Quotes for the Day:

“The buying of more than one can read is nothing less than the soul reaching toward infinity…” 

- A. Edward Newton

"It is the duty of every man, as far as his ability extends, to detect and expose delusion and error." 

- Thomas Paine

"The basic tool for the manipulation of reality is the manipulation of words.  If you can control the meaning of words, you can control the people who must use the words." 

- Philip K. Dick

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 14, 2023

2. Clandestine Ukrainian unit claims successes against Russian forces in Bakhmut

3. Does Putin Have Any 'Red Lines' Left in Ukraine?

4. Taiwan and China Respond to Messenger Report on US Evacuation Planning in Taiwan

5. NATO races to design long-term package for Ukraine, differences remain

6. Russia hits industrial facilities in Ukraine's Kryvyi Rih - governor

7. Cyber Resilience Helps Democracies Prevail Against Authoritarian Disinformation Campaigns

8. Military pay overhaul could mean huge pay boosts for enlisted troops

9. How the Compacts of Free Association Support U.S. Interests and Counter the PRC’s Influence

10. U.S. and allies negotiating security guarantees for Ukraine

11. As Ukraine’s counteroffensive heats up, Washington holds its breath

12. Making the U.S.-Philippines Alliance Count

13. Fort Sill’s top general and fires school commander relieved

14. Army secretary concerned 'woke military' criticism could hurt the service

15. Details of Chinook Crash That Injured 22 Troops Corrected by Pentagon

16. US Rushes F-22s to Stop Russian Harassment Over Syria

17.  Snakes, Stamps, and Javelins: How Ukrainian Information and Influence Operations Brought the Fight to Russia

18. With War Next Door, Poland Wants More from NATO

19. Does Economic Deterrence Work? Understanding the West’s Assumptions About Keeping Russia in Check

20. How the war in Ukraine is impacting security in the Indo-Pacific

21. The Other Counteroffensive to Save Ukraine

22. What It Will Take to Deter China in the Taiwan Strait

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 14, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made gains on June 14.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a division of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) near Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast while they were waiting for the commander of the 20th CAA to give a speech, prompting typical discontent among milbloggers about Russian commanders.
• Russian sources disseminated conflicting reports about the condition of Russian Duma Deputy and Commander of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch, Adam Delimkhanov, on June 14. ISW has not observed any visual evidence to confirm or deny the contradictory claims about Delimkhanov’s condition.
• Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on June 14.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction and south of Kreminna.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and reportedly made gains in this area as of June 14.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 14.
• Satellite imagery suggests that Russian helicopters defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine are likely deployed to an airfield in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.
• A Russian State Duma bill aimed at raising the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin may be aiming to shield specific generations from the demographic and social impacts of the war in Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate economic control of occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 14, 2023

Jun 14, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 14, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

 June 14, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on June 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made gains on June 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 14 that Ukrainian troops have advanced between 200 to 500 meters in unspecified sectors of the Bakhmut front and 300 to 350 meters in unspecified parts of the Zaporizhia direction.[1] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing counterattacks on the northwestern, northeastern, and southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut.[2] Ukrainian and Russian sources additionally reported that fighting continued in western Donetsk Oblast, particularly around Makarivka (directly south of Velyka Novosilka), and in western Zaporizhia Oblast south of Orikhiv.[3] Russian milbloggers speculated that heavy rain and poor weather in southern Ukraine may have decreased the tempo of Ukrainian attacks, but Malyar emphasized that weather conditions do not always have an impact of Ukrainian offensive actions.[4] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Valery Shershen noted that Ukrainian forces in the Tavrisk (Zaporizhia) direction are prioritizing strikes on Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems, and ISW has previously assessed that Russian EW capabilities have been critical in complicating Ukrainian attacks on this sector of the front.[5] US Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh affirmed the United States’ commitment to partially replacing Ukrainian losses of the US-provided equipment used in counteroffensive operations but noted that there may not be a one-for-one replacement ratio.[6]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a division of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) near Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast while they were waiting for the commander of the 20th CAA to give a speech, prompting typical discontent among milbloggers about Russian commanders. ISW has observed both of the 20th CAA’s divisions, the 144th and 3rd Motorized Rifle Divisions, operating in the Kreminna area for the past several months and could not confirm which division was struck by the Ukrainian forces.[7] Russian sources claimed that the division waited two hours in one location while waiting for 20th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Sukhrab Akhmedov to arrive and deliver a speech before the division conducted offensive operations.[8]One milblogger suggested that the reported Ukrainian HIMARS strike killed around 100 Russian personnel and wounded another 100, although ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of the strike or its aftermath.[9]

Milbloggers rightfully criticized the poor decision to concentrate a large number of Russian forces within range of Ukrainian fire for such a long time and used the situation to reiterate longstanding critiques of ineffective Russian command.[10] The outrage is reminiscent of previous instances of notable irresponsible Russian military actions resulting in dramatic losses, particularly the December 31, 2022, Ukrainian strike on a large Russian force concentration in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast.[11] Russian milbloggers previously urged for Russian officials to hold the Russian military leadership accountable for the Makiivka strike, and milbloggers have routinely attempted to place the blame for large scale Russian military failures on individual commanders.[12] Milbloggers complained that Akhmedov and similar commanders continue to occupy key positions instead of being held accountable, a longstanding complaint that is indicative of widespread disdain for the traditional Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) establishment.[13] One milblogger even called for the responsible commanders to be shot in front of their formations, whether they are colonel or generals.[14]

Russian sources disseminated conflicting reports about the condition of Russian Duma Deputy and Commander of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch, Adam Delimkhanov, on June 14. ISW has not observed any visual evidence to confirm or deny the contradictory claims about Delimkhanov’s condition. Some Russian sources claimed on June 14 that Delimkhanov was dead or wounded, and some claimed a Ukrainian strike killed or wounded him in an unspecified location.[15] Other Russian sources including Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, Akhmat Special Forces Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov, and Russian Duma Deputy Andrey Kartopolov later claimed that Delimkhanov was alive and unharmed.[16] Kadyrov published a video on June 14 of himself with Delimkhanov on an unspecified date after rumors began circulating about Delimkhanov’s condition.[17] Kadyrov then claimed that Ukrainian media was circulating reports of Delimkhanov’s death (ignoring that many of the reports originated from Russian sources) as part of an information operation, but did not elaborate on the intent of the supposed information operation.[18]

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on June 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched six Kh-22 cruise missiles, four Kalibr cruise missiles, and 10 Shahed 131/136 drones and noted that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Kh-22 missiles and nine Shaheds.[19] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev reported that Russian forces targeted infrastructure facilities in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa oblasts.[20]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made gains on June 14.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a division of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) near Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast while they were waiting for the commander of the 20th CAA to give a speech, prompting typical discontent among milbloggers about Russian commanders.
• Russian sources disseminated conflicting reports about the condition of Russian Duma Deputy and Commander of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch, Adam Delimkhanov, on June 14. ISW has not observed any visual evidence to confirm or deny the contradictory claims about Delimkhanov’s condition.
• Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on June 14.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction and south of Kreminna.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and reportedly made gains in this area as of June 14.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 14.
• Satellite imagery suggests that Russian helicopters defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine are likely deployed to an airfield in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.
• A Russian State Duma bill aimed at raising the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin may be aiming to shield specific generations from the demographic and social impacts of the war in Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate economic control of occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction and south of Kreminna on June 14. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces conducted seven ground attacks on Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Vesele and Rozdolivka (both 30km south of Kreminna).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[23] Geolocated footage published on June 14 shows that elements of the 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division continue to operate near Kreminna.[24]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on June 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces have advanced between 200 to 500 meters in unspecified areas on the flanks of Bakhmut over the past day.[25] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted on June 13 that the intensity of hostilities in the Bakhmut area decreased slightly and reported that regular Russian elements, including airborne (VDV) units, continue to deploy to the Bakhmut area to take over former Wagner Group positions.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka (8km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest), northwest of Bakhmut near Yahidne (1km northwest), and Berkhivka (3km northwest), and northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka (15km northeast).[27] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly of elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) firing at Ukrainian drones on the flanks of Bakhmut.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations northwest of Bakhmut near Yahidne, Berkhivka, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest) and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (3km southwest) and Bila Hora (13km southwest).[29]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations towards Avdiivka and in Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[30] Geolocated footage posted on June 13 shows that Russian forces have made an incremental advance in western Marinka.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful attacks near Avdiivka and in Marinka.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and reportedly made gains in this area as of June 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 300 to 350m in the Zaporizhia direction over the previous day.[33] Ukrainian officials also reported that fighting continues near Makarivka (6km south of Velyka Novosilka).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured Makarivka on the evening of June 13 after Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of the settlement earlier in the day.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces introduced reserves to positions south of Velyka Novosilka to stop Ukrainian advances in the area and that Russian troops are currently counterattacking south and southwest of Makarivka.[36] Geolocated footage published on June 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces retain control over Makarivka.[37] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian assaults southwest and southeast of Velyka Novosilka.[38] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are defending in western Donetsk Oblast area in accord with Russian tactical defensive doctrine, which calls for a first echelon of defense forces to repel or slow attacking forces while a second echelon of forces counterattacks against any enemy breakthrough.[39] ISW also previously noted that initial Ukrainian assaults and Russian defensive operations should not be extrapolated to predict the outcome of all Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[40]

Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 14. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to fight Russian forces near Novodanylivka (6km south of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (15km southeast of Orikhiv).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully conducted limited assaults southwest of Orikhiv and are continuing reconnaissance-in-force operations in the area.[42]

Satellite imagery suggests that Russian helicopters defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine are likely deployed to an airfield in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast. Satellite imagery published on June 13 indicates that Russian forces deployed 20 new helicopters to the airfield in Berdyansk between May 31 and June 13, which corresponds with the start of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine.[43] The imagery shows that Russian forces have a total of 27 helicopters at the airfield, including five Ka-52 helicopters, nine Mi-8 or Mi-24 helicopters, and 13 Ka-29 helicopters.[44] Russian sources continue to claim that Russian helicopters are actively defending in areas where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations and that Russian forces continue to destroy Western-provided Ukrainian equipment.[45]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian State Duma bill aimed at raising the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin may be aiming to shield specific generations from the demographic and social impacts of the war in Ukraine. The Russian State Duma adopted the first reading of a bill introducing an incremental increase of the military service draft age.[46] The bill proposes that the draft age range will be 19-30 years old in 2024, 20 to 30 years old in 2025, and 21 to 30 years old in 2026. The bill also stipulates that those aged 18 and older can still join the Russian military regardless of the draft age brackets. ISW previously assessed that the gradual increase in the minimum age of conscripts could suggest that the Kremlin is targeting the generation currently suffering losses due to the war in Ukraine and attempting to shield the younger generation from economic, social, and demographic impact of the war.[47]

The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize foreigners to serve in the Russian military. The Russian State Duma adopted the second reading of a bill aimed at simplifying the process of issuing residence permits to foreign highly skilled workers who signed contracts with the Russian military since the start of the war in February 2022.[48] The law will only apply to highly skilled workers who have already worked in Russia in their specialties for a minimum of two years.[49] ISW has previously reported on Russian legislation aimed at incentivizing military service, which now appears to be extending to incorporate foreigners living in Russia.[50]

The Kremlin continues efforts to increase drone production. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a list of instructions aimed at developing the market for drones, including eliminating administrative barriers for drone usage and integrating all drones into the unified Russian airspace.[51] The Kremlin will also establish drone support, design and production centers in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan; Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, Samara, Sakhalin, Tomsk, and Tula Oblasts; and the cities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Russian-occupied Sevastopol.[52] ISW previously reported that Iran is helping Russia establish a drone manufacturing factory in Tatarstan, suggesting that Russia may be partially trying to leverage its relationship with Iran to increase drone production.[53]

Russian forces reportedly doubled the trained dolphins defending the Russian naval base in Sevastopol in occupied Crimea. Online news outlet Naval News reported on June 14 that Russian forces have likely increased the number of dolphins defending the naval base from about three to four to about six to seven and will likely increase their patrol frequency.[54]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate economic control of occupied territories. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on June 14 that he signed agreements on “trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural relations” with the occupation government of Crimea and the Republic of Kalmykia while at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.[55]

Russian sources claimed that unidentified actors unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate an occupation official in Melitopol on June 14. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that an unknown person planted an improvised explosive device (IED) under the car of the head of the occupation department for the “Road Administration of Zaporizhia Oblast” near an apartment building in Melitopol.[56] Rogov reported that the owner of the car noticed the IED and reported it before it could detonate.[57] The Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Investigative Committee opened a criminal case in response to the attempted attack.[58]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Clandestine Ukrainian unit claims successes against Russian forces in Bakhmut

News organizations always search out "clandestine" organizations while many will complain that they should remain in the shadows. Put "clandestine" or "covert" or "secret" or "special" in the headline and you will sell papers (or get clicks on the internet). But that is the nature of news reporting so militaries need to figure out how to exploit that or at least protect their forces. It is only the UK SAS that can nearly maintain its anonymity and I think this is only because of its culture and its consistent policy of not engaging with the media. And it has its government's top cover to continue that policy. That could never happen in the US or in most other countries. So we need ways of doing business that include media scrutiny even as we envy the UK standard which is something we can never achieve.

Clandestine Ukrainian unit claims successes against Russian forces in Bakhmut | CNN

CNN · by Sam Kiley · June 15, 2023

Eastern Ukraine CNN —

His forearms bulged with the effort of holding onto the straining leash of a slobbering dog. The creature’s muffled grunts could be felt as much as heard – like the growls of a souped-up truck.

Which was fitting, given that his owner’s call sign is Brabus – after the German firm specializing in bulking out luxury vehicles with engineering testosterone.

“Come,” Brabus grunted as he was towed back into a roadside building for our clandestine meeting with some of his special operations team.

They’re part of a shadowy tapestry of units falling under various Ukrainian intelligence organizations. They operate in the crepuscular landscapes in the war against Russian occupation on and beyond the front lines.

Other groups run by Ukrainian intelligence include the Russian Volunteer Force and Freedom for Russia Legion, formed of Russian citizens fighting to rid their homelands of President Vladimir Putin, which are currently carrying out raids inside Russia from Ukraine.

But Brabus and his group are entirely homegrown. Former soldiers with specialist skills, they coalesced around an ex-officer from the Ukrainian forces in the first days of Russia’s invasion last year.

“At the beginning of the war there was a big role for small groups who could fight covertly against the Russians. Because Kyiv region, Chernihiv region, Sumy region are forested areas. So, the role of small groups was important and grew fast,” said Brabus’ boss from inside a camouflage balaclava.

An aerial view of a battle field with damaged Russian tanks near Bakhmut in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, Saturday, May 27, 2023.

Libkos/AP

In those early days and weeks, small bands of men in pickups, armed with anti-tank rockets like NATO-supplied NLAW and Javelins, ambushed, trapped, and picked off invading Russian columns down main arteries running in from the north.

Bold, fast-moving and insanely brave, they preyed on Russia’s military Leviathan – eventually, north of Kyiv and Sumy, stopping the invasion in its tracks.

While they were scratched together into “reconnaissance units” back then, some have since been absorbed into the formal army structures.

But all have clung to the freewheeling, partisan-style of warfare with higher risks but greater autonomy.

Those who’ve survived – and many have not – are now often set to work at tactical tasks aiming for strategic effect. Crudely put: killing Russian officers to collapse Russian morale.

Brabus and his group, all former soldiers with specialist skills, coalesced around an ex-officer from the Ukrainian forces after Russia's invasion. CNN has blurred this image for Brabus' safety.

Brabus

Night vision

Brabus agreed to share, to a degree, the story of one such operation.

In early March, when eastern Ukraine was powdered with snow on top of frozen ground, Brabus said he and his team snuck in through skeletal woodlands to a regular army post on the front line south of Bakhmut.

He said that signals intelligence suggested that Russian units were being swapped over. This meant there would be more officers present than normal and – better still – the incoming leadership would be naive and prone to fatal error.

Ukrainian soldiers from the 68th Jaeger Brigade listen to a radio, awaiting news from the frontline.

Vasco Cotovio/CNN

'Our offensive does not end here': CNN visits fluid front lines as Kyiv vows to drive out Russian forces

Illustrating the story with video footage recorded at the time, he explained that his group was immediately caught up in a ferocious firefight with incoming Russian paratroopers new to this front.

“They got it back from us all guns blazing,” he said, his eyes kindled with pleasure at the memory of the Ukrainian fire.

Two videos glow in a metallic orange. Trees show up silver-black, while living creatures, such as men, appear as intense and moving white dots. These are video recordings from his thermal sniper sight while Brabus was at work.

The videos are silent, but more eerie for it. Somehow one can see the white figures are bent double, crouching perhaps. One can imagine these Russian soldiers scanning the darkness, searching for threats, their nerves screeching at every crunch of snow and crack of twig underfoot.

The red cross-hairs of his thermal sight settle on one of the figures. The cross leaps with the recoil of the rifle, and the little ghost crumbles to the ground. The red cross slides right, leaps again, another crumple.

“On the left were their (the Russians) dugouts and trenches from where they could see our positions. We eliminated, or rather I eliminated, paratroopers from the left flank,” Brabus explains in the clinical language characteristic of military reports.

His unit’s task, though, wasn’t to help entrenched troops fighting in the “meat grinder” of the Bakhmut front, he said. Its prey was the Russian paratroop leadership.

“We are a diversionary reconnaissance group. We did the reconnaissance, we got the intel, we prepared the operation,” he said.

“How many Russians did you kill that night?” we ask.

“Seven,” says Brabus.

Sowing chaos

He’s more animated when discussing the weapon that sits behind him, like another enormous pet, in the cafe where we meet. It’s a modified 12.7 Soviet-era heavy machine gun that a local armorer has fitted with a fat, bulging suppressor (silencer).

Shooting from an underground hide with a range, he claimed, of two kilometers (a little over a mile), this weapon is almost silent, Brabus says.

Smoke rises from buildings in this aerial view of Bakhmut, the site of the heaviest battles with the Russian troops in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, April 26, 2023. (AP Photo/Libkos)

Libkos/AP

In May, he was in a dugout overlooking a junction of trees close to Bakhmut. Another video shows him take aim then pull his face from the weapon as he lets rip, sending high explosive supersonic bullets, thicker than a man’s thumb, into clusters of the enemy’s forces.

A drone operator two kilometers back from Bakhmut, is watching where the bullets strike and calling in adjustments to his aim. The video captures his voice crackling over the radio, “spot on, perfect.”

“With this,” Brabus explains. “I kill a lot of Russians, a lot.”

Ukraine is now advancing south of Bakhmut along a salient about four miles deep, pushing Russian forces back.

And, as its counteroffensive to reclaim territory captured by Russia gets under way, Ukrainian forces are fighting in ever greater numbers along an east-west front between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia.

An aerial view shows destruction in the frontline city of Bakhmut, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in a handout picture released on May 21, 2023.

Ukrainian Armed Forces/Reuters

Since Brabus and his group were in Bakhmut, there appears to have been growing anarchy among Russian commanders. Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prighozhin’s Wagner company, who were holding the city, arrested and beat up the commander of the neighboring Russian 72nd Brigade.

They released a recording of the injured man “confessing” to being drunk and opening fire on them. He was beaten up, and released.

He’s now accused Wagner and its mercenaries, who already have a well-earned reputation for murder and summary execution, of attacking this men.

It’s this kind of chaos in the ranks of the enemy that Ukraine most wants, indeed needs, to see.

Brabus is happy to do his part in trying to create it.

Additional reporting by Olha Konavolava, Pierre Bairin and Sanjiv Telreja.

CNN · by Sam Kiley · June 15, 2023

3. Does Putin Have Any 'Red Lines' Left in Ukraine?

Excerpts:

“The very execution of a special military operation” was a response to the West’s crossing of these lines, Putin said before arguing, as he frequently has, that Western countries started the conflict by backing anti-Russian forces within Ukraine. Putin also said that strikes “against Ukraine’s entire energy system” and an attack on the Ukrainian military’s intelligence directorate were responses to red-line violations.

“We will continue to act surgically,” Putin said.

In other words, Russia will respond to perceived transgressions by the West by continuing to do what it’s already been doing. It was a far cry from the speech Putin gave immediately after the invasion last year, when he warned any countries that might “hinder us, and…create threats for our country” would meet “such consequences that you have never experienced in your history,” a not-so-subtle reference to Russia’s nuclear arsenal.

Putin’s response Tuesday also raised the question of whether Russia actually still has any “red lines” left.

Does Putin Have Any 'Red Lines' Left in Ukraine?

The West has crossed many 'red lines' set by the Kremlin - including some that would have been unimaginable a year ago

Published 06/15/23 05:00 AM ET|Updated 43 min ago

Joshua Keating

themessenger.com

Russian President Vladimir Putin doesn’t often submit to tough questioning these days, so a meeting on Tuesday with a group of so-called “Z-bloggers,” online military commentators who have provided constant and often critical commentary on Russia's war in Ukraine, was notably candid and even feisty at times. At one point, a visibly irritated Putin responded to a question about when Russia would push back against the West’s violations of its “red lines,” referring to military assistance to Ukraine that Russia has warned against.

Putin’s answer, more or less: We already have.

“The very execution of a special military operation” was a response to the West’s crossing of these lines, Putin said before arguing, as he frequently has, that Western countries started the conflict by backing anti-Russian forces within Ukraine. Putin also said that strikes “against Ukraine’s entire energy system” and an attack on the Ukrainian military’s intelligence directorate were responses to red-line violations.

“We will continue to act surgically,” Putin said.

In other words, Russia will respond to perceived transgressions by the West by continuing to do what it’s already been doing. It was a far cry from the speech Putin gave immediately after the invasion last year, when he warned any countries that might “hinder us, and…create threats for our country” would meet “such consequences that you have never experienced in your history,” a not-so-subtle reference to Russia’s nuclear arsenal.

Putin’s response Tuesday also raised the question of whether Russia actually still has any “red lines” left.

Shifting lines

The threat that crossing Putin’s red lines might cause him to use nuclear weapons, launch attacks on other European countries, or otherwise escalate has hung over the war since the beginning.

At least two red lines have been observed: NATO refused Ukrainian requests to set up a no-fly zone over Ukraine in the war's early days, because of the likelihood it would lead to direct combat with Russian aircraft; and the U.S. and its allies haven’t deployed their own troops to Ukraine, a step President Joe Biden once warned could lead to “World War Three.” (Files leaked from the Pentagon earlier this year indicated that a few dozen NATO special operations forces were on the ground in Ukraine, though their governments haven't acknowledged these deployments.)

But otherwise, there appear to be almost no taboos left when it comes to foreign help for Ukraine.

From Javelin and Stinger anti-tank weapons to advanced artillery and battle tanks, western countries are now providing Ukraine with a range of weapons systems that officials once described as dangerously escalatory, and which the Kremlin warned would provoke a major response.

“Things are imaginable now that were simply not imaginable a year ago,” said Liana Fix, a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The latest “red-line” taboo to fall was the White House announcement last month that the U.S. would support the training of Ukrainian pilots on American-made F-16 fighter jets and allow other countries to transfer these jets to Ukraine. Biden had categorically ruled out F-16s just a few months earlier.

The next to fall may be the long-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Last year National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said sending these systems could lead to a “third world war,” because they would give Ukraine the ability to strike targets inside Russia. But pressure from Congress to provide them is growing and the United Kingdom has opened the door by providing its own long-range missile, the Storm Shadow, last month.

More than just the weapons

When it comes to Putin's red lines, it’s not just about the weapons. The U.S. is also reportedly providing the Ukrainians with detailed targeting assistance for rocket strikes.

And another supposed red line, attacks on Russia itself, is also looking a lot fuzzier these days.

Drones have repeatedly struck Russian targets just across the Ukrainian border, and some have even reached Moscow itself. Pro-Ukraine Russian militants, armed with western-provided weaponry, have launched repeated cross-border raids on Russian towns. And while Ukraine hasn't claimed responsibility for these strikes, and western governments don’t condone the use of their weapons to attack Russia, no one is trying very hard to distance themselves from these actions either.

And none of these developments have sparked World War III.

The nuclear question

As Putin indicated in his comments Tuesday, it’s not as if Russia has been restrained in its attacks on Ukraine. In May alone, Russia launched an estimated 400 drones and 160 missiles at Ukraine and subjected Kyiv to 20 nights of aerial attacks. If, as the Ukrainian government alleges and as western officials strongly suspect, Russians were behind the destruction of the Kakhovka dam on June 6, they may have unleashed Ukraine’s worst ecological disaster since Chernobyl.

But when policymakers discuss the risks around Russia’s red lines, there’s really only response they’re thinking about.

“When we talk about escalation, we’re really talking about nuclear,” said William Courtney, a former ambassador and White House Russia adviser now with the Rand Corporation. “There’s not much more escalation possible.”

The risk of nuclear use has not disappeared, as Putin underlined this week with the announcement that Russian nuclear weapons would soon be moved to Belarus. Also this week, the prominent and well-connected Russian commentator Sergey Karaganov published an article arguing that Russia should use nuclear weapons against western countries to “bring them to their senses” regarding their support for Ukraine.

But generally speaking, the Kremlin has made fewer overt nuclear threats than it did in the early days of the war and shown few signs that it is setting the stage for using them.

“It is clear by now that Russia cannot use nuclear weapons in or against Ukraine,” Pavel Podvig, an expert on Russian nuclear forces at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, told The Messenger. First, Podvig said, a nuclear strike “will have no military utility, and second, it would be universally condemned.”

If Putin were to actually use nuclear weapons, much if not all of the global support he still retains might evaporate. Most crucially, the government of China, which has largely backed the Kremlin’s line on the war, has repeatedly made clear that it does not approve of the use or threat to use nuclear weapons.

Other “red lines”?

In Podvig’s view, the one action that could change the Kremlin’s calculus when it comes to nuclear weapons would be a “direct US-NATO attack on Russia.”

But as Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive ramps up, Courtney suggested another potential danger.

“One issue could be if Ukraine were to mount a frontal assault on Crimea. That would be very risky,” he said.

While the Russian government has illegally annexed a wide swath of territory in Eastern Ukraine, the Crimean Peninsula has been under Moscow’s control since its annexation in 2014. Crimea also has closer historical ties to Russia, and the Kremlin has attributed literally spiritual importance to keeping it in Russian hands.

“That could conceivably be relevant for Russian thinking around nuclear use,” Courtney said.

Technically speaking, Russia’s nuclear doctrine permits the use of these weapons only “when the very existence of the state is threatened.” But what would constitute such a threat? An attack on Moscow? On Crimea? A major battlefield setback in Ukraine?

Clearly, the West has been able to provide Ukraine with far more assistance than it was willing to at the war’s outset, without provoking a catastrophic response from Moscow. But whether that means the Kremlin’s threats have been empty, or there still is a line waiting to be crossed, is almost impossible to guess.

“The red lines are really just in the head of one person,” said CFR’s Fix. “The only person who knows where they are is Putin.”

themessenger.com

4. Taiwan and China Respond to Messenger Report on US Evacuation Planning in Taiwan

NEO (noncombatant evacuation order) is a strategic issue.

Excerpts:

Asked about The Messenger report Monday, U.S. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said that while it was not standard U.S. policy to evacuate private citizens from war zones, the U.S. has procedures in place “for any type of emergency” — in Taiwan or anywhere else.

“It's not routine U.S. policy to evacuate private American citizens from areas of conflict, and there's no indication at this time that current conditions in Taiwan would warrant any reconsideration of that policy,” Kirby said.

“As always, we take our responsibility for the safety of our citizens and personnel seriously, wherever that is, all around the world,” he said. “And we have routine procedures in place to make sure that we're prepared for any type of emergency."

Taiwan and China Respond to Messenger Report on US Evacuation Planning in Taiwan

News that the U.S. is preparing contingency plans for evacuating its citizens drew a sharp response from Beijing

Published 06/14/23 01:51 PM ET|Updated 16 hr ago

Lili Pike

themessenger.com

China issued a harsh response to a report that the U.S. is preparing evacuation plans for American citizens in Taiwan, saying the U.S. is intent on "the destruction of Taiwan" and comparing the situation to past American departures from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.

"If a war breaks out across the Taiwan Straits, the island will become a battlefield and people there will end up being cannon fodder,” Zhu Fenglian, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of China’s State Council, said Wednesday. “But the Americans in Taiwan will just leave, safe and sound."

Zhu and a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson both responded to Monday’s report in The Messenger, which cited three U.S. sources saying that the U.S. is preparing contingency plans for the possible evacuation of Americans from Taiwan. In the report, sources said the war in Ukraine and heightened tensions over Taiwan had moved the U.S. to undertake the planning. In a statement to The Messenger, a Pentagon spokesperson said, “We do not see a conflict in the Taiwan Strait as imminent or inevitable.”

In response to a question about the report, the Taiwanese government said that emergency plans were not unusual and that U.S. policy toward the island was unchanged.

During a regular press briefing on Tuesday, Ma Boyuan, deputy director of the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry’s North American department, said, “Foreign Minister Joseph Wu has also explained that all countries' foreign missions have emergency contingency plans, which they review regularly."

The Chinese officials’ response to the report echoed critiques they have made in the past – namely, accusing the U.S. of pursuing a military buildup in Taiwan (creating a “minefield” and “ammunition depot,” Zhu said) to provoke and threaten China. Wang Wenbin, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, said the U.S. has a "plan for the destruction of Taiwan."

China has long claimed Taiwan and its leader, Xi Jinping, has pledged to “reunify” his nation with Taiwan – using force if necessary to do so. Western analysts differ on when and whether Xi would move to take control of the island.

The U.S. and Taiwan

U.S.-China tensions surrounding Taiwan have risen in recent years, particularly in the wake of former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last summer. China’s latest comments come in the lead-up to Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing this weekend, which is aimed at reversing the downward spiral of the U.S.-China relationship.

Since 2016, when the ruling Democratic Progressive Party took power in Taiwan, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has grown closer. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. has a commitment to provide Taiwan support for its self-defense, and Taiwan has purchased more than $37 billion in weapons from the U.S. over the past decade. The U.S. military commitment to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion remains unclear; President Biden has said four times that the U.S. would come to Taiwan’s aid; however, officials have stressed repeatedly that the U.S. position on Taiwan’s defense remains one of “strategic ambiguity.”

As for evacuation plans, U.S. policy requires all American embassies to prepare such plans, and in some cases more detailed contingencies are prepared in conjunction with the Department of Defense. But while policies state that the government may assist with an evacuation of American citizens under the right conditions, they do not guarantee such support.

Asked about The Messenger report Monday, U.S. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said that while it was not standard U.S. policy to evacuate private citizens from war zones, the U.S. has procedures in place “for any type of emergency” — in Taiwan or anywhere else.

“It's not routine U.S. policy to evacuate private American citizens from areas of conflict, and there's no indication at this time that current conditions in Taiwan would warrant any reconsideration of that policy,” Kirby said.

“As always, we take our responsibility for the safety of our citizens and personnel seriously, wherever that is, all around the world,” he said. “And we have routine procedures in place to make sure that we're prepared for any type of emergency."

(Photo by Annabelle Chih/Getty Images)

themessenger.com

5. NATO races to design long-term package for Ukraine, differences remain

Will democratic NATO countries be able to sustain long term support when their legislatures grow weary of doing so?

IS the US-Israel relationship a useful model?

Excerpts:

Some suggested loosely basing this on U.S. arrangements with Israel, whereby NATO states would offer fixed bilateral military assistance for a long period of time.

Gabrielle Tarini, co-author of a new RAND Corporation report on Ukraine reconstruction, said that until Ukraine can join NATO the alliance needs to explore such measures.

"Finding an approach that will be strong enough to deter Russian re-attack, but that does not necessarily provoke Russia will be the key here for security arrangements," she said.

Smaller steps are also in the works.

Stoltenberg said he expects the NATO-Ukraine Commission, a forum for cooperation, to be upgraded to become a NATO-Ukraine Council, where Kyiv would be accepted as an equal partner.

NATO will bolster a program of non-lethal aid for Ukraine's security forces to help them transition from Soviet-era to NATO standards, he said.

NATO races to design long-term package for Ukraine, differences remain

By Jonathan Landay and Andrew Gray

June 15, 20232:16 AM EDTUpdated 17 min ago

Reuters · by Jonathan Landay

June 15 (Reuters) - NATO members are racing to complete a plan to provide long-term support to Ukraine, but are wrestling with how best to assure the country's security until it can join the military alliance, according to U.S. and European officials.

With four weeks to go until a NATO summit in Vilnius that is expected to approve the plan, there is agreement that Ukraine cannot join the alliance while fighting is still underway against Russian forces, a position accepted in early June by President Volodymyr Zelenskiy after months of pleading for speedy admission.

Alliance members are close to agreeing incremental steps to strengthen ties with Ukraine, including upgrading how NATO and Kyiv cooperate and a multi-year program to help Ukraine bring its security forces to NATO operational and technical standards, according to officials.

The allies have yet to resolve differences over how to address Ukraine's desire for membership, which has been governed by a vague 2008 declaration that it will join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization without setting out how or when.

U.S. ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told reporters on Wednesday that members are still discussing how to respond to the Kyiv government's membership aspirations.

"There's a rich conversation going on across the alliance with a whole array of views," said Smith.

A senior alliance source, speaking on condition of anonymity, said there is "a hard search on to find a mechanism that brings Ukraine closer to NATO without taking them into NATO."

Western governments such as the U.S. and Germany are wary of moves they fear could take the alliance closer to entering an active war with Russia, which has long seen NATO's expansion into eastern Europe as evidence of Western hostility.

Asked on June 2 about Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said it "would be a potential problem for many, many years."

Russian President Vladimir Putin sent his forces into Ukraine in February last year saying Russian security had to be protected. Few military analysts expect Ukraine's just-launched counteroffensive to bring the grinding conflict to a quick end - instead, many predict years of fighting.

Over that time, popular support for defending Ukraine in the West might fade and the 2024 U.S. election could yield an administration less willing to spend money on the war.

A CLEAR PATHWAY TO NATO?

Hanging over the deliberations is the question of whether alliance members can show unity by forging agreements ahead of the July 11-12 summit in the Lithuanian capital. Failing to do so would hand Putin a political and propaganda coup.

"Nobody wants to take a risk of disunity being displayed openly," said a senior Eastern European diplomat.

To reassure the Ukrainians, Poland and some other Eastern European governments have called on NATO to outline clear steps to eventual membership, and favor accelerated moves in that direction.

Others, particularly the United States and Germany, have been reluctant to embrace this idea, according to diplomats.

But all agree on the need to further boost Ukraine's security between now and the day it joins NATO.

"We must ensure that when this war ends, there are credible arrangements in place for Ukraine's security, so that history cannot repeat itself," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Wednesday.

Stoltenberg said these would include arrangements between Ukraine and a number of NATO allies. The precise nature of those arrangements is the subject of intense discussion.

Some leaders, such as Zelenskiy and French President Emmanuel Macron, have called for Ukraine to receive "security guarantees."

U.S. officials prefer the softer term "security commitments". They declined to define what those commitments would be, but said they were working on a mechanism that would allow individual countries to provide long-term military aid to Kyiv.

"What you will see as Vilnius approaches are increased discussions about what that mechanism could look like with the support of many of our allies and partners," a U.S. National Security Council spokesperson said.

Diplomats and officials said options under discussion include continued supplies of advanced weapons, ammunition and equipment, which has already amounted to tens of billions of dollars.

Some suggested loosely basing this on U.S. arrangements with Israel, whereby NATO states would offer fixed bilateral military assistance for a long period of time.

Gabrielle Tarini, co-author of a new RAND Corporation report on Ukraine reconstruction, said that until Ukraine can join NATO the alliance needs to explore such measures.

"Finding an approach that will be strong enough to deter Russian re-attack, but that does not necessarily provoke Russia will be the key here for security arrangements," she said.

Smaller steps are also in the works.

Stoltenberg said he expects the NATO-Ukraine Commission, a forum for cooperation, to be upgraded to become a NATO-Ukraine Council, where Kyiv would be accepted as an equal partner.

NATO will bolster a program of non-lethal aid for Ukraine's security forces to help them transition from Soviet-era to NATO standards, he said.

Reporting by Jonathan Landay and Andrew Gray; Additional reporting by Humeyra Pamuk and Andrea Shalal in Washington and John Irish in Paris; Editing by Don Durfee and Grant McCool

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Andrew Gray

Thomson Reuters

Andrew is a senior correspondent for European security and diplomacy, based in Brussels. He covers NATO and the foreign policy of the European Union. A journalist for almost 30 years, he has previously been based in the UK, Germany, Geneva, the Balkans, West Africa and Washington, where he reported on the Pentagon. He covered the Iraq war in 2003 and contributed a chapter to a Reuters book on the conflict. He has also worked at Politico Europe as a senior editor and podcast host, served as the main editor for a fellowship programme for journalists from the Balkans, and contributed to the BBC's From Our Own Correspondent radio show.

Reuters · by Jonathan Landay

6. Russia hits industrial facilities in Ukraine's Kryvyi Rih - governor

Russia hits industrial facilities in Ukraine's Kryvyi Rih - governor

Reuters · by Reuters

KYIV, June 15 (Reuters) - Russian missiles hit two industrial facilities in the central Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih on Thursday, and an elderly woman was killed by Russian fire in the southern Kherson region, local officials said.

Kryvyi Rih mayor Oleksandr Vilkul reported no deaths in the latest attack on President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's hometown, but said a 38-year-old man had been wounded when three missiles struck two industrial enterprises overnight.

"The destruction is significant," Vilkul wrote on the Telegram messaging app.

The new attack on Kryvyi Rih followed missile strikes that killed at least 12 people in the city on Tuesday. Russia denies targeting civilians, but Ukrainian officials said none of the buildings hit had any links to the armed forces.

Ukraine's military also reported a new Russian attack on the southern port city of Odesa overnight but said all 18 drones launched by Russia had been shot down.

Authorities in Russia-controlled Crimea also reported an attack overnight, saying they had downed nine Ukrainian drones.

In other incidents, an 80-year-old woman was killed and another person wounded in an attack on the Zelenivka settlement in Kherson in southern Ukraine, regional governor Oleksandr Prokudin said.

Russia's TASS news agency quoted Moscow-installed officials in Russian-occupied territory in the Kherson region, which was hit by flooding after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam, as saying a child had been killed by Ukrainian shelling.

One person was also killed in Russian shelling in the past 24 hours in the village of Pereizne in the eastern region of Donetsk, regional governor Pavlo Kyrylenko said.

Reuters was unable to verify reports from the battlefield. Both sides have reported heavy fighting in the early stages of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Reporting by Anna Pruchnicka and Kyiv newsroom; Editing by Michael Perry and Timothy Heritage

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

7. Cyber Resilience Helps Democracies Prevail Against Authoritarian Disinformation Campaigns

Conclusion:

This is what operational resilience against information warfare looks like: mitigating attacks on communications systems so the adversary does not have an information monopoly, identifying the online infrastructure authoritarians use to promote false narratives, and unmasking attempts to corrupt the information environment. Future conflicts will see authoritarian states attempting to degrade access to information, control the narrative, and convince the public of the futility of the fight. But if the public can see that the enemy’s attacks are failing because democratic countries have hardened their infrastructure and are quickly detecting the adversary’s digital advances, not only will the enemy’s cyberattacks fail, so will his disinformation campaigns.

By ANNIE FIXLER

Cyber Resilience Helps Democracies Prevail Against Authoritarian Disinformation Campaigns

The key is to mitigate attacks on communications systems and unmask attempts to corrupt the information environment.

https://digitalfrontlines.io/2023/05/31/cyber-resilience-helps-democracies-prevail-against-authoritarian-disinformation-campaigns/

Before Russian troops poured into Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin had already begun its war online, using cyber operations to disrupt Ukrainian citizens’ access to information and spread chaos and propaganda. This information warfare, however, has been met with the same resolve and resilience that Ukraine has shown on the battlefield, demonstrating for democracies around the world how to defeat authoritarian disinformation campaigns.

Information warfare often involves denying the adversary—domestic or foreign—access to information. During protests in Iran over the past four years, the regime has repeatedly throttled internet connectivity to try to prevent citizens who are organizing for greater freedoms from communicating with one another and the outside world. Russia has similarly tried—sometimes successfully—to use cyberattacks to disrupt Ukrainian military communications and citizens’ access to information. But Kyiv had planned for such attacks—by, for example, ensuring that alternative systems were in place—and has been able to neutralize the assaults and restart service.

Authoritarian regimes also use cyber-enabled influence operations to contaminate the information environment, pushing false narratives and hiding their own human rights abuses. During the Beijing Olympics, for example, pro-Chinese Communist Party Twitter accounts flooded social media in an attempt to hijack hashtags created by dissidents who were trying to draw attention to abuses in Xinjiang. Throughout its war with Ukraine, the Kremlin has tried to muddy the flow of information to Ukrainians and distort global perceptions of the conflict. Russia has adjusted video evidence to deny war crimes, deployed operators on social media to create fake personas and news sites, and hacked user accounts to promulgate disinformation. Meanwhile, other Russian operations have tried to degrade confidence in the government in Kyiv. Hackers compromised a live Ukrainian news broadcast, inserting a false breaking news chyron claiming that Ukraine had surrendered. But Kyiv has been able to continue its YouTube broadcasts and social media posts to correct the record and reassure Ukrainians that their government still stands​.​

“Kyiv had planned for such attacks—by, for example, ensuring that alternative systems were in place—and has been able to neutralize the assaults and restart service.”

These attacks are meant to affect public behavior: Misinformation about fuel supplies during the May 2021 ransomware attack on the Colonia Pipeline caused panic-buying, leading to gas shortages. Russia has used radio broadcasts to urge Ukrainian soldiers to surrender. The Chinese Communist Party calls information operations “discourse power,” reflecting an understanding that he who controls the conversation, shapes actions on the ground.

Countering Disinformation Requires Thwarting Digital Assaults

The Kremlin has failed to control the narrative in Ukraine, because network defenders have kept communication infrastructure online, and the government in Kyiv has demonstrably shown Russia to be lying. Taiwanese civil society groups, meanwhile, are in a pitched battle to counter Chinese Communist Party disinformation about their leaders, among other fake news, because countering information operations requires not just keeping communication lines open but also thwarting the adversary’s attempts to pollute them. Among the ways the Taiwanese have fought back are teaching schoolchildren about media literacy and creating news-verification tools.

This is what operational resilience against information warfare looks like: mitigating attacks on communications systems so the adversary does not have an information monopoly, identifying the online infrastructure authoritarians use to promote false narratives, and unmasking attempts to corrupt the information environment. Future conflicts will see authoritarian states attempting to degrade access to information, control the narrative, and convince the public of the futility of the fight. But if the public can see that the enemy’s attacks are failing because democratic countries have hardened their infrastructure and are quickly detecting the adversary’s digital advances, not only will the enemy’s cyberattacks fail, so will his disinformation campaigns.

Annie Fixler is the director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an FDD research fellow. She works on issues related to the national security implications of cyberattacks on economic targets, adversarial strategies and capabilities, and U.S. cyber resilience. She also contributes to the work of FDD’s Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab and Center on Economic and Financial Power. She is the co-editor of FDD’s four-part study on the cyber-enabled economic warfare strategies of America’s authoritarian adversaries. Her work has appeared in Defense One, The Hill, and The National Interest, among other publications.

Previous

8. Military pay overhaul could mean huge pay boosts for enlisted troops

​Good. The troops deserve it. But this could also help with recruiting.

Military pay overhaul could mean huge pay boosts for enlisted troops

militarytimes.com · by Leo Shane III · June 14, 2023

This story was updated at 3:45 pm EDT.

Junior enlisted troops could see their monthly pay boosted by up to 35% next year under a massive rewrite of the military’s pay tables proposed under a House Republican defense appropriations plan released Wednesday.

The move would guarantee that even the lowest-ranking service members would make at least $31,000 annually in base pay — roughly equivalent to a $15-an-hour wage. Troops also receive other financial compensation in the form of housing stipends, free health care coverage and food stipends.

The proposal — which still has to survive numerous rounds of negotiations on Capitol Hill — comes in direct response to concerns that thousands of military families are living at or below the federal poverty line, struggling to keep up with rising inflation costs.

RELATED

Troops could see monthly bonuses, better housing pay under House plan

A draft version of the annual defense authorization bill calls for more financial support for younger troops.

But other junior enlisted troops would benefit from the plan as well. Most troops ranked E-5 and below would see boosts under the budget plan. An E-3 with three years service would see his or her annual salary jump from just under $31,000 to more than $35,000 under the plan. An E-4 with six years in service would see annual pay go from about $36,500 to $38,500.

Those pay boosts are separate from a proposed 5.2% pay raise for troops starting next January, meaning that the affected enlisted troops would see an even bigger increase in their take home pay.

But the costs of the plan are unclear. Senate Democrats and White House officials have not indicated whether they will go along with the proposal, or if the money needed to pay for it may cut into other federal programming priorities.

Linked to legislation the Biden White House would likely veto

The pay table overhaul is included in a GOP-written budget plan that also bans the Defense Department from providing abortion assistance to troops, medical care to transgender individuals or diversity training to anyone. Those items are unlikely to gain any support from Democratic lawmakers, putting the future of the whole bill into question.

Junior enlisted pay has been a major focus of lawmakers in recent years. As many as 22,000 active-duty military service members and their families qualify for federal food assistance, earning so little that they are at or below the federal poverty line, according to past government studies.

Last week, lawmakers on the House Armed Services Committee unveiled plans for monthly bonus pay for troops rank E-6 and below next year, to be awarded “as economic conditions dictate.” The exact amounts would be determined by Pentagon officials after passage of the legislation.

Overhauling the military pay tables could minimize the need for those bonuses. Under the appropriations proposal, troops ranked E-1 with at least four months service would see their yearly basic pay increased by more than $8,000 under the changes, a huge financial boon for those families.

RELATED

GOP bill bans military abortions, transgender care, diversity work

The $826.5 billion spending plan is likely to face strong resistance from the White House and Senate Democrats.

Even with the increases, however, most enlisted troops would still earn significantly less than officers. An O-1 with less than two years of service earns about $43,500 annually.

The budget bill — scheduled to be debated behind closed doors by the House Appropriations panel on Thursday and publicly later in June — calls for $826.5 billion in defense spending for fiscal 2024. That matches the levels agreed upon by White House negotiators and House Republican leaders earlier this month.

Senate appropriators have not yet offered their Defense Department funding plans for fiscal 2024, or signaled if they will have similar changes to military pay tables next year. Both chambers must agree upon a new spending plan for the military by Oct. 1 or risk a partial shutdown of defense operations and programs.

About Leo Shane III

Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.​

9. How the Compacts of Free Association Support U.S. Interests and Counter the PRC’s Influence

See Cleo Paskal's testimony at this link: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/06/14/compacts-of-free-association-indo-pacific-task-force/

​Conclusion:

This is why this task force is so important and, frankly, inspiring. What’s needed to block and build is a broad and deep understanding of the Compact, region and issues, and a willingness to find innovative, effective solutions. Combined, the fourteen members of this task force have what it takes. Thank you for stepping up to the challenge. It is one of the most important of the century.

​

How the Compacts of Free Association Support U.S. Interests and Counter the PRC’s Influence | Indo-Pacific Task Force

Cleo Paskal

Non-Resident Senior Fellow

fdd.org · · June 14, 2023

Introduction

Chair Radewagen, Co-Chair Sablan, and distinguished members of this task force, thank you for the privilege and honor of being invited to testify today. The creation of this bipartisan Indo-Pacific Task Force, under the auspices of the Committee on Natural Resources, is innovative, timely, and important — and heartening.

By its very composition, this task force shows how much the United States is not just a Pacific country but a Pacific Islands country, with its chair from American Samoa, its co-chair from the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), and distinguished members from Guam and Hawaii. There is an enormous depth of knowledge in this room. That combined with the truly bipartisan nature of the task force gives hope that real solutions can be found for some of the critical threats facing region.

This testimony will describe some of the ways in which China is trying to accomplish that goal, with examples from each of the FAS. It will also describe how, in each of the FAS, what the United States, in partnership with the people of the PIA and FAS, can do to fight back, including adopting a “Block and Build” strategy in which malign influence is blocked while concurrently domestic security (including economic security) is built.

Block and Build

Fundamentally what’s needed is a “Block and Build” approach in which vulnerable entities, with the support of allies if needed, block malign Chinese influence while simultaneously building domestic security (including economic security).

Given the advanced state of PRC influence operations in the region (described in more detail below), one has to assume that any major project designed to give the FAS economic or political independence (build), especially ones that will make them less reliant on China, will be targeted by PRC agents and slowed down through a range of grey zone tactics, from bureaucratic stalling to unfair competition, from information warfare to lawfare. Unless that targeting is blocked, it will be very hard to build.

At the same time, blocking PRC malign influence alone won’t work. The region is still hurting from Covid-linked economic collapse and, if there is no building, just blocking, social disruptions caused by increasing desperation could become destabilizing and open up new pathways for the PRC that are extremely difficult to block.

The title of this hearing asks “How the Compacts of Free Association Support U.S. Interests and Counter the PRC’s Influence.” They do it in part by giving the United States the tools necessary to Block and Build in the FAS.

That tool, however, is underutilized in some cases and even mis-utilized at times. With financial and service renewal sections of the Compact coming to Congress soon, this task force couldn’t be timelier. The stakes are high. If a block and build strategy that dovetails with the Compacts isn’t adopted, there is a real risk that not only will the long-standing familial relationship with the people of the FAS be betrayed, but the United States’ Pacific military strategy could collapse.

Geographic Importance of the Region (Map at End)

As others in this hearing will describe in more detail, the core American Pacific military strategy for decades has been to reinforce the First Island Chain off the coast of Asia (the string of islands broadly running north-south from Japan, through Taiwan, Philippines, and on past Malaysia). This is reinforced by another broadly north-south chain just to the east, the Second Island Chain (definitions vary, but it roughly runs from Japan, onward to the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, Guam, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and then Australia).

The Pacific Islands of America and the U.S. Freely Associated States have made the island chain strategy to be possible.

The United States also has Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) with three independent countries: the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) — together known as the Freely Associated States (FAS). Combined, their EEZs cover a vast area of the Pacific comparable in size to the continental United States.

Combined, the PIA and the FAS extend the defensive perimeter of the United States to the waters of America’s treaty allies, the Philippines and Japan, and through them to Taiwan. This ‘corridor of freedom’ (including freedom of movement) underpins American strategic planning in the Pacific and makes the island chain defenses possible.

Targeting the FAS

No other countries on the planet have such a deep defense relationship with the United States as do the FAS. The privileges and access granted to the United States by the FAS are unique. However, they are rarely discussed or examined and seem to have just become a ‘given’ in American strategic planning.

China has put enormous effort into understanding the social, political, and economic dynamics of the Pacific islands. In any country with which China has diplomatic relations, Beijing has a large embassy with staffers who speak the local language and have seemingly limitless funds to spend on influence and entertainment. In countries like the Marshall Islands and Palau, which recognize Taiwan, Beijing maintains unofficial operating nodes. The one in Marshall is considered locally as an unofficial embassy.

According to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s December 2022 report on the Chinese Communist Party and triads in Palau:

“Senior officials and elected officials across the whole of our National and State Governments receive offers of gifts as a means to curry favor. The practical impact of this is that some senior officials and elected officials take actions that are contrary to the FSM’s national interest, but are consistent with the PRC’s national interests … So, what does it really look like when so [many] of our Government’s senior officials and elected officials choose to advance their own personal interest in lieu of the national interest? After all, it is not a coincidence that the common thread behind the Chuuk State secession movement, the Pohnpei Political Status Commission and, to a lesser extent, Yap independence movement, include money from the PRC and whispers of PRC support.”

In his letter, Panuelo outlined what would be required for the FSM to recognize Taiwan, in effect offering the United States a rare opportunity to transform the region and support Block and Build. Doing so would have, over time, blocked the sort of PRC-instigated economic and social disruptions (entropic warfare) he described and would give FSM the space to build its economy and society in a resilient and sustainable manner.

It also would have led to all three FAS recognizing Taiwan, reinforcing each other politically, and creating opportunities for cooperation that increase strategic depth, such as illegal fisheries patrols throughout FAS waters that include Taiwanese representatives.

Additionally, it would have been a major psychological boost to those trying to fight PRC influence — a counter to the PRC’s inevitability narrative, which tries to inculcate the idea that resistance is futile.

Yet Washington failed to seize this critical opportunity. As part of putting together a future strategy, it is important to understand why neither the State Department nor any other arm of the federal government actively followed up on Panuelo’s offer.

Marshall Islands — The Department of Justice Inadvertently Undermines Block and Build

The Republic of the Marshall Islands recognizes Taiwan and is home to an important U.S. military base at Kwajalein. RMI will hold elections in November 2023, and, unlike Palau and FSM, it has yet to sign in the current round of Compact negotiations.

As seen in FSM, the United States’ focus on kinetic defense has not been matched by a concern for defense against China’s political warfare. In fact, in some cases, the United States takes misguided and short-sighted actions that only make things easier for the PRC.

An example is the case of PRC-origin Cary Yan and Gina Zhou. Yan and Zhou obtained Marshall Islands passports and then set about trying to undermine the sovereignty and integrity of the Marshall Islands. The incident details below comes from Department of Justice documents.

By December 2016, Yan and Zhou were meeting with RMI officials in both New York City and the RMI itself, proposing the development of a semi-autonomous region within the RMI.

Around April 2018, an NGO controlled by Yan and Zhou hosted a conference in Hong Kong attended by, among others, members of the RMI legislature. The NGO paid for the travel, accommodations, and entertainment of the RMI officials. There, the NGO, with the support of the legislators, publicly launched an initiative to establish the so-called Rongelap Atoll Special Administrative Region (the “RASAR”).

RASAR was to be created by legislation (the “RASAR Bill”) that, if enacted by the RMI legislature, would significantly change the laws on the Rongelap Atoll, including relaxing immigration regulations.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement described RASAR as: “a multi-year scheme that included establishing a nongovernmental organization and allegedly bribing officials in the Republic of the Marshall Islands with the intention of establishing a semi-autonomous region, akin to Hong Kong, in the U.S.-defended Marshall Islands.”

On November 16, 2020, Yan and Zhou were arrested in Thailand. On September 2, 2022, they were extradited to the United States and arrived in New York and charged with conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), violating the FCPA, conspiring to commit money laundering, and committing money laundering.

The maximum penalties for these charges are five years in prison for conspiring to violate the FCPA; five years in prison for each violation of the FCPA; 20 years in prison for conspiring to commit money laundering; and 20 years in prison for committing money laundering.

This might seem like a win for ‘blocking,’ yet due to the pleas, and consideration for time served, their actual sentences were light considering they tried to take over a country — one that is a key component of America’s defense architecture and one of Taiwan’s few official friends.

DOJ also surrendered the opportunity to take the case to trial, which could have served as a powerful deterrent to future political warfare and would have made public the names of the Marshallese who were bribed.

As in the case of Panuelo’s Taiwan offer being made and then ignored, Washington turned what could have been a major ‘blocking’ win into a loss that was worse than if there had been no opportunity at all.

Nor, according to RMI officials, have case details been passed to RMI authorities so Yan and Zhou, and the officials they bribed, can be prosecuted in Marshall Islands. This potentially leaves some of those corrupt officials free to run in the upcoming November 2023 elections.

More concerning, Zhou’s sentence was so light that she had finished serving her time soon after the case was closed, and the United States deported her back to the Marshall Islands.

She is currently there, walking free, able to re-establish her linkages with local elites, and showing by her mere presence that there is little downside to taking or giving Chinese bribes. She is expected to be joined soon by her co-conspirator who is also likely to be deported back to the Marshalls by the United States once he has served his time. He may even get there in time to vote in the elections.

This isn’t an unusual occurrence. Across the FAS, there are Chinese-deemed ‘undesirables’ that the FAS government can’t themselves deport. In some cases, the PRC refuses to admit the undesirables are PRC citizens (because keeping them in country aids PRC entropic warfare). In other cases, the FAS simply doesn’t have the money or political weight to deport them. And so they stay, undermining the countries from within. Sometimes, as in this case, because of the United States Department of Justice.

Palau — A President’s Ideas on How to Block and Build

There are leaders across the FAS who, though beleaguered, are still fighting to block malign influence and build their countries. One is President Surangel Whipps, Jr. of Palau. Palau recognizes Taiwan and was the target of an elaborate political warfare operation by China to try to change that.

Palau, however stood firm. But it was not easy, especially after Covid added a second hit. President Whipps, in preparation for this hearing, was kind enough to give concrete examples of what he thinks his country needs to block and build economically.

Our biggest challenges are trying to build a diversified, resilient economy, combat[ing] climate change, and combat[ing] the influence of [the] Chinese in Palau.

Our economy was devastated by Covid. Tourism isn’t back. We are at 30 percent of pre-Covid numbers. Palau’s GDP fell, so we were accessible for [GDP-level linked] DFC [U.S. International Development Finance Corporation]. But why were we even taken off DFC? We shouldn’t need measures like that to keep us out.

One of our main challenges is direct investment. The largest direct investor in Palau is still China. It’s a challenge to try to not open up direct flights from China back to Palau. I’m going to Japan next week to talk about direct flights, but they might not be back until next year. Right now, there are two flights a week from Taiwan, they are full. They can’t increase.

I’ve just been to Korea trying to get Koreans to start direct flights because Korea is about five hours away. Korean tourists are among the top tourists going to Guam. One airline was interested in Palau but they said the runway wasn’t quite long enough for the large aircraft. It means a 30 percent penalty in cost – it’ll cost 30 percent more than flying to Guam. That makes Palau less interesting.

Meanwhile, for several years, the U.S. government said our runway wasn’t quite long enough for F-35s.

We proposed a solution to the United States, and to Australia, Taiwan, Japan, Korea — help us extend the runway to 3,000m from 2,100m. It would help in deterrence. We believe peace comes through strength, but a strong a resilient economy also provides deterrence.

That’s the sort of area where there is a synergy, where we can do what’s good for defense and for the economy. It’s an opportunity where maybe we can encourage investment from others in the region, other investment instead of China. We really need to work with others in the region to encourage investment. We need partnerships. This year finally for [the] first time Japanese investment in tourism will surpass everyone else — there is a new Japanese hotel being built. We want to see U.S. investment here — a U.S. hotel. We are really trying to bring others here.

We have pressure to open up direct flights to Macau and Hong Kong from Cambodian carriers. Japan is slow, Korea is slow, Taiwan is slow — China is saying ‘give us more flights.’ It’s hard to say we won’t accept them because hotels are empty, boats are empty.

Another concern is that, if not handled by others, environmental crises could be opportunities for China to act. We’ve seen the PRC use humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as a reason to deploy and embed, as seen in Tonga following the devastating volcano eruption. According to Whipps:

FEMA accessibility is really important to Palau. It’s Russian roulette out here. Look at what just happened to Guam. Those systems move up to Guam, down to Yap, down to Palau.

If something happens, it [is] a matter of who’s closest to our door. Who’s fastest to respond? When that disaster happens, who will jump out to say ‘here we are to help you?’ The last typhoon, we got more assistance from the Federated States of Micronesia than the United States.

One way to block and build on this front is to support the development of local capacity to handle crises and also to be better coordinated with the United States. Palau has tried to lead the way on this by setting up a National Security Coordinator office, but in spite of it proving its worth over and over again to the United States, it gets little support.

Similarly, there is an enormous untapped resource in the FAS — the large number of FAS citizens who are American military veterans. Properly organized, perhaps as a variation on reserves but answerable to the FAS governments, they could be invaluable in crises and serve as bridges to U.S. responders. According to Whipps:

There has been some traction on addressing the needs of veterans, but they really need it to be enacted. Why [do] veterans … in Philippines and Canada receive more benefits than … ones in the FAS?

We want them to retire back in the islands — wouldn’t it be wonderful if they return to Palau and receive full benefits in Palau? Then they can be comfortable while contributing to the economy and security of Palau.

It [is] an economically small thing for the U.S. but huge when it comes to improving the lives and security in Palau. Something like 5 percent of graduating high school students join the U.S. military. We are happy to let them come and recruit, but when they are done, please take care of them. Please don’t forget them.

That means being able to see a local doctor here and get the care they need. There are rules that make it difficult, like to get counselling online you need to be on U.S. soil. Also, many have to pay for [their] own tickets to get to Guam for assessment. The United [Airlines] flight to Guam is, per mile, among [the] most expensive in world. In the last years, two veterans have taken their lives in Palau.

Conclusion and recommendations

China is managing to stay below the ‘triggering’ threshold of the tools in the Compact that could help the FAS block and build because of Washington’s self-imposed limits on defining what a threat or attack looks like — which, at this stage, given what is being ignored, seems to involve something as overt as a World War Two-style amphibious storming of the beaches. This needs to change.

At its most basic, this means that rather than sending Chinese who have been found guilty of trying to “corrupt the legislative process” of the Marshall Islands back to the Marshalls (and then not sharing case information with the relevant authorities in Marshall so they can at least prosecute the cases themselves), the United States could help set up special investigative units to uncover and prosecute corruption in the FAS.

If welcomed by the FAS, it might make sense for the U.S. military to assist on some of the investigations. The Department of Defense has the largest American presence on the ground in the FAS and knows and possibly values the region the best.

The most fundamental aspect of blocking is that there needs to be a cost for taking Chinese money. Currently, there rarely is a downside to accepting that brown envelope after the banquet. At the very least, Magnitsky Act charges or something similar could be explored. Just a few high-profile cases could hearten honest officials and make others recalculate their cost/benefit analysis of selling out their country — and by extension, U.S. security. (That can also mean not being shy about ensuring transparency and accountability in the Compact funding spending. The people of the FAS need to know their money is being spent for their benefit.)

Similarly, given the dual-use nature of the Chinese fishing fleet, illegal fishing in the FAS should be seen as a national security issue for the United States. The U.S. military should be defending FAS EEZs aggressively. But that blocking is not enough. Simultaneously, there should be efforts to help the FAS build their fisheries in a way that, as President Whipps said in reference to tourism, is diversified and resilient. That is the only way to truly keep out the malign influence.

When the pieces combine, the overall goal would be to create a Micronesian Zone of Security, Prosperity, and Freedom that would knit the PIA and FAS (and maybe eventually Nauru and Kiribati) together, letting the countries and territories reinforce each other socially and economically, supported by the exceptional tools made available by the Compacts.

Doing that means actively blocking PRC political warfare in the region while, just as actively, helping the PIA and FAS build their economies, thus creating the foundation for an enduring and resilient free and open Indo-Pacific.

In that context, it’s worth understanding what happens if the financial and services components of the Compacts aren’t passed. According to the U.S. Integrated Country Strategy for the FSM:

As Whipps said: “It’s very important that the Compact agreement on economic assistance be passed this year. Last time, we started in 2010, but it wasn’t signed until 2018. That sends a bad signal to Palau and the Pacific about U.S. commitments. Economic stability provides security for all of us.”

This is why this task force is so important and, frankly, inspiring. What’s needed to block and build is a broad and deep understanding of the Compact, region and issues, and a willingness to find innovative, effective solutions. Combined, the fourteen members of this task force have what it takes. Thank you for stepping up to the challenge. It is one of the most important of the century.

Cleo Paskal, “China Winning Entropic Warfare in Pacific Islands,” Sunday Guardian (India), June 4, 2022. (https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/china-winning-entropic-warfare-pacific-islands)

U.S. Department of State, “Integrated Country Strategy: Federated States of Micronesia,” August 16, 2018. (Archived version available at: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Micronesia.pdf)

1. [1] Donna Miles, “China Requires Close Eye as It Expands Influence, Capability,” American Forces Press Service, March 12, 2008. (https://www.dvidshub.net/news/17315/china-requires-close-eye-expands-influence-capability)
2. [2] House Committee on Natural Resources GOP, “Indo-Pacific Task Force Announcement,” YouTube, June 7, 2023. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XxTa3eLxgfg)
3. [3] “Definitions of Insular Area Political Organizations,” U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, accessed 12 June 2023. (https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/politicatypes)
4. RealClearDefense, March 11, 2021. (https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/03/11/us_territories_the_frontlines_of_global_competition_with_china_767683.html)
5. [5] Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770, codified as amended at 48 USC §1681. (https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-99/STATUTE-99-Pg1770.pdf); Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Pub. L. 99-658, 100 Stat. 3672, codified as amended at 48 USC §1681. (https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg3672.pdf)
6. [6] Thomas Lum, “The Compacts of Free Association,” Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2022. (https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12194/1)
7. In broad terms, apart from defense and security provisions, the COFAs also give citizens of the FAS the right to work in the United States and to serve in the U.S. military and they provide financial support and services (such as the postal service) to the government and people of the FAS. The financial and service provisions are renegotiated every twenty years and are currently up for renewal, expiring in FSM/RMI in 2023 and Palau in 2024.
8. [8] House Committee on Natural Resources GOP, “Indo-Pacific Task Force Announcement,” YouTube, June 7, 2023. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XxTa3eLxgfg)
9. [9] Denghua Zhang, “Growing Academic Interest in the Pacific — Pacific Research Centres in China,” Australian National University Department of Pacific Affairs, February 2020. (http://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2020-02/dpa_in_brief_2020_2_zhang_final.pdf)
10. [10] National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic, (Adopted at the 28th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress on June 27, 2017), (China). (https://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2017_PRC_NationalIntelligenceLaw.pdf)
11. [11] Gerry Shih, “China’s backers and ‘triad’ gangs have a history of common foes. Hong Kong protesters fear they are next.” The Washington Post, July 23, 2019. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-backers-and-triad-gangs-have-history-of-common-foes-hong-kong-protesters-fear-they-are-next/2019/07/23/41445b88-ac68-11e9-9411-a608f9d0c2d3_story.html)
12. [12] Bernadette Carreon, Aubrey Belford, and Martin Young, “Pacific Gambit: Inside the Chinese Communist Party and Triad Push into Palau,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, December 12, 2022. (https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/pacific-gambit-inside-the-chinese-communist-party-and-triad-push-into-palau)
13. [14] Cleo Paskal, LinkedIn, March 10, 2023. (https://www.linkedin.com/posts/cleopaskal_panuelo-letter-on-switch-to-taiwan-prc-activity-7039672476045340672-8RmJ)
14. [15] Hart Rapaport and Ivana Nikolić Hughes, “The U.S. Must Take Responsibility for Nuclear Fallout in the Marshall Islands,” Scientific American, April 4, 2022. (https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-u-s-must-take-responsibility-for-nuclear-fallout-in-the-marshall-islands)
15. [16] “Yan Sentenced To 3.5 Years For Marshall Islands Bribery Scheme,” FCPA Professor, accessed June 11, 2023. (https://fcpaprofessor.com/yan-sentenced-3-5-years-marshall-islands-bribery-scheme)
16. [17] United States Attorney’s Office Southern District of New York, Press Release, “U.S. Attorney Announces Extradition Of Two Defendants Charged With Bribing High-Level Officials Of The Republic Of The Marshall Islands,” September 2, 2022. (https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-announces-extradition-two-defendants-charged-bribing-high-level-officials)
17. [18] Ibid.
18. [19] United States Attorney’s Office Southern District of New York, Press Release, “Defendant Sentenced To 42 Months In Prison For Conspiring To Bribe High-Level Officials Of The Republic Of The Marshall Islands,” May 16, 2023. (https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/defendant-sentenced-42-months-prison-conspiring-bribe-high-level-officials-republic)
19. [21] Kate Lyons, “’Palau against China!’: the tiny island standing up to a giant,” The Guardian (UK), September 7, 2018. (https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/sep/08/palau-against-china-the-tiny-island-defying-the-worlds-biggest-country)
20. [22] Interview with President Surengel Whipps, Jr., June 8, 2023.
21. [23] Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770, codified as amended at 48 USC §1681. (https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-99/STATUTE-99-Pg1770.pdf)
22. [24] Bernadette Carreon and Lauren Aratani, “Murder in Yap: sleepy Pacific island rocked by shooting of American lawyer,” The Guardian (UK), November 20, 2019. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/21/in-yap-sleepy-pacific-island-rocked-by-shooting-of-american-lawyer)
23. [1]
24. [2]
25. [3] The Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the PIA combine to cover over 750,000 square miles, or roughly the surface area of Turkey.[4]
26. [5]
27. [6] and a veto over other countries’ military access to the region.[7]
28. [8] was so apt.
29. [9]
30. [10]
31. [11]
32. [12]
33. [14] in which he writes not only how PRC bribery affect national security but that the PRC is actually working to create the conditions to break up the country itself by supporting separatist movements:
34. [15] to contribute to America’s defense. But, as we’ve seen, the PRC’s preferred battlefield today is political — with the goal of obviating the need for kinetic warfare (i.e., to win without fighting) — or to ease the way for a kinetic win if required.
35. [16]
36. [17]
37. [18]
38. [19] and Zhou 31 months.[20]
39. [21] Then, in 2017, China pulled the plug, making it clear that, unless Palau switched from Taiwan to China, the tourists wouldn’t come back. This devastated the economy and left empty and crumbling Chinese-leased real estate and developments across the country — a formidable display of entropic warfare.
40. [22]
41. [23]
42. [24]

fdd.org · by Jack Sullivan · June 14, 2023

10. U.S. and allies negotiating security guarantees for Ukraine

Are they trying to establish bargaining positions for future negotiations?

Excerpts:

Outside of the complexities of any arrangement, what remains unclear is the appetite for each of the four countries to abide by their promises.

“Security guarantees for Ukraine, it seems to me, would never be credible, since we have refused to fight directly for Ukraine in its time of greatest peril,” said Ben Friedman, policy director at the restraint-oriented Defense Priorities think tank. “Why would that change later just because of a paper promise?”

U.S. and allies negotiating security guarantees for Ukraine

By ALEXANDER WARD, JOE GOULD and PAUL MCLEARY

06/14/2023 02:50 PM EDTPolitico

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy hoped the whole of NATO would provide those assurances and a pathway to membership at the alliance’s summit in July.

While the Biden administration is working to provide Ukraine with security guarantees, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy still wants a timetable for Ukraine’s NATO membership. | Evan Vucci/AP Photo

06/14/2023 02:50 PM EDT

The Biden administration is working with allies to provide Ukraine with security guarantees, a step that falls short of Kyiv’s desire for those assurances to come from NATO.

According to multiple American and European officials, the U.S., Britain, France and Germany — known as the “European Quad” — would in essence formalize their military and economic support for Ukraine, keeping it flowing even after the fighting with Russia ends. However, neither a bilateral deal or multilateral agreement would have the legal force of a treaty.

In effect, the four countries are offering more of the same for an indefinite period of time.

“The U.S. is in talks with Ukraine and our allies and partners on how we can reassure Ukraine about their long-term security to deter any future aggression for after this war ends,” a National Security Council spokesperson confirmed. The official was not authorized to use their name when providing this statement to the press.

Still, “these negotiations and discussions are ongoing but they haven’t reached any particular fruition, as of yet, because there’s no doubt that this is also a very, very complicated issue,” said a European official who wasn’t authorized to speak to media.

The Financial Times was first to report on the discussions, which even some allies are upset about.

“The real security guarantee is provided only by the alliance,” said the European official, “and any temporary arrangements cannot be sold as replacements for full membership, which provides a collective guarantee of countries to each other and which is, I would say, the strongest available guarantee in Europe.”

And some U.S. lawmakers also aren’t sure that focusing on providing security guarantees outside of the alliance right now is wise. Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), co-chair of the NATO Observer Group, said he’d prefer NATO send a “strong message” to Russian President Vladimir Putin by having all allies meet their 2 percent defense-spending obligation. “Then we can have a discussion about security agreements, after the facts on the ground [in Ukraine] change.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked that a timetable for Ukraine’s NATO membership and alliance-provided security guarantees be extended at next month’s summit in Vilnius. But all signs point to him getting none of his wishes. “I think the allies now are in agreement that a proper invitation is unlikely while they’re engaged in a full-scale war,” Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, told POLITICO last week.

In the meantime, lawmakers in the U.S. are offering some ideas on how to defend Ukraine for the long term. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, suggested elevating the NATO-Ukraine Commission to a “Council,” thereby giving Kyiv the authority to call for alliance meetings and allowing more for intelligence sharing.

Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.), a close confidante of President Joe Biden, noted certain security guarantees were already extended to Ukraine in the “Budapest Memorandum” after the country turned over nuclear weapons following the Soviet Union’s collapse. We’re “back to the future,” he said in an interview.

Outside of the complexities of any arrangement, what remains unclear is the appetite for each of the four countries to abide by their promises.

“Security guarantees for Ukraine, it seems to me, would never be credible, since we have refused to fight directly for Ukraine in its time of greatest peril,” said Ben Friedman, policy director at the restraint-oriented Defense Priorities think tank. “Why would that change later just because of a paper promise?”

POLITICO

Politico

11. As Ukraine’s counteroffensive heats up, Washington holds its breath

Instead of holding our breath we should be anticipating the next moves: Ukraine's, Russia's, ours, and NATO's.

As Ukraine’s counteroffensive heats up, Washington holds its breath

After 16 months of war, and with tens of billions’ worth of advanced weapons sent, Western backers need Ukraine’s forces to show dramatic gains against Russian occupiers

By Karen DeYoung

June 14, 2023 at 2:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · June 14, 2023

As Ukraine launches its long-awaited counteroffensive against entrenched Russian occupiers, both Kyiv and its backers are hoping for a rapid retaking of strategically significant territory. Anything less will present the United States and its allies with uncomfortable questions they are not yet prepared to answer.

With this year’s flow of billions of dollars’ worth of advanced Western weaponry to Ukraine, “everybody’s hopeful that, you know, you’d see overwhelming success,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters last week. But, he said, adding a note of caution, “I think most people have a realistic outlook on this.”

Western officials claim not to know Ukraine’s exact plans. Ideally, Pentagon officials have indicated, the Ukrainians will use their newly supplied tanks and training to cut through Russia’s land bridge between occupied eastern and southern Ukraine, or take control of the land and sea gateways to the Crimean Peninsula. Such gains would break the current narrative of a stalemate and quell any calls for reconsidering current policy.

The administration is reluctant to say what would constitute a Ukrainian success against formidable Russian defenses, but the stakes for President Biden are high.

As he heads into next year’s reelection campaign, Biden needs a major battlefield victory to show that his unqualified support for Ukraine has burnished U.S. global leadership, reinvigorated a strong foreign policy with bipartisan support and demonstrated the prudent use of American military strength abroad.

Allies in NATO and beyond have bought heavily into Biden’s case. “Let no one doubt U.S. leadership — and resources — are the decisive contribution,” visiting British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said Thursday at a news conference in Washington with Biden.

Biden, Sunak and leaders of the more than 50 other countries backing Ukraine have couched their support as part of an apocalyptic battle for the future of democracy and the international rule of law against autocracy and aggression that the West cannot afford to lose.

“I asked people to picture what would happen if we were not supporting Ukraine,” Biden said, with Sunak at his side last week. “Do we think Russia would stop in Kyiv? Do you think that’s all there would be happening? I think not.” China, a Russian partner with its own aims of world dominance, is watching, he and others have warned.

In Washington, months of anticipation over Kyiv’s counteroffensive have overshadowed political criticism from those who say that sending tens of billions of dollars in U.S. assistance to Ukraine has been too much in a time of domestic economic uncertainty. Others argue that slow deliveries and the administration’s refusal to supply weapons such as longer-range missiles and fighter jets have not given Ukraine the tools it needs to win.

Whether too much or too little, both sides will have rhetorical ammunition if Kyiv fails to capture significant territory in the coming weeks.

Meanwhile, even the measured pace of supply has severely depleted allied arsenals, a problem seen as particularly dangerous amid growing Chinese saber-rattling and the possibility that Ukraine’s counteroffensive will be less than decisive.

Experts and Pentagon officials say support for the war has exposed defense manufacturing delays that are the product of long-ingrained weapons development and acquisition practices, along with pandemic-exacerbated supply-line and workforce deficits.

Despite a 2020 revamping of Pentagon acquisition policies “in an effort to deliver more timely and effective solutions to the warfighter,” the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessed last week in a report to Congress that the Defense Department “continues to face challenges quickly developing innovative new weapons” and meeting military demands.

A muddled outcome of limited gains in Ukraine would provide grist for all of those critiques and further cloud the already murky waters of NATO and European Union debate over future posture toward both Ukraine and Russia. A less than “overwhelming” success would probably also increase pressure in the West to push Kyiv to negotiate a territorial settlement that may not be to its liking.

“The collective West must decide what it wants,” said Daria Kaleniuk, executive director of Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Action Center and a member of the public oversight council of the country’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau. “Ukraine knows what it wants.”

The prize of NATO membership

What Ukraine wants is to regain all of its occupied territory, including Crimea and the eastern Donbas region, first seized in 2014 — with little substantive Western response — along with everything else Russia has taken since its February 2022 invasion. The government of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky seeks full membership in Western institutions as a way of permanently thwarting Russian aggression, not just as a reward for rebuffing it.

“There is no chance for Ukraine to survive if it is not a part of NATO,” Kaleniuk said, reflecting the Zelensky government’s own views.

What happens on the battlefield in the coming weeks will weigh heavily on Western leaders at July’s NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. Though united in rejecting the invasion and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty, alliance governments have disparate views among, and within, them on when — or even if — Kyiv should be on a path to membership.

The Biden administration advocates a measured approach to NATO accession, and has neatly sidestepped the question of peace negotiations with Russia. While assuring unfailing U.S. support for Kyiv’s defense and economic needs, and declaring that Russian President Vladimir Putin has “already failed” in his attempts to “erase Ukraine from the map,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Thursday that when it comes to ending the war, “where exactly this settles and under what conditions and when, that does remain to be determined.”

In the meantime, while the administration still says it sees no sign Putin is planning to use nuclear weapons, the war has been one of steady and increasingly rapid escalation on both sides.

A long road to a summer showdown

Until this year, security aid to Kyiv was designed largely for defensive purposes. Initial shipments of small arms and short-range defensive weapons kept Russian troops from taking the capital. When Moscow regrouped and refocused its objectives to the east and south, expanding its 2014 occupation zone to a solid 600-mile front deeper inside the country, a hesitant West eventually sent heavy artillery and precision rockets that stopped the advance.

In August of last year, with Russian troops concentrated farther south, Kyiv’s forces launched a surprise attack in the northeast. The Russians fell back in disarray, allowing Ukraine to reclaim a significant swath of territory around Kharkiv. By early November, the Ukrainians had retaken the southern city of Kherson after the Russians evacuated to occupied territory across the Dnieper River.

The victories were a morale boost for both Ukraine and its backers. But front lines remained largely static through the winter and much of the spring, with fighting concentrated around the eastern town of Bakhmut, a highly symbolic prize for Kyiv but considered by Western militaries of limited strategic value. More than anything, the grinding Bakhmut combat ate up troops and munitions at an alarming rate for both sides.

With a stalemate came debates about what would happen next. In his fury, Putin began targeting Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure deep inside the country with self-destructing drones purchased from Iran and standoff cruise missiles fired from aircraft behind his front lines. Western attention became focused on providing increasingly sophisticated air defense systems to stop the destruction.

For Kyiv, the answer was to go on offense and drive the Russians out. Zelensky’s government began a concerted campaign to persuade the West to radically step up its assistance with tanks, longer-range missiles and aircraft that the United States — by far the biggest donor — had steadfastly declined to provide.

Russian forces on the ground were seen as degraded, with significant casualties among both poorly trained troops and commanders, dwindling supplies and crippled equipment. Ukraine’s imperative was to strike back before the Russians had time to regroup. The time had long passed, Kyiv argued, for withholding the weapons systems the West worried would provoke Russian nuclear escalation.

Time has never been on Ukraine’s side in the war. For nearly 16 months, it has been fighting an aggressor that boasts many times more people and a larger industry, with an air force and navy still largely held in reserve. But winter was well underway before Austin and Biden were persuaded at least of the need for tanks, training and the logistics support Kyiv would require for a comprehensive counterattack.

That decision effectively set a countdown in motion. As the Russians built extensive defensive lines of trenches and tank traps, the West hustled to ship hundreds of armored vehicles and bring thousands of Ukrainian troops to Europe for training. Ukraine’s counteroffensive was coming, all parties agreed, as soon as the winter snow disappeared and the mud of spring dried up.

‘We’ll see what happens’

The counteroffensive has now begun, although it remains unclear whether scattered new Ukrainian attacks, primarily in the east and southeast, signal a principal line of offense or are only feints to distract Moscow’s attention and draw resources away from bigger prizes farther south.

“I would defer to the Ukrainian leadership … to explain exactly where they are in the preparation and their execution of a planned offensive,” Austin said. Despite their fortifications, the Russians have to defend “across a pretty significant area,” he said. “They probably can’t be strong, you know, in every place. So it’s incumbent upon the Ukrainians to find those points of advantage where they can leverage and exploit. … We’ll see what happens.”

“I remind people that there’s no certainty in any of this, and so we need to be prepared to continue to support Ukraine for as long as it takes,” Austin said another day last week.

Britain has now sent long-range cruise missiles, and Biden has finally agreed not to stand in the way of other allies transferring U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets from their own arsenals, although they will not arrive in time for this round of fighting.

But “as long as it takes” means different things to different donor governments. U.S. and European officials will find it far easier to continue support at the current level or beyond, to reassure domestic public and political opinion, and perhaps even to convince Putin to rethink his goals, if Ukrainian advances look like a strong beginning on a possible road toward victory.

The Western narrative remains that all decisions are Ukraine’s to make. “In terms of my level of confidence,” Austin said, “I think what really matters is how the Ukrainians feel about this. … I think we’re all sensing that Ukrainian leadership is increasingly confident.”

“Does that mean, you know, we’re going to expel every Russian out of every corner of Ukraine? Probably doesn’t,” he said. “But I think … it may have the opportunity to begin to change the dynamics on the battlefield, and that’s really what you’re looking for.”

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · June 14, 2023

12. Making the U.S.-Philippines Alliance Count

Excerpts:

Despite the positive momentum in the alliance and the potential for broader spillover effects, the regional role of the Philippines should not be exaggerated. The Philippines is just one of ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations members. It is the second largest country in the alliance by population but only the sixth largest economically. Despite the Biden administration’s hopes that it will return to a more active leadership role, the Philippines’ influence in the group lags that of others such as Indonesia, Singapore, or Malaysia. There is so far little evidence that Marcos or his foreign secretary is playing a more active role on broader issues such as Myanmar or the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. The role of the Philippines in catalyzing a broader change in the geopolitical orientation of other countries in Southeast Asia may therefore be limited.

Indeed, the United States should be cautious of the reverse possibility: that by elevating the Philippines so prominently, it alienates its other regional partners. The negative regional reaction to Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which referred to just two Southeast Asian countries by name, demonstrates the risks of a highly differentiated approach. Some governments are anxious about the possibility of the region becoming divided along geopolitical lines. Thus, any sense that the United States is looking to play countries off against each other would be damaging. Washington should address this by ensuring that high-level attention is also given to other key partners like Indonesia and Thailand, even though they are less willing to endorse U.S. regional strategic goals.

Making the U.S.-Philippines Alliance Count - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Susannah Patton · June 15, 2023

Over the past 18 months, the health of the U.S.-Philippines alliance has been restored. A patient on life support during the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte is now being readmitted into the ranks of America’s high-functioning Indo-Pacific allies.

Beginning with the reaffirmation of the visiting forces agreement by the Duterte administration in July 2021, the two sides have made steady progress toward establishing an operationally meaningful defense partnership. This includes expanding annual military exercises, designating four new sites for both parties to use under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and agreeing to new bilateral defense guidelines. The Philippines has said it will resume joint patrols with the United States in the South China Sea, and the two sides have flagged plans to improve military intelligence sharing. Finally, there is now a roadmap on military capability enhancement, which includes new transfers of defense equipment to the Philippines.

Though the United States does not say so officially, the reinvestment in its alliance with the Philippines is at least in part because of that country’s potential role in a conflict over Taiwan. The Philippines’ northernmost island is less than 100 miles from Taiwan, providing access points to preposition supplies and provide military support. Given a dearth of other regional options for forward-basing U.S. forces or equipment, U.S. policymakers would be eager to lock Manila into a favorable arrangement now.

Become a Member

However, this is far from assured. Politics on both sides of the alliance is too unpredictable for any access arrangement to be a lock. Even President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s own statements reveal considerable ambiguity about Manila’s willingness to align with U.S. strategic goals. For example, while he has indicated that new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites could be valuable for the purposes of evacuating overseas Filipino workers, he has repeatedly stressed that they are primarily intended to respond to natural disasters and could not be used for “offensive purposes.” Similarly, while making it clear that the Philippines is concerned by China’s behavior in the South China Sea, Marcos has also indicated that Manila wants open lines of communication with Beijing, including to discuss sensitive issues such as the expiry of the Malampaya gas field. Exacerbating this ambiguity is a clear strain of political opposition to closer defense cooperation with the United States. Recent congressional hearings, spearheaded by Senator Imee Marcos (President Marcos’ sister), highlighted that various disparate interests, including local government officials and business groups with links to China, oppose deeper defense cooperation with the United States.

But one need not exaggerate the extent of Manila’s commitment or downplay the obstacles in order to conclude that the revitalization of this alliance is still a big win for Washington. It powerfully undercuts China’s narrative that the United States is on the way out of Asia. And, if managed carefully in coordination with the rest of Washington’s regional relationships, it could demonstrate to other Southeast Asian countries the value and power of closer security and economic ties with the United States.

Undercutting China’s Goals

Washington’s improving ties with Manila are a clear setback for China’s desire to achieve deference from its neighbors. Indeed, Beijing’s public reactions suggest that it perceives the strengthening of this alliance as highly adverse to its interests. In April, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson warned of “grave irreparable consequences” from the expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and noted strong disapproval of the Philippines-U.S. 2+2 ministerial statement. China’s ambassador to the Philippines even made a veiled threat, suggesting that overseas Filipino workers in Taiwan would be at greater risk due to the expanded defense cooperation agreement.

China seeks to portray itself as the natural and inevitable partner for countries in the region. Beijing describes Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy as going against “the trend of the times.” It also rails against “closed” or “small” cliques led by the United States, specifically referring to groupings such as the Quad. Overall, China has been successful in expanding its influence across Southeast Asia over the past decade or more. It has become an increasingly important economic partner to the region, both in terms of trade and investment. China has also achieved some wins on the security front — such as its likely ability to access a Cambodian naval facility at Ream.

Though Southeast Asian countries all want a balance in their external relationships, few have been willing to incur costs from China to do so. Even Vietnam, which, like the Philippines, faces an acute threat from China in the South China Sea, has been reluctant to take symbolic or practical steps that it fears would incur retribution from China. This caution, for example, has prevented Vietnam from agreeing to a “strategic partnership” with the United States. Others across the region may welcome increased military sales or expanded combined exercises but likewise avoid activities that could be perceived as directly supporting the United States in its goal of balancing China.

All of this is favorable to China and risks creating a feeling in Southeast Asia that U.S. presence and influence in the region are in inevitable and terminal decline. The Philippines-U.S. partnership is powerful because it cuts against this narrative. More importantly, it is possible that the growth in U.S.-Philippines relations could also help shift China’s calculations, deterring it from behavior that it would otherwise have contemplated. Following weak U.S. support for the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, for example, Beijing would have had reason to doubt U.S. resolve in supporting Manila. However, in responding to incidents in the South China Sea in 2023, the Biden administration has repeatedly reaffirmed the applicability of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Both Washington and Manila have now signaled they will recommence joint patrols in the South China Sea. The Chinese Coast Guard has continued its harassment of and unsafe behavior toward Philippine vessels in 2023. Yet it is possible that closer Philippine-U.S. ties may now make Beijing think twice before escalating further or seeking to achieve a fait accompli such as removal or total blockade of the vulnerable BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal.

That said, it is still too soon to conclude that stronger U.S.-Philippine ties would complicate China’s calculus about Taiwan. The uncertain prospect of U.S. military access in the Philippines would not be a decisive factor for Beijing. But the risk of a broader regional coalition in opposing the use of force is something that China will now need to consider. Prior to the change of administration in the Philippines, Beijing could be relatively comfortable that while the United States and other Western countries would oppose any use of force toward Taiwan, many southeast Asian countries would be quiescent. President Marcos, however, has shown a willingness to go against China’s preferred narrative on Taiwan, for example, by refusing to attribute rising tensions to former house speaker Pelosi’s 2022 visit.

Showcasing the United States as Ally

So far, the strengthening of the U.S.-Philippines alliance is an exception rather than the rule for Southeast Asia. Elsewhere around the region, narratives about recent events, including elevated tensions over Taiwan, the AUKUS partnership and the war in Ukraine, have generally portrayed the United States, rather than China, as the source of regional tensions. Even scholars from Vietnam have been cautious about endorsing the potentially expanded U.S. military presence in the Philippines.

Improved relations with the Philippines could demonstrate the potential of the United States to deliver economic as well as security benefits to regional countries. Economics was an overriding focus of President Marcos’ visit to Washington — his public address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies focused on this topic almost exclusively. This visit showed that the Biden administration has recognized the region’s priorities. But despite the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, tangible delivery is still lacking. The newly announced presidential trade and investment mission, as well as new cooperation on civil nuclear energy and a program for sustainable infrastructure, are positive but still require follow-through by the U.S. private sector.

Importantly, Washington’s relationship with Manila is developing from a traditional “hub-spoke” dynamic within the U.S. alliance network to a more modern arrangement that can draw in the participation of other U.S. allies in the region. While the United States has downplayed speculation of a new “Quad” incorporating the Philippines, the four countries’ defense ministers met at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. The Philippines and United States have also endorsed deeper trilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia, and trilateral activities with Tokyo have already begun.

The “networking” of this alliance matters for two reasons. First, the Philippines’ participation would help normalize the idea of U.S.-led minilateral security groupings. Many Southeast Asian countries have been wary about these, in particular the Quad, on the basis that they undercut the primacy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Practically focused trilaterals including the Philippines could help mitigate these concerns, as they would help demonstrate that smaller groups of like-minded partners can complement, rather than compete with, the region’s larger and more established forums.

Secondly, there are obvious practical benefits to drawing Japan and Australia into trilateral or quadrilateral arrangements with the Philippines. Canberra already has a reciprocal access agreement with Manila; Tokyo is negotiating one. Both countries have their own direct interest in seeing the Philippines play a more active role in the region’s security. Japan, for example, has provided major support to the Philippine Coast Guard, and Australia has been a leading counter-terrorism partner for Manila. Furthermore, entrenching trilateral cooperation could also help insulate the U.S.-Philippines security alliance from political volatility. Combined trilateral activities, dialogues, or other exchanges that become well institutionalized are less likely to be cancelled due to political ups and downs.

Keeping Expectations Reasonable

Despite the positive momentum in the alliance and the potential for broader spillover effects, the regional role of the Philippines should not be exaggerated. The Philippines is just one of ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations members. It is the second largest country in the alliance by population but only the sixth largest economically. Despite the Biden administration’s hopes that it will return to a more active leadership role, the Philippines’ influence in the group lags that of others such as Indonesia, Singapore, or Malaysia. There is so far little evidence that Marcos or his foreign secretary is playing a more active role on broader issues such as Myanmar or the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. The role of the Philippines in catalyzing a broader change in the geopolitical orientation of other countries in Southeast Asia may therefore be limited.

Indeed, the United States should be cautious of the reverse possibility: that by elevating the Philippines so prominently, it alienates its other regional partners. The negative regional reaction to Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which referred to just two Southeast Asian countries by name, demonstrates the risks of a highly differentiated approach. Some governments are anxious about the possibility of the region becoming divided along geopolitical lines. Thus, any sense that the United States is looking to play countries off against each other would be damaging. Washington should address this by ensuring that high-level attention is also given to other key partners like Indonesia and Thailand, even though they are less willing to endorse U.S. regional strategic goals.

Become a Member

Susannah Patton is the Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute and a former senior Southeast Asia analyst in Australia’s Office of National Intelligence.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Susannah Patton · June 15, 2023

13. Fort Sill’s top general and fires school commander relieved

Violating huntingregualtions on Ft Sill. 

I recall the Deputy Commander General of 2d Infantry Division going into the DMZ in his HMMWV with his personal shotgun to shoot quail in the 1980s. He left Korea the next day.

Fort Sill’s top general and fires school commander relieved

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · June 14, 2023

The Army has relieved the commanding general of the service’s fires school at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, officials confirmed Wednesday.

Maj. Gen. Kenneth Kamper was under investigation by the service’s inspector general for violating hunting regulations at the Oklahoma post, according to reporting from Military.com. The Lawton Constitution first reported Kamper’s firing.

Army spokesperson Cynthia Smith told Army Times that Kamper was removed due to a “loss of trust and confidence in his ability to command.” She added that the allegations — which her emailed statement did not detail — “remain under investigation.”

Kamper’s former command, the Army Fires Center of Excellence, is Army Training and Doctrine Command’s site for training both field artillery and air defense artillery troops.

He isn’t the only general from the command to face inspector general scrutiny in recent years. Now-retired Maj. Gen. Pat Donahoe led the maneuver school at Fort Moore, Georgia, until a lengthy investigation prevented him from leaving the service on time.

Donahoe’s case raised concerns over the weaponization of administrative complaints systems like the IG. He detailed his critiques in a January interview with Army Times following his retirement.

RELATED

Pat Donahoe, civilian, wants a word with the Army

The former Fort Benning commander, whose retirement was delayed over his Twitter posts, sat with Army Times for an exclusive interview.

It’s not yet clear how the allegations against Kamper were reported, nor is it clear how long the investigation has been underway.

Kamper, who did not immediately respond to an emailed request for comment, took command of the Oklahoma post in March 2020, according to his official duty history. He previously served as deputy commander of III Corps and as deputy commander of the 4th Infantry Division.

Smith, the Army spokesperson, said Kamper awaits reassignment as Brig. Gen. Shane Morgan continues as the post’s interim commander.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army. He focuses on investigations, personnel concerns and military justice. Davis, also a Guard veteran, was a finalist in the 2023 Livingston Awards for his work with The Texas Tribune investigating the National Guard's border missions. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill.

​14. Army secretary concerned 'woke military' criticism could hurt the service

I would bet that many and perhaps most of the activities that are criticized as "woke" are the result of regulations ​imposed due to congressional oversight over the years. Surely most of the training is. Now some of the ways training is conducted are open to criticism and some contractor trainers may require stronger oversight and scrutiny by the military leadership but the Army and all the services have been acting in good faith to comply with the regulations that have been imposed on them. The other thing that we have to be careful about is that we do not throw the baby out with the bathwater. The criticism of many training programs for being "woke" actually cover the fact that there are real problems in many areas to include racial and sexual harassment and assault to name two of the large areas that still require a lot of work. 

Army secretary concerned 'woke military' criticism could hurt the service

Claims that the military has gone ‘woke’ are now an issue in the upcoming presidential election.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED JUN 14, 2023 1:46 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · June 14, 2023

For more than two years, cable news pundits and Republican lawmakers have accused the military of going ‘woke,’ a loosely defined term that refers to diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts that Republican critics have claimed portray white people and the United States in a negative light. The term has been used to attack LGBTQ service members and to claim the military is becoming too feminine, unlike Russia.

Now ‘Wokeness’ in the U.S. military has already become an issue in next year’s presidential election.

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, who served in the Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps, has made his criticisms of the ‘woke military’ a pillar of his campaign to win the Republican party’s presidential nomination. He recently vowed to change the name of Fort Liberty, North Carolina back to Fort Bragg if he is elected president.

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Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said on Tuesday that she is concerned about the drumbeat of criticism that the military has gone ‘woke’ becoming part of the 2024 presidential campaign.

“I think one of the things that we see that’s contributing to a decline in trust in the military is a concern on both sides of the aisle about politicization of our military leaders,” Wormuth told reporters during a media roundtable. “I think the more our military leaders are sort of dragged into spaces that have been politicized like that, I think the more it contributes to this perception that they’re political when they really aren’t. So, I hope that we don’t see more of the kind of talk that’s been out in the past few days.”

Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth speaks at the ceremony inducting six Medal of Honor recipients into the Pentagon Hall of Heroes, at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Va., July 6, 2022. (DoD photo/Lisa Ferdinando)

But it is unlikely that the ‘woke military’ rhetoric will go away anytime soon. House Republicans recently added an “anti-woke” amendment to a budget bill that would prevent the Department of Veterans Affairs from providing abortions, transgender health care, or flying LGBTQ Pride flags.

In recent interviews with NPR and MSNBC’s “Morning Joe,” Wormuth has sought to dispel any notion that the Army had gone ‘woke.’

“As I said a few times last week in some media engagements: We are a ready Army, not a ‘woke’ Army,” Wormuth said on Tuesday. “That’s something, frankly, the chief [Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville] and I said throughout posture season in hearings, in meetings with members of Congress.”

Still, the Army’s record at standing up to accusations of going ‘woke’ has been mixed at best. An Army investigation in 2022 found that Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe had “brought a measurable amount of negative publicity to the Army” for defending female soldiers after former Fox News host Tucker Carlson accused the U.S. military of becoming “more feminine.”

In her initial comments following the investigation, Wormuth said the Army needed to stay “out of the culture wars,” but later clarified she expects Army leaders to “stand up for women — and all Soldiers — who are unduly attacked or disrespected.”

U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe, then-commanding general of the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, gives opening remarks to the Georgia Joint Defense Commission April 22, 2021, at Clay National Guard Center in Marietta, Georgia. (Capt. Bryant Wine/U.S. Army National Guard)

The escalating attacks on the military going ‘woke’ come as the Army continues to struggle with a recruiting crisis. The Army recruited 45,000 new soldiers last fiscal year, far short of its goal of 60,000 recruits.

On Tuesday, Wormuth said she does not expect the Army to meet its goal of recruiting 65,000 new soldiers this fiscal year either. She added that the service is recruiting more people than it was at this time last year, but declined to provide any data on how many new soldiers have signed up so far in Fiscal Year 2023.

Although Republican lawmakers have also claimed that military recruiting overall is suffering because the Defense Department has embraced ‘woke’ ideology, Wormuth said the Army’s marketing research indicates that concerns about a weak or ‘woke’ military have not been a major challenge for the Army’s recruiting efforts so far.

Wormuth’s comments are supported by a Defense Department survey of young Americans released in August 2022, which found that the top reasons respondents said they would not consider joining the U.S. military included the possibility of getting injured or killed, concern about developing post-traumatic stress and other psychological or emotional issues, and fear of being sexually harassed and assaulted.

“Wokeness” did not appear anywhere in the survey at all.

But Wormuth added that she has “no doubt” some young Americans are reluctant to join the Army because they believe the Army is ‘woke.’

“I think we did see in our market research some differences geographically in terms of which factors were higher on the list or lower on the list in terms of affecting recruiting,” Wormuth said.

Wormuth also cautioned that young Americans are influenced by what they see on the news and in social media, and is concerned that rhetoric of a ‘woke military’ could hurt the Army going forward.

“What I am trying to do is talk about now how that drip, drip, drip of criticism about a ‘woke military,’ I do think is having some counterproductive effects on recruiting,” Wormuth said.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · June 14, 2023

15. Details of Chinook Crash That Injured 22 Troops Corrected by Pentagon

Helicopter operations are inherently dangerous even at a staging base on takeoff or landing.

Details of Chinook Crash That Injured 22 Troops Corrected by Pentagon

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · June 14, 2023

The Pentagon on revised its narrative of what happened during a helicopter incident in northeastern Syria that left 22 service members injured over the weekend.

A spokesman for the Pentagon said that "while the issue is still under investigation, the current understanding is the crash occurred while landing at a staging base, not during takeoff."

Pentagon spokeswoman Sabrina Singh told reporters at a briefing Tuesday that an MH-47 Chinook had a problem with one rotor, causing a hard landing during takeoff.

The updated message also noted that "the number of injured personnel medically evacuated is updated from 10 service members to 15." A total of 22 service members were injured in the incident, according to the initial statement made by U.S. Central Command.

Neither the Pentagon nor Central Command has offered any further information on the nature of the injuries or what branch the injured service members belong to.

Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany confirmed to Military.com in an email Tuesday that it received injured service members from the incident but did not provide a total number.

The Pentagon has framed the change in detail and increased casualty figures as a correction.

Central Command has recently faced scrutiny over the accuracy of its statements about other operations in the region.

In early May, the command said it carried out a drone strike that it claimed killed a senior al-Qaida leader -- the terrorist group responsible for the September 2001 attacks on the U.S. -- in northwest Syria. Later reporting by The Washington Post, however, forced the command to walk that claim back.

An investigation is now underway to determine whether the U.S. killed a civilian.

The corrected account of the Chinook incident also comes after the Pentagon and the Biden administration had to do an about-face on Wall Street Journal reporting that came out last week claiming China operated a spy base in Cuba.

Asked about it last Thursday, the Department of Defense's top spokesman, Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, told reporters that, "based on the information that we have ... that is not accurate."

Ryder went on to say that "we are not aware of China and Cuba developing any type of spy stations separately" and that he was unaware of any efforts by China to set up a base anywhere else in the region.

On Sunday, The Associated Press, citing an unnamed White House official, said The Wall Street Journal report was indeed accurate and that a Chinese base has been on the island since at least 2019.

On Tuesday, Singh said that Ryder's comments were "not an attempt to mislead reporters by any means."

Singh went on to say that Ryder's comments were "directly referring to The Wall Street Journal report that had come out earlier that afternoon or morning" and not the idea of a Chinese spy base in Cuba.

-- Konstantin Toropin can be reached at konstantin.toropin@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @ktoropin.

military.com · by Konstantin Toropin · June 14, 2023

16. US Rushes F-22s to Stop Russian Harassment Over Syria

US Rushes F-22s to Stop Russian Harassment Over Syria

Iran and Russia's efforts to push the U.S. out of the airspace include an aerial incident last week, Air Forces Central commander says.

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor flies over the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, March 14, 2022. U.S. Air Force / Staff Sgt. Jerreht Harris

Threats

F-22s are being dispatched to the contested region, where Iran and Russia are working to push the U.S. out of Syria, Air Forces Central commander says.

By Audrey Decker

Staff Writer

June 14, 2023 03:12 PM ET

• Air Force
• Middle East
• Syria
• Russia

As Russian planes continue to provoke U.S. fighter jets over Syria, the Air Force is sending F-22s to respond to aggression in the region.

Russia continues to “pressure our presence,” despite the U.S.’s de-escalatory posture, Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, who leads Air Forces Central Command, said Wednesday during the annual Defense One Tech Summit.

In April, the general told Defense One that Russian warplanes had tried to bait U.S. jets into “dogfighting” over Syria.

And just last week, Russia tried again to bait U.S. pilots, Grynkewich said.

But Russia can’t push the U.S. out of the airspace in the Middle East, Grynkewich said. He likened the country’s behavior to a gnat flying over your head: “It’s very frustrating and annoying sometimes, but in the end, it doesn't really matter.”

The Air Force announced Wednesday it’s sending F-22s to the Middle East to track Russian aggression and improve “security and stability” in the region, according to the service.

“The Raptors, from Langley Air Force Base, Va.’s 94th Fighter Squadron, deployed to U.S. Central Command following a successful support mission [in] U.S. European Command, demonstrating the U.S.’ ability to re-posture forces and deliver capabilities at a moment’s notice,” the service said in a statement.

In mid-March, a Russian Sukhoi fighter jet collided with an American MQ-9 drone over the Black Sea. Russia’s defense minister awarded medals to the pilots, which Grynkewich said encourages other Russian pilots to fly aggressively.

“For the life of me, I don't know why the Russians give a medal to someone who makes such an egregious mistake and has such a lack of airmanship. It reflects a decline in the professionalization of their air force, in my view, but they've done it,” he said.

The situation in the region is also driven by a “confluence of our adversaries,” now that Russia is buying drones from Iran, Grynkewich said.

“That dynamic, I think, has resulted in collusion, if you will, between the Russians and the Iranians, both of whom want to see us out of Syria. They're colluding with the Syrian regime and trying to push us out of Syria as quickly as they can. And for the life of me, I don't know why they've come off the reason that we're all actually there, which is to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. That's a real threat. That's the real enemy to all of us. And that's what we ought to be focusing on in Syria. But for whatever reason, the Russians and the Iranians and others are coming off of that,” he said.

17. Snakes, Stamps, and Javelins: How Ukrainian Information and Influence Operations Brought the Fight to Russia

Ukraine has been a laboratory. We can learn a lot from Putin's war there. I think this is especially true in the information domain - probably one of our weakest areas in the US national realm.

Just a reminder from my PSYOP friends. In the US it is easier to get permission to put a hellfire missile on the forehead of the enemy than it is to get permission to put an idea between his ears. We really need to be able to use kinetic and cognitive in the right measure and combinations. There is a yin yang relationship between them

I would bet some of the best work done by Ulraine took place at low levels based on initiative of createive soldiers. Some of these actions would never have made it throughthe arduous approval process in the US or if they did they would have been a dollar short an a day late. Sometimes the best infromaiton operaitons. are botttom up and not top down especially becasue most of the creative thinking is at the bottom with our young people while most of the decision makers at the top are odler and stuck in past paradigms (myself included if I were a decision maker).

Conclusion:

The United States’ ability to revamp its information operations will have significant impact on potential future conflicts, such as in Taiwan. Adversaries like China are watching closely and learning from both Russia’s costly mistakes and Ukraine’s effective innovations. Granted, Ukraine benefits from its proximity to NATO and the European Union, while Taiwan suffers from a stronger adversary and a weaker regional support network. However, these differences only make the role of information more important. For example, China, at present, is significantly more capable than Taiwan at influencing regional actors. The ability of Taiwan and the United States to muster international support in the face of Chinese aggression will be essential. The Chinese Communist Party will, no doubt, try to exploit divisions and weaken international resolve in support of Taiwan. Learning from Ukraine’s informational success will allow the United States to broaden international understanding and support for democratic partners, like Taiwan, who are under threat.

Snakes, Stamps, and Javelins: How Ukrainian Information and Influence Operations Brought the Fight to Russia - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Daniel Grobarcik · June 15, 2023

Daniel Grobarcik

On the cusp of a springtime counteroffensive, Ukraine has defied expectations in its defense against Russia’s invasion. From predictions of an imminent Ukrainian collapse on the eve of invasion to a Ukrainian army that is now set to receive Abrams tanks, foreign aid has bolstered Ukrainian forces who have shown remarkable bravery. But behind this coalition of support stands an unsung hero: Ukraine’s effective information operations.

Ukrainian efforts highlight that information and influence operations, when targeted at neutral or sympathetic nations, are invaluable to securing international support and military assistance. Amplifying events such as the defiant stand of Ukrainian soldiers at Snake Island in February 2022 has helped Ukraine secure and retain the support of foreign publics and leaders. Ukraine’s whole-of-government information efforts should reignite the debate of how the United States conceptualizes and organizes its information capabilities. From military information operations to public diplomacy, Ukraine has shown that these capabilities are an important tool of national power.

The United States should use the lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War to reorient, reprioritize, and reinvigorate its information efforts focused on friendly nations. This would include a national strategy for public diplomacy and information—one fit for this era of strategic competition. Such a strategy would allow the United States to better engage with allies and partners in building support against adversaries and threats. Further, increasing funding for information operations would help the US government keep pace with peer and near-peer competitors, like China, who aggressively fund and propagate their worldview. This threat has significant implications for US partners – particularly Taiwan – who face formidable challenges in effective messaging. Finally, the US must standardize and coordinate information operations across the whole-of-government. In the United States, public diplomacy and military information operations should work in tandem to achieve the government’s objectives.

Understanding Information Operations

Information Operations, broadly, are the use of information to gain competitive advantage for influence and effective decision-making by one’s own side, relative to potential adversaries. Two main actors – the Department of Defense and the State Department – oversee most of these operations; yet their definitions of what they comprise differ greatly. The US has no consistent definition of what, exactly, these operations are.

According to the Defense Department, information operations “influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.” In contrast, the State Department’s wider public diplomacy mandate attempts to “advance national interests by seeking to engage, inform, and understand the perspectives of foreign audiences.” Unlike traditional diplomacy between government officials, the emphasis here is on public engagement.

Not only do these diverging definitions reveal a disjointed approach to information operations within the US government, but these narrow views are also limiting: the military’s emphasis on adversary-driven operations fails to acknowledge the role of information operations among friendly nations. Not all information operations are malicious, and the information environment, even among allies, is a contested space. The State Department is less discriminating between friend and foe in its public diplomacy efforts. However, the notion of either overt or covert attempts at influence is generally viewed as detrimental to its mission. Unsurprisingly, the word “influence” is missing from its public diplomacy mandate.

The struggle to better coordinate information operations isn’t new. Military information efforts have traditionally been sidelined after major conflicts, and DoD remains embroiled in an ever-constant debate about what information warfare entails. Information efforts in friendly nations were historically the purview of the US Information Agency, which was established in the early years of the Cold War to integrate information capabilities and “to understand, inform, and influence foreign communities” in line with national foreign policy objectives. However, the end of the Cold War expedited the demise of the vast infrastructure and budget of the USIA. By 1999 the agency was disbanded, and the State Department assumed control of most public diplomacy efforts. Once absorbed, public diplomacy lost priority. Because of tensions ranging from shared budgets to cultural differences, the merging of the two entities reduced resourcing for US information efforts around the world. Since the agency’s closure, information operations have seen a steady decline in funding. When adjusted for inflation, the peak USIA budget of $1.5 billion in the mid-1990s would be closer to $3 billion today. By contrast, the most recent report from 2021 had the US public diplomacy budget at just $2.1 billion, and the budget estimate for military information operations in 2023 is approximately $250 million.

These efforts also suffer from a lack of leadership. For example, the position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has been vacant for roughly 40 percent of the time since the State Department took the lead in 1999. Without consistent leadership to guide the agency through challenges and controversies during the War on Terror, US public diplomacy has lacked the clear mission and consistent support required for strategic competition.

Ukraine’s Use of Information

Ukrainian operations underscore the importance of maintaining robust information capabilities in neutral or friendly states. Since the beginning of the war last year, the Ukrainian government has deftly used compelling narratives, such as that of the Snake Island defenders and the sinking of the Russian warship Moskva, to showcase the country’s existential struggle and to shape the narrative that it’s a worthy partner, deserving of international support.

From Postage Stamps to Missiles

On the first day of the invasion last year, Ukraine’s small military contingent on the island of Zmiinyi, or Snake Island, found itself in the crosshairs of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Surrounded, the Ukrainian defenders received an ultimatum from the Russian vessels, including the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva, to surrender or be bombed to submission. The Ukrainian defenders replied succinctly, with a phrase to, “Russian warship, go f— yourself.” The story and Hollywood-esque one-liner not only galvanized the Ukrainian people but also became an influential message used to build international support.

In the early days of the war, Russian propaganda fueled speculation that President Zelensky had fled Kyiv, and US intelligence expected the government to collapse within days. US officials were already preparing plans to support an insurgency after the fall of Ukraine. This Western pessimism frustrated Ukrainian officials who understood their position was untenable without international support.

Achieving success in information environments was, therefore, critical to minimizing despair and projecting an image of resilience, which in turn were critical to resisting Russia’s invasion. With the Snake Island story, the Ukrainian government transformed a strategic loss in the initial stages of the conflict into a powerful informational tool. Ukrainian officials posted the defiantly crass words of the soldiers on social media platforms, racking up thousands of likes and shares. The audio recording would eventually go viral, garnering millions of views. Other official channels, including the Ukrainian Strategic Communications Centre and a cadre of embassies around the world, supplemented this guerilla marketing campaign. The message of Ukrainian resolve resonated with international partners. Senior US defense officials, members of Congress, foreign ambassadors, and, more recently, a Latvian MP at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly have all used the tale of Snake Island to inspire support for Ukraine.

The sinking of the Battlecruiser Moskva by two Neptune anti-ship missiles in the Black Sea in April of last year was similarly leveraged by Ukrainian defense officials and news media as evidence of Ukraine’s military prowess and resilience. Memes depicting the attack were tweeted by Ukraine’s defense forces and a stamp depicting the incident was given to the UK Defence Secretary. The Moskva sinking not only tarnished the image of the Russian navy, but also shattered the myth of Russian supremacy in the Black Sea. Hailed as karmic justice, Ukrainian information operations amplified the victory in its messaging. Reinforcing this narrative shift, in turn, fueled political support and became a powerful symbol that resonated with the international community.

These information campaigns and stories spurred the growth of critical support networks for Ukraine that have helped purchase equipment and training for soldiers, along with drones and medical supplies. For example, Ukraine put the imagery of Snake Island to use in crowdfunding efforts around the world. Marketed on Twitter by the government, signed stamps showcasing the incident were auctioned, ultimately garnering $170,000 from international bids. Flags, hats, and other memorabilia adorned with Snake Island are part of a wider campaign that has raised millions of dollars for Ukraine and these efforts show no signs of slowing. Support has not been limited to funding, either. Using the Snake Island defenders’ last words, an inspired Georgian maintenance ship even refused to refuel a Russian ship.

While it is difficult to measure the impact of information operations on high-level decision-making, the Ukrainian government has widely employed stories such as that of Snake Island and the Moskva in its messaging to allies. The success of the country’s information campaign in generating awareness and developing pro-Ukrainian sentiment is meaningful, and likely has contributed to the scale of foreign aid received thus far. The United States alone has provided over $75 billion in aid, while E.U. Institutions and member states have contributed around €60 billion as of February 2023. Ukraine’s partners have also provided weaponry ranging from US High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Javelin anti-tank missiles to the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone. The delivery of modern equipment and weapons helped turn a Ukrainian military built from Soviet surplus into one with the ability to challenge Russian military might.

Reimagining Influence for Defense and Diplomacy

Ukraine’s success in influencing public opinion in friendly nations should act as a catalyst for the United States to reinvigorate its own information capabilities. While the United States has helped sway other states in support of Ukraine, this level of influence is not guaranteed in the long term. Even within NATO, there has been debate and dissent among member states regarding their role in the conflict. Domestic political concerns, economic pressures, and a variety of other factors have a significant impact on how nations perceive even shared threats. Outside of NATO, this is even more pronounced, as can be seen with the coordination of Chinese and Russian propaganda on Ukraine and its reception in Latin America and Africa.

There is little doubt that US information efforts could benefit from better coordination, reprioritization, and focus on the issues facing the United States in the 21st century. Information capabilities are at least as important now as they were during the Cold War. Reminiscent of this bygone era of systemic competition, the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy identifies authoritarian powers as “the most pressing strategic challenge” facing the United States and the rules-based international order. Effective messaging will prove consequential as the United States contends with capable competitors that weaponize information to undermine international security and weaken democracy worldwide.

Efforts to address this challenge should be open and honest. Ukrainian information operations show that informational engagement with allies and partners is one of the best ways to counter these malign powers. While adversaries promote false narratives, the United States should transparently leverage and expand its information apparatus to inform and build support for US policies.

The United States already has proof that targeted information campaigns work. The Biden Administration released intelligence prior to the Russian invasion last year that showed significant build-ups of Russian forces along Ukraine’s borders, which established a powerful narrative of Russian aggression. The DoD and State Department should build on this proven success. Competitors, such as China, see information warfare as an essential component of international relations. The United States should take a similar view if it wants to effectively compete for influence in the information domain. To do this, the US government should develop a national strategy for public diplomacy and the information domain to align and amplify interagency efforts to inform, influence, and coalesce support among allies. This will be critical to forming the “strongest possible coalitions,” outlined in the National Security Strategy.

Once the United States develops a cohesive strategy for information operations, its information infrastructure should be revitalized. Coordination could take place within the National Security Council, which would help to better integrate these efforts across the US government. Oversight of government information operations in a multi-agency forum could also ensure better alignment between policies and the information strategy needed to support them. As others have suggested, multi-agency groups such as the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, which currently focus on countering malign adversary influence, could also support US efforts in friendly information environments.

As Ukraine has shown, military information operations and public diplomacy efforts require close coordination, as these efforts increasingly engage with similar audiences. And the impact of social media cannot be understated. From viral videos of Russian war crimes to TikToks of soldiers dancing, military operations and stories are increasingly available and influential to the public. Learning from Ukraine, the US military could create a cadre of content-creating soldiers, for example, to influence and inform friendly audiences of US policy and feed content across the US government using institutionalized information-sharing pipelines. The synchronization of military and diplomatic information operations is a potent feature of Ukraine’s efforts. It should shape the United States’ own information campaigns going forward.

The United States’ ability to revamp its information operations will have significant impact on potential future conflicts, such as in Taiwan. Adversaries like China are watching closely and learning from both Russia’s costly mistakes and Ukraine’s effective innovations. Granted, Ukraine benefits from its proximity to NATO and the European Union, while Taiwan suffers from a stronger adversary and a weaker regional support network. However, these differences only make the role of information more important. For example, China, at present, is significantly more capable than Taiwan at influencing regional actors. The ability of Taiwan and the United States to muster international support in the face of Chinese aggression will be essential. The Chinese Communist Party will, no doubt, try to exploit divisions and weaken international resolve in support of Taiwan. Learning from Ukraine’s informational success will allow the United States to broaden international understanding and support for democratic partners, like Taiwan, who are under threat.

Daniel Grobarcik is a research associate with the Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute at the US Naval War College.

The views expressed in this essay do not represent the official position(s) of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

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irregularwarfare.org · by Daniel Grobarcik · June 15, 2023

18. With War Next Door, Poland Wants More from NATO

With War Next Door, Poland Wants More from NATO

Its ambassador to NATO says investment, weapons, and a real commitment to Ukrainian membership are some of Warsaw’s asks for the upcoming summit.

defenseone.com · by Kevin Baron

Poland has long understood “the bargain” with Europe: if the Russians invade, Poles would likely be first in the line of fire. So post-Cold War Poland quickly signed up to receive protection from the toughest neighborhood gang: NATO.

Today, as NATO nations arm neighboring Ukraine for its battle with Russia, all eyes, roads, and most weapons lead through Poland. The day after visiting Kyiv in February, President Joe Biden took to an outdoor stage in Warsaw and delivered a Kennedy-esque address. “Knowing who stands with you makes all the difference. The people of Poland know that…more than anybody,” Biden said.

Now, with a NATO summit only weeks away, Poland is coming to Vilnius with hat in hand, expecting to be armed, equipped, and backed by their transatlantic partners more than ever. Warsaw wants to see movement toward admitting Ukraine to the alliance, and in the meantime, new investments and unprecedented cooperation among Europe’s defense industry.

“We need to deliver on our promise” to Ukraine, said Tomasz Szatkowski, in an interview for the Defense One Tech Summit that aired on Wednesday. “We believe we need to show tangible progress” toward NATO membership.

An actual invitation is likely years away. While some European leaders want a more formal security agreement—last month in Slovakia France’s President Emmanuel Macron said Ukraine should receive protection akin to something between full NATO membership and the security the West offers to Israel—Poland seems to be sticking with what already works.

“We believe that the best formula for guarantees in Europe is NATO,” said Szatkowski. “There are discussions on some sort of ‘coalition of the willing’-based guarantees or assurances that may be issued” between now and the end of the war, for long-term commitments.

“This is a very sensitive issue,” he said.

Indeed, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and other member ambassadors are flying to world capitals, making their pitches to shape the package of support NATO will pledge to Ukraine in Vilnius. Membership seems off the table, but upgrading Ukraine’s forum to speak at NATO from a commission to a council—similar to the former status NATO granted to Russia—is one change that could happen.

Executing many of those decisions will fall to the next NATO secretary general, and Poland already is having a big impact on picking the nominee and winner. Jens Stoltenberg is expected to step down from his extra-long tenure, but his replacement remains undecided. Poland opposes one front runner, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, partly because the last two SecGens have come from Scandinavian countries. The other top contender is the popular Prime Minister Kaja Kallas of Estonia.

In other words, Poland is flexing its muscles to get more of what it wants. Szatkowski reminds that this is Poland’s role in “the bargain” of European security, pointing especially to land forces, air defenses, and cyber capabilities.

“Poland is, in a way, destined to have greater responsibility” for a land war. “We basically have to provide the mass, the firepower for any sort of Western coalition in the East—we are the lynchpin of the Eastern front.” While they expect to fight alongside exquisite U.S. capabilities, Poland armed forces planners have goals: 1,500 modern tanks after 2023, the 2nd-largest Apache helo fleet in the world, largest self-propelled artillery, and so on.

Poland is buying U.S.- and Korean-made weapons and systems, but is inking deals to co-manufacture some of those items for itself.

“We are trying to find a balance,” he said, between expanding capabilities as soon as possible through “very rapid procurement of some of the capabilities off-the-shelf,” from the U.S. and South Korea and “trying to build the defense industrial base, to produce farther systems and maintain them in the country.”

Atop Poland’s wish list: Abrams tanks, but also longer-term contracts with South Korean industry to build tanks and give them a foothold in Europe.

“We are now in the finance stage of negotiating a deal on building the entire production chain for their K-2 [Black Panther] tanks in Poland. Same goes to rocket artillery.” Soon, HIMARS systems will be based on a Poland chassis with Polish target-acquisition system, and they’re talking to Lockheed about making missiles in Poland.

“Europe didn’t have what we need. There is an absolute shortage of spare parts for the systems we do have,” he said, declining to name which weapons system.

The shortfalls highlight the difficulty of arming Europe, much less an autonomous Europe in the near future–the age-old problem of convincing countries to work in joint development of weapons instead of competing to make them.

“We have declared that we are very much interested in joining the project of the next European tank, but there was no willingness among the European partners. They basically wanted to develop the tank on their own. So that left us seeking solutions elsewhere.” Hence the Abrams buys. Poland will be the first European ally to operate them.

NATO’s role in solving that problem is mostly advisory. “NATO cannot solve it in a kind of decisive manner. NATO can provide a platform. NATO can incentivize. NATO can provide greater awareness of those issues. NATO can provide common standards.” But NATO members have failed each other, so far, he said.

For more advanced capabilities, he said, the United States has the benefit of a mature start-up ecosystem that is better suited for developing dual-use and joint efforts. Before Europe can create over-the-horizon technologies, it still has to figure out how to solve problems left over from the last century, like fixing mismatched railway gauges and buying matching 155mm artillery shells.

“It’s like a Sisyphean effort,” he said.

defenseone.com · by Kevin Baron

19. Does Economic Deterrence Work? Understanding the West’s Assumptions About Keeping Russia in Check

Excerpts:

Putin and Russia’s disregard for the global economic threats challenge previously held assumptions about the utility of economic deterrence as a practical foreign policy tool. Economic threats failed to dissuade Russia from using aggression, and the result is a world that is now less interconnected, less safe, and less prosperous.

But deterrence is only effective if an adversary correctly assesses the severity and credibility of those who threaten it. An adversary must believe that the actor is willing to follow through on its threats and that the resultant harm would exceed the expected benefits of non-compliance. Putin—guided by logical but incorrect assessments—neither believed those who threatened Russia were willing to act or that they could cause any real harm. These proved costly miscalculations.

However, miscalculations of this magnitude on the global stage are not routine. Every nation is driven by the rational needs of survival and prosperity, and these can seldom be met without complete inclusion into today’s global economy. Open access to international trade and global supply chains are powerful motivators that nations will rarely risk. This is in many ways evidenced by the significant decline in state wars since the era of globalization.

Economic deterrence, thus, remains an effective—though not foolproof—foreign policy tool. Russia’s disregard for economic deterrence and its subsequent economic decline and international exile serves as an example of the risk of defiance and hostility.

Does Economic Deterrence Work? Understanding the West’s Assumptions About Keeping Russia in Check

thestrategybridge.org · June 15, 2023

“I’ve been absolutely clear with President Putin…he has no misunderstanding: Any, any assembled Russian units move across the Ukrainian border, that is an invasion [and would be met with] severe and coordinated economic response.”

—U.S. President Joseph Biden, January 20, 2022.[1]

In the lead-up to the February 24, 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Western nations threatened Russia with severe economic sanctions, export controls, and other punitive economic measures if it proceeded with an invasion. These threats were ignored. Over a year into the invasion, Russia’s economy and war-fighting capabilities are hurting. Punitive economic measures by the West have shut Russia out of the global economy and challenged its ability to profit from oil sales, import critical technology, and finance its war effort.

Russia has also been embarrassed on the battlefield and diplomatically shunned by most of the world’s leading nations. These frayed commercial partnerships and political outcasting have altered Russia’s future and likely relegated it to a third-rate power posturing behind the shadow of its once powerful empire. This is certainly not the outcome President Vladimir Putin envisioned on the eve of invasion.[2] How did he get it so wrong?

Below I explore Russia’s three logical—but incorrect—assessments about the war that led it to disregard the economic threats against it. I also explore what Russia’s aggression in the face of economic threats means about the effectiveness and utility of economic deterrence as a foreign policy tool.[3]

Russia’s Incorrect Assessments

Among the many incorrect assessments Russia made about the war was underestimating the resistance it would face from Ukrainian armed forces, underestimating the impact of the West’s punitive economic measures on the Russian economy, and overestimating its own leverage in preventing the West from interfering in its attempted conquest of Ukraine.

Length of War

Ukrainian servicemen sit atop armored personnel carriers driving on a road in the Donetsk region, eastern Ukraine, Thursday, Feb. 24, 2022 (Vadim Ghirda/AP)

Russian military strategists believed Ukraine was militarily weak and Russian armed forces would quickly overrun them, much as they had done in their 2014 invasion of Crimea.[4] Putin counted on a quick takeover that would avoid prolonged war expenses and minimize the possibility of a collective military counteraction from the West.

In the year after its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s assessment proved wholly wrong. Ukrainian and Russian forces are now at a virtual standstill with many observers expecting a sustained and lengthy war.[5] Its military has made minimal territorial gains against capable Ukrainian forces bolstered by Western security assistance and funding.[6]

The apparent culmination of conflict, which is ongoing as of this writing, has incentivized the West to continue punitive economic measures against Russia. These measures targeted Russia’s defense-related industries, including the electronics, automotive, and aerospace industries, cutting them off from essential imports used in conventional and advanced Russian weapons.[7] The Kremlin turned to inferior replacements from Iran, North Korea, and China.[8] By forcing the use of low-grade components, these attacks on Russia’s military supply chains have compounded the apparent downward spiral in Russia’s combat performance.[9] These measures have also created a significant strain on Russia’s fiscal circumstances, as they must now pay for an expensive war of attrition with declining revenues.

Scope and Impact of Economic Measures

Russia’s second incorrect assessment was underestimating the scope and impact of Western punitive economic measures on its economy and war effort.

Russia was on the receiving end of Western economic sanctions after its 2014 invasion of Crimea. However, these sanctions were generally limited to non-critical industries because Russian oil was sufficiently important to the West as a stabilizer of global crude oil prices and European markets.[10]

Eight years later, Russia—still convinced of its irreplaceable centrality at the center of European oil markets—expected a similar global response in the leadup to its invasion of Ukraine. It further hedged its bets by seeking closer trading partnerships with China, Turkey, and India, and by creating a Russian-led alternative to SWIFT—the global payment communication system used in international trade.[11]

However, these efforts to shield its economy were insufficient to protect against the unified efforts of the Western powers given the prolonged and indefinite nature of the war.[12]

States in the Western coalition imposed a series of cascading punitive economic measures against Russia less than 24 hours into the invasion. These measures included sanctioning almost 80 percent of Russian industries and their third-party facilitators, freezing Russian foreign assets and price capping Russian oil.[13]

Sanctions and price caps on Russia’s oil industry have been particularly painful for Russia.[14] The oil and gas sector makes up about 20 percent of Russia’s GDP and revenue from these accounts for almost 45 percent of its federal budget.[15] Over half of Russian oil is exported, with Europe responsible for over 60 percent of these purchases.[16] A year into the invasion, Russian energy sales are down almost 45 percent from the same period a year earlier, despite sharp increases in global oil prices.[17] Many other export-reliant Russian industries have likewise suffered, and the Russian economy contracted by over three percent in 2022.[18]

Russia has struggled to avoid the West’s punitive economic measures. Economic sanctions limit Russia’s ability to do business internationally, take out loans, and attract global investment. International firms do not want to run afoul of Western sanctions or accept payment in a restricted and unstable Russian currency.[19]

Furthermore, the loss of the European market presents a severe economic challenge: While Russia’s partnerships with friendly non-Western countries have helped buoy its economy in the short-term, Europe is too large and important a commercial market to be replaced for any meaningful period of time.[20] China, India, and Turkey—the largest friendly markets now available—have their own established sources of energy imports and are unlikely to decouple these entirely.[21] Moreover, as Russia’s global business partners dwindle, so too does its leverage to negotiate prices. It has already had to offer significant concessions and discounts for its oil, often doing so at unprofitable amounts.[22] The Russian economy will remain dependent on selling its oil to a global market that is now smaller and less competitive.

Europe’s Reliance on Russian Gas

Russia’s third incorrect assessment was believing that Europe would hesitate to oppose it because of Europe’s reliance on Russian gas, much as it had after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Gas is used for heating homes and buildings and is particularly important during the winter months. With Russia providing almost half of Europe’s gas imports prior to the invasion, Europe could ill afford to lose this critical supply—or so the reasoning went.[23]

But European states have been able to wean themselves off Russian gas by gradually substituting it with liquified natural gas brought in by sea from the U.S. and Qatar.[24] While liquified natural gas is generally more expensive than pipeline-based natural gas owing to its higher production and transportation costs, it presented Europe with a viable supply alternative.

Europe also benefited from 2022’s warm winter, reducing the demand for gas and minimizing the physical suffering of European residents who might have otherwise pressured their leaders into caving to Russian demands.[25]

Freedom from Russian supply chain dependency allowed Europe to participate fully in the global backlash to Russia’s aggression. The closure of its vast market to Russian oil stripped Russia of a significant revenue stream that is not easily replaced and removed a source of funding for its war effort.

Yamal LNG plant in the Russian Arctic (Novatek)

Punitive Economic Measures Are Working

Despite the severe economic measures taken against it, Russia’s economy has not collapsed. In fact, it is forecasted to grow in 2023, driven by favorable revenue from high global oil prices. Above all, Russia’s ability and willingness to wage war rages on.

Some critics point to this as evidence that punitive economic measures are not effective at causing real harm.[26] However, these accusations are incomplete as they fail to recognize that the effects of punitive economic measures on a country’s economy take time to materialize.[27] Regardless of its short-term durability, the Russian economy is projected to lose approximately $190 billion in GDP—or an 8 percent decline—by 2026 relative to its pre-war projections.[28] The loss of high-end technology imports, foreign capital investment, leading multinational corporations, and talented professionals will likely limit Russia’s ability to keep pace in the global economy in the present decade and likely longer.

While the acquisition of territory in Ukraine would serve as a physical buffer for Russia against supposed NATO encroachment, its economic benefits will hardly improve Russia’s financial position. The estimated economic loss for Russia within the initial three years post-invasion alone exceeds the value of the entire Ukrainian economy.[29]

Russia’s actions have rendered it politically and economically isolated, with few friends, limited commercial and financial markets, substandard supply chains, and an economy overleveraged on a single industry.[30] Russia is a nation that is, at best, economically handicapped and, at worst, in steady economic and power decline.[31]

U.S. Senator John McCain once called Russia “a gas station masquerading as a country.”[32] Today, it is worse than that. The gas station is losing money and selling to fewer customers.

So Does Economic Deterrence Work? It Depends.

Putin and Russia’s disregard for the global economic threats challenge previously held assumptions about the utility of economic deterrence as a practical foreign policy tool. Economic threats failed to dissuade Russia from using aggression, and the result is a world that is now less interconnected, less safe, and less prosperous.

But deterrence is only effective if an adversary correctly assesses the severity and credibility of those who threaten it. An adversary must believe that the actor is willing to follow through on its threats and that the resultant harm would exceed the expected benefits of non-compliance. Putin—guided by logical but incorrect assessments—neither believed those who threatened Russia were willing to act or that they could cause any real harm. These proved costly miscalculations.

However, miscalculations of this magnitude on the global stage are not routine. Every nation is driven by the rational needs of survival and prosperity, and these can seldom be met without complete inclusion into today’s global economy. Open access to international trade and global supply chains are powerful motivators that nations will rarely risk. This is in many ways evidenced by the significant decline in state wars since the era of globalization.

Economic deterrence, thus, remains an effective—though not foolproof—foreign policy tool. Russia’s disregard for economic deterrence and its subsequent economic decline and international exile serves as an example of the risk of defiance and hostility.

Jerry Garzon is a graduate student in the Security Studies Program at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. His academic interests include the study of international economics and U.S. national security policy.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

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Header Image: Russian Money, Moscow, Russia 2022 (Vardan Papikyan).

Notes:

[1] Holland, Steve. "Biden Says Any Russian Movement into Ukraine Will Be Considered Invasion." Reuters. January 20, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/biden-says-any-russian-movement-into-ukraine-will-be-considered-invasion-2022-01-20.

[2] Lieven, Anatol. "For Years, Putin Didn’t Invade Ukraine. What Made Him Finally Snap in 2022?" The Guardian. February 23, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/24/vladimir-putin-invade-ukraine-2022-russia.

[3] Schott, Jeffrey J. "Biden Says Any Russian Movement into Ukraine Will Be Considered Invasion." Peterson Institute for International Economics. February 1, 2022. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/will-tough-us-sanctions-deter-russian-aggression-ukraine.

[4] Cancian, Mark F. "Putin’s Invasion Was Immoral but Not Irrational." Center for Strategic & International Studies. May 10, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/putins-invasion-was-immoral-not-irrational.

[5] Wilson, Peter A., and William Courtney. "How the War in Ukraine Could End Sooner Than Expected." The RAND Blog. RAND Corporation, January 7, 2023. https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/01/how-the-war-in-ukraine-could-end-sooner-than-expected.html.

[6] Landay, Johnathon. "Ukrainians Celebrate Soldiers Retaking Kherson, Russia's Latest Defeat." Reuters. November 11, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-urges-ukraine-be-open-talks-with-russia-washington-post-2022-11-06/.

[7] "The Impact of Sanctions and Export Controls on the Russian Federation." U.S. Department of State. October 20, 2022. https://www.state.gov/the-impact-of-sanctions-and-export-controls-on-the-russian-federation/.

[8] Barnes, Julian E. "Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to U.S. Intelligence." The New York Times. September 5, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html.

[9] O'Toole, Brian, and Daniel Fried. "Sanctions Alone Won’t Defeat Russia in Ukraine. But They’re Having a Bigger Impact than It Might Seem." Atlantic Council. February 23, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sanctions-alone-wont-defeat-russia-in-ukraine-but-theyre-having-a-bigger-impact-than-it-might-seem/.

[10] Hanousek, Jan, and Matěj Bělín. "Making Sanctions Bite: The EU–Russian Sanctions of 2014." Center of Economic Policy Research. April 29, 2019. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/making-sanctions-bite-eu-russian-sanctions-2014.

[11] Some Russian banks and companies were kicked out of SWIFT in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea; "Russia and Iran Launch Payment System as an Alternative to Swift." Middle East Eye. January 30, 2023. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/russia-and-iran-launch-payment-system-alternative-swift; Gamino, Lazaro, and Ana Swanson. "How Russia Pays for War." The New York Times. October 30, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/10/30/business/economy/russia-trade-ukraine-war.html; McElwee, Lily, Maria Snegovaya, Alexandra Chopenko, and Tina Dolbaia. "How Russia Pays for War." Center for Strategic & International Studies. March 28, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/xi-goes-moscow-marriage-inconvenience.

[12] "EU Sanctions against Russia Explained." Council of the European Union. March 15, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/.; "FACT SHEET: United States, G7 and EU Impose Severe and Immediate Costs on Russia." The White House. April 6, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/06/fact-sheet-united-states-g7-and-eu-impose-severe-and-immediate-costs-on-russia/.

[13] "Targeting Key Sectors, Evasion Efforts, and Military Supplies, Treasury Expands and Intensifies Sanctions Against Russia." U.S. Department of the Treasury. February 24, 2023. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1296; Gilman, Azure. "Russia’s Economy Is on Track to Lose $190 Billion as Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine Becomes a Slow Motion Financial Crisis." Fortune. February 17, 2023. https://fortune.com/2023/02/17/economy-economy-losing-190-billion-putin-ukraine-invasion/; "UK and Coalition Partners Announce Price Caps on Russian Oil Products." Government of the United Kingdom. February 3, 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-coalition-partners-announce-price-caps-on-russian-oil-products

[14] "FACT SHEET: Disrupting and Degrading – One Year of U.S. Sanctions on Russia and Its Enablers." U.S. Department of the Treasury. February 24, 2023. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1298.

[15] Other sources listed this as 40 percent of Russia’s economy in 2018: "Russia’s Economy Is Becoming Heavily Dependent on Hydrocarbons." Warsaw Institute. February 24, 2020. https://warsawinstitute.org/russias-economy-becoming-heavily-dependent-hydrocarbons/; "Share of the Oil and Gas Industry in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Russia from 1st Quarter 2017 to 3rd Quarter 2022." Statista. March 23, 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1322102/gdp-share-oil-gas-sector-russia/; https://www.iea.org/articles/energy-fact-sheet-why-does-russian-oil-and-gas-matter

[16] "Energy Fact Sheet: Why Does Russian Oil and Gas Matter?" International Energy Agency. March 21, 2022. https://www.iea.org/articles/energy-fact-sheet-why-does-russian-oil-and-gas-matter; "Oil Market and Russian Supply." International Energy Agency. February 2, 2022. https://www.iea.org/reports/russian-supplies-to-glbal-energy-markets/oil-market-and-russian-supply-2.

[17] Korsunskaya, Darya, and Jake Cordell. "Western Sanctions Push Russia's Energy Revenues to Lowest since 2020." Reuters. February 3, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/western-sanctions-push-russias-energy-revenues-lowest-level-since-2020-2023-02-03/.

[18] For instance, Russia’s automobile industry, a multi-billion USD export-reliant industry employing millions of Russian workers, has suffered an estimated 97 percent loss of its value by the end of 2022 since the war’s start: "Russia's Car Manufacturing Collapses by 97% in May." The Moscow Times. June 30, 2022. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/30/russias-car-manufacturing-collapses-by-97-in-may-a78151; "Infographic - Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy." Council of the European Union. March 17, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/.

[19] The Russian Ruble has remained stable because of various capital controls placed on it by the Russian Central Bank, many of which are unsustainable and which create inflationary pressures within the economy: McCabe, Caitlin. "Russia’s Economy Is Tanking but the Ruble Soared. Here’s Why." The Wall Street Journal. May 26, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-economy-is-tankingbut-the-ruble-is-soaring-11653559916.

[20] For example, Russia has increased the transport of natural gas to China through the Power of Siberia pipeline, among many other projects: Rosen, Phil. "Explainer: Does China Need More Russian Gas via the Power-of-Siberia 2 Pipeline?" Reuters. March 2, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/does-china-need-more-russian-gas-via-power-of-siberia-2-pipeline-2023-03-22.

[21] China, for instance, only imported 15 percent of its petroleum and 10 percent of its natural gas from Russia in 2022, with the remaining needs being met by the Middle East and other nearby regions: "China: Executive Summary." Energy International Agency. August 8, 2022. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN.

[22] Rosen, Phil. "Russia Is Offering to Discount Its Oil by as Much as 30% for Asian Buyers as the G7 Pushes Its Price Cap." Business Insider. August 24, 2022. https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/commodities/russian-oil-discount-asia-buyers-price-cap-sanctions-china-india-2022-8.

[23] "How Europe Can Cut Natural Gas Imports from Russia Significantly within a Year." International Energy Agency. March 3, 2022. https://www.iea.org/news/how-europe-can-cut-natural-gas-imports-from-russia-significantly-within-a-year.

[24] Horton, Jake, and Daniele Palumbo. "Russia Sanctions: What Impact Have They Had on Its Oil and Gas Exports?" BBC News. January 26, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/58888451.

[25] Reed, Stanley. "Why Natural Gas Prices in Europe Are Suddenly Plunging." The New York Times. November 10, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/25/business/europe-gas-prices-winter.html.

[26] Only the International Money Fund forecasts an increase in Russia’s GDP. Two other major global finance organizations predict a further contraction of up to 5 percent in 2023; Much of Russia’s oil revenue in 2022 occurred prior to the implementation of a price cap, as well as through sanctions evasions by Russian firms through temporary financial loopholes and capital restrictions and foreign reserve sales by Russia’s Central Bank.

[27] Snegovaya, Maria, Tina Dolbaia, Nick Fenton, and Max Bergmann. "Russia Sanctions at One Year." Center for Strategic & International Studies. February 23, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-sanctions-one-year.

[28] Gilman, Azure. "Russia’s Economy Is on Track to Lose $190 Billion as Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine Becomes a Slow Motion Financial Crisis." Fortune. February 17, 2023. https://fortune.com/2023/02/17/economy-economy-losing-190-billion-putin-ukraine-invasion/.

[29] Russia is expected to lose $190 billion by 2026. The GDP of Ukraine in 2021 was $200 billion.; Williams, Michael J. "How Putin’s Fear of Democracy Convinced Him to Invade Ukraine." Atlantic Council. March 6, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-putins-fear-of-democracy-convinced-him-to-invade-ukraine/.

[30] O'Toole, Brian, and Daniel Fried. "Sanctions Alone Won’t Defeat Russia in Ukraine. But They’re Having a Bigger Impact than It Might Seem." Atlantic Council. February 23, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sanctions-alone-wont-defeat-russia-in-ukraine-but-theyre-having-a-bigger-impact-than-it-might-seem/.; Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey, and Steven Tian. "Actually, the Russian Economy Is Imploding." Foreign Policy. August 1, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/.

[31] Snegovaya, Maria, Tina Dolbaia, Nick Fenton, and Max Bergmann. "Russia Sanctions at One Year." Center for Strategic & International Studies. February 23, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-sanctions-one-year.

[32] Everett, Burgess. "McCain: Russia Is a ‘Gas Station’." Politico. March 26, 2014. https://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/john-mccain-russia-gas-station-105061.

thestrategybridge.org · June 15, 2023

20. How the war in Ukraine is impacting security in the Indo-Pacific

How the war in Ukraine is impacting security in the Indo-Pacific - Breaking Defense

At this year's Shangri-La Diaglogue, it was impossible to escape talk of the conflict thousands of miles away.

breakingdefense.com · by Reuben Johnson · June 14, 2023

Chinese president Xi Jinping and a PLA Navy honor guard await the King of Bahrain (Photo by Feng Li/Getty Images)

SHANGRI-LA — The annual Shangri-La Dialogue Asia-Pacific Security Conference has traditionally been the central meeting for those interested in national security issues for the Indo-Pacific region. So it was striking just how much of the discussion at this year’s conference was about the conflict happening thousands of miles away on another continent: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Numerous discussions at Shangri-La either by accident or by design ended up wandering into the territory of “what does the Ukraine conflict tell us about the potential for a conflict in our own backyard.” Sideline conversations similarly ended up in that territory. Ukrainian officials could be seen sprinkled throughout the crowd, working to shore up regional support.

Participants and delegates to the Singapore event who talked with Breaking Defense were largely in agreement that this European war has raised the level of anxiety about existing tensions in Asia, with three key focus areas.

The first is the uncomfortable reality, articulated in several public forums ahead of Shangri-La by former EUCOM Commander and retired US Army Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, that the Russian invasion of Ukraine “is what failed deterrence looks like.” One senior staff member from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), one of Singapore’s largest foreign policy think-tanks, echoed this to Breaking Defense by saying Ukraine has “shown decision makers in the region that the supposedly ‘unthinkable’ possibility of a major war in which at least one of the protagonists is a nuclear power is now very much a terrifying current-day reality.” And that staff member was not alone in drawing a direct line to thinking about China and Taiwan.

A second issue raised by multiple individuals is that unlike Europe there is no Asian defensive alliance analogous to NATO that could balance the security situation between collective groups of smaller nations and the PRC. The Indo-Pacific is largely defined by its bilateral or trilateral relationships; ASEAN, which brings together a number of smaller countries in the region, is a purely political organization with no NATO-like “Article 5” component as part of its charter.

It is interesting to note that Japan seems to be working to increase its ties with the Atlantic alliance. In May, the UK and Japan signed a new agreement on strategic partnership and pledged “to deepen NATO-Japan cooperation” by having the alliance open a Liaison Office in Tokyo. Japan is also now part of a joint program with the UK and Italy, the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), to develop a new stealthy, 6th-generation platform that would eventually replace the Eurofighter.

During a panel session on the second day of the conference, the UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, who is one of leading contenders to become the next General Secretary of the alliance, commented on the development and stated a liaison office in island nation’s capital “is in the interest of NATO” and “important for a number of issues.”

One of those benefits, said Wallace, “is to share the knowledge of the threat,” pointing towards Russia moving parts of its naval fleet into the Pacific. He also referred to the “High North,” shorthand for the territories of the Nordic countries (home to the two newest NATO-membership aspirants Sweden and Finland) and the recent moves by both Russia and the PRC to expand their presence in the Europe-to-Asia trade routes that run through this region.

Finally, a third concern raised by those who spoke to Breaking Defense was the growing relations between Russia and Indo-Pacific nations. Trade between Russia and India has increased more than 300 percent since Moscow’s invasion, including a ten-fold increase in the purchases of oil by New Delhi. Russian oil represented only two percent of Indian petroleum imports in 2021 but are now over 20 percent. Indian defense specialists who spoke to Breaking Defense also point to the effort by Moscow to keep India dependent on spare parts and technical assistance for the many Russian weapons platforms in Indian inventory.

For its part, the PRC has continued to support Russia with semi-surreptitious transfers of materiel and other military-related items. In late 2022 Ukraine press outlets published flight track records for several Russian Antonov An-124 cargo lifters that had visited Zhengzhou, which is a key air freight hub between the PRC and Europe, nine times in seven days. Most of the return flights to Russia were not capable of being tracked due to the aircraft transponders being switched off in violation of international aviation conventions.

As recently as April, the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell called out Beijing for its support of Moscow in its invasion of and war on Ukraine, and labelled the Chinese actions as “a blatant violation” of its United Nations commitments.

More recently, it was revealed that the PRC was supplying components to Iran for use in the suicide strike drones being supplied to Russia in large numbers despite warnings from the US to cut off these shipments. In April, an Iranian drone shot down by Ukrainian air defense units was found by researchers with Conflict Armament Research, a UK-based weapons design analysis group that tracks defense industry supply chains, to contain a voltage converter made in the PRC in mid-January. It was the first time a component manufactured in the same year had been found in the configuration of one of these drones.

Indonesia’s Mysterious Peace Plan

On the second day of the conference Indonesian defense minister Prabowo Subianto departed from the planned agenda of regional issues in Asia and announced a peace plan to bring a cessation to the hostilities in the Russia-Ukraine war. His proposal included a ceasefire and creation of a demilitarized zone by having both sides withdraw 15 kilometers from their current forward positions.

Prabowo then called for the newly-demilitarized zone to be monitored by a UN peacekeeping force, followed by a UN-sponsored referendum “to ascertain objectively the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of the various disputed areas. I propose that the Shangri-La dialogue find a mode of … voluntary declaration urging both Ukraine and Russia to immediately start negotiations for peace,” he said.

The Indonesian defense chief stated the war has a global impact and “has affected the livelihoods of all the peoples of the world. The price of energy has gone up, the price of food has gone up. This has resulted in much suffering for many peoples of the world.”

The plan met with no enthusiasm and a healthy level of disdain by the Ukrainians in the audience. Some officials from Kyiv present criticized the Indonesian initiative for not condemning Moscow’s invasion and making no mention of the thousands of documented cases of Russian war crimes. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Oleg Nikolenko, dismissed the idea of holding referendums in the Russian-occupied areas, telling the media, “there are no disputed territories between Ukraine and the Russian Federation [within which] to hold referendums.”

“In the occupied territories, the Russian army commits war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Russia is now trying in every possible way to disrupt the Ukrainian counteroffensive,” Nikolenko stated.

But perhaps the strongest condemnation came later in the same day during a break-out session that included Ukraine’s Defense Minister, Oleksii Reznikov. He declared that Indonesia had not consulted or discussed any of the details of this plan with Ukraine before Probowo made it public that morning.

“This sounds like a Russian plan — not an Indonesian plan,” said Reznikov. “He did not discuss it with us. Also, we do not believe Russians in negotiations … Our position is the first step in any negotiations will take place when the Russians have left every piece of Ukraine territory, when they have left all areas – including Crimea, Donetsk, Lugansk. Then when the war is over, we will sit at the table with our partners. And we will discuss ‘peaceful coexistence’ along with the subjects of reparations and a war crimes tribunal.”

Subsequent reporting in the largest Singapore news outlet, The Straits Times, points to a Russian hand behind this Indonesian initiative and detailing the Asian archipelago nation’s long history of ties with Moscow, many of which are related to arms purchases.

Russia’s Rosoboronexport has been increasingly desperate in trying to hold on to its defense export customers in Indonesia, as Jakarta has been negotiating for purchases of both the US Boeing F-15EX and the French Rafale as replacements for their Sukhol Su-27 and Su-30-series models.

One of the PRC’s highest-ranking participants, former Vice Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the US, Cui Tiankai, participated on the same panel with Reznikov. But his response was “predictably condescending,” said another attendee, a senior fellow at one of Singapore’s leading foreign policy think-tanks commented.

The PRC former diplomat somewhat undiplomatically refused categorically a suggestion that Beijing act as an intermediary that could talk to the Russians about the errors of their ways.

“We are not imposing our ideas on Russia, as if we are the older brother,” he responded. “This is not our tradition.”

Instead, he turned to his European colleagues and stated “I don’t think you are managing effectively and constructively your security situation. A better word for it will be ‘mismanaging’ it. You see the outcome: it’s hurting everybody.”

“We used to look to Europe for their experience in regional integration, but nowadays, people in Europe and the Atlantic, can look to us,” he continued. “We should also learn something, a very important something, from your lack of success. I don’t want to use the word ‘failure’, but lack of success.”

Ukraine has tried to maintain a working relationship when the PRC proposes itself as a peace mediator, but this may now be challenged by the position of Beijing regarding US fighter aircraft now approved for Kyiv’s air force.

“The US move to enable the supply of Western jets to Ukraine could intensify the conflict and render Beijing’s mediation efforts futile, casting a shadow over China’s image as a peace broker,” Singapore’s Channel New Asia (CNA), which is known for taking a pro-PRC stance on certain issues, commented in the week after Shangri-La Dialogue. If the PRC continue to oppose the introduction of more advanced weapon by the US, it is likely to be a departure point for Ukraine looking to Beijing to play a constructive role in ending the conflict.

breakingdefense.com · by Reuben Johnson · June 14, 2023

21. The Other Counteroffensive to Save Ukraine

Excerpts:

Russia may retaliate against state countermeasures. But to an extent, it already has by illegally seizing foreign-owned private property. Any further nationalization efforts would complete the painful economic divorce from Europe, North America, and Japan that Russia set in motion when it expanded its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Russia has no good defense to avoid compensating those whose property it has expropriated. Finland and Germany have not invaded anybody. Depending on the specifics of investment agreements, arbitration tribunals may start handing down judgments against Russia. If Russia does not compensate its victims, their claims may join others stemming from the war that could be considered by a claims process funded with transferred Russian assets. Expropriation claims could also lead to court judgments targeting still unfrozen Russian property.

In addition to Russian retaliation, some countries may fear the precedent they would set by transferring Russian assets, worrying that other aggrieved countries might nationalize foreign property as a state countermeasure to gain reparations for past wrongs. Yet this is an old issue. For generations, states have nationalized foreign properties they regard as wrongfully acquired or as legacies of imperialism. In some cases, negotiations after such seizures have eventually led to compensation. In others, they have not. Few who study what happens to countries such as Venezuela that conduct uncompensated nationalizations will wish to imitate those examples. Governments welcome or tolerate foreign investors because they believe it is in their interest to do so. They are unlikely to turn their backs on those investments, sacrificing their own well-being simply because a number of countries seized and transferred Russian assets to compensate victims of the Ukrainian war. As for more liquid financial assets, foreign states usually have jurisdiction over only the financial holdings of their own currencies. They do not have jurisdiction over accounts held in dollars, euros, yen, or sterling.

Far from a dangerous precedent, a transfer of Russian assets would be a powerful warning to other countries that may be considering wars of aggression. It would be a reminder of how costly it can be to assault global norms in a world that is still so deeply interconnected.

A new European recovery program centered on Ukraine and funded by Russian assets is not only a key to winning the peace; it is a key to winning the war and countering Moscow’s strategy of attrition and ruin. Russia left the means to sustain such a program in the hands of free countries. They should literally capitalize on that mistake.

The Other Counteroffensive to Save Ukraine

A New European Recovery Program

By Lawrence H. Summers, Philip Zelikow, and Robert B. Zoellick

June 15, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Lawrence H. Summers, Philip Zelikow, and Robert B. Zoellick · June 15, 2023

As Ukrainians risk their lives battling for national survival, the United States, European countries, and their allies should prepare a counteroffensive of their own against Russian aggression: a massive new European recovery program to begin operation by next year. This counteroffensive would be nonviolent, centered on economic and political reconstruction. But it would help secure a lasting Ukrainian victory. An ambitious recovery program that recalls the Marshall Plan would sustain Ukraine, make Europe more secure, brighten the future of surrounding regions, and revitalize the European project itself. That would be a real triumph over Russia’s effort to plunge Europe back into a darker age.

To give this plan credibility, Western countries should prepare to use frozen Russian assets to help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. The UN General Assembly has already endorsed an international mechanism for compensating Ukraine for loss, damage, and injury suffered during the war, and such a plan can give Moscow another opportunity to comply with its international obligations. But one way or another, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government, not Western taxpayers, should bear most of the costs.

Russia’s military strategy is to ruin Ukraine, outlast it in a war of attrition, and ensure that a free and growing Ukraine does not outshine Putin’s increasingly isolated and corrupt dictatorial regime. In February, the historian Stephen Kotkin told The New Yorker that the Ukrainians were not yet winning because “they need their house, and the Russians are wrecking it,” going on to describe Putin’s strategy as “‘I can’t have it? Nobody can have it!’”

Ukraine’s friends have not countered Russia’s strategy of wreckage. Ukraine lost 29 percent of its GDP in 2022. More than 13 million Ukrainians are displaced. The country’s private sector has been fundamentally damaged, and inflation is running at 27 percent.

The United States and EU countries have provided roughly $3 billion per month ($100 million per day) to keep Ukraine’s government functioning, since it cannot afford more debt. But the World Bank estimates that Ukraine will need about another $14 billion in grants just this year to meet its most urgent reconstruction needs. Over the next ten years, the World Bank reckons, Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction will cost more than $400 billion. And neither of those numbers includes the costs of rebuilding in Ukrainian territories currently occupied by Russia. Although much assistance could eventually come from private investors, private money will follow or be secured only by very large grants of public funds. Many needs, from rebuilding infrastructure to clearing explosives, will not be addressed by private investment at all.

Russia should bear the bulk of these costs. It is a circumstance unique in history that as it launched the largest international invasion since 1942, the aggressor left the means to compensate its victims in the jurisdiction of law-abiding states. Those now frozen Russian state financial assets probably total about $300 billion. Most of the funds are held in euros, with the bulk of these EU holdings concentrated in Belgium’s Euroclear clearing house. But significant Russian financial assets are also frozen in the United States, the United Kingdom (including the Cayman Islands), Switzerland, and several other countries.

It is not right or practical to expect Western taxpayers to foot the bill for reconstruction instead of Russia. The current U.S. Congress is unlikely to be as generous as the last one in passing supplemental appropriations for foreign economic assistance to Ukraine. Transferring frozen Russian reserves to Ukraine would be morally right, strategically wise, and politically expedient.

“AFTER THE VICTORY”

Ukrainians hope their future will be very different from their past. When they look ahead to what comes “after the victory,” as they like to put it, they want political reform as well as economic progress. A recovery program partially funded by Russia’s frozen assets should be created to help get them there.

The Marshall Plan is remembered as an enormous American program that helped Western Europe recover after World War II. But it followed a large multinational emergency humanitarian effort, led by the United States, that fed and sheltered millions of starving and displaced people in Europe and East Asia, including in China. To secure freedom’s victory and give European leaders a vital role in shaping their future, the Marshall Plan linked U.S. aid, mainly spent in the United States on goods for European delivery, to European designs for political and economic recovery, reform, and cooperation.

As missiles fly and tanks roll, it is natural to give less attention to reconstruction and recovery. But the true center of gravity in this war is Ukraine’s economic endurance and prospects, along with the scale and durability of outside support. Inside Ukraine, the needs are urgent. It will still take time to stand up a massive program, with a large role for Europeans and the European Union. It took a year for the Marshall Plan to go from words in a speech to operations on the ground. Regardless of whether the fighting has stopped, a new European recovery program, centered on rebuilding Ukraine, should be up and running by 2024.

FROM SANCTIONS TO COUNTERMEASURES

Russia’s dictatorship planned its program of imperial conquest even as it stored huge foreign exchange surpluses in banks in countries now rallying to help defend Ukraine. After Russia’s February 2022 invasion, those countries promptly froze or immobilized those assets in the sanctions phase of trying to persuade Moscow to abandon its war of aggression.

That phase has run its course. There is no scenario in which Russia gets its money back while its victims go uncompensated. The countries freezing the assets could defer this problem for months or years as Ukraine’s economy dies. But such a delay would only encourage Russia to continue its war of wreckage and test Ukraine’s staying power.

It is time to move from sanctions to state countermeasures. In his treatise on state responsibility for wrongful acts, the international legal scholar James Crawford described the imposition of sanctions as an “‘unfriendly’ but not unlawful act.” By contrast, he wrote, a countermeasure “may be defined as an act of non-compliance by a state with an international obligation owed towards another state in response to a prior breach of international law by that other state . . . [Countermeasures] are taken by states acting alone (or alongside other like-minded states) to seek protection or performance of international legal rights and obligations. The measures are adopted as a consequence of the view of the reacting state that the target state has committed an internationally wrongful act.”

In other words, bank robbers should not expect banks to honor their safe deposit boxes. Except in this case, the banks are national governments with jurisdiction over sovereign accounts they would ordinarily respect. Countermeasures are acts of state that suspend this usual regard, and as a report published by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy co-authored by one of us (Zelikow) points out, they have long been recognized as extrajudicial means of self-help in the international system. As long as the countermeasures are proportionate to the wrongs, they do not require judicial or arbitral processes to implement compensation.

Bank robbers should not expect banks to honor their safe deposit boxes.

Russia has already begun using state countermeasures, but against private property and in violation of international law. In April 2023, through a presidential decree, Russia began more openly taking control of foreign companies and private assets over which it has jurisdiction. This decree, first applied to companies from Finland and Germany, authorizes the Russian government to grab all private property owned by companies from countries defined as “unfriendly” because they joined in asset freezes, as all EU states did. Russia has justified this policy in the language of a state countermeasure, claiming it is “a response to the aggressive actions of unfriendly countries,” as a Kremlin spokesperson put it.

Those who oppose Russia’s aggression should proceed with lawful state countermeasures of their own, suspending their ordinary obligations toward Russian state accounts. Unlike Russia, G-7 governments and other like-minded partners would not go after private property unless its owners were surrogates of the Russian state or a court had found the basis for a civil or criminal forfeiture. But these states would transfer Russian state assets into escrow accounts not for their own enrichment but for the benefit of Moscow’s victims.

Such countermeasures would not be compulsory. As is typical, they would be handled outside the UN Security Council and the UN’s Chapter 7 processes, used for mandates and peacekeeping. But because the UN has established that Russia gravely breached the norms of international law and that this breach is a matter of common international concern, it has given member states the standing to act. And it has established that Russia has a duty to compensate the states injured by its aggression.

Ukraine’s friends have not countered Russia’s strategy of wreckage.

In parliamentary systems, state countermeasures can usually be taken through cabinet decisions or legislation. In presidential systems, executive emergency powers will likely suffice. Current American law already gives the U.S. president the power to order such transfers into escrow accounts, as President Ronald Reagan did with Iranian state funds in 1981 and President George H. W. Bush did with Iraqi state funds in 1992. Such measures do not run afoul of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, developed to shield foreign states from adjudication in other states’ courts. An act of state, moving against the accounts of another state, is different. Such acts are international political choices that are usually not reviewed by courts.

After Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, states adopted countermeasures after sanctions failed. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States led the way in transferring frozen Iraqi state funds to an international escrow account to provide compensation without Iraq’s voluntary consent. Similarly, Russia would be induced to do its duty and compensate its victims, either voluntarily or involuntarily. The aggressor’s rights do not take precedence over the rights of its victims.

Under ordinary circumstances, Russia could seek compensation for such transfers. But under international law, Russia is not entitled to compensation if the countermeasure is proportionate and prompted by Russia’s own grave breach of peremptory norms of international law—a breach that has already been affirmed by both the International Court of Justice and the United Nations. And because the countermeasures would transfer Russian assets into escrow for the benefit of its victims, not for the transferring state’s own public use, any Russian claims could be contrasted with the rights of those injured by Moscow’s aggression.

Justice further delayed will become justice denied.

Ukraine and other countries have already begun setting up a register of damages to undertake the laborious process of recording Ukrainian losses in preparation for an international claims process—for instance, through an international commission that could issue awards. But a long, drawn-out claims process alone cannot rapidly address the broad disruption of Ukraine’s economy and society. Through countermeasures, countries that have frozen Russian assets can flexibly fashion massive programs of reconstruction and recovery while also funding a process to compensate other injured states and claimants.

Some governments may prefer to wait to pursue countermeasures until the prospects for a negotiated settlement have improved. But the process of initiating countermeasures could by itself improve the outlook for negotiations. In accordance with international law, participating countries could jointly notify Russia of their decision to pursue countermeasures and offer to negotiate with Russia as they prepare them. The G-7 could give this notice in the coming weeks and gauge Russia’s readiness to negotiate—but without facilitating Russia’s military strategy of delay and further wreckage.

Even after transfers are made to actively managed escrow accounts, executing large budgetary commitments to projects and claimants will take time. Countries may prefer to start by distributing just the income from these accounts. Nevertheless, trustees of the escrow accounts need to take control of the Russian assets in order to manage and transfer the income from those assets. By 2024, Ukraine will have been at war for ten years, the last two of which have dramatically widened the suffering and disruption. Justice further delayed would become justice denied.

DOLLAR RISK?

Some worry that transferring Russian assets would be so pathbreaking that it could scare countries away from holding large foreign exchange reserves from countries that implement countermeasures. Since the United States runs such large current account deficits and is a reliable and relatively predictable debtor, and since most international trades are settled in dollars, Treasury bonds and other dollar-denominated assets are the most available and liquid foreign exchange reserves for other countries to hold. So even though most of Russia’s frozen assets are in euros, some analysts worry that transferring them could threaten the status of the dollar in international finance. This argument understandably resonates with some bankers, who are annoyed by such political intrusions and accustomed to regarding state accounts as sacrosanct, even though they know that the accounts of ordinary outlaws are hardly untouchable.

Some long-term concerns about the dollar’s role in the world economy are valid, but a transfer of Russia’s already frozen reserves would not add much to those concerns. To begin with, the United States would be acting in concert with issuers of other major reserve currencies, such as the euro, yen, and sterling. Also, if a country such as Brazil were to shift its foreign exchange holdings from dollars into renminbi, the Chinese on the other end of that trade would then need to park those dollars somewhere, probably by reinvesting in other dollar assets, since China runs a current account surplus with the United States. Moving dollars into gold has its limits, since countries must convert it into currency to buy goods. The Chinese renminbi carries risks of its own, including China’s opaque and unpredictable governance and lack of independent rule of law.

There are other reasons to doubt that state countermeasures against Russia would threaten the dollar. In an early warning of its intentions, Russia reevaluated the political risk of its dollar holdings in 2018, apparently putting more than $80 billion into gold, nondollar currencies, and offshore dollar accounts such as those in Belgium’s Euroclear clearinghouse and the British Cayman Islands. But this move had no discernible effect on the value of the dollar, which rose during this period.

Russia has no good defense to avoid compensating those whose property it has expropriated.

Moreover, the freezing of Russian assets by Western countries in February 2022 has already delivered a shock to countries that have reason to worry about their dollar holdings. Heightened political risk is now largely priced into the asset allocations of banks around the world. Brazil and China, among other countries, have tried to move their trade finance out of dollars. But this shift has had little effect on the value of the dollar, which is still involved in nearly 90 percent of global foreign exchange transactions.

According to Colin Weiss, a specialist in international finance at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, as of late 2022, “nearly three-quarters of the U.S. assets held by foreign governments [were] in the hands of allies.” As a result, if many emerging-market and developing economies (including major oil exporting countries) stopped using the dollar and switched to the renminbi, the net effect would be modest.

China already sells dollars to keep its currency from depreciating too low. Confronting such a shift in holdings, China might stop selling dollars and even start selling off its own currency instead to keep it from appreciating too high. The Federal Reserve itself has been selling dollar securities on a large scale as it unwinds its bond-buying program known as quantitative easing. It could, if necessary, put those policies in reverse and tighten worrisome slack.

A WARNING TO WOULD-BE AGGRESSORS

Russia may retaliate against state countermeasures. But to an extent, it already has by illegally seizing foreign-owned private property. Any further nationalization efforts would complete the painful economic divorce from Europe, North America, and Japan that Russia set in motion when it expanded its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Russia has no good defense to avoid compensating those whose property it has expropriated. Finland and Germany have not invaded anybody. Depending on the specifics of investment agreements, arbitration tribunals may start handing down judgments against Russia. If Russia does not compensate its victims, their claims may join others stemming from the war that could be considered by a claims process funded with transferred Russian assets. Expropriation claims could also lead to court judgments targeting still unfrozen Russian property.

In addition to Russian retaliation, some countries may fear the precedent they would set by transferring Russian assets, worrying that other aggrieved countries might nationalize foreign property as a state countermeasure to gain reparations for past wrongs. Yet this is an old issue. For generations, states have nationalized foreign properties they regard as wrongfully acquired or as legacies of imperialism. In some cases, negotiations after such seizures have eventually led to compensation. In others, they have not. Few who study what happens to countries such as Venezuela that conduct uncompensated nationalizations will wish to imitate those examples. Governments welcome or tolerate foreign investors because they believe it is in their interest to do so. They are unlikely to turn their backs on those investments, sacrificing their own well-being simply because a number of countries seized and transferred Russian assets to compensate victims of the Ukrainian war. As for more liquid financial assets, foreign states usually have jurisdiction over only the financial holdings of their own currencies. They do not have jurisdiction over accounts held in dollars, euros, yen, or sterling.

Far from a dangerous precedent, a transfer of Russian assets would be a powerful warning to other countries that may be considering wars of aggression. It would be a reminder of how costly it can be to assault global norms in a world that is still so deeply interconnected.

A new European recovery program centered on Ukraine and funded by Russian assets is not only a key to winning the peace; it is a key to winning the war and countering Moscow’s strategy of attrition and ruin. Russia left the means to sustain such a program in the hands of free countries. They should literally capitalize on that mistake.

• LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS is President Emeritus and Charles W. Eliot University Professor of Economics at Harvard University. He served as U.S. Secretary of the Treasury from 1999 to 2001 and Director of the National Economic Council from 2009 to 2010.
• PHILIP ZELIKOW is Professor of History at the University of Virginia and Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. A former U.S. diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations.
• ROBERT B. ZOELLICK served as U.S. Trade Representative from 2001 to 2005 and as President of the World Bank from 2007 to 2012. He is the author of America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy.
• MORE BY LAWRENCE H. SUMMERSMORE BY PHILIP ZELIKOWMORE BY ROBERT B. ZOELLICK

Foreign Affairs · by Lawrence H. Summers, Philip Zelikow, and Robert B. Zoellick · June 15, 2023

22. What It Will Take to Deter China in the Taiwan Strait

Excerpts:

A full-blown conflict in the Taiwan Strait is neither imminent nor inevitable. Although the Chinese military is rapidly modernizing and preparing for a conflict over Taiwan, it is not yet ready or willing to go to war with the United States. The PLA is still several years away from achieving the capability to take Taiwan by force (assuming U.S. intervention), and Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have likely induced some short-term caution in Beijing. China’s increasingly aggressive maneuvers near U.S. and Taiwanese ships and aircraft should therefore not be seen as attempts to provide a pretext for escalation. Instead, they are designed to establish new norms to govern China’s claimed waters and to prompt the U.S. military to surrender the global commons inside the first island chain, which stretches from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. The United States cannot give in to this bullying, and should continue to operate where international law allows.

Although the United States should accept more risk to bolster deterrence and Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, it should avoid symbolic steps that accomplish neither of these goals. High-level U.S. officials should visit Taiwan when there is a compelling reason for doing so—but these visits should be the exception rather than the rule. Renaming Taiwan’s office in the United States, which a bill introduced in Congress in May would do, would not accomplish anything for U.S. interests. Most important, while some are calling for the United States to walk away from its “one China” policy, doing so is more likely to trigger a crisis than to head one off. Policymakers in Washington should continue to make clear that the United States opposes unilateral changes to the status quo, including from Taipei.

This is a demanding agenda. Avoiding war between the United States and China is relatively easy; doing so while also protecting the substantial U.S. interests at stake in the Taiwan Strait will be incredibly difficult. It will require the United States, Taiwan, and other partners to approach cross-strait dynamics with the same seriousness and conviction that China does. If they fail to do so, Taiwan—a close U.S. partner, an economy that plays a vital role in global supply chains, and a vibrant democracy located at a critical juncture in the Indo-Pacific—will be left to China’s whims. As Taiwan and China continue to drift apart, Beijing’s options for unification are shrinking. The United States and its partners must convince China that using force is not a solution.

What It Will Take to Deter China in the Taiwan Strait

Washington Must Take Difficult Steps to Prevent Catastrophe

By David Sacks and Ivan Kanapathy

June 15, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by David Sacks and Ivan Kanapathy · June 15, 2023

For half a century, peace has held in the Taiwan Strait. This has been due to a combination of creative diplomacy, military deterrence, and self-restraint on the part of China, Taiwan, and the United States. But the factors that kept the peace in previous decades may not continue to do so in the future. The sources of instability are growing in one of the world’s most dangerous hot spots: diplomacy is fraying, deterrence is eroding, and China’s risk tolerance is increasing.

The most significant and destabilizing changes emanate from Beijing. Under President Xi Jinping, China is implementing a persistent and escalating campaign of coercion against Taiwan. Xi’s objective is to normalize threatening behavior and decisively shift the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. In his ideal scenario, Taiwan accepts the inevitability of China’s rise and the United States’ decline and concludes that its future prosperity rests on ever closer ties to the mainland. If successful, such a strategy would allow China to compel unification without having to resort to a risky, unpredictable invasion or blockade. But even if this coercive campaign ultimately fails, Beijing will nonetheless find itself better positioned to pursue its aims through military force.

China is acting both opportunistically and, from its perspective, defensively. Public polling in Taiwan reveals a remarkable rise in inhabitants of the island identifying primarily as Taiwanese (as opposed to Chinese) and virtually no support for unification. The Taiwanese people, having seen China demolish the “one country, two systems” principle in Hong Kong, are increasingly skeptical of Beijing’s intentions and concerned about where further economic integration leads. China believes that Taiwan is slipping away, maybe permanently, and is attempting to halt this trajectory.

Beijing’s provocative actions to alter the status quo are making the Taiwan Strait more dangerous than ever. The United States needs to recognize that deterrence is weakening, and that it must take additional steps to convince Xi that the use of force would be catastrophic. This will require willingness to accept greater friction with Beijing, adapting lessons from the Ukraine conflict to enhance Taiwan’s warfighting capabilities, and signaling Washington’s ability and resolve to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf. There is no doubt that taking these steps, some of which the United States has avoided for decades, will be difficult. Continued drift, however, would be even more dangerous.

BRINKSMANSHIP IN BEIJING

Under Xi, China has increasingly emphasized military power to shape cross-strait dynamics. This focus on hard power is pushing Taiwan away and making the prospect of peaceful unification more remote, increasing the likelihood that China will have to use force if it is determined to achieve unification.

Beijing is nonetheless turning to military power because it perceives an asymmetry of interests and risk tolerance with its rivals that it can manipulate to its advantage. China’s leaders have given the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) wide latitude to conduct provocative military activities because they have calculated that Taiwan cannot risk responding and being perceived as the party triggering an incident. These senior Chinese leaders are also wagering that a more aggressive and unpredictable PLA can induce more caution from U.S. military forces. China’s growing spate of unsafe and unprofessional encounters with U.S. military ships and airplanes and its refusal to discuss guardrails or reopen senior military-to-military communications are critical components of a brinksmanship strategy to cow the United States into reducing military operations in strategic areas near Taiwan that China seeks to dominate.

Beijing has taken a series of steps to flex its military might in order to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. It first normalized incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, the airspace near the island in which Taiwan attempts to identify and control all aircraft. It then increased the number of violations: on any given day for the past three years, it is more likely than not that the Chinese military was operating in Taiwan’s ADIZ. These exercises have increased in sophistication and now include nuclear-capable bombers, fighter jets, antisubmarine warfare platforms, drones, and refueling aircraft. In launching these incursions, China aims to hone its operational capabilities, wear down Taiwan’s military, shrink the warning time if it chooses to initiate hostilities, and potentially disguise the opening salvo of a conflict as a routine exercise.

China is also erasing the de facto center line in the Taiwan Strait, which has served as an important demarcation to physically separate the Chinese and Taiwanese militaries. Both Beijing and Taipei honored the center line for decades, and it proved remarkably resilient even after cross-strait relations began deteriorating in 2016. Following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, however, Beijing has consistently flouted the center line and even denied that it existed in the first place, increasing the risk of an incident.

China could unilaterally declare that it controls Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace.

The Chinese military is now moving in an even more dangerous direction. It is conducting naval operations just outside of Taiwan’s contiguous zone, the 24 nautical miles that extend from the island’s coastal baselines. Anywhere from three to eight Chinese naval vessels now routinely operate in the vicinity of this zone. This presence offers China’s military minimal gains in intelligence collection or operational readiness but highlights Taiwan’s—and, by extension, the United States’—inability to prevent the erosion of Taiwanese security.

China may soon also turn to “lawfare,” or the use of law as a gray zone tool of conflict, to further raise tensions in the Taiwan Strait. For example, it could unilaterally declare that it controls Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace because, in its view, Taiwan is a part of China. This would then serve as a pretext for an even greater provocation, such as sailing ships inside Taiwan’s territorial waters or even flying military aircraft over the island. Doing so would force Taiwan to either ignore a blatant violation of its sovereignty or fire the first shot and risk being labeled as a provocateur. In another potential scenario, Beijing could require civilian vessels heading for Taiwan to submit to Chinese customs control on the grounds that it has jurisdiction over the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan.

While China is pursuing a strategy of brinkmanship, the United States has been prioritizing the establishment of guardrails and open lines of communication. For Beijing, the U.S. focus on de-escalating tensions serves as evidence that China’s strategy is working. To be sure, Washington should demonstrate to its allies and partners that it seeks to responsibly manage U.S.-Chinese competition and put the onus on Beijing for not responding in kind. But in signaling its discomfort with friction, the United States is providing China with a source of leverage. As Washington seeks stability, Beijing portrays itself as unpredictable in order to create space to further tip the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait in its favor.

Counterintuitively, to forestall the risk of conflict, Washington will need to demonstrate that it is comfortable with greater tension in U.S.-Chinese relations. Xi is shifting the basis for his political legitimacy from providing economic growth to satisfying nationalist demands, and this change demands a more confrontational relationship with Washington. The United States must recognize and match this elevated level of risk tolerance to prevent the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait from tipping further in China’s favor. The objective should be to make clear to Xi that further provocations will set back China’s goal of unification, and that seeking forced unification would be enormously costly and ultimately incompatible with Beijing’s other priorities.

SUPPORTING TAIWAN

The war in Ukraine offers lessons for Taiwan and the United States in reinforcing deterrence. Ukrainians have demonstrated that holding off a more powerful foe requires a whole-of-society approach. For Taiwan, the importance of civilian resistance and resilience is hard to overstate. For too long, Taipei focused on the combat capabilities of its active-duty force of less than 200,000 soldiers while neglecting to prepare its 23 million civilians to resist Chinese aggression.

Taipei has begun taking steps to remedy these shortcomings. It has extended mandatory military service from four months to one year, expanded its reserves, and begun to shore up its communications infrastructure. Civil society has also stepped in, with grassroots organizations providing training in conflict preparedness and first aid. But Taiwan remains extremely vulnerable. It relies on imported energy, food supplies, and medical equipment and it is connected to the outside world by just 15 undersea Internet cables. Its military also does not have enough ammunition for wartime needs, and unlike in Ukraine, resupplying it during a conflict would be nearly impossible.

The United States should conduct a joint study with Taiwan of its munitions, ability to produce weapons during wartime, stockpile of essential goods, energy reserves, and communications infrastructure. They should seek to identify critical gaps and create a road map to address them. The objective should be to understand how long Taiwan could hold out against a Chinese invasion or blockade, to extend that time frame, and to ensure that operational plans accord with that reality.

The war in Ukraine also contains important lessons about the weapons that would be most effective during a conflict over Taiwan. Taipei has now witnessed the efficacy of many smaller, cheaper platforms, and will need to aggressively develop or acquire drones and mobile antiship and air defense missiles. Given the speed of modern warfare and the fact that China would seek to cut off Taiwan’s communications infrastructure at the outset of a conflict, Taiwan will also need to decentralize command and control, empowering lower-level military leaders to make operational decisions.

Washington must convince Beijing that it is willing and able to directly intervene on Taiwan’s behalf.

U.S. training of Taiwan’s military should also be as ambitious and comprehensive, if not more so, as its assistance to Ukraine’s armed forces from 2014 to 2022. This will mean inviting Taiwan to rotate more and larger units through U.S. facilities for training, including Taiwan’s military in multilateral exercises, and sending senior U.S. flag officers with relevant portfolios to visit the island. These last two methods of assistance constitute steps that the United States has largely eschewed with Taiwan for decades.

But the Ukraine analogy only goes so far. Indirect support may have been enough to prevent the Russian military from capturing most of Ukraine, but it would be unlikely to prevent China from gaining control of Taiwan. Instead, the United States must convince leaders in Beijing that it is willing and able to directly intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. The Department of Defense should make this clear to the PLA by prioritizing the capabilities most relevant for a conflict with China, including resilient command-and-control systems, stealth bombers, submarines, long-range missiles, and autonomous systems. The United States will also need to take steps to urgently restore its ailing defense industrial base. One way to do so would be to award multiyear contracts for munitions that would be critical in a fight over Taiwan.

Washington must also do more to leverage its strong network of alliances in the Indo-Pacific, which are its most notable advantage over Beijing. China might soon believe that it could fend off U.S. military power in the region, but contending with Australia, Japan, and potentially other countries as well would be a different matter. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait should thus become a major priority for U.S. alliance relationships, in particular the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and should drive force posture and bilateral operational planning and exercises.

BOLSTERING DETERRENCE

A full-blown conflict in the Taiwan Strait is neither imminent nor inevitable. Although the Chinese military is rapidly modernizing and preparing for a conflict over Taiwan, it is not yet ready or willing to go to war with the United States. The PLA is still several years away from achieving the capability to take Taiwan by force (assuming U.S. intervention), and Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have likely induced some short-term caution in Beijing. China’s increasingly aggressive maneuvers near U.S. and Taiwanese ships and aircraft should therefore not be seen as attempts to provide a pretext for escalation. Instead, they are designed to establish new norms to govern China’s claimed waters and to prompt the U.S. military to surrender the global commons inside the first island chain, which stretches from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. The United States cannot give in to this bullying, and should continue to operate where international law allows.

Although the United States should accept more risk to bolster deterrence and Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, it should avoid symbolic steps that accomplish neither of these goals. High-level U.S. officials should visit Taiwan when there is a compelling reason for doing so—but these visits should be the exception rather than the rule. Renaming Taiwan’s office in the United States, which a bill introduced in Congress in May would do, would not accomplish anything for U.S. interests. Most important, while some are calling for the United States to walk away from its “one China” policy, doing so is more likely to trigger a crisis than to head one off. Policymakers in Washington should continue to make clear that the United States opposes unilateral changes to the status quo, including from Taipei.

This is a demanding agenda. Avoiding war between the United States and China is relatively easy; doing so while also protecting the substantial U.S. interests at stake in the Taiwan Strait will be incredibly difficult. It will require the United States, Taiwan, and other partners to approach cross-strait dynamics with the same seriousness and conviction that China does. If they fail to do so, Taiwan—a close U.S. partner, an economy that plays a vital role in global supply chains, and a vibrant democracy located at a critical juncture in the Indo-Pacific—will be left to China’s whims. As Taiwan and China continue to drift apart, Beijing’s options for unification are shrinking. The United States and its partners must convince China that using force is not a solution.

• David Sacks directed the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Taiwan, U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China, which was chaired by Michael Mullen and Susan Gordon.
• DAVID SACKS is a Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
• IVAN KANAPATHY is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and former Deputy Senior Director for Asia at the National Security Council.
• MORE BY DAVID SACKSMORE BY IVAN KANAPATHY

Foreign Affairs · by David Sacks and Ivan Kanapathy · June 15, 2023

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com