Quotes of the Day:
"A politician thinks of the next election – a statesman of the next generation."
- James Freeman Clarke
"A share in the sovereignty of the state, which is exercised by the citizens at large, in voting at elections is one of the most important rights of the subject, and in a republic ought to stand foremost in the estimation of the law…That portion of the sovereignty, to which each individual is entitled, can never be too highly prized. It is that for which we have fought and bled."
- Alexander Hamilton
"The United States has a strategy based on arithmetic. They question the computers, add and subtract, extract square roots, and then go into action. But arithmetical strategy doesn't work here. If it did, they would already have exterminated us with their airplanes."
- Gen Vo Nguyen Giap
1. US issues sanctions targeting North Korean weapons of mass destruction program
2. Treasury Sanctions Individual, Banks, and Trading Company for Supporting North Korea’s WMD and Ballistic Missile Programs
3. DPRK (North Korea): Yesterday’s Vote on a Sanctions Resolution : What's In Blue : Security Council Report
4. Analysis: Security Council split spells end of an era for U.S.-led sanctions on North Korea
5. N. Korean missile tests provide learning experience, creating concerns for U.S.: Pentagon
6. For South Korea’s New President, Challenges Mount at Home and Abroad
7. Biden's promises to Northeast Asian allies
8. Top diplomats of U.S., S. Korea, Japan vow continued efforts to end N. Korean provocation
9. Economic security needs to work both ways
10. South Korea's game changer: New Southern Policy
11. Widespread disbelief over N. Korea's tiny COVID death rate
12. US intelligence assessing whether North Korea tested missile with properties not seen before
1. US issues sanctions targeting North Korean weapons of mass destruction program
Good step forward but not enough.
It is time for a strategic influence campaign as part of a holistic strategy toward north Korea. As we have long argued we need to provide a comprehensive pressure campaign as we outline in our Maximum Pressure 2.0 monograph (HERE). But the most important aspect is the information and influence activities that are needed to fully pressure KJU. Remember that he fears the Korean people in the north more than he does the US military especially when they are armed with information. It is time for us to use all our instruments of power but most importantly the one we have most neglected: strategic influence through information advantage.
US issues sanctions targeting North Korean weapons of mass destruction program
South Korean and U.S. missiles are displayed at the Korea War Memorial Museum in Seoul, May 26. AP-Yonhap
The United States imposed sanctions on two Russian banks, a North Korean company and a person it accused of supporting North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program, Friday, increasing the pressure on Pyongyang for its renewed ballistic missile launches.
The latest American move came a day after China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-led push to impose more United Nations sanctions on the North for its ballistic missile launches, publicly splitting the U.N. Security Council for the first time since it started punishing Pyongyang in 2006.
The vetoes came despite what the United States says was the sixth test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by North Korea this year and amid signs that Pyongyang is preparing to conduct its first nuclear weapon test since 2017.
The U.S. Treasury Department in a statement said it targeted Air Koryo Trading Corp as well as Russian financial institutions the Far Eastern Bank and Bank Sputnik for contributing to procurement and revenue generation for North Korean organizations.
Washington also designated Jong Yong Nam, a Belarus-based representative of an organization subordinate to the North Korea Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS), who Washington said has supported North Korean organizations linked to the development of ballistic missiles.
North Korea's mission to the United Nations in New York did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
"The United States will continue to implement and enforce existing sanctions while urging the DPRK (North Korea) to return to a diplomatic path and abandon its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles," the Treasury's Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Brian Nelson, said in the statement.
China has been urging the United States to take action ― including lifting some unilateral sanctions ― to entice Pyongyang to resume talks stalled since 2019, after three failed summits between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and then-U.S. President Donald Trump. The United States has said Pyongyang should not be rewarded.
Late on Friday, the top diplomats of South Korea, Japan and the United States issued a joint statement saying North Korea had "significantly increased the pace and scale of its ballistic missile launches since September 2021."
In the statement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi urged Pyongyang to "return to negotiations." (Reuters)
2. Treasury Sanctions Individual, Banks, and Trading Company for Supporting North Korea’s WMD and Ballistic Missile Programs
In the spirit of Otto Warmier. We must not forget the evil nature of the Kim family regime.. I am glad to see Treasury put that at the beginning of the press release.
I will ask my friends who have escaped from north Korea and who know about north Korean business and financial activities how effective these sanctions will be.
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Office of Public Affairs
Press Release: FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 27, 2022
Treasury Sanctions Individual, Banks, and Trading Company for Supporting North Korea’s WMD and Ballistic Missile Programs
Actions taken in the spirit of the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions Act of 2019
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today sanctioned one individual, two banks, and a trading company for their support to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs and to the U.S.-designated DPRK national airline. On May 24, 2022, the DPRK launched three missiles: one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and two shorter range ballistic missiles. So far this year, the DPRK has launched 23 ballistic missiles, including six ICBMs — all in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs).
“Today Treasury is targeting supporters of the DPRK’s WMD and ballistic missile programs, as well as foreign financial institutions that have knowingly provided significant financial services to the DPRK government,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States will continue to implement and enforce existing sanctions while urging the DPRK to return to a diplomatic path and abandon its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.”
Today’s action targets an individual who has directly supported or helped generate revenue for DPRK organizations that are linked to the development of ballistic missiles, along with three entities that are contributing or have contributed to procurement and revenue generation for DPRK organizations.
The United States remains committed to seeking dialogue and diplomacy with the DPRK but will continue to address the threat posed by the DPRK’s unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs to the United States and the international community.
DPRK WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SUPPORT
On August 30, 2010, the U.S. Department of State designated both the Munitions Industry Department (MID) and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 (“Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters”) for their involvement with or provision of support for the DPRK’s WMD and missile programs. Additionally, on April 1, 2022, OFAC designated the Ministry of Rocket Industry (MoRI) pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by MID. Today’s action will further restrict the ability of both MID and SANS to utilize their subsidiaries and foreign-based agents to procure both financial and material support from DPRK representatives in foreign countries and from companies that provide services to circumvent sanctions.
OFAC is designating one individual and one entity engaged in various procurement activities on behalf of the DPRK. Jong Yong Nam is designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, SANS. Since 2019, Jong Yong Nam has been located in Minsk, Belarus, as a representative for a SANS-subordinate organization.
The Air Koryo Trading Corporation (AKTC) is designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing, or attempting to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, MoRI. MoRI has sought to acquire various electrical components and dual-use goods, including transistors and hydraulic system components, through AKTC. AKTC has also been used to coordinate MoRI shipments to North Korea. A Dandong, China-based AKTC official coordinated shipments on behalf of MoRI, while O Yong Ho — previously designated by the Department of State pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having engaged in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to the proliferation of WMDs or their means of delivery by the DPRK — used AKTC to coordinate the shipment of luxury goods to the DPRK.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
OFAC is also designating two Russian financial institutions for conducting transactions on behalf of DPRK entities.
The Far Eastern Bank is designated pursuant to E.O. 13722 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of U.S.-designated Air Koryo, the national airline of the DPRK. Far Eastern Bank has provided banking services on behalf of Air Koryo and other DPRK government organizations.
Bank Sputnik is designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, having attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the DPRK Foreign Trade Bank (FTB), a U.S.- and UN-designated entity. In addition to assisting the FTB with the facilitation of a payment for the use of Russian satellite services, Bank Sputnik holds a Russian ruble account for a U.S.-designated FTB front company, Korea Ungum Corporation. This account was used to conduct transactions between two DPRK-affiliated, Moscow-based businesses.
OFAC is taking these actions in the spirit of the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions Act of 2019, which imposes mandatory designations on foreign financial institutions that knowingly provide significant financial services to persons designated under DPRK-related authorities.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list.
###
3. DPRK (North Korea): Yesterday’s Vote on a Sanctions Resolution : What's In Blue : Security Council Report
A useful overview north Korean activities from the UN Security Council and why sanctions are needed. Good consensus on needed action except for the two malign actors and north Korean supporters: China and Russia. I really wish we had a national level strategic influence campaign. Although it is not good that we cannot get new international sanctions passed from an information and influence activities perspective, north Korea, China, and Russia are giving us a lot to work with to be able to show the world their true colors.
Excerpt:
With the exception of China and Russia, it seems that there was broad support for the US-proposed resolution during the negotiations. While it appears that some Council members were more active than others, a majority of the remaining members engaged with the text and suggested amendments to address their specific concerns.
DPRK (North Korea): Yesterday’s Vote on a Sanctions Resolution : What's In Blue : Security Council Report
DPRK (North Korea): Yesterday’s Vote on a Sanctions Resolution
Yesterday (26 May), the Security Council voted on a draft resolution updating and strengthening the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) sanctions regime. The draft resolution was not adopted because China and Russia both cast a veto. The remaining 13 Council members voted in favour of the resolution. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution A/RES/76/262 of 26 April, which stipulates that the President of the General Assembly shall convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly within ten working days of a veto being cast by a permanent member of the Council, the General Assembly is scheduled to hold a debate on the DPRK on 8 June. This will be the first time that the General Assembly has acted in accordance with resolution A/RES/76/262.
The DPRK has conducted an unusually high number of tests this year, including a ballistic missile test that was carried out on 7 May, three days before the inauguration of Republic of Korea (ROK) President Yoon Suk Yeol. On 25 May, the DPRK tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and two other ballistic missiles. The launch marked the second time that the DPRK has tested an ICBM this year and came shortly after US President Joe Biden concluded a trip to the region.
During the 25 March open briefing regarding the DPRK’s 24 March ICBM test, the US, the penholder on the DPRK, announced that it would introduce a draft Chapter VII resolution “to update and strengthen the sanctions regime”. During the ensuing weeks, the US apparently engaged in bilateral negotiations with China regarding the text of the resolution, before sharing a draft with all Council members on 12 April. Following several rounds of negotiations involving all Council members, written comments, and four revised drafts, a fifth draft was put in blue on 26 May without a silence procedure.
Overall, the negotiations regarding the draft resolution were difficult. During the first round of negotiations, which took place on 14 April, China and Russia apparently said that they did not support the draft resolution. It seems that both members argued that strengthening the sanctions regime will not help to resolve tensions on the Korean peninsula and suggested that further sanctions will have a negative effect on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK. China and Russia apparently said that they would support a presidential statement rather than the draft resolution proposed by the US, while also promoting the draft resolution that they circulated in October 2021, which would ease sanctions on the DPRK rather than strengthening them. Both members apparently restated this position during subsequent negotiation rounds and did not otherwise engage with the US-proposed draft text. It seems that China and Russia also did not attend the final round of negotiations involving all Council members. Although China and Russia both pushed for a presidential statement, particularly during the later stages of the negotiations, it appears that neither member circulated a draft text nor indicatied what their proposed presidential statement would entail.
With the exception of China and Russia, it seems that there was broad support for the US-proposed resolution during the negotiations. While it appears that some Council members were more active than others, a majority of the remaining members engaged with the text and suggested amendments to address their specific concerns.
The draft in blue proposed significant changes to the 1718 DPRK sanctions regime, including by extending the existing prohibition on ballistic missile tests by the DPRK to cruise missiles “or any other delivery system capable of delivering nuclear weapons”. It also imposed sanctions on several individuals and entities that had not previously been designated under the 1718 sanctions regime, such as the Lazarus Group, a cyberthreat group reportedly controlled by the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the DPRK’s primary intelligence agency. The Lazarus group has been linked to several major cyberattacks, including a destructive attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014 and the 23 March theft of over $600 million of cryptocurrency from Ronin, a blockchain project that is used to power a popular online game.
Among other matters, the draft resolution amended the oil cap for the 1718 sanctions regime by reducing the amount of oil that member states can supply to the DPRK by 25 percent and also banned the importation of tobacco to the DPRK by member states. It further sought to streamline the current procedure for humanitarian exemptions to the 1718 sanctions regime by directing the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee to issue a list of “well-defined categories of items” that would be exempt from the regime on humanitarian grounds, subject to certain conditions.
New language concerning the DPRK’s cyber activities was also added to the draft in blue. The draft text called on member states to take appropriate measures to prevent the DPRK and its nationals from using their territories to conduct malicious information and communication technology (ICT) activity, including by repatriating DPRK nationals engaged in such activity and by closing any businesses associated with them. The draft also decided that the DPRK shall halt the use of ICT to gain unauthorised access to UN ICT systems and called on it to adhere to the “General Assembly-affirmed framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and its set of voluntary norms”.
The reduction of the oil cap was an issue during the negotiations. The first draft circulated by the US to all Council members reduced the amount of oil that member states can supply to the DPRK by 50 percent, rather than the 25 percent outlined in the draft in blue. While some Council members supported the US’ initial proposal, it appears that other Council members opposed it. The members who did not favour the US’ initial proposal apparently noted that the existing oil cap provides the DPRK with less oil than it needs to meet its national requirements, and suggested that reducing the oil cap by a greater amount could have a punitive effect on the DPRK’s population rather than affecting its nuclear weapons and missile programmes. It seems that the US lowered the proposed oil cap reduction to address these concerns.
The language concerning the DPRK’s malicious ICT activity appears to have enjoyed strong support among Council members. Early drafts of the resolution did not include a reference to the “General Assembly-affirmed framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and its set of voluntary norms”. It seems that this language was added partly to acknowledge the General Assembly’s work in this field. The relevant text was also amended to clarify that the examples of measures that member states can take to prevent DPRK nationals from using their territories for malicious ICT activities was not intended to be prescriptive.
The list of well-defined categories of items subject to a humanitarian exemption was another area of discussion during the negotiations. The initial draft of the resolution provided for a “list of items” instead of a “list of well-defined categories of items”. It appears that this change was made after some Council members raised concerns that listing specific items would be too restrictive for humanitarian organisations working in the DPRK and suggested that a list of categories would afford these organisations greater flexibility in their work.
Language regarding the COVID-19 situation in the DPRK was also added to the draft resolution as the negotiations progressed. Among other matters, the draft text in blue affirmed the Council’s commitment to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic in the DPRK and decided that the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee can exempt humanitarian activities relating to pandemic relief that involve the UN as a package, rather than on a case-by-case basis.
Sign up for What's In Blue emails
4. Analysis: Security Council split spells end of an era for U.S.-led sanctions on North Korea
Will the UN Panel of Experts on north Korean sanctions be disbanded?
I somewhat disagree with my friend Jenny Town. She is right that there was no way CHina and Russia would support this action but I am sure our diplomats knew full well how China and Russia would respond. I think this action makes China's and Russia's complicity in north Korea's malign behavior crystal clear for all to see. We can and should exploit this from a strategic influence perspective. Rather than disband the Panel of Experts I would recommend trying to eject China and Russia from the panel since they have demonstrated they no longer support sanctions they should no longer have a role in surveying and enforcing them. But as P5 members I would assume they could block their own ejection.
Excerpt:
"I think it was a big mistake for the U.S. to push for what was sure to fail rather than showing unified opposition to North Korea's actions," said Jenny Town, director of the U.S.-based 38 North programme, which monitors North Korea. "In the current political environment, the idea that China and Russia could agree with the U.S. on anything would have sent a strong signal to Pyongyang."
Analysis: Security Council split spells end of an era for U.S.-led sanctions on North Korea
May 27 (Reuters) - A decision by China and Russia to veto new United Nations sanctions on North Korea pushed by the United States shattered any veneer of global cooperation, straining efforts to pressure Pyongyang as it prepares to conduct a new nuclear test.
The two countries on Thursday vetoed a U.S.-led push to impose more U.N. sanctions on North Korea over its renewed ballistic missile launches, publicly splitting the U.N. Security Council for the first time since it started punishing Pyongyang in 2006. read more
U.S. officials slammed it as a "sharp departure from the Council's track record of collective action on this issue."
"Today's vote means North Korea will feel more free to take further escalatory actions," Jeffrey Prescott, deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., said on Twitter. "But we can't resign ourselves to this fate – that would be far too dangerous."
Russia's U.N ambassador called the resolution "a path to a dead end," while China's envoy said it would only lead to more "negative effects and escalation of confrontation."
Analysts and some diplomats said Washington may have miscalculated in its rush to impose consequences for North Korea's missile tests.
"I think it was a big mistake for the U.S. to push for what was sure to fail rather than showing unified opposition to North Korea's actions," said Jenny Town, director of the U.S.-based 38 North programme, which monitors North Korea. "In the current political environment, the idea that China and Russia could agree with the U.S. on anything would have sent a strong signal to Pyongyang."
One European diplomat said that their country supported the U.S. resolution but that they were less appreciative of the timing and thought that Washington should have waited until North Korea carried out a new nuclear test.
The United States assessed that North Korea had tested six intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) this year and was "actively preparing to conduct a nuclear test," which would be the country's first since 2017.
FRAGILE CONSENSUS
Over the past 16 years the Security Council has steadily, and unanimously, stepped up sanctions to cut off funding for Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. It last tightened sanctions on Pyongyang in 2017.
A North Korean flag flutters at the North Korean embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia March 19, 2021. REUTERS/Lim Huey Teng
Washington increasingly criticised China and Russia for what it saw as lax enforcement, even before the latest political rift.
China and Russia have called for sanctions to be eased to prevent humanitarian suffering in the North, and to jumpstart stalled denuclearisation talks.
Artyom Lukin, a professor at Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok, said it seemed like the United States wanted to provoke and produce this split in the Security Council, knowing that China and Russia would not support the resolution.
Moscow and Beijing appear somewhat tolerant of North Korea's resuming long-range missile launches, but it is far from clear that Pyongyang has Russia's and China's consent, tacit or otherwise, for a nuclear test, he added.
"Nuclear testing is seen by Beijing, and especially Moscow, as a far more serious matter, compared to missile testing," Lukin said.
Nevertheless, Russia sees the Ukraine crisis as a proxy war with the United States, and the war is now bleeding into the situation around North Korea, he said.
"Even though Moscow and Washington have a real shared interest in the denuclearisation of North Korea, it has now become extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to collaborate," Lukin said.
China's ambassador to the U.N., Zhang Jun, suggested that the United States may see the Korean issue as "a chessman on the chessboard for their so-called Indo-Pacific strategy."
The Chinese and Russian veto is a telling sign of the deterioration of their overall relationship with the United States and its allies, said Beijing-based security scholar Zhao Tong of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
"Beijing could have abstained, but it used the veto to publicly signal its growing disagreement with and resentment toward Washington," he said. "Everyone knew that the veto would send a wrong and dangerous message to North Korea, but Russia and China believe they face higher stakes in pushing back against their perceived hostility from the Western countries."
Beijing and Moscow also genuinely see North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments as driven by threats from Washington and cannot be fully blamed on Pyongyang, Zhao said.
"We have a perception gap problem among the major powers," he said. "North Korea is only exploiting and benefiting from it."
Reporting by Josh Smith. Editing by Gerry Doyle
5. N. Korean missile tests provide learning experience, creating concerns for U.S.: Pentagon
Every test advances their program. That is usually the first priority for their tests though we usually assume it is a deliberate provocation with a message for us. Sometimes it is not all about us. But we should understand if it is not about messaging us directly, the purpose of these tests is to advance their warfighting capabilities which have one main purpose - to be able to dominate the Korean peninsula by force, when subversion and coercion do not succeed.
(LEAD) N. Korean missile tests provide learning experience, creating concerns for U.S.: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with additional remarks from the Pentagon spokesperson in last 3 paras)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, May 27 (Yonhap) -- Every missile launched by North Korea causes concern for the United States regardless of the type of missile fired as each launch provides a learning experience that can help improve the North's missile capabilities, a Pentagon spokesperson said Friday.
Defense Department Press Secretary John Kirby also reiterated that each missile fired by North Korea violates U.N. Security Council resolutions.
"Each one is a violation of existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. Each one only increases tensions on the peninsula," Kirby said when asked about North Korea's latest missile tests that took place earlier this week.
"And each one. no matter what kind of missile or no matter how far it flew or didn't fly, no matter what the trajectory or the metrics were, each one, we believe, is a learning experience for the regime in Pyongyang and that's concerning," he added.
North Korea fired three ballistic missiles on Tuesday (Seoul time), including an apparent intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
The launches marked the 17th of their kind this year. The North is also believed to be preparing for a nuclear test, which, if conducted, will mark the first of its kind since September 2017, and seventh in history.
Kirby declined to provide additional details of the latest North Korean missile launch even when pressed, only saying the U.S. is still analyzing them.
"I am not going to get into the intelligence and analysis that's been done on these multiple launches," he said. "We are continuing to look at that, continuing to consult with our allies and partners in the region."
Kirby also underscored the U.S.' strong alliances with South Korea and Japan, noting the U.S. has conducted joint military exercises separately with both countries in response to the latest North Korean missile tests.
"I would remind that those two exercises that we conducted with Japan and South Korea in the wake of the most recent launch were in response to the missile launches," he said when asked if and how the U.S. plans to increase its deterrence against North Korea.
"In other words, they were put together and executed very quickly, and that doesn't happen by accident. That happens because of the good alliance management and prior knowledge and familiarity with one another's military capabilities and the constant training and operating that we do with both our allies, and I think it's remarkable," he added.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. For South Korea’s New President, Challenges Mount at Home and Abroad
A good summary of the Challenges facing President Yoon.
For South Korea’s New President, Challenges Mount at Home and Abroad
North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs. The China challenge. Social divisions at home. Just two weeks into office, Yoon Suk-yeol has a full plate.
Advertisement
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol was sworn in as the president of South Korea earlier this month, ending a leadership transition tainted by North Korea’s recent “binge” of weapons tests.
The president begins his term as the least popular president in the country’s short democratic history, clinching victory by less than 1 percentage point.
Yoon of the People Power Party is a hardline conservative and is expected to seek closer ties with the United States and take a more hawkish approach to North Korea and China – all while confronting a plethora of domestic challenges.
He begins his five-year term as tensions on the Korean Peninsula heighten, and inter-Korean diplomacy remains at an indefinite impasse. The diplomatic tug-of-war between the United States, South Korea’s defense guarantor, and China, the country’s largest trading partner, is intensifying; both powers are scurrying to win Seoul’s favor.
On the domestic front, housing prices are soaring, birth rates stand at a record low, and political sectarianism is rife. The country’s heated “gender wars” rage, and the president’s opposition – the Democratic Party of Korea – controls the country’s parliament, likely resulting in legislative “paralysis.”
On Friday, U.S. President Joe Biden arrived in Seoul, officially beginning a three-day visit to South Korea as part of his first visit to Asia as president. As Biden met with his South Korean counterpart, U.S. and South Korean officials warned of the “genuine possibility” of a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test or nuclear test.
The summit was Yoon’s first high-profile appearance on the world stage, but the Korean people do not share Biden’s warm embrace of their new president. Recent surveys from Gallup Korea show only 42 percent of Koreans approved of Yoon’s performance as president-elect. His predecessors entered office with approval ratings of roughly 70 percent.
For a popular president, confronting an increasingly bellicose North Korea, easing the country’s economic woes, and mending fractious cultural divides would prove challenging. For the deeply unpopular Yoon, the obstacles ahead may prove insuperable.
Advertisement
Here are some of the issues Yoon will likely confront in his tenure.
North Korea’s Missile Launching ‘Binge’
The new president’s most pressing policy challenge? South Korea’s quarrelsome northern neighbor.
Former President Moon Jae-in and then-U.S. President Donald Trump prioritized face-to-face diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in a bid to cool tensions and inch toward denuclearization. Yoon, however, is his predecessor’s ideological antithesis.
As a candidate, he expressed little interest in diplomacy, vowed to tighten sanctions until the North “makes active efforts in complete and verifiable denuclearization,” and said South Korea would build “a powerful military force that can assuredly deter any provocation.”
Yoon struck a more cautious tone in his inaugural address, noting the North’s weapons programs “are a threat to national and regional security,” but saying the “door to dialogue will remain open.”
In his speech, Yoon proposed reciprocity to court the so-called hermit kingdom, pledging to “present an audacious plan that will vastly strengthen North Korea’s economy” so long as the country “genuinely embarks on a process to complete denuclearization.”
Last Friday, the president offered to send COVID-19 vaccines to North Korea, a day after the country acknowledged its first cases of the coronavirus.
Yoon “plans to provide the North Korean people with COVID-19 vaccines and other medical supplies,” a spokesperson said in a statement. “Suspected cases are said to be rising explosively in North Korea recently due to a massive COVID-19 outbreak. We will hold discussions with the North Korean side about details.”
Seoul says humanitarian aid and security deliberations need not be mutually exclusive, but the North Korean leader has yet to respond to the offer. Previous offers of humanitarian aid from the Moon administration were rebuffed, and North Korea had even refused offers of COVID-19 vaccine doses from the World Health Organization.
Advertisement
Meanwhile, North Korea has launched at least 15 ballistic missiles this year alone. In March, the country abandoned a four-year moratorium on ICBM testing after purportedly launching its “Hwasong-17” missile (although that claim was disputed by Seoul and Washington). The North claims the weapon could strike the mainland United States.
At a military parade last month, Kim promised to ramp up his country’s weapons development program “at the fastest possible speed” to deter those who “violate” the country’s “fundamental interests,” significantly escalating inter-Korean tensions.
U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan last week warned of the “real risk of some kind of provocation [by North Korea] while we’re in the region.” He noted the provocation could be an ICBM or nuclear test but said the White House is “preparing for all contingencies.” His admonishment came roughly a week after the United States requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss the North’s increased weapons testing.
In the near term, observers predict regional tensions will increase as North Korea ramps up pressure on the new Yoon administration.
Update: Shortly after this piece was published, North Korea test-launched three missiles, included a suspected ICBM, on May 25. In response, the U.S. and South Korea conducted a joint missile launch drill of their own.
The China-U.S. Tug-of-War
In a 2008 report from the RAND Corporation, the think tank noted that “by geography alone, sensitivity toward Chinese interests will remain a characteristic of South Korean policies.”
But if previous South Korean politicians avoided rattling Beijing, Yoon’s tough-on-China rhetoric illustrates a broader shift in South Korean politics.
Yoon ostensibly prefers a values-driven foreign policy with the United States as its democratic north star. Still, China receives over a quarter of South Korea’s lucrative exports, making it the South’s largest trading partner.
Here, the tug-of-war between South Korea’s immediate interests and values is on full display. It remains to be seen if the president will “walk the talk” – but most analysts say his comments endorse the latter.
Yoon has called the United States South Korea’s only “true core ally,” and his party has called policies short of unconditional support of the United States “pro-Chinese” and “pro-North Korean.”
He considers the United States a palatable strategic alternative to China: He expressed support for the Biden administration’s new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and vowed to end what he calls the “partial to China” foreign policy of his predecessor. In his inaugural address, the president promised to champion values like “freedom” and “liberal democracy,” certainly a thinly-veiled poke at Beijing.
Advertisement
Kicking off Biden’s visit, the two leaders toured a Samsung semiconductor complex in Pyeongtaek – a model of the $17 billion Samsung semiconductor plant expected to open in Texas in 2024. Yoon said he hoped to deepen a bilateral “economic and security alliance [with the United States] based on cooperation in advanced technology and supply chains.”
Standing beside his South Korean counterpart, Biden signaled his ambition to achieve the long-elusive “pivot to Asia”: “So much of the future of the world is going to be written here, in the Indo-Pacific, over the next several decades,” Biden said. “This is the moment, in my view, to invest in one another to deepen our business ties, to bring our people even closer together.”
These statements from both presidents underscore a warming Washington-Seoul alliance and both countries’ increasingly negative perception of China.
In a December Hankook Research survey, 56 percent of South Koreans said China will become their country’s gravest security threat within the next 10 years. South Koreans favor the United States over China by a six-to-one margin. The same survey found that more South Koreans dislike China than Japan – South Korea’s former colonizer.
Even so, some analysts do not expect harmonious relations between South Korea and its ally.
As a candidate, Yoon endorsed the deployment of U.S. missile systems in South Korea – known as THAAD – bucking Beijing’s previous and likely future objections.
But his new administration later dropped that promise, instead opting for a type of strategic ambiguity. Park Jin, South Korea’s new foreign minister, declined to elaborate on additional THAAD deployments during his confirmation hearing, noting that “in-depth discussions will be held to decide on what conclusions should be drawn.”
“Yoon Suk-yeol takes office with the external environment stacked against him,” Park Won-gon, a professor of Political Science at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, told The New York Times.
“He has to deal with tensions with North Korea. He has to persuade the Biden administration to shake off its lackadaisical stance on North Korea and make it a priority. He has to do the homework Moon Jae-in had left undone, like how to position South Korea in the friction between the United States and China.”
‘Anti-Feminism’ and Domestic Divisions
In a country rent by political divisions, one contentious campaign topic seemed to transcend most others: gender inequality and feminism.
As a candidate in 2017, the left-leaning former President Moon vowed to “become a feminist president.” Yoon has taken the opposite stance.
Analysts say Yoon stoked anti-feminist sentiment to court male voters in their 20s and 30s. As a candidate, Yoon blamed the country’s sagging birth rate on feminism, promised to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality, and vowed to tighten legal punishments for false accusations of sexual assault – a move some activists say will discourage women from reporting sexual abuse.
Yoon’s proposals deepened divisions between self-described “feminists” and “anti-feminists,” intensifying South Korea’s fraught “gender wars.” The anti-feminists argue efforts to alleviate gender inequities amount to reverse discrimination against men. They say South Korea’s conscription system – where all able men must serve in a military plagued by allegations of abuse – undermines their competitiveness in an already tight job market.
Still, political analysts say South Korea’s “anti-feminists” are a coveted voting bloc for some politicians to win.
A Hankook Ibo research survey published in May of 2021 reported that 77 percent of South Korean men in their 20s are “repulsed by feminism.” In a separate survey, only 38 percent of men in their 20s called discrimination against women “serious in Korean society.”
Youngmi Kim, a senior lecturer at the University of Edinburgh, told CNN that South Korea still has “a long journey ahead” before finally overcoming gender-based discrimination.
Earlier this month, Yoon’s transition team published a list of 110 policy proposals that transition committee chair Ahn Cheol-soo said will reposition South Korea “as a nation of people living well together.”
The proposals outlined the president’s vision for South Korea’s government. The first 15 proposals aim to “reform” some past policies and traditions, including the famed Korean age system.
The document also outlined the administration’s aims to revitalize the country’s battered tourism industry and broader post-COVID-19 economy.
In a notable omission, the document did not mention Yoon’s campaign pledge to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality. But in a later statement, the transition team noted that the president’s promise still stands.
Also absent: a promise to pass the country’s long-elusive non-discrimination bill. In South Korea, discrimination on the basis of race, sexual orientation, and gender identity is legally permissible. Calls grew louder for South Korea’s assembly to pass the bill before Yoon took office, but the legislature failed to garner the necessary majority.
The president did not endorse the stalled bill during his confirmation hearing for prosecutor general in 2019, but called any form of discrimination unacceptable.
GUEST AUTHOR
Michael Mitsanas
Michael Mitsanas is an international correspondent based in Seoul, South Korea. He covers South Korean politics, Korean society, and the broader Asia-Pacific. Follow him on Twitter
7. Biden's promises to Northeast Asian allies
Excerpts:
In practical terms, the economic goals of Biden's mission are as important as the military. No one quite imagines war breaking out right away whereas trade never stops.
The bottom line is that Biden, firming up America's role in visits to Seoul and Tokyo, asserted America's support for both these crucial allies while undoing much of the damage done by Trump.
Biden's promises to Northeast Asian allies
By Donald Kirk
U.S. President Joe Biden projected a superficial image of firmness in defense of America's Northeast Asian allies during his five-day mission to Korea and Japan while trying not to inflame regional tensions.
His assurances delighted South Korea's newly inaugurated President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Always soft spoken, Biden pleased both of them with comments that might have appeared tough but maybe were not.
While playing up "strategic deterrence" in Seoul and Tokyo, he stopped carefully short of seriously deepening the chasm between America's friends and enemies. His goal was not to inflame tensions but to brace up alliances that Donald Trump during his presidency had compromised.
The most important takeaway from Biden's visit to Seoul was the affirmation made jointly with Yoon that the U.S. and South Korea would talk about resuming joint military exercises.
In other words, fulfilling the promises made during Yoon's campaign for the presidency, military planners from both the U.S. and South Korea should map out the war game that commanders believe are essential to the alliance. They say games played on computers are fine, but there's no substitute for troops in real-live action.
If that understanding seems like an escalation, however, it's really not. South Korean and American forces were operating together, on the ground, in the air and at sea, for years before Trump, in one of the dumbest moves of his presidency, arbitrarily canceled them hours after meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore nearly four years ago.
I have watched the closing days of several of these exercises, an impressive display on training grounds not far below the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the two Koreas.
Assuming Biden and Yoon were serious about resuming the war games, I can imagine seeing them again in a reversion a few years ago when both the U.S. and South Korea looked realistically at standing up to North Korean threats.
In that context, it's important to remember that the joint statement signed by Trump and Kim in Singapore was a vacuous whiff of fluff that promised only to work toward "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
Yoon's predecessor, Moon Jae-in, never got anywhere in three summits with Kim. Demanding an end to sanctions imposed after his nuclear and missile tests, Kim refused even to see Moon after the failure of his summit with Trump in Hanoi in February 2019.
Ultimately, all the hard work that Moon had invested in bringing about reconciliation resolved nothing. His dream of an end-of-war declaration to be signed by all sides in the Korean War is now on the shelf along with so many other futile efforts to bring about South-North rapprochement.
The goodwill engendered by Biden's meetings with Yoon was not necessarily the highlight of his Northeast Asian odyssey, at least to judge from the publicity over Biden's affirmation in Japan of the U.S. "commitment" to defend Taiwan.
The rulers in Beijing have never stopped declaring China's sovereignty over the island province, to which Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces fled as Mao Zedong's Red Army was taking over the mainland in 1949.
Biden recognized there's only "one China," as the U.S. has been doing ever since it transferred diplomatic recognition of China from Taiwan to Beijing in 1978 when Jimmy Carter was president. How then would U.S. forces fight for Taiwan?
A Chinese attack on Taiwan would not be "appropriate," said Biden. It would be "similar to what happened in Ukraine," he said, but he did not say whether the U.S. would respond with air and naval power or troops on the ground. The name of the U.S. game is "strategic ambiguity."
Still, Biden's remarks on Taiwan were what Kishida wanted to hear. The Chinese have been alarming everyone by sending warplanes over Taiwan's air defense zone. They seem to want to keep their adversaries on edge.
It's hard to believe, however, they would be so stupid as to invade Taiwan, 100 miles across the Taiwan Straits. Considering China's stupendous balance of trade with the U.S., the Chinese would risk killing the golden goose from which they've been profiting immensely for decades.
Until Biden dropped his remarks on Taiwan, the most important aspect of his visit to Japan was the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership from which Trump withdrew the U.S. in one of the first misguided moves of his presidency in 2017.
The framework, binding the U.S. and a dozen other nations, is short on specifics. What counts is how or even if they strive for the framework's goals of fair and resilient trade, supply chain resilience, infrastructure and clean energy, tax reform, and the impossible dream of cleaning up corruption.
In Seoul, visiting the Samsung Electronics plant near Osan Air Base, Biden stressed the need for resiliency in the smooth flow of semiconductors to manufacturers in the U.S. and elsewhere.
In practical terms, the economic goals of Biden's mission are as important as the military. No one quite imagines war breaking out right away whereas trade never stops.
The bottom line is that Biden, firming up America's role in visits to Seoul and Tokyo, asserted America's support for both these crucial allies while undoing much of the damage done by Trump.
Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) has been covering the confrontation of forces in the region for decades.
8. Top diplomats of U.S., S. Korea, Japan vow continued efforts to end N. Korean provocation
I think it is not possible to deter provocations, especially when we describe every weapons test as a provocation. We can (and must) deter war. We can (and must) deter nuclear war, but we are hard pressed to deter provocation especially when the activities that we describe as provocations are part of the Kim family regime's seven decades old playbook and part of the regime's foreign policy and national security DNA.
Top diplomats of U.S., S. Korea, Japan vow continued efforts to end N. Korean provocation | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, May 27 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea, Japan and the United States on Friday pledged efforts to end North Korea's destabilizing activities and bring the country back to the dialogue table.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi also expressed deep regret over the failed attempt to pass a new U.N. Security Council resolution on North Korea.
The U.N. Security Council voted on the U.S.-proposed resolution but failed to pass it due to opposition from China and Russia, both veto power-wielding permanent members of the council and close allies of Pyongyang.
"In spite of 13 Security Council members' support, we deeply regret that the UNSC failed to adopt a resolution in response to the DPRK's blatant and repeated violations of UNSC resolutions," the foreign ministers said in a joint statement released by the state department.
"We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthen our coordination with the international community to urge the DPRK to cease its unlawful activities and instead engage in dialogue," they added, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
North Korea has so far staged 17 rounds of missile tests this year, with the latest round held on Tuesday (Seoul time), in which the recalcitrant state fired three ballistic missiles, including an apparent intercontinental ballistic missile.
The state department earlier noted that Pyongyang has now fired at least six ICBMs this year.
"The United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan strongly condemn recent Democratic People's Republic of Korea ballistic missile launches, commit to strengthen trilateral cooperation towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and full implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and underscore continued openness to meeting with the DPRK without preconditions," the foreign ministers said.
They reiterated their commitment to engaging with North Korea in serious dialogue.
"We stress that a path to serious and sustained dialogue remains open and urge the DPRK to return to negotiations," the joint statement said.
They also urged North Korea to work with the international community to stop the spread of COVID-19 in the impoverished nation.
"We express our deep concern at the grave hardship the people in the DPRK are experiencing, including due to the ongoing outbreak of COVID-19, and hope the DPRK will respond positively to international offers of assistance," they said.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
9. Economic security needs to work both ways
Excerpts:
When South Korean firms like Samsung agree to invest in the development of new production facilities in the United States, such as its $17 billion plant in Taylor, Texas, it increases production capacity in the United States, shortening supply chains. The same is true for electric vehicle batteries. South Korean firms in joint ventures or on their own are constructing 11 of the 13 high-capacity battery plants being built in the United States between now and 2025.
While the U.S. benefits, South Korean firms do as well. After facing restrictions in China, for example, partnering with the United States provides a robust market for South Korean electric vehicle batteries and supports efforts by South Korea to becoming a major player in a rapidly shifting industry.
However, efforts to enhance economic security that largely focus on the United States are less likely to be successful than a true two-way collaboration.
Semiconductors and electric vehicle batteries may be important components in U.S. products, but they also have supply chains that need to be secured.
Economic security needs to work both ways
By Troy Stangarone
In the lead up to Joe Biden's recent trip to South Korea, Washington and Seoul agreed to establish a dialogue channel on economic security. For much of the last few years, the United States has largely focused on how to improve its own economic security. But for the new initiative to succeed it will need to work both ways.
Economic security is a concept that stresses that economic issues are also national security issues. Trump's trade war with China was partially driven by the idea that the United States needed to restore its manufacturing base and prevent China from gaining dominance in critical technologies for national security reasons.
The underpinnings of economic security have also been reinforced by the supply chain disruptions during the pandemic. As the United States struggled to gain access to face masks and test kits early in the pandemic, first the Trump administration and now the Biden administration have sought to bring supply chains closer to the United States or more deeply enmesh them with allies to better insulate the U.S. economy against future economic disruptions or health crises.
Since the Biden administration completed its economic security driven initial supply chain review, South Korea has been viewed as an important partner to shore up U.S. production capacity in electric vehicle batteries and semiconductors.
The United States lacks the manufacturing capacity to produce the volume of semiconductors it needs. The same is true for the number of batteries necessary to meet the Biden administration's goal for half of all new passenger vehicles sold in the United States to be electric vehicles by 2030.
When South Korean firms like Samsung agree to invest in the development of new production facilities in the United States, such as its $17 billion plant in Taylor, Texas, it increases production capacity in the United States, shortening supply chains. The same is true for electric vehicle batteries. South Korean firms in joint ventures or on their own are constructing 11 of the 13 high-capacity battery plants being built in the United States between now and 2025.
While the U.S. benefits, South Korean firms do as well. After facing restrictions in China, for example, partnering with the United States provides a robust market for South Korean electric vehicle batteries and supports efforts by South Korea to becoming a major player in a rapidly shifting industry.
However, efforts to enhance economic security that largely focus on the United States are less likely to be successful than a true two-way collaboration.
Semiconductors and electric vehicle batteries may be important components in U.S. products, but they also have supply chains that need to be secured.
Take semiconductors as an example. Semiconductors have been in short supply during the pandemic. That has slowed the production of products ranging from consumer electronics to automobiles. This is largely due to an increase in global demand for products that utilize semiconductors and an inability to quickly scale up production.
Building new capacity takes time, but securing access to the machinery, chemicals, and other inputs needed to produce semiconductors will be critical, and the challenge will not always be supply chains through countries less friendly to the United States.
In 2019, Japan put in place new export restrictions for fluorine polyimide, hydrogen fluoride, and photoresists ― chemicals critical to the production of semiconductors. In the end, Japan did not cut off South Korea's access to these key chemicals, but the pandemic has previewed the production disruptions that could have occurred if Tokyo had.
South Korea has taken steps to address this vulnerability in its supply chain, including investment from the U.S. chemical firm DuPont, but it still imports significant quantities of these chemicals from Japan. These concerns may decrease if relations between South Korea and Japan improve, but it is incumbent upon the United States to do more than it did in 2019 to make sure key inputs continue to flow should tensions rise again.
Supply chains for electric vehicle batteries are similarly challenging. South Korea imports more than 60 percent of its cobalt oxide ― a key input for battery cathodes ― from China which dominates both the mining and refining of cobalt. China plays a similar global role in many other key minerals.
In time the United States and South Korea may be able to develop alternative mining and processing facilities to meet a significant portion of materials they will need, but Japan's own experience in this field suggests it could take a decade or more.
After South Korea's experience with China over THAAD, the United States will need to be more prepared to assist with Chinese economic coercion as well.
For the United States to enhance its own economic security, it needs to work closely with South Korea to enhance Seoul's. At times, this may mean making it clear to other allies that certain actions are not in the interest of any of the parties, while in others it will require the United States to work with South Korea to develop alternative supply chains that reduce the dependence of both countries on a single supplier. Working together, the United States and South Korea can help to improve both countries' economic security, but only if they work to improve both countries supply chains.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
10. South Korea's game changer: New Southern Policy
I would give credit to South Korean diplomats.
Excerpts:
Credit must go to Moon's leadership and his commitment to strengthening ties with ASEAN, both at government and personal levels through the NSP. Besides visiting all ASEAN countries in the first two years in office, Moon also spent time and effort cementing personal relationships with the ASEAN leaders. Moon's frequent visits to and dialogue with ASEAN also promoted better awareness and understanding among the Korean public about ASEAN. It must be noted that despite the COVID-19 pandemic, ASEAN-Korea ties have proceeded without any stumbling blocks.
It would be wise for the administration of newly elected President Yoon Suk-yeol to further strengthen and expand the NSP. Given the dramatic shifts in the regional and global strategic environment in recent months, it is high time that the ASEAN-Korea ties became more strategic, covering broader issues that would ensure the rules-based order, peace and stability in this part of the world.
Although South Korea does not yet have its own Indo-Pacific framework, the NSP can serve as a platform to synergize with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in the near future. AOIP's guidelines are inclusive and aimed at promoting cooperation and avoiding confrontation. ASEAN has already picked four areas of priority, namely maritime cooperation, sustainable development, connectivity and economic cooperation.
South Korea's game changer: New Southern Policy
By Kavi Chongkittavorn
It was a well-kept secret among the ASEAN members during the 1980s that the only topic that interested South Korea was its unequivocal support of Seoul's position on the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Nothing else would matter. When South Korea was admitted as a dialogue partner in 1989, officials dealing with ASEAN-Korea relations had to work hard to engage each other beyond the crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
In retrospect, it has been a high learning curve on both sides to really understand each other's strategic environment and mutual interests. Gone are the days when the number of missiles tested and fired including diplomatic responses would top the agenda. Today, ASEAN-Korea relations cover a plethora of issues ranging from economic, political, security, socio-cultural and environmental to health security as well as people-to-people connections. They reflect the nature and scope of their comprehensive partnership.
Former President Moon Jae-in's bold diplomatic initiative known as the New Southern Policy (NSP) has done much to propel South Korea from the backseat to the front row of the grouping's dialogue partners since its launch in 2017. The NSP provides the much needed consistency and continuity of South Korea's engagement with ASEAN. Most importantly, NSP elevates ASEAN to the rank of major powers such as the U.S., China, Japan and Russia. No previous administrations in Seoul gave such a high-level strategic value to ASEAN as the Moon government.
Credit must go to Moon's leadership and his commitment to strengthening ties with ASEAN, both at government and personal levels through the NSP. Besides visiting all ASEAN countries in the first two years in office, Moon also spent time and effort cementing personal relationships with the ASEAN leaders. Moon's frequent visits to and dialogue with ASEAN also promoted better awareness and understanding among the Korean public about ASEAN. It must be noted that despite the COVID-19 pandemic, ASEAN-Korea ties have proceeded without any stumbling blocks.
It would be wise for the administration of newly elected President Yoon Suk-yeol to further strengthen and expand the NSP. Given the dramatic shifts in the regional and global strategic environment in recent months, it is high time that the ASEAN-Korea ties became more strategic, covering broader issues that would ensure the rules-based order, peace and stability in this part of the world.
Although South Korea does not yet have its own Indo-Pacific framework, the NSP can serve as a platform to synergize with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in the near future. AOIP's guidelines are inclusive and aimed at promoting cooperation and avoiding confrontation. ASEAN has already picked four areas of priority, namely maritime cooperation, sustainable development, connectivity and economic cooperation.
Granted the current goodwill on both sides, ASEAN and South Korea can identify areas of cooperation and start the ball rolling. The NSP provides the platform for ASEAN to strengthen cooperation in sustainable social and economic development and better livelihoods. During the COVID-19 pandemic, South Korea's efficient public health policies and measures have served as models for Southeast Asia.
Under Moon, South Korea has also fine-tuned its development policy toward the Mekong sub-region, which has distinguished itself from other numerous plans. Today, Seoul is a major player in one of the world's most bio-diverse regions, providing strong financial and capacity-building support to lower riparian countries. The current Mekong-Korea action plan is comprehensive in addressing issues related to the region's well-being encompassing people, prosperity and peace.
With the NSP pathway, South Korea's future trajectory in Southeast Asia will remain dynamic and a way forward. Without any historical baggage, Seoul is well positioned to maximize all round cooperation simultaneously with Southeast Asia. At this juncture, Korean soft power, through its brand known as K-related culture has been well received without causing any local resentment. Southeast Asian talents have also reached global fame through Korean coaching and tutelage. As such, the NSP could be implemented in multi-pronged ways without jeopardy while the people-to-people connections through education, cultural exchanges and know-how would further instill Korea in the hearts of Southeast Asia.
Kavi Chongkittavorn is a senior fellow at the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand.
11. Widespread disbelief over N. Korea's tiny COVID death rate
I think we are seeing these COVID reports as part of a deliberate propaganda effort.
Widespread disbelief over N. Korea's tiny COVID death rate
About two weeks after North Korea acknowledged its first domestic COVID-19 outbreak, it says about 3.3 million people have come down with fever but only 69 have died
ByHyung-jin Kim Associated Press
May 27, 2022, 6:15 AM
SEOUL, South Korea -- According to North Korea, its fight against COVID-19 has been impressive: About 3.3 million people have been reported sick with fevers, but only 69 have died.
If all are coronavirus cases, that's a fatality rate of 0.002%, something no other country, including the world's richest, has achieved against a disease that has killed more than 6 million people.
The North’s claims, however, are being met with widespread doubt about two weeks after it acknowledged its first domestic COVID-19 outbreak. Experts say the impoverished North should have suffered far greater deaths than reported because there are very few vaccines, a sizable number of undernourished people and a lack of critical care facilities and test kits to detect virus cases in large numbers.
North Korea’s secretiveness makes it unlikely outsiders can confirm the true scale of the outbreak. Some observers say North Korea is underreporting fatalities to protect leader Kim Jong Un at all costs. There's also a possibility it might have exaggerated the outbreak in a bid to bolster control of its 26 million people.
“Scientifically, their figures can’t be accepted,” said Lee Yo Han, a professor at Ajou University Graduate School of Public Health in South Korea, adding that the public data “were likely all controlled (by the authorities) and embedded with their political intentions.”
The most likely course is that North Korea soon proclaims victory over COVID-19, maybe during a June political meeting, with all credit given to Kim’s leadership. The 38-year-old ruler is desperate, observers say, to win bigger public support as he deals with severe economic difficulties caused by border shutdowns, U.N. sanctions and his own mismanagement.
“Diverse public complaints have accumulated, so it’s time to (strengthen) internal control,” said Choi Kang, president of Seoul’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “Kim Jong Un has been taking the lead in the anti-epidemic efforts to show that his campaign is very successful and to reinforce his grip on power.”
Before North Korea on May 12 admitted to an omicron outbreak, it had maintained a widely disputed claim that it had zero domestic infections for more than two years. When the North at last publicized the outbreak, many wondered why now.
It was initially seen as an attempt to exploit the outbreak to get foreign humanitarian assistance. There were hopes that possible aid by Seoul and Washington could help resume long-stalled diplomacy on Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
Kim has called the outbreak a “great upheaval” and launched what his propaganda teams call an all-out effort to suppress it.
He’s held several Politburo meetings to criticize officials, inspected pharmacies at dawn and mobilized troops to support medicine delivery. A health official explained pandemic responses on state TV, while state newspapers have churned out articles on how to deal with fever, including gargling with saltwater and drinking honey or willow leaf tea.
“Honey is a rarity for ordinary North Koreans. They likely felt bad when their government asked them to drink honey tea,” said Seo Jae-pyong, a North Korean defector-turned-activist in Seoul. “I have an elder brother left in North Korea and have big worries about him.”
Every morning, North Korea releases details about the number of new patients with fever symptoms, but not with COVID-19. Experts believe most cases should be counted as COVID-19 because while North Korean health authorities lack diagnostic kits, they still know how to distinguish the symptoms from fevers caused by the other prevalent infectious diseases.
North Korea’s daily fever tally peaked at nearly 400,000 early last week; it has nosedived to around 100,000 in the past few days. On Friday, it added one more death after claiming no fatalities for three consecutive days.
“Our country set a world record for having no single (COVID-19) infection for the longest period ... and we’ve now made an achievement of reversing the tide of the abrupt outbreak in a short period,” the main Rodong Sinmun newspaper said Thursday. “This evidently proves the scientific nature of our country’s emergency anti-epidemic steps.”
Medical experts question the validity of North Korea’s stated fatality rate of 0.002%. Given that South Korea’s mortality rate of unvaccinated people for the omicron variant was 0.6%, North Korea must have similar or higher death rates because of its low capacity to treat patients and its people’s poor nutrition, said Shin Young-jeon, a professor of preventive medicine at Seoul’s Hanyang University.
In a study published by the Johns Hopkins University last year, North Korean ranked 193 out of 195 countries for its ability to deal with an epidemic. U.N. reports in recent years said about 40% of its people were undernourished. North Korea’s free socialist public health care system has been in shambles for decades, and defectors testify that while in the North, they bought medicines at markets or somewhere else.
“North Korea wouldn’t really care about fatalities at all,” said Choi Jung Hun, a defector who worked as a doctor in North Korea in the 2000s. “Many North Koreans have already died of malaria, measles, chickenpox and typhoid. There are all kind of infectious diseases there.”
Choi, now a researcher at a Korea University-affiliated institute in South Korea, said North Korea likely decided to admit to the omicron outbreak because it sees it as less lethal and more manageable. He suspected North Korea set up a scenario to raise up and then bring down fever cases so as to boost Kim’s leadership.
Lee, the Ajou professor, said North Korea may have overstated its earlier fever cases to give “a powerful shock” to the public to rally support for the government, but avoided releasing details of too many deaths to stave off public unrest.
The outbreak could eventually kill more than 100,000, if people remain unvaccinated and die at the same death rate as in South Korea, Shin, the Hanyang professor, warned.
The North Korean outbreak will likely last several months, Moon Jin Soo, director of the Institute for Health and Unification Studies at Seoul National University, said. It’s urgent to ship anti-viral pills and other essential medications to North Korea, rather than vaccines whose roll out would take at least a couple of months, he said.
"North Korea could spend a couple more months massaging the statistics, but they could also abruptly announce their victory this weekend,” said Ahn Kyung-su, head of DPRKHEALTH.ORG, a website focusing on health issues in North Korea. “North Korea always operates beyond your imagination. It’s hard to predict what they’ll do, but they do have a plan.”
12. US intelligence assessing whether North Korea tested missile with properties not seen before
There should be no doubt that the regime is trying to advance its military capabilities to be able to employ them to dominate the peninsula if subversion and coercion do not work.
US intelligence assessing whether North Korea tested missile with properties not seen before
CNN · by Barbara Starr and Jeremy Herb, CNN
(CNN)The US intelligence community is trying to determine whether North Korea tested a ballistic missile with properties the US has not seen before earlier this week, according to three US officials.
North Korea's launch of three ballistic missiles on Wednesday included one that flew an unusual trajectory, according to the officials. The missile had a flight path that two officials described as a "double arc" with the missile ascending and then descending twice.
The trajectory may indicate that the goal was to test North Korea's ability to fire a missile and have it re-enter into the Earth's atmosphere to reach a target, according to two of the officials.
The second phase of the missile's possible "double arc" may have been a re-entry vehicle breaking off from the main missile. It's not yet fully clear to the US if that was all part of the planned flight path, one official said.
The US intelligence assessment of all three test launches is still in the preliminary stages, the officials emphasized.
Read More
"The United States, the ROK, and Japan express deep concern about the May 25 DPRK launches of an intercontinental ballistic missile and shorter-range ballistic missiles," read a joint statement from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi on Friday. "The DPRK has significantly increased the pace and scale of its ballistic missile launches since September 2021. Each of these launches violated multiple UNSC resolutions and posed a grave threat to the region and the international community."
It is not clear which of the three missiles launched had the unusual flight pattern. Japan had publicly hinted that one of missiles flew in an unusual manner, with Japan's Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi calling it an "irregular trajectory."
South Korea said a presumed ICBM was fired at about 6 a.m. local time Wednesday with a flight range of about 360 kilometers (223 miles) and altitude of approximately 540 kilometers (335 miles).
At about 6:37 a.m. local time Wednesday, North Korea fired a second ballistic missile -- not believed to be an ICBM -- which seems to have disappeared from South Korean tracking at an altitude of 20 kilometers (12 miles), South Korea said. One preliminary assessment indicated it possible the missile flew over a populated area of North Korea.
The third missile, presumed to be a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), flew about 760 kilometers (472 miles) and had an altitude of 60 kilometers (37 miles), South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said.
The US ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield confirmed one missile had intercontinental range in a statement, "The DPRK's May 25 launch of three ballistic missiles included yet another ICBM launch. The United States assesses this is DPRK's sixth ICBM launch since the beginning of 2022." She warned that the regime has launched 23 ballistic missiles since the beginning of the year and "is actively preparing to conduct a nuclear test."
The trio of launches, which occurred within the span of an hour, come amid concerns that North Korea is preparing for its first underground nuclear test since 2017. South Korea detected signs Wednesday that North Korea was testing a detonation device for a nuclear test, which could be a precursor to an actual test, a South Korean official told reporters Wednesday.
Following the launches, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin held a secure call with South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup "to discuss assessments and response measures for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) recent ballistic missile launches," according to a Pentagon statement.
The latest launches mark the 16th time that North Korea has tested its missiles this year, including what the US believes was a failed ICBM test on May 4 that exploded shortly after launch.
But North Korea is thought to have tested an ICBM in late March.
That missile flew to an altitude of 6,000 kilometers (3,728 miles) and a distance of 1,080 kilometers (671 miles) with a flight time of 71 minutes before splashing down in waters off Japan's western coast, according to Japan's Defense Ministry.
This story has been updated with additional details Friday.
CNN's Gawon Bae contributed to this report.
CNN · by Barbara Starr and Jeremy Herb, CNN
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
