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International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group

Coalition pour la surveillance internationale des libertés civiles

October 29, 2022 - 29 octobre 2022

Following repatriation of four Canadians from Northeastern Syria, the Canadian government must act quickly to bring all detainees home

ICLMG 28/10/2022 - This week brought important, but mixed, news about the approximately 40 Canadians held in indefinite detention in camps and prisons in Northeastern Syria. The good news was that four Canadians, Kimberly Polman, Oumaima Chouay, and Chouay’s two children, were repatriated to Canada. All four had spent years detained in a camp established for the families of individuals accused of being members of Daesh (ISIS), which is administered by the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). This was the first time, it appears, that the Canadian government itself has been directly involved in both the release and repatriation of Canadians being held in these detention camps, although the government has refused to discuss specifics about the operation beyond thanking the AANES and US government for their support.

Previously, a five-year-old girl who was orphaned was able to return to Canada in 2020. In 2021, a four-year-old girl was repatriated in, followed by her mother eight months later. However, those repatriations were coordinated by Patrick Galbraith, a former US diplomat, and not the Canadian government. It was only once they had escaped the camps and arrived at the Canadian Consulate in Erbil, Iraq, that the Canadian government granted them travel documents to return to Canada. In the case of the mother, it was only with the threat of a lawsuit that the government issued the documents. This means that approximately 40 Canadians, including 22 children, 10 women and several men, remain in indefinite detention in Northeastern Syria. They face no prospect of trial, and will not be released without outside intervention. While some have asked whether this may signal a move by Canada to repatriate all its citizens, actions by government lawyers point otherwise.

The second recent development is that the Canadian government has signaled it will continue to fight a case brought by the families of Canadians detained in NE Syria to force the government to act. Specifically, the case was set to go to trial on Nov. 2, 2022, but is now delayed for a month thanks to the government filing a motion to have evidence examined in closed hearings for national security reasons. Those hearings will take place over the next month, and the new hearing date is set for early December. If the federal government were serious about resolving this crisis, they would not be filing delay tactics in court. As legal experts who have brought similar suits against the government have pointed out, this kind of application – known as a Section 38 application – is a delaying tactic that the government has used in national security cases the past. Apart from delaying the hearings, it means that the judge will hear arguments behind closed doors, and without the presence of the families' lawyers, about whether evidence in the case will be kept secret (and away from the families) for national security reasons.

The federal government clearly intends to do all it can to avoid a legal decision ordering it to support the return of these 40 Canadians, despite the fact that they are detained in life-threatening conditions, without access to education, healthcare or the possibility of release. They will remain in these conditions for the foreseeable future, barring any major change in the situation in the camps. This is in clear violation of their fundamental human rights, regardless of concerns of whether any of the adults were involved in terrorism or other illegal activities while in Syria. Each deserves a chance to live a life free of arbitrary detention and to be integrated back into society (including the possibility of facing charges and court hearings back in Canada). While the evidence behind the proceedings for both Polman and Chouay are still undisclosed, the government has shown that they are able to take measures to protect the security of Canadians when the individuals return to Canada. Kimberly Polman has already been placed under a peace bond with strict conditions, including wearing an ankle monitor, not driving a car and not possessing a cell phone or other device that can access the internet, while Oumaima Chouay has been charged with multiple terrorism offences and currently remains in prison awaiting a bail hearing.

It is imperative that, following these repatriations, pressure remain on the government to allow all Canadians detained in Northeast Syria to return. While the most pressure has been on the return of children, often accompanied by calls for their mothers to also be allowed to return, we must avoid a situation where the “good detainees” are freed while the “bad” – male Canadian prisoners, along with women without children in the camps – are left to suffer in these camps because they are viewed as more of a risk, or as already guilty of a crime, without having ever been charged or tried. We have seen throughout the so-called “War on Terror” how individuals – mainly Muslim men – have been labeled as criminals, terrorists and threats to our security, and allowed to be detained in life threatening, rights-violating situations, including being tortured, all without evidence or based solely on suspicions and profiling.

This past summer, a group of United Nations Special Rapporteurs issued a devastating rebuke of Canada’s refusal to provide support to detainees and to put an end to their arbitrary detention in a finding in the case of UK-born Canadian Jack Letts. This was in addition to calls from the NDP, the Green Party of Canada, and multiple human rights groups for the government to act immediately to bring these Canadians home. It is imperative that if, as Prime Minister Trudeau has said, this government truly adheres to their obligations to protect the rights of Canadians, no matter where they are in the world, that they act without delay to repatriate the remaining Canadian detainees in Northeastern Syria. Read more - Lire plus

TAKE ACTION: Children Forced to Eat Sand: Free Jack Letts & 43 Canadian Kids, Women & Men in Syria

TAKE ACTION: Send Birthday Cards to Jack Letts, Illegally Detained in an Overseas Dungeon for 5.5 years!

Urgent need for ban on use of facial recognition technology by police, featuring ICLMG

Red Eye Podcast 16/10/2022 - On October 4, a parliamentary committee released a new report on facial recognition technology and artificial intelligence. The committee stopped short of recommending a ban on the use of facial recognition technology by police, a move that the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group says is critical to prevent mass surveillance of Canadians. We speak with Tim McSorley, national coordinator for ICLMG. Listen - Écouter

Ligue des droits et libertés: La reconnaissance faciale et les droits humains (vidéo)

TAKE ACTION: Protect our rights from facial recognition!

Egypt’s Misuse of Counter-terrorism Measures Casts Shadow over COP27

Ahead of COP27, ICLMG & other organizations condemn Egypt’s misuse of counter-terrorism to repress & wrongfully imprison civil society activists, human rights lawyers, journalists & other critics. We call on states to demand their release.

CIHRS 26/10/2022 - In the weeks running up to the United Nations international Climate Change Conference (COP27) to be held in November, in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, the undersigned members of the Civil Society Coalition on Human Rights and Counter-terrorism express their support for independent civil society activists in Egypt and their call to be allowed to carry out their legitimate, peaceful activities without state harassment, intimidation, defamation, detention, prosecution or violence.

Repression of civil society activists, human right lawyers, journalists, academic researchers, opposition political figures and other non-violent critics of the government in Egypt is facilitated by the misuse of counter-terrorism legislation.

Many prominent imprisoned activists face charges, or have been convicted, of supporting terrorist entities as a result of their non-violent political activities, or exercising their right to freedom of expression.

Egypt holds around 60,000 political prisoners, among them prominent activists like Alaa Abd el-Fattah, who has been on hunger strike for over 200 days to protest his unjust imprisonment; lawyers like Mohamed al-Baqer, Hoda Abdelmoneim, and Ibrahim Metwally Hegazy; journalists like Ismail al-Iskanderani, Hala Fahmy and Safaa Al-Korbagi and blogger Mohamed Oxygen; prominent political figures like Abdel Moniem Aboul Fotouh, and even environmental rights activists, like Ahmed Amasha.

The detention of all of these, and many other, wrongfully imprisoned people rests on false accusations of support for terrorism. They should all be released and the fabricated charges made against them dropped. Egypt is a controversial host for this major international conference. The international community recognizes the essential role that civil society plays in addressing the climate crisis. Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, states have an obligation to “promote and facilitate… public participation in addressing climate change.”[1] Egypt’s harsh crackdown on independent civil society, the media and peaceful dissent has a chilling effect on public participation, which undermines the effectiveness of necessary climate action.

Widespread violations of human rights in Egypt, including disappearances, torture, indiscriminate use of lethal force against unarmed protesters and denial of basic freedoms of assembly, association and expression are built on a false pretext of taking measures to counter terrorism. Such misuse of the fight against terrorism to mask brazen violations of international human rights law is counterproductive.

We join with Egyptian activists, and activists from around the world, in recognizing that there can be no climate justice without civil society space. As members of a coalition dedicated to the protection of human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism, we deplore Egypt’s sustained record of serious human rights violations carried out behind the veil of counter-terrorism. We urge all states participating in COP27 to support the vital role of civil society in advancing climate action, including by calling for the release of Egyptian activists, dissidents and climate activists wrongfully imprisoned on counter-terrorism charges. Read more - Lire plus

Sisters of Alaa Abd El-Fattah Stage Sit-In in U.K. Demanding His Release from Egypt Prison Before COP27

***This online event is hosted on unceded Algonquin territory. This land must be returned to the care of the Algonquin People.

The ICLMG is celebrating its 20th anniversary this year. To highlight two decades of advocacy to protect and promote human rights and civil liberties in the context of the “War on Terror,” we are organizing an online panel with many of our past and present colleagues and partners. Join this incredible group of speakers for a wide-ranging discussion and Q&A on the impacts of Canada’s anti-terror actions and the ongoing efforts to protect fundamental rights and freedoms.

Thursday November 3rd from 7 to 9PM ET

Online. Register here to get the zoom link

Please share via email + on Facebook + Twitter + Instagram

PANELISTS

– Roch Tassé, ICLMG National Coordinator from 2002-2015, current member of the ICLMG steering committee

– Maureen Webb, labor lawyer, human rights activist, and author of Illusions of Security: Global Surveillance and Democracy in the Post-9/11 World

– Dominique Peschard, co-chair of the ICLMG steering committee, representative of La Ligue des droits et libertés

– Yavar Hameed, human rights lawyer at Hameed Law in Ottawa

– Monia Mazigh, author, academic and human rights activist. Former ICLMG National Coordinator for 2015-2016.

– Matthew Behrens, freelance writer and social justice advocate co-ordinating Homes not Bombs, Stop Canadian Involvement in Torture and the Campaign to Stop Secret Trials in Canada.

– Roger Clark, former Amnesty International Canada Secretary General and campaigner for justice for Hassan Diab and extradition law reform

– Patricia Poirier, former ICLMG researcher for the report of the Information Clearinghouse on Border Controls and Infringements to Travellers’ Rights

– Khalid Elgazzar, lawyer specializing in National Security Law, Civil Liberties and Human Rights Law, and board member with the National Council of Canadian Muslims

Moderated by Tim McSorley, ICLMG National Coordinator

The panelists will cover issues they have worked on with the ICLMG over the years, including:

The creation of ICLMG in the wake of the Anti-terrorism Act and the War on Terror
Inquiries into the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, and their fight for redress
The fight against ever-expanding state surveillance, including the International Campaign against Mass Surveillance and campaigns against dangerous surveillance tools like facial recognition technology
Campaigns against rights-violating legislation that expand the security state, including the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, the infamous Bill C-51 (2015) and the more recent National Security Act (2017)
How anti-terrorism tools like the terrorist entities list, the No Fly List, and the targeting of Muslim charities undermine humanitarian aid, justice and civil liberties
Islamophobia’s role in the War on Terror, including campaigns against the illegal detention of Khaled Al Qazzaz, Yasser Albaz, Benamar Benatta, and Abousfian Abdelrazik
Draconian border security measures, including the North American Security Perimeter, and the campaign for accountability for the Canada Border Security Agency
And much more!

Les présentations seront en anglais seulement, mais vous pourrez poser vos questions en français si vous le désirez.

The panel will be livestreamed on our Youtube channel and available to watch afterwards. Subscribe and click on the bell to be notified

Please invite your friends and share widely. We hope to see you there! Source

Justice for Hassan Diab: Rally, press conference and actions!

ICLMG 26/10/2022 - In April 2023, Hassan will face an unfair trial in France for a crime he did not commit. This is despite overwhelming evidence of his innocence. In 2018, two French investigating judges dismissed all charges against him and freed him unconditionally. All the so-called “evidence” that was presented by France to justify Hassan Diab’s extradition in 2014 has been withdrawn, discredited, or rejected. France has offered NO new “evidence” against Hassan. On the contrary, the alibi evidence that Hassan was not in France at the time of the 1980 Paris bombing has proven unshakable.

PM Trudeau must honour the words he uttered in 2018: “I think, for Hassan Diab, we have to recognize first of all that what happened to him never should have happened.” The Canadian Government must protect Hassan and commit to refusing any future extradition request from France. Here are four actions you can take to ensure that there will be no further miscarriage of justice:

1. Attend the November 13th rally in Ottawa

What: Rally Demanding that the Canadian Government Protect Hassan Diab from Further Injustice
When: Sunday November 13, 2022, from 1:00 to 2:30 pm ET
Where: At the Canadian Tribute to Human Rights monument, 220 Elgin St, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

Please invite your friends and share the Facebook event + Instagram post + Twitter post widely!

2. Attend the November 14th online press conference

What: Press conference for Justice for Hassan Diab
When: Monday November 14, 2022, at 11 am ET
Where: Livestream on ICLMG’s youtube channel. Subscribe and click the bell to be notified when we go live!

3. Sign and share the LeadNow petitions to protect Hassan from further injustice

Petition in English + Pétition en français

4. Send an email using ICLMG’s one-click tool and share widely!

Letter in English + Lettre en français

For more information on the case of Hassan Diab, read our webcomic, watch our animated version of the comic, or visit justiceforhassandiab.org. Source

CFSC again raises deep concerns over treatment of Hassan Diab

CSIS weighed whether rail blockades supporting Wet'suwet'en could be classed as terrorism

CBC News 27/10/2022 - Canada's civilian spy service assessed whether First Nations land rights activists who disrupt trains should be classed as a "terrorist threat" to national security alongside the likes of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, according to declassified documents. But the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) eventually decided the label wouldn't stick after probing the issue in secret, internal studies whose findings were shared with government officials in an unclassified March 2021 counterterror briefing.

CSIS reached this conclusion through analysis of the Canadian criminal code, under which, to be considered terrorism, interference or disruption of essential services must inflict death or injury through violence, or otherwise cause serious risk to public health and safety. "Unsophisticated acts of unlawful interference [like blockades] do not cross the terrorism threshold," the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) said in a report released through access-to-information law. "Although these disruptive actions are damaging to the economy and to rail network operations, they have not yet amounted to acts of terrorism."

ITAC employs officials from across Canada's security and intelligence bureaucracy, and generates reports for federal leaders based on openly available and classified sources.

It's housed under CSIS, which is tasked with monitoring and reporting on potential threats to national security stemming from hostile acts of subversion, sabotage, espionage and terrorism. Though heavily censored, the documents confirm the spy service's concerns were tied in part to the February 2020 Wet'suwet'en solidarity demonstrations, which disrupted rail corridors for weeks. Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs oppose construction of the Coastal GasLink pipeline through their nation's territory in northern B.C. Following an armed RCMP raid on road blockades that were stopping construction workers from getting through, dozens of protests popped up across the country to show support.

CSIS was also worried about a standoff over a housing development in Caledonia, Ont., which Haudenosaunee activists from nearby Six Nations began occupying in July 2020 as part of a long-standing land claims dispute, dubbing it 1492 Land Back Lane. Activists mounted road blockades and shut down a CN rail line following police raids in August 2020 and October 2020, respectively. The 247-page release begins with a November 2020 report on the unrest in Caledonia, already published by APTN News, where the service raised "notable concerns" about the camp's impact on critical infrastructure in southern Ontario.

Then on Dec. 15, 2020, CSIS's Intelligence Assessments Branch penned a classified report sparked by a decision by U.S. prosecutors to lay terror charges against two women accused of trying to sabotage trains in Washington state. "The perpetrators had allegedly acted in support of the [2020] Wet'suwet'en pipeline protests and had links to anti-authoritarian movements that seek anarchy and advocate for civil unrest," ITAC said. ITAC assessed, however, that "these acts unlikely constitute terrorism, or defined as such in Canadian law, and likely had more to do with vandalism against a symbol of perceived [oppression]."

Even so, CSIS was evidently worried about anarchists meddling in First Nations-led demonstrations, describing these groups as agitators who latch on to democratic dissent to stir up social disorder "wherever their ideology may benefit." And while not quite terrorists, the documents indicate CSIS labels First Nations activists and allies who engage in blockades as "ideologically motivated violent extremists," and thus potential national security threats who warrant state surveillance.

Criminologist calls reports 'troublesome'

Jeffrey Monaghan, an associate professor of criminology at Carleton University, analyzed the documents and found much of this concerning. Terrorism prosecutions have slowed in recent years, Monaghan said, so he called it interesting to see CSIS "shopping around" the idea of potentially laying terror charges against rail disrupters. "We've expanded the war on terror so broadly that Indigenous rights activists are being scrutinized as potential terrorists," he said. "It's really a symptom of the war on terror stretching out so far and developing all these resources that they have to be used."

Monaghan fears ITAC is disseminating "spurious" claims through the federal security bureaucracy that discredit First Nations-led activism politically, painting it as the work of would-be terrorists, violent extremists or interloping agitators. He said the tendency to ascribe direct action tactics by First Nations to subversive outsiders is part of CSIS's institutional culture going back years. In 1990, Assembly of First Nations National Chief Georges Erasmus denounced this narrative as "implicitly racist."

Monaghan called the documents' use of extremist framing "troublesome" because ITAC reports circulate internally to other agencies, and said they offer "pre-emptive" intelligence police can use to justify heavy-handedness. "It just raises so many questions of why they would be so quick to try and de-legitimize Indigenous-led protests by trying to, basically, say it's antifa," said Monaghan. "Their willingness to just almost skate over the actual political grievance, the actual political movement, and all of a sudden latch on to these de-legitimizing tropes really paints a picture internally of the policing-intelligence culture that does not take Indigenous affairs seriously." Read more - Lire plus

RCMP Spending on Pipeline Conflict Reaches $25 Million

Was the 'Freedom Convoy' a national security threat? Conflicting OPP testimonies at the Public Order Emergency Commission

The Canadian Press 27/10/2022 - The head of the Ontario Provincial Police is defending comments he made about the "Freedom Convoy" posing a threat to Canada's national security. Thomas Carrique told members of Parliament in March that his intelligence unit identified protests in Ottawa as a “threat to national security” about a week after heavy trucks arrived in the capital city.

But the head of intelligence for the force, Supt. Pat Morris, contradicted that this week. In testimony before the public inquiry looking into the federal government’s use of the Emergencies Act, Morris said there was never any credible information showing a direct threat to national security. On Monday, members of Parliament on the public safety committee voted unanimously to seek a response from the Ontario Provincial Police, and Carrique, about those conflicting statements.

Carrique testified at the public inquiry Thursday, where he clarified that he agrees there were no credible national security threats. He said the word "threat" was used to indicate that something could potentially happen, and that the situation called for further analysis.

“This is talking from a strategic level: What are the risks that need to be taken into consideration when making decisions and developing plans?” he said. “The word ‘potential’ is almost immaterial. It's like saying that there's a threat of rain today. Does it change the situation when you say there's a potential threat of rain today? I would suggest to you it does not. What is required is further analysis of that threat.” He also stood by Morris, saying he is the foremost expert on the subject in Ontario. Canada’s spy agency raised concerns over the OPP's suggestion there was a national security threat, but Carrique says any police leader ought to look at potential threats extremely seriously.

Intelligence reports prepared by the OPP and released by the inquiry last week said convoy organizers and participants would be "unlikely to have the ability to control, influence or discipline'' the "fringe elements'' that it expected could pose the biggest threat to public safety. The reports also noted on several occasions that while the OPP had "identified no concrete, specific, or credible threat with regard to the Freedom Convoy protest'' or related events, "a lone actor or group of individuals could enact a threat with little or no warning.'' On Feb. 8, the OPP assessment said "foreign ideological and financial support'' for the protests was helping to harden the resolve' of those taking part.

The intelligence report said, "the ongoing series of protests and blockades represents a potential threat to Canada's sovereignty and national security.'' The Public Order Emergency Commission is set to hear evidence from CSIS, although it is unclear whether the public will learn what they have to say. Late Wednesday, Commissioner Paul Rouleau ruled that the federal government could present both evidence and witnesses from CSIS and the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre behind closed doors for national security reasons. In his ruling, Rouleau also said that after he has heard the evidence, he will decide whether some or all of it should remain confidential. Read more - Lire plus

OPP saw no evidence Freedom Convoy posed direct threat to national security: intelligence officer

Ontario Provincial Police use controversial data-mining platform Palantir for crime analysis

Emergencies Act Inquiry Shows How Ottawa Police Let the ‘Freedom Convoy’ Spiral Out of Control

OPS intelligence report raises serious and troubling questions about the political neutrality of Ottawa Police and its intelligence unit

Canadian Bar Association: Facilitate humanitarian aid in Afghanistan

The CBA National Magazine 02/09/2022 - Canadian charities wishing to operate in Afghanistan have to be able to navigate Canada’s anti-terrorism financing legislation. This is not always an easy task, and it can get in the way of charities carrying out time-sensitive, necessary or even crucial work. In a letter to Justice Minister David Lametti and Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino, the Charities and Not-for-Profit Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association expresses its unequivocal support for three recommendations contained in the House of Commons Special Committee Report on Afghanistan and Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation.

The report, titled “Honouring Canada’s Legacy in Afghanistan: Responding to the Humanitarian Crisis and Helping People Reach Safety,” seeks to empower charities to offer timely humanitarian aid “within the scope of a reasonable legislative regime,” the CBA letter says. The three recommendations the CBA Section endorses are:

9. That the Government of Canada act immediately to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 2615.

10. That the Government of Canada act immediately to ensure that registered Canadian organizations have the clarity and assurances needed – such as carve-outs or exemptions to deliver humanitarian assistance and meet basic needs in Afghanistan without fear of prosecution for violating Canada’s anti-terrorism laws.

11. That the Government of Canada review the anti-terrorism financing provisions under the Criminal Code and urgently take any legislative steps necessary to ensure those provisions do not unduly restrict legitimate humanitarian action that complies with international humanitarian principles and law.

Many Canadian humanitarian organizations testified before the Special Committee that the country’s anti-terrorism financing laws and regulations made it nearly impossible to operate in Afghanistan. What those organizations need is clarity and assurances that they are not going to wind up being prosecuted for having unwittingly violated anti-terrorism laws, for instance if they did not know “that terrorist activity was being facilitated, where terrorist activity was not foreseen or planned at the time of facilitation and even where no terrorist activity was actually carried out,” the letter says. Charitable organizations also testified that the prohibition on paying taxes in Afghanistan – on salaries, rent or imports, in particular – makes their work significantly more dangerous and impedes their ability to operate in that country. “Charities trying to comply with Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation have the difficult choice of continuing to operate in the country without paying taxes at great risk to their staff or to stop operating in Afghanistan altogether,” the Section explains.

Out of step with international practices

The Section is of the view that Canada’s anti-terrorism financing regime is not aligned with international practices such as the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 2615 which states that “humanitarian assistance and other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan” do not violate the UN’s sanctions regime against the Taliban.

Canada has yet to issue an exemption for Afghanistan that would allow humanitarian organizations to operate with the speed required by the urgency of the situation on the ground without fear of violating anti-terrorism financing legislation.

Adopting past CBA recommendations

The CBA Section also suggests the timely adoption of past CBA recommendations would improve anti-terrorism financing legislation, which would result in both the federal government and Canadian charities being better able to support humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere. One of those recommendations, from when the government first introduced anti-terrorism legislation in 2001, says the Crown “must prove criminal intent find anyone guilty of a terrorist offence.” There should also be a due diligence defence for Canadian charities that could accidentally distribute funds to a foreign entity in good faith. As well, the government should “develop Canadian guidelines for charities operating abroad or domestically so those charities can show due diligence in complying with anti-terrorism legislation." Read more - Lire plus

Matthew Behrens: After Devastating Rejection, High-Profile Afghan Women’s Rights Activist Submits New Canadian Application

Homes Not Bombs 120/10/2022 - At 12:01 am on October 17, a dedicated group of Ottawa women submitted a Group of 5 sponsorship application for leading Afghan women’s rights defender Farzana Adell Ghadiya, who formerly worked in Kabul as Chief of Staff for the senior advisor to the president of Afghanistan on UN affairs. They stayed up late because that was the opening date for a recently announced time- and space-limited program to accept 3,000 Afghan refugees who were unable to register with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Bessa Whitmore, a member of the group, has long offered Adell Ghadiya a free bedroom in her Ottawa home. She is part of the group of Ottawa women who maintain weekly contact with the persecuted women’s rights activist, Hazara minority, and Ismaili Muslim, who is now hiding in a third country where her visa runs out in two months. The women, who already provide Adell Ghadiya with monthly financial support, have pledged to ensure all of her needs are taken care of for up to a year if she is approved to come to Canada. The women are relieved that Farzana was able to access the system and has now been assigned a file number, providing them some hope that her application will be seriously considered. Adell Ghadiya continues to maintain hope that the high-profile campaign of support will help get her to safety in Canada.

“I was deeply disappointed when Canada rejected my first application without even reading it,” Adell Ghadiya shared from hiding. “When I got the rejection letter, it looked like they processed it incorrectly, because they said I was not eligible for something I didn’t even apply for. I hope this time that the assigned people in the immigration office read my application in detail and decide without prejudice as soon as possible. Time is running out for me, and I am afraid of being sent back to Afghanistan, where the whole world knows what will happen to a women’s rights defender like me.”

Earlier this month, it was revealed that, despite the clearly-defined risk of being forcibly returned to torture and death in Afghanistan, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) had rejected Adell Ghadiya’s application for protection. She had applied for a Temporary Resident Permit for Protection (TRP) given that she meets all the qualifications under the humanitarian program for Afghan refugees. It was a perfectly legitimate route for refugees to get to Canada (one often employed successfully by the Rural Refugee Rights Network), but IRCC failed to read her application materials and issued a boilerplate rejection usually sent to applicants for a temporary resident visa, a document that is time-limited and premised on the likelihood that the visitor will return to their country of origin. But Farzana did not apply for a temporary resident visa. She applied for a TRP.

Advocates and supporters – including 35,000 people who have signed a support petition – have ever since been calling on Immigration Minister Sean Fraser to immediately intervene and exercise his legally mandated discretion to provide Farzana with a Temporary Resident Permit as a path to safety and permanent residence. “With the Group of Five sponsorship, we have one more pathway for Farzana to get here,” says Whitmore, adding she is “exasperated on behalf of Farzana and so many others in her shoes that the Canadian government just can’t seem to get it together when it comes to honouring the lives of Afghan refugees. The machinery seems to work if you’re Ukrainian, which is great, but not for Afghans. Hopefully this time the result will be different for Farzana.” Farzana’s women’s support group and many other supporters are urging IRCC to expedite Adell Ghadiya’s file given the short time left on her non-renewable third country visa.

Sharen Craig, who speaks daily with Farzana, is hopeful that the sponsorship application will be approved, but worries about the long-term toll Canada’s bureaucratic bungles are having on her friend. “Farzana speaks out despite the risk to herself, not only on her own behalf but for all Afghans facing the brutality of the new regime in Kabul. But what does it take to get her here? We have spoken with so many MPs, there’s been so much attention to her case, and yet all we get is a brick wall of rejection. I am up every night worried with fear for my lovely friend, whom I truly feel has become like a daughter to me. Even though this sponsorship checks all the right boxes, I won’t get a good night’s sleep until I am hugging Farzana here in Ottawa.” Read more - Lire plus

Privacy expert Christopher Parsons: Analysis and highlights of the 2021 National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s Annual Report

Twitter 27/10/2022 - At long last working my way through all of NSIRA’s annual report and I am saddened by the lack of uptake by journalists. There are some alarms ringing, at different part of the report, and not major response or reaction. In this thread I highlight some interesting and some alarming things.

1) NSIRA is pushing CSIS to disclose when it is adopts “a novel authority, technique or technology is used”.

This is what you want a review agency to be alerted to! It’d help keep NSIRA ahead of the next ODAC as an example

2) The federal court, not just the Minister, should get full and unredacted copies of technical reports. Also, the sorta thing you’d want judges overseeing warrants to have when assessing what they’re authorizing.

3) CSIS sometimes lacks documentation on Threat Reduction Measures (TRMs), with the result being neither CSIS or anyone else can assess their efficacy or outcomes when actions are performed by CSIS or external partners

4) CSIS isn’t seeking judicial authorization when it provides information to external parties, which then undertake TRMs that could detrimentally affect an individual’s Charter rights. NSIRA recommends warrants be adopted. [...]

1) The policy review of active and defensive cyber operations found gaps that need addressing. In particular, the broad and generalised classes of activities, techniques, and targets could capture “unintended higher-risk activities and targets.” (These kinds of concerns—that CSE powers could have unintended consequences—were issues that @citizenlab and @cippic raised in their report analysing C-59 oh so many years ago. See: citizenlab.ca/wp-content/upl…. No legislation was harmed/amended as a result of those warnings.)

2) There’s also a risk that pre-emptive DCOs are, functionally, just ACOs by another name. This could lead to “insufficient engagement of GAC.”

The next review stage will be to go beyond policy and NSIRA has a review on deck of how operations are actually conducted. [...]

We now move to some somewhat spicy material.

6) CSE was asked to report on the regularity at which ‘in relation to Canadians’ or “Canadian-collected information” was in the 3,050 foreign intelligence reports it issued to clients. CSE made the decision that this is gonna take time. Result? There’s just no information that CSE has collected about their actions, or that they deign to let NSIRA report on.

7) When it comes to how often Canadian identifying information is suppressed in foreign intelligence/cybersecurity reporting, CSE took the same approach. Because they haven’t done it before they need to assess impact and can’t resolve this in time for NSIRA’s annual report. [...]

10) When it comes to active/defensive cyber operations...CSE also said it wasn't "in a position to provide this information for publication by NSIRA, as doing so would be injurious" to Canada's international relations, national defense, or national security. [...]

12a) Can NSIRA better access CSE information. In short, it looks like the answer is that "[I]n 2021, this challenge persisted...NSIRA and CSE have been unable to achieve a workable trust-but-verify model for any reviews of CSE to date" So what's happening? NSIRA asks for data, and then CSE gets what *it* thinks pertains to the request and then provides it. [...]

On RCMP:

1) expect a lotta reviews. About HUMINT. About bypassing encryption when intercepting communications in national security investigations. About RCMP's access and use of security intelligence.

2) On the 'can NSIRA access the data' front, things are mixed. NSIRA lacks direct access to RCMP IT systems. The proxy model--through the NatSec External Reviews & Compliance Team--seems to be working, but NSIRA wants either direct access or a way to verify what it gets by proxy [...]

Once more, we see NSIRA repeating that it is "entitled to receive all information it deems relevant, except for Cabinet confidences."[...] If NSIRA is prevented in conducting its lawful activities then it cannot assist in legitimising national security agencies' activities or giving confidence to Canadians of the lawfulness of their activities. [...]

My summary thought: the serious challenges that NSIRA seems to be having accessing information, in particular from CSE, is worrying and disturbing. Unlike in other nations NSIRA is having to negotiate with CSE despite having the lawful mandate to compel disclosure of information. This is something that journalists and others REALLY need to be making a LOT more public. While CSE is important for national security, that importance doesn't mean it gets to ignore/set its own special rules for compliance with review. Read more - Lire plus

Cybersecurity Will Not Thrive in Darkness

A Critical Analysis of Proposed Amendments in Bill C-26 to the Telecommunications Act

Citizen Lab 18/10/2022 - On June 14, 2022, the Government of Canada introduced “Bill C-26: An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts.” If passed into law, it will significantly reform the Telecommunications Act as well as impose new requirements on federally regulated critical infrastructure providers. This report, “Cybersecurity Will Not Thrive in Darkness: A Critical Analysis of Proposed Amendments in Bill C-26 to the Telecommunications Act,” offers 30 recommendations to the draft legislation in an effort to correct its secrecy and accountability deficiencies, while suggesting amendments that would impose some restrictions on the range of powers that the government would be able to wield. These amendments must be seriously taken up because of the sweeping nature of the legislation.

As drafted at time of writing, Bill C-26 would empower the Minister of Industry to compel telecommunications providers to do or refrain from doing anything in the service of securing Canadian telecommunications networks against the threats of interference, manipulation, or disruption. The legislation would authorize the Minister to compel providers to disclose confidential information and then enable the Minister to circulate it widely within the federal government; this information could potentially include either identifiable or de-identified personal information. Moreover, the Minister could share non-confidential information internationally even when doing so could result in regulatory processes or private right of actions against an individual or organization. Should the Minister or other party to whom the Minister shares information unintentionally lose control of the information, there would be no liability attached to the government for the accident.

Where orders or regulations are issued, they would not need to be published in the Canadian Gazette and gags could be attached to the recipients of such orders. There may even be situations where the government could issue an order or regulation, with the aforementioned publication ban and gag, that runs counter to a decision by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) and that overrides aspects of that decision. And in any cases where a telecommunications provider seeks judicial review, it might never see the evidence used to justify an order or regulation. However, if a telecommunications provider is found to have deliberately ignored or failed to adhere to an order, then either the individuals who directed the action or the telecommunications provider could suffer administrative monetary penalties.

This report, in summary, identifies and analyzes a series of deficiencies in Bill C-26 as it is presently drafted:

The breadth of what the government might order a telecommunications provider to do is not sufficiently bounded.
The excessive secrecy and confidentiality provisions imposed on telecommunications providers threaten to establish a class of secret law and regulations.
Significant potential exists for excessive information sharing within the federal government as well as with international partners.
Costs associated with compliance with reforms may endanger the viability of smaller providers.
Vague drafting language means that the full contours of the legislation cannot be assessed.
No recognition of privacy or other Charter-protected rights exists as a counterbalance to proposed security requirements nor are appropriate accountability or transparency requirements imposed on the government.

Even if it is presumed that the government does need the ability to encourage or compel telecommunications providers to modify their technical or business operations to enhance the security of their services and facilities, it is readily apparent that more transparency and accountability should be required of the government. All of the recommendations in this report are meant to address some of the existent problems in the legislation. Should these recommendations or ones derived from them not be taken up, then the government will be creating legislation of the worst kind insofar as it will require the public—and telecommunications providers—to simply trust that the government knows what it is doing, is reaching the right decisions, and that no need exists for a broader public discussion concerning the kinds of protections that should be put in place to protect the cybersecurity of Canada’s telecommunications networks. Cybersecurity cannot thrive on secretive and shadowy government edicts. The government must amend its legislation to ensure its activities comport with Canada’s democratic values and the norms of transparency and accountability. Read more - Lire plus

Biden’s New Counterterrorism Policy Guidance Further Entrenches the Forever War

Just Security 11/10/2022 - President Joe Biden has reportedly signed a new classified policy memorandum for conducting counterterrorism drone strikes outside conventional war zones. While its aim of reducing risks to civilians is admirable, the memorandum contains notable exceptions and loopholes. These topics will be covered by others who are reflecting on the new policy in Just Security today and over the coming week. Here, however, I want to speak to a different concern: the way in which the new counterterrorism policies have been formulated and publicized.

First, the memorandum is classified. According to Charlie Savage, reporting for the New York Times, “it was described by a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to explain its key aspects.” This secrecy undermines democracy by making it impossible for the public to know precisely what the rules are that are guiding the country’s use of lethal force abroad. Even if there are some rules that cannot be fully disclosed for security reasons, surely the essential elements can be (as they have been in the past following successful FOIA requests). This leak—or what David Pozen might call a “pleak,” neither a plant nor a leak but something in between—is not a substitute for full disclosure by the government of the rules that regulate American war-making. Allowing the public to learn about the policy from the leak and from academics and former government officials like those writing today for Just Security, who are experts at reading the tea leaves it contains, is no substitute for complete public disclosure and debate.

Second, it is notable that Congress seemingly has played no role at all in determining how the United States uses force abroad in this context. These days, we tend to take Congress’ impotence in the area of war powers for granted, but we shouldn’t. Recall that, while the President is “Commander in Chief,” it is Congress that has the Constitutional authority to “declare War.” And it is Congress that has the power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” “raise and support Armies,” and “provide and maintain a Navy.” Congress, in other words, is supposed to not just be consulted in decisions to wage and regulate warfare, it is supposed to be an essential participant. And yet, as in previous iterations of similar policy guidance, Congress appears to have been sidelined, as President Biden adopted these rules solely as a “Presidential Policy Memorandum” (PPM). This further entrenches the idea that it is up to the president, not Congress, to determine the course of the country’s counterterrorism program.

Third, the PPM is a policy, rather than legal, document. It therefore may be disregarded easily at the President’s discretion, and without public notice. President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump made similar choices in previous iterations of the PPM, the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) and Principles, Standards, and Procedures (PSP) respectively. Adopting constraints on the use of force as a matter of policy, rather than as a matter of law, has a major downside—they can be easily and quickly reversed, as we learned when President Trump dropped crucial restrictions contained in Obama’s PPG, thus undoing much of the hard-fought progress that had been made in adopting it in the first place.

By contrast, adopting limits on the use of force as a matter of law could lead to real, sustained progress because it could serve to bind successors to abide by those constraints. (Which is, of course, why administrations are allergic to such statements—executive branch lawyers, and their policy clients, hate to give up any future room to maneuver.) President Obama made a small step in this direction when he announced in 2011 that the United States considered Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to be customary international law (or at least, that it would “choose out of a sense of legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any individual it detains in an international armed conflict, and expects all other nations to adhere to these principles as well”). The progress was limited by the lack of clarity as to whether the statement applied to non-international armed conflicts as well, which the U.S. military has engaged in much more frequently than international armed conflicts in recent decades.

These problems are not irremediable. The administration could address these failures. It could follow up the leak to Charlie Savage by disclosing the new PPM with minimal necessary redactions. And it could work with Congress to repeal and replace the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force and adopt key limitations on the use of force as a matter of law. It could, moreover, announce that it accepts certain international law obligations on the use of force as obligatory—for example, it could accept clearer legal restrictions, not just policy restrictions, on civilian casualties. Each step would mark real progress. Until then, however, the policy memorandum represents just one more stepping stone in the long path of the forever war. Read more - Lire plus

The Biden Drone Playbook: The Elusive Promise of Restrained Counterterrorism

Just Security 17/10/2022 - In an anonymously sourced article that has all the markings of an officially sanctioned story, the New York Times’ Charlie Savage reports that President Joe Biden has recently approved a new policy on counterterrorism direct action (i.e., drone strikes and commando raids) that appears to largely roll back the Trump-era policies to the 2013 Obama administration standards. [...] Yet the new policy leaves much necessary business undone. How the administration interprets key legal and policy concepts around direct action compared to international allies remains hotly disputed. The faithful execution of the policy by the military – particularly how it seeks to prevent civilian casualties and how it investigates civilian casualty incidents – requires much more work. The transparency agenda is stalled, and much of the “war on terror” remains shrouded in secrecy. And more must be done to actually institutionalize the administration’s policies so as to prevent the next administration from merely rolling back the new standards.

By most accounts, terrorist threats are substantially lower than they were a decade ago, and we are far better at defending against threats that cannot be disrupted by strikes. In this context, a policy that actually does what the 2013 PPG tried to do may be entirely appropriate. The problem is unwinding a decade of interpretations and implementation practices that have often stretched policy principles to more ambitious operational objectives. For one, the United States continues to find itself at odds with Western allies in how it interprets many of the fundamental concepts underpinning its direct action policies. This includes interpretations of imminence, feasibility of capture, presumption of civilian status, and host nation consent, to name just a few. (Brianna Rosen has written about these discrepancies in depth.) In all cases, the United States tends to interpret these concepts more loosely than its allies, ostensibly to make them operationally flexible, but in a way that may also undermine the promises set forth in its ambitious policies. Serious work to reconcile these differences would both bring the United States closer in line with its allies and improve the credibility of its stated policies.

Second, and even more important, is that it’s not clear that the counterterrorism operating agencies have fully institutionalized these policy principles in their operations. The disastrous August 2021 strike in Kabul during the Afghanistan withdrawal that killed 10 civilians and the March 2019 operation in Baghuz that may have killed up to 80 civilians are but two of the most notable and recent examples of significant civilian harm in U.S. operations. Although these operations took place in “areas of active hostilities” where the “near certainty” of no civilian casualties standard did not apply, U.S. officials had frequently touted the discrimination and care for civilian lives U.S. forces employed in both theaters. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff went so far as to call the Kabul strike “righteous,” even as early reports suggested civilian casualties. Yet in both cases, the U.S. military’s investigations showed chronic problems with confirmation bias and inadequate resources to assess the civilian status of the targets. They also revealed an investigatory process that immediately discounts information not produced by the U.S. government and that’s quick to exonerate those involved but hesitant to introduce real changes designed to prevent future failures. Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting from the New York Times’ Azmat Khan detailed rampant undercounting of civilian casualties and military efforts to suppress these numbers. A 2022 RAND Corporation report detailed a stunning string of breakdowns in procedures that systematically produce an undercounting of civilian casualties and a failure to learn.

The Biden administration has begun to acknowledge these problems and has taken some action to address them, though much work remains to be done. After the Kabul strike, the Times reporting on Baghuz, and the RAND report, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered a comprehensive 90-day review of civilian casualty practices and procedures. The result, a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP), released in August 2022, lays out a comprehensive set of new organizational structures, resources, and procedures to mitigate civilian harm. It’s the sort of government directive that could suggest that the department is taking serious, detailed steps to mitigate civilian harm, or that it’s offering a mind-numbing series of bureaucratic responses that appear to address the problem but don’t actually get at the underlying root causes. The CHMR-AP’s directives are welcome reforms, but time will tell whether they alter the mindset of commanders and targeters, enhance civilian and congressional oversight, improve collaboration with non-governmental organizations, and break the tendency of military investigations to paper over systemic problems. Read more - Lire plus

Assessing Biden’s New Policy Framework for Counterterrorism Direct Action

What the White House Use of Force Policy Means for the War in Somalia

What Can a Secretive Funding Authority Tell Us About the Pentagon’s Use of Force Interpretations?

Brennan Centre 11/10/2022 - For nearly two decades, the Department of Defense has used 10 U.S.C. § 127e, an obscure counterterrorism funding authority, to create and command proxy forces across Africa and Asia. The full list of these proxy forces is highly classified and yet unknown. But journalists like Nick Turse, who was recently featured on The Lawfare Podcast, have so far uncovered § 127e programs in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.

While some of the countries in which the Department of Defense has run § 127e programs are unsurprising—the United States’s counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria are no secret—other locales may raise eyebrows and constitutional concerns alike. What gives the Department of Defense the legal authority to run counterterrorism operations in Cameroon, Egypt, or Niger? Particularly when the operations in these three countries have reportedly involved sending § 127e proxy forces on security sweeps, raids, and kill-or-capture missions?

The Department of Defense may conduct its § 127e programs in the shadows, but the range of programs involving combat hints at how the Pentagon interprets its authority to use force. Section 127e does not itself authorize U.S. forces to conduct or direct proxy forces into hostilities; it can only amplify the United States’s capacity to conduct hostilities already permitted by an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) or Article II of the Constitution, which confers on the president an inherent authority to use force in self-defense. Working backward from independent reporting on § 127e, we can infer how the 2001 AUMF and Article II have been used. And we can conclude that these authorities may have been stretched beyond the executive branch’s representations to Congress and the public. Read more - Lire plus

Turkish doctor detained for proposing chemical weapons probe

ABC News 26/10/2022 - Police detained the president of the Turkish Medical Association after she called for an investigation into allegations that the Turkish military used chemical weapons against Kurdish militants in northern Iraq, media reports in Turkey said Wednesday.

Dr. Sebnem Korur Fincanci, 63, was detained on charges of disseminating “terrorist propaganda” as part of an investigation launched by anti-terrorism police, according to the Ankara chief prosecutor’s office said. Fincanci, a forensic expert, has spent much of her career documenting torture and ill-treatment, and is a leading human rights activist in Turkey. She has served as president of the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey. Turkish newspaper Birgun newspaper and other media reported that she was detained in Istanbul following an early morning raid at her home and was being brought to Ankara for questioning.

Last week, Turkish officials strongly rejected allegations by Kurdish militants that the Turkish military used chemical weapons against the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, in northern Iraq, insisting the military doesn’t have such weapons in its inventory.

In comments to a pro-Kurdish news outlet, Fincanci said she inspected a video purporting to show the use of chemical weapons and called for an “effective investigation.” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused her of slandering Turkey’s armed forces and of insulting her country “by speaking the language of the terrorist organization.” He vowed to take actions to clear the Turkish Medical Association and other professional organizations of “supporters of the terrorist organization.” Read more - Lire plus

TAKE ACTION: Turkey: Release Şebnem Korur Fincancı

Turkey detains 11 journalists working for pro-Kurdish media

Israel’s Detention of Palestinian Minors: a Horror Show

The Bullet 13/10/2022 - I want you to look at this picture. No, please don’t look away. Look at it carefully. Beyond the huddle of hefty military figures, armed to the teeth with their machine guns – one pressed threateningly against the young boy’s hips – do you see what I see? Obviously, a shocking abuse of power: a mob of soldiers, poised to kill, if not assault, a vulnerable, lightly clad child. But look again. The devil is in the detail. The angle of the youth’s body says much. His neck is strained, the head tilts backwards under pressure; the shoulder and t-shirt are being tugged so that the collar of the boy’s t-shirt is askew and cuts the neck below the Adam’s apple. Jostled by the force of bodies shoving him from behind, he appears to be staggering. Blindfolded, he has lost his footing. His bloodied cheek and chin foretell the shape of things to come. He will be led at gunpoint to a hellish destination – one of Israel’s detention centres for Palestinian youth; and he will be subjected to torture and merciless interrogation.

The boy in the photo, 16-year-old Fawzi al-Juneidi, was indeed detained in the West Bank city of Hebron in December 2017. He was beaten by soldiers during his arrest (Middle East Eye provides the grim details), and released on bail 20 days later. Israel’s military routinely carries out this standard punitive practice, which typically involves unspeakable abuse. Evidence collected by a host of NGOs and human rights organizations, such as the Israeli organization Ha Moked makes this plain.

In tracking Israel’s arrest of Palestinian children, from the moment these (often) young teens are seized from their homes to the moment they arrive at an interrogation facility, Ha Moked registers a consistent pattern. The detained children are typically blindfolded and handcuffed – “usually with their hands painfully tied behind their backs” – and are taken to a military vehicle. In reporting to the Electronic Intifada, Ha Moked notes: “During the ride, they are often beaten, humiliated, and sworn at by the soldier.” Rifle butts, shoes, and hands have been used to beat children. Injuries have included the breaking of one teenager’s jaw with the use of a rifle butt.

A few glimpses of what transpires in the torture chamber should suffice to confirm Israel’s abominable mistreatment of Palestinians. The depths of cruelty to which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and its entire penal apparatus have descended should shock Canadians – all Canadians. Most disturbing is the systematic and premeditated nature of violence against children. The arrest and detention of young teens in occupied Palestine is not incidental; it is a normalized and longstanding state-sanctioned practice, applied by an entire bureaucracy of military personnel, trained in administering pain to vulnerable youths. The hypocrisy of an army that deems itself the most moral in the world while intentionally maiming, injuring, and humiliating Palestinian children is breathtaking. The mind swirls to make sense of this.

Some have concluded that acts of hatred and physical violence inflicted by Israel’s military on Palestinian children are the result of intense indoctrination. Israel’s education system (1:35 – 4:53; 10:54 – 13:36) instills in its population the racist myth that all Palestinians (including children) are terrorists, deserving of harsh blows, humiliation, caging, medical neglect, starvation, etc. With this ideological psychosis, the IDF torturer (in collusion with a body of administrators, including medical staff) shields him/herself from bad conscience, and justifies committing acts of abuse in the name of eliminating the threatening force that s/he sees embodied in the child. [...]

Organizations throughout North America are acting as the tribunes of social justice. Parliamentary petitions have called upon the Canadian government to defend the rights of Palestinian children in the face of Israel’s violations. The egregious case of the imprisoned Ahmad Manasra, arrested on false charges at age 13, sentenced to 9.5 years, and now being held for months in solitary confinement, is at the forefront of this collective effort. With publicity growing apace around this awful case, there is hope that Canada will be pressured to demand an end to Israel’s heinous assault on the children of Palestine. Read more - Lire plus

TAKE ACTION: Canada needs to tell Israel to stop killing Palestine's children. Send this message to the Canadian government.

TAKE ACTION: #StandWithShadi: Stop the Unlawful Kidnapping of Palestinian Children

TAKE ACTION: Canada Must Tell Israel to Free Palestine's Child Prisoners - Call on Mme Joly to speak out and take action

65 Organisations Send a Letter to the New High Commissioner for Human Rights, Urging for Concrete Measures to Ensure Justice and Accountability for the Palestinian People

India’s Abuses at Home Raise Concerns About Its Global Counterterrorism Role

Just Security 27/10/2022 - On Oct. 28-29, India will host a special meeting of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, which it chairs, on “Countering the Use of New and Emerging Technologies for Terrorist Purposes.” Next year, India will also chair the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), an alliance with a reputation for heavy-handed counterterrorism and that is dominated by serial rights offenders China and Russia (Iran is to join next year, and Turkey waits in the wings).

India’s efforts to increase its influence in this domain are concerning, given its domestic record of undermining human rights under the guise of countering terrorism. Its intensifying internal repression does not bode well for its approach on the Security Council. To a large extent, India’s counterterrorism commitment at the United Nations is driven by a long history of attacks on India by armed groups based in or backed by Pakistan. However, India’s domestic counterterrorism measures have violated the due process and other rights of both actual terrorism suspects and Muslim men simply rounded up and charged on flimsy evidence. Many spend years in prison before the courts eventually dismiss their cases.

Under the administration of Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi, abuses of India’s draconian counterterrorism law, the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, have markedly increased. The authorities have jailed numerous activists, minorities, and critics of the government under the law, along with student protesters, ordinary citizens from rural and tribal communities, and political opponents. Leaders and affiliates of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party often stigmatize Indian Muslims, baselessly accusing them of terrorism.

Muslim Kashmiris, including protesters and independent journalists, have been accused of terrorism or arbitrarily detained under another abusive law, the Public Safety Act. Rohingya Muslim refugees from Myanmar have been at risk of detention and deportation.

One focus of the upcoming Counter-Terrorism Committee meeting in Mumbai and Delhi will be the use of the internet and social media for terrorism purposes. Indian authorities have been targeting online expression, including through the use of counterterrorism, sedition, and hate speech laws, against people who have simply criticized or disagreed with the government. India has adopted new internet and social media rules and policies that expand censorship, weaken encryption, and threaten privacy, all in the name of security.

The meeting will also focus on ways to counter terrorists’ use of new payment technologies, such as cryptocurrencies, to bankroll their operations. Here again, the Indian government’s domestic record hardly serves as a model. The government has used laws intended to prevent money laundering to conduct raids on political opponents and critics, under the guise of preventing terrorist funding. It has also used its law regulating foreign funding for non-governmental organizations to arbitrarily arrest hundreds of civil society members and freeze their assets. Read more - Lire plus

Emerging Tech Has a Front-Row Seat at India-Hosted UN Counterterrorism Meeting. What About Human Rights?

Q&A: Understanding India’s crackdown on Muslim groups

FBI held training with Indian cop who oversaw unit accused of torture and murder

Data retention: France illegally extends blanket mass surveillance of the entire population

Patrick Breyer 18/10/2022 - In a decree made public today, French Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne has extended the temporary retention of communications data of all citizens in France for another year. The blanket retention obligation concerns identity data (surname, first name, date and place of birth, postal address(es), e-mail address(es), telephone number(s)) as well as payment information, connection data (IP addresses, port numbers, identification numbers of users and their devices, date, time and duration of each communication, data on supplementary services and their providers) and also the location data of electronic communications of the entire population. Providers are obliged to retain this data of their customers for 12 months. The reason given for the mass retention order is a current and serious threat to the national security of the country but details and evidence are not provided. The decree comes into force on 21 October 2022 and is valid for another year.

MEP and civil liberties activist Patrick Breyer (Pirate Party Member of the European Parliament) comments:

“Mass surveillance contradicts the European values of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law. Blanket surveillance of any kind places the population under general suspicion. France is wrong in referring to an exception allowed by the European Court of Justice in case of a specific threat to national security. France’s unspecific reference to a permanent, general security risk does not justify mass surveillance, as a former judge confirms in a legal opinion.

The French government makes the EU court’s exception the rule. National security is no free ride for mass surveillance. On the issue of data retention, the EU has a serious problem with the rule of law. Any form of blanket surveillance is a characteristic of authoritarian regimes." Source

The Parts Of Chelsea Manning’s Book Censored By The US Government

Shadowproof 26/10/2022 - The United States government censored parts of Chelsea Manning’s new book, where she attempted to describe the information she provided to WikiLeaks in 2010. Manning says she wrote README.txt because she had not really been able to tell her story, and this the book was a “first draft of history” from her perspective. “While I did testify a little bit during the court-martial, my voice has been kind of lost during this whole process,” Manning declared on “CBS Mornings.” However, the US government used the publication review system to block her from highlighting any of the documents from the Afghanistan War Logs, Iraq War Logs, or US Embassy cables that garnered widespread news headlines.[...]

Can Manning really tell her story if she cannot speak about details in the documents, especially those which had a positive impact on our world? This is all part of the US military weaponizing the classification system against Manning, which is what she contends Major Ashden Fein consistently did when he was the lead military prosecutor in her court-martial. "[Fein] requested that the most limited amount of information possible be released publicly—with huge redactions in even that. My right to a fair public trial was annihilated because of the very structure of my court-martial,” Manning argues. “Actually, it was effectively two courts-martial: there were the hearings that the world saw, and then there were the classified hearings, which were completely sealed.” The classified hearings not only presented a “fuller picture of what had led up to my decision,” but according to Manning, “just about everything that seemed broadly favorable to me appeared only in the classified evidence. Twenty-four of the witnesses the prosecution called gave their testimony, at least in part, under those conditions of secrecy.”

I covered Chelsea Manning’s trial extensively, and this is true. In fact, I don’t know if I can really say I covered Manning’s entire case cause I was not in the courtroom for classified hearings. Judge Colonel Denise Lind maintained, ‘The overriding interest of protecting national security information from disclosure outweighs any danger of miscarriage of justice.” “In other words, the very thing that helped me decide that leaking was worth it—the arbitrary, self-dealing, and occasionally manipulative use of the classification system—[was] weaponized against me,” Manning declares. As Manning puts it, “The control this gave the government verged on Kafkaesque. For example, the cables that I had leaked, which anyone in the world could call up via a simple Google search, remained classified.”[...] Referring to the twelve cables that the State Department withheld as the “dirty dozen,” ACLU's Estevao and Wessler highlighted their contents:

…What is it they don’t want the public to see? Allegations that a former detainee sustained an injury during interrogation at Guantánamo, mention of the tension created between the US and the British and Irish governments over those countries’ disapproval of the US government’s extralegal rendition flights, an account of the Yemeni government’s role in facilitating US airstrikes in Yemen, an explanation of why torture at Abu Ghraib made the United States less secure, and a description of pressure brought by the US government on Germany to prevent Germany from holding the US accountable for kidnapping, torturing, and secretly detaining German citizen Khaled El-Masri. All of these cables describe issues of widespread public concern, so what’s the point of withholding them, but not the others?

Like Estevao and Wessler asserted, the information could not do more “harm” to “national security” if released because the information was already public. Any “damage” was done when leaked. [...] President Barack Obama may have commuted Manning’s sentence, but she will never truly be free. As is the case for all military or national security whistleblowers prosecuted under the Espionage Act, the US government may forever instill fear that FBI agents could come to her home and take her off to jail if she dares to speak about the “classified information”—information we all are within our rights to read and share. This is also information which US officials are prosecuting WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange for publishing in an unprecedented attack on journalism. Read more - Lire plus

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Welcome to Canada!

Every year the federal government incarcerates thousands of people seeking safety or a better life.

Between April 2019 and March 2020, almost 9,000 people were in Canadian immigration detention, including 138 infants and children.

The federal government has contracts with provinces across Canada that allows for immigration detainees to be held in provincial jails.

Call on the federal government of Canada to cancel these contracts!