Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Tact is the art of making a point without making an enemy."

- Isaac Newton

"There is no gate, no lock, no bolt that you can set upon the freedom of my mind."

- Virginia Woolf

"One of the most cowardly things ornery people do is to shut their eyes to facts."

- C.S. Lewis

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2023

2. Russia drops charges against Prigozhin and others who took part in brief rebellion

3. The Russian Mutiny Through a Chinese Lens

4. Russian mercenary chief Prigozhin is a 'dead man walking,' Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer says

5. Senate committee advances bill that may kill Army Combat Fitness Test

6. How this unit could shape the future of infantry battalions for decades

7. After mutiny, Putin says Wagner can go to Belarus, go home or fight for Russia

8. Cluster Munitions Are Biden’s Latest Slow-Roll on Ukraine Aid

9. Washington Needs to Get Ready for Russian Chaos

10. Wagner Is Preparing to Hand Over Heavy Weapons, Russian Military Says

11. Top general could become first female head of the British Army

12. US Open to Expanding AUKUS

13. "The Wise Man Will Be Master of the Stars:" The Use of Twitter by the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service

14. AI companies risk US national security by working with China. Time to choose sides

15. THE TAO OF DECEPTION PART I (Summer Fiction)

16. China offers closer military cooperation with Vietnam

17. It’s Time to Bring Back Conventional Deterrence Patrols

18. Explainer: The China-U.S. military chill: do they talk at all?

19. Army special forces' warfare strategies more relevant amid 'complex threats' faced by PH – Marcos

20. Biden is turning the screw on Putin even as US denies role in Russia’s insurrection

21. Palau under CCP pressure to switch recognition from Taiwan to China

22. Opinion | What happened in Russia — and what happens next? Our columnists weigh in.

23. 10th SFG(A) Trains With Swedish Home Guard | SOF News

24. The KGB, Sun Tzu and the Art of War

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech on June 26 seeking to persuade as many Wagner fighters and leaders as possible to join the Russian military and continue fighting against Ukraine and to cause individuals most loyal to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to self-identify.
The Kremlin indicated that Russia aims to retain Wagner forces to sustain its operations in Ukraine and other international engagements.
Prigozhin attempted to downplay his armed rebellion on June 26 in his first statement since the rebellion failed, likely in an attempt to shield himself from accusations of attempting a coup against Putin.
Prigozhin’s efforts to convince Putin of his loyalty clearly failed as Putin characterized the armed rebellion as a blackmail attempt and denounced its organizers as traitors following Prigozhin’s statement.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to signal that Shoigu will maintain his position for now and that Putin will not give into Prigozhin’s blackmail attempt.
The future of the Wagner Group is unclear, but it will likely not include Yevgeny Prigozhin and may not continue to exist as a distinct or unitary entity.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and advanced on at least two sectors of the front as of June 26.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced as of June 26.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to skirmish in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border area and Ukrainian forces made gains as of June 26.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivsky Bridge in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of June 26.
The Russian State Duma passed a law prohibiting private military companies (PMCs) from recruiting prisoners.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 26, 2023

Jun 26, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 26, 2023, 10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 4pm ET on June 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech on June 26 seeking to persuade as many Wagner fighters and leaders as possible to join the Russian military and continue fighting against Ukraine and to cause individuals most loyal to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to self-identify. Putin continued to denounce the organizers of the armed rebellion as traitors.[1] Putin thanked Russian society and the Russian security forces for defending Russia’s sovereignty and expressed gratitude to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko for brokering negotiations with the perpetrators of the rebellion. Putin did not name Prigozhin specifically, but Putin’s speech leaves little room for any rapprochement with Prigozhin.

Putin stated that Russia’s true enemy is Ukraine and distinguished between the Wagner Group fighters and the armed rebellion’s organizers, presumably Prigozhin and Prigozhin loyalists, and offered Wagner Group fighters three choices. Putin gave the Wagner Group commanders and fighters space to distance themselves from Prigozhin’s armed rebellion, stating that “we know that the overwhelming majority of Wagner Group fighters and commanders are also Russian patriots, devoted to their people and state.”[2] Putin stated that Wagner fighters who seek to continue “serving Russia” can sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or other Russian security services, retire and go home, or go to Belarus (presumably to be with Prigozhin).[3] Putin praised the work of Wagner Group commanders likely in an effort to retain them as the Wagner Group integrates into the MoD. The MoD’s ability to retain as many of Wagner’s current commanders as possible during the integration and subordination process is likely critical to maintaining the Wagner Group’s combat effectiveness and morale.

The Kremlin indicated that Russia aims to retain Wagner forces in order to sustain its operations in Ukraine and other international engagements. Putin could have arrested the Wagner commanders for treason but instead offered to forgive and integrate Wagner forces – which indicates his need for trained and effective manpower. Putin is also likely attempting to finalize the Russian MoD-initiated formalization effort. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reassured his foreign counterparts on June 26 that Wagner will continue operations in Mali and the Central African Republic.[4] Putin’s and Lavrov’s rhetoric supports an ongoing domestic information campaign in Russia to forgive and retain Wagner fighters.[5] Local Russian sources also reported that Wagner employees continue to recruit personnel in St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, and Tyumen.[6]

Some Wagner Group forces may follow Prigozhin to Belarus. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 26 that Belarusian authorities are constructing several new camps to house the Wagner Group fighters in Belarus and that the construction of a 24,000 square kilometer base for 8,000 Wagner Group fighters is already underway in Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast.[7] The location of a Wagner Group base in Asipovichy does not pose an immediate threat against Ukraine; Asipovichy is about 200 kilometers from Belarus’ international border with Ukraine, and the establishment of new Wagner Group bases in Gomel or Brest oblasts on the border with Ukraine would be much more alarming. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may seek to use the Prigozhin and Wagner Group fighters to balance against a longstanding Russian effort to establish a permanent military presence in Belarus, though the extent to which Lukashenko can successfully co-opt Prigozhin or refuse a potential Russian extradition demand for Prigozhin or Wagner fighters in Belarus remains unclear. Prigozhin’s personal whereabouts remain unclear as of June 26, though some unconfirmed reports suggest that he is in the “Green City Hotel” in western Minsk City.[8]

Belarus will not offer Prigozhin or Wagner fighters a true haven if the Kremlin pressures Belarus, however. Putin may be presenting Belarus as a haven for Wagner fighters as a trap. The Kremlin will likely regard the Wagner Group personnel who follow Prigozhin to Belarus as traitors whether or not it takes immediate action against them. Putin notably stated in his June 26 speech that Wagner Group fighters are permitted to go to Belarus and that Putin will keep his unspecified “promise” about Wagner fighters who choose to do so.[9] Putin’s acknowledgement that he made a personal promise, presumably that Wagner personnel who went to Belarus would be safe there, was remarkable. The long-term value of that promise, Putin’s speech notwithstanding, is questionable. Wagner Group personnel in Belarus are unlikely to remain safe from Russian extradition orders if Putin reneges and charges them with treason. Lukashenko previously turned over 33 Belarusian-detained Wagner personnel to Moscow after using them as leverage against the Kremlin in 2020, and there is no apparent reason why he would not do so again.[10]

Prigozhin attempted to downplay his armed rebellion on June 26 in his first statement since the rebellion failed, likely in an attempt to shield himself from accusations of attempting a coup against Putin. Prigozhin stated that Wagner forces did not intend to overthrow the government, but instead attempted to raise awareness about the Russian MoD’s efforts to destroy Wagner forces.[11] Prigozhin accused the Russian MoD of first attempting to dissolve the Wagner PMC on July 1 via its formalization order and then of striking Wagner’s rear areas on June 23. Prigozhin claimed that the Wagner PMC sought to demonstratively turn in their military equipment to the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) on June 30 to appease the Russian MoD’s inventorization requirements until the Russian MoD struck a Wagner camp. Prigozhin reiterated that the Wagner PMC decided to stop its advance 200 kilometers south of Moscow because Wagner realized that advancing further would result in casualties among Wagner and Russian security forces. Prigozhin acknowledged that Lukashenko extended his assistance to help the Wagner PMC legally continue operating as Wagner forces and decided to return to their training camps.

Prigozhin’s efforts to convince Putin of his loyalty clearly failed as Putin characterized the armed rebellion as a blackmail attempt and denounced its organizers as traitors following Prigozhin’s statement.[12] Putin stated that Russian society showed that “any blackmail, any attempt to stage domestic turmoil is doomed to fail.” Putin’s use of the word “blackmail” indicates that Putin perceived that Prigozhin was attempting to coerce him into accepting Prigozhin’s demands rather than intending to directly attack the Kremlin. ISW previously assessed that Prigozhin likely sought to blackmail Putin into firing Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov rather than intending to stage a coup in Moscow.[13] Both Putin and Prigozhin sought to reject the framing of the rebellion as a coup, with Putin attempting to preserve the image of the solidity of his regime. Putin also stated that “organizers of the armed rebellion” deliberately staged the rebellion and misled Wagner forces into criminal action. Putin emphasized that Russian forces and officials conducted all necessary measures to avoid bloodshed under his “direct orders,” which undermines Prigozhin’s claims that Wagner decided to deescalate the situation. Putin added that the armed rebellion could have benefited Ukraine and the West, and Lavrov earlier announced that Russia is investigating whether Western intelligence were involved in the rebellion.[14] The Kremlin may be setting information conditions to try Prigozhin and his loyal subordinates as traitors conspiring with external enemies, and such criminal charges would force Lukashenko to surrender Prigozhin and Wagner forces regardless of these Lukashenko-brokered negotiations.

The Kremlin is likely attempting to signal that Shoigu will maintain his position for now and that Putin will not give into Prigozhin’s blackmail attempt. The Russian MoD reported that Shoigu visited an unspecified forward command post of the Russian Western Group of Forces in Ukraine on June 26 – his first public appearance since Prigozhin’s drive on Rostov-on-Don and Moscow.[15] The Russian MoD previously identified that the Western Group of Forces operates on the Kupyansk-Svatove line in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts. Shoigu reportedly met with Western Group of Forces commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov and tasked the grouping with preventing Ukrainian advances on the frontline. Shoigu notably did not visit the SMD headquarters in Rostov-on-Don after Wagner’s occupation of the city ended and or otherwise connect with SMD forces in southern Ukraine after the armed rebellion concluded. It is currently unclear if the Kremlin will replace Shoigu and Gerasimov, but it is unlikely that the Kremlin would make such drastic command changes immediately since doing so would seem to be conceding to Prigozhin’s demands. ISW has previously assessed that Putin values loyalty, and Shoigu and Gerasimov have demonstrated their allegiance to Putin.[16]

Russian sources, however, continued to speculate about Russian military command changes following Prigozhin’s armed rebellion. Russian milbloggers began a campaign promoting Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin to replace Shoigu as Russian defense minister by amplifying a video in which Dyumin visited a Tula volunteer battalion on June 25.[17] Other milbloggers claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is currently investigating Dyumin’s connection to Prigozhin and Wagner’s reported access to Pantsir missile systems.[18] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger suggested that the Kremlin may reshuffle Head of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces’ Main Combat Training Directorate Lieutenant General Ivan Buvaltsev, and Head of the General Staff’s Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate Colonel General Yevgeny Burdinsky soon.[19] The milblogger claimed that the Kremlin may replace Burdinsky for his inability to account for convicts within “Storm Z” units who were then recruited by other armed formations, and could replace Rudskoy for failing to implement a Kharkiv operational plan – the objectives of which are unknown.

The future of the Wagner Group is unclear, but it will likely not include Yevgeny Prigozhin and may not continue to exist as a distinct or unitary entity. Putin’s appeal to Wagner commanders and servicemen indicates that the Kremlin aims to lure Wagner forces to the Russian MoD, but it is unclear how the Kremlin will organize Wagner into its military structure. The Kremlin may break up Wagner forces operating in Ukraine to reinforce existing military formations, or get Wagner forces to sign up for Russian MoD-affiliated PMCs.[20] The Russian MoD has previously lied to volunteers about keeping their formations together to ensure that recruits sign military contracts, after which the Russian military command dissolved the units.[21] The Kremlin may choose to keep the Wagner entity solely to sustain operations in Africa or the Middle East and break up Wagner’s group of forces in Ukraine. Such scenarios may impact Wagner forces’ morale and combat effectiveness. Prigozhin claimed that Wagner commanders and personnel categorically opposed Wagner’s subordination under the Russian MoD and noted that the Russian military command would misuse experienced Wagner fighters as cannon fodder.[22] Wagner forces, who had previously enjoyed their autonomy, will likely face hostility from Russian military commanders in retaliation for Wagner’s efforts to undermine regular forces. The Telegraph, citing British special services, reported that Russian special forces threatened to harm the families of Wagner commanders during the armed rebellion, which may further trigger tensions and low morale.[23]

Putin’s June 26 speech likely signaled a decisive break between Prigozhin and Putin, and it is likely that the Kremlin will attempt to replace the Wagner leader to distance the PMC from Prigozhin’s betrayal – if the Kremlin decides to keep Wagner as a distinct entity. The Kremlin has not yet made any announcements regarding Wagner’s fate at the time of this publication. Some Russian sources began to mention Wagner founder Dmitry Utkin even though Utkin has remained out of the public eye throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[24] Commander of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion Alexander Khodakovsky, for example, recalled a time when Utkin saved a Wagner employee from Prigozhin and his henchmen’s beatings.[25]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and advanced on at least two sectors of the front as of June 26. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces cleared a Russian bridgehead across the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas canal in the Bakhmut direction, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced southwest of Bakhmut.[26] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar, other Ukrainian officials, and geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured Rivnopil near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts as of June 26.[27] Russian sources additionally confirmed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblast administrative border area.[28] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Robotyne, south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[29] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Valeriy Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces advanced one and a half kilometers in an unspecified area of the Tavriisk (Zaporizhia) direction.[30] Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces have recaptured 130 square kilometers of territory in southern Ukraine since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[31] The UK MoD indicated on June 26 that Russian forces likely lack operational-level reserves that could reinforce against simultaneous Ukrainian threats on multiple areas of the front hundreds of kilometers from each other, chiefly Bakhmut and southern Ukraine.[32]

Russian forces conducted a missile and drone strike on Ukraine on the night of June 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two of three Russian Kalibr cruise missiles and seven of eight Shahed 131 or 136 drones.[33] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that one missile struck a storage facility in Odesa Oblast.[34] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk reported that strong storms over the Black Sea made it difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept targets.[35]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech on June 26 seeking to persuade as many Wagner fighters and leaders as possible to join the Russian military and continue fighting against Ukraine and to cause individuals most loyal to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to self-identify.
The Kremlin indicated that Russia aims to retain Wagner forces to sustain its operations in Ukraine and other international engagements.
Prigozhin attempted to downplay his armed rebellion on June 26 in his first statement since the rebellion failed, likely in an attempt to shield himself from accusations of attempting a coup against Putin.
Prigozhin’s efforts to convince Putin of his loyalty clearly failed as Putin characterized the armed rebellion as a blackmail attempt and denounced its organizers as traitors following Prigozhin’s statement.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to signal that Shoigu will maintain his position for now and that Putin will not give into Prigozhin’s blackmail attempt.
The future of the Wagner Group is unclear, but it will likely not include Yevgeny Prigozhin and may not continue to exist as a distinct or unitary entity.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and advanced on at least two sectors of the front as of June 26.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced as of June 26.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to skirmish in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border area and Ukrainian forces made gains as of June 26.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivsky Bridge in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of June 26.
The Russian State Duma passed a law prohibiting private military companies (PMCs) from recruiting prisoners.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna on June 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), Kryvoshyivka (10km northwest of Svatove), Rozdolivka (32km southwest of Kreminna), and Vesele (32km southwest of Kreminna).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attempted to advance toward Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove) and conducted attacks near Kreminna.[37] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian attacks near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced as of June 26. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces cleared a Russian bridgehead across the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas canal in the Bakhmut direction, possibly referring to an area southwest of Bakhmut.[39] Official Ukrainian footage published on June 26 shows Ukrainian forces attacking positions of the 3rd Battalion of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) in the Bakhmut direction, and Russian forces withdrawing across a waterway.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[41] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on June 25 that Ukrainian forces advanced 600 to 1,000 meters in the Bakhmut direction.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Mynkivka (13km northwest of Bakhmut), Hryhorivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut), and Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[44] Cherevaty stated that Russian forces are transferring airborne (VDV) units, infantry, BARS (Russian Combat Reserve), territorial troops, Storm-Z units, and units of the private military companies (PMCs) “Patriot,” ”Fakel,” and “Veterany” to Bakhmut in an effort maintain control over the city.[45] Russian milbloggers previously claimed that Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom created PMC “Fakel,” which reportedly operated in Bakhmut as of April 26.[46]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 26. Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows that Russian forces recently made limited gains in Marinka.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km south of Marinka).[48] Footage published on June 26 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 9th Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Pervomaiske and elements of the 14th Brigade, formerly the “Kalmius” Artillery Brigade, (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating in the Avdiivka direction.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to skirmish in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border area, and Ukrainian forces made gains as of June 26. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar, other Ukrainian officials, and geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured Rivnopil (9km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on June 26.[50] The Russian MoD and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian attacks near Rivnopil.[51] Other Russian sources acknowledged that Ukrainian forces entered Rivnopil but claimed that Russian forces still maintain positions in part of the settlement.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked along the Levadne-Rivnopil-Makarivka line (5-17km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), the Priyutne-Staromaiorske line (8-14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and near Novodonetske (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Novodarivka (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) in order to recapture positions in the area.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces did retake territory in the area, however.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) or an element of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) is operating in the Makarivka area (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).[56]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 26. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[57] Some Russian milbloggers indicated that Pyatykhatky (23km southwest of Orikhiv) is contested and that Russian artillery fire prevents Ukrainian forces from reentering the settlement, but ISW is unable to confirm these claims.[58]

Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivsky Bridge in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of June 26. Geolocated footage posted on June 25 shows Russian forces firing on Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge as well as Russian infantry retreating from the bridge area.[59] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces fired on Ukrainian positions near the bridge on the east bank on June 26.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control the dacha area near Oleshky (7km southeast of Kherson City) and that the shoreline near Hola Prystan (8km south of Kherson City) is a contested area.[61] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attempted to push Ukrainian forces off the riverbank, but that Ukrainian forces have entrenched in their positions near the Antonivsky Bridge.[62] Russian milbloggers indicated that the Russian 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and 108th Air Assault Regiment (7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division).[63]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian State Duma passed a law prohibiting private military companies (PMCs) from recruiting prisoners on June 24. The head of the Russian State Duma Committee on Legislation and State Construction, Pavel Krasheninnikov, announced on June 26 that the Russian State Duma passed a law prohibiting prisoners from signing contracts with PMCs, only allowing them to sign contracts with the Russian MoD.[64] ISW previously assessed that the Russian MoD blocked Wagner from recruiting prisoners in Winter 2023 as the Russian MoD sought to reassert its primacy over all Russian forces and operations in Ukraine.[65]

The Republic of Bashkortostan continues to form new regional volunteer formations. Bashkortostan Head Radiy Khabirov announced that Bashkortostan formed the main elements of the “Baskhkortostan” volunteer regiment, which will receive its combat banner on June 29.[66] Bashkortostan authorities claimed in April that over 600 people signed up for the new “Northern Amurs” and “Vatan” volunteer battalions.[67] Bashkortostan has also deployed newly created “Sergei Zorin” tank and “Vatan” volunteer battalions to Ukraine in April and May.[68]

Russian military personnel and their families continue to voice grievances over poor treatment in the Russian military. A Russian milblogger posted a letter claiming that volunteers of the 31st Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade have not received their promised pay.[69] The letter claimed that Russian authorities promised higher compensation to those who already fought in Ukraine but have only paid these personnel their basic salaries, while new recruits are not paid at all. The letter also claimed that the Russian MoD denied one volunteer the promised one-time 195,000-ruble (about $2,310) payment for signing an 11-month contract and told him that he would need to sign another year-long contract to receive the money. Footage published on June 26 shows relatives of mobilized personnel from Stavropol Krai appealing to krai governor Vladimir Vladimirov for better treatment of their relatives. The relatives claimed that Russian military commanders send mobilized personnel into battle without ammunition and threaten to kill them if they refuse to conduct attacks.[70] ISW has previously reported on appeals from Russian military personnel and their families to Russian leadership for better treatment.[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

A Ukrainian official reported that Russian forces continue to forcibly remove Ukrainian children from occupied areas under vacation schemes. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on June 26 that Russian occupation authorities sent Ukrainian children from occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast to “summer camps” in Crimea on June 24 and 25.[72] Fedorov stated that Russian occupation authorities shut down the Chonhar, Crimea checkpoint due to recent Ukrainian strikes against the bridge, so the Ukrainian children suffered in hot busses waiting to enter Crimea at the Armyansk, Crimea checkpoint.

A Ukrainian official indicated that Russian forces continue to appropriate civilian medical facilities in occupied territories for military use. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor stated that Russian forces expropriated a medical facility in Luhansk City to treat Russian soldiers.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Russia drops charges against Prigozhin and others who took part in brief rebellion

Russia drops charges against Prigozhin and others who took part in brief rebellion

AP · June 27, 2023

Russian authorities said Tuesday they have closed a criminal investigation into the armed rebellion led by mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, with no charges against him or any of the other participants.

The Federal Security Service, or FSB, said its investigation found that those involved in the mutiny “ceased activities directed at committing the crime,” so the case would not be pursued.

The announcement was the latest twist in a series of stunning events in recent days that have brought the gravest threat so far to President Vladimir Putin’s grip on power amid the 16-month-old war in Ukraine.

Other news

Belarus deal to take in leader of Russian rebellion puts him in an even more repressive nation

Russian mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin was notorious for unbridled and profane challenges to authority even before the attempted rebellion that he mounted Saturday.

Belarus human rights activist gets 7-year prison term for work documenting police crackdown

A court in Belarus has convicted a prominent human rights activist of “inciting social hatred” for her work documenting alleged police abuses against political opposition groups.

Putin says Russian tactical nuclear weapons to be deployed to Belarus next month

Russian President Vladimir Putin says that Moscow will deploy some of its tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus next month, a move that the Belarusian opposition described as an attempt to blackmail the West.

Belarus has no immediate plans to adopt Russian currency, its strongman leader Lukashenko says

TALLINN, Estonia (AP) — Belarus and Russia have no plans to adopt a joint currency in the near future, Belarus’ strongman leader announced on Monday.

Over the weekend, the Kremlin pledged not to prosecute Prigozhin and his fighters after he stopped the revolt on Saturday, even though Putin had branded them as traitors.

The charge of mounting an armed mutiny carries a punishment of up to 20 years in prison. Prigozhin escaping prosecution poses a stark contrast to how the Kremlin has treated those staging anti-government protests in Russia.

Many opposition figures in Russia have received long prison terms and are serving time in penal colonies notorious for harsh conditions.

The whereabouts of Prigozhin remained a mystery Tuesday. The Kremlin has said he would be exiled to neighboring Belarus, but neither he nor the Belarusian authorities have confirmed that.

An independent Belarusian military monitoring project Belaruski Hajun said a business jet that Prigozhin reportedly uses landed near Minsk on Tuesday morning.

The media team for Prigozhin, the 62-year-old head of the Wagner private military contractor, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Belarus’ authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko, a close Putin ally who brokered a deal with Prigozhin to stop the uprising, didn’t immediately address Prigozhin’s fate in a speech Tuesday.

Lukashenko, who has ruled Belarus with an iron hand for 29 years, relentlessly stifling dissent and relying on Russian subsidies and political support, portrayed the uprising as the latest development in a clash between Prigozhin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Their long-simmering personal feud has at times boiled over, and Prigozhin has said the revolt aimed to unseat Shoigu, not Putin.

Lukashenko framed the insurrection by Wagner as a significant threat, saying he placed Belarus’ armed forces on a combat footing as the mutiny unfolded.

Like Putin, he couched the Ukraine war in terms of an existential threat to Russia, saying: “If Russia collapses, we all will perish under the debris.”

In a nationally televised address Monday night, Putin once again blasted organizers of the rebellion as traitors who played into the hands of Ukraine’s government and its allies. Although he was critical of Prigozhin, Putin praised the work of Wagner commanders.

That was “likely in an effort to retain them” in the Russian effort in Ukraine, because Moscow needs “trained and effective manpower” as it faces the early stages of a Ukrainian counteroffensive, according to a Washington-based think tank.

The Institute for the Study of War also noted that the break between Putin and Prigozhin is likely beyond repair and that providing the Wagner chief and his loyalists with Belarus as an apparent safe haven could be a trap.

Prigozhin’s short-lived insurrection over the weekend has rattled Russia’s leadership.

Putin sought to project stability in his speech, criticizing the uprising’s “organizers,” without naming Prigozhin. He also praised Russian unity in the face of the crisis, as well as rank-and-file Wagner fighters for not letting the situation descend into “major bloodshed.”

Earlier Monday, Prigozhin defended his actions in a defiant audio statement. He again taunted the Russian military but said he hadn’t been seeking to stage a coup against Putin.

In another show of projecting authority, the Kremlin on Monday night showed Putin meeting with top security, law enforcement and military officials, including Shoigu, whom Prigozhin had sought to remove.

Putin thanked his team for their work over the weekend, implying support for the embattled Shoigu. Earlier, the authorities released video of Shoigu reviewing troops in Ukraine.

It also wasn’t clear whether he would be able to keep his mercenary force. In his speech, Putin offered Prigozhin’s fighters to either come under Russia’s Defense Ministry’s command, leave service or go to Belarus.

Prigozhin said Monday, without elaborating, that the Belarusian leadership proposed solutions that would allow Wagner to operate “in a legal jurisdiction,” but it was unclear what that meant.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · June 27, 2023

3. The Russian Mutiny Through a Chinese Lens

Excerpts:

Again, all this doesn’t say anything about what will happen in Russia next. But it provides a popular context for Xi’s China and the policies it’s formulating about Russia’s chaos, as Minxin Pei elaborates in his recent Bloomberg Opinion column. Foreign policy must necessarily have a domestic audience — and China’s democrature (the useful French neologism that combines democratie and dictature, that is dictatorship) pays attention to social media indicators. If the Chinese people see Russia through a template of chaos, then perhaps it’s time for Beijing to realign its relationship with Putin, who may have lost the Mandate of Heaven.

While history doesn’t really repeat itself, its lessons always bear repeating.

The Russian Mutiny Through a Chinese Lens

What does the 8th century have to do with the road not taken in Moscow? Perhaps a lot, in the eyes of Xi Jinping

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-06-27/the-russian-mutiny-drew-parallels-in-china-with-a-massive-medieval-rebellion?sref=hhjZtX76

ByHoward Chua-Eoan

June 27, 2023 at 12:00 AM EDT

One of the more notable observations from this past weekend of Russian chaos emerged from Chinese social media. It doesn’t go anywhere toward explaining what happened on the road to Moscow, but it does say a lot about the way ordinary Chinese regard the chaos in their immense neighbor and ally. That popular perspective will likely factor into how Xi Jinping recalibrates his “friendship without limits” with Vladimir Putin.

On Saturday, in the middle of the mess, Eunice Yoon, CNBC’s China bureau chief, tweeted a sampling of Chinese commentary about Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny, including the results of an online poll. The question: Which historical event do you think is most like what’s happening in Russia now? The answer: The An-Shi Disturbance.

More commonly known as the An Lushan rebellion in Western books about China, the 8th century uprising was one of the most cataclysmic upheavals not just in that country but in global history. In The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity, Stephen Pinker describes it as the “worst atrocity of all time… an eight-year rebellion during China’s Tang Dynasty that, according to censuses, resulted in the loss of two-thirds of the empire’s population, a sixth of the world’s population at the time.”

That may be an exaggeration — collecting accurate statistics in the wake of a civil war is hazardous. But the apocalyptic sentiment is consistent with the Chinese historical imagination, heavily inculcated with millennia of lore. The parallels are startling. Just as Prigozhin broke with his apparent patrons to march on Moscow, An Lushan was a favorite of the imperial court in Chang’an (now Xi’an) whose ambitions led him to war against erstwhile allies and march on the capital, forcing the emperor to flee.

Until that moment in 755, the monarch — Xuanzong, also known as the Ming (or brilliant) emperor — had reigned over what was the richest and perhaps most powerful empire on earth, stretching from provinces on the Pacific to military protectorates deep into Central Asia. All too comfortable on the throne for more than four decades, Xuanzong allowed prosperity to get in the way of governance — and thus put at risk the Mandate of Heaven, the philosophical principle that recognized a dynasty’s right to rule. He’d fallen under the influence of his beloved concubine Yang Guifei (who had been married to one of his sons) 1 and by extension her family, many of whom were appointed to high office.

An Lushan (whose origins may be Turkic or Iranian; Lushan likely a form of Roshan, which means “bright” in Persian) had made his reputation defending the northern part of the empire against regional rivals. He used that military prowess to endear himself to the court. Concubine Yang was so taken that she officially adopted him as a son. One story had him obliging her maternal instincts by playing the fool: The obese general would dress up in swaddling clothes to entertain her and her coterie. The emperor built him a palace and showered him with treasure. An became an integral part of the Tang status quo — until the time arrived for him to seize the empire for himself.

In Chinese language tweets over the weekend, Prigozhin is sometimes simply called An Lushan.

Unlike Prigozhin, An Lushan didn’t call off his march on the capital. He captured Chang’an after Xuanzong fled. The armed forces of the Tang would eventually retake the city but not until soliciting the help of Uighur and Arab mercenaries. Meanwhile, the emperor faced a second rebellion from among the military entourage protecting him during his escape. The soldiers were furious at the Yang family, blaming their corruption for the catastrophe. Faced with a threat to his own life, the emperor acceded to their request to kill most of the clan — and to strangle his cherished concubine. That tragedy would be romanticized in a poem written a generation later: The Song of Unending Sorrow by Bai Juyi is still recited from memory by students from the mainland to Taiwan to Southeast Asia.

Paranoid and going blind, An Lushan would become so erratic that his son An Qingxu had him killed with the help of a favorite eunuch. His rebellion would continue under the leadership of Shi Siming (hence the Chinese “An-Shi” terminology for the period) until the Tang once again gained the upper hand. By then, however, the empire was in tatters.

Remarkably, the Tang would sputter on for another 100 years or so. China would continue to be an economic and cultural powerhouse for the rest of East Asia. But its expansionary period was over and another massive rebellion in the 870s would finally render it moribund, leading to China’s division into warring kingdoms until the Song dynasty re-established central authority in 960.

Again, all this doesn’t say anything about what will happen in Russia next. But it provides a popular context for Xi’s China and the policies it’s formulating about Russia’s chaos, as Minxin Pei elaborates in his recent Bloomberg Opinion column. Foreign policy must necessarily have a domestic audience — and China’s democrature (the useful French neologism that combines democratie and dictature, that is dictatorship) pays attention to social media indicators. If the Chinese people see Russia through a template of chaos, then perhaps it’s time for Beijing to realign its relationship with Putin, who may have lost the Mandate of Heaven.

While history doesn’t really repeat itself, its lessons always bear repeating.

The Russian Mutiny Through a Chinese Lens

What does the 8th century have to do with the road not taken in Moscow? Perhaps a lot, in the eyes of Xi Jinping

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-06-27/the-russian-mutiny-drew-parallels-in-china-with-a-massive-medieval-rebellion?sref=hhjZtX76

ByHoward Chua-Eoan

June 27, 2023 at 12:00 AM EDT

In Chinese language tweets over the weekend, Prigozhin is sometimes simply called An Lushan.

While history doesn’t really repeat itself, its lessons always bear repeating.

Russian mercenary chief Prigozhin is a 'dead man walking,' Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer says

KEY POINTS

The armed rebellion by Prigozhin, a former Putin ally who founded the Wagner private militia group, was widely seen as the biggest threat to the Russian president’s 23-year grip on power.
The Prigozhin-led revolt was unprecedented new ground for Vladimir Putin, who had until then been able to swiftly put out the occasional unarmed protest.
“Putin has imprisoned and assassinated people for far less than what Prigozhin has done to him,” said Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group. “It’s inconceivable to me that Putin will allow him to live any longer than is absolutely necessary.”

CNBC · by Clement Tan · June 26, 2023

watch now

VIDEO2:5102:51

Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin is a 'dead man walking,' says Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer

Squawk Box Asia

Russian mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin is a "dead man walking" after leading a botched rebellion against Vladimir Putin, according to Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group.

The weekend's armed revolt by Prigozhin, a former Putin ally who founded the Wagner private militia group, was widely seen as the biggest threat to the Russian president's 23-year grip on power. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the episode exposed "cracks" in the Kremlin that was not previously seen.

Prigozhin is "kind of dead man walking at this point," Bremmer said on "Squawk Box Asia" Monday. "I would be very surprised that he's still with us in a few months' time."

This Prigozhin-led revolt was unprecedented new ground for Putin, who had until then been able to swiftly put out the occasional unarmed protest. On the weekend, the Wagner mutineers got within 200 kilometers from the capital of Moscow before their leader made the abrupt announcement to abort the mission.

Anyone that believes that Putin is suddenly is on the brink of leaving power, also needs to recognize that's not where we are.

Ian Bremmer

president, Eurasia Group

"Putin has imprisoned and assassinated people for far less than what Prigozhin has done to him," Bremmer added. "It's inconceivable to me that Putin will allow him to live any longer than is absolutely necessary."

The Wagner fighters' march toward Moscow sent the Kremlin scrambling to protect the capital after the mercenaries reportedly, in a matter of hours, took control of the southwestern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don.

Rostov is strategically symbolic as the seat of the Southern Military District for the Russian military, a logistical and command hub for Putin's war on Ukraine.

As part of the deal brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Prigozhin would go into exile in Belarus in exchange for calling off the insurrection. The Kremlin agreed to drop the criminal case against Prigozhin, according to the state controlled outlet TASS.

A screen grab captured from a video shows Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin making a speech after Headquarters of the Southern Military District surrounded by fighters of the paramilitary Wagner group in Rostov-on-Don, Russia on June 24, 2023. (Photo by Wagner/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

Wagner | Anadolu Agency | Getty Images

"Obviously this does show a level of unprecedented weakness for President Putin," Bremmer said.

"But at the same time, while Putin was unprecedently tested, there was not a single high-level defection from the Russian military, from the Russian government or among the Russian oligarchs — so anyone that believes that Putin is suddenly is on the brink of leaving power, also needs to recognize that's not where we are," he added.

The bitter feud between Prigozhin and the military establishment in Moscow escalated in recent weeks after the Kremlin wanted all private mercenary forces to sign contracts with the Defense Ministry by July 1. Prigozhin had refused.

The standoff spilled into the open when Prigozhin launched an armed rebellion on Friday after accusing the Russian army of firing at his mercenaries.

"Prigozhin's objective was to draw Putin's attention and to impose a discussion about conditions to preserve his activities — a defined role, security, and funding," Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, wrote on Twitter.

"These weren't demands for a governmental overthrow; they were a desperate bid to save the enterprise, hoping that Prigozhin's merits in taking Bakhmut ... would be taken into account and the concerns would catch Putin's serious attention," she added.

The Wagner fighters have been a significant force in Putin's war against Ukraine, and played an important role in the capture the eastern city of Bakhmut.

CNBC · by Clement Tan · June 26, 2023

5. Senate committee advances bill that may kill Army Combat Fitness Test

I guess this is congressional oversight. But I would think there are more important issues.

Senate committee advances bill that may kill Army Combat Fitness Test

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · June 26, 2023

What’s old could soon be new once more.

The Senate Armed Services Committee passed the chamber’s fiscal 2024 defense policy bill Friday, which according to an official summary, “restores the Army’s Physical Fitness Test (APFT) as the test of record.” Although the bill has a long road ahead before it becomes law, the move signals powerful lawmakers’ frustration with the Army Combat Fitness Test.

The combat fitness test, after a years-long pilot and implementation period, became the official test for active duty soldiers on Oct. 1, 2022.

Army Combat Fitness Test debuts with major changes to scoring April 1

The Army also decided to eliminate the leg tuck event.

But should the Senate committee’s proposal eventually receive President Joe Biden’s signature, which would first require full Senate approval and then agreement from the House of Representatives to include it in the joint version of the bill, the Army couldn’t implement a new test without a three-year pilot and waiting period that includes mandatory briefings to Congress.

The House’s version of the fiscal 2024 policy bill, which is yet to pass the chamber’s Armed Services Committee, currently would task the Army with creating “sex-neutral physical fitness standards” for combat jobs on the test, but stops short of killing it entirely.

The Army’s top NCO, Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Grinston, spoke to reporters Monday morning in the wake of Congress’ move. While he declined to speak in direct response to the bill, Grinston was blunt about the impact reverting to the old fitness test would have on the force.

Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael A. Grinston deadlifts during his visit at Camp Herkus, Lithuania, May 3, 2022. (Army)

Grinston argued the combat fitness test is vastly superior to the old one, which only consisted of two minutes of push-ups, two minutes of sit-ups and a two-mile run.

“The [old] APFT measures two components of fitness,” muscular endurance and cardio fitness, Grinston explained. But the new combat test “covers 10,” including muscular strength, power, speed, agility and more.

The new combat fitness test also plays a central role in the service’s broader efforts to implement its “Holistic Health and Fitness” program, known as H2F. Rather than simply counting pushups as it once did, the Army wants to transform how units collectively approach fitness, sleep, nutrition, mental readiness and spiritual readiness.

H2F, which provides units with additional resources and facilities, is predicated on the service implementing physical fitness standards — like the combat fitness test — that enforce a comprehensive vision of what it means to be fit, service officials have argued. It’s not clear how much of the Army’s investment in H2F would be lost if lawmakers were to roll back the combat fitness test, but the service spent around $78 million on equipment for the test, according to information on its website.

“Although physical fitness is only one small part of [H2F], we’ve worked a lot to make sure that we are training differently than [how] we were in the past,” Grinston said. Early results indicate that units with H2F teams are experiencing lower rates of substance abuse and suicide in addition to its fitness benefits, he reiterated.

And should Congress move forward with eliminating the combat fitness test, the administrative consequences would be greatly disruptive, Grinston noted. The Army ties its fitness tests to performance evaluations, and performance factors into the promotion points formula the service uses for its semi-centralized junior NCO promotions.

“It would just kinda take us into chaos,” Grinston said of a potential elimination of the combat test. “We already changed all of our [regulations]…so it would be completely confusing.”

Ultimately, though, the service’s top NCO — who will retire in August — said maintaining the combat fitness test is about more than just reducing administrative burden. It’s about getting the Army “ready for the fight that we’re going to have in the future.”

“We need to move forward, not backwards,” Grinston said. “This is what’s good for the Army.”

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army. He focuses on investigations, personnel concerns and military justice. Davis, also a Guard veteran, was a finalist in the 2023 Livingston Awards for his work with The Texas Tribune investigating the National Guard's border missions. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill.

6. How this unit could shape the future of infantry battalions for decades

Excerpts:

Comparing the newly-sized battalions with those of only a few years ago, would require analyzing whether Marine units will continue to conduct the “full spectrum of missions that Marine infantry has conducted in the past ― amphibious assault, urban warfare, counterinsurgency and extended operations ashore-or will it just focus on the preferred Western Pacific scenario?”

“Smaller units are often described as ‘leaner but meaner,’ but they are really just smaller,” Cancian said. “There is no evidence here of ‘meaner.’”

The “Thundering Third” returned from deployment earlier in 2023 and was chosen for Phase II of the Corps’ infantry battalion experimentation.

Heckl said that the unit will take the Corps’ battalion experimentation “to the next level.”

How this unit could shape the future of infantry battalions for decades

marinecorpstimes.com · by Todd South · June 26, 2023

A battalion from one of the oldest continuously active Marine regiments will conduct experiments in the next two years that could define how the infantry battalion operates for decades to come.

That unit is 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, out of the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California.

And it’ll be doing that work with a reconfigured, slimmer battalion of 811 Marines and 69 Navy support personnel, for a total manning of 880 personnel, according to figures provided by Marine officials.

That’s down from the standard battalion requirement of 965 Marines and sailors prior to Force Design 2030 efforts that kicked off in 2019, and the current 877 Marines and sailors that are currently the infantry battalion standard manning, officials said.

But the figure remains higher than one of the three experimental battalions that worked through Phase I infantry battalion experiments with only 735 Marines.

Dispersed, more lethal: What Marine infantry battalion experiments have shown so far

Infantry battalions will be more distributed than ever before, and that will be the new normal.

Those numbers came from the annual update to Force Design 2030, Commandant Gen. David Berger’s plan to restructure the Marine Corps, and requests made by Marine Corps Times to the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Warfighting Lab and Manpower & Reserve Affairs.

The Force Design 2030 aims to have the Corps operate more dispersed in littoral zones with precision long-range fires, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance and a host of new capabilities that Berger and his supporters say war-gaming has shown will transform how Marine units operate in future wars.

Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, deputy commandant of Combat Development and Integration, emphasized that Berger has told him Force Design is not a destination but a journey, “to me it’s a waypoint,” he said during a June 2 phone call with media on the Force Design annual update.

“This is what Marines do better than anybody, we’re small enough that we can be agile and quick and make changes quickly and efficiently,” he said. “And that’s exactly what’s happening here.”

There are now 21 active-duty infantry battalions and eight Marine Reserve battalions. The Corps has cut three active-duty infantry battalions from its numbers since 2020 as part of Force Design 2030 changes.

As of early June, the Corps had two battalions already transitioned to 811 Marines, according to data provided by Manpower & Reserve Affairs.

The remaining battalions will transition as follows: two in fiscal year 2024; three each in fiscal years 2025 and 2026; four each in fiscal years 2027 and 2028 and the final three in fiscal year 2029.

As of June 6, the Marine Corps had 2,148 officers and 22,805 enlisted Marines with infantry as their primary job in the active duty ranks, according to manpower data. Another 353 officers and 4,721 enlisted Marines held infantry primary jobs in the Marine Reserve as of May 23.

These force redesign decisions are not without their critics. A series of commentaries have been published in recent years by recent and former high-ranking Marine generals and senior officers openly condemning some of the changes, especially the removal of tanks and reduction in conventional artillery that has happened to make room in funding and manning for new capabilities being added to the force.

The reorganization is a move away from using the Corps as an assault infantry tool and instead, as a force focused on small teams acting as sensors and reconnaissance for a long-range strike, said Mark Cancian, senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and retired Marine colonel.

Cancian, who authored a 2021 report titled “U.S. Military Forces in FY2022: Marine Corps,” that then noted perceived gaps in the redesign initiatives, also said he has questions about how the 811-Marine infantry battalion will be employed.

Comparing the newly-sized battalions with those of only a few years ago, would require analyzing whether Marine units will continue to conduct the “full spectrum of missions that Marine infantry has conducted in the past ― amphibious assault, urban warfare, counterinsurgency and extended operations ashore-or will it just focus on the preferred Western Pacific scenario?”

“Smaller units are often described as ‘leaner but meaner,’ but they are really just smaller,” Cancian said. “There is no evidence here of ‘meaner.’”

The “Thundering Third” returned from deployment earlier in 2023 and was chosen for Phase II of the Corps’ infantry battalion experimentation.

Heckl said that the unit will take the Corps’ battalion experimentation “to the next level.”

Why the Corps’ future may sideline its ground-pounders

Is it the twilight of Marine infantry?

By Philip Athey

Phase I wrapped up in 2022 and Marine leadership landed on the 811-Marine infantry battalion as the ideal size of the unit which will be the base of the Marine littoral regiment, the service’s newest large-scale formation built to counter adversaries such as China in the U.S. Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

Some of the Phase I experimentation on the infantry battalion included:

Removing snipers from the battalion and instead creating a “scout platoon” to conduct some of the past functions of snipers.
Added medical training and personnel for improved casualty care in austere locations where immediate medical evacuation may not be available.
Bringing back a full 81 mm mortar platoon for the battalion’s use. Past experiments with smaller formations had cut that by half.
Added signals intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities at the company level.
Enhanced command and control, sensing, lethality and sustainment experimentation.
Experiments to reduce cognitive load on leaders at all levels, including a new course for company noncommissioned officers on running 21st-century combat operations.

Phase II, which begins with the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, will continue to refine both the scout platoon and arms room concepts while primarily focusing on command, control, communications, computing, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting, sustainment, sensing and lethality, said Brig. Gen. Kyle Ellison, commanding general of the Warfighting Lab and career infantry.

Ellison called phase II the “decisive phase.”

Retired Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, who formerly commanded 2nd Marine Division and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, criticized the arms room concept, which aims to train Marines on all weapons systems, rather than having a dedicated mortarman and machine gunner or other traditional MOS-specific roles and the removal of snipers from the infantry battalion.

The Corps deactivated 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, weapons company on June 1, integrating those Marines into the battalion as it heads into the Phase II experimentation phase likely by January, officials said.

“Anyone who understands weapons, those weapons are complex, they require thorough training and experience,” Van Riper said. “You don’t switch from being a machine gunner to being a mortarman to being a rifleman to being an antitank gunner just like that. You have to have day-to-day experience.”

The retired three-star also noted that the Corps had done away with and brought back snipers multiple times, often to its detriment. He maintained that keeping snipers in the battalion was crucial and pointed to intelligence from the Russo-Ukraine War showing snipers employed on the front lines alongside the infantry.

Ellison also noted that changes in manning put staff sergeants in squad leader roles, which previously were assigned to sergeants but often filled by corporals in short-staffing situations. That move helps with maturing the force at the small unit level, he said.

While the Corps continues to experiment and add newer technologies such as loitering munitions and autonomous systems down to the lower levels such as platoons and squads, those systems can’t do everything.

“What we determined was that some of our autonomous systems and loitering systems that we’re going to bring to bear in the future aren’t all weather,” Ellison said.

That’s one reason the new battalion configuration will see a full 81 mm mortar platoon at its disposal, rather than the half-strength model used in the 735-Marine battalion experiment during Phase I.

Beyond weapons systems, the infantry battalion must consider contingencies that some forces haven’t experienced in generations.

“We’re going to be encountering a level of combat casualty care requirements that we haven’t seen since World War II,” Ellison said.

That observation pushed planners to beef up medical capabilities, including standardizing lifesaver training for all Marines in the battalion and the 69 Navy support staff figure on the roster.

“We’ve increased the medical capability within each company and within the battalion writ large,” Ellison said.

Details of medical training aspects and specific Navy support roles were not immediately available as of publication.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

7. After mutiny, Putin says Wagner can go to Belarus, go home or fight for Russia

So there is a COA 4 which is a combination of COA 1 and 3. What if this was the plan all along: Send Wagner to Belaru to lead the opening of a northern front against Ukraine.

After mutiny, Putin says Wagner can go to Belarus, go home or fight for Russia

By Robyn Dixon and Mary Ilyushina

Updated June 26, 2023 at 5:15 p.m. EDT|Published June 26, 2023 at 7:40 a.m. EDT

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/26/putin-prigozhin-russia-rebellion-wagner/

RIGA, Latvia — Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed his nation Monday for the first time since the weekend mutiny by Wagner mercenaries, saying he would keep his promise and allow the group’s fighters to move to neighboring Belarus.

Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for the latest updates on Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Their other options were to return to their families or sign contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry, he said.

Putin’s speech came hours after Wagner chief Yevgeniy Prigozhin resurfaced in a video posted online, declaring that his motive on Saturday was to save the group from being subsumed by the Russian military — not to topple the Russian president.

In a tone both stern and conciliatory, Putin said that Wagner’s mutiny would have been crushed by Russian security forces if it had not halted its advance on Moscow, but also that the “vast majority” of Wagner fighters were patriots.

Delivered after 10 p.m. Moscow time, the address appeared to be an effort by Putin to reassert control over a shaken nation and to stem concerns that the mutiny had exposed deep flaws in Russia’s security. It also seemed designed to quiet critics of his move to drop insurgency charges against Prigozhin, with many hard-liners saying it was wrong to compromise with traitors.

“All the necessary decisions were immediately taken to neutralize the threat that had arisen,” Putin said. “An armed rebellion would have been suppressed in any case.”

Prigozhin said he ordered the rebellion after Russia’s military killed about 30 Wagner fighters in a missile strike on one of their camps. He accepted a deal, he said in an 11-minute audio address posted Monday on Telegram, to avoid prosecution and move to Belarus because Wagner could continue its operations there. He did not disclose his whereabouts or the location of his fighters.

Prigozhin’s brazen revolt confronted Putin with the fiercest challenge he has faced in more than 23 years as Russia’s supreme leader — calling into question the stability of a system where the rule of law is readily dispensable and oligarchs and officials jostle constantly for presidential favor, state benefits and influence. It also laid bare the bitter divisions over Putin’s handling of the war in Ukraine and could have serious repercussions on the battlefield.

The Ukrainian military on Monday claimed further progress in its counteroffensive to drive out occupying Russian forces. Ukraine said it took control of Rivnopil, the ninth village it has recaptured this month. Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar said Ukrainian forces have regained roughly 50 square miles in the country’s south since the start of the campaign.

Prigozhin said Wagner fighters strongly opposed signing contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry — as they were ordered to do by July 1 — because that would have effectively dismantled the group.

Though Prigozhin has claimed to have 25,000 fighters under his command, the figure is widely believed to be an exaggeration; British intelligence has reportedly put the true number closer to 8,000.

Members of the Wagner Group sit atop a tank in a street in the city of Rostov-on-Don, Russia, on Saturday. (Roman Romokhov/AFP/Getty Images)

Prigozhin expressed regret about Russian aircrews killed by Wagner forces during Saturday’s rebellion, “but these assets were dropping bombs and delivering missile strikes,” he said.

Wagner shot down at least six helicopters and an Il-22 airborne command-post plane during the mutiny, according to open-source intelligence analysts, while Russian military bloggers reported that at least 13 air force personnel were killed. In his speech, Putin paid tribute to the servicemen who lost their lives Saturday.

Without naming Prigozhin, Putin made it clear that the man once called “Putin’s chef” because of his state catering contracts would never be forgiven, stating that “the organizers of the rebellion, betraying their country, their people, also betrayed those whom they lured into this crime.” Still, he said they would be allowed to depart for Belarus.

In a brash new claim Monday, Prigozhin said his forces “blocked and neutralized all military units and airfields that were on our way” without killing any Russian ground forces. Wagner fighters got within 125 miles of Moscow, he said, an achievement that “revealed the most serious security flaws across the country.”

While there was no way to immediately verify the claim, Western military analysts were surprised by Wagner’s swift advance toward the Russian capital after the group seized control of the Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov early Saturday.

In an apparent effort to explain how Wagner fighters managed to get so close to Moscow without facing effective resistance, Putin said he had ordered “that bloodshed be avoided.”

He said it was necessary to give Wagner fighters time to understand that “their actions are resolutely rejected by society, and to what tragic, destructive consequences for Russia, for our state, the adventure in which they were dragged would lead.”

“I thank those soldiers and commanders of the Wagner Group who made the only right decision. They did not follow through with fratricidal bloodshed. They stopped at the last line,” Putin said.

In another demonstration of control Monday, Putin called a meeting of his security chiefs, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, a fierce opponent of Prigozhin who had not been seen since Saturday.

Mercenary boss warned of revolution in Russia, but his own was short-lived

As a state of emergency in the Russian capital was lifted, Russians tried to make sense of why Putin would strike a deal with Prigozhin after accusing his former ally of “treason.” Globally, many observers were left wondering what it would mean in the near term for the war in Ukraine, and for Putin’s long-term political future.

With Putin allowing Wagner fighters to go to Belarus, and to operate legally under Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, it appeared the group would continue its operations in Africa and other parts of the world, leveraging security contracts and political influence operations in return for mining concessions and cash.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Monday that Wagner “instructors” would remain in Mali and the Central African Republic.

It appears that the group’s role in Ukraine may be over, however, and it will no longer have access to Russian state support.

Wagner uprising is reckoning for Putin’s rule

Russian news outlet Verstka reported that a Wagner base for 8,000 soldiers was being constructed in Belarus, southeast of Minsk. While the report could not be independently confirmed, prominent Russian military blogger Mikhail Zvinchuk, who goes by Rybar on Telegram, said Monday evening that Wagner units had entered Belarus with weapons and other equipment.

Until his Telegram post, Prigozhin had not been heard from since leaving the southern city of Rostov-on-Don on Saturday to cheers and shouts of support.

In Putin’s address Monday, perhaps in response to those scenes, he insisted that the whole of Russia was behind him.

“Everyone was united and banded together by the main thing — the sense of responsibility for the fate of the fatherland,” he said.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin called Monday for moves to strengthen Russian unity, but he insisted that the government had worked “smoothly and clearly” during the crisis.

“It is important to ensure the sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the security of citizens, taking into account recent events,” Mishustin said at a meeting of deputy prime ministers. “It is necessary to consolidate society against the backdrop of an attempted armed rebellion.”

Lavrov said the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Lynne Tracy, spoke with Russian government representatives Sunday and conveyed Washington’s view that the events were an “internal affair” and its hope that Russian nuclear weapons remained secure.

“I think it’s important to remember that Mr. Putin still commands a very large and a very capable military. And the bulk of that military is across the border in Ukraine,” National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Monday.

Putin rules by showing strength. Russia’s crisis exposed his weakness.

But news coverage in Russia revealed how deeply the events have rattled Putin’s authoritarian state.

An opinion column in the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper said that the “most terrifying scenario” — of fighting in the streets of Moscow and a split in Russia’s military and security forces — had been averted.

“Russia displayed its vulnerability to the whole world and to itself. Russia dashed to the abyss at full speed and with the same speed stepped back from it,” the columnist, Mikhail Rostovsky, wrote under the headline “Prigozhin Leaves, Problems Remain: Deep Political Consequences of a Failed Coup.”

There were signs of a potential crackdown on Russian private military companies, with widespread calls to bring them to heel, even though they are already technically illegal in Russia.

Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, carried out raids Saturday at the addresses of current and former Wagner mercenaries, Russian media outlet Important Stories reported.

Yet Wagner’s recruiting offices in Novosibirsk and Tyumen have reopened, according to the state-controlled Tass news agency, and the group’s office in St. Petersburg was also working as normal. Wagner is seen by many in Russia as a more prestigious, elite and effective force than the Russian military.

Andrei Kartapolov, chairman of the defense committee in the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, told the Vedomosti newspaper that there was no need to ban Wagner, which he called the country’s most combat-ready force.

Kartapolov said Wagner fighters could continue to serve in the war in Ukraine if they signed contracts with the military. Such a path is likely to be unpalatable to most Wagner fighters, who are intensely loyal to Prigozhin. And it was their initial refusal to sign the contracts that helped give rise to the mutiny.

The road to Moscow: A visual timeline of Wagner’s rebellion

Another newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, called Sunday for all armed formations not officially part of the security structures to be disarmed, given “today’s political reality.”

“It became clear that a man with a gun, if he is not a state official, is a real threat to the state and statehood,” the newspaper’s editor, Konstantin Remchukov, wrote in an opinion column. “In Russia there should not be armed people who are loyal first to their commanders and only secondarily to someone else.”

Social media pages connected to Wagner, Prigozhin and key figures associated with him were blocked on Saturday. By Sunday, many pro-Kremlin Telegram channels were rushing to discredit the Wagner leader. In St. Petersburg, local media published photographs of gold bars, fake passports, millions in cash and “white powder” reportedly seized from his properties by authorities.

Alexander Khodakovsky, head of the pro-Moscow Vostok Battalion, which is fighting in eastern Ukraine, published a story claiming that Prigozhin had one of his underlings beaten “half to death” after the subordinate told the mercenary leader that it would be impossible to meet recruiting quotas for Russian prisoners.

“This incident told me everything: I made an approximate psycho-portrait of Prigozhin, and I began to warn everyone of the growing threat,” Khodakovsky wrote. “It was clear to me that a person with such manners serves only his own interests,” he added.

David L. Stern in Kyiv, Ukraine, contributed to this report.

8. Cluster Munitions Are Biden’s Latest Slow-Roll on Ukraine Aid

Excerpts:

Sending DPICMs now would allow Kyiv to conserve its traditional artillery shells and use each type of munition selectively—for example, using DPICMs in areas where only Russian troops are present. If Biden continues to kick the can down the road, he may still be forced to send DPICMs later, when Ukraine’s ammunition shortage grows more dire. By that point, Kyiv may no longer have the luxury of being selective with where it uses DPICMs.

Some European allies may protest. But as with other types of arms where Washington initially dragged its feet, this issue is unlikely to fracture the unity with which the West has responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Proactive diplomacy will help. European countries that haven’t banned cluster munitions may support deliveries as well. In fact, the United States wouldn’t even be the first NATO member to supply DPICMs to Ukraine, as Turkey reportedly did so last year.

Ukrainian officials understand the risks of using cluster munitions. But facing an existential threat from Russia, Kyiv believes the pros outweigh the cons. Washington should respect that decision and send Ukraine DPICMs now.

Cluster Munitions Are Biden’s Latest Slow-Roll on Ukraine Aid

Yes, they can put some civilians at risk—but that should be the Ukrainians’ call to make.

By John Hardie, the deputy director of the Russia program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Foreign Policy · by John Hardie · June 26, 2023

As it pushes to liberate its territory, Ukraine is asking the United States for a controversial weapon: cluster munitions. These projectiles scatter small bomblets over a wide area and are thus much more effective than single artillery rounds for killing infantry and destroying armored vehicles. As a senior U.S. Defense Department official testified to Congress on Friday, these munitions could help Ukraine clear Russian trenches and other obstacles to Kyiv’s counteroffensive. They would also ease Ukraine’s shortage of traditional artillery ammunition.

Ukraine’s request has also set off opposition. Last week, a coalition of prominent U.S. nongovernmental organizations published an open letter urging President Joe Biden to reject the request, noting that cluster munitions can kill or maim civilians who might encounter any unexploded bomblets. Kyiv understands this risk to its own citizens but counters with a compelling point of its own: These weapons would help defeat the Russian occupiers, who objectively pose a much deadlier threat to Ukrainian civilians than unexploded ammunition. After weighing the pros and cons, Kyiv has decided the former outweigh the latter. That’s the Ukrainians’ call to make.

Since the summer of 2022, Ukraine has been asking the United States for dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, or DPICMs. But Washington has dragged its heels on the request. Effective against both infantry and armored vehicles, this is a type of warhead that releases dozens of explosive submunitions over a targeted area, which increases lethality. In fact, the weapon was originally designed during the Cold War for a similar land war scenario, involving many of the same Soviet-made vehicles Russia is currently using against Ukraine. The United States reportedly has almost 3 million DPICMs in its inventory, many of which can be fired from Kyiv’s Western-donated artillery systems.

Speaking before Congress on Friday, Laura Cooper, the Defense Department’s top official focusing on Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, said these munitions would be a big help for Ukraine. “Our military analysts have confirmed that DPICMs would be useful especially against dug-in Russian positions on the battlefield,” she said. Kyiv’s forces need all the help they can get in overcoming the formidable fortified defensive lines Russia has built across the battlefield.

Several senior Republicans in the U.S. Congress have backed Ukraine’s requests over the past few months. The top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Adam Smith, also expressed openness to the idea last month. Some U.S. Defense Department officials reportedly support it as well.

Yet Biden has demurred. Administration officials cite the need to maintain unity with European allies, some of which oppose Ukraine’s request. Most European Union countries, particularly those that are far away from Russia and surrounded only by friendly nations, have signed an international treaty banning cluster munitions because of the potential danger they pose to civilians. (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland, and Romania are among the EU members that haven’t banned cluster munitions, perhaps because they are closer to Russia and don’t want to limit their options in case they need to fend off an attack.) The White House likely also fears blowback at home, including from the NGOs that wrote to Biden last week.

Neither Moscow nor Kyiv has joined the international cluster munitions ban, and both sides have already employed them in the war. Washington, too, is not a party to the treaty, but U.S. law prohibits the export of cluster munitions with a rate of unexploded duds higher than 1 in 100. However, the law allows for the president to waive that restriction. According to Colin Kahl, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, some of the DPICM rounds in the U.S. arsenal have a dud rate of just over 1 percent—a negligible difference. This range of rates is a vast improvement over past munitions, whose high dud rates were one reason for many countries to begin campaigning against their use.

The Ukrainian military intends to use these munitions in areas of the front that are largely depopulated and already littered with mines and unexploded ordnance. No matter the types of munitions used, Kyiv’s ordnance removal teams would have to clear those areas after the fighting before allowing civilians back, as they have done in other parts of liberated Ukraine.

Sending DPICMs to Ukraine would help offset Russia’s quantitative advantage in artillery ammunition and alleviate Kyiv’s shortage of shells. Like the Russian military, Ukrainian forces have traditionally depended heavily on artillery. In March, Ukraine’s defense minister said Ukrainian forces could fire at more than five times their current rate if they “were not limited by the number of available artillery shells.”

This shortfall has hindered the Ukrainian military in its defensive operations, such as in and around Bakhmut, which Russia took last month. The shortage could also undermine Kyiv’s ongoing counteroffensive if its forces run out of the ammunition they have set aside for the operation. Because one DPICM round is as effective as multiple traditional shells, it would also reduce wear and tear on Ukrainian artillery barrels, allowing more to stay in the fight.

As NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg noted earlier this year, Ukraine expends artillery shells “many times” faster than the Western defense industry can make them. Although Washington and its European allies are working to ramp up production, that process will take years and leave a dangerous gap in the medium term. Meanwhile, Russia is also racing to increase munitions output.

It’s true that Western countries provided Ukraine with a significant amount of artillery ammunition ahead of the counteroffensive Kyiv launched earlier this month. A senior Pentagon official, however, described those supplies as a “last-ditch effort” given dwindling U.S. and European stocks. A reported deal to source ammunition from South Korea will merely delay the coming supply crunch.

In all likelihood, Ukraine’s counteroffensive will burn through ammunition, especially if the offensive takes many weeks or even months, as seems likely. Despite U.S. efforts to help Ukrainian forces adopt a more Western style of fighting that expends fewer shells, the jury is out on whether that will significantly reduce Ukrainian shell consumption. More plausibly, Ukraine’s need for shells will remain high.

Sending DPICMs now would allow Kyiv to conserve its traditional artillery shells and use each type of munition selectively—for example, using DPICMs in areas where only Russian troops are present. If Biden continues to kick the can down the road, he may still be forced to send DPICMs later, when Ukraine’s ammunition shortage grows more dire. By that point, Kyiv may no longer have the luxury of being selective with where it uses DPICMs.

Some European allies may protest. But as with other types of arms where Washington initially dragged its feet, this issue is unlikely to fracture the unity with which the West has responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Proactive diplomacy will help. European countries that haven’t banned cluster munitions may support deliveries as well. In fact, the United States wouldn’t even be the first NATO member to supply DPICMs to Ukraine, as Turkey reportedly did so last year.

Ukrainian officials understand the risks of using cluster munitions. But facing an existential threat from Russia, Kyiv believes the pros outweigh the cons. Washington should respect that decision and send Ukraine DPICMs now.

Foreign Policy · by John Hardie · June 26, 2023

9. Washington Needs to Get Ready for Russian Chaos

Excerpts:

U.S. policymakers should also start thinking about how internal fighting in Russia could impact the various unresolved conflicts Russia has instigated across the region. It is not only Russia’s war in Ukraine that could be impacted if civil war breaks out. The Russian occupations of Moldova’s Transnistria region, as well as Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia, could become untenable, providing an opportunity for these countries to restore their territorial sovereignty. If Putin falls, then Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko’s grip on his country could weaken. Azerbaijan would also seek to remove the Russian peacekeepers that were placed there in the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Any one of these scenarios could be transformative, and none of them should catch the West by surprise.

However, the most difficult issue policymakers must address is how to coordinate an international response to safeguard Russia’s nuclear weapons stockpiles. Unfortunately, the options are limited. Russia has the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons and substantial chemical and biological weapons programs, all of which pose catastrophic risk if they get into the wrong hands. The United States should think now about how it will lead efforts to address this issue. For starters, it needs to invest in better detection capabilities at border crossings across the region. Also, on a case-by-case basis, the United States should be prepared to cut pragmatic deals with Russian powerbrokers who might get their hands on these weapons to guarantee their security or transfer out of the country.

Washington Needs to Get Ready for Russian Chaos

A warlord marching on Moscow is just a foretaste of what might come. Here’s how to prepare.

By Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

Foreign Policy · by Luke Coffey · June 26, 2023

Although the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin succeeded in calling off the latter’s military insurrection, preventing a Russian civil war, and restoring order for now, one thing is certain: This drama is far from over. Putin’s disastrous decision to invade Ukraine has come full circle and set off an unstable power dynamic within Russia. Prigozhin’s quick alleged takeover of two major Russian cities and his warriors’ march on Moscow against virtually no resistance have shown that anything is possible, including Putin’s downfall and civil war.

When it comes to Russia, therefore, nothing can be ruled out. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, many analysts have warned that policymakers should prepare for post-Putin postwar scenarios for Russia, including civil strife and the country’s disintegration. But it probably took Prigozhin’s march on Moscow for Western policymakers to start thinking seriously about how to prepare for what might come next.

While there are limited options for policymakers to influence the outcome of Russia’s internal turmoil, there are some things that should still be done. First and foremost, U.S. policymakers should not lose focus on Ukraine. Yes, the events unfolding in Russia are historical, but the West has little ability to influence them in any meaningful way. Instead, the top priority for Washington should remain supporting Kyiv’s counteroffensive and helping Ukraine win on the battlefield against Russia. It is in Ukraine where the United States can have the biggest impact on the situation in Russia: A strong, victorious Ukraine is the best bulwark against various scenarios of disorder, violence, or disintegration farther east.

Second, U.S. policymakers should accept that the very real possibility of a Russian civil war does not mean Washington must pick a side. Let the different centers of power inside Russia fight it out. Prigozhin’s near-success is a good reminder that if Putin is ousted, whoever replaces him will likely be just as nationalistic and authoritarian. The West should stop hoping for a supposedly moderate Russian leader who wants peace with his neighbors and reforms at home—and plan accordingly.

The converse is also true: Just because we don’t know who will succeed Putin and how violent the transition will be does not mean that the West has a stake in the Putin regime’s stability. The West should learn from the mistakes it made in the 1990s, when it was reluctant to recognize the independence of new states emerging from the collapsing Soviet Union because of a fear of instability. Instead, Western decision-makers naively hoped for democratic governance and economic reforms in Russia that never materialized.

Finally, it is in the United States’ interest that any domestic strife does not spill across Russia’s borders. This means enhancing bilateral cooperation with various countries across the Eurasian landmass to improve military readiness, border security, law enforcement, and intelligence capabilities. There is an urgent need to step up regional diplomacy: The countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus will be key to the region’s stability should Russia descend into chaos, and with Moscow’s influence waning, there is also likely to be more of an appetite for cooperation with the United States and the West. Washington should take advantage of this.

Putin might have made a short-term deal with Prigozhin, but the Russian leader now has a long-term problem to preserve his authority. The proverbial blood is now in the water, and the sharks will soon be circling. If there is a collapse of the central government or civil war breaks out—two scenarios made all too apparent by Wagner’s virtually unimpeded march on Moscow—U.S. policymakers need to be prepared. That requires answering some difficult questions now about how to react to various scenarios.

For example, how should the United States best coordinate an international response to the calls for independence or autonomy that will likely emerge across Russia? Many regions across Russia comprise non-Russian, non-Slavic indigenous peoples with their own cultures and languages, as well as a long history of subjugation and exploitation by Moscow. Some of these areas already have low-level independence movements and even governments in exile. As Russia descends into disorder, Western policymakers should expect some of these regions to seek safety and stability in independence. The United States needs to work with its partners to coordinate a response to these calls for self-determination in a way that is aligned with U.S. interests and international law.

U.S. policymakers should also start thinking about how internal fighting in Russia could impact the various unresolved conflicts Russia has instigated across the region. It is not only Russia’s war in Ukraine that could be impacted if civil war breaks out. The Russian occupations of Moldova’s Transnistria region, as well as Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia, could become untenable, providing an opportunity for these countries to restore their territorial sovereignty. If Putin falls, then Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko’s grip on his country could weaken. Azerbaijan would also seek to remove the Russian peacekeepers that were placed there in the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Any one of these scenarios could be transformative, and none of them should catch the West by surprise.

However, the most difficult issue policymakers must address is how to coordinate an international response to safeguard Russia’s nuclear weapons stockpiles. Unfortunately, the options are limited. Russia has the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons and substantial chemical and biological weapons programs, all of which pose catastrophic risk if they get into the wrong hands. The United States should think now about how it will lead efforts to address this issue. For starters, it needs to invest in better detection capabilities at border crossings across the region. Also, on a case-by-case basis, the United States should be prepared to cut pragmatic deals with Russian powerbrokers who might get their hands on these weapons to guarantee their security or transfer out of the country.

How the Wagner rebellion will ultimately impact Putin remains to be seen, but the weekend’s events demonstrated the fragility of the Kremlin’s rule. Russia has already suffered major blows to its economy and military power since its invasion of Ukraine. The last thing Putin needed was a direct challenge to his authority.

Now is not the time to avoid asking difficult questions about Russia’s future. It is high time to prepare for the possibility that Putin will lose his grip on power, a transition might not be peaceful, and that Russia’s borders could look very different on a map in 10 or 20 years. The West needs to recognize the historical magnitude of the political dynamic set off by Putin’s war in Russia and start planning accordingly.

Foreign Policy · by Luke Coffey · June 26, 2023

10. Wagner Is Preparing to Hand Over Heavy Weapons, Russian Military Says

Are they prepared to pry them from their cold dead hands? It is hard to imagine the Wagner mercenaries giving up their weapons.

Wagner Is Preparing to Hand Over Heavy Weapons, Russian Military Says

Moscow drops charges against mutineers as Belarus leader says there were ‘no heroes’ in the crisis

By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow

June 27, 2023 6:08 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/wagner-is-preparing-to-hand-over-heavy-weapons-russian-military-says-723e7a53?mod=hp_lead_pos1

Russia’s Ministry of Defense said Tuesday that the Wagner paramilitary group that launched a mutiny last week was preparing to hand over its heavy weapons, an indication that it could be disbanded as an autonomous force in coming days.

President Vladimir Putin said Monday that Wagner members who wanted to sign contracts with the regular Russian military were welcome to join, while others could go home or follow the group’s owner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, to exile in Belarus.

There was no immediate confirmation that Wagner, which counted 25,000 troops by Prigozhin’s assessment, was indeed preparing to disarm. Its arsenal includes tanks, aircraft, howitzers, multiple-launch rocket systems and air-defense batteries that were used to shoot down six Russian helicopters and one airborne command center plane on Saturday, as Wagner’s columns swiftly moved toward Moscow.

Under a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko that pulled Russia from the brink of civil war, Prigozhin Saturday night agreed to halt what he had described as a “march of justice” and accepted, at least for now, to go to Belarus.

On Tuesday morning, the Russian Federal Security Service said it closed the criminal case against Wagner’s mutineers. An Embraer Legacy 600 jet affiliated with Wagner was spotted by flight-monitoring services leaving the southern Russian city of Rostov—which had been seized by Prigozhin on Saturday—and landing in the Belarusian airport of Machulishchy near Minsk on Tuesday. There was no confirmation that Prigozhin was on board.

Speaking in Minsk, Lukashenko said Tuesday that he had offered his mediation because Belarus wouldn’t have survived strife in Russia, its main ally. “My position is: If Russia collapses, we will all be under its wreckage, and we will all die,” he said.

Top general could become first female head of the British Army

The Sun · by Jerome Starkey · June 26, 2023

A HIGHLY-rated general could become the first female head of the Army.

Lt Gen Sharon Nesmith, 53, has been invited to apply for the Chief of the General Staff role by Defence Secretary Ben Wallace.

Major General Sharon Nesmith is already the Army’s most senior woman and first to reach the rank of General Officer CommandingCredit: PA

She joined in 1991 and was commissioned into the Royal Signals, serving in the Balkans and Iraq before taking charge of Army recruitment.

The mum of two is already the Army’s most senior woman and first to reach the rank of General Officer Commanding.

She is one of four in the running to replace General Sir Patrick Sanders, who is expected to stand down next year.

Lt Gen Ralph Wooddisse, Lt Gen Nick Borton and Lt Gen Roly Walker are also hoping to land the top job.

However, an Army source said: “Sharon is a really strong candidate.”

Wooddisse and Walker are seen as the favourites, defence insiders said.

Nesmith made headlines in 2015 as the first woman to command and operational brigade.

She led Army recruitment from 2019 and was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff last year.

The Army rejected “hair-brained plans” to let Royal Marines apply for the post.

Royal Maine Generals Gwyn Jenkins, a former commander of the Special Boat Service, and Charlie Stickland, were tipped as candidates for the post

The Army said: “We are unable to comment on speculation surrounding the next Chief of the General Staff.”

The Sun · by Jerome Starkey · June 26, 2023

12. US Open to Expanding AUKUS

What will the name be if New Zealand, the ROK, and France join AUKUS?

But why the focus on technology only. There is so much more potential for AUKUS beyond just technology. I think AUKUS special operations forces is one area.

AUKUS Special Operations Forces in Strategic Competition, Integrated Deterrence, and Campaigning: Resistance to Malign Activities

https://securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org/essays/aukus-special-operations-forces-in-strategic-competition-integrated-deterrence-and-campaigning-resistance-to-malign-activities/

Excerpts:

The AUKUS agreement was established in September 2021 and is made up of two “pillars”: the first is providing Australia nuclear-powered attack submarines, and the second involves key technologies such as hypersonics, underwater drones, and artificial intelligence, as well as “functional” areas like information sharing, according to a Congressional Research Service report.

New Zealand, South Korea, and France have expressed interest in the second pillar, said Charles Edel, the CSIS Australia chair. The White House in April 2022 said that as their work matures “within these and other critical defense and security capabilities, we will seek to engage allies and partners as appropriate.”

US Open to Expanding AUKUS

New participants to the partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States would need to provide beneficial tech contributions, officials said.

defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney

The United States is open to allowing more countries to participate in the technological side of the monumental Australia-United Kingdom-U.S. agreement known as AUKUS, but they would have to show they can contribute in meaningful ways, officials said Monday.

“We are in conversation with a variety of countries who are interested. And frankly, it goes far beyond just those countries, and we're grateful for that. The fact that countries are interested in it is a positive, and we will explore those appropriately,” Kurt Campbell, the deputy assistant to the president and coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, said during an event Monday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“I think all three countries have made clear that under the appropriate circumstances we would be prepared to work collaboratively with other partners who bring capacity to the challenge.”

The AUKUS agreement was established in September 2021 and is made up of two “pillars”: the first is providing Australia nuclear-powered attack submarines, and the second involves key technologies such as hypersonics, underwater drones, and artificial intelligence, as well as “functional” areas like information sharing, according to a Congressional Research Service report.

New Zealand, South Korea, and France have expressed interest in the second pillar, said Charles Edel, the CSIS Australia chair. The White House in April 2022 said that as their work matures “within these and other critical defense and security capabilities, we will seek to engage allies and partners as appropriate.”

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday said “there’s huge potential” in having more countries participate, with the caveat that it be in “selected areas.”

Instead of a broad invitation to join, “I would look at certain areas where nations bring technology to bear that is going to make a difference, and that we have high trust and confidence that we can share that information back and forth,” Gilday said.

Campbell added that the U.S. would want real contributions from those who join.

“I think the key is going to be…what do you bring to the table? And are you able to do it in such a way that's going to be practical and operational?,” he said. “So we're not just looking for theoretical applications and partnerships, but practical, real efforts that will enhance defense capabilities.”

Pillar two also allows the partnership to leverage the research and development already being done by private industry to deliver new technology even faster, Gilday said.

“So we're trying to use, in some ways, pillar two to accelerate that significantly, so we can take disruptive technologies …and to get them on the table,” he said.

defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney

13. "The Wise Man Will Be Master of the Stars:" The Use of Twitter by the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service

Excerpts:

Concluding Remarks and Reflection

The HUR’s release of COMINT, traditionally considered highly classified and sensitive, can be seen as a modern development in a world where very few secrets are likely to remain secret forever, and in which carefully selected intelligence can be used to inform the public and seize the moral high ground. Then again, the HUR deliberately chooses what COMINT-related material it releases. The intercepted conversations selected by the HUR for publication on Twitter purposefully portray a negative picture of the Russian armed forces. Corruption, incompetence, criminal activity, and civilian mistreatment solidify a narrative meant as much to inspire the Ukrainian population and its military as to influence the international community.

As such, the Ukrainians have employed an approach that draws upon the concept of moral conflict described by John Boyd. The HUR’s emphasis on execrable Russian behavior aims to maintain public opinion against the invasion in both western countries and Ukraine. By maintaining strong international opinion opposing the Russian invaders, Ukraine sustains essential support of training and weapons from western governments while preserving the loyalty of the Ukrainian populace in wartime. Both are critical for Ukraine’s survival and reflect Boyd’s concept of moral conflict in which the successful integration of material and moral imperatives are prerequisites for victory.

"The Wise Man Will Be Master of the Stars:" The Use of Twitter by the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Peter Schrijver · June 27, 2023

Peter Schrijver

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is the largest conventional land war in Europe since the end of World War II. Russia’s goals: to overthrow and replace Ukraine’s elected government through territorial conquest and by subjugating the entire country’s populace to its political and informational influence. Consequently, the information environment, described as: “an environment comprised of the information itself, the individuals, organizations, and systems that receive, process, and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual, and physical space in which this occurs,” has received significant attention from both Russia and Ukraine.

Ukrainian activities in the information environment have been an integral part of its response to Russia’s aggression. This strategy can be connected to John R. Boyd’s concept of moral conflict, which he explains in an article titled, “Discourse on Winning and Losing.” Boyd emphasizes the importance of non-physical factors in modern warfare, which is particularly relevant in the context of asymmetric warfare, where weaker forces do battle with stronger opponents. Granted, Ukraine’s conventional forces have steadily gained strength and capability due to western weapon deliveries and training and the commitment and grit of Ukraine’s military. However, the country cannot match Russia’s ability to mobilize additional manpower. Therefore, Ukraine must rely on psychological operations and other irregular tactics to create confusion, demoralization, and disorientation among its Russian invaders.

To gain deeper insight into the tactics of Ukraine in the information environment, this article analyzes the social media strategy of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, commonly known as the HUR . This service joined the social media platform Twitter in 2021 with the message “Sapiens Dominabitur Astri,” Latin for, “.” A remarkable aspect of the HUR’s social media presence is the service’s disclosure on its Twitter feed of raw intelligence, including sensitive communications intelligence (COMINT), as a means for interaction with outside audiences.

The article focuses on the content of the HUR’s Twitter feed (@DI_Ukraine), which in June 2023 had over 250,000 followers, and to what extent the HUR’s communication strategy aligns with the existing concept of coercive intelligence disclosure.

Intelligence Disclosure as Strategy

Starting in November 2021, American and British policy makers intentionally disclosed sensitive information to international media about the threat of Russia towards Ukraine. Media ran stories on the intelligence disclosures provided by the American and British services in the months and weeks leading up to the invasion. For example, in February 2022 – just days before the actual invasion – the New York Times quoted a senior American official about the possibility of a Russian false flag operation. The source shared intelligence that revealed a Russian plot to manufacture a justification for an invasion of Ukraine by creating a fake video depicting the Ukrainian military assaulting Russian-speaking individuals in eastern Ukraine. These disclosure policies, observed in the run-up to the Russian invasion, make a compelling case for the use of intelligence for influence operations. Israeli researchers Riemer and Sobelman argue that states can leverage intelligence as a coercive instrument. They describe this coercive intelligence disclosure as the public disclosure of secrets or the signaling of an intention to do so, which can exploit the vulnerabilities of other actors and ultimately be manipulated to one’s advantage.

Riemer and Sobelman contend that coercive intelligence disclosure can further three aims. First, it can stop adversaries from achieving their strategic and operational goals by interfering with their operations, forcing them to refocus their resources, and inducing them to adapt to the reality that their secrets have been made public. Second, by influencing domestic communities and eroding political standing, coercive intelligence disclosure might exert indirect pressure on the aggressor’s political leadership to stop their malign activities. Third, this disclosure might help the disclosing authority create or support a compelling narrative that persuades other international players to act. This third aim also helps the nation disclosing the information achieve ‘narrative superiority’ over the aggressor.

With regard to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, western researchers have noted that the use of telecommunications infrastructure by the Ukrainian government, specifically through the successful incorporation of smartphones, social media, and messaging apps, provided the Ukrainians with a significant informational advantage over the Russian invaders.

A qualitative content analysis using the web-based tool Vicinatas to collect real-time and historical tweets provides insight into the recurring themes of the HUR’s efforts on Twitter. The dataset consists of all 2,000+ tweets that the HUR has published on Twitter since opening an account in June 2021 through mid-March 2023. From this database, tweets containing COMINT were extracted for further analysis. Achieving absolute certainty about the dependability of intelligence material is a challenging undertaking. Understandably, the HUR only released excerpts of audio material which it deemed suitable. Nevertheless, this study presents an analysis of themes and narratives related to the strategic communication practices of the Ukrainian military intelligence service.

Tweeting on the Russian invasion

Before the Russian invasion in February 2022, the content creators of the HUR disseminated tweets on a wide range of topics, such as Ukrainian commemoration days, excerpts of media interviews with HUR Director Major General Kyrylo Budanov, and the accomplishments and remembrances of personnel. Once Russia invaded, the HUR was silent for several days. It explained this silence on Feb. 28, 2022, saying in a strong Twitter message that it was due to a focus on targeting Russian personnel and equipment. This tweet set the stage for a new phase in the HUR’s social media strategy.

On March 1, 2022, the HUR began publishing lists with information on Russian and Belarusian military units. These records included names, ranks, birthdays, and other personal information of military personnel. According to the HUR, the lists contained the names of military personnel who either participated in or supported the invasion. The intelligence service sought to encourage the surrender of enemy personnel with doxing—publishing personally identifiable information online—and justified it by claiming those people contributed to Russia’s illegal invasion.

Even more remarkable than the doxing of Russian and Belarusian military members is the publication of intercepted Russian military communications. The HUR regularly tweeted voice files containing conversations between Russian military personnel and with Russian soldiers and their family members. It remains unclear how the Ukrainian military intelligence service recorded these conversations, but the decision to withhold sources and methods remains consistent with COMINT procedures. The sensitive nature of COMINT stems from the fact that it entails the interception and analysis of the communications of government officials, military personnel, and other groups or individuals. If it becomes public knowledge that an entity has access to this information, then that tends to mean the end of this access.

Despite concerns over losing access to intelligence sources, the HUR started to release tweets containing audio recordings that fit into three categories: alleged Russian war crimes, Russian disillusionment with the war, and the weakness or corruption of Russian military leadership.

On April 20, 2022, the HUR released an audio intercept that revealed a command to kill all Ukrainian prisoners of war in the Popasyana area of Luhansk Oblast in eastern Ukraine. Ten days later, the HUR released audio that revealed the ‘occupiers’ stealing solar panels and complaining about their losses. Then on May 23rd, the HUR intercepted the audio of two soldiers from the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) discussing rape and looting by members of their unit. Later in June, an intercept revealed the Russians had captured a Ukrainian tank crew member, interrogated him, and then shot him, ‘as they did not leave prisoners alive.’ On August 2nd, a Russian admitted in a recording to using phosphorus ammunition, which is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions.

The second category of released intercepts by the HUR provides a glimpse into the disillusionment with the war felt by Russian military personnel. On June 21, 2022, a member of the Russian military discussed potential encirclement by Ukrainian forces and the poor quality of their rear units. Then, on June 27th, a Russian confessed to his mother that many soldiers in his unit had given up mentally and wished to escape the war. At the end of July, a Russian soldier compared the war in Ukraine with the wars in Chechnya and Afghanistan, expressing his negative attitude towards the Russian government and military command. On August 21st, a Russian military officer reported the mass refusal of soldiers to fight and voiced his confidence that they would soon be withdrawn from the conflict. On September 4th, Russian soldiers complained about the poor supply of new units who arrived without clothes, sleeping bags, and other basic supplies. These statements, if true, reveal the depth of deprivation experienced by the Russian invasion forces.

The third and final category of HUR tweets contained examples of weak or corrupt Russian leadership. These audio intercepts released by the HUR provide a window into the attitude of Russian military personnel towards their leadership during the conflict in Ukraine. On September 14th, a Russian military member in the Kharkiv area complained about the disorganization and incompetence of his superiors. On November 28th, a military officer described his commanding officers as idiots who were unwilling to fight. On December 26th, a Russian military member near Donetsk talked about the cowardice of his command’s staff officers and of military deserters, and his seemingly vain hopes of withdrawing from the combat zone.

Figure 1: A screenshot of a social media post on the Twitter account of the HUR, which contains an intercepted phone call in which a Russian military member complains about his “cowardly command” and “deserters”.

Further audio intercepts obtained by the HUR highlighted the challenges faced by Russian soldiers on the front lines. On January 4, 2023, a Russian soldier talked to his mother about the problem of alcoholism in the ranks and how Russian commands falsified soldiers’ places of death. The recent verbal attacks by Wagner CEO Yevgeny Prigozhin on Twitter of Russian military incompetence also lend credence to what the HUR Twitter account claims.

Applying the concept of coercive disclosure

One motive behind the HUR’s sensitive intelligence disclosures may be to compel Russia to modify its operations. Naturally, the HUR is vested in the cessation of Russian operations in Ukraine and the termination of violence against civilians and Ukrainian prisoners of war. However, Russian leadership in Moscow has yet to issue orders to the armed forces to alter their behavior or tactics, despite the HUR’s dissemination of evidence on social media relating to Russian war crimes, ineffectiveness, and declining morale.

A second possible motive for the HUR’s disclosure of intelligence on Twitter is to sway Russian public opinion and make its citizens demand better conduct of the Russian military in Ukraine. Although the use of Twitter is restricted in Russia, its citizens can still approach the platform through Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections. Further, the HUR posts similar content on YouTube and Telegram, the latter of which is widely used in Russia. However, it is unlikely the HUR sees its release of social media content as a viable approach to change public opinion in Russia, given the outright denial of and disinterest in widely documented Russian military acts of violence against the Ukrainian population.

The main reason for the ongoing intelligence disclosures by the HUR is likely that it helps to support a compelling narrative that persuades other states and international organizations to act. This is the third option Riemer and Sobelman researched: the belief that the controlled release of intelligence can help to achieve ‘narrative superiority.’ The consistent messaging by the HUR about Russian misbehavior against civilians and military personnel; low morale of Russian soldiers; and weak leadership, supports a wider Ukrainian government communication strategy in which narratives like this are regularly stressed, both to international and domestic audiences. Time and time again, Ukraine asks for international attention and action and tries to mobilize actors to take action against alleged Russian war crimes. The HUR’s release of raw intelligence, containing testimonies of Russian misconduct, adds an extra layer of credibility to strategic communications to western audiences and its own population. Ukraine no doubt assesses there is a huge public relations benefit in releasing intercepted material that embarrasses the Russian military and reveals details of Russian atrocities on the battlefield.

Concluding Remarks and Reflection

The HUR’s release of COMINT, traditionally considered highly classified and sensitive, can be seen as a modern development in a world where very few secrets are likely to remain secret forever, and in which carefully selected intelligence can be used to inform the public and seize the moral high ground. Then again, the HUR deliberately chooses what COMINT-related material it releases. The intercepted conversations selected by the HUR for publication on Twitter purposefully portray a negative picture of the Russian armed forces. Corruption, incompetence, criminal activity, and civilian mistreatment solidify a narrative meant as much to inspire the Ukrainian population and its military as to influence the international community.

As such, the Ukrainians have employed an approach that draws upon the concept of moral conflict described by John Boyd. The HUR’s emphasis on execrable Russian behavior aims to maintain public opinion against the invasion in both western countries and Ukraine. By maintaining strong international opinion opposing the Russian invaders, Ukraine sustains essential support of training and weapons from western governments while preserving the loyalty of the Ukrainian populace in wartime. Both are critical for Ukraine’s survival and reflect Boyd’s concept of moral conflict in which the successful integration of material and moral imperatives are prerequisites for victory.

Bio: Major Peter Schrijver is a PhD researcher affiliated with the Netherlands Defence Academy. In his professional capacity, he serves as an officer within the Royal Netherlands Army and has operational experience across multiple postings in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

Lead Image: Screengrab of a June 19, 2023 post from the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine’s Twitter account.

Spies, Lies and Algorithms: US Intelligence in a Changing World
Shawna Sinnott and Laura Jones Episode 58 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast focuses on the US intelligence community and its role in supporting the spectrum of national security missions, from the heavy…
Strengthening the Medical Sphere of Influence Through Guerilla Trauma Systems and Covert Medical Intelligence Networks
Mason H. Remondelli This piece was selected as a finalist in an essay contest co-sponsored by IWI and the Joint Staff J7 Office of Irregular Warfare and Competition (OIWC). Due…
Putin’s Mobilization of Masculinity in the Invasion of Ukraine—and the Role of Ukrainian Women in Stopping Him
Her statue watching over Kyiv’s Saint Michael’s Square, Saint Olga has played an important role in inspiring the defenders who have protected Ukraine since Russia’s invasion a year ago. In…

0 Shares

irregularwarfare.org · by Peter Schrijver · June 27, 2023

14. AI companies risk US national security by working with China. Time to choose sides

AI companies risk US national security by working with China. Time to choose sides

foxnews.com · by Patrick Murphy | Fox News

Video

The US has no strategic plan to combat China: Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg

Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, former Pence National Security adviser, weighs in on reports that China is working to establish a military base in Cuba.

NEWYou can now listen to Fox News articles!

This month, 79 years ago, Allied troops stormed the beaches of Normandy in World War II. The greatest amphibious invasion in human history was a product of unprecedented levels of planning, heroism, sacrifice, and new technology.

Scientists, service members, and industrialists came together to develop and build underwater pipelines, artificial harbors, specialized landing craft, and tide prediction equipment. Everyone had a job to do – and everyone did it as one team in the fight.

Today, America is at a critical period in our strategic competition with China, and technology – especially Artificial Intelligence (AI) – will again play a central role.

China is aggressively pursuing AI using a whole-of-government, industrial collaboration policy, including research into AI’s military applications.

China’s spy balloons fly over our nation while its hackers relentlessly attack our critical infrastructure. Even so, some U.S. technology companies remain entranced by access to China’s vast consumer market and willing to at best ignore – and at worst support – China’s military and human rights abuses.

SENATE URGED TO PUNISH US COMPANIES THAT HELP CHINA BUILD ITS AI-DRIVEN ‘SURVEILLANCE STATE’

As someone who served on the Cybersecurity Solarium Commission with fellow veteran and chairman of the China Oversight Committee, Congressman Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., we’ve looked at potentially decoupling America’s economy with China.

For example, Microsoft Research Center has boosted China’s AI achievements for a quarter-century, developing strategic AI technologies such as computer vision, natural language processing, speech, and intelligent multimedia in China. Microsoft even discloses cybersecurity vulnerabilities in its software to the CCP, which turns around and uses those same vulnerabilities to attack the U.S. government, according to Microsoft's own research.

Video

Microsoft is not alone – IBM and Dell have significant footprints in that same market. We need them as partners advancing America’s interests as it relates to America’s fiercest competitor, who happens to be three times our size geographically and via population.

Microsoft and other U.S. companies with deep investments in China may argue that they are simply complying with China’s laws, that their investment in the country predates the souring of the bilateral relationship, or that their customers have no connection to China’s police state, military or human rights abuses. But these pleas expose an underlying motivation, driven by profits and the need to access China’s vast economy.

American values demand that these companies not look the other way when over a million people are being held in concentration camps in China. It was America that stood against ethnic cleansing in towns like Srebrenica in Bosnia. I know because I deployed there as an American soldier after 9/11.

HOUSE DEMANDS AI UPDATE FROM PENTAGON AS THREATS FROM CHINA, OTHER ADVERSARIES PILE UP

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Secretary of State Antony Blinken shake hands in Beijing, Monday, June 19, 2023. (AP)

We should have no illusions about what China intends to do with advanced technologies like generative AI.

China is aggressively pursuing AI and technological development using a whole-of-government, industrial collaboration policy. This includes research into AI’s military applications, particularly in advanced decision-making.

China’s Next-Generation AI Development Plan set out to establish an AI industry to reach parity with leading countries by 2020, lead in some areas by 2025, and lead the world by 2030. It coincided with the People’s Liberation Army’s "Revolution in Military Affairs," transitioning from "informatized" to "intelligentized" warfare.

Video

Chinese investment in AI pairs with its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy: a "whole-of-society" approach to enable China to develop the most technologically advanced military in the world.

Now, it’s time for American companies to choose a side: the CCP or the national security of the American people. When it comes to powerful technologies like generative AI, they can either develop those technologies in America and allied countries that share our democratic values, or they can develop them in China, and risk those technologies being exploited by the CCP.

AI DRONE SWARM SHOWS MILITARY MIGHT BUT ALSO QUESTIONS OF WHO HOLDS THE POWER

America, while young and imperfect, understands the moral responsibility that comes with great power. We must keep pace in the AI race in the long term, not just because of the significant investment American taxpayers have made in AI research and development here in the United States, but because our nation is anchored in the core values of freedom and opportunity.

Video

We must reinforce the vibrant, open innovation ecosystem that fuels the American AI advantage and create a seamless public-private sector match as we did during World War II.

The vibrant private sector is our distinctly American asset, but it needs guidance and direction. At the same time, the government must also take steps to prevent companies like Microsoft from giving the crown jewels to China. I’m glad to see the administration and Congress both considering new restrictions on outbound investment into strategic sectors in China like AI and quantum computing, and semiconductors.

Nothing would provide that market signal more clarity than a well-articulated National AI Strategy so that issues like national security, ethics and social cohesion are not subordinated to profit-seeking but also so that private capital can flow to public strategies. It should include tools that leverage the power of federal procurement, especially through the Defense Department, to incentivize investment at home and neutralize it in China and other competitors.

Video

When I was the 32nd under secretary of the Army, I was struck by how much the purchasing power of our military can be market-shaping; with the carrot of billions of dollars in federal IT contracts, it’s time to bring that muscle to bear in the AI race: if you’re providing advanced technology to Uncle Sam, you shouldn’t also be selling it to an adversary that can use it against us.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE OPINION NEWSLETTER

This is our Normandy moment, and patriotism demands that we’re all in on the same side together to make sure that these breakthrough technologies reflect democratic and American values. Those of us who’ve seen combat don’t want our children to fight unnecessary wars, especially against an AI-enabled military that could eliminate America’s technological and moral advantage.

The billon Chinese people are good, but the totalitarian regime that governs them will do us harm if given the chance. American tech companies can’t continue to allow that to happen.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

Patrick Murphy was the 32nd under secretary of the Army, and the first Iraq War veteran elected to Congress.

foxnews.com · by Patrick Murphy | Fox News

15. THE TAO OF DECEPTION PART I (Summer Fiction)

Some interesting fiction.

Read Part II on June 29.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/interactive/2023/tao-of-deception-david-ignatius-part-one?itid=hp_opinions_p002_f001

Post Opinions Presents

Summer Fiction

THE

TAO OF

DECEP

TION

PART I

A Four-Part Thriller

By David Ignatius

When Yu Qiangsheng, a top official of the Ministry of State Security, stole across the border to Hong Kong in November 1985, he left behind a fragile Chinese intelligence service that seemed ready to collapse. But it is the nature of intelligence that nothing is what it at first appears. China’s spymasters gradually regained their balance and a decade ago, they shattered the network of CIA informants inside the country, killing or arresting more than two dozen people.

Spy stories always mix fact and fiction. Intelligence agencies give their real-life assets invented names, as in a novel. They create “legends” for their operatives to document an imaginary past. The spy world, as people so often say, is painted in “shades of gray,” and its facts are embossed with fiction.

So, too, with this narrative. This isn’t a “true” account of what happened in the spy wars between the CIA and the Chinese Ministry of State Security over the past few decades. There are fragments of fact. And, certainly, the starting point of Yu’s defection is accurate. You can look it up. But the characters in this story inhabit the world of imagination. This is a work of fiction.

1

1985, HONG KONG

The week after Yu Qiangsheng defected from China, he was closeted in a safe house in Repulse Bay, facing the sea. Guards from the CIA’s Office of Security kept watch from a nearby flat and from across the street. Britain controlled Hong Kong back then, and the apartment was safe from the Chinese agents who would have killed Yu if they knew where he was hiding.

Yu paced the rooms of the safe house the first few days, sleepless and depressed. He wanted to be gone, but he was still in Beijing’s reach; worse, he was in a colony. His stomach hurt, and he complained about the food at every meal. He demanded bottled water from Europe and a food taster to make sure he wasn’t being poisoned.

Every day that first week, Yu received a young, well-mannered American visitor. His name was Thomas Crane. His parents had been missionaries in Henan and Shandong provinces, and he spoke fluent Mandarin Chinese. They had hoped their son would become a missionary, too, but he had joined the Central Intelligence Agency, which was entirely different and also in some respects the same.

Press Enter to skip to end of carouselAbout ‘The Tao of Deception’

“The Tao of Deception” is a fictional spy thriller by Post columnist David Ignatius inspired by real-life events in CIA history.

Want to receive the next installment by email as soon as it’s live? Sign up to follow David Ignatius.

Have questions about this story or the case that inspired it? Submit them here for David’s reader Q&A at 12 p.m. Eastern on Monday, July 3.

Have feedback on this story or format? Tell us here.

End of carousel

Crane’s first assignment was to babysit Yu Qiangsheng while the agency decided whether to bring him to America.

Yu had the face of a mandarin: thin lips; sharp eyes; a high forehead; dark hair going to gray, without the usual black dye. Perhaps that was part of his problem. He was too good to be true: a son of the revolution; no, more than that, a prince. His father had been hiding with Mao Zedong in the caves of Yan’an; his father’s first wife had run off to become Mao’s mistress. Yu had survived the Cultural Revolution to become the head of foreign operations of the Chinese spy service. He had been adopted after his father’s death by a ruthless man who became head of China’s secret police. Truly, he knew all the secrets.

And now, Yu declared, he despised China and wanted to escape. The agency at first didn’t trust him. He had been dropping a hanky, passing tidbits of information, for two years. But the agency’s counterintelligence staff warned that he might be a dangle, a provocation meant to trick the CIA into revealing its secrets. And, perhaps, the agency didn’t want to hear what he had to say.

“There are five kinds of spies,” Yu Qiangsheng explained to Tom one morning in the sticky, windless heat of Hong Kong. As he enumerated each variety, he raised a soft, slender finger.

“There are ‘local spies’ who mingle with the enemy; there are ‘internal spies’ who penetrate the enemy’s secret service; there are ‘turned spies’ sent by the enemy but doubled; there are ‘living spies,’ who appear ordinary but hide their deeper purpose. And there are ‘dead spies,’ whose lives are expendable.”

“Which one are you?” asked Crane, not just to be polite.

“I am a dead spy, perhaps,” answered Yu. “But that is a decision for your agency. They choose and I accept. The ch’i of trustworthiness is to be correct and calm.”

Story continues below advertisement

Correct and calm were usually good words to describe Tom Crane, too. He was nearly six feet, not quite tall. He had a pleasant face, soft brown hair; eyes that held a steady gaze; a mouth that naturally formed an easy smile. It was a face you might look past at a gathering or on a street, and that was just part of what made him a natural intelligence officer.

Crane was good at listening, and the old man liked to talk, so that morning and for many months afterward, Crane received a tutorial in Chinese intelligence. He learned the tradecraft of the Ministry of State Security, the “Tao of deception,” as Yu called it. He learned the unwritten history of the revolution, and its legacy of betrayal and shame.

Yu was saving his biggest secret that first week. As the second-ranking leader of Chinese intelligence, he knew the name and history of the agent his ministry had recruited within the CIA. He had written it in his own code in a small notebook, a mìjiàn, the Chinese called it. The CIA wanted Yu’s notebook when he first came over the border, but he refused to decode it. He wanted to be on the plane to America first.

But after a week, Yu was running out of time. He was nearly a dead spy, and he wanted to remain a living one. So, he told Crane to summon the CIA station chief from the American consulate on Garden Road to the safe house.

The station chief was perspiring when he arrived at Repulse Bay in the steam bath heat of the November afternoon. The Americans were a sweaty people, Yu thought, hairy and smelly, too. But they had power and money. The station chief looked like an overstuffed wallet.

He shook Yu’s hand firmly when he arrived, squeezing the fine bones. That was another thing about Americans; they didn’t appreciate the politeness in a soft handshake. “What have you got for me?” the chief demanded.

“You have been penetrated,” said Yu. “There is a Chinese spy in the CIA. We recruited him in 1944. We have been running him ever since. His English first name is ‘Larry.’ In Chinese, we call him ‘Wu-Tai.’”

“Prove it,” said the chief.

Yu opened the small notebook and pointed to an encrypted name. “This one. It means ‘Chin.’ He is a translator for your foreign broadcast information service. He told us Nixon’s plans when he came to China in 1972. He provided defense documents. He gave us the code names and locations of your deep-cover agents in China. Go on! Check and see.”

Story continues below advertisement

“Larry Chin,” said the station chief. A sour look came over his face, as if he had swallowed a bad radish. “I know him.”

“Arrest him now. If he learns that I have defected, he will tell his MSS case officer, and he will flee. Hurry, now.” He made a gesture with his hands, as if to say, go away, do your business.

The station chief went to his car, where he had secure communications. He awakened the watch officer in the East Asia Division and requested traces on Larry Wu-Tai Chin. He waited while the watch officer called in the most senior counterintelligence officer on duty.

Counterintelligence already had a file on Chin. He had indeed joined the U.S. Army as a translator in 1944; he transferred to the CIA in 1952, and as one of the agency’s few competent Chinese linguists, he had handled for more than 30 years some of the CIA’s most sensitive information about China. The FBI had warned two years before that he might be a Chinese double agent, but the CIA’s spy catchers hadn’t wanted to admit that he might be rotten. Now they had no choice.

The station chief wanted more from Yu’s mìjiàn, but he said no, not until he was in America.

Yu Qiangsheng departed Kai Tak Airport that night on a Gulfstream jet; the CIA plane had no markings except the tail insignia. The Office of Security sent a team of bodyguards, but the only case officer who accompanied Yu was Crane. Yu asked for champagne; the plane had only whiskey, so Yu drank that, the whole bottle.

The FBI arrested Larry Chin a week later. At his trial in February 1986, he was convicted of espionage. “When I think about what I accomplished,” he said, “my imprisonment for life is a very small price to pay. It was worth it.” A few weeks later, he suffocated himself in his jail cell in Manassas, Virginia.

Yu wasn’t easy to manage when he arrived in the United States. He made extravagant demands. He wanted the CIA to provide him with a harem of women. He drank. He thought he was the chosen one, the person whose lineage was red gold.

The only CIA officer who ever established rapport with him was young Crane. He would pose simple questions and draw complicated answers.

“Tell me about your family,” Crane would ask.

Story continues below advertisement

[Do you have feedback on this story? Tell us here.]

And the nightmare would emerge, chapter by chapter. Yu’s father was a physics student who broke from his Kuomintang family to become a revolutionary; he married a beautiful but faithless Shanghai actress who abandoned him for Mao; impossibly, she became the leader of the ultra-leftist “Gang of Four” that terrorized China. Yu’s family was hounded during the Cultural Revolution, but he survived and eventually prospered. His younger brother, who would sell anyone to save his skin, also rose in the party ranks.

Crane wondered at first what had broken Yu’s loyalty. As he listened, he realized that before his defection, Yu had been choking on self-disgust. He knew the party’s true history. He had accompanied the American writer Edgar Snow in the early 1970s to visit the old comrades who made the revolution. What he heard was a sense of betrayal. The revolution was a lie; the party was infested with cruelty and corruption. Yu tried to live with it, but blood dripped from the walls.

Yu had attempted to contact the Americans before he finally fled. He was suffocating in the newly powerful Chinese police state, but Washington had fallen in love with Beijing. Three times, he signaled to the FBI that a Chinese spy was in their midst. The CIA rebuffed the warnings; they didn’t want a flap. Finally, like steam rising in a kettle, Yu had blown out the top. He crashed the border into Hong Kong, carrying his mìjiàn in his coat pocket.

Crane listened to his hurt and anger. But this was espionage, not therapy, and he kept pulling on the string of how the Chinese ran their intelligence service. Yu delighted in telling the young CIA man about Chinese tradecraft; after all, he had invented much of it.

Yu laid bare the MSS. In his last days at the ministry, he had wandered the halls, photographing documents atop people’s desks, pulling secret files, inquiring about special projects. He was a red prince. No one would stop him. He had brought out spools of film along with his mìjiàn.

He gave Crane the order of battle. “The MSS doesn’t have money to buy people’s loyalties or establish fancy covers,” he said. It rode on the wind.

“What China has is people,” Yu explained. He gave an example of a surveillance operation against a Russian illegal agent in Beijing two years before where the Chinese had used three thousand people to follow him. “Can you imagine that?” he laughed. He said that Americans might scoff at Chinese technology, but the security agencies had put microphones everywhere — in every park bench where a foreigner might sit, or restaurant table where they might eat.

One night, when Yu had been drinking, he whispered into Tom’s ear: The MSS had a program called “a thousand talents” to steal Western knowledge. The Americans made it easy. They invited Chinese researchers to every university and corporate lab. They were sloppy in guarding their own secrets. That was China’s best weapon, American inattention.

Story continues below advertisement

“You cannot stop being Chinese,” Yu said. “Many of these Chinese students in the United States, they don’t remember Mao’s horrors. They believe in a new China dream. And if not, their parents in Beijing and Shanghai will remind them. The Chinese in Singapore, Malaysia, Berkeley, Cambridge, the same. They are still Chinese. That is where we recruit the MSS army.”

Tom heard it all, month after month. Sometimes he brought his new bride, Sonia Machel, to the sessions. She was the daughter of a Mozambican father and a Chinese mother who had grown up in Macau when it was a Portuguese colony. She also spoke fluent Chinese.

Sonia’s father had spied for the United States before leaving Macau, so the CIA trusted her, too. They were a “tandem couple,” as the agency liked to say. Every marriage has secrets, but for a tandem couple there are only secrets. Yu Qiangsheng relaxed with her and told more stories.

After more than a year of debriefing the Chinese spy, the Cranes were assigned overseas. Their first posting was to Kuala Lumpur to work the large Chinese diaspora in Malaysia. They were good at it. Sonia spotted and developed the best prospects for recruitment as agents, and Tom pitched them. They were rising stars. They moved on to Phnom Penh after that, to seek recruits among the Chinese community there.

Yu was resettled in a suburb of Los Angeles. The CIA found him a wife. He was a complainer, like many defectors, wanting more money and perks. He thought he had given the agency the keys to the kingdom. The Chinese put out rumors several times that he had been assassinated abroad. It made Yu happy that the Chinese government remained so deeply ashamed by his defection that it needed to pretend he was dead.

The Cranes came home to Washington briefly after their tour in Cambodia. They were slotted next for China. Their first posting would be in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. Consulates were an afterthought for diplomats, but not for spies. They could be better hunting grounds.

Before Tom left for China, he asked the Office of Security for permission to see Yu. He hadn’t come to love the old man, but he felt responsible for him. Tom was the closest thing to Yu’s American son.

Yu had gotten fat eating American food, and he was drinking more. But he was happy to see the CIA officer with whom he had shared all his secrets.

“You are a ‘traveling man’ now,” said Yu. That was the Chinese expression for spy. He took out one of the books he had brought from China, and he held Crane’s hand while he read: “Be just like a blackbird entering the heavy forest or a fish diving into the deepest pool without a trace.”

Yu asked for another glass of whiskey. Crane went to fetch it, then kissed the old man on the forehead and left.

2

1998, CHENGDU

Tom and Sonia arrived at a newly built U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. Previously, the staff had been squeezed into a local hotel, so this was liberation. The compound was bounded by stucco walls on a narrow street in an unfashionable part of town south of the murky river that bisected the city. Inside the main gate was a grand portico topped by the seal of the United States and guarded by two Chinese stone lions.

Chengdu was thought to be easy duty for American diplomats. It lies west of the sweltering cities of the Yangtze delta, nestled on a fertile high plain. To the north and west are rugged mountains that might once have been visible on a clear day, but Chinese industrial cities didn’t get those anymore.

Chengdu was a boom town in the late 1990s. “To get rich is glorious” was China’s mantra now, and Sichuan was living the dream. Investment money surged in from Hong Kong and Taiwan and America; old buildings were razed for new factories and office buildings, which soon were demolished to make room for even bigger ones.

The consulate had a large staff of Chinese nationals, presumed to be spies, who snooped around any space that was open to them. The site was surrounded by tall office blocks, so Americans were warned that the building was probably bathed in electromagnetic energy; they should assume that conversations in rooms with windows could be read by lasers that measured the vibrations of the panes.

The CIA base was behind a maze of doors on the second floor at the rear of the building. Crane had to open a dozen locks to get to his classified workstation. The space was hidden away from Chinese employees, and conversations within its baffled “Acoustic Conference Room” were secure, or so it was assumed.

Tom held a meeting in the ACR his first week with the five officers serving under him. Three were “declared,” meaning that the State Department had told the Chinese government that they were CIA personnel. The other three, including Tom and his wife, were “undeclared,” with cover as ordinary members of the consular staff. The Cranes were the only truly fluent Chinese speakers.

Story continues below advertisement

“We can’t make mistakes here,” Crane began his first team huddle, remembering what Yu had told him about Chinese tradecraft. “We’re under constant, pervasive surveillance. At home, at work, on the bus, out walking on the street. Don’t assume you’re ‘clean,’ even after a surveillance detection route that has taken you half the day.”

Heads nodded. They’d heard all that in training at the Farm. Tom saw the false confidence. He’d been cocksure once himself, in Kuala Lumpur, and burned an agent. He admonished the group:

“The Chinese own this space. Our disguises are great. Sure. But don’t trust them. Our counter-surveillance technology is excellent, too. We have friendly eyes and ears in space to watch over us. But don’t trust that, either. It is very, very hard to beat Chinese fixed surveillance that’s on every street corner.

“Assume the worst. If you’ve gotten to a drop site and you think you’re clean after a five-hour SDR, you’re almost certainly wrong. Do another five hours. If you have the tiniest shred of doubt whether you’re clean, then abort the drop. Otherwise, you’ll get someone killed.”

“So, what are we doing here?” asked a woman who was on her first assignment. “Other than going to the gym.”

“We’re waiting,” said Tom, “for the moment when someone slips a note in our pocket in the market, or stops to talk at a party, or happens to meet us in the park. The golden moment. And then we will have a day, maybe just a few hours, to respond.

“Be ready,” he continued. “Anytime, any day, a walk-in could crash the front door of the consulate. Any afternoon you stroll down Lingshiguan Road, a Chinese official could drop that note in your purse. And then it’s off to the races.

“We’ll have everything set. A template: Where to hold the first meeting. How to map an SDR that gives you a chance of coming out dry in a monsoon of surveillance. A comms protocol that’s ironclad. But be ready to go. This is a street ballet. You have to be limber, flexed, in position behind the curtain, always. Otherwise, when it’s showtime, we’re screwed. Understood?”

Heads nodded. Of course they understood. That’s what they had signed up for. Old-timers still referred to the agency sometimes as “Clowns in Action,” but they were remembering the sloppy days when cocktail parties were the habitual venues for spotting agents, and good tradecraft meant not getting fall-down drunk. That was over. The Chinese didn’t drink vodka. They had cameras watching their cameras.

3

1998, BEIJING

Tom still heard Yu Qiangsheng’s voice in his head, and the Chinese hadn’t forgotten him either. The senior cadres of the Ministry of State Security remembered the white-knuckle panic they felt after Yu’s defection. The lights had stayed on all night for weeks at the ministry’s new headquarters in Xiyuan, next to the Summer Palace. The office overlooked the imperial gardens and the lake where the carp were so thick they made the water gleam golden-pink. But in the years after the No. 2 official fled, the shutters remained drawn and the heavy curtains behind them, too, to shield a ministry that remained shellshocked.

Senior MSS cadres had hoped at first that Yu might have run off with one of his mistresses, or maybe died in a car accident. But those comforting fictions dissolved when Larry Wu-Tai Chin was arrested. He had messaged his case officer in New York, a Catholic priest, as it happened, to say that he feared he was under surveillance. A few days later, the FBI arrived at his home.

Some members of the Central Committee claimed that if the ministry had moved faster, it might have saved Chin. But that was nonsense. If they had tried to exfiltrate him, they would only have exposed more MSS officers. The blessing was that Chin had done the right thing and killed himself with a plastic bag tightened around his neck.

The MSS did the right thing, in return. It erected an anonymous memorial to him, no name, no message, in Fragrant Hills Park, north of the city center in Beijing. MSS cadres still wandered by on weekends to pay their respects.

How to rebuild when the house is in ruins? This had been the question in the decade after Yu Qiangsheng fled. Some thought the ministry could limp along with modest repairs. But there was a revolt. It came from above, from the generals of the People’s Liberation Army who had never liked the idea of an independent spy service in the first place. And from below, from the younger officers who knew that Yu Qiangsheng had probably compromised every major operation that their service was running.

So, the ministry started over. And in this project, the most creative officer turned out to be a young woman named Ma Wei.

Ma Wei was from Shanghai, whose residents liked to think they were the best at everything, including spying. But she was from an ordinary family. Her father was a policeman. Her mother worked in a factory. She didn’t attend one of the fancy high schools, but she received extremely high marks from her teachers in Suzhou district. She was hazed for her good grades. She got into fights with girls who bullied her and, small as she was, she always won. The Shanghai party committee noticed her. She received a scholarship to study in the United States.

Ma Wei went to college in the “heartland.” She studied at the University of Wisconsin for four years as an undergraduate, and then two more as a graduate student in psychology. She rooted for the Badgers. She ate fried cheese curds. She learned to speak perfect English. She was the girl nobody noticed.

The Ministry of State Security had invited Ma to a special training camp the summer before she left for Madison, as they did with many Chinese studying abroad. From Madison, she filed reports every six months to the Shanghai office of the Ministry of State Security, via a Chinese “friend” in America.

Ma was living on campus when an American newspaper published a report of Yu Qiangsheng’s defection. She felt physically ill. She knew the ministry. She was a secret member of the team. It was her work, too, that Yu had betrayed. When she finished her studies and returned home, she applied for a job with the ministry and was given a place in the North America branch.

Story continues below advertisement

People at MSS headquarters called her “the American girl.” She wore jeans and black sneakers, and she gathered her long black hair in a ponytail. Her favorite singer was Madonna. She had rap musicians on her playlist. Older cadres in the MSS didn’t know what to make of her.

Ma Wei thought that the MSS was too afraid of the CIA. China had more money now. It didn’t need to concentrate so much on “loyal” Chinese like Wu-Tai Chin. It could buy loyalty. She had seen the Americans up close. They were as greedy and selfish as anyone. And the CIA made mistakes. Agents were sloppy. They got caught.

And now the Americans were getting scared about terrorism. This could provide an opening. Al-Qaeda had bombed the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The CIA was looking for partners.

Ma Wei was one of the young MSS employees in Beijing sent to attend counterterrorism seminars offered by the CIA for “the liaison service.” The seminars took place in an embassy annex in Beijing. The CIA knew she spoke English, but she was mostly quiet. She listened very carefully and filed extensive notes after every meeting.

“Miss Ma” was the name she asked the Americans to call her. She asked for help on some of the exercises. What was MASINT? How did geolocation work? How did a name get on a watchlist? She would ask one CIA officer to explain, and appear not to understand, so another would try. Back at work, she made a “face book,” with all the individuals she had met and notes about each.

The MSS already knew the names of the declared officers in the Beijing station, but Miss Ma was able to give more details. Then, working with information provided by MSS agents who were part of the Chinese staff inside the embassy, they could match known intelligence officers with other Americans with whom they socialized, shared lunch in the cafeteria, played sports on weekends.

This was her Tao: She was careful and precise like an engineer, but also creative like an artist. The tradecraft of Yu’s era had been to mobilize in great numbers. Ma despised this approach for all sorts of reasons. Her style was nimbler. And she had a burr under her saddle — something to prove to herself and a few of her senior colleagues: She wanted nothing to do with this man Yu.

The MSS called her operation “CT File,” in English. It exposed nearly all the CIA deep-cover officers in Beijing, and it brought great credit to Ma. The ministry promoted her two ranks and, a year after that, they made her deputy chief of the North America section. This new role gave “the American girl” confidence to develop more aggressive targeting.

“Let’s test them,” proposed Ma at a staff meeting in Xiyuan. “Let’s run defectors at them and see how they react. Real ministry officers, with intelligence histories that are verifiable and accurate. Then we can see how the Americans vet agents, why they trust one and not another. We need more Wu-Tai operations. We want to have so many moles in the CIA that they bump into each other.”

4

1999, CHENGDU

Tom Crane learned to use his intuition. He heard Yu’s voice in his mind, from late nights when the old man was homesick and wanted to read aloud from his dog-eared text of Sun Tzu. Yu spoke in his courtly Mandarin, his voice mellowed by Scotch whisky:

“‘Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity.’ Do you hear that, Tom? ‘Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.’ Are you listening? ‘Under fragrant bait, there is certain to be a hooked fish.’ Understand?”

Tom had heard. During his first year in Chengdu, five Chinese offered to defect — each of whom claimed to have urgent actionable intelligence and wanted immediate covert support. Which ones were real? Crane wished he had an assay, to tell fool’s gold from the real thing. In the end, he had his instinct, and it proved unusually reliable.

The dangles were artfully packaged. Two of the would-be defectors were especially tantalizing. They claimed to be from the local MSS branch. One threw a message over the stucco wall on Lingshiguan Road; he claimed to be recruiting Chinese students to go to America. The other left a handwritten message under the windshield wiper on an embassy car; she said she was responsible for placing agents inside American companies based in Sichuan.

They wanted immediate contact, of course. Tom delayed; he sensed they might be phonies. He had the FBI run checks on the students who had supposedly been dispatched to America; most of the names were duds. He asked the National Resources Division to query the companies about their employees in the province. The company security officers said they didn’t allow Chinese employees in their secure workspaces. So, Tom left those dangles dangling.

The easiest thing to do with a defector was to say no: Nobody in the agency ever got blamed for being too careful. The costs of being wrong were usually higher than the benefits of being right. But the best intelligence officers have a sixth sense. They know which risks are worth taking. And that instinct kicked in when the fifth offer to spy for America landed in Tom’s pocket.

Tom was strolling home after work from his office on Lingshiguan Road to his apartment in the Jinjiang Hotel across the river. It was early spring; the trees were budding, half green. He made this trip on foot every day he could; a friendly American, practically advertising his availability, in the hope that a Chinese would make contact.

Tom was walking up Renmin Road toward the bridge when a man bumped him from behind. He was tall and he had a hungry look, eyes blazing as he looked directly at Crane and then darting away. Tom felt the man plunge his hand into his coat pocket and then clumsily withdraw. After the bump, the man hurried on his way. Tom studied him, height, build, clothes. The sidewalk had been crowded when the man brushed past, so the cameras monitoring Renmin Road wouldn’t have a good shot.

Tom kept walking, crossing the bridge, but he loitered in a riverside park before going back to his rooms. The hotel had been the former location of the consulate; every ceiling panel and wallboard might hide a camera. It wasn’t the place to read a covert message.

He took a seat on an empty bench facing the river. He removed the message from his pocket, holding it with a handkerchief, and read the Chinese characters. He quickly translated them in his head:

“I work for the Ministry of State Security. I need money. I have a woman problem. I can sell you secrets. The first is free. Your deputy consul general, Louis Chen, has been recruited by my ministry. I have many other secrets. Meet me tomorrow at 4:00 pm at the eastern edge of Xinglong Lake, south of the city, on the path below Hupan Road. If you are alone, with no surveillance, I will approach you. Bring a brown paper bag with $20,000 in cash as a first payment and a plan for future communications. I will bring a brown paper bag with intelligence. We will exchange bags.”

Story continues below advertisement

Tom folded the message in his handkerchief to preserve any prints or DNA. He rose from the bench and took a taxi back to the consulate. He passed through the 12 locks to his workspace. He sat down and wrote a flash message on the Restricted Handling channel to Hendrick Hoffman, the chief of the East Asia Division.

Why did Crane think this one was real, after a series of fakes? He tried to explain it in his cable to Headquarters. This man was straightforward and transactional. He made a proffer of extremely valuable information, the identity of a Chinese mole in the consulate, but he held back other information. The man said that he needed money, and he explained why, an expensive mistress. He proposed a plausible meeting place, in a location far enough from the city center that Tom might be able to shake free of surveillance.

But that wasn’t really the reason. Tom believed the man because of the half-crazy look in his eye, of fear and determination. He felt the man’s hand tremble as it hit his pocket, and the way his thumb got caught as he pulled his hand away. He saw the desperate stare — can I trust you with my life? — before the man’s eyes skittered away. It is always a question of a man’s ch’i, Yu had told him. His inner spirit. Tom couldn’t prove this one was the real thing. But he knew it.

Headquarters was wary. They were used to saying no. And this walk-in wanted the keys to the kingdom, namely, a communications protocol, on his first meeting. But Tom insisted. He prepared an ops plan, with a long surveillance detection run that would include a car, the metro, three bus rides, two long walks and three disguises. Tom would have only one person for operational support, Sonia. She would begin the run by driving him to a bend in the road outside the city center where watchers would be blind for twenty seconds.

Headquarters took one urgent step. Cable traffic to and from Louis Chen, the deputy consul, was immediately controlled. To investigate him, the agency created a tiny compartment, with one representative each from State, the FBI and the CIA.

Tom’s ops plan was scrubbed by the East Asia Division, which proposed some changes. He wanted to give the asset one of the new covert communications devices that bounced burst messages off a satellite, but Headquarters said no, too fancy and too risky if he’s double. They proposed instead an old-fashioned, one-time code pad. Tom said fine.

[Sign up for David Ignatius’s Follow email alerts to get the next installment as soon as it publishes.]

“This guy sounds too good to be true,” warned Hoffman, the East Asia Division chief, on a secure call after midnight Chengdu time. “Either he’s a nut, or he’s a plant.” He had recently left as station chief in Beijing and didn’t trust anything in China.

“I think he’s real,” answered Tom. “So does my wife, and she’s much smarter about China than me.” The division chief knew Sonia. He agreed. That sealed the deal.

Sonia Machel was what the military liked to call a force multiplier. She would have appeared striking anywhere, with lustrous skin and a face at once Asian and East African. Her family had emigrated from the Portuguese colony of Mozambique to Macau a half-century earlier. Her Portuguese was nearly as good as her Chinese. She could look like many people, and like no one.

The operation began with Sonia driving their Volkswagen to a park west of the city that was popular with foreigners. It had tennis courts and, nearby, a golf club. The Cranes had traversed this route a dozen times, always with a nominal destination but, really, looking for a topographical anomaly, a blind spot where a car could turn into a slow curve and become invisible long enough for a passenger to open the door and gently roll to the bushes by the curb. They’d found “the perfect curve,” as Sonia called it, and over the six months constructed the SDR plan around it.

Now practice was over.

“Here it comes,” said Sonia as she braked before entering the turn. Several cars had been following them, changing places since they left the city center, but they had remained a discreet distance, allowing the essential twenty seconds.

“Goodbye, darling,” she said. The door opened, a body fell gently to the pavement, a rubber dummy popped into place in the passenger seat.

“Roll,” Tom told himself. He had practiced the maneuver so many times, starting more than a decade ago at Camp Peary. Out the door, across the pavement, into the shrubs and gone before the trailing car approached. And then into his first disguise, and his first chain of subway and bus rides.

Tom reached Xinglong Lake an hour before the meeting. He thought he was clean. But was he willing to bet a man’s life on it? There was an underground garage on the west side of the lake. He entered it in one disguise and left in another. He stealthily walked the circumference of the lake, which offered a 360-degree view, looking for people, cameras, any hint of danger. Sometimes on a surveillance run, the hair on his arms prickled as if from static electricity. This time he was flat calm. Clean.

As 4:00 p.m. neared, Tom found the underpass hideaway he had diagrammed in his operations plan; he took off his last disguise and placed it in his backpack. From the pack he removed the brown paper bag, which contained $20,000 and the code pad and instructions.

Tom walked along a dirt path beside the lake. Hupan Road was above him, to his left. He didn’t want to look back. He might break the spell, like Orpheus gazing at Eurydice. He was beginning to give up hope when a Chinese man walked quickly past him. He recognized the gait, the quick, impulsive step; he remembered the height and the build. The man was carrying a brown bag.

Story continues below advertisement

There was a bench ahead, at a curve in the lakeside path. The Chinese man sat down and placed his bag on the wooden slats. Tom approached and took the adjacent seat, placing his bag next to the other man’s. The sound of the traffic on Hupan Road faded; they were alone in the still of the afternoon. Tom looked into the Chinese man’s eyes for a long moment, nodded slowly, okay, let’s do this, and the other man did the same.

Tom took from his pocket a piece of paper on which he had drawn a Chinese character. The left half was a symbol for speech; the right side represented foliage. The image conveyed the idea of hidden communication, words under cover. The name of the character was dié. It meant: “to spy.” He showed it to the Chinese man, and then put it back in his pocket.

Each man rose from the bench, taking the other’s paper bag. Tom didn’t breathe easily until he returned home late that night, exhausted, to the embrace of his wife. His apartment wasn’t secure, and he didn’t want to arouse Chinese suspicions by returning to the base so late. He didn’t dare look into the bag until they were in the base early the next morning.

Tom opened it in the ACR. He removed a photograph from the brown paper. The picture had been taken from an underground shaft; the camera looked upward, toward a hole bored through a concrete floor. The photograph was marked with an address, 4 Lingshiguan Road, and a timestamp, from two years ago, when the consulate was being completed.

“Holy crap!” he whispered. “They’re inside the building.”

To be continued.

Read Part II on June 29. Sign up for David Ignatius’s Follow email alerts to get the links to the next installments as soon as they are published.

16. China offers closer military cooperation with Vietnam

Strategic competition.

China offers closer military cooperation with Vietnam

Reuters · by Reuters

BEIJING, June 27 (Reuters) - China is willing to work with Vietnam to strengthen high-level communication and cooperation between their militaries, Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu said on Tuesday as he met his Vietnamese counterpart.

In their meeting in Beijing, Li said the international situation was chaotic and intertwined, and the security of the Asia-Pacific region was facing challenges, the Chinese defence ministry said in a statement.

"China and Vietnam should continue to work hand in hand and closely unite in the new journey of socialism, safeguard the common strategic interests of the two countries, and make positive contributions to regional peace and stability," Li said in the talks with Vietnam's defence minister, Phan Van Giang.

Li told Phan that relations between their militaries had developed well, adding that China's military was willing to push relations to a new level.

Their meeting came after the USS Ronald Reagan made a stop in the Vietnamese port of Danang on Sunday - the third by a U.S. aircraft carrier since the end of the Vietnam War.

The U.S. navy visit comes amid tension between China and the United States in the South China Sea, most of which China claims, as the two powers jostle for influence in the energy-rich region.

In the past few weeks, Li has met South Africa's defence force commander and Thailand's army chief but he has not held talks with U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin.

Both Li and Austin attended a security summit in Singapore in early June but Li declined the offer of a meeting.

Li, appointed defence minister in March, is under U.S. sanctions over his role in a 2017 weapons purchase from Russia's largest arms exporter. China has said it wants the sanctions dropped to facilitate discussions.

As tensions simmer in the South China Sea, where several countries have overlapping territorial claims and also hold military exercises in its waters, any thaw in Sino-U.S. military relations is being closely watched.

Beijing scrapped three major avenues of military communication with the United States in August last year in an angry response to a visit by then U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to self-ruled Taiwan.

Reporting by Beijing newsroom; Writing by Bernard Orr; Editing by Kim Coghill, Robert Birsel

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

17. It’s Time to Bring Back Conventional Deterrence Patrols

Excerpt:

Preparing to implement conventional deterrence patrols would enable the Air Force to buy time for itself and the joint force. All the services face significant waits for new Taiwan-relevant systems and operational concepts to come online. The Air Force also has a series of large bills to pay, including the cost of over 1,700 F-35s and new inter-continental ballistic missiles. Furthermore, it has a long wait before its new hypersonic missiles and next-generation penetrating bomber, the B-21 Raider, become available for combat use. In the interim, the Air Force should be taking relatively cheap steps that will generate increased combat power without requiring new airframes or new production lines. By looking at history and taking advantage of the joint force’s diverse arsenal of anti-ship missiles, the Air Force can maintain relevance in the Pacific theater and help to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

It’s Time to Bring Back Conventional Deterrence Patrols - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by David Zikusoka · June 27, 2023

After decades of war in the Middle East, the joint force is retooling to pierce the bubble of China’s formidable anti-access, area-denial defenses. The national defense strategy calls China the pacing challenge and Defense Department officials have called a cross-strait Chinese invasion of Taiwan the pacing scenario. The most stressing part of this scenario would be the fight to sink the invasion fleet as it approaches Taiwan’s shores. The joint force would need to find and strike Chinese naval assets while protecting bases and aircraft carriers from China’s arsenal of long-range missiles.

The Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy are each proposing new operational concepts to funnel combat power into China’s backyard. The Air Force faces a particular challenge because it relies heavily on short-range aircraft and bases within striking distance of Chinese missile raids. To overcome this dependence and maintain relevance, the Air Force should call upon a combination of Cold War tactics and advanced missile technology. At the core of this approach is the “conventional deterrence patrol.” This is an operational concept for an alert model that makes the joint force’s most advanced anti-ship munitions available for employment at a moment’s notice during a crisis. Conventional deterrence patrols would provide significant, flexible combat power for the joint force by keeping strike aircraft airborne within range of the battlespace but at the edges of China’s reach.

Agile Combat Employment

The Air Force currently operates short-range aircraft out of bases in the first and second island chains of the western Pacific. From Okinawa to Guam though, these bases are threatened by China’s extensive arsenal of long-range missiles like the DF-21 and DF-26. In the opening hours and minutes of a conflict, they would likely come under withering attack, with many aircraft lost on the ground before they can join the fight.

Become a Member

The Air Force has elected to tackle this problem by implementing an operational concept called Agile Combat Employment. This calls for dispersing aircraft across a constellation of small bases throughout the western Pacific to keep Chinese strike planners guessing. By pre-positioning supplies like fuel, munitions, and runway repair equipment, and employing active missile defenses and passive base hardening, the Air Force intends to continue operating in the contested environment of China’s near abroad. Regardless of the amount of dispersal, however, an operational base has a signature, and that signature can be detected and attacked. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether Agile Combat Employment can outlast China’s deep magazine of missiles.

If the Air Force cannot protect its short-range aircraft and the bases they operate from, it will need to look elsewhere if it is to apply combat power to the problem of sinking ships in the Taiwan Strait. With this in mind, the Air Force might be better off concentrating its resources in long-range aircraft that can reach into the theater from bases outside the range of China’s missiles.

Cold War Tactics

During the Cold War, the Air Force faced a similar problem of vulnerable bases and aircraft. In the 1960s, B-52 bombers, the air leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, operated out of bases within range of the Soviet Union’s intercontinental ballistic missiles. At the time, the United States had not yet completed construction of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System that could alert bomber and tanker bases to impending attack, allowing crews to scramble their planes into the air and away from the blast zone of incoming nuclear weapons. Furthermore, as the Minuteman had not yet been fully deployed, the United States lacked a 24/7/365-alert ground-based ballistic missile.

Until a missile warning system and the Minuteman fleet were fully procured, the Air Force implemented a near-term stopgap measure called Operation Chrome Dome. From 1960 to 1968, at any given time, twelve B-52s known as a “Daily Dozen” were airborne somewhere over a route that extended from the continental United States to positions near the North Pole. The job of these aircraft was deterring a Soviet surprise first strike. Should the United States and its bomber bases come under attack, these aircraft were ready to conduct retaliatory strikes against the Soviet Union.

In the event of a crisis over Taiwan, the Air Force should carry out a modern version of Operation Chrome Dome. It should be prepared to fly a handful of aircraft loaded with anti-ship weapons on “conventional deterrence patrols” at the edge of the western Pacific theater on a 24/7 basis for the duration of the crisis. In addition to bombers like B-52s and B-1s, these patrols should bolster their available aircraft by including C-17 and C-130 cargo aircraft. Called up from logistics duties to swing into a strike role, each cargo aircraft would carry palletized magazines that could release anti-ship cruise missiles through its rear cargo ramp. The cargo aircraft would introduce a particularly complex shell game, hiding among the regional logistics traffic servicing coalition bases and preparing for possible combat operations. All told, this approach would make 788 aircraft available to participate in conventional deterrence patrols, a complement large enough to sustain continuous 24/7 operations for a handful of aircraft.

Conventional deterrence patrol aircraft would cycle in and out of the theater from bases as far away as Australia, Hawaii, Alaska, and the continental United States. Operating in the immense volume of western Pacific airspace, they would pose a difficult search problem for China’s air force. Lacking base infrastructure to reach out eastward over long distances, China would be forced to extend its range by relying heavily on its small, underdeveloped fleet of air-to-air refueling tankers. Conventional deterrence patrols could further exacerbate this problem by using a diverse family of standoff missiles that allow for operation at the furthest edges of China’s surveillance range.

Old Tactics, New Missiles

The Air Force can best exploit the availability of conventional deterrence patrols by equipping them with missiles that employ the best anti-ship capabilities currently available to the joint force. This effort would involve not only using missiles already deployable on bombers but expanding that arsenal with missiles whose speed and range would impose a complex missile defense problem on Chinese forces. All of the necessary munitions are available today and the only cost to the Air Force would be for integration onto the full set of conventional deterrence platforms.

The first step is expanding the magazine of available subsonic missiles. The Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile is currently deployable only on the B-1. The Air Force should take on the task of integrating it on the B-52 as well as the cargo pallet magazines of C-130s and C-17s. While the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile is the most capable air-launched anti-ship missile available, its 250-mile range limits the flexibility of conventional deterrence patrols and places aircraft at risk of interception. With this in mind, the Air Force should take steps to implement software commonality updates that would give the missile’s twin, the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, the capability to take out ship targets. The latter missile has a longer range, affording launch aircraft the ability to engage targets from as far as 1,000 miles away. Finally, the Air Force should work with the Navy to integrate the Maritime Strike Tomahawk onto airborne platforms. Launching this 1,000-mile-range missile from the air instead of the surface would keep expensive Navy cruisers and destroyers outside the reach of Chinese anti-ship missiles.

The Air Force should call upon an additional missile in the Navy’s arsenal, the SM-6, which currently deploys from the vertical launch tubes of Navy cruisers and destroyers. The Block IB version averages a speed of Mach 5 out to ranges in excess of 600 miles. The Air Force should integrate an allotment of SM-6s for deployment from the wing pylons and bomb bays of B-52 and B-1 bombers. There is precedent for deploying the SM-6 from the air, as shown by the Navy’s flight tests aboard the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The hypersonic SM-6 could play a specialized role in the conventional deterrence arsenal, serving as a munition specifically deployed against high-value, time-sensitive targets.

Implementing Conventional Deterrence

Implementing conventional deterrence patrols would require the Air Force to take a few key steps. First, the Air Force should demonstrate its capability and capacity for conventional deterrence. It should make publicly known its plans to conduct conventional deterrence patrols in the event of a crisis. At least once a year, it should conduct a week-long exercise to demonstrate its ability to make patrol aircraft available on a 24/7 basis. To avoid exacerbating tensions in the western Pacific, the Air Force could leverage its global footprint to conduct this exercise in other locations, perhaps over the U.S. west coast.

Second, the Air Force should also make public its weapons integration plans. While maintaining classification at the highest levels, it could still exploit the deterrent effect of announcing a latent capability to strike from a variety of ranges over a variety of speeds. Notably, the Air Force has been plagued by high-profile failures of the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, its planned boost-glide hypersonic munition. With the cancellation of this program, the Air Force lacks a hypersonic weapon in the near term. Integrating the SM-6 would give the service the capability to strike critical targets on short timelines — a capability that could then be publicly advertised.

Third, the Air Force will need to be realistic about the challenges that will be imposed on its resources. Weapons integration and flight testing will take time. Deploying weapons from cargo holds, a new and unusual approach, has been in testing since at least 2020. This goes for air-deploying naval munitions normally fired from vertical launch tubes as well. The assignment of cargo aircraft to strike missions will need to be modeled in the context of the enormous logistical burden the Air Force would be supporting in a crisis scenario. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether the Air Force would have sufficient spare capacity to support conventional deterrence patrols with cargo aircraft.

Finally, the Air Force will need to overcome institutional challenges. Anti-surface warfare is not a traditional Air Force mission. The joint force’s premier anti-ship cruise missile, the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile is certified for carriage aboard only the B-1 bomber. Agile Combat Employment, the service’s western Pacific concept of operations, focuses on smaller tactical aircraft. Given these headwinds, advocates will have to make the case for conventional deterrence patrols by illustrating the strategic utility of the concept. Cross-strait shipping is the linchpin of any Chinese attempt to overtake Taiwan. Operationally, bombers are uniquely positioned to take on this challenge, offering an asymmetric threat to Chinese naval power that’s far cheaper to operate than naval cruisers or destroyers. They are long-range assets, they have deep magazines, and they are highly mobile, with the ability to respond to a crisis in hours rather than days. Politically, they offer the joint force more flexibility because, unlike the land-based missile batteries being pursued by the Army and Marine Corps, they do not necessarily need the permission of partners and allies to deploy. Taking on anti-ship missions would keep the Air Force relevant in the most important part of the joint force’s pacing scenario.

Buying Time

Preparing to implement conventional deterrence patrols would enable the Air Force to buy time for itself and the joint force. All the services face significant waits for new Taiwan-relevant systems and operational concepts to come online. The Air Force also has a series of large bills to pay, including the cost of over 1,700 F-35s and new inter-continental ballistic missiles. Furthermore, it has a long wait before its new hypersonic missiles and next-generation penetrating bomber, the B-21 Raider, become available for combat use. In the interim, the Air Force should be taking relatively cheap steps that will generate increased combat power without requiring new airframes or new production lines. By looking at history and taking advantage of the joint force’s diverse arsenal of anti-ship missiles, the Air Force can maintain relevance in the Pacific theater and help to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Become a Member

David Zikusoka is a non-resident senior fellow at New America. He has previously served in positions at the White House and the Department of Defense.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by David Zikusoka · June 27, 2023

18. Explainer: The China-U.S. military chill: do they talk at all?

Explainer: The China-U.S. military chill: do they talk at all?

Reuters · by Greg Torode

HONG KONG, June 27 (Reuters) - Amid intensifying military deployments across East Asia, high-level defence dialogue between China and the United States remains frozen. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken did not secure any progress on the issue during his visit to Beijing last week. U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin attempted talks with China's Defence Minister Li Shangfu during a defence conference in Singapore this month, but did not get beyond a handshake.

WHAT IS THE SITUATION NOW?

General Li, appointed in March, remains sanctioned by the U.S. over his role in a 2017 weapons purchase from Russia's largest arms exporter, Rosoboronexport. Chinese officials have repeatedly said they want those sanctions, imposed in 2018, dropped to facilitate discussions.

Li and other senior officials also say they want signs from the U.S. of "mutual respect" - easing its patrolling and surveillance off China's coasts and an end to arms sales for Taiwan. Neither is about to happen. The tension predates Li's appointment, with Beijing's scrapping three avenues of military communication in August 2022 in protest of then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. This scuppered planned talks between theatre-level commands, regular defence policy co-ordination and military maritime consultations, which included operational safety issues.

A senior U.S. defence official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that since 2021 China had declined or not responded to more than a dozen requests to talk with the Pentagon and nearly 10 working-level engagement requests.

Regional countries are watching closely, with some leery of being drawn into a wider conflict or forced to choose between the superpowers.

Serving and retired military officers stress the importance of smooth communications beyond political leaders, given the dangers of operational miscalculations.

HOW DEEP IS THE FREEZE?

Significantly, it isn't total. Diplomats and Chinese analysts say military attaches at embassies Beijing and Washington are still able to meet officials - an important element of routine communication.

Operationally, routine military ship-to-ship and aircraft-to-aircraft communication still takes place and is, according to three diplomats familiar with the situation, often professional at a basic level. At moments of tension, however, it is more fraught.

Senior Chinese military intelligence officials also participated in a secret meeting of regional spies in Singapore earlier this month - a session that included U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines.

WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE?

Washington will still push for military dialogue - it is not a reward but a necessity, Austin said this month - but there is no sign the United States is about to drop sanctions on Li. And changes to U.S. deployments to East Asia or a significant shift in its Taiwan posture are even more unlikely.

With Li set to serve a five-year term, some Chinese analysts say it will be impossible for the U.S. to foster talks with military officials above or below him.

"The U.S. sanction on Li is like a tiger that blocks the path," said Zhou Bo, a retired senior PLA colonel and a senior fellow at Beijing's Tsinghua University.

Senior Chinese foreign ministry official Yang Tao also highlighted the sanctions on Li this week, telling Reuters at a briefing that it was "one of the reasons we cannot have military-to-military exchanges. The U.S. needs to first remove this obstacle".

Some defence analysts say that in the short-term, routine discussions between theatre commanders would build confidence and ease tensions.

Another U.S. official said that the head of Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral John Aquilino, had a standing request to talk with his Chinese counterpart, Eastern Theatre commander General Lin Xiangyang, but that the conversation had not yet happened. The official said some lower-level interactions with the Chinese military had continued.

In the longer term, the Pentagon is eager to deepen engagement with China on broader strategic issues, particularly its nuclear weapons build up, but has signalled difficulties ahead.

"It remains unclear how the (Chinese) leadership and decision-makers accept the premise behind strategic stability, including the utility of crisis stability and communications," the Pentagon's annual China report said last November. "(Chinese) officials have been reluctant to engage on nuclear, cyberspace, and space issues as it pertains to strategic risk reduction in official or unofficial dialogue, particularly in defence channels."

In Singapore this month, General Li told an audience of regional counterparts and scholars that China remained open to a military relationship but the "fundamental principle" had to be mutual respect.

Without that, he said, "then our communications will not be productive".

Reporting By Greg Torode in Hong Kong and Yew Lun Tian in Beijing; Additional reporting by Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart in Washington. Editing by Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Greg Torode

19. Army special forces' warfare strategies more relevant amid 'complex threats' faced by PH – Marcos

Army special forces' warfare strategies more relevant amid 'complex threats' faced by PH – Marcos

cnnphilippines.com · by CNN Philippines Staff

Published Jun 25, 2023, 2:37:50 PM

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. watches a military free-fall capability demonstration during the 61st anniversary of the Philippine Army’s Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) held in Fort Magsaysay.

Metro Manila (CNN Philippines, June 25) — President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. lauded the "unconventional warfare strategies" of the Philippine Army’s Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) or SFR(A), saying these have become more relevant amid the “complex threats” faced by the country.

Marcos also pledged his “unassailable commitment” to the SFR(A) during their 61st founding anniversary held in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija on Sunday.

"To the men and women of the Special Forces Regiment (Airborne), we are grateful to have witnessed the efforts that leverage your expertise and demonstrate the core principles in the performance of your duties. Your mastery of unconventional warfare strategies [becomes] all the more relevant and significant in view of the complex threats that our nation now faces," he said.

The president noted that the SFR(A) members have lived up to their moniker as "silent professionals."

"You have not only played a pivotal role in times of battle but have also become dependable sentinels for the Filipino people," the commander-in-chief said. "Through the responses for humanitarian assistance, you have created a ripple of hope in our communities, increased our people's trust in the military and in the government."

"We assure you of the administration's unassailable commitment and that of your commander-in-chief's support in all of your undertakings, strengthening your capabilities, and ensuring your welfare and that of your families," he added.

The president cited the adoption of the Riverine Operations Equipment Project to further improve the capabilities of the SFR(A).

He also called on the SRF(A) to continue helping Filipinos in times of crisis and "uphold the moral of the people” as they maintain their standing as "experts of unconventional warfare strategies."

During the event, Marcos recognized combat and civilian awardees, and watched a military free-fall capability demonstration and simulations of hostage situations.

Established in 1962, the SFRA was first spearheaded by then-captain and former President Fidel Ramos.

It is the first operational special forces unit with airborne capability, and one of the several units forming the Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Command.

cnnphilippines.com · by CNN Philippines Staff

20. Biden is turning the screw on Putin even as US denies role in Russia’s insurrection

Biden is turning the screw on Putin even as US denies role in Russia’s insurrection

Analysis by Stephen Collinson, CNN

Updated 2:35 AM EDT, Tue June 27, 2023

https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/27/politics/biden-putin-dilemma/

CNN —

Russia’s short-lived insurrection has handed Joe Biden the most perilous version yet of a dilemma that has confounded the last five US presidents: how to handle Vladimir Putin.

Every US commander in chief since Bill Clinton has sought in some way to engage the former KGB officer, whose mission to restore Russian greatness was ignited by his humiliation at the fall of the former Soviet Union. Most have sought some kind of reset of US-Russia relations. But all failed to avert the plunge in ties between the two nuclear superpowers.

Ex-President George W. Bush looked into Putin’s eyes and got “a sense” of his soul, only for Putin to invade Georgia on his watch. Barack Obama initially saw the Russian leader as a partner in a drive to end the threat of nuclear Armageddon. That didn’t stop Putin from annexing Crimea in 2014. And Donald Trump adopted a fawning approach to an autocrat and US foe he often seemed to want to emulate more than condemn.

US gathered detailed intelligence on Wagner chief's rebellion plans but kept it secret from most allies

Biden, who came of age in Washington as a senator during some of the most embittered years of the US-Soviet standoff in the 1970s and 1980s, had fewer illusions about Putin than most. But even he tried to break the chill, by meeting his counterpart at a summit in Geneva in 2021.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, led him instead to reinvigorate the NATO alliance with an extraordinary pipeline of arms and ammunition designed to ensure the country’s survival. Western support has not only enabled Ukraine to fight back against invading forces, it has helped turn the war into a quagmire that spiked political pressure on Putin and created battlefield conditions that likely helped lead to mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s revolt over the weekend.

Putin appeared on camera on Monday, defiantly warning that he would have had no trouble suppressing the uprising had the Wagner Group leader not chosen to halt his march on Moscow in a deal that ostensibly will see him exiled to Belarus.

Video Ad Feedback

Putin speaks out after Wagner revolt

04:55 - Source: CNN

But there was widespread agreement outside Russia that the showdown represented the most serious challenge to Putin’s grip on power during his generation in control and could even be a crack that spells the beginning of the end of his authority.

So Biden, therefore, faces a possibility that none of the predecessors who wrestled with Putin had to contemplate – that he is dealing with the endgame of this modern czar, and the prospect of instability rocking a nuclear superpower that could have global implications.

Avoiding escalation

During the chaos that engulfed Russia this weekend, the US and its allies made clear that the eventually aborted showdown between Putin and Prigozhin was an internal Russian affair. After Moscow opened a propaganda front on Monday by claiming it was probing whether Western intelligence was involved in the coup attempt, Biden went out of his way to dismiss the idea, discussing how he had consulted with Western leaders on the right approach.

“They agreed with me that we had to make sure we gave Putin no excuse. Let me emphasize, we gave Putin no excuse to blame this on the West or to blame this on NATO. We made clear that we were not involved. We had nothing to do with it,” the president told reporters.

Biden says the US and its allies had nothing to do with Wagner Group's rebellion against Russia

CNN reported Monday that the US had warning of Prigozhin’s intentions in advance, but only shared it with select senior officials and allies, including the British. The revelation appeared to be the latest indication that the US is getting high-grade, accurate intelligence from inside Russia, as it appears to have done for the last year. This in itself must be deeply irksome to Putin and may deepen his bunker mentality.

Biden’s comments, meanwhile, also reflected the odd dichotomy of his strategy toward Putin. While sending Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky billions of dollars in arms and ammunition to fight for his country’s survival, Biden has simultaneously insisted that the US is not involved in a showdown with Russia, doing everything he can to avoid a direct clash between NATO and Russian forces that could risk a world war-style escalation.

But the red lines have been constantly expanding. The stocks of ammunition, heavy artillery, Patriot anti-missile missiles and tanks that have been flowing into Ukraine would have been considered unthinkable when Putin ordered his troops over the border last February.

Still, Biden’s insistence that there was no US involvement in the weekend rebellion is almost certainly a statement of fact. The US has no dog in a fight between a warlord like Prigozhin, whose guns for hire are accused of a catalog of atrocities in Ukraine and Syria, and a Russian leader who is the subject of an arrest warrant for war crimes.

Moscow’s claims that the West was complicit in the uprising come across as a diversion from splits threatening to erode Putin’s rule. They appear designed to convince Russians to unite against an outside enemy. Putin has repeatedly styled the war in Ukraine as a struggle against what he sees as a Western effort to deny Russia its rightful status as a global power. This is a distraction from the fact he sent his troops into Ukraine in contravention of international law, sparking a conflict that has exposed the supposedly mighty Russian army as poorly led and equipped – a shell of the Red Army that upheld the Soviet Empire.

An evolving Western response

While the US and its allies took care not to show triumphalism while Prigozhin’s rebellion was taking place, Western governments are now seeking to capitalize on it politically, as they try to build pressure on Putin inside Russia.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken argued on America’s Sunday talk shows that while the US was not involved in the rebellion, it showed cracks in Putin’s power. This was a refrain taken up in Europe on Monday.

“Prigozhin’s rebellion is an unprecedented challenge to President Putin’s authority, and it is clear that cracks are emerging in the Russian support for the war,” British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly said. European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell adopted a similar line, after several days of consultation between top officials in the Western alliance. He said events show Russia’s military power “is cracking,” adding that the instability is also “affecting [Russia’s] political system.”

Why Prigozhin's short-lived Russian rebellion failed

Some experienced American observers have warned that it is far too soon to write Putin off.

“This struck me as a desperation by Prigozhin to somehow keep the Wagner Group in operation. I don’t see it as a populist threat to Putin, I don’t see it as cracking the aura of Putin’s invincibility,” former Trump national security adviser John Bolton told CNN Monday, though he did allow that Putin’s military position is “undeniably” weakened.

Putin has shown no sign that outside heat from Moscow’s foes will force him to retreat and bring his troops home. Indeed, his position may be so vulnerable that doing so without gains he could pass off publicly as a victory could pose an existential threat to his leadership. This explains why thousands of Russian troops have been sent into a “meat grinder” of a conflict, as Prigozhin called the battle in Bakhmut, that has shattered Russian prestige and worsened its strategic position in Europe.

But with the war going poorly in Ukraine, Putin is now facing a new political front at home after his personality cult of an all-powerful autocrat impervious to challenge was punctured by Prigozhin.

Unless the Russian leader can reestablish his authority, Biden may end up being the first 21st century American president who ends up outmaneuvering the strongman in the Kremlin.

21. Palau under CCP pressure to switch recognition from Taiwan to China

Palau under CCP pressure to switch recognition from Taiwan to China - The Sunday Guardian Live

sundayguardianlive.com · by CLEO PASKAL · June 24, 2023

The President of Palau, Surangel Whipps Jr., speaks to

The Sunday Guardian on what his Pacific Island Country is facing.

Koror, Palau

The United States has exceptionally close defence and security relationships with three countries—closer than it has with any others. And they aren’t the ones you think.

Through the Compacts of Free Association (COFAs), the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)—together known as the Freely Associated States (FAS) have voluntarily granted the United States uniquely extensive defence and security access in their sovereign territories.

In the words of the Compacts: “The Government of the United States has full authority and responsibility for security and defence matters in or relating to the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia [and Palau].”

That includes the right to base and to deny entry to the FAS by someone else’s military. This “strategic denial” has happened at least once, in 2019.

Apart from defence and security provisions, the COFAs also give citizens of the FAS the right to work in the United States, to serve in the US military and they provide financial support and services (such as the postal service) to the government and people of the FAS.

The FAS extend over an enormous swath of the central Pacific Ocean. Combined, their maritime exclusive economic zones cover an area of the Pacific comparable in size to the continental United States. The relationship with the FAS is what allows the US military largely unimpeded deployment from Hawaii to Guam (and through Guam and the Marianas to treaty ally Japan).

Two of the three FAS also recognize Taiwan—by not having Chinese embassies on their soil, that gives them another layer of protection from Chinese influence operations, while standing for a free and open Indo-Pacific in one of the most politically courageously ways possible.

All of this combines to make the FAS three of the biggest targets of Beijing.

China is using a wide range of levers to try to get the two that recognize Taiwan to flip, and to weaken support for the US in all three.

Take what’s happened in Palau, one of the two that recognizes Taiwan. Beijing first worked to build up Palau’s dependence on Chinese tourism. In 2008, there were 634 Chinese tourists in Palau, less than 1% of all tourists. By 2015, it was more than 91,000, or around 54%.

Then, in 2017, China pulled the plug, making it clear that, unless Palau switched from Taiwan to China, the tourists wouldn’t come back.

This devastated the economy and left empty and crumbling Chinese-leased real estate and developments across the country—a formidable display of entropic warfare.

Palau, however, stood firm. But it was not easy, especially after Covid added a second hit, hitting the service sector hard. Now, the Chinese are inching back in, perhaps in preparation to gain influence before next year’s elections. Recently, chartered flights from Macau have started up again. And previously empty and decrepit Chinese-leased properties are being fixed up. The President of Palau, Surangel Whipps Jr., agreed to be interviewed for this edition of “Indo-Pacific: Beyond the Headlines”, to describe a bit of what’s going on in Palau now.

Q: What are Palau’s greatest challenges?

A: Our biggest challenges are trying to build a diversified, resilient economy, combat[ing] climate change, and combat[ing] the influence of [the] Chinese in Palau.

Our economy was devastated by Covid. Tourism isn’t back. We are at 30% of pre-Covid numbers.

One of our main challenges is direct investment. The largest direct investor in Palau is still China. It’s a challenge to try to not open up direct flights from China back to Palau. We have pressure to open up direct flights to Macau and Hong Kong from Cambodian carriers.

Q: What options are you exploring?

A: We need more direct flights. I’ve met one-on-one with Prime Minister Kishida twice, including last week. Japan might start direct flight towards the end of the year, but that’s a long way away. Right now, there are two flights a week from Taiwan, they are full. They can’t increase.

I’ve also just been to Korea trying to get Koreans to start direct flights because Korea is about five hours away. Korean tourists are among the top tourists going to Guam. One airline was interested in Palau but they said the runway wasn’t quite long enough for the large aircraft. It means a 30% penalty in cost—it’ll cost 30% more than flying to Guam. That makes Palau less interesting.

Meanwhile, for several years, the US government said our runway wasn’t quite long enough for F-35s.

We proposed a solution to the United States, and to Australia, Taiwan, Japan, Korea—help us extend the runway to 3,000m from 2,100m. It would help in deterrence. We believe peace comes through strength, but a strong a resilient economy also provides deterrence.

That’s the sort of area where there is a synergy, where we can do what’s good for defence and for the economy. It’s an opportunity where maybe we can encourage investment from others in the region, other investment instead of China.

We really need to work with others in the region to encourage investment. We need partnerships. This year finally for [the] first time Japanese investment in tourism will surpass everyone else—there is a new Japanese hotel being built. We want to see US investment here—a US hotel. We are really trying to bring others here. Japan is slow, Korea is slow, Taiwan is slow—China is saying “give us more flights”. It’s hard to say we won’t accept them because hotels are empty, boats are empty.

Q: Another concern is that, if not handled by others, environmental crises could be opportunities for China to act. We’ve seen the PRC use humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as a reason to deploy and embed. What is the situation in Palau?

A: FEMA accessibility is really important to Palau. It’s Russian roulette out here. Look at what just happened to Guam. Those systems move up to Guam, down to Yap, down to Palau. If something happens, it [is] a matter of who’s closest to our door. Who’s fastest to respond? When that disaster happens, who will jump out to say “here we are to help you”? The last typhoon, we got more assistance from the Federated States of Micronesia than the United States.

Q: People from Palau serve in the US military in large numbers. Properly organized, perhaps as a variation on reserves but answerable to the Palau government, could they serve as bridges to US responders? How are they treated by the US Veterans Administration?

A: There has been some traction on addressing the needs of veterans, but they really need it to be enacted. Why [do] veterans…in Philippines and Canada receive more benefits than…ones in the FAS?

We want them to retire back in the islands—wouldn’t it be wonderful if they return to Palau and receive full benefits in Palau? Then they can be comfortable while contributing to the economy and security of Palau. It [is] an economically small thing for the US but huge when it comes to improving the lives and security in Palau. Something like 5% of graduating high school students join the US military. We are happy to let them come and recruit, but when they are done, please take care of them. Please don’t forget them.

That means being able to see a local doctor here and get the care they need. There are rules that make it difficult, like to get counselling online you need to be on US soil. Also, many have to pay for [their] own tickets to get to Guam for assessment. The United [Airlines] flight to Guam is, per mile, among [the] most expensive in world. In the last years, two veterans have taken their lives in Palau.

Q: How was the FIPIC meeting in Papua New Guinea with Prime Minister Narendra Modi

A: Really good—well organized. Many interesting proposals. India is offering some things that Palau could really use, including support for people with disabilities. We would also like to see some Indian weddings as well.

Cleo Paskal is a non-resident senior fellow for the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

sundayguardianlive.com · by CLEO PASKAL · June 24, 2023

22. Opinion | What happened in Russia — and what happens next? Our columnists weigh in.

Opinion | What happened in Russia — and what happens next? Our columnists weigh in.

The Washington Post · by Washington Post Staff · June 27, 2023

A remarkable series of events in Russia kept the world on edge this weekend. Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the leader of the mercenary Wagner Group, took over a regional capital on Saturday and sent a column of soldiers to Moscow in what looked like a coup in the making. Then, just as suddenly as it began, Prigozhin called it all off on Saturday night, sending his forces back to their barracks. He had seemingly struck a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin — a deal that entailed broad amnesty for himself and his fellow mutineers, and that will supposedly see his organization integrated into the Russian army.

What does it all mean? And what’s next for Russia — and by extension, Ukraine? We asked our columnists to weigh in.

David Von Drehle: Even failed coups have consequences

They say a bird that walks and quacks like a duck is probably a duck. Events in Russia that looked like a military coup, and were initially interpreted as a coup by Putin, were probably an attempted coup — until the coup fell apart.

Which coups typically do. In an exhaustive study of coup attempts from 1950 to 2000, scholar Naunihal Singh identified the central challenge for all coup planners. Detailed planning for the attempted overthrow of an authoritarian government is too dangerous. Dictators — such as Putin — organize their entire governments around ferreting out such plans and crushing them. A coup attempt must begin, therefore, with a bold move by a small group, with hopes others will join in. There is no plan, Singh wrote, only hopes and beliefs. “Each individual’s choices are based on his or her beliefs about the likely actions of others.”

As Prigozhin motored up the highway toward Moscow on Saturday, he surely had a sinking feeling. The uprising he apparently hoped to inspire inside the Russian Ministry of Defense was neither up nor rising. Like coup planners in Turkey in 2016 and Venezuela in 2020, Prigozhin issued an invitation to a spontaneous overthrow of the government, but no one showed up.

The wild card in this case was the government’s reaction. Putin evidently had no more confidence than Prigozhin as to the outcome of the clash. Rather than test the loyalty and strength of government forces to crush the uprising, the Russian leader grabbed the first exit he was offered — a sign of weakness that might invite another attempt.

There’s good news and bad news in this. The good news is that Russia’s reckless leaders are not suicidal, which is a welcome quality in a nuclear power. The bad news: A weakened Russia has weakened leaders and is spinning out of control. Putin has taken his country into a disaster, and there is no one in sight to save it.

Max Boot: Prigozhin has made Putin’s weakness clear to everyone

The past few days have been the most tumultuous in Russia’s history since the constitutional crisis in October 1993 when Boris Yeltsin ordered the army to shell the parliament to stop an attempt to oust him. Yeltsin held on to power, but he could never quite claim the same degree of legitimacy again, and within six years, he was gone from office. His handpicked successor, Putin, has now had his own legitimacy undermined by the revolt of Prigozhin and his Wagner Group mercenaries. Whether the damage is fatal remains to be determined.

Putin did not — perhaps could not — mobilize the Russian armed forces to crush the Wagner uprising. Indeed, aside from a few Russian Air Force pilots, the regular military were bystanders even as Prigozhin and his mercenaries seized the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don and headed for the capital. Ordinary people in Rostov cheered the Wagner forces on, showing how little love they have for the man who has ruled their nation with an iron fist for more than two decades. Putin suffered the humiliation of relying on the diplomatic help of his sidekick, President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, to avert the kind of street fighting that Moscow last saw in 1993.

Putin will no doubt try to reassert control now. He might well undertake a purge of the government and exact a grim revenge against Prigozhin and his supporters. The Wagner boss would be well-advised to hire a teataster and stay away from open windows.

Putin could ultimately emerge at the head of an even stronger dictatorship that launches a Stalinist mobilization to fight Ukraine. Alternatively, his display of weakness might embolden other challengers to the throne from his own inner circle because his mystique of control has been shattered. At this point, we just don’t know what the repercussions will be for Russian politics.

So, too, the fate of the Wagner Group remains unclear. Its fighters might finally have to sign contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry — a demand, first made on June 10, that might have precipitated Prigozhin’s uprising. But disbanding the Wagner Group will lead to a loss of military effectiveness, because it has been one of the few units that have fought with some degree of success in Ukraine (albeit at a staggering cost). At the very least, the infighting in the Kremlin is a distraction for Russian generals who need to concentrate on stopping the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Whatever happens to Prigozhin next, he has clearly struck a chord with his blistering denunciations of the corruption and incompetence that characterize the Putin regime. A petty criminal turned war criminal, Prigozhin is an expert rabble-rouser who has been able to tap into popular dissatisfaction with the Kremlin more effectively than any liberal critic. Even if Prigozhin is gone, the discontent he has revealed will remain an Achilles’ heel for Putin.

David Ignatius: After dodging the bullet, Putin will need to show he’s in control

The mystery of this story is what Prigozhin expected would happen in his march on Moscow. The Wagner militia leader was so talkative about his plans that U.S. intelligence officers learned of the plot last week. Prigozhin believed he had support. That’s what must haunt Putin now. How far did this conspiracy go?

Prigozhin gave some hints about how his support rose — and then collapsed — in his videotaped statement Monday. Bragging of his race toward Moscow on Saturday, he said that as he approached the capital, “all of the military facilities along the route were blocked and neutralized. … All military personnel who saw us during the march supported us.”

Then what happened? When he was less than 200 kilometers away, he “conducted reconnaissance of the area, and it was evident that a lot of blood would be shed if we continued.”

What that tells us is that Priogzhin realized the military and security backing he had expected in his “march of justice” had vanished. Moving forward would have meant slaughter for his forces. So, he reversed course — and made an amnesty deal for himself and his forces through his friend Lukashenko.

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA station chief in Moscow, argues that Prigozhin “surrendered when he realized that the cavalry wasn’t going to arrive.” Prigozhin’s forces were cheered when they seized Russian command headquarters in Rostov-on-Don early Saturday — not surprisingly, as they have been the bravest and most successful Russian fighters in Ukraine. But by the time he neared Moscow, Putin had broken the back of his rebellion.

Now, the inquisition begins. Mowatt-Larssen explains: “Putin has to learn every detail of how far and deep this plot reached in the military and special services. This was in the works for at least a couple of weeks. Who was Prigozhin talking to? Who promised their support? Who switched sides in the heat of the moment?”

Prigozhin is arrogant, but he’s no fool. He tried Monday to reassure Putin that he had no intention “to overthrow the government.” And he dressed up last weekend’s armed assault as a “fight against bureaucracy and other ailments that exist in our country today.” But he must understand that he will survive only at Putin’s sufferance. He shot at the king and missed.

Putin’s vulnerabilities were vividly on display last weekend, but so were his uncanny survival skills. He got inside Prigozhin’s conspiratorial plot and stopped it. The Russian leader is a mysterious figure, far more so than the cartoon versions sketched by his enemies. He is Shakespeare’s Macbeth, a villain whose hands drip with the blood of his victims. But he’s also Hamlet, the vain, self-absorbed prince who delayed taking action against his enemies until it was nearly too late.

Putin will need to show that he’s in command now, after this near-death experience. That’s the bad news for Ukraine and Russia both.

Eugene Robinson: Putin is likely to survive this crisis

I wouldn’t count Putin out just yet. This weekend’s armed rebellion might be the toughest challenge he has faced in his two-plus decades as Russia’s modern-day czar, but he looks likely to survive, at least for now. And he still gets to control his own fate.

The revolt by the mercenary butcher Prigozhin did reveal Putin’s regime to be more brittle than it had appeared from afar. But in the end, Prigozhin was the one who blinked. If Russian soldiers and citizens had rallied to his cause and joined him as his convoy rolled toward Moscow, perhaps he wouldn’t have turned back. But his hardened mercenaries — Prigozhin claims his Wagner forces number 25,000; British intelligence reportedly puts the number closer to 8,000 — would have been met by a bigger force, including Chechen soldiers with the mission to kill first and ask questions later.

Prigozhin announced to not just the broader world but also, critically, the Russian people the inconvenient truth about Putin’s meat-grinder of a war in Ukraine: that Kyiv posed no threat to Russia, making this a war not of necessity but of choice. The Wagner Group warlord who rose to prominence as “Putin’s Chef” has the makings of a folk hero but not the subtlety and cunning of a Russian leader. Imagine a scenario in which he somehow toppled Putin. Prigozhin, a very bad man, has called for Russia to become more of a totalitarian state like North Korea — hardly a development that the Russian people, or the international community, would welcome.

Prigozhin, who surfaced in a video on Monday, claims his Wagner forces will operate from Belarus. Here are some facts not to be forgotten: The Russian military establishment Prigozhin tried to topple is still intact, at least for now. The future of his Wagner Group, the source of his money and power, remains up in the air. And wherever he ends up, Prigozhin will always have to worry about the bad luck that seems to mysteriously befall so many of Putin’s enemies — they tend to fall out of high windows or suddenly become desperately ill from exotic poisons.

Putin, meanwhile, can portray his decision to grant the rebels amnesty as an act of generosity, not a sign of weakness.

In brief remarks Monday, Putin said the “armed rebellion would have been suppressed.” Perhaps Putin will strike out at some civilian target in Ukraine to demonstrate that he is still large and in charge. But perhaps not. Maybe he will continue the same grinding war of attrition he has been fighting for the better part of a year, not really trying to take more Ukrainian territory but fiercely defending what he has already seized. Ukraine’s brave forces are encountering defensive emplacements — trenches and minefields — that are no easier to overrun today than they were last week.

If there are mutinies in the regular army or if Russian public opinion turns decisively against the war, Putin will have to make adjustments. But he’s still in the driver’s seat. Prigozhin tried, but failed, to dislodge him.

Charles Lane: Prigozhin is the only Russian to publicly speak the truth

Much remains to be learned about the mutiny against Putin’s regime by the Wagner Group leader Prigozhin. But we know Prigozhin did one thing that might threaten the Russian regime long after his uprising ended: He told the truth.

In a 30-minute interview on Friday, Prigozhin debunked every rationale Putin has given for his aggression against Ukraine. “The armed forces of Ukraine were not going to attack Russia with the NATO bloc,” he said. (Note that this rebuts, albeit implicitly, those in the United States and Europe who accuse the West of provoking Putin.)

Also, he said, the invasion “was not needed to return our Russian citizens and not to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine.” Rather, the war — Prigozhin used that forbidden word, not the official euphemism, “special military operation” — was a corrupt venture that “oligarchs” launched. “They were stealing loads in Donbas, they wanted more.”

Prigozhin has not only called out the lies and errors of Russia’s leadership but also praised the conduct of the other side. In a June 5 video, he unfavorably contrasted Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s deskbound ways with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s willingness to visit front-line units. Prigozhin even acknowledged that most civilians living under Russian occupation in southeastern Ukraine will support the Ukrainian army if it breaks through Russian lines.

These words cannot be unsaid. They cannot be unheard.

To be sure, the man who uttered them is anything but an unimpeachable witness, considering his involvement in the Putin regime’s violence and deceit. Monday, he disavowed any intent to topple Putin. No one should imagine that Prigozhin’s outspoken criticism implies that he wants to end the war.

And yet his outbursts have credibility because they represent an insider view that corresponds to the reality that ordinary Russians see all around them.

For those Russians, it must have been exhilarating to hear someone, anyone, even a notorious thug such as Prigozhin, say what so many of them are thinking. Perhaps this helps explain why Russians’ online searches for his name outnumbered those for “Vladimir Putin” in the weeks leading up to his mutiny, according to Verstka, an independent Russian media outfit, or why the people of Rostov-on-Don, the front-line city 60 miles from Ukraine, turned out to welcome him and his Wagner troops.

In 1978, at a time when communist ideology seemed dominant in Czechoslovakia, the dissident playwright Vaclav Havel insisted that truth still exercised a mysterious, but latent, power.

It can unexpectedly “issue forth … in something visible: a real political act or event, a social movement, a sudden explosion of civil unrest, a sharp conflict inside an apparently monolithic power structure, or simply an irrepressible transformation in the social and intellectual climate,” Havel wrote. “And since all genuine problems and matters of critical importance are hidden beneath a thick crust of lies, it is never quite clear when the proverbial last straw will fall, or what that straw will be.”

Spy, oligarch, warlord — Prigozhin was an unlikely candidate to confirm Havel’s prophecy. But in a way, he did.

Jason Willick: Chances for escalation in Ukraine have gone up

As the weekend events in Russia illustrate, no one can predict the course of intra-Russian power struggles. But I do think it’s possible to draw one conclusion about the war in Ukraine: The Prigozhin mutiny increases the incentives for escalation on all sides.

First, the West. The mutiny took place a few weeks into Ukraine’s highly anticipated counteroffensive. In the days before the mutiny, we were starting to see signs of disappointment in the counteroffensive’s early progress. Russian lines appeared to be holding; Ukrainian assaults largely hadn’t broken through.

If that sense of stalemate had persisted, Western pressure on Ukraine to reach at least a temporary settlement with Russia would have built. The mutiny will give Ukraine more running room. For the West, Prigozhin’s abandoned revolt is evidence of the brittleness of Putin’s regime. It shows that sustaining the war is putting pressure on the Kremlin in visible and invisible ways, even if the lines of territorial control in Ukraine remain roughly the same. U.S. and other NATO leaders arguing for greater military investment in Ukraine will now win arguments they might otherwise have lost.

I would also expect Russia to double down on its commitment to the war. Failed revolts tend to increase repression, and this could push Russia further down the road to totalitarianism. Some observers might be overstating Putin’s weakness — he did suppress the mutiny quickly, after all — but the spectacle has clearly dented his image of control. The viability of his regime is now even more tightly bound up with its war in Ukraine — and his appetite for risk could grow.

It’s going to be a long war. And it might get worse before it gets better.

Josh Rogin: Prigozhin’s failed gambit is an opportunity for the West

The ultimate fate of the Wagner Group and its founder Prigozhin is still unknown. What’s clear is that Wagner is in disarray. The Russian Defense Ministry is reportedly set to absorb Wagner fighters in Ukraine into its command structure. Prigozhin is (allegedly) headed to exile in Belarus.

That doesn’t settle the question of what will happen with Wagner’s myriad military and industrial operations in places such as Syria, the Central African Republic, Mali, Libya, Sudan and Venezuela, to name just a few. For years, Prigozhin’s mercenaries have been acting as semi-deniable agents of the Kremlin around the world, committing atrocities while fomenting instability and corruption along the way.

The current chaos provides the best chance yet for the United States and Europe to get their act together and do what should have been done years ago — shut down Wagner’s international network of armed intervention and crime. With Prigozhin seemingly sidelined and his commanders around the world scattered and confused, his company is vulnerable like never before.

For years, Wagner has used its network of shell companies, its army of international lawyers and financiers, and its purported autonomy from the Russian state to avoid accountability for its crimes, said Candace Rondeaux, senior director for the Future Frontlines program at New America and professor with the Center on the Future of War at Arizona State University.

“Three U.S. presidents have failed to fully comprehend this threat and come up with a plan to address it comprehensively,” she told me. “But now the jig is up when it comes to sanctions circumvention for Wagner. Everyone smells blood in the water.”

Although Wagner was first placed under sanctions in 2017 for its actions in Ukraine, only this year did the U.S. Treasury Department recognize its worldwide reach by designating it as a “transnational criminal organization.” In May, the federal government imposed sanctions on Wagner’s top commander in Mali, which has become a hub for Wagner’s efforts to funnel weapons into Ukraine, as well as some of Wagner’s international enablers. Several other Western countries have followed suit.

Prigozhin was known to demand payment from Wagner’s African mining interests and other shady businesses in gold, diamonds and commodities such as oil and gas. The reason: fear of sanctions. But there’s a lot more that can and should be done. Bipartisan legislation pending in Congress called the Harm (Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries) Act would seek to compel the Biden administration to designate Wagner as a “foreign terrorist organization.” That’s just one idea.

Now that the Kremlin can no longer pretend Wagner is a separate entity, Russian government and defense officials must also be held accountable for Wagner’s worldwide crimes, which include credible allegations of mass murder, torture, rape and other atrocities. Wagner is down but not out. It’s time to put this criminal organization out of business once and for all.

Megan McArdle: Turmoil in Russia shows the fragility of illiberalism

I don’t know what the events of this past weekend mean for Russia. But I have been thinking a lot about the message they should send to the rest of us about the dangers of illiberalism.

Even in America, a beacon of liberal values for over two centuries, commitment to liberalism waxes and wanes. Recently, it has been waning on both ends of the political spectrum. In its zeal to protect minorities, a significant fraction of the left has abandoned free speech and religious liberty in favor of speech codes, “disinformation” crackdowns and cancel culture. Meanwhile, as people on the right have grown more alarmed by critical race theory and gender ideology, some have embraced the idea that only a strongman such as Donald Trump — or Hungary’s Viktor Orban or, yes, Putin — can hold back the Rainbow Horde.

Readers will have strong opinions about the moral differences between these two positions. Logically, though, both sides make the same argument: Our opponents are dangerously wrong, maybe existentially wrong, and must be stopped. At this critical historical juncture, we cannot afford dissent or procedural niceties. They must be drummed from the public square, their views must be made anathema, and any institutions they control must be discredited or destroyed.

What happened in Russia over the weekend illustrates just why this way of thinking is so flawed. Illiberal regimes are not merely unpleasantly oppressive; they are at constant risk of catastrophic failure.

Energetic suppression of dissent creates apparent harmony, but this is an expensive fake. Fake because, as the aphorism goes, “one convinced against their will is of the same opinion still.” Expensive because it becomes impossible to know what people believe; if you ask them, they will simply parrot the officially approved answer.

Initially, this might work, because no one knows which parrots actually believe the party line, and this makes it hard for any opposition to organize. But if the opposition grows to become a secret majority, the country becomes vulnerable to a sudden preference cascade: Ffolks realize that their neighbors agree with them, and the official narrative collapses.

Nominally, Putin controls a massive army, a substantial police force and a population that returned him to office in 2018 with a resounding 77 percent of the vote. But when push came to shove, those same folks were indifferent between him and a murderous warlord — or, at least, didn’t care enough about the distinction to risk getting shot. Putin survived, but the risk to his regime has risen now that it is clear how little actual support he has.

Dictators understand this problem, which is why their regimes tend to get worse over time: The more thoroughly you suppress dissent, the greater the risk that even a tiny expression of defiance will trigger a preference cascade.

The inherent fragility of authoritarianism does not mean liberalism is destined to always win out; this is a dangerous delusion that, in the years after the Berlin Wall fell, helped lay the groundwork for Putin and his ilk. Liberal institutions, and the social trust that undergirds them, are hard to build from scratch, so when one authoritarian regime is torn down, it is easily replaced by another.

Which is precisely why it is folly for liberal societies to flirt with illiberalism: Even a temporary resort to repression is apt to be permanently catastrophic for everyone.

The Washington Post · by Washington Post Staff · June 27, 2023

23. 10th SFG(A) Trains With Swedish Home Guard | SOF News

10th SFG(A) Trains With Swedish Home Guard | SOF News

sof.news · by Guest · June 27, 2023

By Anthony Bryant.

KALIX, Sweden – A U.S. Army Special Forces team assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) acted as both Observer Coach Trainers and opposition forces for the Swedish Armed Forces Home Guard in Swedish Lapland from May 28 – June 2, 2023, to strengthen Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities and enhance partner force readiness.

“My role at the beginning of the exercise was to work with, observe and offer any help I could with company-level training,” said a Special Forces medical sergeant with 1st Battalion, 10th SFG (A). “First, we established a baseline of the capabilities of our partner force …And then we’d offer ways we’d tweak things or ways to make their (tactics, techniques and procedures) a bit more compatible with ours so that we could work together.”

Midway through the exercise, U.S. and Swedish Forces shifted from shooting ranges and combat drills to the scenario where Green Berets trained a simulated guerilla force composed of soldiers from a sister battalion to take on the Home Guard.

“The aircraft we were flying in went down and we landed somewhere we didn’t plan to and made a link-up with our partner force,” said the medical sergeant. “We eventually met up with the rest of our team, minus one [teammate]. We then conducted a hasty personnel recovery mission based on some limited intelligence we got in the scenario.”

Over the next few days, the Special Forces team conducted mission planning alongside their partner force to perform actions that would degrade, disrupt or destroy Home Guard capabilities.

“The scenario gave us time to almost completely rehearse what we’d be doing in irregular warfare – conducting a link-up with a force we didn’t know too much about; working through assessments, hitting a few targets to see what their capabilities are, what we have to work with and what direction we need to go,” said the Special Forces team sergeant. “What it really did was give us the time over five days to work through a very surface-level unconventional warfare campaign.”

The Department of Defense defines unconventional warfare as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

“There was one mission where we conducted a recon on one of the Home Guard positions,” said the medical sergeant. “We took the opportunity to discuss procedures for conducting that recon, and we walked through how we’d do it…to adapt to what the threat was.”

Unconventional warfare is a thinking man’s game, and you will be thrown into scenarios where you have to make quick decisions that have strategic outcomes, the team sergeant said. The team took full advantage of the opportunity to train.

**********

This story by Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant was first published by the U.S. Army on June 22, 2023. DoD content is in the public domain.

Top photo: A U.S. Army Special Forces medical sergeant assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) instructs Soldiers with the Swedish Armed Forces Home Guard on combat tourniquet application in Kalix, Sweden, May 28, 2023. Photo by Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant.

sof.news · by Guest · June 27, 2023

24.The KGB, Sun Tzu and the Art of War

Conclusion:

Today the KGB’s covert active measures are being deployed in Putin’s war in Ukraine. But the role of Russia’s intelligence agencies, operating as a clandestine branch of government, shines a light not just on its foreign policy. The nature of these operations also reveals the way in which Russia’s political elite regards itself and its role in the world. The FSB operates like a private army for Putin as a means for preserving his power, but it is characterised by brutality and deception. The legacy of the KGB lives on.

The KGB, Sun Tzu and the Art of War

theneweuropean.co.uk · by Mark Hollingsworth · June 24, 2023

“Political warfare has returned,” declared General Sir Nick Carter, Britain’s chief of defence staff, during a lecture in 2019. Missiles, ammunition, and tanks still matter, he told his military audience, but authoritarian states such as Russia increasingly undermine the West using disinformation, cyber-attacks and agents of influence. And the West has under-rated or misunderstood this threat to its cost.

At the outset of the Cold War, the diplomat George Kennan pointed out that Americans view war “as a sort of sporting contest outside of all political context”, while the Russians grasp “the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war”. For Russia and Putin, war is the continuation of politics by other means.

In the new Cold War, technology has enhanced the effectiveness of organised deception, so that its incarnations are more sinister and pernicious. Waves of trolls and bots promoting pro-Kremlin hashtags during the Ukraine invasion have been unleashed with a speed and magnitude that was impossible before the internet. But their underlying purpose, as tools of disinformation, remains the same as the Cold War. The historical parallels are chilling.

The favourite author of many KGB officers during the Cold War was not Tolstoy or Dostoevsky. Instead, it was the Chinese military strategist, Sun Tzu (544-496 BC). Best known for The Art of War, Sun Tzu argued that the most effective way to win a war was not on the battlefield but through influence operations and psychological tactics. “All warfare is deception,” he wrote. “Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable. When using our forces, we must seem inactive. When we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away. When far away, we must make him believe we are near.”

One of Sun Tzu’s most devoted admirers was a KGB officer called Yuri Bezmenov. Between 1965 and 1970 he worked ostensibly for Novosti press agency but in reality was an intelligence officer based in a secret unit called Political Publications. Bezmenov placed fake stories in foreign countries in order “to change the perception of reality of every American”, as he recalled.

The Cold War was fought through the hearts and minds of the combatants and Bezmenov’s task was to distort reality to such an extent that no-one could reach sensible conclusions to defend their country. For the committed KGB officer, Sun Tzu was his operational mentor.

“The highest art of warfare is not to fight at all but to subvert anything of value in your enemy’s country,” recalled Bezmenov. “These include moral and cultural traditions, religion and respect for leaders and authority. And so anything that puts white against black, old against young, the rich against poor works. As long as it disturbs their society and cuts the moral fibre of their nation, that’s good. And when everything in this country is subverted, disorientated, confused, demoralised and destabilised, then the crisis will come.”

For the KGB disinformation was a primary weapon in their armoury. Its purpose was to create chaos and fear in which nobody could be trusted. In The War of Nerves, Martin Sixsmith, a former BBC correspondent in Moscow, argues: “The aim of Soviet disinformation in the Cold War was to undermine the confidence of people in the West in the open nature of their ‘free’ society and in the probity of the men who ran it. Moscow sought out the potential weak points in a nation’s psyche, applying pressure, hoping to speed its degradation.

“The impact of fake news on the human mind is profound. The mind creates mental maps and finds it hard to redraw them once they are settled. Accepting the unreliability of a ‘fact’ on which others have subsequently been built throws the mind into intolerable doubt. Perversely, the more unlikely an assimilated ‘fact’ might seem, the harder it is to dislodge.”

For KGB officers, the deployment of disinformation was a top priority against the US, UK and NATO. “Only about 25 per cent of our time, money and manpower was spent on espionage,” recalled Bezmenov. “The other 75 per cent was a slow process focusing on what we called ideological subversion or active measures.”

This was confirmed by Ladislav Bittman, a former Czech intelligence officer who worked closely with the KGB. He said that every KGB officer was required to spend most of their time conjuring up ideas for “deliberately distorted information” which was secretly “leaked through a variety of channels in order to deceive and manipulate.”

The sponsorship of strategic deception can be traced back to Lenin who advocated underhand tactics by “various strategies, artifices (tricks), illegal methods, evasions and subterfuges.” In a memo to a Commissar, he wrote: “To tell the truth is a petty bourgeois habit whereas for us to lie is justified by our objectives.”

In 1947 a new disinformation unit was set up “to unmask the anti-Soviet activity of foreign circles, influence the public opinion of other countries and compromise anti-Soviet officials and public figures of foreign governments.” Its aim was to create “a carefully constructed false message leaked to an opponent’s communication system to deceive the decision-making elite or the public”, according to Ladislav Bittman. To succeed, “every disinformation message must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views because without a considerable degree of plausible, verifiable information, it is difficult to gain the victim’s confidence.”

The KGB believed the dissemination of disinformation would significantly alter the balance of power between the Soviet bloc and NATO. The priority was to discredit and destroy American institutions and to create rifts with its NATO allies. Practically every evil and misdeed in the world was attributed to the Americans: the CIA was accused of assassinating President Kennedy, attempting to murder Pope John Paul II and when the UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold died in a plane crash, the KGB fuelled rumours that American spies orchestrated the accident.

By the 1960s the dissemination of fake news focused on the under-developed, and newly independent nations. As Sixsmith argues: “Weak, disenfranchised individuals, or indeed nations, appear to be more likely to turn to conspiracy theories. It is comforting to be able to ascribe the troubles in their lives and the lack of control they have over their fate to a single outside factor that is not their responsibility and cannot be overcome by their own effort, relieving the individual of the usually unavailing effort of remedying them.”

Disinformation did not need to persuade people to believe that a conspiracy theory was true – merely to consider it. If there was enough fact to make it plausible, even if it was outlandish, this might be enough to convince them it was possible. Hence a feverish atmosphere could be created whereby the population was willing to believe the worst of its own government. Like a virus, lies spread often untraced, circulating further and faster and gaining traction every time they are repeated.

There were no limits and operatives were encouraged to implement increasingly outlandish plots. In the 1980s, even cynical intelligence veterans were uneasy when the KGB manufactured neo-Nazi propaganda in imitation of crude Western-style language and posted such pro-Nazi leaflets to the disaffected youth in West Germany. The KGB-written leaflets were accepted as authentic and caused outrage in the West, created needless fear and placed people’s lives in danger – all for the sake of trying to embarrass West Germany politically.

By 1985, the KGB’s annual budget for active measures was a staggering $3.63 billion, employing 15,000 people. It was a small army of which Sun Tzu would have been proud. And spreading disinformation was the priority. Hundreds of millions of dollars of KGB cash poured into covert political operations. Some of the funds went to front organisations and subsidies to foreign Communist Parties. But most was given to media outlets staffed by intelligence officers – TASS, Novosti, Pravda, and select foreign newspapers.

The renewal of the nuclear arms race was high up on the KGB target list of active measures. In one year alone the Soviet Union spent $200 million on “special campaigns” against NATO plans to deploy nuclear weapons in western Europe. As negotiations faltered and both sides promoted the instalment of nuclear missiles, the stakes were frighteningly high. But according to former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Tretyakov, the notion of a nuclear winter was a KGB’s disinformation operation. He claimed the KGB deliberately exaggerated the prospect of a nuclear war of mutual destruction to scare the west into reducing its nuclear arsenal, even at the risk of Armageddon.

Today the KGB’s covert active measures are being deployed in Putin’s war in Ukraine. But the role of Russia’s intelligence agencies, operating as a clandestine branch of government, shines a light not just on its foreign policy. The nature of these operations also reveals the way in which Russia’s political elite regards itself and its role in the world. The FSB operates like a private army for Putin as a means for preserving his power, but it is characterised by brutality and deception. The legacy of the KGB lives on.

Mark Hollingsworth is the author of Agents of Influence – How the KGB Subverted Western Democracies, published by Oneworld

theneweuropean.co.uk · by Mark Hollingsworth · June 24, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 26, 2023

Russia drops charges against Prigozhin and others who took part in brief rebellion

___

The Russian Mutiny Through a Chinese Lens

The Russian Mutiny Through a Chinese Lens

Russian mercenary chief Prigozhin is a 'dead man walking,' Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer says

Senate committee advances bill that may kill Army Combat Fitness Test

How this unit could shape the future of infantry battalions for decades

After mutiny, Putin says Wagner can go to Belarus, go home or fight for Russia

Cluster Munitions Are Biden’s Latest Slow-Roll on Ukraine Aid

Yes, they can put some civilians at risk—but that should be the Ukrainians’ call to make.

Washington Needs to Get Ready for Russian Chaos

A warlord marching on Moscow is just a foretaste of what might come. Here’s how to prepare.

Wagner Is Preparing to Hand Over Heavy Weapons, Russian Military Says

Moscow drops charges against mutineers as Belarus leader says there were ‘no heroes’ in the crisis

Top general could become first female head of the British Army

US Open to Expanding AUKUS

Concluding Remarks and Reflection

"The Wise Man Will Be Master of the Stars:" The Use of Twitter by the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Intelligence Disclosure as Strategy

Tweeting on the Russian invasion

Applying the concept of coercive disclosure

Concluding Remarks and Reflection

Related Posts

AI companies risk US national security by working with China. Time to choose sides

THE

TAO OF

DECEP

TION

PART I

1

2

3

4

China offers closer military cooperation with Vietnam

It’s Time to Bring Back Conventional Deterrence Patrols - War on the Rocks

Explainer: The China-U.S. military chill: do they talk at all?

WHAT IS THE SITUATION NOW?

HOW DEEP IS THE FREEZE?

WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE?

Army special forces' warfare strategies more relevant amid 'complex threats' faced by PH – Marcos

Biden is turning the screw on Putin even as US denies role in Russia’s insurrection

Avoiding escalation

An evolving Western response

Palau under CCP pressure to switch recognition from Taiwan to China - The Sunday Guardian Live

Opinion | What happened in Russia — and what happens next? Our columnists weigh in.

David Von Drehle: Even failed coups have consequences

Max Boot: Prigozhin has made Putin’s weakness clear to everyone

David Ignatius: After dodging the bullet, Putin will need to show he’s in control

Eugene Robinson: Putin is likely to survive this crisis

Charles Lane: Prigozhin is the only Russian to publicly speak the truth

Jason Willick: Chances for escalation in Ukraine have gone up

Josh Rogin: Prigozhin’s failed gambit is an opportunity for the West

Megan McArdle: Turmoil in Russia shows the fragility of illiberalism

10th SFG(A) Trains With Swedish Home Guard | SOF News

**********

The KGB, Sun Tzu and the Art of War