Quotes of the Day:
We may either fall greatly or succeed greatly; but we can not avoid the endeavor from which either great failure or great success must come.
— Theodore Roosevelt (1902)
Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of poverty, but the symptom. The cause may lie deeper in our failure to give our fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own capacities.
— Lyndon B. Johnson (1964), in reference to his “war on poverty”
There are no constraints on the human mind, no walls around the human spirit, no barriers to our progress except those we ourselves erect.
— Ronald Reagan (1985)
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 20 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Ethics In Special Operations - Special Warfare Magazine
3. "I'm a former Marine training Ukrainians—the Russians are worse than ISIS"
4. 5 covert actions that could turn the tide for Ukraine, according to a former CIA officer
5. First American howitzers bound for Ukraine arrive in Europe as US troops begin training Ukrainians on the cannons
6. WAS SUN TZU AN INEPT STRATEGIST?
7. US Army document details plan to update WWII-era ammo plants and depots
8. Putin claims victory in Mariupol, leaving Ukrainian defenders holed up
9. The absence of an off-ramp – A diplomatic end to Putin’s war is becoming unlikely
10. Ukraine war shows America could be outgunned without investing in energetics
11. Russian Offensive Bears Down on Donbas as West Races to Supply Ukraine With More Weapons
12. US Army veteran: Fighting in Ukraine ‘more dangerous than Afghanistan was’
13. Army Golden Knights demo at Nats Park causes brief Capitol evacuation
14. Russia’s ‘Satan 2’ missile changes little for U.S., scholars say
15. 3,000 of Russia’s feared Wagner mercenaries have already been killed in Ukraine after 8,000 were sent in
16. Pentagon chief speaks for 1st time to Chinese counterpart
17. A Tale of Two Bears: Russian Experience in Syria and Ukraine
18. Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis
19. Among Lithuanian fighters in Ukraine: 'it's our chance to crush them here'
20. Ukrainian official tells Grid: ‘Without the U.S., we’d be dead’
21. How Putin Conned the American Right
22..Germans, SEALs, JSOC, and One Soldier's First Jump | SOF News
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 20 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 20 (putin's war)
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Karolina Hird
April 20, 6pm ET
Russian forces made minor advances in the ongoing offensive in eastern Ukraine on April 19, seizing several small towns and advancing into the key frontline towns of Rubizhne and Popasna. Russian forces continued major assaults with heavy air and artillery support but are continuing to build the logistics and command-and-control capabilities necessary for a larger offensive. Russian forces have not achieved any major breakthroughs, nor have they demonstrated any new capability to conduct multiple successful, simultaneous advances. Russian forces additionally made grinding progress against remaining Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Works and announced plans for a May 9 Victory Day parade in the city – indicating Russian forces will declare victory in Mariupol by that date at the latest.
Key Takeaways
- Russia’s offensive in eastern Ukraine secured minor gains in the last 24 hours, taking parts of the key frontline towns of Rubizhne and Popasna.
- Ukrainian forces reported the presence of small numbers of Syrian or Libyan mercenaries fighting in Popasna (eastern Ukraine), likely individual recruits fighting under the umbrella of the Wagner Group rather than larger units.
- Russian forces made incremental advances in Mariupol and continued to set conditions to declare victory in the city by –at the latest – May 9.
- Russian forces made minor advances around Izyum but have not secured any major breakthroughs.
Russian forces may be preparing to conscript Ukrainian citizens amid continuing recruitment challenges. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 20 that Russian occupation forces are planning to hold pseudo-referendums in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts to declare a forced mobilization and “throw ‘mobilized’ Ukrainians to the hottest parts of the front.”[1] If confirmed, this effort is highly unlikely to generate meaningful combat power and will provoke an uptick in protests and partisan actions against Russian forces in these regions. The GUR additionally reported that Russia’s FSB is conducting a purge of the political leadership of the LNR in retaliation for its failure to achieve military objectives since February 24.[2]
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:
- Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate main effort – Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian forces made marginal gains in assaults against the Azovstal Steel Plant on April 20.[3] Video footage depicted Russian Naval Infantry and other mechanized units fighting on the outskirts of the plant.[4] Russian aircraft continued to heavily target the Azovstal plant.[5] Pro-Russian Telegram channels claimed that DNR militia and potentially Russian Special Operations forces are "clearing" the Azovstal Plant of Ukrainian sources, but we cannot confirm if Russian forces have been able to take portions of the plant itself.[6] Notably, DNR-appointed occupation authorities of Mariupol announced on April 20 that Russian and DNR forces will hold a ”Victory Day” parade in Mariupol on May 9.[7] Russian forces may undertake hasty and poorly-organized offensive actions to clear Azovstal before this date.
Subordinate main effort – Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations concentrated on Rubizhne, Popasna, and Malinka and likely captured several outlying suburbs of Severodonetsk on April 20.[8] Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen and LNR troops took full control of Rubizhne on April 20, but ISW is unable to independently verify this claim, and the Urkainian General Staff reported Ukrainian forces remained in control of Rubizhne an hour before Kadyrov’s claim.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 20 that Russian forces are actively fighting in Torske and Zelena Dolyna, two towns west of Russian positions in Rubizhne.[10] Pro-Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces took control of Kreminna and Stara Krasyanka, west of Rubizhne, on April 20.[11]
Russian forces continued attempts to advance into Popasna and reportedly captured residential sectors of the city.[12] A Ukrainian officer and military blogger posted images of what he claimed to be dead Libyan mercenaries in Popasna on April 20, and Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov reported that Ukrainian forces killed 20-25 ”Libyan and Syrian mercenaries” in Popasna.[13] Danilov stated he thinks Russia has deployed only 300-500 Syrian and Libyan mercenaries to the frontline. ISW has not observed any deployments of cohesive units of Syrian or Libyan fighters, and these recruits are likely individual fighters operating under the umbrella of the Wagner Group. Russian forces additionally conducted unsuccessful attacks north towards Temirivka and Hulyaipole on April 20, likely attempting to begin an encirclement of Ukrainian forces near Donetsk city.[14]
Russian forces are continuing to deploy reinforcements to eastern Ukraine and prepare for further offensive actions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 20 that elements of Russia’s 90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army, and 232nd Rocket Artillery Brigade deployed into Ukraine from Russia.[15] The General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces are reconnoitering routes to prep for further offensives towards Lyman and Sloviansk (west of Severodonetsk).[16]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)
Russian forces continued to shell areas of Kharkiv Oblast and partially block Kharkiv city on April 20.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces mounted attacks south and southwest of Izyum with ”partial success,” indicating localized advances.[18] Russian forces are continuing to take losses over the course of such attempted offensives in Kharkiv Oblast, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that a battalion tactical group (BTG) of the 237th Tank Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division withdrew from Kharkiv Oblast back to its permanent deployment point in Belgorod, Russia due to heavy combat losses.[19]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in Oleksandrivka, west of Kherson city, and may have secured minor advances on April 20.[20] Russian forces are likely conducting localized attacks to reduce Ukrainian pressure on Kherson city, rather than resuming major offensive operations towards Mykolayiv.
Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)
There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.
Immediate items to watch
- Russian forces will likely continue attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City via Avdiivka.
- Russian troops and aircraft will continue to pound the Azovstal facility, and Russian officials may declare victory in Mariupol even before the facility is fully cleared.
- Russian forces will likely increase the scale of ground offensive operations in the coming days, but it is too soon to tell how fast they will do so or how large those offensives will be. It is also too soon to assess how the Russians will likely weight their efforts in the arc from Izyum to Donetsk City.
[1] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/putin-planuie-provesty-prymusovu-mobilizatsiiu-na-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-zaporizkoi-ta-khersonskoi-oblastei.html.
[2] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/na-foni-nevdach-na-fronti-moskva-rozpochala-chystky-kerivnykiv-lnr.html.
[13] https://t dot me/a_shtirlitz/17714?single; https://t dot me/a_shtirlitz/17714
2. Ethics In Special Operations - Special Warfare Magazine
Access the entire Special Warfare Magazine HERE
Ethics In Special Operations - Special Warfare Magazine
6 | Developing SOF Moral Reasoning
Preparing Humans for Hard Wear on the Moral Terrain
BY CAPTAIN BENJAMIN ORDIWAY
12 | Ethics is Leader Business
BY DR. JOSEPH E. LONG AND DR. KARI A. THYNE
31 | All Training is Ethics Training
BY MAJOR BART KENNEDY
3. "I'm a former Marine training Ukrainians—the Russians are worse than ISIS"
A former MARSOC Raider and a good man.
Conclusion:
I don't think it is going to be a short war. I think it's going to last at least a year. We are going to be working on de-mining certain areas—we're going to train, but we have our guys who are actually going out and helping the Ukrainians defuse bombs—and I also want to get into the evacuation of vulnerable citizens. My goal is to continue doing what we're doing but expand. What worries me most is not the Russians, it's the prospect of money running out and letting people down.
"I'm a former Marine training Ukrainians—the Russians are worse than ISIS"
ANDY MILBURN
ON 4/20/22 AT 4:14 PM EDT
I came back to Ukraine on March 12, originally to write for an American outlet that covers defense related news. I wrote four or five articles in the first week but then it just started to seem so frivolous; I didn't want to be an observer. People who I knew from previous visits, who are now in the Ukrainian military, asked me for help. They thought, because I am a former U.S. Marine, that I was representing the U.S. government, no matter how often I said that I wasn't.
My first experience of combat as a Marine was in Mogadishu, Somalia in the '90s and then subsequently I was in the first Marine division during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. I have completed tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan, been involved in the evacuation of civilians from Libya in 2011 and commanded a special operations task force against the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2016.
So I realized I could help, in some small way, other than writing. I felt a weight and a responsibility, because the Ukrainian military has undergone rapid expansion. They have taken in thousands of recruits, which creates a significant training problem. The world of military special operations is quite small and I'm a member of The Global SOF Foundation, an association for international Special Operations Forces (SOF). There is a saying that your reputation is the most important thing you have, so I would imagine that people here heard my name and asked about me. I was taken seriously.
We started off small, with a handful of guys, training Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) with a focus on resistance, because we were in Kyiv and at the time the fight was going on on the outskirts of Kyiv, less than 10km away from us. It was a city under siege.
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Andy Milburn a former U.S. Marine who has served in Iraq and Afghanistan is currently in Ukraine and has formed The Mozart Group, and organization who help train Ukrainian Special Operations Forces. Andy Milburn/The Mozart Group
Some of the guys I work with came up with the idea of calling us The Mozart Group and I thought it was catchy. I wonder now if that was a mistake, because we're not mercenaries like Russia's Wagner Group. Our goals and the way we operate are so different. I don't want anyone to think we're anything like them and I don't want anyone to think our sole purpose is to oppose them. We have such contempt for that organization.
We have been providing basic tactical training: How to handle weapons without shooting yourself. You start with basic procedures because a lot of people think they're very advanced but they don't know how to move tactically, without being seen, or they don't understand camouflage and basic weapons handling or formations. We did do some sniper training, but it was really more marksmanship training. Our interaction has been with the Ukrainian SOF and Ministry of Defence of Ukraine not with President Volodymyr Zelensky himself. And there has been a broad mix of Ukrainians; from guys who had spent some years in the military, snipers and those who had spent time in the territorial defense, to middle aged women.
I have observed that the Ukranians are good at a number of things and are better at U.K. and U.S. troops in a number of key areas. One of those is understanding a drone and what drones can do. Not just strike drones, but how drones extend the reach of your senses. They also understand how to use precision fires, they take basic quadcopters and turn them into deadly weapons. There is some very ingenious stuff going on.
The Ukranians' morale is remarkably high. It was even when Kyiv was under threat. It's just this confidence that the Russians will not win that increases with the more atrocities that they come across. I've been through Iraq and Afghanistan and I was in Mogadishu before that. I have fought against the Islamic State. Obviously you hear bad things happening in war; I'm not any stranger to how depraved people can become. But I was saying to someone the other day that I have a greater respect for the ethical behavior of the Islamic State than I do for the Russians. That is no exaggeration. I've never committed a war crime, I've always told my guys that we fight with the values we represent, we don't adopt those of our enemy. I don't think of myself as a vicious person, but currently, I'm filled with the deepest contempt and anger.
I was one of the first people in Bucha after the Russian retreat and I saw the bodies dumped there, including kids' bodies. Things happen in war. When you have soldiers who are nervous they get trigger happy, but this appears to have been a very, very deliberate approach to killing civilians. People were dragged from their homes and killed, women gang-raped in cellars and executed. The Ukrainians' hands are not unbloodied either but I find it hard to blame them. Because I imagine this was my country and those were families I knew. I'm also not rolling into this as someone who is naive and hasn't seen cruelty and depravity before. Hopefully that gives a scale of the cruelty that is occurring here.
Andy Milburn pictured in Bucha after Russian forces retreated from the area in April 2022.Andy Milburn/The Mozart Group
We now have 100 volunteers coming in so I think we're going to have a greater impact. We did tend to gravitate to special ops applicants, but those who came from conventional forces with particular skills—if they were sniper instructors or knew how to use a stinger missile or man anti-tank gunners—were brought in to help train Ukrainians. We have two vetting teams, in the U.S. and U.K, because the last thing we want over here is guys who are cowboys. But I don't want to pretend we've changed the course of the war. Honestly, I think a lot of the effect we've had has been intangible. The Ukrainians seem really excited to have Americans and Brits behind them, helping them and supporting them. I think that's important.
Now, we have to push and we have a plan to push out mobile training teams and logistic sites behind the front line. We're doing our first site survey where we'll take out medical equipment and provide medical training, because the Ukrainians need combat support. That's not shooting people, it's providing casualty evacuation and helping at triage points. The Mozart Group has recruited plenty of combat medic volunteers.
We have to be able to act in self defense but we're not mercenaries; that is not my intention. We're trying to save lives.
We are completely run on donations. There's no money in it for us. There are no grants because we're not a non-government organization (NGO). But we are trying to do more than stick a band aid on the problem, we are trying to build capability and capacity and resilience.
I don't think it is going to be a short war. I think it's going to last at least a year. We are going to be working on de-mining certain areas—we're going to train, but we have our guys who are actually going out and helping the Ukrainians defuse bombs—and I also want to get into the evacuation of vulnerable citizens. My goal is to continue doing what we're doing but expand. What worries me most is not the Russians, it's the prospect of money running out and letting people down.
Andy Milburn is a former U.S. Marine and CEO of The Mozart Group. You can find out more about their work in Ukraine at themozartgroup.com.
All views expressed in this article are the author's own.
As told to Jenny Haward.
4. 5 covert actions that could turn the tide for Ukraine, according to a former CIA officer
The five:
1) Direct tactical and strategic-level intelligence support
2) Direct targeting support
3) Procurement and delivery of ‘sensitive’ military hardware
4) Training in sensitive hardware, systems, and SOPs
5) Establishing and maintaining escape routes and stay-behind infrastructure for guerrilla operations
This is what some SF leaders who have served with the CIA have called the "shared battlespace" between the CIA and Special Forces (particularly number 5). But when the CIA needs some "mass" to conduct these operations at scale (which will likely move them beyond covert) it may need the assistance of and partnership with Special Forces (e.g. Afghanistan, Northern Iraq)
5 covert actions that could turn the tide for Ukraine, according to a former CIA officer
Let me preface this article by stating that I have absolutely zero current knowledge of any U.S. intelligence activities in Ukraine, nor would I write or speak about them if I did. I am writing this piece as a hypothetical wishlist of potential covert activities that I would like to see the U.S. government undertake in support of the Ukrainian government’s fight against an unprovoked and illegal invasion by Russia. Think of it as a position paper reflecting solely this author’s suggested courses of (covert) action that the U.S could undertake to help Ukraine win this war.
First, definitions are necessary: A covert action undertaken by the U.S. government is a single operational activity, or range of activities, planned and executed by the government — in a manner that conceals its role — in order to impact, influence, or otherwise affect conditions in a foreign country or against a non-U.S. entity (such as a transnational terrorist group, for example). A specific covert action would be authorized by a presidential finding, and would generally be focused on altering either political, economic, or military conditions abroad (or sometimes, a combination of all three). Once again, the role of the U.S. government would be both concealed and denied publicly, if necessary.
A U.S. Soldier peers through the undergrowth. (U.S. Army via DVIDS)
There are different statutory (legal) authorities that separately govern the U.S. Military and the Intelligence Community (IC) when each is carrying out the range of their respective activities, including covert action programs. For the purposes of this piece, I will be focused solely on “Title 50” activities, which is common shorthand for Title 50 of the U.S. Code, denoting activities of the Intelligence Community (IC). Covert Action (CA) programs, for the most part, are the domain of the IC, and specifically, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), despite the military’s decades-long attempts to get deeper into the CA game.
In terms of starting a CA program, first, a U.S. president authorizes it through a finding. This is essentially his order and permission to carry it out. Next, some details of the program are briefed to select members of Congress, and then the agency or agencies designated to carry out the program do so. That is the simplest way to describe how it works. With that said, below are five possible covert action programs that I would like to see the government undertake in support of Ukraine.
First, though, it is worth noting that before any CA program would be authorized or undertaken in this effort, direct engagement with Ukrainian officials to find out what exactly they would need, in terms of covert assistance, would of course be necessary. The Ukrainians would obviously know best what they need to win. A U.S. intelligence official at the level of a chief of station (or higher) should be and likely is in constant direct contact with Ukrainian intelligence leadership to ensure that these kinds of exchanges of information are occurring. Now, onto my suggested programs.
1) Direct tactical and strategic-level intelligence support
U.S. Soldiers from Delta Company 341st Military Intelligence Battalion conduct Low-Level Voice Interception. (Photo by Joseph Siemandel/Washington National Guard)
While this kind of intelligence support would not normally need to fall under a special presidential finding, as it falls under the CIA’s normal remit to work with liaison intelligence services, given the sensitivity of possible direct lethal aid being provided against Russian forces, and given that it would involve U.S. intelligence personnel on the ground in Ukraine, such support would likely need to fall under a covert action authority. Again, this would give the United States plausible deniability in terms of playing a nearly-direct role in the killing of Russian soldiers.
The CIA should be on the ground in Ukraine providing intelligence on both current and future movements and disposition of Russian forces, as well as on the plans and intentions of senior military and political leaders of Russia. This should include direct engagement with Ukrainian officials across all disciplines of intelligence collection (HUMINT, SIGINT, etc). This kind of direct assistance could play a pivotal role in providing Ukrainian decision-makers with invaluable information to counter Russian political and military maneuvers.
2) Direct targeting support
A North Carolina National Guard soldier (right) from 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne) trains a U.S. Army cadet in guerrilla warfare. (Photo by Sgt. Mary Junell/U.S. National Guard)
In addition to strategic-level intelligence and tactical-level order of battle information, the United States should also have personnel on the ground (covertly) providing granular-level targeting data. This would entail direct hands-on assistance in identifying, finding, and fixing Russian targets for attack.
Such targets could include senior-level Russian military commanders on the battlefield, as well as high-profile military assets like the Russian warship Moskva. It is entirely possible that U.S. assistance played a role in the sinking of the Moskva and in the successful targeting of the former Russian battlefield commanders. Again, I have no information on this, and I am only speculating.
3) Procurement and delivery of ‘sensitive’ military hardware
A U.S. Army multiple launch rocket system (MLRS/HIMARS) (U.S. Army photo)
We have all seen the various news reports since the war began of different countries at different times raising public objections to providing certain types of armaments to Ukraine. The United States has been one of those countries. This does not mean, however, that some of these systems and platforms could not be provided to Ukraine covertly so that countries have plausible deniability.
In fact, I would like to see a covert action program that facilitates the covert purchase, shipment, and delivery of certain “sensitive” armaments into Ukraine, in order to get around the political sensitives of certain countries providing arms for use against Russia. This would also allow for the creation and maintenance of an established covert delivery corridor in the event that the non-covert shipments become impossible.
4) Training in sensitive hardware, systems, and SOPs
In conjunction with the above, the Ukrainians might very well also need on-the-ground, hands-on training in how to operate some of these systems, as well as training in the standard operating procedures and tactics that accompany a certain weapons system. We should be providing personnel on a covert basis inside Ukraine to facilitate this assistance, as needed.
5) Establishing and maintaining escape routes and stay-behind infrastructure for guerrilla operations
(U.S. Army photo)
Finally, if we are not doing so already, we should be formulating a plan for the escape of various designated Ukrainian officials from the country, or at a minimum, from the more dangerous parts of the country, as required given events on the ground. This would allow for a continued resistance directed, if necessary, from outside of Ukraine (for example, from Poland).
Going along with this should be extensive planning for, and establishment of, a resistance/guerrilla infrastructure that would allow for continued resistance in areas like the Donbas, should it be lost to Russia. This will allow Ukraine to continue to bleed Russian occupying forces and thus prevent the Russians from advancing deeper into Ukrainian territory.
Glory to Ukraine
As I stated above, I have no way of knowing if some or all of these programs — or versions of them — are already in place. I can only hope that they are so that the United States can offer to the valiant Ukrainians the greatest possible support as they stand against an illegal and unprovoked invading army. Even these limited measures could allow Ukraine to continue its relentless and glorious resistance to Putin’s invading hoard.
Frumentarius
Frumentarius is a former Navy SEAL, former CIA officer, and currently a Captain in a career fire department in the Midwest.
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5. First American howitzers bound for Ukraine arrive in Europe as US troops begin training Ukrainians on the cannons
It is easy to be an armchair quarterback and type on a keyboard (as I am doing) but as Cohen and Gooch remind us all military failures are a result of three things: failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate. I am sure there are intelligence analysts and military professionals who anticipated the type of war that is likely to be fought in eastern Ukraine and the Donbass. But we are only now deploying and beginning to train Ukrainian soldiers on these artillery systems. What if we had provided these systems before the war and conducted the training in preparation for the possibility of war to include (and especially) during the previous two administrations? Yes it is easy to second guess now. But I think the reasons we did not do this (despite the anticipation by professionals) is due to politics. And of course politics trumps everything but we can learn from this and examine the impact of political decisions on the ability to effectively prosecute and win the war and try (again) to educate our political leaders about the second and third order effects of their political decisions.
The good news is the Ukrainian military is full of very proficient and smart personnel who will quickly learn these new systems.
First American howitzers bound for Ukraine arrive in Europe as US troops begin training Ukrainians on the cannons
Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Aliyor Rashidov with 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division, clears an M777 towed 155 mm howitzer during an artillery relocation training program at the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Hijudai Training Area, Japan, April 16, 2022. (Lance Cpl. Davin Tenbusch/Marine Corps photo)
Some – but not all – of the 18 howitzers and 40,000 artillery rounds that the U.S. is sending Ukraine as part of the aid authorized April 13 by President Joe Biden have arrived in Europe as the U.S. delivered another four flights of military aid during the past 24 hours, said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity.
In that time, U.S. troops have begun training some Ukrainian forces on how to use the American howitzers, the official said. The training is expected to last “about a week."
The official declined to say whether the U.S. is sending its M777 or M198 155mm howitzers. Both American cannons are a different caliber than Ukraine’s 152mm Msta-B howitzers, but they share the same “basic outlines,” a defense official said Monday.
Both U.S. howitzers can fire up to about 4 rounds per minute, according to the Army.
The U.S. is sending the howitzers after Ukrainian officials asked for artillery, which is expected to play a significant role in Russia’s new focus on the flat, rolling plains of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, the official said.
“We knew from talking to Ukrainians that artillery was going to be a critical need because of the way the terrain lays,” the official said. “And so we saw early on the Russians were moving artillery [for the battle in the Donbas].”
Despite the latest delivery, the Pentagon might need to send more artillery in the future, the official said Wednesday. With 18 howitzers and 40,000 rounds on its way to Ukraine, it amounts to about 2,222 rounds per cannon.
“I think you can assume that should there be additional need in the future for more 155 artillery rounds, the United States will be right at the front of the line doing what we can to help get them there,” the official said.
Biden on Tuesday told reporters he planned to send Ukraine more artillery as he got off Air Force One after landing in New Hampshire for a public address.
Earlier that day, he also discussed “providing more ammunition and security assistance to Ukraine” on a video call with allies and partners, including the presidents of France, Poland, and Romania, White House Press secretary Jen Psaki said Tuesday.
Also on the call were the prime ministers of Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy, the chancellor of Germany, and European Commission, NATO and European Council leaders.
“Certainly, we will continue to provide them more ammunition as we will provide them more military assistance,” Psaki said. “There's an ongoing discussion with the Ukrainians about what they need, with Congress about what we can provide.”
6. WAS SUN TZU AN INEPT STRATEGIST?
Oh! Sacrilege. Heresy.
But well worth the read.
As an aside, I have long believed that any complex political-military problem can be solved by reading Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. On war and The Art of War do not provide the answers themselves, but by engaging with these two books the reader's critical thinking will help her or him develop ways to solve complex political-military problems. The answers are not in the books but the books will help the reader open his or her mind to discover the answers. I made my argument here nearly two decades ago, Timeless Theories of War in the 21st Century (p. 23) https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjvol3.pdf
Excerpts:
We should not, however, lament the demise of this long-standing myth. Rather than measuring ourselves against a fictionalized vision of strategic perfection, studying the Zuozhuan’s more believable and historically reliable campaign narrative reminds us that even talented commanders can stumble in their strategic planning and execution. Many of the miscalculations made by Sun Tzu in his plan for defeating Chu are very similar to ones the U.S. recently made in Afghanistan.
...
These pointed critiques by Sun Tzu’s own contemporaries remind us that reliable historical context is a necessary component in properly assessing his influence. As Thucydides aptly noted, “most people, in fact, will not take the trouble in finding out the truth, but are much more inclined to accept the first story they hear.” While the History Channel’s problematic version of the Boju campaign will likely continue to be the first story most people hear, let’s make sure it’s not the last.
WAS SUN TZU AN INEPT STRATEGIST?
Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true.
One of the enduring appeals of Sun Tzu’s Art of War is the belief that its author was not only a talented theorist of war, but also a highly successful practitioner. His writings, therefore, were validated in the uncompromising crucible of combat. His crowning achievement of military and strategic prowess, according to conventional wisdom, is found in his brilliant victory at the Battle of Boju, fought in 506 BCE between the forces of Wu and Chu. In Deciphering Sun Tzu, Derek Yuen claims that the battle was one “in which Sun Tzu played a major planning and commanding role, eventually winning a stunning victory against his state’s (Wu) arch-enemy, the state of Chu, [marking] the pinnacle of military operations in the Spring and Autumn Period and represent[ing] Sun Tzu’s greatest military achievement.”
How valid is this claim and what is it ultimately based on? Yuen, like many others who invoke this battle as incontrovertible proof of Sun Tzu’s strategic acumen, provides frustratingly little historical evidence to substantiate assertions of tactical and strategic mastery. This is surprising, because not only the Boju campaign, but the broader century-long Wu-Chu rivalry in which it was fought is documented in extensive detail in China’s oldest historical narrative, the Zuozhuan. Comparing the Zuozhuan’s wider context and detailed account of the campaign with its sensationalized popular version, however, paints a starkly different picture. Wu’s campaign against Chu was a risky gamble, not a masterclass in strategic execution, and Wu lacked a viable plan for how to exploit its early battlefield success. Despite its initial serendipitous victory at Boju, Wu’s territorial gains were quickly erased. Understanding why the state of Wu ultimately failed to achieve its strategic objectives, rather than blindly lauding its Pyrrhic tactical victory, will provide modern strategists more useful historical lessons.
Good Television, Bad History?
What constitutes our conventional interpretation of this campaign? In the History Channel’s documentary on Sun Tzu, it relies heavily on a popularized, loosely sourced version of the Boju campaign as a narrative vehicle to sharply contrast with Western strategic failures, such as the U.S. war in Vietnam. It will be instructive to summarize its recreation of the campaign here. According to the program, Wu is a small and relatively peaceful state on the verge of extinction at the hands of its aggressive and powerful neighbor, Chu. The dilettante ruler of Wu, King Helu, hires the itinerant general Sun Tzu in desperation after first reading his text and then observing a sly demonstration of his unconventional training techniques successfully applied to his harem of concubines. As newly appointed supreme commander, Sun Tzu quickly transforms Wu’s pitiable armed forces into a small but highly disciplined fighting force.
Turning the tables on Chu, Wu ceaselessly harasses Chu’s border forces, launching lightning attacks followed by quick withdrawals, thereby exhausting the large and cumbersome enemy army. When the demoralized and desperate Chu kingdom attempts to punish a recalcitrant ally, the state of Cai, Wu suddenly strikes decisively. Dispatching a decoy force designed to convince Chu that its objective is to help break the siege of Cai, Sun Tzu’s main force instead conducts a mad dash towards Chu’s undefended capital, racing nearly 600 miles through the inhospitable terrain of the Yangtze River valley—a mind-boggling display of command and logistical mastery in a historical era not known for long-range military deployments.
The Chu commander, although leading a force ten times the size of Sun Tzu’s and fighting on his own terrain, is completely surprised by this brilliant maneuver. As the Chu force races back to defend its suddenly exposed capital, Sun Tzu closes the trap, annihilating the massive Chu army in a deliberate envelopment at Boju. With the Chu army destroyed, Sun Tzu occupies its capital city, Ying, thereby annihilating its greatest rival and saving the fledgling Wu state. Total victory has been achieved with Sun Tzu’s strategic acumen firmly secured for posterity.
An Alternate, More Historically Grounded Version
Almost none of this, though, is validated in the Zuozhuan account, which constitutes our earliest and most detailed description of both the Boju campaign and the broader strategic backdrop in which it was fought. According to this account (which is outlined and linked to the primary source, here), Wu’s campaign against Chu was never a war of necessity. It was an invasion by choice and a risky gambit driven by the Wu court’s impetuous desire for power, glory, and revenge. The Wu army never launched a long-range invasion through the treacherous Yangtze River valley, instead transporting its army via river craft along the more reliable and secure Huai River to the much closer state of Cai, which was not, at the time, undergoing a siege by Chu forces. From the starting point of Cai—now close to the Chu capital but perilously distant from Wu’s own logistical base—Wu jointly launched its invasion via a direct route to Ying. The defending Chu army, meanwhile, was not caught flat-footed. It deliberately waited for the Wu-Cai army to reach its initial defense line along the Han River, which blocked the invader’s route to its capital.
The Battle of Boju was not won through tactical brilliance but through sheer luck, as Chu’s commander intentionally sabotaged his military advisor’s shrewd counter-attack plan for petty personal reasons. Moreover, the capture of Ying was far from the final act of the campaign and Wu’s good fortune quickly ran out. Wu never had a viable strategy for what it wanted to accomplish beyond the capture of Chu’s capital city. Its invading force was too small to effectively control the massive Chu state, it failed to either capture the deposed king or prevent Chu forces from regrouping, and it never gained support from the local population. Most fatally, Wu grossly miscalculated how other neighboring states would react to Chu’s defeat. Its inability to anticipate how the powerful state of Qin would respond to a newly established Wu presence on its immediate border remains an inexplicable intelligence failure. Prior to the invasion, Qin relied on Chu as a vital strategic counterweight to its own primary geopolitical rival, the state of Jin. Wu’s conquest of Chu upset this balance, and Qin’s eventual military intervention to restore the Chu king to the throne ensured Wu’s quick military collapse in Chu.
Less than a year after its unexpected victory at Boju, the entire Wu army was humiliatingly ejected from Chu territory by the combined forces of Chu and Qin. As a result, Chu’s leadership, military, and government entities were fully reconstituted, while Wu was left in a weakened state culminating in its complete annihilation within three decades. Conversely, Chu would survive for nearly another three centuries as a major power within the existing Zhou system. By any objective historical measure, the Boju campaign was a catastrophic strategic failure for Wu.
Why Sun Tzu Would Have Also Struggled in Afghanistan
We should not, however, lament the demise of this long-standing myth. Rather than measuring ourselves against a fictionalized vision of strategic perfection, studying the Zuozhuan’s more believable and historically reliable campaign narrative reminds us that even talented commanders can stumble in their strategic planning and execution. Many of the miscalculations made by Sun Tzu in his plan for defeating Chu are very similar to ones the U.S. recently made in Afghanistan.
Much like Wu, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan with enough forces to secure initial military victory, but not nearly enough to effectively control or pacify an entire country. While the U.S. never truly understood the complex tribal loyalties within Afghanistan, Wu remained similarly baffled by the complex Chu clan system. Wu’s efforts to apprehend the deposed king were thwarted by the determination of these various clan leaders to hide and protect the unpopular king from the even more unpopular and unwelcome foreign interlopers. Finally, much like Sun Tzu failed to anticipate Qin’s determination that Chu’s defeat constituted a direct threat to its own strategic interests, U.S. military leaders failed to fully grasp the scope and scale of Pakistan’s misgivings over replacing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
The problem in the West is that we too easily rely on a flawed belief that Sun Tzu’s slim treatise is the only reference work necessary to gain sufficient understanding of Chinese military and strategic thinking. Much like mastering Clausewitz does not render the study of Thucydides redundant or superfluous, familiarization with Sun Tzu does not absolve us of the need to study the larger corpus of historical and military texts from the Chinese strategic canon. Moreover, our hyper focus on Sun Tzu’s Art of War at the expense of other ancient Chinese works leaves us blind to the fact that even Sun Tzu’s own near contemporaries occasionally questioned his strategic acumen. At the conclusion of the second century BCE biographical sketch on Sun Tzu (and two other famous military theorists) prepared by the renowned historian Sima Qian, he both recognizes the Art of War’s popularity while simultaneously slighting Sun Tzu’s actual military accomplishments using an ancient parallel to our modern pejorative phrase, “those who can’t do, teach”:
“When the common people of our time refer to armies and brigades they all speak of the thirteen chapters of Sun Tzu and Wu Qi’s Art of War. Many in our times possess these; thus, I have not discussed them [but instead] discussed the accomplishments of their actions. A saying goes: “Those who can do it cannot necessarily speak of it, and those who can speak of it cannot necessarily do it.” … How sad!”
In the eponymous text attributed to the third century BCE Confucian scholar, Xunzi, a lengthy chapter is dedicated to dispelling the view that adopting Sun Tzu’s military advice is conducive to long-term strategic success. While the chapter does not specifically mention the Boju campaign, it is difficult to not see in Xuzi’s critique a condemnation of its disastrous result: “To capture and take over others is something that it is easy to be capable of doing, but it is solidifying and consolidating one’s grip on them that is the hard part.” In another third century BCE text, The Annals of Lü Buwei, one verse perfectly captures the fatal flaw in the planning and execution of the Boju campaign, even though it never references it directly. As we prepare for the inevitability of future campaigns and conflicts, it is worth searing this ancient warning into our own collective memory: “Victors who do not know how to build on their victories are no different from losers.”
These pointed critiques by Sun Tzu’s own contemporaries remind us that reliable historical context is a necessary component in properly assessing his influence. As Thucydides aptly noted, “most people, in fact, will not take the trouble in finding out the truth, but are much more inclined to accept the first story they hear.” While the History Channel’s problematic version of the Boju campaign will likely continue to be the first story most people hear, let’s make sure it’s not the last.
John F. Sullivan is a former U.S. Army China Foreign Area Officer. He is currently working on an historical commentary to the Sunzi Bingfa, grounding its interpretation in the wider body of contemporaneous military, philosophical, and historical texts from the Warring States era. His other works can be found at Academia.edu
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Statue Of Sun Tzu at the Military Museum Of The Chinese People`s Revolution
7. US Army document details plan to update WWII-era ammo plants and depots
What is wrong with this picture? World War II- era?
We must never forget that the "superpower" of the US is our ability to produce military weapons and equipment – actually to outproduce any adversary – and deliver that equipment anywhere in the world.
Have we done enough to protect our industrial base to sustain our "superpower" or have we been living with too much kryptonite? Will Urkaine be a wake-up call? What if US forces were engaged in a major theater war right now?
US Army document details plan to update WWII-era ammo plants and depots
McALESTER, Okla. — Many of the U.S. Army’s ammunition plants, arsenals and depots, mostly constructed in World War II, are time capsules of the era. The service has tried to update these wartime facilities, but there is much left to do to bring them into the 21st century.
McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma is dotted with shrub-cloaked ammunition bunkers built around 1943 and resembling Hobbit-holes. Old covered bridges that extend from external break rooms to manufacturing facilities across roads loom overhead but are now closed because of the presence of asbestos.
Since WWII, trains have carried in supplies and carted out ammunition in cargo containers. The Army has worked to update rail gauges and train cars to keep shipments moving on time, day and night.
Long, dark tunnels connect one facility for painting and prepping bomb shells to another where explosives are loaded into those rounds. A robotic arm spray-paints the outside of a shell in one facility.
But this automated capability isn’t available for the nuances of mixing explosives or filling shells, Brig. Gen. Gavin Gardner, commander of Joint Munitions Command, told Defense News on a tour of the ammunition plant’s production line for the Mark 82, a 500-pound bomb used by the Air Force. Chemists still manually mix explosives — like tritonal, which is 80% TNT and 20% aluminum powder — using a resonant acoustic mixer, then adding it to the weapon mostly by hand.
Defense News accompanied Army Secretary Christine Wormuth on a trip to the plant last month.
A McAlester Army Ammunition Plant explosives handler monitors a robot applying paint to a Mark 82 bomb body. (Courtesy of McAlester Army Ammunition Plant)
Parts of the facility that manufacture these bombs recently received upgrades, prior to the coronavirus pandemic, including the integration of brand-new machinery. The plant was tasked to mass manufacture hand sanitizer on the Mark 82 production line before the equipment was ever used to build weapons because it was clean and could be configured to do the job.
More upgrades are expected in 2023, including an Air Force-funded multipurpose loading facility that is partly unmanned and keeps the bombs underground encased in deep concrete when being loaded for blast protection.
McAlester supplies one-third of munitions for the Defense Department and is considered the premier bomb- and warhead-loading facility, delivering thousands of Mark 84 2,000-pound bombs, M11 artillery rounds and 105mm artillery rounds, to name a few.
But McAlester is just one of several critical ammunition plants and depots that make up the DoD’s organic industrial base — and modernization is needed across the board.
State of the base
The Army’s organic industrial base is made up of 23 depots, arsenals and ammunition plants. And more than 19,000 facilities manufacture, rebuild, maintain or store equipment, supported by more than 32,000 skilled artisans and technicians.
Since 2009, the Army invested more than $5 billion to upgrade facilities, infrastructure, and operations equipment, but the service acknowledges a more focused investment plan is needed.
Congress has taken a particular interest in modernizing the organic industrial base over the last several years, having held hearings on the subject since at least 2020 and supplying the Pentagon with funding to bring aging facilities into the 21st century — making them safer and more efficient.
“ ‘Shocking’ is not overstating the condition of some of our facilities,” Rep. Donald Norcross, D-N.J., chairman of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, said during a hearing last month. “The production progress, the tooling facilities are all operating much like they did during the Second World War.”
In the last two National Defense Authorization Acts, Norcross noted, Congress supported the Army’s baseline budget and its unfunded priorities to cover the cost of modernization plans.
“That was meant to kick-start the process of upgrading, modernization, and safe and efficient production of conventional ammunition,” he said. But he’s concerned the Army did not include adequate funding in its fiscal 2023 budget request to cover the costs of modernizing its industrial base facilities.
Crane Navy employees work on a munitions production line in 1942, one year after Crane Naval Ammunition Depot was established amid World War II. (Courtesy of the U.S. Army)
Plan of action
“Critical to modernization efforts are minimizing human exposure to hazards through robotics and remote operating processes, seeking to reduce single points of failure and dependence on foreign suppliers, and building capacity and capability to support the Army and the joint force as we move into the future, all while sunsetting and divesting of legacy equipment, facilities and processes,” Daly said.
According to the Army’s organic industrial base implementation plan, the service will focus on five lines of effort — facilities; tooling and processes; workforce; network and cyber; and energy and environment — across three, five-year phases stretching from FY24 through FY38.
The 15-year plan, obtained by Defense News, is aimed at posturing to support enduring and modernized systems, ensuring the ability to surge production, reducing single points of failure, identifying and mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers and retiring legacy equipment and excess capacities.
The Army plans to modernize its facilities through the adoption of agile industrial processes, process improvement with sustainable utilities and resilient data infrastructure. The service will develop an “interconnected network of machine and sensors” that can gather data and analyze the information to streamline manufacturing, optimize production and generate surge capacity, the plan stated.
The workforce will need to be trained and developed to become artisans in a modernized infrastructure, the Army acknowledged.
The service also cites a need to use modern industrial standards, such as higher levels of automation and data exchange, which will require updating information technology and operational technology systems to make them more secure from cyberattacks.
The plan is geared toward ensuring facilities are climate resilient and that they efficiently use energy and other resources, such as water.
From FY23 to FY28, the Army’s projects will help build the foundation for 21st century capabilities, according to the plan. “The first phase focuses on building secure industrial control networks, leveraging robotics with computer program logic [and improving] workforce safety,” the document stated.
This includes building an optimized component remanufacturing facility and installing an industrial control network at Anniston Army Depot in Alabama; building a modernized powertrain facility for enduring platforms and to support future vertical lift aircraft when they come online at Corpus Christi Army Depot in Texas; and building a “one-way luminescence ammunition facility” for more efficient tracer production at Lake City Army Ammunition Plant in Missouri.
Other facilities will be built and upgrades made to Holston Army Ammunition Plant in Tennessee; Radford Army Ammunition Plant in Virginia; Red River Army Depot in Texas; Tobyhanna Army Depot in Pennsylvania; and Watervliet Arsenal in New York.
In the second phase, from FY28-FY32, the Army will continue to build capabilities while addressing vulnerabilities. Projects include a consolidated combat vehicle assembly at Anniston; modernized pyrotechnic production at the Crane Army Ammunition plant in Indiana; future precision fires remanufacturing and the construction of a modernized and adaptive joint missile maintenance facility at Letterkenny Army Depot in Pennsylvania; and an upgraded primer mix house complex for Lake City.
At the end of this phase, “the Army will have a workforce postured to capitalize on the increased use of modern technologies such as robotics, artificial intelligence and data analytics,” according to the plan.
In the final phase stretching from FY32 to FY38, the Army will maintain and sustain its investments in a modernized organic industrial base. Corpus Christi will get a new aircraft remanufacturing facility; Letterkenny will get a Future Precision Fires Remanufacturing Complex; and Red River will get command-and-control and emerging-services facilities.
Also in this phase, the Army will provide Tooele Army Depot in Utah with accredited microgrids for energy resilience; Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas will get a multi-spectrum obscurant production upgrade; and the Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center in Illinois will receive upgrades in aluminum and titanium casting and forging.
By the end of this phase, the Army will have “a technologically advanced infrastructure that leverages data, analytics, and process automation as its foundation, with a safer workforce employed in more energy and cyber resilient industrial processes,” according to the plan.
Staying on track
Throughout the process, the Army will use a comprehensive database visualization tool and master plan repository it is calling Vulcan, which will validate and synchronize hundreds of projects.
“Vulcan hosts vast amounts of detailed planning and budgetary data supporting 2500+ modernization projects planned and budgeted,” the document read. “Vulcan provides full-spectrum visualization capabilities for modernization — macro to micro — and it accurately links all projects to their transformation strategy, planned location, funding type and weapon system(s) to be supported.”
The tool will reside in the Army’s Vantage system, a data-driven operations and decision-making platform, the document notes.
“By merging the millions of data points contained in Vulcan into the Vantage environment, it can take full advantage of the Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) capable applications available to improve and accelerate decisions on everything from major construction, human capital and personnel readiness as well as Return on Investment (ROI) for each dollar spent on modernization,” the plan read.
The Army believes its plan to spend slightly more than $1 billion annually is cost-neutral and sustainable.
“However, this operationalized approach to modernization is contingent upon sufficient, predictable, sustainable and timely funding to ensure a successful outcome,” the document warned.
Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts from Kenyon College.
8. Putin claims victory in Mariupol, leaving Ukrainian defenders holed up
Sealing up the steel plant will be brutal for the brave Ukrainian defenders. Someone speculated this would be a target for some kind of chemical weapon. Or the Russians will just seal it up and let the defenders starve to death. What brutality.
Putin claims victory in Mariupol, leaving Ukrainian defenders holed up
- Summary
- 'No need to climb into these catacombs', says Putin
- Ukraine seeks talks on fate of defenders and civilians
- Resolution in Mariupol would end biggest battle of war
KYIV, April 21 (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin claimed victory in the biggest battle of the Ukraine war on Thursday, declaring the port of Mariupol "liberated" after nearly two months of siege, despite hundreds of defenders still holding out inside a giant steel works.
In a televised meeting with his defence minister inside the Kremlin, Putin said there was no need for a final confrontation with the last defenders who were boxed in after surviving nearly two months of Russia's siege.
"I consider the proposed storming of the industrial zone unnecessary," he told Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in a televised meeting at the Kremlin. "I order you to cancel it."
"There's no need to climb into these catacombs and crawl underground through these industrial facilities," he said. "Block off this industrial area so that not even a fly can get through."
Shoigu estimated 2,000 Ukrainian fighters remained inside the plant. Putin called on them to lay down their weapons and surrender, saying Russia would treat them with respect.
Asked to comment on Russia's decision to blockade the steel works rather than storm it, Ukraine's defence ministry spokeswoman said the move testified to Putin's "schizophrenic tendencies" and gave no further response.
Putin's declaration of victory lets him claim his first big prize since his forces were driven out of northern Ukraine last month after failing to capture the capital, Kyiv.
CIVILIAN SUFFERING
Mariupol, once home to 400,000 people, has been the scene of by far the worst fighting of the war and its worst humanitarian catastrophe, with hundreds of thousands of civilians cut off for nearly two months under Russian siege and bombardment.
Journalists who reached it during the siege found streets littered with corpses, nearly all buildings destroyed, and residents huddled freezing in cellars, venturing out to cook scraps on makeshift stoves or to bury bodies in gardens.
Two incidents in particular became symbolic of what Kyiv and the West call Russian war crimes - the bombing of a maternity hospital and, a week later, of a theatre with hundreds of civilians in the basement. Moscow denies targeting civilians, and, without evidence, says those incidents were faked.
Ukraine estimates tens of thousands of civilians have died in Mariupol. It says some have been buried in mass graves, others removed from the streets by Russian forces using mobile cremation trucks to incinerate bodies. The United Nations and Red Cross say the civilian toll is still unknowable, but at least in the thousands.
The intensified Russian campaign to seize large swathes of eastern Ukraine has further diminished the prospects of stop-start peace talks producing any rapid agreement to end the war.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Moscow was still waiting for Kyiv's response to a proposal it had handed over.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Wednesday that he had not seen or heard about the document that the Kremlin said it had sent.
1/13
Smoke rises above a plant of Azovstal Iron and Steel Works company during Ukraine-Russia conflict in the southern port city of Mariupol, Ukraine April 20, 2022. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko
NO SURRENDER
Shoigu told Putin that Russia had killed more than 4,000 Ukrainian troops in its campaign to take Mariupol and that 1,478 had given themselves up. Those figures could not be verified. Two of those who surrendered are British.
Azovstal is one of the biggest metallurgical facilities in Europe, covering 11 sq km, with huge buildings, underground bunkers and tunnels.
Ukrainian deputy prime minister Iryna Vereshchuk said an agreed humanitarian corridor to evacuate civilians from the factory had not worked as planned, blaming Russian forces. She said 1,000 civilians and 500 wounded soldiers needed to be brought out immediately.
On Tuesday, a commander of the far-right nationalist Azov battalion, a former militia now incorporated into Ukraine's national guard, rejected Russia's call to surrender but urged that the civilians be rescued.
"We do not accept the conditions set down by the Russian Federation on giving up our weapons and our defenders giving themselves up as prisoners," Svyatoslav Palamar said in a video message.
Russia has blocked all efforts by Ukraine to send aid to Mariupol or to send buses to evacuate civilians to Ukrainian-controlled territory, and Kyiv accuses it of forcibly deporting tens of thousands of residents to Russia.
Moscow says Russia has taken in 140,000 civilians from Mariupol in humanitarian evacuations. Kyiv says some were deported by force, in what would be a war crime.
DONBAS PUSH
Mariupol is the link that Moscow needs to provide a secure connection between territory held by the separatists it backs in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region and Crimea, the peninsula it seized in 2014.
It is also the main port of the Donbas, two provinces that Moscow demands Ukraine fully cede to the separatists in what the Kremlin now describes as the war's main objective.
After failing to capture Kyiv last month and being forced to withdraw from northern Ukraine, Russia regrouped to launch a major new offensive this week in the Donbas, pushing from several directions to try to encircle Ukrainian troops.
Ukraine said Russian forces had failed so far to completely capture Rubizhne, a Donbas town that has been a focus of their advance. The city of Kharkiv, near the Russian supply lines into Donbas, came under heavy bombardment, its mayor said.
British military intelligence said Russian forces were keen to demonstrate significant success by May 9, the anniversary of the allied victory in Europe in World War Two.
Russia calls its incursion a "special military operation" to demilitarise and "denazify" Ukraine. Kyiv and its Western allies reject that as a false pretext for an illegal war of aggression.
U.S. President Joe Biden will deliver an update on Ukraine at 9:45 a.m. (1345 GMT) on Thursday as he works to complete a new arms package, which is likely to be a similar size to an $800 million one announced last week, a U.S. official said.
Reporting by Reuters journalists; Writing by Peter Graff; Editing by Kevin Liffey
9. The absence of an off-ramp – A diplomatic end to Putin’s war is becoming unlikely
Excerpts:
American isolationists on both the left and right will urge Mr. Biden to back off, to grant Russia and China their “spheres of influence.” If tyrants run roughshod over the world beyond our shores, why should that matter to Americans, ensconced as we are between two deep blue oceans?
What they have failed to learn from history is that appeasement never sates the appetites of those ambitious to conquer and subjugate others. Once men like Messrs. Putin and Xi believe they have the algorithm for making America and other free nations retreat and capitulate, they’ll use it again and again.
To paraphrase Churchill: No matter how much you feed the crocodile, in the end you’ll be the dessert.
No, we don’t want the new Cold War now being waged against us by Moscow, Beijing and their allies – notably the Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea – to turn hot. But attempting to make ourselves inoffensive to aggressors who despise and want to destroy us is no solution.
So, as noted, we’re treading on dangerous ground. It will require an unusually wise and courageous leader to walk the strategic tightrope and choose the least-bad policy options. Let’s acknowledge, too, that it’s been a while since we’ve had a leader who fits that description.
April 20, 2022 | The Washington Times
The absence of an off-ramp
A diplomatic end to Putin’s war is becoming unlikely
fdd.org · by Clifford D. May Founder & President · April 20, 2022
Let’s acknowledge that we’re treading on dangerous ground. Russia is ruled by a thug who has launched a war intended to extinguish Ukraine as an independent nation.
In 1990, there was a similar crisis. Another thug, Saddam Hussein, invaded and occupied Kuwait which, he insisted, was not a real country but only a rogue province of Iraq.
“This will not stand!” pronounced President George H. W. Bush who then mobilized more than two dozen nations to participate in a military campaign to oust the aggressors.
They did so not because Kuwait was lovely, free, and democratic. They did so to support Mr. Bush’s vision – a quintessentially American vision – of “a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.” And, yes, they also didn’t want the Iraqi dictator to get his hands on Kuwait’s oil which he would have used to support terrorism and other nefarious purposes.
Saddam Hussein had attempted to acquire nuclear weapons but was denied that capability when Israel, in 1981, bombed an unfinished Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad.
By contrast, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s ruler, has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, including ten times as many tactical nukes as the U.S. So, the perils of taking him on directly are much greater.
America and its NATO allies have not sent troops to defend Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky has not asked for that. The democratically elected Ukrainian leader is only asking that he and his fellow countrymen be given the means to defend their land, their families, and their freedom. We should give them those means – urgently and unstintingly.
They have been fighting with inspiring zeal and success. Over the weekend, it was reported that another Russian general had been killed – the eighth since the invasion began.
A few days earlier, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, was destroyed. Russian officials said it was an accident. More plausibly, the ship was hit by two made-in-Ukraine ground-to-sea Neptune missiles. “We have one more diving spot in the Black Sea now,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov tweeted Friday.
Are such developments inducing Mr. Putin to think about what diplomats call an “off-ramp”? I suspect he’s thinking about revenge instead.
Simultaneously, his lengthening list of war crimes is leading Ukrainian patriots and their supporters to conclude that there can be no diplomatic solution.
“Ukraine must be victorious, and any instrument of peace should document this fact,” former undersecretary of state Paula Dobriansky and former first deputy assistant secretary of the Navy Richard Levine wrote in the Wall Street Journal over the weekend.
That is certainly the outcome justice demands. Can it be achieved? At present, I don’t see Mr. Putin winning. But neither do I see him being decisively defeated and expelled from all of Ukraine, including Crimea and the eastern region of Donbas where he’s maintained forces since 2014 and where a new phase of the war is about to begin.
Nothing we’re hearing from the Putinists suggests they are reconsidering their insistence that Ukrainians are rebels and traitors to their neo-colonialist empire.
“Ukrainism is an artificial anti-Russian construction that does not have its own civilizational content, a subordinate element of an alien civilization,” snarled RIA Novosti, a Russian state-owned media agency.
Some Russian officials are also now insisting that the Cold War never ended. Olga Kovitidi, a Russian senator from Crimea, went even further, telling an interviewer that “the Second World War did not end.” She added that “this snake of Nazism (has) raised its head” again in Ukraine. Germany, too, she added, remains a Nazi regime.
Such propaganda is being relentlessly disseminated by multiple Kremlin media outlets. If the polls can be believed, many if not most Russians are buying it.
That may be further emboldening Mr. Putin who reportedly sent a letter to Mr. Biden warning of “unpredictable consequences” if he does not “stop the irresponsible militarization” of “the Kiev regime.”
In other words, Mr. Putin is instructing the U.S., a sovereign nation, not to help Ukraine, a sovereign nation, defend itself from his barbarism.
Similarly, Xi Jinping, Mr. Putin’s key ally and the ruler of the increasingly powerful Chinese empire, recently warned that he would “take strong measures” if the U.S. does not cease official interactions with the democratically elected government in Taiwan, which he calls a rogue province of China.
American isolationists on both the left and right will urge Mr. Biden to back off, to grant Russia and China their “spheres of influence.” If tyrants run roughshod over the world beyond our shores, why should that matter to Americans, ensconced as we are between two deep blue oceans?
What they have failed to learn from history is that appeasement never sates the appetites of those ambitious to conquer and subjugate others. Once men like Messrs. Putin and Xi believe they have the algorithm for making America and other free nations retreat and capitulate, they’ll use it again and again.
To paraphrase Churchill: No matter how much you feed the crocodile, in the end you’ll be the dessert.
No, we don’t want the new Cold War now being waged against us by Moscow, Beijing and their allies – notably the Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea – to turn hot. But attempting to make ourselves inoffensive to aggressors who despise and want to destroy us is no solution.
So, as noted, we’re treading on dangerous ground. It will require an unusually wise and courageous leader to walk the strategic tightrope and choose the least-bad policy options. Let’s acknowledge, too, that it’s been a while since we’ve had a leader who fits that description.
Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for the Washington Times. Follow him on Twitter @CliffordDMay. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Clifford D. May Founder & President · April 20, 2022
10. Ukraine war shows America could be outgunned without investing in energetics
Excerpts:
The Covid-19 pandemic revealed that global, just-in-time supply chains come with serious security risks. But vulnerabilities in energetics production reveal that, like so many of these problems, wounds are often self-inflicted. Dealing with a dangerous world means preparing to deter and if necessary, fight and win wars.
Investing in the resources we need, like munitions and the energetics that power them—is a crucial first step. Production at scale still matters. Absent a robust industrial base for munitions and energetics, America’s ability to fight and win a protracted war is in jeopardy.
Ukraine war shows America could be outgunned without investing in energetics - Breaking Defense
Energetic materials — critical chemicals that help determine the range, size, and explosive power of missiles and rockets — are in dangerously short supply for American interests, write Nadia Schadlow and Brady Helwig of the Hudson Institute.
on April 20, 2022 at 9:03 AM
Energetics make US weapons work – and the industrial base is dangerously thin. (U.S. Army Central Public Affairs)
With Ukraine’s military expending munitions as quickly as the US and its partners can get them to the beleaguered country, there are growing questions about whether all sides involved will start running low — including the quantity, and quality, of stockpiles back home. In a new opinion piece, former deputy national security advisor Nadia Schadlow and researcher Brady Helwig say that America’s energetic industrial base, already stretched thin, needs new attention in light of the war in Europe.
Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been a wake-up call. Footage of missile strikes and burned-out tanks reminds us that control of territory still matters, and that the explosive power behind munitions like missiles, rockets, and artillery is key to asserting control of the battlefield.
What these munitions have in common is that they rely on energetic materials — critical chemicals that help determine the range, size, and explosive power of missiles and rockets. Unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has underinvested in energetics and now faces serious supply chain vulnerabilities. If the United States is pulled into a protracted war, it could find itself outgunned, fast.
Energetics come in three main forms: explosives; propellants, which produce thrust; and pyrotechnics (think flares or fireworks). This means that better energetics offer major advantages in combat. In some cases, depending on the system, they can boost the range of missiles by 40 percent or more — allowing the targeting of an adversary from a safer distance — while also improving lethality, upping the likelihood a target is destroyed on the first try. Improved energetics can help the Department of Defense build smaller munitions that still pack a punch. At the operational level, defending allies and partners such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan from Chinese aggression will require an ample supply of munitions powered by energetic materials.
Yet the supply chain for a broad range of energetics has badly eroded, which could limit US access to munitions during a crisis.
According to a 2018 DoD study, China is “the sole source or a primary supplier for a number of critical energetic materials used in munitions and missiles.” The munitions supply chain also features an alarmingly high number of single points of failure: of 198 second- and third-tier suppliers in the industrial base, 98 percent rely on a single or sole source. And the materials that are produced in the United States tend to be made in in a handful of outdated, government-owned facilities using 20th century equipment.
Even worse, the United States has fallen behind our adversaries in deploying advanced energetics. Both Russia and China employ CL-20, the most powerful non-nuclear explosive in the world. American scientists invented CL-20 in the 1980’s, but bureaucratic hurdles, coupled with complacency as the Cold War ended, meant that DoD never deployed it at scale. Instead, the US military still relies on many of the same materials it used during World War II.
Meanwhile, China may be positioning itself to lead the world in the energetics of the future. Data from Georgetown’s Center for Strategic and Emerging Technologies suggests that over the past five years Chinese scientists have published nearly seven times as many papers relating to energetics materials than have their American counterparts. And the Energetics Technology Center has pointed out that China “heavily supports four top academic institutions to perform energetics research and develop their workforce.”
The US lags behind advanced energetics research. “I was away from the energetics field for 31 years,” noted a former DoD scientist we spoke with. “While I was gone, nothing changed.”
To make up for years of underinvestment, Congress and the White House must partner with the Defense Department to bring the US energetics enterprise into the 21st century. This effort must start with a shift in mindset — our national security leaders must recognize that energetics, and munitions more broadly, cannot be taken for granted. DoD should provide a clear demand signal for new compounds and require its weapons programs to incentivize greater range, speed, and lethality.
Second, the White House and Congress must work with the Department of Defense to rebuild energetics production in the United States and allied nations. The US needs a resilient supply chain that does not depend on a handful of outdated facilities and the good graces of our adversaries. The Defense Production Act could be used to provide loans, grants, and purchase agreements to startups and defense companies willing to invest in these critical compounds. And defense leaders can use the AUKUS pact to boost production capacity and create munitions stockpiles, building on Australia’s announcement that it will invest $1 billion to build a Sovereign Guided Weapons Enterprise.
Third, Congress and Department leadership should boost R&D funding for energetics to encourage the development of new compounds, using artificial intelligence and machine learning to drive new breakthroughs.
The Covid-19 pandemic revealed that global, just-in-time supply chains come with serious security risks. But vulnerabilities in energetics production reveal that, like so many of these problems, wounds are often self-inflicted. Dealing with a dangerous world means preparing to deter and if necessary, fight and win wars.
Investing in the resources we need, like munitions and the energetics that power them—is a crucial first step. Production at scale still matters. Absent a robust industrial base for munitions and energetics, America’s ability to fight and win a protracted war is in jeopardy.
Dr. Nadia Schadlow is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute, where she serves as co-chair of the Hamilton Commission on Securing America’s National Security Innovation Base. Schadlow is also on the Advisory Board of the Krach Institute for Tech and Diplomacy. Brady Helwig is a research associate at Hudson Institute.
11. Russian Offensive Bears Down on Donbas as West Races to Supply Ukraine With More Weapons
Learn, Adapt, Anticipate.
Many photos at the link below.
Russian Offensive Bears Down on Donbas as West Races to Supply Ukraine With More Weapons
Ukraine is reinforcing units as it also counterattacks southeast of Kharkiv
Updated Apr. 20, 2022 9:24 pm ET
PAVLOHRAD, Ukraine—Russian forces Wednesday made incremental gains in their offensive in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, as Western nations rushed more weapons to the outgunned Ukrainian military.
In the Donbas port city of Mariupol, besieged by Russian forces since late February, the remaining Ukrainian defenders warned that time was running out and asked to be evacuated to a third country, alongside the wounded and the civilians sheltering in the shrinking area under Ukrainian control. Russia has insisted on an unconditional surrender and kept pounding the Ukrainian forces—who are mostly holed up in the sprawling Azovstal steel plant—with artillery and airstrikes.
With the fighting intensifying, the Biden administration is considering sending another $800 million in military aid to Ukraine to boost the country’s defenses against Russia. President Biden is scheduled to provide an update on the conflict Thursday morning.
An image from a video made available by the Russian Defense Ministry on Wednesday showed a launch of Russia’s new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile at the Plesetsk cosmodrome in northwest Russia.
PHOTO: RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY PRESS SERVICE/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK
Ukraine’s General Staff said in its Wednesday briefings that Russian forces had tried to attack the Ukrainian-controlled part of Donbas from the north and northwest, with artillery barrages followed by probes of weak points in Ukrainian defenses all along the front line.
After seizing the town of Kreminna over the weekend and advancing toward the villages of Torske and Zelena Dolyna, Russian forces are regrouping ahead of a renewed push toward the town of Lyman, northeast of Slovyansk, one of the main cities in Ukrainian-held Donbas, the Ukrainian military added. Russian forces also entered the village of Dibrovne north of Slovyansk, the military said.
Ukraine is reinforcing its units in the area while also trying to counterattack southeast of the city of Kharkiv, in an effort to disrupt Russian supply lines and cut off the forces that massed for the main thrust of the offensive in the town of Izyum. Ukrainian forces have also destroyed a dam on the Oskol river, leading to flooding in the area and making roads and fields impassable to Russian armor—a tactic that Ukrainian defenders successfully deployed northwest of the capital, Kyiv, in March.
Watch: Putin Tells Troops Not to Storm Mariupol Holdout
Watch: Putin Tells Troops Not to Storm Mariupol Holdout
Play video: Watch: Putin Tells Troops Not to Storm Mariupol Holdout
The Russian president said the military operation in Mariupol was a “success,” although Ukrainian forces were still resisting in a strategic steel plant. Separatists in Donbas announced that children there started pro-Russia schooling. Photo: Maximilian Clarke/Zuma Press
Days before launching the war on Feb. 24, Mr. Putin recognized the independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, the two statelets that were carved out with Russian assistance in about one-third of Donbas in 2014. Moscow considers the entirety of Donbas as the territory of these republics, and—after failing to seize Kyiv in the first phase of the war—has proclaimed the “liberation” of Donbas as its key aim.
Ukraine on Wednesday endorsed a call by the United Nations for a humanitarian cease-fire during Orthodox Easter in the coming weekend, saying it could facilitate the evacuation of civilians from Mariupol and other towns.
Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, Iryna Vereshchuk, wrote on Telegram that plans to evacuate civilians from Mariupol fell apart Wednesday and another attempt will be made on Thursday.
While Russian forces have withdrawn from the northern regions of Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy after sustaining severe losses, they have continued to occupy most of the southern Ukrainian regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, as well as a large part of the Kharkiv region. The war has displaced 12 million people, or nearly one-third of the country’s prewar population, according to the U.N.
Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-most-populous city before the war began, is subjected to daily artillery barrages that have reduced many neighborhoods to rubble. “The aggressor is trying to frighten us, to break our spirit—but it will fail,” Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov said Wednesday, adding that 1,929 high-rises in the city have been destroyed by Russian attacks. “Shelling is becoming more widespread and more cruel with every day.”
Ukrainian officials warn that seizing Donbas is just an intermediate objective for Mr. Putin, and that his initial war aim—destroying Ukraine as an independent state—hasn’t changed. Should Moscow succeed in encircling and destroying Ukraine’s best units in Donbas, it could push forward and try taking Kyiv once again, they say.
A pro-Russian tank in front of a damaged apartment building in Mariupol.
PHOTO: ALEXANDER ERMOCHENKO/REUTERS
A local resident weeps in front of a building in Mariupol that was destroyed.
PHOTO: ALEXANDER ERMOCHENKO/REUTERS
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Wednesday that Russia had handed Ukraine a draft document with Moscow’s terms for a peace deal, the latest development in so-far fruitless negotiations that began in February.
“The ball is in their court, we are waiting for an answer,” Mr. Peskov told reporters, without offering details.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told reporters after meeting with European Council President Charles Michel on Wednesday that he hasn’t received the Russian proposal.
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres sent formal letters to the Russian and Ukrainian missions asking for meetings with Messrs. Putin and Zelensky in an effort to end the war.
Talks have stalled in recent weeks, with both sides waiting for the outcome of the unfolding battle for Donbas. While progress has been made in trading Ukraine’s aspirations to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for international security guarantees, Ukraine is resisting Russian demands to recognize the separation of Crimea and Donbas from the country, or to demilitarize, negotiators say.
The U.S. on Wednesday targeted another Russian bank, several dozen firms owned by a blacklisted Russian oligarch and—for the first time—a cryptocurrency-mining firm, in a tranche of sanctions marking a new phase in the West’s pressure campaign against Moscow.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Ukraine Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko walked out of a meeting of the Group of 20 major economies, joining other officials in leaving the room, when Russia’s finance minister started speaking over video, according to people familiar with the matter.
A damaged building in Kharkiv, northeastern Ukraine.
PHOTO: FELIPE DANA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Medical workers put a dead body into a bag in a residential area of Kharkiv that was hit by Russian artillery shelling.
PHOTO: ROMAN PILIPEY/SHUTTERSTOCK
In a sign that Russia continues to sustain heavy losses in Ukraine, including among its senior officers, Russian media Wednesday reported the combat death of Col. Mikhail Nagamov, commander of the engineering-sapper regiment of the Western military district. Meduza, an independent Russian publication, meanwhile, said 37 sailors died and an unknown number were missing as a result of the sinking last week of missile cruiser Moskva, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Russia has said it evacuated the entire crew, even though several families of conscripted sailors have since told Russian media that their sons had died in the attack.
In Mariupol, the deputy commander of the Azov regiment that is leading the resistance there, Capt. Svyatoslav Palomar, said in a video message Wednesday that the Ukrainian troops are ready to leave the city with their arms, taking with them their wounded and their dead, if their safety would be guaranteed by a third party. He said senior Ukrainian negotiators were willing to come to Mariupol to meet their Russian counterparts to strike such a deal. Ukrainian forces in Mariupol won’t surrender to Russia, he added.
In parallel to the fight for Donbas, Ukrainian and Russian forces are engaged in battles in the southern region of Kherson, most of which is occupied by Moscow. Ukrainian officials say that occupying authorities there plan next month to carry out a bogus referendum on creating a nominally independent “Kherson people’s republic,” along the lines of the pro-Russian statelets in Donetsk and Luhansk.
On Wednesday, an unknown gunman in Kherson assassinated one of the few prominent pro-Russian activists there, Valeriy Kuleshov. Anton Gerashchenko, an adviser to Ukraine’s Interior Ministry, wrote on social media that Mr. Kuleshov was a collaborator with Russian forces and a candidate to become Kherson’s police chief under Russian authority.
In the unfolding battle for Donbas, Ukraine possesses a fraction of the artillery and armor that Russia has deployed to the front line. Moscow also has an overwhelming advantage in aviation, using jet fighters, helicopter gunships and armed drones. It is firing dozens of cruise missiles daily at targets in Donbas and across the country, with Ukraine’s weak air defenses able to shoot down only a handful.
Ukraine’s government has been asking its Western partners for months to supply it with more heavy weapons, particularly long-range artillery, tanks, wide-area air-defense systems and aircraft. The U.S. and some allies are only now beginning to respond to these requests, moving from the earlier policy of mostly providing portable short-range weapons such as Javelin and NLAW antitank missiles and Stinger antiaircraft missiles.
A Ukrainian serviceman stands beside a BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launch system in the Kharkiv region as Russia’s relentless attack on Ukraine continued on Wednesday.
PHOTO: SERHII NUZHNENKO/REUTERS
Ukrainian soldiers on what was left of a bridge in Irpin on the outskirts of Kyiv on Wednesday.
PHOTO: EMILIO MORENATTI/ASSOCIATED PRESS
“If we had obtained in the first week of the war what we are receiving today, it would have been much more useful for Ukraine and the cause of freedom in Europe,” Mr. Zelensky said in his Tuesday night address. “And if we obtain now what some of our partners plan to transfer to Ukraine in coming weeks, it would help save the lives of thousands and thousands of people.”
President Biden said Wednesday that the U.S. and its allies were working to provide more military supplies to Ukraine.
“Weapons and ammunition are flowing in daily,” Mr. Biden said during a meeting with top U.S. defense officials at the White House.
Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said Tuesday that between eight and 10 plane loads of weapons for Ukraine land daily at transshipment sites in Europe, from where the equipment gets taken into Ukraine by road.
The Biden administration hasn’t provided details about what could be included in a new $800 million package in military aid for Ukraine, which could be announced later this week. The new aid would come a week after Mr. Biden authorized an earlier $800 million package in weapons for Kyiv, which included for the first time heavy artillery—18 howitzer guns. Unlike Soviet-model artillery pieces in the Ukrainian arsenal, those guns use 155 mm ammunition, which is much more readily available in the West.
Mr. Kirby said that these howitzers, as well as 40,000 rounds of ammunition, would be in Ukraine within days.
The leaders of Canada and the U.K. also have pledged to supply Ukraine with more artillery. “This will become an artillery conflict, they need support with more artillery, that is what we will be giving them,” British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said.
A woman getting bread being distributed in Chernihiv, Ukraine.
PHOTO: ADRIENNE SURPRENANT/MYOP FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Aid delivered to residents in Borodyanka, Ukraine.
PHOTO: ADRIENNE SURPRENANT/MYOP FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Evan Gershkovich contributed to this article.
12. US Army veteran: Fighting in Ukraine ‘more dangerous than Afghanistan was’
What we might call a blinding flash of the obvious (BFO). But we need to recognize this. We must have great respect for the Ukrainians.
US Army veteran: Fighting in Ukraine ‘more dangerous than Afghanistan was’
A U.S. Army veteran volunteering to fight in Ukraine for its army said Wednesday that the conflict between the country and Russia is “more dangerous than Afghanistan.”
“So they came here and they expect to get it done in three or four days. Well, you know what? I told you that there are a lot of civilian casualties outside of Kyiv, there are also a lot of Russian casualties as well,” Popovich told Sciutto.
“Which for us is a good thing to see our military completely wipe them off. I tell you honestly, I am surprised. I was not … I did not think that it’s our military is so capable. But you know, we showed resilience, we showed that we are strong and capable.”
The State Department warned Americans who volunteer in the fight to defend Ukraine that they may face capture by Russian forces and possible death.
Popovich told Sciutto that people should “think twice” before joining the fight, noting that Russian forces are capable of creating more damage.
Popovich, who is of Ukrainian descent, served a tour during the American war in Afghanistan and was a college student before he joined Ukrainian forces amid the Russian invasion.
The war has continued for more than two months, and Ukraine alleged that Russia has continued to engage in war crimes, including the killing and rape of civilians. Five million refugees have fled the country since the war began on Feb. 24.
“It’s more dangerous than Afghanistan was because right here we have to deal with their artillery, with their tanks, with their missiles. It’s — it can become pretty hard and pretty dangerous here,” Popovich said.
“So if you want to come here, think twice. I’m not saying it’s a suicide mission. But I’m saying that there is a big chance that you can get damage you can get killed or you can get captured. So just think twice, and if you want to come here, thank you.”
13. Army Golden Knights demo at Nats Park causes brief Capitol evacuation
In the voice of the captain in the film Cool Hand Luke: "What we've got here is failure to communicate."
Army Golden Knights demo at Nats Park causes brief Capitol evacuation
armytimes.com · by Michael Balsamo, The Associated Press · April 21, 2022
This story has been updated with a statement from Army Recruiting Command
The U.S. Capitol was briefly evacuated Wednesday evening after police identified an aircraft that they said posed “a probable threat” — but the plane was actually carrying members of the U.S. Army Golden Knights, who then parachuted into Nationals Park for a pregame demonstration.
The alert from the U.S. Capitol Police sent congressional staffers fleeing from the Capitol and legislative building around 6:30 p.m.
The incident suggested a stunning communications failure between the military and the Capitol Police, all the more remarkable because of Washington’s focus on improving security since the January 6, 2021, attack on the building by supporters of then-President Donald Trump.
The Army is investigating whether it followed all procedures to coordinate the event, according to a statement released to Military Times.
“We are aware of the issues that occurred during the U.S. Army Golden Knights parachute team’s demonstration at the Washington Nationals baseball game as part of Military Appreciation Night April 20. We are reviewing all aspects of the event to ensure all procedures were followed appropriately to coordinate both the flight and the parachute demonstration,” wrote Kelli LeGaspi, a spokeswoman for Army Recruiting Command.
Many who work on Capitol Hill have remained on edge more than a year after hundreds of pro-Trump rioters pushed their way past overwhelmed police officers, broke through windows and doors and ransacked the Capitol as Congress was voting to certify Joe Biden’s electoral win.
The U.S. Army Golden Knights jump out of their aircraft before a baseball game between the Washington Nationals and the Arizona Diamondbacks at Nationals Park, Wednesday, April 20, 2022, in Washington. (Alex Brandon/AP)
In Wednesday’s incident, the aircraft, a twin-engine plane, took off from Joint Base Andrews in Maryland and had been circling inside heavily restricted airspace close to the Capitol when the alert was sent. Radar tracking data shows the plane, a De Havilland Twin Otter, remained clear of the prohibited airspace over the Capitol Building and other government complexes at all times. Air traffic control recordings capture the army plane coordinating its flight with the control tower at nearby Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
Investigators were still working to determine why the event wasn’t properly coordinated with law enforcement officials in Washington, two people familiar with the matter told The Associated Press. Multiple federal agencies began scrambling officials as the plane circled overhead.
The capital region is defended by several surface-to-air missile sites, as well as military aircrews on round-the-clock alert. It did not appear that any of those systems were scrambled.
Officials believe, based on a preliminary review, the pilot may have not properly reported taking off or had appropriate clearance, the people said. They were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly and spoke to the AP on condition of anonymity.
The plane landed back at Andrews around 6:50 p.m. after the parachuters descended into the middle of the field at Nationals Park. The stadium, home of the Washington Nationals baseball team, is a little more than a mile away from the U.S. Capitol.
Associated Press writers Mary Clare Jalonick and Alan Fram contributed to this report.
14. Russia’s ‘Satan 2’ missile changes little for U.S., scholars say
Russia’s ‘Satan 2’ missile changes little for U.S., scholars say
Mary Ilyushina and
Yesterday at 9:21 p.m. EDT
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Wednesday that his military successfully test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile with the potential to carry a large nuclear payload, but the Pentagon said it was not a significant threat to the United States.
“This truly unique weapon will strengthen the combat potential of our armed forces, reliably ensure Russia’s security in the face of external threats, and will provide food for thought to those who in the heat of frenzied aggressive rhetoric try to threaten our country,” Putin said in televised remarks.
The RS-28 Sarmat, which NATO has dubbed “Satan 2,” is considered Russia’s most powerful ICBM: a super-heavy, thermonuclear-armed intercontinental-range ballistic missile.
The missile that was introduced during a 2018 Russian state-of-the-nation address was the “next generation” of weaponry that could breach “any missile defense” system, Putin claimed at the time.
Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters Wednesday that the United States did not consider the weapon a threat to Washington or its allies. Defense policy and strategy scholars told The Washington Post that although the weapon sounds intimidating, the escalating threats Putin has made since his unprovoked Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine should be more concerning.
The Sarmat was intended to replace the Soviet-designed Voevoda, which was designed in 1962 with the capability to carry three warheads. The Sarmat weighs 200 metric tons (220 tons) and has a longer range, allowing it to fly over the North or South poles and strike targets anywhere in the world, Putin said in 2018. He added that the Sarmat carries a larger number of more powerful nuclear warheads. The Pentagon minimized the features of the weapon and said that “the American people should rest assured that we are fully prepared.”
Russia initially planned to finish Sarmat trials in 2021 and begin deploying it to the army soon after, but several test launches, considered late-stage trials in arms development, were postponed until 2022, the state-run Tass news agency reported last year.
“Sarmat is the most powerful missile with the longest range of destruction of targets in the world, which will significantly increase the combat power of our country’s strategic nuclear forces,” the Russian Defense Ministry said Wednesday, announcing a successful test launch from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk region.
Putin praised the Sarmat engineers in his speech Wednesday for creating a purely “domestic” product. Rounds of economic sanctions imposed on Russia over the years, most recently for its invasion of Ukraine, have essentially barred Russia from importing any dual-purpose goods that could help advance its military complex and have left many key industries that rely heavily on imports, such as aviation, vulnerable to production and maintenance disruptions.
The United States and Canada this week pledged to send more heavy-duty weapons to Ukraine, and other nations have sent more tools to fight Russia’s invasion.
Russia has always had a substantial number of ICBMs that could strike the United States and Europe, said John Erath, senior policy director for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
Putin’s recent threats are more worrisome than the weapon itself, Erath said.
“We should be very concerned about this practice of making threats as an instrument of Russian policy [that] is gaining currency,” Erath said.
The Kremlin’s strategy of “escalate-to-deescalate” has included threats to use nuclear weapons since the early 2000s, according to Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the director of its Scowcroft Strategy Initiative.
Putin was making nuclear threats in his 2014 invasion of Ukraine, warning other nations about the consequences of interfering, said Kroenig, who is also a Georgetown University professor.
“Every time Biden says he doesn’t want escalations with Russia … the strategy is working,” Kroenig said. Putin “is making us cautious and limiting our activities to try to avoid nuclear war. The flip side of that is that he doesn’t want a nuclear war either. It’s bad for Putin, Russia and the war effort.”
After Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine, the United States postponed and subsequently canceled a planned test of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, a decision made to ensure that Russia would not misconstrue such a display of firepower — or use it as justification to escalate the hostilities in Ukraine.
Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman, said Russia had notified the United States in keeping with Russia’s obligations under New START, an arms-control treaty governing such nuclear-capable weapons that expires in early 2026. The United States was not surprised by the test, he added.
15. 3,000 of Russia’s feared Wagner mercenaries have already been killed in Ukraine after 8,000 were sent in
Wow. if this is accurate it is quite a statistic and I hope the Ukrainian strategic influence campaign can exploit this (of course this is probably the strategic influence campaign in action).
Maybe the Ukrainians will do us a great service and rid the world of the Wagner Group.
3,000 of Russia’s feared Wagner mercenaries have already been killed in Ukraine after 8,000 were sent in to boost Putin’s flagging invasion, British MPs are told
- The shadowy Private Military Company has been linked to a string of war crimes
- Wagner are used by the Kremlin to carry out dirty work at arms length from Putin
- It has been widely reported that they have been deployed by Putin in Ukraine
- Christo Grozev, executive director of the Bellingcat investigative website, said 3,000 of its members are thoughts to have been killed on the battlefield so far
- He said his sources inside the group told him their numbers were 'much higher' than had first been expected by Western officials
PUBLISHED: 12:34 EDT, 20 April 2022 | UPDATED: 02:46 EDT, 21 April 2022
Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers For Mailonline · April 20, 2022
Nearly 8,000 mercenaries from the notorious Wagner Group have been deployed by Russia in Ukraine to boost Vladimir Putin's flagging invasion, but have suffered heavy casualties, British MPs have been told.
Giving evidence to the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Christo Grozev, executive director of the Bellingcat investigative website, said 3,000 members of the private military company (PMC) were thought to have been killed on the battlefield.
The shadowy group - which has been linked to a string of killings, rapes and war crimes around the world - is known as Putin's private army which carries out his dirty work at an arm's length from the state, while giving him plausible deniability.
Before Ukraine, they were active in Syria, and developed a reputation for brutality, but also in some cases for recklessness - such as the 2018 Battle of Khasham, where as many as 200 Russia PMCs were killed, according to some estimates.
Grozev said sources within the group - the largest of three mercenary groups involved in the conflict - had told them that the numbers fighting alongside Russian forces had been 'much higher' than had been expected.
Nearly 8,000 mercenaries from the notorious Wagner Group have been deployed by Russia in Ukraine, but have suffered heavy casualties, British MPs have been told. Pictured: A fighter with a PMC Wagner Group bade is seen in Donetsk
They included 200 personnel sent to Kyiv before the conflict in a failed mission to 'scout out and assassinate' political figures, while a 'large number' were deployed with convoys which advanced on the capital from Belarus.
He said they had also been present in Bucha, where some of the worst evidence of alleged war crimes had been discovered.
Mr Grozev said they had been told by one former group member that some chose to fight because they enjoyed killing.
'He said that about 10 percent to 15 percent are sociopaths, people who go there just because they want to kill. They are bloodthirsty, they are not just adrenalin junkies,' he told the committee.
Dr Sean McFate, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank and professor at the US National Defence University, said the group's brutality in the conflicts such as the Syrian civil war was 'part of their selling point' as far as Russian president Vladimir Putin was concerned.
'If you look at Bucha and others, there is the same pattern you saw in Syria, where they would interrogate, torture and behead people,' he said. 'One reason I think it has become one of Putin's weapons of choice is it allows some plausible deniability between excesses on the ground, failures on the ground, and policy.'
However Dr McFate said that to date, western countries had not taken the threat of the group very seriously, and had not tracked the movements of its members.
'This has emboldened them (Russia) to use this as a stratagem for national expansion, national interests,' he said.
'We have not done a good enough job in tracking them. We see them as cheap Hollywood villains, but in fact they are not.'
Mr Grozev said that while imposing more sanctions on the group's head, Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as 'Putin's chef', would have little impact, it may be more effective targeting individual group members who like to holiday abroad with their families.
'The knowledge that they do is a cause of ridicule about western sanctions because this spreads through the rumour mill,' he said.
'So stopping all of these people being able to travel internationally, at least to the western world, might be much, much bigger than slapping one more sanction on Prigozhin.'
Giving evidence to the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Christo Grozev, executive director of the Bellingcat investigative website, said 3,000 members of the Wagner Group have been killed in Ukraine. Pictured: Grozev attends the 'Navalny' New York Premiere at Walter Reade Theater on April 6, 2022 in New York City
In light of Russia's startling losses and their new assault on the Donbas, the head of the Wagner Group is believed to have made the trip to Ukraine to oversee his men's deployment in the east.
Yevgeny Prigozhin - a man known as 'Putin's Chef' - is now believed to be on the ground in the Donbas to oversee operations, though the wealthy friend of Putin is not a military veteran.
'Prigozhin, who has no military experience and is the financier and organiser of Wagner Group rather than its military commander, is likely in Donbas to co-ordinate recruitment and financing of Wagner Group operations rather than to command combat operations,' said the Institute for War Studies, an American think tank.
Rami Abdurrahman, who heads the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an opposition war monitor, has said that even more than the 8,000 Wagner mercenaries detailed by Mr Grozev are in Ukraine.
Abdurrahman has said that 18,000 Wagner fighters are taking part in the conflict, in addition to 700 fighters from Syrian Brig. Gen. Suheil al-Hassan's 25th Special Missions Forces Division, known in Syria as the 'Tiger Force.'
The 700 men left Syria over the past weeks to fight along Russian forces, Abdurrahman said. The numbers could not be independently confirmed.
Pro-government activists posted videos over the past two weeks on social media showing members of the Tiger Force performing military drills including parachuting from helicopters.
Russian officers appeared in one of the videos advising the paratroopers inside a helicopter as al-Hassan praised the young men by tapping on their heads. It was not immediately clear if the videos were new.
Abdurrahman said there are also volunteers from the Russian-trained 5th Division; the Baath brigades, which is the armed wing of Assad's ruling Baath party; and the Palestinian Quds Brigade, made up of Palestinian refugees in Syria.
All have fought alongside the Russian military in Syria's war.
'The Russians are looking for experienced fighters. They don't want anyone who was not trained by the Russians,' Abdurrahman said.
The Tiger Force took credit for some of the biggest government victories in the 11-year conflict. It was involved in a monthslong Russian-backed campaign into the rebels' last enclave, located in the northwest province of Idlib, which ended in March 2020 with government forces capturing a vital north-south highway - though rebels remain in control of the enclave.
A mural praises the Russian Wagner group and its mercenaries fighting in Ukraine on March 30, 2022 in Belgrade, Serbia
Christo Grozev said Wagner had been present in Bucha, where some of the worst evidence of alleged war crimes had been discovered. Pictured: A general view of the cemetery in Irpin where three dug graves await the next funerals on Tuesday, April 19, in the outskirts of Kyiv
Meanwhile, a European official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Russia has a total of 10,000 to 20,000 foreign fighters in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region.
The official said they are a mix of mercenaries from Russia's private Wagner Group and Russian proxy fighters from Syria and Libya.
Kremlin officials boasted early in the invasion that thousands of experienced fighters from the Middle East would join Russian forces.
However, military analysts say only a small number appears to have arrived in Russia for training before being deployed to the front lines, but they say that could change as Russia prepares for a full-scale offensive on Donbas.
U.S. officials and activists monitoring Syria say the Russians have been actively recruiting. Rami Abdurrahman leads the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. He reported that about 40,000 people have registered so far.
Rayan Maarouf of Suwayda24, an activist collective that covers IS activities in the Syrian desert, said fighters were promised no less than $600 a month. That's a huge sum of money amid widespread unemployment in Syria.
Analysts say fighters from Syria are more likely to be deployed in coming weeks, especially after Gen. Alexander Dvornikov was named war commander.
Dvornikov is well acquainted with the paramilitary forces Russia trained in Syria.
Though some question how effective Syrian fighters would be in Ukraine, they could be brought in if more forces are needed to besiege cities or to make up for rising casualties.
Syrian and Palestinian officials in Syria have played down reports of fighters heading to Ukraine. The Syrian government is likely wary of having Syrian fighters flock to Ukraine, opening opportunities at the front lines that its opponents could exploit.
In a potentially worrying sign for the Syrian government, Russia has significantly scaled down its operations in Syria since the war in Ukraine started, with fewer airstrikes targeting IS or opposition positions in Idlib.
'Any change in the posture of Russian forces or pro-regime militias creates security gaps that anti-regime actors including Turkey, ISIS, al-Qaida and Syrian opposition groups can exploit,' the ISW report said.
Muhannad Haj Ali, a former legislator and a commander with the armed wing of Syria's ruling Baath party said no Syrians have gone to fight in Ukraine and that he didn't expect any to go.
He said he was certain Russia will win in Ukraine without any need for Syrians' help.
'The way the operations are going is clear indication that Ukraine will not be another Afghanistan,' he said.
Daily Mail · by Chris Jewers For Mailonline · April 20, 2022
16. Pentagon chief speaks for 1st time to Chinese counterpart
To be a fly on the wall for this.
Excerpts:
In Wednesday’s phone call, Austin echoed Biden’s messages on the importance of managing U.S.-Chinese strategic competition, including in the nuclear, space and cyber arenas, and improving crisis communications between the global powers, the senior defense official said.
Austin also raised U.S. concerns about what Washington views as Chinese military provocations against Taiwan, the island democracy that Beijing has insisted must ultimately be united with the Chinese mainland, the official said. He also expressed U.S. concerns about Chinese activities in the South China Sea and East China Sea and raised U.S. worries about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
The long-strained U.S.-China relationship may have reached a new low with the Russian invasion. At times, Beijing has sought to distance itself from the conflict but avoided directly criticizing Moscow. At other moments, Beijing’s actions have been provocative, including amplifying unverified Russian claims that Ukraine ran chemical and biological weapons labs with U.S. support.
Pentagon chief speaks for 1st time to Chinese counterpart
WASHINGTON (AP) — Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Wednesday spoke with his Chinese counterpart for the first time since becoming Pentagon chief more than a year ago, breaking a communications impasse that American officials saw as increasingly dangerous amid concern that Beijing might provide military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Austin, who calls China the U.S. military’s leading long-term challenge but has been forced to focus heavily on Russia this year, requested the telephone conversation with Gen. Wei Fenge after months of failed effort to speak with Gen. Xu Qiliang, the highest ranking uniformed officer in the Communist Party military structure.
Austin wanted to talk to Xu because, as deputy chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission, which controls the People’s Liberation Army, Xu is more influential than Wei. But Beijing insisted on sticking to protocol and having Austin talk to Wei, who officially is his counterpart as defense minister but ranks below Xu in the hierarchy and has less military operational clout.
Austin’s predecessors had typically spoken with Wei, mostly recently on Aug. 6, 2020 when then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper raised with him a U.S. request for greater transparency on the origins of Covid-19 and other issues.
Austin had no expectation of a major breakthrough on key issues with Wei when he made the call on a secure telephone link that was established by the Pentagon and China’s Ministry of National Defense in 2008, according to a senior defense official who was involved in the arrangement and spoke on condition of anonymity in advance of the call, which has not been publicly announced.
Austin intended the call, which lasted about 45 minutes, as a follow-up to President Joe Biden’s video call with President Xi Jinping on March 18 in which he laid out stiff consequences the Chinese would face if they provided military or economic assistance for Russia’s war in Ukraine. The White House gave no indication that Biden received any assurances from the Chinese leader, and it was not immediately clear how Wei responded Wednesday.
For years Washington has portrayed China as seeking to reshape the international order to better assert its national interests and to build enough military strength to eventually supplant the United States as the dominant power in Asia.
The U.S.-China relationship has become more strained on multiple levels since the start of Biden’s presidency. Biden has repeatedly criticized China for military provocations against Taiwan, human rights abuses against ethnic minorities and efforts to squelch pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong. U.S. officials also have expressed concern about signs that China is vastly increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal, although it remains fall smaller than America’s.
In Wednesday’s phone call, Austin echoed Biden’s messages on the importance of managing U.S.-Chinese strategic competition, including in the nuclear, space and cyber arenas, and improving crisis communications between the global powers, the senior defense official said.
Austin also raised U.S. concerns about what Washington views as Chinese military provocations against Taiwan, the island democracy that Beijing has insisted must ultimately be united with the Chinese mainland, the official said. He also expressed U.S. concerns about Chinese activities in the South China Sea and East China Sea and raised U.S. worries about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
The long-strained U.S.-China relationship may have reached a new low with the Russian invasion. At times, Beijing has sought to distance itself from the conflict but avoided directly criticizing Moscow. At other moments, Beijing’s actions have been provocative, including amplifying unverified Russian claims that Ukraine ran chemical and biological weapons labs with U.S. support.
American officials have expressed concern at the prospect of an Moscow-Beijing alliance of authoritarian states. In February, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that the friendship between their counties “has no limits,” although it remains to be seen whether the subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine has cooled Xi’s interest in closer ties.
The Biden administration’s first high-level meeting with Chinese officials came in March 2021 when Secretary of State Anton Blinken and Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, met in Anchorage, Alaska, with their Chinese counterparts, who surprised their American hosts by complaining about a litany of issues.
Since then, there have been a succession of phone and video calls between Blinken and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi but relatively few in-person meetings. Those calls have been dominated largely by issues of the day ranging from the situation in Afghanistan, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea and Iran. Blinken has yet to visit China and the most senior U.S. diplomat to travel to the country has been Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman.
AP Diplomatic writer Matthew Lee in Washington and AP writer Joe McDonald in Beijing contributed to this report.
17. A Tale of Two Bears: Russian Experience in Syria and Ukraine
Very thoughtful analysis and recommendations.
Excerpts:
Russian operations in Syria merged a robust advise-and-assist capability with technological advances at the tactical level, establishing a template for future Russian military successes. As Russian forces adjust and adapt from the shambolic nature of their operations in Ukraine, Syria will likely provide the organizational baseline by which Russian forces attempt to right the ship. While the ongoing fight against the Ukrainian military poses an entirely different challenge, Russian operations to target resistance elements in rear areas will likely bear more than a passing resemblance to their formula for success in Syria. US irregular warfare practitioners should apply a nuanced understanding of the adaptations in Russian force composition and integrated technology when predicting Russia’s response to Ukrainian resistance in occupied zones.
US practitioners cannot assume that unconventional warfare training, planning, and thinking built around historical paradigms is adequate preparation to conduct irregular warfare against a contemporary Russian CIW capability. Nor can they simply incorporate new enemy weapons capabilities as planning factors and assume that the opponent will behave the same. Irregular warfare practitioners deploying in proximity to Russian forces must understand the threat as modular, multilayered, and employed differently from the older stereotypes of Russia’s military capabilities. Although Russian performance against the Ukrainian military has so far proven far less effective than previously assumed, Russia remains a capable and potent threat with an impressive track record of suppressing civil unrest and insurgency.
A Tale of Two Bears: Russian Experience in Syria and Ukraine - Modern War Institute
Over the opening phase of their invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces have struggled to achieve their most ambitious objectives. In the face of spirited Ukrainian resistance, the Russian advance has slowed, and losses of men and equipment have been substantial, even if hotly debated. Russia’s difficulties have surprised some Western observers, who expected a rapid victory. Russian malaise is even more surprising considering recent experience in Syria, where Russian forces demonstrated efficient use of drones and tailored force structure—elements they have failed to effectively implement in Ukraine thus far.
Although Russian forces have yet to subdue the Ukrainian military, in certain areas of the country, such as the southern front and recently occupied portions of the Donbas, Ukrainian resistance forces may soon face Russian counter–irregular warfare (CIW) capabilities honed over the past decade in Syria. The current conflict remains predominantly a conventional fight, with the Russian military focused on defeating the uniformed Ukrainian military. The last time Russia faced a comparable foe was the 2008 Georgian campaign, which also exposed deep flaws within the military. However, as Russian forces attempt to secure their rear areas and consolidate control of territorial gains, they will likely increasingly employ CIW methods.
Understanding how Russia employed CIW in Syria can give a fuller picture of potential Russian capabilities and illuminate the challenges faced by a future Ukrainian insurgency in occupied zones. For US practitioners, as Russia once again proves itself to be an enduring security challenge for the West, understanding the methods Russia has used successfully in the past to defeat formidable irregular opponents is more important than ever.
Those Who Can, Advise
Russian operations in Syria leaned heavily on an advise-assist-accompany model incorporating operators from the Russian Special Operations Forces Command (KSSO). Although no strangers to using indigenous forces, the Russian military has often left relationships with those forces to the Russian intelligence services. Spetsnaz (special assignment forces) have focused instead on direct action and reconnaissance missions. In Syria, however, KSSO troops demonstrated an ability to advise and augment indigenous formations. The Russian CIW model now includes a viable foreign internal defense capability. After the fall of Aleppo in 2016, KSSO elements augmented Syrian Arab forces with reconnaissance and airstrikes, and led trainees on raids in Recondo-style live-fire exercises. Although the bulk of Russian forces in Ukraine remain focused on large-scale combat operations, the incorporation of Chechen forces and Donetsk People’s Republic units in the southern offensive against Mariupol could portend a similar approach if these regions are occupied for the long term.
The Russian force composition in Syria reflected lessons learned from operations in the North Caucasus and Africa. Whereas previous CIW operations used traditional Russian divisions executing conventional warfare writ small, the Russian expeditionary force in Syria employed military police units composed of deliberately recruited Muslim servicemen to secure humanitarian convoys, escort journalists onto the battlefield, and prevent sectarian violence by patrolling recently pacified regions in the country. The Russian military police concept is theoretically an adoption of American equivalents during the mid-2000s, but the Russians have expanded their military policemen as a staple of stability operations. In occupied Kherson, this has manifested in an overt reliance on Rozgvardia forces to oppose initial civil resistance.
In Syria, Russia also shifted its force structure to emulate aspects of the Western concept of population-centric counterinsurgency. As early as the siege of Aleppo, the Russian Reconciliation Center was involved in implementing an overtly conciliatory approach to separatist Syrian forces. Units from the Russian expeditionary forces executed what Western practitioners would identify as civil affairs operations. Delivering humanitarian aid, establishing field hospitals for wounded civilians, and negotiating neighborhood-level ceasefires became part of the Russian CIW strategy in Syria. Although the idea of a population-centric CIW effort seems hard to imagine when Russian forces are deliberately bombing medical infrastructure throughout Ukraine, Russian tactics were equally brutal in Syria. Similar civil affairs operations along the model of the reconciliation centers may emerge in occupied zones in Ukraine over the months to come.
Dogs of War on the Russian Leash
In addition to an indigenous approach and the incorporation of stability-focused units, the Russian integration of private military companies (PMCs) in Syria yielded an arguable success. Somewhat counterintuitively to Western observers, even the 2018 killing of several hundred Syrian government and Wagner Group fighters by US forces in Deir ez-Zor province bolstered the utility of PMCs to Russia. After the dust had settled, Russia had lost a significant number of fighters in direct confrontation with little backlash or media coverage at home. Given the current Russian information campaign to limit domestic blowback, recent recruiting drives for Wagner and its affiliates are not surprising. While Wagner Group mercenaries may have mothers, they do not carry the same cultural and historical weight as the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee.
Tactical Tech in CIW
Syria was a live-fire proving ground for new Russian technology, specifically drones and integrated mission command systems. Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flew tens of thousands of sorties against anti-Assad forces and provided increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to ground elements. During the drive to Aleppo in 2015, Russian drones enabled Syrian Tiger Force columns to quickly clear large portions of the city while protecting their flanks from ambushes. The Russian UAV fleet in Syria also provided aerial observation for airstrikes and artillery. Russian drones were used to shorten the kill chain by finding and fixing enemy forces, and for laser designating targets for precision strike. Although Russian drone integration in Ukraine has been noticeably absent during the first weeks of the conflict, reports of loitering munitions have increased in recent days. In occupied areas of Ukraine, drones will likely be used increasingly to target resistance elements.
Much like PMCs, drones provoke limited to no response from the Russian public when lost, and have been described as indispensable to military conflict by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Russia has thus far fallen short of its goal to integrate strike-capable drones, a priority during operations in Syria. Russia’s Orion drone platform executed a lukewarm kinetic debut in Ukraine striking military infrastructure. However, the prioritization of drones within the Russian Ministry of Defense, combined with the significant role they have played for Russian enemies in both Syria and Ukraine, will likely make them a fixture of the battlefield in the coming months.
Another new piece of technology debuted en masse in Syria was the Russian Strelets system. A command-and-control system similar to the Android Tactical Assault Kit in the US military, Strelets represents a milestone improvement in the Russian ability to track friendly forces, submit digital calls for fire, and manage the battlefield at a tactical level. Designed as a network of communications, data transfer, and blue force tracking, the Strelets system has been heralded by Russian sources as having reduced the time it takes Russian forces to clear ground and commit fires to eight to ten minutes. Although much like Russian advances in drones the Strelets itself is not an overly impressive piece of equipment when compared to Western equivalents, it is significant in its use by the Russian military in a CIW environment. During large-scale combat operations in Ukraine, Russian forces have been reminded of the dangers of unsecured communications platforms. Given the opportunity to consolidate gains in occupied zones, digital mission command platforms will likely be increasingly employed by Russian forces fighting resistance elements.
Challenges and Opportunities
Although far outshone by reports of Ukrainian Bayraktar use so far in the conflict, unmanned aerial vehicles are a major pillar of Russian warfare and are only gaining in importance and proficiency. The layered effect of strike capability from drones combined with digital command-and-control structures means the kill chain will be shorter when targeting Ukrainian resistance fighters than it was even in Syria. Combined with Russia’s historical trend of accepting high levels of collateral damage in targeting operations, it appears likely that Russia’s irregular foes will increasingly find drones to be one of the most lethal tools deployed against them.
The urban environment poses a distinct challenge for irregular fighters facing Russian forces. Population centers such as Kyiv and Mariupol remain vital to the success or failure of both sides. However, as highlighted in Grozny, Aleppo, Kharkiv, and Mariupol, Russia has historically chosen to destroy cities rather than fight for them. While irregular forces will need to continue to contest these areas, the risks of operating within the cities will remain high for defenders, the civilian population, and infrastructure. Bringing the fight to an urban area will likely result in Russia’s mass application of firepower rather than accepting the risks of facing continued armed resistance or fighting block by block.
Any discussion of the current war in Ukraine would be incomplete without emphasizing the critical role messaging and information operations have played thus far and will certainly continue to play as the conflict evolves. The Ukrainian military has put on a veritable masterclass in information operations so far in the conflict, from having young Russian captives call their mothers to highlighting the role of average Ukrainians in resistance and publishing photos of dead Russian soldiers to allow their families to identify them. Information operations will continue to play a hugely important role as Ukrainian resistance continues in occupied zones. Irregular warfare practitioners should take note of the effective layering of information platforms and tailoring of themes and messages for target audiences.
Syria as a Blueprint
Russian operations in Syria merged a robust advise-and-assist capability with technological advances at the tactical level, establishing a template for future Russian military successes. As Russian forces adjust and adapt from the shambolic nature of their operations in Ukraine, Syria will likely provide the organizational baseline by which Russian forces attempt to right the ship. While the ongoing fight against the Ukrainian military poses an entirely different challenge, Russian operations to target resistance elements in rear areas will likely bear more than a passing resemblance to their formula for success in Syria. US irregular warfare practitioners should apply a nuanced understanding of the adaptations in Russian force composition and integrated technology when predicting Russia’s response to Ukrainian resistance in occupied zones.
US practitioners cannot assume that unconventional warfare training, planning, and thinking built around historical paradigms is adequate preparation to conduct irregular warfare against a contemporary Russian CIW capability. Nor can they simply incorporate new enemy weapons capabilities as planning factors and assume that the opponent will behave the same. Irregular warfare practitioners deploying in proximity to Russian forces must understand the threat as modular, multilayered, and employed differently from the older stereotypes of Russia’s military capabilities. Although Russian performance against the Ukrainian military has so far proven far less effective than previously assumed, Russia remains a capable and potent threat with an impressive track record of suppressing civil unrest and insurgency.
Maj. Benjamin Arbitter and Maj. Kurt Carlson are Army Special Forces officers with operational and combat experience in the European Command and Central Command areas of responsibility. Both are from 10th Special Forces Group and have recently completed master’s degrees in defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or any organization the authors are affiliated with, including the 10th Special Forces Group.
18. Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis
Excerpts:
The Biden administration has been commendable in clearly and consistently communicating to Russia, and other audiences, what the United States will not do in the Ukraine crisis — like sending American forces to Ukraine or establishing a no-fly zone. In addition, the administration should be equally clear about what is off the table in cyberspace — what Jacquelyn Schneider has termed a “strategic no-first-use” policy in cyberspace. Specifically, the United States should unequivocally convey to Russia that it will refrain from taking actions in cyberspace during this crisis that would undermine nuclear stability, such as conducting disruptive cyber-attacks against early warning satellites. This is different — the opposite, in fact — from drawing “red lines” in cyberspace, which are meant to deter unwanted behavior but can often backfire. Instead, the United States should communicate where it will exhibit restraint in cyber operations — a form of confidence-building. This could be conveyed publicly through statements by administration officials, similar to statements that Biden has made about other aspects of America’s role in Ukraine. It could also be privately communicated through ongoing backchannels taking place between U.S. allies, like France, and Russia.
There are also policy implications beyond the Ukraine conflict, especially in an environment in which the United States confronts potential future crises with other nuclear powers. In particular, senior national security officials have repeatedly emphasized that China represents a “pacing challenge” for the United States, including across the nuclear and cyber realms. In fact, Gen. Nakasone recently announced the creation of a China Outcomes Group under Cyber Command and the NSA. And researchers have identified how hypothetical crises involving the United States and China could escalate along dangerous trajectories, including to the use of nuclear weapons. The consequences of misunderstanding the utility of cyber signaling in this area are significant. Therefore, policymakers must consider how to improve civil-military coordination and cohesion so that the employment of military cyber power — especially when used against sensitive adversary systems, particularly nuclear ones, during delicate periods — is not out of sync with strategic objectives. The United States should also develop a more robust effort to clarify to adversaries, including China, how it will constrain its own behavior in cyberspace specifically during nuclear crises. The potential implications of misperceptions surrounding cyber operations targeting nuclear systems during a future crisis with a nuclear-armed adversary are simply too significant.
Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis - War on the Rocks
From its opening moments, the conflict in Ukraine has involved a nuclear dimension. On Feb. 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin ominously warned of “consequences you have never seen” if other countries tried to get involved in Ukraine — an implied nuclear threat. Several days later, Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear forces would be put on a “special combat readiness” status. More recently, Dmitry Medvedev, a senior Russian official, warned that if Finland and Sweden join NATO, “there can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic.”
So far, the Biden administration has attempted to dismiss Russia’s announcement as irresponsible saber-rattling. But as Putin continues issuing nuclear threats, policymakers are likely to feel growing pressure to respond. In particular, they may be tempted to find ways to signal to Russia to deter the use of nuclear weapons. One way this might be done is through cyber operations. In fact, some cyber experts are already calling for the United States to consider cyber attacks against Russia for signaling purposes. For example, writing in the Washington Post, Dmitri Alperovitch and Samuel Charap call on the Biden administration to conduct a cyber “shock-and-awe demonstration,” such as disrupting the internet throughout Russia, to signal U.S. resolve.
But this would be a terrible idea. Conducting cyber operations to signal deterrence would, paradoxically, increase risks of escalation. This risk is not just hypothetical, especially in light of Russia’s updated declaratory policy for the first use of nuclear weapons, which may include responses to cyber attacks. Russia has reinforced this message during the war in Ukraine. In early March, a hacking group affiliated with Anonymous claimed that it had shut down the control center of Russia’s space agency. While denying that the attack took place, Russia nevertheless warned that a cyber attack against its satellites would be a justification for war.
The Biden administration should clearly communicate that cyber operations for nuclear signaling are out of bounds, just as it declared restraint in other aspects of this conflict, like the deployment of American troops to Ukraine.
How Cyberspace Is Creating Nuclear Risks
Policymakers and academics are attuned to the cyber risks to nuclear command and control. The practitioner community has largely focused on U.S. vulnerabilities and how to mitigate them. Scholars, in turn, worry about how cyber operations could have unintended escalatory consequences. But less attention has been paid to another likely scenario: the use of cyber operations for signaling purposes (operations with visible effects that aim to convey a message to another state) in a nuclear context. The ambiguity of cyber operations can sometimes be useful for signaling — but the same ambiguity can be dangerous during a nuclear crisis. The problem is that civilian leaders in particular, distinct from the military, are inclined to see cyber attacks as effective signaling tools.
Cyber operations could have nuclear implications, especially because modern nuclear command and control systems, like those in Russia and the United States, are becoming increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure. Nuclear command, control, and communications systems, which include early warning, information collection, and communications capabilities, alert decision-makers to impending nuclear strikes and also enable leaders to control decisions about nuclear use (or non-use). But their digital dependencies are creating opportunities for exploitation using cyber means. In a 2020 report, the Nuclear Threat Initiative found that “almost 9 out of 10 planned nuclear modernization programs involve at least some new digital components or upgrades.”
Vulnerabilities inherent in the digital infrastructure that undergird modern nuclear systems provide opportunities for actors to engage in cyber espionage — gaining access to a network or system to steal information — or even conduct cyber attacks. Hypothetically, a cyber power like Russia could conduct a cyber attack against a U.S. early warning satellite to degrade its functionality. This has become an urgent concern for practitioners. U.S. Strategic Command, for instance, is currently working to “operationally harden NC3 systems against cyber threats.” Congress has also gotten involved, requiring the Defense Department to evaluate the cybersecurity of major weapon systems. And the Government Accountability Office has published multiple reports decrying the state of cybersecurity and scope of vulnerabilities of weapon systems, including elements of the nuclear triad.
From an academic perspective, scholars have investigated how cyber operations targeting nuclear systems could exacerbate escalation risks. Focusing on nuclear forces, early research, such as work by Martin Libicki, was skeptical of the dangers posed by cyber operations. Nuclear forces were seen as being largely immune from digital attacks because they were “air gapped,” meaning that they were separated from information technology systems.
However, as nuclear systems have become increasingly intertwined with the digital environment — not to mention the dual-use nature of many elements of nuclear command, control, and communications systems (like early warning or position, navigation, and timing satellites) — the protection offered by being segregated from the internet is less robust. Jacquelyn Schneider, Benjamin Schechter, and Rachael Schaffer, for instance, ran a series of war games demonstrating that decision-makers in hypothetical crises are likely to use their cyber exploits against an adversary’s nuclear systems. They found that this could have negative effects on states’ respective nuclear strategies, especially decisions to pre-delegate nuclear launch authority or automate nuclear responses. Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay argue that the clandestine nature of cyber operations means that one state could secretly gain access to an adversary’s nuclear command, control, and communications systems, giving the former an information advantage or even creating an incentive for the latter to use its nuclear weapons out of the fear that it may lose them. James Acton notes that the difficulties of distinguishing between cyber espionage and attack could lead a state to misperceive the intent behind a cyber operation, generating a similar “use it or lose it” calculus.
The Limited Escalation Risks of Cyber Operations
But all of this focus on cyber operations causing nuclear escalation may be misplaced and, more importantly, distract policymakers from the dangers of a more plausible scenario: the use of ambiguous cyber signals during nuclear crises. Specifically, the nature of cyber operations reduces their inherent escalatory potential, particularly when compared to other ways a state could attack an adversary’s nuclear forces or command, control, and communications systems, like a direct counterforce strike or employing anti-satellite weapons. But their misuse as a signaling tool could do more harm than good.
First, successfully conducting cyber operations against strategic targets, like nuclear systems, is harder than the conventional wisdom might suggest. It requires a means of gaining access to a particular system and developing an exploit to cause a desired effect — and then maintaining persistent (and stealthy) access to be able to conduct an offensive operation at the desired time. Moreover, the overall outcome may be unpredictable and net less-than-desirable results.
Second, even if a state is able to conduct these kinds of operations, they typically prefer to do so in secret — and this mitigates some escalation concerns. That’s because, to cause an escalatory response, a state like Russia would have to uncover a cyber operation during a particular time period — such as while the Ukraine conflict is unfolding. For example, Russia would have to detect a cyber operation against a nuclear command and control system to cause Putin to perceive a “window of vulnerability,” perhaps assessing that it is part of a U.S. or NATO counterforce strategy to disable Russia’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. But the likelihood of these circumstances arising is low because — unless a state is trying to signal with a cyber capability — it will try to keep these kinds of sensitive operations secret. Therefore, the chances of such an operation being discovered at a particular time period are relatively small.
Finally, even if, hypothetically, Russia was to discover a cyber operation taking place, the likelihood of it leading to escalation is low. This is due to the virtual nature of cyber “weapons” — they rarely cause destruction in the physical world, let alone permanent damage. For example, even Russia’s 2015 cyber attack against Ukraine’s power grid, an important example of a strategic cyber attack against civilian critical infrastructure, only resulted in service disruptions for a few hours. During the current conflict, Russia-linked actors have so far been stymied in using cyber operations for strategic impact, such as the failed cyber attack by the group Sandworm against Ukraine’s power grid.
Taken together, this reasoning suggests that, in practice, cyber operations may not rise to a level that would cause a state like Russia to actually fear the integrity of its nuclear command, control, and communications systems, creating few reasons to escalate to the level of nuclear employment.
Civil-Military Relations and the Risks of Cyber Signaling in Nuclear Crises
But what if a state, such as the United States, wanted a cyber operation to be visible to an adversary, such as Russia, during a nuclear crisis — in other words, to send a cyber signal?
Signaling is essential for coercive diplomacy and international crises because it helps states convey their intent to one another. The civil-military relations literature has found that civilian (rather than military) leaders are more inclined to use military force as a form of signaling, rather than for operational effect.
Why does this matter? When civilian and military leaders have different views, civilians could make decisions around using military force for signaling purposes in a way that exacerbates ongoing crises. For instance, writing about Cold War nuclear crises, Scott Sagan has shown that civilian decision-makers have made crises more dangerous by taking actions without fully understanding the military implications and risks of inadvertent escalation. Jack Levy, writing about the causes of World War I, discusses how, during the July Crisis preceding the outbreak of war, civilians saw military mobilization as a political tool for coercive diplomacy, whereas military leaders, who were focused on the operational implications, perceived mobilization as a means of preparing for imminent war.
Differences in how civilian and military leaders see the use of military power are likely to be even more salient in cyberspace, for three reasons. First, cyberspace is a highly technical environment where civilians typically lack subject matter expertise. Practitioners are likely to have far more up-to-date operational experience and, therefore, fluency with the technical issues and constraints posed by cyber operations than civilian leaders (even those with prior and, potentially, outmoded experience). Cyberspace is also a highly classified environment — one in which information is highly segmented and only accessible to a select group of individuals. Therefore, some civilian officials may not be privy to all of the details surrounding cyber operations. Finally, unlike other technical and secretive environments, cyberspace has an additional element that makes it even more difficult for non-experts to grasp its nature. Specifically, cyberspace is also an esoteric environment; cyber operations and their effects are not easily visible in a way that other types of military capabilities are, making it difficult to conceptualize their utility in a tangible manner.
There is evidence supporting this idea. For instance, senior civilian leaders across multiple U.S. administrations, as well as in Congress, typically describe cyber operations as useful for signaling deterrence and resolve. Chris Inglis, the Biden administration’s inaugural National Cyber Director, described how he’d “like to change the decision calculus of those who transgress in this space,” and contemplated that “[p]erhaps our actions should be felt by an adversary. They should know that they have just felt the hand of whomever.” Similarly, Senator Angus King, discussing the threat of Russian-linked ransomware attacks in the summer of 2021, noted that he wants “somebody … in the Politburo to say, ‘Gee, boss, I’m not sure we ought to do this because we’re liable to get whacked in some way by those Americans.’”
John Bolton, former national security advisor under President Donald Trump, in multiple public statements, has depicted the purpose of U.S. cyber operations — especially offensive ones — as a means of influencing adversary perception. He described how the employment of offensive cyber power creates “structures of deterrence, so that it’s publicly known,” and that “it is important that our adversaries know [that] …we have authorized offensive cyber operations to … demonstrate to our adversaries that the costs of engaging in operations against us is higher than they want to bear.” Michael Daniel, the Obama administration’s cyber czar, depicted the purpose of imposing costs on Russia in response to its 2016 election interference as “to openly demonstrate that we could do it as a deterrent and also clandestinely disrupt their operations as well.”
In contrast, while some military leaders do talk about cyber deterrence, the language they employ is anchored in tactical and operational objectives, rather than aiming to influence adversary perception and decision-making. This is evident in how both civilian and military leaders use the language of “imposing costs.” Military leaders tend to describe cost-imposition as supporting the disruption, degradation, denial, or destruction of adversary offensive capabilities and operations. For instance, in December 2021, Gen. Paul Nakasone, commander of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency (NSA), described “imposing costs” against Russian-linked ransomware groups as the goal in itself. The month prior, at the November 2021 Aspen Security Forum, he argued for the United States to impose costs in cyberspace, but stated that a traditional deterrence strategy “does not comport to cyberspace.” In another example, in 2019, Lt. Gen. Stephen Fogarty, commander of Army Cyber Command, voiced skepticism about cyber deterrence in remarks about defending the 2020 elections against cyber interference, noting that “I don’t know of a single thing we could do that would prevent [adversaries] from competing, but I want to impose as much cost on them as possible.”
Implications for the Ukraine Crisis and Beyond
What are the implications of this for the current Ukraine crisis? Thus far, while cyber operations have been used on both sides of the conflict, they have not played a decisive role on the battlefield. So far, the United States has been focused on providing cyber defense support to Ukraine and NATO, reportedly to include dispatching Cyber Command’s cyber mission teams to Eastern Europe, as well as seeking to deter potential Russian cyber retaliation in response to U.S. and Western sanctions, especially attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure.
However, if the nuclear dimension of the crisis becomes more acute, policymakers may be tempted to turn to cyber operations to signal resolve to deter Russia in the nuclear domain. Such an approach could be seen as particularly appealing precisely because cyber operations are not kinetic and, therefore, less dangerous than other military moves. But this could have the inverse effect of making nuclear escalation, rather than deterrence, more likely, for the following reasons.
In 2020, Russia clarified its nuclear declaratory policy to state that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons under a range of contingencies, including an adversary attack against “critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces’ response actions.” Cynthia Roberts has suggested that this particular scenario “likely include[s] cyber attacks against command and control infrastructure and/or attempted leadership decapitation.” Similarly, Dmitry Stefanovich wrote that “[t]here is a wide consensus within the Russian expert community that this also includes possible cyber threats as well as other non-nuclear dangers.” Interestingly, Russia’s declaratory policy contains parallels to the implicit link between cyber attacks and nuclear use contained in the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. That document notes that the United States would consider using nuclear weapons under “extreme circumstances,” including “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks … [such as] attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”
Therefore, a hypothetical attempt by the United States to conduct a cyber operation against Russian nuclear command, control, and communication systems for signaling purposes, such as to demonstrate resolve or convey a desire to deter the use of nuclear weapons could in practice make their use more likely. Unlike most cyber operations, which rely on secrecy, signals are meant to be seen. And to be sufficiently credible, this kind of cyber operation would have to demonstrate an ability to cause a meaningful effect against Russia’s nuclear systems, rather than a low-cost, unsophisticated cyber operation. Therefore, assuming such an attack were feasible, the chances are greater in this scenario that Russia could interpret U.S. cyber signals as an attack against its critical military systems.
The problem is that, more often than not, cyber operations are ambiguous signals. There is evidence that states can use cyber operations under some (narrow) conditions to signal a desire to de-escalate international crises. But these findings do not extend well to nuclear crises where clarity, rather than uncertainty, is important for stability. The use of cyber operations to diffuse crises have involved cyber signaling short of war, not during an ongoing conventional conflict involving nuclear powers. And they have not involved cyber operations targeting a state’s nuclear command and control where states, like Russia, have already staked out declaratory policies. Moreover, states are still at a nascent stage in developing shared indices to inform assessments of intent in cyberspace, especially when it comes to cyber operations in nuclear crises.
Therefore, even if Russia would not take the cataclysmic step of escalating to the first use of nuclear weapons in response to a U.S. cyber operation, it could misinterpret U.S. signaling efforts and take measures to make nuclear use easier (such as making warheads operational, dispersing forces, pre-delegating authority, or increasing automaticity). These readiness measures could increase the chances of inadvertent or even accidental escalation.
The Biden administration has been commendable in clearly and consistently communicating to Russia, and other audiences, what the United States will not do in the Ukraine crisis — like sending American forces to Ukraine or establishing a no-fly zone. In addition, the administration should be equally clear about what is off the table in cyberspace — what Jacquelyn Schneider has termed a “strategic no-first-use” policy in cyberspace. Specifically, the United States should unequivocally convey to Russia that it will refrain from taking actions in cyberspace during this crisis that would undermine nuclear stability, such as conducting disruptive cyber-attacks against early warning satellites. This is different — the opposite, in fact — from drawing “red lines” in cyberspace, which are meant to deter unwanted behavior but can often backfire. Instead, the United States should communicate where it will exhibit restraint in cyber operations — a form of confidence-building. This could be conveyed publicly through statements by administration officials, similar to statements that Biden has made about other aspects of America’s role in Ukraine. It could also be privately communicated through ongoing backchannels taking place between U.S. allies, like France, and Russia.
There are also policy implications beyond the Ukraine conflict, especially in an environment in which the United States confronts potential future crises with other nuclear powers. In particular, senior national security officials have repeatedly emphasized that China represents a “pacing challenge” for the United States, including across the nuclear and cyber realms. In fact, Gen. Nakasone recently announced the creation of a China Outcomes Group under Cyber Command and the NSA. And researchers have identified how hypothetical crises involving the United States and China could escalate along dangerous trajectories, including to the use of nuclear weapons. The consequences of misunderstanding the utility of cyber signaling in this area are significant. Therefore, policymakers must consider how to improve civil-military coordination and cohesion so that the employment of military cyber power — especially when used against sensitive adversary systems, particularly nuclear ones, during delicate periods — is not out of sync with strategic objectives. The United States should also develop a more robust effort to clarify to adversaries, including China, how it will constrain its own behavior in cyberspace specifically during nuclear crises. The potential implications of misperceptions surrounding cyber operations targeting nuclear systems during a future crisis with a nuclear-armed adversary are simply too significant.
Erica D. Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a research scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. The views expressed are personal and do not reflect the policy or position of any U.S. government entity or organization.
Keren Yarhi-Milo is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the political science department and the School of International and Public Affairs. She is also the director of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.
19. Among Lithuanian fighters in Ukraine: 'it's our chance to crush them here'
The region, if not the world, is rallying for the Ukraininas and the defense of freedom against the Russian bear.
Among Lithuanian fighters in Ukraine: 'it's our chance to crush them here'
On the outskirts of Kyiv, a team of Lithuanian volunteers, AKs in hand, are moving in pairs, putting rounds into a target bearing a caricature of Vladimir Putin. Around them, the blaring air raid sirens are a reminder that they are not merely practising – they are here to fight Russia.
The outfit of Lithuanian volunteers is led by Sigitas Maliauskas. Like everyone else, he introduces himself using his callsign – Pagonis (The Pagan). Their team of six Lithuanians is joined by three Ukrainians.
“We have been asked to form a Lithuanian unit that could do autonomous tasks – reconnaissance,” says Pagonis. This includes setting up a network of contacts in their operating area, which remains under the control of Ukraine, to have “eyes and ears” who could inform them of Russian troop movements, according to Pagonis.
“We have links with artillery, with air defence, we will simply transmit the information to whoever needs it. A good scout is someone who goes out, finds what he needs, and returns without firing a shot.”
"The Ukrainians are burning, burning with the desire to take revenge, to make the Russians feel the same way they feel here," says Lu. / B. Gerdžiūnas/LRT
The Ukrainian leadership has also asked them to prepare for hit-and-run missions to target Russian convoys. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion on February 24, the Ukrainian military has surprised most analysts with its ability to fight light and inflict heavy casualties.
The Russian vehicles “are too heavy for fields, so they move only on roads”, says Pagonis. “The Russians were making it obvious where they would advance.”
The Ukrainians used this as their chance to strike. The videos of burning Russian tanks and fuel trucks have gone viral across social media.
The Lithuanians, meanwhile, remain cool-headed about the looming battles.
“If I am needed [to go into battle] – I will go,” says Barzda (Beard). “It’s our chance to crush them here, for everything [they have done].”
Newly arrived Lithuanians sign contracts with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. / B. Gerdžiūnas/LRT
The decision to go
In early April, three more Lithuanian volunteers arrived to join the fight. A car with Lithuanian number plates enters the parking lot of a Kyiv hotel, which has now become a centre for international volunteers.
Passing through the once upscale foyer, three men make their way to sign documents and get ID photos taken. Their journey to fight for Ukraine begins here.
The hotel is a “collection and distribution centre of internationals”, according to Pagonis. “Sometimes, for example, drivers of armoured vehicles arrive and are then sent to different battalions [of the Ukrainian military].” Here, Lithuanians have also run into Georgians, Poles, Spanish, and Scottish fighters.
Pagonis shows the torrent of messages he receives from other Lithuanians, asking to join his unit. However, he only accepts those with prior military experience. “I sometimes look at their Facebook profiles and think that maybe they should just stay home.”
“Very often, there is a lot of enthusiasm, but when you tell them about all the nuances, [...] they get on a train and go back,” he says. One such case allegedly involved a foreign fighter, not a Lithuanian, who was due to join their unit but decided to head back.
Pagonis claims that he has received a phone call from the Lithuanian military, asking him to refuse enlisted personnel.
Laser gets his picture taken for military ID. / B. Gerdžiūnas/LRT
“Regardless of the fact that we are reserve officers of a NATO member state, when you say NATO you are not speaking about people who are currently enlisted,” says Pagonis. “There have been people [contacting me], who are serving in the military or the National Defence Volunteer Force (KASP), who said they would take holidays and come to help.”
Pagonis also claims that the Lithuanian military has stopped accepting requests from serving members of the armed forces to leave the service, aiming to stem the flow of people seeking to fight for Ukraine.
In a written comment, the Lithuanian Defence Ministry said “some temporary restrictions may exist [...] due to the existing geopolitical situation”, falling short of mentioning the war in Ukraine. Every request is approached on a case by case basis, it added.
“I knew many people with burning eyes, saying that they want to go to the legion, they want to kill,” adds Barzda. “Being this hot-headed will only lead to returning to Lithuania in a bodybag.”
“These people need to think really hard before going,” he says.
The crew would still like for more Lithuanians to join them, but they are careful about letting anyone in.
“When you come here and see the ruins, the dead bodies lying a few metres away, it hits you,” says Lu, another volunteer. “When all of these feelings go through your body, then you decide whether this is truly your place.”
Pagonis shows one message with one eager three-word enquiry: "noriu į frontą” (I want to go to the frontline). He has not replied.
“If the Russian army is not smashed here,” it could reach Lithuania, Maliauskas says. “We are helping Ukrainians here, so indirectly we are also defending our families in Lithuania.” / B. Gerdžiūnas/LRT
The Ukrainian reality
On February 27, just three days after the Russians struck, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for foreign volunteers to join the fight, saying “this is not just a Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is the beginning of a war against Europe”. Answering the call, people like Pagonis and Barzda departed for Ukraine.
What followed for the eager international volunteers, however, was described by some as chaos.
“I think you’d have to come up with a different word than disorganised,” a Canadian volunteer said in an interview in April. “I don’t think they were ready for that call to action.”
There have also been reports about the alleged lawlessness of the international volunteers – as well as Ukraine’s attempts to better vet the incoming individuals. Testimonies also include outright dissertations after seeing the intensity of combat, as well as the logistical shortcomings of the Ukrainian military.
But for those with more knowledge of Ukraine, the chaos did not catch them off guard. In the eight years of the war in Donbas, basic supply issues have persisted. Self-organisation and grassroots support – something which had blossomed during the Euromaidan revolution and erupted again after Russia invaded the country – has always been necessary to fill the gaps.
International volunteers have previously taken to social media to complain of ammunition shortages, not being provided with an adequate kit, or even enough weapons. But this is something that Ukrainians have faced themselves for years.
“Things are very difficult here, they really like little presents [bribes] here,” says Pagonis.
Arriving at the training site near Kyiv, Pagonis goes off to the side of the road, while swearing on the phone. “There is something new here every day,” he exclaims when he comes back. They were due to be given weapons but the person in charge did not arrive, despite arranging everything a day before. “Here, the word “tomorrow” means nothing,” he adds. The same sentiment is repeated by many – it’s just the way it is in Ukraine.
Inside their temporary accommodation. / B. Gerdžiūnas/LRT
The foreign fighters in Ukraine can be a colourful bunch. A drunk South Korean man in his 20s on the Polish border, who could barely speak English let alone Russian, said he was eager to join the fight, saying he could no longer sit idle after he w pictures of massacred civilians in Bucha.
Previous causes involving foreigners – such as the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria – also attracted people seeking social media attention and outright adventurers.
For Lithuanians, the war in Ukraine is more than that. Here, the war is as close to home as it can get.
“My father said he was too old, he said he would also go himself,” says Lazeris (Laser), one of the Lithuanian volunteers. His grandparents were deported by the Soviets to Siberia, while he also has ancestor links to Cossacks in Ukraine.
“We will do what needs to be done,” adds Lu. “We are here to stop them [the Russians] on this land. If we don’t stop them here, it will be too late to do so in Lithuania.”
Currently, their team is part of the 9th Kyiv Territorial Defence Battalion, outside of the purview of the Foreign Legion. Pagonis says they are using their status merely as an umbrella to operate legally in the country as a stand-alone group. But the exact structure remains difficult to grasp, with Pagonis himself admitting that “things are changing daily”.
They first volunteered to train mobilised Ukrainians in Lviv, condensing a three-month basic course into just two weeks, before proceeding to Kyiv. Now, alongside preparing for combat duties themselves, they will also train Ukrainian scouts.
Smolas loading a magazine. / B. Gerdžiūnas/LRT
Meanwhile, it’s impossible to establish the number of foreign fighters currently in Ukraine. According to the statistics announced by Ukraine in March, 20,000 people from 52 countries have answered the call to fight. But the authorities have never published the exact numbers of international volunteers currently in the country.
The number of Lithuanians involved is also unclear. LRT knows at least two more men serving with the Ukrainian armed forces, including at least one of them being involved in active combat duties. There are reportedly many more.
Pagonis’ crew are also unaware of other Lithuanian crews. “According to my knowledge, we are the only [Lithuanian] combat unit,” says Lu. His claims are impossible to verify.
“It’s an open secret that there are Lithuanians and other internationals here,” says Lu. “But this message needs to be spread, this needs to be shown because such things inspire [others to join].”
“It’s always better to be among your own,” he adds.
Although officially part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, they are yet to receive a wage. According to Pagonis, other international volunteers are also yet to be paid. For now, they are funded entirely by donations from Lithuanians, including high profile business owners.
“Over time, we found our donors,” says Pagonis. The team also collects funds via direct donations, as well as the crowdfunding Contribee platform.
Pagonis and Barzda. / B. Gerdžiūnas/LRT
Bucha massacres
At night, we drive at speed through the empty streets of Kyiv. We are met at each checkpoint with smiles, a brief conversation, a glimpse at the fluttering Lithuanian flag mounted on the jeep, followed by a raised hand or a fist in the air, waving the convoy through.
“Our presence here [...] is a very big moral encouragement for the Ukrainians so that they do not feel alone,” says Pagonis.
We sit down inside their temporary accommodation. They ask to keep the location secret.
What’s bonding them here is their decades-long experience of serving in the Lithuanian military. Some of the volunteers in their 40s were among the first to serve in the post-independence military and spent decades in uniform. The younger recruits, meanwhile, have spent only several years in the armed forces.
Lithuanian troops at the shooting range. / B. Gerdžiūnas/LRT
“Pagonis has a lot of knowledge, you can learn something new from him every day, things which you haven’t learned during three years in the Lithuanian military,” says Barzda. “The person is basically like a father.”
“You are ready to turn your back [toward fire] for that person, to shield him with your body,” Barzda adds. “When such people are together, the motivation increases, and we support each other in such difficult times.”
Lazeris was one of the three men to arrive earlier in the day. “I quit my well-paying job in Sweden to come here,” he says. The civilian massacres sealed the decision for him to join the fight. “I saw the scenes from Irpin, Bucha. The same evening I called my director and said I was leaving.”
“I don’t have a family, children, which is something that is stopping many more from going. [...] We will settle things here first, then we can make money any time later,” Lazeris adds, smiling.
For families of others, the news of their departure was difficult to process. “You saw in their eyes that [they thought] they may be seeing you for the last time,” says Lu. “This is difficult to witness, [but] they make peace with it after a while.”
“It’s most important to remain in touch, to speak, to tell them what you are doing,” he says. “War is, of course, difficult, no one needs weak people here.”
A target bearing a caricature of Russian President Vladimir Putin. / B. Gerdžiūnas/LRT
Text and pictures: Benas Gerdžiūnas
Video report: Augustinas Šulija
20. Ukrainian official tells Grid: ‘Without the U.S., we’d be dead’
Ukrainian official tells Grid: ‘Without the U.S., we’d be dead’
In a “David versus Goliath” war, he has kind words for the U.S., Poland and Estonia; for Germany and France, not so much.
This weekend will mark two months since Russia invaded Ukraine. The milestone comes as Moscow, beaten back from Kyiv by a determined Ukrainian resistance, launches a new offensive in the country’s east. “Another stage of this operation [in eastern Ukraine] is beginning, and I am sure this will be a very important moment,” Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, said Tuesday. As Grid reported that day, the “battle for the Donbas” will be a critical and very different fight.
For Ukraine, this new phase of the war underlines the need for international support — in particular, for more weapons and more sanctions against Russia, according to Oleksandr Merezhko, head of the Ukrainian parliament’s international affairs committee. Merezhko has been liaising with foreign politicians and other officials since the war began.
Speaking to Grid from his office in Kyiv, Merezhko acknowledged the support his country had received from the U.S., the U.K., Poland and the Baltic countries that themselves feel increasingly threatened by an expansion-minded Kremlin. But two months into the war, with entire Ukrainian cities razed to the ground by Russian bombs, he had harsh words for the major European powers that he said were “dragging their feet,” even trying to appease Moscow. “Germany and France have disappointed me,” he said.
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As Russia steps up its violent campaign in eastern Ukraine, Merezhko said his conversations with colleagues around Europe had left him with the impression that some “would prefer that we lose this war.”
This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Grid: We’re almost two months into the war in your country — looking back at how the conflict has unfolded, what stands out for you? And what is your assessment of where things stand now?
Oleksandr Merezhko: The most important thing is that we have survived. We have not only managed to defend ourselves, but we’ve repelled Russian attacks. We’ve saved Kyiv — that’s our biggest achievement so far. Russia seriously underestimated our capabilities. We sank the Moskva warship. We have held the front line in eastern Ukraine. These are the symbols of our resistance.
Ukraine’s fight against Russia is like the biblical story of David versus Goliath. We are highly motivated, and that is because we are fighting for our families and homes. And that is why [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has already strategically lost this war.
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G: What about the broader international landscape? We’ve seen unprecedented sanctions on Russia. We have seen military and humanitarian aid for your country, particularly from the West. But what — as someone intimately involved with your country’s foreign policy — has been missing? What’s disappointed you?
OM: To me, the biggest disappointment was that we had hoped that countries like Germany and France will wake up, that they will give us the heavy weapons we need. That they will give us whatever we need for this fight. But they have been dragging their feet. I still don’t see wholehearted support on their part. Sometimes I get the impression — and I have been in Zoom meetings with colleagues around Europe — that for some European politicians the fact that we have survived, that we continue to fight, is very uncomfortable for them. Because they would prefer that we lose this war, that we surrender and that they — these European politicians — can then return to business as usual with Russia.
We have been trying to reach out to our colleagues around Europe with one message: Give us a no-fly zone, give us heavy weapons, and impose even tougher sanctions on Russia. Unfortunately, the reaction of some countries has not been as we had hoped.
There are countries in Europe that do understand us, and we don’t have to explain everything to them — the United Kingdom, Poland, the Baltic countries. They are very sympathetic. For instance, Estonia, it is a small country. But it is doing more than many bigger countries.
But other countries, like unfortunately Germany and France, sometimes it feels like they are under the influence of Russian propaganda. Both Germany and France have disappointed me. At one point, it had seemed like they are ready to provide us with what we need, then they aren’t. They are not doing enough.
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G: What about the U.S.?
OM: Without the U.S., and this is the truth, we would be dead. It is the biggest supporter we have right now. Of course, we want more. But they are leading in the support. I don’t have insider information regarding their military help, but what I do know is that they have been ahead of everyone in terms of supporting us. They have for example taken a lead in imposing sanctions on Russia. Naturally, we will continue to ask for more support. But I can say that the U.S. has been very important for us to survive, and we are extremely grateful to them.
Looking ahead, given the situation right now in the east, what we need more of now are things like tanks and jets — and we need them fast.
G: What about China — what have you made of the way it has sided with Russia?
OM: We should expect more from China. China is trying to preserve good relations with Russia. They have a strategic interest in Russian resources. We understand that. But it is also a fact that China could stop this war. It has serious influence over Russia. But of course I do not see that happening. It is unfortunate. I hope their position changes. But at the present moment, all I can tell you is that I am disappointed in their position. I am not losing hope completely, but I am getting more and more realistic about China.
In this moment, we are learning who is our friend and who is not our friend.
G: There are several other countries around the world that have tried to avoid taking sides in this conflict — big players like India, Brazil and others. What do you make of their position? What is your message to them?
OM: First of all, I don’t expect much from them because they are not members of the European Union or of NATO. Of course we want the support of all of these countries.
And then what I would say is that everyone around the world should really see that this war is not only about Ukraine. It is about international law and norms. If today we allow an aggressor like Russia to invade the territory of a weaker neighbor, then it is like we are going back in time to the 19th century. So that is the reason for other countries to support us. Because what is happening in Ukraine ultimately is a conflict between democratic states and authoritarian states. It is a global war.
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
21. How Putin Conned the American Right
This will be panned for partisanship but it is a good study in propaganda. All Putin supporters should reflect on this.
How Putin Conned the American Right
He carefully planted the seeds for his popularity among conservatives.
If you could hop in a time machine, buckle up, and pop back three decades—or even just one—and tell a loyal Republican of yesteryear that prominent American conservatives in 2022 would admire and defend the former KGB officer who rules Russia, you would be met with disbelief. Yet here we are:
Like Patrick Buchanan, for example. "In the culture war for the future of mankind, Putin is planting Russia’s flag firmly on the side of traditional Christianity." https://t.co/q3pejRtOW8 /2
Now that the world has seen the brutality and horror of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, much of Putin’s fan base on the American right has either become “anti-anti-Putin” or gone quiet altogether. But it’s worth taking a moment to look back at what attracted them to the dictator in the first place. Doing so helps us to see that Putin’s American stans are not savvy observers of the international scene, but gulls. Putin has long been positioning himself as the leader of global cultural conservatism, but not because he believes in the policies and ideas. He simply understands their value to him in domestic and international politics.
Consider his surreal televised speech on March 25, during which he said that “the proverbial ‘cancel culture’ has become the cancellation of culture” while invoking the criticism of Harry Potter creator J.K. Rowling. He gave a similar speech as recently as February, echoing the talking points of American conservatives in his warnings against an assault on “basic things such as mother, father, family or gender differences.” These resonances didn’t come as a surprise to Kremlin watchers, who know that Putin, who often literally cancels his adversaries, doesn’t give a fig about figuratively “canceling” authors or about any kind of decency. But many on the American right have loved his shtick for years.
Podcast · April 20 2022
Both Democrats and Republicans agree on only one thing, but it isn’t even true: that…
Putin made his first moves in the direction of conservative cultural leadership in 2013. The previous year, President Barack Obama had put social conservatives on a defensive footing by coming out in favor of gay marriage. Then, in 2013, the Supreme Court agreed to hear United States v. Windsor. Six weeks after the oral argument, the Russian Duma passed what would come to be known as the “anti-gay law,” but Putin didn’t sign the bill into law immediately. He let it sit on his desk for three weeks. Days after the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, he signed it into law.
Later in 2013, a Kremlin-connected Russian think tank called the Center for Strategic Communications published a report titled, “Putin: World Conservatism’s New Leader.” The document repeated populist talking points that would prove influential during the 2016 presidential election. It rejected “ideological experiments” and called for social stability and conservative family values instead. It characterized immigration as a threat to the nation-state, and it framed Putin as a defender of sovereignty.
We know that there are more and more people in the world who support our position on defending traditional values that have made up the spiritual and moral foundation of civilization in every nation for thousands of years: the values of traditional families, real human life, including religious life, not just material existence but also spirituality, the values of humanism and global diversity.
The speech made Putin an icon in segments of the right. Pat Buchanan and Franklin Graham wrote op-eds praising him as a new standard-bearer for Christian values. Graham even traveled to Moscow to meet him. Christian groups such as the World Congress of Families began developing stronger associations with Russia, and conservatives on social media began to publicly express support for Putin as an avatar of social conservatism.
In 2019, the Center for Social and Conservative Policy, another Kremlin-connected think tank, published a report that identified “the leading role of culture in social development [as] a landmark point of Putin’s political philosophy.” Putin went on the offensive soon after. In an interview with the Financial Times, he questioned social changes in the West, using them as evidence for liberal democracy’s weakness, and called for a return to traditional social values—“biblical” values—instead.
Putin has also exploited conservatives’ anxieties about the retreat of masculinity in the West. Pictured shirtless on a horse or doing judo, he has created an image of himself as a strong, masculine leader. Even his military campaign in Syria played a role. While his targets were mostly the secular opposition to Bashar al-Assad, Putin’s propaganda machine portrayed the campaign as a decisive leader’s war against Islamist extremists. The contrast with the West was pronounced: The United States kept its operations against the Islamic State limited and its profile low to avoid getting mired in the Syrian civil war.
Putin’s information strategy is a continuation of the old Soviet information strategy. It prioritizes a large variety of low-cost operations; efforts and resources are multiplied for whichever works best. And just like the Soviet regime before it, Putin’s regime is impotent in understanding American politics, but it is well versed in understanding American societal divisions—and how to exploit them.
For years, Putin’s strategy seemed to pay off, as a segment of writers and magazines and broadcasters on the American right praised him, or at least took it easier on him than they otherwise would have. But the war in Ukraine has shown the limits of Putin’s soft power: An overwhelming majority of Americans object to Russia’s invasion and view the Russian leader as a menace and a pariah. But his erstwhile supporters on the American right, now gone mostly quiet, could prove themselves gulls again if Putin’s media specialists attempt a rehabilitation campaign. This possibility proves that Putin’s efforts to court social conservatives were not a total waste.
22. Germans, SEALs, JSOC, and One Soldier's First Jump | SOF News
For all the paratroopers out there (and for those who are not). Probably no one else has ever had a water jump for their first jump after Airborne school.
Germans, SEALs, JSOC, and One Soldier's First Jump | SOF News
by Maurice D. Valentine, The War Horse, April 20, 2022.
I came to Antigua, West Indies, on a lark.
Whispers went around Camp Smith, New York, that something was amiss. Herbie, the cantankerous senior jumpmaster of our unit, walked up to me as I cleaned my weapon after training. The “old geezer” (nobody was older than 45) had all the connections to the fun jumps, always tapping a few LRRPs to come. That’s what we called the guys on the long-range reconnaissance patrols.
He glided over to me.
“Wanna go to the Caribbean?” he said. “I can get you some water jumps in Antigua.”
My eyes bulged. “What? Hell yeah, Herbie!”
He gave me a sly look. “Have you [had your first jump], Valentine?” He used a euphemism, of course.
I smiled sheepishly. “No.”
Herbie laughed out loud, “Well, gooooolllllleeeee! Gimme 20 pushups for just being a [newbie].”
Here we go. “Yes, Sergeant.” I knocked out 20 while he cracked up.
I had already earned my blood wings out of Airborne School. I bled profusely and was sure I was going to get tetanus.
But I hadn’t had my first jump out of school.
I knew that if I let it be known I was A) going to Antigua and B) going to have my first jump, I’d be in big trouble. I didn’t care to sweat in the parking lot doing jumping jacks and burpees until I dropped.
So, I kept my mouth shut.
One week later I was on an empty C-130 flying out of Dover Air Force Base with two other long-range reconnaissance patrol soldiers, making a quick stop on the military side of Dulles International Airport.
More guys boarded. They wore different fatigues from us—unlike anything issued in America.
Then I noticed a black, yellow, and red tricolor on the right shoulder of their blouses. I knew exactly what that meant: Germany.
And I knew exactly who they were: The German paratroopers, and they brought loads of beer, food, and parachutes as they boarded.
Sgt. Richter, one of the old warriors of my unit, was as shocked as I was. “I thought this was going to be a normal Airborne operation.” He gave me a toothy grin. “Feel like getting some German wings with your [first] jump, Valentine?”
There was a lump in my throat. “Do you really think I can?”
“As long as you jump with them. Not bad for a [first-timer]. Just don’t let everyone else know that!”
We took off again in the lumbering Hercules. The platoon of Germans were quite talkative and friendly. One of them told us they had been training in Virginia, got word of the jump, and their commander got them slots.
A sore ass and hours later, we hit the ground again with a thunk, vibrating like crazy. We were in Antigua. I craned my head to look out the small port window: rolling tarmac, palm trees, and lots of military planes mixed with civilian ones. Then I saw a sign not too far off in the distance. Welcome to Bermuda.
I leaned over to Sgt. Richter. “We’re in Bermuda. What for?”
“Beats me. Maybe we need gas.”
The cargo door opened again and in came a bunch of guys wearing blue T-shirts and tan shorts. They carried small backpacks and quickly found empty seats.
An athletically built blond guy with a chiseled face sat not too far from me. His T-shirt had a small gold decal of an eagle holding a trident and a revolutionary pistol. Beneath it were the words “SEAL Team Two.”
I jabbed Cpl. Miles sitting across from me like I had just seen a superstar. “Yo, Miles,” I whispered. “We got SEALs on board!”
“Looks like this is going to be some helluva training mission.”
Herbie, hanging in the cockpit with the crew chief, came over. “Hey, Herbie, Germans, SEALS, who’s next?”
He gave me a wink. “JSOC. This jump is with them.”
“That’s why I had to be sneaky,” Herbie added. “If everyone knew that JSOC was going, everyone would’ve wanted to go.
Photo: Spc. Maurice Valentine, right, poses with a teammate. Photo courtesy of the author.
“You should feel lucky, Valentine,” he said. “And this is your [first jump]? Gimme 20.” I laughed, and jumped up on some seats to knock out the pushups.
I just hoped nobody else saw.
The flight to Antigua was long. I wondered who else would be at this jump fest. The PJs? Combat Control? Rangers? This was going to be very elite, indeed.
My answers came when the doors opened up once again. A warm breeze blew into the aircraft as the engines shut down. We disembarked with the stars out brightly that night. The place looked heavenly. Several birds from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and other parts of America surrounded us. A few soldiers gravitated to us, greeting Herbie as if he were an old friend.
I looked at the patches on the uniforms surrounding me, and most were members of JSOC, with a couple of 82nd Airborne thrown into the mix. It was awe-inspiring to be among them.
After an hour, we sat in a Navy office for our in-country briefing. The officer there briefed us about what to see during our off hours. I was excited, this trip being my first outside of the United States.
The young officer quieted us all down as he began.
“Welcome to Antigua,” he said, bored. “For those of you who don’t know, Antigua is the largest island of the Leeward Chain, with Barbuda, not too far from here, being the smaller. …”
He warned us about the local transportation of Antigua, which was notoriously slow. It ran on that “Caribbean Time,” and you couldn’t count on it if you had to get anywhere in a hurry. Renting a car from the airport was the only way to go.
And of Barbuda, he said, “It’s very expensive. If you watch Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous, you’d know the people living there don’t want to see you. Don’t go.”
But the beaches? They were everywhere. Our barracks had one of the best beaches on the island, too. All we had to do was walk out the door, grab a towel, and stretch out to watch all the jumping.
“So who’s the [new guy]?” a Green Beret named Stan said as the plane we were going to jump out of banked hard. He was a big African American soldier, at least six-foot-four. He sat on one knee maintaining his balance in all the turbulence from the open cargo door. He had a large tattoo that said “De Oppresso Liber” on a muscular arm. He wore a gray free-fall parachute on his back as he hung on the edge of the ramp, looking down into the ocean. I was amazed he didn’t get sucked out.
I raised my hand. “Me, Sergeant.”
He smirked. “You know how lucky you are, right? It’s Valentine’s Day, your last name is Valentine, this is your [first] jump, and you’re getting German jump wings?” He shook his head.
I grinned, happy to have been lucky enough to escape being dogged by everyone.
Miles stood in front of me. I looked over his shoulder out the gaping cargo door. Nothing but a huge beautiful blue expanse.
The German gave Miles the signals. The jump light inside the aircraft went from red to green, and within moments he had a “Go!” and was gone.
Seconds later I saw him. His chute opened with no problems and he gently turned out of the slipstream to enjoy the ride down.
Then it was my turn. I walked quickly toward the Jumpmaster, he immediately said, “Go!” and I stepped off the ramp.
My first thought? Damn, I’m a bit high up in the air. … With my eyes open, the world whirled around me as my body position kept me straight in the air, like a bomb falling vertically from the sky. I felt the tug of the static line attached to my parachute as my canopy deployed, the risers slapping me hard in the face.
I made a 180-degree turn into the wind to slow my descent. But I wasn’t slowing down. I was speeding up. The winds pulled me backward as I descended, and I immediately worried that I would drown.
There was nothing I could do but ride it out. Down below, I saw the Navy SEALs’ rigid boat make a beeline for me, popping up and down on the choppy surf.
As I got closer to the water, I pulled my floatation vest and began to estimate my distance. I loosened my harness, unclipping the chest strap.
I tightened my body as I looked down. I could see my shadow grow in the water.
PLOOSH!
My canopy fell behind me and I surfaced. I put my hands behind my head and lay on the surface waiting for the boat to come get me. I saw the C-130 fly over once again to let out some more jumpers.
I did it.
The SEALs’ boat drove up. Miles and a few of the German paratroopers were inside, dripping wet.
“Yo, Valentine, whatta [first jump]! You now have some German wings!”
One of the SEALs laughed. “Hey, how does it feel? Better than sex?”
I smirked.
“No.”
*********
Editors Note: This article first appeared on The War Horse, an award-winning nonprofit news organization educating the public on military service. Subscribe to their newsletter.
About the author: Maurice D. Valentine is a born-and-bred New Yorker and was a member of the 142nd Long Range Surveillance Detachment (ABN) of the 42nd Infantry Division of the New York Army National Guard in the early 1990s. After his honorable discharge from the Army, Valentine backpacked around the world for several years before eventually finding his career in the advertising industry in New York City. He now lives and works in Sydney, Australia, where he owns his own production company, Moman Productions.
Top image: Map and photo of Antigua courtesy of CIA, photo of German wings courtesy of author.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
