Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

The response to insurgency after 2001 it's not solely a story of the thinking of Americans, British, French, and Israelis. It is also a story about Iraqis, Afghans, and Syrians shape this thinking from the bottom up. They had no equivalent of Petraeus or McChrystal. Their influence came from an assortment of different actors and thinkers. – Karzai, Sittar, Raziiq, Mazluom, and countless tribal leaders, military officers, and politicians long – sometimes serendipitously. They changed how the Americans and their allies, thought about and executed their strategy. Attention to civilian casualties, large-scale tribal mobilization, and confidence in strategic effectiveness owed more than a little to them. Preferences on tactics, governance reforms, and timeliness yielded to their culture, identity, and politics. Local peoples adjusted the trajectory of Western strategic thought.

- Carter Malkasian.

“An intellectual is someone whose mind watches itself.”

- Albert Camus

"I had grown tired of standing in the lean and lonely front line facing the greatest enemy that ever confronted man - public opinion."

- Clarence Seward Darrow

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 8, 2023

2. Why the Ukraine Counteroffensive Is Such Slow Going

3. Congress Dives Back Into Fights on Spending Cuts, Military as Deadline Draws Near

4. Busting this big myth about Baby Boomers reveals something about Gen Z, too

5. China Controls Minerals That Run the World—and It Just Fired a Warning Shot at U.S.

6. The Future of War Has Come in Ukraine: Drone Swarms

7. ‘Several Things Have Shocked Me’: An Ex-Insider on Business in China

8. Here’s how to fix the Pentagon’s CAPE office

9. Taiwan’s new Mumbai office highlights growing ties with India

10. From Chess and Rubik's Cube to Go, Rethinking Irregular Warfare

11. Russian army failed to achieve any of its goals during 500 days of war against Ukraine - ISW

12. Zelensky: Grain deal and people's lives cannot depend on Putin's mood

13. Opinion | They’re Ready to Fight Again, on Artificial Legs

14. Buying Power Is the Invisible Shortfall of the 2024 Defense Budget Request

15. Why Jens Stoltenberg Should Be a Candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize

16. DOD has not 'adapted' to strategic competition yet, according to a prominent think tank

17. Diplomacy Watch: Washington may deny it, but it looks someone wants to talk to Russia

18. Will China Change Its Approach to the Ukraine War?

19. The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 8, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-assessment-july-8-2023

Key Takeaways:

Five hundred days ago Russia launched an unprovoked war of conquest against Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 8. US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl noted on July 7 that current Ukrainian operations across the front are the "beginning of the middle” of the wider counteroffensive and that it is therefore "too early to judge” how the counteroffensive is going.
The United States announced a new military aid package for Ukraine that includes cluster munitions on July 7.
Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed 131/136 drone and missile strikes against Ukraine's industrial and infrastructure facilities overnight from July 7 to 8.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Ukraine “deserves NATO membership” ahead of the July 11 to 12 NATO summit in a press conference on July 7 in Istanbul with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky returned to Ukraine from Turkey with five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast whom Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey had previously agreed would remain in Turkey until the end of the war.
Ukrainian intelligence indicated that Russian authorities are capitalizing on the fear of a provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to drive out Ukrainian personnel and increase the Russian presence at the ZNPP ahead of the upcoming NATO summit.
A Wagner commander stated that the Wagner Group will go to Belarus after completing rest and recuperation through August 2023. The status of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prigozhin is unclear, and the deal may be in flux.
The Kremlin may be attempting to ensure that it has control over Wagner leadership and personnel in Africa and the Middle East.
A prominent Russian milblogger speculated that the Russian military leadership may be in the process of making the decision to replace Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, suggesting that the implications of the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion may still be having ramifications on the highest echelons of military command.
Russian authorities reportedly prevented former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin from holding a talk about the Wagner Group rebellion.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border and south of Kreminna, and Ukraine likely continues to conduct strikes on Russian concentration areas deep within the rear of occupied Luhansk Oblast.
Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts on July 8.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reportedly observed combat training of Russian contract servicemen at the Southern Military District (SMD) training grounds on July 8, likely in an attempt to favorably portray Russian formalization efforts and incentivize personnel recruitment.
The Ukrainian government has indicated that Russian occupation authorities struggle to compensate staff in critical industries, resulting in staffing shortages that could hinder the Russian war effort.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ASSESSMENT, JULY 8, 2023

Jul 8, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 8, 2023

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 8, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Five hundred days ago Russia launched an unprovoked war of conquest against Ukraine. The Russian military intended to take Kyiv within three days but failed to accomplish any of its intended objectives in Ukraine. Determined and skillful Ukrainian resistance has forced the culmination of multiple Russian offensives including the one aimed at Kyiv and has liberated Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts, as well as the parts of Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces had temporarily seized. Ukrainian forces have secured and retained the initiative and are conducting counteroffensive operations along most of the frontline with Russian forces focused almost entirely on trying to hold on to the Ukrainian lands they still occupy. With Western assistance, Ukraine has ensured its independence but faces the critical task of liberating the strategically vital territory still under Russian control.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 8. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced more than 1km on the southern flank of Bakhmut, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops attacked Russian positions southwest and northwest of Bakhmut.[1] Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.[2] Ukrainian military sources confirmed that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions and are having partial success in unspecified areas of these directions.[3]

US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl noted on July 7 that current Ukrainian operations across the front are the “beginning of the middle” of the wider counteroffensive and that it is therefore “too early to judge” how the counteroffensive is going.[4] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Mykhaylo Podolyak also emphasized on July 8 that Ukrainian forces are focusing on the destruction of Russian manpower as part of the first phase of counteroffensive operations and noted that the initial phase of the counteroffensive is focused on shaping the battlefield.[5] ISW continues to assess that the current pace of Ukrainian counteroffensives is reflective of the deliberate and strategic effort to create an asymmetrical attrition gradient to conserve Ukrainian combat power and attrit Russian manpower and equipment at the cost of slower territorial advances.[6]

The United States announced a new military aid package for Ukraine that includes cluster munitions on July 7. The $800 million aid package includes dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICMs), and more ammunition for Patriot air defense systems and HIMARS MLRS systems.[7] US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl stated that the US is providing cluster munitions to Ukraine due to the “urgency of the moment” to equip Ukrainian forces with artillery ammunition to use against Russian military targets during the counteroffensive.

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed 131/136 drone and missile strikes against Ukraine's industrial and infrastructure facilities overnight from July 7 to 8. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Shahed drones, of which Ukrainian forces shot down five. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the rest of the drones struck industrial and infrastructure facilities in Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad oblasts.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also used S-300 ground-to-air missiles against unspecified facilities.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that some of the Russian drones struck storage facilities in Kryvyi Rih.[10]

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Ukraine “deserves NATO membership” ahead of the July 11 to 12 NATO summit in a press conference on July 7 in Istanbul with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[11] Erdogan also noted Turkey’s support for extending the Black Sea grain deal between Ukraine and Russia and stated that he would discuss prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges with Russian President Vladimir Putin during Putin’s visit to Turkey in August.[12] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 8 that there is no confirmed date for the meeting between Putin and Erdogan.[13]

Zelensky returned to Ukraine from Turkey with five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast whom Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey had previously agreed would remain in Turkey until the end of the war.[14] Peskov claimed that both Ukraine and Turkey violated agreements by returning the five commanders to Ukraine and insinuated that the West forced Turkey into releasing the commanders due to claimed Ukrainian failures in the war.[15] Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government questioning why Russia would allow POWs to reside in a third country that is not sympathetic to Russia and why the Russian government would exchange defenders of the Azov Metallurgical Combine for former Ukrainian politician and Kremlin ally Viktor Medvedchuk.[16] Erdogan’s statements regarding the Ukrainian bid for NATO membership in addition to the release of Azovstal defenders is a notable shift in the Russia-Turkey relationship, although the depth and permanence of Erdogan’s apparent support for Ukraine are not clear at this time.

Ukrainian intelligence indicated that Russian authorities are capitalizing on the fear of a provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to drive out Ukrainian personnel and increase the Russian presence at the ZNPP ahead of the upcoming NATO summit. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky discussed providing Russian ZNPP personnel with housing seized from Ukrainians who fled occupied Enerhodar. The GUR also noted that Kiriyenko and Balitsky aim to increase the Russian presence in occupied Enerhodar by 4,500 Russian personnel.[17] The GUR reported that Russian occupation authorities continue to mine various areas of the ZNPP, including technical and machine rooms.[18] The Kremlin may seek to take additional physical control over the ZNPP operations to falsely portray Russia as the only safe operator of the ZNPP and Ukraine as a threat to the security of the plant to discourage Western support for Ukraine at the NATO summit.

A Wagner commander stated that the Wagner Group will go to Belarus after completing rest and recuperation through August 2023. A Russian milblogger published an interview with Wagner Group commander Anton “Lotos” Yelizarov on July 7, who stated that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin had personally ordered all Wagner personnel in Ukraine to take leave to rest until an unspecified period in early August before the Kremlin may be attempting to ensure that it has control over Wagner leadership and personnel in Africa and the Middle East. The implications of the Wagner armed rebellion for Wagner forces and Prigozhin remain unclear, but Ukraine has already benefited from the rebellion and may gain further benefits. Wagner Group has to undertake “big work” — the move to Belarus.[19] Yelizarov stated that Wagner’s Commanders’ Council needs to rotate Wagner personnel in “distant directions” (presumably meaning Wagner Group forces in Africa and the Middle East) to prepare and organize logistics for its new bases in Belarus. ISW previously reported that the status of the Wagner Group’s reorganization and possible redeployment to Belarus may not be clear until fall 2023.[20]

The status of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prigozhin is unclear, and the deal may be in flux. Yelizarov stated that Putin promised that Russian law enforcement would not prosecute the Wagner Group, though it remains unclear why the Kremlin has not either aggressively integrated Wagner forces into the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or immediately exiled them to Belarus.[21] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s July 6 confirmation that Wagner forces are not in Belarus ran contrary to the public understanding that Wagner fighters should already be signing contracts with the Russian MoD, going home to retirement, or moving to Belarus.[22] Yelizarov’s interview suggests that Wagner fighters and commanders are still able to move about freely within Russia and associate with each other and that Russian authorities are not otherwise interfering with Wagner affairs beyond conducting an information operation to separate the Wagner Group from Prigozhin. The rotation of Wagner’s non-Ukraine expeditionary forces could give Prigozhin access to a cadre of loyal and capable lieutenants, presumably within Russia, if Prigozhin is controlling the rotation. ISW has seen no evidence that Russian authorities are exiling or detaining Wagner commanders or fighters who participated in the rebellion.

Putin continues to allow Wagner and Prigozhin to operate in Russia and potentially pose a threat to his regime. Allowing Prigozhin, his commanders, and as many as 25,000 Wagner fighters who led and participated in the armed rebellion apparent full freedom of movement and communication in Russia shows that Putin has either remarkable (and unwarranted) confidence in their renewed loyalty, desperation to lure as many as possible to his side, or an inability to take action against them.

The Kremlin may be attempting to ensure that it has control over Wagner leadership and personnel in Africa and the Middle East. Reuters - citing Syrian security officials, sources based near deployed Russian forces, and regional officials – reported that Syrian and Russian military commanders undertook swift measures to prevent the Wagner armed uprising from spreading among the Wagner forces in Syria.[23] Syrian and Russian officials reportedly cut phone lines, summoned around a dozen Wagner commanders to the Russian military base at Hmeimim in western Latakia Province, and ordered Wagner forces to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or leave Syria. A regional military source close to Damascus and two Syrian sources noted that a group of Russian military officers was quickly dispatched to Syria to take charge of Wagner forces after Prigozhin announced the start of the armed rebellion. Three sources indicated that the Russian MoD cut pay for Wagner personnel and noted that dozens of Wagner personnel were flown out to an unspecified location on Russian planes when they refused to sign contracts with the Russian MoD. Syrian officials noted that they expected more Wagner personnel to refuse to sign contracts with the Russian MoD. ISW previously reported on unconfirmed reports that Russian military police detained four Wagner commanders and visited Wagner forces in Syria.[24] The Kremlin’s swift action in Syria may indicate that the Kremlin is not confident that Wagner personnel would not pose a security risk to the Russian forces in Syria.

NBC News obtained footage that appears to show more than 600 Wagner forces departing from an airport in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR).[25] NBC News observed that a regional newspaper also reported the departure of hundreds of Wagner personnel on July 6 and noted that it is unclear if these departures are part of a routine rotation of troops or a Kremlin-orchestrated purge of Prigozhin loyalists. A CAR official claimed that there has been no change in Wagner’s presence in the country, and senior Wagner representative Dmitry Sytii implied that Wagner forces have not been ordered to return to Russia at this time. It is possible that some Wagner personnel in CAR may be leaving after refusing to sign contracts with the Russian MoD given reports of similar departures of Wagner personnel from Syria.

The implications of the Wagner armed rebellion for Wagner forces and Prigozhin remain unclear, but Ukraine has already benefited from the rebellion and may benefit even further. Putin’s handling of the Wagner Group – Russia's most effective fighting force at this time – following the June 24 rebellion will likely keep them from fighting in Ukraine for the duration of the current Ukrainian counteroffensive and may permanently degrade Russia’s overall capability to wage war in Ukraine. The Wagner Group’s hasty withdrawal from Bakhmut disrupted Russian positions in the area and has facilitated the tactically significant gains that Ukrainian forces have been making around Bakhmut.[26]

A prominent Russian milblogger speculated that the Russian military leadership may be in the process of making the decision to replace Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, suggesting that the implications of the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion may still be having ramifications on the highest echelons of military command. The milblogger claimed on July 7 that several factors suggest that Shoigu may be replaced, specifically citing the fact that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyashenko met with Vietnamese Deputy Defense Minister Hoang Xuan Tien in Moscow on July 6 instead of Shoigu.[27] The milblogger suggested that it is “unprecedented” for the Russian MoD to not send a representative to such negotiations, which, the milblogger asserts, suggests that the Russian military leadership may be moving to sideline Shoigu.[28] The milblogger noted, however, that it is unlikely that the final decision has been officially made yet due to Shoigu’s personal ties with regional leaders and powerful oligarchs, including within the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations.[29] ISW cannot independently confirm rumors of Shoigu’s replacement and has, in fact, previously assessed that it is unlikely that Putin will replace Shoigu or Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov soon, and the Russian MoD appears to be actively interested in presenting Shoigu as an effective defense minister and posted footage of Shoigu visiting Russian contract servicemen at Southern Military District (SMD) training grounds on July 8.[30] Milblogger speculation about Shoigu’s fate indicates that the Kremlin will have to continue to balance widespread discontent with Shoigu’s and the MoD‘s leadership and conduct of the war with the desire to avoid seeming to capitulate to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s demands following Wagner’s armed rebellion.

Russian authorities reportedly prevented former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin from holding a talk about the Wagner Group rebellion. St. Petersburg bookstore Listva claimed on July 8 that St. Petersburg police illegally raided the bookstore to prevent Listva from hosting Girkin’s talk on the rebellion and gave the store an official warning for hosting the talk without coordinating the event.[31] Listva claimed that this raid was illegal because Russian law does not require registering events of fewer than 50 people.[32] Listva claimed that St. Petersburg authorities frequently target the bookstore, including arresting an employee for an altercation on July 7 that the bookstore describes as protecting “a Russian man who was threatened by a crowd of Tajik migrants.”[33] Girkin briefly condemned the law enforcement action, sarcastically asking whether authorities would criminally charge him for condemning the Wagner rebellion or calling for Russian victory in the war in Ukraine.[34]

Key Takeaways:

Five hundred days ago Russia launched an unprovoked war of conquest against Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 8. US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl noted on July 7 that current Ukrainian operations across the front are the "beginning of the middle” of the wider counteroffensive and that it is therefore "too early to judge” how the counteroffensive is going.
The United States announced a new military aid package for Ukraine that includes cluster munitions on July 7.
Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed 131/136 drone and missile strikes against Ukraine's industrial and infrastructure facilities overnight from July 7 to 8.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that Ukraine “deserves NATO membership” ahead of the July 11 to 12 NATO summit in a press conference on July 7 in Istanbul with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky returned to Ukraine from Turkey with five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast whom Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey had previously agreed would remain in Turkey until the end of the war.
Ukrainian intelligence indicated that Russian authorities are capitalizing on the fear of a provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to drive out Ukrainian personnel and increase the Russian presence at the ZNPP ahead of the upcoming NATO summit.
A Wagner commander stated that the Wagner Group will go to Belarus after completing rest and recuperation through August 2023. The status of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prigozhin is unclear, and the deal may be in flux.
The Kremlin may be attempting to ensure that it has control over Wagner leadership and personnel in Africa and the Middle East.
A prominent Russian milblogger speculated that the Russian military leadership may be in the process of making the decision to replace Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, suggesting that the implications of the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion may still be having ramifications on the highest echelons of military command.
Russian authorities reportedly prevented former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin from holding a talk about the Wagner Group rebellion.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border and south of Kreminna, and Ukraine likely continues to conduct strikes on Russian concentration areas deep within the rear of occupied Luhansk Oblast.
Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts on July 8.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reportedly observed combat training of Russian contract servicemen at the Southern Military District (SMD) training grounds on July 8, likely in an attempt to favorably portray Russian formalization efforts and incentivize personnel recruitment.
The Ukrainian government has indicated that Russian occupation authorities struggle to compensate staff in critical industries, resulting in staffing shortages that could hinder the Russian war effort.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border and south of Kreminna on July 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops tried to advance northwest of Svatove near Berestove (19km northwest), Novoselivske (14km northwest), and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest) and south of Kreminna near Berestove (30km south of Kreminna) and Vesele (32km south of Kreminna).[35] Russian Western Group of Forces spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) struck Ukrainian equipment near Pishchane (25km northwest of Svatove).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Zherebets River between Svatove and Kreminna and attacked from Karmazynivka (12km southwest of Svatove) towards Chereshchyna (20km southwest of Svatove).[37] Russian sources reported that elements of the 285th Guards Artillery Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) and 24th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation [GRU]) are fighting in the Kreminna area.[38] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Center Group of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Torske (15km west of Kreminna).[39] Geolocated footage posted on July 8 shows that Russian forces have additionally made gains near Spirne, 23km due south of Kreminna.[40]

Ukrainian forces likely continue to conduct strikes on Russian concentration areas deep within the rear of occupied Luhansk Oblast. Footage posted by local sources on July 7 shows fires and the aftermath of an explosion near Sorokyne, about 35km southeast of Luhansk City and 130km away from the current frontline.[41] Several sources suggested that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot using Storm Shadow missiles.[42] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) occupation administration has not yet commented on the strike.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut on July 8. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced more than 1km in unspecified areas south of Bakhmut.[43] Malyar noted that battles are ongoing north of Bakhmut without changes to Russian or Ukrainian positions and that Ukrainian forces are making it difficult for Russian forces to move out of Bakhmut itself. ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian forces experiencing difficulties moving personnel out of Bakhmut. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and Kurdiumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and that fighting is ongoing for the heights north and west of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on the western outskirts of Bakhmut City.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Berkhivka.[46] Russian State Duma deputy from the Republic of Sakha Sardana Avksentyeva sent a complaint to Russian Defense Minister Shoigu on July 8 about the treatment of personnel in the 83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade (VDV) who are operating near Klishchiivka.[47] Elements of the 83rd Guards VDV Brigade have likely only been serving in the Bakhmut direction for about two weeks, as ISW reported on June 21 that Russian forces deployed elements of the 83rd Guards VDV Brigade to the Klishchiivka area to replace elements of the 31st Guards VDV Brigade that had suffered heavy losses.[48]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City).[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[50] Prominent Russian milblogger and former Russian officer Igor Girkin characterized the Russian attacks near Avdiivka as “meatgrinder assaults.”[51] Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov published footage on July 7 and claimed that Chechen forces, possibly “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units, use loitering munitions to strike Ukrainian underground fortifications in Marinka.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts on July 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Blahodatne (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), Rivnopil (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[54] The Russian Ministry MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Group of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack and destroyed a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Urozhaine.[55] Russian milbloggers amplified footage claiming to show units of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) repelling a Ukrainian attack and destroying Ukrainian equipment near Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[56]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 8. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[57] Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces are destroying Russian equipment, weapons, and ammunition depots in this direction to significantly reduce Russian capabilities.[58] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valery Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces have achieved partial success and advanced in the Melitopol direction.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from the Pyatykhaty-Zherebyanky area, about 25 km southwest of Orikhiv.[60] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian reconnaissance units near Marfopil (9km south of Hulyaipole) and Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and stopped a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Dorozhnyanka (6km south of Hulyaipole).[61]

Russian milbloggers continue to contradict the Russian MoD’s official narrative regarding the claimed defeat of a Ukrainian presence near the Antonivsky Bridge on July 1. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still have observation posts or hold other limited positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[62] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are working to remove Ukrainian forces from the area and continue to repel Ukrainian attempts to land reinforcements on the east (left) bank.[63] Another milblogger claimed that Russian reporting that Ukrainian forces have been cleared from those positions is a “blurring” of reality.[64]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reportedly observed combat training of Russian contract servicemen at the Southern Military District (SMD) training grounds on July 8, likely in an attempt to favorably portray Russian formalization efforts and incentivize personnel recruitment.[65] The Russian MoD announced that Head of the Russian Main Combat Training Directorate Colonel General Ivan Buvaltsev reported to Shoigu about the training progress of the new formations, and Shoigu inspected the driving and firing exercises of T-90 tank crews. Russian state media showed Shoigu inspecting a row of Russian tanks.[66] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian contract servicemen are currently undergoing a 38-day intensive training course that trains personnel in urban warfare, combat coordination, and other military skills such as combat driving and special equipment. The servicemen reportedly underwent two weeks of individual training before beginning the 38-day program. The Russian MoD is continuing its efforts to incentivize Russian volunteers to sign military contracts with the Russian Armed Forces, and Shoigu’s visit to the SMD training camp was likely an advertisement attempt to facilitate further recruitment.

Elements of the 83rd Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade are complaining about a lack of rotations and expressing low morale after being recently committed to Bakhmut’s southern flank. Russian State Duma Deputy for the Republic of Sakha, Sardana Avksentyeva, sent a written appeal to Shoigu on July 8 regarding the complaints she received from families of the servicemen serving in the 83rd Guards VDV Brigade.[67] Avksentyeva asked Shoigu to provide information on the provision of holidays and on rotation procedures and asked Shoigu to initiate an inspection into the command of the 83rd Guards VDV Brigade. Avksentyeva’s appeal likely indicates that elements of the 83rd Guards VDV Brigade – who are currently fighting and losing ground near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) – have expressed concerns over the lack of personnel rotations to their families. The lack of rotations likely supports other indicators that Russian forces lack operational reserves. The unit’s complaint about holidays also indicates low morale as these forces appear to be less concerned with repelling ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks than about returning home.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Ukrainian government has indicated that Russian occupation authorities struggle to compensate staff in critical industries, resulting in staffing shortages that could hinder the Russian war effort. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities pay poor wages to railway workers in occupied Ukraine, resulting in 1,600 workers leaving the occupation-run Donetsk Railways enterprise in 2022 and 750 so far in 2023.[68] The Resistance Center noted that the new Russian effort to restructure occupied rail companies into the “Railways of Novorossiya” structure will further decrease railway staffing levels. The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that poor Russian salaries and reorganization efforts, as well as forcibly mobilizing civilians in occupied territories, have reduced the number of miners in occupied Ukraine by over 50 percent.[69]

Russian occupation authorities continue fostering patronage networks with Russian federal subjects to bolster infrastructure projects. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that Ryazan Oblast is providing building materials to the Kherson Oblast occupation administration.[70] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration also reported that the Republic of Mordovia is leading restoration efforts of the Kalanchak Raion multifunctional center.[71]

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to repopulate areas of occupied Ukraine with Russians. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that Russian civilians are purchasing land and real estate in occupied Mariupol.[72]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Follow ISW on social media: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, LinkedIn, Telegram, Post, Mastodon, Threads

2. Why the Ukraine Counteroffensive Is Such Slow Going

Excerpts:

“It’s impossible to completely destroy such a well-prepared position before advancing,” said a 38-year-old rifle unit commander in the 108^th brigade, who goes by the call sign Vados. To be able to take it, he said, Ukrainian artillery forces would need to first bombard the area and then advance with armored vehicles to bring in infantry. A shortage of tanks and other armored vehicles has made that strategy hard to execute, he said.

Assaulting entrenched occupiers has been a grinding feat even for the world’s top armed forces. Allies in World War II, after gaining a beachhead in France on D-Day, needed more than two months to break through German blockades and push inland. In 1991, before coalition land forces advanced in Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. led a five-week air campaign to wear down Iraqi positions.

Ukraine lacks the firepower and air-superiority that America and its partners had in those fights. Kyiv’s air force consists of a small number of Soviet-era fighter jets and helicopters, some supplied by former East Bloc allies now in NATO.

The Russians, meanwhile, are deploying advanced Sukhoi fighter jets and Ka-52 helicopters across the southern front.

Why the Ukraine Counteroffensive Is Such Slow Going

Outgunned, outmanned and facing a deeply entrenched enemy, Ukrainian troops are attempting one of the most daunting operations a military can undertake

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-war-counteroffensive-frontlines-russia-add3e4e4?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Ian LovettFollow

and Daniel MichaelsFollow

July 9, 2023 12:08 am ET

On a hilltop near the occupied southern Ukrainian town of Polohy, Russian forces set up an observation point that can spot Ukrainian soldiers more than 6 miles away. Four times, Ukrainian forces destroyed the Murom-M surveillance system, said Lt. Col. Oleksiy Telehin, of Ukraine’s 108^th Territorial Defense brigade. Four times, the Russians promptly installed a new one.

Ukraine successfully outmaneuvered Russia’s far larger invading forces last year, despite being outmanned, outgunned and vastly overpowered in the air. With a nimble approach, superior knowledge of the terrain and the efficient use of drones and digital technology, its units were able to repel a far larger army that often seemed lumbering and mired in bureaucracy.

That’s all over. Ukraine is now attempting to dislodge an entrenched enemy, one of the most daunting operations any military can undertake. Russian troops have spent months building physical defenses that include bunkers, tank traps and minefields—some more than 15 miles deep.

In this phase of the war, Ukraine’s lack of resources is proving as much of a challenge as the dug-in Russian defenses. Despite the delivery of new Western weapons in recent months—and a promise by the U.S. Friday to send deadly cluster munitions in the future—Kyiv’s effort to push south through Russian territory toward the Sea of Azov has stalled. Though Ukrainian officials say they are making progress, and have reclaimed a handful of villages in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions over the past month, they also acknowledge the herculean nature of their task.

“If we kill a whole unit—100 soldiers—the next day they will bring another unit. And the day after, another,” Lt. Col. Telehin said.

For Russian forces, who earlier this year tried to take more Ukrainian territory, “the offensive wasn’t successful, but holding defensive positions will be easier,” said Michael O’Hanlon, a specialist in security studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. He pointed to the Russian mobilization of more than 250,000 troops last year.

Ukrainian servicemen operate an M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle in the Zaporizhzhia region. PHOTO: SERHII NUZHNENKO/REUTERS

Ukrainian soldiers said the Russians in the Zaporizhzhia region have constructed miles of zigzagging, interconnected trenches, some of them reinforced with concrete, or covered with wood-and-earth roofs so they are difficult to spot using drones. Fields are heavily mined. In at least two cases, Ukrainian soldiers said, the bodies of their killed comrades had been mined as well.

“It’s impossible to completely destroy such a well-prepared position before advancing,” said a 38-year-old rifle unit commander in the 108^th brigade, who goes by the call sign Vados. To be able to take it, he said, Ukrainian artillery forces would need to first bombard the area and then advance with armored vehicles to bring in infantry. A shortage of tanks and other armored vehicles has made that strategy hard to execute, he said.

Assaulting entrenched occupiers has been a grinding feat even for the world’s top armed forces. Allies in World War II, after gaining a beachhead in France on D-Day, needed more than two months to break through German blockades and push inland. In 1991, before coalition land forces advanced in Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. led a five-week air campaign to wear down Iraqi positions.

Ukraine lacks the firepower and air-superiority that America and its partners had in those fights. Kyiv’s air force consists of a small number of Soviet-era fighter jets and helicopters, some supplied by former East Bloc allies now in NATO.

The Russians, meanwhile, are deploying advanced Sukhoi fighter jets and Ka-52 helicopters across the southern front.

Poland, a staunch ally of Ukraine, recently sent Kyiv about a dozen Soviet-designed Mi-24 helicopter gunships, according to people familiar with the matter, in a transfer not previously disclosed. But Ukraine’s fleet remains small compared with Russia’s, with less sophisticated targeting and defensive systems. Kyiv uses it sparingly to avoid losing aircraft.

“The Ukrainians have made gains, but they face fierce fighting, tough terrain and well-prepared Russian defensive lines,” said North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. He said the situation is “an argument for continuing our support.”

At NATO’s summit this week in Lithuania, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is slated to attend, alliance leaders will “send the message that we will be there for as long as it takes,” Stoltenberg said.

NATO countries are discussing sending Ukraine U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets, but the planes are unlikely to enter the war this year. Lacking F-16s, Ukraine is lobbying allies for shells of all sizes—from machine gun bullets to artillery projectiles.

The U.S. recently said it would send Ukraine cluster munitions, which have the potential to kill or wound more Russians. Fired from artillery, the shells spew small bomblets over a wide area. Their downside is that some fail to explode, potentially endangering civilians after a conflict ends.

A Ka-52 helicopter gunship of the Russian air force fires rockets over Ukraine. PHOTO: RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY PRESS S/ASSOCIATED PRESS

A video still of Ukrainian military hardware destroyed by Russian Ka-52 helicopter crews. PHOTO: RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY/TASS/ZUMA PRESS

Kyiv is trying to soften the Russian defenses before sending troops in, but doesn’t have enough ammunition to simply flatten Russian-held villages, as the Russians did in Bakhmut and other parts of eastern Ukraine. Instead, Ukrainian troops usually make artillery strikes only if they have confirmed Russian positions with drones.

Soldiers said a lack of armored vehicles was also slowing their efforts to advance. Speaking recently from a command post in the Zaporizhzhia region, Vados, the rifle-unit commander, said that his unit had tried to assault a Russian-held village the previous day. As Ukrainian infantry advanced on foot, the Russians moved to surround them.

“If we had more vehicles, we could have brought more infantry to the flanks,” Vados, a lieutenant, said. Instead, the unit retreated without taking the village. In the month since the offensive began, Vados said he hasn’t been part of an operation that successfully seized a well-prepared Russian position.

Ukraine still hasn’t thrown into battle much of its best new Western equipment. Kyiv has dozens of German-made Leopard 2 tanks, but after several of them got stuck in minefields in early June, they haven’t been seen on the battlefield. Some brigades that were spared from the fighting earlier this year to train on the Western equipment also haven’t been used since the offensive began.

Military analysts believe Ukraine is still probing for weak spots before committing the bulk of its Western weaponry. The reconnaissance is difficult because Russians can often see Ukrainians approaching across open ground.

Russia’s hilltop lookout post near Polohy proved particularly frustrating. A rare rise in a region of fields, it gives Moscow’s troops a big advantage.

High ground has always been the most valuable terrain in warfare and also the most contested, forming the centerpiece of fights from the first-century siege of Masada to the Battle of Gettysburg.

Vados, rifle-unit commander in the 108th Brigade. PHOTO: SERHII KOROVAYNY FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

A medic who goes by the call sign Lysyy, or Bald. PHOTO: SERHII KOROVAYNY FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Ukrainian officials have declined throughout the war to discuss casualty figures. But soldiers on the southern front say that a unit can sometimes lose dozens of men in one assault.

A 19-year-old combat medic, who goes by the call sign Bald, said he made three runs to pick up injured comrades during a recent assault, transporting eight men to stabilization points. Earlier in the summer, a mortar hit his car during an evacuation. Another vehicle came to pick up the growing number of wounded.

“We had to evacuate the evacuation team,” he said.

Ukrainian forces have shot down some of Russia’s helicopters in recent weeks. One soldier from an antiaircraft unit near the border of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions said Russian choppers sometimes fly within 5 miles of Ukrainian troops. The proximity improves Russian attackers’ accuracy, but also leaves them vulnerable. The soldier said he shot down two in one week last month, using Soviet-era antiaircraft systems.

Still, infantry say the aircrafts remain a menace.

“We don’t have proper air defense systems to deal with the threat,” said Dmytro, a 40-year-old platoon commander in the 108^th brigade. “When we’re warned that an enemy plane has taken off, the only way to deal with it is to take cover.”

The region of mostly flat, open fields separated by thin treelines offers little protection. In the spring, some troops who fought in the area questioned whether an offensive could succeed here, given the landscape.

The difficulty of the task hasn’t been a surprise, Lt. Col. Telehin said.

“We knew that to be able to move forward against such well prepared defenses,” he said, “we’d need experience, resources and surprise.”

—Nikita Nikolaienko, Sharon Weinberger and Karolina Jeznach contributed to this article.

Ukrainian soldiers cover their ears to protect from Russian tank shelling in a shelter in the Zaporizhzhia region. PHOTO: LIBKOS/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Write to Ian Lovett at ian.lovett@wsj.com and Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

3. Congress Dives Back Into Fights on Spending Cuts, Military as Deadline Draws Near

Congress Dives Back Into Fights on Spending Cuts, Military as Deadline Draws Near

Lawmakers have to approve a series of bills ahead of the new fiscal year’s Oct. 1 start

By David Harrison

Follow

July 9, 2023 5:30 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-dives-back-into-fights-on-spending-cuts-military-as-deadline-draws-nears-c9fcee?mod=hp_lead_pos6

WASHINGTON—Lawmakers face a stacked legislative agenda with the threat of a government shutdown looming in the fall, marking a fresh test of Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s ability to keep his conference in line and Congress functioning.

Top of mind on Capitol Hill as lawmakers return from recess this week are the annual spending bills to keep the government open, which must be enacted by the time the new fiscal year starts on Oct. 1. Other priorities include legislation authorizing military programs, updating agriculture and food-aid policy and keeping the country’s airports running, all of which must also be enacted by the new fiscal year, although Congress can also agree to temporarily extend current programs.

While must-pass bills often go down to the wire, the tensions this year are higher because of McCarthy’s shaky hold on the House GOP conference and some conservatives’ resentment over the terms of the recent debt-ceiling deal. Conservative insurgents have forced McCarthy to make significant concessions in recent weeks in the House budget appropriations process, setting up a clash with moderate Republicans and the Democrats who control the Senate.

Besides the various must-pass bills, House and Senate leaders could devote some of their energy before August’s long break to other priorities. For instance, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.) has said he wants to take up a freight-rail safety bill introduced by Ohio Sens. Sherrod Brown, a Democrat, and J.D. Vance, a Republican.

Ohio Sens. Sherrod Brown, a Democrat, and J.D. Vance, a Republican, have introduced a freight-rail safety bill. PHOTO: ANNA MONEYMAKER/GETTY IMAGES

Competing for attention in the House are calls from conservative members to potentially move forward with efforts to impeach Biden administration officials including Attorney General Merrick Garland and Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas. McCarthy recently headed off a push to hold an impeachment vote on President Biden, holding a vote instead to send the matter to a committee.

Last month, in an effort to appease conservative insurgents in the House, McCarthy and other top House Republicans agreed to diverge from the terms of the debt-ceiling bill he had negotiated with the White House. Instead of holding nonmilitary discretionary spending roughly flat next year, they agreed to cut spending back to 2022 levels.

The debt-ceiling agreement “set a top-line spending cap—a ceiling, not a floor—for fiscal year 2024 bills,” argued Rep. Kay Granger (R., Texas) who, as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, is responsible for shepherding the spending bills.

That infuriated Democrats who accused Republicans of reneging on the agreement. Senate Democrats are preparing spending bills in line with the figures in the debt-ceiling agreement. House and Senate spending plans will have to be reconciled by Oct. 1 to keep the government operating.

If the two sides can’t resolve their differences by the deadline, as is often the case, they could agree to keep existing funding levels in place while they continue to negotiate, essentially punting a decision until later. But it isn’t clear that House conservatives would be willing to do that.

Another wrinkle this year is a provision in the debt-ceiling agreement that would impose cuts on military and other spending if lawmakers fail to enact spending bills by Jan. 1. In theory, Congress must enact 12 individual spending bills directing money to various agencies and programs, although those bills are often bundled together.

Sarah Binder, a political scientist at George Washington University, said that provision likely means lawmakers will be able to postpone a major fight on government spending until the winter. They could even push past the Jan. 1 deadline, since the automatic cuts don’t take effect until April, she said.

“Some of these deadlines are a bit malleable,” she said. “It seems really the rubber does not exactly hit the road until we get to the fall season, even though it could slip past Jan. 1.”

Rep. Kay Granger (R., Texas), chair of the House Appropriations Committee, says spending levels in the recent debt-ceiling agreement are ‘a ceiling, not a floor’ for next year. PHOTO: BILL CLARK/ZUMA PRESS

Other must-pass priorities will be competing for lawmakers’ attention.

The National Defense Authorization Act, which allocates over $870 billion for the Defense Department’s annual budget, represents another challenge for Congress.

A version of the bill passed the House Armed Services Committee with a resounding 58-1 vote and features a variety of Republican-favored policies to curtail the Pentagon’s diversity initiatives, reinstate troops who bucked vaccine mandates and prevent environmental clampdowns on the military’s operations.

Conservatives are also pushing to repeal a Biden administration policy covering travel expenses and time off to female service members who need to travel for abortion services.

Including an abortion provision in the defense bill could make passage difficult in the House and sets up a clash with the Senate.

Kevin McCarthy, (R., Calif.), is expected to face pressure from within his conference for more changes to food aid and the farm safety-net in the farm bill. PHOTO: ANNA MONEYMAKER/GETTY IMAGES

Lawmakers also hope to pass a new version of the five-year farm bill by year’s end. The most bitter partisan battle typically occurs over the food-stamp program, which provides aid for low-income households to buy food.

Lawmakers agreed to beef up work requirements for food aid as part of a deal to raise the debt limit earlier this year, but Republicans have signaled they may press for further changes in the farm bill. In a tight budget environment, lawmakers are also bracing for a fight over which, if any, farming safety-net programs will get a funding boost. Because conservative Republicans often balk at some of the government support provided in the farm bill, McCarthy will likely need bipartisan support to get the legislation passed in the House, potentially putting him at odds with conservatives in the House Freedom Caucus.

Finally, Congress will have to reauthorize the Federal Aviation Administration by the end of the fiscal year, setting priorities for the country’s air-travel management. Both the House and Senate have introduced bipartisan reauthorization bills but conflict could still flare up as the measures move to the floor.

Already, an amendment sponsored by Sens. Kyrsten Sinema (I., Ariz.) and John Thune (R., S.D.) that would credit alternative training methods toward the 1,500 hours of flight training required for aspiring commercial pilots has sparked opposition from many Democrats.

Kristina Peterson and Simon J. Levien contributed to this article.

Write to David Harrison at david.harrison@wsj.com

4. Busting this big myth about Baby Boomers reveals something about Gen Z, too

Reflection for a Sunday.

I just skimmed through the documentary film on Woodstock (I was interested in re-watching some of the performances). I am glad this was not representative of all of us boomers.

I recommend Louis Menands's book The Free World: Art and Thought in the Cold War. A review is that this link: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/06/louis-menand-the-free-world-cold-war/618713/. Quote from the review: "The book is so masterful, and exhibits such brilliant writing and exhaustive research, that I wonder whether Menand could truly have intended where his history of the postwar era landed me. I learned so much, and ended up caring so much less."

Excerpts:

But in his recent post about Pew’s new approach to generational research, Dimock says this anti-war image is an example of an “upper-class bias” that often surfaces when we generalize about generations.

“Popular history recalls that Baby Boomers in the 1960s and ’70s were deeply opposed to the Vietnam War. This notion is based on attention-grabbing protests on college campuses and at political events,” Dimock writes. “Many high-quality surveys at the time showed that younger Americans – most of whom were not attending college – were more supportive of the war than older generations who had lived through previous conflicts.”

Opinion of the war, both nationally and on college campuses, shifted over time. By 1969, a Gallup poll found that 50% of college students supported the war, but there were notable regional differences. Criticism of President Nixon’s Vietnam policies were more prevalent on East Coast campuses. But in other parts of the US, students were significantly more supportive.

Cultural critic Louis Menand has pointed out that another important detail often gets overlooked when talking about this chapter in Baby Boomers’ past.

Many were children during some of the 1960s most notable cultural and political shifts.

“At the time of Woodstock, in 1969, more than half the baby-boom generation was under thirteen,” Menand wrote in a New Yorker story.

Menand, a Baby Boomer himself, says his generation is incorrectly credited with liberal initiatives that were really driven by people from earlier generations.

“All the things that we think about as typical of the ‘60s, activism, liberation movements, none of that stuff really is attributable to my generation,” Menand told CNN in a recent interview. “We were passive. We were consumers. We weren’t producers.”

And those who did attend the famed 1969 concert, he says, were only a sliver of the population. Most young people in the 1960s, Menand says, “did not practice free love, take drugs, or protest the war in Vietnam.”

In other words, one of the most well-known images tied to Baby Boomers in their youth wasn’t the reality lived by most members of that generation.

Busting this big myth about Baby Boomers reveals something about Gen Z, too | CNN

CNN · by Catherine E. Shoichet · July 8, 2023

CNN —

There’s nearly a 50-year age gap between the oldest Baby Boomer and the youngest member of Gen Z. And for years we’ve heard how different these generations can be, from how they spend their money to how they work to how they use emojis.

We’ve seen “OK Boomer” trend on TikTok as Gen Z criticized their elders, and heard Boomers retort that younger generations should “stop whining.”

But Baby Boomers and Gen Z have something in common that’s often overlooked: Bias is shaping the way we talk about them, allowing stereotypes and myths to drown out facts and reality.

It’s an important point the president of the Pew Research Center made in a recent post. And it’s worth unpacking, because it has big implications for how we can better understand huge swaths of the US population – and the country’s political future.

As Pew President Michael Dimock put it, a common misconception about Baby Boomers’ past serves as a reminder of a key question we should be asking as we talk about Gen Z today.

What many get wrong about Boomers’ history

Student protests of the Vietnam War are a common reference point in contemporary conversations about Baby Boomers, the generation born between 1946 and 1964.

But in his recent post about Pew’s new approach to generational research, Dimock says this anti-war image is an example of an “upper-class bias” that often surfaces when we generalize about generations.

“Popular history recalls that Baby Boomers in the 1960s and ’70s were deeply opposed to the Vietnam War. This notion is based on attention-grabbing protests on college campuses and at political events,” Dimock writes. “Many high-quality surveys at the time showed that younger Americans – most of whom were not attending college – were more supportive of the war than older generations who had lived through previous conflicts.”

Opinion of the war, both nationally and on college campuses, shifted over time. By 1969, a Gallup poll found that 50% of college students supported the war, but there were notable regional differences. Criticism of President Nixon’s Vietnam policies were more prevalent on East Coast campuses. But in other parts of the US, students were significantly more supportive.

Cultural critic Louis Menand has pointed out that another important detail often gets overlooked when talking about this chapter in Baby Boomers’ past.

Many were children during some of the 1960s most notable cultural and political shifts.

“At the time of Woodstock, in 1969, more than half the baby-boom generation was under thirteen,” Menand wrote in a New Yorker story.

Menand, a Baby Boomer himself, says his generation is incorrectly credited with liberal initiatives that were really driven by people from earlier generations.

“All the things that we think about as typical of the ‘60s, activism, liberation movements, none of that stuff really is attributable to my generation,” Menand told CNN in a recent interview. “We were passive. We were consumers. We weren’t producers.”

Baby Boomers are often tied to the Woodstock Music Festival, but many were children when the famed 1969 concerts took place.

Owen Franken/Corbis/Getty Images

And those who did attend the famed 1969 concert, he says, were only a sliver of the population. Most young people in the 1960s, Menand says, “did not practice free love, take drugs, or protest the war in Vietnam.”

In other words, one of the most well-known images tied to Baby Boomers in their youth wasn’t the reality lived by most members of that generation.

It’s a lesson that applies to other generations, too.

As Dimock points out after describing this widely believed Baby Boomer myth, “Readers today should similarly question whether stereotypes of Gen Z might be skewed toward the experiences of the upper middle class.”

A major conversation right now is misunderstanding much of Gen Z’s reality

For Gen Z, one of the starkest examples of upper-class bias often bubbles up in media reports that try to predict workplace trends, according to Kim Parker, Pew’s director of social trends research.

“A lot of the discussion about Gen Z and work leaves out such a big swath of young people and their experiences,” Parker says.

The generation, generally described as those born between 1997 and 2012, is often tied to conversations about remote work. But that’s missing a key point, Parker says.

“Most workers, and particularly young workers, don’t even have jobs that can be done remotely,” she says.

A Pew study in late 2020 found that remote work was an option for less than a third of workers aged 18-29, an age range that would include members of Gen Z and Millennials, another generation that’s often subject to stereotyping.

Members of those generations are more heavily concentrated in service-sector, hospitality and retail jobs, Parker says.

And Gen Z may not be as ‘woke’ as you think

Could our understanding of Gen Z’s politics – frequently described as liberal – also be missing part of the picture?

Psychologist Jean M. Twenge thinks so, though she says class bias may not have as much to do with it.

“There are examples out there based on anecdotes, or only looking at certain regions, or people trying to extrapolate based on their kids’ and kids’ friends,” she says.

Even as many members of Gen Z do have more liberal viewpoints, there’s still a sizeable conservative contingent, says Twenge, author of “Generations: The Real Differences between Gen Z, Millennials, Gen X, Boomers and Silents — and What They Mean for America’s Future.”

“With young people in general and Gen Z in particular earning a reputation as liberals, it’s especially surprising how many politically are far right,” she writes in her book.

Twenge, a professor at San Diego State University, cites studies of high school seniors and college freshmen and observes a common thread: “There is a groundswell of support for the extremes of political belief.”

“More high school seniors now identify as ‘very conservative’ (as opposed to merely ‘conservative’) – surprisingly twice as many Gen Zers identify as very conservative as Gen X high school seniors in the Reagan era late 1980s,” she writes. “The number identifying as ‘very liberal’ or radical has also increased, but more moderately.”

Menand, an English professor at Harvard, says that when talking with his own students he regularly sees how stereotypes about Gen Z’s politics don’t match up with reality.

“I have more students that complain about wokeness than are woke,” he says.

Some findings about Gen Z after recent polling have painted a more complicated picture of voters from that generation.

“We were surprised,” says Whitney Ross Manzo, an associate professor of political science at Meredith College and assistant director of its Meredith Poll.

She and coauthor David McLennan summarized some of their results in an opinion piece for The Hill last year, titled “Why Generation Z might not be as ‘woke’ as most think.”

The Meredith Poll, which surveys North Carolina residents, did find that Gen Z voters had more liberal views on issues like abortion rights, LGBTQ+ protections and legalization of marijuana. But the poll also recently found that over half of Gen Z respondents felt it was more important to have a strong leader than to protect democracy, and two-thirds agreed that force should be used if the American way of life was disappearing.

“They were embracing authoritarianism more than we would have guessed,” Manzo says.

Young supporters of former President Donald Trump cheer at the Turning Point USA Student Action Summit in Tampa, Florida, on July 23, 2022.

Joe Raedle/Getty Images

“In poll after poll, we have found enormous diversity among Gen Z and their views,” she says.

And leaders from either party preparing for America’s political future, she says, ignore this at their peril.

“We don’t think it’s going to be as clear-cut as a lot of pundits have made it seem like it’s going to be,” she says.

We hear a lot about Baby Boomers vs. Gen Z, but there’s a bigger debate happening

When it comes to Gen Z’s politics, experts say another point is often overstated by market researchers, consultants and journalists.

The more conservative Baby Boomers and the more liberal Gen Z are portrayed like opposing forces in generation wars rather than people with shared goals living in the same society.

“It feels like we’re incredibly tense or divided between the generations,” says Bobby Duffy, a professor of public policy and director of the Policy Institute at King’s College London. That, Duffy says, is a tale as old as time.

“The issues change, but there’s always a difference between the attitudes of young and old,” says Duffy, author of “The Generation Myth: Why When You’re Born Matters Less Than You Think.”

That doesn’t mean there’s no common ground. Within any generation, there’s a wide variety of opinions and life experiences that can easily get lost when we talk about everyone born in certain years as a monolithic group.

High school students in Tampa gathered in March 2022 to protest the Republican-backed bill dubbed "Don't Say Gay" that prohibits classroom discussion of sexual orientation and gender identity. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis signed the measure into law later that month.

Octavio Jones/Reuters

That’s why experts have been weighing a larger question: Should we label generations at all?

Pew had been planning a large research project on Gen Z, but recently halted that effort to reassess its approach to generational research in the face of criticism from a group of social scientists who’ve been arguing that generation labels are harmful and unscientific.

That’s significant because Pew is known as one of the most authoritative sources on generations, including its oft-cited definitions of when different generations begin and end.

Now Pew is changing its approach.

Going forward, Pew says it will only analyze generations when it has enough data to compare different generations in similar stages of life, to make sure it’s highlighting generational change rather than differences based on age that can change over time. The organization also says it’s trying to avoid perpetuating stereotypes and will no longer default to using standard generational labels.

“Our recommendation is for readers to bring a healthy dose of skepticism to the generational discussions they see,” Dimock says.

That includes reports about generations, he says, that “assume or exaggerate intergenerational divides that may actually be quite small.”

In the end, when we look at the facts, we may find that Baby Boomers and Gen Z have even more in common than how misunderstood they often are.

CNN · by Catherine E. Shoichet · July 8, 2023

5. China Controls Minerals That Run the World—and It Just Fired a Warning Shot at U.S.

China Controls Minerals That Run the World—and It Just Fired a Warning Shot at U.S.

Beijing’s export restrictions on two minerals this week show it is willing to use its dominance to rock Western supply chains

By Jon Emont

Updated July 7, 2023 11:49 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-controls-minerals-that-run-the-worldand-just-fired-a-warning-shot-at-u-s-5961d77b?utm_source=pocket_saves

SINGAPORE—China’s decision this week to restrict the export of two minerals used in semiconductors, solar panels and missile systems was more than a trade salvo. It was a reminder of its dominant hold over the world’s mineral resources—and a warning of its willingness to use them in its escalating rivalry with the U.S.

Around two-thirds of the world’s lithium and cobalt—essential for electric cars—is processed in China. The country is the source of nearly 60% of aluminum, also used in EV batteries, and 80% of polysilicon, an ingredient in solar panels. It has an even tighter grip on rare-earth minerals that go into crucial technologies, like making smartphone touch screens and missile-defense systems, accounting for 90% of their refining, according to the International Energy Agency.

Chinese companies also often control processing that isn’t done at home. A significant share of the world’s nickel supply, for instance, comes directly from China, but much of the rest is also in Chinese hands, refined by companies from China in places such as Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

On Friday, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen told U.S. businesses in China that the Biden administration was still evaluating Beijing’s decision announced Monday to restrict the export of gallium and germanium, but the move was a reminder of the importance of diversified supply chains.

The Future of War Has Come in Ukraine: Drone Swarms

The innovations that have led to Kyiv’s remarkable successes against Russia will change combat dramatically.

By Eric Schmidt

July 7, 2023 3:25 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-future-of-war-has-come-in-ukraine-drone-swarms-kamikaze-kyiv-31dd19d7?reflink=article_copyURL_share&st=2d8gbh58m374l1s&utm

A Ukrainian serviceman operates a drone with a grenade attached to it along the front line, June 28. PHOTO: ALEX BABENKO/ZUMA PRESS

Kramatorsk, Ukraine

My most recent trip to Ukraine revealed a burgeoning military reality: The future of war will be dictated and waged by drones.

Amid a front line covering 600 miles, the Ukrainian counteroffensive faces a formidable Russian force, as it tries to break through to the Azov Sea and stop the Russian overland supply line to Crimea. Between the two armies, there are at least 3 miles of heavily mined territory followed by rows of concrete antitank obstacles, with artillery pieces hidden in nearby forests. The Russian military has amassed so much artillery and ammunition that it can afford to fire 50,000 rounds a day—an order of magnitude more than Ukraine.

Traditional military doctrine suggests that an advancing force should have air superiority and a 3-to-1 advantage in soldiers to make steady progress against a dug-in opponent. Ukrainians have neither. That they’ve succeeded anyway is owing to their ability to adopt and adapt new technologies such as drones.

Drones extend the Ukrainian infantry’s limited reach. Reconnaissance drones keep soldiers safe, constantly monitoring Russian attacks and providing feedback to correct artillery targeting. During the daytime, they fly over enemy lines to identify targets; at night, they return with payloads.

Unfortunately, Russia has picked up these tactics, too. Behind the initial minefields and trenches blocking Kyiv’s advance, there’s a more heavily defended line. If courageous Ukrainians make it there, Russian soldiers will send in drones and artillery. All the while Russia’s army—which excels at jamming and GPS spoofing—is working to take out Ukrainian drones. A May report from the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies estimated that Ukraine was losing as many as 10,000 a month even before the start of the counteroffensive.

Yet Ukraine has continually out-innovated the enemy. Its latest drone models can prevent jamming, operate without GPS guidance and drop guided bombs on moving targets. Ukrainian command centers use personal computers and open-source software to classify targets and execute operations.

Ukraine has also pioneered a more effective model of decentralized military operations that makes its tech use varied and quickly evolving. In the war’s early stages, Ukraine’s government put the new Digital Ministry in charge of drone procurement but left important decision making to smaller units. While the ministry sets standards and purchases drones, the brigades are empowered to choose and operate them. Ten programmers can change the way thousands of soldiers operate. One brigade I visited independently designed its own multilayered visual planning system, which coordinates units’ actions.

To win this war, Ukraine needs to rethink 100 years of traditional military tactics focused on trenches, mortars and artillery. But the innovations it and Russia make will carry on far beyond this particular conflict.

Perhaps the most important is the kamikaze drone. Deployed in volume, this first-person-view drone—invented for the sport of drone racing—is cheaper than a mortar round and more accurate than artillery fire. Kamikaze drones cost around $400 and can carry up to 3 pounds of explosives. In the hands of a skilled operator with several months of training, these drones fly so fast they are nearly impossible to shoot down.

Costly materiel, such as combat aircraft that are vulnerable to missile attacks, will be replaced by cheaper drones—operating on land, sea and air. In the future, like murmurations of starlings, ruthless swarms of AI-empowered kamikaze drones will track mobile targets and algorithmically collaborate to strike past an enemy’s electronic countermeasures. Naval drones will take the same concepts into the sea, converging like a shoal of small torpedoes at the waterline of targeted ships. Land-based drones will clear obstacles, demine fields and eventually act as remote machine guns and other weapons.

As I departed Ukraine, what stuck with me were the rolling fields along the Dnipro River, with cinnabar-colored flowers covering the gentle landscape. In the 1930s, Stalin enforced the Holodomor, the forced starvation of about four million Ukrainians in the middle of the breadbasket of Europe. The industry of the tractors cultivating fields only miles from the front line was a powerful reminder of how human civilization can withstand unbelievable hardship—and emerge stronger.

The war in Ukraine shows us the best and worst humanity can offer, from the ruthlessness of the invasion to the bravery of the defenders. It’s also a stark warning of the future wars to come. Just as drones can be deployed to protect soldiers, they can be used to hunt civilians.

The world needs to learn and innovate from the lessons of this emerging form of fighting to be ready to deter and prevent such conflict from ever happening again.

Mr. Schmidt was CEO of Google, 2001-11, and executive chairman of Google and its successor, Alphabet Inc., 2011-17. He is the chairman of the Special Competitive Studies Project and a co-author of “The Age of AI: And Our Human Future.”

‘Several Things Have Shocked Me’: An Ex-Insider on Business in China

The New York Times · by Ravi Mattu · July 8, 2023

Desmond Shum built a multibillion-dollar empire in the boom times, and says the economy is in far worse shape than outsiders realize.

July 8, 2023, 7:43 a.m. ET

Desmond Shum’s 2021 memoir lifted the lid on links between business and politics in China.Credit...Andrew Testa for The New York Times

Desmond Shum was one of China’s most well-connected businessmen. He and his former wife, Duan Weihong, used their relationships with top government officials to build a multibillion-dollar property development company during a golden age for entrepreneurs starting in the mid-1990s.

Now, tensions with the West dominate discussion, with Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen sharply criticizing China’s treatment of American companies on a trip to Beijing this week.

Mr. Shum left China in 2015 as Xi Jinping, the country’s leader, asserted greater state control over the country and its businesses. Duan, also known as Whitney, disappeared two years later. (It is believed that Communist Party officials detained her after a high-ranking political ally was held on suspicion of corruption.)

Mr. Shum told the story of their rise and fall — and the murky reality of doing business in China — in his 2021 memoir. Many details cannot be independently verified but his role at the intersection of business and politics is certain. He now lives in Britain with the couple’s son (neither of them has seen Duan since she vanished) and says it is unsafe for him to travel to China.

Mr. Shum will testify next week in Congress about the challenges for U.S. businesses operating in China. This conversation has been condensed and edited for clarity.

What has changed since you published your book?

First, the perception of China has become more negative. Covid has had a lot to do with it, especially in shifting the general public’s views. That has helped to speed things up in terms of how policymakers deal with China — they now have a tide to ride.

Second, the outside world underestimates how badly the Chinese economy is deteriorating. Several things have shocked me in conversations I’ve had with businesspeople in China. A big dairy company is producing more milk powder because people are cutting back on buying milk. Normally this is one of the last things you would cut out.

Many executives also say that staff are blatantly robbing and stealing from companies since the pandemic. Why? They have lost hope because the economic outlook is so bad.

How is this affecting governance and business?

It adds to the growing insecurity of the Chinese Communist Party, so the government is tightening control using measures it introduced during the pandemic. That is affecting business: Raids on due diligence firms with Western ties and restrictions on access to Wind, a Chinese data provider, are part of an effort to control foreigners.

How are international companies adjusting?

Companies are overwhelmingly reducing their exposure. People talk about “deglobalization,” but the proper term is “reglobalization minus China.” You won’t have one country replacing China, but operations are spreading to Vietnam, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and elsewhere. Look at how many Taiwanese manufacturers are moving into Mexico on a large scale. And then you have friendshoring and nearshoring in Europe.

Does the U.S.’s messaging — tough talk while also saying it wants to maintain dialogue — complicate matters?

After four years of Trump and three years of Biden, you see a general consistency on China policy. A slight change or variation in tone won’t affect China’s perception that the U.S.’s view of it is set. They need some lessening of tension for the sake of reviving business confidence and bringing in more capital. If they can mitigate or delay U.S. measures, they want to do that.

Ravi Mattu is the managing editor of DealBook, based in London. He joined The New York Times in 2022 from the Financial Times, where he held a number of senior roles in Hong Kong and London. More about Ravi Mattu

The New York Times · by Ravi Mattu · July 8, 2023

8. Here’s how to fix the Pentagon’s CAPE office

From my former foxhole I cannot recall anything good coming out of CAPE but of course where you stand depends on where you sit and I was probably too far down the chain to observe any good from CAPE.

Here’s how to fix the Pentagon’s CAPE office

The changes must go to the heart of the operation.

defenseone.com · by Winslow T. Wheeler

When the House Armed Services Committee reported its massive 2024 National Defense Authorization Act by an overwhelming 58 to 1 vote, it adopted a quick, simple solution to a research problem. The Pentagon’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, or CAPE, had failed to endorse the congressionally mandated plan of building more amphibious warships on a quicker schedule for the Marines, something President Biden’s fiscal 2024 defense budget request had also eschewed. The House committee’s solution: abolish the agency, fire its director, and give the work to someone else, presumably more servile to the committee, in another Pentagon office.

It’s a bit awkward for a congressional committee to reach across to a separate but equal branch of government to tell people what to think, but the abolition is a recommendation that the House Armed Services Committee can make stick, given Congress’ exclusive constitutional control of funding—if the rest of the House and the Senate agree.

Instead, others in Congress should reject the House Committee’s arrogance and instead fundamentally revitalize CAPE, which—in truth—has not distinguished itself with the kind of work that continuing, even deepening, Pentagon pathologies demand. As discussed below, the fixes must go to the heart of the operation, involving the people and bureaucratic status—perhaps even location—of CAPE.

In the past, firing people and abolishing agencies for thinking what lawmakers in power believe is the wrong thing was a time-honored congressional reaction to unwanted research. In 1995, Congress abolished its own Office of Technology Assessment as one of Newt Gingrich’s so-called reforms of congressional spending.

Not coincidentally, the technology assessment office had failed to match the enthusiasm of most Republicans for a national missile defense. Not long after that, as Sen. Pete Domenici’s, R-N.M., national security analyst on the Senate Budget Committee, I was tasked to resolve a request in a letter from several Republican senators to fire a team of analysts at the Congressional Budget Office who had assessed the cost of a national missile defense significantly higher than the advocates wanted to admit to. As chairman of the Budget Committee, Domenici was in a position to make life miserable for CBO if it did not comply. To his credit, Domenici refused, even though he supported the missile defense. He knew that making CBO the plaything of congressional whims would mean the death of CBO’s credibility.

However, the problem at CAPE goes beyond the House Armed Services Committee’s crude behavior. CAPE was created by Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz. and Carl Levin, D-Mich., in the 2009 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act to replace the previous Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. PA&E, as it was called, had a mixed record. Under some of its directors and managers, such as Russell Murray and Thomas Christie, in the 1970s and 80s, it had a reputation for extraordinary work. But there was no serious objection to its being reorganized into CAPE as its work had declined from the office’s heyday and clearly needed revitalization. Unfortunately, no revival took place. As revealed in a 2018 RAND study, CAPE’s cost analysis was methodologically weak and persistently wrong. The organization was never the center of the badly needed, rigorous analysis of Pentagon problems that had sometimes characterized the earlier PA&E. Note, for instance, the absence of a single example of compelling analysis in a commentary by some former directors of CAPE arguing against the HASC’s recommended abolition.

Some in the Senate Armed Services Committee have serious concerns about the nature and quality of CAPE’s work. These apprehensions are described in the press as a need to “tweak” the organization, perhaps to create in it a “Competitive Analysis Cell” to provoke superior work.

The need to fix CAPE should be obvious. The question is, how?

As an assistant director in GAO’s Program Evaluation and Methodology Division, or PEMD, I had the privilege of working in an organization that had the characteristics that those interested to revitalize CAPE should foster there.). Guided by an incisive and habitually frank director Eleanor Chelimsky, PEMD specialized in how to design breakthrough evaluations and then went on to perform them. In PEMD’s defense section, we executed work that others in GAO said could not be done, and once we did it, our GAO critics said our work couldn’t be right, because the Pentagon didn’t like it. When our comprehensive evaluation of the air war in Desert Storm used a unique data-based synthesis to prove the performance of many high-cost aircraft and munitions was preposterously overstated, our GAO criticsargued that the proof against us was that Air Force officials told them we were wrong. The data the Air Force itself had collected, scores of pilots from the war, and hundreds of after-action and other reports all said otherwise.

Those GAO critics rarely ventured beyond a pathetically weak “this is what officials told us” methodology, and they always tolerated the Pentagon’s selective release of documents to them. To do otherwise would foster unhappy “relations with the agency,” they argued: a revealing proposition

Happily, in my opinion, more recent GAO work has shown some improvement.

The primary lessons of this history are that for better analysis of cost and programs you must have:

● Aggressive and fearless leadership dedicated to the proposition that staff are expected to peel the onion of the research object down to the inner core. And they should expect support from management when others try to obstruct that work in any way;,

● Unrestrained organizational independence to deny others the opportunity to filter, alter, or squelch research. This includes access to all relevant documentation and outside advice and assistance, when needed, to fully achieve selected evaluation objectives, as well as the right to distribute the completed research to all relevant parties, and;

● A highly trained professional staff that has demonstrated real evaluation or auditing skill and is free of affiliations that could compromise work. This means staff who do not have an interest, expressed or implied, toward defense corporations, and who will not be compromised by a current or future professional affiliation. This would mean that an active-duty member of a military service might be inappropriate to assess a program of his/her own service, but evaluating another service’s program might be an effective use of expertise. It could also mean that a retired military expert is preferable to an active-duty one.

Others may have other important suggestions for effective, uncompromised, independent research. If parts of the existing CAPE organization—from the bottom to top—cannot epitomize these characteristics, the need for real change should be obvious. Legislative directives to “tweak” CAPE should have these characteristics very much in mind. If the Pentagon won’t fully cooperate with a CAPE remake, the Senate Armed Services Committee “tweakers” may want to consider moving the cost analysis and program evaluation function to a newly created division in GAO or some other fully independent construct.

There is a caveat, however. Even exemplary leadership with an extraordinary staff and unfettered evaluation power are not a guarantee of ultimate success. PEMD had a long record of making bureaucratic enemies inside GAO by telling other divisions their work was inferior and by doing far better. They struck back. First, our director was fired, and when her successors proved equally supportive of work others did not want done, GAO management abolished the division.

The House Armed Services Committee campaign to punish CAPE for being insufficiently servile is congressional crudeness and arrogance at their worst. However, the work in the Senate to “tweak” CAPE into being a more successful and independent voice for uncompromised research is to be praised. The road to that end is not an easy one, and there is no guarantee that there will not be dead evaluation bodies at the end of the street. But it is an important journey nonetheless.

Winslow Wheeler was an evaluator then assistant director in GAO for nine years. In addition, he spent 22 years working for Republican and Democratic senators and then 13 years at the Center for Defense Information, ultimately as director.

defenseone.com · by Winslow T. Wheeler

9. Taiwan’s new Mumbai office highlights growing ties with India

Excerpts:

The bilateral trade between India and Taiwan currently stands at around US$ 9 billion. But Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, Jaushieh Joseph Wu, has said that Taiwan has an “enormous appetite” to expand ties with India.

Taiwan is a champion chip-maker and India is keen on having a manufacturing facility of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), the world's largest semiconductor firm, in the country.

“Our trade relations have been picking up steam,” the Taiwanese foreign minister has said, and added that “Taiwanese investors are hungry for India and their cooperation in semiconductors has the blessings of the top leadership of the two countries.”

In order to establish itself as a global electronics manufacturing hub, India has announced $10 billion in incentives to attract microchip manufacturers.

Under the plan, India will extend up to 50 percent financial support to semiconductor producers setting up shop in the country.

Taiwan, which set up its TECC in Chennai in 2012, said nearly 60 percent of all Taiwanese business investing and opening factories in India have chosen to set up operations in southern India.

Taiwan’s new Mumbai office highlights growing ties with India

A menacing China has rattled countries in the region. As a result, some of Taiwan’s leading tech firms are looking to relocate their manufacturing to India in a bid to curb exposure to the Chinese market and to fortify their global supply chains.

PRANAY SHARMA JULY 08, 2023 / 05:37 PM IST

moneycontrol.com · by Pranay Sharma

The opening of the Mumbai office comes in the wake of leading Taiwanese companies' desire to relocate their manufacturing to India from China.

The decision to allow Taiwan to open a new office in Mumbai this week — its third in India after Delhi and Chennai — signifies not only the possibility of closer economic ties between the two sides, but also an evolution of the Indian position on the Taiwan issue.

The opening of the Mumbai office comes in the wake of leading Taiwanese companies' desire to relocate their manufacturing to India from China.

Taiwan’s Deputy Minister for National Development, Kao Shien-Quey, has said that there is a huge scope for collaboration between New Delhi and Taipei in areas of emerging and critical technologies, including semiconductors and electronics.

Last month, addressing the joint session of the US parliament during his state visit to the US, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had warned that dark clouds of coercion and confrontation were casting their shadow over the Indo-Pacific, a region whose stability has become a key concern of the Indo-American partnership.

“We share a vision of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, connected by a secure sea, defined by international law, free from domination, and anchored in ASEAN centrality,” Modi had said.

Though no country in particular was named by Modi, it was clear that his concerns were regarding China.

In recent months, aggressive Chinese policy in the Indo-Pacific, especially its threat to take Taiwan — which it claims is a breakaway province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — by force if necessary, has rattled countries in the region.

Additionally, India is also locked in a military stand-off with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) — the unofficial boundary between the two countries — since May 2020, to thwart Beijing’s unilateral attempt to alter the status quo that existed there.

The current bonhomie between India and Taiwan comes against this backdrop.

Reports quoting senior policy makers in the Taiwan government said that some of the country’s leading tech firms are looking to relocate their manufacturing base to India in a bid to curb exposure to the Chinese market and to fortify their global supply chains.

Officially, India follows a “one-China” policy which recognises the PRC as the legitimate government and Taiwan as part of China. This prevents Taiwan from opening an embassy in India, which would have given it the status of an independent country. It operates in the country through the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Centre (TECC).

But China’s aggressive behaviour has led many countries to re-assess their “one-China” and Taiwan policy.

India’s position on the issue has also evolved. Though it has not yet discarded its “one-China” policy, it has refused to mention it in official statements in recent years.

The hardening position of China on Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh, and its refusal to regard them as Indian territory, has also led India to maintain ambiguity on Taiwan.

As the US and China have been engaged in a tussle for dominance in the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan, India’s policy on the issue has gained salience.

The bilateral trade between India and Taiwan currently stands at around US$ 9 billion. But Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, Jaushieh Joseph Wu, has said that Taiwan has an “enormous appetite” to expand ties with India.

Taiwan is a champion chip-maker and India is keen on having a manufacturing facility of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), the world's largest semiconductor firm, in the country.

“Our trade relations have been picking up steam,” the Taiwanese foreign minister has said, and added that “Taiwanese investors are hungry for India and their cooperation in semiconductors has the blessings of the top leadership of the two countries.”

In order to establish itself as a global electronics manufacturing hub, India has announced $10 billion in incentives to attract microchip manufacturers.

Under the plan, India will extend up to 50 percent financial support to semiconductor producers setting up shop in the country.

Taiwan, which set up its TECC in Chennai in 2012, said nearly 60 percent of all Taiwanese business investing and opening factories in India have chosen to set up operations in southern India.

Chennai and its surrounding areas have benefited from the investment made by Taiwanese manufacturing industries, said a statement issued by Taiwan.

Taiwan-based Foxconn, which is Apple’s largest supplier, has set up an iPhone manufacturing facility in Tamil Nadu and it is now setting up another such facility in Karnataka, where production is expected to start by next April.

The establishment of the TECC in Mumbai is expected to have a similar effect in western India, the statement said.

Under Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy, the TECC expects to promote exchange and cooperation in science and technology, education, and culture between Taiwan and western India from its new office in Mumbai.

moneycontrol.com · by Pranay Sharma

10. From Chess and Rubik's Cube to Go, Rethinking Irregular Warfare

I have never solved Rubik's cube. I lose every game of Go I play with the computer. I must not be suited for irregular warfare.

On a serious note the author provides an interesting perspective on IW analogy, e.g., one analogy does not work, you need to use three.

And the short comment about IW adding in another layer to LSCO is important as well.

And then on a less serious note here is how I described IW in some of my lectures: Irregular Warfare is like playing Monopoly on a three dimensional chess board with one side playing football and the other side playing soccer, and a third or more sides playing baseball and all following rugby rules.

On a serious note

images from the internet

From Chess and Rubik's Cube to Go, Rethinking Irregular Warfare

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/from-chess-rubiks-cube-go-rethinking-irregular-warfare-sal-artiaga/?trackingId=VRXa7Eby7n4peaUlVKwHwQ%3D%3D&utm_source=pocket_saves

Sal Artiaga

10 articles Following

July 8, 2023

Introduction

The art of warfare, particularly in the context of irregular warfare (IW), is often compared to a game of chess. This analogy suggests a linear, ordered battleground with clearly defined roles and a set of predictable moves. However, the complexity and non-linearity of IW, particularly in the context of large-scale combat operations (LSCO), demands a shift from this paradigm. A more apt comparison might be drawn from the ancient game of Go or the intricate Rubik's Cube, underscoring the multilayered dynamics and inherent unpredictability of modern warfare.

Chess, Go, and the Rubik's Cube, a Comparative Analysis

Chess is a game of strategic conquest, where every piece has a defined role, and victory is achieved by capturing the king of the opponent. The battlefield in chess is a confined square grid with a clear start and end. On the contrary, Go, an East Asian board game, focuses not on capturing a single figure but on encircling territories and maximizing control over the board. Unlike chess, Go doesn't end when a specific piece is captured; instead, it ends when there are no advantageous moves left.

The Rubik's Cube presents another level of complexity. It's a three-dimensional puzzle, where every action affects multiple outcomes, and to reach the final objective, all facets need to align in perfect harmony. With each twist and turn, the puzzle's configuration changes dramatically, demanding adaptability and constant re-evaluation of strategy.

Historical Perspectives

Adding yet another layer of complexity to the understanding of irregular warfare is the fact that no two IW conflicts are identical. Each conflict is influenced by a unique set of cultural, political, and geographical variables that necessitate a tailored approach. To borrow from our gaming analogies, it is as if each game of Go has its unique board shape and topography, or every Rubik's Cube has a different number of squares on each side.

Drawing from historical context, the IW tactics employed by the French Resistance during World War II vastly differed from the Viet Cong's approach during the Vietnam War. The former was primarily characterized by sabotage and intelligence collection in a state of foreign occupation, while the latter incorporated guerilla tactics and leveraged local terrain and population support in a fight against an external power.

Similarly, in the contemporary landscape, the counter-insurgency operations in Iraq contrast sharply with the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The former scenario unfolded in a largely urban environment with a different socio-political context compared to the latter's rugged terrain and tribal societal structure.

This is especially relevant today as those that like to describe what is happening in Ukraine as a template for what could happen in Taiwan. No two conflicts are the same and unique techniques and strategies will be necessary in each case.

Large Scale Combat Operations and Irregular Warfare

In the context of LSCO, irregular warfare adds another layer of complexity. Consider an urban environment under siege, such as the Battle of Mosul in 2017. Irregular forces can blend into the population, use guerrilla tactics, or exploit local grievances against conventional forces. These scenarios are not a series of linear confrontations (chess); instead, they require controlling and influencing the larger area (Go) while maintaining a dynamic understanding of multiple variables (Rubik's Cube).

Furthermore, integrating irregular warfare into LSCO would require the alignment of multiple domains - land, sea, air, space, and cyber (Rubik's Cube). Any action in one domain will invariably affect the others, necessitating a coordinated, synchronized approach to attain the final objective.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense's reliance on the chess analogy oversimplifies the nature of irregular warfare, potentially leading to strategic missteps. Modern warfare, especially when it involves IW within LSCO, is better compared to a game of Go or a Rubik's Cube, highlighting the importance of flexible strategies, influence over territories, and multidimensional coordination. A shift towards these analogies may provide a more nuanced understanding of irregular warfare, enhancing strategic planning and operational effectiveness in the face of 21st-century threats.

11. Russian army failed to achieve any of its goals during 500 days of war against Ukraine - ISW

You read this in ISW's July 8 report. It is not surprising the Ukrainian media picked this up. Will any western or mainstream media emphasize this assessment as well?

From ISW: Five hundred days ago Russia launched an unprovoked war of conquest against Ukraine. The Russian military intended to take Kyiv within three days but failed to accomplish any of its intended objectives in Ukraine. Determined and skillful Ukrainian resistance has forced the culmination of multiple Russian offensives including the one aimed at Kyiv and has liberated Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts, as well as the parts of Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces had temporarily seized. Ukrainian forces have secured and retained the initiative and are conducting counteroffensive operations along most of the frontline with Russian forces focused almost entirely on trying to hold on to the Ukrainian lands they still occupy. With Western assistance, Ukraine has ensured its independence but faces the critical task of liberating the strategically vital territory still under Russian control.

Russian army failed to achieve any of its goals during 500 days of war against Ukraine - ISW

ukrinform.net

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said this in a new Russian offensive campaign assessment, Ukrinform reports.

"Five hundred days ago Russia launched an unprovoked war of conquest against Ukraine. The Russian military intended to take Kyiv within three days but failed to accomplish any of its intended objectives in Ukraine," ISW analysts said.

According to analysts, Ukrainian forces have secured and retained the initiative and are conducting counteroffensive operations along most of the frontline with Russian forces focused almost entirely on trying to hold on to the Ukrainian lands they still occupy.

"With Western assistance, Ukraine has ensured its independence but faces the critical task of liberating the strategically vital territory still under Russian control," the ISW report said.

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

ukrinform.net

12. Zelensky: Grain deal and people's lives cannot depend on Putin's mood

Food security throughout the world is threatened and disrupted by Putin's actions.

Zelensky: Grain deal and people's lives cannot depend on Putin's mood

08.07.2023 08:21

ukrinform.net

Zelensky said this at a joint news conference with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul, according to an Ukrinform correspondent.

"The whole world is interested in the functioning of the 'grain corridor.' It is very important. And it is very important that we start acting with our partners so that the life of the 'grain corridor' and therefore the lives of other people on other continents, including Africa and Asia, do not depend on the mood with which the Russian president woke up. We are all independent states, we currently have this corridor, it exists. It is not free, but it is structured and complicated due to the fact that Russia is blocking the Black Sea," Zelensky said.

He noted that there should be other corridors in the Black Sea, including those that would allow the passage of ships that have been stuck in Ukrainian ports in the Mykolaiv region since February 2022.

The president said that to make that happen, "it is necessary that Russia simply does not shoot at these vessels so that they can be released and unblocked.

He said he did not see the point of meeting every two months and every time thinking about how to ensure the operation of the "grain corridor."

"We don't need to get together. We have a lot of different problems and challenges. We cannot gather every time to think about how people around the world should live the next two months, about how to negotiate again. It is very important to do everything so that this corridor does not depend on the wishes of one state," Zelensky said.

At the same time, he added that recently Russia has been blocking the movement of grain ships through corridors in the Black Sea as much as it could.

"Russia behaves as if it owns the Black Sea, as if it is the master here. The peoples of our region need greater efforts to limit Russia's aggressive ambitions and guarantee stability in the Black Sea region," Zelensky said.

Photo: TRT Haber

ukrinform.net

13. Opinion | They’re Ready to Fight Again, on Artificial Legs

The human spirit is truly amazing and inspiring.

Excerpts:

“I do not see disabled people,” Oleksandra Kabanova said as she sat waiting for her husband, Oleh Spodin, to complete a physical therapy session. “I see superheroes.”

She eagerly shared the story of how Spodin lost his leg: He volunteered to go out and rescue a wounded comrade. “He’s very sexy without a leg,” she added, beaming.

That’s where I think Vladimir Putin miscalculated when he invaded Ukraine last year: He underappreciated Ukrainian grit and resilience. I suspect some Americans make the same mistake. Month after month, Ukrainians have lost buildings, heat, electricity, lives — yet they are ready to keep sacrificing, and there is a society-wide reverence for those who have given so much.

Opinion | They’re Ready to Fight Again, on Artificial Legs

The New York Times · by Nicholas Kristof · July 8, 2023

Nicholas Kristof

They’re Ready to Fight Again, on Artificial Legs

July 8, 2023

Oleh Spodin and his wife, Oleksandra Kabanova, at the Superhumans Center in Lviv, Ukraine.Credit...Photographs by Kasia Strek for The New York Times

Opinion Columnist

LVIV, Ukraine — The Superhumans Center is full of war amputees learning to walk on artificial limbs or smoking cigarettes clutched in prosthetic fingers.

Yet this philanthropically supported hospital for wounded Ukrainians is not antiseptically depressing, as hospitals often are. Perhaps that’s because of the admiration that Ukrainians feel for these veterans, leading them to carry their stumps with pride — and to plan a return to the front with artificial arms and legs.

“I do not see disabled people,” Oleksandra Kabanova said as she sat waiting for her husband, Oleh Spodin, to complete a physical therapy session. “I see superheroes.”

She eagerly shared the story of how Spodin lost his leg: He volunteered to go out and rescue a wounded comrade. “He’s very sexy without a leg,” she added, beaming.

That’s where I think Vladimir Putin miscalculated when he invaded Ukraine last year: He underappreciated Ukrainian grit and resilience. I suspect some Americans make the same mistake. Month after month, Ukrainians have lost buildings, heat, electricity, lives — yet they are ready to keep sacrificing, and there is a society-wide reverence for those who have given so much.

A veteran, who lost his left arm and leg, gets his muscles stretched and exercised.

Yevhen Tiurin, 30, works out in the swimming pool at the Superhumans Center.

A recent poll found that 78 percent of Ukrainians had close relatives or friends killed or injured in the fighting. That’s a staggering toll, yet if anything, it has strengthened Ukrainian determination rather than weakened it. On each of my visits to wartime Ukraine, what has struck me the most is not the immense suffering but the even more overwhelming resolve to win.

While the pain and difficulty faced by those struggling to learn to walk again are enormous, the public adulation is a salve.

“This week, a woman tried to embrace me at a bus stop,” said Denys Kryvenko, 24, who lost both legs and an arm in January in fighting near Bakhmut. “People have tried to give me food, give me money, give me hugs.”

Kryvenko told me that even as a triple amputee, he is going to rejoin his unit on the front line.

“My unit is waiting for me,” he insisted. He is discussing two roles: either as an instructor for paramedics — he is proof of the value of tourniquets, three of which saved his life — or as a counselor to coach soldiers struggling in bleak times.

Denys Kryvenko, 24.

Bohdan Petrenko, 21.

Bohdan Petrenko, 21, whom I met when he was practicing walking with his artificial leg, is likewise planning to rejoin his military unit as soon as he fully recovers from the mortar injuries that took his leg and mangled his arms. Petrenko said he would return to the front as a radio man or drone operator.

Petrenko had a crush on a girl in his hometown before the war but had never dared ask her out, and when fighting broke out she evacuated to Poland. On a trip back to Ukraine to visit her parents, she heard he was injured and when passing through Lviv stopped by to visit him in the hospital.

“She never left,” he added. “She’s still here. It’s magical.”

They’re now living together, he said, adding, “Someone can have all his arms and legs and still not be successful in love, but an amputee can win a heart.”

The West should surely do a better job providing Ukraine with the F-16s, tanks and long-range missiles it needs to end this war. But what may matter even more than weaponry is the value of the Ukrainian determination to win — even on prosthetic legs.

Yevhen Tiurin with his wife, Olha Baranych, at home.

Making adjustments to a new prosthetic arm.

The war amputees are stoical about their challenges, for they’ve lost friends and, by that standard, feel fortunate. “After the amputation, I didn’t feel so bad,” mused Yevhen Tiurin, 30, with a grin. “The problems in my leg were now over.”

The nurse treating him, Olha Baranych, was impressed. “Something clicked in my heart,” she recalled. They married and are expecting their first child in August.

Kabanova, the woman who thinks her husband looks sexy without a leg, acknowledges that heroes aren’t always family-friendly. Being alone while Spodin was on the front was “10 months of hell,” she said. When he was injured the first two times, she begged him to come home to her.

Spodin refused. Then on Feb. 15, he called Kabanova and sounded different, weak.

“Are you injured?” she asked.

“My leg is missing,” he said faintly but, trying to maintain his humor, added, “A piece of me will stay behind forever.”

Oleksandra Kabanova and Oleh Spodin during a break between rehab sessions.

Kabanova becomes teary at the recollection. “People thought that girls would dump guys after their injuries,” she said fiercely. “No way! It doesn’t work that way.”

Spodin’s amputation was imperfect, so he had to undergo another surgery to reshape the stump, and now he’s waiting for the wound to heal so that he can get a prosthetic limb — and then he’ll be back to war.

“Amputation is a temporary difficulty,” Spodin explained. “These are just new conditions in our lives that we must adjust to.”

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

Nicholas Kristof joined The New York Times in 1984 and has been a columnist since 2001. He has won two Pulitzer Prizes, for his coverage of China and of the genocide in Darfur. You can follow him on Instagram and Facebook. His latest book is “Tightrope: Americans Reaching for Hope.”

A version of this article appears in print on , Section SR, Page 3 of the New York edition with the headline: Minus a Limb But Stalwart

208

The New York Times · by Nicholas Kristof · July 8, 2023

14. Buying Power Is the Invisible Shortfall of the 2024 Defense Budget Request

Conclusion:

A failure to utilize uniform, realistic inflation estimates has allowed Washington to draw misleading conclusions on the size and impact of the latest inadequate defense budget request. The ‘24 topline may be nominally the largest in history; however, in real terms the military is losing money at a rapid clip.

Buying Power Is the Invisible Shortfall of the 2024 Defense Budget Request

By Mackenzie Eaglen

July 08, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/07/08/buying_power_is_the_invisible_shortfall_of_the_2024_defense_budget_request_964806.html

As China’s military budget continues its rocket-like trajectory upward for the eighth straight year in a row, America’s military spending—and ambitions—are in decline. This is before even accounting for all of Beijing’s yuán for hard power that U.S. intelligence agencies now estimate as roughly approaching our own. While the United States is coming out of the Budget Control Act era and confronting spending handcuffs yet again, China regularly doles out double-digit increases for its military.

But the U.S. military will start the next fiscal year $90 billion in the hole—behind where the defense budget was just three years ago.

What seem like modest reductions in the name of debt reduction are far deeper when accounting for delayed appropriations, spending freezes called continuing resolutions that misalign accounts and priorities while restricting new equipment and technology programs, and uncertainty regarding final enactment of defense bills. Even absent all these outside forces that cut the U.S. military’s buying power before a dollar is spent, there are internal Pentagon challenges that further shrink its proverbial bang for the buck.

For a variety of reasons linked to expenses on autopilot, the U.S. military’s budget must be cut from within every single year to simply tread water. The reality is that most spending is fenced or fixed inside the defense budget with precious little trade space for leaders to impose change or shift course. Further, to remain competitive in attracting talent, the so-called mandatory bills inside the defense budget get bigger every year, whether the topline matches inflation or not.

The result is reduced buying power year over year that slowly erodes American combat capability and eats away at the force over time. When weighted against just pre-pandemic inflation, the military sees a colossal drop in buying power in just the past few years alone.

The impact is akin to the United States sharpening its bayonets when the rest of the world is girding for hypersonic weapons.

Doctor From Ashburn Told How To Melt Belly Fat In 5 Days

Blood Sugar Above 100? Try This Tonight

Keto Doesn’t Work. Noom Does

A Simple Way To Get Rid Of Tinnitus At Home

Tinnitus? Do This Simple Hack Immediately

Think Dental Implants Are Expensive? Think Again! (See Prices)

A Teaspoon On An Empty Stomach Burns 12 Lbs Of Fat A Week Safely!

How To Lose 40.5 Lbs In A Month (Eat This Once Every Day)

See How Much Gutter Repair And Installation Services Should Cost

At 62, This Is Dennis Rodman's Bank Balance

Yet policymakers continue to tout nominal increases to the defense budget as triumphs for those in uniform. Just last month, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin commended the record size of this year’s military modernization budgets, highlighting them as “the largest procurement and R&D budgets ever.”

However, many Americans have no doubt noticed that their money isn’t worth as much as it was just a few years ago with elevated inflation persisting. The Pentagon is not immune from this challenge. Indeed the effects of compounding inflation have diminished buying power steadily for years, resulting in a defense budget that is losing ground and falling behind.

A declining defense budget disguised under bigger numbers still reaps the consequences and the result is faltering conventional deterrence. Beijing has noticed; Tehran is increasingly aggressive; and, Moscow continues to wreak havoc in eastern Europe.

Where Does the Military’s 2024 Budget Really Stand?

At first glance, the armed forces budgets appear immense in the latest White House request, with the Army at $185.5 billion, Navy at $202.5 billion, and the Air Force at $185.1 billion. But once pervasive inflation of the last few years is factored in, the reality changes starkly.

In the chart below, the blue category represents President Joe Biden’s topline budget request for fiscal year (FY) 2024 for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Marine Corps, Space Force, and other pass-through and defense-wide funding was omitted to make more direct comparisons.

To accurately assess the continuing decline in military purchasing power, funding levels were reverse calculated using start of fiscal 2021 consumer price index (CPI-U) averages to illustrate what the proposed 2024 topline would be worth in October 2020. Comparing and contrasting the 2024 budget request with inflation levels of FY 2021 is beneficial, as the FY21 budgeting process experienced a period of relatively stable inflation, nearly six points down from March 2022, and within a point of the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) average inflation estimate of 2.2 percent for future years’ defense spending. 2021 was also the first year that Space Force funding was separate from Air Force totals, allowing for a more accurate outlooks.

This loss in buying power between FY21 and FY24 is represented grey bars in the chart. For example, the Army’s 2024 budget request stands at $185.5 billion. When calculating for inflation, $185.5 billion today buys the same amount of goods and services as $158.8 billion could in FY21. That is a $30 billion difference in buying power in just three years.

When comparing the services’ blue and grey bars, one can see that each service has effectively suffered a whopping 16.8 percent cut in their buying power across the board.

What Difference Does 3 Years Make?

This hidden disease of real negative growth in the defense budget highlights why politicians’ focus on the supposedly record-high defense topline in 2024 is misplaced.

The more appropriate question to answer is what would the Pentagon budget look like if this loss of buying power was being adequately addressed? The third green bar illustrates the difference that could be made up to right this wrong, representing what the services’ toplines would need to be in 2024 to have the same buying power of 2021.

To find this new value, FY24 budget toplines were increased by 16.8 percent to offset that value lost to inflation since FY21. Returning to the example of the Army, if this year’s budget request kept pace with the buying power present in FY21, the Army’s 2024 budget would total $216.7 billion—a roughly $30 billion increase for next year. The other services share similar results.

The armed forces are therefore going to start this coming fiscal year in 2024 nearly 90 billion dollars behind 2021.

Why Does this Matter?

It’s no surprise our military is falling behind when budgets aren’t breaking even.

Even a hypothetically flat topline—which the White House is not seeking nor is Congress providing—would not reverse recent declines in military buying power, capacity, presence and capability. The effects of this budgetary mismatch repeatedly bear fruit that is bad.

The Army is considering cuts to overall manpower and their potent special forces. The Air Force is busy retiring nearly 1,400 aircraft over the next five years, while purchasing only a third of that amount in replacements. The Navy fares similarly, as China continues to pump out hulls and grow its naval capacity, with retirements outpacing shipbuilding. Drops in procurement across the services have resulted in permanently shuttered production lines, delaying the ability to ramp up our essential defense industrial base.

As the administration continues to pile on more responsibilities on our shrinking armed forces, consistently providing real increases are key to maintaining credible and potent forces that are also trained and ready. To fully execute the national defense strategy, the armed forces need real growth above inflation to convince Beijing that tomorrow is not the day to attempt to take Taiwan by force.

A failure to utilize uniform, realistic inflation estimates has allowed Washington to draw misleading conclusions on the size and impact of the latest inadequate defense budget request. The ‘24 topline may be nominally the largest in history; however, in real terms the military is losing money at a rapid clip.

Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness. She is also a regular guest lecturer at universities, a member of the board of advisers of the Alexander Hamilton Society, and a member of the steering committee of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security.

15. Why Jens Stoltenberg Should Be a Candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize

Conclusion:

A major escalation of NATO political aims in Ukraine has an understandable appeal to many individuals who are justifiably horrified by Russian aggression and war crimes, but as a matter of policy and strategy it would be a serious mistake. Eventually, negotiations to end this war will have to take place between Ukraine and Russia, and neither Putin nor Ukrainian President Zelenskyy is going anywhere, at least in the near term. For these negotiations to be successful, they will have to involve bargaining and marginal trade-offs that both sides can live with, even if they are far from ideal as seen from Kiev, Washington, Brussels or Moscow. It’s a long haul and heavy lifting, but that’s where diplomats, like Stoltenberg, earn their money, and it is better than endless numbers of dead Ukrainians and Russians. And, if a durable peace returns to this embattled war zone, Jens Stoltenberg’s indispensable leadership, which has been extended for another year, should be taken into account by those considering who should receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

Why Jens Stoltenberg Should Be a Candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize

By Lawrence J. Korb & Stephen Cimbala

July 08, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/07/08/why_jens_stoltenberg_should_be_a_candidate_for_the_nobel_peace_prize_964808.html

It might seem that nominating the leader of the world’s largest and most important military alliance for a Nobel peace prize is a contradiction in terms but, the appearance of contradiction is mistaken. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is deserving of being considered for this recognition, primarily because of the way he has managed the challenge resulting from NATO’s response to the massive and illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In pulling together a coalition as diverse as NATO to be marshaled for a military effort of the size and scope that was necessary to continue to support Ukraine for more than a year against the Russian invaders, Stoltenberg had to successfully manage at least three critical tasks: political unity; military interoperability; and escalation control.

NATO’s political unity in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine has been unprecedented. Even during the Cold War, NATO leaders had to deal with challenges resulting from the Suez crisis, French President Charles de Gaulle’s withdrawal of France from the NATO military command structure, conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and West German interest in Ostpolitik.

On the other hand, as of July 2023, no members of NATO have defected from the mission of supporting Ukrainian sovereignty and independence against Russian attackers. In fact, because of Stoltenberg’s leadership, Putin’s political miscalculation, that his war against Ukraine would divide and weaken NATO, has had the opposite effect. NATO has never been stronger, and Putin never weaker or Russia in more disarray as many members of his national security team have turned against the war. Even Finland decided to abandon its historically neutral status and join NATO! (With Sweden waiting in the wings). That in itself represents a strategic setback for Russia, regardless of the outcome of military operations in Ukraine.

While Ukrainian soldiers have been fast learners, they still needed to receive expert training from NATO on an enormous tranche of weapons. NATO has brought interoperability by providing guidance in C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), drone warfare, deception and disinformation, and other military arts. Although Russia always produced larger numbers of ground force combatants and reservists than Ukraine, Ukrainian commanders and troops with NATO guidance and assistance have made quality more important than quantity. Whether the projected counteroffensive makes decisive gains against Russian forces in eastern and southern Ukraine, or is stalemated in the attempt, it remains the case that, for the first 500 days of war, NATO - coached Ukrainian forces fought with more agility and closed the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) faster than their Russian counterparts. Even in Bakhmut in the spring of 2023, where superior numbers of the Wagner group and other Russian fighters claimed victory after many months of exhaustive battle, it was such a humanitarian disaster that the embittered Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin publicly attacked the Russian Defense Ministry and its top military commanders for their alleged incompetence and even went so far as to try to remove them by force in an attempted coup.

Escalation control was NATO’s third challenge and is often misunderstood or mistakenly explained. It is not only about nuclear weapons and Putin’s repeated public threats of nuclear first use in case of unacceptable military losses for Russia. Escalation control also applies to NATO’s definition of its political objectives with respect to this war. In the face of considerable controversy about this matter, Stoltenberg has held fast to a clear position that NATO is defending Ukraine against aggression – not undertaking a war between NATO and Russia. Even if some commentators refer to this as a NATO “proxy war” against Russia, this has never been NATO’s public position and Stoltenberg has made it remain thus. Unfortunately, this situation frustrates certain elements in the American media commentariat, the U.S. Congress, and the national security and foreign policy bureaucracies. Some would prefer an open embrace by NATO of more ambitious political and military objectives, including the infliction of such devastating battlefield losses on Russian forces that the Putin regime will fall. Short of that, but also ambitious, is the desire among some of the same chorus of commentators and policy makers for the incorporation of Ukraine into NATO, first as a “partner” and eventually as a full member.

Don't Pay For New Gutters. Get This 3-In-1 System Instead!

Learn Sustainable Weight Loss Habits With Noom

Premium Wooden Jigsaw Puzzles - Closing Sale - 85% Off

Blood Sugar Above 100? Try This Tonight

Tinnitus? Do This Simple Hack Immediately

Doctor From Ashburn Told How To Melt Belly Fat In 5 Days

This Method May Beat Tinnitus Overnight (Watch Now)

The Tragedy Behind American Chopper Gets Sadder And Sadder

Think Dental Implants Are Expensive? Think Again! (See Prices)

This Stuff Will Melt The Fat On Your Problem Areas In 3 Days

A major escalation of NATO political aims in Ukraine has an understandable appeal to many individuals who are justifiably horrified by Russian aggression and war crimes, but as a matter of policy and strategy it would be a serious mistake. Eventually, negotiations to end this war will have to take place between Ukraine and Russia, and neither Putin nor Ukrainian President Zelenskyy is going anywhere, at least in the near term. For these negotiations to be successful, they will have to involve bargaining and marginal trade-offs that both sides can live with, even if they are far from ideal as seen from Kiev, Washington, Brussels or Moscow. It’s a long haul and heavy lifting, but that’s where diplomats, like Stoltenberg, earn their money, and it is better than endless numbers of dead Ukrainians and Russians. And, if a durable peace returns to this embattled war zone, Jens Stoltenberg’s indispensable leadership, which has been extended for another year, should be taken into account by those considering who should receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Stephen Cimbala is a professor of political science at Penn State University, Brandwine.

16. DOD has not 'adapted' to strategic competition yet, according to a prominent think tank

The 28 page Atlantic Council report (by Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), Lt Col Justin M. Conelli, USAF, Clementine G. Starling, and Julia Siegel) can be downloaded here: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Operationalizing-Integrated-Deterrence.pdf

Note the comments on technology but also tactics and training. The report highlights the first SOF truth ("Humans are more important than hardware. - which is not exclusive to SOF)) but do we pay more than lip service to that?

Excerpts:

“[A] new competitive mindset requires broadening the joint force’s tool kit beyond traditional military effects,” the study states. “Fusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires is critical not only from a deterrence perspective but also, more significantly, to enable victory in armed conflict.”

In fusing these capabilities, the joint force must also take advantage of capabilities across government and allies, not solely the DOD apparatus. This means combining diplomatic channels with intelligence and military capabilities to not only create a more holistic picture of adversary efforts in a region, but also to identify and assess potential targets.

...

The other aspect to “stacking the deck” before conflict, as the authors phrase it, is developing new capabilities. However, it’s not enough to merely have the best technology, they note. An effective combination of technologies, tactics and training are needed.

“Technology development must be informed by an understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of adversaries, and the nature by which the joint force executes operations,” the report states.

DOD has not 'adapted' to strategic competition yet, according to a prominent think tank

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · July 7, 2023

A new report from the Atlantic Council argues the Department of Defense must adapt its thinking and approach to technology as a means of deterrence in order to succeed against myriad adversaries in an increasingly complex world.

The geopolitical environment has significantly changed from the Cold War and the post-9/11 counterterrorism campaigns. The current landscape involves multiple sophisticated adversaries seeking to gain regional and global supremacy by simultaneously subverting U.S. influence, the authors of the new report write.

This is often done through so-called gray zone operations, which exist below the threshold of armed conflict. Traditionally, the U.S. has viewed conflict in binary terms of war and peace while adversaries view it on a constant continuum, experts say.

While the DOD has begun to recognize this reality — even publishing a joint concept for how to compete in this gray zone — the Atlantic Council study argues the DOD has not put its money where its mouth is.

The Pentagon has identified China, and to a lesser degree Russia, as its top strategic competitors.

“Strategic competition requires a significant mindset shift to effectively harness the effects of multiple instruments of power in a global, multi-domain, and coherent manner. DOD doctrine acknowledges this, but the department and joint force have yet to fully operationalize it,” the report authors write. “An expanded competitive mindset will allow the joint force to view competition not as an inevitable march toward future conflict, but rather as a persistent effort to gain and maintain positional advantage across all domains.”

The U.S. military needs a better targeting approach across theaters and domains, they say. Advancements in technology, such as cyber, allow an actor to collect information and actually conduct effects operations across traditional geographic boundaries.

In order to posture itself for success, the Pentagon must meld existing frameworks for joint targeting with a model that “places a premium” on gaining placement and access within a region, per the report.

“[A] new competitive mindset requires broadening the joint force’s tool kit beyond traditional military effects,” the study states. “Fusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires is critical not only from a deterrence perspective but also, more significantly, to enable victory in armed conflict.”

In fusing these capabilities, the joint force must also take advantage of capabilities across government and allies, not solely the DOD apparatus. This means combining diplomatic channels with intelligence and military capabilities to not only create a more holistic picture of adversary efforts in a region, but also to identify and assess potential targets.

Data will be absolutely critical in the next fight and certainly within the competition sphere, the authors argue.

“The joint force’s ability to leverage data at speed and scale, predicated on its adoption of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), enables this framework for targeting and effects generation,” the report notes. “The DOD must build a robust and extensive data architecture, fusing private sector data with government data, and build frameworks and standards to harness it into actionable information. Data fuels everything from access and understanding, to options, targeting, and analysis, to predictions and recommendations.”

However, this data must be accessible at the appropriate echelons in order to be acted upon.

One of the key aspects of the competition arena is the ability to shape the environment ahead of a potential conflict. While the ultimate goal is deterring war before it occurs, in the event a conflict breaks out, the joint force must be postured to understand where the enemy’s assets are and have targets pre-developed to act upon immediately to ensure decisive victory.

“Shaping the environment is crucial to securing a position of advantage across multiple domains left of conflict. In the context of targeting and effects generation, activities to shape the environment must center around closing critical operational and intelligence gaps associated with a prioritized target list tied to operational plans. These activities are intended to enhance precision and lethality of engagement and shorten the kill chain once armed conflict begins,” the report states.

This extends to “non-kinetic” weapons as well, especially with countless digital targets the adversary may have. Capabilities such as cyber tools, electronic warfare and directed energy systems are typically described as “non-kinetic” weapons in DOD parlance.

“To hold millions of virtual targets at risk instantaneously necessitates significant preparation of the environment,” the authors write. “Indeed, a multiyear campaign built around access and understanding — by, with, and through regional allies and partners — may be necessary to simply gain access to the right adversary networks. Development and installation of cyber capabilities would be executed in parallel, with the associated development and intelligence gaps feeding back into the overall campaign approach.”

The other aspect to “stacking the deck” before conflict, as the authors phrase it, is developing new capabilities. However, it’s not enough to merely have the best technology, they note. An effective combination of technologies, tactics and training are needed.

“Technology development must be informed by an understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of adversaries, and the nature by which the joint force executes operations,” the report states.

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · July 7, 2023

17. Diplomacy Watch: Washington may deny it, but it looks someone wants to talk to Russia

Diplomacy Watch: Washington may deny it, but it looks someone wants to talk to Russia - Responsible Statecraft

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Blaise Malley · July 7, 2023

Diplomacy Watch: Washington may deny it, but it looks someone wants to talk to Russia

Experts have made the case in recent months that such openings are crucial to avoiding a vicious circle of mistrust and protracted war

July 7, 2023

Written by

Blaise Malley

Diplomacy Watch: Washington may deny it, but it looks someone wants to talk to Russia

Communication between Washington and Moscow has been rare over the first 500 days of the war in Ukraine. But NBC News reported Thursday that a group of former high-level U.S. officials have held secret talks with Russians perceived to be close to the Kremlin, with the goal of laying the groundwork for an eventual diplomatic solution to the war.

According to the NBC News story, which cites “people briefed on the discussions,” the talks focused on some of the most pressing questions concerning the conflict, including “the fate of Russian-held territory that Ukraine may never be able to liberate, and the search for an elusive diplomatic off-ramp that could be tolerable to both sides.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended at least one of the meetings when he made a rare visit to New York City to chair the UN security council in April, according to the report. The former U.S. officials named in the article are Richard Haass, the outgoing president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Charles Kupchan, and Thomas Graham — all of whom previously worked in senior positions in the State Department, among other national-security agencies — as well as former Pentagon official Mary Beth Long.

The Biden administration reportedly was aware of the meetings, but did not organize them. There was no indication of whether or not the White House endorsed the discussions.

Kupchan, now a senior fellow at CFR, wrote a piece for Responsible Statecraft on the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion in February that made the case that “as Ukraine and its Western supporters seek to build on their successes, they should embark on year two determined to continue the fight — but also ready to marry efforts on the battlefield to a diplomatic strategy aimed at bringing the war to a close sooner rather than later.” While, at the time, Kupchan predicted that the war would drag on for months, if not longer, he argued that “[j]ust as Washington readied plans to support Ukraine before the fighting started, it should ready plans for a diplomatic endgame before the fighting stops.”

Two months later, Haass and Kupchan co-authored an article published by the influential Foreign Affairs journal entitled “The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine: A Plan for Getting from the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table.”

The kinds of unofficial talks in which they reportedly participated — known as Track II diplomacy (or “track 1.5” in the case of the meeting that Lavrov attended, since a government official was present for one side) — can be an important step in preparing for real negotiations and a chance to get a better sense of where the other side stands and what opportunities for compromise may lie in the future. Experts have made the case in recent months that such preparations are crucial to avoiding a vicious circle of mistrust and protracted war.

“Track II is intelligence gathering. As the fighting goes on, talks are needed to assess how the other side reacts to changing realities on the ground,” wrote Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, in RS in response to Thursday’s story. “Is their resolve weakening? Are they overconfident? What are they seeing that we are missing?”

“Track II is needed to explore possible pathways to real negotiations and a lasting solution,” Parsi added. “When real talks start, you don’t want to go flying blind; you want to know as much as possible to maximize your chances of success.”

The NBC News report follows a Washington Post story last weekend that broke the news of CIA director Bill Burns’ secret trip to Ukraine last month during which the former deputy secretary of state discussed possible plans for an endgame with officials in Kyiv. The Post described these officials’ approach as “an ambitious strategy to retake Russian-occupied territory and open cease-fire negotiations with Moscow by the end of the year.”

“In private, military planners in Kyiv have relayed to Burns and others bullish confidence in their aim to retake substantial territory by the fall; move artillery and missile systems near the boundary line of Russian-controlled Crimea; push further into eastern Ukraine; and then open negotiations with Moscow for the first time since peace talks broke down in March of last year,” according to the Post.

In this plan, Ukraine would agree not to try to retake Crimea by force in exchange for Russia accepting whatever security guarantees Ukraine can get from the West.

It was also reported that Burns had called his counterpart in Russia after the short-lived Wagner mutiny to assure their intelligence services that Washington had nothing to do with it.

In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:

—The short-lived Wagner rebellion in Moscow raised fears about the future stability of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. “[M]onths of nuclear posturing by Putin and other senior Russian officials, and a new debate among Moscow analysts on using a nuclear weapon on a NATO country, have raised doubts about whether Putin really provides the stability necessary to avoid an atomic Armageddon — or if he is the risk they should fear most,” according to The Washington Post.

As the Quincy Institute’s Anatol Lieven told the Post, if Putin faced the loss of occupied Crimea, “the chances of escalation would be extraordinarily high because he would believe it was necessary to save Crimea, but it would also be necessary to save his regime at that point.”

—Sweden kicked off its push to be admitted to NATO in Washington this week in advance of next week’s summit in Vilnius. Sweden’s prime minister visited the White House Wednesday, and President Joe Biden told him that he was “anxiously looking forward” to welcoming Sweden into the alliance. Sweden’s bid has been held up by Turkey and Hungary. Ankara claims that Stockholm has been too lenient towards Kurdish groups and individuals that Turkey considers terrorists, while Budapest faults Stockholm’s criticism of the decline in liberal democratic governance in Hungary.

—In an interview with CNN broadcast Wednesday evening, President Volodymyr Zelensky blamed the slow transfer of U.S. weapons for Kyiv’s stalled counteroffensive. “I’m grateful to the U.S. as the leaders of our support, but I told them, as well as the European leaders, that we would like to start our counteroffensive earlier, and we need all the weapons and matériel for that,” he said through an interpreter, according to The New York Times. “Why? Simply because if we start later, it will go slower.”

—Moscow indicated on Tuesday that it was open to discussions with Washington regarding a possible prisoner exchange involving Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich so long as the talks remained private, reports the Associated Press. “We have said that there have been certain contacts on the subject, but we don’t want them to be discussed in public,” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said in a conference call with reporters. “They must be carried out and continue in complete silence.”

U.S. State Department news:

The State Department did not hold its regular press briefing this week.

Written by

Blaise Malley

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Blaise Malley · July 7, 2023

18. Will China Change Its Approach to the Ukraine War?

Excerpts:

China’s strategy in Ukraine proves that national interests always drive the great powers’ decisions in state-led mediation. In watching the Russia-Ukraine war, Chinese policymakers might be reminded of a humiliating history where another great power sat on the sidelines during a brutal invasion. In the aftermath of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Chinese Nationalist government asked the United States for help. Washington’s politicians predictably prioritized U.S. interests over the moral obligation to world peace that the U.S. had preached since President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I.

Instead, the United States played a fence-straddler. Top diplomat Henry Stimson staked out the position, since known as the “Stimson Doctrine,” stating that the U.S. government would not recognize any territorial change owing to armed conflict and also warned against any agreement between Japan and China that limited free commercial intercourse in the region, thereby harming U.S. interests in China. Consequently, China had to fight against Japanese aggression alone for over 10 years, until more Western powers were dragged into World War II.

Ironically, China is nearly repeating this scenario 92 years later, but has now reversed roles.

Will China Change Its Approach to the Ukraine War?

China’s ambivalent stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects its national interests, and is unlikely to significantly change.

thediplomat.com · by Zhenze Huang · July 8, 2023

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought major complications for China’s foreign policy. In the face of strong international demands for Beijing to influence Moscow’s policies and uncertain regional geopolitics, Chinese policymakers have struggled to find the positioning that best serves China’s national interests. Further complicating the situation, the unsuccessful rebellion initiated by the paramilitary organization Wagner Group called into further question Moscow’s ability to achieve its original strategic goal in the Ukrainian battlefield.

With the twin developments of this Eurasian conflict and Russian domestic politics, Beijing, driven by national interests, will have to reconsider its strategy in dealing with the two sides and seek the answer to the puzzle of how to serve as a responsible mediator.

An obvious clue to China’s predicament is that Chinese diplomats have been expressing completely contradictory positions on Ukrainian territory. In April, China’s then-ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, questioned the status of former Soviet countries in international law, implying that Ukraine was not a sovereign state. China’s Foreign Ministry soon disavowed the remarks. In May, the Chinese government’s special envoy for Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, allegedly tried to convince officials in Poland, Germany, France, and the European Union that they should recognize the occupied Ukrainian territories as belonging to Russia in order to achieve a ceasefire. One month later, however, Fu Cong, China’s envoy to the EU, stated that Beijing could back up Ukraine’s aim of reclaiming its territorial integrity based on the 1991 borders – including Crimea, which has been occupied by Russia since 2014.

These push-and-pull expressions reveal that China has not found a unified formula to deal with the erratic dynamics of Russia’s war in Ukraine and its domestic politics. For Beijing, adopting an ambiguous approach is the most rational choice in the face of intricate national and geopolitical interests.

In retrospect, China has adopted seemingly ambiguous and paradoxical approaches to tackle the Ukraine crisis. Beijing has refrained from participating in condemnation or international sanctions led by major Western powers against Russia, instead blaming the outbreak of war on NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe. These critical views have been embedded into Chinese media coverage of the war. Initially, Chinese mainstream media referred to the war as a “special military operation,” aligning with Russia’s rhetoric. As the Russian army faced setbacks on the battlefield, resulting in a protected war, Chinese media quietly shifted to recognizing it as a “conflict,” although they still evaded using the term “invasion.” Chinese officials, meanwhile, describe the situation as the “Ukraine crisis.”

China’s behavior does not mean it is leaning toward Russia, however. A range of diplomatic actions, such as the refusal to provide aid and weapons to Russia, the offer of approximately $1.57 billion in humanitarian assistance to Kyiv, and China’s vote in favor of a U.N. resolution that mentioned Russia’s” aggression” against Ukraine, among others, seem to indicate that Beijing is strenuously maintaining a balance among various parties involved. This strategy was manifested in an official document issued by China’s Foreign Ministry, which claimed Beijing’s neutral position on the conflict offered a 12-point proposals for peace, including “respecting the sovereignty of all countries,” “ceasing hostilities,” “resuming peace talks,” “protecting civilians and prisoners of war,” and “keeping nuclear power plants safe.”

In the West’s view, this statement was hollow, because it neither denounced the Kremlin’s war crimes nor requested the withdrawal of the Russian army from occupied Ukrainian territories. Several factors explain China’s consideration in staying strategically ambiguous in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Ongoing tensions between China and the Western states, especially the United States, make it all but impossible for Beijing to swiftly establish a consensus with Washington regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A breakthrough came in late June when U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken finally visited China for the first time, breaking the deadlock in bilateral ties since the global pandemic. Blinken was followed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, who visited China this week. Yet, it is unrealistic to expect China-U.S. relations to warm significantly in the short term.

Notably, a battery of unresolved divergences remain over Taiwan, trade, high technology, security in the South China Sea, etc. On the Ukraine issue specifically, China resents the West’s imperative, even accusatory, attitude of asking Beijing to play a more influential role in Eurasia. Hence, it is difficult for Chinese leaders to commit to mediating the Ukraine crisis in a way that pleases Washington, particularly as long as they do not see any reciprocal efforts from their counterparts to settle the existing disputes between China and the United States and/or European Union.

No Good Outcome for China From the Russia-Ukraine War

Chinese policymakers are also concerned that rash decisions could impact the complicated China-Russia relationship. From Beijing’s perspective, any outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war will bring both positives and negatives. Moscow’s partial or complete victory in the war would enhance its role as a leading military power in Eurasia. This, in turn, would strengthen the quasi-alliance between Russia and China by intensifying their cooperation in traditional security against Western Europe and the United States, ultimately forcing the rivals to concede terms of the shared geopolitical interest. Given the frosty China-U.S. relations, it is reasonable that Beijing will keep close ties with Moscow to hedge against potential political and economic risks and losses.

That said, a more powerful Russia may provoke security concerns in Beijing. In recent centuries, China has deeply learned historical lessons about remaining vigilant toward this ambitious neighbor with a history of chauvinistic tendencies. The Sino-Russian relationship is far from being as cohesive as the outside perceives it. In particular, the silent stand-off between the two states in Central Asia, home to rich natural gas and oil reserves, has escalated. The first in-person China-Central Asia Summit held on May 18 and 19 in Xi’an was Beijing’s attempt to fill the void in the region while Russia is distracted by the conflict with Ukraine. China’s ambivalence toward a Russian victory in Ukraine is shown through its decision to limit support for Russia to non-military areas, while simultaneously capitalizing on the conflict to maximize its interests.

On the other hand, China would be vulnerable to the chain reactions of Russia’s failure in Ukraine. Whether Putin’s regime can stabilize domestic politics throughout the war is crucial to the survival of China’s party-state system under Xi. If this war ends in disgrace for Russia, Beijing fears that Moscow’s authoritarian system will accelerate toward collapse due to mounting internal and external pressures, thus depriving China of one of its most crucial allies.

Against the backdrop of prolonged hostilities between China and the Western countries, it is geopolitically impossible for Beijing to stand with Ukraine. Doing so would be tantamount to sending a message of weakness to adversaries while undermining the nationalist ideological system China’s leaders have so painstakingly built up. Therefore, even though China is the largest trading partner of Ukraine, the former is hardly likely to risk destabilizing the CCP’s regime by leaning toward Kyiv in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

China’s Ukraine Strategy: Driven by National Interests

China is moving to play a more pivotal role in managing various regional disputes. On March 10, Beijing successfully brokered a reconciliation agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which seemed to bolster observers’ belief that China can help mediate the Ukraine crisis. However, the Middle East model does not map well on to the Eurasia puzzle. The Saudi-Iran rapprochement resulted from substantive diplomatic efforts from Iraq and Oman before China’s involvement. Besides, Riyadh and Tehran were both willing to compromise. The Russia-Ukraine dispute is much farther from a settlement, as the two leaders are playing a zero-sum game with support from their respective camps. In this context, China will be more concerned about the potential damage to its credibility should it undertake serious mediation efforts that fail.

China’s strategy in Ukraine proves that national interests always drive the great powers’ decisions in state-led mediation. In watching the Russia-Ukraine war, Chinese policymakers might be reminded of a humiliating history where another great power sat on the sidelines during a brutal invasion. In the aftermath of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Chinese Nationalist government asked the United States for help. Washington’s politicians predictably prioritized U.S. interests over the moral obligation to world peace that the U.S. had preached since President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I.

Instead, the United States played a fence-straddler. Top diplomat Henry Stimson staked out the position, since known as the “Stimson Doctrine,” stating that the U.S. government would not recognize any territorial change owing to armed conflict and also warned against any agreement between Japan and China that limited free commercial intercourse in the region, thereby harming U.S. interests in China. Consequently, China had to fight against Japanese aggression alone for over 10 years, until more Western powers were dragged into World War II.

Ironically, China is nearly repeating this scenario 92 years later, but has now reversed roles.

GUEST AUTHOR

Zhenze Huang

Zhenze Huang is a Ph.D. student in Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park.

thediplomat.com · by Zhenze Huang · July 8, 2023

19. The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition

Conclusion:

Success in gray zone operations requires thoughtful management of the human weapon system. To do this, the United States must also leverage the diverse talents of its force and fully integrate diverse perspectives into operational planning and readiness. As our near-peer competitors are becoming increasingly narrow in their view of security, there is an opportunity to leverage diverse perspectives and be successful before competition escalates to conflict. While the United States has enacted various diversity initiatives in the past several years, the importance of personnel cannot be eclipsed by investments in technology. As the United States shifts focus on a new pacing threat, the human weapon system remains the linchpin of our success.

The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition

Master Sergeant Bonnie L. Rushing, USAF; and Kyleanne Hunter, PhD

https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-14-no-1/Human-Weapon-System-in-Gray-Zone-Competition/

https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20231401011

PRINTER FRIENDLY PDF

EPUB

AUDIOBOOK

Abstract: Russia’s experience in Ukraine highlights the importance of the human weapon system in next generation warfare. They show that despite technological superiority and investment in sophisticated weapons and equipment, such as hypersonic missiles, people are the core of a successful military strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in kinetic and largely conventional warfare, the human weapon system is essential across the range of military operations, particularly in gray zone operations. There may be no place where the human weapon system is more important; strategic and meaningful management of the human weapon system for use in countering gray zone activities may prevent escalation into kinetic operations.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, gray zone, Russia, China, diversity, inclusion, human weapon system, strategic competition, military operations, Joint force, innovation, national security, personnel, talent, recruitment, retention, strategy, policy, workforce management, employment, armed forces, stereotypes, operational effectiveness, equity

At the onset of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Russia was (and one could argue still is) the technologically superior force with more than 4,000 military aircraft, 12,000 tanks, 605 naval vessels, 850,000 active duty troops, antisatellite weapons, the world’s widest inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles, nuclear forces, hypersonic technology, clandestine and proxy forces, and extensive cyber and information warfare operations.1 It had a sophisticated military apparatus, coupled with the power of nuclear deterrence. On paper, the invasion of Ukraine should have been a quick victory for Russia. Their military campaign, however, has been largely unsuccessful, and as of fall 2022, Ukraine has fought back and stunningly recovered territory throughout their country.2

Russia’s experience in Ukraine highlights the importance of the human weapon system in next generation warfare. By human weapon system, the authors are referring to the role that individuals play in operations. This includes how diversity, past lived experiences, and unique backgrounds are utilized. Russia’s experiences show that despite technological superiority and investment in sophisticated weapons and equipment, such as hypersonic missiles, people are the core of a successful military strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in kinetic and largely conventional warfare, the human weapon system is essential across the range of military operations, particularly in gray zone operations. The gray zone refers to those activities that take place between peacetime and war. They may be conceived of as gradualist campaigns and employ nonmilitary and quasimilitary tactics that fall below the threshold of conflict. They may include both state and nonstate actors. There may be no place where the human weapon system is more important; strategic and meaningful management of the human weapon system for use in countering gray zone activities may prevent escalation into kinetic operations.

Indeed, Russia can serve as a case study for how poor management of the human weapon system can undermine technological advancements. Intercepted calls, former Russian officials, and social media accounts show the extent to which Russia’s human weapon system is in poor shape. “I don’t want to be here. I’m not a warrior. I wasn’t even f——g trained, to run away from the tanks, for f——k’s sake,” a disgruntled Russian soldier expressed to his mother over the phone.3 Another soldier described the deficiencies: “There is simply no discipline, and it will only get worse now that they have mobilized 300,000 people who will be barely trained. . . . The army doctrine is based on punishment, so soldiers get penalized if they mess up. . . . Screw-ups will happen until they change the whole philosophy.”4 A former Russian official shares these details about the state of Vladimir Putin’s military forces in the Ukraine war.

As the United States considers next generation warfare, particularly how it is going to shape the force to successfully compete in gray zone operations with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), management of the human weapon system must be a primary concern. As put forward in the National Security Strategy, outcompeting the PRC and containing Russia are key strategic priorities.5 The National Defense Strategy prioritizes deterring aggression from these countries and being prepared to prevail in armed conflict if necessary.6 There are certainly material solutions to addressing these challenges, including modernized combat systems, tactics, and technologies like long-range precision fires, hypersonic missiles, modernized bomber fleets, littoral combat operations, and other agile mission capabilities.7 Without a clear understanding of how to leverage the human weapon system, all technological, doctrinal, or strategic advancements are ineffective. In Force Design 2030, the Commandant of the Marine Corps further recognizes that while there are structural changes that need to be made, and technological investments (and divestments) to meet the pacing threats, investment in Marines is a linchpin to success in any changes that may occur.8 This people-focused approach is mirrored in all branches of the U.S. military. The Army 2030 initiative asserts that despite the need for technical advancements, people are the key advantage that the U.S. Army has over its adversaries.9 The Chief of Naval Operations’ Navigation Plan 2022 asserts that empowering our people is the key warfighting advantage that the Navy brings to the future fight.10 The chief of staff of the Air Force asserted that “we must empower our incredible airmen to solve any problem” as a key pillar of his Accelerate Change or Lose strategy.11 And the Space Force’s Campaign Support Plan emphasizes the importance that relationships play in the ability of the Service to fulfill its mission and contribute to national security.12 The Services clearly recognize that people play a key role in military operations. Continuing to highlight how people contribute to current and future operational needs will strengthen investment in our people and continue to give the United States a competitive edge.

In this article, the authors lay out the case for why management of the human weapon system must continue to be prioritized as a focus of competition in the gray zone. If the United States is going to succeed in outcompeting our near-peer adversaries, it begins with leveraging our people. The authors begin with a discussion of the human weapon system and its application in the military context, including the importance of human weapon systems management to understand internal military capabilities and the external environment in which a military is operating. The article then discusses how the human weapon system will give the United States an edge in gray zone competition. The authors conclude with a discussion of current challenges to human weapon system management and what the Department of Defense and military Services can do to mitigate them.

What Is the Human Weapon System?

The human weapon system refers to the role that people play in warfighting. While people have always been essential to warfighting, recent decades have seen a deliberate focus on developing the human weapon system and integrating a whole of person approach to optimizing military operational effectiveness. In 2006, the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences hosted the first conference on “Human Performance Optimization.”13 The conference grew out of the realities on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. In the early years of the Global War on Terrorism, Special Operations Forces leadership declared that “humans are more important than hardware,” and in 2004 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz stated that we need to “develop the next generation of . . . programs designed to optimize human performance and maximize fighting strength.”14

Throughout the early and mid- 2000s, the Department of Defense (DOD) and military Services invested in modernizing human performance.15 They developed a capabilities-based model of understanding the performance requirements of the operational environment and revamped training, equipment, and standards to meet new needs.16 Physical performance labs studied the best ways to optimize training to meet the physical demands of military operations. Physical fitness assessments were updated to incorporate both functional movements and provide an overall assessment of individual health and well-being. Nutritionists have been hired to overhaul chow-hall food to ensure that servicemembers are receiving the optimal nutrition to meet physically demanding jobs.17 As technology rapidly advances, there are additional calls to continue to invest in understanding the human-technology interaction regarding human performance.18

While physical performance is one part of the human weapon system, managing the human weapon system is not only about physicality. Mental resilience is just as important as physicality to successful military operations.19 Developing programs that build mental resilience, investing in mental health care, and incorporating a range of practices to promote self-care, unit cohesion, and build trust are ways that mental resilience has been built into the human weapon system.20

Physical performance and mental resilience are aspects of the human weapon system that the military Services can develop within individuals. Fitness and resiliency are largely trainable traits; the Services invest in and customize training for their specific operational needs. Yet, there are untrainable and more intrinsic aspects of the human weapon system that are just as important. Optimizing the human weapon system focuses on ensuring that the United States has the most effective fighting force in the world. It includes both optimizing the physical and mental well-being of U.S. citizens so that they can perform at their best while leveraging the unique backgrounds of individuals to strengthen U.S. national security through employment of diverse skill sets, innovation, and talents.

The nearly two decades of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the importance of how diverse backgrounds were essential for military operations. Lioness teams and Female Engagement Teams were essential for combat operations.21 All-male infantry units, even with extensive training, could not have the same impact as women, who were able to engage in culturally sensitive and appropriate ways. Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-24, codified the need to bring diverse backgrounds to the fight, discussing both the unique role that women play in these types of conflicts and the need for deliberate cultural understanding as part of the way the United States exploits its adversaries.22

Figure 1. Examples of the various facets of the human weapon system

Source: Bonnie Rushing, 2022, adapted by MCUP.

Counterinsurgency provides a clear and obvious example of how the unique backgrounds of servicemembers can contribute to military operations. Now, the United States pivots to focus on strategic competition where it is just as critical to understand the importance of the human weapon system and leverage the unique and diverse talents of our servicemembers. Though technology continues to evolve and strategic competition is unfolding, the United States’ strength depends on the ability of the DOD to recruit and retain individuals with diverse skills and abilities to take on the country’s toughest security challenges.

Leveraging the diversity of our servicemembers is essential for the United States to be competitive across the range of potential military operations—from competition in the gray zone to kinetic combat operations. This idea is reinforced at the executive level. In a recent memorandum, “Memorandum on Revitalizing America’s Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships,” President Joseph R. Biden notes that diversifying the national security workforce—including the military—is essential for closing mission critical gaps in skills and perspectives.23 The White House’s National Security Strategy (NSS) further emphasizes the need to ensure the well-being of our military servicemembers and also to continue to diversify the force as essential components to achieving the United States’ strategic goals.24 As the United States competes against near-peer threats, diversity and innovation are critical. As the NSS states, the primary means by which our national security objectives will be obtained is by “strengthening the national security workforce by recruiting and retaining diverse, high-caliber talent.”25

The diversity of our workforce is particularly important as our primary adversaries—namely the People’s Republic of China and Russia—are engaging in training and recruiting efforts that narrow the opportunities for independent decision making, innovation, morale, and personnel development.26 Leveraging the human weapon system is thus a strategic asset that is required in today’s rapidly changing security environment.

Diversity is critical while considering all potential courses of action. Instead of operating in an echo chamber where a leader surrounds themselves with only like-minded team members that may simply agree on everything or generate similar ideas, diverse teams generate higher levels of innovation, creatively solving problems with higher success rates. Research shows that teams that are diverse consider more facts before deciding and are more likely to accurately interpret facts than homogeneous teams.27 Diverse teams also create more technologically innovative solutions and are more likely to come up with “radical” solutions that solve the root cause of problems.28

Proper management of the human weapon system has an internally and externally reinforcing function. Strategic leaders must understand the needs of their airmen, guardians, soldiers, Marines, and sailors (the internal aspect of the human terrain) while also understanding the ever-changing sociocultural environment (external) in which they operate. The Department of Defense’s Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan captures aspects of the reinforcing mechanisms between the internal and external aspects of the human terrain.29 The ordering of the three defense objectives provides a roadmap for how understanding the human weapon system can help the United States succeed in strategic competition.

Defense Objective 1. The Department of Defense exemplifies a diverse organization that allows for women’s meaningful participation across the development, management, and employment of the Joint Force.

Defense Objective 2. Women in partner nations meaningfully participate and serve at all ranks and in all occupations in defense and security sectors.

Defense Objective 3. Partner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are protected, especially during conflict and crisis.

Defense objective 1 is the internal aspect of human terrain. As will be discussed below, it includes understanding how to create policies and pathways that allow for all to meaningfully participate in the institution. From defense objective 1 flows defense objective 2. Success in strategic competition hinges on the United States being a leader in the protection of democracy, human rights, and empowerment. To be an international partner of choice, the United States must model these actions internally. Objective 2 cannot be fully achieved without meaningful investment in objective 1. Finally, defense objective 3 is aimed at creating a more just and secure world. The protection and treatment of women is directly related to the security of states.30 As the article will show, the ability to have a meaningfully diverse force (objective 1) and build allies and partners around a shared sense of purpose (objective 2) will lead to a more holistic and meaningful understanding of the operational environment, including ensuring that women and girls are protected and empowered during crises.

The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition with the PRC and Russia

The PRC and Russia currently challenge U.S. national security with advanced technology, weapons development, and ceaseless gray zone warfare tactics. Regardless of the ever-changing battlefield and technology environment, the human weapon system remains crucial for operational success, including effectively countering adversarial gray zone threats. Through proactive and positive management of the human weapon system, the United States can succeed in competition and potentially prevent gray zone competition from escalating into kinetic operations.

The National Defense Strategy defines these operations as “coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for U.S. military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the U.S. Government.”31 It calls out both the PRC and Russia (as well as other adversaries) for employing gray zone tactics as part of their overall strategies and asserts that campaigning in the gray zone must be a key part of the Joint force’s capability in the future threat environment.

The PRC views gray zone activities as a natural extension of how countries exercise power and uses it to build favorable geopolitical conditions without triggering major backlash.32 The People’s Republic of China particularly focused on using gray zone tactics against our allies and partners in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility, targeting Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, and India. Russia sees gray zone activities as a way to compete with the United States—and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) more broadly—in unconventional ways that go predominantly uncontested because they fall below the threshold of what typically elicits a military response.33 Russia may also be using gray zone activities to actively shape their near environment to be more favorable for follow-on kinetic military operations (such as the invasion of Ukraine).34

Gray zone operations are difficult to counter because they are “gradualist campaigns,” combining a mix of traditional military activities with both nonmilitary state and nonstate actors.35

Table 1. Examples of gray zone activities

Tactic

Examples

Information operations

Disinformation campaigns in the media

Censorship of dissenting or antigovernment messages

Political coercion/disruption

Blocking of NATO expansion into Balkans Belt and Road Initiative

Economic coercion/disruption

Use of military vessels to intimidate or harass commercial shipping

Market dominance (i.e., Russia’s liquified natural gas energy market dominance)

Disruption of space operations

Jamming and spoofing of satellites

Testing offensive space weapons by the PRC and Russia

Proxy forces/paramilitary

Funding of “little green men” by Russia

China’s use of commercial fishing vessels to challenge international water access

Establishing dual-use bases or ports in contested areas

Military basing in disputed territories

Forward deployed troops or equipment in contested areas

Creation of artificial military bases in disputed sea territory

Conducting exercises in contested areas

Cyber operations

Breaches of election security systems

Hacking into financial systems

Source: courtesy of the authors.

As seen in table 1, gray zone operations include a wide range of activities. Military responses to these activities must walk a fine line. Conventional military responses can escalate gray zone activities and draw unwanted international attention, yet the military participates in responding to gray zone activities, and, in many ways, are the key actors responsible for ensuring that activities do not escalate.

The human weapon system is a key component of the military capability to appropriately respond to gray zone activities. Diversity in experiences and backgrounds is essential to countering mis- and disinformation. Diverse understanding of the cues and codes contained in images and language are essential for differentiating real from fake information and for providing important social context as to why certain populations are the targets of falsehoods.36

Members of the military are specifically targeted by mis- and disinformation campaigns.37 A more diverse force will help inoculate servicemembers from falling for this gray zone tactic both through a greater collective understanding of what mis- and disinformation is and through creating more creative solutions to countering fake information.38 These strategies can also be used to counter mis- and disinformation that appear more broadly in society.

A diverse force also offers our allies and partners a counter to China and Russia’s authoritarian politics. China’s Belt and Road Initiative not only brings economic impact to countries, but it also imposes China’s narrow political and social norms to trading partners. These include anti-LGBTQ policies, a male-sex preference in children, and single-party rule.39 Authoritarian regimes—or even authoritarian leaning factions among democracies—center many of their policies around misogyny.40 As a result, women and girls have been central in countering authoritarian regimes.41 The political and economic coercion by the PRC and Russia seek to undermine or destabilize democracy. As the United States engages with allies, partners, and potential partners around the world, it has an opportunity to model an alternative to these authoritarian policies. By embodying a diverse and cohesive force, the United States can counter efforts by China and Russia to deny diversity in society. The DOD’s implementation guidance to the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 recognizes the importance of promoting diversity with our allies and partners. Meaningful management of the human weapon system will ensure the United States does.42

Additionally, proper management of a diverse human weapon system will help ensure that economic investments are meaningful and less prone to corruption. While the military is not the primary arm of economic investment, it works closely with organizations like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other private entities to ensure overall security and stability. When women are involved in economic aid, the outcome results in more security and stability in the place where the aid was distributed.43 Similarly, when national economic growth is coupled with strategies that help women—such as access to child care, equality in education, and equitable health care benefits, women are able to take better advantage of such opportunities and the whole of society is strengthened.44 A diverse military will help to see where risks to an equitable distribution of economic opportunity may be, as well as key opportunities.

Finally, a diverse force is essential for countering military posturing—including adversarial basing and exercises. Much of the posturing done by our adversaries’ militaries is done to elicit a response from the United States as a means of escalating activity. Yet, rather than countering with direct military action, strategic engagement in military exercises can counter the impact of our adversaries in the region. For example, the U.S.-Australia joint exercise Talisman Saber both had the countries engaging with a near-peer competitor and worked to promote gender equality in vulnerable countries in the region.45 The Joint exercises Viking 18 and Viking 22 integrated gendered components to planning high-north exercises, and the result was an ability to counter Russia’s narrative about hard security outcomes.46

While the military alone is not responsible for responding to gray zone activities, it plays a significant role. U.S. forces are forward deployed throughout the world, at permanent bases, temporary assignments, and as part of force projection and quick response packages. As such, they are often the first to respond to a crisis. Additionally, forward deployment serves as a soft-power cultural exchange with allies and partners, which gives them key insights into the risks posed by gray zone activities.

Diversity Directives and Personnel Policies

To effectively manage the human weapon system through the recruitment and retention of a diverse force, the DOD and the Services publish directives and policies related to diversity, equity, and inclusion. Furthermore, Service branch leaders update and implement policies related to diversity initiatives to expand servicemember lifestyle options, quality of life, more inclusive dress and appearance, increased awareness and combat of biases, and care for victims of harassment and assault.

Directives on diversity at the federal level include: Executive Order 13583, Establishing a Coordinated Government-wide Initiative to Promote Diversity and Inclusion in the Federal Workforce; the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017; and the Department of Defense DEI Military Equal Opportunity Program.47 Collectively, these directives aim to advance equity, inclusion, civil rights, racial and gender rights, and equal opportunity at the highest levels of the country’s national security infrastructure. They cultivate diverse and dignified workforces, international security, peace, development and afford equitable opportunities in safe environments, free from prohibited discrimination, retaliation, and harassment.

At the Service levels, there are branch-specific policies and regulations related to diversity that mirror much of the federal-level guidance. Each Service branch of the military has similar regulations and goals: Diversity and Inclusion, Air Force Instruction 36-7001; the Army’s Army People Strategy: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Annex; the Navy’s “Diversity, Equity & Inclusion” objectives; and the Marine Corps’ Talent Management 2030.48 These directives tailor national guidance to Service-specific objectives.

They are intended to guide the Services’ recruitment and workforce management to attract, recruit, develop, and retain high quality, diverse personnel, with a culture of inclusion to leverage America’s talent pool and power of diversity for strategic advantages in the Joint force. This includes diversity of demographics (personal characteristics, age, race/ethnicity, religion, gender, socioeconomic status, family status, disability, sexuality, gender identity, and geographic origin), cognitive and behavioral diversity (neurodivergent individuals, differences in styles of work, thinking, learning, and personality), organizational and structural diversity (institutional background characteristics and experience), and global diversity (knowledge of and experience with foreign languages and cultures, inclusive of both citizens and noncitizens).49 Services similarly describe diversity as a critical way to enhance decision making, creativity, and the competitive edge to optimize operational effectiveness.50

There are additional policies that enable diversity in the military, including freedom of religion, sexual assault prevention and response (known as SAPR, including mandatory annual training to help shape healthy and safe climate and culture, victim care, and support) the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy against nonheterosexual servicemembers, and updated guidance welcoming transgender military personnel to serve openly.

Support policies can also indirectly increase diversity. For example, parental leave policies have expanded to include both caregivers, regardless of gender, lengthened in duration, and the inclusion same-sex couples and adoptions. Support is also provided for miscarriages and other fertility-related concerns. Pregnant personnel may continue to fly actively if they desire. New mothers also have a longer recovery time available prior to an official fitness test requirement.51

Dress and appearance regulations have been updated to include more hairstyles, such as ponytails, increased bun and bangs size, more options for women to wear trousers, jewelry, cell phone use, hands in pockets, and more. These changes consider different hair types, comfort, and quality of life while still upholding good order, discipline, and military effectiveness.52

Within different Services, physical fitness standards and programs are being updated to both reflect changes in the demographics of the force and the changing nature of military requirements. While not diversity policies directly, they recognize that outdated physical fitness norms may harm servicemembers.53 In the Air Force, the physical fitness test is now including alternative event choices, the ability to take a “diagnostic” physical fitness test and choose to save it as official afterward, special considerations for certain career fields where higher standards are required, and updated accounting for gender, age, climate acclimation, injuries, and test location altitude.54 The Marine Corps is updating its body composition standards, allowing for higher weights and body fat percentages to reflect the strength and body mass requirements of women in newly opened career fields.55

There are also efforts to improve diversity and remove potential bias from promotion and special assignment positions. Service directives have worked to eliminate references to race, gender, parental status, or religion from all promotion, award, and special assignment boards.56 While the intent is to remove conscious and unconscious biases that may be inhibiting diversity, it is a large undertaking to remove all identifying markers. In briefings about the updated process, the Services acknowledge that scrubbing records of all identifying information is not yet complete and identifying information is still a part of some records.57

The policy commitment to diversity is essential in setting top-down focus on human weapon system management. Yet, personnel-focused policy alone will not ensure U.S. success in gray zone competition. There are ongoing challenges to fully managing the human weapon system that must be addressed.

Challenges to Human Weapon System Management and Employment: Recruitment and Retention

While the United States is currently more successful than the PRC and Russia in managing the human weapon system, it still faces significant challenges, particularly with recruitment and retention of diverse servicemembers and national security professionals. The United States needs a qualified and diverse talent pool to counter adversary gray zone operations and to harness servicemember expertise and innovation for the next generation of warfare. This diversity is what sets America apart from its adversaries: “Indeed, pluralism, inclusion, and diversity are a source of national strength in a rapidly changing world.”58

The all-volunteer force presents challenges, in that diverse individuals must self-select into Service. Propensity to serve in the military for all young people continues to decline, and in fiscal year 2022 the Army missed its recruiting goal by approximately 15,000 soldiers, and while other Services met their goals, they had to rely on unplanned bonuses and financial incentives or changes to recruiting targets.59

Some demographics do not join or remain in the armed forces as often, for example, “military service still skews heavily towards men (4 out of 5 active duty enlistees are male)” and there is an overrepresentation of the Black American population in the military—specifically, about twice as many Black men serve in the U.S. military as their White male counterparts, numerically.60 This “can be seen as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the military has served as an important means of economic mobility for many Black men. On the other hand, the dominance of Black Americans in military service—and therefore among these most likely to be put in harm’s way on behalf of the nation—is striking, especially in light of broader current conversations about race, justice and equity.”61

It is important for the military to represent the people it serves, and that starts at recruiting stations where there must be visibility on diverse personnel in the office, on the materials, and seen in marketing campaigns. Recruiters must enhance their current approaches by following social trends of America’s teenage population.62 Growing youth propensity to serve also requires engaging with youth in the means they are the most comfortable, including popular social media platforms, other information networks, and in trending applications.63 Distributing correct facts, debunking military stereotypes and myths, and wholly representing the talent pool is crucial for attracting talent of all demographics. Women and their families, for example, fear possible sexual assault in the military and may not join for this reason.64 Effective delivery of inclusive practices, accurate narratives, and employment of inclusion-focused recruiting not only builds diversity in our ranks, but it also builds trust with the American people and taxpayers who feel wholly represented by troops of every background.

In addition to recruiting diverse and effective talent, retaining talent is a challenge for the U.S. military. The Department of Defense Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2023 prioritizes objectives for career progression and retention. There must be opportunities for all demographics to be promoted and serve in key positions and gain career-enhancing education with selection transparency. Additionally, the roadmap prioritizes mentorship for underrepresented groups and elimination of work environment and policy barriers that inhibit equitable practices.65 Leaders must ensure all members have fair opportunities to develop and succeed. Furthermore, structural concerns may disproportionately impact certain demographics. Women are almost one-third more likely to leave the Service at any time than their male counterparts. Family concerns, including access to adequate and affordable housing, stability for children, family planning support, reliable and affordable childcare, and other quality of life factors are cited as top reasons women leave the Services.66 These issues are “inextricably linked” to military readiness.67 Addressing and rectifying these problems must be a priority to retain talented personnel.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA) addresses some of these issues. The Services and the Department of Defense are hiring more than 2,000 prevention professionals, aimed at changing the culture around sexual harassment and assault and other adverse behaviors that harm recruitment and retention efforts.68 The NDAA also called for studies to examine compensation models, barriers to home ownership, and promotion pathways for servicemembers.69 Other recent DOD actions may also address barriers. A recent memorandum on family planning by the secretary of defense seeks to address both privacy and access to care concerns that arose out of the Dobbs vs. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) that overturned the provision of a constitutional right to an abortion.70 While it is too soon to determine the impact of these changes, they show an understanding of the requirement to meet the needs of servicemembers to recruit and retain a diverse force.

Challenges to Human Weapon System Management and Employment: Ties to Operational Effectiveness

Recruitment and retention are not the only challenges that the United States faces regarding the human weapon system. Most of the directives discussed are focused on personnel systems and policies. However, for the Services to fully embrace an action, there must be direct ties to operational effectiveness. The Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military found that while personnel issues are frequently talked about as “readiness issues,” they are not measured or tracked as such, allowing them to become afterthoughts in the minds of operationally minded military leaders.71

Making the direct connections between personnel actions and operational effectiveness is a missing link for the effective management and employment of the human weapon system. Arguments about the “wokeness” of the military highlight that the operational link between a diverse force and operational necessity is not yet fully understood.72 To fully engage across gray zone activities, the Services need to incorporate the importance of diversity in their doctrine, planning, and professional military education processes.73

These actions have proven tactically, operationally, and strategically effective. Gender advisors and gender focal points at the combatant commands have strengthened the United States’ strategic partnerships in key contested regions and improved stability and security during humanitarian and disaster response operations.74 Additionally, they have proven successful in strengthening ties between the DOD and other government agencies, such as the Department of State and USAID.75 This whole-of-government approach is necessary for gray zone competition.

Building off the success of combatant commands, the DOD and military Services would benefit from standardizing aspects of the gender advisor workforce and integrating diverse perspectives throughout the operational planning process. Revising the planning process to consider all perspectives will signal to the force that addressing diversity initiatives is essential and leads to an inclusive culture where the safety and well-being of all members is seen as an essential part of security and military operations.76

Conclusion

Success in gray zone operations requires thoughtful management of the human weapon system. To do this, the United States must also leverage the diverse talents of its force and fully integrate diverse perspectives into operational planning and readiness. As our near-peer competitors are becoming increasingly narrow in their view of security, there is an opportunity to leverage diverse perspectives and be successful before competition escalates to conflict. While the United States has enacted various diversity initiatives in the past several years, the importance of personnel cannot be eclipsed by investments in technology. As the United States shifts focus on a new pacing threat, the human weapon system remains the linchpin of our success.

About the Authors

MSgt Bonnie Rushing is course director and academic faculty at the U.S. Air Force Academy’s Military & Strategic Studies Department. She joined the Air Force in 2009 as an airborne linguist and earned her master of science in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University. Dr. Kyleanne Hunter is a senior political scientist at Rand. She was a professor of military and strategic studies as well as the director of the Strategy and Warfare Center and associate director of the Institute for Future Conflict at the U.S. Air Force Academy. She earned her MA and PhD from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver.

The views and opinions expressed in the article are the authors' own and do not necessarily represent that of their employers, the Air Force, or the Department of Defense.

Endnotes

“Global Firepower 2023,” Global Firepower, accessed 29 December 2022; Deganit Paikowsky, “Why Russia Tested Its Anti-Satellite Weapon,” Foreign Policy, 26 December 2021; and Ian Williams, “Missiles of Russia,” Missile Threat, 10 August 2021.
Gian Gentile, Raphael S. Cohen, and Dara Massicot, “Ukraine’s 1777 Moment,” Rand (blog), 19 September 2022.
Gerrard Kaonga, “Furious Russian Soldier Complains to Mom after Fleeing Ukrainian Offensive,” Newsweek, 25 November 2022.
Daniel Boffey and Pjotr Sauer, “ ‘We Were Allowed to be Slaughtered’: Calls by Russian Forces Intercepted,” Guardian, 20 December 2022.
National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2022).
2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022).
Andrew Feickert, U.S. Army Long-Range Precision Fires: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021); “B-21 Raider Makes Public Debut: Will Become Backbone of the Air Force’s Bomber Fleet,” U.S. Air Force, 2 December 2022; and “Littoral Combat Regiment,” Marines.mil, 2 August 2021.
Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2020).
“Army of 2030,” Army.mil, 5 October 2022.
Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2022 (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 2022).
Gen Charles Q. Brown Jr., Accelerate Change or Lose (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2020).
“2021 USSF Campaign Support Plan,” Spaceforce.mil, 6 December 2021.
Patricia A. Deuster et al., “Human Performance Optimization: An Evolving Charge to the Department of Defense,” Military Medicine 172, no. 11 (November 2007): 1133–37, https://doi.org/10.7205/MILMED.172.11.1133.
A. P. Tvaryana et al., “Managing the Human Weapon System: A Vision for an Air Force Human-Performance Doctrine,” Air & Space Power Journal 23, no. 2 (2009).
“Human Performance,” AFRL, accessed 8 May 2023.
Tvaryana et al., “Managing the Human Weapon System,” 34–41.
Gina Harkins, “The Military is Overhauling Troops’ Chow as Obesity Rates Soar,” Military Times, 19 August 2018.
Daniel C. Billing, “The Implications of Emerging Technology on Military Human Performance Research Priorities,” Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport 24, no. 10 (2021): 947–53, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsams.2020.10.007.
Jill R. Scheckel, “Preparing the Human Weapon System: Promoting Warrior Resiliency” (research paper, Air War College, Air University, 2010.
“Integrated Resilience,” U.S. Air Force, 31 December 2022.
Ginger E. Beals, “Women Marines in Counterinsurgency Operations: Lioness and Female Engagement Teams” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 2010).
Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-24 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 April 2018).
“Memorandum on Revitalizing America’s Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce, Institutions, and Partnerships,” White House, 4 February 2021.
National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2022).
National Security Strategy.
Eric Danko, “Officer and Enlisted Quality Comparison in the U.S. and the PLA,” WildBlue Yonder, 13 May 2022.
Katherine W. Phillips, Katie A Liljenquist, and Margaret A. Neale, “Is the Pain Worth the Gain?: The Advantages and Liabilities of Agreeing with Socially Distinct Newcomers,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35, no. 3, 336–50, https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208328062; and Sheen S. Levine, “Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, no. 52 (2014): 18,524–29, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1407301111.
Cristina Díaz-García, Angela González-Moreno, and Francisco Jose Sáez-Martínez, “Gender Diversity within R&D Teams: Its Impact on Radicalness of Innovation,” Innovation 15, no. 2 (2013): 149–60.
Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020).
Valerie M. Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
National Defense Strategy, 6.
Bonny Lin et al., Competition in the Gray Zone: Countering China’s Coercion Against U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2022), https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA594-1.
Anthony H. Cordesman and Grace Hwang, Chronology of Possible Russian Gray Area and Hybrid Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Today’s Wars Are Fought in the Gray Zone: Here Is Everything You Need to Know About It,” Atlantic Council, updated 23 February 2022.
Cordesman and Hwong, Chronology of Possible Russian Gray Area and Hybrid Warfare Operations.
Peng Qi et al., “Improving Fake News Detection by Using an Entity-Enhanced Framework to Fuse Diverse Multimodal Clues,” in MM ‘21: Proceedings of the 29th ACM International Conference on Multimedia (New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 2021).
Peter W. Singer and Eric B. Johnson, “The Need to Inoculate Military Servicemembers Against Information Threats: The Case for Digital Literacy Training for the Force,” War on the Rocks, 1 February 2021; and Kristofer Goldsmith, An Investigation into Foreign Entities Who Are Targeting Troops and Veterans Online (Culpeper, VA: Vietnam Veterans of America, 2019).
Sonner Kehrt, “Troops, Veterans Are Targets in the Disinformation War Even If They Don’t Know It Yet,” Warhorse, 1 September 2022.
Min Ye, “Fragmented Motives and Policies: The Belt and Road Initiative in China,” Journal of East Asian Studies 21, no. 2 (2021): 193–217, https://doi.org/ 10.1017/jea.2021.15.
Nitasha Kaul, “The Misogyny of Authoritarians in Contemporary Democracies,” International Studies Review 23, no. 4 (December 2021): 1619–45, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab028.
Kathleen McInnis, Benjamin Jensen, and Jaron Wharton, “Why Dictators Are Afraid of Girls: Rethinking Gender and National Security,” War on the Rocks, 7 November 2022; and Erica Chenoweth and Zoe Marks “Revenge of the Patriarchs: Why Autocrats Fear Women,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2022.
Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan.
Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov, “Empowering Women through Development Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (2013): 540–57.
Mayra Buvinić and Rebecca Furst-Nichols, “Promoting Women’s Economic Empowerment: What Works?,” World Bank Research Observer 31, no. 1 (2016): 59–101.
Stéfanie von Hlatky and Andréanne Lacoursière, Why Gender Matters in the Military and for Its Operations (Montreal: Centre for International and Defence Policy, 2019).
Lisa Sharland and Genevieve Feely, eds., “Women, Peace and Security: Defending Progress and Responding to Emerging Challenges,” Strategic Insights ASPI, June 2019.
“FACT SHEET: U.S. Government Women Peace and Security Report to Congress,” statement, White House, 18 July 2022.
Diversity and Inclusion, Air Force Instruction 36-7001 (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force); Army People Strategy: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Annex (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 2020); “Diversity, Equity & Inclusion,” U.S. Navy, updated 3 April 2023; and Talent Management 2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2021).
Diversity and Inclusion.
“Diversity, Equity & Inclusion.”
“Military Parental Leave Program (MPLP),” U.S. Army, accessed 8 May 2023.
“Department of the Air Force Guidance Memorandum to DAFI 36-2903, Dress and Personal Appearance of United States Air Force and United States Space Force,” memorandum, U.S. Air Force, 31 March 2023.
Jeannette Gaudry Haynie et al., Impacts of Marine Corps Body Composition and Military Appearance Program (BCMAP) Standards on Individual Outcomes and Talent Management (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2022), https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1189-1; and “Physical Fitness,” in Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services: 2019 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019).
Department of the Air Force Physical Fitness Program, Department of the Air Force Manual 36-2905 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2022).
“Marine Corps Study on Body Composition Leads to Change,” Marines.mil, 22 August 2022.
Lolita Baldor, “Esper Order Aims to Expand Diversity, Skirts Major Decisions,” Washington Post, 15 July 2020.
DACOWITS December 2022 briefing.
National Security Strategy.
“Fall 2021 Propensity Update,” Office of People Analytics, 9 August 2022; and Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Status of Recruiting and Retention Efforts Across the Department of Defense, 118th Cong. (21 September 2022).
Isabel V. Sawhill and Larry Checco, “Black Americans Are Much More Likely to Serve the Nation, in Military and Civilian Roles,” Brookings Institution, 27 August 2020.
Sawhill and Checco, “Black Americans Are Much More Likely to Serve the Nation, in Military and Civilian Roles.”
Douglas Yeung et al., Recruiting Policies and Practices for Women in the Military: Views from the Field (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2017), https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1538.
Yeung et al., Recruiting Policies and Practices for Women in the Military.
Yeung et al., Recruiting Policies and Practices for Women in the Military.
Department of Defense Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2023 (Washington, DC: Office for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, Department of Defense, 2022).
Female Active-Duty Personnel: Guidance and Plans Needed for Recruitment and Retention Efforts (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2020).
“CMSAF Wright Testifies before Congress on Air Force Quality of Life,” news, Joint Base San Antonio, 12 February 2019.
“DOD Begins Hiring Prevention Workforce,” DOD News, 30 November 2022.
Providing for the Concurrence by the House in the Senate Amendment to H. Res. 7776, 117th Cong. (2022).
“Ensuring Access to Reproductive Healthcare,” Department of Defense, 20 October 2022; and Kyleanne M. Hunter et al., How the Dobbs Decision Could Affect U.S. National Security (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2022), https://doi.org/10.7249/PEA2227-1.
Hard Truths and the Duty to Change (Washington, DC: Independent Review Commission on Military Sexual Assault, 2021).
Thomas Spoer, “The Rise of Wokeness in the Military,” Heritage Foundation, 9 September 2022.
Hard Truths and the Duty to Change. See recommendation 3.4.
Jim Garamone, “Women, Security, Peace Initiative Militarily Effective,” DOD News, 5 November 2020.
“Gender Advisors Key to Effective Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations, 14 September 2020.
Hard Truths and the Duty to Change, recommendation 3.4.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ASSESSMENT, JULY 8, 2023

Why the Ukraine Counteroffensive Is Such Slow Going

Outgunned, outmanned and facing a deeply entrenched enemy, Ukrainian troops are attempting one of the most daunting operations a military can undertake

Congress Dives Back Into Fights on Spending Cuts, Military as Deadline Draws Near

Lawmakers have to approve a series of bills ahead of the new fiscal year’s Oct. 1 start​

By David Harrison

Follow

July 9, 2023 5:30 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-dives-back-into-fights-on-spending-cuts-military-as-deadline-draws-nears-c9fcee?mod=hp_lead_pos6

​WASHINGTON—Lawmakers face a stacked legislative agenda with the threat of a government shutdown looming in the fall, marking a fresh test of Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s ability to keep his conference in line and Congress functioning.

Busting this big myth about Baby Boomers reveals something about Gen Z, too | CNN

What many get wrong about Boomers’ history

A major conversation right now is misunderstanding much of Gen Z’s reality

And Gen Z may not be as ‘woke’ as you think

We hear a lot about Baby Boomers vs. Gen Z, but there’s a bigger debate happening

China Controls Minerals That Run the World—and It Just Fired a Warning Shot at U.S.

Beijing’s export restrictions on two minerals this week show it is willing to use its dominance to rock Western supply chains

The Future of War Has Come in Ukraine: Drone Swarms

The innovations that have led to Kyiv’s remarkable successes against Russia will change combat dramatically.

‘Several Things Have Shocked Me’: An Ex-Insider on Business in China

Here’s how to fix the Pentagon’s CAPE office

Taiwan’s new Mumbai office highlights growing ties with India

A menacing China has rattled countries in the region. As a result, some of Taiwan’s leading tech firms are looking to relocate their manufacturing to India in a bid to curb exposure to the Chinese market and to fortify their global supply chains.

PRANAY SHARMA JULY 08, 2023 / 05:37 PM IST

The opening of the Mumbai office comes in the wake of leading Taiwanese companies' desire to relocate their manufacturing to India from China.

From Chess and Rubik's Cube to Go, Rethinking Irregular Warfare

Sal Artiaga

Russian army failed to achieve any of its goals during 500 days of war against Ukraine - ISW

Zelensky: Grain deal and people's lives cannot depend on Putin's mood

Opinion | They’re Ready to Fight Again, on Artificial Legs

They’re Ready to Fight Again, on Artificial Legs

Buying Power Is the Invisible Shortfall of the 2024 Defense Budget Request

Where Does the Military’s 2024 Budget Really Stand?

What Difference Does 3 Years Make?

Why Does this Matter?

Why Jens Stoltenberg Should Be a Candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize

DOD has not 'adapted' to strategic competition yet, according to a prominent think tank

Diplomacy Watch: Washington may deny it, but it looks someone wants to talk to Russia - Responsible Statecraft

Diplomacy Watch: Washington may deny it, but it looks someone wants to talk to Russia

Will China Change Its Approach to the Ukraine War?

The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition

Lawmakers have to approve a series of bills ahead of the new fiscal year’s Oct. 1 start

WASHINGTON—Lawmakers face a stacked legislative agenda with the threat of a government shutdown looming in the fall, marking a fresh test of Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s ability to keep his conference in line and Congress functioning.