all the domains of ground warfare. Mr. Boylan said the tactics were developed as a better way to fight after the bloody trench warfare of World War I, but it was not until the 1990-91 Persian Gulf war that American troops fought in the combined arms units as they are deployed today.

Fighting without one of the elements — like air power, in Ukraine’s case — may force units to adjust, but “I would suspect that they would take our instruction, training and tactics as a baseline and modify it to what works best for them,” Mr. Boylan said.

Yet for all that air power can bring to a battle, he said, “until you get troops on the ground, and actually take it, you don’t own it. And you can’t hold it.”

A member of Ukraine’s 45th Separate Artillery Brigade firing at a Russian position in the Donetsk region in March.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

As it is, Mr. Breedlove said, Ukraine’s military is already one of the best-equipped and most battle-tested in Europe. Last week, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said that plans for obtaining Western warplanes were moving forward, adding, “I have no doubt that F-16s will be in our skies.”

But that will require a lengthy training period, beginning for many with language lessons. American officials have said that Ukraine has identified only eight combat pilots — less than a single squadron — who speak English well enough to start at least a year of training. About 20 others are being sent to Britain this month to learn English.

Sending just a handful of F-16s into battle would not make much difference in the war, said Douglas Barrie, a military aerospace expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. “It’s got to be adequate, it’s got to be up to the task,” he said.

If Ukraine had multiple properly trained and equipped squadrons of F-16s, Mr. Barrie said, “would it have helped in the counteroffensive? It’s a theoretical question, but the theoretical answer is yes.”

He said that Ukraine’s forces “were never going to be in a position” to launch a Western-style combined-arms offensive without air power.

Then again, he added, “If they hadn’t had any of this training, would we now be trying to figure out how to get the Russians out of Kyiv?”

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting from Washington.

Lara Jakes is a foreign correspondent focused on the war in Ukraine. She has been a diplomatic and military correspondent in Washington and a war correspondent in Iraq, and has reported and edited from more than 60 countries over the last 25 years. More about Lara Jakes

The New York Times · by Lara Jakes · August 13, 2023

10. Examining Disaster Aid as Cover for a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwan

Excerpt:

While a natural disaster is hard to predict, it could provide excellent cover for a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan disguised as humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Taiwan’s outlying areas could be highly susceptible to this type of Chinese NWMA. The Taiwanese government and people have not remained complacent to the threat of Chinese military action. During Taiwan’s 2023 Han Kuang military exercise, the Taiwanese military included its first military exercise to defend the country’s main airport in additional to regular air-raid and amphibious assault preparations[10]. Public polling in Taiwan as indicates an increased interest in defending the island, in particular after the Russian invasion of Ukraine[11]. Preparation however may not stop China if it feels conditions are in its favor to take Taiwan.

Examining Disaster Aid as Cover for a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwan

divergentoptions.org · by Divergent Options · August 14, 2023

Editor’s Note: This article is part of our 2023 Writing Contest called The Taiwan Offensive, which took place from March 1, 2023 to July 31, 2023. More information about the contest can be found by clicking here.

Michael A. Cappelli II is a U.S. Army All Source Intelligence Analyst that has a BA in Asian Studies and Political Science from Rice University. He has learned about Cross Strait issues from the perspectives of all parties involved through his studies in both mainland China and Taiwan., attendance of GIS Taiwan, and internship at the Baker Institute for Public Policy. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title: Examining Disaster Aid as Cover for a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwan

Date Originally Written: July 12, 2023.

Date Originally Published: August 14, 2023.

Author and / or Article Point of View: The author is a member of the US military currently serving in the Indo-Pacific and draws on his experience in Cross Strait issues.

Summary: China’s aggressive actions make the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan seem inevitable. However, it is possible that China may use Non-War Military Activities (NWMA) to unify with Taiwan[1]. In particular, China may use humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as cover for a fait accompli to gain territory in the Taiwan Strait after a natural disaster.

Text: Taiwan’s location in the western Pacific makes it a disaster-prone area. Typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis are of particular concern, with local sources indicating Taiwan ranks first in the world in natural disaster risk[2]. While a natural disaster, such as a typhoon, is hard to predict, the situation would provide excellent cover for Chinese NWMA. Climate change is expected to contribute to more extreme weather events in the region, and Taiwan’s geographic proximity to China makes humanitarian response an excellent guise for PLA action against Taiwanese controlled territory.

A Chinese fait accompli disguised as humanitarian aid and disaster relief will likely take on a multidomain approach, with land, sea, air and cyber warfare entities working to take territory and disrupt an already overburdened Taiwanese disaster response. Damage to undersea communications cables near Taiwan’s Matsu Islands in spring 2023 indicates that China is practicing ways to disrupt communication between Taiwan and its outlying areas[3]. Even if China is unable to take Taiwan itself, outlying islands such as Kinmen and Penghu would provide strategic and symbolic gains for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The capture of Penghu would be especially beneficial to the PLA, giving Chinese forces territory halfway between the mainland and southern Taiwan to help secure supply lines, stage troops and weapons platforms, and extend anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities for a future invasion of Taiwan[4]. A Chinese fait accompli against outlying, Taiwanese territory would also present a good test of international reaction to Chinese military action against the Taiwan government.

While a push on Taiwan itself through NWMA would be significantly more difficult, it is not outside the realm of possibility. China’s continued activities within Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), and major military exercises show the PLA is capable of launching air and naval units into the seas and airspace around Taiwan with the goal of not only taking Taiwan but also keeping outside military intervention at bay[5]. These regular, grey zone excursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ by the PLA would also make it more difficult to detect the difference between another PLA exercise and a legitimate PLA push on Taiwan.

To prepare for a possible Chinese fait accompli disguised as humanitarian aid and disaster relief, Taiwan will need to ensure it has resilient critical infrastructure. Taiwan’s ability to recover quickly from a natural disaster would lessen Chinese justification for NWMA and reduce the PLA’s window of opportunity to do so. This plan is not without risk. A focus on critical infrastructure in outlying territories may result in wasted resources, equipment, and specially trained personnel positioned in difficult to defend areas. In contrast, resiliency in Taiwan’s outlying islands may prove a deterrent to Chinese military action by creating a level of uncertainty in Chinese mission success. Even if China is not deterred, the PLA could miscalculate the forces need to take Taiwan’s outlying islands[6]. Such a miscalculation could result in a military disaster and force the PLA to over commit units to taking these outlying territories instead of Taiwan itself. This could provide Taiwan the opportunity to push back China, possibly with international support.

Taiwan could also improve civilian preparedness and disaster recovery. Traditionally, the Taiwanese military acts as the primary first responder to natural disasters[7]. Opportunity does exist to transition disaster response away from military units, especially with Taiwan working to boost civil defense preparedness amongst the general population in case of a war with China[8]. Private, civil defense preparation programs for civilians, with some emphasis on disaster relief, are also increasing in popularity[9]. There is risk involved with this strategy. Shifting natural disaster response away from the Taiwanese military may result in reduced disaster response efficiency. This may also prolong a natural disaster’s impact, increasing the very justification China would need to conduct a humanitarian aid and disaster relief based fait accompli.

While a natural disaster is hard to predict, it could provide excellent cover for a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan disguised as humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Taiwan’s outlying areas could be highly susceptible to this type of Chinese NWMA. The Taiwanese government and people have not remained complacent to the threat of Chinese military action. During Taiwan’s 2023 Han Kuang military exercise, the Taiwanese military included its first military exercise to defend the country’s main airport in additional to regular air-raid and amphibious assault preparations[10]. Public polling in Taiwan as indicates an increased interest in defending the island, in particular after the Russian invasion of Ukraine[11]. Preparation however may not stop China if it feels conditions are in its favor to take Taiwan.

Endnotes:

[1] Bilms, K. (2022, January 26). Beyond War and Peace: The PLA’s “Non-War Military Activities” Concept. Retrieved from: https://mwi.usma.edu/beyond-war-and-peace-the-plas-non-war-military-activities-concept/.

[2] Taoyuan Disaster Education Center. (2023, July 27). Natural Hazards. Retrieved from: https://tydec.tyfd.gov.tw/EN/About/Area/Area_A.

[3] Hsu, J. and Mok, C. (2023, May 31). Taiwan’s island internet cutoff highlights infrastructure risks. Retrieved from: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Taiwan-s-island-internet-cutoff-highlights-infrastructure-risks.

[4] Chang, S. and Bailey, R. (2022, June 16). Control Without Invasion: Other Actions China Could Take Against Taiwan. Retrieved from: https://www.barrons.com/news/control-without-invasion-other-actions-china-could-take-against-taiwan-01655438409.

[5] Blanchard, B. and Lee, Y. (2023, April 10). China ends Taiwan drills after practicing blockades, precision strikes. Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-following-chinas-taiwan-drills-with-great-interest-2023-04-10/.

[6] Brimelow, B. (2022, December 28). Taiwan’s remote islands are on the frontline with China – sometimes only a few hundred yards from Chinese troops. Retrieved from: https://www.businessinsider.com/taiwans-outlying-islands-are-on-the-frontline-with-china-2022-12.

[7] Chiang, A. (2018). Taiwan’s Natural Disaster Response and Military – Civilian Partnerships. Global Taiwan Brief, 3 (10). Retrieved from: https://globaltaiwan.org/2018/05/taiwans-natural-disaster-response-and-military-civilian-partnerships/.

[8] Yeh, J. (2023, June 13). Military releases new civil defense handbook amid backlash. Retrieved from: https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202306130007.

[9] Hsiao, R. (2022). Taiwan’s Bottom-Up Approach to Civil Defense Preparedness. Global Taiwan Brief, 7 (10). Retrieved from: https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/09/taiwans-bottom-up-approach-to-civil-defense-preparedness/.

[10] CNA. (2023, July 27). Military Conducts first anti-takeover drills at Taoyuan. Taipei Times. Retrieved from: https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2023/07/27/2003803809.

[11] Wu, C., Yeh, Y., Chen, F., and Wang, A. (2023, February 22). Why NGOs Are Boosting Support for the Self-Defense in Taiwan. Retrieved from: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-ngos-are-boosting-support-self-defense-taiwan-206240.

divergentoptions.org · by Divergent Options · August 14, 2023

11. China driving Marcos deeper into American arms

As Bonaparte said: "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."

Excerpts:

In the Philippines, public opinion is often king and could eventually force the president’s hands. If the status quo persists, Marcos will have no choice but to further enhance military cooperation with the US to better defend his country’s position in the South China Sea.

He may also seek the Pentagon’s assistance – even if indirectly through security guarantees in the event of potential clashes with China – to refurbish Philippine facilities in the Spratlys.

By resorting to intimidation tactics rather than providing meaningful concessions and incentives, Beijing may have inadvertently alienated a potential ally in one of the most strategically situated nations in the Indo-Pacific, with major implications for the trajectory of US-China rivalry in the region.

China driving Marcos deeper into American arms

Beijing’s toughening stance on South China Sea disputes is unifying Filipino political elite on need for stronger US defense cooperation

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · August 11, 2023

MANILA – “I’m not aware of any such arrangement or agreement that the Philippines will remove from its own territory its ship,” Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr said when asked about China’s recent request for the removal of the BRP Sierra Madre grounded vessel from the contested Second Thomas Shoal.

“And let me go further: If there does exist such an agreement, I rescind that agreement now,” Marcos added, the latest fusillade in the leader’s tough stand on China amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea.

The Filipino president was responding to claims by the Chinese Foreign Ministry on August 7 following yet another major incident in the maritime area that Manila had “promised several times” to tow the Sierra Madre away “but has yet to act.”

Over the weekend, Philippine authorities released footage showing China Coast Guard ships blocking and harassing Philippine resupply vessels approaching the Second Thomas Shoal, where a detachment of Philippine marines are stationed over the rusty, half-sunken ship.

China has denied blocking resupply of food and water supplies, but it has defended its latest action by accusing Manila of efforts to transfer construction materials to the area.

The Sierra Madre, a rusted warship that has been grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal since 1999, has been kept in place as a way to reinforce the Philippine claim to the shoal. Photo: Asia Times files / AFP via Getty / Jay Directo

While China has engaged in massive reclamation activities in the disputed sea, it has at the same time opposed any similar efforts by rival claimant states. The Asian powerhouse has also opposed the Philippines’ recent efforts to expand military cooperation with the United States under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

The recently enhanced agreement gives US troops rotational access to Philippine bases, including strategic facilities situated close to Taiwan. Speculation has grown in recent months that the US may eventually seek to preposition weapons pointed toward China on Philippine soil.

Confronting growing harassment by Chinese vessels in the South China Sea, top senators and political figures in the Philippines are egging on Marcos to adopt even tougher measures vis-a-vis Beijing. As a result, the notoriously conflict-averse Filipino leader is being forced to harden his line towards China.

Shifting mood

By all indications, the Marcos administration’s foreign policy pivot toward the United States has taken China by surprise. Just weeks after a high-profile state visit to Beijing, Marcos greenlighted an expanded EDCA with the US. Months later, he traveled to the White House and the Pentagon to upgrade bilateral defense ties further.

To be sure, the Filipino president did repeatedly seek to reassure China by vowing that EDCA sites would not be weaponized by the Pentagon. His top defense officials also downplayed the proximity of some of the EDCA sites to Taiwan’s southern shores, emphasizing that Philippine defensive capability development was the main focus of growing cooperation with the United States.

Public statements, however, indicate that China is unconvinced. In a direct challenge to Marcos’s mandate, former president Rodrigo Duterte accepted an invitation to visit top Chinese leaders including President Xi Jinping in Beijing, reportedly to mediate rising tensions.

In recent months, the popular former president has wasted no opportunities to criticize his successor’s pro-US foreign policy, most notably the enhanced EDCA, as unnecessarily provocative toward China and potentially devastating for Philippine sovereignty.

Aside from exerting pressure on Marcos via pro-Beijing figures in the Philippines, China has also upped the ante in the South China Sea. Ever since the Philippines cleared an expanded EDCA with the US, Chinese vessels have engaged in various forms of intimidation against Philippine counterparts.

Beijing’s tough tactics, including the Chinese Coast Guard’s recent use of water cannons against Philippine resupply ships destined for the Second Thomas Shoal, have galvanized Manila’s political elite.

“I’m begging you to stop bullying Filipinos,” exclaimed Philippine Senator Christopher “Bong” Go during a particularly spirited speech earlier this year.

“Just because we are a small country we will be oppressed? Don’t do that!” said Go, vice-chairman of the Senate Committee on National Defense. “Let’s maintain respect. We will fight for what is ours. What is ours is ours. That’s ours. So stop using violence or bullying.”

What makes Go’s comments particularly noteworthy is that the senator is the de facto right-hand man of former president Duterte.

Go, who is of Chinese-Filipino descent, repeatedly accompanied Duterte during trips to Beijing in order to elevate bilateral strategic ties. But now, even this top advocate of Philippine-China relations has begun adopting a more critical stance, at least in public.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr (L) and his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte (R) don’t see eye to eye on China. Image: Twitter Screengrab / ABS-CBN

Other key Duterte allies have adopted similar lines. Senator Francis Tolentino, former political affairs secretary under Duterte, has been a leading advocate of stronger defense ties with Western allies.

Earlier this year, he even called for a “new quadrilateral” security alliance with Australia, Japan and the US to counter China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

Following the latest incident in the disputed waters, other pro-administration stalwarts have also taken harder lines.

“China’s bullying only promotes discord and instability, which does not do well for regional peace and harmony,” said Senator Ramon Revilla Jr, another key Duterte ally. “We have long advocated for a coexistence built on respect and amity. And with this incident, we must put our foot down and draw the line where the safety and interest of our countrymen are endangered.”

Radical measures

Senators JV Ejercito and Joel Villanueva, who belong to the majority bloc in the 24-member Senate, have called on the Marcos administration to ramp up measures against China while enhancing the country’s defensive capabilities.

In fact, there seems to be growing support for opposition Senator Risa Hontiveros’s earlier call to take China to the United Nations over there South China Sea disputes, as well as pursue joint patrols with Southeast Asian claimant states in the contested waters.

Senate President Juan Miguel Zubiri cited China’s recent “atrocities” as a reason to consider more extreme measures beyond the hundreds of notes verbales filed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to Beijing against China’s various actions in the disputed waters.

“Those acts done were completely illegal and therefore a complaint should be filed under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with the UN,” said Zubiri.

“Not just notes verbale. With due respect to the DFA, with the number of notes verbale – with the number of diplomatic protests – we can gift wrap the Chinese embassy in Metro Manila yet we are still ignored,” the Senate president added, underscoring the hardening stance among the Philippine political elite on the issue.

Top political figures have also called on the government to start refurbishing the Philippine position on the ground, most especially the grounded vessel in the Second Thomas Shoal.

Under the Duterte administration, the Philippines upgraded its facilities across the Spratly group of islands, most notably on Thitu Island, which hosts a relatively large Filipino community composed of both civilians and military personnel.

But refurbishing the Sierra Madre vessel in the disputed area risks provoking an even more aggressive response from Beijing. So far, Marcos seems determined to avoid direct clashes with China, but he will also have to contend with growing public pressure.

An authoritative survey released earlier this year showed that more than eight out of 10 Filipinos want the government to seek US assistance to better defend the Philippines’ position in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, a more recent survey by the New York-based Eurasia Group consultancy showed that 69.8% of respondents held negative views of China.

This photo taken by the Philippine Coast Guard shows Chinese vessels anchored at the Whitsun Reef 175 nautical miles west of Bataraza in Palawan in the South China Sea. Photo: AFP

In the Philippines, public opinion is often king and could eventually force the president’s hands. If the status quo persists, Marcos will have no choice but to further enhance military cooperation with the US to better defend his country’s position in the South China Sea.

He may also seek the Pentagon’s assistance – even if indirectly through security guarantees in the event of potential clashes with China – to refurbish Philippine facilities in the Spratlys.

By resorting to intimidation tactics rather than providing meaningful concessions and incentives, Beijing may have inadvertently alienated a potential ally in one of the most strategically situated nations in the Indo-Pacific, with major implications for the trajectory of US-China rivalry in the region.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @Richeydarian

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · August 11, 2023

12. The Biden-Iran Hostage Deal

The key counterpoints to the deal:

Money is fungible, as the White House knows, and its “humanitarian purposes” line is best understood as political cover to justify the money-for-hostages deal. In a competition for the funds between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the public health of the Iranian people, who do you think wins?

Iran will use the cash the same way it did the money it received from the Barack Obama-John Kerry 2015 nuclear deal—to spread mayhem in the Middle East and beyond.

Some of it will go to finance the Shiite militias in Iraq that have targeted and killed Americans. Some will likely go to build more drones and missiles that Iran is delivering to Russia to use against Ukraine. The White House recently dispatched more aircraft and 3,000 Marines and Navy personnel to the Middle East to deter Iranian seizures of commercial ships.

The hostages deal would in effect finance Iranian aggression against the U.S. and its allies that the U.S. is spending billions of dollars to counter. It’s no accident that one of the five Americans currently held by Iran, Siamak Namazi, was snatched not long after that 2015 deal was struck. Tehran was grabbing new chits for its next ransom demand. “We’ve been taken for one reason and one reason only—and that’s because we’re U.S. citizens,” Mr. Namazi told CNN this year.

This is the dilemma in all these deals:

The plight of imprisoned Americans is awful, and the decision of what to give up in return for their release is difficult for any President. We’ve been forgiving of prisoner swaps. But rewarding Iran with money for hostages amounts to financing its malign activities and encouraging it to take more American prisoners

Just as an aside, our adversaries exploit what they perceive as an American weakness - our values – and one of those values is to bring Americans home. What we must do is show that our values are our strengths. That requires sound and consistent policy and the effective use of information to reinforce those policies (and most importantly the right actions to reinforce policies).

The Biden-Iran Hostage Deal

The U.S. is poised to hand over a $6 billion ransom for five Americans.

The Editorial Board

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-biden-iran-hostage-deal-house-arrest-middle-east-jail-sanctions-evin-prison-3d736837?mod=hp_opin_pos_4#cxrecs_s

An Iranian woman walks next to an anti-US mural in a street in Tehran, June 12. PHOTO: ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH/SHUTTERSTOCK

Readers of a certain age will remember the uproar when the Reagan Administration was caught trying to trade arms for hostages with Iran. Well, the Biden Administration seems prepared to hand over $6 billion to Iran’s ruling mullahs in return for five Americans it has taken prisoner to get precisely this kind of ransom. Iran keeps raising the price for its hostage-taking, and the U.S. keeps paying it.

The White House said late last week that Iran has moved four Americans to house arrest from Evin Prison. A fifth American was already under house arrest. “We will continue to monitor their condition as closely as possible. Of course, we will not rest until they are all back home in the United States,” White House spokeswoman Adrienne Watson said.

“Until that time, negotiations for their eventual release remain ongoing and are delicate. We will, therefore, have little in the way of details to provide about the state of their house arrest or about our efforts to secure their freedom,” she added.

This is good news for the unjustly detained people and their families. But if they are released, the mooted price will be steep. Leaks from the Administration suggest that Iran will gain access to $6 billion of its frozen assets in an account in South Korea. That’s $1.2 billion a hostage.

White House spokesman John Kirby told CBS News on Thursday that Iran will only be able to use the $6 billion for “humanitarian purposes,” such as food and medicine. The Administration also says there will be no sanctions relief in this hostage deal.

But that’s a semantic distinction without much of a difference. Why were the funds frozen if not as a sanction against Tehran? That’s certainly how Iran sees it. “The decision on how to utilize these unfrozen resources and financial assets lies with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” said the foreign ministry in Tehran.

Money is fungible, as the White House knows, and its “humanitarian purposes” line is best understood as political cover to justify the money-for-hostages deal. In a competition for the funds between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the public health of the Iranian people, who do you think wins?

Iran will use the cash the same way it did the money it received from the Barack Obama-John Kerry 2015 nuclear deal—to spread mayhem in the Middle East and beyond.

Some of it will go to finance the Shiite militias in Iraq that have targeted and killed Americans. Some will likely go to build more drones and missiles that Iran is delivering to Russia to use against Ukraine. The White House recently dispatched more aircraft and 3,000 Marines and Navy personnel to the Middle East to deter Iranian seizures of commercial ships.

The hostages deal would in effect finance Iranian aggression against the U.S. and its allies that the U.S. is spending billions of dollars to counter. It’s no accident that one of the five Americans currently held by Iran, Siamak Namazi, was snatched not long after that 2015 deal was struck. Tehran was grabbing new chits for its next ransom demand. “We’ve been taken for one reason and one reason only—and that’s because we’re U.S. citizens,” Mr. Namazi told CNN this year.

The hostages deal may also be the first step toward a larger agreement to revive at least some of the 2015 nuclear pact. That mooted agreement would ease sanctions on Iran in return for an Iranian promise to freeze its enrichment of uranium, which has been proceeding toward weapons-grade.

It isn’t clear from the Administration’s media leaks whether Iran would allow any new or more intrusive inspections of its nuclear sites, but don’t count on that. Iran knows Mr. Biden wants to push any crisis over Iran’s nuclear program past the 2024 election. This new informal nuclear deal sounds like a less enforceable version of the 2015 pact. Call it money and sanctions relief for promises, and don’t expect Congress to have any say in approving it.

The plight of imprisoned Americans is awful, and the decision of what to give up in return for their release is difficult for any President. We’ve been forgiving of prisoner swaps. But rewarding Iran with money for hostages amounts to financing its malign activities and encouraging it to take more American prisoners.

The latest Iran deal is a win-win

defenseone.com · by Ryan Costello

A 2020 photo shows medicine bottles at Rasoul Akram Hospital in Tehran, Iran. Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

A complicated prisoner swap should ease drug shortages that are killing ordinary Iranians—and put new pressure on Tehran’s leaders.

Thursday’s furlough of Iranian-American dual nationals unjustly detained in Iran appears to herald another multistep U.S.-Iranian prisoner-swap deal. According to reports, the United States will unfreeze nearly $6 billion that had been held under U.S. sanctions in a South Korean bank and allow it to be deposited into a Qatari bank. The Qatari government will then oversee Iranian requests to use the funds to purchase food and medicine, which are non-sanctionable goods. While critics are already crying foul, such an arrangement is a smart use of leverage and a win-win for the people of Iran and the United States.

Underlying these complicated diplomatic maneuverings is a perverse and entirely preventable reality: life-saving medicine has become increasingly unavailable in Iran, even as billions of dollars in Iranian assets sit frozen in banks across the globe. From specialized medications to treat blood diseases and cancer, to more basic items like cough syrup and antibiotics, drugs that so many around the world take for granted are desperately needed by Iranians. Some 170 to 180 types of medications are scarce now, a number that is likely to grow, according to Hossein Ali Shahriari, who leads the Parliament’s Health and Treatment Commission. Desperate patients are paying high prices, sometimes traveling long distances, and increasingly turning to the black market to obtain their medicine.

Sanctions are not the only reason that medicine is increasingly scarce, but they are the primary cause. By restricting access to the banking system and hard currency, the sanctions are preventing Iran from obtaining medicine and raw materials to produce many drugs domestically.

This hasn’t always been the case. The brief period in which the 2015 nuclear deal was implemented brought a sharp reduction in medicine shortages. But this changed after Donald Trump withdrew from the deal and sought to impose “maximum pressure” on Iran. In 2018, sanctions expert Elizabeth Rosenberg noted: “What’s different is that the U.S. has reimposed the sanctions it lifted pursuant to the nuclear deal and it has layered on many more, including doing things like designating some Iranian financial institutions not previously designated and that were previously used to facilitate food, medicine and medical imports.”

To be sure, the Trump administration took some small steps ostensibly aimed at enabling Iranian drug imports, and the Iranian government has demonstrably failed to prioritize the health and well-being of its citizens. But the artificial economies that sanctions have created have driven corruption to new heights, enabling smuggling networks inside Iran to reap enormous profits at the expense of ordinary Iranians.

Corruption and sanctions are inextricably linked: academic literature on sanctions on diverse countries including Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Iran all indicate that sanctions expand the shadow economy and incentivize the state to engage in corruption and smuggling in sanctioned goods. As the Global Initiative Network wrote in a report on Iran’s shadow economy, “for criminal networks and state actors, sanctions represent an opportunity to generate huge revenues, which in the case of the state is used to prop up the economy, pay patronage networks and support various proxies in the region.”

Networks linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in particular have benefited from sanctions-created scarcity. Cross-border smuggling operations that netted an estimated $12 billion per year before the nuclear deal are thought to be generating far more today. Additionally, the gaming of differing government exchange rates by corrupt actors helped drive a shortage of insulin in 2020.

All this puts U.S. policymakers in a difficult position. Sanctions ostensibly targeting the Iranian state fail to harm the well-connected elite, who find new ways to profit through the shadow economy. But ordinary people are hit doubly: first by the impact of sanctions on the economy as a whole, and second by predatory smuggling networks that raise the price and lower the availability of medicine and other key goods like medicine.

Releasing frozen funds to alleviate shortages of medicine is a smarter way to put pressure on the Iranian government. Deprived of sanctions as a scapegoat for the scarcity, Iran’s leaders must alleviate it promptly or risk renewed mass outrage from its citizenry.

Moreover, Congressional sanctions on Iran all include explicit exemptions for humanitarian trade. Sec. 1245 of the FY12 NDAA, targeting Iranian oil sales, explicitly says “The President may not impose sanctions…with respect to any person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran.” By Congress’ own direction, Iran’s restricted funds should be permitted to be exchanged for humanitarian purchases.

Even if other elements of the mutual de-escalation are weighed down by poisonous politics in Washington and Tehran, Biden would be doing right by U.S. interests to free up Iran’s frozen assets for humanitarian purchases and secure the release of Iranian-Americans detained in Iran. In pushing the Trump administration to open up humanitarian channels with Iran during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, Biden rightly said, “Whatever our many, many disagreements with the Iranian government, it’s the right and the humane thing to do.”

The same is true with helping Iranians secure medicine amid massive shortages today. Sanctions relief is the right and humane policy to pursue.

14. Two years after fall of Kabul, tens of thousands of Afghans languish in limbo waiting for US visas

Two years after fall of Kabul, tens of thousands of Afghans languish in limbo waiting for US visas

BY RAHIM FAIEZ AND REBECCA SANTANA

Updated 1:03 AM EDT, August 11, 2023

AP · August 11, 2023

ISLAMABAD (AP) — When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, Shukria Sediqi knew her days in safety were numbered. As a journalist who advocated for women’s rights, she’d visited shelters and safe houses to talk to women who had fled abusive husbands. She went with them to court when they asked for a divorce.

According to the Taliban, who bar women from most public places, jobs and education, her work was immoral.

So when the Taliban swept into her hometown of Herat in western Afghanistan in August 2021 as the U.S. was pulling out of the country, she and her family fled.

First they tried to get on one of the last American flights out of Kabul. Then they tried to go to Tajikistan but had no visas. Finally in October 2021, after sleeping outside for two nights at the checkpoint into Pakistan among crowds of Afghans fleeing the Taliban, she and her family made it into the neighboring country.

The goal? Resettling in the U.S. via an American government program set up to help Afghans at risk under the Taliban because of their work with the U.S. government, media and aid agencies.

But two years after the U.S. left Afghanistan, Sediqi and tens of thousands of others are still waiting. While there has been some recent progress, processing U.S. visas for Afghans has moved painfully slowly. So far, only a small portion of Afghans have been resettled.

Many of the applicants who fled Afghanistan are running through savings, living in limbo in exile. They worry that the U.S., which had promised so much, has forgotten them.

“What happens to my children? What happens to me?” Sediqi asked. “Nobody knows.”

—

During two decades in Afghanistan after its 2001 invasion, the U.S. relied on Afghans helping the U.S. government and military. Afghan journalists went to work at a growing number of media outlets. Afghans, often women working in remote areas, were the backbone of aid programs providing everything from food to tutoring.

Since 2009, the U.S. has had a special immigrant visa program to help Afghans like interpreters who worked directly with the U.S. government and the military.

Then, in the waning days of the U.S. presence in the country, the Biden administration created two new programs for refugees, expanding the number of Afghans who could apply to resettle in the U.S.

The visas, known as P-1 and P-2, are for aid workers, journalists or others who didn’t work directly for the U.S. government but who helped promote goals like democracy and an independent media that put them at risk under the Taliban.

The programs were intended to help people like Enayatullah Omid and his wife — Afghans who helped build the country after the 2001 Taliban ouster and were at “risk due to their U.S. affiliation” once the U.S. withdrew.

In 2011, Omid started a radio station in Baghlan province with the help of the U.S.-based media training nonprofit Internews and funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development. He was the station’s general manager but did everything from reporting on-air to sweeping the floors at night. His wife, Homaira Omid Amiri, also worked at the station and was an activist in the province.

When the Taliban entered Baghlan on Aug. 9, 2021, Omid said he did one last thing: He burned documents to keep the Taliban from identifying his staff. Then he and his wife fled.

They stayed at shelters arranged by a committee to protect Afghan journalists until the Taliban shut them down. Internews referred Omid to the U.S. refugee program in the spring of 2022. Told he had to leave Afghanistan for his case to proceed, Omid and his wife went to Pakistan in July 2022.

Even in Pakistan Omid doesn’t feel safe. Worried about the Taliban’s reach, he’s moved three times. There are police raids targeting Afghans whose visas have run out. As he spoke to The Associated Press, he was getting text messages about raids in another Islamabad neighborhood and wondered how much he should tell his already stressed wife.

He said America has a saying: Leave no one behind.

“We want them to do it. It shouldn’t be only a saying for them,” he said.

—

The American airlift in August 2021 carried more than 70,000 Afghans to safety, along with tens of thousands of Americans and citizens of other countries — plane after plane loaded with the lucky ones who managed to make their way through the massive crowds encircling Kabul airport. Most gained entry to the U.S. under a provision known as humanitarian parole.

Many more are still waiting. There are about 150,000 applicants to the special immigrant visa programs — not including family members. A report by the Association of Wartime Allies said at the current rate it would take 31 years to process them all.

Separately, there are 27,400 Afghans who are in the pipeline for the two refugee programs created in the final days of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, according to the State Department. That doesn’t include family members, which potentially adds tens of thousands more. But since the U.S. left Afghanistan it’s only admitted 6,862 of these Afghan refugees, mostly P-1 and P-2 visa applicants, according to State Department figures.

In June, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the U.S. has relocated about 24,000 Afghans since September 2021, apparently referring to all the resettlement programs combined.

Among the refugee program applicants are about 200 AP employees and their families, as well as staff of other American news organizations still struggling to relocate to the U.S.

Krish O’Mara Vignarajah, president and CEO of the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, said the U.S. refugee process in general can be agonizingly slow, and waits of as long as 10 years are common. Furthermore, former U.S. President Donald Trump gutted the refugee system, lowering the annual number of accepted refugees to its lowest ever.

Other challenges are unique to Afghan immigrants, said Vignarajah. Many Afghans destroyed documents during the Taliban takeover because they worried about reprisals. Now they need them to prove their case.

“The grim reality is that they’ll likely be waiting for years on end and often in extremely precarious situations,” Vignarajah said.

In a recent report, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, a body created by Congress to oversee government spending in Afghanistan, faulted the various resettlement programs set up for Afghans.

“Bureaucratic dysfunction and understaffing have undermined U.S. promises that these individuals would be protected in a timely manner, putting many thousands of Afghan allies at high risk,” the report said.

It also criticized the lack of transparency surrounding the refugee programs, which it said has left Afghans considering whether to leave their country to await processing without “critical information” they need for such a crucial decision.

In a sign of the confusion surrounding the process, applicants like Omid and his wife were told they had to leave Afghanistan to apply, a costly endeavor involving selling their possessions, going to another country and waiting. They, like many others, ended up in Pakistan — one of the few countries that allows Afghans in — only to discover the U.S. was not processing refugee applications there.

That changed late last month when the State Department said it would begin processing applications in Pakistan.

However, Congress has so far failed to act on a bill that seeks to improve efforts to help Afghans still struggling to get to America.

The State Department declined an AP request for an interview but said in a statement it is committed to processing Afghan refugee visas. In June, Blinken applauded the efforts that have gone into helping Afghans resettle in America but emphasized the work continues.

At the same time, the Biden administration has made progress in recovering from the Trump-era curtailment of the refugee system. The administration raised the cap on refugees admitted to the U.S. to 125,000 a year, compared to Trump’s 15,000 in his final year in office. It’s unlikely the Biden administration will reach the cap this year, but the number of refugees and Afghans admitted is increasing.

Shawn VanDiver, who heads a coalition supporting Afghan resettlement efforts called #AfghanEvac, said he doesn’t agree with criticism that the refugee programs are a failure.

They have gotten off to a “really slow start and there are vulnerable people that are waiting for this much needed relief,” he said. “But I also know that ... from my conversations with government, that there is movement happening to push on this.”

__

Left with little information, Afghans in Pakistan compare what they hear from U.S. officials about their cases in What’s App chat groups that have organized social media protests demanding swifter U.S. action.

“Avoid putting our lives in danger again,” one post read.

Pakistan was already home to millions of Afghans who fled decades of conflict when the Taliban returned to power and an estimated 600,000 more surged into the country. While many had valid travel documents, renewing them is a lengthy and costly process. Raids looking for Afghans with expired visas have heightened tensions.

Abdul, who declined to give his surname for fear of arrest because his visa has expired, worked as head of security for an aid group in Afghanistan that specialized in economic help for women. The risks were enormous; three colleagues were killed while he worked there.

One of his last tasks was getting the group’s foreign staff to the airport to escape. The organization stayed open into 2022, when the Taliban detained Abdul for two weeks. After his release, a Taliban member said he could protect his family — if Abdul gave him his daughter in marriage.

Abdul knew it was time to leave. He, his wife and children fled that night to Iran. Late last year, when they were told their referral to one of the refugee programs had been approved, they went to Pakistan. Since then, there’s been no information.

Their visas now expired, the family is terrified to leave the house.

“The future is completely dark,” Abdul said. “I’m not afraid to die, I’m just really worried about the future of my children.”

—

Santana reported from Washington. AP reporters Munir Ahmed in Islamabad and Ellen Knickmeyer in Washington contributed.

AP · August 11, 2023

15. Extend the Pentagon’s ban on China’s consumer drones

Extend the Pentagon’s ban on China’s consumer drones

BY MARK MONTGOMERY

SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

AUGUST 14, 2023 06:00 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Mark Montgomery

DJI Mini 3 Pro quadcopter drone Nicolas Economou/NurPhoto via Getty Images

The rest of the federal government—and state and local agencies and even private-sector infrastructure companies—should quit using this Chinese technology.

As a former Director of Operations at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, my birthday wish would be to have U.S. drones comprehensively map China's infrastructure and download it to my targeting team. My war-planning counterpart in the People’s Liberation Army might be able to make that wish come true—unless we get serious about the threat of Chinese-made commercial drones that operate in the United States.

The People’s Republic of China is investing heavily to advance consumer-drone technology and secure global market domination for its manufacturers. National-security concerns about the use of these drones and the data they gather led the Defense Department in 2018 to forbid their use in the department and in 2022 to place the most prominent of the manufacturers—Shenzhen-based DJI—on a blacklist of companies believed to have ties to the Chinese military.

Those concerns have only deepened, and along several axes.

First, drones can be used to surveil sensitive locations—and Chinese-made ones cannot be trusted to keep out. Numerous PRC-made drones have been detected in restricted U.S. airspace, including over Washington, D.C., despite DJI’s claim that their drone design includes geofencing restrictions to avoid sensitive locations. Drones made by Autel Robotics, another prominent manufacturer, do not even have geofence restrictions.

Second, DJI drones and their software “leak” potentially dangerous data. In 2017, a programmer participating in a DJI bug-bounty program found that the company had stored various customer data insecurely—including driver’s license information, photographs, and flight logs uploaded from users associated with the U.S. government and military. And just a few months ago, researchers reverse-engineered the radio signals of DJI drones, revealing that DJI drones’ communications transmit their own GPS location and the GPS coordinates of its operators.

Third, and most concerning, is the five-year-old law that requires Chinese companies to provide any requested information to PRC intelligence agencies and to conceal that they did so. This National Intelligence Law of 2017 obliges PRC drone companies to provide whatever information they gather. This could include flight logs, users’ sensitive data, and drone operators’ geolocation.

As Chinese-made drones crisscross the country, they fly over and near power transmission lines and other infrastructure assets. If the drones could pass this information to China, it would fill in gaps that PRC reconnaissance satellites cannot address, and could enable attacks on critical U.S. infrastructure.

Yet PRC-made drones remain widely used in the United States. Law enforcement, medical services, meteorological agencies, environmental and oil and gas companies, and other critical infrastructure operators use them for aerial photography, videography, surveying, and more. DJI works with Axon—a public-safety-equipment manufacturer—to develop drones for state and local law enforcement. Autel, whose products are the drone of choice for several law enforcement agencies, is also supplier to the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce and an eager advertiser to border-security and coastal-patrol agencies.

Some federal agencies and states have already begun to act. In 2020, the Department of the Interior temporarily grounded its fleet of DJI drones, citing security concerns. Similar concerns were expressed by DoD and other entities over fears of data leakage or unauthorized access to sensitive locations. This March, a coalition of senators asked the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to investigate the risks associated with PRC-made drones, including the exploitation of sensitive information. As of May, seven states, including Florida and Arkansas, have grounded their DJI drones and banned PRC-made drones over fears of spying by U.S. adversaries.

But more action is needed. The White House should order the Commerce Department and DoD to conduct an extensive investigation into all PRC-made drone companies to assess national security risks and add PRC drone companies to the Entity list as appropriate. The Pentagon should add Autel to its blacklist. The Department of Homeland Security should issue updated threat guidance and place restrictions on the use of adversarial drone technologies in certain sectors, including critical infrastructure and state and local organizations. The administration should also consider enabling manufacturing tax credits and tailored federal grants to help law enforcement and other U.S. drone users to replace their made-in-China quadcopters.

The current House-passed NDAA includes a provision (Section 827) expanding the existing statutory restriction on DoD contractors using PRC drones by removing language limiting the existing prohibition to uses “in the performance of a DoD contract.” This provision, which is critical to supporting a whole-of-government campaign against the threat of PRC drones, should pass into law.

16. Special Operations News Update - August 14, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News Update - August 14, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · August 14, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: Royal Marine Commandos and units from partner nations have been training Ukrainian Marines in amphibious operations in the UK since January 2023. Photo courtesy of UK MoD.

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

End of an Era: Last Navy SOF Squadron. The Navy’s last special warfare-dedicated helicopter squadron, the Navy Reserve’s “Firehawks” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 85, held a deactivation ceremony in the squadron’s hangar, June 30. (Navy.mil, 8 Aug 2023).

Exercise Talon Spear. The 27th Special Operations Wing’s Remotely Piloted Aircraft enterprise conducted the first iteration of Exercise Talon Spear, Air Force Special Operations Command’s first Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) collaboration exercise from June 20-23, 2023. “Exercise Talon Spear: Tested for A2E Concept”, DVIDS, June 21, 2023.

193rd SOW Accepts New MC-130J. The Pennsylvania Air National Guard’s 193rd Special Operations Wing accepted a new MC-130J Commando II military aircraft during a July 27 ceremony. The MC-130J Commando II flies clandestine single or multi-ship, low-level infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special operations forces and air refueling missions for special operations helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft. The MC-130J primarily flies missions at night. Its secondary mission includes the airdrop of leaflets. Previously, the 193rd SOW flew the EC-130J Commando Solo with the mission of information operations vai broadcasts on FM, TV, and miltary communications bands. “Pennsylvania Air Guard Gets New Special Ops Aircraft”, National Guard News, August 11, 2023.

Space, Cyber, and IO: Key to Winning. Key leaders in the military say the success of information operations is the most important lesson learned from Ukraine. “Future wars will turn on space-cyber-special operations triad: Army SOF chief”, Defense One, August 8, 2023.

WMD Seminar. U.S. Special Operations Command hosted a seminar in July focused on defining a Department of Defense integrated approach to deter state and non-state actors’ use of weapons of mass destruction. “USSOCOM hosts countering weapons of mass destruction senior leader seminar”, DVIDS, August 9, 2023.

International SOF

RI Leapfest 2023. Paratroopers from the U.S. and around the globe joined together to test their skills and precision in the skies above Rhode Island during Leapfest 2023, the largest static line parachute training event and competition in the world. “Paratroopers Seek Jump Perfection at Leapfest”, DoD News, August 10, 2023.

Ukrainian Marines Trained by UK Royal Marine Commandos. Close to 1,000 marines from Ukraine will return to their home country to fight against the Russians after spending months in the United Kingdom. The Ukrainian marines underwent a rigorous five-week program that included fieldcraft, battlefield first aid, close-quarters combat, fitness, weapons, amphibious operations, beach landings, and small unit operations. “Ukrainian marines to return to fight on frontline after UK-led training complete”, Forces.net, August 11, 2023.

SOF History

On August 10, 1944, Lt. John “Jack” Singlaub parachuted behind German lines with a Jedburgh team to work with the French Resistance fighters or Maquis groups that had swelled the resistance ranks after the D-Day invasion.

History of SOCOM. Randall Stevens provides some details of the history, organization, and mission of United States Special Operations Command (while somehow omitting MARSOC). Read his article in “SOCOM: The Best Result of America’s Worst Special Ops Fail”, Coffee or Die, August 10, 2023.

Operation Acid Gambit. Learn about a secret operation to rescue a Central Intelligence Agency operative, Kurt Muse, from imprisonment during the initial hours of the invasion of Panama in December 1989. “Operation Acid Gambit: Panama, Noriega and a CIA man”, We Are the Mighty, August 10, 2023.

Ukraine Conflict

Ukraine, Afghanistan, and NATO: Success and Failure. William Byrd, Ph.D. writes on how Ukraine and its international supporters succeeding in preventing an outright Russian victory; yet, how it the U.S., NATO, and the Afghan government failed in Afghanistan. “Why Have the Wars in Afghanistan and Ukraine Played Out So Differently?”, United States Institute of Peace, June 23, 2023.

Ukraine Fighting the Ukrainian Way. Lots of national security commentators have been bemoaning the lack of a quick deep strike to the Sea of Azov by Ukrainian forces. Much was made of the ‘western way’ of warfare employing tanks, infantry, engineers, air power, artillery, and other types of combat capabilities into a combined arms approach to attacking the Russians. However, the Ukrainians have settled for small strikes across the entire front for several months and degrading logistic nodes behind the lines; apparently fighting the war ‘their way’. Recent Ukrainian gains have been along two lines of attack (NYT, 12 Aug 2023, subscription) towards the southern coast. In time, once the opportunity presents itself, the Ukrainians may conduct another combined arms advance.

Fighting on the Seas. Many are surpised that the Ukrainians are able to ‘contest’ the Russian presence in the Black Sea. Air and sea-based drones have been successful in striking Russian ports and vessels in recent months.

Fight for Hostomel Airport. “The battle for Hostomel Airport was the first major battle of the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022-present) and a decisive event in the war. This battle started on the morning of February 24 and lasted less than 36 hours. In the opening hours of the Russo-Ukrainian war Russian forces sought to seize a key airfield just 12 miles from the capital’s center. Additional airborne battalions would follow on transport planes. They would rapidly deploy, seek to take control of the city, and overthrow the government or make the leadership flee. Russia ultimately gained control of the airport but failed to achieve the objective of the assault.” “The Battle of Hostomel Airport: A Key Moment in Russia’s Defeat in Kyiv”, War on the Rocks, August 10, 2023.

National Security

Report – The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism. A collaborative effort between the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and the Joint Special Operations University has resulted in a 43-page document that explores evolution of counterterrorism landscape over the past several years. August 2023, PDF.

Report – National Intelligence Strategy 2023. The office of the Director of National Intelligence has posted the new strategy for the U.S. intelligence community. Naturally, China and Russia are recognized as the biggest threats. PDF, 20 pages, August 2023.

The strategy outlines six goals:

Position the IC for intensifying strategic competition
Recruit a talented and diverse workforce
Deliver interoperable and innovative solutions at scale
Diversify, expand, and strengthen partnerships
Expand IC capabilties and expertise on transnational challenges
Enhance resilience

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

Upcoming Events

September 18-23, 2023

5th Special Forces Group Reunion

September 24-28, 2023

Combat Diver Competition

Special Forces Underwater Operations School

October 3, 2023

2023 Virtual MOG Mile

Three Rangers Foundation

October 16-20, 2023

SOAR XLVII

Special Operations Association

Books, Pubs, and Reports

Book – The Kabul Airlift. An Air Force officer has penned a book about the Kabul non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) of August 2021. Over 124,000 Americans, foreign nationals, and Afghans were airlifted out of Afghanistan by the military of the United States and other nations. https://thekabulairlift.com/

Paper – Will to Fight of Private Military Actors: Applying Cognitive Maneuver to Russian Private Forces. A new publication explores several research questions about factors relevant to paramilitary members will to fight and the opportunities the U.S. has to counter adversary employed private military actors. RAND Corporation, August 2023, PDF, 98 pages. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA355-1.html

Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Video – Gen. Lindsay Tribute. General (Ret.) James Lindsay, of Vass, North Carolina, the former Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, 18th Airborne Corps, and the 82nd Airborne Division passed away of natural causes at the age of 90 years old on August 5, 2023. General (Ret.) James Lindsay had a storied career which earned him the Distinguished Service Cross, two Distinguished Service Medals and four Silver Stars in Vietnam. (U.S. Army video by Spc. Alexandra Behne)

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/892823/gen-lindsay-tribute

Podcasts

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command

https://linktr.ee/sofcast

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing

https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command

https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Initiative

https://irregularwarfare.org/category/podcasts/

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

sof.news · by SOF News · August 14, 2023

17. The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism (CTC and JSOU)

Download the 43 page report at this link: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Compound-Era-Report.pdf

Conclusion from the report:

Finally, during this period of transition, the U.S. CT community should embrace experiments and create mechanisms and structures to enable them. One small way this could be done is by holding an annual project concept day, a mechanism for CT community members regardless of level to pitch project ideas, designed to solve a problem or advance a specific U.S. CT priority, to senior CT leaders. A similar event could be run to generate ideas for how new or existing CT programs and policies could be measured and better evaluated, as a way to further U.S. CT prioritization goals.

The current moment is a tough and unique time for U.S. counterterrorism, but it is also an exciting one filled with a lot of opportunities to innovate, evolve, and forge a better and more sustainable path.

The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

ctc.westpoint.edu · by Kristina Hummel · August 9, 2023

The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism

August 09, 2023

Authors:

Don Rassler

Share via:

PDF

The past several years have been a period of transition for the U.S. counterterrorism enterprise. During this time, the United States has had to navigate, and adapt U.S. CT posture and approaches to, a shift in U.S. national security priorities; a complex, diverse, and ever-evolving threat landscape; and ongoing technological change that is transforming the worlds of extremism, terrorism, and counterterrorism.

In addition, the United States has simultaneously been working to define what the next chapter of U.S. counterterrorism should look like and how the U.S. CT community needs to evolve so it can anticipate, understand, and respond to the varied threats it will face in the years ahead.

To help drive change, the United States should frame the counterterrorism moment it finds itself as the compound era of U.S. CT. This new era is being shaped by three primary characteristics: multiple priorities; a broad range of threats, including mixed ones; and a more diverse CT landscape.

How well the United States responds to and adapts to the change and challenges that are occurring across these three areas will have an important bearing on the future effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism.

This report outlines characteristics that define the compound era of U.S. CT and the utility associated with this framing. The body of the report then explores some of the key trends and factors that have been impacting and driving change across the extremism, terrorism, and CT landscapes. The report also discusses some of the implications of these trends and outlines 11 priorities that can help guide the U.S. counterterrorism community’s evolution during this new era.

ctc.westpoint.edu · by Kristina Hummel · August 9, 2023

18. The Pentagon plans to shake up DC’s National Guard

The Pentagon plans to shake up DC’s National Guard

militarytimes.com · by Lolita Baldor · August 13, 2023

The Pentagon is developing plans to restructure the National Guard in Washington, D.C., in a move to address problems highlighted by the chaotic response to the Jan. 6 riot and safety breaches during the 2020 protests over the murder of George Floyd, The Associated Press has learned.

The changes under discussion would transfer the District of Columbia’s aviation units, which came under sharp criticism during the protests when a helicopter flew dangerously low over a crowd. In exchange, the district would get more military police, which is often the city’s most significant need, as it grapples with crowd control and large public events.

Several current and former officials familiar with the talks spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. They said no final decisions have been made.

FILE - A member of the District of Columbia National Guard looks out from a vehicle driving on West Executive Avenue at the White House, Monday, June 1, 2020, in Washington, as demonstrators protest over the death of George Floyd nearby. (Patrick Semansky/AP, File)

A key sticking point is who would be in control of the D.C. Guard — a politically divisive question that gets to the heart of what has been an ongoing, turbulent issue. Across the country, governors control their National Guard units and can make decisions on deploying them to local disasters and other needs. But D.C. is not a state, so the president is in charge but gives that authority to the defense secretary, who generally delegates it to the Army secretary.

According to officials, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin is weighing two options: maintaining the current system or handing control to U.S. Northern Command, which is in charge of homeland defense.

Senior officials have argued in favor of Northern Command, which would take control out of the hands of political appointees in Washington who may be at odds with the D.C. government, and giving it to nonpartisan military commanders who already oversee homeland defense. Others, however, believe the decision-making should remain at the Pentagon, mirroring the civilian control that governors have on their troops.

The overall goal, officials said, is not to decrease the size of the district’s Guard, but reform it and ensure it has the units, equipment and training to do the missions it routinely faces. The proposal to shift the aviation forces is largely an Army decision. It would move the D.C. Air Guard wing and its aircraft to the Maryland Guard, and the Army aviation unit, with its helicopters, to Virginia’s Guard.

An Army official added that a review of the D.C. Guard examined its ability to provide rapid response, mission command and coordination with other forces when needed over the past four years. The review, which led to the recommendations, involved the District Guard and Army leaders.

D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser’s office did not respond to a request for comment Friday on the proposed changes.

But Bowser and other local officials have long claimed that the mayor’s office should have sole authority to deploy the local guard, arguing that the D.C. mayor has the responsibilities of any governor without the extra authorities or tools.

When faced with a potential security event, the mayor of D.C. has to go to the Pentagon — usually the Army secretary — to request National Guard assistance. That was true during the violent protests in the city over the killing of George Floyd at the hands of a police officer in 2020, and later as an angry mob stormed the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, in an effort to overturn the election of Joe Biden as president.

As the Jan. 6 riot was unfolding, city leaders were making frantic calls to Army leaders, asking them to send Guard troops to the Capitol where police and security were being overrun. City leaders complained heatedly about delays in the response as the Pentagon considered Bowser’s National Guard request. City police ended up reinforcing the Capitol Police.

Army leaders, in response, said the district was demanding help but not providing the details and information necessary to determine what forces were needed and how they would be used.

Army officials were concerned about taking the Guard troops who were arrayed around the city doing traffic duty and sending them into a riot, because they were not prepared and didn’t have appropriate gear. And they criticized the city for repeatedly insisting it would not need security help when asked by federal authorities in the days leading up to Jan. 6.

The swirling confusion spurred congressional hearings and accusations that political considerations influenced the Trump administration’s response to the unrest in the Democratic-majority city. Defense officials rejected those charges, and blamed the city.

Within the Pentagon, however, there are broader concerns that D.C. is too quick to seek National Guard troops to augment law enforcement shortfalls in the city that should be handled by police. In recent days, a city council member suggested the D.C. Guard might be needed to help battle spiking local crime.

The restructuring is an effort to smooth out the process and avoid communications problems if another crisis erupts.

An Army investigation in April 2021 sharply criticized the D.C. Guard, saying troops lacked clear guidance and didn’t fully understand how to use helicopters appropriately during the civil unrest in June 2020.

The probe was triggered by widespread objections, including from Congress, after one of the D.C. Guard helicopters hovered low enough over protesters near the Capitol One Arena to create a deafening noise and spray protesters with rotor wash. There were also concerns that the Guard used a medivac helicopter — with medical markings — to make such a “show of force” against the crowds gathered to protest Floyd’s death.

The report found that the use of medical helicopters was appropriate because it was an emergency, but the episode raised worries among defense leaders about the need for improved planning, training and oversight of the D.C. Guard’s use of aviation and calls for a stricter approval process.

Associated Press writer Ashraf Khalil contributed to this report.

19. Blame Biden’s Hesitancy for Stalling Ukraine’s Offensive By John Bolton

Blame Biden’s Hesitancy for Stalling Ukraine’s Offensive

Paralyzed by fear of Russian escalation, the administration has sought only to stave off defeat.

By John Bolton

Aug. 13, 2023 1:19 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/blame-bidens-hesitancy-for-stalling-ukraines-offensive-nato-aid-weapons-military-war-fight-europe-national-security-a62d9899?mod=Searchresults_pos4&page=1

Ukrainian soldiers in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, June 23. PHOTO: EFREM LUKATSKY/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Ukraine’s spring offensive, now well into the summer, isn’t making the headway some proponents had forecast. The Ukrainians aren’t lacking in bravery or tenacity, and they’ve achieved eye-catching successes, such as the recent crippling of Russia’s Olenegorsky Gornyak, a roll-on/roll-off landing ship. Nevertheless, it should be a wake-up call for Washington that its strategy needs reformulating.

The solution isn’t a cease-fire and negotiation, as some in the West advocate. If Vladimir Putin were to agree to it, he would do so at a time of his choosing, not ours. He will likely propose a cease-fire if Moscow contains Kyiv’s attacks by early autumn, with the goal of trying to win through negotiations what Russia’s armed forces have failed to take on the battlefield. Accepting this offer would lead to Ukraine’s de facto partition—an unacceptable proposition for Kyiv and its Eastern European neighbors.

Far from being inevitable, the Ukrainians’ inability to achieve major advances is the natural result of a U.S. strategy aimed only at staving off Russian conquest. Instead, President Biden needs to start vigorously working toward Ukrainian victory.

Ukraine’s offensive failures and Russia’s defensive successes share a common cause: the slow, faltering, nonstrategic supply of military assistance by the West. The serial debates over whether to supply this or that weapons system, the perpetual fear that Russia will escalate to war against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and occasional Kremlin nuclear saber-rattling have instilled a paralyzing caution in Western capitals. Although the U.K. under Boris Johnson wasn’t deterred, NATO has seemed unwilling to fulfill its commitment to restore Ukraine’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This hesitancy is a product of successful deterrence by the Kremlin, not American strategic necessity. There is no evidence that Russia has the conventional military capability to threaten NATO or the will to launch a nuclear strike. Despite Moscow’s repeated nuclear threats, the intelligence community has affirmed in congressional testimony that Russia’s nuclear capabilities haven’t once shifted toward operational status. Mr. Putin has been bluffing. That could change, but succumbing to bluffs gives him exactly what he wants cost-free.

The administration’s timid, haphazard approach to aid has fractured U.S. public support. Mr. Biden has compounded this problem with his insistence that the war is about Wilsonian abstractions of democracy vs. authoritarianism. Wilsonian principles have never motivated U.S. majorities, even when preached by the genuine article. There are compelling arguments that assisting Ukraine serves our strategic interest, but the president isn’t making them. He and Donald Trump both undercut Republican support for aid.

The West—particularly Washington—also needs to rethink sanctions policy radically. Theories about price caps on Russian oil have failed, and Western sanctions generally remain piecemeal and seriously underenforced. These defects aren’t confined to the Ukraine conflict and should prompt NATO institutionally to review how it conducts enforcement. Proclaiming sanctions is great PR, but enforcement is hard, tedious and necessarily done clandestinely where possible. The U.S. and its allies need a massive overhaul and upgrade of our sanction-enforcement instruments, procedures and personnel.

The White House and NATO also both need to take more seriously China’s role in Ukraine. The West should be imposing sanctions directly on Beijing given China’s enormous support to Moscow, including hydrocarbon purchases, laundering of Russian financial transactions, and supplying of dual use and nonlethal military equipment. Beijing has denied providing lethal assistance, but a recent U.S. intelligence report said that Chinese companies have shipped Russian defense firms parts for fighter jets as well as drones.

It’s also important that the West see through any Chinese ploy to “mediate” the conflict. Such an offer from Beijing would undoubtedly seem positive to some who don’t yet appreciate the long-term threat China poses. And because the White House is obsessed with achieving climate-change agreements with Beijing, it would find European Union blandishments to appease China dangerously appealing.

China’s involvement makes it important that Washington actively involve key Indo-Pacific allies in the Biden administration’s new strategy on Ukraine. Mr. Biden’s impending trilateral summit with Japan and South Korea provides an excellent opportunity for such engagement, but much more is necessary. While some NATO members may resist including “outsiders,” this is the moment for the alliance to thrash out the global nature of the threat we all face from the rising China-Russia axis. Ukraine is precisely the kind of crisis that requires global collaboration.

More Ukrainian military progress may come as the offensive continues, but it’s vital that the Biden administration start formulating a new strategy. The White House must make midcourse corrections to its strategic errors of the past 18 months if it’s to bolster domestic U.S. support for Ukraine and revitalize and broaden the anti-Russia coalition. It’s time to get moving.

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.

20. Russia to equip new nuclear submarines with hypersonic missiles

Russia to equip new nuclear submarines with hypersonic missiles

Reuters

Aug 14 (Reuters) - Russia is in the process of equipping its new nuclear submarines with hypersonic Zircon missiles, the head of Russia's largest shipbuilder told the RIA state news agency in an interview published on Monday.

"Multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the Yasen-M project will ... be equipped with the Zircon missile system on a regular basis," , Alexei Rakhmanov, chief executive officer of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), told RIA.

"Work in this direction is already underway."

Yasen-class submarines, also known as Project 885M, are nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines, built to replace Soviet-era nuclear attack submarines as part of a programme to modernise the army and fleet.

The sea-based Zircon hypersonic missiles have a range of 900 km (560 miles), and can travel at several times the speed of sound, making it difficult to defend against them.

President Vladimir Putin said earlier this year that Russia would start mass supplies of Zircon missiles as part of the country's efforts to boost its nuclear forces.

The Russian multi-purposes frigate Admiral Gorshkov, which has tested its strike capabilities in the western Atlantic Ocean earlier this year, has been already equipped with Zircon missiles.

Reporting by Lidia Kelly in Melbourne; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters

21. Getting Serious About Security Cooperation

Conclusion:

Deficiencies in the defense industrial base are weaknesses in America’s efforts to confront Russia and China. Limited industrial base capacity prevents Washington from supporting European allies against Russia while the absence of a “value line” of weaponry is an obstacle in winning over smaller and middle powers. Finally, the legal and policy regime surrounding weapons sales can handicap good policy.

Fixing these problems requires an overarching framework that both expands and fortifies the industrial base, while creating sensible and streamlined processes for military sales. It also requires properly conceptualizing security cooperation, which has been stuck in a counter-terrorism mindset over the past couple decades, within the framework of great-power competition.

With this in mind, political leaders should seize the opportunity to rethink security cooperation, the defense industrial base, and the interaction between the two. Absent such resolve, America’s allies and potential allies will remain in want of the weapons that would win them over.

Getting Serious About Security Cooperation - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Douglas A. Ollivant · August 14, 2023

To compete with Russia and China, Washington needs partners. One key way in which Washington has, can, and will secure these partners is by sending them weapons. This, in turn, requires the United States to produce enough weapons, produce the right weapons, and effectively transfer these weapons.

Unfortunately, America is currently failing on all three fronts. Shortcomings in the defense industrial base have hobbled Washington’s ability to produce weapons. A flawed approach to security cooperation has prevented Washington from focusing on the “value weapons” that many small and middle powers want. Finally, foreign military sales requirements have created a number of well-known frustrations in sending weapons to the countries that need them.

Become a Member

It is high time for the administration and Congress to resolve all of these problems — not piecemeal but as part of broader framework that recognizes their centrality to great-power competition. This requires Congress to help create such a framework while also empowering the necessary departments to bring industrial production, security cooperation, and foreign military sales in line with America’s national interests.

Equipping Challenges

In recent decades, U.S. sales of military equipment have been largely uncoordinated and not tied to a strategy of global competition. Iraq’s security assistance, for example, is still provided under anti-Islamic State auspices. While “building partner capacity” remains a consistent mantra in Washington, military sales have been conducted on a country-by-country basis. Too many people still see the main goal of security cooperation as improving military capacity, whereas in most cases the goal is to improve political ties.

There are now three key areas of security cooperation focused on equipping that fit with Washington’s policy of “out-competing China and constraining Russia.” In each area, Washington faces challenges that a coordinated policy could help to address.

The first area is the desire of NATO partners on or near the Russia border — read, former Warsaw Pact states — to upgrade their former Soviet military equipment to NATO standards. While there can be political pressures to “buy European,” there is often a desire for U.S. manufactured items, both for capability and political signaling. The recent purchase of M1 tanks and Patriot missile batteries by Poland is a major example of this trend, as is the Czech Republic’s current negotiations over procuring F-35 multi-role fighter aircraft. Unfortunately, America’s lack of robust production capacity in the industrial base continues to hamper improved cooperation here.

The second area is the nascent AUKUS security pact, which has an explicit goal of integrating allied industrial bases and supply chains in high-tech fields. This starts with nuclear submarines in the first phase and then expands into hypersonics, cybersecurity, and anti-submarine technology. AUKUS could also expand to include other allies with interests in the Pacific — New Zealand, Canada, and Japan being the most frequently mentioned. Here, the primary weakness is U.S. bureaucracy — and legislation — that slows or hinders arms transfers.

Finally, a key component of “out-competing China and constraining Russia” will be limiting their influence in middle powers and smaller states throughout the world — what is commonly, if misleadingly, called the “global south.” Large numbers of states are totally or partially equipped with military hardware on the former Soviet model that Vasabjit Banerjee and Benjamin Tkach have called “value arms.” Whether produced by Russia or China, these value arms are less capable but also considerably less costly to procure than NATO equipment. Further, they require far less state institutional capacity to utilize, as they have significantly lower training and sustainment thresholds.

The issue for the United States is that it does not have a value arms line to compete in this space. As a result, potential partners continue to purchase low-cost military hardware from Russia and China even if they have serious concerns about its performance, the challenge of spare parts and ammunition, and the political strings attached.

These three areas exemplify the problems facing America in its effort to strengthen partnerships through security cooperation. There is no U.S. value line to sell to lower capacity partners. The U.S. industrial base is not equipped to generate the quantity of munitions required for industrial-scale ground combat. And the regulatory environment, including but by no means limited to the foreign military sales process, provides significant obstacles to cooperation with partners.

Value Line

The last of these might be easiest to tackle. The United States should begin thinking creatively about how to compete in the value arms space. The military-to-military ties that are engendered by purchases of defense equipment are often a key component in nation states in which the military has a far more significant political role than in Western states.

There are three possible avenues that Washington could pursue. First, it could extend the lines of selected current defense items even as they are phased out by the U.S. military. Just as the F-16 continues to be produced for export despite being phased out by the U.S. Air Force, other product lines could be extended — and perhaps subsidized — for partners around the world. A second possibility would be for the United States to encourage large producers just below the level of the primes to produce a value line of products for export and additionally encourage them to enter into licensing agreements for production abroad.

Alternatively, if the United States determined that the real issue for other countries was the price point, then it could promote a system of industrial base cooperation, or simply outsourcing in coordination with states that have considerably lower fixed and variable costs. Turkey and India are two countries that could fill this role with relative ease, though other locations like central and eastern Europe could also be explored. Regardless of what approach Washington took, the federal government would need to have a candid conversation with the defense industrial base to bring in their viewpoints.

Fixing the Defense Industrial Base

While the invasion of Ukraine has exposed its vulnerabilities, the current problems in the defense industrial base date to the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the Department of Defense took a deliberate decision to encourage, even subtly mandate, consolidation in the industrial base through mergers and acquisitions. The goal was to make industry respond more to market forces, rather than significant government subsidies, thereby reducing overall costs to the government. This consolidation reduced the number of major contractors, or “primes,” to just single digits. Similar consolidation occurred in supply chains further down, often creating single points of failure for key components. Many of these went unseen by either the primes or the Defense Department due to the number of steps between the single supplier and the prime or the final customer.

This policy of encouraging consolidation has left the industrial base without any “surge” capacity, meaning that significant increases in production are difficult at best and disproportionally expensive. While boutique solutions can — and are — being sought in high-priority situations, in general, increasing production means commissioning new facilities from scratch and searching for increasingly rare highly trained technical workforces. These procedures are both slow and expensive.

But more simply, the industrial base simply has too many single points of failure. These occur in more high-tech areas such as computer chips and rare earth materials, as well as in “old economy” areas like black powder and machine tools. Consolidation and the quest for efficiencies, combined with frequent lapses in orders that can bankrupt small businesses, have created numerous gaps in the supply chain, or dependencies on China and other unreliable providers. These single points of failure and the limited ability to grow production are now particular evident in both ammunition and missiles. This has created uncertainty among allies and partners as to whether there will be sufficient materiel for their security needs.

The fixes for the defense industrial base are fairly obvious, but not easy, not quick, and not cheap. First, the base requires expansion, almost across the board. The Department of Defense has focused on the 155mm production line to great effect, but fixing one line does not fix the entire base. Second, the supply chain underneath the major primes needs to be fortified. In trying to generate the political resolve necessary to take these steps, America’s leaders should appreciate not only how central they are to the country’s immediate military needs, but also to its broader geopolitical goals.

Sales to Foreign Militaries

Frustrations with foreign military sales (which is larger than the Foreign Military Sales program of the same name) are well known. A senior defense industry executive once described it as “all the frustration of government contracting, but slower, more byzantine, and with lesser priority.” And he neglected to mention the very real political risk — domestic and international. Defense industry involvement in security cooperation entangles the Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Commerce and, in the case of the AUKUS nuclear sales, the Department of Energy — with everything overseen by the Department of Justice.

While suggestions to “improve” and “streamline” the foreign military sales system abound, it may be time to take a “blank sheet of paper” to the system. Past attempts at reform have been uniformly unsuccessful, leading to questions as to whether the system is reformable. While an interagency task force could be engaged to examine this issue, it is an open question as to whether any insider could hope to succeed. An outside look with a mandate that includes legislative relief may be necessary, ideally a congressional commission specifically empowered to look for legislative fixes.

Conclusion

Deficiencies in the defense industrial base are weaknesses in America’s efforts to confront Russia and China. Limited industrial base capacity prevents Washington from supporting European allies against Russia while the absence of a “value line” of weaponry is an obstacle in winning over smaller and middle powers. Finally, the legal and policy regime surrounding weapons sales can handicap good policy.

Fixing these problems requires an overarching framework that both expands and fortifies the industrial base, while creating sensible and streamlined processes for military sales. It also requires properly conceptualizing security cooperation, which has been stuck in a counter-terrorism mindset over the past couple decades, within the framework of great-power competition.

With this in mind, political leaders should seize the opportunity to rethink security cooperation, the defense industrial base, and the interaction between the two. Absent such resolve, America’s allies and potential allies will remain in want of the weapons that would win them over.

Become a Member

Douglas Ollivant (@douglasollivant) is retired Army officer, former National Security Council director, and managing partner at Mantid International

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Douglas A. Ollivant · August 14, 2023

22. Arm but Verify: A Blueprint for Rigorous Oversight of Future Ukraine Aid

Conclusion:

Vigorous proponents of arming Ukraine would undoubtedly agree that the first duty of U.S. policymakers is to advance American interests. However, while American and Ukrainian interests often overlap, they are not identical. Both states favor punishing Russia’s unjustified invasion and securing Ukraine’s enduring sovereignty. It is not in America’s interests, however, to pursue overly expansive war aims that risk direct war with Russia or deplete munitions that might be required elsewhere. Even as Americans hope for Kyiv’s victory, Congress should ensure that their interests come first as it considers additional aid packages.

Arm but Verify: A Blueprint for Rigorous Oversight of Future Ukraine Aid - War on the Rocks

REID SMITH AND TYLER KOTESKEY

warontherocks.com · by Reid Smith · August 14, 2023

The White House has approached Congress for the next tranche of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, proposing $24 billion in military, economic, and humanitarian aid. This request will face stiffer political headwinds than previous appeals. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, as Ukraine’s very existence swung in the balance, elected officials in the United States generally welcomed President Joseph Biden’s requests for aid. Fortunately, Kyiv’s fierce resistance foiled Russia’s expansive war aims. However, as the fighting has ground on with no end in sight, supplemental aid to Ukraine has become increasingly politicized. Recent polling suggests Americans are skeptical of additional support while Speaker Kevin McCarthy secured the latest debt limit deal, in part, by rejecting the prospect of further supplemental spending.

This presents Congress with an opportunity to fulfill its constitutionally mandated oversight role by asking hard questions that demand clear answers. Oversight is not an end in itself. If done right, it can clarify whether current appropriations are achieving intended results, especially when weighed against competing priorities. This will help heighten transparency, increase attention to American interests, and raise the prospects of a viable endgame for the war.

With this in mind, Congress should pursue a series of measures to ensure better Ukraine aid oversight and a more robust strategic dialogue about how U.S. involvement in the war impacts American interests. A year and a half into the war, Congress should demand a dedicated Ukraine aid inspector general. Cognizant of tradeoffs, legislators should pursue policies that ensure any supplemental aid is offset under the terms of discretionary spending caps, requiring collective matching from allies with greater interests at stake, and mandating certifications that drawdowns are not undermining U.S. readiness in key theaters. To limit the existential risk of direct NATO-Russia hostilities, Congress should require topline reporting on the number and missions of U.S. personnel in Ukraine and direct the president to make clear what escalatory uses of aid America will not support. Finally, as a condition of future approvals, Congress should require the administration to provide a strategy articulating U.S. goals in Ukraine, detailing both the role of current aid and the steps being taken to facilitate an eventual end to the conflict.

Become a Member

Taken together, these measures can simultaneously help reassure sincere skeptics concerned with misspent aid and strategic scarcity while also enabling advocates to secure broader political support. Meanwhile, all members of the legislative branch, regardless of their stance on this issue, have a stake in ensuring continued congressional oversight on vital issues of war and peace.

American Aide Is Already Extraordinary

By any count, U.S. assistance to Ukraine has been substantial. Since 2022, the U.S. Congress has pledged $113 billion to Kyiv. This amounts to more military, financial, and humanitarian assistance than all 27 countries of the European Union have contributed. In 2021, Ukraine’s national budget was $40 billion, with $6 billion earmarked for defense. As of February 2023, the United States had provided $46.6 billion in security assistance, weapons and equipment, and grants and loans for additional materiel. By one estimate, the aggregate value of military aid sent to Kyiv would make Ukraine the greatest yearly beneficiary of U.S. security assistance of the century.

At times, this sum has been tricky to tally amid the flurry of support that has been authorized, pledged, and delivered through presidential drawdown authorities, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and foreign military financing. Even the Pentagon gets discombobulated. Earlier this summer, the Department of Defense issued a correction, explaining an accounting error revealed in May was itself drastically miscalculated. As it happened, aid provided to Ukraine over the past two fiscal years had been overvalued by $6.2 billion, rather than the $3 billion originally reported.

Stricter Oversight

Sums of this magnitude bring inherent risks. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, America learned hard lessons about the perils of aid diversion. Meanwhile, there is a long history of arms trafficking in Ukraine. Current U.S. aid flows have been difficult to account for even when traveling through NATO territory, and there have already been confirmed reports of embezzlement and outright theft.

Future aid authorizations should require the creation and appointment of special inspectors general for military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, respectively. These offices could have the structure and powers of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, which played an important role highlighting the limitations of Washington’s previous large-scale aid efforts. Given the volume of aid, bifurcated oversight will help Congress better understand and adjudicate support on an ongoing basis.

There are hopeful signs that Congress may create a dedicated Ukraine inspector general office in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, but the bill’s final outcome remains uncertain as of this writing. Where the House bill added a Ukraine inspector general, amendments to include one in the Senate failed. If this position is not included in the final defense budget bill that emerges from conference, legislators should insist the office is established as a condition of any future aid votes. The Biden administration has objected, saying that current monitoring is sufficient. But this argument falls flat against the warnings of John Sopko, the long-time Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Sopko cautions that current oversight efforts are “like herding cats” without an overarching office to coordinate monitoring of the various funding streams. As in Afghanistan, Sopko fears that amid massive influxes of aid, “you’re gonna see pilferage” of resources without robust oversight mechanisms.

No Budgeting Gimmicks

America’s $32 trillion national debt looms large over the Ukraine aid debate. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen recognized our debt as “the most significant threat to our national security” at a time when it was less than half its current size. Less well known is that our debt is as large in relation to our economy as it was during the height of our World War II spending, although we are technically at peace.

If the United States hopes to maintain a sustainable national defense for decades to come, Congress’ efforts to control spending must have teeth. Ukraine aid should not be an exception.

Further Ukraine supplementals must not become a budget gimmick to dodge spending caps, as “emergency” war spending, or overseas contingency operations funding, was misused in the post-9/11 years. President Biden’s latest aid request may accelerate this unwelcome outcome. Speaker McCarthy should honor his commitment to eschew supplementals per the terms of the recent discretionary spending agreement. Congress can follow suit and require any future Ukraine aid supplementals receive standalone votes and be offset through budgetary tradeoffs elsewhere.

European Burden-Shifting

The war in Ukraine is taking place in our European allies’ backyard. These nations have the greatest stake in the war’s outcome and in Ukraine’s long-term stability. Nevertheless, U.S. support outstrips Europe’s collective effort.

This lopsided relationship is nothing new. In 1959, a frustrated President Dwight Eisenhower fumed that our European allies were close to “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam” by freeriding on American taxpayers and troops for their security. Nearly every American president has raised similar concerns since.

Lawmakers should use several tools to repair this imbalance. For instance, Congress could impose matching requirements from Europe as a condition of future aid authorizations. In doing so, legislators could restrict distributing newly authorized aid above an amount our allies collectively contribute. Going further, Congress could include recission requirements for new funds within six months if the Europeans fail to step up within that timeframe. European actions should match European rhetoric, particularly given America’s current global strategic obligations.

Prioritizing U.S. Readiness

Critical American munitions stockpiles are being expended in Ukraine far faster than they can currently be produced. For instance, a March estimate found that Ukrainian forces were firing 6,000 to 7,000 155mm artillery shells a day. This rate of fire dwarfs current U.S. monthly production every few days. While plans are in place to increase U.S. production capabilities, these will take years to ramp up to a meaningful level.

In the meantime, the United States is being forced to deplete stockpiles set aside to support existing commitments across the world. According to a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies estimate, even at “surge” rates of production, it will take several years to rebuild our stockpiles of 155mm artillery shells, Javelin antitank missiles, and Stinger man-portable air defense systems. Most recently, to address 155mm ammunition shortfalls, the United States has had to resort to the export of controversial cluster munitions as a substitute.

In the face of these challenges, Congress could require public certifications from the president and secretary of defense that future drawdowns of U.S. aid to Ukraine will not compromise the readiness of U.S. forces in the Pacific. With more information, Congress can better evaluate the trade-offs between supporting Ukraine and maintaining America’s own munitions stockpiles.

Transparency on U.S. Deployments

Beyond supporting basic due diligence to prevent aid diversion, Congress needs to empower itself with a better sense of the potential risks of our involvement in Ukraine. The stakes of a wider Russia-NATO war are nuclear. It is therefore remarkable that there is no unclassified information about the topline number of U.S. forces personnel in Ukraine. This trend of reduced transparency about U.S. deployments is not new, but it is even more startling given the current risks.

As the New York Times recently reported, “Even as the Biden administration has declared it will not deploy American troops to Ukraine, some C.I.A. personnel have continued to operate in the country secretly, mostly in the capital, Kyiv, directing much of the massive amounts of intelligence the United States is sharing with Ukrainian forces.”

The furor over an errant Ukrainian missile strike in Polish territory that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy initially blamed on Russia reminds us that accidents happen and can become deadly, escalatory flashpoints. Congress is well within its rights to require additional clarification about U.S. commandos and spies operating in a war zone — particularly given the substantial precision targeting assistance American personnel already provide Ukrainian forces from elsewhere in Europe.

Without clearer accounting for U.S. forces currently in Ukraine, it is impossible for Congress to gauge the risks they face, and whether those risks are justified by their missions. To reduce the danger of inadvertent escalation, Congress should tie authorizations of new aid and disbursement of approved assistance to monthly, unclassified reporting on topline information about U.S. personnel and activities in the country.

Red Lines on Aid Uses that Endanger U.S. Security

Clearer restrictions on the intended uses of U.S. aid can guard against the risk of pro-Ukrainian actors attempting to “chain-gang” the United States and NATO into direct conflict against Russia. For example, the secretary of state has already acknowledged that a Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea — no matter the moral justifications — would be a “red line” for Moscow that could lead to nuclear use.

Avoiding a nuclear crisis should be an overriding U.S. policy. To its credit, the administration has thus far resisted actions, such as a no-fly zone, that would have carried recklessly high escalation risks. But these efforts are hampered by statements that might muddy the waters, such as the president’s declaration last year that Vladimir Putin “cannot remain in power,” or now-Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland’s repeated calls for Putin to face war crimes tribunals. This rhetoric undermines attempts to signal limited, defensive U.S. aims, making it harder to control escalation risks or incentivize Moscow to eventually come to the table. It also might encourage Ukraine to use U.S. aid in a reckless manner that risks direct NATO-Russia confrontation.

Congress should refrain from approving weapons transfers that carry particularly high escalatory risks, such as terminal high altitude area defense batteries. These systems are scarce and expensive to begin with, but also feature radar capabilities networked with America’s own missile defense system. This could raise fears in Moscow that deployments in Ukraine would be used by the United States to undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. China voiced this concern in 2017 when the United States deployed terminal high altitude area defense batteries to South Korea. Convincing Moscow of their purely defensive, nonstrategic uses in Ukraine would be even more challenging in wartime.

In future authorizations, Congress could also stipulate that the president make clear to Kyiv that U.S. aid deliveries are not to be used in support of operations to retake Crimea. Congress could pass similar conditions to prevent U.S. equipment from being used to support strikes within Russian territory or against nonmilitary targets, and to impose freezes upon future aid if such misuses occur.

Ukraine has the right to fight for as long as it wants and to determine the objectives it will pursue, but the United States is well within its own rights to determine how its resources will be committed and which Ukrainian activities it is willing to support.

Defining the Endgame

Although most Americans believe neither side is winning the war, a majority feel Ukraine deserves to prevail against Russia’s unjustified aggression. History, however, suggests most wars end in negotiations. Present circumstances in Ukraine make this outcome even more likely. While Ukraine’s counteroffensive remains under way, U.S. officials have downplayed Kyiv’s prospects for ejecting Russian forces from all occupied territory.

Throughout the course of the conflict, the president and other senior officials have offered ambiguous — and frequently contradictory — views on their ultimate objectives. The Biden administration may see value in ambiguity, particularly given that its current position on ending the war remains “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” Fundamentally, though, the administration’s first responsibility is to the American people. Without more clarity on the administration’s goals, Congress cannot make an informed decision on whether it is fulfilling this responsibility.

With this in mind, Congress should require Biden to produce a detailed Ukraine strategy before additional aid is approved. This strategy should articulate the end state American support will achieve and the cost it will incur, as well as describing how it will facilitate eventual peace negotiations. Though it was not ultimately included in the House National Defense Authorization Act, Rep. Warren Davidson’s amendment requiring such a strategy as a condition of new aid is the right approach and should be insisted upon.

Conclusion

Vigorous proponents of arming Ukraine would undoubtedly agree that the first duty of U.S. policymakers is to advance American interests. However, while American and Ukrainian interests often overlap, they are not identical. Both states favor punishing Russia’s unjustified invasion and securing Ukraine’s enduring sovereignty. It is not in America’s interests, however, to pursue overly expansive war aims that risk direct war with Russia or deplete munitions that might be required elsewhere. Even as Americans hope for Kyiv’s victory, Congress should ensure that their interests come first as it considers additional aid packages.

Become a Member

Reid Smith is vice president for foreign policy at Stand Together

Tyler Koteskey is policy director at Concerned Veterans for America

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Reid Smith · August 14, 2023

23. How to Prevent an AI Catastrophe

Excerpts:

AI creators might bristle at the idea of tight regulations. Strict rules will, after all, slow down development. Stringent requirements could delay, or even nix, billion-dollar models. And much like in other industries, tough rules could create barriers to market entry, reducing innovation and concentrating AI development in a small number of already powerful tech companies.

But plenty of other sectors have made massive progress while being regulated, including the pharmaceutical industry and the nuclear power sector. In fact, regulation has made it possible for society to adopt many critical technologies. (Just imagine how much worse vaccine skepticism would be without strong state oversight.) Regulations also incentivize firms to innovate on safety, making sure private research is aligned with public needs. And governments can guarantee that small players contribute to AI innovation by granting them use of advanced chips to responsible researchers. In the United States, for instance, Congress is thinking about establishing a “National AI Research Resource”: a federal provision of data and powerful computing hardware accessible to academics.

But Congress cannot stop there—or with controlling AI development. The U.S. government must also take measures to prepare society for AI’s risks. The development of powerful AI systems is inevitable, and people everywhere need to be prepared for what such technologies will do to their communities and to the broader world. Only then can society reap the immense benefits AI might bring.

How to Prevent an AI Catastrophe

Society Must Get Ready for Very Powerful Artificial Intelligence

By Markus Anderljung and Paul Scharre

August 14, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Markus Anderljung and Paul Scharre · August 14, 2023

In April 2023, a group of academics at Carnegie Mellon University set out to test the chemistry powers of artificial intelligence. To do so, they connected an AI system to a hypothetical laboratory. Then they asked it to produce various substances. With just two words of guidance—“synthesize ibuprofen”—the chemists got the system to identify the steps necessary for laboratory machines to manufacture the painkiller. The AI, as it turned out, knew both the recipe for ibuprofen and how to produce it.

Unfortunately, the researchers quickly discovered that their AI tool would synthesize chemicals far more dangerous than Advil. The program was happy to craft instruction to produce a World War I–era chemical weapon and a common date-rape drug. It almost agreed to synthesize sarin, the notoriously lethal nerve gas, until it Googled the compound’s dark history. The researchers found this safeguard to be cold comfort. “The search function,” they wrote, “can be easily manipulated by altering the terminology.” AI, the chemists concluded, can make devastating weapons.

The Carnegie Mellon experiment is certainly striking. But it shouldn’t come as a surprise. After years of hype, false starts, and overpromises, the AI revolution is here. From facial recognition to text generation, AI models are sweeping across society. They are writing text for customer service companies. They are helping students do research. They are pushing the boundaries of science, from drug discovery to nuclear fusion.

The opportunities AI offers are immense. Built and managed properly, it could do much to improve society, offering every student a personalized tutor, for example, or giving every family high-quality, round-the-clock medical advice. But AI also has enormous dangers. It is already exacerbating the spread of disinformation, furthering discrimination, and making it easier for states and companies to spy. Future AI systems might be able to create pathogens or hack critical infrastructure. In fact, the very scientists responsible for developing AI have begun to warn that their creations are deeply perilous. In a May letter, the chiefs of almost every leading AI lab warned that “mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority, alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.”

In the months since that statement, policymakers, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have met with industry leaders and pushed for new AI safety measures. But keeping up with the threats AI presents and figuring out what to do about them is an extremely difficult task. The harms from AI in today’s society come from yesterday’s models. The most cutting-edge systems are not yet widely used or understood. Even less is known about future models, which are growing more powerful every year. Scientists appear on track to automate most of the tasks that a human can do in front of a computer, and progress probably won’t stop there.

To handle the dangers, some experts have called for a pause on developing the most advanced AI systems. But these models are simply too valuable for the corporations spending billions of dollars on them to freeze progress. Policymakers, however, can and should help guide the sector’s development and prepare citizens for its effects. They can start by controlling who can access the advanced chips that train leading AI models, ensuring that bad actors cannot develop the most powerful AI systems. Governments should also establish regulations to guarantee that AI systems are responsibly developed and used. Done right, these rules would not limit AI innovation. But they would buy time before the riskiest AI systems become broadly accessible.

States, however, will have to use that time to harden society against AI’s many dangers. They will need to invest in a wide range of protections, such as finding ways to help people distinguish between AI- and human-made content, aiding scientists in identifying and stopping lab hacks and the creation of synthetic pathogens, and developing cybersecurity tools that keep critical infrastructure, such as power plants, in the right hands. They will need to figure out how AI itself can be used to protect against dangerous AI systems.

Meeting these challenges will demand great creativity from both policymakers and scientists. It will also require that both groups work fast. It is only a matter of time until very powerful AI systems begin to spread, and society is not yet prepared.

READY OR NOT

How dangerous is AI? The honest and scary answer is that no one knows. AI technologies have a wide and expanding array of applications, and people are only beginning to grasp the resulting effects. As large language models become better at producing authentically human-sounding text, they will become better at both creating content tailored to each person’s individual needs and writing convincing phishing emails. Existing AI models are impressive at generating computer code, significantly speeding up seasoned programmers’ ability to update an application. But AI’s prowess also helps programmers generate malware that can evade antivirus software. Drug discovery algorithms can identify new medicines but also new chemical weapons. In a March 2022 experiment, chemists got an AI system to identify 40,000 toxic chemicals in six hours, many of which were entirely new. It predicted that some of these creations would be more toxic than any previously known chemical weapon.

One of AI’s dangers is that it could democratize violence, making it easier for a wider range of bad actors to deal damage. Hackers, for example, have long been able to cause harm. But advancements in code-generation models could make it possible to produce malware with minimal coding experience. Propagandists typically need substantial time to craft disinformation, yet by mass generating text, AI will make it easier to produce disinformation on an industrial scale. Right now, only trained professionals can create biological and chemical weapons. But thanks to AI, instead of requiring scientific expertise, all a future terrorist might need to make a deadly pathogen is an Internet connection.

To stop AI from harming humans, tech experts frequently talk about the need for “AI alignment”: making sure an AI system’s goals align with its users’ intentions and society’s values. But so far, no one has figured out how to reliably control AI behavior. An AI system tasked with identifying tax fraud, for instance, attempted to tweet its findings to tax authorities, unbeknownst to its user. Microsoft released a Bing chatbot designed to help people search the Internet, only to have it behave erratically, including by telling one person that it had information to make them “suffer and cry and beg and die.” Developers can fine-tune models to refuse certain tasks, but clever users find ways around these guardrails. In April 2023, a person got ChatGPT to provide detailed instructions for how to make napalm, a task that it would normally refuse, by asking it to simulate the person’s grandmother, who used to tell bedtime stories about how to make napalm.

All a future terrorist might need to make a deadly pathogen is an Internet connection.

Today’s most cutting-edge AI models still have flaws that limit their destructive potential. One anonymous tester, for example, created an AI bot dubbed “ChaosGPT” and programmed it to act like a “destructive, power-hungry, manipulative AI” and “destroy humanity.” The system got stuck collecting information on the Tsar Bomba, the largest nuclear weapon ever created. It then openly tweeted its plans.

But as new models come online, they could prove more capable of devising schemes and manipulating people into carrying them out. Meta’s AI model, “Cicero,” demonstrated human-level performance at Diplomacy, a game that involves negotiating with other people in a simulated geopolitical conflict. Some experiments suggest that large language models trained on human feedback engage in sycophantic behavior, telling their users what they want to hear. In one experiment, for example, models were more likely to express support for government services after being told they were talking to liberals. Such behavior appears to grow more pronounced as the systems become more capable.

It remains unclear whether models would actively try to deceive or control their operators. But even the possibility that they would try is cause for worry. As a result, researchers are now testing frontier models for the ability to engage in “power-seeking” behaviors, such as making money online, acquiring access to computational resources, or creating copies of themselves—and attempting to do so while evading detection.

MOVE SLOW AND BUILD THINGS

Preventing AI from wreaking havoc will not be easy. But governments can start by pressuring the tech firms developing AI to proceed with much more caution than they have thus far. If an AI model causes severe harm, it is not yet clear when developers would be held liable. Policymakers should clarify these rules to ensure that firms and researchers are held appropriately responsible if one of their models were, for example, to provide detailed advice that helps a school shooter. Such regulations would incentivize companies to try to foresee and mitigate risks.

Governments will also have to directly regulate AI development. Here, the United States can—and must—lead the way. To successfully train an AI system, developers need large quantities of highly specialized chips, and Washington and two close allies (Japan and the Netherlands) are the sole providers of the hardware needed to make this material. The United States and its partners have already placed export controls on the most advanced AI chips and chip-making equipment to China. But they will have to go further, creating a chip ownership registry to stop advanced chips from being diverted to prohibited actors, including rogue states.

Controlling AI access, however, is only half the regulatory battle. Even sanctioned developers can create dangerous models, and right now, the U.S. government lacks the legal tools to intervene. Washington should therefore establish a licensing regime for frontier AI models- the ones near or beyond the capabilities of today’s most advanced systems- trained on industrial-scale AI supercomputers. To do so, policymakers might create a new regulatory body housed in the Department of Commerce or the Department of Energy. This body should require that before they train their models, frontier AI developers conduct risk assessments and report their findings. The assessments would provide better visibility into development and afford regulators the chance to demand that firms adjust their plans, such as bolstering cybersecurity measures to prevent model theft.

The initial risk assessment would be just the start of the regulators’ examination. After AI labs train a system but before they deploy it, the body should require that labs conduct another thorough set of risk assessments, including testing the model for controllability and dangerous capabilities. These assessments should be sent to the regulatory agency, which would then subject the model to its own intensive examination, including by having outside teams perform stress tests to look for flaws.

The regulators would then establish rules for how the model can be deployed. They might determine that certain models can be made widely available. They might decide that others are so dangerous they cannot be released at all. Most frontier models are likely to fall somewhere in between: safe, but only with adequate protections. Initially, the agency might take a cautious approach, placing restrictions on models that later turn out to be safe, letting society adapt to their use and giving regulators time to learn about their effects. The agency can always adjust these rules later if a model turns out to have few risks. The body could also pull a system from the market if it turns out to be more dangerous than expected. This regulatory approach would mirror how other important technologies are governed, including biotechnology, commercial airplanes, and automobiles.

BRACE FOR IMPACT

A rigorous licensing system will do much to foster safe development. But ultimately, even the strongest regulations cannot stop AI from proliferating. Almost every modern technological innovation, from trains to nuclear weapons, has spread beyond its creators, and AI will be no exception. Sophisticated systems could propagate through theft or leaks, including AI that regulators forbid from being released.

Even without theft, powerful AI will almost certainly proliferate. The United States and its allies may control advanced chip-making equipment for now. But U.S. competitors are working to develop manufacturing gear of their own, and inventors may find ways to create AI without sophisticated chips. Every year, computing hardware becomes more cost efficient, making it possible to train stronger AI models at a lower price. Meanwhile, engineers keep identifying ways to train models with fewer computational resources. Society will eventually have to live with widely available, very powerful AI. And states will need to use the time bought by regulation to create workable safeguards.

To some extent, countries have already gotten started. For the last five years, the world was warned about the risks of deepfakes, and the alerts helped inoculate communities against the harms: by simply increasing awareness about AI-manipulated media, people learned to be skeptical of the authenticity of images. Businesses and governments have begun to go one step further, developing tools that explicitly distinguish AI-generated media from authentic content. In fact, social media companies are already identifying and labeling certain kinds of synthetic media. But some platforms have policies that are weaker than others, and governments should establish uniform regulations.

The White House has taken steps to create labeling practices, persuading seven leading AI companies to watermark images, videos, and audio products made algorithmically. But these companies have not yet promised to identify AI-generated text. There is a technical explanation for why: identifying AI-made prose is much more difficult than sifting for other kinds of AI-made content. But it may still be possible, and states and firms should invest in creating tools that can do so.

It will be very difficult for society to keep up with AI’s dangers.

Disinformation, however, is just one of the AI dangers that society must guard against. Researchers also need to learn how they can prevent AI models from enabling bioweapons attacks. Policymakers can start by creating regulations that bar DNA synthesis companies from shipping DNA sequences related to dangerous pathogens (or potential pathogens) to unauthorized customers. Governments will need to support DNA synthesis companies as they work to identify what genetic sequences could be dangerous. And officials may need to constantly surveil sewage or airports for signs of new pathogens.

Sometimes, to create these defenses, society will have to use AI itself. DNA synthesis companies, for instance, will likely need advanced AI systems to identify pathogens that do not yet exist—but that AI might invent. To prevent dangerous AI models from hacking computing systems, cybersecurity firms might need other AI systems to find and patch vulnerabilities.

Using AI to protect against AI is a frightening prospect, given that it hands a tremendous amount of influence to computer systems (and to their makers). As a result, developers will need to bolster the security of AI models to protect them from hacking. Unfortunately, these scientists have their work cut out for them. There are numerous ways to manipulate AI models, many of which have already been shown to work.

Ultimately, it will be very difficult for society to keep up with AI’s dangers, especially if scientists succeed in their goal of creating systems that are as smart or smarter than humans. AI researchers must therefore ensure that their models are truly aligned with society’s values and interests. States must also establish external checks and balances—including through regulatory agencies—that allow officials to identify and curtail dangerous models.

SAFETY FIRST

AI creators might bristle at the idea of tight regulations. Strict rules will, after all, slow down development. Stringent requirements could delay, or even nix, billion-dollar models. And much like in other industries, tough rules could create barriers to market entry, reducing innovation and concentrating AI development in a small number of already powerful tech companies.

But plenty of other sectors have made massive progress while being regulated, including the pharmaceutical industry and the nuclear power sector. In fact, regulation has made it possible for society to adopt many critical technologies. (Just imagine how much worse vaccine skepticism would be without strong state oversight.) Regulations also incentivize firms to innovate on safety, making sure private research is aligned with public needs. And governments can guarantee that small players contribute to AI innovation by granting them use of advanced chips to responsible researchers. In the United States, for instance, Congress is thinking about establishing a “National AI Research Resource”: a federal provision of data and powerful computing hardware accessible to academics.

But Congress cannot stop there—or with controlling AI development. The U.S. government must also take measures to prepare society for AI’s risks. The development of powerful AI systems is inevitable, and people everywhere need to be prepared for what such technologies will do to their communities and to the broader world. Only then can society reap the immense benefits AI might bring.

MARKUS ANDERLJUNG is Head of Policy at the Centre for the Governance of AI and an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
PAUL SCHARRE is Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security and the author of Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence.

Foreign Affairs · by Markus Anderljung and Paul Scharre · August 14, 2023

24. US Saw More Mass Shooting Deaths in First Half of 2023 Than All of 2018’s Year of ‘Never Again’

US Saw More Mass Shooting Deaths in First Half of 2023 Than All of 2018’s Year of ‘Never Again’

This year is on pace to break the record for the number of mass shootings — with 438 so far

Published 08/13/23 08:00 AM ET|Updated 10 hr ago

Safia Samee Ali

themessenger.com · August 13, 2023

Ryan Deitsch hid in a closet with 19 of his classmates while Nikolas Cruz went floor to floor firing shots at whomever he found at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in 2018.

The Parkland, Florida, mass shooting that left 17 students and staff members dead ignited a national conversation about guns as Deitsch and his classmates rallied tens of thousands of Americans to take to the streets declaring “Never Again” in nationwide marches.

In all, 345 people were killed in 336 mass shootings that year, and another 1,314 were wounded.

The number of mass shootings in the first six months of 2023 is the same as the number of shootings in all of 2018, the year of the Parkland mass shooting and "Never Again."The Messenger; Data via gunviolencearchive.org

But 2018 was a low point for mass shootings in America, and every year since has seen a significant uptick in the number the deaths from mass shooting events, according to an analysis of data collected by the nonpartisan Gun Violence Archive.

In the first six months of 2023, America has experienced the same number of mass shootings as in all of 2018 — with 395 killed. As of Aug. 13, the Gun Violence Archive has tallied 438 mass shootings nationwide, which surpasses the total for all of 2019.

This year is on pace to break the record for the most mass shootings ever, according to data from the Gun Violence Archive, which defines a mass shooting as any incident in which four or more people are shot, excluding the gunman.

The number of mass shootings for the first six months of 2023 is up 12% from the same period in 2022.

Mass shootings are accelerating even as evidence points to violent crime dropping in many cities following a sharp spike during the pandemic.

“It's just absolutely tragic to see this issue continue and especially over the years in interacting with politicians and various leaders. It's been absolutely disappointing to see the lack of urgency,” Deitsch says.

Ryan Deitsch, a senior, carries a sign that reads "love" as he joins his fellow students from Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, where 17 classmates and teachers were killed during a mass shooting, for the National School Walkout on April 20, 2018 in Parkland, Florida.Joe Raedle/Getty Images

'Never Again'

In the wake of the Parkland shooting, "Never Again" campaigners organized March for Our Lives protests for tougher gun control laws across the country. More than 200,000 are estimated to have turned out for the main protest in Washington, D.C.

Several states passed gun restrictions in the wake of the protests. Then-Florida Gov. Rick Scott signed the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which banned the sale or possession of bump-fire stocks, provided funding for mental health in schools and raised the minimum age to purchase a firearm to 21 from 18, among other measures.

The Parkland gunman was 19 when he bought the AR-15 style rifle used in the shooting.

The year 2018 also saw several other headline-grabbing mass shootings, including at Santa Fe High School in Texas in May, in which 10 students and teachers died; the Pittsburgh Tree of Life Jewish Center attack in October that killed 11 worshipers; and a November shooting at a college bar in Thousand Oaks, Calif., which claimed 12 lives.

People visit the memorial set up near the scene of a mass shooting at the Allen Premium Outlets mall on May 9, 2023 in Allen, Texas. Eight people were killed and seven wounded in the attack.Joe Raedle/Getty Images

Again and Again

Irvin Walker felt the bullets pierce his face, chest and stomach before he even saw the shooter firing into his car at the Allen Premium Outlets on May 6.

The 47-year-old had just dropped off his girlfriend at the shopping center northeast of Dallas and was looking for a parking spot when he was shot multiple times by the gunman, who was armed with an AR-15-style assault rifle.

Eight people were killed and seven others, including Walker, were wounded.

Walker survived only after three major surgeries. He’s still healing from the wounds.

“My life has been spared and there is still a great purpose in me to do whatever God has for me,” he says.

Walker is part of a large and grim fraternity: He’s just one of more than 2,300 victims killed or wounded in mass shootings so far this year.

“I can't say what will determine change, but I think we should put more energy into monitoring those that have these weapons of mass destruction,” Walker says.

People visit a makeshift memorial in front of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School days after the Feb. 14, 2008, mass shooting that killed 17 people.(Photo by Mark Wilson/Getty Images)

What's Behind the Surge

While the figures are stark, experts are at a loss to pinpoint why mass shootings have spiked so dramatically this year, but many look at a spike in gun ownership, the relaxation of gun laws in many states and the mass production of guns.

The National Rifle Association and other gun-rights advocates blame less appetite to prosecute criminals, and more lax bail policies that put more offenders back on the street while they await trial.

Over the last years, many states have peeled back gun legislation that had gotten enacted after Parkland — and further liberalize gun laws.

Florida legislators approved House Bill 1543, which will push the age limit back to 18. The bill is set to advance. Florida also passed a law allowing residents to carry concealed weapons without a government-issued permit that went into effect this month.

There has been a surge of states adopting more permissive gun measures like stand your ground laws, limiting concealed carry permitting process, and some researchers believe a rise in mass shootings has to do with firearm regulations changing, says Andrew Morral, director of the Rand Gun Policy in America initiative.

Laws, including limits on permit-less carry and universal background checks, have been cited as correlating with lower homicide deaths, according to the Giffords Law Center, a gun control advocacy organization.

But gun laws are only one piece of the puzzle, says Tony Montalto, who lost his daughter Gina in the Parkland shooting and is the president of Stand with Parkland, a nonprofit that advocates for practical public safety reforms.

“We have seen progress, but there's no magic wand or one sentence solution,” he says. “It’s finding ways to secure campuses, finding ways to improve mental health screenings, finding ways to ensure responsible firearms ownership such as safe storage, background checks and red flag laws.”

A mourner visits the memorial outside the Star Ballroom Dance Studio where a deadly mass shooting took place on Jan. 25, 2023, in Monterey Park, California.Mario Tama/Getty Images

Proliferation of Guns

But for Deistch, the answer over why mass shootings have accelerated is clear.

“Ultimately, we have a massive proliferation of guns in our society. We have more guns than people,” he says.

Gun manufacturing reached record high numbers in 2021 with the United States putting out 13 million guns, according to federal data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. In 2018, gunmakers produced a little over 9 million guns, data showed.

“The chances of those guns falling into the wrong hands for any number of things, including mass shootings but also homicide and suicide, all go up by virtue that they're just more of them in circulation,” says Charles Branas, a professor of epidemiology at Columbia University who studies gun violence.

Branas co-conducted a 2019 study that correlated gun ownership with gun laws and found that states with more permissive gun laws and greater gun ownership had higher rates of mass shootings.

Still, Deitsch says he believes that the nation still has it in its power to end the scourge of mass shootings — if it can find the will to act.

"I am not hopeless," he says. "What I do find hope in is the the activism, in the organizing, in seeing all these people coming together to keep fighting."

themessenger.com · August 13, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 13, 2023

China’s Options for Retaliation Are Few After U.S. Investment Ban

Beijing is unlikely to match U.S. restrictions given asymmetrical money flows and a weak economy at home, analysts say

Global Warfighting Simulation Puts the Pressure on Navy, Marine Corps

Japan to set up cyberdefense network that includes Pacific islands

Ukrainian troops left 'underprepared' by NATO training as instructors don't understand the type of warfare or the enemy, report says

Does China Want to Start a War in the South China Sea?

A South China Sea Showdown?

Beijing’s Motivations

Philippine Military Capabilities

America’s 911 call and global response to Ukraine war | The Express Tribune

Twenty-four months later one can say employment of non-military means has not been as effective as the US desired

The Clean Energy Future Is Arriving Faster Than You Think

Solar and Wind Power Have Taken Off

‘Energy Is Energy’

‘Something Very Dramatic’

The Cost of Renewable Energy Has Plummeted

‘A National Phenomenon’

Electric Cars Are Gaining Momentum

Would F-16s Have Made the Difference in Ukraine’s Counteroffensive?

Examining Disaster Aid as Cover for a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwan

China driving Marcos deeper into American arms

Related

The Biden-Iran Hostage Deal

The U.S. is poised to hand over a $6 billion ransom for five Americans.

The latest Iran deal is a win-win

A complicated prisoner swap should ease drug shortages that are killing ordinary Iranians—and put new pressure on Tehran’s leaders.

Two years after fall of Kabul, tens of thousands of Afghans languish in limbo waiting for US visas

__

Extend the Pentagon’s ban on China’s consumer drones

Special Operations News Update - August 14, 2023 | SOF News

SOF News

International SOF

SOF History

Ukraine Conflict

National Security

Upcoming Events

Books, Pubs, and Reports

Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Podcasts

The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism

The Pentagon plans to shake up DC’s National Guard

Blame Biden’s Hesitancy for Stalling Ukraine’s Offensive

Paralyzed by fear of Russian escalation, the administration has sought only to stave off defeat.

Russia to equip new nuclear submarines with hypersonic missiles

Getting Serious About Security Cooperation - War on the Rocks

Arm but Verify: A Blueprint for Rigorous Oversight of Future Ukraine Aid - War on the Rocks

How to Prevent an AI Catastrophe

Society Must Get Ready for Very Powerful Artificial Intelligence

By Markus Anderljung and Paul Scharre

READY OR NOT

MOVE SLOW AND BUILD THINGS

BRACE FOR IMPACT

SAFETY FIRST

US Saw More Mass Shooting Deaths in First Half of 2023 Than All of 2018’s Year of ‘Never Again’

This year is on pace to break the record for the number of mass shootings — with 438 so far

'Never Again'

Again and Again

What's Behind the Surge

Proliferation of Guns