Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“All men make mistakes. But a good man yields when he knows his course is wrong. And he repairs the evil. The only crime is pride.”

– Sophocles

“Silence that covers you with honor is better than speech that earns you regret."

– Imam Ali

“Judge a man by his questions rather than his answers.”

– Voltaire

1. Exploring Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea

2. N Korea keeping Russia rich in missiles and shells

3. North Korea: the forgotten front in the global wars

4. Military set to resume drills halted under 2018 inter-Korean accord buffer zones

5. Hamas is using North Korean weapons in Gaza, South Korea confirms

6. S. Korea to strengthen border surveillance with AI technology

7. Kremlin has 'no comment' on U.S., Ukraine claims it fired North Korean missiles

8. S. Korea to hold forums on N.K. human rights in Washington, Geneva

9. Dog Meat Will Be Off the Menu in South Korea

10. N. Korea’s redefining of inter-Korean relationship causes concern inside the country

11. Soldier’s freezing death prompts military to build inns across country (north Korea)

12. Defense chief calls for stronger anti-drone measures against N. Korea

13. S Korea revamps National Security Office with economic focus

14. Kim Jong Un reopens political prison camp to house political enemies

15. Possible COVID-19 cases surge in North Korea near border with China

16. When will North Korea do something good for the world?

17. DNA Exclusive: Will Kim Jong-Un's Actions Trigger A Third World War?

18. A Tax by Any Other Name: Understanding North Korea’s “Non-tax Burden” System

19. ‘No more buffer zone based on 2018 military agreement,’ S. Korea says

1. Exploring Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea

Even though Frank and I sometimes have professional disagreements, he does important work and this will significantly add to the debate on Korea policy and strategy. But my bias is that as long as the Kim family regime remains in power there can be no peaceful coexistence (just as there will never be denuclearization or an end to the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity as long as the Kim family regime is in power.). As most know, I support a new strategy based on a human rights upfront approach, a sophisticated information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. I base my views on what I think are correct assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. This of course is how we disagree: we have fundamental differences in our assumptions.

But I look forward to reading all the essays in this project from USIP as I know I will learn something even if I disagree with the arguments.

-

@USIP

is launching an essay series in which experts explore peaceful coexistence with #NorthKorea, starting with my own examination of what this means and why this may be a more tangible, realistic way to reduce the risk of conflict and improve relations.

Exploring Peaceful Coexistence with North Korea

The United States and South Korea’s prioritization of denuclearization above all else needs to change to fit the new reality.

Monday, January 8, 2024 / BY: Frank Aum

usip.org

As a result, the two sides have not talked in over four years, have only engaged in official security discussions in one out of the last 11 years and do not appear to be prioritizing future diplomacy seriously. Similarly, their citizens are largely prohibited from visiting and interacting with each other.

More worrisome, the two sides are intensifying their military postures to perilous levels. North Korea has developed and tested an array of new nuclear weapon delivery systems, including hypersonic glide vehicles and solid-fuel long-range missiles, emphasized the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and enacted the automatic use of nuclear weapons in its nuclear doctrine. Likewise, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has accelerated the deployment of nuclear-armed submarines, B-52 bombers and other U.S. strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, increased the scope and scale of bilateral military exercises (and trilaterally with Japan), and sharpened provocative rhetoric about the end of the North Korean regime.

The United States has also led international efforts to isolate North Korea diplomatically while applying economic sanctions and financial measures to squeeze it out of the dollar-based global financial system. North Korea has coped, however, by bolstering ties with Russia and China, which all but removes further U.N. Security Council sanctions from the table, and engaging in cyber theft and other U.N.-proscribed activities to subsist economically and advance militarily.

The upshot is a dangerous, simmering situation on the Korean Peninsula that is one misstep away from boiling over into a catastrophic conflict. This status quo is untenable. Washington should explore a new modus vivendi with North Korea that reduces the risk of conflict, improves security and builds mutual trust and understanding in a tangible, proactive and realistic way.

The Golden Era of U.S.-North Korea Relations?

A hostile relationship between Washington and Pyongyang was not always the case. Even though they have never normalized diplomatic relations and continue to remain in a technical state of war, there was a period not too long ago when the United States and North Korea basically coexisted in relative peace. Between 1994 and 2008, the two countries engaged in meaningful, productive and sustained interactions across the diplomatic, military, economic and people-to-people dimensions, with mostly manageable levels of security tensions.

During this period, the two countries participated regularly in diplomatic dialogue to strengthen their respective security and reduce potential misperceptions. Their diplomats met often to implement the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, address North Korea’s incipient ballistic missile program and explore a permanent peace treaty. In 1998, when Washington suspected a North Korean underground site of being nuclear-related, it negotiated visits to the facility to confirm that the site could not house nuclear operations.

Diplomacy continued even with setbacks. When North Korea conducted its first intermediate-range missile test in August 1998, the United States arranged senior-level meetings with North Korea, including former Defense Secretary William Perry’s visit to Pyongyang in May 1999 and an exchange of visits by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Jo Myong Rok, vice chairman of North Korea’s National Defense Commission, in 2000, to hear Pyongyang’s perspective and seek an end to its missile program.

Productive engagement also occurred beyond the diplomatic sphere. Between 1996 and 2005, U.S. Department of Defense officials worked side-by-side with Korean People’s Army officers in North Korea to recover and repatriate the remains of 153 U.S. servicemembers from the Korean War. U.S. congressional delegations, including members and staffers, periodically visited the country to share perspectives with North Korean government officials. Starting in 1995, numerous U.S. nongovernmental organizations established operations in North Korea to provide aid and assistance on health, agricultural and other humanitarian issues. Approximately 800 to 1,000 U.S. citizens traveled to North Korea every year to go on tours, reunite with family members or conduct academic and scientific exchanges, with minimal negative incidents. Also, North Korean scientific, academic and cultural delegations made dozens of trips throughout the United States to study agriculture, energy, health, business and law, as well as conduct taekwondo demonstrations.

Most importantly, during much of this time, security tensions remained relatively low. Between 1994 and 2002, North Korea conducted zero nuclear tests, only one ballistic missile test and did not reprocess any plutonium for fissile material. The environment began to worsen in 2002 when the Bush administration characterized North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” and scrapped the Agreed Framework due to North Korea’s development of a uranium enrichment facility. This led Pyongyang to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the following year. After the United States froze North Korean assets in a Macau bank out of money laundering concerns in September 2005, North Korea boycotted the Six-Party Talks for a year and conducted its first nuclear test, signaling a shift in its strategic calculus and a tougher road ahead for disarmament efforts. Yet despite all this, the two sides still engaged through the Six-Party Talks process (2003 to 2008) to achieve important outcomes, including North Korea’s delivery of 18,000 pages of nuclear declarations and destruction of a nuclear plant cooling tower in 2008, and even a New York Philharmonic performance in Pyongyang.

In essence, for 15 years, the United States and North Korea coexisted in relative peace — to the benefit of the people in both countries and the rest of the international community.

Pursuing Peaceful Coexistence Today

The situation today is different. After five additional nuclear tests and hundreds of ballistic missile and other military tests over the past 15 years, North Korea is de facto, and certainly for alliance planning purposes, a nuclear weapon country. It solidified this nuclear status in its constitution, and the U.S. intelligence community assesses that North Korea will not abandon it. In response, the U.S. government, other than then-President Donald Trump’s anomalous year of engagement, has implemented a comprehensive, sustained, and relentless international pressure campaign against North Korea, with the hope of coercing it back to the negotiating table.

The dynamics of U.S.-North Korea engagement have also reached uncharted territory. From the early 1970s up until 2019, it was mostly Pyongyang soliciting dialogue with Washington, which had the leverage and standing to accept, ignore or apply preconditions. Since 1992, the United States has chosen to engage with North Korea, but always prioritizing denuclearization on the agenda. Today, the tables have turned. It is now Washington seeking talks, ostensibly without preconditions, and Pyongyang that is shunning them. North Korea likely detects implicit preconditions in the proposal for unconditional talks — that they start at the working-level and they address denuclearization. In response to the most recent U.S. offer, Kim Yo Jong, the North Korean leader’s sister, stated that “[t]he sovereignty of an independent state can never be an agenda item for negotiations, and therefore, [North Korea] will never sit face to face with the United States for that purpose.”

The U.S.-South Korea alliance’s approach of prioritizing denuclearization above all else needs to change to fit the new reality. While the denuclearization objective originally began as an effort to reduce the North Korean threat and uphold the nonproliferation regime, it now tends to engender the opposite effect. A rigid, narrow focus on denuclearization has foreclosed opportunities for engagement and accelerated North Korea’s drive to attain a nuclear deterrent, while the constant failures to achieve it in the near term have fueled South Korean debates about pursuing indigenous nuclear capabilities.

A more realistic and productive objective would be to proactively pursue mutual interests that tangibly improve military and economic security for both sides. These interests would include, among others, risk reduction, climate and energy cooperation, economic training and projects, academic and scientific collaboration, humanitarian initiatives, and people-to-people exchanges.

The primary focus of U.S. policy, within the reality of a nuclear North Korea, should be to strive for peaceful coexistence. This means largely normal bilateral relations that consist of low military hostility and regular engagement aimed at improving diplomatic ties, reducing security risks and tensions, enhancing economic trade and welfare, and facilitating exchanges and dialogue related to humanitarian, human rights and people-to-people matters. Throughout this process, deterrence should be maintained, but diplomacy should be maximized.

Peaceful coexistence would not require the U.S.-South Korea alliance to abandon the goals of denuclearization and unification entirely. But subsuming these intractable objectives within the broader, long-term drive for peaceful coexistence and risk reduction could provide a more productive, albeit less immediate, way to skin the cat. Even the desire for a peace treaty and official normalization, goals that might provide an imprimatur of amity but in practice are subject to political realities, legal requirements and potential reversals, should be subordinate to the actual exercise of coexisting peacefully.

Initiating this process would be extremely difficult given the history and current environment of animosity and mistrust. Strong political will and unconventional risk-taking would be necessary to transform old paradigms. True unconditional talks and even unilateral conciliatory gestures would be required to overcome diplomatic inertia and propel a cycle of reciprocation. These notions may be tough to stomach but maintaining the status quo of hostile existence could be worse. A scenario like the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and subsequent Israeli response in Gaza may be a little farfetched for the Korean Peninsula, but North Korea has demonstrated a willingness in the past, despite the presence of alliance deterrence measures and extended periods of apparent stability, to take violent action, either to generate a crisis for leverage or to push back against alliance coercion for reputational reasons. Small crises, in an environment that now includes South Korea’s preemptive strike plans and North Korea’s automatic use of nuclear weapons, have the potential to escalate inadvertently to the worst-case scenario—a nuclear conflict that inflicts unspeakable costs on both sides.

The concept of peaceful coexistence may raise suspicion for its potential inconsistencies and disingenuousness. For example, when Nikita Khrushchev argued in 1959 that the Soviet Union and the United States should coexist in peace despite their contrary systems to avoid nuclear war, George Kennan incisively responded that the Soviet Union was seeking this to maintain the status quo of the territorial gains it had already pocketed through force and violence. He also noted the contradictory nature of engaging economically with a foreign government that controls all trade and prevents interactions with the other side. And yet, throughout the Cold War, Kennan devoted himself to promoting “serious diplomacy” to reach “an honorable settlement that would reduce tension” between Moscow and Washington.

The United States may never succeed in achieving North Korea’s denuclearization in the foreseeable future. But the two sides must never fail in preventing a nuclear war. Washington’s strategies should reflect this distinction.

usip.org

2. N Korea keeping Russia rich in missiles and shells

Excerpts:

North Korea’s support for Russia’s war effort may stem from a belief that a Russian victory would lead to the repeal of US sanctions on its impoverished economy and thus reduce its current overreliance on China as its main economic and political lifeline.

The Ukraine war has also brought Russia and Iran in closer alignment, with Moscow seeking Tehran’s political and military support to sustain its war effort and Iran viewing the conflict as an opportunity to win military, economic and political support from a nuclear technology leader and energy superpower.

Russia initially supported Western sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program with the view that having yet another nuclear-armed state in Asia would unfavorably impact the regional balance of power.

However, Iran may have found an opportunity in the Ukraine war to make itself indispensable to Russia’s war effort, increasing its bargaining power over the latter to assist in its nuclear program, modernize its obsolete conventional military and secure Russian commitment to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), seen by some as a sanctions evasion route for Iran and now also Russia.

N Korea keeping Russia rich in missiles and shells

Russia now using North Korean missiles to bombard Ukraine while reportedly also reaching to Iran to help fill a weapons gap

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 8, 2024

Russia has used North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine while also seeking Iranian missiles, highlighting the deepening military cooperation among the sanctioned nations amid the ongoing Ukraine war.

This month, multiple media sources reported that Russia has used North Korean ballistic missiles to bombard Ukraine, aiming to degrade the latter’s critical infrastructure and morale amidst what appears to be an increasing stalemate on the battlefront.

Declassified US intelligence reports mention that Russia used North Korean short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) on December 30 and January 2, and is planning to use those missiles in the coming weeks to hit Ukrainian targets as far as 885 kilometers away.

The North Korean missiles, most likely the KN-23 and KN-24 SRBMs, are analogous to the Russian Iskander-M and US MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The KN-23 is estimated to carry a 500-kilogram warhead 450 kilometers or 690 kilometers with a reduced payload and can perform evasive maneuvers to avoid interception.

Its similarity to Iskander-M has led to speculation that it was designed with foreign assistance. The KN-24 is believed to carry a 400 to 500-kilogram warhead up to 410 kilometers and, as with the KN-23, maneuver in flight to defeat missile defenses.

The Iskander M missile as presented at the 4th international military-technical forum in August 2018 in Kubinka. Photo: Sputnik / Ramil Sitdikov

Russia is also reportedly seeking to source SRBMs from Iran, which has previously supplied Russia with Shahed loitering munitions and ammunition for its war on Ukraine. However, it is unclear if Iran has delivered the weapons.

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Iran could potentially supply Ababil and Fateh SRBMs. The Ababil is a close-range ballistic missile (CRBM) with an 86-kilometer range, a 45-kilogram warhead and an optical seeker guidance system. The larger Fateh is an SRBM with a 200 to 300-kilometer range, a 450 to 600-kilogram warhead, and a GPS or INS guidance system.

Autocratic Russia, Iran and North Korea have common cause in their disdain for the Western-dominated international order and as heavily sanctioned economies.

While Russia has burned through its prewar missile stockpiles, it has ramped up production to sustain its aerial bombardment campaign against Ukraine. At the same time, the US and its allies have sought to hobble Russia’s missile production through severe sanctions, which appear to have only partially hit their prohibitive mark.

In September 2023, The New York Times reported that Russia has overcome Western sanctions and export controls to expand its missile production above prewar levels. The New York Times mentions that while Western sanctions forced Russia to dramatically slow missile production for six months from February 2022, the time of the initial invasion, Russia’s defense industry began to regain speed by that year’s end.

Russia’s arms producers are surprisingly dependent on Western-made components, An August 2022 study by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) said that 450 foreign-made components were found in 27 of Russia’s most modern military equipment and weapons including cruise missiles, electronic warfare complexes and communications gear.

The majority of the parts were manufactured by US companies involved in supplying sophisticated electronics for the US military. The report said 80 different components that ended up in Russia were subject to US export controls.

The same New York Times report said that while Russia has used its intelligence services to run covert networks to smuggle processors and circuit boards for missiles, it still faces a shortage of explosives and propellants.

While those electronics can easily be hidden in backpacks, energetics are much harder to smuggle over borders. As such, Russia has reached to North Korea and Iran to fill its missile energetics production gap.

The Ukraine war has brought North Korea and Russia together in a quid pro quo partnership, with Pyongyang providing weapons and Moscow much-needed economic relief and missile technology.

North Korea’s military is equipped with Soviet or Russian-standard weaponry. Despite international isolation and the impact of severe sanctions, Pyongyang still maintains a robust arms industry and missile program.

Both sides in the Ukraine war are suffering from severe artillery shell shortages, with Ukraine’s Western allies struggling to scale up production of 155-millimeter artillery rounds.

In November 2023, the Associated Press reported that North Korea is believed to have sent one million artillery rounds to Russia, with Pyongyang running its factories at full production and sending instructors to Russia to teach Moscow’s military personnel how to use the weapons.

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Russia has reportedly used North Korean missiles in Ukraine. Photo: iStock

North Korea’s support for Russia’s war effort may stem from a belief that a Russian victory would lead to the repeal of US sanctions on its impoverished economy and thus reduce its current overreliance on China as its main economic and political lifeline.

The Ukraine war has also brought Russia and Iran in closer alignment, with Moscow seeking Tehran’s political and military support to sustain its war effort and Iran viewing the conflict as an opportunity to win military, economic and political support from a nuclear technology leader and energy superpower.

Russia initially supported Western sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program with the view that having yet another nuclear-armed state in Asia would unfavorably impact the regional balance of power.

However, Iran may have found an opportunity in the Ukraine war to make itself indispensable to Russia’s war effort, increasing its bargaining power over the latter to assist in its nuclear program, modernize its obsolete conventional military and secure Russian commitment to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), seen by some as a sanctions evasion route for Iran and now also Russia.

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · January 8, 2024

3. North Korea: the forgotten front in the global wars

Excerpts:

“Despite harsh rhetoric such as ‘pacifying South Korea’s territory,’ it is unlikely that Kim Jong Un will push the nuclear crisis to the extreme from the beginning of the year,” Kim of Seoul National University told Japanese media outlet Toyo Keizai.

“This is because they believe they have an advantage due to the competition for hegemony between the US and China and the war between Russia and Ukraine.

It is also expected that the economy will improve due to arms exports to Russia and the resumption of trade between North Korea and China. Therefore, it is likely that they will try to avoid actions that will significantly change the situation for the time being.”

The upcoming US election may also factor in Pyongyang’s calculations. “If candidate Donald Trump is re-elected, there is a high possibility that a summit between the United States and North Korea will be held,” says Professor Kim, “so it may be a good idea to wait for that time.”

But Kim also warns that if the North Korean economy does not revive due to help from China and Russia, the regime could act more aggressively.

The most optimistic view is that, for the moment, “Pyongyang is unlikely to initiate a strategic conflagration,” as former intelligence analyst Klingner put it. “In short, get your helmets on, but no need to get under the desk just yet.”

North Korea: the forgotten front in the global wars

Kim is beating war drums but Pyongyang’s dictator has incentive to bide his time rather than spark a new conflict

asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · January 9, 2024

Global attention is understandably riveted by the two deadly wars being waged in Ukraine and the Middle East. But an exchange of artillery fire on January 5 in drills held by North and South Korea near a disputed border area served to remind the world that there is a forgotten front in the global wars.

The North Korean regime launched some 200 artillery shells into the waters off its western coast near two South Korean-held islands on the maritime border of the Northern Limit Line, or NLL.

The South Korean military announced plans to conduct its own “naval fire” drills. It is precisely that location that the two Koreans last had a deadly exchange of fire in 2010 and came perilously close to wider conflict.

The artillery exchange marked the end to a tenuous 2018 agreement to withdraw armed forces from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), where hundreds of thousands of heavily armed troops, including US forces, face off.

The General Staff of the North Korean People’s Army claimed they were only acting in response to the actions of the South Korean “military gangsters” and warned that “if the enemies commit an act which may be regarded as a provocation under the pretext of so-called counteraction, the KPA will show tough counteraction on an unprecedented level.”

All this comes within a week of a gathering of the North Korean communist party where leader Kim Jong Un declared in unprecedented fashion that they were abandoning the goal of reunification and now would treat the South as an enemy state under the control of the United States.

In his speech to the meeting, Kim called on the People’s Army to be prepared to carry out a “great event” in the South where they would “subjugate the entire territory of South Korea by mobilizing all physical means and forces, including nuclear forces.”

Analysts closely monitoring the Korean situation are increasingly concerned about the danger of escalating tensions, not only because North Korea has declared hostility but also the tough-minded attitude of the conservative government of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol.

“2024 is shaping up to be a year for provocations, heightened tensions and greater potential for tactical clashes along the DMZ and NLL,” Bruce Klingner, former CIA analyst and senior research fellow at the Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation, told this writer.

“The potential for stumbling into conflict is rising. Both Koreas are leaning further forward on bold military moves close to the DMZ and President Yoon has shown a greater willingness to respond more firmly than his predecessor.”

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has taken a harder line with North Korea Image: CNN / Screengrab

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The collapse of the Comprehensive Military Agreement reached in 2018 means that armed troops from both sides will now be in effectively closer contact.

The danger of exchanges of the kind that took place along the NLL is that “both sides will likely strive to avoid appearing weak,” says Andrei Lankov, a respected Russian-trained expert long resident in South Korea.

“Neither party is inclined to yield first, which could potentially lead to escalation. It’s quite conceivable that the North Koreans might decide to teach the Yoon administration a lesson, punishing it for its hyper-hawkish policy line.”

In an eerie replay of the Korean War, the rise in tensions comes as the Korean peninsula is again a zone of confrontation between Russia and China, backing the North, and the United States, standing alongside the South.

After a summit meeting last September between Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his North Korean counterpart, the two countries have tightened their military and economic ties.

The North Korean regime has unloaded large amounts of its stored artillery ammunition onto trains heading to the frontlines of the Ukraine war. In recent days, according to US officials, the Russians have fired North Korean-supplied ballistic missiles at Ukraine.

The North Koreans have stepped up the pace of their missile testing, including the recent launch of a spy satellite mounted on a long-range missile, along with further tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).

Nuclear facilities that can ramp up production of fissile material for warheads have recently been activated and there are indications of preparations for a new nuclear test, possibly of a thermonuclear warhead.

South Korean intelligence officials believe the Russians are actively assisting the perfection of their missile systems and may also supply advanced aircraft and other weapons.

“The regime’s latest rhetorical barrage signals the door for inter-Korean dialogue remains firmly closed as it continues to bulk up its nuclear and missile arsenals,” says Klingner.

The regime has also made it clear that it has no interest in pursuing talks or diplomacy of any kind with the Biden administration, understanding perhaps correctly that the Americans have no interest in such contacts either.

Moscow undoubtedly would not be unhappy if the US was faced with yet another front in the global contest for power, though it is not clear that this new axis has emboldened Kim to act to seek strategic confrontation.

Nor is it evident how China, which remains the main supplier of economic aid and trade to North Korea while it faces severe economic conditions at home, would respond.

China may not be happy with the current honeymoon between Russia and North Korea, argues Professor Kim Byung-yeon, a prominent North Korea expert and head of the Institute of Future Strategy at Seoul National University.

“A North Korea backed by Russia and with advanced nuclear weapons on its hands may no longer kowtow to Beijing,” Kim wrote recently. “China could attempt to tame North Korea by cutting back on its economic assistance to the country.”

Provocation may not serve the purposes of China’s Xi Jinping, especially at a moment when he is trying to ease tensions with Washington and also improve ties with Seoul and Tokyo.

However, cautions Lankov, a long-time observer of North Korean relations with its powerful neighbors and allies, “we can imagine scenarios where China might try to send a signal to the Americans about its ability to create additional troubles – especially if preparations for a Taiwan invasion accelerate.”

Even so, Lankov believes that “North Korea has some reasons to confront South Korea – and also some reasons to remain quiet – but none of those reasons are significantly influenced by the situation in the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang triangle.”

The North Korean leadership may see a confrontation with Yoon and the conservatives as a useful way to influence the upcoming elections for the South Korean National Assembly, feeding fear of war and thus aiding the progressive opposition.

But the end-of-year policy shift made it clear that Kim also has little use for the progressives. In a statement issued on January 5, Kim Yo Jong, the flamboyant sister of the dictator, dismissed the previous liberal leader Moon Jae-in as “a wicked man with honey in his mouth and a sword in his heart.”

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Still, most Korean analysts tend to believe that the Kim regime is not yet prepared to risk the potential benefits of the resurgence of trade with China and the new ties with Russia to push a confrontation past a certain point.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in a strategic embrace. Photo: KCNA

“Despite harsh rhetoric such as ‘pacifying South Korea’s territory,’ it is unlikely that Kim Jong Un will push the nuclear crisis to the extreme from the beginning of the year,” Kim of Seoul National University told Japanese media outlet Toyo Keizai.

“This is because they believe they have an advantage due to the competition for hegemony between the US and China and the war between Russia and Ukraine.

It is also expected that the economy will improve due to arms exports to Russia and the resumption of trade between North Korea and China. Therefore, it is likely that they will try to avoid actions that will significantly change the situation for the time being.”

The upcoming US election may also factor in Pyongyang’s calculations. “If candidate Donald Trump is re-elected, there is a high possibility that a summit between the United States and North Korea will be held,” says Professor Kim, “so it may be a good idea to wait for that time.”

But Kim also warns that if the North Korean economy does not revive due to help from China and Russia, the regime could act more aggressively.

The most optimistic view is that, for the moment, “Pyongyang is unlikely to initiate a strategic conflagration,” as former intelligence analyst Klingner put it. “In short, get your helmets on, but no need to get under the desk just yet.”

Daniel Sneider is a lecturer on international policy and East Asian studies at Stanford University and a non-resident distinguished fellow of the Korea Economic Institute. Follow him on Twitter at @DCSneider

This article was originally published by The Oriental Economist. It is republished with permission.

asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · January 9, 2024

4. Military set to resume drills halted under 2018 inter-Korean accord buffer zones

Military set to resume drills halted under 2018 inter-Korean accord buffer zones | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 9, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's military is expected to resume exercises in buffer zones set under a 2018 inter-Korean military accord as they have become effectively invalid after North Korea's recent artillery firing, officials said Tuesday.

On Monday, the South's military said it will resume artillery firings and drills near the sea and land border, noting Pyongyang's recent shellings nullified the zones where live-fire and large-scale drills are banned.

Tension has escalated after North Korea fired hundreds of artillery shells from its west coast into the maritime buffer zone near the Northern Limit Line, the de-facto maritime border in the Yellow Sea, between Friday and Sunday.

Defense ministry spokesperson Jeon Ha-kyou told a briefing Tuesday that the nullification will pave the way for South Korean troops to maintain better readiness, noting the agreement had restricted drills near the border.

"These issues are expected to be resolved, and I believe that there will be better conditions for exercises by units," he said.

Jeon, however, noted the ministry would have to hold talks with other government branches on whether to completely scrap the 2018 agreement.

In light of the nullification, the Army plans to resume exercises halted under the 2018 accord, such as live-fire artillery drills and regiment-level field maneuvers within five kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.

The Navy is also set to conduct live-fire and maneuver drills that had been halted in the maritime buffer zone created by the 2018 agreement.

The Marine Corps will also resume regular live-fire artillery exercises with K9 self-propelled howitzers on the northwestern border islands of Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong.

Marines on the two islands staged such drills Friday for the first time since August 2017 in response to the North's artillery firing earlier that day.

Last November, North Korea vowed to restore all military measures halted under the 2018 pact after South Korea partially suspended the deal and resumed surveillance near the border in protest of the North's first spy satellite launch earlier that month.

Marines on the northwestern border island of Baengnyeong stage a live-fire exercise on Jan. 5, 2024, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 9, 2024

5. Hamas is using North Korean weapons in Gaza, South Korea confirms

Hamas is using North Korean weapons in Gaza, South Korea confirms

https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-781219#google_vignette

Jerusalem Post

South Korea's spy agency said Monday that Hamas is using weapons made in North Korea to fight Israel in Gaza, according to a report in the South Korean outlet Yonhap.

It has been suspected in the past that Hamas used North Korean weapons since the war broke out three months ago, with North Korea’s first public denial of the allegations coming less than a week after the October 7 attack on Israel. The totalitarian state denies any involvement in attacks on Israelis.

The South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed a report on Voice of America, the US’s state-owned international broadcaster, in which a photo of an F-7 grenade launcher allegedly used by Hamas bore Korean writing on it. The NIS said its “assessment is the same as the VOA report.”

NIS said it is “collecting and accumulating” further evidence of North Korea’s supply of arms to Hamas, but that “it is currently difficult to provide such evidence due to the need to protect information sources and in consideration of diplomatic ties,” according to Yonhap. NIS had previously reported to the South Korean parliament that Kim Jong-Un, the North Korean dictator, had ordered officials to strategize assisting the Palestinian cause.

The confirmation by South Korea comes just days after it was revealed that North Korea is also supplying weapons to Russia that have recently been used in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

FILE PHOTO - Military vehicles carrying DF-21D ballistic missiles roll to Tiananmen Square during a military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2015 (credit: DAMIR SAGOLJ/ REUTERS)Confirmation comes after IDF reveals Chinese weapons in Gaza

The report of North Korean arms supplies to Gaza comes just days after the IDF revealed stockpiles of sophisticated Chinese-made weaponry, including assault rifles, grenade launchers, M16 cartridges, and communications equipment that Israeli soldiers have discovered in Gaza throughout the war thus far. China and North Korea have a mutual defense pact, the only one either has with any country in the world.

“This is top-grade weaponry and communications technology, stuff that Hamas didn’t have before,” an Israeli intelligence source told the British newspaper The Telegraph at the time, “with very sophisticated explosives which have never been found before and especially on such a large scale.”

Although the arms were made in China, it is not known whether the Chinese government was involved in the transfer or sale of the weapons. A third-party state actor to whom China sold the weapons, such as Iran, may have passed them on to Hamas, or an illegal weapons dealer may have sold them to the group directly.

In the last two decades, Israel-China relations have improved, and the country is deeply involved in the ongoing construction of Tel Aviv’s metro system. The war with Hamas has complicated relations, however, beginning as early as October 8, when Beijing released a statement calling for a ceasefire and two-state solution, without any condemnation of Hamas’s attack the day before. The Chinese Communist Party has also encouraged a rise in anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric, which has exploded online since the outbreak of the war.

Hamas killed four Chinese nationals on October 7 and kidnapped Chinese-Israeli Noa Argamani, whom the terrorist group continues to hold captive in Gaza. Her mother and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have asked the Chinese government and its leader, Xi Jinping, to intervene for her release.

6. S. Korea to strengthen border surveillance with AI technology

All well and good to augment capabilities. But there is no substitute for boots on the ground. And we should include American boots on the ground in the DMZ as I have recommended:

Return U.S. Troops to the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

Until 1991, U.S. Army infantrymen conducted combat patrolling in an American sector surrounding the Joint Security Area. In 2024, the U.S. military should return to combat patrolling, but this time, it should support ROK forces throughout the entire DMZ. This will reduce stress on ROK forces, increase interoperability between ROK and U.S. forces, demonstrate commitment to the defense of the ROK, and improve morale by conducting missions that bring them eye to eye with the enemy. Rotating infantry battalions will conduct pre-mission training in the United States, spend three months preparing to conduct combat patrols on the DMZ, complete a three-month rotation with ROK forces, then three months of large-scale unit training, and then rotate back to the Homeland.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/revitalizing-americas-north-korea-policy-207642?page=0%2C1

S. Korea to strengthen border surveillance with AI technology | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 9, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea plans to introduce artificial intelligence (AI)-powered surveillance technology in some front-line outposts to replace outdated systems and better detect threats along the border with North Korea, the state arms agency said Tuesday.

The new system with enhanced monitoring capabilities will be introduced in eastern front-line general outposts (GOPs) and coastline units by the end of this year, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA).

GOPs are military outposts located along the southern edge of the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.

The system employs AI analysis technology to detect humans and animals, and is equipped with thermal vision and short-wave infrared technology to enhance monitoring capabilities in harsh weather, according to the agency.

DAPA said it expects the system to enhance service conditions of front-line troops by minimizing false alarms.

The agency launched the project in 2022 and signed a contract with security company S-1 for the system in November last year.

"(We) will expedite the deployment of the AI scientific guard system and actively utilize it in guard operations to optimize the readiness posture," Gen. Son-sik, head of the Army Ground Operations Command, said, according to DAPA.

This file photo, provided by the defense ministry on Dec. 12, 2023, shows troops under a general outpost unit of the Army's 21st Infantry Division in Yanggu County, 113 kilometers northeast of Seoul, checking wire fences on the eastern front line. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · January 9, 2024

7. Kremlin has 'no comment' on U.S., Ukraine claims it fired North Korean missiles

Russia falls back on the time worn strategy: Admit nothing. Deny everything. Make counter accusations.

Excerpts:

Asked about the U.S. and Ukrainian accusations during a call with reporters, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said: "No comment."

Peskov added that Ukraine had repeatedly struck civilian targets inside Russia using missiles produced by "Germany, France, Italy, the United States, and other countries".

Kremlin has 'no comment' on U.S., Ukraine claims it fired North Korean missiles

Reuters

January 9, 20244:52 AM ESTUpdated 2 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-has-no-comment-us-ukraine-claims-it-fired-north-korean-missiles-2024-01-09/?utm

A firefighter extinguishes remains of an unidentified missile, which Ukrainian authorities claimed to be made in North Korea, at a site of a Russian strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kharkiv, Ukraine January 2, 2024. REUTERS/Sofiia Gatilova/ File Photo Acquire Licensing Rights

MOSCOW, Jan 9 (Reuters) - The Kremlin declined on Tuesday to comment on U.S. and Ukrainian assertions that Moscow had fired North Korean missiles at Ukrainian targets, but it also accused Kyiv of using missiles produced by Western nations to strike targets in Russia.

Last week the White House said Russia had used short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) sourced from North Korea to conduct multiple strikes against Ukraine, citing newly declassified intelligence. A senior Ukrainian official later corroborated the assertion.

Both Moscow and Pyongyang have drawn closer since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, though they deny making any arms deals. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met President Vladimir Putin in Russia's Far East region last September and senior Russian officials have made several visits to Pyongyang.

Asked about the U.S. and Ukrainian accusations during a call with reporters, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said: "No comment."

Peskov added that Ukraine had repeatedly struck civilian targets inside Russia using missiles produced by "Germany, France, Italy, the United States, and other countries".

Ukraine struck the Russian border city of Belgorod on Dec. 30, killing more than 20 people including two children and injuring 111, Russian media reported.

The Belgorod region, which adjoins northern Ukraine, has like other Russian border zones suffered shelling and drone attacks all year that authorities have blamed on Ukraine, although none had previously been on such a scale.

Moscow, which sent tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, with the stated aim of "demilitarising" and "denazifying" the country, has said Western nations including the United States bear responsibility for the consequences of supplying weapons to Kyiv.

Writing by Felix Light; Editing by Guy Faulconbridge and Gareth Jones

8. S. Korea to hold forums on N.K. human rights in Washington, Geneva

We need a ROK/US alliance and an international community human rights upfront approach. The ROK is taking the lead.

S. Korea to hold forums on N.K. human rights in Washington, Geneva | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 9, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs said Tuesday it plans to organize forums in the United States and Switzerland this year as part of efforts to highlight dire human rights situations in North Korea.

The forums will each take place in Washington in June and in Geneva in November, according to the ministry.

The ministry, which had organized the forum on an annual basis in 2022 and 2023, said it will hold the event twice this year, given the importance of solidarity and cooperation with the international community to resolve the issue.

North Korea has long been accused of grave human rights abuses, ranging from holding political prisoners in concentration camps to committing torture and carrying out public executions.

In the forum held in Seoul last month, Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho called for concerted international efforts to address the issue, saying human rights violations are the "status quo" in the North.

Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho speaks during the 2023 International Dialogue on North Korean Human Rights on Dec. 18, 2023, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 9, 2024

9. Dog Meat Will Be Off the Menu in South Korea

Dog Meat Will Be Off the Menu in South Korea

A national ban will take effect in 2027 despite industry protests

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/dog-meat-will-be-off-the-menu-in-south-korea-3ec5b05f?mod=hp_listb_pos2

By Timothy W. Martin

Updated Jan. 9, 2024 5:42 am ET

N. Korea’s redefining of inter-Korean relationship causes concern inside the country

"I didn't have high hopes for reunification, but I thought it would happen someday. This meeting has convinced me that it won't happen. I feel confused and disappointed," a source told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - 2024.01.08 3:00pm

dailynk.com

N. Korea’s redefining of inter-Korean relationship causes concern inside the country | Daily NK English

A photo published in state-run media showing a scene from the party meeting, which was held from Dec. 26 to Dec. 30, 2023. (Rodong Sinmun - News1)

At a year-end party meeting, North Korea’s leadership declared a shift in the relationship between the two Koreas as one between two enemy states. Some North Koreans Daily NK spoke to said the declaration extinguished the small hope for unification they once had.

Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Jan. 8: “We don’t know when reunification will happen, but in my heart, I was hoping that it would happen quickly so that we could live well like other countries. Now, however, it seems that reunification has become a completely impossible task, which is depressing.”

Another source in the country told Daily NK: “I didn’t have high hopes for reunification, but I thought it would happen someday. This meeting has convinced me that it won’t happen. I feel confused and disappointed.”

At the party meeting, Kim Jong Un stated: “It is unbecoming of our national character and status to discuss the issue of reunification with strange groups that are nothing more than colonial pawns of the United States just because of the rhetorical expression that we are kin.

“We must speed up preparations for a major change to pacify the entire territory of South Chosun by mobilizing all physical means and capabilities, including nuclear weapons in case of emergency,” Kim ordered, referring to South Korea.

Kim’s statement was a blatant reminder that North Korea will continue to provoke the South while focusing on developing its military capabilities, including nuclear missiles.

No more hope for unification?

North Koreans have been urged by their government to chant for decades “Our wish is reunification,” but many people in the country feel that it is “ridiculous” Kim claimed that unification cannot be achieved anymore.

During the year-end party meeting, North Korea’s leadership emphasized that unification was impossible, leading to discouragement among some people who had hoped that reunification would lead to a better life.

In fact, many North Koreans believe that rather than pouring resources into strengthening the country’s defense capabilities, the government should focus on stabilizing market prices so that people can make a living.

“The state says it has produced more grain than planned, but state-run food shops are closed for more than two weeks per month because there is no supply of grain,” one of the sources said. “Food prices have also started to rise since last month.”

He added: “The same is true for seafood and coal. We can only enjoy them once a year during the holidays, and the price of coal has exceeded KPW 300,000 per ton.”

However, at the year-end party meeting, North Korean officials claimed that “remarkable achievements in the overall people’s economy were outlined,” with the economy occupying all the “12 high points of People’s Economic Development,” including “a 103% increase in grain, a 100% increase in electricity, coal, and nitrogenous fertilizer, and a 105% increase in seafood products.”

While the party session touted the achievements of various economic sectors, there has been no real economic improvement for the people, one of the sources claimed.

“People don’t expect the state to do anything for them,” she said. “They just want to be able to move around freely to improve their lives and for circumstances to improve so they can do business and make a living.”

Translated by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources who live in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information-gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Seulkee Jang

Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynk@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

11. Soldier’s freezing death prompts military to build inns across country (north Korea)

What about barracks, BOQs, and BEQs and mess halls for all soldiers? I guess he did not have access to the nKPA Defense Travel System (DTS) or did not reserve a room at a hotel in advance. Or maybe his travel credit card was suspended or lost. (note attempt at sarcasm).

Excerpts:

The soldier was traveling for work, delivering secret documents from one part of the country to another. When he arrived in Hamju county in the eastern province of South Hamgyong, he was not able to afford a room, so he stayed out in the open air and froze to death, a resident of the northern province of Ryanggang told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“Currently, there is one military inn in each province, but it is not available to regular soldiers,” the resident said. “Only high-ranking commanders or the regiment commander and above can use it. Soldiers on remote missions have to spend their own money to secure lodging and meals, so those without money have no choice but to survive by stealing or robbing.”

Soldier’s freezing death prompts military to build inns across country

The orders come from Kim Jong Un himself.

By Moon Sung Hui for RFA Korean

2024.01.08

rfa.org

After a soldier froze to death in November due to a lack of lodging, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un personally ordered the construction of inns and restaurants specifically for military use, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.

The soldier was traveling for work, delivering secret documents from one part of the country to another. When he arrived in Hamju county in the eastern province of South Hamgyong, he was not able to afford a room, so he stayed out in the open air and froze to death, a resident of the northern province of Ryanggang told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“Currently, there is one military inn in each province, but it is not available to regular soldiers,” the resident said. “Only high-ranking commanders or the regiment commander and above can use it. Soldiers on remote missions have to spend their own money to secure lodging and meals, so those without money have no choice but to survive by stealing or robbing.”

The incident is reminiscent of one in 2016, when four soldiers got lost during winter training and froze to death, even though there were residents nearby that could have helped them. The soldier who died in November was in a populated town.

Though in South Korea one can travel across the country in a matter of hours via high-speed rail, in the North, travel to rural parts of the country can take days due to aging technology and infrastructure and restrictions on movements of people. Some stations only see one train every few days.

A traveler making a transfer to a different line might need to wait a few days for the train to come, so finding food and lodging is important.

Soldiers who have to pay their own way often cannot afford either, and must endure without until they arrive at their destination.

Before and after

Things were different before the “Arduous March,” what North Koreans call the 1994-1998 famine and economic collapse that resulted after aid from the Soviet Union stopped.

“Before the Arduous March, there were separate travel certificates and meal tickets for soldiers, so soldiers could show these at inns or restaurants,” he said. “However, after the Arduous March, these travel certificates and meal tickets for soldiers have become useless,” he said.

The reason the certificates are not honored is because businesses stopped being held aloft by the government as they were before the economic collapse, he said. Now they had to be in business for themselves, and that meant charging prices far higher than the prices the government set.

The resident said that in some towns, people with extra rooms in their homes might rent them out to travelers, but at a steep 10,000 won (US$1) per day, soldiers cannot afford this.

Children stand beside a railway track in the industrial city of Chongjin on North Korea's northeast coast, Nov. 21, 2017. Train travel to rural parts of the country can take days due to aging technology and infrastructure. (Ed Jones/AFP)

Though there is clearly a need for places for soldiers on remote missions to sleep, the order to create more military inns and restaurants may have other reasons, he said.

“The intention is to fundamentally block contact between residents and soldiers,” said the resident. “The goal is to prevent the leak of military secrets by blocking contact between citizens and soldiers and also to prevent crimes such as theft of military supplies.”

He explained that North Korean marketplaces routinely sell supplies of food, clothing, gasoline, electrical appliances and auto parts that came from the military.

“More than half of the goods sold at the market, including food, clothing, gasoline and diesel oil, electrical appliances, and automobile parts, are military supplies stolen by soldiers,” he said.

Order from the top

Another Ryanggang resident explained that the orders to build military inns came from Kim Jong Un himself, and that every city and county across the country should have at least one. The goal would be to construct a military inn in about 200 cities and counties throughout North Korea, he said.

Members of the military are to serve as construction workers and the work is to be directed by the city and county party committees.

“The Central Military Commission of the Central Committee instructed the construction of military restaurants and inns to be completed within this year,” he said.

He said this would be difficult because it would require coordination between “front-line” and “rear” troops, who operate in different areas. The former are more in number, but concentrated in smaller areas, whereas the rear troops are fewer in number but spread out more.

“The frontline corps, which is responsible for attacking in case of emergency, has more than 100,000 active-duty military soldiers,” he said. “But the rear corps, which is organized around civilian forces, has less than 20,000 active-duty military soldiers.”

Translated by Claire Shinyoung Oh Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

12. Defense chief calls for stronger anti-drone measures against N. Korea

Defense chief calls for stronger anti-drone measures against N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 8, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense chief called Monday for the military to beef up its defense posture and combat capability against rising threats posed by North Korean drones.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik visited the Drone Operations Command in Pocheon, 52 kilometers northeast of Seoul, to inspect small stealth drones and unmanned attack aerial vehicles, which are soon to be deployed by the military.

"North Korea keeps raising the level of asymmetric threats by bolstering its drone capability and advancing nuclear and missile program," Shin was quoted as saying.

Defense Minister Shin Won-sik (C) checks a drone at the Drone Operations Command in Pocheon, 52 kilometers northeast of Seoul, on Jan. 8, 2024, in this photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The command was established in September to bolster counter-drone measures after North Korea's drone incursions into South Korean air space in late 2022, which stoked concerns over the South's counter-drone competence.

Pyongyang unveiled its surveillance and attack drones during an arms exhibition and a military parade in July and vowed to build new drones during a key year-end meeting of the ruling Workers' Party.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 8, 2024

13. S Korea revamps National Security Office with economic focus

S Korea revamps National Security Office with economic focus

It will take on a new role to develop supply chain initiatives with like-minded nations, says source.

By Lee Jong-Ho for RFA

2024.01.08

Seoul, South Korea

rfa.org

South Korea has reorganized its National Security Office to prioritize “economic security,” reflecting a growing global trend where countries are combining their economic and political tactics to optimize their diplomatic interests.

Established in 2013, the office serves as a control tower to oversee the national security affairs of South Korea and frequently holds emergency meetings when North Korea shows hostile or provocative movements towards the South. Its director often serves as the counterpart of the National Security Advisor of the United States.

South Korea’s President Yook Suk Yeol convened a cabinet meeting Tuesday and passed a bill to revise the organizational structure of the nation’s security office, according to a statement released by the Presidential Office.

The restructuring includes the addition of a third deputy role in the office, dedicated solely to what Yoon referred to as “economic security” – terminology that the Yoon administration often uses in recognition of current international economic dynamics being an integral part of national security.

The new deputy will oversee the “emerging security areas,” including economic security, science and technology, the statement added, noting that the role will further expand the office’s responsibility encompassing issues related to Seoul’s supply chain management, export controls, and technology cooperation.

The new position is expected to be responsible for establishing new supply chain initiatives among democratic nations while also solidifying Seoul’s technological security, a South Korean senior government official, requesting anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, told Radio Free Asia.

The administration acknowledged that the boundary between economy and security has increasingly blurred in current international politics, the official added, noting that it has long been contemplating how to effectively address the evolving dynamics of such political developments.

South Korea has recently been actively involved in talks with other democratic nations including the U.S., United Kingdom, Netherlands, Indonesia, India and Japan, a move designed to diversify key resource supply chains to reduce dependence on specific countries.

In fact, there has been growing fear in Seoul over the possibility of China using its dominant control of essential resources, such as rare earth materials, as a means of strategic influence in international politics. This concern is particularly relevant given the potential impact on crucial South Korean industries like semiconductors and electric vehicles, which could lead to significant economic disruption.

Such concerns are not unfounded, as South Korea faced indirect economic repercussions from Beijing in 2017, following its decision to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system on its soil. Beijing said the deployment of the system was a direct threat to its national security, claiming its radar could monitor Chinese military activities on the mainland.

As a result, China implemented informal retaliatory measures, including a de facto ban on Chinese tourists visiting South Korea and informal sanctions targeting South Korean businesses, particularly in the entertainment and retail sectors.

This has increased South Korea’s resolve to participate actively in U.S. President Joe Biden’s initiative to establish an alternative supply chain that requires less of China.

Recently, Seoul has become more outspoken on issues sensitive to China, including those concerning the South China Sea and Taiwan, ahead of the self-ruled island’s presidential election on Saturday.

For instance, South Korea – along with the U.S. and Japan – convened its first trilateral Indo-Pacific dialogue in Washington last week, and released a joint statement defending freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. The three also “opposed any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion anywhere in the waters of the Indo-Pacific,” the statement said.

In addition, the statement underscored the trilateral alignment on the Taiwan issue, saying that the three “reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community.”

On Monday, China’s foreign ministry criticized the joint statement, labeling it interference in Beijing’s internal affairs.

Yoon in April also made comments about Taiwan in an interview with Reuters, saying that the situation in the Taiwan Strait was a “global issue.”

Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.

rfa.org

14. Kim Jong Un reopens political prison camp to house political enemies

The Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

Kim is concerned with internal instability and threats from within. This bears watching.

We need to be preparing for the full range of contingencies from war to regime collapse because unfortunately the conditions that could lead to regime collapse could lead to Kim making the decision to go to war.

Kim Jong Un reopens political prison camp to house political enemies

Camp 18 in South Pyongan Province, which had previously been downsized, has expanded significantly, surpassing its size before Kim came to power

By Mun Dong Hui - 2024.01.09 5:00pm

dailynk.com

Kim Jong Un reopens political prison camp to house political enemies | Daily NK English

The general location of a political prisoner camp in Sungho-ri. (Google Earth)

A political prison camp originally thought to have been closed has been reopened since North Korean leader Kim Jong Un took power in 2011. In addition, power struggles since Kim Jong Un’s ascension to the leadership have led to the expansion of other previously closed or downsized camps.

A source with knowledge of the country’s political prison camps told Daily NK on Jan. 2 that “Camp 17 [Gaechon], which had been closed, was reopened in November 2014 on the orders of the Supreme Leader [Kim Jong Un]. Upon taking office, Kim executed a number of his political opponents and reopened the camp to house the many family members of those who had been purged.”

The source explained that the aftermath of Kim Jong Un’s purges led to the reopening of previously closed political prison camps.

According to a 2013 report by the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU), Prison Camp 17 was closed sometime around 1983.

However, the source explained that “whenever a new leader came to power, the rules changed. These power shifts led to new camps.”

“Just as when the Dear General [Kim Jong Il] began implementing his Songun policy after succeeding the Dear Leader [Kim Il Sung], the Ministry of State Security’s political prison camps and forced labor camps grew in size, and the political prison camp system expanded as a result,” the source said, referring to Kim Jong Il’s “military first” policy. “This pattern has been repeated under Kim Jong Un, resulting in the need for an additional prison camp to accommodate [all the new victims] of his consolidation of power and rule changes.”

The source added: “Whenever there is a change in leadership, we see a ‘purging of the ranks’ and a new batch of political prisoners and other tainted individuals who need to be contained. If these people are simply left alone in society, they could become the seeds of resistance growing under the leader’s nose, so they need to be taken care of.”

Data: Daily NK

Similarly, under Kim Jong Un, Camp 18 (Pukchang) in South Pyongan Province, which had previously been downsized, has expanded significantly, surpassing its size before Kim came to power.

“The number of prisoners and the scale of Camp 18’s operations had been declining until 2013. However, following Kim Jong Un’s early purges – including the execution of Jang Song Thaek – the number of prisoners at Camp 18 began to rise again. It is known among the North Korean population that many cadres and their families with ties to Jang Song Thaek were sent to Camp 18 after Jang’s downfall.”

Camp 18 holds those responsible for failure of 2019 US-DPRK summit

Camp 18, in particular, holds not only prisoners linked to Jang Song Thaek but also those deemed responsible for the collapse of the 2019 US-DPRK summit in Hanoi.

“Camp 18 has a special area for prisoners linked to Jang Song Thaek and the failed Hanoi summit. This area is known to be a total control zone where prisoners held there have no chance of returning to the outside world,” the source said.

According to the source, from mid-2013 to 2020, the operation of Camp 18 was split between the Ministry of Social Security, North Korea’s national police agency, and the Ministry of State Security, the country’s secret police. The Ministry of Social Security now runs the entire camp.

North Korea’s political prison camps are usually divided into two main zones: “revolutionary zones” and “total control zones.” Prisoners in the former are released after serving their sentences, while those in the latter are deprived of the right to return to the outside world. The Ministry of Social Security usually administers the revolutionary zones, while the Ministry of State Security usually administers the total control zones.

Previously under the joint management of the Ministry of Social Security and the Ministry of State Security, Camp 18 recently came under the management of the Ministry of Social Security, giving ordinary prisoners new hope that they might one day be released back into society. However, prisoners within the total control zone of Camp 18 remain imprisoned with no chance of release.

“Kim Jong Un has ordered officials to keep the camps running even without prisoners. High-ranking officials tend to follow the party’s instructions closely, even if it results in more cadres and guards maintaining the camps than there are prisoners,” the source said.

According to Daily NK’s ongoing research on political prison camps from 2020 to the present, there are an estimated 200,000 to 240,000 prisoners held in camps across the country.

Translated by Matthew Eteuati, Jr. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Mun Dong Hui

Mun Dong Hui is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about his articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com

15. Possible COVID-19 cases surge in North Korea near border with China

Another potential contributor to internal instability. We could see another harsh implementation of draconian population and resources control measures.

Possible COVID-19 cases surge in North Korea near border with China

The majority of deaths have been among the elderly and young children, leading many to believe that the latest outbreak is linked to COVID-19

https://www.dailynk.com/english/possible-covid-19-cases-surge-in-north-korea-near-border-with-china/

By Seulkee Jang - 2024.01.09 3:00pm

Recently, the number of people complaining of symptoms associated with COVID-19 has risen sharply in several North Korean regions along the border with China. Daily NK has learned of several cases of elderly people and children dying after experiencing COVID-like symptoms.

According to a Daily NK source in North Pyongan Province, the city of Sinuiju has recently seen a spike in the number of people suffering from high fever along with other symptoms such as cough, sore throat, headache, muscle aches, and fatigue.

Local health authorities have attributed these symptoms to influenza. However, these claims are difficult to verify as the authorities lack the equipment to determine whether patients are suffering from influenza or COVID-19.

Many people interpret high fevers of nearly 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) for a week or more as a sign of COVID-19.

Another Daily NK source in Yanggang province said: “Recently, there has been an increase in the number of patients with high fever and cough and more than a few deaths.”

The fact that the majority of deaths have been among the elderly and young children has led many to believe that the latest outbreak is likely to be COVID-19.

Even in cases where the symptoms are particularly severe, the majority of people have to go without medication due to shortages of medicines.

People turn to traditional medicines to relieve symptoms

Western medicines such as Tylenol are not only expensive but are also hard to find. People struggling to make ends meet cannot afford to even think about getting their hands on expensive medicines.

North Koreans can buy domestically produced “Koryo” medicine (traditional Chinese medicine) at pharmacies, but few seek it out because of its relatively low effectiveness, one of Daily NK’s sources explained.

“They say that pharmaceutical factories have sprung up all over the country and are pumping out a large amount of Koryo medicine to improve people’s health, but there is still no medicine for people who are seriously ill. We need imported medicines [now]”.

At the 9th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in late December, the authorities claimed that “the public health sector has made remarkable contributions in 2023. Through the construction of new pharmaceutical factories, medical product factories, and specialized facilities for disease prevention, we’ve further strengthened the material and technological foundation of the public health sector and created a favorable environment for economic development and people’s daily well-being.”

However, despite the public health and medical achievements touted at the meeting, many people point out that it is a challenge to get proper medicines. In severe cases, it is not uncommon for people to turn to drugs such as opium or crystal meth.

“Imagine a parent forced to give crystal meth to a child with a high fever because they have nothing else to give. It’s frustrating not to know when things will get better,” one of the sources lamented.

Translated by Matthew Eteuati, Jr. Edited by Rose Adams and Robert Lauler.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

16. When will North Korea do something good for the world?

What is something good he could do? Abdicate and turn the north over to the South peaceful reunification?

But on a serious note this is an article partly about the trade challenges with north Korea (from Indonesia).

Unfortunately, I have to concur with this conclusion:

When will the North change and become a blessing for global civilization? As long as Kim Jong-un and his sister try to cling to their absolute power, they will only focus on the development of deadly weapons such as nuclear arms. But in the end, the only loser of their desired war will be the North itself.

When will North Korea do something good for the world?

Kornelius Purba (The Jakarta Post) Jakarta ● Sun, January 7, 2024

thejakartapost.com · by The Jakarta Post

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Kornelius Purba (The Jakarta Post)

Jakarta ● Sun, January 7, 2024 2024-01-07 15:10 2 534d85dcc1d414d7fac963ca613223f0 1 Academia North-Korea,kim-jong-un,Nuclear,threat,missile,economy,poverty,business,Anthoni-Salim,Trade Free

North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un and his sister Kim Yo-jong marked the New Year on Monday by repeating their routine threats to demolish with nuclear weapons South Korea and all other adversaries, especially the United States and Japan, if they do not bow to the siblings' demands. They followed the aggressive actions of their father, Kim Jong-il, and grandfather, Kim Il-sung. However, all three leaders ignored economic developments.

CNBC Indonesia recently ran a story about the bitter experience of young Anthoni Salim, now the owner of the widely diversified Salim Group in the communist state of North Korea. The story is part of the book Liem Sioe Liong's Salim Group, The Business Pillar of Soeharto's Indonesia, a biography of Salim Group written by veteran journalist Richard Borsuk and Nancy Chng. Liem, or Sudono Salim, is Anthoni’s father, who founded the conglomerate.

As a 22-year-old man who had just graduated from a reputable university in the United Kingdom in 1971, Anthoni was very eager to prove his business acumen to his father, one of Soeharto’s closest business cronies.

The young Anthoni imported cement from North Korea and invested a lot in the business. However, he suffered a massive loss because of the low quality of the imported cement, especially its packaging. More than 70 percent of the cement ended up as waste.

"Whereas most cement producers used five-layer sacks, North Korea used only two layers. More than 70 percent of the cement sacks were torn during the unloading process at the port," Anthoni recalled.

His lousy fortune was not only caused by the poor packaging but, more importantly, because at that time Indonesia was reeling in the aftermath of the mass killings of alleged communist sympathizers. In addition, North Korea was known for its bad reputation and was internationally regarded a pariah state.

Anthoni was not alone. Many Indonesian state and private companies shared a similar experience of doing business with North Korea. Most of them swore to never return to the isolated country.

Trade between Indonesia and North Korea has been insignificant for the last five decades. In 2021, Indonesia’s imports from North Korea were valued at only US$410,000, down by nearly 50 percent year-on-year. In 2022, Indonesia's total exports to the North were worth only $35,967.

The world has never heard anything positive from reclusive North Korea, such as the invention of scientific breakthroughs vital to treating uncured diseases like cancer, or technological inventions much needed by people in the developing world, such as cheap water treatment and rice seeds that can multiply production.

Many Indonesians initially admired the North for its courageous resistance against the United States, the world's only superpower until two decades ago. They also adored North Korean leaders. At the same time, South Korea's economy has continued thriving and many Indonesians are among the fans of K-pop and the South’s technological advancements.

While the North remains one of the world's most impoverished nations, the South has transformed from an extremely poor country into the world's 12th largest economy. Samsung, LG, Hyundai and many other large companies have become global household names.

On the other hand, some young Indonesians like Kim Jong-un not because of his success story in developing his nation, but because of his eccentric hairstyles.

Many countries, including Japan, the US and ASEAN member states, fear the North's nuclear weapons threats because a minor human error in Pyongyang could spell a global disaster.

North Korean leaders have been preoccupied with their nuclear ambitions, their only form of deterrence, but left millions of their people living in extreme poverty and facing starvation. They have seemingly forgotten about economic development.

Very few countries are willing to make business deals with the North because, in many cases, if not most, they will be disappointed, as Anthoni experienced more than five decades ago.

Nikkei Asia and the Associated Press reported that in a meeting with senior military commanders on Monday, Kim Jong-un said that the Korean Peninsula was "inching closer to the brink of armed conflict" and that peaceful unification with the South was no longer possible.

North Korea has continued to expand its military and, in recent months, carried out its first successful launch of a spy satellite.

Chairman Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, mocked South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol's attitude toward confrontation. She also sarcastically "thanked" Yoon for providing the North with a new impetus to build its armaments.

Residents of a South Korean island in the Yellow Sea near North Korea were ordered to evacuate on Friday because of shelling by the North, the South's military said.

The military said the North fired roughly 200 shells near South Korean Yellow Sea islands between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m. local time on Friday. The shells landed on the North Korean side of the maritime border, it added.

The islands have been a recurrent hotspot over the years. In 2002, six South Korean sailors died in a battle with North Korea's navy. In 2010, four South Korean civilians were killed in a shelling attack by the North.

What the world has routinely heard from Pyongyang for decades are reports of terror ranging from lethal and chemical weapons production to the latest development of Pyongyang's nuclear ballistic missiles. The purpose is clear: to force the targeted countries to pay a "ransom", which has sometimes worked, as has been the case with Japan, South Korea and the US.

When will the North change and become a blessing for global civilization? As long as Kim Jong-un and his sister try to cling to their absolute power, they will only focus on the development of deadly weapons such as nuclear arms. But in the end, the only loser of their desired war will be the North itself.

***

The writer is senior editor at The Jakarta Post.

Topics :

thejakartapost.com · by The Jakarta Post

17. DNA Exclusive: Will Kim Jong-Un's Actions Trigger A Third World War?

Who is unnerved by Kim Jong Un? I certainly am not. But I do agree that Kim is potentially a threat to global peace if he miscalculates.

Unfortunately Zee News anchor Sourabh Raaj Jain 's in depth analysis on the video at the link is not in English.

Excerpts:

Kim's recent display of firepower not only unnerved the United States and South Korea but also disrupted global peace. The international community is now anxiously monitoring North Korea's actions, contemplating whether Kim's provocations could propel the world into a third global conflict.

DNA Exclusive: Will Kim Jong-Un's Actions Trigger A Third World War?

The international community is now anxiously monitoring North Korea's actions, contemplating whether Kim's provocations could propel the world into a third global conflict.

Written By Zee Media Bureau|Edited By: Ritesh K Srivastava|Last Updated: Jan 06, 2024, 12:03 AM IST|Source: Bureau

https://zeenews.india.com/india/dna-exclusive-will-kim-jong-uns-actions-trigger-a-third-world-war-2706628.html

New Delhi: The world is no stranger to the enigmatic North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, often dubbed the "missile man" on the global stage. Beyond the borders of his nation, Kim's allure lies not in popularity but in his obsession with weaponry, an infatuation that extends to explosives, missiles, and a relentless pursuit of military might. Conducting missile tests almost annually, Kim flaunts his arsenal, menacingly waving the spectre of atomic bombs at his adversaries on a near-weekly basis.

In an unprecedented move, Kim's eccentricity took centre stage in the first week of the new year. Just two days ago, he issued a chilling nuclear threat against the United States, vowing to annihilate the nation. Now, South Korea, a long-standing foe, finds itself under a barrage of threats from Kim Jong Un. In a world already contending with conflicts like Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas, North Korea sits ominously, presenting a confrontational front to its significant adversary, South Korea.

On January 1, Kim Jong Un warned his military that any military action from South Korea and the United States would trigger a forceful retaliation from North Korea, delivering a potentially devastating blow to its enemies. The aggressive actions, marked by missile launches, in the first week of the year, have escalated tensions between the two nations, capturing the world's attention.

Kim's recent display of firepower not only unnerved the United States and South Korea but also disrupted global peace. The international community is now anxiously monitoring North Korea's actions, contemplating whether Kim's provocations could propel the world into a third global conflict.

As the world grapples with mounting tension, Zee News anchor Sourabh Raaj Jain delves into the intricacies of the global situation in tonight's edition of DNA. His in-depth analysis aims to illuminate potential consequences and diplomatic manoeuvres in response to Kim Jong Un's alarming moves, providing viewers with crucial insights during these critical times.

18. A Tax by Any Other Name: Understanding North Korea’s “Non-tax Burden” System

Conclusion:

The North Korean authorities know that non-tax burdens are wildly unpopular and can cause more harm than good when levied excessively. In the early years after taking power, Kim Jong Un openly mentioned the reduction of non-tax burdens as part of his agenda. He has continued to pay lip service to the issue by issuing a security decree that called for an end to the practice in March 2018 and later calling for an end to the practice again during remarks at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021. Lessons from 1980s China and other developing nations, however, suggest that the state will not be able to force local governments to stop levying non-tax burdens without first remedying the underlying issue of revenue shortfalls.

A shift to transparent taxation would also be exceedingly difficult since the visibility of taxation introduces a political risk that residents might demand greater welfare in exchange for their taxes. Unless the state effectively reverses its trend towards fiscal decentralization or is suddenly able to generate significantly more income through trade, non-tax burdens seem likely to remain a fixture of the state’s predatory revenue structure.

The government’s strict border closures and restrictions on the private market system have indirectly undermined residents’ ability to make a living, but the unceasing application of non-tax burdens truly demonstrates the callousness with which the state prioritizes its survival above the welfare of the people. To paraphrase a complaint from one resident, “the government has no interest whether the common people starve to death or not. All they do is say ‘give us [money]’ until they’re blue in the face.”[15] While this economic predation may sustain the North Korean government in the short term, levying non-tax burdens without allowing residents to make money on the private market is both cruel and ultimately unsustainable.

A Tax by Any Other Name: Understanding North Korea’s “Non-tax Burden” System

BY: ROSE ADAMS
JANUARY 8, 2024

https://www.38north.org/2024/01/a-tax-by-any-other-name-understanding-north-koreas-non-tax-burden-system/

Homework is a source of stress for children and parents alike around the world. In North Korea, however, school tasks can be much more strenuous and far less educational. In addition to being mobilized for tasks like garbage hauling and farm work, children are often told to bring in large quantities of specific items, such as scrap metal, manure for fertilizer or rabbit pelts. Other times, teachers require parents to contribute cash for supplies like firewood or computers. However, these “social tasks” (과제, kwaje)” are part of a larger exploitative and opaque system of taxation referred to as “non-tax burdens” that will follow North Korean children into adulthood and the rest of their lives.

Understanding this invisible taxation burden—how it arose, how it has changed under Kim Jong Un, and the toll it takes on citizens—is essential in understanding the relationship between the North Korean regime and its subjects. An analysis of defector testimony, small-scale reporting, and comparisons from China reveal the non-tax burden system as a parasitic structure driven by the regime’s unilateral command economy that places the weight of the state’s economic failings overwhelmingly on the shoulders of ordinary citizens. Kim Jong Un has openly acknowledged the unpopularity of the practice, but this is not a problem that can be fixed with just a few words from the leader. Until North Korea addresses the fundamental weaknesses of its economy, non-tax burdens are here to stay.

The Basics

The phrase “non-tax burdens” (세외부담, sewoe budam) refers to irregular or semi-regular mandatory contributions that citizens must pay to the local government.[1] This generally involves contributing a fixed quantity of a designated resource, money or essential goods. Non-tax burdens are usually levied in response to a seasonal need, in preparation for special dates or holidays, or in support of specific local projects or policies. Notably, non-tax burdens are a universal and well-established practice across the country, but they are not technically part of official state practice and hence lack an established definition. Officially, North Korea abolished taxation in 1974 and celebrates “Tax Abolition Day” every year on April 1.

Non-tax burdens are also closely tied to North Korea’s organizational life.[2] They are generally levied at the local level but carried out organizationally. For example, members of a municipal people’s committee might decide when to levy a non-tax burden and the nature of the tax, but the local heads of neighborhood watch units inminbanjang (인민반장, inminbanjang), school teachers and factory managers will be put in charge of actually collecting contributions and enforcing the policy. The universal and mandatory nature of organizational life offers tax-levying officials an established and easily accessible network capable of reaching every household.

Non-tax burdens are often levied per household in the form of quotas, such as 100 kilograms of scrap metal per household. If households are unable to meet the quotas, authorities often name a cash price households can pay in place of the requested goods. In some more recent cases, residents have suspected authorities of occasionally imposing unreasonable quotas to force people to pay cash instead. There are also examples of the authorities demanding cash outright or a mix of goods and cash.

Pleading inability to pay these non-tax burdens, be it in cash or goods, is not an option, and non-payment is often construed as an ideological failing or even a political crime. In the case of the non-tax burdens levied at the beginning of the new year, for example, progress towards meeting quotas is measured regularly, and individuals who fail to meet their allotted tasks are publicly shamed at regular self-criticism sessions. This public shaming system serves not only to add pressure but also exerts an emotional toll by making individuals feel ashamed or guilty for failing to produce the requested materials.

The Origins and Evolution of Non-tax Burdens

Non-tax revenue is by no means a North Korean invention and has appeared in economies transitioning towards fiscal federalism, including other socialist states like China and Russia.[3] The particular emphasis on contribution in the form of goods and labor, as opposed to hard cash, is directly linked to the nature of the socialist economy. When the state owns all of the means of production and distributes goods to the people, the main “input” in the economy is people’s labor. When local resources are insufficient to produce a necessary good, the state must sell state property (such as goods produced by state-owned enterprises, SOEs) to other nations to purchase items from outside the state economy. For example, North Korea could buy the extra rice needed to cover agricultural shortages or purchase steel for a state construction project by selling domestic resources like timber, coal or SOE-produced items like textiles and wigs.

Put simply, in socialist economies, the government extracts labor from citizens, which can then be converted into goods or cash. By contrast, governments in capitalist economies extract cash, which can later be converted into necessary goods and services. With such miniscule salaries from work at state-owned enterprises, there wouldn’t be much for the North Korean government to take from its citizens if it asked for cash “donations.” With this perspective, it is easy to understand how the North Korean government could “get rid of taxes” for individuals without significant impact on its revenue structure or ability to provide state services.[4] “Non-tax burdens” are simply taxation in a different, more relevant currency: goods (often foraged by citizens) and labor mobilizations beyond the ordinary scope of the workplace.

However, with the rise of local, unofficial markets (장마당, jangmadang) in the 1990s, North Korea saw a sudden influx of resources for the government to tax. Private citizens engaging in trade had access to a greater range of material goods beyond simple foraged items, as well as foreign and domestic hard currency. This came at a time when North Korea’s export revenues were plummeting, and the cost of imports was increasing following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the associated socialist trade sphere in 1991. Naturally, the government began to turn inwards to look for revenue to make up this shortfall, especially once the private economy began to stabilize and thrive in the 2000s.

Non-tax Burdens in the Kim Jong Un Era

Since the 1990s, markets have flourished in North Korea, with some level of market activity becoming state-sanctioned and subject to the equivalent of state and local taxes.[5] Some research, however, suggests that non-tax burdens have also increased in recent years under Kim Jong Un.[6] There are a number of factors at play that likely contribute to this phenomenon, including drops in foreign trade as a result of economic sanctions; Kim’s massive expenditures on large-scale construction of “legacy projects” and military development; a post-marketization growth in extractable wealth among ordinary citizens; and reforms that decentralized the economy and burden-sharing. While the first two are a relatively simple case of decreasing state revenues and ballooning state expenditures, the latter two are related to how the state attempts to bolster revenue and reduce expenditures.

The shift in the state’s burden-sharing, also known as fiscal decentralization, is perhaps one of the clearest links to non-tax burdens. In order to cope with the chasm between state revenue and expenditures, the North Korean state leverages rhetoric about “self-reliance” or Juche to foist a share of costs for state projects onto local governments. One benefit of North Korea’s particular style of governance is that the central government can unilaterally announce a new policy and then leave local governments to handle the execution.

For example, in 2021, the fourth plenary meeting of the Eighth Central Committee announced a grand initiative to build new residences in neglected rural areas. The actual implementation, however, has floundered as the central government concentrated material support for construction in Pyongyang, and rural construction has become dependent on funding and materials from the provincial governments. In North Hamgyong Province, for example, officials were caught taking cost-saving shortcuts to satisfy the state’s policies by remodeling or repairing existing homes and reporting the repaired buildings as “new.”[7] When officials did build new residences in the “model city” of Kimchaek, for instance, the cost of construction was passed along to residents by requiring each household to contribute five kilograms of diesel or gasoline.

A similar pattern appears in the relationship between state and state-owned enterprises. The 2002 7.1 economic reforms and Kim Jong Un’s follow-up policies in 2013 granted greater autonomy to state-owned enterprises so they could (at least theoretically) become self-sufficient and generate enough profit to cover their own operating costs without government subsidy, thereby reducing the financial burden on the central government.[8] However, North Korea’s poor infrastructure, theft, corrupt bookkeeping, and other factors make true profitability and sustainability difficult. Moreover, the government’s ability to impose production quotas without respect for the enterprise’s capacity or actual profitability further complicates the feasibility of the system and can be passed on to residents as non-tax burdens. In one recent example from South Pyongan Province, a government campaign to increase the production of infant foodstuffs led to a 4,000 North Korean won (KPW) tax per household in order to purchase new equipment and increase production.

Case Study: China

In considering the possible structural reasons behind this reliance on non-tax burdens and the potential ramifications, 1980s China offers a well-studied precedent for another socialist economy transitioning towards greater local-level autonomy. During this time, China was also passing off greater responsibilities and burden-sharing to local governments and enterprises without giving local governments the power to impose local taxes independently. Deng and Smyth (2000) posited that this dynamic led local governments to rely heavily on “non-tax levies” (non-tax burdens) in order to make up for budget shortfalls in a way that could not be as easily siphoned off by the central government as formal taxes.[9]

Beyond the ideological and propagandistic value of being able to claim no taxation, the Chinese example suggests there is also likely a political and practical benefit to intentionally obscuring taxation. Changdong Zhang, an associate professor of political science at Peking University, posited that authoritarian regimes are more likely to rely on non-tax burdens and indirect taxation than their democratic counterparts.[10] His argument draws on a fundamental political science argument about the relationship between taxation and representation: the greater the taxation, the greater the people’s demand for representation (voice) in the use of their tax money.

Authoritarian regimes like North Korea use indirect taxation strategies to reduce the public’s ability to perceive and track the amount that they pay in taxes, thereby reducing their demand for commensurate representation. Guangming Jiang, in response to Zhang’s argument, added that the political environment in authoritarian states also likely makes it difficult for citizens to demand representation in return for their tax revenue, but that residents might express this frustration through pressure for greater welfare or provision of public goods in return for their financial contributions.[11] Obscuring the degree of taxation reduces the government’s commitment to the provision of public goods, even as it levies non-tax burdens in the name of public projects.

The Human Cost

If non-tax burdens are not alleviated, there will likely be repercussions for the regime. While a Boston Tea Party-style “no taxation without representation” revolt is highly unlikely in North Korea, residents may look for ways to reduce their burdens by seeking ways to avoid the system that levies the quasi-taxes (organizational life). One manifestation of this phenomenon can be seen in the significant drop in school attendance following the pandemic, even after the most stringent pandemic restrictions on schools were lifted.[12] Assorted school fees and tasks are one of the most onerous elements of the non-tax burden system for families with school-age children.[13] As a result, during the pandemic period, many families pulled their children out of their “free education” in order to save money. Children who remained in school have been increasingly mobilized to directly provide the firewood and other supplies that their parents could not afford. Not only does this infringe on universal rights to education and prohibitions on child labor, but the exhausting nature of mobilizations can be outright dangerous for young children.

Additionally, non-tax burdens are incredibly regressive by nature. Not only is the amount fixed regardless of a household’s ability to pay, but the overlapping nature of organizational life can increase this burden. Taking the example of a typical household, Daily NK journalist Lee Chae Un explained that “the father might pay non-tax burdens to his company, the mother may pay through the inminban, and the child will make contributions to the school they attend. In other words, the different affiliations of each family member may add up to a double or even triple burden per household.”[14]

When it comes to actually paying these quasi-taxes, Lee added, the responsibility within the household is distinctly gendered. Just as women are often the main breadwinners in North Korean households, they are also the ones made responsible for helping their family members meet quotas or for furnishing the cash needed to make up the difference. “With women already devoting enormous energy just to put food on the table, securing the means necessary to pay non-tax burdens is no easy feat,” Lee concluded. “The resulting stress to provide for their families is simply indescribable.” In some cases, the unrelenting nature of the state’s demands and the stress of single-handedly supporting their families have even led some women to take their own lives out of desperation.

Conclusion

The North Korean authorities know that non-tax burdens are wildly unpopular and can cause more harm than good when levied excessively. In the early years after taking power, Kim Jong Un openly mentioned the reduction of non-tax burdens as part of his agenda. He has continued to pay lip service to the issue by issuing a security decree that called for an end to the practice in March 2018 and later calling for an end to the practice again during remarks at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021. Lessons from 1980s China and other developing nations, however, suggest that the state will not be able to force local governments to stop levying non-tax burdens without first remedying the underlying issue of revenue shortfalls.

A shift to transparent taxation would also be exceedingly difficult since the visibility of taxation introduces a political risk that residents might demand greater welfare in exchange for their taxes. Unless the state effectively reverses its trend towards fiscal decentralization or is suddenly able to generate significantly more income through trade, non-tax burdens seem likely to remain a fixture of the state’s predatory revenue structure.

The government’s strict border closures and restrictions on the private market system have indirectly undermined residents’ ability to make a living, but the unceasing application of non-tax burdens truly demonstrates the callousness with which the state prioritizes its survival above the welfare of the people. To paraphrase a complaint from one resident, “the government has no interest whether the common people starve to death or not. All they do is say ‘give us [money]’ until they’re blue in the face.”[15] While this economic predation may sustain the North Korean government in the short term, levying non-tax burdens without allowing residents to make money on the private market is both cruel and ultimately unsustainable.

Disclaimer: This author works for Unification Media Group and has a professional relationship with Daily NK.

Special thanks to journalist Lee Chae Un for fact-checking and sharing her insight into the psychological toll of non-tax burdens, as well as to Robert Lauler for his assistance during the editing process.

[1]
Also sometimes referred to as 세대부담 (sedae budam, or “household burdens”) because they are levied per household.
[2]
“Organizational life” (조직 생활, jojik saenghwal) refers to the requirement that all members of North Korean society belong to one or more state-affiliated organizations: the youth league, women’s league, the trade union, the farmers’ union, or the Party. See Andrea Nikolaevich Lankov, In-ok Kwak and Choong-Bin Cho’s “The Organizational Life,” Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no. 2 (2012) for a detailed introduction and analysis. Interestingly, the “Ten Principles,” which made organizational life a permanent fixture of North Korean life (Principle 9), were made official in 1974, the same year that Kim Il Sung also officially abolished taxation.
[3]
The Chinese case will be discussed in the “Case Study: China” section below. In Russia, these supposedly voluntary non-tax burdens were called “self-taxes” (Самообложение) and were similarly levied on a one-off basis by local governments for specific local projects. The practice began in 1924 under the Soviet Union and is still included as a relatively minor part of modern Russian Federation tax codes. See: “Resident Altruism and Local Public Goods,” Free Network Policy Briefs, April 15, 2019, https://freepolicybriefs.org/tag/voluntary-contributions/.
[4]
Before Kim Il Sung abolished income tax and individual taxes in North Korea in 1974, Khrushchev made a very similar proposition in 1960. Contemporaneous analysis by Alexander Korovushkin (Chairman of the Board of the State Bank of the Soviet Union) estimated that 91.2 percent of the government’s taxes came from SOEs, collective farms, and cooperatives, demonstrating the relatively small role of individual income taxes under the Soviet socialist economy. See Gerald E. Hoy, “The Abolition of Income Tax in the U.S.S.R.,” Canada Tax Journal 9, no.6 (December 1961): 436-440.
[5]
These various taxes and fees on market activity have proven to be extremely lucrative for the North Korean government. A 2020 Korea Development Institute study included anecdotal evidence that market-derived revenue made up 10 percent of local government budgets, while a 2018 Beyond Parallel study estimated that the North Korean authorities were collecting a total of 56.8 million dollars a year in taxes and fees from state-sanctioned markets.
[6]
Changyong Choi and Eulchul Lim, “North Korea’s Tax System and the Relationship Between Citizen and State (북한 세금제도와 국가-주민간 신뢰관계),” KDI School of Public Policy and Management Development Studies Series 9 (2020): 12.
[7]
Examples of cost-saving shortcuts from other regions include skipping on furnishings, leaving residents to install their own septic tanks, and encouraging households to hire private contractors to fix their homes (which would be reported as a local achievement) by selling construction materials at a subsidized price.
[8]
The 2002 7.1 guidelines (also known as the July 2002 economic reforms) refer to a bundle of economic reforms that introduced some market elements to the socialist economy, including realistic adjustments to prices and wages and productivity incentives in the form of a “merit system.” These reforms also notably laid the basis for the formalization of legal jangmadang markets, and guidelines for operating government-sanctioned markets were released soon after in May 2003. In 2013, Kim Jong Un built on the 2002 reforms and introduced the “socialist enterprise responsibility management system (SERMS),” which aimed to improve productivity by offering more incentives and greater autonomy to state-owned enterprises to make their own decisions (within the boundaries of state guidance).
[9]
Xin Deng and Russel Smyth, “Non-Tax Levies in China: Sources, Problems and Suggestions for Reform,” Development Policy Review 18, (2000): 91-411, https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/6h440v58s.
[10]
Zhang, Changdong, Governing and Ruling: the Political Logic of Taxation in China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021).
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
No national numbers are available, but reports from North Hamgyong Province (Daily NK, Radio Free Asia), Yanggang Province (Daily NK, Radio Free Asia) and Chagang (Jagang) Province (Daily NK) suggest unusual drops in attendance rates. These regions are all located along the border, where the pandemic-caused economic downturn has been especially severe and may not be representative of the country as a whole.
[13]
Choi and Lim, 22.
[14]
Private correspondence with Lee in November 2023, translated from the original Korean.
[15]
Ibid.

19. ‘No more buffer zone based on 2018 military agreement,’ S. Korea says

‘No more buffer zone based on 2018 military agreement,’ S. Korea says

donga.com

Posted January. 09, 2024 08:00,

Updated January. 09, 2024 08:00

‘No more buffer zone based on 2018 military agreement,’ S. Korea says. January. 09, 2024 08:00. by Hyo-Ju Son hjson@donga.com.

The South Korean military made a statement on Monday that there is no more buffer zone that suspends hostilities on the ground and in the ocean based on the September 19 inter-Korean military agreement made in 2018. Prior to this, North Korea made a series of provocations by laying a large number of landmines along the Gyeongui ground line in the demilitarized zone, rearming front-line guard posts, and taking other actions that broke most clauses in the agreement. As the North fired multiple rounds of artillery shells in the buffer zone in the Yellow Sea for three consecutive days starting on Friday, the South Korean military decided to counter it with a bold decision. As a result, there is no more buffer zone on the ground or in the ocean between the two Koreas that were put in place by the September 19 agreement.

“North Korea violated the September 19 agreement over 3,600 times and fired artillery shells for three consecutive days in the Yellow Sea,” the spokesperson of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lee Sung-jun, said on Monday in a briefing. “As a result, we announce that there is no more buffer zone.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the South Korean military will resume normal shooting and training in the buffer zones on the ground and sea.

As the South Korean military announced the nullification of the September 19 agreement one month after North Korea made an announcement to renounce the agreement, training will be resumed in the buffer zones in the land, sea, and air. On the ground, targets will be set within five kilometers from the military demarcation line where hostilities were prohibited, and large-scale live fire training will take place, mobilizing K-9 self-propelled artillery. The naval maneuver is expected to begin in the Yellow Sea.

한국어

donga.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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