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Quotes of the Day:
"Always stick to what makes you weird, odd, strange, different. That's your source of power."
- Robert Greene
"Ignorance is not a simple lack of knowledge but an active aversion to knowledge, the refusal to know, issuing from cowardice, pride,or laziness of mind."
- Carl Popper
“It is easy to sit up and take notice. What is difficult is getting up and taking action.”
- Honore de Balzac
1. Why Joe Biden will host Japan and South Korea’s leaders at Camp David
2. You say Taiwan; I say Korea
3. U.N. grants sanctions exemptions for WHO's humanitarian activities in N. Korea
4. South Korea Needs a Drone Strategy
5. Korea, U.S. Japan discuss joint military exercises and trilateral summits
6. Street Market (north Korea)
7. North Koreans ordered to protect portraits of Kim Jong-un as tropical storm Khanun looms
8. No impact from release of Iranian assets from S. Korea: White House
9. South Korea throws huge K-Pop concert for Scouts after storm Khanun disrupted their Jamboree
10. South Koreans rally in Seoul against Japanese plans to release treated nuclear wastewater into sea
1.Why Joe Biden will host Japan and South Korea’s leaders at Camp David
Perhaps the best way to institutionalize cooperation might be to establish a trilateral alliance. But I do not think we are there yet.
As I have written I would like to see a "Camp David Consensus" to complement the Washington Declaration that would be focused on trilateral support for a free and unified Korea as the path toward denuclearization and the end of the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed by the Kim family regime.
But the practical goal is expressed in this excerpt:
Thus the most important aim of the upcoming summit is to begin locking in the gains of recent months. The leaders need to institutionalise their relationship, creating structures that cannot easily be dismantled by their successors, Mr Sahashi says. That may mean scheduling regular trilateral meetings and perhaps even creating a formal leaders’ hotline. As Mr Johnstone puts it, such steps, especially when announced in a setting like Camp David, “become something harder for future leaders to walk away from”.
Why Joe Biden will host Japan and South Korea’s leaders at Camp David
America wants to institutionalise co-operation with two key Asian allies
The Economist
CAMP DAVID, the American president’s country residence, occupies a special place in diplomatic lore. The wooded grounds have been the setting for intimate meetings and historic negotiations, including a wartime confab between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill and peace talks between Israel and its Arab neighbours. On August 18th President Joe Biden will host Japan’s prime minister, Kishida Fumio, and South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, for the first-ever standalone summit between the three countries’ leaders. Officials hope the meeting will enter the annals by cementing ties between America and two key allies whose bitter history has often divided them.
These days China’s assertiveness, North Korea’s belligerence and Russian aggression are bringing the three closer. The governments’ strategic visions “have never been this closely aligned”, boasts Rahm Emanuel, America’s ambassador to Japan. A recent rapprochement between Japan and South Korea has helped, too. The summit will focus on deeper defence ties. Technology and supply chains for energy and semiconductors will also be on the agenda. The leaders will probably issue a joint declaration laying out their shared interests in military and economic security.
Though short of a formal three-way alliance, such steps herald a strategic shift in the Indo-Pacific. Under Moon Jae-in, Mr Yoon’s left-wing predecessor, security co-operation stalled and intelligence sharing dried up as Japan and South Korea bickered over Japan’s colonial-era atrocities, much to China’s and North Korea’s delight. Yet since Mr Yoon took office in 2022, South Korea has sought to put such gripes aside. In May Mr Kishida made the first official visit by a Japanese leader to Seoul, South Korea’s capital, in more than a decade.
The three countries’ armed forces are working together again. The American, Japanese and South Korean defence ministers met in June and pledged to begin sharing intelligence about North Korean missile launches in real time. Closer co-ordination between the three sends a signal to North Korea and other would-be belligerents that if “we are attacked, we can deal with the situation”, says Wi Sung-lac, a former South Korean diplomat and nuclear negotiator. Since Mr Yoon came to power they have stepped up defence exercises. In May a Japanese destroyer flying a controversial Imperial-era flag made a port call in South Korea; Mr Yoon’s government played down the incident—a small sign that present-day security concerns are taking precedence over historical grievances.
Trilateral discussions have taken on a wider scope. When the governments talk, “they don’t just talk about the Korean peninsula, they talk about the Indo-Pacific more broadly,” notes Christopher Johnstone of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington, DC. Japan and America see South Korea as a key player in South-East Asia, where both seek to counter Chinese influence. Warming relations have allowed conversations on semiconductors to deepen, too: Samsung is reportedly planning to invest in a new chip factory in Japan.
China is paying attention. Chinese officials have been pushing to restart high-level trilateral talks between China, Japan and South Korea, which have withered in recent years. “This is what summit envy looks like,” Mr Emanuel quips. During a recent forum in Qingdao, Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, addressed Japanese and South Koreans attending. “No matter how blond you dye your hair, how sharp you shape your nose, you can never become a European or American,” he said.
Crude appeals are unlikely to lure Japan or South Korea away from America. Yet there are limits to how close the three can get. Mutual suspicion between Japan and South Korea still runs deep. Japan’s constitution makes it difficult to enter new formal alliances. For South Korea, a Japanese military presence or role on the peninsula remains controversial. Even sharing intelligence is “difficult to accept for Korean people”, says Choi Eun-mi of the Asan Institute, a think-tank in Seoul.
The three countries also have different security priorities. For South Korea, the focus remains North Korea. Japan is more concerned about China and potential conflict over Taiwan, which South Korea is hesitant to discuss. America had hoped to launch a trilateral dialogue on extended nuclear deterrence, the commitment to use America’s nuclear forces to defend allies. But approaches to nuclear issues in South Korea and Japan differ. “Japan wants extended deterrence to be as invisible as possible, whereas South Korea wants it to be as visible as possible,” says Sahashi Ryo of the University of Tokyo. Japan and South Korea both gripe about America’s trade policies. Yet South Korea is more reluctant to alienate China.
Domestic politics in all three countries threatens to undo diplomatic progress. Most South Koreans agree that the relationship with Japan ought to improve, but many feel that Mr Yoon has papered over Japan’s crimes. His proposed solution to a long-running court case over colonial-era forced labour is no more popular than it was when he announced it in March. Constrained by his party’s nationalist conservative wing, Mr Kishida is unlikely to offer further concessions. If a candidate from Mr Moon’s party, which is ideologically ill-disposed towards the Japanese, were to be elected in 2027, Mr Yoon’s work might come to naught. A second term in America for Donald Trump, with his disdain for alliances, would be similarly damaging.
Thus the most important aim of the upcoming summit is to begin locking in the gains of recent months. The leaders need to institutionalise their relationship, creating structures that cannot easily be dismantled by their successors, Mr Sahashi says. That may mean scheduling regular trilateral meetings and perhaps even creating a formal leaders’ hotline. As Mr Johnstone puts it, such steps, especially when announced in a setting like Camp David, “become something harder for future leaders to walk away from”. ■
The Economist
2. You say Taiwan; I say Korea
Quite a provocative essay. A lot to consider and discuss here.
Excerpts:
This reality makes the Korean peninsula one of Asia’s most dangerous flash points for future strains.
Tension is on the rise around China. Saber-rattling has become frequent around Taiwan, the island de facto independent but, in theory, part of One China. Strategists’ risk assessments consider the possibility of a clash around Taiwan because the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might attempt to invade the island.
There are also risks of skirmishes that could get out of control in the contested waters of the South China Sea between China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.
A fight that gets out of hand could also start in the high altitudes of the Himalayas between Chinese and Indian troops. Yet, the North Korean scenario could be the most significant jeopardy.
It is impossible to assess Chinese intentions on all these borders. However, a war on the Korean peninsula could be less risky and more advantageous to Beijing in the present situation.
If North Korean forces were to start a bombardment of Seoul and move infantry and tanks over the ceasefire line, it could inflict the most significant damage to the Western world with the least pain to China.
You say Taiwan; I say Korea
A new Korean war could serve China’s interests best among the various regional flash points that threaten to tilt toward conflict
asiatimes.com · by Francesco Sisci · August 12, 2023
In theory, it is a peninsula, but actually, for all practical purposes, it is an island. South Korea is separated from the rest of the Asian continent by its intractable half-brother to the North, making any land contact with its neighbors impossible.
The gap between the reality (being an island) and the theoretical aspiration (being a peninsula) is compounded by being one of the world’s wealthiest and most dynamic locations, bordering one of the most backward and stagnant places globally, its northern half-brother.
This reality makes the Korean peninsula one of Asia’s most dangerous flash points for future strains.
Tension is on the rise around China. Saber-rattling has become frequent around Taiwan, the island de facto independent but, in theory, part of One China. Strategists’ risk assessments consider the possibility of a clash around Taiwan because the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might attempt to invade the island.
There are also risks of skirmishes that could get out of control in the contested waters of the South China Sea between China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.
A fight that gets out of hand could also start in the high altitudes of the Himalayas between Chinese and Indian troops. Yet, the North Korean scenario could be the most significant jeopardy.
It is impossible to assess Chinese intentions on all these borders. However, a war on the Korean peninsula could be less risky and more advantageous to Beijing in the present situation.
If North Korean forces were to start a bombardment of Seoul and move infantry and tanks over the ceasefire line, it could inflict the most significant damage to the Western world with the least pain to China.
The start of a conflict in South Korea could cause the collapse of the South Korean financial system, which in turn could trigger the crash of stock exchanges worldwide.
A new Korean war could quickly upend South Korea’s economic miracle. Image: Asia Times Files / AFP
Unlike 70 years ago, at the time of the Korean War, South Korea is a crucial component of global wealth creation, and an attack on Seoul could spark a global financial tsunami. It would have the extra benefit of forcing an engagement of American troops stationed there while not engaging Chinese troops directly.
Of course, such a move would put the Pyongyang regime at risk, but North Korean leader Kim Jong Un might be tempted to action if goaded by Beijing or in a moment of total miscalculated madness.
None of these scenarios are impossible, looking at the history of North Korea, and as tension builds up around North Korea and China, either side might be tempted to get out of their actual or perceived encirclement and do something crazy for crazy returns.
Unlike any other theater, a war there, as we saw, could be reasonably safe for China. Chinese troops would risk their lives in all different scenarios, whereas Americans could take a backseat.
After a possible attack, North Korea could try to bargain its way out of the mess and hope to bolster a very precarious domestic situation.
The point is not to see if Beijing or Pyongyang will dare to move on South Korea. After the irrational and unreasonable Russian attack on Ukraine, only considering rational and reasonable calculations can’t be enough. Most of the world thought Russia would never attack Ukraine because it was wild, yet it happened.
Therefore, one must assume Kim, far more irrational and unreasonable than Russian President Vladimir Putin, could move on South Korea. Its present nuclear and missile build-up could point in that direction.
Moreover, a land attack and a bombardment of Seoul, limited in the hope of some later bargaining, is more reasonable than trying a landing on Taiwan or an engagement with enemy fleets in the South China Sea, or a significant clash with India.
An attack on Taiwan is most likely to fail. Landings are the most dangerous military maneuvers; they have often been botched.
A more significant missile attack on Taiwan could entail a more extensive retaliation from the United States and Japan, both keen on preserving the island’s political existence. A clash with the Vietnamese or the Philippine fleets in the South China Sea could spur US intervention, and the US Navy still far outguns China’s PLA-Navy.
A large conflict with India may have its rewards because China is militarily much more assertive than India along the border; however, politically, it would definitely poison the atmosphere between the two Asian giants.
A large but possibly limited war between the two Koreas could be different. China could deny its involvement and put the blame only on crazy Kim.
Yet, meanwhile, China could show its power in the region and hope to seed anxiety in the regional hostile alliance. Thus it could give Beijing greater room for maneuvering.
Chinese bind
It’s not essential to assess if these are Beijing’s intentions. There are enough material elements that could feed suspicion on Beijing’s role as Pyongyang’s puppeteer.
Therefore, given this perception, all present North Korean military build-up could also be blamed on China for its inability to restrain the neighbor.
After China supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Beijing can ill-afford suspicions about its role with Pyongyang, especially without any sure reward from a possible war.
It puts China in a bind. China may want to use North Korea to keep South Korea, Japan and the United States at bay. However, its ability to distance itself from Pyongyang at any given moment puts Beijing in a corner. It could be blamed for many of Pyongyang’s actions.
The United States, South Korea, and Japan require China’s deeper involvement in the North Korean quandary. China might be unwilling to follow through because it has no interest in improving the life of these three countries.
At the same time, tensions with China keep piling up. Still, the war scenario and its unfathomable implications put China on the spot.
A linear way forward would be to restart the six-party talks, press North Korea to stop its nuclear and missile build-up, and help to find a peaceful solution for the future of this rump country.
Still, if China helps to solve North Korea’s problems, it possibly won’t translate into easing its general situation; if it doesn’t help, it will help to create even more tension for China all around its borders.
China might have chosen to ease the tension cautiously. At the latest Pyongyang grand event, the July 27 commemorations of the war’s end 70 years ago, Beijing’s delegation was low-key compared to Russia’s, which sent over its Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.
But this may not be enough. Kim, with or without China’s support, has been trying to wangle his way into the limelight by showing off his latest military toys, and it muddies Beijing’s intentions, making the world suspect that the Chinese like its neighbor’s posture.
Brinkmanship here could become very difficult to manage. The communists ruling Beijing and the heirs of the KMT nationalists in Taiwan have been dealing with each other for a century. They know very well how to manage brinkmanship between themselves. The possibility of incidents and escalation is reasonably small.
However, China is not managing Kim’s brinkmanship directly, whether it wants or not to be Pyongyang’s puppeteer. Kim may be forced to toe Beijing’s line, but this has always been an extra effort.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are flanked by their wives as they watch a mass gymnastics performance in Pyongyang. Photo: Xinhua
Plus, Beijing would have to deal with Russia, which has a different Korean agenda, and the United States, Japan and South Korea. Too many balls in the air, and all very difficult to coordinate. Incidents are far more easy to happen, and so is escalation.
Therefore things can go wrong faster, and China could get hijacked into supporting a Korean conflict it doesn’t control. It could be like the Chinese initial support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, only much worse. Or Beijing could get directly involved in Korea, and things would go back to 70 years ago, again, only much worse.
Still, if properly managed, all the suspicions and doubts could be positive. They can lead to better and deeper discussions that will not turn South Korea into an actual peninsula but hopefully defuse some of the regional tensions. Without it, Korea becomes the hottest place on earth.
This essay first appeared on Settimana News and is republished with permission. The original article can be read here.
Related
asiatimes.com · by Francesco Sisci · August 12, 2023
3. U.N. grants sanctions exemptions for WHO's humanitarian activities in N. Korea
U.N. grants sanctions exemptions for WHO's humanitarian activities in N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · August 12, 2023
SEOUL, Aug. 12 (Yonhap) -- A U.N. Security Council panel has approved sanctions exemptions for the World Health Organization (WHO) allowing the delivery of tents into North Korea, its website showed Saturday.
On July 20, the U.N. committee overseeing sanctions approved the waiver on the importation of five "multipurpose" tents into the North for humanitarian relief to civilians to help cope with flood, drought and other emergencies, according to the U.N. website.
The exemption will be valid for nine months, the committee said.
It remains unclear when the items will be delivered to the North, as the reclusive country maintains border controls due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · August 12, 2023
4. South Korea Needs a Drone Strategy
Some excellent food for thought from Dr. Kim. I think she is absolutely right that a sound strategy is required and must come first. There are three components to it: one is to counter nK UAV capability. The other more important components are how to effectively employ UAVs in warfighting and offensive operations in support of achieving operational and perhaps strategic objectives and then as an enabling capability supporting intelligence collection, communications, and possibly even logistics support There is much more to the strategy than simply counter north Korean UAV capabilities.
South Korea Needs a Drone Strategy
Before Seoul invests in UAVs, it should develop a workable strategy to deter Pyongyang’s incessant drone activity.
The National Interest · by Lami Kim · August 11, 2023
Last month, Seoul issued an ordinance establishing a drone operation command by this September. The ordinance follows the revelation last December that South Korea’s military failed to destroy North Korean unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that intruded national airspace. Seoul seeks to develop capabilities to detect and destroy adversarial drones while creating its own UAVs capable of surveillance and strike operations. Seoul’s efforts to seek these capabilities should be welcomed. North Korean drones pose a significant military and psychological threat, and drones are now an essential part of modern warfare. However, Seoul has yet to clearly indicate what it seeks to achieve by developing drone and counter-drone capabilities and establishing the drone operation command. Also, Seoul has so far focused on developing technologies and weapons but not operational concepts to utilize these capabilities and serve South Korea’s policy objectives. Seoul should answer these questions to ensure its means match its ends before establishing the new drone command.
On December 26, 2022, five North Korean drones crossed into South Korean airspace and flew there for five hours. One drone penetrated the no-fly zone that protects the presidential office in Seoul. South Korea’s military failed to detect the drones at first. Upon detection, the military scrambled fighter jets and attack helicopters, which fired a combined 100 rounds but failed to shoot down any of the drones. The only aerial vehicle that crashed was one of South Korea’s attack aircraft. This incident revealed the vulnerability of South Korea’s air defense system and its military’s low readiness for drone incursions. Other incidents abound. North Korean drones took aerial photographs of the presidential office in 2014 and a critical military installation in 2017 before crashing.
To be fair, countering drones is hard. Drones are difficult to detect, track and intercept because they are slow, small, and fly at low altitudes. Traditional radar systems have difficulty recognizing such objects. Even when they do, radar cannot automatically distinguish drones from other objects of similar sizes, such as birds. Technical challenges aside, however, another contributing factor to the mishaps was South Korean commanders’ lack of clear rules of engagement as well as the fragmented air defense system between the services.
South Korea’s low level of readiness vis-à-vis North Korea’s drones is concerning in light of North Korea’s growing UAV capabilities. The most immediate threat North Korean drones pose is their intelligence collection on South Korean forces and facilities. North Korea cannot afford the expensive surveillance assets and reconnaissance aircraft South Korea uses, so it has developed surveillance drones to compensate for this weakness. Surveillance drones can also enhance North Korea’s military operations during wartime. At a minimum, North Korean drones regularly penetrating South Korean airspace will wreak psychological havoc on South Korean civilians and military personnel.
Additionally, North Korea has acquired combat UAVs, including a modified American target drone (MQM-107D). Pyongyang boasted these new combat and surveillance drones during last month’s ‘Victory Day’ parade. Reportedly, recent satellite imagery of a North Korean air force base detected a new type similar to Chinese killer drones, which can carry air-to-surface missiles, GPS-guided bombs, and anti-tank missiles. Obviously, UAVs carrying cluster bombs or weapons of mass destruction can inflict substantial damage. If sent in swarms, drones can deal a debilitating blow even to sophisticated weaponry. As technology evolves and drones become more integrated into the armed forces, drones will likely assume even more battlefield roles than we can foresee today.
Seoul has stepped up its efforts to enhance its drone and counter-drone capabilities to counter North Korea's growing drone threats. It plans to spend $441 million over the next five years to build systems capable of detecting, disabling, and destroying drones, including an airborne laser weapon and a signal jammer. South Korea is also acquiring long-distance surveillance and combat drones equipped with stealth technology to evade North Korean radar systems. The new drone operation command will oversee the planning and execution of missions for surveillance and reconnaissance, psychological and electronic warfare, and counter-drone maneuvers.
While South Korea’s efforts should be welcomed, it is questionable whether they are adequate. South Korea’s announced policy has focused on means (technology and weapons), largely disregarding ends (operational concepts and doctrines). Technologies and weapons by themselves do not guarantee victories on the battlefield. For instance, although Russia appeared to have an advantage in technology and weaponry at the outset of the Ukraine invasion, they could not press their advantage due to poor strategy and command and control. In contrast, Ukraine’s ability to cobble together a hodgepodge of technologies and capabilities in a coherent manner greatly enhanced its warfighting capabilities. Considering these examples, South Korea’s lack of a clear drone strategy and operational concepts is a significant problem. How will it use drone and counter-drone capabilities to meet its strategic objectives?
To begin with, South Korea’s objectives for its drone command are unclear. South Korean officials mentioned deterring North Korea’s drone incursions as a goal but have not announced whether South Korea’s deterrence mechanism will be one by denial or by punishment. Denying North Korea’s ability to carry out successful drone missions will be difficult. South Korea can limit damage incurred by drones with its new counter-drone capabilities. Still, it likely cannot detect and destroy the majority of North Korean drones crossing into the South due to radar’s technical limitations described above. As of last October, Ukraine shot down a significant number of Russian drones, but those it missed still had a debilitating impact on Ukraine’s electrical grid. Further, even if enemy drones are disabled or captured, their presence alone is still likely to inflict psychological costs on the South Korean public. Finally, convincing North Korea of the futility of sending drones into the South is inherently tricky since drones are relatively inexpensive.
What about deterring North Korea from sending drones by promising unacceptable punishment? President Yoon Suk Yeol has vowed to provide an “overwhelming response” to any North Korean provocation by sending ten drones for every North Korean drone that intrudes on South Korean airspace. But what real cost will this action inflict on the North? Will South Korea be willing to strike North Korean targets with its drones even at the risk of military escalation? The North will not consider such a threat of a disproportionate response credible. Without a clear deterrence mechanism, South Korea’s plan seems like a tit-for-tat exchange without strategic merit.
For deterrence to work, Seoul should craft strategies aimed at the North’s pressure points. For example, South Korea could signal it will retaliate to drone incursions by sending its own drones to surveil North Korean nuclear and missile sites and enable surgical strikes, such as the “bloody nose” option contemplated by former U.S. president Donald Trump. Seoul could also signal that it will use drones to detect the locations of North Korea’s leadership and facilitate a potential “decapitation” strategy, eliminating the North’s ruling caste. The leadership is North Korea’s center of gravity, and Pyongyang has shown sensitivity by attempting to garner intelligence related to the South’s decapitation strategy several times. Alternatively, South Korea could send its drones to disseminate anti-Pyongyang fliers to target the North’s worries about information campaigns. Punishing North Korea does not have to involve drones at all. The key is discovering what would convince Pyongyang it will regret sending drones into South Korea.
Another goal of the new drone operation command should be the integration of drones into the South Korean armed forces to enhance warfighting capabilities. As recent conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Russia and Ukraine illustrate, drones can play a decisive role in armed conflicts. Drones’ ability to provide real-time, high-resolution imagery helps military leaders gather critical intelligence about adversary movements and fortifications, identify and strike enemy targets accurately, and adapt quickly to constantly changing combat situations, all while minimizing the risks to human personnel. South Korea should develop ways to utilize drones as a force multiplier that amplifies existing military capabilities in a limited war scenario that falls below the nuclear threshold. Seoul should also devise ways to use drones in other regional conflicts and for capacity-building with regional partners. Lastly, South Korea should work with the United States to ensure that integrating drones into military operations does not downgrade the interoperability of joint forces.
As North Korea’s drone capabilities increase, the South Korean military must enhance its capability to counter North Korea’s drone threats. As drone technology evolves and drones increasingly become an essential tool of the armed forces, Seoul must also find ways to utilize drones effectively in conjunction with other weapons systems on the battlefield. South Korea’s decision to establish a drone operation command is a step in the right direction. However, as it stands, South Korea’s strategy lacks clear objectives. Deciding on these should be the first step.
Additionally, Seoul seems singularly focused on developing technology and weapons rather than operational concepts and doctrines. It is one thing to build technology and acquire weaponry and quite another to utilize them purposively. South Korea must develop effective strategies to counter North Korea’s drone threats before establishing its new drone operation command this September.
Lami Kim is a Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies under the U.S. Department of Defense. She is also a member of the Mid-career Nuclear Cadre at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Nonresident Scholar at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and an Adjunct Fellow at Pacific Forum. Until recently, she served as an Associate Professor and Director of the Asian Studies Program at the U.S. Army War College.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Image: Shutterstock.
The National Interest · by Lami Kim · August 11, 2023
5. Korea, U.S. Japan discuss joint military exercises and trilateral summits
Korea, U.S. Japan discuss joint military exercises and trilateral summits
donga.com
Posted August. 12, 2023 08:02,
Updated August. 12, 2023 08:02
Korea, U.S. Japan discuss joint military exercises and trilateral summits. August. 12, 2023 08:02. dapaper@donga.com.
Korea, the U.S., and Japan are finalizing the remaining details for formalizing trilateral summits and regular joint military exercises. The upcoming trilateral summit, scheduled to take place at Camp David in the U.S. on Friday (local time), is anticipated to encompass these particulars within the jointly issued statement.
During a phone call with The Dong-A Ilbo on Friday, a senior official from the presidential office shared, “We are currently engaged in discussions aimed at formulating a comprehensive framework and strategy for the military exercises involving South Korea, the U.S., and Japan.” This statement was made in response to a report by Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun on the same day, which indicated that “South Korea, the U.S., and Japan intend to incorporate the specifics of regularized joint military exercises into a collaborative joint statement, thereby enhancing the depth of trilateral cooperation.”
“We are not in the process of devising entirely new military exercises,” the official said. “Regularization aims to methodically structure the current military exercises involving South Korea, the U.S., and Japan.” The official emphasized that ‘regularization’ revolves around the organized execution of training that has been conducted. Evidently, given the sensitivity surrounding military training involving Japan from the perspective of the Korean government, it is discernible that a distinct boundary has been established about the initiation of novel military exercises.
The formalization of the South Korea-U.S.-Japan summit is poised to attain official status during this imminent summit. Underlining this development, a government official emphasized, “Consensus has already been solidified regarding the regularization of the trilateral summit.” Simultaneously, Japan's Kyodo News conveyed a parallel report on the day, asserting that South Korea, the U.S., and Japan have concurred to convene a summit meeting at a minimum annual frequency.
한국어
donga.com
6. Street Market (north Korea)
Posted by Committee for Human Rights in North Korea with No comments
By Morninglight*
August 11, 2023
https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2023/08/street-market.html
*The following short story was written by a North Korean escapee.
Kyungju got out of school around 5 p.m. Thinking that today’s school activity ended early, she chose to walk home. After passing a small playground, the station street appeared on her right. As usual, the street was half filled with folks selling stuff, buyers, and passers-by. Then, from a distance, she saw a man in a beige-brown uniform walk towards the street. He wore an armband that read gyu-chal-dae. He was a trainee at the local police station.
The trainee blew his whistle wildly to clear the street. Within an instant, many of the sellers jumped up, packed away their stuff in an instant, and ran. A lady who had chunks of cabbages took the most time. As the trainee approached, cabbages tumbled to the ground from her wide wrapping cloth. The lady struggled desperately.
She seemed to be in her mid-40s. With a small body and a weary face, it looked as though her family depended on her to make a living. This was the first time that Kyungju had seen her, but she could tell that this woman had experienced great hardship, and could not afford to have her cabbages taken away.
As Kyungju looked on, she hoped that the lady would run far away, so that the trainee could not catch her, and so that her cabbages wouldn’t be confiscated by the police.
The street is much quieter now. There are no sellers. The gyuchaldae trainee is nowhere to be seen. Pacing her footsteps a bit faster, Kyungju looked for the woman. If she sees her, she wants to ask her, “Are you alright?” The lady did not appear, and Kyungju felt a bit sad. Maybe she should’ve run after her. But more than that, she was relieved that the lady managed to escape.
Then, Kyungju imagined what the lady might say in reply. She would say “Yes, it’s okay,” even though she is not alright. Then she will let out a big sigh—the sigh that speaks of her devastated heart, the sigh that tells her big relief at not being caught. Then the woman would say:
“Today is not the first time. And it’s not even just me.”
“That’s true. It’s any street where selling stuff is not allowed.”
“Folks like me can’t afford a space in the local market. Only if the gyuchaldae guys have mercy when chasing us down, it would be so much bearable.”
“I wish we can make them never show up again.”
The lady will smile in silence. Though she understands the futility of her situation, she is comforted by hearing these words.
The conversation in Kyungju’s imagination ended with unrealistic hope. But her thoughts kept on going. Like the woman said, today’s incident is far from a surprise. It is a norm to the point that many folks shake it off and accept it as part of life. In the worst case, though, they would lose their merchandise. This could shatter their lives. If the officer has mercy on you and lets you go, you are lucky that day. But not everyone is so lucky, and you can’t afford to take risks. Then, could you tell the trainee guys to leave the sellers alone? Sure, a brave soul could stand up and raise their voice, but it will not make the problem disappear.
The sellers hate the gyuchaldae officers. Then again, what can the officers do? As part of their post-military service, they are assigned to the local police department. Far away from home, they have no attachment to the local folks, which is why it is easier to be merciless and strict. Perhaps they might not like their job. In fact, some of them are sick and tired of chasing and shouting at commoners who are simply trying to survive. But it is their duty. Their superiors order them to clear up the merchants off the street, and they have to carry their orders.
It is a muddy reality. The deep resentment (han) built in people’s souls cried out quietly. Yet it does not make their lives easier, so the folks at the bottom blame themselves. They say: who would I blame? Nobody. If I was from a different background, I won’t even be living in this circumstance. If I had a connection with a police officer, I would easily avoid the gyuchaldae’s rules. It’s my fault that I’m not from a privileged family—my lack of ability to do better. And this is the cost that I have to endure…
No one blames the societal structure. No one blames the rule-makers. Even if they fully understand the root of the problem, they won’t dare to speak out. Of course they wouldn’t. What would they say, and why? To get in trouble and be punished? No one would dare to do so in public.
Kyungju felt bitter at the reality she observed. Yet she couldn’t stop her thinking there. People can’t live like this forever. This outrageous system of rules and regulations has to be fixed. Can somebody change this? It would have to be a high-ranking official with authority and influence. Then, she scorned her hope. Why would they care? They probably don’t even know what struggles these street merchants have to endure. Also, those in such positions have everything to lose. Maybe it’s better if somebody with nothing to lose can question the system. This hope seemed to be more realistic. Still, Kyungju felt bad for what that person would face. It would be too much for one person to bear.
The evening sun set slowly. The sunset painted the sky with an orange and purple hue. Under these two shades of light, the day appeared to be both ordinary and odd. Carrying the image of the street and a nameless hope in her heart, Kyungju walked steadily with her gaze on the setting sun.
Categories: Escapee, Human Rights, North Korea
7. North Koreans ordered to protect portraits of Kim Jong-un as tropical storm Khanun looms
Priority for protection on propaganda portraits.
North Koreans ordered to protect portraits of Kim Jong-un as tropical storm Khanun looms
State media urges citizens to focus on ‘ensuring the safety’ of propaganda relating to the Kim dynasty
The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · August 11, 2023
North Koreans have been told to do everything possible to protect portraits of the Kim dynasty, as the country braces for heavy rain and strong winds caused by tropical storm Khanun.
The Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the ruling Korean Workers’ party, said people’s “foremost focus” should be on “ensuring the safety” of propaganda portraits of its current leader, Kim Jong-un, his father, Kim Jong-il, and his grandfather and North Korea’s founder, Kim Il-sung.
The newspaper also urged citizens to safeguard the large number of statues, mosaics, murals and other monuments to the Kim dynasty, which has ruled North Korea since it was founded in 1948.
Kim Jong-un fires North Korea’s top general and calls for weapons production boost
Read more
Khanun, which made landfall on the Korean peninsula on Thursday, was expected to move across to the North on Friday.
Natural disasters can have a devastating impact on the impoverished North, where weak infrastructure and deforestation has increased its vulnerability to flooding.
The tropical storm has already caused floods and landslides in South Korea, with one death reported and more than 16,000 people forced to evacuate homes in at-risk areas.
North Korea’s state-run KCNA news agency said that “all the sectors and units” in the country were “conducting a dynamic campaign to cope with disastrous abnormal climate”. It added that “strong wind, downpour, tidal wave and sea warnings” had been issued.
Khanun’s arrival comes just weeks after torrential rain caused flash floods and landslides that killed at least 47 people in South Korea.
The order to protect Kim imagery was a reminder of the importance the regime places on symbolism to reinforce its legitimacy.
Portraits of Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung adorn every home and office in the country, and people can face execution for damaging them, even by accident, according to NK News.
“Let’s not forget that North Korea among other things is a theocratic state,” Andrei Lankov, a professor at Kookmin University, told the website.
“These statues and portraits are not just symbols, but are sacred religious symbols – essentially icons. Every religion since times immemorial expects its faithful to be ready to die – or at least suffer – in order to save sacred icons.”
North Korean state media said that members of the military and the ruling party had been ordered to prepare flood-mitigation measures and salvage crops, amid reports that the storm could strike the capital, Pyongyang.
The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · August 11, 2023
8. No impact from release of Iranian assets from S. Korea: White House
No impact from release of Iranian assets from S. Korea: White House
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · August 12, 2023
By Yonhap
Published : Aug 12, 2023 - 21:09 Updated : Aug 12, 2023 - 21:09
NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby answers questions during the daily press briefing at the White House in Washington, US, July 17, 2023. (Reuters-Yonhap)
WASHINGTON -- There will not be a significant impact from the release of frozen Iranian assets in South Korea, a White House official said Friday, amid reports that the transfer of up to $7 billion from South Korea may weaken the local currency.
John Kirby, National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, said the US has worked "extensively" with South Korea to that end.
"All I can tell you without getting into too much of the details is that we have worked extensively with the South Koreans on this and there's no impact to the movement of the account from South Korea," the NSC spokesperson told a virtual press briefing when asked about any potential impact to the value or exchange rate of the South Korean won.
Earlier reports said the US has agreed to release the Iranian assets, frozen in two South Korean banks since 2019, in exchange for the release of five American citizens detained in Iran.
South Korea on Friday declined to confirm the US-Iran deal, but said it hopes for a smooth resolution of the issue of frozen Iranian assets, adding the government has been in close consultation with relevant countries, including the US and Iran, to address the issue. (Yonhap)
9. South Korea throws huge K-Pop concert for Scouts after storm Khanun disrupted their Jamboree
South Korea throws huge K-Pop concert for Scouts after storm Khanun disrupted their Jamboree
AP · August 11, 2023
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SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — A day after a powerful tropical storm flooded dozens of homes and turned streets into muddy rivers, South Korea threw a huge K-Pop concert in Seoul for 40,000 Scouts whose global Jamboree was disrupted by the weather.
Friday’s concert at a wet soccer stadium featured various performers, including girl groups NewJeans and Ive. The show was quickly put together by government officials as the closing event of the World Scout Jamboree. It came as the country began to clean up and make repairs in the aftermath of the storm, Khanun, which pounded the country’s southern and eastern regions with intense rains and winds that forced thousands to evacuate and left at least one person dead after making landfall early Thursday.
Khanun had weakened by the time it arrived in the densely populated Seoul metropolitan area Thursday night, and it blew into North Korea early Friday as a tropical depression.
The Jamboree was held at a coastal campsite before Khanun forced mass relocation efforts to house the Scouts in university dormitories, government and corporate training centers and hotels in the greater Seoul region and nearby areas.
Even before the storm effectively cut the Jamboree short, organizers struggled to continue the event in the face of punishing heat wave and hygiene problems that led thousands of British and Americans Scouts to leave the campsite early.
Those pullouts were a huge public relations setback for a country that continuously seeks the recognition huge international events bring. Friday’s concert came after frantic government efforts to give the Jamboree a proper ending.
“We are sorry about the difficulties Scouts experienced in the face of an unprecedented heat wave and typhoon triggered by climate change,” South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo said in a speech before the concert at the Seoul World Cup Stadium. He didn’t get much attention from the huge crowds of global scouts packing the seats in multicolored unforms and raincoats, who roared in excitement and made waves rising in sequence around the stadium as Han read out his statement.
The Scouts cheered enthusiastically as the singers began performing on a brightly illuminated stage amid light rain, waving heart-shaped light sticks and filming with their phones.
Government officials said most commercial flights and train services had resumed and power was mostly restored to some 46,000 households that had been knocked out of electricity as Khanun blew through the country.
No major storm damage has been reported in Seoul, where rain continued into the evening. In the nearby port city of Incheon, workers responded to flooded homes and collapsed walls.
In the southern inland city of Daegu, a 67-year-old man found near a bloated stream was later pronounced dead. Workers were searching for another person who was swept into a stream while using a wheelchair.
In Gangwon province, a mountainous region on the east coast that was drenched with some of Khanun’s heaviest rain, emergency workers in the seaside cities of Gangneung and Sokcho waded across rivers of brown, thigh-high water covering what used to be streets.
Nearly 16,000 people, mostly in southern regions, had been forced to evacuate from the storm but around 11,400 have returned home as of Friday, according to the Ministry of the Interior and Safety.
The storm damaged or destroyed at least 64 roads and damaged around 50 homes and buildings. Authorities restricted access to nearly 700 motorways as the rain persisted.
North Korea didn’t immediately confirm any meaningful damage caused by the storm, although its state TV mentioned some uprooted trees. State media has previously described nationwide efforts to strengthen the monitoring of roads, railways, bridges and coastlines, and to employ measures to protect factory machines and crops.
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AP · August 11, 2023
10. South Koreans rally in Seoul against Japanese plans to release treated nuclear wastewater into sea
South Koreans rally in Seoul against Japanese plans to release treated nuclear wastewater into sea
AP · August 12, 2023
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SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — Anxious about Japan’s impending release of treated nuclear wastewater from the tsunami-damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant, hundreds of South Koreans marched in their capital on Saturday. Protesters called for Tokyo to abandon the plans, and expressed anger toward Seoul for endorsing the discharge despite alleged food safety risks.
Saturday’s rally was the latest of weekslong protests since the International Atomic Energy Agency approved the Japanese discharge plans in July, saying that the process would meet international safety standards and pose negligible environmental and health impacts.
The safety of the wastewater release plans has also been advocated by the government of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, who in recent months has actively taken steps to repair long-strained ties with its fellow United States ally in the face of growing North Korean nuclear threats.
The Japanese government has said the wastewater release is set to start this summer, but it has not confirmed a specific date.
Wearing raincoats and holding signs that read, “We oppose the disposal of Fukushima’s contaminated water,” and, “No radioactive material is safe for the sea,” the demonstrators marched in light rain through the streets of downtown Seoul. The rallies were proceeding peacefully and there were no immediate reports of clashes or injuries.
South Korea has been trying to calm people’s fears of food contamination and environmental risks ahead of the release of Fukushima’s wastewater, including expanding radiation tests on seafood at the country’s major fish markets and even testing sand from its southern and western beaches. None of the tests have so far triggered safety concerns, Jeon Jae-woo, an official at the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, said during a briefing Friday.
Park Ku-yeon, first vice minister of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, said South Korea was hoping to wrap up working-level consultations with Japan next week over allowing South Korean experts to participate in the monitoring of the release process.
Liberal opposition lawmakers controlling the country’s National Assembly have accused Yoon’s government of putting people’s health at risk while trying to improve bilateral ties.
The Democratic Party said this week that it plans to file a complaint with the United Nations Human Rights Council to highlight the what it says are perils posed by the release of Fukushima’s wastewater, and question whether the IAEA properly reviewed the risks before greenlighting the discharge plans.
The party also urged Yoon to reverse his position and use a trilateral summit later this month with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and U.S. President Joe Biden to state Seoul’s opposition to the wastewater release.
The safety of Fukushima’s wastewater has been a sensitive issue for years between the U.S. allies. South Korea and Japan have been working in recent months to repair relations long strained over wartime historical grievances to address shared concerns such as the North Korean nuclear threat and China’s assertive foreign policy.
A massive earthquake and tsunami in 2011 destroyed the Fukushima plant’s cooling systems, causing three reactors to melt and contaminate their cooling water.
Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, which operates the facility, has been collecting, filtering, and storing the water in hundreds of tanks, which will reach their capacity in early 2024.
Japan first announced plans to discharge the treated water into the sea in 2018, saying the water will be further diluted by seawater before being released in a carefully controlled process that will take decades to complete.
The water is being treated with what’s called an Advanced Liquid Processing System, which is designed to reduce the amounts of more than 60 selected radionuclides releasable levels — except for tritium, which officials say is safe for humans if consumed in small amounts.
Junichi Matsumoto, the corporate officer in charge of treated water management for TEPCO, pledged in a news conference last month to conduct careful sampling and analysis of the water to make sure its release is safely carried out in accordance with IAEA standards.
AP · August 12, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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