Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:

"A politician thinks of the next election – a statesman of the next generation"
_ James Freeman Clarke

"I don't believe you have to be better than everybody else. I believe you have to be better than you ever thought you could be.
- Ken Venturi

 “Bad officials are elected by good citizens who do not vote.” 
- George Jean Nathan




1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 12 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Flag Officer Announcements (New JSOC Commander)
3. US intelligence community launches review following Ukraine and Afghanistan intel failings
4. U.S. Embraces Finland’s Move Toward NATO Membership. What About Ukraine?
5. Marine Raiders tackle ‘influencing’ to disrupt adversaries before the fight
6. Here’s what US Army leaders are learning from the Russia-Ukraine war
7. The Russians Lost An Entire Battalion Trying To Cross A River In Eastern Ukraine
8. FDD | Biden Should Press WHO to Suspend Russia
9. F.B.I. Told Israel It Wanted Pegasus Hacking Tool for Investigations
10. Are the U.S. and Russia Destined for War over Ukraine?
11. Seven (Initial) Drone Warfare Lessons from Ukraine
12. No Marshall Plan for Ukraine
13. Lawmakers worry Army doesn't have basing agreements for long-range fires
14. Why the West just can’t get enough of Zelensky
15. Challenge of maintaining US ‘arsenal of democracy’
16. Satellite images ‘suggest China is practising missile strikes on targets in Taiwan and Guam’
17. Afghanistan: Resistance Front claims killing of 22 Taliban members in Panjshir
18. The US may be using Ukraine as a blueprint for how Taiwan could stop a Chinese invasion
19. Will Ukraine Break The Back Of Beleaguered US Indo-Pacific Strategy? – Analysis




1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 12 (PUTIN'S WAR)

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 12
May 12, 2022 - Press ISW

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 12, 6:45 ET
Russian forces may be abandoning efforts at a wide encirclement of Ukrainian troops along the Izyum-Slovyansk-Debaltseve line in favor of shallower encirclements of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. Russian forces likely control almost all of Rubizhne as of May 12 and have likely seized the town of Voevodivka, north of Severdonetsk.[1] They will likely launch a ground offensive on or around Severodonetsk in the coming days. The relative success of Russian operations in this area combined with their failure to advance from Izyum and the notable decline in the energy of that attempted advance suggest that they may be giving up on the Izyum axis. Reports that Russian forces in Popasna are advancing north, toward Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, rather than east toward the Slovyansk-Debaltseve highway, support this hypothesis.
It is unclear if Russian forces can encircle, let alone capture, Severodonetsk and Lysychansk even if they focus their efforts on that much-reduced objective. Russian offensives have bogged down every time they hit a built-up area throughout this war, and these areas are unlikely to be different. Continued and expanding reports of demoralization and refusals to fight among Russian units suggest that the effective combat power of Russian troops in the east continues to be low and may drop further. If the Russians abandon efforts to advance from Izyum, moreover, Ukrainian forces would be able to concentrate their efforts on defending Severodonetsk-Lysychansk or, in the worst case, breaking a Russian encirclement before those settlements fall.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive around Kharkiv is also forcing the Russian command to make hard choices, as it was likely intended to do. The UK Ministry of Defense reports that Russian forces pulled back from Kharkiv have been sent toward Rubizhne and Severodonetsk but at the cost of ceding ground in Kharkiv from which the Russians had been shelling the city.[2] The counteroffensive is also forcing Russian units still near the city to focus their bombardment on the attacking Ukrainian troops rather than continuing their attacks on the city itself. The Ukrainian counteroffensive near Kharkiv is starting to look very similar to the counteroffensive that ultimately drove Russian troops away from Kyiv and out of western Ukraine entirely, although it is too soon to tell if the Russians will make a similar decision here.
Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces made marginal gains to the north of Severodonetsk and have likely captured Rubizhne and Voevodivka.
  • Russian forces fired intensively on Ukrainian positions in northern Kharkiv to stop the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive around Kharkiv City. The artillery focus on Ukrainian positions has likely diverted the Russian artillery that remains in range of Kharkiv to the more urgent task of stopping the Ukrainian advance.
  • Russian forces are strengthening their position on Snake Island in an effort to block Ukrainian maritime communications and capabilities in the northwestern Black Sea on the approaches to Odesa.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Mariupol;
  • Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances around Izyum on May 12.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces transferred additional equipment and one battalion tactical group (BTG) to the Izyum area.[4] Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults on Oleksandrivka and Novoselivka, 20 and 30 km east of Izyum respectively, to gain a foothold on the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets River.[5] The Russians may abandon attempts at a wide encirclement of Ukrainian forces from Izyum along the Slovyansk road in favor of smaller encirclements in Lyman, Kreminna, and Severodonetsk, The UK Defense Ministry reported that Russian units withdrawn from near Kharkiv City will likely replenish units on the eastern flank of the Seversky Donets River in an effort to defend the western flank of Russian lines of communication.[6] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Ukrainian forces fortified 170 km between Kramatorsk and Slovyansk and, falsely, that the Ukrainians are using civilians as human shields, likely in an attempt to set information conditions to explain the abandonment of the Izyum axis or justify the slow and limited advances in the area.[7]
Russian forces likely seized Rubizhne and made marginal advances to Voevodivka, a suburb of Severodonetsk. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai said that Ukrainian forces partially control Rubizhne, but Ukrainian servicemen claimed that Ukrainian forces only have access to the T1302 highway exit on the settlement’s western outskirts.[8] The Luhansk People’s Republic and Chechen units entered the Zorya Chemical Plant between Rubizhne and Voevodivka on May 11. Fighting was ongoing at the plant as of May 12.[9] Ukrainian forces destroyed a second Russian pontoon bridge in the vicinity of Bilohorivka, approximately 13 km from Rubizhne, on May 11 to slow the Russian encirclement of the settlement from the northwestern direction.[10] Severodonetsk Regional State Administration Head Oleksandr Stryuk confirmed that Russian forces seized Voevodivka on May 12, contradicting the Ukrainian General Staff’s assertion that the Russian offensive was unsuccessful.[11] Russian forces will likely launch a ground offensive on Severodonetsk in the coming days once they fully secure Voevodivka.
Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful and disjointed offensive operations in northwestern Donetsk Oblast in the vicinity of Avdiivka.[12] Russian forces tried and failed to seize settlements north of Donetsk City, likely in an effort to advance via Bahmut to Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.[13] Ukrainian artillery continued to strike Russian forces on the western border of Donetsk Oblast, stopping Russian advances in the Bahmut and Zaporizhia City directions.[14]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces continued to conduct air and artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions in the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 12.[15] Russian troops notably did not conduct a ground offensive on Azovstal on May 12 but rather focused on blocking Ukrainian defenders from using tunnels to exit the plant.[16]
Russian authorities additionally continued occupation activity in Mariupol. Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces have established filtration checkpoints throughout the entire city to further consolidate control.[17] Andryushchenko noted that occupation authorities may hold a referendum for Mariupol to join Russia as soon as May 15, which is consistent with earlier reporting that children in Mariupol and the surrounding areas are signing their school notebooks with “Mariupol, Rostov Region, Russia.”[18]

Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Retain positions on the outskirts of Kharkiv within artillery range of the city and prevent further Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued their defensive against Ukrainian gains made by the on-going Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv City on May 12. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made any confirmed advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces are focusing on regrouping troops and firing intensively on Ukrainian positions in Pytomnyk and Ruski Tyshky (both within 20 kilometers north of the northern border Kharkiv City) to prevent a further northward advance toward the Russian border.[19] Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration Oleg Synegubov noted that Russian forces did not shell Kharkiv City on May 12, which indicates that Russian troops are likely largely out of artillery range of the city and that fire from units that are still in range is likely being directed at Ukrainian troops advancing on Russian positions instead of civilian suburbs.[20]

Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces attempted to improve their positions along the Southern Axis and continued to fire on Ukrainian troops but did not make any confirmed advances on May 12.[21] Ukrainian Operational Command “South” emphasized that Russian forces are conducting hostilities along the Mykolaiv-Kherson border in order to launch an offensive into Mykolaiv.[22] Russian forces additionally fired on Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, and Kryvyi Rih.[23]
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense stated that the Russian grouping on Snake Island is trying to improve its position on the island in an effort to block Ukrainian maritime communications and capabilities in the northwestern Black Sea, particularly toward Odesa.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces have built up their air defense system in Western Crimea in a likely attempt to provide air cover for naval activities in the northwestern Black Sea.[25]

Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
There were no significant events on this axis in the past 24 hours.
Immediate items to watch
  • The Belarusian Defense Ministry announced the second stage of rapid response force exercises, but Belarus remains unlikely to join the war in Ukraine.
  • Russia is likely setting conditions to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories directly into Russia, as opposed to creating proxy “People’s Republics.”
  • Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.
  • Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City are pushing back Russian positions northeast of the city toward the international border and will likely continue to force the Russians to reinforce those positions at the cost of reinforcing Russian offensive operations elsewhere.
[5] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/12/vorog-bezuspishno-atakuvav-novoselivku-namagavsya-zakripytysya-na-pravomu-berezi-siverskogo-donczya/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/315521040760981; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/315147577464994
[7] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/14601173
[10] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2527lhttps://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/12/vygovczi-zrujnuvaly-perepravu-rosiyan-cherez-siverskyj-donecz/; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1524433731666288644
[11] https://t.me/stranaua/41792; https://hromadske dot ua/posts/78-j-den-povnomasshtabnoyi-vijni-rf-proti-ukrayini-tekstovij-onlajn; https://hromadske dot ua/posts/evakuaciya-z-syevyerodonecka-na-luganshini-prizupinena-cherez-postijni-obstrili-golova-vca; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/315521040760981
[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/12/u-rajoni-chornomorske-vorog-rozgornuv-zenitnu-raketnu-batareyu-zrk-s-300v-naroshhuye-prysutnist-na-ostrovi-zmiyinyj/



2. Flag Officer Announcements (New JSOC Commander)

From SOCCENT to JSOC.

Admiral Bradley's bio is below
Flag Officer Announcements
Immediate Release
May 11, 2022

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III announced today that the president has made the following nominations:
Navy Rear Adm. Michael E. Boyle for appointment to the grade of vice admiral, and assignment as commander, Third Fleet, San Diego, California. Boyle is currently serving as director, Maritime Operations, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Navy Rear Adm. Frank M. Bradley for appointment to the grade of vice admiral, and assignment as commander, Joint Special Operations Command; and commander, Joint Special Operations Command Forward, U.S. Special Operations Command, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. Bradley is currently serving as commander, Special Operations Command Central, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
Navy Rear Adm. Richard A. Correll for appointment to the grade of vice admiral, and assignment deputy commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Correll is currently serving as director, Strategic Integration, N2/N6T, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
Navy Capt. Aaron C. Rugh for appointment to the grade of rear admiral (lower half), and assignment as chief prosecutor for military commissions. Rugh is currently serving as division director, Criminal Law Division, Office of the Navy Judge Advocate General, Washington, D.C.

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Commander, Special Operations Command Central

Commander, Special Operations Command Central
Rear Adm. Frank M. Bradley is a SEAL Naval Officer who assumed command of U.S. Special Operations Command Central, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida in July of 2020 following assignment as assistant commander, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Fort Bragg, North Carolina from 2018 – 2020.
Bradley is a native of Eldorado, Texas and a 1991 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy where he studied physics and was a varsity gymnast. He began his career as a SEAL after completing Basic Underwater Demolition school (BUDs/SEAL) Class 179 in 1992.
He has commanded at all levels of special operations, including commander of Naval Special Warfare Development Group. He has multiple tours in command of joint task forces, and was among the first to deploy into Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and has deployed consistently since. Additionally, he has served with SEAL Team FOUR, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team TWO and the Italian Incursori (Italian SEALs) as an international exchange officer.
Bradley earned a Masters in Physics from Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California where he received a provisional patent for his research in 2006.
His staff duty has included service as JSOC’s J-3 Technical Operations division chief and deputy J-3; vice deputy Director for Global Operations for the Joint Staff J-3; executive officer for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. and the deputy director for CT Strategy for the Joint Staff J-5.
Last Updated: 16 September 2021




3. US intelligence community launches review following Ukraine and Afghanistan intel failings
Will we add north Korea to the list after it collapses and we fail to assess it? (apologies for my snarky question).
US intelligence community launches review following Ukraine and Afghanistan intel failings
CNN · by Katie Bo Lillis and Natasha Bertrand, CNN
Washington (CNN)The US intelligence community is carrying out a sweeping internal review of how it assesses the fighting power of foreign militaries amid mounting pressure from key lawmakers on Capitol Hill who say officials have failed twice in one year on the two major foreign policy crises faced by the Biden administration in Ukraine and Afghanistan.
The Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday sent a classified letter to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Defense Department and the CIA pointing out that the agencies broadly underestimated how long the Ukrainian military would be able to fend off Russian forces and overestimated how long Afghan fighters would hold out against the Taliban last summer after the US withdrawal from the country, multiple sources familiar with the matter tell CNN. They questioned the methodology behind the intelligence community's assessments, and the underlying assumptions behind them, the sources said.
CNN has learned that one smaller intelligence agency within the State Department did more accurately assess the Ukrainian military's capability to resist Russia. But while that assessment was shared within the US government, it did not override the wider intelligence community's predictions.

Critics say the US might have moved to arm Ukraine sooner and with heavier weaponry if the intelligence community had assessed that it stood a fighting chance against the Russian army. In the days leading up to the war, the intelligence community told policymakers that Kyiv would likely fall within three to four days of a Russian invasion.
"I think there was a major issue that we missed that had a significant influence on how this has unfolded. And had we had a better handle on the prediction, we could've done more to assist the Ukrainians earlier," Sen. Angus King, an independent of Maine, said during a tense exchange with a top defense intelligence official in a public hearing on Tuesday.
Taken together, the review and the push from Capitol Hill suggest a widespread acknowledgment within the US government that the intelligence community needs to reassess how it judges the strength of other nation's militaries -- and underscore how high the stakes are when officials miss the mark.
"In this case, where you are making an assessment more or less in the present of something that turned out to be pretty dramatically wrong -- that's a good reason to do a serious postmortem," said Greg Treverton, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council under President Barack Obama.
In Ukraine, officials broadly believe that the intelligence community gave too much weight to Russia's conventional military advantages and failed to account for how important Ukraine's will to fight would be to the conflict.
Only one intelligence agency appears to have accurately predicted that the Ukrainian resistance would be far more effective than most believed, multiple people familiar with the assessments told CNN: the State Department's intelligence arm, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The department's intelligence directorate was also the lead dissenting voice in 2002, when the majority of US intelligence agencies assessed wrongly that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction prior to the Iraq war in 2003 -- widely regarded as a catastrophic foreign policy blunder.

A senior State Department official told CNN that one tool driving the department's high confidence in a Ukrainian resistance campaign was basic opinion polling: analysts reviewed a steady stream of public polls, particularly from eastern Ukraine, throughout the fall of 2021 and into 2022 that showed growing anti-Russian sentiment, the official said, and a growing Ukrainian willingness to engage in armed combat.
Other intelligence agencies, meanwhile, had largely focused on how dramatically outgunned Ukraine was by the Russian military. On paper, Russia had an overwhelming advantage in terms of weaponry, equipment and manpower.
No one, it appears, anticipated how poorly Russia would execute their initial campaign. Despite being more optimistic about Ukraine's effectiveness, the State Department's intelligence arm also overestimated Russia's military capabilities, the official said. Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier said during the public hearing on Tuesday that the two-month-old conflict is now in "a bit of a stalemate."
The intelligence community has been widely praised for the accuracy of its insights into Russian planning leading up to the invasion. But its ability to predict the unknowable -- in this case, how the war would play out once Russian and Ukrainian troops began fighting -- has historically been spotty. So-called "will to fight" is among the most difficult intangibles for intelligence to predict, former officials say, and it has failed time and again: in Vietnam, in Iraq, and now, in Afghanistan and Ukraine.
The intelligence community's review, which predates the letter from the Senate committee, is using Ukraine and Afghanistan as case studies to try to better understand what indicators officials should be using to predict how successful a foreign military will be when faced with enemy fire.
"I would say that it's a combination of will to fight and capacity," Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said during the public hearing on Tuesday. "The two of them are issues that are ... quite challenging to provide effective analysis on and we're looking at different methodologies for doing so."
How they got it wrong
Intelligence officials have defended their work in the lead-up to the war in Ukraine, arguing that the bulk of their predictions were accurate and that the assessment that the Ukrainian military would collapse and Kyiv fall to Russia within a matter of days was justifiable based on the information available to the United States at the time -- primarily data on the amount of manpower and equipment possessed by both militaries, and years of study of Russian military doctrine.
Russia surprised many US officials by appearing to ignore their own military doctrine, marching on Kyiv in a massive column without first softening the city with overwhelming airstrikes. It was an unpredictable opening move that senior intelligence officials have publicly attributed in part to a mistaken belief by Russia that it would be treated as a liberator by the local population.
Berrier, the Defense Intelligence Agency head, told lawmakers that because the Russians massively outgunned the Ukrainians at the outset of the conflict, "it was the thought of senior analysts that it wasn't going to go very well for a variety of factors. But there was never an intelligence community assessment that said the Ukrainians lacked the will to fight."

"Yeah, but there wasn't an assessment that they did either," King snapped back. "The assessment was Ukraine would be overrun in a matter of weeks. That was grossly wrong."
The State Department's more optimistic assessment of Ukraine's capabilities was shared within the US government, the senior official said. And despite its relatively obscurity and size compared to the CIA, DIA and other better-known intelligence agencies, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research often bats above its weight in interagency discussions, current and former officials say.
"They get paid attention to because they're good and they tend to be contrarian, which is also good," Treverton said. "Often they're contrarian and right."
But just because an administration is presented with a given assessment does not mean that it will act on it.
In the case of Afghanistan, some intelligence assessments had held that the US-backed government in Kabul would be able to withstand the Taliban for at least a year, long enough for the US to complete its withdrawal and evacuation. But assessments varied within the intelligence community, with even some public Defense Department reports hinting that the US-backed Afghan military would be unlikely to hold together long in the face of Taliban attack, and it quickly became clear that the Biden administration had relied on the wrong assessments of fighting power. After the Taliban takeover of Kabul, President Joe Biden pinned the defeat in part on the collapse of the Afghan military -- "sometimes without trying to fight."
The administration had vowed to get the United States out of Afghanistan and it's not clear that a better assessment of the Afghan army's fighting power would have led the Biden administration to make dramatically different policy decisions. But some critics on Capitol Hill and elsewhere have argued that better predictions about how quickly the Taliban would overrun the US-backed Afghan military might have allowed the administration to engineer a less chaotic final departure. In reality, US audiences were shocked by images of desperate Afghans hanging off of the outside of departing C-17s and the death of 13 US service members in an ISIS suicide bombing at the airport.
Human factors
Current and former intelligence officials acknowledge that only looking at military "capabilities" leaves out the quintessentially human factors that could prove decisive. Assessing a population's will to fight is an art, not a science, that defies purely data-driven analysis, the senior State Department official said. But, the official said, it is a key element to determining how successful a military will be in a fight.
"The basic challenge is, you can see what you can count: so you know something about the armaments they have and you can maybe see something about the training they have," said Treverton.
"But the things that matter are all intangible," he said. "You just don't know how good they're going to be and how willing they're going to be to fight. I've never seen us have much by way of a good method for doing that."

And in fact, it is a focus on softer political indicators that may have allowed the State Department to reach a more accurate conclusion in Ukraine that the military-focused Defense Department or the broader intelligence community, Treverton, the State Department official, and other sources suggested.
"The IC makes assessments based on what it collects. DOD makes assessments based on what it knows about militaries. But State has people who have spent entire careers on the ground, firing diplomatic relationships and so they understand the mentality of the people and the culture," said one source familiar with the assessments.
"That matters when it comes to assessing resistance."
The State Department official said that the department is well positioned to analyze "will to fight" given its inherent emphasis on cultural and historical context.
The combative exchange between King and Berrier hinted at deep-rooted concern amongst lawmakers that US intelligence is missing those key human indicators.
"All I'm saying is, the intelligence community needs to be able to do a better job on this issue," King said.
"I think the intelligence community did a great job on this issue, senator. We will --," Berrier replied.
King cut him off with a raised voice.
"General, how can you possibly say that when we were told explicitly Kyiv would fall in three days and Ukraine would fall in two weeks? You're telling me that was accurate intelligence?"
CNN · by Katie Bo Lillis and Natasha Bertrand, CNN



4. U.S. Embraces Finland’s Move Toward NATO Membership. What About Ukraine?

Excerpts:
The question now is whether expanding NATO risks cementing a new Cold War — and perhaps something worse. It is a debate similar to the one that took place during the Clinton administration when there were warnings about the dangers of NATO expansion. George F. Kennan, the architect of the post-World War II “containment” strategy to isolate the Soviet Union, called the expansion “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.”
Last week, Anne-Marie Slaughter, the chief executive of the New America think tank, warned that “all parties concerned should take a deep breath and slow down.”
“The threat of Russia invading either Finland or Sweden is remote,” she wrote in The Financial Times. “But admitting them to the military alliance will redraw and deepen Europe’s 20th-century divisions in ways that will probably preclude far bolder and braver thinking about how to achieve peace and prosperity in the 21st.”
That is the long-term concern. In the shorter term, NATO and American officials are concerned about how to assure that Russia does not threaten either Finland or Sweden before they are formal members of the alliance. (That assumes no current member of the alliance objects; many believe Mr. Putin will lean on Hungary and its prime minister, Viktor Orban, to reject the applications.) Only Britain has been explicit on the issue, signing a separate security pact with the two countries. The United States has not said what security assurances it is willing to give.
But it has blamed Mr. Putin for bringing NATO expansion upon himself by invading a neighbor. Jen Psaki, the White House press secretary, loosely quoted Finland’s president, Sauli Niinisto, who made clear that Ukraine had forced the Finns to think differently about their security.
“You caused this,” Mr. Niinisto said of Mr. Putin. “Look at the mirror.”
U.S. Embraces Finland’s Move Toward NATO Membership. What About Ukraine?
The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · May 12, 2022
May 12, 2022, 7:43 p.m. ET


The Finnish Parliament on Thursday. The White House welcomed the announcement by Finnish leaders that their country should “apply for NATO membership without delay.”Credit...Mauri Ratilainen/EPA, via Shutterstock
WASHINGTON — In embracing Finland’s, and soon Sweden’s, move to join NATO, President Biden and his Western allies are doubling down on a bet that Russia has made such a huge strategic mistake over the past three months that now is the time to make President Vladimir V. Putin pay a major price: enduring the expansion of the very Western alliance he sought to fracture.
But the decision leaves hanging several major questions. Why not allow Ukraine — the flawed, corrupt but also heroic democracy at the heart of the current conflict — to join as well, enshrining the West’s commitment to its security?
And in expanding NATO to 32 members, soon with hundreds of additional miles of border with Russia, is the military alliance helping ensure that Russia could never again mount a vicious, unprovoked invasion? Or is it only solidifying the divide with an isolated, angry, nuclear-armed adversary that is already paranoid about Western “encirclement”?
The White House welcomed the announcement on Thursday by Finland’s leaders that their country should “apply for NATO membership without delay,” while Swedish leaders were expected to do the same within days. Russia, not surprisingly, said it would take “retaliatory steps,” including a “military-technical” response, which many experts interpreted as a threat to deploy tactical nuclear weapons near the Russian-Finnish border.
For weeks, American officials have quietly been meeting with both Finnish and Swedish officials, planning out how to bolster security guarantees for the two countries while their applications to join the alliance are pending.
To Mr. Biden and his aides, the argument for letting Finland and Sweden in, and keeping Ukraine out, is fairly straightforward. The two Nordic states are model democracies and modern militaries that the United States and other NATO nations regularly conduct exercises with, working together to track Russian subs, protect undersea communications cables and run air patrols across the Baltic Sea.
In short, they have been NATO allies in every sense except the formal one — and the invasion of Ukraine ended virtually all of the debate about whether the two countries would be safer by keeping some distance from the alliance.
“We have stayed out of NATO for 30 years — we could have joined in the early ’90s,” Mikko Hautala, the Finnish ambassador to the United States, said on Thursday as he was walking the halls of the U.S. Senate, drumming up support for his country’s sudden change of course. Trying to avoid provoking Mr. Putin, he said, “hasn’t changed Russia’s actions at all.”
Ukraine, in contrast, was at the core of the old Soviet Union that Mr. Putin is trying to rebuild, at least in part. And while it altered its Constitution three years ago to make NATO membership a national objective, it has been considered too full of corruption and too devoid of democratic institutions to make membership likely for years, if not decades, to come.
Key members of NATO — led by France and Germany — have made clear they are opposed to including Ukraine. It is a view that has hardened now that President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government is engaged in an active shooting war in which the United States and the other 29 members of the alliance would be treaty-bound to enter directly if Ukraine were a full-fledged member, covered by its core promise that an attack on one member is an attack on all.
Mr. Zelensky understands this dynamic, and weeks into the conflict, he dropped his insistence that Ukraine be ushered into NATO. In late March, a month after the Russian invasion and a point when there still seemed some prospect of a diplomatic solution, he made clear that if it would bring about a permanent end to the war, he was prepared to declare Ukraine a “neutral” state.
“Security guarantees and neutrality, nonnuclear status of our state — we are ready to go for it,” he told Russian journalists, a line he has repeated several times since.
Those statements were a relief to Mr. Biden, whose first objective is to get the Russians out of Ukraine, irreversibly, but whose second is to avoid World War III.
By that, he means staying clear of direct conflict with Mr. Putin’s forces and avoiding doing anything that risks escalation that could quickly turn nuclear. If Ukraine were ushered into NATO, it would reinforce Mr. Putin’s contention that the former Soviet state was conspiring with the West to destroy the Russian state — and it could be only a matter of time until that direct confrontation broke out, with all its perils.
Under that logic, Mr. Biden declined to send MIG fighters to Ukraine that could be used to bomb Moscow. He rejected a no-fly zone over Ukraine because of the risk that American pilots could get into dogfights with Russian pilots.
Russia-Ukraine War: Key Developments
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Finland’s NATO membership bid. Finland’s leaders announced their support for the nation to join the alliance, while Sweden is expected to do the same within days. The Kremlin said that Finland’s possible accession was a threat and that Russia would “take necessary measures” to protect itself.
On the ground. Ukrainian and Western officials said Russia is reportedly withdrawing forces from around Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, where it has been losing territory. The officials said Moscow may redirect troops to the southeast, where Russian troops are making greater progress.
Civilian killings. The United Nations human rights chief said that the bodies of more than 1,000 civilians, including several hundred who were summarily executed, have been recovered in areas near Kyiv that were occupied by Russian forces in the early stages of the invasion.
American aid. The House voted 368 to 57 in favor of a $39.8 billion aid package for Ukraine, which would bring the total U.S. financial commitment to roughly $53 billion over two months. The Senate still needs to vote on the proposal.
But his once-clear line has grown fuzzier over the past few weeks.
As Russia’s military weaknesses and incompetence became clear, Mr. Biden approved sending the Ukrainians heavy artillery to frustrate Russia’s latest drive in Donbas, and he has sent missiles and Switchblade drones that have been used to hit Russian tanks.
When the administration denounced reports last week that the United States was providing Ukraine with intelligence that helped it sink the Moskva, the pride of Mr. Putin’s naval fleet, and target mobile Russian command posts and the Russian generals sitting inside them, the reason for the upset was clear. The revelations showed how close to the line Washington was getting in provoking Mr. Putin.
The question now is whether expanding NATO risks cementing a new Cold War — and perhaps something worse. It is a debate similar to the one that took place during the Clinton administration when there were warnings about the dangers of NATO expansion. George F. Kennan, the architect of the post-World War II “containment” strategy to isolate the Soviet Union, called the expansion “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.”
Last week, Anne-Marie Slaughter, the chief executive of the New America think tank, warned that “all parties concerned should take a deep breath and slow down.”
“The threat of Russia invading either Finland or Sweden is remote,” she wrote in The Financial Times. “But admitting them to the military alliance will redraw and deepen Europe’s 20th-century divisions in ways that will probably preclude far bolder and braver thinking about how to achieve peace and prosperity in the 21st.”
That is the long-term concern. In the shorter term, NATO and American officials are concerned about how to assure that Russia does not threaten either Finland or Sweden before they are formal members of the alliance. (That assumes no current member of the alliance objects; many believe Mr. Putin will lean on Hungary and its prime minister, Viktor Orban, to reject the applications.) Only Britain has been explicit on the issue, signing a separate security pact with the two countries. The United States has not said what security assurances it is willing to give.
But it has blamed Mr. Putin for bringing NATO expansion upon himself by invading a neighbor. Jen Psaki, the White House press secretary, loosely quoted Finland’s president, Sauli Niinisto, who made clear that Ukraine had forced the Finns to think differently about their security.
“You caused this,” Mr. Niinisto said of Mr. Putin. “Look at the mirror.”
The New York Times · by David E. Sanger · May 12, 2022


5.  Marine Raiders tackle ‘influencing’ to disrupt adversaries before the fight

MARSOC gets it.  
Marine Raiders tackle ‘influencing’ to disrupt adversaries before the fight
marinecorpstimes.com · by Todd South · May 12, 2022
WASHINGTON ― More than a decade of finding, fixing and killing terrorist targets gave Marine Corps Special Operations Command a baptism into the world of fast-paced, worldwide joint operations.
But to contribute to the next fight, MARSOC will push itself into deeper levels of war-fighting, finding ways to tackle both the deep, strategic shaping and reconnaissance challenges of near-peer adversaries while also delivering on irregular warfare needs across the globe.
That’s how Col. Ian Fletcher, assistant chief of staff of plans and resourcing, described the newest members of the special operations community’s way forward on Tuesday at the 2022 Modern Day Marine exposition in Quantico, Virginia.
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Those moves dovetail with the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 efforts, for which MARSOC has been part the recent experimentation.
The recently released 2022 update to force design puts a premium for the Marine Corps getting after reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. The update went so far as to note that early planning focused too much on lethality and must be rebalanced to emphasize the recon/counterrecon capability the Corps can deliver, especially inside the enemy’s bubble.
Commandant Gen. David Berger highlighted in the update an “issue requiring further analysis” for the service was to identify ways to “enable the service to conduct reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance operations” with the Navy, joint force, interagency groups, allies and partners.

Marines with 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, board a U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook as a part of Exercise Raven 2-21 in Nashville, Tennessee, May 21, 2021. (Cpl. Patrick King/Marine Corps)
The service is looking at adding specific recon/counterrecon liaison officers to the ranks to focus on that task.
The planning has put a near-term focus on seven capability areas that MARSOC is looking to fund by 2026. These are operations in the information environment; all-domain command and control; multidiscipline intelligence; littoral information warfare; littoral mobility; littoral special reconnaissance and contested logistics capabilities.
Key documents that will frame how MARSOC will go after the new missions and redesign itself in certain areas are expected by early summer, Fletcher said.
“We’ve had to look at areas of how to train operators not just to be special operators enabling direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, but also be facilitators and accelerators for other joint force capabilities that needed access to that space,” Fletcher said.
That means prioritizing their view to a multidomain framing of their operations, he said.
“You can no longer think of physical operations disconnected from operations within the digital ecosystem,” Fletcher said. “So, cyber operations, space operations, everything is interconnected.”
By Marine Special Operations Force definition, the strategic shaping and reconnaissance are activities that allow the force to get awareness of what an adversary can do, wants to do and is doing so that U.S. forces and their allies can “deter, disrupt or increase the adversary’s risk.”

Rifleman Pfc. Luis Reyes Quiterio provides security during Exercise Raven 2-21 in Nashville, Tennessee, May 22, 2021. (Cpl. Patrick King/Marine Corps)
Basically, they’re pulling war-fighting judo moves to put an enemy off balance before they can make their next move.
But at the same time, MARSOC wants to serve both Special Operations Command and the Navy-Marine Corps littoral fight.
That’s where the split focus might best come into view.
The command’s irregular warfare experience in the past decades of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency work that Marine Raiders earned their stripes in will come into play on the edges of combatting peer and near-peer adversaries.
The deep, strategic reconnaissance assets that MARSOC brings are aimed at giving joint commanders ways to “already be there” in areas that adversaries such as the Chinese, Russian, Iranian or other militaries might not expect, closely watching, sensing and detecting targets ripe for strikes, if necessary.
And it’s a good way to “influence” the adversary’s moves.
The one thing to say about the littoral space is that the littoral space is the convergence of not just economic systems but it’s also emerged as a digital ecosystem,” Fletcher said. “And it’s that digital ecosystem that’s presenting some great opportunities for us to do both military and influence operations.”
Littorals as a concept are expanding.
The move is to see the littoral space as more than Marines, Raiders or Navy SEALs running ops on the beach.
“It’s about conducting operations in the cities, in the economic systems, in the digital ecosystems that allows us to get access into a global ecosystem that is integrated by the digital constellation,” Fletcher said.
That translates into special operators such as Raiders, finding ways to exploit weak points to influence adversary decision-makers, and not just military generals but also individuals with national influence in an adversary state, he said.
About Todd South
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

6. Here’s what US Army leaders are learning from the Russia-Ukraine war


Here’s what US Army leaders are learning from the Russia-Ukraine war
armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · May 12, 2022
Top Army officials told House lawmakers Thursday that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has vindicated many of their technological modernization priorities.
“Long-range precision fires are extremely important,” said Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville, indirectly referencing Ukraine’s ability to translate battlefield intelligence into high-impact strikes on key Russian leaders and equipment. “We’re seeing the value of that...the ability to sink ships, the ability to hit command posts.”
Ukrainian forces have killed at least 12 Russian generals since the war’s onset, and the New York Times reported that U.S. officials have provided real-time intelligence on their locations to Ukraine. The Pentagon has denied that report.
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The American-made FGM-148 Javelin has been making mincemeat of T-72s and T-90s in Ukraine, according to reports.
McConville also pointed to drones — both military and modified commercial off-the-shelf units — and “anti-drone capability” as key assets whose importance has been on display in the war. Many videos have emerged from both sides in the conflict that show drones coordinating fires, too.
“It’s really about speed, range and convergence — bringing all those systems together,” said McConville. “Doing combined arms as a joint force coming together would give you the capabilities that you need to be very, very effective [like] what’s happening in Ukraine.”
Army Secretary Christine Wormuth added that the service is “investing” in counter-drone technology.
Both leaders also pointed to lessons about the importance of joint training exercises that offer partner countries experience in large-scale maneuvers.
“About 75% of [Ukraine’s] brigades have been through” large-scale U.S.-led training exercises, said McConville. “The more we can do to build the capacities and capabilities of our allies and partners — or just friends — is really important.”
Beyond tech and strategy, the chief of staff noted important tactical lessons — such as Russia’s apparent failure to effectively integrate armor and infantry at the tactical level, which has left their vehicles vulnerable to portable anti-tank systems like the Javelin and NLAW.
“We have the best tanks and armored personnel carriers...but to me, it’s also how you employ them,” McConville said. He added that the Army is also working to field active protective systems on its vehicles.
“I think we’re in a much better position [than Russia],” McConville said.
About Davis Winkie
Davis Winkie is a staff reporter covering the Army. He originally joined Military Times as a reporting intern in 2020. Before journalism, Davis worked as a military historian. He is also a human resources officer in the Army National Guard.


7. The Russians Lost An Entire Battalion Trying To Cross A River In Eastern Ukraine


The Russians Lost An Entire Battalion Trying To Cross A River In Eastern Ukraine
Forbes · by David Axe · May 13, 2022
The aftermath of the Russian attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets River.
Ukrainian army capture
The better part of two or more Russian army battalions—potentially 100 vehicles and more than a thousand troops—in recent days tried to cross a pontoon bridge spanning the Siverskyi Donets River, running west to east between the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.
Ukrainian artillery caught them at the river bank—and destroyed them. The rapid destruction of around six dozen tanks and other armored vehicles, along with the bridge itself, underscores Russia’s deepening woes as its troops try, and fail, to make meaningful gains in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.
“We still assess Russian ground force in the Donbas to be slow and uneven,” an unnamed U.S. Defense Department official told reporters on Tuesday.
The Russians’ inability to cross rivers might explain their sloth. To be fair, “conducting river-crossings in a contested environment is a highly risky maneuver,” the U.K. Defense Ministry noted.
The Siverskyi Donets, which threads from southern Russia into eastern Ukraine then back into Russia, is just one of several water barriers Russian battalions must cross in order to advance west into Ukrainian-held territory. According to the Ukrainian armed forces’ general staff, the battalion that got caught at the pontoon bridge apparently was trying to strike at Lyman, a city of 20,000 that lies 17 miles west of the doomed crossing.
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The Ukrainian army’s 17th Tank Brigade spotted the bridge, perhaps using one of the many small drones that function as the army’s eyes over the battlefield. The 17th is one of the army’s four active tank brigades. Its line battalions operate T-64 tanks and BMP fighting vehicles.
But it was the brigade’s artillery battalion with its 2S1 122-millimeter howitzers that apparently got first crack at the Russian bridge and the vehicles and troops concentrated on and around it, out in the open.
The 17th’s shelling destroyed more than 70 T-72 and T-80 tanks, BMPs, MT-LB armored tractors and much of the bridging unit itself, including a tugboat and the pontoon span.
It’s unclear how many Russians died or were wounded, but it’s worth noting that no battalion can lose most of its vehicles and remain capable of operations. In one strike, the Ukrainians removed from the battlefield one or two of the roughly 99 Russian battalion tactical groups in Ukraine.
In the aftermath of their defeat, local Russian forces mostly stuck to their side of the river, “trying to hold positions on the right bank,” according to the general staff in Kyiv. The disastrous river-crossing comes as Russian forces also are retreating away from the city of Kharkiv, farther north.
To be fair to Moscow, crossing any water obstacle during wartime is dangerous. The Ukrainians can claim perhaps the most lopsided victory over an enemy bridging effort, but the Russians have knocked out some Ukrainian spans, too.
Forbes · by David Axe · May 13, 2022


8. FDD | Biden Should Press WHO to Suspend Russia


FDD | Biden Should Press WHO to Suspend Russia
fdd.org · by Richard Goldberg Senior Advisor · May 12, 2022

May 12, 2022 | Policy Brief
Biden Should Press WHO to Suspend Russia
Iselin Brady
Intern
The member states of the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region overwhelmingly passed a resolution on May 10 condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with 43 votes in favor and only Russia, Belarus, and Tajikistan opposed. The vote advances the Biden administration’s efforts to isolate Russia within international organizations yet imposes no meaningful consequences on Russia for its aggression.
Ukraine and 37 other members of the WHO European Region proposed the resolution, titled “WHA75: Health emergency in Ukraine and neighbouring countries, stemming from the Russian Federation’s aggression.” “WHA75” refers to the 75th meeting of the World Health Assembly — the annual gathering of WHO member states — which will take place in Geneva from May 22 through May 28. The assembly may consider additional measures against Russia.
The European Region resolution, which follows condemnations by the UN General Assembly on March 2 and March 24 and the UN Human Rights Council on March 4, expresses strong concern “over the ongoing health emergency in Ukraine and neighbouring countries triggered by the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.” Lacking binding authority, the resolution then urges the WHO to relocate outside of Russia its European Office for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases. The resolution also calls on the WHO not to hold regional meetings in Russia until the Russian military withdraws beyond Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders.
While the resolution demonstrates European support for Ukraine, it stopped short of urging perhaps the most important steps the WHO could take: removing Russia from the WHO Executive Board and suspending Moscow’s voting rights within the organization. The WHA is likely to consider additional Russia-related measures later this month, but neither the United States nor its allies have announced specific plans.
Under Article 7 of the WHO Constitution, the WHA has the authority to suspend a member’s voting rights if it “fails to meet its financial obligations to the Organization or in other exceptional circumstances.” The WHO Constitution does not explicitly assign authority to remove a country from the Executive Board, though Ukraine has contended the WHA retains the authority to do so. These moves would add to Moscow’s international isolation following its suspension from the UN Human Rights Council and the UN World Tourism Organization.
Some WHO members have expressed concern that isolating Russia at the WHO could upend technical cooperation and information exchanges related to the COVID-19 pandemic and other global health priorities. Yet voting rights and service on the WHO Executive Board are political privileges. Their denial should not interfere with technical programs or information exchanges.
As part of its commitment to isolate Russia within international organizations, the Biden administration should lead a multilateral campaign to suspend Moscow’s voting rights at the WHO. It should also work with key allies to support Ukraine’s contention that the WHA can vote to remove Russia from the WHO Executive Board.
Should the administration fail in achieving either result, Congress should consider, as a last resort, conditioning a percentage of U.S. funding for the WHO on the suspension of Russia’s voting rights and its removal from the Executive Board.
Richard Goldberg is a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he directs its International Organizations Program. Iselin Brady is an international organizations research intern at FDD. For more analysis from the authors and the International Organizations Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Richard on Twitter at @rich_goldberg. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Richard Goldberg Senior Advisor · May 12, 2022


9. F.B.I. Told Israel It Wanted Pegasus Hacking Tool for Investigations

Excerpts:
Israel has used the tool as a bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations, most notably in the secret talks that led to the so-called Abraham Accords that normalized relations between Israel and several of its historic Arab adversaries.
In November, the Biden administration put NSO and another Israeli firm on a “blacklist” of firms that are prohibited from doing business with American companies. The Commerce Department said the companies’ spyware tools had “enabled foreign governments to conduct transnational repression, which is the practice of authoritarian governments targeting dissidents, journalists and activists outside of their sovereign borders to silence dissent.”
F.B.I. Told Israel It Wanted Pegasus Hacking Tool for Investigations

May 12, 2022
The New York Times · by Ronen Bergman · May 12, 2022
A 2018 letter from the bureau to the Israeli government is the clearest documentary evidence to date that the agency weighed using the spyware for law enforcement operations.

Pegasus is produced by an Israeli firm, NSO Group, which needs to gain approval from the Israeli government before it can sell the hacking tool to a foreign government.

May 12, 2022
WASHINGTON — The F.B.I. informed the Israeli government in a 2018 letter that it had purchased Pegasus, the notorious hacking tool, to collect data from mobile phones to aid ongoing investigations, the clearest documentary evidence to date that the bureau weighed using the spyware as a tool of law enforcement.
The F.B.I.’s description of its intended use of Pegasus came in a letter from a top F.B.I. official to Israel’s Ministry of Defense that was reviewed by The New York Times. Pegasus is produced by an Israeli firm, NSO Group, which needs to gain approval from the Israeli government before it can sell the hacking tool to a foreign government.
The 2018 letter, written by an official in the F.B.I.’s operational technology division, stated that the bureau intended to use Pegasus “for the collection of data from mobile devices for the prevention and investigation of crimes and terrorism, in compliance with privacy and national security laws.”
The Times revealed in January that the F.B.I. had purchased Pegasus in 2018 and, over the next two years, tested the spyware at a secret facility in New Jersey.
Since the article’s publication, F.B.I. officials have acknowledged that they considered deploying Pegasus but have emphasized that the bureau bought the spying tool mainly to test and evaluate it — partly to assess how adversaries might use it. They said the bureau never used the spyware in any operation.
During a congressional hearing in March, the F.B.I. director, Christopher A. Wray, said the bureau had bought a “limited license” for testing and evaluation “as part of our routine responsibilities to evaluate technologies that are out there, not just from a perspective of could they be used someday legally, but also, more important, what are the security concerns raised by those products.”
“So, very different from using it to investigate anyone,” he said.
The Times revealed that the F.B.I. had also received a demonstration by NSO of a different hacking tool, Phantom, that can do what Pegasus cannot — target and infiltrate U.S. cellphone numbers. After the demonstration, government lawyers spent years debating whether to purchase and deploy Phantom. It was not until last summer that the F.B.I. and the Justice Department decided not to deploy NSO hacking tools in operations.
The F.B.I. has paid approximately $5 million to NSO since the bureau first purchased Pegasus.
The Times has sued the F.B.I. under the Freedom of Information Act for bureau documents related to the purchase, testing and possible deployment of NSO spyware tools. During a court hearing last month, a federal judge set a deadline of Aug. 31 for the F.B.I. to produce all relevant documents or be held in contempt. Government lawyers said the bureau thus far had identified more than 400 pages of documents that were responsive to the request.
The F.B.I. letter to NSO, dated Dec. 4, 2018, stated that “the United States government will not sell, deliver or otherwise transfer to any other party under any condition without prior approval of the government of Israel.”
Cathy L. Milhoan, an F.B.I. spokeswoman, said the bureau “works diligently to stay abreast of emerging technologies and tradecraft.”
“The F.B.I. purchased a license to explore potential future legal use of the NSO product and potential security concerns the product poses,” she continued. “As part of this process, the F.B.I. met requirements of the Israeli Export Control Agency. After testing and evaluation, the F.B.I. chose not to use the product operationally in any investigation.”
The Times article in January revealed that the C.I.A. in 2018 arranged and paid for the government of Djibouti to acquire Pegasus to assist its government in counterterrorism operations, despite longstanding concerns about human rights abuses there.
Pegasus is a so-called zero-click hacking tool — it can remotely extract everything from a target’s mobile phone, including photos, contacts, messages and video recordings, without the user having to click on a phishing link to give Pegasus remote access. It can also turn phones into tracking and secret recording devices, allowing the phone to spy on its owner.
NSO has sold Pegasus to dozens of countries, which have used the spyware as part of investigations into terrorist networks, pedophile rings and drug kingpins. But it has also been abused by authoritarian and democratic governments alike to spy on journalists, human rights activists and political dissidents.
On Tuesday, the chief of Spain’s intelligence agency was ousted after recent revelations that Spanish officials both deployed and were victims of Pegasus spyware.
The firing of the official, Paz Esteban, came days after the Spanish government said that the cellphones of senior Spanish officials, including Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Defense Minister Margarita Robles, had been penetrated last year by Pegasus. It was also revealed recently that the Spanish government had used Pegasus to penetrate the cellphones of Catalan separatist politicians.
Israel has used the tool as a bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations, most notably in the secret talks that led to the so-called Abraham Accords that normalized relations between Israel and several of its historic Arab adversaries.
In November, the Biden administration put NSO and another Israeli firm on a “blacklist” of firms that are prohibited from doing business with American companies. The Commerce Department said the companies’ spyware tools had “enabled foreign governments to conduct transnational repression, which is the practice of authoritarian governments targeting dissidents, journalists and activists outside of their sovereign borders to silence dissent.”
Mark Mazzetti reported from Washington, and Ronen Bergman from Tel Aviv.
The New York Times · by Ronen Bergman · May 12, 2022

10. Are the U.S. and Russia Destined for War over Ukraine?

Excerpts:
Alliance members and officials continue to act like they have an obligation to accept as members any nation that asks to join. That’s nonsense. NATO’s charter states that the alliance invites countries to join which they believe enhance shared security. Ukraine has been given the runaround since Bucharest in 2014 precisely because adding it, as well as Georgia, would have increased the likelihood of war. The failure to forthrightly close NATO’s door likely was the necessary – though perhaps not sufficient – trigger for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The president, or whoever currently is in charge of U.S. policy, should move back from the brink. The longer the Russo-Ukraine war goes on, the greater the death and destruction in Ukraine, the greater the isolation and radicalization of Russia, and the greater the chance that the conflict could spread westward. The imperative for Washington and its NATO allies should be to end, not extend, the conflict.
Are the U.S. and Russia Destined for War over Ukraine?
19fortyfive.com · by ByDoug Bandow · May 12, 2022
Traditionally, nations joined alliances to improve their security. This is no longer the case for the US. For Washington, alliances have become charitable endeavors. For instance, in Europe America has been allying itself with military midgets, most recently bringing North Macedonia and Montenegro into NATO.
Charitable Alliances
So far, at least, these two nations have simply been useless militarily. If the Russian hordes poured forth to conquer Europe—more than a little unlikely even before Moscow’s botched attack on Ukraine—they wouldn’t be stopped by Podgorica and Skopje. But Washington pretends that these countries matter.
Worse, however, members of the first round of charity cases have come to believe that they are essential and their counsel should be heeded. This activity has made NATO’s open accession policy affirmatively dangerous.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania came in during the George W. Bush years. They spent years clamoring for America to do more for them while doing little for themselves. Although they could not stop a determined Russian invasion, Ukraine demonstrated that a determined territorial defense could sharply increase the price of aggression. These Baltic State members finally made the two percent NATO standard but continue to lobby for US garrisons, believing themselves entitled to Washington’s protection even though their nations are not important for America’s defense.
Until the Ukraine war, the Baltic States’ special pleading was annoying but not particularly threatening. With successive US presidents hoping to “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia, there was little U.S. desire to bulk up America’s military presence in Europe.
Unfortunately, that has changed. These countries now are pressing for war with Moscow. And NATO is listening to them.
War with Russia
Granted, they don’t quite put it in those terms. Following the lead of Ukraine, which has an obvious interest in bringing America into the war, the Baltic countries advocated a no-fly zone. The US imposed a no-fly zone on Iraq, which had no effective air force. However, attempting to protect Ukraine from Russian air attack would require shooting down Russian planes and destroying Russian air defenses in Russia as well as Ukraine. Since Moscow would be unlikely to turn control of its territory over to the US, the likely consequence would be war.
Surely the Baltic States know this. And they know that they would not be enforcing the policy and doing the inevitable fighting. Certainly, Montenegro and North Macedonia would not be doing so, nor Germany and Italy. It would be America’s job to defeat Russia, especially if the fight went nuclear.
Now Lithuania is pressing on, openly advocating war. Again, Vilnius is making the case indirectly. Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis is demanding regime change in Moscow. He opined: “And so as long as a regime that intends to wage wars outside Russian territory is in place, the countries surrounding it are in danger.”
This inevitably led to his conclusion: “From our standpoint, up until the point the current regime is not in power, the countries surrounding it will be, to some extent, in danger. Not just Putin but the whole regime because, you know, one might change Putin and might change his inner circle but another Putin might rise into his place.”
Pushing a Regime Change
In principle, ousting Putin seems like a good idea. However, the U.S. has no way to do so, other than defeating Russia in a full-scale war. Moreover, no one knows who or what would replace him if he is removed. There are more true-believing nationalists than liberals in Russia. Ruling elites with the best opportunity to oust him, mostly the security-minded siloviki, are more likely to rethink his means rather than ends. And a violent implosion of the Russian state, with thousands of potential, loose nuclear weapons, would make for a very bad day around the world.
Moreover, turning Russia’s war against Ukraine into one between Moscow and Washington would become much more dangerous for all concerned. Regime survival is Putin’s most important objective; a demand for regime changes leaves him with little to talk about. If anything might trigger a nuclear exchange, it is an attempt by the West to toss the current ruling elite. How much cost and risk are Americans willing to incur to defenestrate the Putin government, compared to the latter’s determination to retain power?
U.S. policymakers complain how the popular fear of nuclear escalation prevents them from doing what they think proper to pressure Russia. However, the best policy must reflect realities on the ground. One of the most important factors for Moscow is that Ukraine is a vital interest.
For America the latter is at best a peripheral matter. It would be great for Kyiv to thwart Russia’s criminal aggression, but that is not an objective over which the U.S. should risk war.
Indeed, the greater the Western support for Ukraine, the greater the pressure on Russia to respond accordingly. Vladimir Putin can ill afford to lose, however losing may be defined. He may choose to fight rather than negotiate, and escalate rather than compromise. He will be tempted to shift Russia on a full wartime footing and use his superiority in firepower, including nuclear weapons. And if the fight turns into a full-scale proxy war with Washington working harder to defeat Russia than defend Ukraine, Moscow might respond in unpredictable ways, expanding the conflict still further.
Washington should remember that alliances are not free and allies can be quite costly. The primary purpose of NATO was to keep the Soviets out of Western Europe. Even President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to shift toward offense when the Soviet Union cracked down in East Germany and Hungary. President Lyndon Johnson was similarly circumspect when the Soviets and their allies overran what was Czechoslovakia.
Yet the alliance seems likely to continue expanding. With Finland and Sweden set to become the next members. And who knows about Ukraine? The U.S. and European powers have been going up to the line of war and perhaps over it. Kyiv is demanding as a price of neutrality, Western military guarantees that look a lot like NATO’s Article 5. Steadily increasing Western support encourages Ukraine to fight rather than negotiate. If Ukraine defeats Moscow—still unlikely given what appear to be slow but continuing Russian advances in the east—the temptation for NATO to add Ukraine would increase.
Javelin anti-tank missile. Image Credit: Creative Commons
Russian MLRS firing. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Alliance members and officials continue to act like they have an obligation to accept as members any nation that asks to join. That’s nonsense. NATO’s charter states that the alliance invites countries to join which they believe enhance shared security. Ukraine has been given the runaround since Bucharest in 2014 precisely because adding it, as well as Georgia, would have increased the likelihood of war. The failure to forthrightly close NATO’s door likely was the necessary – though perhaps not sufficient – trigger for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The president, or whoever currently is in charge of U.S. policy, should move back from the brink. The longer the Russo-Ukraine war goes on, the greater the death and destruction in Ukraine, the greater the isolation and radicalization of Russia, and the greater the chance that the conflict could spread westward. The imperative for Washington and its NATO allies should be to end, not extend, the conflict.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire.
19fortyfive.com · by ByDoug Bandow · May 12, 2022

11. Seven (Initial) Drone Warfare Lessons from Ukraine

Excerpts:

1. Drone warfare is relevant to conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary , , ,
2. . . . but how relevant—and in what ways—is unclear.
3. Technology and concepts alone aren’t enough.
4. Targets especially vulnerable to drones must be identified.
5. Drones are expanding the information environment.
6. Drone warfare isn’t just for the big dogs.
7. Air superiority concepts may need to be adjusted.

Seven (Initial) Drone Warfare Lessons from Ukraine - Modern War Institute
mwi.usma.edu · by Zachary Kallenborn · May 12, 2022
The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia has seen significant drone use on both sides. Ukraine has made extensive use of drones, from the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2 to hobbyist drones supporting civil resistance. Although evidence of Russian drone use early in the conflict was limited, Russia appears to have stepped up its efforts, employing systems like the Orlan-10 and the KUB-BLA loitering munition. Drones have been used in a wide variety of roles from carrying out strikes to guiding artillery and recording video that feeds directly into information operations.
The conflict offers at least seven initial lessons that should influence the thinking of US planners, policymakers, and military leaders about the future of the United States’ own drone capabilities. While the conflict is ongoing and some of these lessons may change, the basic points are general enough that even radical changes are likely to add nuance to these points, rather than rendering any of them less meaningful.
1. Drone warfare is relevant to conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary , , ,
Various analysts have been skeptical about the relevance of drones to conflict between advanced militaries. Such forces have sophisticated air defense systems, electronic warfare countermeasures, and specialized counterdrone systems that will rapidly mitigate any drone threat. But that’s not what happened in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. For some, even modest air defenses mean drones would play limited roles.
While Russia has shot down a few Ukrainian drones, much of Ukraine’s fleet of Bayraktar TB-2s, the Turkish-made military drones that proved devastating in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, remains intact more than two months into the war. TB-2s have carried out numerous successful attacks against Russian forces, accounting for almost half of Russia’s surface-to-air missiles that have been destroyed and helping to sink the Moskva, the flagship in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Drones have also aided intelligence and reconnaissance, such as guiding Ukrainian artillery strikes. Drones have also been a major propaganda win for Ukraine, helping provide images and video of Ukrainian strikes. Drones are perceived to be such an important part of Ukrainian success so far a song was written to celebrate the TB-2.
2. . . . but how relevant—and in what ways—is unclear.
During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, drones operated by Azerbaijani forces were highly successful in taking out Armenian platforms. Open-source analysts attribute the destruction of 120 tanks, 53 armored fighting vehicles, 143 towed artillery pieces, and numerous other targets to Azerbaijan’s TB-2s. By comparison, so far in Ukraine, the TB-2s’ successful strikes have been high profile, but have destroyed only six armored fighting vehicles, five towed artillery pieces, and no tanks. But it’s also not clear Ukraine needed drones to fulfill the same role as Azerbaijan. Western military powers made a tremendous effort to provide Ukraine with Javelin and other antitank missiles. Using antitank missiles instead of drones against tanks makes a lot of sense, though it also makes direct comparison with drone use in the Nagorno-Karabakh War difficult.
Ukraine’s drone successes may also really just be Russian failures. Russia’s military operations in Ukraine have been marked by significant problems, with its campaign plan failing to provide adequate logistics support, prepare for the stiff Ukrainian resistance, and establish air superiority, among other problems. Russia’s failure to adequately counter Ukrainian drones may just be one more error to add to the list. Perhaps a better-prepared military would not have the same drone problem.
3. Technology and concepts alone aren’t enough.
Russia is no novice to drone warfare. Russia used and was on the receiving end of drone attacks during the conflict in Syria. Yet Ukrainian drones have still had significant impact. Sam Bendett, a leading analyst of Russian drones, notes that Ukrainian drones flew in close proximity to Russian vehicles without the counterdrone or electronic warfare protection he would expect. Perhaps Russia did not follow established doctrine around counterdrone systems. This suggests Russians soldiers simply may not appreciate the threat.
Of course, this problem is not unique to Russia. Similar dynamics may arise in other countries too, whereby soldiers who have not experienced drone warfare may discount the threat it poses. On the flipside, they may also discount the utility of their own drones. In the US Army, for example, risk aversion has been noted as a longstanding problem plaguing tactical drone use.
4. Targets especially vulnerable to drones must be identified.
Even if Russia did a better job of counterdrone operations, there always will be limits. Drone detectors and interceptors have different advantages and disadvantages, and supply will always be limited just the same as any other military capability. Technological, doctrinal, and conceptual changes will also affect detector and interceptor use and success, for good and for ill. For example, the vast majority of counterdrone systems are jammers, either severing drone command or GPS links. As drones become more autonomous and less dependent on GPS, jammers will be less effective. Even militaries that prove much more effective than Russia at counterdrone operations will have vulnerabilities.
The big, obvious question becomes this: What targets will be more or less vulnerable to drones? Answering that question is difficult. It will require the United States and allied nations to understand adversary doctrines, concepts, and technological capabilities around drone employment. The location and type of detectors and interceptors will be a big factor. Some analysis has suggested critical differences between defending static and mobile assets. This seems plausible: Static assets, especially high-value ones, might be equipped with layered sensors and interceptors to identify and counter a broad range of drone threats. Those defenses can be selected for the particular environment (e.g., if a critical building or base is near a crowded urban area, it is prudent not to rely primarily on sound-based detectors). Mobile assets will have limited organic counterdrone systems, which may have more or less value depending on when and where a drone attacks.
The United States and allied nations should also think about how they deploy and use drones to exploit those vulnerabilities. Wolf pack tactics developed for submarines in World War II might prove useful. Because drones need relatively small support infrastructure compared to manned aircraft, they can be dispersed more broadly across a theater of operation. When intelligence identifies targets vulnerable to drone strikes, multiple drones may be launched from disparate areas and converge as a group on the target. An unmanned, airborne wolf pack could include everything from simple modified commercial systems to specially designed military systems. Like submarine warfare, a wolf pack could prove particularly adept at striking vulnerable logistics convoys.
5. Drones are expanding the information environment.
Social media, smartphones, and drones have helped create a virtual panopticon in the Ukraine conflict. The Ukrainian military, Ukrainian civilians, and observers around the world have built unprecedented awareness of the day-to-day conflict, capturing stories of horror and heroism. The torrent of information helps in three ways. First, the Ukrainian military monitors Russian troop movements and uses information to guide strikes. Second, there is a morale component, whereby Ukrainian military and civilians may be encouraged about the war effort. Third, the awareness provides unprecedented insight, which no doubt encourages global allies to provide diplomatic, economic, and military support.
The role drones play within the panopticon is twofold, expanding the range of sight and strengthening propaganda efforts. Even commercial drones can range miles away from the operator, providing a much broader field of view than that of a person alone. Drone also capture live images and video of events on the battlefield, which can help demonstrate the success of the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian government encouraged this with calls for civilians to donate their drones to the war effort.
6. Drone warfare isn’t just for the big dogs.
The Ukrainian military absolutely has proved its mettle against Russian forces; however, Ukraine is hardly considered a great power. Ukraine ranks fortieth in the world for defense spending, outspent by the likes of Vietnam and Kuwait. Ukraine’s drone success adds evidence to broader claims that drones offer significant military capability at relatively low cost. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict reinforces that: Azerbaijan ranks sixtieth in defense spending, just below the Czech Republic. Drones offer relatively cheap access to airpower, and training requirements are likely far smaller than with manned aircraft, particularly because various operations can be easily automated: the TB-2 can taxi, take off, land, and cruise autonomously.
7. Air superiority concepts may need to be adjusted.
There can be no doubt that Russia has struggled to establish air superiority over Ukraine. But even if Russia were far more successful, drones still complicate the picture. Flying numerous, successful high-altitude air superiority missions does not mean much for low-altitude drone threats. A commercial quadcopter isn’t going to be in a dog fight with a Russian Sukhoi Su-35, but neither is that Su-35 well equipped to stop the quadcopter from carrying out an aerial attack.
Even if Russia managed to destroy every Ukrainian airstrip, drones do not need much to take off. This creates a similar challenge to man-portable air defense systems: air threats may be highly distributed, difficult to identify, and even more difficult to prevent. Air superiority concepts do not need to be thrown out, but drones add complexity to what it means to have control of the air.
In certain cases, even simple drones can create real threats to air assets. In September 2020, a hobbyist drone struck a police helicopter in Los Angeles by accident. An affidavit in the subsequent criminal case noted that a strike on the helicopter’s main rotor would have brought the helicopter down. Although militaries have long tested aircraft for resilience against bird strikes, drones have much harder materials, may be flying much faster, and may carry explosives. Drones also allow for the creation of aerial minefields, in which drones fly about and autonomously target nearby aircraft. The Russian Lancet-3 loitering munition reportedly is aimed at creating such a capability.

Of course, every conflict is unique. Future conflicts will have different participants with different military capabilities and organizations, and will be fought over different territory with different strategic goals. Drone technology, concepts of operation, and counterdrone capabilities are also evolving. But the war in Ukraine is making one thing very clear: drones have a place in modern warfare and any military that hopes to achieve its battlefield objectives needs to pay attention.
Zachary Kallenborn is a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a research affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, an officially proclaimed US Army “Mad Scientist,” and national security consultant. His research on autonomous weapons, drone swarms, and weapons of mass destruction has been published in a wide range of peer-reviewed, wonky, and popular outlets, including the Brookings Institution, Foreign Policy, Slate, War on the Rocks, and the Nonproliferation Review. Journalists have written about and shared that research in the New York Times, NPR, Forbes, the New Scientist, and Newsweek, among dozens of others.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
mwi.usma.edu · by Zachary Kallenborn · May 12, 2022

12. No Marshall Plan for Ukraine

But the "Marshall Plan" is the default shorthand for any kind of stability operation or rebuilding of a nation.

The subtitle is correct. We need a plan that is appropriate for geography (and culture and politics) and geopolitics.

Excerpts:
Ukraine’s remarkable courage and will to resist foreign aggression have earned it enormous respect and admiration around the world. The country will, however, never attract large-scale investment while it remains under the shadow of a hostile Russia, which is willing and able to unleash devastation at a moment’s notice. Whereas the creation of NATO was integral to the success of the Marshall Plan, ending the prospect of Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO is a stated Russian war aim. Unless the United States is willing to escalate all the way to nuclear confrontation with Russia, it will never be able to neutralize the ongoing threat to Ukraine and its economy.
The regrettable but inescapable conclusion is that long-term, credible internal and external security is a precondition for a successful Marshall Plan in Ukraine, and that the United States and its allies are incapable of providing it. If the latter were to mount a massive aid program aimed at cementing Kyiv’s western orientation, Russia could credibly threaten Ukraine, its officials, its allies, its trading partners, and any enterprises operating there with costly cyber, military, and economic attacks. To be clear, Russia may never be able to conquer Ukraine, but it is more than capable of making it a hellish place to live and do business.
Humanitarian relief aid is, of course, desirable in its own right. But it will not seed a stable, prosperous democracy without major domestic and foreign private investment, and such investment will not be forthcoming unless it is safe from expropriation and destruction. When it comes to making a Marshall Plan, there are simply no substitutes for auspicious geography and donors willing and able to deter or defeat determined opponents. The Marshall countries had both. Ukraine, sadly, has neither.


No Marshall Plan for Ukraine
Geography and Geopolitics Dictate a Different Reconstruction Model
May 13, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Benn Steil · May 13, 2022
Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Marshall Plan, the massive U.S. program to rebuild Western Europe’s economy after World War II, is the endless desire to repeat it. Daunting geopolitical challenges invariably spawn appeals for new Marshall Plans to foster stability and prosperity. The global financial crisis seeded in 2008 brought forth calls for a Marshall Plan in southern Europe. The Arab Spring did the same in the Middle East. Ditto the civil war in Syria.
Today, Ukraine, victim of horrific mass brutality and destruction, is only the latest in a procession of stricken countries spurring calls for the legend’s reapplication. “There will be a new Marshall Plan for Ukraine,” declared Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in March. European Council President Charles Michel concurred, announcing that a May donor conference was “the starting point for [a] kind of European Marshall Plan for Ukraine.”
On its surface, Ukraine would appear to be fertile ground for a Marshall Plan. It is, much like most of the 16 Marshall Plan recipients of 1948–1952, a market-oriented European country with democratic foundations, anxious to integrate more closely with its neighbors to the west. It has great untapped potential in energy production, chemicals, agriculture, and industrial manufacturing.
Yet Ukraine suffers from an immutable characteristic that even the most noble and generous of foreign saviors cannot change: geography. Ukraine borders a powerful country to the east, Russia, whose government does not wish it to look westward for salvation or to succeed as a prosperous, independent country. And Russia is fully capable of undermining, with mere threats, any steps Ukraine may take in this direction.
To be sure, Ukraine’s rich friends in the United States and western Europe can do much to aid the country’s suffering people and to rebuild its damaged infrastructure. Yet without Russian cooperation or at least committed noninterference—a noninterference that is inconceivable currently or in the foreseeable future—the robust and enduring revival experienced by the Marshall countries is simply beyond Ukraine’s reach.
BUTTER, AND GUNS
The fundamental error made by champions of new Marshall Plans is to presume that the essence of the original program was simply the application of vast amounts of government money. The sums committed by the Truman administration between 1948 and 1952 were indeed substantial: about $160 billion in current dollars. During that period, the 16 Marshall countries rebuilt and recovered rapidly, with economic output expanding nearly 60 percent. This fact underlies the belief that those dollars were the source of its achievement. Yet economists who have analyzed the aid’s direct impact on Western Europe’s economic revival have concluded that the effect was modest. My own research suggests that other, less quantifiable, factors were comparably or more important than those dollars or, at the very least, vital complements to them.

No doubt, Marshall aid did serve to reverse the rising tide of communist political influence, particularly in France and Italy. But an indispensable complementary factor in the success of that aid was credible U.S. security guarantees. These had been wholly absent from the original State Department blueprint for the Marshall Plan, which aimed to boost production capacity in the recipient countries as quickly as possible so they could provide for their own defense. At the insistence of France and the United Kingdom, however, U.S. defense pledges quickly became integral to the program.
Without Marshall aid, Paris and London, fearing an industrially revived Germany, would never have cooperated with U.S. plans for quickly repairing German infrastructure and ramping up the country’s industrial production, which proved a major engine of Western Europe’s stunning recovery. But even that aid would not have been sufficient to overcome French and British resistance had the United States not also agreed to provide them with security guarantees—guarantees against aggression by either the Soviet Union or Germany. Those guarantees, enshrined in Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, represented a fundamental shift in U.S. policy. This policy had, until 1948, been to continue rapidly withdrawing troops and materiel from Europe. Between 1945 and 1948, annual U.S. defense spending plummeted from $963 billion to $95 billion. In 1949, however, it increased sharply, to $128 billion, and U.S. troops began surging back to the continent. It was this reversal of earlier U.S. designs for deindustrializing Germany (known as the Morgenthau Plan) and disengaging from Europe that animated the revival of business confidence and private investment in the region.

Ukraine will never attract large-scale investment while it remains under the shadow of a hostile Russia.
Because the countries ultimately covered by the Marshall Plan were not as geographically vulnerable to the threat of Soviet attack as, for example, the eager but unfortunate Czechoslovakia and Poland, the United States could credibly underwrite their security. This fact allowed the Marshall countries to quickly integrate economically rather than pursue hopelessly inefficient autarkic policies of the sort necessary to assure supplies of steel and other commodities critical to unaided self-defense.
It is notable that the United States committed large annual sums, comparable to those of the Marshall years, to European relief efforts in 1946 and 1947—with no material effect on economic recovery. This earlier pan-European aid, funneled through the new United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, was undermined by the Soviet Union, which subverted democratization, economic reform, and private investment in Eastern Europe, as well as by communist Yugoslavia, which shot down U.S. relief planes. Going forward, the Truman administration was therefore determined to take full control of U.S. aid dollars, focusing them on only those countries capable of making full and productive use of them.
Fast forward to the new millennium, and the same challenges exist. The United States committed $210 billion to war reconstruction in just two countries, Afghanistan and Iraq—$50 billion more than it committed to the 16 Marshall countries, in current dollars. Yet there is precious little to show for that money. The main reason for this failure was the inability of the United States to defeat the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and Iran-sponsored militias in Iraq. In such inherently fragile security environments, in countries never friendly to Western-style market reform to begin with, the private domestic and foreign investment necessary to generate sustained transformational economic growth never materialized. The lesson for today is clear: security must come first. Positive political reform and economic revival, assisted by foreign aid, can only follow in stability’s wake.
THE RUSSIAN SHADOW
Ukraine’s remarkable courage and will to resist foreign aggression have earned it enormous respect and admiration around the world. The country will, however, never attract large-scale investment while it remains under the shadow of a hostile Russia, which is willing and able to unleash devastation at a moment’s notice. Whereas the creation of NATO was integral to the success of the Marshall Plan, ending the prospect of Ukraine’s incorporation into NATO is a stated Russian war aim. Unless the United States is willing to escalate all the way to nuclear confrontation with Russia, it will never be able to neutralize the ongoing threat to Ukraine and its economy.

The regrettable but inescapable conclusion is that long-term, credible internal and external security is a precondition for a successful Marshall Plan in Ukraine, and that the United States and its allies are incapable of providing it. If the latter were to mount a massive aid program aimed at cementing Kyiv’s western orientation, Russia could credibly threaten Ukraine, its officials, its allies, its trading partners, and any enterprises operating there with costly cyber, military, and economic attacks. To be clear, Russia may never be able to conquer Ukraine, but it is more than capable of making it a hellish place to live and do business.
Humanitarian relief aid is, of course, desirable in its own right. But it will not seed a stable, prosperous democracy without major domestic and foreign private investment, and such investment will not be forthcoming unless it is safe from expropriation and destruction. When it comes to making a Marshall Plan, there are simply no substitutes for auspicious geography and donors willing and able to deter or defeat determined opponents. The Marshall countries had both. Ukraine, sadly, has neither.

Foreign Affairs · by Benn Steil · May 13, 2022


13. Lawmakers worry Army doesn't have basing agreements for long-range fires

The host nation has a vote. It actually has THE vote.

Lawmakers worry Army doesn't have basing agreements for long-range fires - Breaking Defense
"I don't think it would be wise for us to wait to develop the kinds of weapons systems, we need for a future conflict until we had the diplomatic agreements signed," Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said.

breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · May 13, 2022
The U.S. Army’s Multi Domain Task Force operates from the Tactical Command Post as a part of their premier appearance at Valiant Shield 2018 Sept. 20, 2018. (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Danica M. Sirmans/US Navy)
WASHINGTON: While the Army has hyped its foray into long-range missiles as part of its Pacific strategy, members of Congress expressed concern that the service is missing a critical element: the basing agreements with friendly nations there where the weapons would need to be effectively deployed to deter any Chinese designs on Taiwan.
During a House Armed Services Committee hearing Thursday Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc., asked Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville whether the Army had sufficient basing agreements, only to have McConville defer to policymakers and say that “there’s discussions” ongoing.
Likewise, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told lawmakers that there is “still conversations and work to be done,” but named Japan and the Philippines as allies the Army believes it has solid relationships with.
The Army leaders said they were wary of discussing potential specific basing locations for the Army’s long-range fires capabilities in the public hearing. Asked if he felt that Army was in where it needed to be to deploy the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) — the service’s new theater-specific units that employ long-range precision effects, including missiles, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities — McConville nodded his head in the affirmative.
“There are possibilities for basing the MDTF, but I also think we have to have a pretty robust diplomatic effort with other countries in the region to try to open up opportunities for basing and access,” Wormuth said, adding that “it’s remarkable” how Japan’s “threat perception has changed in the last few years.”
Gallagher said it was time for a full court press.
“At least in Indo-PACOM, this has to be our top diplomatic priority,” he said. “What we should integrate is the State Department moving heaven and earth to negotiate basing agreements with key allies so that we can deploy teams of Marines or soldiers in order to deny PLA invasion of Taiwan.”
Rep. Elaine Luria, D-Va., followed up on Gallagher’s questions by pressing the two service leaders “from where” in the region the service planned to launch its forthcoming ship-targeting Mid-Range Capability, raising skepticism because the earlier exchange pointed to the fact “there was not any identified basing locations that we [the US military] have access” to, she said.
“I don’t think it would be wise for us to wait to develop the kinds of weapons systems we need for a future conflict until we had the diplomatic agreements signed,” Wormuth said.
Long-range fires are among the Army’s key modernization priorities. The MDTF will be armed with two of the Army’s forthcoming missile capabilities, the Mid-Range Capability missile and Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon. The Mid-Range Capability, McConville told lawmakers today, can fly “about” 1,000 km, while the LRHW has a range of about 2,775 km.
The Army established the first MDTF back in 2017, based out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord. The second MDTF is assigned to Europe, and the third MDTF, which will be officially established this year, will be based in Hawaii.
US Army Pacific, led by Gen. Charles Flynn, is working to forge relationships with countries in the region through an initiative called Pacific Pathways, a series of engagements and exercises with armies across the Indo-Pacific. In an interview with Breaking Defense in April after a five-week trip in the region, Flynn touted the importance of Pathways in developing the relationships the service needs to have in order to operate in the Pacific.
“What we’re trying to have is almost a version of more faces and more places,” Flynn told Breaking Defense last month. “And by having that we’re able to ensure our ability to operate in using ports and using airfields and using training areas.”
Meanwhile, the Marine Corps is also developing precision strike capabilities for its expeditionary advanced base operations concept. That concept is a focus area for the Marines’ new 3rd Littoral Regiment, established to be highly mobile and low-signature, and equipped a ship-sinking missile battery. Rep. Elaine Luria, D-Va., asked the Army leaders if they were working with the Marines to develop some commonality and interoperability in the weapons systems.
Wormuth said that the Army is in “active discussions” with the Marines and sees the Multi-Domain Task Force and Marine Littoral Regiment as “complementary.” Both the LRHW and Mid-Range Capability are being developed in tandem with the Navy. First prototypes of both capabilities are set to be delivered in fiscal 2023.
breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · May 13, 2022


14. Why the West just can’t get enough of Zelensky

He has been an inspiring leader.
Why the West just can’t get enough of Zelensky
Effective use of historical analogies and simplified ideas explain why Ukraine’s president has won so many Western hearts and minds
asiatimes.com · by Michael Butler · May 13, 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dominated headlines since late February 2022. The war struck a nerve among Western audiences, evoking a high degree of support for Ukraine. The reasons for the prominence of the war in the West are many and varied.
A ground war in Europe launched by a major military power evokes the ghosts of World War II. This is especially true when the attacking country has designs on territory it considers integral to its nation, and is led by a personalist authoritarian regime where all power is concentrated in a single leader.
The deep involvement of the US and European countries, both individually and collectively through NATO and the European Union, also inspires Cold War comparisons. The resulting humanitarian crisis, including the mass exodus of over 5 million refugees, underscores the ethical and moral implications of the war.

These historical analogies and simplifying ideas help explain why the West’s imagination has been captured by this war.
But there’s more to the West’s captivation with the war than is immediately apparent. As a scholar of armed conflict and security, I also find a compelling explanation for why the West is so focused on Ukraine in the Ukrainian government’s ability to provide information about the war in a way that appeals to Western sensibilities.
‘A ground war in Europe launched by a major military power evokes the ghosts of World War II,’ writes the author. Here, buildings destroyed by intensive shelling by Russian troops in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Photo: Eugene Zinchenko / Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images / The Conversation
Weaponizing information
Russia’s use of propaganda and symbols during the conflict, most recently in the “Victory Day” celebrations attempting to draw its own distorted parallels to World War II, has gotten a lot of attention. In the process, Ukraine’s skillful use of information warfare should not be overlooked.
Information warfare entails one party denying, exploiting or corrupting the delivery and function of an enemy’s information. It is used both to protect oneself against the enemy’s information and to create a favorable environment for one’s own information.
With the charismatic President Volodymyr Zelensky leading the way, Ukraine’s savvy use of traditional and social media as well as direct appeals to the US Congress, European Parliament and the court of world opinion have provided a clear and compelling framing of the war.

That frame is structured around five affecting themes: the inherently just cause of Ukrainian self-defense; the tenacity of Ukrainian resistance; the barbarity of Russian conduct; Russia’s flawed military strategy and general ineptitude; and Ukraine’s desperate need for more, and more sophisticated, military hardware.
Ukraine’s successful strategy in the battle over information demonstrates the connection between armed conflict and information warfare.
Ukraine has forged a stalemate with Russia by stressing these themes of a just war for national liberation using not only traditional tools of warfare – bullets, missiles, tanks – but also by shaping the Western public’s perceptions of the war.
Learning from the enemy
The information front in the Russia-Ukraine war is nothing new. It was opened by Russia in 2014 during its annexation of Crimea and incursion in the Donbas region. Russia took the offensive to cover up its territorial aims, saying instead that it was there to protect civilians and resist the further spread of Western imperialism.
At the time, Ukrainians and Russians alike were buffeted with this disinformation through Russia’s state-controlled international English-language service RT and viral videos on YouTube and various social media outlets.

Since then, Ukraine’s security and defense establishment has focused on improving its ability to counter such disinformation tactics. Zelensky’s surprise landslide victory in the 2019 presidential election gave Ukraine what has proved to be its biggest asset.
skilled communicator and performer, Zelensky regularly and effectively uses available information to present Ukraine’s version of the war and debunk Russia’s. His initial selfie videos from the streets of Kyiv underscored Ukrainian bravery and unity in a war of self-defense – “the citizens are here, and we are here.”
Zelensky’s mid-March virtual address to the US Congress drew a direct line from Russian atrocities – featured in a graphic video clip he showed to lawmakers – to the need for the West to “do more.”
His address to the UN in early April expanded the scope and terms of the war, defining it as an existential struggle against tyranny and evil and for the very soul of the UN:
“If this continues, the finale will be that each state will rely only on the power of arms to ensure its security, not on international law, not on international institutions. Then, the UN can simply be dissolved. Ladies and gentlemen! Are you ready for the dissolving of the UN? Do you think that the time of international law has passed? If your answer is no, you need to act now, act immediately.”
Getting by with a little help …
Ukraine’s use of the techniques of information warfare as well as its compelling messaging and messengers account for much of its success on that front. Among those messengers are former champion boxers the Klitschko brothers, one of whom is the mayor of Kiev, and both of whom are now prominent advocates for the defense of their country.

Ukraine has also benefited from pro bono public relations services from major Washington, DC, firms such as 5WPR and SKDK as well as some of their UK counterparts.
SKDK’s managing director, Anita Dunn, served as senior adviser to President Joe Biden throughout his presidential campaign and in the early months of his administration and is reportedly returning to the White House in advance of the upcoming midterm elections.
SKDK assisted in drafting Zelensky’s speeches condemning Russian aggression and war crimes to the UN General Assembly and Security Council. This parallels pro bono legal support from Washington, DC, law firms such as Covington & Burling, which filed a brief to the International Court of Justice on Ukraine’s behalf in March.
A section of PR and lobbying firm SKDK’s disclosure form that stated it was providing free help to the Ukrainian government ‘in connection with the foreign. principal’s remarks to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.’ FARA Registration Unit
The limits of framing
In a textbook example of hybrid warfare – warfare fought in domains other than the physical battlefield – Ukraine has transformed successes on the information battleground into effective defense of its homeland from Russian aggression. The West has massively increased its support of the country through weapons shipments, intelligence sharing and other aid.
Still, questions remain about the long-term viability of this strategy. Can Ukraine’s strategic use of information continue to offset Russia’s material advantages?
By definition, information warfare obscures and distorts reality in order to tilt perceptions of a conflict to a country’s advantage. Paraphrasing an age-old adage, the war between Russia and Ukraine is a reminder that the first battle in contemporary wars may be for the truth.
Michael Butler is Associate Professor of Political Science, Clark University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
asiatimes.com · by Michael Butler · May 13, 2022


15. Challenge of maintaining US ‘arsenal of democracy’

Excerpts:
Successful defense depends on a host of things: political will and leadership, diplomacy, allies, strategy, appropriate technology, resolute commanders, a vigorous defense industrial base, and unreproachable logistics—to name a few.
It also – as Winston Churchill reminded Franklin D Roosevelt – rests on the “tools” of war.
“Give us the tools,’ the British prime minister said in a February 1941 speech in Parliament, “and we will finish the job.”
Notwithstanding hopes and prediction, the world faces again the prospect of major combat at sea and on land. Not only for its allies’ sake but for its own security, the US must rebuild its arsenal.
Challenge of maintaining US ‘arsenal of democracy’
The US cannot mortgage its supplies for a fight against China
asiatimes.com · by More by Seth Cropsey · May 12, 2022
The United States and its NATO allies are playing a critical role in Eastern Europe, ensuring that the Ukrainian military remains well supplied, and the Ukrainian state economically functional. However, the US is no longer the “arsenal of democracy” it was in the 1940s, nor is it the industrial power it was until the 1980s.
Russia, moreover, is not the only threat to American and allied interests. China poses an equal, if not greater, threat. As the Ukraine war settles into a long attritional phase, the US must ensure it has the capacity to support Kiev in its fight against Russian imperialism while maintaining the supplies to counter China in a future Pacific war.
In a fundamental respect, the US administration has recalibrated, shifting to a new strategic heuristic. This is remarkable, both in general and given specific circumstances.

All policy stems from a worldview, a series of general assumptions about the nature of man and political interaction, and specific assumptions about political actors and their interest. Inertia drives the American policy establishment, particularly in foreign affairs.
Presidents have the unique ability to shift agendas, although their power is not unlimited. See, for example, the State Department’s bureaucratic resistance to the George W Bush administration’s long-term planning for Iraq. More than the caricature of neoconservatism that was in vogue at the time, this prosaic political infighting placed the US in a severely adverse position after the 2003 invasion.
Some executives can overcome inertia and impose a new policy: Richard Nixon did so vis-à-vis China, Ronald Reagan executed a similar shift toward the Soviet Union. In each case, the president in question established a new strategic heuristic.
However, once a strategic heuristic is determined, it does not change, even if the policies that stem from it fail. Typically, transformative events shift strategic heuristics.
Dwight Eisenhower, despite his strategic irrationality during the Suez Crisis, shifted tacks in his final three years, scaling up explicit Soviet containment strategies in the Middle East. Jimmy Carter, faced with the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, revived military assistance programs in the Middle East and Latin America, and ironically prepared the policy establishment for Reagan’s radical shift in 1980.

Barack Obama, by contrast, stayed the course in Eurasia, consistently ceding the initiative to America’s adversaries and refusing to modify his worldview.
Biden and Ukraine
Joe Biden’s presidency has revealed him not as a great statesman, but rather as a reflexive anti-interventionist deeply skeptical of American power. This should shock no one, given his record on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and what we know of his role in the Obama administration.
Similarly, the Biden team seemed unable to craft a coherent strategy. This is unsurprising, given Biden’s foreign-policy staff: With the exception of Lloyd Austin, until 2016 an army officer, all established themselves during the Obama years.
One would have expected Biden to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as his Democratic predecessor did in 2014: Briefly admonish Russia rhetorically, impose token sanctions, and leave Ukraine to its fate. To its great credit, this is not what the Biden team has done.
It prepared a sanctions package and pressured recalcitrant allies, namely Germany and France, to comply. It directed US intelligence to support Ukraine, increasing Ukrainian combat power. Most critically, since late 2021, the Biden administration, followed closely by the equally fragile Boris Johnson government in the UK, has poured military equipment into Ukraine.

Initially it offered light systems like shoulder-launched anti-tank and anti-air missiles. Then it offered loitering munitions and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Then it agreed to the transfer of Soviet-era heavy equipment, particularly air defenses.
Now, it provides Ukraine with NATO-grade field artillery and ammunition, counter-battery radars, older armored vehicles, and potentially anti-ship missiles.
The Biden administration clearly remains conscious of the potential for escalation. But unlike six weeks ago, it no longer believes that expansive NATO military support to Ukraine will provoke a Russian nuclear response.
Perhaps the US will green-light a MiG-29 sale soon, a measure that it publicly killed in early March. Moreover, the US is training Ukrainians to use their new systems.
Clearly, a heuristic has shifted. The Biden administration no longer deems support for Ukraine inflammatory. Rather, it is morally and strategically critical.

The US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provide Ukraine with crucial strategic depth. If Western aid continues, Ukraine will remain in the fight. Its expansive territory and the quality of its military still preclude a rapid Russian breakthrough.
By arming Ukraine, and providing it economic support, the US and its allies have forced Russia to contend with a much more dangerous adversary than the Kremlin confronted in 2014 or expected to confront in February.
Western support must be sustained to be effective. The Ukraine war’s operational and strategic realities all point to an extended conflict, one that lasts at least until 2023, and perhaps longer.
High-intensity ground combat will subside in several weeks once Russia’s offensive in the Donbas either stabilizes a new front line or is defeated by a Ukrainian counterattack. But Putin will not walk away.
Ukraine will remain under constant military pressure over the summer, and Russia will return for another round of fighting in the fall or winter, after its most recent conscript class is trained and equipped, and perhaps after a general mobilization. American and allied support must continue, perhaps indefinitely, to ensure that Russia does not erode Ukrainian resistance over time and subjugate the country.
The Taiwan question
Does Biden’s policy shift stop at Ukraine? The US and its allies face an equally significant adversary that has not yet made its geopolitical move.
The China question remains entirely unresolved. Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CPC) still eye Taiwan, hoping to absorb the “renegade province” much like Vladimir Putin sought to return Ukraine to Russia’s imperial sphere.
Just as resolving the Ukraine question in Putin’s favor would solidify his legacy and secure his regime, resolving the Taiwan question in Xi’s favor would elevate him to Mao Zedong’s status. Moreover, Taiwan is strategically critical.
More so than Ukraine toward Russia, its sovereign existence bars China’s guaranteed access to the World Ocean and gives the US and its allies a commanding position in the Western Pacific. In turn, Xi and the Party believe that the US and its allies will object to their imperial conquest for strategic and ideological reasons. A cross-Strait conflict carries every expectation of becoming a general war.
Xi is unlikely to make his move in the next nine months. Until October or November, the 20th Party Congress will be his undivided focus. It is the final opportunity hostile elements within the CPC possess to remove Xi from power.
If he is re-elected as China’s paramount leader, he will rule indefinitely, exercising absolute control over the Party and the country. This helps explain the CPC’s insistence upon draconian Covid control measures and its “zero-Covid” policy. Like Putin vis-à-vis Ukraine, Xi has expended so much political capital on defeating Covid-19 through centralized Party control that he must stay the course or lose credibility.
However, after the Party Congress, Xi may return to external pursuits. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not prepared fully for a Taiwan assault.
Russia’s difficulties in Ukraine demonstrate its need to improve combined arms integration, accelerate UCAV development, expand conventional long-range fires, and improve air control capabilities. But barring an American collapse, China has a relatively short window of opportunity.
The US is in the process of modernizing its naval forces, reorienting its military posture toward China, and creating a durable alliance system to contain a Chinese military threat. The Ukraine war has split American attention, turning it back to western Eurasia, rather than eastern Eurasia. This will not last indefinitely.
The PLA would like to wait until it has modernized further and expanded its traditional amphibious assault capabilities to attack Taiwan. Nevertheless, at the summit, politics and strategy are one.
Supply stress
Chairman Xi may deem it more reasonable to capitalize on American inattention now than wait another five to seven years, risking a more coherent US-led coalition that opposes Chinese aggression, and a more effective American military that can defeat a PLA invasion.
Supporting Ukraine in a long war requires accessing American high-end weapons stocks, cultivated over years or decades. The US has sufficient stocks to sustain Ukraine for the next nine to 12 months. But inventories are declining.
The US has already sent a third of its Javelin anti-tank missile stockpile to Ukraine – around 7,000 weapons, 5,500 of which were delivered after February 24 – and a quarter of its Stinger portable anti-air missile stockpile. Lockheed Martin’s facility in Troy, Alabama, that produces Javelins can make 2,100 a year. Raytheon has produced only a limited number of Stingers since 2000, when the Pentagon bought its final batch.
Neither of these weapons will be as critical in the immediate future. The war’s next phases will involve either static defenses or wide-area combined arms actions, in which armored vehicles and heavy artillery are crucial. Nevertheless, Stingers and Javelins will still be needed, as will ammunition and heavy weapons systems. Ukraine’s shell expenditure already has increased, and it will lose some of its new artillery to Russian counter-battery fire.
Moreover, the most critical weapons the US can offer, anti-ship missiles to allow Ukraine to break a Russian blockade of Odessa and contest its control of the Black Sea, are in limited supply. Their stocks would also be needed in a Sino-American conflict, which will be a sea war, not a land war.
Additionally, America’s allies rely on the US for defense-industrial capacity in peacetime. Europe will seek to rearm. Japan needs missiles, Australia submarines. Taiwan needs armored vehicles, missiles, artillery and aircraft. These demands will place stress on an already brittle defense industrial base.
The delays have already begun: This week, Taiwan announced it would seek interim options now that M109 howitzer will be delayed until 2026 at the earliest, as opposed to next year.
The way forward
If we Americans are to fight and win a global confrontation against Russia and China, the US must again become the arsenal of democracy. Three steps are needed to achieve this.
First, the US should encourage smaller producers to step in alongside the mega-conglomerates that currently dominate Western defense production. In the 1990s, the US consciously shrank its industrial base, creating a government-sanctioned oligopoly. Breaking up the big defense providers is impractical. Rather, the US government should provide incentives for those large defense manufacturers to work with new smaller firms, while also sponsoring some smaller companies akin to venture capital funding for startups.
Second, the US should work with its allies to identify dual-use infrastructure. Throughout the Cold War, the American defense industrial base relied on the additional capacity of civilian industry, a legacy of the national mobilization that won the World War. Modern defense production is more complex.
However, there are some industries particularly suited to dual-use production. Shipyards and automotive plants are clear examples. This would have the added upshot of attracting new labor talent and mitigating the challenges of an aging workforce.
Third, the US and its allies must ensure older equipment stays at a sufficient level of readiness to cover shortfalls. Ukraine, for example, has employed 200 donated M113 armored personnel carriers to great effect, although they are old and lightly armored. Similar equipment should be maintained as “surge” capacity in the event of a high-end conflict.
Successful defense depends on a host of things: political will and leadership, diplomacy, allies, strategy, appropriate technology, resolute commanders, a vigorous defense industrial base, and unreproachable logistics—to name a few.
It also – as Winston Churchill reminded Franklin D Roosevelt – rests on the “tools” of war.
“Give us the tools,’ the British prime minister said in a February 1941 speech in Parliament, “and we will finish the job.”
Notwithstanding hopes and prediction, the world faces again the prospect of major combat at sea and on land. Not only for its allies’ sake but for its own security, the US must rebuild its arsenal.
asiatimes.com · by More by Seth Cropsey · May 12, 2022


16. Satellite images ‘suggest China is practising missile strikes on targets in Taiwan and Guam’

Satellite images ‘suggest China is practising missile strikes on targets in Taiwan and Guam’
  • Analysts say new images of mock targets in the Taklamakan desert suggest the PLA is refining its strike capacity to hit smaller ships
  • One of the mock targets is described as resembling a base in northeast Taiwan that would be a key target in the event of conflict
By Minnie Chan South China Morning Post3 min

Analysts said the model pier resembles the Suao naval base in Taiwan. Photo: Google
The Chinese military has refined its anti-ship missile training from striking large, carrier-sized targets to smaller ships and naval bases, according to recent satellite images.
They show a training base in Xinjiang’s remote Taklamakan desert with the layout of mock-up ship moored in a naval base that resembles one in northeast Taiwan and other targets in Guam, according to a Taipei-based naval analyst.
The US Naval Institute (USNI) news site said new satellite photos show China is building more large-scale target ranges along the rim of the desert, including model destroyers and piers.
One of the new targets – a mock-up of a destroyer and pier – was built in December, just 13km (eight miles) southeast of an elaborate model aircraft carrier that was exposed by the Colorado-based satellite imagery company Maxar Technologies in November last year.
In February that target was destroyed by a test missile, according to HI Sutton, the writer of the USNI article.
Another similar naval base, built in 2018, about 310km (190 miles) southwest of the original aircraft carrier layout, was found by Damien Symons, an independent defence analyst, Sutton added.
In 2017, Google Earth images of missile test sites on the edge of the Gobi appeared to show models of US bases in Japan, the military newspaper Stars and Stripes reported.
Sutton said the nature, location and strikes on the mock-up layouts had suggested that the targets are meant for testing ballistic missiles.
China has developed at least two types of hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles, the DF-21D and DF-26.
The former is known as the “carrier-killer”, while the latter was dubbed the “Guam Express” due to its range of up to 5,000km (3,000 miles) – enough to reach the US overseas territory which is home to a major military base.
Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at Taiwan’s Naval Academy in Kaohsiung, said he had found a layout that is very similar to the Suao Naval Base in Yilan county in northeast Taiwan.
02:06
Chinese hypersonic weapons test ‘has all of our attention’, US General Mark Milley says
“I tried to compare [the layout] of US naval bases in Yokosuka and Sesabo [in Japan] and Subic Bay [in the Philippines], but Suao naval port is the most similar,” Lu said, adding the target ship in the site is supposed to be the Kidd-class destroyer in the Taiwanese naval base.
“The mock-up and drill designs suggested the PLA warships are simulating precision strikes to hit targets in both Guam naval base and Suao military port by its YJ-21 anti-ship missile.”
Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said the US carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups and force concentrations in Guam, which is the forward military hub outside the first island chain would be a key target for the People’s Liberation Army’s missiles.
Suao is a strategic port designed to keep Taiwan’s access to maritime supply chains open in times of war, so Koh said it would also be priority targets of the PLA missiles.
“The PLA would also prime its wartime missile strike targeting key Taiwanese installations – including not just the airbases, [command and control] centres, storage bunkers but also naval bases,” he said.
“Suao is located on the Taiwan eastern seaboard, which renders a certain degree of strategic depth and would be less vulnerable than, say, Keelung which is another key [Taiwanese] fleet hub that’s located on the western seaboard facing right at the strait and therefore more exposed to PLA strikes.”
Minnie Chan is an award-winning journalist, specialising in reporting on defence and diplomacy in China. Her coverage of the US EP-3 spy plane crash with a PLA J-8 in 2001 near the South China Sea opened her door to the military world. Since then, she has had several scoops relating to China's military development. She has been at the Post since 2005 and has a master's in international public affairs from The University of Hong Kong.

17. Afghanistan: Resistance Front claims killing of 22 Taliban members in Panjshir


The forgotten Afghan resistance. Is anyone assessing the resistance potential? Are there any plans to support this resistance or have just completely abandoned Afghanistan?

Afghanistan: Resistance Front claims killing of 22 Taliban members in Panjshir
aninews.in · by ANI |

Kabul [Afghanistan], May 10 (ANI): The National Resistance Front (NRF) on Monday claimed to have killed 22 Taliban members in the Panjshir conflict.
NRF spokesman Sebghatullah Ahmadi, in a statement, said that the Taliban are under pressure in Panjshir and have suffered casualties, adding that six Taliban were captured and seven Taliban tanks were entirely destroyed, reported The Khaama Press.

However, local Taliban leaders in Panjshir refuted the claims, claiming that only three had been wounded.

"Hostilities had grown in Dara district, but a small-scale damage had been done to Taliban troops, including the destruction of three vehicles and the injury of three members," Abu Bakr Siddiqui, spokesman for the Taliban governor in Panjshir province, told the media.
Meanwhile, a Taliban spokesman for the province claims that their "operation" to clear members of the NRF in the AbdullahKhel village has forced them to flee to the mountains.

The public sources in Panjshir province stated that two military helicopters evacuated all Taliban bodies and wounded to Kabul yesterday, reported Khaama Press.

The bodies taken to Kabul were also said to have been returned to the provinces, according to the media.

Videos have also surfaced on social media saying that the Taliban abused residents after defeating the National Resistance Front and inflicted high fatalities.
The Taliban have yet to respond, and tensions in Panjshir appear to have escalated. (ANI)
aninews.in · by ANI |

18.  The US may be using Ukraine as a blueprint for how Taiwan could stop a Chinese invasion

Will anyone ever again "close with and destroy the enemy?" Or do we think everything will be standoff long range precision fires?

The US may be using Ukraine as a blueprint for how Taiwan could stop a Chinese invasion
Missiles. Lots of missiles.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED MAY 12, 2022 9:31 AM
taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · May 12, 2022
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President Joe Biden’s administration reportedly wants to arm Taiwan with the same types of portable weapons that the United States and other NATO members have been providing to Ukraine, such as Javelin and Stinger missiles.
Politico and the New York Times have reported that the U.S. government has accelerated its efforts to make Taiwan harder for any invader to swallow – like a porcupine – based on lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Not only have U.S. officials urged Taiwan to buy portable weapons systems that would be harder for China to target, but the State Department also indicated it would not respond to Taiwan’s request for MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, which can be used to attack submarines and surface ships, both media outlets reported.
Both the National Security Council and Pentagon deferred questions to the State Department about which weapons systems the U.S. government intends to provide to Taiwan.
The U.S. government support’s Taiwan’s strategy of preparing an asymmetric defense of the island, said a State Department spokesperson, who declined to provide any information about ongoing discussions about possible arms sales to Taiwan.
In this photo released by the Taiwan Military News Agency, Taiwanese artillery guns fire live rounds during anti-landing drills as part of the Han Guang exercises held along the Pingtung coast in Taiwan, on Thursday, Sept. 16, 2021. (Military News Agency via AP)
Not all weapons systems would meaningfully contribute to Taiwan’s defense strategy, said the spokesperson, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue. Since 2017, the United States has sold Taiwan more than $18 billion in weaponry.
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The Ukrainians have proven to be very skilled at using Javelins and other anti-armor missiles to destroy Russian tanks. They have also effectively used Stinger missiles to shoot down Russian helicopters. Now, they are getting Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost drones, which can loiter above the battlefield and then strike targets that include Russian armor.
One major lesson from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that applies to Taiwan is that it is vital to prevent an adversary from achieving air superiority, said Timothy Heath, a senior international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit research organization.
“Arming and equipping Taiwan with surface-to-air-missiles, in general, I think is a valuable and useful idea,” Heath told Task & Purpose. “MANPADS [man-portable air-defense systems] – or Stingers – are part of that solution. The limitation of Stingers is they have a relatively modest range. What Taiwan probably needs – in addition to that – is medium-range and longer-range surface-to-air missiles to keep the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] efforts to seize air control in check – or at least keep it contested.”
The State Department approved a $100 million sale in February to help Taiwan maintain and improve its Patriot missiles, followed by another $95 million sale of equipment and training for Taiwan’s Patriot missiles in April.
In this image released by Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Service, Ukrainian soldiers use a launcher with US Javelin missiles during military exercises in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Thursday, Dec. 23, 2021. (Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)
Heath said that Javelins could also allow Taiwanese troops to destroy Chinese amphibious vehicles before they could make it ashore.
“We’ve seen that the ability of the Ukrainian military to destroy larger numbers of armor contributed to a stalling of the Russian offensive,” Heath said. “Similarly in the Taiwan Strait, heavy losses in aircraft, shooting down air transport aircraft that are trying to bring airborne troops and air assault troops, and then sinking large numbers of amphibious vessels – these are all, I think, valuable ideas. Dollar for dollar, I think these are good investments and they would be money well spent.”
However, Stingers and Javelins would mostly be used for ground combat instead of preventing the Chinese military from getting to Taiwan, said retired Navy Capt. Thomas Shugart, a military innovation expert with the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington, D.C.
If the People’s Liberation Army can get troops ashore and then resupply those forces, they will eventually be able to take Taiwan, Shugart told Task & Purpose.
“The war may be won or lost on land, but it’s going to be decided in the air and on the sea,” Shugart said.
To prevent Chinese troops from making it ashore, Taiwan needs smart naval mines and anti-ship missiles that can specifically target amphibious assault ships, said Shugart, who explained the Chinese would be expected to use fishing boats and other vessels as part of an invasion force to serve as decoys for Taiwan’s defenses.
Some of the weapons that could potentially help Taiwan select and destroy Chinese ships carrying invasion troops include the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile and Naval Strike Missile, he said.
While Taiwan might be able to defeat the People’s Liberation Army on the beaches, China will win if it can gain air superiority and control of the Taiwan Strait, allowing it to resupply and reinforce its invasion troops, Shugart said.
“I don’t see how the Taiwanese army could withstand the capabilities the PLA could bring to bear,” Shugart said. “The PLA is just much, much larger than the Taiwanese ground forces are.”
M60A3 Patton main battle tanks in a line fire during the 36th Han Kung military exercises in Taichung City, central Taiwan, Thursday, July 16, 2020. (Chiang Ying-ying/AP)
A spokesman for Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C., declined to comment.
The U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, an independent trade association funded by American companies, has had doubts about the Biden administration’s approach to arming Taiwan since it was briefed on the matter by a State Department official in March, said Rupert Hammond-Chambers, the group’s president.
“Frankly, the first red flag on the matter was their inability to define what ‘asymmetric’ is or what it means – they have no definition and/or refuse to give us one,” Hammond-Chambers told Task & Purpose.
Hammond-Chambers also claimed that the Biden administration is dictating to Taiwan what types of weapons systems it is allowed to purchase.
He added that while the Biden administration is focused on helping Taiwan respond to only one type of scenario – a full invasion – Taiwan also needs to prepare for a range of possible Chinese actions including a grey-zone conflict that does not rise to the level of a conventional war.
“This is policy paternalism and policy direction,” Hammond-Chambers said. “The Biden administration is telling Taiwan: This is what’s going to happen. This is not a discussion over the efficacy of one program over another. The U.S. is placing in front of Taiwan direction and saying: This is the direction you’re going to go.”
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Jeff Schogol is the senior Pentagon reporter for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for 15 years. You can email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com, direct message @JeffSchogol on Twitter, or reach him on WhatsApp and Signal at 703-909-6488. Contact the author here.

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · May 12, 2022

19. Will Ukraine Break The Back Of Beleaguered US Indo-Pacific Strategy? – Analysis
Is his strategy beleaguered?

Will Ukraine Break The Back Of Beleaguered US Indo-Pacific Strategy? – Analysis
eurasiareview.com · by Mark J. Valencia · May 12, 2022
The US Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) intends to prevent China’s hegemony in the region by building greater coordination with allies and partners “across war-fighting domains”. Its success depends on a US-centered network of security allies and partners and their willingness to go along with it in confronting China. But its implementation is already facing significant obstacles and now divisions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are further undermining US diplomatic efforts.
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First of all, the US emphasis on a militarist approach is not welcome by many countries. Indeed, the U.S. military buildup in the region and its thinly-veiled threats to use force against China in the South China Sea worries ASEAN members who will suffer collateral damage from a US-China kinetic conflict.
Other obstacles to the military approach include India’s non-alignment and Japan’s constitutional restraints on the uses of its military. Also many Southeast Asian states are reluctant to offend China.
The IPS states that “Our objective is not to change China but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share”.
But few countries in the region share core US values. ASEAN autocracies like Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam do not share Western democratic ideals like freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and free and fair elections. This is underscored by the fact that the only Southeast Asian countries invited to the US-organized Summit for Democracy were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste.
Behind the verbal veil, the IPS is essentially saying that the US-Southeast Asia commonality is fear of China. But some Southeast Asian states like Cambodia and Laos have made their accommodations with China and do not fear it while others will continue to hedge between the two because of their national economic interests – not values. Moreover, the recent turmoil and stultifying divisions in US politics undermine the attractiveness of US ‘democratic values’.
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ASEAN and the U.S. have fundamentally different visions for the region. The U.S. vision of an implicitly anti-China, security-oriented Free and Open Indo-Pacific contrasts with ASEAN’s inclusive [including China], less militaristic Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and will create tensions that may be insurmountable.
Now adding the straw that may break the back of the IPS, the tragedy of Ukraine has exposed the fragility of the ‘international order’ and is further stress testing US relations in Asia. Indeed, just as the U.S. is beginning to implement the IPS, Asian responses to the Ukraine crisis have revealed fundamental differences with the US world view.
It is true that China -fearing US allies Japan and South Korea have given whole hearted support to US-led sanctions. But that is about it for the rest of Asia.
It is no surprise that under this ‘diplomatic stress test’, China has so far chosen its strategic partnership with Russia over improving ties with the West. “China opposes NATO enlargement, blames the US for inciting tensions, and stands by Russia’s demands that its legitimate security concerns must be respected. “
Among Southeast Asian countries, only Singapore—surrounded by potentially unfriendly countries–has joined the political fray on the side of the West. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said ” Unless we as a country, stand up for principles that are the very foundation for the independence and sovereignty of smaller nations, our own right to exist and prosper as a nation may similarly be called into question”. But Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong qualified this by stating that “_ _ we think it is good that you [the U.S.] are participating in the region, but that does not mean we fight your wars or that we are expecting you to ride to our rescue should something happen to us_ _ we are not lined up eyeball to eyeball”.
Indeed, many small Southeast Asian nations have likely learned from the tragedy of Ukraine the realist lesson that they must maintain their neutrality between the U.S. and China. Otherwise they may become political pawns in the US-China ‘great game’ and be invaded by their land or maritime neighbor. Moreover if this happens, most realize that the U.S. will not come to their rescue militarily.
Even US ally the Philippines may be further distancing itself from the U.S. The likely next president Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has said he would not ask for help from the U.S. to deal with China. “The problem is between China and us. If the Americans come in it’s bound to fail because you are putting the two protagonists together”.
Although nine of eleven Southeast Asian states voted for a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution condemning Russia’s invasion, Vietnam and Laos abstained. Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Cambodia abstained from another UNGA resolution removing Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. Indonesia initially criticized the invasion but has since become a fence sitter. Because of US sanctions imposed for its conduct in East Timor, it does not want to rely on the U.S. for advanced military weaponry such as fighter jets. It has instead decided to purchase them from Russia.
Others–including Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines have been relatively silent reflecting the ASEAN principle of noninterference in others’ internal affairs, particularly those so far away.
The U.S. tried to persuade and pressure India—the Western anchor of the Quad– to join it in condemning Russia, but it has remained neutral. It abstained from voting on both UNGA resolutions. India depends on Russia significantly for its defensive armaments and some of its energy needs. The U.S. is threatening to make matters far worse by sanctioning India for these deals. If it does so it can probably forget about a strong role for India in the Quad.
The U.S. has been courting Vietnam to be a partner against China. But Vietnam has refused to condemn Russia. Russia is its main supplier of arms and a major partner in oil exploration in the South China Sea. The two have a long history of defense cooperation. If it lost access to Russian weapons and technology, it would make it more vulnerable to pressure from China . Now it plans to undertake military exercises with it in the near future. This is a slap in the face to the U.S.. As Vietnam expert Carlyle Thayer says ‘ How will the Vietnamese leader be able to look [US President Joe] Biden in the eye ” at the upcoming US-ASEAN summit.
In referring to Ukraine, US State Department spokesperson Ned Price recently said ” _ _there are principles that are at stake here that have universal applicability everywhere–that each and every country has a sovereign right to determine its own foreign policy, has a sovereign right to determine for itself with whom it will choose to associate in terms of its alliances, its partnerships, and what orientation it wishes to direct its gaze. ” These words have come back to haunt the U.S. Indeed, the tragedy of Ukraine has cast a long shadow on the US IPS and its effort to win over Asia.
An edited abridged version of this piece appeared in the South China Morning Post
eurasiareview.com · by Mark J. Valencia · May 12, 2022



V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
Company Name | Website
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