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Note that I am traveling this week (15-21 Oct) and in Hawaii (work, not vacation) so my daily news will be about 6 hours later.
Quotes of the Day:
“The individual has always had to struggle to keep from being overwhelmed by the tribe. If you try it, you will be lonely often and sometimes frightened. But no price is too high to pay for the privilege of owning yourself.
- Rudyard Kipling
"I don't know what your destiny will be, but one thing I do know: the only ones among you who will be really happy are those who have sought and found how to serve."
- Albert Schweitzer
"This is the lesson: never give in, never give in, never, never, never, never - in nothing, great or small, large or petty - never give in except to convictions of honor and good sense. Never yield to force; never yield to the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy."
- Winston Churchill
1. Three key takeaways from the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy
2. Party of One - The CCP Congress and Xi Jinping’s Quest to Control China
3. What Nixon’s Endgame Reveals About Putin’s
4. Army's Wormuth wants emerging tech to 'strengthen' Indo-Pacific logistics
5. United Nations: Rape Is Part Of Russia’s Military Strategy
6. One Ukrainian City in the Way of Putin’s New Total War
7. Xi Jinping’s Endgame: A China Prepared for Conflict With the U.S.
8. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (14.10.22) CDS comments on key events
9. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 14 (Putin's War)
10. $725 Million in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine
11. Taiwan's per capita GDP highest in East Asia, says IMF
12. China has given up on the West
13. Allies that Hurt America
14. Opinion | No, We Aren’t Headed to Civil War
15. Memorializing the failures of the ruling class on the National Mall
1. Three key takeaways from the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy
The three takeaways:
The Concept of ‘Integrated Deterrence’ Might Already Be In Trouble
Ye Olde ‘Strategy Versus Reality’ Problem
Climate Change Is a Top Priority…And the GOP Won’t Like That
Three key takeaways from the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy - Breaking Defense
The National Security Strategy is finally out, 22 months into the Biden administration. But what does it actually say?
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · October 14, 2022
U.S. Navy MV-22 Ospreys take-off on Aug. 1, 2022 during an amphibious raid for a multinational littoral operations exercise as part of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022. (Cpl. Dillon Anderson/Royal New Zealand Air Force)
WASHINGTON — Twenty two months after taking office, the Biden administration finally released its National Security Strategy, ending a drawn out process that was compounded by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February.
On the whole, the strategy provided few major surprises. Concerns about the rise of China — and the threat the autocratic state poses to both its neighbors and the United States — continue to be the largest national security focus for the administration. And while the war in Ukraine has brought a sense of immediacy and greater attention to threat still posed by Russia, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Wednesday that the conflict didn’t result in any major alterations to the strategy.
However, the devil is always in the details, defense experts told Breaking Defense. Here’s what they see as the major takeaways.
The Concept of ‘Integrated Deterrence’ Might Already Be In Trouble
While an unclassified version of the National Defense Strategy has not been released yet, Pentagon officials — including Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in a statement on the NSS made earlier today —have made clear that a cornerstone of the NDS will be a concept called “integrated deterrence,” which calls for the US military to work with other US government agencies as well as international partners to impose whole-of-government penalties on an enemy.
“We will rely on integrated deterrence, as detailed in the Department’s National Defense Strategy, which will soon be released in unclassified form,” Austin said in the statement, defining the concept as “seamlessly combin[ing] our capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities far outweigh any possible benefits—in all theaters, in all domains, and across the spectrum of potential conflict.”
But while “integrated deterrence” was mentioned in the NSS, it is cited only in a section on US military modernization, which could point to it being a Defense Department concept that won’t be widely adopted by other government agencies, said Stacie Pettyjohn, director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security.
“Integrated deterrence, in my view, always made the most sense as a centerpiece of the National Security Strategy where the DoD part focuses on the high-end deterrence,” she told Breaking Defense.
And while the NSS does “more narrowly conscribe” the Defense Department’s portion of integrated deterrence as the traditional backstop of conventional and nuclear capabilities, the concept “didn’t seem to be the centerpiece of it the way that one might hope, since integrated deterrence includes a focus on all of the tools of government, and for that to happen that’s beyond the DoD’s remit,” she said.
The definition of integrated deterrence in the strategy also failed to resolve a major question about the concept, according to Pettyjohn: Does threatening an adversary with so many potential forms of punishment actually make the United States more credible, particularly in a situation where the US will not actually follow through with all courses of action?
“If it’s this huge encompassing of all things, I think that actually sort of makes it harder to have an explicit and credible deterrent threat that allies and adversaries understand,” she said.
U.S. Marines with 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, Marine Raider Regiment set up communication during a night raid exercise at landing zone Dodo, Ariz., April 21, 2016. (U.S. Marine Corps/Zachary M. Ford)
Ye Olde ‘Strategy Versus Reality’ Problem
The NSS paints a complex and troubling challenge for the United States, which finds itself at the beginning of a “decisive decade” where it must contend with the threat of near-peer competitors like China and Russia, while at the same time mitigating problems like inflation, pandemics, climate change and other issues that threaten American prosperity and that of nations worldwide.
Bradley Bowman, senior director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ center on military and political power, said the strategy does a good job of describing the scope and urgency of the problems facing the United States. However, it lacks detail on how the administration plans on implementing solutions that will ensure that the nation is able to meet its strategic aims.
“I agree that we’re at an inflection point. I agree that this is a decisive decade,” he said. “But when I look at into details — when I look into our force posture, when I look at the insufficient defense budgets, when I when I look at how we’re not procuring vital weapons systems at max production capacity … I see a large and increasingly dangerous gap between words and actions.”
The Biden administration needs to be honest about where it faces risk and ensure that it does the work to mitigate capability gaps and fix potential vulnerabilities, he said.
“What are urgent Indo-Pacific requirements that are not being met right now?” he said. “If you say this is an inflection point or decisive decade, I think the burden of proof is on this administration to explain any cases where they’re disregarding serious requirements in particularly [US Indo-Pacific Command], but also [US European Command],” he said.
Emma Ashford, a senior fellow with the Stimson Center, compared the scope of the NSS to “Lean In,” the popular self-help book for women in the workplace by Facebook’s former Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg that posited that women could find massive success in all areas if only they would “lean in” to a bigger workload.
But people — and nations — face constraints, Ashford said, and if the US doesn’t have the resources or capability to meet its strategy goals, it needs to moderate those goals.
“The NSS wants to have it all: competition with China, containment of Russia, building global coalitions on climate change, and pandemics; shared democracy as a unifying principle and democracy promotion while continuing to work with autocracies, a diplomacy first approach while maintaining global military primacy; using trade as a core component of foreign policy while rejecting new trade agreements that don’t ‘level the playing field;’ building on existing alliances while establishing new ones,” she wrote on Twitter.
In short, the NSS “acknowledges that we live in an increasingly multipolar world, accepts that there are limitations to U.S. power, and then doesn’t change policy in response,” she said.
Climate Change Is a Top Priority…And the GOP Won’t Like That
Compared to the Biden administration’s interim strategic guidance in March 2021, the National Security Strategy emphasizes the competition between democracies like the United States and authoritarian regimes like its rivals, China and Russia — a change likely due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, said Mark Cancian, a senior adviser with the Center for International and Strategic Studies’ international security program.
There’s a greater concern with “irredentism — the fact that Russia and China are unsatisfied with their current borders and aiming to maybe expand them,” he said. However, he added that the strategy’s descriptions of China and Russia suggest a difference in tone rather than a substantive change in policy.
Like the Trump administration’s 2017 strategy, the Biden-era NSS continues the focus on China as the single largest military and economic threat to the United States and similarly declares a need to modernize the military and invest in American technology, Cancian said.
However, the strategy’s attention on progressive causes — specifically climate change, which the document says is the “greatest [problem] and potentially existential for all nations” — will likely draw the ire of Republicans, who may argue that the focus should remain solely on competition against China and Russia, Cancian said.
“Climate is mentioned [about] 65 times in the document,” he said. “Of course, this is very different from the Trump national security document where they talked about energy dominance and encouraging fossil fuel production.”
Several top Democrats have already released public statements expressing support for the NSS. House Armed Services Committee chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., said the document is “right on target,” while his counterpart, Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Jack Reed, D-R.I., called it a “strong, thoughtful vision for advancing America’s interests.”
Meanwhile, Republicans are starting to level criticism at the strategy. Alabama Rep. Mike Rogers, HASC’s ranking Republican, blasted the document for asserting that the United States should be willing to work with China and Russia on areas where they share common goals with the US.
“The strategy produced by the Biden administration takes 48 pages to say nothing. It is based in a fantasy world where all nations, even adversaries, work together to advance the common good,” Rogers said in a statement. “Our adversaries are dangerous, they don’t care about the common good, and they don’t want to work with us to achieve altruistic goals – they want to destroy us.”
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · October 14, 2022
2. Party of One - The CCP Congress and Xi Jinping’s Quest to Control China
Excerpts:
A key question that the congress may well answer is just how much further Xi is going to push the system toward a personalized dictatorship. Although much has been made of Xi’s cult of personality, it is a rather banal cult with very little personality. No one is yet paying tribute to Xi in the form of mangoes, as many ordinary Chinese did to Mao after he received a gift of the fruit from a Pakistani delegation in 1968. But if Xi claims new titles at the congress, such as party chairman, and if Xi Jinping Thought is formalized in the party’s charter, it would mean Xi is so unconstrained and so focused on consolidating institutional and political power that he fails to see the dangers ahead, and those around him are unable to do anything about it.
It was, until very recently, an established truth in formal party historiography that the trappings of absolute power under Mao had nearly brought the country to ruin. Imperfect efforts to address this—term limits on the office of the presidency, abolishing the title of party chair—have either been rolled back or reconsidered under Xi. This does not, however, make Xi a new Mao. The men are drastically different in temperament, outlook, and style. But the governing pathologies unique to the CCP system accommodated both of their pursuits of unchecked power.
It is unpleasant to contemplate China’s political system moving in this direction. Many still hope that Xi just needs to consolidate a bit more power in order to finally push through much-needed reforms. Others wait for senior officials or retired cadres to finally intervene and place some limits around Xi. But this is not the China of the 1980s, the 1990s, or the early 2000s. The old ways of conceptualizing Chinese politics no longer prevail. Opposing factions won’t constrain Xi. The much-vaunted but rarely seen reformers aren’t coming to rescue economic policy. Coming to grips with Xi’s continued rule is the first step to navigating it.
Party of One
The CCP Congress and Xi Jinping’s Quest to Control China
October 14, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Jude Blanchette · October 14, 2022
On October 16, the Chinese Communist Party will begin its 20th National Congress, the highest-level and most important assembly of China’s senior political and military leadership. Past party congresses have been important inflection points in the development of the party and the country. The Eighth Party Congress, in 1956, saw the removal of Mao Zedong Thought (which had enshrined the revolutionary leader’s ideology) from the party’s constitution, a temporary setback for Mao after a series of policy and political mistakes. At the 14th Party Congress, in 1992, the leadership unveiled the term “socialist market economy” to signal a reorientation of economic policy in the wake of the CCP’s violent crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later. In 2002, the 16th Party Congress formally incorporated the “Three Represents” guiding theory into the party’s constitution, paving the way for a pronounced softening of the CCP’s position toward private enterprise. And for the past several decades, every other party congress has seen the orderly and peaceful transition of power from one leader to the next, a rare feat for an authoritarian system.
At the upcoming 20th Party Congress, the CCP will reshuffle personnel, issue reports, and project an image of Spartan unity and discipline. But the meeting will be more elegy than transformation. Despite the pomp that will surround the congress, it will mark a disquieting moment for the party. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term as general secretary will drag the CCP back to the pathologies of the Mao era and simultaneously push it toward a future of low growth, heightened geopolitical tension, and profound uncertainty.
The continuation of Xi’s rule means that on the big questions of China’s future, Beijing is unlikely to shift its policies dramatically: after a decade in power, Xi’s impulses, assumptions, and judgment are already clear. The bilateral relationship with the United States, Beijing’s view of state-market relations, its use of coercion toward Taiwan, its strategic alignment with Moscow, its approach to economic statecraft—none of this will fundamentally change at or after the congress. The meeting is designed not as a showcase for some dramatic new approach to governance or policy but rather as pure political theater meant to reassure the Chinese citizenry and convince global audiences that the party remains steadfast and unified under Xi as he pursues the goal of transforming China into a socialist great power.
But aiming for a destination and arriving at it are two separate matters. Xi’s grip on China’s political, economic, and security institutions is formidable, and his stated plans for China’s future are many and detailed. Yet his ability to steer complex ecosystems and the forces that shape them is, as all rulers eventually learn, fixed and limited. What is more, the reactive, shortsighted, and often incoherent set of policies that Xi has promoted over the past five years intended to achieve his global ambitions and confront the country’s innumerable challenges have placed China on a worrying path of anemic economic growth, declining global prestige, and rising domestic repression. The congress will not change these realities either.
Outside observers expecting that the congress might mark some sort of inflection point are thus correct but largely for the wrong reasons. What one could previously hope for—the installation of a new leadership coterie and with it, the prospect of serious change—will not occur. Rather than a moment of course correction, the 20th Party Congress sees the CCP—a regime that has long enjoyed a reputation of competence, pragmatism, and predictability—cross a threshold into outright dictatorship and, with it, a likely future of political ossification, policy uncertainty, and the ruinous effects of one-man rule.
LARGE AND IN CHARGE
The foundational and most consequential fact of the upcoming congress is that Xi will assume a third term as general secretary of the CCP and chair of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This development formally marks the end of the post-Mao effort to (imperfectly) constrain the power of an individual leader and (again, imperfectly) systematize the process of leadership succession. These steps were not adopted out of any normative belief in constraining power but because a more normalized succession procedure was in the party’s long-term interest. Abandoning them is a Rubicon moment even if it has been expected since Xi abolished term limits for the office of the Chinese presidency in March 2018. Clawing back some sense of predictability in how future leaders are chosen, groomed, and installed will be a project for a distant future—and one that likely won’t begin until Xi leaves office, is pushed out, or “goes to see Marx.”
China now enters a period of pronounced uncertainty, driven by the likely open-ended rule of an autocrat. Although some observers now append the title “ruler for life” to Xi, this is only one possible outcome for the country—and not necessarily the worst. Even assuming that Xi plans to step down at some point in the future, what would happen if he died unexpectedly or suffered a serious health complication that left him incapacitated? How well would the system operate when it came time to select and install a replacement? What impact would this have on the domestic and global economy? In a similar vein, although the prospect of a leadership challenge or coup remains remote owing to the sheer scale of logistical hurdles and political dangers, Xi’s positioning as a potential ruler for life simply aggravates the incentives for opponents to scuttle his agenda or plot his exit. Authoritarian systems and authoritarian leaders always appear solid on the outside—until suddenly, they don’t.
It is thus darkly ironic that a leader who has championed the rejuvenation of China and the survival of the CCP now imperils both. In this regard, however, Xi is not unique. He is merely the latest in a long procession of rulers who—across history, geography, and regime type—have succumbed to the temptations of absolute power and its corrupting influence. But the consequences of this tragedy—both imminent and potential—cannot be ignored or downplayed in a world in which China is the second-largest economy, maintains the globe’s largest military, and possesses a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons. Xi has already shown that simple miscalculations in domestic economic policy can wipe out billions in wealth. Although he still demonstrates rationality in his efforts to swallow Taiwan, one cannot look at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s catastrophic invasion of Ukraine and not worry about Xi someday making a similar miscalculation.
Under autocracy, a leader can misgovern for an extended period and stay secure in power.
Some may hope that these same failures are planting the seeds for Xi’s own future dismissal. Surely a leader of the CCP, even one with Xi’s level of power, cannot mismanage the country for long without suffering reprisals from his peers. Xi may well grab a third term, but is a fourth and a fifth obtainable, given the dismal trajectory of the country’s economy?
One cannot rule out the possibility that Xi is forced from power or persuaded to resign. But a Marxist-Leninist system is a peculiar type of authoritarian regime, one that grants incumbent leaders a significant degree of institutional and organizational power. And, by consequence, the prospect of ousting a leader through a formal process or through violence remains improbable. It is an uncomfortable reality that under autocracy, a leader can misgovern for an extended period and stay secure in power.
HUMAN RESOURCES
Besides prolonging Xi’s tenure, the congress will have broader consequences. The eventual lineup of the CCP’s Politburo, the Politburo’s Standing Committee (PBSC), and the PLA Central Military Commission will undoubtedly impact the precise, if marginal, contours of China’s domestic and foreign policy development and execution. Subordinates matter, even in China’s increasingly personalist dictatorship. If the director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, Yang Jiechi, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, China’s current foreign policy frontmen, retire and are replaced by hacks or loyalists, one can expect the space for considered deliberation on diplomatic matters to shrink even further. If a commissar such as Miao Hua rises to the position of CMC vice chair, this will mean Xi is surrounded by advisers who think primarily in political, not military, terms—a dynamic fraught with risks of miscalculation. If He Lifeng, a longtime Xi ally and the current head of the National Development and Reform Commission, replaces the current economic czar, Liu He, it would signal that Beijing continues to place importance on economic growth. But with He also comes the acknowledgment that economic policy will continue to prioritize Xi’s agenda of high-tech industrial policy and efforts at “self-sufficiency” in areas at risk to global supply chain disruptions and restrictions. Recent actions by the Biden administration to limit China’s access to chips and related components likely strengthen Xi’s resolve to create a “Fortress China.”
On the other hand, the promotion of officials with clear competence, independence, and pragmatic leanings would not likely mark a broad change in trajectory. The fact that Xi achieves a third term is in itself the clearest declaration of his unrivaled dominance. Specific personnel decisions, then, must be understood in the context of this larger truth.
If, for example, the somewhat reform-minded PBSC member and chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Wang Yang, is elevated to the position of premier, this will not mean that Xi has been forced to accede to the demands of putative reformers. Although the premier traditionally is empowered to manage economic affairs, such a promotion can be easily read as a tactical accommodation, not a forced concession. The economic setbacks of the past 12 months might now require Xi to make compromises to his ruling coalition in order to help hold together his governing coalition. Such decisions, though, do not reflect a diminution of Xi’s political power but rather the fact that if he wants to drive a policy agenda through the party-state bureaucratic system, he will need to work through a dizzying array of regulatory and political organs at both the national and local level. Some compromise might be necessary to achieve larger goals.
Life near the top is a Hobbesian ordeal.
As with the long-marginalized current premier, Li Keqiang, it is clear that under Xi, formal offices do not inherently confer institutional power or control over policy portfolios—that is left to the grace of Xi. A future premier will navigate the same shoals as his predecessor. These individuals will be working within a political consensus and structure that is increasingly oriented around Xi’s own preferences. They may well have a degree of agency, but it is within a system in which autonomy shrinks day by day as Xi’s governance philosophy and policy agenda serve as the lodestar. Countless Chinese economic officials may quietly bristle at the continuation of the ruinous “zero COVID” policy, and many apparatchiks in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs certainly understand the damage that Xi’s close and abiding relationship with Putin is doing to China’s broader reputation. But any grumblings from them will not shift policy under one-man rule.
If Li remains in his current position, that would not indicate some newfound political clout on his part or that the “reformers” are storming the barricades. Li has been an active face on China’s political stage for nearly a decade, but his long-term impact has been largely relegated to combating government red tape. Xi may decide to keep him on as simply the path of least resistance or as a way to soften the blow of his third term. With or without Li, the office of premier will be a shadow of its past importance for driving economic policy.
Similarly, if one or more younger officials (such as Party Secretary of Chongqing Chen Min’er or Vice Premier Hu Chunhua) is promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee, it would not mean that Xi has chosen his successor. First, throughout the CCP’s 100-year history, formal designation as the heir apparent has almost always been an indication of who will ultimately not assume power. Life near the top is a Hobbesian ordeal. Established leaders often postpone announcing credible successors or seek to marginalize them if they are imposed from outside; no one wants to share power or be seen as a lame duck. Xi may well appoint a younger official to the top leadership body, but now that the duration of Xi’s rule is undetermined and largely at his discretion, this individual should be seen as a low-probability prospect rather than next in line.
PERSONALITY TEST
A key question that the congress may well answer is just how much further Xi is going to push the system toward a personalized dictatorship. Although much has been made of Xi’s cult of personality, it is a rather banal cult with very little personality. No one is yet paying tribute to Xi in the form of mangoes, as many ordinary Chinese did to Mao after he received a gift of the fruit from a Pakistani delegation in 1968. But if Xi claims new titles at the congress, such as party chairman, and if Xi Jinping Thought is formalized in the party’s charter, it would mean Xi is so unconstrained and so focused on consolidating institutional and political power that he fails to see the dangers ahead, and those around him are unable to do anything about it.
It was, until very recently, an established truth in formal party historiography that the trappings of absolute power under Mao had nearly brought the country to ruin. Imperfect efforts to address this—term limits on the office of the presidency, abolishing the title of party chair—have either been rolled back or reconsidered under Xi. This does not, however, make Xi a new Mao. The men are drastically different in temperament, outlook, and style. But the governing pathologies unique to the CCP system accommodated both of their pursuits of unchecked power.
It is unpleasant to contemplate China’s political system moving in this direction. Many still hope that Xi just needs to consolidate a bit more power in order to finally push through much-needed reforms. Others wait for senior officials or retired cadres to finally intervene and place some limits around Xi. But this is not the China of the 1980s, the 1990s, or the early 2000s. The old ways of conceptualizing Chinese politics no longer prevail. Opposing factions won’t constrain Xi. The much-vaunted but rarely seen reformers aren’t coming to rescue economic policy. Coming to grips with Xi’s continued rule is the first step to navigating it.
Foreign Affairs · by Jude Blanchette · October 14, 2022
3. What Nixon’s Endgame Reveals About Putin’s
An interesting thesis I certainly haven't considered.
Conclusion:
The central fact of this war is that one side is outperforming the other on the conventional battlefield. The losing side has nuclear weapons, and the conflict is likely to end, as have similar ones before it, with those weapons sitting irrelevantly on the sidelines while the conflict’s outcome is decided. Among the many casualties of the war in Ukraine, therefore, may turn out to be judgments regarding the value and utility of the vast nuclear arsenals that the great powers maintain at such large cost, effort, and risk.
What Nixon’s Endgame Reveals About Putin’s
Can Russia’s War in Ukraine End Like the Vietnam War?
October 14, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Gideon Rose · October 14, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to recent military setbacks with defiance. After Ukrainian military successes this fall, Putin has ordered the hasty mobilization of several hundred thousand more troops, orchestrated sham referendums in occupied areas to formally incorporate them into Russia, issued increasingly explicit nuclear threats, and launched a wave of missile strikes across Ukraine. Many attribute this behavior to uniquely terrifying characteristics of Putin and his regime and argue that the West should force Ukraine to give in, lest the war escalate to terrifying new levels of carnage and destruction.
That would be a mistake. Early in the war, Moscow’s effort was plagued by ignorance, overconfidence, and bad planning. Those problems are hardly unique to Russia, having marked many U.S. interventions, as well. Now that Moscow has run into trouble, the Kremlin’s anger in the face of defeat is also familiar, resembling how the Nixon administration approached the Vietnam War half a century ago. Bluster, bombing, and nuclear saber rattling didn’t work then, and eventually, Washington accepted reality and withdrew from the conflict. It is possible to get Moscow to do the same today.
Despite the problems he faces, Putin seems to think that if he can hold on until winter, all will be well. His new recruits will stabilize the battlefield, the pace of military operations will slow, his threats of escalation will scare everybody, and Western opposition to the war will increase as high energy prices and inflation bite. All this, he hopes, will set the stage for a sustainably frozen conflict or a negotiated settlement generous enough to let him claim a victory.
This plan can be frustrated, however, so long as Washington and Europe can hold fast against Russian bullying and maintain Ukrainian military pressure on the ground. Relentless conventional operations can continue to push Russian lines backward and force Moscow into accepting its least bad option—a negotiated settlement that restores the February 24 territorial status quo. And once reality sinks in on the Russian side and such a settlement becomes possible, Washington should work with Kyiv and Europe to lock it in and close out the fighting.
BACK IN THE SUMMER OF ’69
Like chess, war has three phases: an opening, a middle, and an endgame. In the first, the parties engage one another and deploy their forces. In the second, they fight it out. And in the third, they settle the details of the outcome. The transition to a war’s endgame is not a military or political event but a psychological one. It involves recognition by the belligerents that the conflict is stuck in a stalemate or trending irreversibly in one direction. Such recognition is always hard for losers. They have to give up their hopes of victory, going through the psychiatrist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’s famous five stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance.
One can see the Kremlin doing this in real time right now, as the success of Ukrainian operations brings the endgame of this war closer. Moscow’s nuclear threats, for example, are both a heightened form of anger and an implicit form of bargaining. Yet however shocking and transgressive such brinksmanship may appear today, there is no need to attribute it to an unprecedentedly disturbed individual psyche or to a particular national context. The United States behaved similarly as it confronted defeat in Vietnam before ultimately extricating itself from its quagmire—as Russia is also likely to do down the road, if all its other choices look even worse.
In 1965, the administration of President Lyndon Johnson ramped up the United States’ involvement in Vietnam to save its South Vietnamese ally from defeat. A combination of gradually increasing aerial bombing and ground combat, the thinking went, would convince North Vietnam to abandon its efforts to unify the country and allow the regime in Saigon to survive. But the Communists refused to give in, proving to be far more resilient and capable than expected, and Washington had no plan B. In 1968, unwilling to withdraw but realizing that Americans didn’t have the stomach for further escalation, a frustrated Johnson announced that he would not run for reelection, capped U.S. troop deployments, restricted bombing in the North, and kicked the problem to his successor.
Losers in war go through the five stages of grief.
Richard Nixon entered the Oval Office in January 1969 committed to the same objective as his predecessor—a negotiated settlement guaranteeing an intact and secure South Vietnam—but knowing that U.S. patience with the war was wearing thin. So he and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, decided to try bringing Hanoi to the negotiating table with sticks and carrots. As White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman put it, Nixon wanted to mix threats of extreme force with promises of lavish aid:
With this combination of a strong warning plus unprecedented generosity, he was certain he could force the North Vietnamese—at long last—into legitimate peace negotiations.
The threat was the key, and Nixon coined a phrase for his theory…. He said, “I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.”
Previous U.S. efforts at coercion hadn’t worked because they weren’t taken seriously enough, the thinking went. But the new team could cow its opponents into submission by showing its toughness. Kissinger told his staff to plan a “savage, punishing blow” against the enemy, saying, “I can’t believe that a fourth-rate power like North Vietnam doesn’t have a breaking point.” In the spring of 1969, the White House authorized unprecedented bombing campaigns against Communist areas in Laos and Cambodia. In the summer, it threatened massive future attacks. And in the fall, it sent patrols of thermonuclear-armed B-52 bombers in looping arcs over the polar ice cap toward the Soviet Union in order to spook Moscow into reining in Hanoi.
This first Nixon strategy failed, however, because the Communists simply absorbed the blows and called Washington’s bluff. Realizing that actually carrying out his threats would make things worse rather than better, the president shifted course. By November, he had adopted a second strategy of extrication, gradually diminishing U.S. military involvement while maintaining a commitment to the existing regime in Saigon. After three more years of war, an agreement emerged permitting the United States to walk out, get its prisoners back, and not formally betray an ally. That same agreement, nevertheless, paved the way for the fall of South Vietnam two years later.
FROM VIETNAM TO UKRAINE
Three lessons can be learned from this episode for those interested in pushing a stronger nuclear power out of their country. The first concerns the importance of successful ground combat. Americans often try to gain victory in war through indirect measures such as sanctions, bombing, or threats of future devastating actions. But the fact remains that at the end of the day, wars are decided on the battlefield. The military skill and passion of the Vietnamese Communists kept them in the war against a stronger foe and ultimately led them to win it. The same thing is happening in Ukraine now, as skilled and passionate Ukrainian forces push the Russians backward field by field, village by village. If that progress on the ground can continue, nothing else will matter, and the war will be wrapped up in due course. So enabling it to keep going should be Washington’s highest priority.
The second lesson is to resist bullying. Losing powers do not go gently into that good night, especially strong ones for which defeat comes as a nasty surprise. One should therefore expect Moscow to rage against its fate now, just as Washington did half a century ago. Loud threats of escalation are a sign of weakness, not strength; if Russia had good options for changing the situation in its favor, it would have used them already. The United States and Europe should thus mostly ignore Russian threats and provocations and avoid getting distracted from their main task: helping Ukraine win on the ground.
The third lesson is to integrate force and diplomacy. The United States had struggled to do this in Korea, as Kissinger noted in 1957: “Our decision to stop military operations, except those of a purely defensive nature, at the very beginning of the armistice negotiations reflected our conviction that the process of negotiation operated on its own inherent logic independently of the military pressures brought to bear,” he wrote. “But by stopping military operations we removed the only Chinese incentive for a settlement; we produced the frustration of two years of inconclusive negotiations.”
Loud threats of escalation are a sign of weakness, not strength.
In the later stages of Vietnam, both sides avoided that mistake and kept fighting while negotiating. The same will likely happen in Ukraine, and so everyone should expect the intensity of the war to increase, not decrease, as settlement approaches. Russia will want to cover its retreat with a burst of violence, to release its fury at losing and publicly demonstrate its remaining potency. This pattern can be seen in Putin’s response to Ukraine’s destruction of Kerch Strait Bridge, and similar actions will follow future Ukrainian successes. But again, this is nothing new. The United States did even worse with the so-called Christmas bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972, the most destructive raids of the entire Vietnam war. (As Kissinger’s aide John Negroponte would quip, “We bombed the North Vietnamese into accepting our concessions.”) The Communists did not let such American behavior derail their own military or diplomatic efforts then, nor should the West let such Russian actions do so now.
Putin is channeling the tsars, not Hitler. For all his anticolonial pretensions, Russia’s president is fighting to reclaim provinces in his country’s lost empire. When colonial wars go bad, imperial powers eventually cut their losses and go home. And metropolitan elites know the difference between core and periphery. The votes arranged in Russian-occupied territory in September were a desperate attempt to paint a pretty surface on the ugly reality beneath. (The eighteenth-century Russian statesman Grigory Potemkin, buried in Kherson, would have found the move amusing.) But even formal incorporation of a colony into a great power’s national territory is no guarantee of permanent residence; just ask a Pied-Noir from Algeria. If Ukraine can keep up sufficient military pressure, at some point Russia will start looking for the exit and this war’s endgame will begin in earnest. Then, and not before, the inevitable necessary compromises on all sides will come to the fore, and difficult tradeoffs will have to be made.
Russia will be bruised but not beaten, humbled but not humiliated. Like the White House in the early 1970s, the Kremlin will be obsessed with maintaining its influence and credibility at home and abroad. Any settlement that emerges will not be a capitulation stemming from collapse, but a deliberate decision to pull back in order to staunch the flow of blood, treasure, and political capital. Given how much residual power Russia will retain, some Ukrainian objectives, even major ones, will have to be deferred. The least that should be demanded is a return to the February 24 positions, making it clear that Moscow has not gained territorially from its aggression. Progress locked in there could be built on later in other areas, such as the fate of other occupied areas in the Donbas, the ultimate status of Crimea, Russian war crimes, and broader regional security arrangements.
IS PUTIN BLUFFING?
There is every reason to believe that Russia will not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Threatening to do so makes sense. It frightens people, induces worry and caution in Ukraine’s supporters, and prompts calls for early negotiations to head off the danger, all at zero cost. Actually using them, however, would reverse the calculus, bringing few benefits and many additional costs, including retaliation, opprobrium, and loss of international support. This is why all previous nuclear threats since 1945 have not been followed up with action. Even if they were used, however, it would not improve Russia’s position or change the outcome.
Large-scale nuclear use—say, taking out a major city with a giant bomb—remains safely deterred by the multiple kinds of catastrophic consequences for Moscow that would swiftly follow. The least improbable uses, therefore, would be at a smaller scale, involving warheads at the lower end of the tactical nuclear spectrum, either over deserted areas as a demonstration or against Ukrainian forces during combat.
The point of a nuclear demonstration would be to show resolve and intention. In essence: “Everybody freeze, or next time we’ll bring on the apocalypse.” Such moves have been considered by policymakers in many countries at many times and have always been rejected, for good reason. The very restrictions placed on the demonstration, such as remote location and few casualties, would make it ineffective by conveying hesitation as much as resolve. If you were scared to go for broke this time, why would you be less scared next time?
As for using small nuclear weapons in combat, that could be helpful in certain military contexts, such as taking out an aircraft carrier at sea, destroying a large formation of tanks in the desert, or blocking a crucial passage through the mountains. But the war in Ukraine features none of those. It consists of relatively small units fighting in close quarters on territory Russia now claims as its own. Deploying tactical nuclear weapons in such circumstances would not affect the larger strategic picture while poisoning the very places Moscow is supposedly trying to rescue.
In either of these scenarios, after the explosions, Ukraine would still be on track to defeat Russia on the ground, its Western supporters would be even more determined to continue their support and deny Moscow anything resembling a victory, and foreign support for Russia would evaporate. Nuclear use would be self-defeating—not a prelude to general war or a model to be followed but a cautionary tale of reckless strategic ineptitude.
The central fact of this war is that one side is outperforming the other on the conventional battlefield. The losing side has nuclear weapons, and the conflict is likely to end, as have similar ones before it, with those weapons sitting irrelevantly on the sidelines while the conflict’s outcome is decided. Among the many casualties of the war in Ukraine, therefore, may turn out to be judgments regarding the value and utility of the vast nuclear arsenals that the great powers maintain at such large cost, effort, and risk.
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GIDEON ROSE is Mary and David Boies Distinguished Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of How Wars End.
Foreign Affairs · by Gideon Rose · October 14, 2022
4. Army's Wormuth wants emerging tech to 'strengthen' Indo-Pacific logistics
Excerpts:
“There has to be a way of distributing supplies, munitions, fuel to the entire joint force — to providing command and control, you know, over that very wide area. And the Army, I think, is very well-positioned to do that.” she said then.
To do exactly that, Wormuth said during the show last week that the Army has “a lot that we can learn from the kind of innovation that’s happening in the commercial sector.”
“We’ve done a very good job of partnering with industry around the development of new combat capabilities, but I think we need to make sure we’re fully exploring what we can do in terms of logistics with the commercial sector,” she said.
Army's Wormuth wants emerging tech to 'strengthen' Indo-Pacific logistics - Breaking Defense
breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · October 14, 2022
Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth discusses lessons learned on newly fielded equipment with 41st Artillery Brigade in Grafenwohr, Germany, Oct. 27, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Keisha Brown)
AUSA 2022 — The US Army wants to harness emerging technology to enhance its logistics capabilities across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific as the service looks to define its role in the region.
Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said that she had tasked Gen. Edward Daly, commander of Army Materiel Command, to “lead a comprehensive effort to strengthen” the service’s capabilities in the region.
“We really have to focus on contested logistics in the Indo-Pacific which is the most demanding theater, if you will, from a logistics perspective because of the distances involved,” Wormuth told reporters last week during a press conference on the side of the annual Association of the United States Army conference, adding that “we’re just getting started with that initiative.”
FULL COVERAGE: AUSA 2022
Army Materiel Command is a four-star command responsible for deploying the service’s assets from installations to tactical positions, making it the backbone of the Army’s logistics efforts. Wormuth said she wants the command to explore autonomous distribution, more energy efficient combat systems as well as predictive analytics.
“Leveraging experimentation, wargames and exercises, this effort will bring together our logistics community with the commercial sector to look at our requirements and focus on the opportunities presented by autonomous distribution, energy efficient combat systems, and data analytics,” Wormuth said in her keynote speech.
Wormuth said during the press conference that she’s looking for AMC to “really explore where can we get ahead leveraging those kinds of technologies.”
As the Pentagon writ large looks to transition its focus away from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, the Army is looking to define its role in the region dominated by vast oceans. Last year, Wormuth said that the service would be the “linchpin” service for the joint force in the region, providing command and control capabilities, offensive fires and movement of materiel for the US and allies.
“There has to be a way of distributing supplies, munitions, fuel to the entire joint force — to providing command and control, you know, over that very wide area. And the Army, I think, is very well-positioned to do that.” she said then.
To do exactly that, Wormuth said during the show last week that the Army has “a lot that we can learn from the kind of innovation that’s happening in the commercial sector.”
“We’ve done a very good job of partnering with industry around the development of new combat capabilities, but I think we need to make sure we’re fully exploring what we can do in terms of logistics with the commercial sector,” she said.
breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · October 14, 2022
5. United Nations: Rape Is Part Of Russia’s Military Strategy
Yes, this evil must be called out.
United Nations: Rape Is Part Of Russia’s Military Strategy
Forbes · by Dr. Ewelina U. Ochab · October 14, 2022
On October 13, Pramila Patten, Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, confirmed that rape is part of Russia’s “military strategy” and a “deliberate tactic to dehumanize the victims.” She emphasized that “when women are held for days and raped, when you start to rape little boys and men, when you see a series of genital mutilations, when you hear women testify about Russian soldiers equipped with Viagra, it's clearly a military strategy.”
According to Patten, the United Nations managed to verify more than a hundred cases of rape or sexual assault in Ukraine since Russia invaded in February 2022. The data obtained to date suggests that the age of the victims of sexual violence ranges from four to 82 years old. The victims are mostly women and girls, but also men and boys. Patten added that “it's very difficult to have reliable statistics during an active conflict, and the numbers will never reflect reality, because sexual violence is a silent crime.” As such, as she noted, “reported cases are only the tip of the iceberg.”
... [+]AFP via Getty Images
According to Patten, the first cases were reported just three days after Russia’s attack on Ukraine.
Indeed, the issue of conflict related sexual violence has been raised from early days. For example, on March 4, 2022, Ukraine's foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba, spoke of numerous cases of sexual violence in the week of Putin’s war, during an event organized by the Chatham House think-tank. ” On March 17, 2022, four Ukrainian MPs visiting the U.K. Parliament, Lesia Vasylenko, Alona Shkrum, Maria Mezentseva, and Olena Khomenko, reported that Putin has been deliberately targeting women and children after Ukraine did not surrender. They spoke of this targeting to have included rape and sexual violence. As they told journalists in Westminster, “We have reports of women gang-raped, these women are usually the ones who are unable to get out. We are talking about senior citizens. Most of these women have either been executed after the crime of rape or they have taken their own lives.” In April 2022, the Ukrainian Ombudswoman Lyudmyla Denisova was said to have received 400 reports of rape committed by Russian soldiers. The reports were mostly coming from the temporary occupied territories or recently liberated areas.
In her address, Patten stressed the need for justice and accountability. She added that “There is now political will to fight impunity, and there is consensus today on the fact that rapes are used as a military tactic, a terror tactic.” In Ukraine, investigations and prosecutions of the crime are under way. In June 2022, media reported on the first trial of a Russian charged with rape and sexual violence. The soldier stood accused of raping a Ukrainian woman during Russia’s invasion. Reportedly, “The suspect, Mikhail Romanov, ... [stood] accused of breaking into a house in March in a village in the Brovarsky region outside Kyiv, murdering a man and then repeatedly raping his wife while threatening her and her child.”
The evidence of the crime is also being collected and preserved by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry (Commission of Inquiry), a new mechanism established to investigate all alleged violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, and related crimes against Ukraine by the Russian Federation, and to establish the facts, circumstances and root causes of any such violations and abuses. In its oral update to the Human Rights Council in September 2022, the Commission of Inquiry confirmed the evidence of the use of sexual violence, including “cases in which children have been raped, tortured, and unlawfully confined.”
MORE FOR YOU
As more information of Russia’s use of sexual violence is coming to light, evidence is collected and preserved, justice and accountability must follow. However, equally, more needs to be done to prevent this horrific crime from being perpetrated. The pandemic of sexual violence in conflict requires a vaccine and not only a medication to deal with the consequences.
Forbes · by Dr. Ewelina U. Ochab · October 14, 2022
6. One Ukrainian City in the Way of Putin’s New Total War
Excerpts:
The city, which lies on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River, is in Ukrainian-held territory in the country’s southeast. The war’s front line is barely 20 miles away, and the nuclear-power plant that shares the city’s name is only a 70-mile drive around the Kakhovka Reservoir, in Russian-occupied territory.
“The inhuman monsters,” Vaselyuk exclaimed, when she told me about the attack later. The closest shelter was more than six miles from her house. She knew there were a couple of strategic targets, potential objectives for a Russian attack, in the region.
One Ukrainian City in the Way of Putin’s New Total War
As they rush to evacuate children, the civilians of Zaporizhzhya face a double threat of nuclear devastation.
By Anna Nemtsova
The Atlantic · by Anna Nemtsova · October 14, 2022
Some sixth sense awoke 66-year-old Svitlana Vaselyuk on Tuesday at 5:45 a.m. She had just put on her slippers when, as she sat on her bed, a major missile struck her city, shaking her entire house. That was one of dozens of missiles Russia fired at Zaporizhzhya this week, destroying dozens of apartment buildings, historical streets, and important infrastructure.
The city, which lies on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River, is in Ukrainian-held territory in the country’s southeast. The war’s front line is barely 20 miles away, and the nuclear-power plant that shares the city’s name is only a 70-mile drive around the Kakhovka Reservoir, in Russian-occupied territory.
“The inhuman monsters,” Vaselyuk exclaimed, when she told me about the attack later. The closest shelter was more than six miles from her house. She knew there were a couple of strategic targets, potential objectives for a Russian attack, in the region.
The Zaporizhzhya nuclear-power plant had recently lost its external electrical power supply and was relying on diesel generators to maintain safe operation and manageable temperatures in the reactor core. Could Putin order the plant itself blown up, or a strike against Zaporizhzhya with a nuclear weapon, as he has threatened to do more broadly against Ukraine? Vaselyuk was convinced that he might, after every other unimaginable thing that had happened—including the full-scale invasion, the mass graves, the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas.
Eric Schlosser: What if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine
“‘God, let it not be nuclear,’ I prayed,” she said. “Here, in Zaporizhzhya, we are the ground zero, but we are not ready for nuclear bombs. We have no place to hide from them, no proper shelters with stored water, food, or medicine.”
Vaselyuk has experience of a nuclear catastrophe. She had lived through the Chernobyl disaster. “Four days after the reactor blew up in Chernobyl, in 1986, Soviet authorities made us march at the May 1 parade,” she told me. “I went out with my little daughter instead of sitting at home with all windows and doors shut, and now both of us suffer from thyroid health issues.”
Still, she did not want to abandon Zaporizhzhya. Such fatalism is typical in Ukraine today. After the panic of the first few months, people are not ready to give up on the defense of their cities. Even Moscow’s threat to use a low-yield nuclear weapon in Ukraine is not causing panic.
Assisted by humanitarian aid from all over the world, Ukraine’s civil society has organized itself, repaired infrastructure, and reinforced defenses. As bad as things got, with Putin’s attempt to avenge the bombing of the Kerch Bridge last weekend, Vaselyuk was determined to stay put.
An engineer by trade, Vaselyuk has been working to evacuate families with children, packing up food rations for displaced Ukrainians still fleeing from Mariupol, Melitopol, and other towns destroyed in the struggle for the southeast. Each package she prepared included food items specifically designed to enable people to survive for seven days sheltering from outside radiation in the event of a nuclear strike.
But at the back of her mind is always the fate of the nuclear-power plant. Zaporizhzhya faces double jeopardy: Russian use of a tactical nuclear weapon near the front line and possible sabotage and destruction at the power plant downriver. “Our city authorities are not preparing us for the nuclear meltdown,” she said. “People have zero information about how to survive it. All I know is that we have to be inside for at least three days and then cover exposed skin with wet cloths.”
David Patrikarakos: Russia’s hunger war
Zaporizhzhya’s military chief, Oleg Buriak, was busy helping residents under constant attack. Rescue teams in the city were working constantly to free injured people from under the debris. The municipal services had to fix destroyed power lines, while trying to tackle a shortage of transport for evacuating the hundreds of victims. Because Zaporizhzhya Oblast straddles the front line, civilians are arriving constantly. Some 365 people managed to escape from the occupied zone on Monday, including 65 children.
“People were in basements; they are alive,” Buriak said on local TV this week. “We provide them with medical help.”
Russian forces have been pounding Zaporizhzhya with an array of armory: air-launched cruise missiles, air-to-ground missiles from Su-35 jets, Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, and S-300 air-defense missiles that the Russian army is now using to attack land targets. Some analysts see a desperation creeping into Russia’s strategy, as the country throws whatever it has into the fight—including specialized military ordnance to attack civilian targets indiscriminately.
“Our brave army destroyed six S-300 systems,” Buriak said. “Russia has been producing them since the 1960s, so they have plenty of S-300 missiles in stock, but these systems are inaccurate.”
Pastor Albert Khomiak has been unable to sleep these past nights. He had been looking after 19 adopted and foster children—some old enough to be serving: Six are now soldiers defending Ukraine, and three more are preparing to join the military. Of his younger charges, he has evacuated seven children to Finland; most of them have disabilities, and needed care he could no longer be sure of providing in a war zone. Khomiak continues to take care of three children in Zaporizhzhya, because, as a local pastor, he felt he could not leave his parish.
Tom Nichols: How should the U.S. respond to Putin’s nuclear provocation?
“When bombing begins, the children are asleep and I am running around the house with my heart pounding,” he told me this week. “I am not sure if I should wake them up or if the bombardment is far away and they can sleep a bit longer.”
Every day, his parish has been distributing several tons of food aid delivered by an international Christian mission for displaced families. He was too exhausted to think about what a worse escalation might mean. “We have a very slow reaction to this disaster … Our community has finally received iodine tablets,” he explained. “So far, this is the only preparation for nuclear disaster. Nobody knows what to do if the Russians use nuclear missiles.”
Volunteers like Pastor Khomiak are the main source of assistance to the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons passing through Zaporizhzhya. But every day, the city-center shelter fills up with mothers and kids made homeless by Russian bombardment. “This morning I felt completely lost for the first time in seven months. The major transport company helping us refused to work under the missile attacks,” a volunteer worker named Natalia Aradlyanova told me on Monday, as she tried to cater to a couple of toddlers. “I have to move at least 36 children. They are very small and terribly stressed.”
Help came instead from a U.S. nonprofit, the Romulus T. Weatherman Foundation, which was working to evacuate children from areas now under Russian bombardment. “No child should ever have to live with a threat of bombing, genocide, and a literal nuclear meltdown,” a co-founder, Andrew Duncan, told me from the foundation’s base in Poland on Wednesday. “It is time for the West to do the honorable thing and protect the children of Ukraine.”
The Atlantic · by Anna Nemtsova · October 14, 2022
7. Xi Jinping’s Endgame: A China Prepared for Conflict With the U.S.
I liked Matt Pottingers first incorrectly reported words before they were corrected (see correction below)
Excerpts:
To achieve China’s rejuvenation, “we must demonstrate stronger vigilance and always be prepared for potential danger, even in times of calm,” Mr. Xi said in a speech last year.
These efforts became even more U.S.-focused after a May 2020 speech in which Matt Pottinger, then a senior National Security Council official, traced the history of China’s democratic movement and suggested Chinese citizens should hold their leaders accountable. Mr. Xi saw the speech—delivered in Mandarin—as a challenge to his rule, because it was aimed at everyday Chinese people rather than its leaders, according to people familiar with the matter.
“The Communist Party has always feared three things: frank talk about Chinese history, the idea of Chinese citizens enjoying basic political rights and attempts by U.S. officials to engage directly with Chinese citizens. My speech touched on all three themes, which explains the panic Beijing still feels from what were fairly modest words,” said Mr. Pottinger, who is now chairman of the China program at the nonprofit Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Chinese citizens are now regularly warned about spies and told not to be guilty of “America worship” or “kneeling before America.” Such calls have expanded in recent months to target those adopting an English first name and questioning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In his economic remodeling efforts, Mr. Xi has directed Chinese companies to invest more heavily in strategic industries. He cracked down on private technology companies focused on educational tutoring, social media and other consumer services for failing to adequately serve state interests or sufficiently ringfence sensitive user data that Beijing fears could be shared with U.S. regulators.
Xi Jinping’s Endgame: A China Prepared for Conflict With the U.S.
He has unleashed an array of military, economic and political campaigns to brace the country for the possibility of confrontation
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-congress-xi-jinping-us-11665753002?mod=hp_lead_pos7
By Jonathan ChengFollow
Oct. 14, 2022 9:34 am ET
Since rising to power a decade ago, Xi Jinping has unleashed an array of campaigns to help ensure that China would prevail in, or at least withstand, a confrontation with the West. He has bolstered China’s military, reorganized the economy and remade society around a more ideologically committed Communist Party.
Mr. Xi has made clear that his overarching goal is to restore China to what he believes is its rightful place as a global player and a peer of the U.S. As a consequence, he has come to see the possibility of a showdown with the West as increasingly likely, according to people familiar with his thinking. Now he stands on the edge of a third five-year term in power at a Communist Party conclave starting Sunday, in a break with a recent precedent of stepping aside after two terms. That will likely ensure that his vision, which is simultaneously assertive and defensive, will guide China for years to come.
His approach could be summed up in a favorite aphorism of Mao Zedong that Mr. Xi has invoked, warning against a lack of vigilance, according to people familiar with the matter: “Don’t fight unsure wars, and don’t fight unprepared battles.”
Politically, Mr. Xi has installed trusted lieutenants at every level of the ruling Communist Party and cracked down on opposition in places like Hong Kong and Xinjiang, to help shore up his authority and weed out foreign influences.
Militarily, Mr. Xi has reorganized the People’s Liberation Army, doubled its budget and begun work to enhance China’s nuclear arsenal. He has also launched a societywide campaign to promote toughness, punish denigration of the military and prevent young men from wasting time playing videogames. All are meant to ensure China is ready to engage in combat, if necessary, for the first time since 1979—especially if elections in the U.S. and Taiwan in 2024 result in leaders willing to embrace independence for the island, the reddest of red lines for Mr. Xi.
Economically, Mr. Xi has redirected billions of dollars to develop homegrown technologies, including advanced semiconductors it has long bought from abroad. He has reined in the private sector and reconstituted state-owned giants to compete on the global stage.
Mr. Xi Jinping inspected People's Liberation Army soldiers at a camp in Hong Kong in 2017.
PHOTO: VINCENT YU/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The moves could help China withstand further pressure from Washington to restrict trade or otherwise try to slow the nation’s rise. Last week, the U.S. Commerce Department added to the pressure with new export restrictions on advanced semiconductors and chip-manufacturing equipment, in an attempt to keep them from advancing China’s military power.
Many of Mr. Xi’s steps have boosted national pride and made China stronger. He regularly trumpets signs of China’s ascendancy and Western decline. But his moves have also alienated would-be friends, unified rivals and harmed many of the strongest parts of its economy, especially through the country’s harsh Covid-19 lockdowns.
Mr. Xi’s assertiveness and attempts by then-President Donald Trump and President Biden to take a more forceful stance on China have contributed to the deterioration in the two countries’ relations. American companies are rethinking their investment plans in China, once a promising growth market. Diplomatic meetings have degenerated into hectoring sessions. Both sides have imposed sanctions on the other, while Chinese companies have delisted from U.S. exchanges.
Mr. Xi’s next five years will be “one of the most highly uncertain periods we have had in recent memory,” said Damien Ma, managing director and co-founder of the MacroPolo think tank at the Paulson Institute in Chicago, who sees Mr. Xi as being fixated on military deterrence in its near periphery and economic parity with the U.S., among other goals. “It’s going to require some astute and careful management in both capitals.”
Beijing has said it’s merely responding to U.S. provocations, and that China’s rise is peaceful. Spokespeople for the information office of China’s cabinet, the State Council, as well as its Foreign Ministry, didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Mr. Xi has made no secret of his plans to make China one of the world’s superpowers.
After taking office in 2012, he began laying out an expansive vision, labeled the China Dream, which called for ambitious steps to strengthen the country’s military and economy.
It built on a long-held desire to address grievances China has harbored since the collapse of the Qing dynasty, and the parceling out of Chinese territory to Western powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Mr. Xi called it the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Initially, he had sought more accommodation with the U.S. that would clear the way for China’s continued rise. During a February 2012 trip to the U.S., just before he secured his position at the top of the Communist Party, Mr. Xi met with Henry Kissinger and other U.S. political luminaries and sought advice on building closer ties, a person with knowledge of the meeting said. They told him to increase communication with Washington, with more calls and official visits than his predecessors. Spokespeople for Mr. Kissinger didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Once he was in office, Mr. Xi felt the Obama administration wasn’t treating Beijing as an equal, people familiar with the matter said. Mr. Xi frequently spoke of forging a “new type of great power relations” with the U.S., but Washington resisted the formulation, seeing it as an attempt to get the U.S. to recognize China as a peer and fearing that would send the wrong signal to American allies, the people said.
President Barack Obama and Mr. Xi at the White House in 2015.
PHOTO: RON SACHS/ZUMA PRESS
Mr. Xi forged ahead with his grand plans back home.
He needed to ensure he firmly controlled the Communist Party, which had been riven by elite infighting, graft and factionalism during his predecessor’s tenure. He developed a reputation early on as a leader willing to take on widespread corruption and took down rivals in high-profile investigations, replacing them with loyal cadres.
Mr. Xi now controls levers of power across the country, having appointed all but seven of the 281 members of the Communist Party’s provincial-level Standing Committees as of June, according to Wu Guoguang, a senior research scholar at Stanford University.
Mr. Xi took steps to secure the country’s periphery, insulating the mainland to a greater degree against external pressures, often in ways that directly challenged Western values. He oversaw a rollout of cutting-edge surveillance systems that blanketed the country in face-scanning cameras and collected vast troves of behavioral data.
He defied warnings from Washington to militarize disputed islands in the South China Sea, and drew further ire for a mass internment campaign that imprisoned ethnic minority Uyghurs in the restive northwest region of Xinjiang, U.S. and United Nations officials say.
He then ordered a crackdown on Hong Kong—the most visible bridge between China and the Western world—that snuffed out antigovernment protests and, along with tough Covid controls, sent many in the city’s financial sector fleeing. He sharpened his rhetoric on Taiwan, suggesting that he wanted to expedite efforts to take control of the island, by force if necessary.
A screen displayed a People's Liberation Army advertisement in Beijing, Aug. 30.
PHOTO: BLOOMBERG NEWS
He expanded combat drills and increased military spending to $200 billion last year, more than double the amount China spent a decade earlier. Much of China’s efforts have gone to tools like hypersonic missiles, nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers that enhance China’s capabilities in a potential conflict with powers like the U.S., rather than smaller neighbors.
To encourage martial spirit, Mr. Xi launched a wide-ranging effort to rally nationalistic fervor.
Teenage idols, once praised for their dewy-eyed features, are being cast as young revolutionary soldiers in military movies. On China’s popular short-video apps, before-and-after clips touted by the military show once-scrawny young Chinese men doing push-ups, their biceps bulging.
To achieve China’s rejuvenation, “we must demonstrate stronger vigilance and always be prepared for potential danger, even in times of calm,” Mr. Xi said in a speech last year.
These efforts became even more U.S.-focused after a May 2020 speech in which Matt Pottinger, then a senior National Security Council official, traced the history of China’s democratic movement and suggested Chinese citizens should hold their leaders accountable. Mr. Xi saw the speech—delivered in Mandarin—as a challenge to his rule, because it was aimed at everyday Chinese people rather than its leaders, according to people familiar with the matter.
“The Communist Party has always feared three things: frank talk about Chinese history, the idea of Chinese citizens enjoying basic political rights and attempts by U.S. officials to engage directly with Chinese citizens. My speech touched on all three themes, which explains the panic Beijing still feels from what were fairly modest words,” said Mr. Pottinger, who is now chairman of the China program at the nonprofit Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Chinese citizens are now regularly warned about spies and told not to be guilty of “America worship” or “kneeling before America.” Such calls have expanded in recent months to target those adopting an English first name and questioning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In his economic remodeling efforts, Mr. Xi has directed Chinese companies to invest more heavily in strategic industries. He cracked down on private technology companies focused on educational tutoring, social media and other consumer services for failing to adequately serve state interests or sufficiently ringfence sensitive user data that Beijing fears could be shared with U.S. regulators.
China is trying to develop its own payments network and has rolled out a government-backed digital currency—tools that could ultimately help Beijing avoid using the U.S. dollar and circumvent the U.S.-led global financial system.
Mr. Xi appeared on screen during a gala celebrating the founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing in 2019.
PHOTO: NG HAN GUAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Beijing officials say they have no other choice but to pursue more self-sufficiency and involve the state more in the economy after the Trump-era tariffs and U.S. government’s assault on networking-gear maker Huawei Technologies Ltd., both of which signaled rising U.S. suspicion toward China.
Inside the country, Mr. Xi’s efforts to tighten political control have deepened anxiety among lower-level cadres, many of whom now spend large portions of their time trying to prove their loyalty—a concern Mr. Xi has called out repeatedly. Such behavior slowed the city of Wuhan’s response to the initial outbreak of Covid, The Wall Street Journal previously reported.
The U.N.’s human-rights agency said China’s government may have committed crimes against humanity in Xinjiang in an August report, charges that China denies.
The U.S. has organized an informal alliance with China’s neighbors India, Australia and Japan, known as the Quad, and a military agreement with the U.K. and Australia known as Aukus, both of which have prompted denunciations from Beijing.
A Beijing-led grouping known informally as China 17+1 with Central and Eastern European nations, started by China around the beginning of Mr. Xi’s tenure, has shrunk to 14+1 in the past year as the region once eager to deepen ties with Beijing grows warier of Chinese assertiveness.
Mr. Xi’s strict policy to contain Covid, with lockdowns imposed when even a handful of cases are found, is itself a reflection of his obsession with U.S.-China competition. He has consistently framed China’s zero-tolerance approach, which has led to far fewer deaths than in the Western world but also hurt its economy, as evidence of the superiority of Communist Party governance.
People try to break out of a quarantine fence during Covid lockdowns in Shanghai in June.
PHOTO: ALEX PLAVEVSKI/SHUTTERSTOCK
On the economic front, many of Mr. Xi’s moves to achieve greater self-sufficiency, including in semiconductors, have sputtered. Mr. Xi’s heavy-handed approach toward managing the economy, including crackdowns on companies like internet giant Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., has given Beijing greater control over the economy and won some plaudits from people who feared they had grown too powerful—but also snuffed out much of the entrepreneurial spirit that drove China’s growth and shut off a source of jobs. Urban youth unemployment is near its all-time high, with nearly one in five people between the ages of 16 and 24 out of work.
While experts had long projected China’s economy would slow as it matured, Mr. Xi’s unwillingness to bend this year has expedited that shift in ways that many economists believe could leave permanent scars.
The longer-term outlook for China’s economy could be even more dire, with China’s population projected by many demographers to shrink this year for the first time in generations.
The World Bank forecasts this year’s growth to reach just 2.8%, and 4.5% in 2023. The government’s official target for this year is 5.5%.
A flag displayed at the Museum of the Communist Party of China in Beijing.
PHOTO: FLORENCE LO/REUTERS
Corrections & Amplifications
In a May 2020 speech, Matt Pottinger, then a senior National Security Council official, suggested Chinese citizens should hold their leaders accountable. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said he called on the Chinese people to stand up to Xi Jinping for thwarting democracy.
Write to Jonathan Cheng at jonathan.cheng@wsj.com
8. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (14.10.22) CDS comments on key events
CDS Daily brief (14.10.22) CDS comments on key events
Humanitarian aspect:
As of the morning of October 14, 2022, more than 1,233 Ukrainian children are victims of full- scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation, Prosecutor General's Office reports. The official number of children who died and were wounded during the Russian aggression is 423, and more than 810 children, respectively. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories. According to the state child search portal "Children of War," as of October 14, 243 children considered missing, 8,140 — deported, and 6,603 — found.
According to the World Health Organization, during the full-scale invasion, the Russian Federation carried out 620 attacks on medical facilities in Ukraine. In addition, according to Hans Kluge, director of the WHO Regional European Bureau, mental health problems are likely to "exacerbate". At a press conference on the impact of the war on the health of the population of Ukraine, he said that "Ten million people ... are at potential risk of developing mental disorders, including acute stress, anxiety, depression, substance abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder," noting that the estimate was made before the recent escalation in Ukraine.
The Russian Federation troops shelled eight Ukraine regions during the past day, according to the morning round-up of Oblasts Military Administrations of Ukraine.
• Russian military targeted Zaporizhzhia with three S-300 missiles this morning. There are confirmed hits on infrastructure objects with a fire that broke out at one of the sites. According to preliminary information, there are no victims.
• In the Sumy Oblast, the Russians shelled the Druzhbivska community at night with rocket artillery (10 hits) and Bilopolska, Vorozhbyanska, Znob-Novgorodska, Velikopysarivska communities. No victims are reported.
• In the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, the enemy shelled the Nikopol and Synelnyky districts. One person was injured. Private houses and an industrial enterprise were damaged. The Russians attacked the Nikopol district with "Hrads", heavy artillery and drones. Private homes, water pipes and power lines were damaged in three other districts. The air defense forces destroyed four enemy kamikaze drones over the Oblast during the night.
• In the Kharkiv Oblast, the enemy continued to launch missile attacks on the civilian population, including Kholodnogirsk, Chuhuiv and Slobozhansk districts (a road and infrastructure object were damaged); no casualties were reported. During the day, the enemy massively shelled Kupyansk and its neighbourhoods. Over the past day, six people were hospitalized in the Kupyanskyi district, including a 16-year-old boy, one person - in the Chuhuyiv district, and another 16-year-old boy was injured in the Izyum district. Demining continues; during the day State Emergency Service neutralized 702 explosive objects.
• In the Donetsk Oblast, the Russians shelled Kostyantynivka at night; a high-rise apartment building was damaged. The invaders also shelled Pisky, Nevelske, Vodyane, and Pervomaiske. Two people were killed, and another six were injured.
In the aftermath of yesterday's massive rocket attack by Russian forces on Mykolaiv, the number of victims increased to eight, among them a child. Rescuers retrieved the last victim's body from the rubble of a residential building hit by a Russian rocket on October 13. According to the mayor of the city Alexander Senkevich, four high-rise residential buildings were damaged.
In Zaporizhzhia, the number of victims of the October 9 Russian missile attack increased. The bodies of 15 people have already been found under the rubble of a multi-story building hit by a Russian rocket; six are still considered missing.
At Kyiv National University, work has begun to repair the damage caused by the massive Russian rocket attack on October 10, but the exact amount of damage is currently unknown.
It is already possible to get to almost all liberated territories of the Kherson Oblast (except for the last five liberated villages) with appropriate permission, deputy of the Kherson Regional Council Serhii Khlan reported during a briefing in Ukrinform. According to Khlan, the main task in the de-occupied territories is restoring the energy supply. Mobile communications and the Internet are also being restored. In addition, people are helped with building materials. In particular, there is a big problem with slate.
Occupied territories
The Russian invaders hardly let people out of the temporarily occupied territories at the checkpoint in Vasylivka, Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov informed during a briefing at the Ukraine- Ukrinform media center. "From September 27, the queue in Vasylivka began to pile up. There were 1,200 cars with 6,000 residents. Currently, there are more than 1,000 cars with more than 4,000 residents." However, the number insignificantly decreased not because the people were allowed to pass but because they decided not to stay [in line]. "Now a new evacuation route emerged through Melitopol-Berdyansk-Mariupol-Novoazovsk," Fedorov said. Fedorov noted that earlier, more than 1,000 residents from all temporarily occupied territories of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk Oblast could leave daily [to Ukraine-controlled territory] across the demarcation line in Vasylivka. Currently, there is no such possibility because the occupiers let only 20-30 vehicles pass. Moreover, there are days when no cars are released. For example, they declared last Saturday and Sunday off.
In Kherson, the occupiers shot the conductor of the regional philharmonic orchestra, Yuriy Kerpatenko. The Kherson Regional Prosecutor's Office reported that the investigation had been launched. It is noted that, according to the investigation, representatives of the aggressor country shot the conductor in his own home in the city of Kherson because he refused to cooperate with them. Before that, the occupiers tried to persuade the man to cooperate with threats. He stopped contacting relatives in September.
In the occupied Kherson Oblast, under the guise of going on vacation, lists are being compiled for the deportation of schoolchildren [to Russia], deputy of the regional council Serhiy Khlan said during a briefing at the Media Center Ukraine. He explained that the collaborators organized
holidays in schools (from October 6 - on the Dnieper right bank of the Oblast, from 15 - on the left bank). He urged parents not to succumb to forced deportation, even despite Russia's statements about [children's] "recovery" and [promises of] provision with everything necessary.
Operational situation
(please note that this part of the report is mainly on the previous day's (October 13) developments)
The 233rd day of the strategic air and ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy continues attempts to implement its plans to reach the administrative border of the Donetsk Oblast and to maintain control over the captured parts of the Kherson, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv Oblasts.
The Russian military shells the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the entire contact line, fortifies positions in certain directions, and conducts aerial reconnaissance. They also continue increasing reserves, drafting for mobilization, and recruiting mercenaries.
The enemy does not stop striking Ukraine's critical infrastructure and civilian facilities. During the past 24 hours, the Russian fire hit civilian targets and residents of Brody, Nalyvaykivka of the Kyiv Oblast, Mykolaiv, and Nikopol. Near the state border, the villages of Ukrainske, Atynske, Velyka Rybytsia in Sumy Oblast, Mykolaivka in Chernihiv Oblast, and Strilecha, Ohirtseve, Starytsia, Gatyshche, Dvorichna and Hryanikivka in Kharkiv Oblast were shelled with mortars and barrel artillery.
Russian military carried out strikes with cruise, aviation, anti-aircraft guided missiles and attack- UAVs of Iranian production. In general, the enemy launched 2 rocket and 16 air strikes over the past day and fired more than 70 MLRS rounds. During October 13, Russian troops launched missile attacks on critical infrastructure and civilian objects in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv Oblasts and launched kamikaze drone strikes throughout Ukraine. Rocket attacks were also carried out on objects in Rivne, Ternopil, Lviv, and Chernivtsi Oblasts.
To replenish the losses in manpower, the Russian military leadership continue recruiting mercenaries, including citizens of other countries. According to available information, about four hundred foreign combatants arrived in the temporarily occupied territory of the Republic of Crimea on October 9. It is planned to further involve them in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine.
In Primorsko-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar Krai, Russia), the sending of mobilized soldiers to training centres has been suspended until November 1 due to unpreparedness for accommodation, training and comprehensive provision for a large number of personnel.
During the past 24 hours, Ukraine's Defense Forces aviation carried out 25 strikes on enemy targets, damaging more than 19 enemy weapons and military equipment concentration areas
and 6 anti-aircraft missile systems. In addition, Air Defense units shot down 5 cruise missiles and 9 UAVs. Ukraine's missile forces and artillery struck 3 enemy command and control points, 5 areas of concentration of manpower, weapons and military equipment, 2 ammunition warehouses, and an EW station.
The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Russian troops are looting shops in occupied Kherson and preparing pontoon crossings for escape from the right bank to the left bank of the Dnieper.
Kharkiv direction
• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;
• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.
In the Svatove direction, the command of the enemy's troops continues active measures to stabilize the front line and organize the defense system. To the northwest and west of Svatove, the enemy concentrated up to eight consolidated BTGs from the 11th Army Corps, 6th Army, 1st Tank Army, 41st Army, and Rosgvardia (Russian National Guards). The total number is 3.5-4 thousand personnel, 45-50 tanks, up to 130 BMP/APC, about 100 other BBM, up to 50 guns and up to 40 MLRS. The main task of this tactical group is to hold the Svatove area.
In the Tavilzhanka area, the enemy BTG from the 11th Army Corps, with the support of the artillery from the 45th high power artillery brigade of the Western Military District, conducts a defense to prevent the advance of Ukrainian forces from the direction of Dvorichne.
The reinforced motorized rifle company of the 55th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 41st Army continues to hold its positions in the village of Vilshana, trying to restrain the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine between the Dvorychne and Kupiansk bridgehead. However, it would soon be knocked out of its positions and forced to withdraw in the direction of Pershetravneve - Verkhnya Duvanka.
In the area of Kotlyarivka – Kiselyvka – Nova Tarasivka, the enemy forces of the 15th separated SOF detachment "Vyatich", the 21st separated SOF detachment "Tyfun" and the BARS-9 detachment with the support of the consolidated BTG from the units of the 4th and 47th tank divisions of the 1st Tank Army, the BTG of the 200th separate motorized rifle brigade trying to hold the line of defense along the R-07 road Kupyansk - Svatove.
In the area of Kuzemivka, Kryvoshyivka, the enemy forces of the "Orel" SWAT detachment, consolidated BTG of the 15th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division of the
1st Tank Army, and a BTG of the 27th separate motorized rifle brigade continue to hold the line of defense, periodically counterattacking on the flanks to prevent the advance units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces from bypassing them.
Russian troops continued to maintain defense around Kreminna. The enemy controls the directions of Svatove – Kreminna and Kreminna – Rubizhne.
In the Svatove direction, the enemy is deploying two additional BTGs (incomplete) from the 15th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd Army and from the 60th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 5th Army (which is odd because the 5th Army is deployed partly east of Nova Kakhovka, partly - near Mariupol).
In the Volodymyrivka area, the enemy troops are equipping a new battalion defense area.
Russian soldiers voluntarily surrendered to Ukrainian troops in the area of Krokhmalne. Ukrainian forces took control of Pishchane, Berestove and Tabaivka and attacked Orlyanka and Kotlyarivka; the fighting continues.
The Ukrainian defense forces are strengthening their positions west of Kreminna and trying to cross the Zherebets River.
Kramatorsk direction
● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;
● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.
The enemy fired with the artillery of various types at the Ukrainian Defence Forces' positions in Spirne, Terny, Zarichne, Nadiya, Olhivka, Torske, Bilohorivka, Yampolivka and Travneve.
Ukrainian units repelled enemy attacks of the 3rd motorized rifle division units of the 20th Army on Terny.
Donetsk direction
● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The enemy fired from tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery along the entire line of contact, in particular, in the areas of Bilohorivka, Yakovlivka, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Ivangrad, Zelenopillia, Soledar, Mayorsk, Chasiv Yar, Opytne, Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka, Vodyane, Maryinka, Novomykhailivka, Nevelske, Pervomaiske, Zolota Nyva.
Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled enemy attacks in the directions of Opytne, Vesele, Nevelske, Odradivka, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Ozaryanivka, Nova Kamianka, and Suhy Stavok.
The joint forces of the so-called "LPR" and "DPR" captured Ivangrad; fighting continues on the outskirts of Opytne village; the enemy attacked Maryinka. "DPR" troops are also fighting on the western outskirts of Donetsk and preparing for an offensive on Nevelske.
Zaporizhzhia direction
● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The areas of Vugledar, Novoukrainka, Vremivka, Novoandriivka, Novodanylivka, Dorozhnyanka, Gulyaipole and Komyshuvaha were shelled. Russian troops also struck Nikopol with the Grad anti- aircraft missile system.
The increase in the number of Russian troops was noted in Energodar on the territory of the ZNPP. The Russian military uses the station as a base due to the fact that the NPP would never be fired upon [by Ukrainian troops].
The enemy is intensifying policing regime measures. At checkpoints around Melitopol, FSB representatives are present together with ordinary military personnel to conduct thorough searches.
Tavriysk direction
- Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;
- Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault
division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.
Areas of towns and villages near the contact line were damaged by fire. Nikopol and Vyshchetarasivka were directly affected by enemy fire. Russian troops continued to shell Ukrainian positions in Pravdyne, Soldatske and Ternovy Pody.
Russian troops made an unsuccessful assault in the direction of Kostromka and Sukhyi Stavok on the eastern bank of the Ingulets River. The enemy conducted a reconnaissance attack in the area of Sukhyi Stavok.
The Ukrainian Defense Forces strengthen their positions north of Ishchenka, repelling the enemy's attack.
Units of the Ukrainian 46th separate airborne brigade carried out raids in the districts of Borozenske and Bezvodne.
Artillery of the Ukrainian Defense Forces continued shelling Russian pontoon and barge crossings across the Dnipro and Ingulets rivers. They destroyed a command and observation post in the Berislavsk district and five enemy ammunition depots, and struck the area of concentration of Russian forces in Tokarivka, killing 150 Russian servicemen.
Damage to the Kerch bridge continues to slow down the delivery of Russian cargo and personnel to southern Ukraine. Only four ferries with a capacity of 90 trucks and 300 people operate on the crossing.
Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:
The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.
In the open sea, the Russian naval group numbers 15 units located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Among them are 3 carriers of cruise missiles, namely two corvettes of project 21631 and a submarine of project 636.3 carrying a total of 20 missiles. Since the beginning of the week, the Russian Federation has used more than 20 Kalibr missiles at Ukraine.
In the Sea of Azov waters, enemy patrol ships and boats are located on the approaches to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports to block the Azov coast.
Enemy aviation continues to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 11 Su-27, Su-30 and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved. During the past day, the A-50U long-range radar
reconnaissance and targeting aircraft also operated over the Crimean peninsula. On the outskirts of Yevpatoria, air defense forces were activated by unidentified flying objects.
On the road approaches to Simferopol and Sevastopol, reinforced checkpoints have been installed, which are manned by personnel of "Rosgvardiya" (Russian National Guard), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB, using armored personnel carriers. There are huge queues at the Kerch crossing, gathering up to 1,000 trucks. The so-called "Crimean Ministry of Transport" continues an information campaign to encourage drivers of vehicles to transport by an alternative route through the south of Ukraine captured by the Russian Federation.
The enemy continues shelling Ukrainian ports and coastal areas. On the night of October 14, the enemy again attacked Odesa and Mykolaiv with "Shahed-136" kamikaze drones. Three drones were shot down by air defense. Iranian instructors are present for the launch of Shahed-136 kamikaze drones in the temporarily occupied territories of the Kherson Oblast and Crimea. According to the available information, the Iranians are based in Zalizniy Port, Hladkivka (in Kherson Oblast) and Dzhankoi (Crimea). They teach the Russians to use kamikaze drones and directly control the launch.
"Grain Initiative": More than a hundred vessels have gathered in the Sea of Marmara near Istanbul, awaiting inspections by coordination center inspectors operating under the Grain Initiative. The insufficient number of inspectors is the reason for the many-day delays of ships that left or headed to the ports of Odesa. Last week, an anti-record was set - 120 dry cargoes and tankers were waiting for inspection. Ships are waiting for inspection for more than ten days, and some are delayed for 20 days, which affects the timing of food delivery.
The UN Black Sea Grain Initiative coordinator, Amir Abdullah, confirmed the insufficient number of inspectors. He stated that there is no agreement in the coordination center to increase their number. The Russian side is the opponent to increasing the number of inspectors, putting "sticks in the wheels" of the coordination center. This way, it tries to disrupt food delivery to the world's poorest countries. However, the accumulation of the vessels indicates the need to continue the grain agreement. The grain initiative expires on November 19, so Ukraine, Turkey, and the UN are currently negotiating to extend the agreement for another 120 days.
Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 14.10
Personnel - almost 64,300 people (+500);
Tanks 2,521 (+10);
Armored combat vehicles – 5,172 (+5);
Artillery systems – 1,566 (+10);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 362 (+5); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 186 (+3); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,944 (+9); Aircraft - 268 (0);
Helicopters – 240 (+6);
UAV operational and tactical level – 1,199 (+17);
Intercepted cruise missiles - 316 (0); Boats / ships - 16 .
Ukraine, general news
Defenders Day is celebrated in Ukraine on October 14th. Today, for the first time in the realities of the full-scale Russian aggression and daily shelling of peaceful civilian cities. Ukrainian defenders are traditionally honored on this day, including branches of the military, as well as medics, rescuers, and volunteers. This date was chosen in 2014 to establish a national holiday for the defenders of Ukraine - as a sign of respect for those who stood up for defense against the beginning of Russian aggression in the east and south of our country in 2014. It coincides with the Intercession of the Holy Mother of God holiday (as the protection of all the defenders), the Day of the Cossacks and the Day of the Creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (УПА).
"More than 40,000 women currently serve in military positions in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 8,000 of them are in officer positions," stated the commander of the Joint Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Serhiy Naev. According to Nayev, currently, more than 5 thousand women are in the areas of active hostilities. Among them are commanders of batteries, platoons, [armored] vehicles and commanders of UAV units, as well as snipers.
Trains would be running to Kramatorsk after a six-month break [after the Russian shelling of Kramatorsk station, that killed 60 civillians, including 7 children], Ukraine's Railroad company "Ukrzaliznytsia", announced. The trains Kyiv-Kramatorsk would operate daily in both directions, making stops in Lubny, Myrgorod, Poltava, Krasnograd, Lozova and Slovyansk.
Ukraine's National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption proposes to apply sanctions to another 529 Russians for involvement in pseudo-referendums. In particular, deputies of the State Duma, the chairman of the Constitutional Court, the chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation and the leaders of the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts, who were involved in Russia's illegal annexation of the part of the territory of Ukraine.
International diplomatic aspect
"We're just following his recommendation," Elon Musk reacted to a former Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany's "F*** off is my very diplomatic reply" comment on Musk's fishy "peace plan." It was in the background of the news of the Starlink service disruption at Ukraine's battlefields and the announcement that SpaceX was "not in a position to further donate terminals to Ukraine or fund the existing terminals for an indefinite period of time."
On the day of the all-out invasion, Russian state hackers targeted the American satellite company Viasat. It resulted in an instant and significant loss of communication in the most crucial period of the war, for the UAF command and control were heavily dependent on Viasat's services. In parallel, there was a massive attack on the Ukrainian governmental IT infrastructure. Therefore,
the delivery of Starlink equipment and services was crucial for Ukraine's defense and for restoring and keeping governmental and humanitarian activities in war-affected areas.
SpaceX sought the Pentagon to step into the Ukrainian project in September. So, contrary to social media buzz, the twitter-exchange crossfire has not been the reason for the company's decision to wind down its support of Ukraine. The company claims that funding for Ukraine's government needs, foremost the UAF, would cost more than $120 million this year and up to
$400 million the next year. So far, about 20,000 Starlink satellite units have been donated to Ukraine (including some 15% at the company's expense), and the operation has already cost SpaceX $80 million.
However, according to @blockpost_ua, the figures are a bit exaggerated. Out of 20,000 pieces of equipment, 5,000 were provided by USAID, 5,000 by the Polish Government, 5,000 by the other EU countries, 5,000 by private companies and donors (including SpaceX), and several thousand pieces donated by Ukrainian and foreign private individuals. So even if there are 25,000 pieces bought at the total price of $659, though SpaceX provided discounts in many cases, the total cost would be $16.5 million.
The total subscription fee for all officially donated devices (20,000) would amount to $17 million, though the company provided some devices free of charge, and recently the monthly fee was cut by half to $60. SpaceX also provided Ukraine with 50 Tesla Powerwall, highly reliable batteries worth about $1 million. So, overall expenses aren't reaching even $35 million, way less than the company claims to spend ($80 million) and asks Pentagon to cover in the future. Elon Musk played an essential role in Ukraine's struggle for survival, and Ukrainians are grateful for what he and his company have done. Still, some less pleasant aspects [connected to alleged speculation on the origins of Musk's "peace plan" and disruptions of Starlink on the battlefield during Ukraine's counteroffensive] should be taken into consideration as well.
Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov said that Starlink terminals are working and will continue to work. Furthermore, as reported by Ukrinform, the adviser to the head of the President's Office, Mykhailo Podoliak, said earlier that Ukraine will find a solution for the continuation of the Starlink system and expects that the company will provide a stable connection by the end of the negotiations.
The US Treasury coordinates the activities of relevant institutions of 32 nations aimed at filling the gaps in sanctions policy over the Russian defense industry. "Given the stage we are in at war, the key for us is to keep going after critical things that we know they need right now, that we want to make sure they can't get over time, to be able to reinforce their military and continue to wage this war," said Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo. The US warned it could impose sanctions on physical persons, companies, and countries involved in supplying components and supporting Russian defense companies.
Though imposed sanctions and export control restrictions have affected Russia's ability to replace weapons and equipment lost in Ukraine, there have been cases of sanctions evasion. Just days
before the US Treasury meeting with counterparts, Reuters reported that "a publicly traded American technology company, Extreme Networks (EXTR.O), was providing MMZ Avangard with computer networking equipment for its office IT systems." MMZ Avangard, a Russian state- owned company producing the S-400 air defense system, was sanctioned back in 2014. But with the help of shell companies, it was able to acquire the necessary components. MMZ Avangard's parent, Almaz-Antey, was involved in the disinformation campaign related to the false accusation of Ukraine downing flight MH17. The Dutch-led joint investigation team concluded that the passenger plane was hit by the Buk-M1 missile originating from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade of the Russian Federation and fired from the Russia-occupied territory of Ukraine.
Belarusian self-proclaimed president announced the formation of a joint regional grouping of the troops of Russia and Belarus, 70,000 strong with some 10-15,000 Russian troops. He went on with demagogy about Poland seeking to deploy nuclear arms on Belarus territory. Although supporting Russia's invasion of Ukraine from the beginning, Lukashenko is trying to avoid his Armed Forces being directly involved in fighting in Ukraine. He doubled down his anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western rhetoric and donated hundreds of tanks, artillery pieces, and ammunition to Russia but didn't go for physical involvement.
However, one shouldn't rule out the direct participation of the Belarusian troops in Ukraine, either with Lukashenko's consent or without it. The commanding and middle-ranked officers received military education in Russian institutions and have been indoctrinated with a Russia- centric worldview. At the same time, conscripts are not motivated to fight a foreign war and are well aware of the course of the war and the casualties of the Russian forces during the Battle for Kyiv. Whatever the strength of the Belarusian Forces, they won't change much a dynamic in the war, though they might distract some resources of the UAF. The direct involvement of Belarus in the war would undermine the precarious position of Lukashenko, who has no comparable resources to mobilize and no demographics to cover up losses like Russia's endured.
Russia, relevant news
Danone sells the remaining business in Russia and finally leaves the country. Danone has announced that it has transferred control of its Russian dairy and plant products business to a new owner. One of the world's largest food brands estimated its exit from the Russian market at about one billion euros.
Meanwhile, a number of foreign companies continue to carry out their activities and regularly pay taxes to the budget of the Russian Federation (more than 20 billion dollars a year), despite Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine. Those include retailers Leroy Merlin, Auchan, alcohol companies Bacardi-Martini, InBev Efes, banks Raiffeisen, UniCredit, FMCG Nestle, etc.
Most Russians support mercenaries. According to the Levada Center poll, 64% of respondents are aware that mercenaries and private military companies are fighting on the side of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. At the same time, 63% of Russians consider their use permissible, and only 26% are against it. Most of all, the use of PMCs is supported in Moscow - 81%.
From October 4, the Kyrgyz bank "Kompanion" suspended the service of Russian payment cards "Mir" "in connection with the decision of the processing center." As reported by Interfax, other Kyrgyz banks did not report the suspension of Mir card services. It is noted that on September 15, the OFAC of the US Treasury Department warned that non-American banks, concluding agreements with the Russian National Payment Card System (NSPK, the operator of the Mir payment system), risk being involved in actions to circumvent US sanctions, expanding the territory of use of the Mir system outside Russia. The clarification is that the NSPK itself is not on the sanction lists. After that, banks in Turkey and other countries that previously accepted Mir cards began to refuse to work with the Russian payment system. As reported by Ukrinform, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka would not allow the use of Russian Mir cards in the country due to US sanctions.
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9. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 14 (Putin's War)
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his “partial” mobilization will end in “about two weeks”—likely to free up bureaucratic bandwidth for the normal autumn conscription cycle that will begin on November 1.
- Putin may intend for mobilized personnel to plug gaps in Russia’s frontlines long enough for the autumn conscripts to receive some training and form additional units to improve Russian combat power in 2023.
- Ukrainian and Western officials continue to reiterate that they have observed no indicators of preparations for a Belarusian invasion of Ukraine, despite alarmist reports in the Belarusian information space that President Alexander Lukashenko has introduced a “counter-terrorist operation” regime.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on October 14 that there is currently no additional need for further massive strikes against Ukraine.
- Russian authorities are continuing to engage in “Russification” social programming schemes that target Ukrainian children.
- A prominent Russian milblogger accused unspecified senior officials within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of preparing to censor Russian milbloggers on October 14, but there is no official confirmation of an investigation or prosecution of these milbloggers.
- Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations in northeast Kharkiv Oblast east of Kupyansk.
- Russian troops conducted limited ground attacks west of Kreminna in order to regain lost positions.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northwestern Kherson Oblast in order to regain lost positions.
- Russian troops continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and Donetsk City.
- Russian authorities expressed increasing concern over Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear logistics lines in southern Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian occupation authorities are continuing to consolidate control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) through strengthened security measures amid negotiations to establish a nuclear safety and protective zone at the plant.
- Russian officials continued to brand their movement of populations out of Kherson Oblast as recreational “humanitarian trips” rather than evacuations.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 14
understandingwar.org
Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 14, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin likely attempted to make a virtue of necessity by announcing that his “partial” mobilization will end in “about two weeks”—the same time the postponed fall conscription cycle is set to begin. Putin told reporters on October 14 that “nothing additional is planned” and that "partial mobilization is almost over."[1] As ISW previously reported, Putin announced the postponement of Russia’s usual autumn conscription cycle from October 1 to November 1 on September 30, likely because Russia’s partial mobilization is taxing the bureaucracy of the Russian military commissariats that oversee the semiannual conscription cycle.[2] Putin therefore likely needs to pause or end his partial mobilization to free up bureaucratic resources for conscription. Putin ordered the conscription of 120,000 men for the autumn cycle, 7,000 fewer than in autumn 2021. However, Russia’s annexation of occupied Ukraine changes the calculus for conscripts. Russian law generally prohibits the deployment of conscripts abroad. Russian law now considers Russian-occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts to be Russian territory, however, ostensibly legalizing the use of conscripts on the front lines.
Putin may intend for mobilized personnel to plug gaps in Russia’s frontlines long enough for the autumn conscripts to receive some training and form additional units to improve Russian combat power in 2023. Putin confirmed on October 14 that mobilized personnel are receiving little training before they are sent to the frontlines. Putin announced that of the 220,000 people who have been mobilized since his September 21 order, 35,000 are already in Russian military units and 16,000 are already in units “involved in combat missions.”[3] Putin also outlined the training these mobilized forces allegedly receive: 5-10 days of “initial training,” 5-15 days of training with combat units, “then the next stage is already directly in the troops taking part in hostilities.” This statement corroborates dozens of anecdotal reports from Russian outlets, milbloggers, and mobilized personnel of untrained, unequipped, and utterly unprepared men being rushed to the frontlines, where some have already surrendered to Ukrainian forces and others have been killed.[4] Even the 10 days of training that mobilized personnel may receive likely does not consist of actual combat preparation for most units; anecdotal reports suggest that men in some units wandered around training grounds without commanding officers, food, or shelter for several days before being shipped to Ukraine.[5] Many would-be trainers and officers were likely injured or killed in Ukraine before mobilization began.[6] Russian training grounds are also likely understaffed, a problem that will likely persist into the autumn conscription cycle. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 14 that Russian military officials in Krasnodar Krai suspended sending mobilized persons to the training grounds in Primorsko-Akhtarsk until November 1 because Russian training grounds are not ready to accommodate, train or comprehensively provide for a large number of personnel.[7]
Ukrainian and Western officials continue to reiterate that they have observed no indicators of preparations for a Belarusian invasion of Ukraine, despite alarmist reports in the Belarusian information space that President Alexander Lukashenko has introduced a “counter-terrorist operation” regime.[8] Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei gave an interview to Russian outlet Izvestia on October 14 wherein he claimed that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko introduced a ”counter-terrorist operation regime” after a meeting with several law enforcement agencies.[9] Makei cited concern that unspecified neighboring states were planning provocations related to seizure of areas of Belarusian territory.[10] This claim was amplified by several Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian sources, who claimed that as part of the ”counter-terrorist operation regime,” Lukashenko began deploying groups of Belarusian forces supplemented by Russian troops.[11] Belarusian opposition outlet Nasha Niva claimed that as part of this regime, Belarusian forces are conducting covert mobilization under the guise of combat readiness checks.[12] However, Lukashenko emphasized in a comment to the press that there has been no introduction of a ”counter-terrorist operation regime” and that he has instead introduced a ”regime of a heightened terrorist threat.”[13]
Despite the contradicting claims of an escalated preparatory regime in Belarus, White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told Voice of America that there are no indicators that Belarusian troops are preparing to enter Ukraine.[14] ISW continues to assess that joint Belarusian and Russian forces will not invade Ukraine from the territory of Belarus. Russian forces continue to attrit their own combat capabilities as they impale themselves on attempts to capture tiny villages in Donbas and simply do not have the combat-effective mechanized troops available to supplement a Belarusian incursion into northern Ukraine and certainly not to conduct a mechanized drive on Kyiv. As ISW has previously reported, Lukashenko remains unlikely to enter the war on Russia’s behalf due to the domestic risks this would pose for the continued viability of his regime, as well as the low quality of Belarusian Armed Forces.[15] Russian President Vladimir Putin is more likely weaponizing concerns over Belarusian involvement in the war to pin Ukrainian troops against the northern Ukraine-Belarus border.
Russian authorities are continuing to engage in “Russification” social programming schemes that target Ukrainian children. A local news outlet from Russia’s Novosibirsk Oblast reported on October 13 that 24 orphans from Luhansk Oblast arrived in Novosibirsk for placement with Russian foster families.[16] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov similarly reported that Russian occupation authorities in Melitopol and other occupied regions are deporting Ukrainian children to Russian-occupied Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, and Tula and Volgograd Oblasts under the guise of “children’s trips” and “further education” programs.[17] As ISW has previously reported, such forced deportations of Ukrainian children to Russia and Russian-occupied territory may constitute violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[18] Occupation authorities in Russian-occupied Mariupol are also reportedly pressuring Ukrainian teenagers to join the “Youth Guard,” a children’s paramilitary organization that encourages anti-Ukrainian sentiments. Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on October 14 that uniformed members of the Youth Guard visited a Ukrainian school and gave children one week to consider joining the group.[19] The coerced engagement of Ukrainian children in youth militarization programs fits into wider Russification schemes intended to erase Ukrainian identity in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on October 14 that there is currently no additional need for further massive strikes against Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russian forces struck 22 of their 29 intended targets and that there are now unspecified “other tasks” for Russian forces to accomplish.[20] Putin’s statement was likely aimed at mitigating informational backlash among pro-war milbloggers who oppose curtailing the costly missile campaign; Russian milbloggers had largely praised the resumption of strikes against Ukrainian cities but warned that a short campaign would be ineffective. Putin’s statement supports ISW’s previous assessment that Putin knew he would not be able to sustain high-intensity missiles strikes for a long time due to a dwindling arsenal of high-precision missiles.[21] Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov claimed on October 14 that Russian forces have 609 high-precision missiles left from the pre-war stockpile of 1,844.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued cruise missile, aviation, kamikaze drone, and anti-aircraft missile strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast, Zaporizhzhia City, Mykolaiv City, and other areas in Mykolaiv Oblast on October 14.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 14 that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian command and control elements and energy infrastructure in Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts with sea-based missiles.[24] These reports demonstrate a lower tempo of strikes than the 84 cruise missile strikes reported on October 10.[25]
A prominent Russian milblogger accused unspecified senior officials within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of preparing to censor Russian milbloggers on October 14. Prominent Russian milblogger Semyon Pegov (employed by Telegram channel WarGonzo) accused “individual generals and military commanders” of developing a “hitlist” of Russian milbloggers that the MoD seeks to criminally prosecute for “discrediting” the Russian MoD’s activity and the Russian special military operation in Ukraine.[26] Russian news aggregator Mash reported on October 14 that Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov personally signed an order instructing Russian state media censor Roskomnadzor to investigate prominent Russian milbloggers Igor Girkin (also known as Igor Strelkov), Semyon Pegov (WarGonzo), Yuri Podolyaka, Vladlen Tatarsky, Sergey Mardan, Igor Dimitriev, Kristina Potupchik, and authors of the Telegram channels GreyZone and Rybar. Unspecified Russian authorities detained the manager of several milblogger Telegram channels linked to Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on October 5.[27] Moscow police previously arrested and released Pegov under unusual circumstances (reportedly for drunkenly threatening a hotel administrator) in Moscow on September 2.[28] The situation will likely become clearer in the coming days. A key indicator for the status of a crackdown on Russian milbloggers will be any status update from former Russian militant commander and nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin. Girkin has not posted since October 10—a significant change in his behavior given that he usually posts multiple times daily.[29]
There has been no official confirmation of an investigation or prosecution of these milbloggers as of October 14. Senior Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan responded to Pegov’s claim on October 14 and implied that prosecuting military bloggers is not only a bad idea but impossible to implement.[30] Many milbloggers expressed outrage at the prospect that elements of the Russian government would seek to censor ardent patriots who seek to hold the MoD accountable and expressed hopes that ”rumors” about the milblogger hitlist are untrue.[31] The interests of the Kremlin do not intrinsically align with the MoD in this situation: Putin has overtly courted the support of the milblogger community in recent months, as ISW has extensively covered, and has used the milbloggers to frame senior MoD officials and the MoD as a whole as possible scapegoats for military failures in Ukraine.[32] Nor did the milbloggers blame the Kremlin for the alleged hitlist; Pegov emphasized that this sort of alleged censorship was likely not Putin’s intention when he opened dialogue with milbloggers in June and called for reporters and journalists to tell the truth about the “special military operation.”[33]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his “partial” mobilization will end in “about two weeks”—likely to free up bureaucratic bandwidth for the normal autumn conscription cycle that will begin on November 1.
- Putin may intend for mobilized personnel to plug gaps in Russia’s frontlines long enough for the autumn conscripts to receive some training and form additional units to improve Russian combat power in 2023.
- Ukrainian and Western officials continue to reiterate that they have observed no indicators of preparations for a Belarusian invasion of Ukraine, despite alarmist reports in the Belarusian information space that President Alexander Lukashenko has introduced a “counter-terrorist operation” regime.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on October 14 that there is currently no additional need for further massive strikes against Ukraine.
- Russian authorities are continuing to engage in “Russification” social programming schemes that target Ukrainian children.
- A prominent Russian milblogger accused unspecified senior officials within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of preparing to censor Russian milbloggers on October 14, but there is no official confirmation of an investigation or prosecution of these milbloggers.
- Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations in northeast Kharkiv Oblast east of Kupyansk.
- Russian troops conducted limited ground attacks west of Kreminna in order to regain lost positions.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northwestern Kherson Oblast in order to regain lost positions.
- Russian troops continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and Donetsk City.
- Russian authorities expressed increasing concern over Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear logistics lines in southern Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian occupation authorities are continuing to consolidate control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) through strengthened security measures amid negotiations to establish a nuclear safety and protective zone at the plant.
- Russian officials continued to brand their movement of populations out of Kherson Oblast as recreational “humanitarian trips” rather than evacuations.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)
Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops are conducting counteroffensive operations in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on October 14. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in the Kupyansk area.[34] A Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Ukrainian troops are continuing to attack along the Pershotravene-Kyslivka line, about 20km east of Kupyansk.[35] ISW offers no assessment of these Russian claims.
Russian sources conducted limited ground attacks to regain lost positions west of Kreminna on October 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack near Terny, 16km northwest of Kreminna.[36] Russian sources similarly reported fighting ongoing in the Terny-Torske area, with one milblogger claiming that the 208th Russian Cossack Regiment is fighting near Terny.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that between 35,000 and 45,000 Ukrainian personnel have concentrated along the Svatove-Kreminna line and that Ukrainian troops are continually conducting reconnaissance operations in the direction of Kreminna.[38] ISW offers no assessment of this Russian claim.
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northwestern Kherson Oblast on October 14 to regain lost positions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack on Sukhyi Stavok, 10km southwest of Davydiv Brid and near the Inhulets River along the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border.[39] Russian sources similarly reported that Russian troops are attacking Ukrainian strongholds around Sukhyi Stavok and making marginal gains in this area, although ISW has not observed any confirmation of Russian gains in the Sukhyi Stavok-Davydiv Brid pocket.[40] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian troops are conducting ground attacks throughout northern and northwestern Kherson Oblast, particularly towards Piatykhatky (20km southeast of Davydiv Brid) and Ishchenka-Bezvodne (8km southeast of Davydiv Brid).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian troops are reinforcing their positions along the Osokorivka-Novooleksandrivka line along the west bank of the Dnipro River north of Beryslav.[42] The same Russian sources also cautioned that the Ukrainian command is preparing for a counteroffensive northwest of Kherson City towards Ternovi Pody and Pravdyne.[43] ISW makes no effort to forecast potential Ukrainian operations.
Ukrainian military officials maintained operational silence regarding Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in Kherson Oblast on October 14. Footage and imagery taken by locals provides visual evidence of the continued Ukrainian interdiction campaign against Russian concentration areas and military assets east of Kherson City in the Beryslav-Nova Kakhkova area. Social media footage shows smoke rising over Tavriisk and the Kakhovka Raion (district), approximately 55km east of Kherson City.[44] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command confirmed that Ukrainian troops struck four Russian air defense positions in Beryslav and the Kakhkova Raion.[45]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut, northeast of Bakhmut near Vesele and Nova Kamianka, and south of Bakhmut near Optyne, Odradivka, and Ivanhrad.[46] Russian sources made conflicting claims on whether Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from or rotating forces in and around Bakhmut.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks west of Donetsk City near Nevelske.[48] Russian news outlet RT reported that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups frequently probe Russian positions near Zolotarivka, east of Siversk, indicating that the Russian position near Bilohorivka may be vulnerable.[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces retreated from positions in the Vremivka area in western Donetsk Oblast and that Russian forces took positions on high ground near Vremivka, though ISW cannot verify this claim.[50]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian authorities expressed increasing concern over Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear logistics lines in southern Donetsk Oblast. The Mariupol occupation administration claimed that Russian air defenses in Primorsky Raion intercepted several missiles targeting the Mariupol port area.[51] Images reportedly from Mariupol show smoke plumes supposedly from air defense missiles in the Mariupol area.[52] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian air defense did not activate in Primorsky Raion or near the Mariupol port but instead activated near Mariupol’s left bank and Kalmius districts.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are intensifying security measures and conducting searches at checkpoints in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[54] Russian forces may be reacting to the recent Kerch Strait Bridge attack, which increased the importance of securing the logistics lines through Mariupol and Melitopol to Kherson Oblast.
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks west of Hulyaipole on October 14 and continued routine artillery strikes throughout western Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[55] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces targeted Dnipro City and Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with loitering munitions.[56]
Russian occupation authorities are continuing to increase their presence and strengthen security measures at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid negotiations to establish a nuclear safety and protective zone at the plant. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 14 that Russian occupation authorities increased the presence of Russian personnel at the ZNPP on October 10-11 and are using the plant as a base.[57] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Deputy Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselyov posted footage from Russian outlet Izvestia in which the correspondent claimed that there are no Russian military vehicles or other assets at the ZNPP.[58] The footage also shows Rosgvardia personnel at the ZNPP entrance conducting identification checks.[59] A Russian source stated that Russian authorities believe that Ukraine will not keep its promises regarding the establishment of a nuclear safety zone and reported that occupation authorities are building a protective cover for the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel.[60]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The presence of large numbers of Russian citizens fleeing mobilization continues to drive tensions in Central Asian states. Kyrgyzstan Minister of Labor, Social Security and Migration, Kudaibergen Bazarbaev, told the Kyrgyz parliament on October 12 that 760,000 Russian citizens have entered Kyrgyzstan in 2022 and that 730,000 have left for other countries.[61] However, the Deputy Minister of Digital Development, Aidarbek Mambetkadyrov, claimed that 190,000 Russian citizens arrived in Kyrgyzstan in the first nine months of 2022, a huge and unexplained discrepancy in official Kyrgyzstan government statistics. A member of Kyrgyzstan’s parliament called for restrictions on Russians entering the country in response to huge numbers of Russian migrants.[62]
Russian citizens are likely continuing to resist mobilization through arson attacks on military commissariats. An unidentified person threw a Molotov cocktail into a window of the military registration and enlistment office in Votkinsk, the Udmurtia Republic on October 14.[63]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian officials continued to brand their evacuations of Kherson Oblast as recreational “humanitarian trips” rather than evacuations. The deputy head of the Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration, Kirill Stremousov, encouraged Kherson Oblast civilians on October 14 to take “a humanitarian trip for recreation and recovery to the Russian Federation” to avoid civilian casualties during the “cleansing of the territory.”[64] Stremousov promised that Russian officials would find accommodations for Kherson residents in Russia and provided a hotline to call for interested residents. Stremousov unintentionally implied that Kherson is not yet part of the Russian Federation despite the Kremlin’s illegal September 30 annexation of Kherson Oblast. Continued Ukrainian advances toward the Dnipro River in central Kherson Oblast correlate with Russian evacuation attempts, as ISW has previously reported.[65]
Russian occupation officials continued their filtration measures and crackdowns in occupied Ukrainian territory. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 14 that Russian authorities in occupied areas are continuing to organize raids to hunt for partisans who report Russian movements and locations to Ukrainian authorities, checking basements, garages, and civilians’ phones for evidence of partisan sympathies.[66] Local Ukrainian outlets in occupied areas shared advice for citizens in occupied areas to stay safe at Russian checkpoints.[67] Russian forces are also undertaking counterintelligence measures outside of Ukrainian territory. The Russian-appointed Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) deputy internal minister, Vitaly Kiselyov, claimed on October 14 that the FSB detained a Belgorod police officer suspected of transferring data from the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry database to Ukrainian officials.[68]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/16061415
[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/16061415
[9] https://iz dot ru/export/google/amp/1409815; https://nashaniva.com/ru/301068
[10] https://iz dot ru/export/google/amp/1409815; https://nashaniva.com/ru/301068
[20] https://rg dot ru/2022/10/14/putin-sejchas-net-neobhodimosti-v-novyh-massirovannyh-udarah-po-ukraine.html
[26] Pegov is an experienced military journalist and WarGonzo has extensive links to the Russian military and access to Russian military operations in Donbas in 2014, Syria in 2015, and Ukraine in 2022. https://t.me/wargonzo/8702; https://t.me/wargonzo/8717; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[38]
[47] https://t.me/brussinf/5093; https://t.me/sashakots/36533 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/15296; https://ria dot ru/20221014/vsu-1823974447.html; https://t.me/ukraina_ru/108158; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/67144
[51] https://iz dot ru/1410174/2022-10-14/v-mariupole-srabotala-sistema-pvo; https://t.me/rybar/40198; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/67143
[61] https://24 dot kg/vlast/247826_chastichnaya_mobilizatsiya_deputatyi_obespokoenyi_naplyivom_rossiyan_vkyirgyizstan/
[62] https://24 dot kg/vlast/247826_chastichnaya_mobilizatsiya_deputatyi_obespokoenyi_naplyivom_rossiyan_vkyirgyizstan/
[66] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/14/shukayut-pidpillya-okupanty-vlashtovuyut-oblavy-na-meshkancziv-tot/
understandingwar.org
10. $725 Million in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine
$725 Million in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine
defense.gov
Release
Immediate Release
Oct. 14, 2022 |×
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Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) announces the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown of security assistance valued at up to $725 million to meet Ukraine's critical security and defense needs. This authorization is the Biden Administration's 23rd drawdown of equipment from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021.
The United States has delivered unprecedented security assistance to Ukraine and will continue to work with allies and partners to ensure Ukraine has the support it needs. This new security assistance package includes:
- Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS);
- 23,000 155mm artillery rounds;
- 500 precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds;
- 5,000 155mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems;
- 5,000 anti-tank weapons;
- High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs);
- More than 200 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs);
- Small arms and more than 2,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition;
- Medical supplies.
This announcement follows Secretary of Defense Austin's gathering of defense ministers of nearly 50 countries at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Brussels this week, at which leaders committed to providing additional security assistance. Some examples of this additional support included:
- Germany recently delivered the first of four IRIS-T air-defense systems committed to Ukraine. This critical donation will help Ukraine better defend its civilians from Russian airstrikes. Germany also recently announced that it will deliver more MARS rocket systems and howitzers.
- Spain announced it will provide four HAWK launchers to strengthen Ukraine's air defense.
- Norway, Germany, and Denmark invested into Slovakia's indigenous production of Howitzers.
To meet Ukraine's evolving battlefield requirements, the United States will continue to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with key capabilities.
In total, the United States has committed more than $18.2 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since January 2021. Since 2014, the United States has committed more than $20.3 billion in security assistance to Ukraine and approximately $17.6 billion since the beginning of Russia's unprovoked and brutal invasion on February 24.
defense.gov
11. Taiwan's per capita GDP highest in East Asia, says IMF
Taiwan's per capita GDP highest in East Asia, says IMF
Per capita GDP in Taiwan outgrew that of Japan and South Korea this year
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4685794?utm_source=pocket_mylist
4554
By Duncan DeAeth, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2022/10/13 20:49
Taipei at night. (Unsplash, User Timo Volz)
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Taiwan’s per capita GDP growth rate is expected to be the largest in East Asia for 2022, it was reported on Thursday (Oct. 13).
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Taiwan’s per capita GDP in 2022 is set to increase from US$33,140 (NT$1 million) to around US$35,510 (NT$1.1 million). Taiwan’s rate of GDP growth will be higher than Japan’s for the first time in history and higher than South Korea’s for the first time since 2003.
South Korea’s per capita GDP for 2022 is expected to be about US$33,590, which represents a 4% decrease compared to 2021. Meanwhile, Japan’s will be close to US$34, 360, which marks a 12% decrease. The gap between the per capita GDP for Japan and South Korea this year is the smallest it has ever been, reports CNA.
Throughout the COVID pandemic, Taiwan’s government placed great emphasis on protecting Taiwan’s economy. Last week, Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs Wang Mei-hua noted that Taiwan’s total trade for the year increased by 29% over 2021, with the 16th largest trade volume in the world in 2022.
12. China has given up on the West
Excerpts:
At the beginning of 2022, when international concern about human rights abuses in Xinjiang became focused on businesses operating there, two Western companies responded in strikingly different ways. While American-owned Walmart took some products off its shelves and hunkered down, the French supermarket chain Carrefour did the opposite. It launched a “Xinjiang fine foods week” promotion. The reason is simple. Carrefour, once the largest foreign retailer in China, is no longer French. In 2020, it sold 80% of its Chinese business to a local company, Suning International. Chinese capital, and the Communist Party, now controls the business. And as a result, the ability of Western governments to influence the company’s behaviour or pressure China to change its policies in Xinjiang is now minimal.
In China, then, the walls are going up. A country that once headed towards openness is now closing. For all the Chinese leadership’s talk of globalisation, it has chosen to deliberately decouple from the world to ensure the survival of Communist Party control. When Xi is once again anointed on Sunday, he will do so knowing that his decade-long inward turn is finally bearing fruit.
China has given up on the West
President Xi's inward turn is finally bearing fruit
BY BILL HAYTON
unherd.com · by Bill Hayton · October 13, 2022
Xi Jinping’s great moment is nearly upon us. This weekend, if the Pekingologists are correct, the Communist Party’s Congress will pave the way for him to become the longest-serving Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.
The Party has weathered the Covid storm, crushed opposition in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and kept the economy afloat. Total recorded Covid deaths were kept to a tiny 15,000 (about the same as Scotland) while GDP growth was boosted to 8% in 2021. All of this was achieved while China sealed itself off from the world.
The Party has not so much learned to live with Covid restrictions as learned to love them. Although it’s now easier to enter the country (visitors must spend only ten days in quarantine rather than the previous 21), all kinds of other measures are still in force. The staging of the Congress this month seems to be one explanation: the Party does not want an embarrassing outbreak or lockdown to mar the political spectacle. But it’s unlikely that restrictions will go once the Congress is done. There seem to be several reasons for this, but chief among them is the fact the Party leadership has found the various Covid control measures to be very useful.
A self-imposed “walling off” is becoming the leitmotif of Xi’s China, with the CCP separating its people from the outside world through the creation of physical, political and economic barriers. The aim is to exclude disease from the national homeland, but also unwanted information, influence and pressure. During the Eighties, the leader who oversaw China’s opening up to the world, Deng Xiaoping, is reputed to have said: “If you open a window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in.” Xi is fed up with the flies: he’s closing the windows.
Take the new “Great Fence of China” along the country’s southeastern borders with Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar. The barrier is a substantial structure, clearly designed to last well beyond the likely duration of any pandemic. Yunnan province alone is reported to have earmarked $500 million for its construction. It snakes up and down steep hills, dividing mountain communities that long predate the existence of the border and obstructing unofficial cross-border movements of people and goods. More fences have been built, or rebuilt, along parts of the border where more restive minorities live, in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.
While these structures will block the spread of disease as well as subversion, none of this is to say that Xi is turning China into North Korea. The Party leadership knows that China’s prosperity depends upon international trade, that trade depends upon international flows of finance, and that national development requires skills and technologies that can only be acquired by studying or travelling abroad. So, there must be portals through which goods, money and certain people can pass. But at the same time the leadership is trying to secure its position by reducing the ability of foreigners to influence its politics, society or economy.
In the past few years, there has been increased talk of “decoupling” between the US and China and of “deglobalisation” around the world. But the vast majority of the focus has been on American efforts to sanction China. There has been much less attention on China’s efforts to decouple itself. This is partly a result of the United States turning the dollar-based financial system into a tool of foreign policy. Its case against Huawei, for example, was based on the company breaking American laws by trading with Iran and clearing the payments through the New York banks. China’s response has been to try to reduce its dependency on the US financial system.
The Party’s efforts to reduce foreign influence lie behind the restructuring of its entire economy towards what it calls dual circulation. It is trying, in effect, to create two economies: a domestic economic circuit, which is insulated from the rest of the world, and a global circuit that relies on political connections (the Belt and Road Initiative) to open markets in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The organising principle of both circuits is that they are controlled by the Party, and not subject to international pressure. Pure economic autarky is not possible for a China that depends upon global trade, but dual circulation is an attempt to create as much autarky as possible.
It’s worth remembering that all these efforts towards self-reliance stem from the Party’s need to avoid foreign pressure so that it can continue to oppress dissident voices in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, continue trading with vicious regimes from Myanmar to Iran, and prepare for war over Taiwan. They are, in other words, part of Xi’s decade-long drive to reassert Communist Party domination of all areas of life in China.
This overarching agenda, announced immediately after Xi was appointed General-Secretary of the Communist Party, is ”the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. His vision is of a homogenous mass of people, stretching from Shanghai to Xinjiang, all loyal to his “five identifications”: identifying with the state, the unified Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the Communist Party and Chinese socialism. As a result, all threats to Party rule, any rival source of leadership, whether it be imams in Xinjiang or student leaders in Hong Kong, must be flattened.
The inward turn is also squeezing out foreigners — though not all of them, of course. The Party is happy to host certain skilled individuals, such as English language teachers and pet bloggers, who amplify its messages about how the Tibetan and Uyghur peoples have benefitted from Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Equally, the few hundred thousand Southeast Asians toiling on its production lines are welcome to stay. But at the levels of business management and control, something significant is happening.
Ker Gibbs, who was President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai from 2019 to 2021, has watched the growing de-foreignerisation of foreign-owned firms in China. To some extent, this reflects the development of a new generation of skilled Chinese managers able to manage complex supply chains. But he also notes that the constant pressure piled on Americans and other foreigners is causing an exodus. “It’s just not fun anymore” he tells me. “The space to operate freely has become more and more narrow.” Gibbs notes the growing authoritarianism of Xi’s China over the past decade was already pushing foreign businesspeople to leave, even before the pandemic. The draconian Covid lockdowns, particularly in Shanghai, were the last straw for many. In a few years’ time, American firms in China may no longer be run by Americans.
The same exodus can be seen in Hong Kong, once the “Gate to China” but increasingly just another Chinese city. Xi’s crackdown on free speech, the Party’s assault on the rule of law, Covid restrictions and the slow but constant “mainlandisation” of the territory are steadily diminishing its attractiveness. Hong Kong is still an “air lock” through which China can access foreign capital, but foreigners are leaving, which is exactly what the Party wants.
At the same time, the Communist Party is pushing foreign enterprises to facilitate the establishment of party cells inside their operations. There will be twin chains of command, with one from head office and another from Beijing. When push comes to shove, head office will be far away, and Beijing will have the guns. Fearing the consequences, some businesses are taking the money and running. In the process, the Chinese economy is becoming insulated from foreign pressure.
At the beginning of 2022, when international concern about human rights abuses in Xinjiang became focused on businesses operating there, two Western companies responded in strikingly different ways. While American-owned Walmart took some products off its shelves and hunkered down, the French supermarket chain Carrefour did the opposite. It launched a “Xinjiang fine foods week” promotion. The reason is simple. Carrefour, once the largest foreign retailer in China, is no longer French. In 2020, it sold 80% of its Chinese business to a local company, Suning International. Chinese capital, and the Communist Party, now controls the business. And as a result, the ability of Western governments to influence the company’s behaviour or pressure China to change its policies in Xinjiang is now minimal.
In China, then, the walls are going up. A country that once headed towards openness is now closing. For all the Chinese leadership’s talk of globalisation, it has chosen to deliberately decouple from the world to ensure the survival of Communist Party control. When Xi is once again anointed on Sunday, he will do so knowing that his decade-long inward turn is finally bearing fruit.
unherd.com · by Bill Hayton · October 13, 2022
13. Allies that Hurt America
I have to disagree with my friend Duug and his characterization the ROK/US alliance.
Allies that Hurt America - The American Conservative
Our so-called alliances with Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Turkey demand re-evaluation.
The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · October 13, 2022
One of Washington’s many mantras is that allies are essential. Since America has more allies than any other country, the U.S. should be more secure than any other country. But Washington’s supposed friends increasingly prove to be both faithless and useless.
Alliances are intended to be a means, not an end. Their objective is to increase America’s security. Charity does exist in international relations: for instance, humanitarian aid in response to natural disasters. And a military alliance could be established for similar reasons. However, in practice, participants never justify them as such. NATO includes many members who are militarily useless—Luxembourg and Montenegro immediately come to mind—but neither alliance nor American officials ever admit the obvious. Rather, they pretend that all members magically enhance U.S. security, treating even the weakest like Facebook friends, the more the merrier irrespective of value.
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Unfortunately, America’s power and wealth has made it the target of the international equivalent of gold-diggers. Governments around the world scheme and beg to be treated as an “ally” of the global superpower known to be a soft touch, willing to defend, apparently forever, countries no matter how irrelevant to U.S. security and how much their circumstances change over time. Indeed, scan the list of formal allies in Asia, Europe, and the Mideast. Even the best among them tend to be leeches, whiners, deadbeats, scammers, poseurs, and swindlers. Worse, most are military black holes, creating greater obligations than assets. Some are also ostentatiously faithless, trashing the U.S. while demanding ever greater protection.
Number one on the list is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and especially its de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MbS. The Kingdom is one of the few absolute monarchies left on earth. It is a human rights hell, dwelling in the bottom ten of more than two hundred countries and territories rated by the group Freedom House. While reducing totalitarian social strictures, the crown prince has greatly increased political repression.
MbS’s worst crime is the invasion of Yemen, in which some 400,000 civilians have been killed. Of course, in this the U.S. government has been a bloody accomplice, as Washington has supported the KSA as it committed multiple war crimes. The royal regime is best characterized by its sense of entitlement. Kings and princes get palaces and yachts. Expatriates do the dirty work. The regime expects American soldiers to act as princely bodyguards. Indeed, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates reported that the Saudis were upset when Washington did not go to war with Iran on command. Most recently, Riyadh humiliated the Biden administration, reducing oil production after the president humbled himself by going to the Kingdom and cravenly begging MbS to increase oil sales. The spectacle made one wonder which country was the superpower.
Also on the list is South Korea. At least Seoul has created a serious military, but it still underinvests in its defense, counting on America to bail it out if necessary, especially in the face of North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the Republic of Korea’s sense of entitlement may be as great as in Saudi Arabia. The ROK’s economy is more than 50 times as large as that of North Korea; the South’s population is twice as large; Seoul is internationally active, with friends and partners around the globe. Why doesn’t the ROK protect itself? It doesn’t have to so long as Americans are willing to stand guard, while South Koreans focus on their economy.
Indeed, though ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol wants a closer alliance, he seems unimpressed by Washington’s provision of substantial U.S. defense subsidies for 72 years. He was quite unhappy after his short meet-and-greet with President Joe Biden last month at the United Nations. He was overheard calling U.S. congressmen “f***ers” or “idiots” (reports varied) and citing Biden’s “s**t-faced embarrassment.” Although South Korean gratitude isn’t necessary, such insults are quite annoying.
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Finally, Turkey, which joined NATO during the Cold War and enjoyed protection from the Soviet Union, has become a fifth columnist in the alliance. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is merely a dictatorial wannabe compared to Saudi Arabia’s crown prince. Still, the Turkish president has destroyed what once was a formally democratic system. Explained Freedom House:
Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. After initially passing some liberalizing reforms, the AKP government showed growing contempt for political rights and civil liberties and has pursued a wide-ranging crackdown on critics and opponents since 2016. Constitutional changes in 2017 concentrated power in the hands of the president, removing key checks and balances. While Erdogan continues to dominate Turkish politics, a deepening economic crisis and opportunities to further consolidate political power have given the government new incentives to suppress dissent and limit public discourse.
Erdogan has undermined U.S. international interests in multiple ways: allowing the Islamic State to operate in Syria, attacking Syrian Kurdish forces allied with America, purchasing Russian weapons systems, and intervening in Libya’s ongoing civil war. The dalliance with Moscow has been Washington’s most serious concern, at least until recently. Now Ankara is threatening war against fellow NATO member Greece.
Relations between the two have long been difficult. The governments nearly ended up at war in 1974, when Greece’s military regime fostered a coup in Cyprus, after which Turkey intervened militarily on behalf of the island’s ethnic Turkish minority, carving out a new state recognized only by Turkey. Since then, Ankara has regularly challenged Greek control over islands near Turkey’s coast. Now tensions are on the rise, with Erdogan playing the nationalism card by threatening war against Athens.
Explained the Naval Postgraduate School’s Ryan Gingeras: “A myriad of issues divide Athens and Ankara, but Erdogan has now focused his rage upon Greece’s militarization of its Aegean islands. While the Greek military presence there has remained largely consistent over the last several decades, Ankara insists that it is in violation of the 1923 and 1947 treaties that established Greece’s sovereignty over the islands.” Although no one quite believes the two NATO members will end up at war, Erdogan’s popularity has suffered from Turkey’s economic travails and presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for next year. A war might be his best hope for victory. Even if conflict is avoided, who believes that Ankara can be relied on in a crisis, most importantly a NATO war with Russia?
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America enjoys an extraordinarily favorable geographic position, so it little needs allies for its own defense. By long providing a military shield, Washington has enabled friendly states to develop economically. Now is the time to end needless allied dependence on the American people.
Foreign policy is uniquely practical and contingent, dependent on the state of world affairs. Washington should drop useless and faithless allies, especially when they shamelessly take advantage of America. Saudi Arabia has bought lots of U.S. weapons: the royals should be left to use these weapons to defend themselves. South Korea has vastly outstripped its potential antagonist: it should be encouraged to use its resources to build a military sufficient to deter, and if necessary, defeat North Korea. Turkey is more likely to attack America’s friends than adversaries: Ankara should be defenestrated from NATO and left to handle its own defense.
That should be just the start.
The American Conservative · by Doug Bandow · October 13, 2022
14. Opinion | No, We Aren’t Headed to Civil War
A little whataboutism aside, Mr. Lowry gives us some food for thought.
Excerpt:
There’s no doubt that it is corrosive for Trump to undermine faith in our elections, and he’s not the only one. Democrats didn’t truly accept his victory in 2016 even if they didn’t try to overturn it, and they would be even more loath to do so should he — or some other Republican — win in 2024.
There is indeed a violent fringe on the right, and as the Supreme Court prepared to overturn Roe, the left engaged in protests at the homes of the justices and vandalized anti-abortion pregnancy centers. All this may be a sign, not of impending civil war, but that a 40-year period of extraordinary civil peace may be fraying and giving way to the kind of conflict that hasn’t been unusual in American history.
Mostly recently, in the late 1960s and the 1970s, the United States experienced a spasm of political violence — assassinations of major political figures, large sections of cities burning to the ground, and radical underground groups conducting bank robberies and bombings. There were thousands of bombings in the 1970s. An FBI official called San Francisco “the Belfast of North America.”
We have a long way to fall before we return to anything approaching this level of routine violence. Of course, it is to be assiduously avoided — even if this lamentable state of affairs would itself be nothing like Shiloh, and not a civil war.
Opinion | No, We Aren’t Headed to Civil War
Politico
Magazine
Opinion | No, We Aren’t Headed to Civil War
The U.S. is sharply divided, but the depths of our political conflict shouldn’t be overstated.
Dusk falls over the U.S Capitol building on Dec. 20, 2020, in Washington, D.C. | Samuel Corum/Getty Images
Opinion by Rich Lowry
10/13/2022 02:54 PM EDT
Rich Lowry is editor in chief of National Review and a contributing editor with Politico Magazine.
In two days at Shiloh in April 1862, the Union and Confederate armies suffered 23,000 casualties, a shattering total that was the worst of the war to that point.
If we aren’t on a path to the carnage of Shiloh, we are on a straight-line trajectory to a new civil war — at least according to commentators on the right and left, who can’t agree on anything except looming violent conflict.
So prevalent are the predictions of civil war on both sides that they are themselves taken as a potential sign that we might be headed to civil war.
The New York Times podcast The Argument just posted an episode asking, “Is America Headed for a Another Civil War?” Voices on the right have warned of a brewing civil war and speculated how Red America could win it. Barbara Walter of the University of California, San Diego published a widely praised book, How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them.
There’s no doubt that our politics is in a perpetual febrile state; that a former president of the United States denies to this day the legitimacy of his defeat in the 2020 election and has made that contention a central pillar of his still potent political movement; and that faith in our institutions is at a low ebb.
It is entirely possible that we will experience more political violence, and that would be a tragedy. But it would hardly be unprecedented in our national life and wouldn’t constitute anything remotely like a civil war.
The American Civil War was decades in the making, a clash between rival systems of political economy and ways of life with different moral underpinnings in two sections of the country marked by relatively clean geographic lines. The economic and political stakes were enormous at a time when the nature of the American union was still a matter of significant dispute. The growing sectional conflict loomed over congressional debate for years and pulled apart key institutions of American civic life.
Mean tweets and barbed prime-time cable TV shows don’t compare.
In her book, Walter makes a sustained case for the coming of a low-intensity civil war. Much of her material about internal conflicts in foreign countries, though, serves to demonstrate how different we are from the places that descend into civil war.
Our political tribalism is nothing like the dispute between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, wherein the Hutus overthrew the Tutsi monarchy in the 1960s, leading to the exile of Tutsis who formed a rebel army and invaded the country in 1990. It bears zero resemblance to Lebanon’s multi-sided conflict from 1975-1990, which included a dizzying array of religious and ethnic factions and foreign powers taking a large hand in the fighting.
Countries torn by civil wars are prone to endemic instability and divisions that go much deeper than disputes over the causes of inflation, how much federal money we should spend fighting climate change, or whether abortion should be legal.
The United States has a long-standing, widely-respected Constitution, a durable two-party system, national elections that still hinge on persuadable voters in the middle, and a federal system that coheres while giving latitude to state and local differences. The same can’t be said of Syria, Somalia, Congo, Tajikistan or any number of other places that are or have been beset by civil war.
Walter points out that so-called anocracies, governments somewhere been authoritarianism and democracy, are particularly prone to civil war. Leaders of democratizing states can be too weak to control factions and command loyalty — Uganda and Georgia are examples. On the other side of the ledger, democracies backsliding into authoritarianism are prone to conflict, too — she points to Ukraine under the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, overthrown by the Maidan Revolution.
This is all fine and good, but the U.S. doesn’t have much in common with Uganda or Ukraine. Walter points to the work of something called the Polity Project to prove otherwise. The outfit rates countries on their autocratic or democratic attributes. Supposedly, American democracy took a hit instantly when Donald Trump became president in 2016 — after winning a fully free and fair election. In the aftermath of 2020, the U.S. score dropped further such that, according to Walter, “We are no longer the world’s oldest continuous democracy. That honor is now held by Switzerland, followed by New Zealand, and then Canada.”
This is a preposterous claim, given that Trump lost an election in 2020 and control of offices large and small, national and local, have continued to be determined by totally legitimate, often high-turnout elections. If we are no longer a democracy, no one has bothered to tell the candidates or the voters.
Trump’s attempt to overturn his loss in 2020 was a disgrace and a black eye for the country, but no one with real authority went along with his scheme. If he’ll have more sympathetic state officials in place in 2024 if he runs and loses again, it will still be an insuperable political and legal challenge for them to ignore a democratic outcome in an election conducted in accordance with state laws.
There’s no doubt that it is corrosive for Trump to undermine faith in our elections, and he’s not the only one. Democrats didn’t truly accept his victory in 2016 even if they didn’t try to overturn it, and they would be even more loath to do so should he — or some other Republican — win in 2024.
There is indeed a violent fringe on the right, and as the Supreme Court prepared to overturn Roe, the left engaged in protests at the homes of the justices and vandalized anti-abortion pregnancy centers. All this may be a sign, not of impending civil war, but that a 40-year period of extraordinary civil peace may be fraying and giving way to the kind of conflict that hasn’t been unusual in American history.
Mostly recently, in the late 1960s and the 1970s, the United States experienced a spasm of political violence — assassinations of major political figures, large sections of cities burning to the ground, and radical underground groups conducting bank robberies and bombings. There were thousands of bombings in the 1970s. An FBI official called San Francisco “the Belfast of North America.”
We have a long way to fall before we return to anything approaching this level of routine violence. Of course, it is to be assiduously avoided — even if this lamentable state of affairs would itself be nothing like Shiloh, and not a civil war.
POLITICO
Politico
15. Memorializing the failures of the ruling class on the National Mall
Wow. Such negative waves about our national monuments. I guess we should bulldoze the national mall and turn it back to nature.
This is really troubling to me:
How about the memorial to the Korean War or the Vietnam War? In both instances, American foreign policy elites and the officer corps seemed largely indifferent to the idea of victory. Consequently, U.S. troops gave their lives in Korea to solidify what was supposed to be a temporary border between the south and north. In Vietnam, the accelerating moral corrosion of the elites and the unwillingness of the officer corps to alert the public to that corrosion led to absolute defeat. Both wars were dramatic failures of public policy generally and our political leadership specifically.
If you believe that these two memorials are testaments to the dead, you should also be certain that those who died in those wars would much rather have remained alive. Or, if their lot was to die, they would have preferred to die in a victorious effort.
I have to keep this quote in mind: “I may not agree with what you have to say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” - Voltaire
Memorializing the failures of the ruling class on the National Mall
washingtontimes.com · by Michael McKenna
OPINION:
Sometimes what Americans choose to memorialize is difficult to understand.
For instance, at the tail end of the National Mall, there are monuments to President Abraham Lincoln, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and President Franklin Roosevelt. It is not immediately apparent what these memorials have in common, but a closer look reveals some unhappy truths.
Let’s take them one at a time.
Lincoln has risen to the level of icon, primarily because he freed the slaves. Fair enough. But it is important to remember that every other nation in this hemisphere — from Argentina to Canada — freed their slaves in the first half of the 19th century (before the United States). And, without exception, none of them required bloodshed to do so.
It is, of course, not fair to blame Lincoln for the Civil War; that conflict had been brewing for a century. Nor is it fair to imagine that he was not, in some small part, responsible for it. Without a doubt, the Civil War was the single greatest public policy failure in American history. Yet as a nation, we choose to memorialize one who played an important part in that failure.
Let’s think about the memorial to Franklin Roosevelt. As president, Roosevelt either bumbled or managed America toward war in 1941 through his trade embargo on the Empire of Japan. Once engaged in the war, Roosevelt set up concentration camps and interned U.S. citizens in them. Toward the end of the war, he made it clear to our allies (the murderous and rapacious Soviet Union) that we would tolerate Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, which is especially odd, given that the entire purpose of the war in Europe was to prevent the Germans from setting up such a regime in the middle of the Continent.
The Eastern Europeans suffered under the Soviets for 40 years.
Yet as a nation, we choose to memorialize Roosevelt.
How about the memorial to the Korean War or the Vietnam War? In both instances, American foreign policy elites and the officer corps seemed largely indifferent to the idea of victory. Consequently, U.S. troops gave their lives in Korea to solidify what was supposed to be a temporary border between the south and north. In Vietnam, the accelerating moral corrosion of the elites and the unwillingness of the officer corps to alert the public to that corrosion led to absolute defeat. Both wars were dramatic failures of public policy generally and our political leadership specifically.
If you believe that these two memorials are testaments to the dead, you should also be certain that those who died in those wars would much rather have remained alive. Or, if their lot was to die, they would have preferred to die in a victorious effort.
You know who and what is not memorialized on the National Mall? There are no memorials to those who made this country truly great but who had the misfortune of not being politically powerful — Edison, Bell, the Wrights, Howe, Borlaug, Mitchell, Drake, Fulton, Whitney, Morse, McCormick, Eckert and Mauchly — the list could continue for pages. These were men (mostly) who invented things that made life better, richer and healthier. For the most part, they didn’t send anyone to their deaths, nor did they seek opportunities to exert their power over their fellow citizens.
We could just as easily include scholars, authors, artists, etc., in the list of those who are not memorialized.
So, the next time someone starts advocating yet another memorial to a public policy disaster that resulted in pointless fatalities — and it is only a matter of time before someone wants to erect a monument to our most recent disaster in the Middle East — maybe we should be contrary and suggest memorializing something better.
• Michael McKenna, a columnist for The Washington Times, co-hosts “The Unregulated Podcast.” He was most recently a deputy assistant to the president and deputy director of the Office of Legislative Affairs at the White House.
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De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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