Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“If my body dies, let my body die, but do not let my country die.”

- Genghis Khan

“I have no choice of living or dying, you see, sir--but I do have a choice of how I do it. If I tell them not to fight, they will be sorry, but they will fight. If I tell them to fight, they will be glad, and I who am not a very brave man will have made them a little braver.”

- John Steinbeck, The Moon Is Down

"History is Philosophy teaching by examples."

-Thucydides

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2023

2. U.S. Offers India Drones, Jet Engines to Lure It From Russia

3. ASEAN easing China stance in lockstep with US

4. Tackling Maritime Security Requires A Revised Indo-Pacific Strategy

5. Pacific War Manual: Modern Warfare Lessons—from the US Army in World War II

6. China Is Ready for a World of Disorder – America Is Not

7. Battling Russia, Ukrainian Leaders Also Fight High Expectations

8. Exclusive: Taiwan on alert for Chinese-funded election interference

9. Pentagon finds an extra $6.2 billion for Ukraine aid

10. Air Force's Elite Close-Air Support Jobs May Be Cut by 44%

11. Army Aims to Fix Storage Program that Sent Defective Humvees to Ukraine

12. China Is A Dying Paper Dragon

13. Why Biden can't pry India away from Russia

14. Communist China’s Tentacles Are All Over the Western Hemisphere By: Congressman Mike Waltz

15. Migrant Smuggling “Influencers” Offering Services Via TikTok & YouTube

16. These American Businessmen Are Cozying Up With China

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2023

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 21.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that the progress of Ukrainian counteroffensives has been slower than expected, likely due to effective Russian defenses.
The overall slower than expected pace of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations is not emblematic of Ukraine’s wider offensive potential, and Ukrainian forces are likely successfully setting conditions for a future main effort despite initial setbacks.
Ukrainian defense industry conglomerate “Ukroboronprom” announced on June 20 that Ukraine built and successfully tested a 1,000km-range drone, indicating Ukraine’s intent and ability to target Russian military infrastructure in Russian-occupied territories and Russia with Ukrainian-made drones.
Russian occupation authorities continue to codify legal mechanisms for forcible deportations from occupied areas of Ukraine.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Bakhmut area and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian military command is reportedly forming a new Azov Naval District as part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
The Russian State Duma passed a law in the third reading raising age limits for Russian contract personnel and officer, likely to keep personnel currently due to retire in the force.
Russian occupation authorities continue to deport children from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Russia under the guise of medical necessity.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 21, 2023

Jun 21, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark

June 21, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on June 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 21. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 21 that Ukrainian troops had partial success during offensive operations in the Bilohorivka-Shypylivka direction (about 10km south of Kreminna in Luhansk Oblast).[1] A Russian milblogger additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the areas south and west of Kreminna.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on the Vilne Pole-Makarivka line, and Russian milbloggers continued to discuss Ukrainian attacks in this area, particularly south of Velyka Novosilka.[3] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, both south and southwest of Orikhiv and that Russian forces are counterattacking to regain lost positions in this direction.[4] Russian sources noted a relatively slower pace of Ukrainian offensive operations in both western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts compared to the previous days.[5]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that the progress of Ukrainian counteroffensives has been slower than expected, likely due to effective Russian defenses. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive progress has been “slower than desired” and will take time.[6] Zelensky noted that Ukrainian advances are not easy because Russian forces have mined 200,000 square kilometers of frontline territory.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin also addressed ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives and preposterously claimed that Russian forces have destroyed 244 tanks and 679 armored vehicles since these operations began on June 4.[8] Russian forces’ doctrinally sound defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast and prepared defensive positions throughout southern Ukraine are likely slowing Ukrainian advances, as ISW has previously assessed.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian defensive positions in southern Ukraine, dubbed the “Surovikin Line” after former overall theater commander Army General Sergei Surovikin, consist of several defensive zones between lines along dominant elevated positions up to 30km into Russian held territory.[10] The milblogger claimed that the “Surovikin Line” consists of a forward line of defense with several dozen platoon and company strongholds, and a main defensive line roughly 25km back with minefields, anti-tank ditches, and other defensive structures in between, though the extent of these defenses along the entire front line is unclear.[11] These Russian defensive lines are likely arrayed to enable a first echelon of Russian forces, deployed to the forward defensive line, to slow advancing Ukrainian forces while a second echelon of forces deployed closer to the main defensive line launch counterattacks against any Ukrainian breakthroughs, as well as providing prepared fallback positions for frontline Russian units.[12] Localized Ukrainian territorial gains are unlikely to immediately disrupt these Russian defensive lines and localized Ukrainian attempts at rapid breakthroughs are less likely to degrade these lines than a wider concerted operational effort, one which may be focused on degrading Russian defenders and fixing reserves rather than the immediate liberation of territory.

The overall slower than expected pace of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations is not emblematic of Ukraine’s wider offensive potential, and Ukrainian forces are likely successfully setting conditions for a future main effort despite initial setbacks. Ukrainian officials have long signaled that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would be a series of gradual and sequential offensive actions and have more recently offered the observation that currently ongoing operations do not represent the main thrust of Ukraine’s counteroffensive planning.[13] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar emphasized on June 20 that it is not useful to gauge the success of military actions based "solely by kilometers or the number of liberated settlements.”[14] Malyar’s statement echoes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s observation that war is not a ”Hollywood movie” that will deliver immediate and tangible results.[15]

The observation that current Ukrainian operations may have objectives that are not simply territorial is an important one. Ukrainian forces may be conducting several offensive operations across the entire theater in order to gradually attrit Russian forces and set conditions for a future main effort. Losses are inevitable on both sides, but careful operational planning on the Ukrainian side likely seeks to mitigate and balance this reality with the equally important observation that the degradation of Russian manpower is a valuable objective. Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin voiced his concern that Russian forces are suffering major manpower and equipment losses as a result of ongoing Ukrainian attacks, especially in southern Ukraine.[16] The success of Ukrainian counteroffensives should not be judged solely on day-to-day changes in control of terrain, as the wider operational intentions of Ukrainian attacks along the entire frontline may be premised on gradually degrading, exhausting, and expending Russian capabilities in preparation for additional offensive pushes.

Ukrainian defense industry conglomerate “Ukroboronprom” announced on June 20 that Ukraine built and successfully tested a 1,000km-range drone, indicating Ukraine’s intent and ability to target Russian military infrastructure in Russian-occupied territories and Russia with Ukrainian-made drones.[17] Ukroboronprom Spokesperson Nataliya Sad stated that Ukrainian forces successfully used the new Ukrainian-made drone but did not provide information on whether this drone was already used for strikes. Ukroboronprom previously announced its development of the 1,000km range drone in October 2022. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov told The Economist that Ukraine is at war and that drones over the Kremlin show that Russian defenses are “Potemkin villages” - an expression referring to the purported construction of fake settlements by a historical Russian minister to hide the true state of the Empire from the Tsar.[18] While Budanov did not confirm that the Ukrainian forces previously launched drones over the Kremlin on May 3, US intelligence officials previously assessed that the Ukrainian special military or intelligence units are behind a series of covert actions against Russian targets including the May 3 strike.[19] ISW had previously incorrectly assessed the May 3 attack on the Kremlin may have been a Russian false flag.[20] Ukraine’s focus on development of long-range drones alongside US intelligence indicates that Ukraine will likely continue to pursue Russian rear targets with Ukrainian-made drones. International law allows Ukrainian forces to strike legitimate targets even in Russian territory, especially targets from which Russian forces are launching attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.[21]

Russian occupation authorities continue to codify legal mechanisms for forcible deportations from occupied areas of Ukraine. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin signed an order on June 20 that creates a working group to regulate and oversee the creation of “temporary detention facilities for foreign citizens and stateless persons” in occupied Donetsk Oblast and designates these individuals as subject to expulsion or deportation from territory considered to be Russian under Russian law.[22] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 27 that presaged Pushilin’s order by defining those living in occupied areas who refuse to accept Russian passports as “foreign citizens and stateless persons currently residing in the Russian Federation.”[23] The establishment of the new DNR working group essentially sets formal conditions for the DNR government to detain residents of occupied Donetsk Oblast who are classified as “foreign citizens and stateless persons” under the April 27 law and officially designate them as subject to deportation from occupied Donetsk Oblast. The working group will also likely serve as a coercive tool aimed at forcing residents of occupied areas to obtain Russian passports out of fear of arbitrary detention and potential deportation. ISW continues to assess that all lines of effort aimed at codifying and formalizing the deportation of Ukrainians may constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as well as a potential deliberate ethnic cleansing campaign.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 21.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that the progress of Ukrainian counteroffensives has been slower than expected, likely due to effective Russian defenses.
The overall slower than expected pace of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations is not emblematic of Ukraine’s wider offensive potential, and Ukrainian forces are likely successfully setting conditions for a future main effort despite initial setbacks.
Ukrainian defense industry conglomerate “Ukroboronprom” announced on June 20 that Ukraine built and successfully tested a 1,000km-range drone, indicating Ukraine’s intent and ability to target Russian military infrastructure in Russian-occupied territories and Russia with Ukrainian-made drones.
Russian occupation authorities continue to codify legal mechanisms for forcible deportations from occupied areas of Ukraine.
Russan and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Bakhmut area and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian military command is reportedly forming a new Azov Naval District as part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
The Russian State Duma passed a law in the third reading raising age limits for Russian contract personnel and officer, likely to keep personnel currently due to retire in the force.
Russian occupation authorities continue to deport children from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Russia under the guise of medical necessity.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles on the Kupyansk-Svatove line on June 21. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces stopped three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Kotlyarivka, (27km northwest of Svatove), and Novoselivske (13km northwest of Svatove).[24] Russian Western Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Sergei Zybinsky claimed that artillery units of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) struck Ukranian troops near Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk).[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles continue in the Kupyansk direction but that Russian forces cannot break through to the city.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are pushing Ukrainian forces out of Synkivka and are establishing a foothold on the right bank of the Oskil River.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to outmaneuver Ukrainian forces west of the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[28]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on June 21. Ukranian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces conducted partially successful offensive operations in the Bilohorivka-Shypylivka direction (10km south of Kreminna) and have established themselves on newly captured frontlines.[29] The Ukranian General Staff also reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the direction of Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), Serebrianka (10km southwest of Kreminna), and the Kremmina-Yampolivka line (17km west of Kreminna).[30] Geolocated combat footage posted on June 20 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian armored assault east of Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked towards Kremmina and that Russian forces continued advancing in the direction of Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and the Oskil River west of Kreminna.[32] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the intensity of fighting increased on June 20, and Russian airborne (VDV) units occupied several Ukrainian strongholds in the Serebrianske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of Russia’s Central Group of Forces are conducting assault operations and repelling Ukrainian counterattacks in several areas near Kreminna.[34] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed two Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups attempting to advance from the Terny direction (17km west of Kreminna).[35] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian artillery units repelled a Ukranian armored attack and forced a retreat near Dibrova and claimed that Russian artillery units repelled two Ukranian attempts to break through Russian lines in the Serebrianske forest area.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that there is heavy fighting around Bilohorivka (12km southwest of Kreminna) in the Lyman direction.[37]

Russian forces are constructing unknown military infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Satellite imagery published on June 20 shows the construction of unspecified military infrastructure on military grounds of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), southeast of the occupied city of Khrustalnyi.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on June 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), and Bila Hora (16km southwest of Bakhmut).[39] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that several combat engagements occur in the Bakhmut area daily.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces deployed elements of the 83rd Guards Airborne Assault (VDV) Brigade to the Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) area to replace elements of the 31st Guards VDV Brigade that recently suffered heavy losses.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut).[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Vesele (20km northeast of Bakhmut).[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults north of Bakhmut near Yahidne (4km north of Bakhmut), Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut), and Orikhovo-Vasylivka and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka.[44] One milblogger claimed that the tempo of Ukrainian ground assaults near Berkhivka is declining and that Ukrainian forces have temporarily paused assaults near Rozdolivka (19km north of Bakhmut) to regroup.[45]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on June 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[46] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Heorhiivka (29km southwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske, Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka) Vodyane (8km southwest of Avidiivka), and Marinka.[47] Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating in northern parts of Marinka that Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces controlled.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted assaults near Pobieda (32km southwest of Avdiivka) and made unspecified gains in the area.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Vuhledar area on June 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Vuhledar.[50]

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on June 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations along the Vilne Pole-Makarivka line (up to 7km south of Velyka Novosilka).[51] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations south, southwest, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces have already liberated the settlement.[53] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces have liberated Urozhaine. Geolocated footage published on June 21 purportedly shows elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) operating near Makarivka (6km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and the “Kaskad” Operational Combat Tactical Formation (a Donetsk People’s Republic formation) operating near Urozhaine.[54] Footage published on June 21 purportedly shows the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) operating near Novodonetske (10km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[55]

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Pyatykhatky direction (25km southwest of Orikhiv).[56] ISW geolocated footage published on June 21 that shows continued Ukrainian control of Pyatykhatky.[57] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces control Pyatykhatky, and others Russian sources claimed that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces control the settlement.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to recapture Pyatykhatky from positions in Zherebyanky (27km southwest of Orikhiv.[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations along the Novodanylivka-Robotyne (6km south of Orikhiv to 15km south of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka-Verbove (9km southeast of Orikhiv to 20km southeast of Orikhiv) lines.[60] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing to conduct offensive operations in southern Ukraine with partial success, consolidating gained positions, and leveling the frontline.[61] Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces control Pyatykhatky and areas north of Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv).[62] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Robotyne and Zherebyanky.[63] Footage published on June 21 purportedly shows elements of the 292nd Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment and 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and the “Crimea” and “Sudoplatov” volunteer battalions operating near Pyatykhatky.[64]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against a Russian rear position in Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on Rozivka, about 65km northwest of Mariupol in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[65]

Prigozhin claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to cross the Dnipro River in the Hola Prystan (12km southwest of Kherson City) area. ISW has not observed visual evidence to support his claim.

The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces continue to construct defensive lines to protect occupied Crimea. The UK MoD reported that Russian forces have built a 9km-wide defensive zone about 3.5km north of Crimea.[66] ISW has previously reported on Russian forces constructing defensive lines in northern Crimea and continues to assess that the construction of fortifications in Crimea may suggest that Russian forces are unsure of their ability to hold occupied territory in southern Ukraine.[67]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military command will reportedly form the Azov Naval District as part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet by July 1. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Russian forces are establishing the Azov Naval District headquarters in occupied Mariupol, and plan to complete its formation by July 1.[68] The Resistance Center added that the Russian military command plans to rebase eight warships and boats, as well as 16 support vessels, from the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla to the Azov Naval District. The center added that these ships include three small missile ships – “Zyklon,” “Askold,” and “Amur” - which will have a total of 24 Kalibr missiles.

The Russian federal government adopted and approved several laws changing contract service procedures on June 21. The Russian State Duma adopted a law in the third reading that increases age limitations for contract servicemen during the period of mobilization, martial law, and wartime.[69] High-ranking officer to colonel generals will serve until age of 70, and all other contract servicemen will be able to retire at 65 years of age - likely essential to keep many aging Russian General Officers in their positions without needing special exemptions.[70] The Russian Federation Council approved a law that allows individuals who committed crimes of “small or medium gravity” and men of limited fitness for military service to sign military contracts with the Russian MoD.[71]

A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian presidential order extending social benefits to Russian veterans excludes provisions for the “Storm Z” assault units composed of convicts. The milblogger noted that these convicts practically do not have any rights despite volunteering to fight in Ukraine and that they sign a separate contract with the Russian MoD.[72]

Russian elite airborne forces (VDV) reportedly suffer problems with morale on the frontlines. A Russian source amplified a document claiming that 325 servicemen of the 83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade have left their positions since February 2023.[73] Russian officials reportedly found 228 of the servicemen while 97 are still missing. ISW previously observed elements of the Russian 83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade in Zaporizhia Oblast as of March 2023.[74]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed that Wagner is recruiting gamers to operate drones.[75] Russian opposition media began reporting on June 19 that Wagner was disseminating recruitment messages for people with "gaming experience” to join Wagner as UAV specialists.[76]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to deport children from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Russia under the guise of medical necessity. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor stated on June 20 that Russian occupation authorities have taken 150 children from Starobilsk Raion, occupied Luhansk Oblast to Russia under the guise of “rehabilitation” thus far in June.[77] Lysohor reported that doctors from Russia examined children in occupied Luhansk Oblast and claimed to find unspecified “pathologies” in 70 percent of children, using these “pathologies” as justification to deport the children to Russia for medical treatment and rehabilitation.[78] Lysohor also noted that Russian authorities in Starytsia Luhanska are deporting children and their mothers to Russia, likely in support of a large line of effort to forcibly depopulate areas of occupied Ukraine.[79]

The Crimea-based Atesh partisan group reportedly conducted an attack on a railway in occupied Crimea on June 21. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov reported on June 21 that unspecified actors damaged a railway track near Feodosiya in southeastern Crimea.[80] The Ukrainian Resistance Center attributed the attack to the Atesh partisan movement and noted that the damage disrupted important railway logistics lines that run through the occupied Crimean Peninsula.[81]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on June 21 that Ukrainian intelligence has not observed information corroborating Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 16 announcement that Russia transferred tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.[82] Budanov stated that Belarusian and Russian forces are continuing to prepare facilities in Belarus for storing Russian tactical nuclear warheads.[83] ISW will likely not be able to independently verify when Russian forces transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus but will continue to cover rhetoric surrounding the issue.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. U.S. Offers India Drones, Jet Engines to Lure It From Russia

U.S. Offers India Drones, Jet Engines to Lure It From Russia

Closer defense ties also aim to strengthen a regional rival to China

By Gordon Lubold

Follow, Michael R. Gordon

Follow and Sabrina Siddiqui

Updated June 22, 2023 11:22 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-offers-india-drones-jet-engines-to-lure-it-from-russia-e8b06a23?mod=hp_listc_pos1

WASHINGTON—India is set to buy state-of-the-art U.S. drones and jointly produce jet-fighter engines in a multibillion-dollar deal designed to wean New Delhi off arms purchases from Russia.

The deal is expected to be unveiled Thursday in Washington as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi joined President Biden at the White House on a high-profile visit that includes a formal state dinner. New Delhi had long sought some of the U.S.’s most advanced weaponry and equipment, but Washington was reluctant until now to share such sensitive technology because of India’s past, and continuing, purchases of Russian military gear.

Biden welcomed Modi to the White House Thursday morning with a ceremony on the South Lawn that included 7,000 guests, many of them Indian Americans who chanted Modi’s name. The ceremony kicked off a day of meetings and events for the Indian leader, capped by a state dinner hosted by Biden.

ASEAN easing China stance in lockstep with US

Indonesia moves proposed joint ASEAN naval drills to less confrontational waters while Philippines hosts a PLA-Navy goodwill contingent

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · June 22, 2023

The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to Beijing, the first in five years by an American top diplomat, was welcomed with a sigh of relief across the region, especially in Southeast Asia.

Over the past month, the two superpowers had at least two near-encounters in Asian waters, namely in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, thus raising fears of direct armed clashes amid the virtual breakdown of communication channels in recent months.

Beijing’s decision to scale back institutionalized dialogue with Washington came on the heels of rising tensions over Western sanctions targeting China’s high-tech industries, especially semiconductors, as well as senior officials, including the country’s defense chief, Li Shangfu, over human rights and Russia-related issues.

But another major source of bilateral tensions is the US’ expanded diplomatic and military presence in the region, most notably former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last year as well as the expanded the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) deal with the Philippines this year.

In April, China accused its rival of “endangering regional peace” through expanded military access to Philippine bases, some of which are relatively close to Taiwan’s southern shores.

Blinken’s conciliatory statements in Beijing, including his insistence on upholding the “One China Policy” had its share of critics who claimed that the trip was “misguided” and only “emboldened” Beijing.

By most indications, however, key Southeast Asian nations have not only welcomed any potential thaw in Sino-American relations but are also actively courting Beijing’s goodwill amid fears of a New Cold War.

This is particularly true in the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) two largest states, which now seem determined to secure a geopolitical soft landing after months of rising tensions in the region.

On one hand, Indonesia has signaled its willingness to adjust the location of proposed joint ASEAN naval drills, potentially the first-ever held, to ease China’s concerns while the Philippines has welcomed resumption of maritime talks shortly after hosting a Chinese naval contingent.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo visits a military base in the Natuna islands during a standoff with Chinese vessels in the maritime area on January 8, 2020. Photo: Handout / Indonesian Presidential Palace / AFP

Last year, Southeast Asian nations played a crucial role in brokering a temporary détente between the two superpowers, when US President Joe Biden and Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping held a much-vaunted summit on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia.

The ensuing “Bali Detente”, however, proved short-lived, especially after the White House shot down a Chinese spy balloon flying over US territory earlier this year.

Subsequent efforts to resuscitate defense diplomacy, especially on the sidelines of the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this year, also failed to yield concrete results. Thus, Blinken’s surprise visit to Beijing was carefully watched by outside observers, who remained skeptical of any major breakthrough.

For critics, the trip almost reeked of diplomatic desperation, with the US seemingly chasing after China for just routine dialogue.

There were also concerns over unnecessary “concessions”, especially after the US top diplomat reiterated the Biden administration’s opposition to Taiwan’s formal “independence” ahead of the self-ruling island’s presidential elections in early-2024.

“Antony Blinken, effectively, threw Taiwan under the bus,” former US defense intelligence officer Rebekah Koffler told Fox News following the top US diplomat’s insistence that America “does not support Taiwan independence.”

“His statement about the US not supporting Taiwan is an invitation to Beijing to execute its long-held ambition of establishing control over the self-governing island,” the former US official said.

“Xi Jinping will almost certainly be emboldened by Blinken’s announcement to invade Taiwan…now Beijing will feel more confident that Washington will not even put up a major fight and assist Taipei,” he added.

Cognizant of potential criticism, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink sought to reassure allies by emphasizing how stable Sino-American relations are “critically important” for regional peace and security.

He also emphasized how seeking functional dialogue to “prevent the risk of miscalculation” doesn’t preclude countermeasures against China’s aggressive behavior in the neighborhood.

“We have made clear that we will stand up to and we will counter a range of concerns that we have with Chinese activities including in the South China Sea, and including those directed at some of our key partners and allies such as the Philippines,” Kritenbrink added, emphasizing the Biden administration’s commitment to a “rules-based international order” and to the “security and defense of our allies.”

Multiple aircraft fly in formation over the USS Ronald Reagan, a US Navy aircraft carrier, in the South China Sea. Photo: Kaila V Peters / US Navy

In fairness, the Blinken visit seems to have raised hopes of de-escalating Sino-American tensions. During his meeting with the US diplomat, China’s leader said, “[We have] made our position clear and the two sides have agreed to follow through the common understandings President Biden and I had reached in Bali.”

For his part, Biden welcomed the resumption of formal dialogue and indicated “over the next several months I’ll be meeting Xi again,” likely on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in India and/or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in the US, to talk about “legitimate differences we have but also…areas we can get along.”

In effect, both superpowers have vowed to build on the diplomatic momentum generated by their summit in Bali last year. Key ASEAN states are also adjusting their sails to contribute to a broader de-escalation.

Indonesia, the current ASEAN chair, has adjusted its plans for an inaugural ASEAN naval drill later this year. Indonesia’s military chief, Yudo Margono, initially said the exercises were planned in the so-called “North Natuna Sea”, which overlaps with China’s expansive claims across the South China Sea basin.

Following pushback by Beijing-friendly ASEAN members, namely Cambodia, Indonesia, which just hosted major wargames along with the US and China, is now signaling the relocation for the planned drills to the waters of South Natuna, which is far outside areas claimed by Beijing.

For its part, the Philippines, a US treaty ally, is also reaching out to China. Earlier this month, the Southeast Asian nation hosted Chinese naval officers and cadets during a goodwill visit by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy contingent.

The visiting PLA Navy training vessel, named after a 16th-century Chinese Ming Dynasty navy officer, was reportedly the “largest and most advanced naval training vessel designed and built by China herself”, according to the Chinese embassy in Manila.

“A steady step in CN-PH defense cooperation, the visit is following the tradition of exchanges between the two militaries in addition to implementing the important consensus between the heads-of-state of China and the Philippines,” the Chinese embassy said in a statement.

The Philippine Navy welcomed the visit and underscored its commitment to “the customary and usual accommodation it renders to all visiting navies which fulfill its diplomatic role and promotes naval cooperation.”

Philippine marines on exercise with their Amphibious Assault Vehicles during a landing at a beach facing the South China Sea north of Manila on September 21, 2019. Tensions have been rising between the Philippines and China. Photo: AFP / Ted Aljibe

Crucially, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr also announced that the two countries were “making some progress” toward a potential breakthrough in their maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

“We already have coordination with them (China) when there is a fishing ban so there won’t be a sudden fishing ban. At least we can have a plan,” Marcos said, referring to tensions over China’s annual unilateral fishing ban in areas that fall within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone.

“These things do not come very quickly… but we are slowly making progress because the key to that is the improved communication between the Philippine government and the Chinese government,” the Filipino president added, underscoring his commitment to maintaining amicable relations with Beijing, even as he welcomes expanded defense ties with the US.

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @Richeydarian

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · June 22, 2023

4. Tackling Maritime Security Requires A Revised Indo-Pacific Strategy

Conclusion:

The Biden administration has joined with other nations to prioritize illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing through capacity investments and local governance improvements and by emphasizing human rights concerns. The U.S. Coast Guard is now at the center of maritime security and capacity-building in the Indo-Pacific. Rear Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian recently noted that U.S. Coast Guard forces stationed in Hawaii are helping to train maritime security forces in the Indo-Pacific to combat illegal fishing. Combatting illegal fishing is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, but our research highlights the importance of carefully assessing policy measures to avoid unintended consequences. While measures to combat illegal fishing can deter foreign perpetrators, there is also a potential risk of displacing crime from one type to another. In this case, local illegal fishers may turn to ship raiding. Moreover, previous research indicates that the odds of pirate attacks increase when cooperation among countries in the region is low. Consequently, a holistic policy approach that involves regional partnerships remains critical to prevent and deter crime in the maritime domain.

One example of this was in May of last year, when the United States, alongside Australia, India, and Japan, inaugurated a new initiative designed to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific called the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). The partnership will serve as a mechanism for cooperation on COVID-19 response and global health security, climate, critical and emerging technologies, cyber, space, and infrastructure. Criminals can be difficult to find and apprehend in the maritime domain. Tracking systems on vessels can be disabled, and many ships that engage in illicit activity operate at night to thwart government surveillance. Putting a stop to maritime crime requires both information collection and sharing. This is where the regional fusion centers can help by providing real-time data on crime patterns to local authorities to facilitate more effective patrolling of the spaces where criminals are working.

In March 2023, after ten years of negotiations, nearly 200 countries signed on to a new international framework being called “the High Seas Treaty.” The new treaty will put international waters into protected areas to limit damage from activity that is not consistent with new international conservation objectives. This could mean illegal fishing. There is a clear multilateral appetite for international cooperation on managing international waters. Our research shows that maritime threats do not occur in isolation. As illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing declines, and nearby vessel traffic increases, maritime piracy increases as well. Therefore, combating piracy must be done in combination with illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing through a multifaceted and sustained approach. Environmental protection, development, and a robust blue economy are vital. But so too is an international regime with clear, enforceable rules that provide guidance to littoral states that possess the capacity to surveil, arrest, and prosecute maritime criminals. The United States should continue to lead multilateral efforts that are designed to improve mechanisms for cooperation, capacity-building, and information-sharing.

Tackling Maritime Security Requires A Revised Indo-Pacific Strategy - War on the Rocks

BRANDON PRINS, ANUP PHAYAL, AARON GOLD, CURIE MAHARANI, DENG PALOMARES, DANIEL PAULY, AND SAYED FAUZAN RIYADI

warontherocks.com · by Brandon Prins · June 22, 2023

Criminals are nothing if not flexible. As the United States considers how to grapple with the challenges stemming from illegal and unreported fishing, our research has shown that progress made in tamping down illegal fishing may lead to an increase in piracy. As the United States focuses more on illegal fishing — particularly given China’s use of maritime militias for this act — it is important to understand how support for policing may inadvertently spawn other illegal acts that impinge on U.S. global interests.

Just days before leaving office, the Trump administration declassified its Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific region. The Trump administration’s approach focused primarily on great power competition with China. The Trump administration acknowledged the problems of maritime security, including piracy and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and the need to build cooperative relationships with Indo-Pacific countries and assist them with capacity-building.

In practice, however, the Trump administration never really made maritime security a strategic priority. The Biden administration has refocused U.S. government attention toward Asia, seeking to reengage with Pacific allies (e.g., the Quad partnership renewal, the trilateral submarine deal with the United Kingdom and Australia, and modernized bilateral alliances), sometimes at the expense of European partners. While the recent Pacific Deterrence Initiative, an effort to better prepare U.S. forces for armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, centers on China’s military modernization, the program also shores up cooperative security partnerships in the region as well as enhancing maritime awareness.

Become a Member

To tackle maritime security comprehensively, however, China should not be the sole focus of U.S. policy in the region. The United States should recognize that nontraditional maritime security threats remain significant barriers to a free, safe, and prosperous maritime domain in the Indo-Pacific. As maritime piracy has declined globally, there has been an increased focus on the role illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing plays in marine ecosystem destruction as well as a gateway to other maritime criminal activity. Illegal foreign fishing has been long believed to drive sea piracy. This narrative is clear when it comes to Somali piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden. While foreign industrial trawlers can sometimes push local anglers into maritime crime, the relationship is more nuanced and localized than previously thought.

In some geographic spaces, illegal fishing is perpetrated by local actors, not foreign ones. Pirate attacks are also localized in that local actors are once again responsible for the vessel boardings. Our evidence suggests these two maritime crimes are related. Where illegal fishing declines, piracy tends to rise. Presumably, local anglers fish both legally and illegally in the same waters. If illegal fishing is removed as an option for increased income, vessel robbery is sometimes used as a replacement for that lost revenue. For policymakers, our study cautions that local efforts to combat illegal fishing can inadvertently shift criminal activity to ship raiding. Sustainable policy approaches that address the underlying causes of maritime crime clearly remain critical. But, in isolation, they are insufficient since perpetrators can easily shift from one illicit activity to another. Comprehensive policy actions, such as the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, the new High Seas Treaty, and the Port States Measures Agreement will help address both the grievances driving criminal activity as well as the coordinated regional actions necessary to prevent displacement.

Illegal Foreign Fishing Is a Problem, but It’s Not the Primary Cause of Local Maritime Crime

Our research, funded through the Minerva Initiative, explores a critical element of maritime insecurity in the Indo-Pacific. Healthy, sustainable marine fisheries are essential to the well-being of thousands of communities worldwide. Fishing supports millions of jobs and provides even more people with their primary source of protein. Protecting this resource can help improve maritime security. One principal narrative on sea piracy maintains that illegal foreign fishing drives local anglers to maritime crime. Based mostly on the Somali experience, this narrative centers on both overfishing and the extensive damage inflicted on marine ecosystems by industrial foreign trawlers in Somali waters.

The Somali author Awet Weldemichael insists that “Somalia’s commercially oriented, small-scale, artisanal fishing became one of the main casualties of the intensification of foreign [illegal, unreported, and unregulated] fishing.” The near-complete absence of centralized authority in Somalia after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 precluded the supervision of Somali waters, with the consequence that local fishers sometimes took their boat-handling skills to maritime crime. This story became a popular framework to explain the onset of piracy in other parts of the world, such as in the Gulf of Guinea. However, while it sounds plausible at first glance, a more in-depth analysis cautions against such a “causal leap.” There is little doubt that large-scale illegal fishing by industrial trawlers tends to deplete marine resources, sometimes driving local fishers out of work. However, it remains unclear whether illegal foreign fishing is a primary trigger for pirate attacks against commercial cargo vessels. Quite the contrary, this narrative only provides a justification and legitimacy for the pirates.

The Local Story Needs to Be Understood to Better Address Illegal Fishing

Past studies show that there are multiple interconnected causes of maritime piracy. Piracy thrives in places where the maritime borders between countries are disputed and where littoral governments lack the ability or will to stop it. It also exists where international cooperation falters and where the local fishing economy declines.

Surprisingly, piracy does not appear to be concentrated in areas where governing institutions have collapsed. Indeed, pirates need ships to prey on, operational commercial ports where goods are exchanged, and the ability to sell stolen loot through illegal markets. Previous research establishes that piracy regularly thrives in and around ports and anchorages where local governance is both weak and corrupt. Illegal fishing also prospers in the waters of countries characterized by fragile political institutions that create opportunities for collusion between criminal actors and state authorities.

Our research explores the link between illegal fishing and piracy. We observe that sea piracy incidents follow declines in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and we infer that local anglers are substituting one illicit activity for the other.

Past works on the crime milieu indicate that factors like an individual’s criminal history and networks are essential in predicting such incidents. Past works have also noted that pirates are sometimes fishers since they have the boat-handling skills to navigate the waters. We argue that constraints on illegal fishing, due to either enhanced policy measures or depleting resources, lead local perpetrators to engage in risky but more rewarding pirate attacks. We also propose that opportunistic pirate attacks involving local fishers are common in target-rich, high-shipping-traffic areas. Since the perpetrators are from the local area, we should be able to observe a decrease in illegal fishing followed by an increase in piracy incidents.

For evidence, we initially focus on Indonesian waters between the years 1990 and 2017. We systematically analyze available data on illegal fishing and piracy incidents. We first carve up the entire Indonesian exclusive economic zone into 55-by-55-kilometer grid cells and comb through the data in each grid cell to explore this association. The results obtained from these analyses are robust, and they support our causal narrative.

As shown in the figure below, illegal fishing in Indonesia has generally declined since the 1990s, largely due to better enforcement, but pirate attacks have increased and decreased significantly at different times depending on macro-economic and political factors.

Pirate attacks require targets. We accounted for targets by including the yearly vessel traffic density from the Automatic Identification System data. As shown in the figure below, vessel traffic is not uniform across the Indonesian maritime space.

Our primary findings from the statistical models show that a decrease in illegal fishing, and nearby vessel traffic, independently increases the odds of piracy events in an area. But more importantly, the interaction of these two events nearly doubles the likelihood of sea piracy incidents in the area. We do not find a decline in legal fishing to have the same effect on piracy. We think that local efforts to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing inadvertently shift criminal activity to ship raiding.

A Free and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Requires Awareness of the Blue Economy and Blue Crime

In an address outlining his foreign policy vision, President Biden said his foreign policy will have the diplomacy of Benjamin Franklin, the vision of the Marshall Plan, and the passion of Eleanor Roosevelt. In addition to defending the homeland and confronting natural adversaries, the president cited human rights, climate change, development, international law, and democracy at home and abroad as major points of focus.

Later, when the Biden administration posted its National Security Strategy, once again the Indo-Pacific took center stage, with China representing the central security challenge confronting the United States. But transnational organized crime, including illegal fishing, is also noted as a shared threat to peace and prosperity. At a recent United Nations Ocean Conference, the administration emphasized working with global partners to use the ocean to combat the climate crisis and boost the blue economy. The fishing industry is a labor-intensive sector with very few legal and social safety net protections where illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and maritime piracy are key concerns.

Perhaps the good news is that it does seem like the U.S. government has been improving its approach to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. There have been federal-level attempts to focus on this issue. In 2014, the Obama administration issued a memorandum on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. In 2020, during the Trump administration, an interagency working group was established and offered its own recommendations, including directing the secretary of state to make combatting illegal fishing and seafood fraud a diplomatic priority. The Biden administration’s 2022 memorandum continues with a full-government approach and, in our view, correctly emphasizes human rights, development, information-sharing with our partners, and integrating combatting illegal fishing as part of our trade and diplomatic policies.

Conclusion

The Biden administration has joined with other nations to prioritize illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing through capacity investments and local governance improvements and by emphasizing human rights concerns. The U.S. Coast Guard is now at the center of maritime security and capacity-building in the Indo-Pacific. Rear Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian recently noted that U.S. Coast Guard forces stationed in Hawaii are helping to train maritime security forces in the Indo-Pacific to combat illegal fishing. Combatting illegal fishing is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, but our research highlights the importance of carefully assessing policy measures to avoid unintended consequences. While measures to combat illegal fishing can deter foreign perpetrators, there is also a potential risk of displacing crime from one type to another. In this case, local illegal fishers may turn to ship raiding. Moreover, previous research indicates that the odds of pirate attacks increase when cooperation among countries in the region is low. Consequently, a holistic policy approach that involves regional partnerships remains critical to prevent and deter crime in the maritime domain.

One example of this was in May of last year, when the United States, alongside Australia, India, and Japan, inaugurated a new initiative designed to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific called the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). The partnership will serve as a mechanism for cooperation on COVID-19 response and global health security, climate, critical and emerging technologies, cyber, space, and infrastructure. Criminals can be difficult to find and apprehend in the maritime domain. Tracking systems on vessels can be disabled, and many ships that engage in illicit activity operate at night to thwart government surveillance. Putting a stop to maritime crime requires both information collection and sharing. This is where the regional fusion centers can help by providing real-time data on crime patterns to local authorities to facilitate more effective patrolling of the spaces where criminals are working.

In March 2023, after ten years of negotiations, nearly 200 countries signed on to a new international framework being called “the High Seas Treaty.” The new treaty will put international waters into protected areas to limit damage from activity that is not consistent with new international conservation objectives. This could mean illegal fishing. There is a clear multilateral appetite for international cooperation on managing international waters. Our research shows that maritime threats do not occur in isolation. As illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing declines, and nearby vessel traffic increases, maritime piracy increases as well. Therefore, combating piracy must be done in combination with illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing through a multifaceted and sustained approach. Environmental protection, development, and a robust blue economy are vital. But so too is an international regime with clear, enforceable rules that provide guidance to littoral states that possess the capacity to surveil, arrest, and prosecute maritime criminals. The United States should continue to lead multilateral efforts that are designed to improve mechanisms for cooperation, capacity-building, and information-sharing.

Become a Member

Brandon Prins (@bcprins) is professor of political Science and Department Head at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, USA. He is the co-author of Pirate Lands (Oxford University Press, 2021).

Anup Phayal is an assistant professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, USA.

Aaron Gold is a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Politics at Sewanee: The University of the South, USA.

Curie Maharani is a Lecturer at BINUS University, Indonesia.

Deng Palomares is a Senior Scientist and Project Manager of the Sea Around Us at the University of British Columbia, Canada.

Daniel Pauly is University Killam Professor of Fisheries at the University of British Columbia, Canada.

Sayed Fauzan Riyadi is Executive Director of the Center for Southeast Asia and Border Management Studies at Raja Ali Haji Maritime University, Indonesia.

Funding for this project was provided by the U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Naval Research, through the Minerva Initiative. The opinions and interpretations are those of the authors and not the U.S. Navy or Department of Defense.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Brandon Prins · June 22, 2023

5. Pacific War Manual: Modern Warfare Lessons—from the US Army in World War II

Summer reading for all the INDOPACIFIC practitioners.

Pacific War Manual: Modern Warfare Lessons—from the US Army in World War II - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Benjamin Phocas · June 22, 2023

John C. McManus, Fire and Fortitude: The US Army in the Pacific War, 1941–1943 (Penguin Random House, 2020)

John C. McManus, Island Infernos: The US Army’s Pacific War Odyssey, 1944 (Penguin Random House, 2021)

John C. McManus, To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945 (Penguin Random House, 2023)

With the recent publication of To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945, John C. McManus completed an epic trilogy of the US Army’s involvement in the Pacific theater of World War II. The series is a masterwork of historical research and storytelling. The completion of the trilogy could hardly be more relevant, as the US Army and US government transition their attention toward a potential conflict in the Pacific. For scholars and practitioners, McManus’s series should be viewed as the handbook on organizing, supplying, and fighting expeditionary, high-intensity warfare in the Indo-Pacific theater.

Fire and Fortitude: The US Army in the Pacific War, 1941–1943

McManus begins the trilogy by laying bare all the grim details of the US Army’s rough start to the war in the Pacific. The first volume details the Army’s confusion and panic at Schofield barracks as Japanese planes flew overhead as well as the simultaneous loss of island garrisons on remote Pacific islands. General Douglas MacArthur’s failures and counterproductive leadership in defense of the Philippines hindered the initial American response and led to a significant strategic disadvantage for the United States. Analyzing the Japanese campaign plan, it takes little imagination to overlay ongoing tensions in the South Pacific on the Japanese logic of limited preventive strikes and rapid seizure of key islands with such speed and audacity as to deny the possibility of, or psychologically deter, an escalatory US response. With US forces again operating in the Philippines and concerned about strategically vital atolls, the adversarial calculus of targeting such locations becomes much the same as it was for Japan in 1941.

After departing the Philippines, MacArthur began rebuilding his forces, and his credibility as a leader, in Australia. Crucial to MacArthur’s ability to strike back was the need to reconstitute and rebuild the US Army and US Army Air Forces after the staggering losses in men and materiel in the Philippines. Here, McManus expertly tells the story of the rapid arrival and acculturation of thousands of new service members into the military after Pearl Harbor and their subsequent arrival in Australia.

The use of Australia, a nation at war since 1939, as a home was strategically essential but not without complications. McManus expertly details the challenges of conducting multinational coalition warfare through the lens of the Australian-American alliance. Despite fighting a common enemy, the partnership was rocky at the start of the war. The seemingly close allies had their own share of troubles, as thousands of raw US Army soldiers began pouring onto the continent, bringing with them American culture, and even racial inequalities. These tensions eventually led to the Battle of Brisbane, a deadly riot between American and Australian personnel.

The challenge of aligning missions with a partner force is not a new one and will continue to be as inherent in coalition warfare in the future as it was for MacArthur. MacArthur found ways to publicly minimize the Australian contribution to the war, from claiming Australian victories as American to mocking the Australian soldiers who fought and died along the Kokoda Trail in New Guinea. These actions themselves provide lessons on the often-fraught political nature of coalition warfare and highlight the importance of maintaining respect and dignity at all levels, even in the harshest of combat conditions.

Meanwhile, far across the Asian continent, McManus tells a very different story of another US Army fighting alongside the Chinese Kuomintang against the Japanese in the rugged terrain of Burma. There, General Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek’s contentious relationship and simultaneous interdependency make for an interesting study in coalition warfare, the role of security force assistance, and the intersection of personalities and strategic objectives. McManus includes details of how the Kuomintang leader and his wife crowdfunded support across the United States, a strategy that has more recently been effectively repeated by organizations such as the North Atlantic Fellas Organization which globally fundraised through the internet to buy weapons for the defense of Ukraine.

Further to the north, American soldiers engaged in the only cold-weather battles of the Pacific war, as they fought to reclaim the captured Aleutian Islands in Alaska. The Japanese seizure of the Aleutians, while sometimes considered a strategic feint to divert US forces from Midway, demonstrated that the far northern reaches of the Pacific were both accessible to military forces and strategically valuable. Now as the Arctic opens to the world, the need for Arctic-focused security and policy studies is only further validated.

Island Infernos: The US Army’s Pacific War Odyssey, 1944

McManus’s second book details the transition of the Army from a force made brittle by the interwar peace and initial defeats into the brutally effective fighting force it would become by year’s end. This transition offers powerful insight for the contemporary US Army, as it seeks to transition from twenty years of counterinsurgency operations to one oriented on multidomain operations and large-scale combat operations.

Much as in the first book, special attention is paid to the dysfunctional relationships between leading generals and their subordinate commanders, which often led to arbitrary dismissals of competent leaders and the frivolous waste of soldiers on pointless missions dictated by commanders far from the action. Despite General George Marshall’s ruthless screening process of senior officers during the war, the problem of senior leader misconduct remained, and does so today with ripple effects across formations and greater American society.

McManus simultaneously captures the challenges of the terrain, the extensive logistical demands of high-intensity combat, and the expeditionary character of the war. Throughout the war, men and supplies had to be transported from the United States to distant battlefields in the Pacific theater. Departing in great fleets of ships that carried them across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, supplies were unloaded onto hastily constructed docks or, in many cases, directly onto recently secured beaches on islands where no logistical infrastructure existed before. From these depots, supplies were then carried by truck, mule, or men, along rough or entirely nonexistent roadways deep into the unforgiving jungles and mountains to the front lines. Little has changed in many of these locations today and the lift requirements from home station to combat have only increased.

As the Army grew accustomed to the challenges of jungle warfare through the fighting in New Guinea, the beginnings of what would be known as the island hopping campaign, and the campaign to reclaim the Philippines, emerged. When writing about the battles on Guam, Saipan, and Peleliu that the Army was involved in, McManus paints a picture of Army forces seizing terrain to set conditions for naval and aerial freedom of maneuver. US Army Pacific envisions a similar role in the Indo-Pacific today, by applying landpower to joint campaigns.

While covering details of the 27th Infantry Division’s fight on Saipan, McManus also lays bare challenges of joint operations, including differences in service culture. These challenges were laid painfully bare in the relief of the division commander, US Army Major General Ralph Smith, by his commanding officer, Marine Lieutenant General Holland Smith, on the belief that the Army forces fighting on Saipan lacked the aggression of their Marine counterparts. This contentious moment again provides valuable lessons to modern practitioners. As with coalition warfare, joint operations require a high level of respect and understanding for other services. The nature of the terrain and the threat in the Pacific currently will again force the various branches of the US military to be tightly integrated in the joint and multidomain fight, with no room for petty bickering and finger pointing.

To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945

The final book of the trilogy is the conclusive finale of the Army’s fight in the Pacific. McManus expertly captures the intense urban combat of the liberation of Manila, highlighting perhaps one of the most important but often overlooked aspects of any future conflict in the Pacific. Since the end of World War II, the Pacific region has urbanized greatly, particularly in the littoral zone. A glance at a map of the Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan shows dozens of major cities spanning their coastlines. As people and power flow into cities, so too will conflict as various armed forces seek to control the populations and the centers of regional and national power.

Much of the rest of the book is devoted to the savage fighting on Okinawa, the last major battle of World War II. The protracted campaign to capture the densely populated island set the stage for its continued American presence to this day. Special attention is paid to the plight of the native Okinawans, who, decades later, remain acutely aware of the destruction inflicted upon them by the clashing American and Japanese forces. To this day the lingering resentment from this battle and the subsequent occupation has created challenges for US forces based on the island.

McManus dedicated the final chapters to the events that occurred after representatives of the Empire of Japan surrendered on the deck of USS Missouri. He captures the victorious attitude and its lapse into apathy as soldiers went home or began occupation duty. In doing so, he explains how the war’s end was instrumental in setting the conditions for the Korean War, as well as the geopolitical outcomes that continue to dominate that region in contemporary times.

Overall, McManus’s series is an excellent work that ties together not only the tactical and strategic history of the US Army’s war in the Pacific, but also its cultural, social, and political components. There is no single series on the war in the Pacific that captures all of these variables and details in the same manner. His attention to the most minute details, such as local soil conditions or the case of two estranged brothers meeting on a battlefield in New Guinea in the middle of a suicidal Japanese attack, is unrivaled and manages to paint an extremely detailed picture while losing none of the greater strategic image of the massive conflict.

Rick Atkinson’s Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944–1945, which chronicled American operations in Europe and was the conclusion of his Liberation Trilogy about the US Army in Europe, was described by one reviewer as the “Big Wars Manual.” McManus’s series now serves as the timely and complementary “Pacific Wars Manual,” presenting the oft-understudied Army campaigns in the Pacific with relevance today. For modern practitioners, both uniformed and civilian, this series is an outstanding resource on the specific challenges that the US Army faced in the Pacific theater during World War II. From the grand plans of generals to the breathless, split-second decisions made by junior leaders, McManus tells the story of the men and women who waged the war in the Pacific.

Benjamin Phocas is a cadet at the United States Military Academy, where he is in the Defense and Strategic Studies program. He is an intern for the National Center for Urban Operations and the Urban Warfare Project of the Modern War Institute.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: New York National Guard

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Benjamin Phocas · June 22, 2023

6. China Is Ready for a World of Disorder – America Is Not

Excerpts:

Both trends are in evidence today, and the United States believes that this history is repeating itself as policymakers try to revive the strategy that succeeded against the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, dividing the world and mobilizing its allies. Beijing disagrees, and it is pursuing policies suited to its bet that the world is entering an era in which self-determination and multialignment will trump ideological conflict.

Beijing’s judgment is more likely to be accurate because the current era differs from the Cold War era in three fundamental ways. First, today’s ideologies are much weaker. After 1945, both the United States and the Soviet Union offered optimistic and compelling visions of the future that appealed to elites and workers worldwide. Contemporary China has no such message, and the traditional U.S. vision of liberal democracy has been greatly diminished by the Iraq war, the global financial crisis of 2008, and the presidency of Donald Trump, all of which made the United States seem less successful, less generous, and less reliable. Moreover, rather than offering starkly different and opposing ideologies, China and the United States increasingly resemble each other on matters from industrial policy and trade to technology and foreign policy. Without ideological messages capable of creating international coalitions, Cold War–style blocs cannot form.

Second, Beijing and Washington do not enjoy the same global dominance that the Soviet Union and the United States did after 1945. In 1950, the United States and its major allies (NATO countries, Australia, and Japan) and the communist world (the Soviet Union, China, and the Eastern bloc) together accounted for 88 percent of global GDP. But today, these groups of countries combined account for only 57 percent of global GDP. Whereas nonaligned countries’ defense expenditures were negligible as late as the 1960s (about one percent of the global total), they are now at 15 percent and growing fast.

Third, today’s world is extremely interdependent. At the beginning of the Cold War, there were very few economic links between the West and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The situation today could not be more different. Whereas trade between the United States and the Soviet Union remained at around one percent of both countries’ total trade in the 1970s and 1980s, trade with China today makes up almost 16 percent of both the United States’ and the EU’s total trade balance. This interdependence prohibits the formation of the stable alignment of blocs that characterized the Cold War. What is more likely is a permanent state of tension and shifting allegiances.

China’s leaders have made an audacious strategic bet by preparing for a fragmented world. The CCP believes the world is moving toward a post-Western order not because the West has disintegrated but because the consolidation of the West has alienated many other countries. In this moment of change, it may be that China’s stated willingness to allow other countries to flex their muscles may make Beijing a more attractive partner than Washington, with its demands for ever-closer alignment. If the world truly is entering a phase of disorder, China could be best placed to prosper.

China Is Ready for a World of Disorder

America Is Not

By Mark Leonard

July/August 2023

Published on June 20, 2023

China Is Ready for a World of Disorder

Foreign Affairs · by What Does China Think?

In March, at the end of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin stood at the door of the Kremlin to bid his friend farewell. Xi told his Russian counterpart, “Right now, there are changes—the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years—and we are the ones driving these changes together.” Putin, smiling, responded, “I agree.”

The tone was informal, but this was hardly an impromptu exchange: “Changes unseen in a century” has become one of Xi’s favorite slogans since he coined it in December 2017. Although it might seem generic, it neatly encapsulates the contemporary Chinese way of thinking about the emerging global order—or, rather, disorder. As China’s power has grown, Western policymakers and analysts have tried to determine what kind of world China wants and what kind of global order Beijing aims to build with its power. But it is becoming clear that rather than trying to comprehensively revise the existing order or replace it with something else, Chinese strategists have set about making the best of the world as it is—or as it soon will be.

While most Western leaders and policymakers try to preserve the existing rules-based international order, perhaps updating key features and incorporating additional actors, Chinese strategists increasingly define their goal as survival in a world without order. The Chinese leadership, from Xi on down, believes that the global architecture that was erected in the aftermath of World War II is becoming irrelevant and that attempts to preserve it are futile. Instead of seeking to save the system, Beijing is preparing for its failure.

Although China and the United States agree that the post–Cold War order is over, they are betting on very different successors. In Washington, the return of great-power competition is thought to require revamping the alliances and institutions at the heart of the post–World War II order that helped the United States win the Cold War against the Soviet Union. This updated global order is meant to incorporate much of the world, leaving China and several of its most important partners—including Iran, North Korea, and Russia—isolated on the outside.

But Beijing is confident that Washington’s efforts will prove futile. In the eyes of Chinese strategists, other countries’ search for sovereignty and identity is incompatible with the formation of Cold War–style blocs and will instead result in a more fragmented, multipolar world in which China can take its place as a great power.

Ultimately, Beijing’s understanding may well be more accurate than Washington’s and more closely attuned to the aspirations of the world’s most populous countries. The U.S. strategy won’t work if it amounts to little more than a futile quest to update a vanishing order, driven by a nostalgic desire for the symmetry and stability of a bygone era. China, by contrast, is readying itself for a world defined by disorder, asymmetry, and fragmentation—a world that, in many ways, has already arrived.

SURVIVOR: BEIJING

The very different responses of China and the United States to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed the divergence in Beijing’s and Washington’s thinking. In Washington, the dominant view is that Russia’s actions are a challenge to the rules-based order, which must be strengthened in response. In Beijing, the dominant opinion is that the conflict shows the world is entering a period of disorder, which countries will need to take steps to withstand.

The Chinese perspective is shared by many countries, especially in the global South, where Western claims to be upholding a rules-based order lack credibility. It is not simply that many governments had no say in creating these rules and therefore see them as illegitimate. The problem is deeper: these countries also believe that the West has applied its norms selectively and revised them frequently to suit its own interests or, as the United States did when it invaded Iraq in 2003, simply ignored them. For many outside the West, the talk of a rules-based order has long been a fig leaf for Western power. It is only natural, these critics maintain, that now that Western power is declining, this order should be revised to empower other countries.

Hence Xi’s claim that “changes unseen in a century” are coming to pass. This observation is one of the guiding principles of “Xi Jinping Thought,” which has become China’s official ideology. Xi sees these changes as part of an irreversible trend toward multipolarity as the East rises and the West declines, accelerated by technology and demographic shifts. Xi’s core insight is that the world is increasingly defined by disorder rather than order, a situation that in his view harks back to the nineteenth century, another era characterized by global instability and existential threats to China. In the decades after China’s defeat by Western powers in the First Opium War in 1839, Chinese thinkers, including the diplomat Li Hongzhang—sometimes referred to as “China’s Bismarck”—wrote of “great changes unseen in over 3,000 years.” These thinkers observed with concern the technological and geopolitical superiority of their foreign adversaries, which inaugurated what China now considers to be a century of humiliation. Today, Xi sees the roles as reversed. It is the West that now finds itself on the wrong side of fateful changes and China that has the chance to emerge as a strong and stable power.

Xi at the China–Central Asia summit in Xi'an, China, May 2023

Mark Cristino / Reuters

Other ideas with roots in the nineteenth century have also experienced a renaissance in contemporary China, among them social Darwinism, which applied Charles Darwin’s concept of “the survival of the fittest” to human societies and international relations. In 2021, for instance, the Research Center for a Holistic View of National Security, a government-backed body linked to the Chinese security ministry, published National Security in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers, edited by the economist Yuncheng Zhang. The book, part of a series explaining the new national security law, claims that the state is like a biological organism that must evolve or die—and that China’s challenge is to survive. And this line of thinking has taken hold. One Chinese academic told me that geopolitics today is a “struggle for survival” between fragile and inward-looking superpowers—a far cry from the expansive and transformative visions of the Cold War superpowers. Xi has adopted this framework, and Chinese government statements are full of references to “struggle,” an idea that is found in communist rhetoric but also in social Darwinist writings.

This notion of survival in a dangerous world necessitates the development of what Xi describes as “a holistic approach to national security.” In contrast to the traditional concept of “military security,” which was limited to countering threats from land, air, sea, and space, the holistic approach to security aims to counter all challenges, whether technical, cultural, or biological. In an age of sanctions, economic decoupling, and cyberthreats, Xi believes that everything can be weaponized. As a result, security cannot be guaranteed by alliances or multilateral institutions. Countries must therefore do all that they can to safeguard their own people. To that end, in 2021, the Chinese government backed the creation of a new research center dedicated to this holistic approach, tasking it with considering all aspects of China’s security strategy. Under Xi, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is increasingly conceived of as a shield against chaos.

CLASHING VISIONS

Chinese leaders see the United States as the principal threat to their survival and have developed a hypothesis to explain their adversary’s actions. Beijing believes that Washington is responding to domestic polarization and its loss of global power by ramping up its competition with China. U.S. leaders, according to this thinking, have decided that it is only a matter of time before China becomes more powerful than the United States, which is why Washington is trying to pit Beijing against the entire democratic world. Chinese intellectuals, therefore, speak of a U.S. shift from engagement and partial containment to “total competition,” spanning politics, economics, security, ideology, and global influence.

Chinese strategists have watched the United States try to use the war in Ukraine to cement the divide between democracies and autocracies. Washington has rallied its partners in the G-7 and NATO, invited East Asian allies to join the NATO meeting in Madrid, and forged new security partnerships, including AUKUS, a trilateral pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), which aligns Australia, India, and Japan with the United States. Beijing is particularly concerned that Washington’s engagement in Ukraine will lead it to be more assertive on Taiwan. One scholar said he feared that Washington is gradually trading its “one China” policy—under which the United States agrees to regard the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of Taiwan and the mainland—for a new approach that one Chinese interlocutor called “one China and one Taiwan.” This new kind of institutionalization of ties between the United States and its partners, implicitly or explicitly aimed at containing Beijing, is seen in China as a new U.S. attempt at alliance building that brings Atlantic and European partners into the Indo-Pacific. It is, Chinese analysts believe, yet another instance of the United States’ mistaken belief that the world is once more dividing itself into blocs.

With only North Korea as a formal ally, China cannot win a battle of alliances. Instead, it has sought to make a virtue of its relative isolation and tap into a growing global trend toward nonalignment among middle powers and emerging economies. Although Western governments take pride in the fact that 141 countries have supported UN resolutions condemning the war in Ukraine, Chinese foreign policy thinkers, including the international relations professor and media commentator Chu Shulong, argue that the number of countries enforcing sanctions against Russia is a better indication of the power of the West. By that metric, he calculates that the Western bloc contains only 33 countries, with 167 countries refusing to join in the attempt to isolate Russia. Many of these states have bad memories of the Cold War, a period when their sovereignty was squeezed by competing superpowers. As one prominent Chinese foreign policy strategist explained to me, “The United States isn’t declining, but it is only good at talking to Western countries. The big difference between now and the Cold War is that [then] the West was very effective at mobilizing developing countries against [the Soviet Union] in the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Africa.”

To capitalize on waning U.S. influence in these regions, China has sought to demonstrate its support for countries in the global South. In contrast to Washington, which Beijing sees as bullying countries into picking sides, China’s outreach to the developing world has prioritized investments in infrastructure. It has done so through international initiatives, some of which are already partially developed. These include the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, which invest billions of dollars of state and private-sector money in other countries’ infrastructure and development. Others are new, including the Global Security Initiative, which Xi launched in 2022 to challenge U.S. dominance. Beijing is also working to expand the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security, defense, and economic group that brings together major players in Eurasia, including India, Pakistan, and Russia and is in the process of admitting Iran.

STUCK IN THE PAST?

China is confident that the United States is mistaken in its assumption that a new cold war has broken out. Accordingly, it is seeking to move beyond Cold War–style divides. As Wang Honggang, a senior official at a think tank affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security, put it, the world is moving away from “a center-periphery structure for the global economy and security and towards a period of polycentric competition and co-operation.” Wang and like-minded scholars do not deny that China is also trying to become a center of its own, but they argue that because the world is emerging from a period of Western hegemony, the establishment of a new Chinese center will actually lead to a greater pluralism of ideas rather than a Chinese world order. Many Chinese thinkers link this belief with the promise of a future of “multiple modernity.” This attempt to create an alternative theory of modernity, in contrast to the post–Cold War formulation of liberal democracy and free markets as the epitome of modern development, is at the core of Xi’s Global Civilization Initiative. This high-profile project is intended to signal that unlike the United States and European countries, which lecture others on subjects such as climate change and LGBTQ rights, China respects the sovereignty and civilization of other powers.

For many decades, China’s engagement with the world was largely economic. Today, China’s diplomacy goes well beyond matters of trade and development. One of the most dramatic and instructive examples of this shift is China’s growing role in the Middle East and North Africa. This region was formerly dominated by the United States, but as Washington has stepped back, Beijing has moved in. In March, China pulled off a major diplomatic coup by brokering a truce between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Whereas Chinese involvement in the region was once limited to its status as a consumer of hydrocarbons and an economic partner, Beijing is now a peacemaker busily engaged in building diplomatic and even military relationships with key players. Some Chinese scholars regard the Middle East today as “a laboratory for a post-American world.” In other words, they believe that the region is what the entire world will look like in the next few decades: a place where, as the United States declines, other global powers, such as China, India, and Russia, compete for influence, and middle powers, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, flex their muscles.

Many in the West doubt China’s ability to achieve this goal, mostly because Beijing has struggled to win over potential collaborators. In East Asia, South Korea is moving closer to the United States; in Southeast Asia, the Philippines is developing closer relations with Washington to protect itself from Beijing; and there has been an anti-Chinese backlash in many African countries, where complaints about Beijing’s colonial behavior are rife. Although some countries, including Saudi Arabia, want to strengthen their ties with China, they are motivated at least in part by a desire for the United States to reengage with them. But these examples should not mask the broader trend: Beijing is becoming more active and steadily more ambitious.

SPARE WHEELS AND BODY LOCKS

Economic competition between China and the United States is also increasing. Many Chinese thinkers predicted that the election of U.S. President Joe Biden in 2020 would lead to improved relations with Beijing, but they have been disappointed: the Biden administration has been much more aggressive toward China than they expected. One senior Chinese economist likened Biden’s pressure campaign against the Chinese technology sector, which includes sanctions on Chinese technology companies and chip-making firms, to U.S. President Donald Trump’s actions against Iran. Many Chinese commentators have argued that Biden’s desire to freeze Beijing’s technological development to preserve the United States’ edge is no different than Trump’s efforts to stop Tehran’s development of nuclear weapons. A consensus has formed in Beijing that Washington’s goal is not to make China play by the rules; it is to stop China from growing.

This is incorrect: both Washington and the European Union have made it clear that they do not intend to shut China out of the global economy. Nor do they want to fully decouple their economies from China’s. Instead, they seek to ensure that their businesses do not share sensitive technologies with Beijing and to reduce their reliance on Chinese imports in critical sectors, including telecommunications, infrastructure, and raw materials. Thus, Western governments increasingly talk of “reshoring” and “friend shoring” production in such sectors or at least diversifying supply chains by encouraging companies to base production in countries such as Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Xi’s response has been what he calls “dual circulation.” Instead of thinking about China as having a single economy linked to the world through trade and investment, Beijing has pioneered the idea of a bifurcated economy. One-half of the economy—driven by domestic demand, capital, and ideas—is about “internal circulation,” making China more self-reliant in terms of consumption, technology, and regulations. The other half—“external circulation”—is about China’s selective contacts with the rest of the world. Simultaneously, even as it decreases its dependence on others, Beijing wants to boost the dependence of other players on China so that it can use these links to increase its power and exert pressure. These ideas have the potential to reshape the global economy.

Chinese honor guards, Beijing, May 2023

Thomas Peter / Reuters

The influential Chinese economist Yu Yongding has explained the notion of dual circulation with two new concepts: “the spare wheel” and “the body lock.” Following the “spare wheel” concept, China should have ready alternatives if it loses access to natural resources, components, and critical technologies. This idea has come in response to the increasing use of Western sanctions, which Beijing has watched with concern. The Chinese government is now working to shield itself from any attempts to cut it off in case of a conflict by making enormous investments in critical technologies, including artificial intelligence and semiconductors. But Beijing is also attempting to exploit the new reality to reduce the global economy’s reliance on Western economic demand and the U.S.-led financial system. At home, the CCP is promoting a shift from export-led growth to growth driven by domestic demand; elsewhere, it is promoting the yuan as an alternative to the dollar. Accordingly, the Russians are increasing their yuan reserve holdings, and Moscow no longer uses the dollar when trading with China. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has recently agreed to use national currencies, rather than just the dollar, for trade among its member states. Although these developments are limited, Chinese leaders are hopeful that the weaponization of the U.S. financial system and the massive sanctions against Russia will lead to further disorder and increase other countries’ willingness to hedge against the dollar’s dominance.

The “body lock” is a wrestling metaphor. It means that Beijing should make Western companies reliant on China, thereby making decoupling more difficult. That is why it is working to bind as many countries as possible to Chinese systems, norms, and standards. In the past, the West struggled to make China accept its rules. Now, China is determined to make others bow to its norms, and it has invested heavily in boosting its voice in various international standard-setting bodies. Beijing is also using its Global Development and Belt and Road Initiatives to export its model of subsidized state capitalism and Chinese standards to as many countries as possible. Whereas China’s objective was once integration into the global market, the collapse of the post–Cold War international order and the return of nineteenth-century-style disorder have altered the CCP’s approach.

Xi has therefore invested heavily in self-reliance. But as many Chinese intellectuals point out, the changes in Chinese attitudes toward globalization have been driven as much by domestic economic challenges as by tensions with the United States. In the past, China’s large, young, and cheap labor force was the principal driver of the country’s growth. Now, its population is aging rapidly, and it needs a new economic model, one built on boosting consumption. As the economist George Magnus points out, however, doing so requires raising wages and pursuing structural reforms that would upset China’s delicate societal power balance. Rekindling population growth, for instance, would require substantial upgrades to the country’s underdeveloped social security system, which in turn would need to be paid for with unpopular tax increases. Promoting innovation would require a reduction of the role of the state in the economy, which runs counter to Xi’s instincts. Such changes are hard to imagine in the current circumstances.

A WORLD DIVIDED?

Between 1945 and 1989, decolonization and the division between the Western powers and the Soviet bloc defined the world. Empires dissolved into dozens of states, often as the result of small wars. But although decolonization transformed the map, the more powerful force was the ideological competition of the Cold War. After winning their independence, most countries quickly aligned themselves with either the democratic bloc or the communist bloc. Even those countries that did not want to choose sides nevertheless defined their identity in reference to the Cold War, forming a “nonaligned movement.”

Both trends are in evidence today, and the United States believes that this history is repeating itself as policymakers try to revive the strategy that succeeded against the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, dividing the world and mobilizing its allies. Beijing disagrees, and it is pursuing policies suited to its bet that the world is entering an era in which self-determination and multialignment will trump ideological conflict.

Beijing’s judgment is more likely to be accurate because the current era differs from the Cold War era in three fundamental ways. First, today’s ideologies are much weaker. After 1945, both the United States and the Soviet Union offered optimistic and compelling visions of the future that appealed to elites and workers worldwide. Contemporary China has no such message, and the traditional U.S. vision of liberal democracy has been greatly diminished by the Iraq war, the global financial crisis of 2008, and the presidency of Donald Trump, all of which made the United States seem less successful, less generous, and less reliable. Moreover, rather than offering starkly different and opposing ideologies, China and the United States increasingly resemble each other on matters from industrial policy and trade to technology and foreign policy. Without ideological messages capable of creating international coalitions, Cold War–style blocs cannot form.

War–gaming potential conflict in Taiwan, Washington, D.C., April 2023

Amanda Andrade Rhoades

Second, Beijing and Washington do not enjoy the same global dominance that the Soviet Union and the United States did after 1945. In 1950, the United States and its major allies (NATO countries, Australia, and Japan) and the communist world (the Soviet Union, China, and the Eastern bloc) together accounted for 88 percent of global GDP. But today, these groups of countries combined account for only 57 percent of global GDP. Whereas nonaligned countries’ defense expenditures were negligible as late as the 1960s (about one percent of the global total), they are now at 15 percent and growing fast.

Third, today’s world is extremely interdependent. At the beginning of the Cold War, there were very few economic links between the West and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The situation today could not be more different. Whereas trade between the United States and the Soviet Union remained at around one percent of both countries’ total trade in the 1970s and 1980s, trade with China today makes up almost 16 percent of both the United States’ and the EU’s total trade balance. This interdependence prohibits the formation of the stable alignment of blocs that characterized the Cold War. What is more likely is a permanent state of tension and shifting allegiances.

China’s leaders have made an audacious strategic bet by preparing for a fragmented world. The CCP believes the world is moving toward a post-Western order not because the West has disintegrated but because the consolidation of the West has alienated many other countries. In this moment of change, it may be that China’s stated willingness to allow other countries to flex their muscles may make Beijing a more attractive partner than Washington, with its demands for ever-closer alignment. If the world truly is entering a phase of disorder, China could be best placed to prosper.

MARK LEONARD is Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations and the author of What Does China Think? and The Age of Unpeace: How Connectivity Causes Conflict.

Foreign Affairs · by What Does China Think?

7. Battling Russia, Ukrainian Leaders Also Fight High Expectations

A double edged sword. Try to generate support and sustain morale without providing unrealistic expectations.

Battling Russia, Ukrainian Leaders Also Fight High Expectations

The New York Times · by Cassandra Vinograd · June 22, 2023

Seeking to bolster morale and Western support, President Volodymyr Zelensky and his aides say that the slow progress of Ukraine’s counteroffensive is to be expected.

The 28th Mechanized Brigade, positioned several miles south of Bakhmut, firing on Russian positions this month.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine

June 21, 2023

As much of the world pays close attention to the slow progress of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, its leaders are trying to tamp down expectations, saying that the fight to expel the Russian invaders was inevitably going to be a hard, bloody slog, not a lightning advance.

“Some people want some sort of a Hollywood movie, but things don’t really happen that way,” President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Wednesday, when asked in a BBC interview about the attitudes of the allies supplying Ukraine with weapons.

“We would definitely like to make bigger steps,” he said, according to a transcript provided by the BBC, but he insisted that he remained confident and suggested that expectations of rapid success were unrealistic. Allies may try to pressure Ukraine, but “with all due respect, nothing will depend on that opinion,” Mr. Zelensky told the BBC’s Yalda Hakim. “We will advance on the battlefield the way we deem best.”

The counteroffensive in southeastern Ukraine, now in its third week, has so far recaptured only a smattering of villages in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, with progress often measured in yards, not miles. Ukraine’s forces are also trying to advance around the Russian-held city of Bakhmut, in Donetsk. At the same time, Russian forces have attempted to go on the offensive elsewhere in Donetsk and the Luhansk region, potentially diverting Ukrainian resources.

Military analysts have said that it would take weeks or months, not days, to gauge the success of Ukraine’s offensive, and warned that the fight would be long and bloody. But anticipation over the operation, including among allies, has been building as Ukraine spent months amassing a powerful arsenal of Western-supplied weapons and training tens of thousands of soldiers for the campaign.

Mr. Zelensky said his government needed to show progress to motivate both its own troops and its foreign backers. Officials in Kyiv and some of their supporters abroad worry that if the long-anticipated counteroffensive does not produce significant gains, then the Western allies might lose patience with pouring billions of dollars into the war, and pressure Ukraine to reach a negotiated settlement that would leave Russia holding vast tracts of conquered lands.

Ukrainian soldiers resting inside a destroyed and abandoned building on the outskirts of Blahodatne, recently recaptured from Russian forces.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

The president’s remarks echoed those of other Ukrainian officials, who have said for weeks that the counteroffensive was going to move slowly — though perhaps not as slowly as it has. Hanna Malyar, a deputy defense minister, said on Tuesday evening that gains so far were less than some had hoped, but that Ukraine’s forces were advancing “in small steps.”

The terrain in Ukraine’s south is unforgiving for attackers, with wide open fields and little high ground, and Ukrainian troops are meeting staunch resistance from Russian forces. The Russians have had months to construct multilayered defenses — minefields, tank obstacles, trenches, bunkers and gun emplacements — in the areas they occupy.

“Defensively they know how to hold their ground,” said a soldier fighting for Ukraine, who asked that his name be withheld for security reasons. He added that Russian entrenchments have frequently been well built.

While Ukraine has not disclosed losses, analysts have said its attacks on Russian lines are likely taking a heavy toll on Kyiv’s forces and on their newly supplied Western tanks and armored vehicles. Since the Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine’s casualties, while heavy, have been lower than Russia’s, according to Western estimates, but going on the offensive generally means taking more losses.

The Ukrainians, probing for weaknesses to attack with forces still held in reserves, are struggling to breach the initial lines of defense, with miles to go before the main defensive lines are encountered.

“They haven’t committed a significant chunk of their forces yet, so the pace is not surprising,” Seth Jones, a defense expert focused on the war at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview. “If they were to throw everything in right now and the pace were slow, that would be problematic.”

Ukrainian soldiers testing a drone, used for combined tactical operations on the front line with other units, outside their compound near Lyman, in eastern Ukraine, on Monday.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times

Throughout the war, Russia’s superior fleets of warplanes and attack helicopters have avoided Ukrainian-controlled air space for fear of being shot down, but the Ukrainian advance offers them new opportunities.

“This is one of the few times the Russians can bring air power to bear against exposed Ukrainian forces,” Mr. Jones said.

Last September, Ukrainian forces, exploiting an area of Russian weakness, were able to recapture a large swath of the northeastern Kharkiv region with astonishing speed. Advancing at a more measured pace, they retook the southern city of Kherson and neighboring areas in November. But those offensives did not have to overcome as formidable a set of defenses as the Ukrainians now face, and Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov warned against drawing comparisons.

“It is impossible to expect that everything will happen as quickly as it was with Kharkiv, because the front line is completely different, and the terrain, and weather conditions,” he said in an interview this week with Current Time TV. “Plus, the Russians had the opportunity to prepare. There is an incredible density of minefields.”

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia suggested on Wednesday that Ukraine’s losses were contributing to “a certain lull” in the fighting, and expressed certainty about an ultimate Russian victory. However, he said that Ukraine’s “offensive potential has not been exhausted,” and that Kyiv was considering how and where to deploy its reserves.

His comments — to a state television reporter, on the sidelines of a Kremlin event — were the latest instance of Mr. Putin seeking to project confidence publicly and to underscore his insistence that Russia has the resources to outlast and exhaust Ukraine and the West.

A picture of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia used as a target at a shooting range for Ukrainian soldiers.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times

Thomas Gibbons-Neff contributed reporting from Kramatorsk, Ukraine, and Anton Troianovski from Berlin.

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 6 of the New York edition with the headline: Kyiv Battles Another Foe: Impatience

The New York Times · by Cassandra Vinograd · June 22, 2023

8. Exclusive: Taiwan on alert for Chinese-funded election interference

Unrestricted and the three warfares.

Exclusive: Taiwan on alert for Chinese-funded election interference

Reuters · by Yimou Lee

TAIPEI, June 21 (Reuters) - Taiwan's government says China will try to interfere in key elections in January by illicitly funding Beijing-friendly candidates using communications apps or group tours, according to three internal security reports reviewed by Reuters.

President Tsai Ing-wen's government has repeatedly warned of China's attempts to influence public opinion on the democratically governed island, which Beijing claims as its own territory despite Taipei's strong objections.

Although senior Taiwan officials, including the head of the National Security Council, Wellington Koo, have this year warned that China could try to sway the presidential and legislative elections with influence campaigns including misinformation, details of how Taiwan thinks China may use illicit funding have not previously been reported.

"They hope to influence Taiwanese people by reaching out to the grassroots," said one Taiwan security official with direct knowledge of the matter. "They hope to influence swing voters who don't have particular political affiliation and would vote for whoever gives them benefits."

High on the government's watch list for likely recipients in Taiwan are small political parties that support Beijing's sovereignty claims over the island, local councillors, and temples that engage in exchange activities with China, according one of the classified reports reviewed by Reuters.

Beijing could also offer free trips to China to hundreds of Taiwanese involved in election campaigns ahead of the vote to "influence voting decisions", another of the internal reports said, pointing to local politicians such as borough chiefs and village heads.

The government formed a cross-ministry security task force dubbed "Ping Shun", or safe and sound, this year to look into possible voting interference at home or abroad, according to that person and another security official with direct knowledge of the matter. Both declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the matter.

It is illegal under Taiwanese law for an election campaign to receive money from "external hostile forces," including China.

According to another of the internal reports, which Reuters has reviewed and is based upon Taiwanese intelligence, China could send money in via popular Chinese social networking and chat app WeChat, which allows direct transfers among users, and is available in Taiwan.

The Chinese government could "instruct candidates to set up public WeChat accounts and then mobilise users to give monetary support via 'viewer donations'," the report said. WeChat allows individuals to transfer up to 50,000 yuan ($6,971) to others in a single transaction and a maximum of 200,000 yuan a day.

The report, citing an analysis of intelligence, also said China could work with travel agencies and ask members of group tours to carry cash into Taiwan. The report said the underground banking systems in Taiwan, which are widely known but difficult to regulate, could provide foreign exchange support.

"The Chinese Communist Party could financially support specific domestic groups or people and give them political donations or funding needed for elections," a third classified report from the agency said.

China's Taiwan Affairs Office did not respond to requests for comment. China has refused to talk to Tsai or her Democratic Progressive Party, calling them separatists. She cannot run for president again because of term limits.

"China has used various means to actively intervene in elections to interfere in or influence election results," Taiwan's China policy-making Mainland Affairs Council told Reuters, adding the moves were meant to push for China's political agenda that included "promoting unification" with Taiwan.

Some Taiwanese have been prosecuted in recent years over receiving illicit support from China in election campaigns. A government unit in southern China sponsored COVID-19 self-testing kits for the election campaign of a borough chief candidate in New Taipei City last year, who was this month found guilty of violating bribery and anti-infiltration laws.

The reports say other possible funding channels include payment cards that use the China UnionPay network, which allows Taiwanese to legally withdraw money from bank accounts in China, as well as via direct transfers to Taiwan-based charitable funds.

($1 = 7.1717 Chinese yuan renminbi)

Reporting By Yimou Lee. Editing by Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Yimou Lee

9. Pentagon finds an extra $6.2 billion for Ukraine aid

The budgeteers working their budget magic?

Pentagon finds an extra $6.2 billion for Ukraine aid

Mo money, mo problems.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED JUN 21, 2023 1:51 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · June 21, 2023

For the Pentagon – which has been unable to pass an audit for years – the true enemy is not Russia or China, it’s math.

Case in point: The Defense Department has managed to overestimate the cost of military equipment that it provided to Ukraine by $6.2 billion, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters on Tuesday.

“In a significant number of cases, services used replacement costs rather than net book value, thereby overestimating the value of the equipment drawn down from U.S. stocks and provided to Ukraine,” Singh said during a Pentagon news conference.

In other words, the Pentagon estimated the value of some military equipment sent to Ukraine based on how the latest models of the equipment cost when in fact its value had depreciated with age. No information was immediately available on which specific equipment the Defense Department had overvalued.

The Defense Department overestimated the value of military assistance to Ukraine by $2.6 billion in Fiscal Year 2022 and $3.6 billion in this fiscal year, Singh said on Tuesday.

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After the Pentagon discovered the accounting mix-up, the Defense Department’s comptroller issued guidance on March 31 that clarified how the military estimates the value of equipment, Singh said.

President Joe Biden has allocated roughly $40 billion in military assistance to Ukraine so far, including the $6.2 billion in overestimated costs, according to the Pentagon. Because the $6.2 billion has not yet been spent, the Defense Department can use that amount of money to provide Ukraine with more equipment without requiring Congress’ approval.

The Pentagon also has $1.7 billion on top of that in allocated funds for Ukraine that it has not yet spent, according to the Defense Department.

The Ukraine equipment SNAFU is the latest example of the Pentagon having trouble keeping an accounting of its vast resources. The Defense Department has failed annual audits every year since 2018 and defense officials don’t expect the Pentagon to be able to pass an audit until later this decade.

In its latest audit, the Defense Department was unable to account for 61% of its $3.5 trillion in assets.

“We have very big numbers here at DOD, so we can have numbers that may look big that are still quite accurate,” the Pentagon’s Comptroller Michael McCord told reporters in November when the Defense Department’s Fiscal Year 2022 audit was released. “I would not say that we’ve flunked. The process is important for us to do, and it is making us get better. It is not making us get better as fast as we want.”

McCord also cited the Defense Department’s ongoing efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance provides a “very teachable moment for us on the audit” because it demonstrates why it is so important for the U.S. military to have an accurate inventory of its munitions and other weapons and equipment.

“I mean that’s a, to me, a really great example of why it matters to get this sort of thing right, of counting inventory, knowing where it is,” McCord said.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · June 21, 2023

10. Air Force's Elite Close-Air Support Jobs May Be Cut by 44%

State your budget and personnel plans and you provide your priorities.

Air Force's Elite Close-Air Support Jobs May Be Cut by 44%

military.com · by Thomas Novelly · June 21, 2023

As Congress moves toward retiring more A-10 Warthogs from service, the Air Force also aims to cut over the next three years the number of elite airmen responsible for calling in close-air support on the battlefield.

Rose Riley, a Department of the Air Force spokeswoman, confirmed to Military.com that the service plans to shrink the Tactical Air Control Party, or TACP, job field to about 2,130 positions -- a decrease of 44%, according to the service. The Air Force said the manning is now "roughly" 3,700 airmen.

"Currently, there are no plans to retrain TACPs to other career fields in light of the manning reduction, but the Air Force is opening opportunities for those who would prefer to pursue other careers," Riley said.

Tactical Air Control Party airmen are part of a special warfare job in the Air Force and embed with other services to help scout and guide air support in the heat of battle. It's one of the service's toughest jobs and involves rigorous physical training and hazardous assignments.

But these cuts come as the Air Force seeks to reassess its close-air support capabilities amid escalating tensions with China, even looking to scrap more A-10 Warthogs -- one of the main airframes that TACPs have worked with -- in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

In the next three fiscal years, the Air Force is asking to decrease TACPs by "44% to approximately 2,130 positions with a reduction of roughly 370 positions in FY23, 610 positions in FY24, and 600 positions in FY25," Riley said in an emailed statement.

The Tactical Air Control Party field has remained, historically, around 80% manned, Riley said. The service would try to make cuts from that unmanned 20% first.

The decrease from 3,700 down to 2,130 airmen is just over a 42% cut, and it was not immediately apparent how the Air Force was calculating the slightly higher reduction.

While Riley added that TACPs remain an important part of the Air Force's strategy and that they will "become even more imperative as the Department of Defense postures toward strategic competition after focusing on counterinsurgency for the last 20 years," some veterans remain skeptical.

News of the TACP reduction was first reported by Military Times in April. Troops-In-Contact, an advocacy group led by A-10 and air support veterans, issued a statement after the cuts were revealed saying close-air support, or CAS, is crucial to the military. The group argued that the results of cutting TACPs could be deadly.

"If successful, this plan would kill the CAS profession and cripple America's CAS capability," the group wrote on its website. "Ground troops would be supported, if at all, by CAS amateurs in a small, expensive fleet of fragile aircraft that are far less effective. In Low Intensity Conflict, that will cost lives."

The group has also fought against cuts to the A-10 Warthog, the close-support aircraft with a more than 57-foot wingspan has been flown by the military since the 1970s. Known for its menacing 30-mm Gatling-style guns, the aircraft protected troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the first Gulf War.

But Air Force officials haven't run to the A-10's rescue.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles "C.Q." Brown, who has been nominated as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the Air and Space Forces Association's Air Warfare Symposium in March that he expected the service to retire all A-10s by 2028 or 2029. He argued that the F-35A Lightning II is capable of providing close-air support.

"I would say over the next five or six years we will probably [have] the A-10 out of our inventory," Brown told reporters. "The A-10 is a great airplane. It's a great airplane in an uncontested environment. The challenge is we're going to be in more contested environments in the future."

-- Thomas Novelly can be reached at thomas.novelly@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @TomNovelly.

military.com · by Thomas Novelly · June 21, 2023

11. Army Aims to Fix Storage Program that Sent Defective Humvees to Ukraine

Are we learning lessons or encountering them? (as my friend Joe Collins would say)

Army Aims to Fix Storage Program that Sent Defective Humvees to Ukraine

The service’s prepositioned-stores effort is key to U.S. war plans.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

The Army is re-evaluating how it stores equipment abroad after the Defense Department’s inspector general found that an Army unit and a contractor sent Humvees with rotted tires to Ukraine.

Army senior leaders will “review all aspects of this instance and apply the necessary improvements” to the Army Prepositioned Stocks program, said service spokesperson Jason Waggoner. “The Army is looking at all recommendations to make necessary changes to the APS program.”

The service keeps large stores of equipment abroad at seven sites, which allows soldiers to quickly deploy to those locations without first having to ship bulky items like tanks, self-propelled artillery, or trucks.

Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine last year, the Army ordered the 401st Army Field Support Battalion in Kuwait to send equipment to Ukraine, including all six of its M777 howitzers and all 29 of its M1167 Humvees.

But inspections revealed that the M777s had problems with their firing mechanisms, some of which could have killed their own gun crews. Meanwhile, all but one of the Humvees had rotted tires, which were discovered after one vehicle’s tire and its spare shredded as the Army attempted to hand them off to Ukraine.

On May 25, the Defense Department inspector general released a report that blamed the Army and its contractor for not performing certain maintenance checks.

In their response to the report, Army Materiel Command officials accepted some of its recommendations, but also noted that Congress had provided less money for maintenance than the Army requested. They also disagreed that the contractor was obligated to maintain the equipment at the level cited by the inspector general.

Army regulations do appear to allow some wiggle room, as they distinguish between the conditions under which an item is stored and the conditions under which it is issued, said Elvira Loredo, an associate program director at the RAND Corporation,

“The IG report raises good points and should force a discussion about APS,” Loredo said.

“However, I don’t think the topic of the discussion should be the contractor. It should be how the Army and the Department of Defense set requirements and standards for APS management, how it reports the readiness of the equipment, and how it funds that readiness.”

The inspector general cited the same unit and contractor, Amentum Services, for similar issues in 2018.

The Army also experienced some problems when it used prepositioned stocks in Europe to help soldiers deploy to Europe at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

According to a Feb. 27 inspector general report, contractors failed to adequately maintain some equipment, leading to more than ten percent of equipment being less than fully ready to use. Some of these problems were due to a lack of necessary maintenance facilities.

The overall impression was better, though, with the Army and the inspector general noting the speed at which the equipment was issued.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

12. China Is A Dying Paper Dragon

Charts at the link: https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/china-is-a-dying-paper-dragon

China Is A Dying Paper Dragon

Don’t rejoice – China’s death throes will be a danger to us all.

andmagazine.substack.com · by Chet Nagle

The global order is ending and is being replaced by an accelerating disorder obvious to any observer of international affairs. The old order of warring empires was destroyed by World War II, so the United States and its allies met in 1944 at Bretton Woods to decide what would replace it. There, the victorious Americans laid the foundations of today’s order, a system that would contain the Soviet Union’s empire in a Cold War, initiate globalization, and bring us 75 years of prosperity and growth unmatched in human history. That globalization is now giving way to a disorder that will change the world and end the Communist Peoples Republic of China.

The Bretton Woods deal that America made with its allies was simple. First, the American market would be open to all its allies. Second, the United States and its navy, the most powerful fleet the world had ever known, would guarantee the safety of all ocean supply chains. And third, in exchange for that largesse the allies would side with us against the Soviet Union. China joined that system in 1980 and together with cheap labor, industrial espionage, and intellectual property theft rapidly became the workshop of the world. Not only was China the most populous country in the world, it promised to overtake the United States economy, become the world’s leader in technology, and dominate the emergent global world order. Those dreams are now being terminated by the impacts of demographics, geography, and “Xi Jinping thought.”

Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012 and President the following year. Along the way to becoming China’s dictator for life, Xi systematically eliminated everyone who could possibly challenge him, whether party members, government officials, or billionaire leaders of industry. Prominent individuals and even CCP members were jailed or just disappeared.

Then, in 2017, the 19th Party Congress amended the CCP constitution to include Xi’s political thinking: “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” as well as his “Belt and Road” project. With such a background, it is understandable that no one, whether party member or private citizen, dares suggest to Xi that he modify his policies lest they too, “disappear.” Disappearing also makes it understandable why Xi’s “Zero Covid” policy would result in workers sanitizing airport runways. Or that Xi’s anger about U.S. computer chip sanctions would result in China sanctioning Micron, a major chip supplier for Chinese industry.

And who would dare to disagree with attacking Taiwan to satisfy Xi’s “One China” policy? Who would tell him that an attack on Taiwan could result in boycotts and international sanctions on China, just like sanctions imposed on Russia for attacking Ukraine? Since China cannot feed itself and has no substantial sources of domestic energy, sanctions would curtail China’s importation of food and energy, leading to famine and power disruptions that will accelerate the deindustrialization of China. We have seen other dictators lead their country to destruction because of a psychotic insistence on obedience to their ideology. Nevertheless, irrational or not, there is one thing that members of Xi’s personality cult cannot make disappear, and that is China’s demographics.

Last year India surpassed China as the world’s most populous nation. That might be a marginal consideration until specifics are examined. The fact is, China’s population fell for the first time in 60 years, and China is now the fastest-aging nation in human history. As most know, the population replacement rate is 2.1 children per woman. China’s 2011-2020 census (as far as CCP numbers can be trusted) shows their replacement rate is 1.3 at best. Peter Zeihan has reported the replacement rate of women in highly populated urban areas like Shanghai is 0.7! Here is a demographic chart of China:

Now here is the chart for India, the nation whose population surpassed China last year:

Replacement rates, and these charts, tell us that China’s demographic collapse will occur within one generation – within a human lifetime! China’s worker-age population peaked in the last decade, and by 2050 will be less than half of what it was in 2020. The population collapse of China is not just starting, it is happening right now! And what will happen when China, at the end of the longest supply chains on the planet, cannot import sufficient amounts of fertilizers, food, energy and other basics because the United States no longer protects those supply chains? The Chinese navy, despite all the hype, cannot protect the cargo ships China must have from pirates, privateers, and unfriendly nations along those lengthy sea lanes. Neither can China’s navy protect Chinese exports.

Wall Street is beginning to catch on too. Ruchir Sharma, chairman of Rockefeller International, said: “something is rotten in the Chinese economy.” Observers have noted that the unemployment level of young Chinese is now 20% and growing. Chinese millionaires know it too. The Henley Private Wealth Migration Report stated China will have a 13,500 net loss of millionaires in 2023. The yuan and Chinese stock indexes are tumbling this year, with commentators calling China’s expected post-Covid rebound a “charade,” and some are even predicting China is headed for a “lost decade.”

Insulated as he is, even Xi Jinping must see some economic news. The Belt and Road initiative (BRI) he established to guarantee China’s access to raw materials, food and energy is failing. Forbes reported CSIS calling it a “Global Trail of Trouble,” and noted it “has lost support amid the scandals, debt traps and failed projects that have emerged in recent years. Countries along the corridors are now operating with far more caution and scrutiny, pumping the breaks on many projects and potentially setting the BRI back for years to come.” Those are years China no longer has.

Further evidence of the growing economic maelstrom is the Chinese debt to GDP ratio and the level of private credit. The United States debt ratio, after spending trillions in the last two years, was 123.4% of GDP in December 2022. Chinese debt is now 279.9% of GDP. The growth of private credit in China beggars belief, making ludicrous any notion the yuan could ever challenge the dollar as a global reserve currency.

Chart courtesy of Zeihan on Geopolitics

The connections between China’s demographics, geography, and economy are becoming obvious. No workers, no products – not even dishwashers and refrigerators, let alone an army, a navy, jet aircraft, satellites, and rockets to establish bases on the moon. No imports of food and energy for any one of several likely reasons – immediate famine and economic collapse.

Demographics don’t lie. China is a dying paper dragon.

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andmagazine.substack.com · by Chet Nagle

13. Why Biden can't pry India away from Russia

Why Biden can't pry India away from Russia

Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · June 22, 2023

As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi heads to Washington to meet with U.S. President Joe Biden, much of the fanfare surrounding the visit is focused announcements regarding the growing partnership between the two nations. But while the White House seeks to isolate Russia over its war in Ukraine, New Delhi remains steadfast in its commitment to a deep-rooted relationship with Moscow.

Although tensions continue to simmer between India and China, with whom Russia has cultivated increasingly close relations, New Delhi counts on its unique dynamic with Moscow to realize its interests and serve as a buffer to Beijing.

Former Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao explained that "a good part of India's strategy to deal with a belligerent Beijing runs through Washington." At the same time, she argued, "it also runs through Moscow."

"I think China is being given quite a free hand in in Asia and Eurasia," Rao, who also previously served as ambassador to the U.S., China and Sri Lanka, said during a discussion hosted by the Defense Priorities think tank, "especially with the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, and a very boxed-in Russia."

"And at this moment, I think India feels that it cannot afford to neglect its relationship with Russia," she added, "because I think it also helps that that connection is in a way a means to counter China's, in a sense, monopolizing of the space within Asia."

This dynamic also extends to the multilateral institutions of which China, India and Russia are members, such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

"India has been working with BRICS and the SCO," Rao said, "and, as you know, this presence, especially against the context of the war in Ukraine, kind of raises eyebrows in the West."

Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) meets with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leaders' summit in Samarkand on September 16, 2022. The SCO is comprised of China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with Iran soon to be admitted as a full member, and others such as Saudi Arabia also seeking closer ties. ALEXANDR DEMYANCHUK/Sputnik/AFP/Getty Images

While Rao acknowledged criticisms "that India treats the SCO and such membership organizations where Russia is a member in a rather stepmotherly way, and it seems to be focusing more on its relations with the West, particularly the United States," she argued that "India sees the necessity for maintaining these Eurasian connections."

"I think a lot of Central Asian countries want India there," Rao said. "They are a little apprehensive of China's moves in the region and what China's intentions are, which are not very clear. So, in that sense, we have friends among these nations who welcome India's participation."

She described India as a "very important power in the region" and one well-suited to participate in BRICS talks regarding development and SCO discussions around connectivity and counterterrorism.

"Given India's geographical position, where we are in South Asia, I think these connections, these channels that we keep open work for India," Rao said. "And I think India definitely acts to protect its interests and to keep those security concerns and the dialogues that we've traditionally had with countries of this region going."

The longstanding partnership between Moscow and New Delhi has its origins in the decade following India's independence from the United Kingdom and bloody partition with Pakistan in 1947. The Soviet Union became a primary supporter of the new, vast nation on the subcontinent, even as India became mired in border conflicts with Pakistan and China, which repeatedly objected to the Soviet position as ties between the two communist powers began to disintegrate in the 1960s.

"The Soviet relations with China were also deteriorating and it began to see India as a balance against China, and I do think that view has entirely changed," Rao said. "It is true that Russia and China have come closer together with almost a confederacy today, but it is also a relationship of convenience as we see it."

She argued that, still today, "a strong India works for Russia," and that, in spite of the warm ties between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, Putin and Modi "have a relationship that I think is far freer than the relationship that Xi Jinping and Putin may have."

Among the most tangible ways in which the partnership between India and Russia lives on is in the field of defense. Rao noted how Russian equipment accounts for some 80 percent of the Indian Navy's arsenal, along with 70 percent of that possessed by the Indian Air Force and 60-65 percent of that wielded by the Indian Army.

"You cannot say that Russia is the past and America is the future," Rao said. "I mean we'd like to put it in such simple terms, but it doesn't work that way. I think the past, the present and the future are all so mixed up in this situation."

Even as India strives to diversify its arsenal and seek Western arms, Rao said such an endeavor was "not going to happen so easily." In the meantime, she said India would continue to invest in its relationship with the U.S. and its Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) also led by Australian and Japan, while maintaining the historical partnership with Russia as well.

"I don't believe Russia is against our closer relations relationship with the United States," Rao said. "It is suspicious of what we do in the QUAD, just as China is, but this relationship between India and Russia continues to work. It is not falling apart, and I don't believe for us in India, given our interests, we would want it to fall apart, even as we engage in a much closer fashion with the United States."

Nandan Unnikrishnan, a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, also attested to the significance of the India-Russia relationship, through which he said "there are multiple levels at which India has benefitted," including the "strategic, political and economic."

And while he asserted that "India sees its relationship with the U.S. as the most consequential relationship currently," a trend he said was "driven by China's rise," he echoed Rao in pointing out that Russia played a key part in this strategy as well.

"Surprisingly to the Western audience, India also sees a role for Russia as a balancer against China, particularly in Eurasia," Unnikrishnan told Newsweek. "But the relationship between Russia and China will be one that is closely monitored by New Delhi given the U.S.-China confrontation and the war in Ukraine."

This picture taken on April 4 shows an Indian border post near the disputed frontier with China in Khinzemane, in India's Arunachal Pradesh state, much of which China claims as part of "South Tibet." The area was the site of a deadly war fought between the neighbors in 1962 and, six decades later, freshly laid roads, bridges, upgraded military camps and new civilian infrastructure dot the winding high Himalayan route to the Indian frontier village of Zemithang, which China renamed "Bangqin" last month to press its claim to the area. ARUN SANKAR/AFP/Getty Images

And Unnikrishnan too saw no contradiction in New Delhi's stance which he argued was rooted in promoting India's interests first.

"India doesn't view geopolitics as a game in which you have to choose sides," Unnikrishnan told Newsweek. "India understands geopolitics as an arena in which it has to protect its interests, almost identical to the U.S. understanding of geopolitics except without the heft that the U.S. has."

"Indian policymakers do not see contradictions in simultaneously being members of the Indo-Pacific Quad, the I2U2 [India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the U.S.] in the Middle East, and membership of SCO or BRICS," he added, "basically, different horses for different races."

Gleb Makarevich, a junior research fellow at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), took a similar position from Russia's perspective.

"I do not see any risk of promoting the kind of bloc-building mentality of the Cold War in India's steps. Its involvement in QUAD and I2U2 does not entail eagerness for military buildup in the Indian Ocean," Makarevich told Newsweek. "On the contrary, India stands for a peaceful and non-aggressive agenda in these organizations."

"Russian leadership and expert community appreciate India's strategic autonomy," he added. "I suppose that concept throughout Indian elites is unlikely to change."

India has traditionally rejected any formal alliances in the West or the East, and has instead invested in stepping up its role in an array of multilateral institutions, including the Group of 20 (G20), the influential body of major economies also including China, Russia and the U.S. and of which India currently serves as chair.

After the G20's top diplomats met in March, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said that the gathering had failed to release a joint statement over "divergence" on the war in Ukraine.

Makarevich argued that "India did not condemn Russian actions in Ukraine since the conflict is unlikely to affect its critical interests." And he highlighted how Moscow has "put a premium on the Indian stance in such sensitive issues as Kashmir [and] Afghanistan," while raising the "Indian profile on the international arena" along with "its resolve to achieve technological sovereignty" among other aims.

"Consequently, Indian leadership took into account Russia's concerns about NATO expansion, its military build-up and took a neutral stance in the conflict," Makarevich said, "preferring maintenance and further expansion of collaboration in traditional spheres—defense cooperation, nuclear energy sector—and exploring new fields."

"At the same time," he added, "Russia was eager to recalibrate its foreign trade— primarily, gas and oil flows—so as to substitute former counterparts from the West and finally conduct its long-proclaimed pivot to the East."

And while this pivot has largely entailed a rapid uptick in interactions with China, Makarevich expressed confidence "that intensifying India-U.S. and Russia-China ties do not affect the strategic partnership between Russia and India."

"I am positive that Russia will not seek deepening ties with China at the expense of the partnership with India," he said. "Indian leadership does not pursue harming Indo-Russian ties as well. I am convinced that both sides are aware of the counterpart's concerns and do not appear to sacrifice those trustful relations for any fleeting gain."

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi waves to supporters after performing yoga on the North Lawn of the United Nations headquarters on June 21, the International Day of Yoga, in New York City. The Indian premier is next set to travel to Washington, D.C. to meet with U.S. President Joe Biden. Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images

The U.S., for its part, has largely avoided direct criticism of India's ongoing ties with Russia. Washington has opted not to implement sanctions against New Delhi for buying Russian oil amid the war in Ukraine and for acquiring the S-400 surface-to-air missile system as part of a $5 billion defense deal reached by Modi and Putin in 2018.

India's rise in recent years has given the nation that surpassed China this year to become the world's most populous and seeks to become the world's third-largest economy by the end of the decade a stronger hand in international affairs.

Still, as noted by Nivetida Kapoor, a post-doctoral fellow at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, India's limited clout as a "middle power" also fuels its willingness to deal with an array of nations, including Russia.

"The U.S. and China outstrip other powers in the overall distribution of capabilities, and this constrains the conduct of middle powers in general, even if the latter have power to influence outcomes in specific contexts or geographies," Kapoor told Newsweek. "So, India as a middle power has decided to deal with the constraints imposed by its limited capacities by engaging in a multi-alignment policy, which avoids alliance relationships but rather engages with other powers based on alignment of interests."

But this position could become endangered should the geopolitical environment continue to worsen around the larger powers.

"The rise in the priority of the China issue in India has added to the commonality of interests with the U.S.," Kapoor said. "This does not mean India will abandon its other engagements but given the factors mentioned above, I think that while bilateral cooperation with Russia will continue based on mutual interests, it will be much more difficult to expand cooperation at the regional and multilateral level."

"A lot will now depend on a combination of how the U.S.-China rivalry pans out, how Russia-West ties develop, what happens to future Russian positioning in the East and how China behaves towards its neighbors," she added, "which will in turn impact India's policies towards both China and Russia."

Also paramount to this balancing act at the center of which is advancing India's national interests is avoiding the border dispute between China and India from devolving into an all-out war. Rather than serve to boost India's position, Kapoor argued such a conflict could prove devastating to the country's aspirations on the world stage.

"There is no denying that India needs to focus on its own economic development and the improvement of the lives of millions of its own people if it wants to become a more influential power in the international system," Kapoor said. "Therefore, a war is a wholly undesirable situation."

Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · June 22, 2023

14. Communist China’s Tentacles Are All Over the Western Hemisphere By: Congressman Mike Waltz

Communist China’s Tentacles Are All Over the Western Hemisphere

By: Congressman Mike Waltz

KILLBOX

JUN 22, 2023

killbox.substack.com · by Killbox

A note from Morgan:

“I’ve known Mike Waltz for years - he is the definition of an American patriot. He served our country across the world as a combat-decorated Green Beret with four bronze stars, including two for valor. I was so glad he got elected to Congress in 2018, where he fights every day for a stronger America that can protect our sons, daughters, and loved ones against our enemies - foreign and domestic. Mike aptly sits on the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs Committees, continuing his long career defending our country by working in Congress to stop the ever-growing China threat around the world.”

Congressman Mike Waltz

This month, Americans were again stunned by the news of yet another Chinese espionage campaign leveled against our homeland.

The Wall Street Journal first reported the totalitarian regimes in Communist China and Cuba had come to an agreement to allow the Chinese to build an “eavesdropping facility” on the island - just 90 miles away from Florida.

What then transpired was almost more troubling. The Biden administration first questioned the accuracy of the report, only then to backtrack a few days later to confirm the facility had been operational since 2019, saying they had inherited this problem from the Trump administration.

Even if this is true, it calls into question the Biden administration’s efforts – or lack thereof - to thwart Chinese influence in our hemisphere.

One of the hallmarks of the Trump foreign policy doctrine was building partnerships in Latin America to curb our adversary’s influence and strengthen mutual interests with countries in the region. These include: the Trump administration’s successful efforts, along with several Latin American countries, to sanction the Iran-backed terrorist group Hezbollah which is spreading terror cells across South America; the isolation campaign against the Maduro regime to starve his corrupt narco-syndicate government of resources; and designating the Cuban government a state sponsor of terrorism. These actions sent a clear-eyed signal of American resolve to the rest of the world.

Despite all these successes, there is still an enormous problem plaguing Latin America – Chinese investment and influence. Unfortunately, to our peril, the Biden administration has done little to push back.

Thanks for reading Killbox Substack! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

China’s predatory Belt & Road Initiative has locked in participation from at least 21 regional countries who receive high-interest loans for Chinese-run development projects. We need to communicate to our Latin American partners this is a dangerous policy to undertake and provides the Chinese government with massive leverage over their government.

Approximately 56% of the world’s 86 million tons of identified lithium resources are located in the South American Andes range. In her testimony to Congress, SOUTHCOM Commander Laura Richardson said: “The PRC’s efforts to extract South America’s natural resources to support its own population of 1.9 billion people are conducted at the expense of our partner nations and their citizens.”

In May 2021, a Chinese state-owned entity purchased a Canadian mine in Argentina that undermined the Trump-era U.S.-Canada Joint Action Plan for Critical Minerals Cooperation.

Under this agreement, the U.S. should have been notified of such a purchase by the Trudeau government. However, two years later, we still don’t have answers whether the Biden Administration was even consulted. Allowing such purchases to be made flies in the face of such bilateral agreements.

We must quickly address the dangerous national security implications of Chinese ownership of major ports and mines in the Western Hemisphere. Currently, Chinese investment firms control major ports on the Panama Canal, a major global trade route the U.S. economy is reliant on, and other critical chokepoints throughout Latin America.

These ports could easily become militarized with a simple directive from Beijing. This must not be allowed to happen. In fact, the Chinese military already runs a space station in Argentina that is ‘black box’ in the local community and shrouded in secrecy.

The U.S. desperately needs a new Monroe Doctrine focused on securing the Western Hemisphere from this communist expansion into the region. To counter aggressive Chinese maneuvers such as the spy base in Cuba, hoarding critical minerals, or buying up vital infrastructure in the region, the U.S. should consider implementing secondary sanctions on countries who do the bidding of Communist China. We should target the private sector companies in the region if they are doing business with Chinese entities that further endanger U.S. interests and our national security.

Time is running out and it’s time the federal government act with urgency.

Mike Waltz represents Florida’s 6th Congressional District. He serves on the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Armed Services Committee, and Foreign Affairs Committee. He is also a National Guard Colonel and combat-decorated Green Beret.

Thanks for reading Killbox Substack! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

killbox.substack.com · by Killbox

15. Migrant Smuggling “Influencers” Offering Services Via TikTok & YouTube

Something that does not make the mainstream radar.

Migrant Smuggling “Influencers” Offering Services Via TikTok & YouTube - The Foreign Desk | by Lisa Daftari

foreigndesknews.com · by byElliot Nazar · June 21, 2023

As the United States continues to face rampant illegal crossing at the US-southern border with Mexico, migrant smugglers have publicly begun advertising transportation services via social media outlets, generating billions of dollars.

According to recent media reports, these new migrant smuggling social media “influencers” have been advertising illegal transportation into the homeland for more than $10,000 per person via TikTok videos.

The carte-linked human smugglers (coyotes in Spanish) have been posting high-quality promotional videos, which show them escorting illegal migrants across rivers.

The coyotes have public profiles on TikTok and YouTube, where they flaunt their schemes, mocking the US immigration system.

According to reports, any individual can open their mobile device, and with a few clicks, talk to a smuggler through their social media account and obtain a quote for transporting a migrant illegally into America.

By using words on TikTok like “sueño americano” (“American dream”), “levanto” (“pick up”), and “inmigrantes” (“immigrants”), it revealed dozens more accounts of suspected coyotes.

Speaking to the New York Post, an alleged human smuggler said the charge for him to sneak a Mexican immigrant into the US was $10,500.

On YouTube, Soy Xulen, whose handle is @ELINMIGRANTEAVENTURERO, which means “the migrant adventurer,” had footage of smugglers in camouflage slipping illegal immigrants over the border.

In one video, users can see smugglers with backpacks heading along a dusty path to guide a family into a vehicle bound for the US.

The footage from the YouTuber handler also showed raft crossing at the Rio Grande and other illegal immigrant crossings. Some of the videos include children as young as 7 or 8 years old while failing to mention the risks that have claimed the lives of so many migrants in the past few years.

“For people who have that desire to know more about it. Here you find ADVENTURES OF AN IMMIGRANT. And the different ways of living in the USA,” read Xulen’s About Me page on his YouTube channel.

Other migrant smuggling influencers have also posted videos of themselves handing out clothing, toiletries, food, and other supplies to individuals crossing illegally.

According to reports, stash houses have been created in border cities like El Paso, Texas, housing illegal immigrants until they can be transported into the US.

The videos and posts from YouTube and TikTok include young migrants floating on rafts and inner tubes across the Rio Grande to coyotes coming to different parts of the border fence and flashing large stacks of cash in moving vehicles with social media hashtags like #bienpagado (#wellpaid).

“These social media portrayals and pictures are sick,” said Lora Ries, director of the Border Security and Immigration Center at The Heritage Foundation.

“A smiling kid in a stash house? A woman hugging her smuggler? An ‘adventure’? The cartel smugglers are so brazen because there are no consequences,” Ries told The Foreign Desk.

Many migrant smugglers have monitored US Border Patrol agents, listing their locations to aid their detection. Since the administration took over in 2020, the number of migrants crossing the border without being arrested has increased.

Data from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) shows that around 1.5 million illegal immigrants have crossed the US-Southern border since President Biden took office.

US Customs Border Protections officials say that the social media usage of migrant smugglers is common and that these operations are linked to the drug cartels, which have a say in smuggling people over the border.

Ries notes that the Biden administration’s open border policies have “both caused the flow of illegal aliens and prevented CBP and ICE agents from enforcing the law. Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas often says, ‘We’re taking it to the cartels. ‘These social media posts show that is just another one of his lies.”

foreigndesknews.com · by byElliot Nazar · June 21, 2023

16. These American Businessmen Are Cozying Up With China

These American Businessmen Are Cozying Up With China

spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · June 21, 2023

Home » Hot off the Press » These American Businessmen Are Cozying Up With China

Traders in Our Midst

These American Businessmen Are Cozying Up With China

Bill Gates said he was “honored” to be meeting again with the Chinese dictator.

June 20, 2023, 11:09 PM

Microsoft founder Bill Gates (Frederic Legrand - COMEO/Shutterstock)

Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft and one of the world’s richest men, recently met with China’s President Xi Jinping at Beijing’s Diaoyutai state guesthouse. Xi greeted Gates as “an old friend of ours” and said that he welcomed Microsoft and other U.S. businesses to bring their artificial intelligence technology to China.

“China is willing to carry out extensive scientific and technological innovation cooperation with all countries in the world, and actively participate in and promote global challenges such as climate change, epidemic prevention and public health,” Xi stated.

Gates said he was “honored” to be meeting again with the Chinese dictator and lauded China for making “significant gains reducing poverty and improving health outcomes within China,” suggested that China “can play an even bigger role in addressing the current challenges,” especially in Africa, and looked forward to working with his Chinese “partners” to address these global challenges.

CNBC noted that Gates’ visit “comes on the heels of visits to China by other prominent tech leaders such as Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon and Apple CEO Tim Cook.” What James Burnham called the “suicidal mania of American businessmen” continues unabated as war clouds gather in the western Pacific.

In his book Red-Handed: How American Elites Get Rich Helping China Win, Peter Schweizer identified Gates, Musk, and other Silicon Valley and Wall Street titans (Jack Dorsey, Eric Schmidt, Ray Dalio, Stephen Schwarzman, John Thornton, Larry Fink, and Mark Zuckerberg) whose business dealings with the CCP have made them richer while helping to facilitate China’s apparatus of domestic surveillance and oppression of its own people and improving China’s military capabilities. Wall Street Journal reporters Josh Chin and Liza Lin in Surveillance State recount how Western companies such as Cisco Systems, Motorola, Sun Microsystems, Siemens, Nortel Networks, and others partnered with Alibaba, Tencent Holdings, Huawei, and other Chinese companies, effectively “midwifing the [CCP’s] surveillance state since its embryonic beginnings in the late 1990s.”

Gates is merely the latest American supplicant to China’s “tributary system.” Prior to what China’s communist leaders call the “century of humiliation” (1849–1949), Chinese rulers often conducted foreign policy according to a tributary system or tianxia by which they “handled relations with neighboring vassal states.” Chen Shangsheng, a professor of history at Shandong University in China, dates the tributary system back to the Western Han dynasty (202 to 8 BCE). It was particularly evident during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties, but suffered a breakdown in the latter part of the Qing dynasty.

China was the “Celestial Empire” and its smaller, less powerful East Asian neighbors referred to China as the “superior domain.” The tributary system involved both economic and political relations between China and its neighbors. “When the Chinese empire received tributes from its neighbors,” Chen writes, “it reciprocated with investitures and tributes. Investitures established a relationship in which the Chinese empire enjoyed superior standing, and tributaries an inferior one.”

The Chinese court bestowed economic rewards upon the tributary states. “Through these investitures and tributes,” Chen explains, “China formed a political relationship with its neighbors, thus achieving regional order in its international relations, as intended.”

“The essence of the tributary relationship,” according to Chen, “lies in its subordinate nature; the tributary state submits to the imperial court.” And Chen notes that China’s tributary system dissolved when “confronted with Western powers.” Thus, the century of humiliation that beginning in 1949 the CCP brought to an end.

Giovanni Andornino of the London School of Economics called China’s tributary system “the most consistent world-system in human history, spanning two millennia despite several systemic breakdowns.” Andornino described China’s foreign policy under the tributary system as “ethnocentric centripetal hegemony.” The tributary system, Andornino explained, “enhanced the ideological legitimacy of the Emperor’s rule ‘All Under Heaven’ [and] strengthened the state’s military credibility.” John Hobson and Shizhi Zhang of the University of Sheffield, U.K., have written about the similarities between imperial China’s tributary system and Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. China’s “economic statecraft” has geopolitical implications.

Xi Jinping has been quite clear about what those geopolitical implications are: Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland; China’s hegemony in the western Pacific; and China’s replacing the United States as the leader of the world order — in essence, a return to China’s tributary system with China once again the “superior domain” and the United States one of many tributary states. Gates and other American and Western businessmen who act as supplicants to Emperor Xi simply reinforce Xi’s belief that the U.S. is a declining world power.

That American businessmen would cozy up to a communist regime is nothing new. One need only read Joseph Finder’s Red Carpet to recall how prominent American businessmen like David Rockefeller, Donald Kendall, Cyrus Eaton, and Armand Hammer were willing to overlook the Soviet Union’s gulags and aggressive foreign policies in search of a profitable relationship with Kremlin leaders. Like those American capitalists of another era, Bill Gates is apparently willing to overlook Xi Jinping’s genocidal policies toward the Uyghurs, China’s conventional and nuclear buildup, Xi’s increasingly repressive surveillance state, and his aggressive foreign policy in the interest of working with his Chinese “partners” to solve global challenges.

In 1975, the exiled Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn in a speech to the AFL-CIO in Washington noted the “alliance between our communist leaders and your capitalists.”

“For … 50 years,” he said, “we see continuous and steady support by the businessmen of the West for the Soviet Communist leaders.”

“We have Western capital to thank,” Solzhenitsyn noted, for the Soviet Union’s powerful police and military forces, all because of “a burning greed for profit that goes beyond all reason, all self-control, all conscience, only to get money.”

“Why,” he asked, “must we hand over to Communist totalitarianism more and more technology — complex, sophisticated technology which it needs for armaments and for oppressing its own citizens?”

We should ask Bill Gates and his fellow supplicants to China’s tributary system the same question.

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spectator.org · by Francis P. Sempa · June 21, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE