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Quotes of the Day:
"Being in a minority, even in a minority of one, did not make you mad. There was truth and there was untruth, and if you cling to the truth even against the whole world, you were not mad."
- Goerge Orwell
We think too much and we feel too little. More than machinery, we need humanity. More than cleverness we need kindness and gentleness."
- Charlie Chaplin
“None of us have the promise of tomorrow, God forbid. This is my last day on this beautiful earth, it won't be spent listening to some news person telling me how rotten we are, how rotten life is, heck, no, I'm going out and seeing how beautiful life is. As humans, our time on this planet is very limited… Turn off, tune out and turn on your life. Peace”.
- Frank Zappa.
1. US and allies confirm North Korea-Russia ‘deleterious’ arms deal
2. South Korea, US and Japan condemn North Korea's alleged supply of munitions to Russia
3. PACAF Leaders Visit South Korea Bases and Talk Readiness
4. South Korea seeks to beef up annual amphibious drills with more US Marines
5. Korea, US launch joint rare earth project in Vietnam
6. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ A recent report on conditions at farms (4) Telescopic lens shows the present conditions in North Korea’s farming communities
7. Yoon vows to revive spirit of ex-president Park Chung-hee
8. Mother of Travis King, soldier charged with desertion to North Korea, says family plans to 'fight charges hard'
9. NK blames Israel over Gaza hospital blast
10. Korea's democratic erosion
11. Ruling camp's reform
12. ‘NIS meddling in politics with claims of election hacking’: Democratic Party of Korea
13. How did the Koreans and Jews endure?
14. US House to adopt resolution for ‘Kimchi Day’
15. US Navy Special Operations in the Korean War
16. U.S. AI firm WEKA opens 1st Asia-Pacific regional office in Seoul
17. No imminent sign of N. Korea's spy satellite launch: unification ministry
18. Hyesan residents turn to soy milk to make kimchi this year
19. North Korean police arrest ten people for drug dealing
1. US and allies confirm North Korea-Russia ‘deleterious’ arms deal
Excerpts:
Radio Free Asia cited analysis by a private U.S. research organization the Institute for the Study of War as saying that the North could have already provided up to 500,000 pieces of ammunition to Russia, which could be used in its invasion against Ukraine. The joint statement by the allies confirms that there has been illegal trading between the two countries.
The allies on Thursday also warned both Pyongyang and Moscow that such an action is highly illegal. “We emphasize that arms transfers to or from the DPRK – as well as the transfer to the DPRK of certain items and technical cooperation related to the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile, or conventional weapons programs, – would violate multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions,” the statement said.
“Russia itself voted for the U.N. Security Council resolutions that contain these restrictions,” it added.
US and allies confirm North Korea-Russia ‘deleterious’ arms deal
The allies warned such a trade could bolster Moscow’s aggression towards Ukraine.
By Lee Jeong-Ho for RFA
2023.10.25
Seoul, South Korea
rfa.org
The United States and its allies have verified an arms trade deal between Russia and North Korea that could bolster Moscow’s aggression towards Ukraine, issuing a stern warning that the allies would respond against these “deleterious” actions.
“The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) strongly condemn the provision of military equipment and munitions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the Russian Federation for use against the government and people of Ukraine,” the joint statement said Thursday, referring to the two Koreas formal names.
“Such weapons deliveries, several of which we now confirm have been completed, will significantly increase the human toll of Russia’s war of aggression,” the statement said, adding that North Korea was seeking military assistance from Russia in return to advance its own military capabilities.The allies “stand together, resolute in our opposition to arms transfers and related military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia and the deleterious effect such actions have on global security and nonproliferation,” according to the statement.
The statement came as North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin met at the symbol of Russian space prowess in Russia’s Far East last month, where they vowed to boost their comprehensive cooperation, spanning from the economy to military.
Authorities of both the U.S. and South Korea have been warning publicly that Russia’s weapons technology transfer in exchange for Pyongyang’s conventional ammunition was at the heart of the cooperation.
Both Kim and Putin are yet to publicly comment on any ammunition deal, but the Kremlin said last month that it would cooperate with North Korea in “sensitive areas that can’t be disclosed.”
Radio Free Asia cited analysis by a private U.S. research organization the Institute for the Study of War as saying that the North could have already provided up to 500,000 pieces of ammunition to Russia, which could be used in its invasion against Ukraine. The joint statement by the allies confirms that there has been illegal trading between the two countries.
The allies on Thursday also warned both Pyongyang and Moscow that such an action is highly illegal. “We emphasize that arms transfers to or from the DPRK – as well as the transfer to the DPRK of certain items and technical cooperation related to the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile, or conventional weapons programs, – would violate multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions,” the statement said.
“Russia itself voted for the U.N. Security Council resolutions that contain these restrictions,” it added.
Russia and North Korea have recently beefed up their efforts to establish a “united front” against the U.S. and its regional partners.
At the summit between Kim and Putin last month, both leaders committed to establishing an “anti-imperialist united front.” Pyongyang has consistently labeled the U.S. and its allies as “imperialists.”
North Korea’s recent foreign policy maneuvers also suggest a broader strategy in motion. This includes Pyongyang’s alleged support for Hamas during its conflict with U.S.-ally Israel, and strengthening relations with Russia after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These actions indicate Pyongyang’s intent to form a cohesive stance against Washington.
Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.
rfa.org
2. South Korea, US and Japan condemn North Korea's alleged supply of munitions to Russia
Excerpt:
“We will continue to work together with the international community to expose Russia’s attempts to acquire military equipment from (North Korea),” said the joint statement by South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa.
South Korea, US and Japan condemn North Korea's alleged supply of munitions to Russia
BY HYUNG-JIN KIM
Updated 2:13 AM EDT, October 26, 2023
AP · October 26, 2023
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea, the U.S. and Japan strongly condemned what they call North Korea’s supply of munitions and military equipment to Russia, saying Thursday that such weapons shipments sharply increase the human toll of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
A joint statement by the top diplomats of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan came days after Russia’s foreign minister scoffed at a recent U.S. claim that his country received munitions from North Korea, saying that Washington has failed to prove the allegation.
“We will continue to work together with the international community to expose Russia’s attempts to acquire military equipment from (North Korea),” said the joint statement by South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa.
“Such weapons deliveries, several of which we now confirm have been completed, will significantly increase the human toll of Russia’s war of aggression,” it said.
The joint statement was meant to show the three countries’ resolve to actively respond to a weapons transfer deal that Russia and North Korea have been pursuing in defiance of repeated warnings by the international community, South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lim Soosuk told reporters.
North Korea and Russia — both locked in separate confrontations with the U.S. and its allies — have recently taken steps to strengthen their military ties. Speculation about North Korea’s provision of conventional arms to refill Russia’s exhausted weapons stores flared last month, when North Korean leader Kim Jong Un traveled to Russia’s Far East to meet President Vladimir Putin and visit key military facilities.
The U.S., South Korea and others believe North Korea seeks to receive sophisticated weapons technologies from Russia to enhance its nuclear program in exchange for its munitions supply.
During his visit to Pyongyang last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in a reception speech that Russia valued North Korea’s “unwavering” support for its war on Ukraine. After returning to Moscow, Lavrov dismissed the U.S. accusation of the North Korean arms transfers, saying that “the Americans keep accusing everyone.”
“I don’t comment on rumors,” he said, according to Russian state media.
Earlier this month, the White House said that North Korea had delivered more than 1,000 containers of military equipment and munitions to Russia. The White House released images that it said showed the containers were loaded onto a Russian-flagged ship before being moved via train to southwestern Russia.
Thursday’s Seoul-Washington-Tokyo statement said the three countries are closely monitoring for any materials that Russia provides to North Korea in support of the North’s military objectives.
“We are deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear- or ballistic missile-related technology to (North Korea),” the statement said. It noted arms transfers to and from North Korea would violate U.N. Security Council resolutions, which Russia, a permanent Security Council member, previously voted for.
Since last year, North Korea has performed more than 100 missile tests, many of them designed to simulate nuclear attacks on South Korea and the U.S. Experts say Russia’s provision of high-tech weapons technologies would help Kim build much more reliable nuclear weapons systems.
Among the military assets North Korea reportedly wants to manufacture with Russian assistance are spy satellites. Two recent North Korean attempts to place a spy satellite into orbit failed for technical reasons, and North Korea vowed a third launch in October. But South Korea’s Unification Ministry said Thursday there have been no signs of an impending launch at the North’s main launch facility.
In response to North Korea’s growing nuclear capability, the U.S. and South Korea have been expanding their regular military drills and restoring some trilateral training involving Japan. Earlier this week, the South Korean, U.S. and Japanese militaries conducted their first-ever trilateral aerial exercise near the Korean Peninsula.
On Thursday, South Korea’s navy said it has been holding a large-scale maritime drill off the Korean Peninsula’s west coast this week as part of broader annual military training. This year’s maritime drill, which involves live-firing exercises, drew U.S. military helicopters and patrol aircraft as well, according to a navy statement.
North Korea didn’t immediately comment on the drill. But it has previously slammed U.S-South Korean exercises as invasion rehearsals and responded with missile tests.
AP · October 26, 2023
3. PACAF Leaders Visit South Korea Bases and Talk Readiness
A lot of high level military visits and exercises are taking place. We are showing we are not taking our eye off the ball with north Korea. And airpower is a key element to the defense of the ROK and is certainly one of the alliance's many comparative advantages (more than an advantage - superiority and supremacy).
Here is a counterintuitive thought. Our sustained high level engagement and exercises may help somewhat reduce north Korean provocations (but north Korea will still test systems when it deems necessary to advance its programs - not every test is intended to be a provocation to send a message). They help support the regime's narrative of the threat to the north so the regime can use them in its propaganda campaign to explain why the Korean people in the north have to sacrifice and suffer for the protection of Kim Jong Un. Kim seems to act out more when he feels neglected. This would be an interesting hypothesis to examine. Perhaps the researchers at Beyond Parallel or 38 North could research this.
PACAF Leaders Visit South Korea Bases and Talk Readiness
airandspaceforces.com · by Unshin Harpley · October 25, 2023
Oct. 25, 2023 | By Unshin Lee Harpley
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Pacific Air Forces leaders conducted readiness inspections and spoke about quality of life concerns with Airmen during a sweep of the U.S. Air Force’s two bases in South Korea last week.
PACAF commander Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach and PACAF command chief Chief Master Sgt. David Wolfe stopped by Osan and Kunsan air bases on Oct. 19 and 20, emphasizing the enduring U.S. commitment to the region.
“We are here in Korea to stay,” Wilsbach said while visiting the 51st Fighter Wing at Osan base, according to a release.
Both South Korean bases are strategically located near North Korea, China, and Russia, making their responsiveness essential for the broader Indo-Pacific region’s stability.
“While the Wolf Pack’s main objective is to defend this country [Republic of Korea], I want to also emphasize that Kunsan’s readiness has a larger impact on the actions of these nations in the broader region,” said Wilsbach, while meeting with Airmen at the 8th Fighter Wing.
The command team discussed PACAF priorities, assessed readiness, and reviewed long-term infrastructure strategies during their visit.
Wilsbach and Wolfe’s tour of Korean bases came in conjunction with a visit to the Seoul Air and Defense Expo, which showcased a wide range of USAF aircraft including the B-52, F-22s, and F-16s.
Earlier this week, the U.S., ROK, and Japan conducted their first-ever trilateral aerial exercise on Oct. 22. A U.S. B-52H Stratofortress was escorted by fighter aircraft from all three nations.
North Korea has condemned the presence of B-52s in the peninsula through its state-controlled KCNA media.
While Wilsbach emphasized the importance of the Air Force’s presence in Korea, acting undersecretary of defense for policy Mara Karlin also highlighted the significance of the U.S.’s close collaboration with South Korea and Japan to address the growing threat from North Korea effectively.
“We’ve got these persistent threats that exist and that are probably going to worsen,” Karlin said at a Brookings event on Oct. 24. “So we’ve got to really understand how to monitor and respond to those threats, and to do so in a way that really involves working closely with allies and partners.”
Pyongyang’s most recent provocation was the launch of two short-range ballistic missiles ahead of a bilateral summit between Kim Jong Un and Russia’s Vladimir Putin on Sept. 13, according to South Korean military officials.
In April, Washington and Seoul established the Nuclear Consultative Group through the “Washington Declaration” to reinforce a unified approach to regional security while promoting dialogue and diplomacy with North Korea for denuclearization.
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan highlighted the Biden administration’s commitment to bolster extended deterrence in response to Pyongyang’s threats.
“In the face of North Korea’s dangerous and illicit nuclear and missile programs, we are working to ensure that the United States’ extended deterrence is stronger than ever so that the region remains peaceful and stable,” Sulivan wrote in an article for Foreign Affairs, published Oct. 24.
“That is why we concluded the Washington Declaration with South Korea and why we’re advancing extended trilateral deterrence discussions with Japan, as well.”
Recent reports have suggested Hamas utilized North Korean-made munitions in their attack. As a result, observers have expressed concerns regarding the potential for Pyongyang’s engagement with militant groups in the Middle East, and the possibility of North Korea emulating Hamas’ attacks within the peninsula.
Bruce Bennett, international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, suggested in a recent commentary that while it is unlikely that leader Kim Jong Un would resort to a full-scale attack similar to Hamas, he does share the goal of discouraging U.S. military involvement in the region.
National Security
airandspaceforces.com · by Unshin Harpley · October 25, 2023
4. South Korea seeks to beef up annual amphibious drills with more US Marines
A key to the counterattack.
South Korea seeks to beef up annual amphibious drills with more US Marines
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · October 25, 2023
A South Korean marine takes aim during the Ssangyong exercise in Pohang, South Korea, March 29, 2023. (David Choi/Stars and Stripes)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — The South Korean military wants more U.S. Marines to participate in annual large-scale amphibious training on and around the Korean Peninsula.
Plans to expand Ssangyong — Korean for “double dragons” — were submitted in a report to lawmakers during a National Defense Committee hearing on Tuesday, a South Korean marine headquarters spokesman told Stars and Stripes by phone the next day.
The hearing took place at the naval headquarters in South Chungcheong Province.
Though the South Korean marines seek to increase the number of U.S. Marines who train during Ssangyong 2024, its own troop levels will remain the same, the spokesman said.
He declined to provide the specific number of troops used by either country in this year’s exercise, which took place in March, citing security concerns.
It’s customary in South Korea for some government officials to speak to reporters on condition of anonymity.
Discussions with the Marine Corps are ongoing and a final decision has not been made, the spokesman added.
U.S. Marine Forces Korea did not immediately respond to a request for comment by phone Wednesday.
This year’s Ssangyong was the largest joint maritime drill in South Korea since 2018 and included the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, along with its strike group, air wing and about 7,000 sailors and Marines.
Around 30 British marines, taking part in the exercise for the first time, conducted reconnaissance operations.
The Marine Corps describe Ssangyong as routine training designed to boost cooperation with their South Korean counterparts.
“This exercise was an opportunity for our team to conduct training with our [South Korean] allies, develop relationships and improve our ability to work together,” 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit commander Col. Samuel Meyer said in a news release April 5.
Military cooperation between the two allies have taken unprecedented steps this year after President Joe Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol agreed to deploy strategic assets to the peninsula in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile testing.
The USS Kentucky sailed to Busan in July, becoming the first nuclear-capable U.S. submarine to visit South Korea in 42 years. Last week, a nuclear-capable B-52H Stratofortress bomber landed on the peninsula for the first time in at least 30 years.
Stars and Stripes reporter Yoo Kyong Chang contributed to this report.
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · October 25, 2023
5. Korea, US launch joint rare earth project in Vietnam
Good. The ROK/US alliance is not geographically limited to the peninsula.
I think this may also be a result of the work by ROK and US officials following on from the Biden-Yoon summit.
Korea, US launch joint rare earth project in Vietnam
The Korea Times · October 26, 2023
Rare earth oxide samples are seen at mining company VTRE in Hanoi, Vietnam Sept. 7. Reuters-Yonhap
South Korea and the United States have launched a joint research project on the extraction of rare earth elements in Vietnam, as part of efforts to bolster cooperation in enhancing the supply chain of critical minerals, Seoul's foreign ministry said Thursday.
The two countries will send their researchers and geological experts to Hanoi for three months starting in October, to work on extracting rare earths and other critical elements from coal ash, under the U.S. Embassy Science Fellow (ESF) project.
The U.S. has been running ESF projects since 2001, but it is the first time for Washington to dispatch its scientists to a third country in collaboration with a foreign partner, according to Seoul's foreign ministry.
The allies are also working closely with the Vietnamese government to facilitate the joint research.
The project will seek to promote the use of environmentally friendly technologies to extract rare earth elements and bolster international cooperation in the processing of critical minerals, the ministry said.
The collaboration also adds to the efforts in existing multilateral mechanisms on critical minerals, such as the U.S.-led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) that the allies have signed up for.
The MSP was launched in 2022 by the U.S. to strengthen the global supply of and promote investment in critical minerals, such as lithium, cobalt and nickel.
The alliance is largely seen as a partnership that also aims to reduce the risk of dependence on China for raw materials. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · October 26, 2023
6. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ A recent report on conditions at farms (4) Telescopic lens shows the present conditions in North Korea’s farming communities
We must pay close attention to conditions inside north Korea and anticipate the possible effects.
＜Inside N. Korea＞ A recent report on conditions at farms (4) Telescopic lens shows the present conditions in North Korea’s farming communities -1 Photographs show people mobilized for farming (5 recent photos)
asiapress.org
＜Inside N. Korea＞ A recent report on conditions at farms (1) The harvest is better than last year, but lack of materials remains a serious problem (4 recent photos)
In late September, a Chinese reporting partner took photos of a farming area near the Yalu River in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. The reporting partner approached North Korean territory on a ferry. At the time, the farm was at the height of the corn harvest. The photos show a large number of people mobilized for the harvest from different areas of North Korea. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)
Women are conducting a meeting in a corn field. They appear to be members of the “Socialist Women’s Union” mobilized for the harvest from a different area of the country.
◆ Middle school girls wave to Chinese tourists with smiling faces
Photo 1 shows what appears to be members of the “Socialist Women’s Union” mobilized for the harvest from another area of North Korea. Farmers conduct the harvest as part of sub-work teams, the smallest production units on collective farms. The sub-work teams are typically made up of 10-12 men and women. The Socialist Women’s Union is made up of housewives without formal jobs. In the photograph, they appear to be conducting a review of the day’s work in the middle of a field. The woman standing on the right seems to be the head of the group. There’s also a woman who has brought her child.
On the sloped field to the left, just harvested yellow corn can be seen on the ground. There’s a structure above the corn that was built to watch for thieves. In the middle of the field, women are gathered for what appears to be a meeting.
Photo 2, meanwhile, was taken at the same place. At the center of the photo are women in the middle of a meeting. The red circle to the upper left is a structure built to monitor the fields for thieves.
Middle school students mobilized for the fall harvest. All of them have short hair. They are waving at the Chinese tourist ferry and smiling. They are carrying sacks with grass they picked to feed rabbits they are raising at home.
Photo 3 shows female middle students mobilized for the harvest. North Koreans are instructed to wave nicely to Chinese people on ferry boats navigating the Yalu River. The children’s smiles are reassuring because there have been people dying this year due to malnutrition caused by the country’s economic troubles.
The girls are carrying a white sack, which appears to be grass that they’ll use to feed to rabbits they are raising at home. Households in North Korea are required to raise rabbits, whose meat and fur are supplied to the military. Photo 4, meanwhile, shows a middle school student mobilized for the harvest in a nearby area.
A middle school student who appears to have been mobilized for the fall harvest.
A man sitting in a guard house next to barbed-wire fencing along the Yalu River. The man appears to be a farmer mobilized to guard the border. People in farming communities form units of the paramilitary Worker and Peasant Red Guard. They monitor the border for defections and crossings into China.
◆ Farmers mobilized to guard the border and watch over soldiers’ activities
Photo 5 shows a farmer who appears to have been mobilized for border security. Immediately after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020, the Kim Jong-un regime closed the country’s borders. The regime then moved to strengthen the barbed-wire fence network along most of the river borders with China. The pretext for the project was to prevent the spread of the virus, but the real aim was to prevent North Koreans from crossing or running away over the border to China.
At the same time, the regime built even more inspection points and guard houses along the border manned by both soldiers and local civilians. Several ASIAPRESS reporting partners living near the Yalu and Tumen rivers have reported that the regime’s decision to put civilians in charge of security along the border is “mainly to watch over soldiers guarding the frontier.” The civilians are tasked with preventing soldiers from taking bribes to turn a blind eye to defections, border crossings, and smuggling activities. In short, civilians and soldiers are watching over each other’s activities.
All the photographs in this article were taken on the Chinese side of the border across from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, in late September 2023. (ASIAPRESS)
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
Map of North Korea ( ASIAPRESS)
asiapress.org
7. Yoon vows to revive spirit of ex-president Park Chung-hee
I am not sure this will help the President politically.
Yoon vows to revive spirit of ex-president Park Chung-hee
The Korea Times · October 26, 2023
President Yoon Suk Yeol talks with former President Park Geun-hye during a ceremony to commemorate the 44th anniversary of the death of Park's father, former President Park Chung-hee, at Seoul National Cemetery in Dongjak District, Thursday. Courtesy of presidential office
President attends former president's memorial ceremony to seek unity of conservatives
By Nam Hyun-woo
President Yoon Suk Yeol attended a memorial ceremony honoring former conservative President Park Chung-hee and met his daughter and former President Park Geun-hye, Thursday, in what appears to be an effort to seek the support of conservative voters before next year’s general elections.
The ceremony was held at Seoul National Cemetery in Dongjak District, to mark the 44th anniversary of Park Chung-hee’s death. Yoon attended the ceremony just hours after he arrived from a six-day trip to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
It was the first times for a serving president to attend the ceremony, which has been taking place every year since 1980.
“Former President Park Chung-hee rallied our citizens under the slogan, 'we’ll make it if we try,’ and propelled the country’s industrialization, which is a historic global milestone known as the Miracle on the Han River,” Yoon said, describing Park as “a great leader.”
“He instilled national pride in our people and harnessed the untapped potential of Koreans, so that they can be united as a great people. In this time of a comprehensive global crisis, we have to rekindle his spirit and achievements and make the country take another leap forward.”
President Yoon Suk Yeol pays tribute to former President Park Chung-hee's grave during a ceremony to commemorate the 44th anniversary of his death at the Seoul National Cemetery in Dongjak District, Thursday. Courtesy of presidential office
The late Park served as president from 1963 until he was assassinated on Oct. 26, 1979. He still commands huge support from Korea’s conservatives, despite contradicting assessments on his achievements in driving the country’s economic growth and industrialization from the ashes of the Korean War, while ruling the country as a dictator.
“After taking office, I met 92 international leaders and discussed economic partnerships, and all of them showed their respect for Korea’s rapid development, which was achieved by late President Park Chung-hee,” Yoon said. “And I told them to study Park to be able to facilitate rapid growth.”
During the ceremony, Yoon also expressed his condolences to Park’s daughter. It was the third time that the two met after Yoon won the presidential election in March last year.
Yoon also has a thorny relationship with the junior Park. She served as president from 2013 to 2017 until she was impeached due to her involvement in a large corruption scandal, and Yoon was one of the lead prosecutors investigating that scandal.
“People are saying we are facing various challenges, but I believe our government and the people will overcome them,” the former president said.
“Looking back, there hasn't been a time in Korea's history without challenges… but our remarkable citizens overcame all these hardships,” she said. “And I believe my father, myself and others who are here today share the same dream that Korea can achieve prosperity and happiness through cohesion and understanding.”
President Yoon Suk Yeol shakes hands with former President Park Geun-hye during a ceremony to commemorate the 44th anniversary of the death of Park's father, former President Park Chung-hee, at the Seoul National Cemetery in Dongjak District, Thursday. Joint Press Corps
Yoon's presence at the ceremony was widely seen as an attempt to unite conservatives ahead of the general elections next April.
Following the ruling People Power Party's (PPP) resounding defeat in a by-election to select a Seoul district mayor earlier this month, Yoon's job approval ratings, as well as those of the PPP, have been plummeting in recent polls, particularly in their strongholds in the Gyeongsang Provinces.
Since the PPP’s mainstream is now made up of Yoon's loyalists, there are concerns that the president caused a rift among conservatives while phasing out those who were loyal to Park.
In line with this view, there are rumors that Park's loyalists are considering running as independent candidates in the election, raising concerns over the conservative bloc’s division.
Against this backdrop, Yoon’s attendance at the ceremony and tribute to the late president are viewed as an effort to rally conservatives’ support.
According to presidential spokesperson Lee Do-woon, Yoon and Park had conversations while burning incenses at the late president’s tomb. Although the conversations between Yoon and Park during the ceremony were not revealed to the media, pundits suspect that they could have exchanged views on the general elections and ways to unite conservatives.
The Korea Times · October 26, 2023
8. Mother of Travis King, soldier charged with desertion to North Korea, says family plans to 'fight charges hard'
I think the best they can hope for is a plea bargain that gives him credit for time served in north Korea. The evidence of desertion seems pretty clear cut. Are there sufficient mitigation and extenuating circumstances that can be used in reducing the sentencing if he is convicted? Sure. But I do not think those same circumstances and conditions will be useful in defense.
And his actions did have some national security effects that were somewhat detrimental to the US.
Mother of Travis King, soldier charged with desertion to North Korea, says family plans to 'fight charges hard'
ABCNews.com · by ABC News
The mother of Travis King, a U.S. Army private charged by the Army with desertion for crossing the Demilitarized Zone into North Korea this summer, said that her family plans "to fight the charges and fight the charges hard."
In an exclusive interview with ABC News Tuesday, Claudine Gates and Dan Jovanovic, King's mother and stepfather, said the eight counts leveled against King last week that include desertion, possession of child pornography, assaulting fellow soldiers, and disobeying a superior officer shock them because they do not align with the "peaceful person" they know.
"The actions that the Army is saying that he's doing is not Travis. He's not like that. He's a good boy," Gates said.
Claudine Gates and Dan Jovanovic are speaking with ABC News' Linsey Davis in an interview airing in full on Wednesday night at 7 p.m. ET on ABC News Live Prime.
Claudine Gates and Dan Jovanovic, the mother and stepfather of Travis King, a US Army private charged by the Army with desertion for crossing the demilitarized zone into North Korea speaks with ABC News, Oct. 24, 2023.
ABC News
Defense officials say King, 23, crossed the demilitarized zone from South Korea into North Korea in late July. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea released King in September. King is being held in pre-trial detention in El Paso, Texas.
King's parents said they are concerned about his mental health and characterized the Army as being unhelpful in giving them answers. In a reunion with King two weeks ago in Texas, Gates described King as "very drowsy and tired."
"I didn't think that they were doing any harm to him or anything … But he seemed like he was still withdrawn," said Jovanovic.
Both parents said King told them he signed paperwork that prevented him from divulging details of his detainment in North Korea and the reasons why he crossed into the country. The Army likewise would not give them details.
"He seemed very worried," Gates said.
King has not contacted them since, they said.
King solicited a Snapchat user to take lewd photos of herself in exchange for money in early July, according to the charging document. Gates said she was "blindsided" by the accusation of King possessing child pornography and found out about the charges on the news. Jovanovic added the charge is "100 percent-plus out of character" for King.
"That's not him, period," Jovanovic said.
Both parents say King lost his phone in South Korea, which would have made his social media account vulnerable.
"If you got all these devices accessible or laying around and everything, God only knows how that manifested itself in there," said Jovanovic.
Claudine Gates, the mother of Travis King, a US Army private charged by the Army with desertion for crossing the demilitarized zone into North Korea speaks with ABC News, Oct. 24, 2023.
ABC News
Before he fled to North Korea, King had been detained in South Korea due to an incident at a Seoul nightclub in October 2022 where he allegedly punched a victim. King served 47 days in a South Korean detention facility following the altercation, according to a U.S. official. King was released in July and was set to board a return flight to the U.S. where disciplinary procedures awaited him. He failed to show up and instead joined a tour group at the Demilitarized Zone which he crossed to enter North Korea.
One of six children raised in Racine, Wisconsin, King "deplored alcohol," especially when seeing family members "overindulging" at parties, according to his mother and stepfather. They described a young man who was often solitary, enjoyed playing video games in his room, independently read the Bible, and had good manners.
They blasted the Army for not putting him in treatment to address the drinking they say apparently started in South Korea.
"They should have given him some type of help and got him off that juice," said Jovanovic. "Something had to be done about it so it [didn't] escalate to being worse, which I think that's what happened."
The Army did not respond to requests for comment from ABC News.
Army spokesperson Kimbia Rey told ABC News last week that "to protect the privacy of Private King, the Army will not comment on the details of ongoing litigation. Private King is presumed innocent of the charges until proven guilty."
With neither King nor the Army revealing what happened, Gates and Jovanovic say they are left grappling with a mystery that has been relatively unchanged since July when King fled to North Korea.
"He's got to open up so we can get these matters resolved, and he can go on with his life, you know? I'm sure the military would like to see that too … I don't really believe they want to hurt him … They just want to get the truth out there. And if they're responsible for some of it, I think they'll own up to it," Jovanovic said.
As to King's current incarceration in Texas, Gates said, "I'm afraid."
ABCNews.com · by ABC News
9. NK blames Israel over Gaza hospital blast
north Korea wants to play a major role in what it thinks is a Cold War 2.0 and is now willing to carry the water (talking points) of the revisionist, rogue, and revolutionary powers and the violent extremist organizations. I heard a real north Korea expert this week talk about Kim as a student of history and especially his grandfather and maybe he thinks he is going to be a major leader in the non-aligned movement like his grandfather tried to be. Maybe he has grand delusions (I mean grand allusions - no I think "delusions" is probably right for Kim ).
NK blames Israel over Gaza hospital blast
The Korea Times · by 2023-10-26 13:47 | World · October 26, 2023
Palestinians walk by buildings destroyed in the Israeli bombardment on al-Zahra, on the outskirts of Gaza City, Oct. 20. AP-Yonhap
North Korea on Thursday accused Israel of conducting a deadly explosion at a hospital in the Gaza Strip and lambasted the United States over its "undisguised patronage" of such an act.
The North's belated criticism of the incident came after hundreds of people died in the Oct. 17 bombing at the al-Ahli Hospital in the ongoing war between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas.
While Hamas has accused Israel of carrying out the strike, Israel has claimed it was caused by a botched Islamic Jihad rocket launch. U.S. President Joe Biden echoed the view during his visit to Israel, attributing the explosion to a "terrorist group."
"What should not be overlooked is that Israel's such criminal act was openly committed under the undisguised patronage of the U.S," a spokesperson for the North's foreign ministry said in an English-language statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency.
Israeli troops launch brief ground raid into Gaza ahead of expected wider incursion
The official slammed Washington for being an "accomplice" to Israel's "hideous war crime."
"Immediately after the bombing of the hospital by Israel, the U.S. covered such crime, making absurd sophism that the incident seemed to be committed by other forces rather than Israel," the official said. "This shows that the U.S. is an accomplice who connived at and fostered Israel's genocide."
North Korea on Monday accused the U.S. of being behind the Israel-Hamas war, saying Washington is "entirely" responsible for the tragedy.
Earlier this month, the North denounced Israel over the conflict, saying it is the "consequence of Israel's ceaseless criminal actions" against the people of Palestine.
It also denied as "groundless" that the Hamas militant group used North Korean weapons for its surprise attack on Israel, accusing Washington of cooking up false accusations. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · by 2023-10-26 13:47 | World · October 26, 2023
10. Korea's democratic erosion
Troubling. I heard from a Korean friend that the opposition party is discussing plans to impeach the president following the next election which they will likely dominate just as they did this month. My friend said that Korea is in the midst of an ideological war that had remained in an uneasy truce between the conservatives and the liberals until the previous Moon administration ripped the bandages off of Korean history and created new narratives. Will the alliance survive elections in 2024?
Korea's democratic erosion
The Korea Times · October 25, 2023
Bipartisan dialogue needed to recover democracy
By John Burton
President Yoon Suk Yeol has a generally good reputation in Washington, based primarily on his efforts to improve relations with Japan and strengthen the trilateral defense alliance with the U.S. in Northeast Asia. Less attention has been paid to what critics say are his authoritarian tendencies, part of a troubling global trend of democratic erosion.
The lack of attention on this issue may reflect the fact that Korea is widely seen by Americans through the lens of national security. Few articles have appeared in the U.S. media about Yoon’s controversial domestic policies.
One notable exception was a recent article in the New Yorker, which described how “Yoon, a career prosecutor with no previous experience in politics, has started to scrape away protections for women, the right to associate and organize, and, most strikingly, freedom of the press.” It was only last week that the New York Times, regarded as the standard bearer of foreign coverage in the U.S. media, finally decided to devote a lengthy article to the growing polarization of Korean politics caused by Yoon’s actions.
Perhaps Yoon’s crackdown on the Korean media, such as his battle with broadcaster MBC, will start to produce more such stories in the U.S. since American journalists are particularly sensitive to issues of press freedom, whether at home or abroad.
“So much of the foreign-policy establishment was gleeful when Yoon was elected,” Jake Werner of the Washington-based Quincy Institute told the New Yorker. The Biden administration has ignored the fact that “it’s authoritarians who are welcoming the direction we’re taking in foreign policy” when it comes to China.
Among independent analysts in Washington who closely follow Korean domestic politics, there are worries that Yoon’s actions could threaten the country’s stability and weaken the defense alliance that the president says he is seeking to strengthen by instead provoking a backlash.
They note that members of the Yoon government and its supporters have used terms such as "gongbi" (commie) to attack critics. “Such terms were last heard in the 1970s and 1980s during the Park (Chung-hee) and Chun (Doo-hwan) dictatorships. This will only increase political polarization,” said one former U.S. official with long experience in dealing with Korea.
Yoon has embraced "culture war" issues that connect him to global populist right-wing movements. These include his anti-feminist stance such as threatening to close the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, and anti-immigrant measures such as closing support centers for them.
Other troubling signs include Yoon’s reliance on a team of aggressive prosecutors, his former colleagues, to investigate political opponents, including Lee Jae-myung, who ran against Yoon and narrowly lost the presidential election. This is occurring against the backdrop of internal divisions in the opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), which is split between a faction supporting Lee and those who want to dump him as party leader.
Whether this will cause the DPK to lose its National Assembly majority in next April’s election remains an open question. Both the ruling People Power Party (PPP) and DPK are unpopular, with support levels in the low 30s for both, which matches the favorability ratings for Yoon and Lee.
One sign that the DPK may be on the rebound was its recent landslide victory in the Gangseo District chief by-election, which was formerly held by the PPP. This has led to a party shake-up, with naturalized Ihn Yo-han (known to many foreigners as John Linton, head of the international clinic at Seoul’s Severance Hospital) to head the PPP’s reform committee. Ihn, who supported Park Geun-hye in her presidential campaign, may have been tapped to give the party a more international look.
Despite whoever comes out on top in the forthcoming elections, the conditions that threaten democracy in Korea will remain. Some of them are deeply embedded, including corruption, the lack of protection of minority rights and Cold War-era national security laws still on the books.
Increased political polarization is often produced by growing economic inequality and Korea has one of the highest income gaps among advanced countries. The public’s heavy reliance on conspiracy-tinged social media is feeding their disenchantment with the two main political parties, potentially paving the way for politicians on both the extreme right or left.
This also makes it harder to reach a consensus on economic and foreign policy, which is already difficult to achieve due to the fact that Korean politics is often personality-driven rather than based on policy-making or ideology.
Korea still has time to change the dangerous path it is treading. It has not yet reached the same stage of democratic crisis that the United States is facing, with a dysfunctional Congress and populist demagogues seeking the presidency. But it needs to begin conducting a serious bipartisan dialogue on the state of democracy and how to protect it to prevent such crisis from happening.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
The Korea Times · October 25, 2023
11. Ruling camp's reform
While we praise the work President Yoon has done to strengthen the alliance, and develop trilateral cooperation, the Korean people in the South do not necessarily view those as important as domestic political and economic issues (like most people in most democratic countries). All the good national security and foreign policy work will not elect a conservative or PPP president or gain the PPP a majority in the National Assembly.
Ruling camp's reform
The Korea Times · October 26, 2023
Yoon should change first and focus on people's livelihoods
Since some time ago, a new pattern has emerged in Korea’s party politics.
Whenever a party loses a key election, major officeholders resign and set up a “reform committee.” They usually usher in an outsider as the organization’s interim leader and make cosmetic changes.
However, it is a way of avoiding the responsibility on the part of officials who hold real power — the party chairman or the president in the case of the governing party. That’s what the ruling People Power Party (PPP) is doing now.
The catalyst was a by-election two weeks ago to select the mayor of a Seoul district.
A vote to pick a county or borough chief could, and should, have ended as a small event. However, the ruling camp unnecessarily escalated the significance of the vote as a referendum on the Yoon Suk Yeol government and suffered a stunning defeat. The PPP, of course, did not want to do so. The president, unduly confident of his vote-gathering ability, overdid it and invited disaster.
The anecdote shows how Yoon, while pretending to stay above partisan politics, tightly governs the ruling party. To be sure, the incumbent is not the first one to do so. Unlike his predecessors, however, Yoon is a political novice and stubborn, raising the possibility of a one-man rule. He must change. Even some U.S. political analysts have reportedly begun to notice how democracy is regressing in Korea.
To the relief of many Koreans, the president seems to be changing. He has no other option. The ratio of votes supporting the conservative and progressive candidates in the by-election stood at 3.5 to 6, showing how the public feels about the Yoon administration. However, people do not appear to be pinning too much hope on the chief executive’s inclination or capability to pursue sweeping changes. Voters believe all this is a strategic shift for a far more important political event — next April’s parliamentary elections.
Only a month ago, for instance, the chief executive emphasized the need for a strong ideology and the struggle to achieve that. Since the election defeat, Yoon has called for his aides and cabinet ministers to care more about the public's livelihood through effective communication. However, that was only in words. For example, Ministry of National Defense officials are still trying to remove the bust of a legendary anti-Japanese fighter from the Korean Military Academy’s compound, citing ideological reasons. That has nothing to do with the people’s daily lives. Moreover, most Koreans oppose it.
Yoon’s supporters and other rightwingers have one common misperception: The president is trying to do the right thing but through the wrong method.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Take Yoon’s foreign policy. Some Koreans feel the trilateral alliance with the U.S. and Japan has enhanced national security. However, a similar number of Koreans feel uneasy because of escalating tensions. They think a small country’s “value diplomacy” will only make it a sidekick and take the brunt of possible conflicts later. It is foolish to pursue strategic diplomacy by showing off your cards in advance, And for Washington, Seoul is a subordinate variable to Tokyo.
The same thing is happening with the economy. Yoon’s tax cuts for big businesses and wealthy individuals and his fiscal stringency during a slump only make the rich richer and the poor poorer. His conservative, small-government ideology is outdated and ill-timed. Yoon shifted his diplomatic and economic policy stances without consulting with experts outside of his small talent pool, let alone his political opponents.
Against this backdrop, the PPP named Ihn Yo-han (John. A. Linton), a physician and naturalized Korean, as the head of its reform panel. Ihn, a fourth-generation grandson of the American missionary Eugene Bell (1868-1925), is a conservative born in the progressive Jeolla province, like a Trumpian in a blue state. It will help the ruling camp overcome regional disadvantage. “I will change everything,” Ihn said. “Don’t I look different?”
We hope the difference will not end only in appearance. Already, the PPP set up two special committees for nominating candidates and recruiting talents, raising concerns that Ihn could face setbacks in carrying out his job.
Ihn also said he will talk with the president without restraint “if provided with such opportunities.”
The president must change. Or his party will experience what its name suggests — people power — six months from now.
The Korea Times · October 26, 2023
12. ‘NIS meddling in politics with claims of election hacking’: Democratic Party of Korea
And of course this is a problem, obviously.
‘NIS meddling in politics with claims of election hacking’: Democratic Party of Korea
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · October 26, 2023
By Kim Arin
Published : Oct. 26, 2023 - 18:16
National Election Commission (NEC)
The main opposition Democratic Party of Korea on Thursday downplayed the National Intelligence Service findings that the country’s election infrastructure is vulnerable to cyberattacks, claiming that the spy agency was trying to get involved in politics.
The Democratic Party linked the accusations of cybersecurity vulnerabilities by the NIS with the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s “attack on democracy.” The party also alleged that the spy agency was seeking access to the election service’s systems for political purposes.
Rep. Hong Ihk-pyo, the Democratic Party’s floor leader, said that the Yoon administration was “deliberately campaigning to taint the public’s view” of the election service to weaken its authority with the general election just six months away.
Hong and his party see the concerns of cyberattacks being raised as the NIS’ attempt to “meddle in politics” and “collect domestic intelligence” -- a function that was taken away from the spy agency as a part of the preceding Moon Jae-in administration’s intelligence reform.
“It’s hard not to wonder what the true intentions behind the NIS announcement might be,” he said. “I’d like to remind the NIS that it should serve the people, and not the administration.”
The People Power Party said in response that the Democratic Party or any political party “should have no reason to object to” the cybersecurity issues being addressed ahead of the general election.
“This cybersecurity evaluation showed that the National Election Commission was defenseless against cyberattacks, including those by hostile countries such as North Korea,” the ruling party’s lawmakers on the Assembly interior committee, which oversees the election service, said in a joint statement. “The Assembly has to concentrate its focus on building a system that will allow the South Korean people to vote with confidence.”
The ruling party lawmakers dismissed the Democratic Party claims that the NIS carried out the security evaluation with “ulterior motives.” “The election service itself has already agreed to additional security fortifications,” they said.
The NIS, jointly with the Korea Internet and Security Agency, conducted a security evaluation on the election service for 12 weeks after its email servers were known to have been perpetrated by North Korean hackers.
Over the evaluation, the NIS found that the election service systems were unable to fend off mock cyberattacks and that there had been successful breaches by North Korea in the past two years.
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · October 26, 2023
13. How did the Koreans and Jews endure?
Conclusion:
Perhaps, then, the stickiness of an ethnic identity story lies in the adversity that a group of people have had to endure over time from outside groups. In this case, instead of the in-group identifying the boundaries that define the out-group, it is the attacks from the out-group that push the attacked into a cohesive sense of common identity, armed with adversity stories that are reinforced every time they face danger again from another out-group. In this case, ironically, it is the constant existential threat to a group's survival that makes their story more enduring and powerful.
How did the Koreans and Jews endure?
The Korea Times · October 26, 2023
By Jason Lim
It’s impossible to not feel affected by the current conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, with photos of innocent men, women and children from both sides dying due to horrible violence, whether they are Jews intentionally butchered by Hamas on that fateful Saturday or Palestinian children buried under the rubble of concrete and steel crumbling after a bomb has been dropped. What suddenly struck me, however, was that the victims looked remarkably similar. If they weren’t distinguished by the types of clothing or delineated by the voice-overs from reporters as the video footage flashed by, I wouldn’t be able to tell who was a Jew and who was a Palestinian.
Perhaps this is only natural since both are descended from ancient Canaanites, intermixed with the other ancient peoples of the times from Egypt, Mesopotamia and Anatolia. Further, Jews have been driven from their biblical lands multiple times throughout history and lived for long periods in different parts of the world, intermixing with indigenous peoples in those parts. In fact, genetics studies have shown that there is no one common genotype for all Jews from different areas of the world. This is self-evident. Jews can look Swedish with blonde hair and blue eyes or Arab with olive skin and jet-black hair. So, who is a Jew?
We can ask that same question to Koreans. Despite the Korean myth that says Koreans are homogeneous people who uniformly wore white and were preternaturally good with a bow and arrow, I doubt that there is a specific genotype that would distinguish a Korean from a Japanese from a Manchurian. Genotypes, like culture, are not a static end state but an ongoing process of complex intermingling that undulates with history, migration, climate and other multiple macro factors that drive the collective behavior of a set of people over time. If cultural artifacts such as language and clothing can change over time, why can’t the genotypes and phenotypes of a people?
This then, brings up the intriguing question of, what defines a people? If it’s not how you look, what language you speak, or even what DNA you share, then what is the glue that keeps the identity of a group of people intact, consistent, and cohesive across thousands of years? Moreover, how come some people manage that cohesion while most others fade away into the mists of history? How come we still have Jews, Koreans, Egyptians etc. today but can no longer encounter the Hittites, Scythians, Huns, etc.? I am sure that we still have their genetic descendants walking amongst us today, but their collective identities have gone.
I don’t think there is a definitive answer to this question, but I would venture to guess that it might have to do with the strength, resilience and reinforcement of the story that define a particular ethnicity. In the absence of anything else that can define an ethnicity, what else is there except a story that members of that particular group share in common, a story that is propagated and passed on through generations?
As Yuval Noah Harari writes, “Sapiens rule the world, because we are the only animal that can cooperate flexibly in large numbers. We can create mass cooperation networks, in which thousands and millions of complete strangers work together towards common goals … The real difference between us and chimpanzees is the mysterious glue that enables millions of humans to cooperate effectively. This mysterious glue is made of stories, not genes. We cooperate effectively with strangers because we believe in things like gods, nations, money and human rights. Yet none of these things exists outside the stories that people invent and tell one another.”
The resilience of this narrative cohesion is especially impressive when you think of the Jews, since they were scattered and had to maintain this common story without a land to anchor them. Of course, the Jewish ethnic story is based on Judaism the religion that kept the common practices and rituals alive even as the people themselves underwent changes – perhaps this helped. On the other hand, Koreans, while they had the advantage of geographical steadfastness, never had a singular religion, cultural tradition, or historical milestone that kept the “Korean story” together and consistent to constitute a single ethnic identity over the millennia.
Perhaps, then, the stickiness of an ethnic identity story lies in the adversity that a group of people have had to endure over time from outside groups. In this case, instead of the in-group identifying the boundaries that define the out-group, it is the attacks from the out-group that push the attacked into a cohesive sense of common identity, armed with adversity stories that are reinforced every time they face danger again from another out-group. In this case, ironically, it is the constant existential threat to a group's survival that makes their story more enduring and powerful.
Jason Lim (jasonlim@msn.com) is a Washington, D.C.-based expert on innovation, leadership and organizational culture. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect The Korea Times’ editorial stance.
The Korea Times · October 26, 2023
14. US House to adopt resolution for ‘Kimchi Day’
What amazes me and is interesting is how people have a taste for kimchi and have never experienced Korea. I have met many people who truly crave kimchi and have no other experience with Korea. It must illustrate the power of kimchi!
US House to adopt resolution for ‘Kimchi Day’
koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · October 26, 2023
By Choi Si-young
Published : Oct. 26, 2023 - 15:46
A bowl of kimchi. (123rf)
The US House of Representatives will adopt a resolution in early December to recognize Kimchi Day, honoring the Korean dish of fermented vegetables.
According to the Museum of Korean American Heritage in New York, the adoption will take place on Dec. 6 after the House Oversight and Accountability Committee puts the resolution on the floor, which Rep. Young Kim (R-California) proposed with bipartisan backing. The resolution did not pass last year.
The adoption this time, an official at the museum said, is “born out of a joint decision by both Democrats and Republicans” to show gratitude to the Korean American community. The resolution recognizes that the Korean American community has contributed to American society in many ways.
It also says this year marks the 120th anniversary of the arrival of the first Korean immigrants and the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the US. The two allies established ties following the 1950-53 Korean War, where the US helped fight back North Korea’s attack and reach an armistice.
Kimchi Day will fall on Nov. 22, which is the same day that South Korea has also been celebrating since 2020 to not only raise awareness of a dish with many health benefits, but also to build on living traditions and practices associated with its making, known as kimjang.
Kimjang was recognized as intangible cultural heritage by UNESCO in 2013.
koreaherald.com · by Choi Si-young · October 26, 2023
15. US Navy Special Operations in the Korean War
An often overlooked aspect of the Korean War. I think there are lessons to be learned. And I think NAval Special Warfare will have a greater impact on a future war in Korea.
US Navy Special Operations in the Korean War
history.navy.mil
The advent of the Korean War found the Navy in the midst of a shaky recovery from the tumultuous months of debates on its roles and missions, the "Revolt of the Admirals," and the extensive downsizing of naval forces after World War II.
Dr. Richard P Hallion
It was a shaky recovery indeed. Beyond the organizational havoc caused by a five-year-long demobilization that stripped its fleet by 90 percent, the navy had lost a particularly acrimonious "roles and missions" battle with the air force only months earlier. In the fall of 1949 this bitter debate over the relative merits of and funding priorities for naval aviation versus land-based strategic air power, erupted into full public view in what the news media soon dubbed the "Revolt of the Admirals."
Ultimately, the navy "revolt" failed, and amid considerable media and political criticism for the public manner in which the naval aviators had pursued their goals, the effort was judged by many at the time to have culminated in "a serious defeat for the navy." Eight short months later President Truman stunned virtually everyone, especially the Department of Defense, with his directive to commit America's enfeebled military forces to combat in Korea. Not surprisingly, the navy found itself, as did the air force and army, with few forces in Asia prepared to support this directive.
At the outset of war, the Naval Forces, Far East (NAVFE) staff–the naval component to MacArthur's U.S. Far East Command– numbered a minuscule twenty-nine officers, and ComNavFE (commander, NAVFE) himself, Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, was actually in Washington, D.C., the day the North Koreans attacked. Mirroring the command's limited responsibilities at this time, NAVFE's fleet totaled only one cruiser, four destroyers, four amphibious ships, one submarine, ten minesweepers, and a frigate attached from the Australian navy. This situation changed dramatically within forty-eight hours, however, as the commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, transferred operational control of the Seventh Fleet–essentially all of the navy's ships in the western Pacific–to ComNavFE. The following month all United Nations naval forces committed to resisting the North Korean aggression were also placed under the operational control of ComNavFE. This international mix was quickly organized into four separate task forces (TF): TF 77, the carrier strike force; TF 95, the blockade-and-escort force; TF 96, Naval Forces, Japan, and, of particular importance to the special operations forces that would soon raid the North Korean coastline, TF 90, the Far East Amphibious Force.
The two most urgent challenges facing NAVFE in the summer of 1950 required that it both support the Eighth Army's battered forces on the Korean peninsula and neutralize the North Korean People's Navy. The first task was begun that July with a massive, if poorly coordinated, navy-air force campaign to support the Eighth Army's fighting retreat southward before the North Korean People's Army. The second was effectively accomplished early that same month after NAVFE ships sank three of four North Korean torpedo boats during a single battle. Following this loss, North Korea withdrew the remainder of its naval offensive power to the protection of Soviet and Chinese territorial waters for the remainder of the war.
Unfortunately for the overall UN campaign in Korea, the navy's quick neutralization of the seaborne threat to its ships did little to help the rapidly deteriorating situation on the peninsula where, it appeared, the Eighth Army might be driven into the sea within a matter of weeks. So grim was the situation that many in FEC thought the Communists would likely overrun the three American and five South Korean army divisions–about ninety-two thousand troops–making a final stand along the 145-mile-long Pusan perimeter, the last UN toehold in Korea. Only the U.S. Navy, it seemed, had the power to reverse the situation, if indeed it could be reversed, but what more could the navy do?
The navy's answer to that question was to begin an interdiction campaign against the vital lines of communication that carried the trains and truckloads of ammunition and fresh troops to the bulk of the North Korean army then attacking the Pusan perimeter. Facing the distinct possibility that the worst military defeat in American history was imminent, ComNavFE ordered TF 95 to bombard the important railway lines running the length of North Korea's eastern seaboard. As a wartime navy source noted, "Down this funnel, fed by the six rail lines from Manchuria and the connecting Trans-Siberian line, flowed all the war material for the Pohang-Taegu front [two major approaches to the Pusan perimeter]."
To its dismay, however, the navy quickly found that its shipboard radar technology was not sufficiently developed to detect the nightly trains moving through mountainous terrain. Nor did daylight air strikes prove any more effective, as the alert train crews responded to the mere sight or sound of approaching aircraft by immediately hiding in the many tunnels cut by the railways through the granite mountains. These evasive tactics were made still more effective by the North Koreans' use of locomotives at both ends of each train, thus allowing movement of the all-important cargo cars even when on the odd occasion air or naval bombardment crippled the lead or trail locomotive. Even when rail lines were damaged, repair crews frequently returned them to use in an amazingly short time. As Rear Adm. J. I. Clark, CTF 77, observed at the time, "Destroying enemy communications was simple enough, but the Reds built up a fabulously successful technique of repairing bridges and railroads. With pre-bolted ties and rails they could repair normal bomb damage to a railroad in four hours or less. The Reds soon poured in about eighty thousand Chinese coolie laborers to keep the railroads operating and supplies moving, with the result that our interdiction campaign did not interdict. "
In reviewing both the desperate situation on the peninsula and the failure of air-sea interdiction efforts to date, Admiral Joy faced three inescapable realities. First, Pusan's defenders were too weak to counterattack in the near term. The UN's best, if not only, hopes for reversing the tide of battle thus lay in action by its naval forces. Second, an air-sea interdiction campaign mounted by these naval forces was the strategy most likely to relieve the growing enemy pressure against the Pusan perimeter. Third, attempts to execute this strategy by air and naval bombardment had proven ineffective for the reasons already given. It was a discouraging dead end for the senior NAVFE officers, who realized how badly the soldiers and marines at Pusan were counting on the navy to get the NKPA off their backs.
Responding to these realities and the still-urgent need for an effective interdiction campaign, Joy called a meeting with the navy's acknowledged expert on amphibious warfare, Task Force 90 commander Rear Adm. James H. Doyle. By sheer chance, Doyle's Amphibious Group 1 ships had begun amphibious familiarization training in Japan with the U.S. Army's 35th Regimental Combat Team, only the month before the war started. At this meeting Joy assigned Doyle's TF 90 a role in the interdiction effort, personally suggesting in the process that Doyle form a raiding group from among the marine reconnaissance and navy underwater demolition team (UDT) personnel inbound shortly from California. To assist Doyle with implementing his suggestion, Joy made available to Doyle's staff a combat-experienced raider and reconnaissance specialist, Maj. Edward P. Dupras of the Marine Corps. Already in Japan teaching amphibious tactics to U.S. Army troops when the war broke out, Dupras would soon figure prominently in TF 90's raiding war.
Doyle's command was the obvious choice to execute this type of raiding strategy, though the money needed to organize and maintain such a specialized raider force had simply not been available in the lean prewar military budgets of the late 1940s. To conduct the proposed raids, Doyle would have at any one time beginning that August at least one and usually two high-speed transports designed to carry raiding teams. But as the admiral quickly learned, there were no raiding teams in-theater, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade–not due to arrive in Korea before 3 August–was to be fully committed upon its arrival to the Pusan perimeter.
The oncoming marine brigade did have within its ranks one company of infantry with extensive prewar raider training aboard the U.S. Navy's only Pacific Fleet submarine dedicated to the special operations role. But while this submarine would arrive in Japan less than a week after the brigade, the infantrymen with whom it had trained so arduously would not be released from the brigade's total commitment to the defense of Pusan. NAVFE also had a ten-man detachment of UDT personnel in Japan at the time–working with Dupras to train army soldiers–but the navy had neither trained nor equipped its frogmen for onshore raiding missions.
Beyond what the navy-marine team could provide, MacArthur's headquarters was quickly assembling an ad hoc army team for the raiding role. But as this all-volunteer group did not come from those who had received prewar training from Dupras's team, its lack of amphibious proficiency was a critical defect in light of Doyle's need to produce immediate results.
The problems and worries hung over Doyle's planning group that July like some endless dark cloud. But help was on the way, literally, in the form of a handful of unique ships and crews that were already steaming toward that Japan that month.
High-Speed Transports
The sailors became very protective, possessive even, of "their" raiders. To the ship's crew it became a matter of pride, if not outright honor, that the ship not let the raiders down when the going got tough on the North Korean coastline. This principle was irrevocable, whether the raiders be American, Korean, or British Royal Marine Commandos, all of whom entered the unique world of APD operations.
The navy called them "high-speed transports," or APDs, though there was certainly much more to both the ship and its mission than this simple title suggested. Operating singly or in pairs at different times during the war, four of these highly specialized ships provided the operational catalyst for the multinational raiding force that repeatedly struck North Korea's railway system.
Rotating from other Pacific Fleet bases into Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan, the Horace A. Bass (APD-124), Begor (APD-127), Diachenko (APD-123), and Wantuck (APD-125) constituted Transport Division 111. Because their raiding missions were most effective when these ships operated singly or in pairs, commander, Transport Division 111 usually flew his flag aboard one of the ships then engaged in combat operations. In order to oversee as much of the combat action as possible, he shifted his flag after each operation in order to assume tactical command of the operating ships and raiding force committed to the following mission.
Built during World War II, these high-speed transports combined the hull of a warship, a destroyer escort, with the superstructure of a troop transport designed to both carry and launch amphibious landing forces. To accomplish this dual role, a substantial length of the main deck was enclosed to house 160 troops, while a cargo hold fitted with a crane capable of handling light vehicles and equipment was added further aft. In addition, the three-tube centerline torpedo station found on the destroyer escort class was removed to make room for port and starboard boat stations capable of launching and recovering four thirty-six-foot landing boats.
To make room for these structural modifications, each high-speed transport featured only one 5-inch gun for its main armament, rather than the two such weapons found on a destroyer escort. Both this 5-inch gun and the six 40-mm cannon (placed in three gun mounts) could be aimed either optically or through the ship's fire control radar system. The eight 20-mm cannon (placed in four gun-mounts) were aimed optically by their gunners. Thus modified, these high-speed transports were usually called APDs.
During World War II the navy had found the versatile APD to be a flexible and potent weapon. Moreover, this wartime experience revealed that the key to its effectiveness lay in the teamwork developed between the ship's crew and the raiding forces it carried and launched into combat. Not surprisingly, this teamwork and sense of common purpose between the two groups led to a camaraderie that soon became recognized as a hallmark of the best APD operations.
It says a great deal about human nature that this teamwork and camaraderie remained a hallmark of APD operations in Korea, overcoming centuries-long cultural barriers and the mutual surprises that surfaced as tough Korean guerrillas boarded the APDs for their raids. And some of these surprises also brought their share of humor, as Lt. Hilary D. Mahin, gunnery and boat officer aboard the Bass, recalls from his ship's first mission with the Koreans:
The Bass was fitted with larger shower stalls to accommodate the troops that we carried on our missions. Nevertheless, our shipboard evaporators could produce only so much fresh water and all ships practiced strict fresh water rationing. No one thought however to mention this to the Koreans as we departed from their base on Yang-do Island for our first mission up north with them.
We had barely cleared the island harbor when the Koreans discovered the troop shower stalls, and they took to them like ducks to water! Before we caught on they had drained the ship's supply of fresh water to such an extent that we diverted into Pusan harbor to have a water tender refill our tanks. By then they had also discovered the food served in a U.S. Navy ship's galley!
Korean bliss aboard the Bass took a momentary dive after the guerrillas discovered the way American cooks "ruined" rice, the Korean dietary mainstay. But the APD's skipper resolved the issue quickly with a nice combination of cultural sensitivity and common sense by allowing the guerrillas into the ship's galley to prepare their own rice. In return, the grateful Koreans kept their large crocks of kimchee, the fermented, pungent end product of vegetables and garlic used in virtually all Korean meals, on the ship's fantail, as far away from American noses as possible. Now it was the crew's turn to be grateful, as kimchee exudes a powerful odor that invariably stuns the American sense of smell.
Underlying these humorous moments was something much more fundamental at work, something that turned duty aboard an APD into something very special. As the sailor-raider camaraderie developed, the ship's crew became very protective, possessive even, of "their" raiders. To the sailors it became a matter of pride, if not outright honor, that their ship not let the raiders down when the going got tough on the North Korean coastline. This principle was irrevocable, whether the raiders be American frogmen, CIA-led Korean guerrillas, or British Royal Marine Commandos. And as the commandos in particular would discover, this American sense of protectiveness extended both on and below the ocean's surface.
The Perch
The numerous drills and dives had convinced the crew that the Perch was not the left-handed, dangerous freak that she was once thought to be. Experience showed that the ship dives faster than a normal submarine (40 seconds) and can take and recover from large angles easily.
When the war started there were only two such submarines in the entire U.S. Navy. One conducted training exercises in the Atlantic Ocean, after which its crew sailed in broad daylight to the friendly ports found throughout the Americas and Europe. The other prowled the Sea of Japan by night, surfacing from its cold depths only long enough to unleash black-faced British Commandos against the North Korean coastline. Well-skilled and still better-rewarded would be the North Korean gunners who could send these raiders to a watery grave in the freezing black waters offshore. Moreover, in October 1950, the crew of this submarine began giving NKPA gunners just the opportunity they needed to collect such a reward.
The USS Perch (SS-313) was one of two World War II-era fleet-type submarines to undergo extensive modifications in 1948 for adaptation to the amphibious raiding role. While at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard in Vallejo, California, its two forward-most engines and generators (of four total) were removed to provide cargo and troop space amidships. Still additional room was created in the forward and aft compartments with the removal of all ten of the boat's torpedo tubes. Altogether these modifications created sufficient space for 110 raiders and their equipment, plus 35 to 50 crewmen. And with the adaptation of the wardroom into a standby surgical ward, space was also created for the emergency surgery that would likely be needed by wounded raiders. But these changes were only the beginning of the boat's makeover for its specialized role.
A special snorkel system was added to the superstructure to induct fresh air from the surface, thus allowing the Perch to run submerged on its diesel engines instead of its batteries, as required by other submerged submarines. Engine exhaust gases were expelled underwater, dispersed by a special plate designed to avoid leaving a telltale trail of bubbles that could be seen from the surface. This unique snorkel system allowed the submarine to approach the intended landing area submerged, in order to conduct a much longer than usual periscope reconnaissance of the target.
Behind the snorkel, a sixteen-foot-wide and thirty-six-foot-long cylindrical hangar was mounted to the boat's after deck. This airtight hangar carried an LVT (landing vehicle-tracked), an amphibious vehicle large enough to carry a jeep as well as a pack howitzer and its crew. Thus modified, the Perch was recommissioned on 20 May 1948. Nearly eighteen months of sea trials and evaluations of the sub-marine-raider concept followed, the latter with B Company, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division. With the navy largely satisfied with the results of these evaluations, the Perch was redesignated yet again on 31 January 1950, as ASSP-313 (Submarine Transport-313).
During its months of arduous amphibious training with the marine infantrymen, the Perch conducted intensive training drills along the California coastline adjacent to the large naval port at San Diego. These early drills went well, as both submariners and marines became proficient in the surface launching and retrieving of the inflatable rubber rafts used for the exercises. During this same period, the Perch also conducted joint training with frogmen assigned to UDT-3; the latter were anxious to test a submerged submarine's capability to launch them through its escape trunk for beach reconnaissance operations. In this aspect of training they were disappointed, however, for the Perch's intensive training program was dedicated exclusively to its surface raiding role.
The wisdom of committing to this emphasis on surface warfare training would be revealed far sooner than any could know in the late spring months of 1950, for this was precisely the wartime role immediately assigned to the Perch when war in Korea broke out. Three weeks after the war started, the boat was en route to Japan, the marines from B Company sent ahead of them on surface transport. The submarine arrived at Yokosuka Naval Base on 8 August 1950, and as a subsequent ship's report notes, morale aboard the ship was high: "The numerous drills and dives had convinced the crew that the Perch was not the left-handed, dangerous freak that she was once thought to be. Experience showed that the ship dives faster than a normal submarine (40 seconds) and can take and recover from large angles easily. All the training and experimenting instilled a tremendous 'can do' attitude."
The submariners were, however, dismayed to learn soon after their arrival in Japan that the B Company marines with whom they had trained so hard and developed such proficiency would not be available for combat operations with them. Desperate for every rifleman that could be mustered in Korea, marine commanders committed to the last-ditch defense of the Pusan perimeter had wasted no time in pulling B Company's "submarine-raiders" into the meat grinder of combat on the peninsula.
As former Perch crewman M. E. Kebodeaux recalls, "We later learned that B Company had been shot up so bad at Pusan that even the few survivors were in various hospitals. The unit existed on paper, but not the marines we had trained with for so long." Despite their disappointment, however, the enthusiastic crewmen produced some innovative improvements to their equipment during their first weeks in Japan.
The basic four-step attack maneuver developed by the Perch-marine team off the California coastline had the merit of simplicity. It required that the submarine approach the target beach while submerged, surface at night to launch the raiders in their inflatable boats, submerge again to minimize the likelihood of detection by coastal defense forces, then surface a final time to retrieve the returning raiders. Though fundamentally sound, the maneuver did not allow the submerged Perch to communicate with the raiding force ashore.
This lack of ship-to-shore communications represented a potentially serious flaw should the raiders encounter unexpected problems or enemy opposition. From four miles offshore–the range from which it normally launched the inflatable boats–the Perch's periscope would be virtually useless for viewing the action ashore, especially on the dark nights preferred by the raiders. This problem was corrected in Japan, however, after the crew installed a short whip antenna on the snorkel-head valve, which would remain just above the surface while the submerged Perch awaited return of its raiders. Another problem overcome during this period involved the four-mile open-ocean distance the raiders would have to cover twice during a raid.
While the large LVT carried in the after-deck hangar was capable of towing a number of inflatable boats to the beach, its noisy engine precluded any chance of the raiders maintaining the surprise on which a successful mission–indeed their survival–was dependent. Searching for a less-noisy alternative during their stay in Yokosuka, the crew obtained a twenty-four-foot plywood boat powered by a six-cylinder Chrysler-Crown engine that could push the boat along at fifteen knots with no rafts in tow. Christened Suzuki (the Japanese name for the perch fish), the boat-or "skimmer" as it was called-proved its worth in combat later that year, carrying the mission-necessary explosives while towing the raiders in seven inflatable rubber boats to within five hundred yards of the beach.
To launch and retrieve the skimmer, the Perch flooded its aft ballast tanks, in the process partially submerging only the stern of the submarine to the minimum extent necessary to guide the skimmer on or off the special carriage on which it rode in the hangar. The crew soon became proficient in accomplishing this seemingly awkward maneuver in two to three minutes. Satisfied with its new arrangement, the Perch never carried the LVT into combat.
Far less satisfying to the crew, however, was the emotional yo-yo it was undergoing as it trained in Japan with first one, then another, group of potential raiders, none of which stuck around long enough to put their training to the test with a combat patrol aboard the submarine. A report of their training activities in Japan that August describes the problem:
We embarked Underwater Demolition Team One [for] . . . the roughest week of training they or the Perch had seen. The morale of the crew and UDT were terrific. It was a blow to have to deliver the UDTs to an airplane for some other mission. We proceeded to Camp McGill on 22 August to pick up Major J. H. Ware, U.S. Army, and sixty-seven men from a Special Activities Company. On 29 August we embarked Captain D. H. Olson and the remaining fifty-six men from Major Ware's company. By 30 August we had trained 125 army men. We found at this time that we were not to land these troops either.
Despite the obvious heart-and-soul effort put into the training by both submariners and would-be raiders, it appears that the real problem–the obviously higher priority of simply maintaining a UN foothold in Korea–led to the repeated, frustrating events experienced by the Perch crew.
Though badly disappointed by this seemingly endless cycle of training then losing a potential raiding force, crew morale shot up again in mid-September with the arrival aboard their boat of yet another set of exuberant visitors, these from England's 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines. Training with these newcomers began immediately, and the youthful enthusiasm of each group, fueled by the prospect of immediate action, quickly created the same kind of camaraderie between crew and raiders as that aboard the APDs. And, just as with the earlier example, the humorous side of their meeting came together in the ship's galley as the submariners introduced the "Brits" to submarine food, reputedly the best to be found in the entire U.S. Navy.
The young stalwarts who manned the 41 Independent Commando carried vivid memories of the World War II-era food rationing system–meat and eggs in particular had been in short supply–that had so severely tested British morale. In the process of "familiarizing themselves with the submarine and American procedures" the marines attacked the Perch's food budget with the same enthusiasm they would soon show for raiding the North Korean railroad system. As the Perch's skipper noted, "One of our steaks is a week's meat ration in England, and they had been in US territory only two weeks. One morning they averaged six eggs per marine for breakfast." To the navy's credit, it somehow found the funds to feed its enthusiastic guests, in the process creating yet another colorful story in the history of the "Silent Service."
Frogmen
We were ready to do what nobody else could do, and what nobody else wanted to do.
Exhausted from their two-hundred-yard-long swim through the cold, swift current that sweeps around the southern tip of the Korean peninsula, the two men crawled out of the ocean onto a deserted beach deep behind enemy lines. Too tired for the moment to care or even notice the small beach stones cutting into their bodies, the U.S. Navy's Lt. (jg) George Atcheson and BM3C Warren Foley shivered and sucked the cold ocean air into their lungs. It was close to midnight as the two frogmen lay exposed under the glow of a nearly full moon, both distinctly possessed of that terrible apprehension so well known to intruders suddenly caught in the beam of an inescapable light.
Their apprehension was well justified, for in fact these intruders were intent on committing an act that would sorely antagonize a North Korean army already credited with committing a number of atrocities against UN prisoners of war. Launched from the high-speed transport Diachenko earlier that night, the two men had just begun the reconnaissance phase of TF 90's first sabotage mission of the war. It was 5 August 1950, and other than their courage, the total weaponry carried by the two intruders included one .45-caliber pistol, one K-Bar combat knife, and a small number of grenades.
The presence of the two men on the beach that night represented both the fortunes and misfortunes that had befallen the navy's elite underwater demolition teams since the end of World War II. The courage and determination displayed by their wartime predecessors had clearly survived the postwar years, as reflected by Atcheson's remarkable statement some years later that this particular mission had been undertaken "[because] some of the other targets would have been suicidal." But on a less salutary note, the desperate effort also underscored the results that invariably follow when suddenly hard-pressed commanders attempt to overcome years of command neglect with the raw courage of an elite few.
Salutary or not, Doyle's TF 90 had little operational choice in the matter of UDT employment that August, given the interdiction mission and its critical time constraints. For, regardless of the morality or tactical wisdom of thrusting these few into such extreme danger, the simple truth was that the navy simply had no one else-beyond a handful of reconnaissance marines and frogmen-capable of attempting such high-risk missions. As another Korean War frogman succinctly put it, "We were ready to do what nobody else could do, and nobody else wanted to do." The comment wasn't a complaint but rather a statement of professional pride that went well beyond Atcheson's inaugural 5 August mission into enemy territory. But if the pride was obviously still there, the same could not be said for the UDT's training and equipment, or even the manpower necessary to support a large-scale raiding campaign.
The numbers alone provide a sad commentary on just how much of the UDT capability had been lost during the demobilization programs of the late 1940s. With the onset of war in 1950, the four remaining teams present for roll call were a mere shadow of the thirty-two combat-experienced teams that supported the major amphibious landings throughout the Pacific during World War II. These bleak numbers were even worse than they looked on paper, however, for the overall reduction in force was exacerbated still further by additional postwar reductions that cut nearly in half the manpower authorized each of the remaining teams, The cumulative effect of these reductions over the five years from 1945 to 1950 cut navy-wide UDT strength by nearly 95 percent.
Beyond the scarcity of combat veterans in the remaining UDTs, operational capabilities and morale were further impaired as overall personnel shortages throughout the navy led to the assignment of non-UDT officers to the proud teams. Of the four UDTs on active duty in 1947, for example, an experienced UDT officer commanded only UDT-2. And beyond the difficult organizational reductions that affected virtually every command at the time, the teams also suffered from the animosity felt toward them by many conventional officers of the period. In what was not likely an isolated incident, one non-UDT officer selected to command a UDT was told in no uncertain terms by his superiors to "get that bunch of rag-tags straightened out as quickly as possible."
Although the UDTs conducted some valuable training during the interwar years–including that previously described aboard the submarines Perch and Sea Lion–the navy's lean postwar budgets severely restricted the development of new concepts, or for that matter, even new equipment. As a result the Korean War found the under-strength UDTs still woefully unprepared to conduct the two new missions–onshore raiding and the detection/destruction of moored anti shipping mines–that would take them far beyond the limits of their World War II-era training and equipment.
Very few senior officers serving on either the Pacific Fleet or Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet staffs during the war were enthused with the prospect of committing scarce UDT resources for these two new missions, and not without reason. Perhaps the best explanation for this point of view was that provided in a Pacific Fleet study prepared in early 1952, which concluded that "UDTs PACFLT are not adequately prepared by training or with equipment for operations more advanced or different from those of World War II." And it was the experience derived from those World War II-era operations that dictated the navy doctrine limiting UDT operations to obstacle demolition and beach reconnaissance between the three-fathom curve line and the high-water mark found on the target beach.
The major problem with the Pacific Fleet report was that, despite the soundness of its rationale, NAVFE had nonetheless committed the UDT to "more advanced or different" combat operations from the very beginning of the war. Moreover, the frogmen were still conducting these special operations missions when the Pacific Fleet report was published eighteen months later, certainly sufficient time for the navy to have delegated the mission elsewhere had it chosen to do so. Between this report and battlefield reality something was clearly amiss; oddly, the navy was slow to look further into the discrepancy.
Perhaps some on the Pacific Fleet staff attributed the small UDT casualties to date–two killed and less than half a dozen wounded–to the World War II-era training in "operations beyond the high-water mark" provided to selected frogmen at the UDT Advanced Training Base established on Maui, Hawaii. Even this training, however, did not envision the kind of combat undertaken in Korea in 1950, and much of the expertise gained on Maui was lost during the huge demobilization programs that followed the Japanese capitulation in 1945. Thus UDTs 1 and 3 went to war with training and weapons that made them virtually indistinguishable from their World War II-era predecessors.
For the UDTs, the operational pace in the combat zone frequently found two of their platoons–approximately thirty men-forward–deployed to a particular APD for periods of six to eight weeks. The platoons usually ran between ten and twenty demolition or beach reconnaissance missions while aboard the APDs, depending on weather and enemy activity. In addition, individual UDT personnel were often away on temporary duty with other military or CIA units, usually for advisory and training duties. This included the forward-basing of small teams on islands close to the North Korean coastline, where they stood alert duty with UN Escape and Evasion organizations assisting in the recovery of downed airmen.
The individual weaponry taken by the frogmen behind enemy lines was usually limited to the submachine guns, pistols, and knives found most useful for the close-quarters combat that characterized most raiding missions. Though presumably available, sound suppressors for the weapons are not known to have been used. UDT-1 veteran QM2C James Short recalls that on the few occasions when frogmen were required to eliminate North Korean sentries, the task was usually accomplished with a knife. But few frogmen had undergone training for this kind of closeup killing, and the dangerous business was usually accomplished with a combination of "on the job training" and the hope that a dozing sentry would make the bloody job easier.
The frogmen used a variety of demolitions in their work, but the standard UDT charge was the Mark-135 Demolition Pack, which contained twenty pounds of C-3 plastic explosive. Though aqua-lungs had been introduced to the UDT community by this period, they were never used in combat during the war.
Three Pacific Fleet UDTs served in the Far East during the war, with elements of one and usually two of the teams always present in the combat zone. As described earlier, UDT-1 shipped out from the Coronado Amphibious Base aboard the Bass following Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. Arriving in early August, this UDT absorbed UDT-3's ten-man detachment, the latter having been sent to Japan prior to the war to provide amphibious training to U.S. Army units.
The majority of UDT-3 departed Coronado in mid-August for a nonstop sailing that brought it to Japan later that month, Neither of these UDTs arrived in the Far East at their authorized strength, but the buildup continued so that by late November 1950 both were reported at 140 percent of their wartime complement.
As earlier noted, the Pacific Fleet responded quickly in getting both of its west coast UDTs to Japan, realizing in the process that fully half of the navy's entire UDT force had been committed to the war in less than six months. The navy didn't know what direction this new war might take or how long it might last, but it did know that any further requirements for UDT support in Korea would leave it with no option but to begin stripping the Atlantic Fleet UDTs of their personnel.
Faced with the obvious drawbacks of such a move, the navy recalled a number of UDT reservists to active duty, running them through an abbreviated refresher course before commissioning UDT-5 at Coronado in September 1951. UDT-5 arrived in Korea the following spring and, although employed primarily in beach survey operations, the enthusiastic reservists were evidently ready for any "special operation" that came their way, as a former officer aboard the Bass recalls: "In July 1952 we were working with UDT-5 on a beach survey near the island of Cheju-do southwest of Pusan. Here our froggies soon discovered that someone else was in the water with them, bare-breasted female Korean pearl divers! In a remarkable display of United Nations teamwork the UDT began diving with their newfound 'friends,' helping them recover pearls until we left the island a few short days later. UDT-5 always had high morale."
UDT-5 was the third and final UDT to serve in Korea during the war. By the fall of 1952 all UDT raiding missions had ceased, and with the signing of the armistice in July 1953 all combat operations were terminated.
Marine Reconnaissance
Both [Dupras's] close-quarters combat experience and the expertise found in his exceptionally well-trained reconnaissance platoons would soon be tested in Korea, where the marines were committed to their first raid scarcely a week after their arrival in Japan.
As with the other uniformed services, Marine Corps manpower dropped sharply during the postwar years, from a wartime high of 485,833 to 74,279 in June 1950. Despite this precipitous fall in numbers, however, the warrior spirit apparently remained high, for the marines responded to the onset of war with an enthusiasm unique to their traditions. Nor was this enthusiasm limited solely to the active duty force, for many individual reservists and former marines voluntarily reported to the Marine Corps staging base at Camp Pendleton, California, without bothering to wait for their official recall to active duty.
Chaos reigned at Pendleton as active duty cadre worked around the clock, unpacking mothballed World War II equipment and organizing individuals and small units into a provisional brigade, the first elements of which sailed from San Diego, California, on 14 July 1950. The brigade's departure was an impressive response, considering that only twelve days had passed since the Pentagon first received a request for marine reinforcements from MacArthur. And sailing with the ships carrying the marine brigade westward across the Pacific Ocean was the high-speed transport Bass, aboard it a company of marines to be disembarked at Pusan, as well as UDT-1 frogmen destined for subsequent delivery to Japan.
Following their arrival in Yokosuka, Japan, Bass skipper Lt. Cdr. Alan Ray and his crew would soon meet Major Dupras, a battle hardened marine with a fighting history unusual even by Marine Corps standards. Dupras, a veteran of the 1st Raider Battalion's bloody fighting on Guadalcanal in 1942 and a survivor of the Corps' pyrrhic victory on Tarawa the following year, had later served in China, where he trained, then fought with, Chinese guerrillas. While waiting in Japan for the arrival of the Bass, Dupras had already achieved considerable progress in melding together the UDT and 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company elements that had been flown out to Japan as part of the proposed raiding campaign. The Bass arrived in Japan too late to play a role in TF 90's inaugural 5 August raiding attempt aboard the Diachenko. But immediately following the ship's arrival at Yokosuka the following day, Ray, along with Cdr. Selden C. Small, then commanding Transport Division 111, met Dupras and UDT-1 boss Lt. Cdr. David F. "Kelly" Welch aboard Doyle's flagship, the USS Mount McKinley.
Within a matter of days, twenty-five frogmen from UDTs 1 and 3 and sixteen of Dupras's reconnaissance marines were merged on 6 August into the ad hoc Special Operations Group (SOG). Following just two nights of rehearsals, the SOG departed Japan aboard the Bass on 9 August. Three nights later the SOG struck the railway system running along Korea's eastern coastline north of the thirty-eighth parallel, some two hundred miles behind enemy lines. During the three demolition missions that took place between 12 and 15 August, Dupras's marines provided beach security while the UDT placed their standard Mark-135 satchel charges under railroad tracks and bridges. As Dupras later recalled, "The hardest part of my job was continually to impress the boys that our job was demolition, not fighting. If possible, we tried to avoid any firefights. If there was any interference, or if our party was detected, we withdrew and hit 'em someplace else."
These three raids represented NAVFE's first successful amphibious interdiction missions of the war and were credited with severely damaging the targeted segments of the railway system. Later that month the SOG also conducted beach reconnaissance operations along Korea's western coastline.
The SOG's efforts that month provided an impressive display of navy-marine professionalism, the group having attained a level of performance far beyond that which could reasonably have been expected from its drastically abbreviated joint-training schedule. An appreciative Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Far East Air Forces commander, was so impressed he sent a letter of congratulations to ComNavFE Joy, noting that "the damage reported resulting from the raids conducted is an excellent testimonial to the ability and the high state of training of the units involved."
In further recognition of its achievements the SOG was later awarded a well-deserved Navy Unit Commendation for "outstanding heroism in support of military operations against enemy aggressor forces in the Korean Area from 12-25 August 1950. . . 200 miles behind enemy lines on the east coast . . . destroying bridges and tunnels, disrupting enemy lines of communications . . . hydrographic surveys of three enemy-held beaches, despite opposition encountered the last night which forced the recon party to withdraw under fire."
The recognition was certainly well deserved, though the SOG was disbanded at the end of August as its marines rejoined the 1st Marine Division then preparing for Operation Chromite, the major amphibious assault at Inchon two weeks later. Less than thirty days after it began, the U.S. Marine Corps involvement in coastal raiding was effectively terminated for the duration of the Korean War. It was an odd ending for the military service whose very existence itself was so closely linked to the strategy of amphibious warfare, especially considering the small number of marines involved in the SOG.
Even as the marines moved out to join the Inchon landing force, however, their replacements were familiarizing themselves with American weapons and amphibious tactics. These, too, were high-spirited marines, and bearing the proud traditions wrought from countless battles since their establishment in 1664 as the Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment, they carried the modern-day title of Royal Marine Commandos.
Royal Marine Commandos
MacArthur openly questioned whether the results that could be expected from the proposed raids justified the risks inherent with such operations. When Admiral C. Turner Joy voiced his confidence, MacArthur pushed his point with terse questions: "Can you prove?" and "Why is the Navy so keen to use Brits, but not UDTs?"
Few combatants moved out to war in the summer of 1950 with more speed and élan than did Britain's Royal Marine Commandos. Following the government's short-notice decision that August to activate a special raider unit for duty in Korea, the Royal Marines quickly selected Lt. Col. Douglas B. Drysdale to raise and command the 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines. A highly regarded officer who had served with 3 Commando Brigade in the Far East during World War II, Drysdale moved immediately to fill the ranks of his new command.
Blessed with a surplus of highly trained and eager volunteers looking for some action, the Commando leader soon gathered an elite group of combat swimmers, demolition experts, and heavy weapons specialists. Included in Drysdale's pick–and not atypical of the superb quality and spirit in those volunteering for the adventure–was Sergeant Major Trevor-Dodds, the European kayaking champion. As Drysdale well knew, such skills were more than mere sport for the marines, who would later use their two-place Klepper kayaks for combat reconnaissance missions along the North Korean coastline.
With some 150 officers and men thus assembled, the group, dressed in Admiralty-provided civilian suits, boarded commercial airliners for transport to the Far East under what British historian Max Hastings describes as "melodramatic and wholly ineffectual security restrictions." Once there, the Royal Marine Commandos were bolstered with the addition of a further 150 volunteers–diverted while en route to duty with 3 Commando Brigade in Malaya–to Camp McGill, Japan. At McGill they were completely resupplied with American equipment, weapons, and clothing, keeping only their distinctive green berets to denote their proud Commando lineage.
Immediately beginning an intensive, around-the-clock training program aboard Doyle's APDs and the recently arrived Perch, the Commandos quickly impressed the Americans with their enthusiasm and skill. As a report from the Perch observed, "These [Commandos] were experienced raiders with a 'can do' attitude comparable to that of the Perch's. They seemed to enjoy having more thrown at them than they could possibly assimilate in the short time available, and rose to the occasion by becoming a well-trained and coordinated submarine raiding team in a remarkably short time."
It was indeed a remarkably short time–little more than two weeks–for the American sailors and British marines to develop the team cohesiveness necessary for survival in combat. Royal Marine Fred Heyhurst describes this period in the same excited tone felt by all at the time: "There was a tremendous spirit, to learn all we needed to know and get on with the job. We would get the hang of one [U.S.] weapon and go straight on to another, whatever the time was. . . It [41 Commando] was the best unit anyone could have joined."
The mutual respect that developed overnight between the Brits and Yanks was an intangible, yet critical, element of the strike force. Like their SOG predecessors the raiders had precious little time to train together–less than a month–to develop the skills that would help ensure their mutual survival in the face of a disciplined, well-armed, and unforgiving enemy. Moreover, this enemy would be expecting their arrival, having been alerted to the UN raiding threat posed by the SOG missions. But just as the Commando training at McGill drew to a close with the men preparing for their first combat mission, the navy learned that its raiding plans had obviously raised some pointed questions in the mind of MacArthur himself.
In a series of messages to ComNavFE, General MacArthur openly questioned whether the results that could be expected from the proposed raids justified the risks inherent with such operations. When Admiral Joy voiced his confidence in the minimal risks to be taken and the destructive potential of the raids, MacArthur again pressed his doubts on the admiral with terse questions, "Can you prove?" and "Why is the navy so keen to use Brits, but not UDTs?" Sticking to his guns, Joy replied, "Request reconsideration. The 41 Royal Marine Commando was formed and trained especially to conduct commando raids. Plans are ready for destruction of several key points between latitudes 40 and 41 on east coast. Believe they can be executed without serious risk. Submarine crew and commandos are keen to fight and gain experience for evaluation of this type of operation."
MacArthur did reconsider, finally relenting in a 20 September message to ComNavFE authorizing raids by the Perch and "a detachment not to exceed seventy individuals of the 41 Royal Marine Commando." Less than a week later, the Perch quietly crept out of Japan in the dead of night, its adrenaline-filled crew and sixty-seven Commandos eager for their first taste of combat in Korea.
The CIA's Special Missions Group
Most of the guerrillas inserted across North Korean beaches were sent ashore in small teams, at night, to conduct limited reconnaissance missions, establish Escape and Evasion networks, or collect local intelligence, particularly on the railway system. According to CIA records however–still partially classified nearly a half-century later–the Agency decided in 1951 to add a bigger punch to its amphibious operations.
Commander in chief MacArthur's strong antipathy to a CIA presence in his theater of operations inevitably influenced a number of early-war decisions taken by the Agency's senior officials in Japan. And among the most important of these decisions was their commitment to field their own intelligence networks and guerrilla forces in North Korea, independent of similar efforts undertaken by MacArthur's Far East Command. An effort of this magnitude still required military support, however, and this reality frequently led to acrimonious fights when Agency representatives approached MacArthur's army-dominated headquarters to ask for such support. Though in most cases the requested support was eventually provided, this continuing acrimony led in turn to the Agency's preference for working whenever possible with the two uniformed services with which it enjoyed much smoother relations, the U.S. Air Force and Navy.
Naval special operations–through Task Force 90–supported the Agency with both UDT and APD elements, the former training, then leading ashore, guerrillas launched from the APD providing the necessary transport and firepower. Unlike the U.S. Army, which used the term "partisan" when referring to the Koreans it employed behind enemy lines, the CIA and the navy used the more traditional title "guerrilla." As might be expected, these bureaucratic differences in terminology were of little interest to the frogmen and APD crews who risked their lives to deliver and retrieve the Koreans along the always-dangerous North Korean coastline. What did interest the sailors, however, were the rugged Korean raiders themselves, their temporary shipmates for the seven to ten days the two groups lived together during a typical mission north of the thirty-eighth parallel.
To the surprise of everyone and yet the surprise of no one, a tight camaraderie quickly sprang up aboard ship between American sailors and Korean guerrillas. This camaraderie often found form in the poker games that transcended substantial cultural and language barriers or, more notable yet, in the Koreans' noisy enthusiasm for the always popular "shoot 'em up" Hollywood westerns viewed nightly on the fantail of an APD at sea. Despite such light moments, however, the trips "up north" were anything but a light-hearted adventure, especially to the guerrillas, for whom the missions represented little more than a dangerous change of pace to their otherwise bleak existence.
For the most part, the guerrillas were North Korean civilians, screened and recruited by the Agency from among the large populations of pathetic, hungry refugees that filled the numerous camps around Pusan. As Hans Tofte, then the senior CIA officer in Japan, described them, "The refugees were down-in-the-mouth, bored with nothing to do. Joining the guerrillas would give them a chance to get out, to eat three meals a day, to have something to do. They would be buddies with a purpose, rather than shuffle around the camp."
During the first six months of the war the Agency recruited several hundred refugees from such camps. Those selected were taken to the CIA's guerrilla training base, a tent city situated within a twenty-acre site on the small island of Yong-do, located some ninety miles south-southwest of Pusan. There the Koreans were put through an accelerated training program by a small number of American military personnel (commanded by a marine, not an army officer) "on loan" to the CIA from their respective services.
The courses taught included the use of various weapons, sabotage techniques, and small rubber-boat handling for night insertions of small teams. The UDT were initially tapped to run the small boat training, but as the frogmen soon learned, they were also expected to take their "guerrilla graduates" on the dangerous insertions into North Korea. As Tofte himself later recalled, "I wanted it known [by the Koreans] that the Americans [UDT] took the guerrillas in by hand. This gave the Koreans respect for us and the military services also."
Most of the guerrillas inserted across North Korean beaches were sent ashore in small teams, at night, to conduct limited reconnaissance missions, establish Escape and Evasion networks, or to collect local intelligence, particularly on the railway system. According to CIA records however–still partially classified nearly a half-century later–the Agency decided in 1951 to add a bigger punch to its amphibious operations: "A . . raider team was recruited and trained by a Navy Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) specialist during July and August 1951. Between August 1951 and October 1952 this team carried out amphibious reconnaissance and raider operations along the east coast of North Korea. [A number of] successful landings were made."
This team would almost certainly be the forty-to-fifty-man Special Missions Group (SMG) formed at the direction of the CIA by Lt. Atcheson (the same UDT officer whose 5 August 1950 mission west of Pusan is described earlier in this chapter). If the numbers involved were admittedly modest, so too were the numbers advisable for the kinds of hit-and-run missions for which these raiders were organized. In any case, the SMG certainly fit in with TF 90's continued commitment to interdict the enemy's coastal railway system. These high-speed transport sailors and frogmen were going forward with whatever raiders–military or CIA–the UN would entrust into their care.
The Perch at War
[Watching from the conning tower] wasn't exactly conducive to our peace of mind. We could see the gun flashes and moving lights. We could hear the crack of rifles and the stutter of machine guns and yet we were just sitting there, powerless to help. Finally we saw a blinding explosion followed by instant shock waves that reached far out to sea. We knew the mission was completed, but we didn't know at what cost.
On the night of 30 September 1950, the Perch rose silently out of the cold, dark depths of the Sea of Japan, its steel-gray conning tower cutting through the water like a dorsal fin. Some 150 miles behind enemy lines, the submarine broke the surface into the three-quarters moonlight that covered the sea. Scarcely a month had passed since the SOG's marines were pulled out to support MacArthur's dramatic invasion at Inchon, and only five days since the Perch's stealthy night departure from Japan.
As the submarine surfaced four miles off North Korea's eastern coastline this night, its crew and Royal Marine Commandos gratefully took in the fresh air pumped below deck. For the last fourteen hours the boat's atmosphere had become increasingly foul with the exhalations of crew and raiders–despite use of the snorkel–while the boat's skipper, Lt. Cdr. Robert D. Quinn, conducted a thorough periscope reconnaissance of the target area. In a scene that would he repeated many times in the future, this raid targeted a section of the north-south railroad track that came within a short distance of the shore.
As the Commandos spilled out onto the forward deck to inflate their black rubber rafts and Perch crewmen dragged the skimmer from the partially flooded after-deck hangar, lookouts stared intently through binoculars for signs of enemy activity ashore. Working rapidly in blacked-out conditions, seven rafts were quickly inflated and launched within the next thirty-two minutes. But to the submariners' dismay, the skimmer's engine refused to start, its ignition system grounded out by the excessive humidity built up in the hangar during the prolonged dive.
Without the skimmer to tow the Commando-laden rafts the mission was finished before it started, the distance to the beach precluding any chance of paddling to and from the shoreline. But even as the submariners worked frantically on the engine, sick with the thought that failure on their part could force the cancellation of the eagerly awaited first raid, the submarine's radar detected a patrol boat maneuvering in the target area. The already tense situation worsened shortly thereafter when lookouts spotted two sets of vehicle lights moving into the target area before being extinguished–an ominous sign. With little choice, Quinn prudently concluded that the enemy had most likely been alerted to the submarine's presence and was attempting to set a trap for the Commandos. Quickly ordering the return of the rafts and skimmer to their storage areas, Quinn turned the big submarine out to sea. Staying on the surface for the next several hours to recharge the submarine's batteries, the Perch returned to the safety of the depths with the arrival of dawn.
Surfacing later that same day, the Perch completed a rendezvous with the destroyers H. J. Thomas and Maddox, the latter carrying commander, Destroyer Division 92. In a hasty conference aboard the Maddox, Quinn, along with the Perch's embarkation officer (responsible for towing the rafts to/from the beach), and the Commando leader worked quickly to plan a raid that night against a secondary target in the area. As the enemy was obviously alerted to their presence, the plan entailed a diversionary attack by the Thomas on the previous night's target, while the Perch surfaced farther south to launch the Commandos against the secondary target. For its part, the Maddox would close protectively to within four thousand yards of the Perch after it surfaced, should the destroyer's firepower be needed.
At 7:45 P.M. the Perch again broke the surface four miles off the coastline, having completed another submerged reconnaissance of the beach earlier in the day. This time the skimmer started without hesitation, towing seven rafts-six filled with Commandos and a seventh with explosives-to within five hundred yards of the shoreline. Releasing the tow ropes, the skimmer waited at the five-hundred-yard mark while the Commandos paddled the remaining distance to the beach and immediately fanned out to establish a defensive perimeter for the demolition teams.
But even as the covering force raced into position, the first of several firefights broke out when its lead elements encountered small groups of enemy soldiers. With the element of surprise obviously gone, the Commandos forming the defensive perimeter fought off the growing pressure on their position while the explosives were quickly planted in a culvert and railroad tunnel. Back on the Perch's bridge, Quinn watched the fireworks through binoculars with increasing anxiety: "It wasn't exactly conducive to our peace of mind. We could see the gun flashes and moving lights. We could hear the crack of rifles and the stutter of machine guns and yet we were just sitting there, powerless to help. Finally we saw a blinding explosion followed by instant shock waves that reached far out to sea. We knew the mission was completed, but we didn't know at what cost." The charges exploded at 1:15 on the morning of 2 October, much to the satisfaction of the Commandos. With the culvert and tunnel destroyed, they withdrew quickly to the landing beach to board their rafts for the tow back to the Perch.
The Commandos had not returned unblooded from their first successful combat mission of the war, however, as Royal Marine P. R. Jones had been killed during the fighting ashore. He was buried at sea with full honors aboard the Perch later that day, as the Thomas and Maddox trailed in formation behind the submarine with UN flags flown at half-mast. The two destroyers made a high-speed departure following the firing of a twenty-one-gun salute by the Maddox, leaving the Perch to return alone to Japan three days later.
Following the return of the Perch to Yokosuka, Quinn completed a short "lessons-learned" report that clearly reflected both the anticipation and apprehension he felt regarding additional raiding missions for his boat. Some of his comments suggested mechanical improvements to the Perch, such as an access door between the submarine hull and the after-deck hangar that would allow crewmen to enter the airtight hangar while the submarine was submerged. Such access might have, for example, allowed the crew to detect and repair the skimmer's faulty engine before the submarine surfaced on the night of the aborted 30 September mission. Other suggestions involved tactical improvements, particularly those regarding the submarine's vulnerability on the surface in the target area.
The Perch had remained on the surface under a bright moon for nearly two hours on the night of 30 September, as the Commandos were first launched, then retrieved after the faulty skimmer engine could not be made to start. Moreover, the Perch remained on the surface in the target area for nearly seven hours the following night while the Commandos fought off the North Koreans attempting to thwart their demolition mission against the railway. It was on the second night that Quinn discovered (as would the APD skippers in future raids) that the submarine crew needed a bright moon both to guide the Commandos to the exact landing site and effect assistance should the raiders ashore need help.
But to remain essentially motionless on the surface for so long, within range of the enemy's coastal artillery, obviously put the submarine and crew at considerable risk. Further complicating attempts to judge the risk factors was that the skipper could not discount seaborne threats as well. A surprise attack by one of North Korea's fast patrol boats, for example, would have left the skipper of the lightly armed Perch with the cruel choice of either risking his entire boat and crew, or abandoning the Commandos to a bloody fate ashore.
In fact, it was precisely this potential seaborne threat that drove the decision to bring the Maddox to within easy rescue distance of the surfaced submarine on the second night's raid. Unfortunately, the unusual presence of a warship so close to shore also tipped off alert coastal defenses that something, probably an amphibious operation, was likely in progress. A final obstacle was the winter weather itself, which often turned the Sea of Japan into a submariner's nightmare: "The water became so cold and the sea so unpredictable in December 1950 that submarine patrols were abandoned because the snorkels froze up and endangered those vessels. The patrols were not resumed until April 1951." For all of these man-made and weather-related reasons, NAVFE terminated submarine-raider operations following the Perch's safe return to Yokosuka on 5 October 1950.
Like the SOG, the Perch-Commando team had come and gone in less than a month. So much had happened in so little time that for some it was hard to remember that the war was scarcely ninety days old. This latest turn of events with the Perch did, however, stabilize the raiding lineup that would essentially continue in place until such missions wound down sharply in the final year of the war.
The Dangerous Ride to Work
No matter how many times we took a raiding party ashore, I could still feel the apprehension sweep through the boat as the Bass gradually disappeared into the darkness behind us. We couldn't even see the beach, only the dark vagueness of the coastal mountains a couple of miles ahead. I had to concentrate hard on the immediate task of keeping the boats in echelon formation and staying on course to the right beach.
From October 1950 forward, the UDT, British Commandos, and Korean guerrilla teams raiding North Korea's railway system were carried aboard the four APDs that formed the backbone of TF 90's fast-transport strike force. Moreover, it was from within this small group that the Bass had developed such a combat reputation that it came to be called "the Galloping Ghost of the Korean Coast. " The moniker may have sounded "Hollywood" to some, but as the ship's war records and interviews with its crewmen have since revealed, the raiding war was anything but glamorous.
It certainly hadn't been glamorous the previous August, for example, when the Bass took the SOG on its first forays into enemy-held territory. This first APD-UDT team had cut its teeth on those three missions, with all involved painfully aware that they were "winging it" in the face of an alert and well-armed enemy. Even at this early stage of the war, few of the raiders or commanders held any illusions that these raids could seriously interdict the enemy's overall campaign.
Nevertheless, such attacks could still be useful to the UN effort when they compelled the NKPA to divert even a few of its front-line combat units from the decisive fighting along the Pusan perimeter. With the outcome of the combat around Pusan seeming to hang in the balance with every daily attack and counterattack, the NKPA was desperate for every rifleman and artillery piece it could muster to finish a battle that many on both sides thought might well end the war.
The primary significance of the SOG's mid-August raids was twofold. First, they did in fact force the NKPA to divert scarce resources for the defense of the railway system that kept its army fueled, fed, and armed. Second, the amphibious assault methods tested during the SOG's brief tenure were further refined into the two beach landing tactics practiced by the APD-raider teams for the remainder of the war. Both tactics had advantages and disadvantages, and, after considering the relative merits of each, the two raiding groups–British Commandos and Korean guerrillas–chose a different tactic for their operations.
For the Commandos it was the familiar, World War II-era "dry ramp landing" approach, in which the forward half of the LCPR's (landing craft, personnel-ramped) hull was beached ashore, the bow ramp dropped, and the raiders disgorged at a dead run for the nearest cover. In contrast, the guerrillas cut loose their seven-man inflatable rafts from the LCPR, towing them up to the surf line, then paddled through the surf to the beach. While the Commando approach had the advantages of a quicker and safer passage through the surf line, the placing of one-third to one-half of the entire assault force in a single LCPR could lead to disaster if the boat overturned in the surf or was hit by enemy fire. In either event, the three-quarters-inch plywood hull of the LCPR provided precious little protection for its occupants.
As important as these beach-landing tactics were, they were still only one part in a very complex, choreographed play–a play in which even the slightest mistake in any of the other parts could reduce the entire show to shambles in a matter of minutes. And for both British and Korean raiders, the "show" began with an APD launching its LCPR's within two to four miles of the coastline. This considerable difference in distance was driven in turn by ComNavFE orders that kept the APDs outside the one-hundred-fathom curve, a line at variable distances from the shore that kept the ships in water at least six hundred feet deep. This order followed the loss of one ship and heavy damage to another four, all due to shallow water mines, during the last week of September 1950. It was the most costly week of the war for UN naval forces.
For the Commando operations, the launched LCPR's immediately moved alongside the ship's fantail, where raiders waited to scramble down the big cargo nets hung minutes earlier from the main deck. In contrast, the guerrillas first lowered their rafts by rope into the sea below the cargo nets, moved down the nets into the rafts, then paddled off to hook up to the LCPR's waiting a short distance away.
The deliberately slow and carefully choreographed movement to shore that began with the embarkation of the raiding force–always conducted at night–was indeed a "dangerous ride to work." From the moment the boats began slowly moving forward at a snail's pace in total, blacked-out conditions, the APD's boat officer assumed tactical command of the raiding party from his position aboard the lead LCPR. Regardless of the beach-landing tactics employed, the boat officer halted the LCPR's just outside the dangerous surf line while he anxiously peered through the darkness attempting to judge whether the force had arrived at the right beach and whether the treacherous waves and tides would permit a landing.
Trying to watch, listen, and feel the sea conditions around him while ignoring the freezing cold cutting through his clothes, the boat officer was under enormous pressure to think quickly as his vulnerable force floated nearby, awaiting his decision. If his call was affirmative, a single UDT scout-swimmer clad in a rubber dry suit was dispatched into the icy black waters to swim ashore for a quick beach reconnaissance. Only after receiving an "all-clear" light signal from the beach, usually some thirty minutes later, would the boat officer commit to either taking the Commandos ashore in the LCPR's or cutting the guerrillas loose to paddle their rafts through the surf.
For nearly twenty of these nerve-wracking missions conducted by the Bass during its second combat tour in Korea, the heavy responsibility of making these quick life-or-death judgments fell on the shoulders of the previously introduced Lt. Hilary D. Mahin. Moreover, his vivid memories some forty-five years later reveal the intense concentration required of the boat officer on every one of these missions:
No matter how many times we took a raiding party ashore, I could still feel the apprehension sweep through the boat as the Bass gradually disappeared into the darkness behind us. We couldn't even see the beach, only the dark vagueness of the coastal mountains a couple of miles ahead. I had to concentrate hard on the immediate task of keeping the boats in echelon formation and staying on course to the right beach.
As the Boat Officer, I rode in the lead LCPR, taking navigation guidance over the radio from the ship, which had both the shoreline and our boats on its search radar. In addition to the boat crew of course the Commando leader and the UDT scout-swimmer were usually with me, as were the explosives we carried for the job. We had two .30-caliber machine guns in the bow, and if it were a Commando operation, twenty to twenty-five of them aboard as well. If we were taking guerrillas in, we usually towed three of their rafts behind each LCPR.
By using the boat's underwater exhaust system we kept the exhaust sound pretty low, which usually enabled us to get within two-three hundred yards of the beach where the surf roar would mask the sound of the engine from ashore. Here I had to decide whether the surf conditions would allow us to proceed in. If I did, the troop leader released the scout-swimmer into the sea for a cold swim to shore to perform a quick reconnaissance of the area. It was at this time that I released tactical control of the mission to the Commando leader.
For the next half-hour or so there was little we could do but hold position in the dark beyond the surf line, listening for the sound of a train or perhaps an enemy patrol craft. If the coast were clear we got a small green light signaling "come ashore." If the surf conditions were bad or the enemy was present in strength, our UDT would swim back out to us for the return to the ship.
With British Commandos aboard, the light signal from the beach called in the waiting LCPR's to beach, drop the raiders off, and then back out quickly through the surf to await a "mission-accomplished" call from the raiding party. The boat officer responded immediately to this call by moving the LCPR's forward again as the Commando leader ashore fired a prearranged flare signal high into the night sky over the target–the signal for all raiders to return immediately to the beach. Given the unreliability of radios exposed to salt air and water, the confusion that inevitably accompanies night combat, plus the language problems when Korean guerrillas were employed, the simple flare signal was the key to ensuring that no raiders were left behind.
With the guerrillas, the "mission-accomplished" signal from shore also sent the LCPR's waiting beyond the surf line onto the beach for the pickup. While designated guerrillas helped strap the rafts outboard of the LCPR, the main party boarded the boat, which then backed out (as with the Commandos) through the surf. Regardless of the makeup of the raiding party, however, the passage back out through the pounding surf could prove more dangerous than the mission itself, and, as Mahin recalls, men sometimes died in the attempt:
Getting back out through the surf usually proved more difficult than getting in, as the boats backed out to avoid being capsized by breaking waves while attempting to turn around in shallow water. In April 1952 four of our Koreans, fully loaded with combat gear and weapons, were swept into the waves as they attempted to climb into our LCPR after securing their raft to its hull.
Without thinking, I jumped in to grab one of them, followed immediately by Bosun's Mate MacDonald. I grabbed one guerrilla, but was going under myself as I wore no life jacket. MacDonald, who did have a lifejacket, grabbed me and another guerrilla, keeping us all afloat just long enough for other hands to drag us back over the gunwale into the boat. Unfortunately, the two other guerrillas drowned. We returned the following day to retrieve their bodies.
Given the inevitability of casualties among the raiders during these hazardous missions, either from enemy action or accidents, Mahin added an emergency medical team to the raider force. This team was placed in a third LCPR, a combination backup boat and seagoing ambulance. Trailing behind the assault force by some five hundred yards, this LCPR carried two corpsmen and their supplies, plasma, medical stretchers, and so on.
Medical help was bolstered aboard the APD as well, with the addition of a physician to the ship's crew for each combat mission. As Mahin recalls with a laugh, however, this otherwise-welcomed assistance took an unexpected turn with the arrival of the first doctor. Anticipating an emergency room specialist or at least a general surgeon, the crew was astonished to learn that the U.S. Navy, in its infinite wisdom, had sent them a gynecologist!
No doubt the raiders, even given the occasional odd choice of specialists sent to the APDs, appreciated this increased medical support. However, the LCPR crews endured another problem, one found in the psychological dimension but potentially more devastating than a physical wound. Unlike individual Commandos or guerrillas, few of whom would participate in every mission undertaken by their unit, the boat crews aboard an APD went on every raid conducted by every raiding party carried aboard their ship. Thus the individual boat crewman's exposure to death, crippling injury, or capture was–by this one statistic alone–higher than that faced by any single Commando or guerrilla. And it was a statistic rammed home by such heart-stopping close calls as that experienced by Mahin and Boatswain's Mate Ken Eckert on the night of 23 June 1952, when a stream of machine-gun slugs slammed into their LCPR, sending hot bits of shrapnel into their faces.
Unlike the Commandos or guerrillas, these sailors were not selected from an all-volunteer pool that had been physically and psychologically screened before being put through a punishing selection course designed to weed out all but the most aggressive. Beaching their LCPR's under enemy fire at night, deep behind enemy lines, was only a part-time job for these seamen, who held full-time duties aboard ship. Under such circumstances, the emotional stress on the LCPR crews in general, and the boat officer in particular, could only have a cumulative effect as the missions wore on throughout the war.
It is a well-known axiom within the profession of arms-borne out through centuries of warfare–that each individual has only a limited supply of courage. Moreover, each frightening experience endured by the individual dips into that supply of courage, much like someone drinking from a cup holding only a finite amount of liquid. And to those repeatedly subjected to the test of combat, few experiences in life are more frightening than the shock of realizing that the cup of courage is finally and suddenly empty. For Mahin this shock hit home on the final raid conducted by the Bass on its second combat tour in Korean waters:
The missions never got easier, although the competence of our boat crews increased with every raid, because no amount of raiding experience changed the critical conditions beyond my control, The surf and the enemy's reaction were always unpredictable in the dark, and there was always that fear that the wrong decision on my part could get people killed.
You just wondered bow long competence and especially luck could carry you. In the end my courage deserted me on a mission, somewhere near my twentieth raid, and I can never forget that indescribable apprehension that overwhelmed me. I seemed to be frozen physically and mentally; even calling out a command was a major effort that took all my willpower. In short, I'd run out of gas.
As Mahin's candid account of his experience attests, the burden of combat rarely falls equally on all those involved. Almost by definition, the bravest are inevitably consumed in body and spirit by the near-inhuman demands placed on those who willingly position themselves again and again on that lethal edge of human performance found in combat behind enemy lines.
The Raids
One of the most dangerous and successful special operations missions of the entire war had already taken place in the spring of 1951, when one of these navy-CIA raiding parties escorted a U.S. Army general, a doctor, into enemy held territory south of Wonsan.
The chronological progression of NAVFE's raiding activities during the war was fairly straightforward–dramatic to be sure, but still relatively simple from the headquarters viewpoint. Following the termination of the Special Operations Group and submarine-raider operations in September and October 1950, respectively, the U.S. Navy provided the transportation (APDs) and scout-swimmers (UDTs) for the British Commandos until the withdrawal of the Commandos from combat in December 1951.
During the following year the same APD-UDT combination carried CIA guerrillas ashore, with individual frogmen commanding the raids ashore in all but name. This U.S.-Korean teamwork tapered off sharply in mid-1952, no doubt reflecting the American realization that, at this late stage of the war, such raids were virtually meaningless in determining the final outcome. There was a time, however, in the fall of 1950, when the fires burned bright in the hearts of raiders intent on taking the war back to the North Koreans' homeland.
This time came right after the navy withdrew the Perch from combat, when C Troop, 41 Commando, boarded the Bass for a strike against the North Korean coastline on the night of 6-7 October 1950, their target a railway tunnel 150 miles north of Hungnam. This raid took place only some 80 miles south of the Soviet border and was the first British Commando raid launched from an APD. It and the raid the following night were the first in a series of attacks over the next several months against the railway system which ran along a 120-mile stretch of coastline located between forty and forty-two degrees north latitude.
This first raid was more complicated than most that would follow, as the surveillance radar on the Bass failed just before its boats were launched, forcing its raiding partner, the Wantuck, to assume control and guidance of the boats on the long, slow approach to the beach. A British journalist accompanied this mission all the way ashore, subsequently publishing his experiences in vivid detail:
The umbilical towrope [attaching the black rubber raft to the LCPR] has been unhitched. We are twelve men . . . gliding quickly by paddle towards . . . the hills which loom nearer (I never before felt the full menace of the verb "loom"). One officer-Lieutenant Peter R. Thomas-has swum ahead alone: a tiny winking red light tell us that he has got there, that it is at least possible to land.
The silence grows half-perceptibly into sound, the rhythmical swish of surf. ... For a second or two we are caught violently in a chaos of foam. We hit something solid: "Out, quick, get out Come on, for Christ's sake!" It is an urgent but not quick task to drag the boat up to [the beach]; no tug-o'war team ever heaved so desperately.... This patch of sand becomes Commando H.Q. A new, temporary bridgehead is established in North Korea... less than a 100 miles from the Soviet frontier.
Troop Commander Lieutenant Derek Pounds had told the troops: "Civilians are to be left alone if they stay indoors; if they interfere, they get rubbed out." A [Korean] man came out, and wandered about. Some were for shooting him; but it was less noisy to knock him on the head. ("I was sorry for him in a way," the marine who did it said afterwards, showing me the teeth-marks on his rifle-butt, "but he oughtn't to have been out there.").
The long tow back to the ship was an agreeable anti-climax; the marines' wet clothing clung icily about them, yet there was sense of fulfillment and of intense relief. . . . On board there was a miniature bottle of brandy for each man (strictly medicinal, for U.S. Navy ships are dry). The Bass is a fast armed troop carrier. . . . Her youthful, smilingly taciturn captain, Lieutenant Commander Alan Ray, presides over her with unruffled equanimity.
This raid and the one that followed appear to be the first and last missions in which the Commandos went ashore in rubber rafts towed behind LCPR's, the tactic used exclusively by the Korean guerrillas in 1952. Following these two missions, the Commandos reverted to the dry ramp landing tactics with which they were more familiar.
The raiders had the satisfaction of watching their demolitions explode against the targets on both missions, the second night's explosion setting off a large fire that was still burning as the APDs prudently left the area. The North Korean reaction to these early raids was surprisingly light (though one Commando was killed during the first mission), and the APDs returned to Sasebo, Japan, on 9 October to replenish and stand by for further duty as directed by Task Force 90. This standby period proved shorter than expected, as the APDs were dispatched almost immediately for the kind of special operations duty that made their crews claim-half in tears, half in laughter-that what "APD" really stood for was "any purpose designated"!
The last three months of 1950 became the "mine season" for APDs Begor, Diachenko, and Bass, as well as the frogmen of UDTs 1 and 3. Always sensitive to the UN naval dominance of the waters surrounding North Korea, the Communists fought back with virtually the only weapon at their disposal: extensive mining of the major harbors within their control. In particular, this included the east coast ports of Wonsan and Hungnam as well as Chinnampo, the west coast port of entry for the North Korean capitol city of Pyongyang. Sweeping for 250-pound mines moored just below the surface was a dangerous business, even for minesweepers built for this sole purpose. So dangerous, in fact, that in Wonsan Harbor the minesweepers Pledge and Pirate were sunk on 12 October by the very mines they were attempting to sweep.
The frogmen found Wonsan particularly difficult, as one veteran of the UDT mine-sweeping effort notes:
UDT was rushed into the destruction of loose surface mines. . . . UDT men were placed in whale boats, given M1 rifles with armor-piercing shells, and the go-ahead to sink or detonate the mines, What a zoo! In rolling, pitching seas, here were the gunners on a bobbing cork, taking aim on another bobbing cork. Another mission for UDT? What the hell, we're flexible!
It wasn't over yet. Wonsan, always the mines. What a nightmare-cruising around with our four-foot draft LCPR's was no picnic, even with the mine watch on the bow. On 17 October another minesweeper sank, and another on 18 October, both of which had Korean crews to be rescued.
That December a ten-man UDT detachment boarded the Begor for a demolition mission that would later be described as the single largest nonnuclear explosion to date. Having earlier evacuated the port of Hungnam just ahead of the advancing Chinese army, the UN moved to deny use of the harbor facilities to the Communists for the duration of the war if possible. That goal was accomplished quite handily the day before Christmas, 1950, when Hungnam harbor rocked with an explosion generated by a substantial combination of UDT explosives as well as "400 tons of frozen dynamite, five hundred 1000-pound aerial bombs, and about two hundred drums of gasoline."
The Hungnam fireworks display was a fitting, as well as impressive, culmination of the overall UDT performance during the first six months of the war. For the UDTs to have taken and survived such extraordinary risks in raids, minefields, and other dangerous tasks so far beyond the scope of their World War II-era training and equipment–without a single death–seemed to many at the time to be too good to be true. As events were soon to prove, it was.
Typical of these hair-raising experiences was that experienced by a UDT-3 element on the night of 23-24 September 1950, as an LCPR from the Bass towed five inflatable rafts full of frogmen toward the beach approach to Taechon, just north of the west coast port city of Kunsan. What was supposed to be a "routine combat recon on an enemy beach" revealed virtually all the weaknesses of the still-infant APD-UDT program. With tongue-in-cheek humor, one participant describes the operation:
In the briefing prior to launch, all crews and swimmers were given the latest intelligence . . . including the fact that a tourist who had been on the beach in 1949 had seen no soldiers or guns there, What more could we ask? A piece of cake! Right on schedule, Bass steamed into the area and sounded General Quarters, which could be heard for miles, and with a nearly full moon we didn't have any vision problems finding the beach–a stroke of luck!
Within minutes the [enemy] guns started blazing, tracers everywhere! Boat #1 hit, eight men in the water[,] . . . four men in the water from the other boats. For what seemed like hours, the LCPR fished around for swimmers.
In his official after-action report for this mission, the UDT-3 commander on the scene describes, with considerably less humor, the subsequent recovery of the men in the water, most of which took place under enemy fire: "Small arms fire from hill on left flank of beach....Men missing: 10. . . recovered one swimmer off center of beach . . . recovered two swimmers off right flank of beach. . . . Small arms fire from the right flank of beach. . . . Recovered another swimmer off center of beach . . . recovered one swimmer off right flank of beach . . . recovered one swimmer 1000 yards off beach . . . recovered one swimmer 1200 yards off beach . . . recovered one swimmer 3000 yards off beach . . . recovered two swimmers 4000 yards off beach. All men accounted for."
But the good luck that always seemed to favor the UDT in such close calls came to an end on 19 January 1951, when a similar beach reconnaissance farther south resulted in the deaths of two UDT-1 swimmers, the only such combat casualties of the war. In addition to the two killed, two other UDT were wounded, as were two LCPR crewmen from the Bass.
The details of the terse after-action report reveal the chilling drama played out in the cold dark waters that night, when the North Koreans got a rare opportunity to catch the frogmen in their gunsights:
About ten men came over the dune line, assumed prone firing positions and commenced firing at the beach party. Immediately all of the [beach party] took to the water and commenced swimming with the rubber boat. . . . Lt (j.g.) E. I. Frey was swimming to [a tow line] when he was hit twice in the head. ... Lt (j.g.) Pope and QM2 Boswell attempted to keep the body afloat but, due to the strong current, they were dragged under the LCPR and were forced to let go. The body of Lt (j.g.) Frey was never again seen [Frey's body was, in fact, subsequently recovered].
Due to the extreme cold, the swimmers were unable to help [pull other swimmers aboard]. . . . Lt (j.g.) Satterfield was boosted to the gunwale where he was shot in the back and died immediately. During this action, the coxswain [BM3 Sidney A. "Swede" Petersen], was shot in the left knee but continued to man his station. He finally collapsed and his job was assumed by a UDT 1-man. The boat's radioman [SM Frank D. Prosser] was shot through the left elbow as he helped to pull Satterfield aboard.
Two dead and four wounded were not large numbers by the standards of combat in Korea, but the losses cut especially deep into the small APD-UDT community. This one mission incurred the single largest casualty rate among the UDT throughout the entire war, a deadly reminder of the danger inherent in these operations.
Despite their losses, there was little time for mourning as the entry of the Chinese army into the war the previous November had an immediate impact on the raider community. In response to an urgent request that same month from the hard-pressed 1st Marine Division, the 41 Independent Commando was dispatched to join the Americans fighting near the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea. With the Commandos' departure, coastal raiding virtually ceased until the spring of 1951, when the British returned to Japan to reequip and absorb the new replacements that returned its strength to near that of the original three hundred with which it had started the war.
The Commandos resumed coastal attacks in April 1951, when the British teamed up with the UDT in a raid that ripped up large sections of railway track north of Hungnam. That July and August, B and C Troops of the Commando set up forward bases on two small islands in Wonsan harbor. From these islands further raids were conducted, as were a number of small reconnaissance missions, the latter often undertaken in two-man kayaks. Raiding casualties during 1951 were relatively light–one officer and sergeant killed and twenty other ranks wounded–due in no small part to the commonsense approach to the raiding role as expressed by their senior officer on the scene, Lt. Col. F. N. "Chips" Grant: "On each [raid] I pulled my men out when the opposition got serious. I did not consider a ten-foot bridge worth serious casualties. Our main aim–that of keeping up the threat to the coast–was achieved. We could have maintained ourselves [against heavy opposition], but only at a cost not commensurate with the value of the target." This pattern of coastal raiding continued until the Commandos were permanently withdrawn from Korea on 22 December 1951.
While the departure of the Commandos from Korea broke up an effective UN raiding team, it also demonstrated the adaptability of the APD-UDT concept to function just as effectively with other UN raiders. This critical point was reaffirmed that winter by the relative speed and effectiveness with which the Korean guerrillas of the Special Missions Group replaced the Commandos.
Also assisting in this mid war transition was the earlier APD-UDT experience with other CIA-sponsored guerrillas, many of whom had already proven their effectiveness on a number of special operations missions. In fact, one of the most dangerous and successful special operations missions of the entire war had already taken place in March 1951, when one of these CIA raiding parties escorted a U.S. Army general, a doctor, into enemy-held territory south of Wonsan.
The U.S. Army rarely sends its generals behind enemy lines, especially if indigenous guerrillas recruited for the most part from the roster of the opposing team are providing this senior officer with his only protection in such dangerous territory. It's a scenario not unlike that of throwing a forward pass in a football game in which two of the three subsequent possibilities are bad news for the offense. Had the Communists succeeded in killing Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams during his clandestine intrusion into North Korea on the night of 13-14 March, they would have achieved a victory of significant proportions. However, capturing FEC's surgeon general would have been a propaganda coup of immense proportions. Even more important than his general officer status was the fact that his mission had as its goal nothing less than puncturing a hole in one of the Communists' most treasured propaganda programs:
In February 1951 both Peking Radio and the People's Daily reported that Koreans had witnessed American aircraft drop insects that resulted in cases of cholera. In March, the Communists alleged that American artillery had been used to shoot typhus germs across the Imjin River, and that the U.S. Army had sent infected animals and [infected material to four locations.
The North Koreans stated that the U.S. was responsible for 3,500 cases of smallpox in civilians and demanded that UN commanders Mathew B. Ridgway and Douglas MacArthur be tried for these "crimes." [North Korean leader) Kim Il Sung Issued an emergency decree, calling for the National Extraordinary Anti-Epidemic Committee [and other bureaucracies) to destroy insects.
However fallacious the charges sounded to American ears, they were not claims that could go unanswered, especially because in at least one area highlighted by the Communists there did indeed appear to be an epidemic of some kind.
The problem for the UN was that the territories allegedly affected were all under Communist control, and the Communists refused to allow health inspectors from the International Red Cross or the UN World Health Organization into the areas. What Communist leaders would not admit was that in the face of widespread epidemics stemming from displaced refugee populations, contaminated water, and a variety of other factors, its rudimentary medical system had collapsed.
The UN Command suspected as much, but in the face of Communist propaganda charges of germ warfare, Headquarters, Far East Command developed an audacious plan to put proof behind its suspicions. Evidently (and no doubt reluctantly) concluding that its public rebuttal to the Communist allegations would require the firsthand report of the most senior medical authority possible, FEC authorized the insertion into North Korea of General Sams. Perhaps considering the political fall-out should Sams be killed or captured, the wily MacArthur allowed the navy and CIA–the latter still his least-favorite intelligence organization–to conduct the high-risk mission. Two separate postwar CIA reports are combined here to describe the mission:
This mission was more dangerous than usual because the Wonsan area was on the alert, having detected lights at sea. The [CIA-guerrilla team] operating from a U.S. destroyer took Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams . . . by whaleboat and raft. .. into an enemy fishing village at night, outposted the area, made contact with the village chiefs, and returned the Surgeon General to the destroyer. The mission was successful and the disease was identified as hemorrhagic smallpox. Both Sams and the commander in chief, Far East Command, were impressed by the speed and efficiency of the CIA operations.
Returning to Tokyo immediately, Sams subsequently presented his medical findings before the UN and various other public forums, effectively dispelling for the moment the credibility, if not the zeal, of the Communist propaganda. An appreciative General MacArthur later awarded Sams the Distinguished Service Cross for his unique and dangerous mission.
On the night of 25 January 1952 the SMG continued the creditable performance of its predecessors with one of the more successful hit-and-run raids of the war, an assault on the railway line some nine miles south of Songjin. Departing from the Wantuck, the guerrillas struck a train sitting between two tunnels. In addition to derailing the locomotive and tender, one small railroad trestle was destroyed, and eleven North Korean soldiers were killed and one captured. The attacking force suffered no casualties.
U.S. records of these raids, found primarily in the war diaries and memoirs of the APDs and their crews, suggest that such forays dropped off sharply in the summer of 1952. In a scenario eerily prescient of one that would follow nearly two decades later in Southeast Asia, the U.S. strategy at this stage of the war concentrated almost wholly on minimizing its casualties and withdrawing most if its forces from the region with some form of "honorable peace." And just as they would again some twenty years later, the negotiations with the Communists were moving forward at an agonizingly slow pace.
Perhaps to help nudge the Communists along, the navy sent its APD-UDT team north for one final series of operations, this time against the enemy's food supply. From July to September 1952, elements of UDT-5 and UDT-3 from the Diachenko and Weiss [APD-135), respectively, began destroying fishing nets and sampans in the Sea of Japan north of Wonsan. Though the results from these net-destruction missions were "below expectations," the navy planned further such operations in the spring of 1953 before finally being ordered to cease its planning in light of the belated progress then being made at the negotiation table. From this period until the signing of the armistice on 27 July 1953, the APD-UDT teams were committed to beach survey and harbor cleanup duties requiring their demolition skills.
After the war the APDs were steadily retired, without fanfare, to Fleet Reserve moorings at various locations around the U.S. The UDTs, on the other hand, had begun a philosophical and operational evolution from its World War II beginnings from which they would not turn back. Its onshore raiding experiences in Korea would underpin a slow but steady growth in such capabilities until the early 1960s, at which time President John F. Kennedy set the UDT on the irreversible path that led to the present-day SEAL (sea-air-land) teams.
********
Endnotes
1. To many of the navy's flag-rank aviators it appeared that Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson was giving priority to the air force's B-36 strategic bomber program at the expense of the navy's commitment to develop a number of "supercarriers." The admirals were right, though the subsequent growth of Cold War-era military budgets eventually allowed the navy to resume its aircraft carrier modernization plans.
2. Barlow, "Navy's View of the Revolt of the Admirals," 25.
3. Sandler, Korean War, 240.
4. Ibid.
5. In August 1950 nearly 30 percent of the close air support strikes attempted by NAVFE were canceled due to the lack of common radio systems between ground controllers and aircrews. And with tensions between the two services still raw from the navy "revolt" the previous fall, yet another nasty debate broke out between the naval aviators and their air force counterparts (Sandler, Korean War, 231-32).
6. Walter Karig, Malcom W. Cagle, and Frank A. Mason, Battle Report: The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1952), 59. See also Sandier, Korean War, 188-89, which claims all four torpedo boats were sunk.
7. SandIer, Korean War, 282.
8. Ibid., 152.
9. Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare," 13.
10. Clark, Carrier Admiral, 275-76.
11. Doyle was dual-hatted as both the operational commander of TF 90 (NAVFE's amphibious force) and administrative commander of Amphibious Group One. While conducting raids, the high-speed transports and their raiders operated as a component or task element of TF 90.
12. Karig, Cagle, and Mason, Battle Report, 152.
13. Capt. Alan Ray, USN (Ret.) (former commander of the Horace A. Bass), to author, 15 October 1998.
14. The boats were LCPR (landing craft, personnel-ramped) or LCVP (landmg craft, vehicle-personnel).
15. The letters "AP" are used to identify transports, with the letter "D" added to denote transports built on destroyer-type hulls. The term "APD" is used informally to denote high-speed transports.
16. Lt. Hilary D. Mahin, former boat and gunnery officer aboard the Horace A. Bass, telephone interview with author, 15 August 1998.
17. The USS Sea Lion (SS-315) was destined for the Atlantic Fleet after its conversion to ASSP standard.
18. The removal of the torpedo tubes and main deck gun left the Perch with only two 40-mm cannon on the superstructure with which to defend itself.
19. Former Perch crewman M. E. Kebodeaux, interview with author, 11 August 1998.
20. War Patrol Report: Commanding Officer to CNO, series 0015, subject: "USS Perch (ASSP 313); Report of First War Patrol," September–October 1950, prologue, 3. Post-January 1946 Submarine War Patrol Reports File, Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center (hereafter cited as War Patrol Rep–Perch).
21. Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 110.
22. Hoyt, Submarines at War, endnotes, n.p.
23. Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, ill.
24. War Patrol Rep–Perch, 1.
25. Kebodeaux interview.
26. War Patrol Rep–Perch, 4.
27. Hoyt, Submarines at War, 300.
28. War Patrol Rep–Perch, 2.
29. Ibid., 3.
30. Ibid.
31. War Diary, USS Diachenko, 1-31 August 1950.
32. The explosives necessary to destroy the target, a small railroad bridge, waited just offshore in an inflatable boat manned by sailors from the Diachenko. The mission was aborted, however, after a railway handcar carrying North Korean soldiers burst upon the scene, apparently by sheer accident. After Foley was wounded in the ensuing exchange of gunfire, Atcheson helped him back to the beach for the subsequent return to the Diachenko (Dockery, SEALs in Action, 72-74).
33. Dockery, SEALs in Action, 73.
34. George Atcheson to Dwyer, July 1985, in Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 237.
35. Capt. Ted Fielding, USN (Ret), to Dwyer, July 1985, in Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 239.
36. Pacific Fleet UDTs 1 and 3 were based at the Coronado Amphibious Base near San Diego, California, while Atlantic Fleet UDTs 2 and 4 were based at the Little Creek Amphibious base near Norfolk, Virginia.
37. Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare," 1-2.
38. Ibid., 5.
39. Hundevadt, "Spindrift: Recollections of a Naval Career," unpublished memoir, 153, in Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare," 6.
40. "Korean War, U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, Interim Third Evaluation Report, I May 1951-31 December 1951," in Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare," 11.
41. Korean War-era UDT member Dr. James Short, interview with author, 13 April 1997.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Russ Eoff, ed., "UDT in Korea ...1950," undated paper, 3. Author's collection.
45. "Korean War, U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, Interim Second Evaluation Report, 16 November 1950-30 April 1951," in Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 232-33.
46. Mahin interview, 25 September 1998.
47. Sandier, Korean War, 206.
48. Ibid, 207.
49. Ibid.
50. Karig, Cagle, and Mason, Battle Report, 152.
51. Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare," 17. See also Karig, Cagle, and Mason, Battle Report, 152.
52. Karig, Cagle, and Mason, Battle Report, 153.
53. Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare," 244.
54. Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Commander, Far East Air Forces, to COMNAVFE, 12-16 August 1950, subject: "Operations of USS Horace A. Bass." Alan Ray Collection.
55. Citation to accompany award of the Navy Unit Commendation to Special Operations Group, Amphibious Group One (USS Horace A. Bass, Under-water Demolition Team One, and Reconnaissance Company [Minus], First Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force), from the secretary of the navy (date not on citation). Author's copy from former Bass skipper, Alan Ray.
56. Hastings. Korean War. 94.
57. Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 246.
58. Hastings, Korean War, 94.
59. War Patrol Rep–Perch, 3.
60. Neillands, In the Combat Zone, 88-89.
61. Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare," 25-26.
62. COMNAVFE to CINCUNC, message, 19 September 1950, in Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare," 26.
63. CINCUNC to COMNAVFE, untitled message. 20 September 1950, in Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare," 25-26.
64. Coulden, Korea, 469.
65. Central Intelligence Agency, Infiltration and Resupply of Agents in North Korea, 1952-1953, vol. 1, December 1972, 37-38 (secret) (hereafter cited as Infiltration, followed by volume and page number). December 1972. Washington, D.C.: CIA. Information extracted is unclassified.
66. Goulden, Korea, 470.
67. CIA in Korea 1:123.
68. Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 251.
69. Hoyt, Submarines at War, 301.
70. War Patrol Rep–Perch, 1.
71. Ibid., 2.
72. Karig, Cagle, and Mason, Battle Report, 286.
73. Ibid., 3.
74. Hoyt, Submarines at War, 303.
75. Withdrawn from combat, the Perch participated in numerous amphibious training exercises throughout the Pacific during the following years. Returning to Mare Island for decommissioning in 1960, the boat emerged the following year absent its hallmark aft-deck storage hangar. For the following decade the Perch continued training U.S. and foreign special operations units in the Far East.
76. The Bass earned six battle stars and a Navy Unit Commendation for its Korean War Service.
77. By necessity the commandos had used the rubber raft technique aboard the Perch. Perhaps as a result of that experience, they did so again during their first combat raids from an APD in October 1950. This, however, appears to be their last such use of inflatable rafts before switching to "dry ramp landings."
78. Field, History of United States Naval Operations in Korea, 217.
79. Mahin interview, 25 September 1998.
80. Ibid.
81. Mahin interview, 14 October 1998.
82. War Diary, USS Horace A. Bass, October 1950, 2-3.
83. Tom Driberg, Tom Driberg's Personal Diary: The Best of Both Worlds (London: Phoenix House, 1953), 16-22.
84. Eoff, "UDT in Korea," 5.
85. Blair, Forgotten War, 545.
86. Eoff, "UDT in Korea," 6.
87. Action Report, UDT-3, 1 October 1950, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 7.
88. Ibid., 4.
89. After Action Report, UDT-1, 5 February 1951, Naval Historical Center. Washington, D.C., 3~.
90. Lt. Col. F. N. Grant to Rear Adm. George C. Dyer, December 1951. Author's collection.
91. Report: Commander UN Blockading and Escort Force to Commander, Seventh Fleet, series 0031, subject: "Review of Operations and Comments on the United Nations Blockading Escort Force (TF 95) from 28 March 1951 to 9 January 1952," 30 January 1952, 6, Post-January 1946 Action Rep Files, in Andrade, "History of Naval Special Warfare."
92. Sandler, Korean War, 46.
93. CIA in Korea 1:99-100. See also Secret War in Korea, 23.
94. At the war's end the UN General Assembly named a five-power commission to investigate the Communists' wartime claims of germ warfare, "but the communists were no longer interested in the question" (Sandler, Korean War, 47).
95. FEC General Order 94/51, for actions by Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams on night of 13-14 March 1951. See also Secret War in Korea, 23.
********
Since the copyright for this chapter is held by the Naval Institute Press, 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, MD, 21402, copies may not be made without the express permission of the Naval Institute Press.
[END]
history.navy.mil
16. U.S. AI firm WEKA opens 1st Asia-Pacific regional office in Seoul
U.S. AI firm WEKA opens 1st Asia-Pacific regional office in Seoul | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · October 26, 2023
By Kim Na-young
SEOUL, Oct. 26 (Yonhap) -- WEKA, a U.S.-based artificial intelligence (AI) data platform company, officially announced Thursday it has established a regional office in South Korea, the first of its kind in the Asia-Pacific region, saying it will support local AI companies achieve innovation in terms of data management.
Established in 2013, WEKA helps organizations store, process, and manage data in the cloud and on premises to fuel next-generation workloads.
With the establishment of its Seoul office, the platform company said it will provide a software solution to South Korean companies aiming to develop secure and efficient AI platforms, and help AI companies optimize their performance and cost-efficiency.
"We are the only storage vendor, the only data management vendor, where the exact same product that runs on premises also runs on the cloud," WEKA's co-founder and CEO, Liran Zvibel, said in a press conference held in Seoul, noting its solution can run on major clouds, including those developed by Google and Amazon Web Services, as well as on-premise infrastructures.
Zvibel said the company decided to open its first Asian-Pacific office in Seoul because "it is easier for future-looking technologies to be successful here" as the market is innovative and practical when picking good solutions and products.
WEKA will provide better speed, simplicity and sustainability for managing data as well as different storage scales to local businesses in the AI, financial services, pharmaceutical, entertainment and manufacturing industries, he added.
In November last year, WEKA raised US$135 million in Series D funding from Nvidia, Samsung Catalyst Fund, a venture capital fund under South Korean tech giant Samsung Electronics Co., and others.
Kim Seung-whoon, former head of Inspur Korea, has been appointed as the head of WEKA's Korean branch.
Liran Zvibel, WEKA's co-founder and CEO, speaks at a press conference held in central Seoul on Oct. 26, 2023, in this photo provided by the company. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · October 26, 2023
17. No imminent sign of N. Korea's spy satellite launch: unification ministry
No imminent sign of N. Korea's spy satellite launch: unification ministry | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · October 26, 2023
SEOUL, Oct. 26 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification ministry said Thursday there is no imminent sign of North Korea launching a military spy satellite, despite its earlier pledge to make a third attempt in October.
The North launched a military spy satellite, named the Malligyong-1, mounted on a Chollima-1 rocket in May and August, but both ended in failure. Pyongyang has announced it will make a third attempt in October.
"(In the run-up to North Korea's satellite launch), there were usually signs of a launch in advance, and the country had previously notified international organizations of its launch plan. But currently, there are no such indications," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
The official declined to comment on speculation that North Korea may be holding off its satellite launch, as Russia has been transferring satellite technology to enable it to fix technical problems following the Sept. 13 summit between the leaders of the two nations.
"There should not be such (military technology) cooperation between North Korea and Russia. This would be in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions," he said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un traveled to Russia's Far East last month for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin amid speculation that they may have reached an arms transaction deal for Moscow's use in war in Ukraine.
In a recent interview with Yonhap News Agency, Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho voiced doubts over whether North Korea could make a third launch attempt soon, noting that it had a short span of time to fix technical issues since its second failed attempt in August.
This file photo provided by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on June 1, 2023, shows the launch of the North's new Chollima-1 rocket carrying a military reconnaissance satellite, the Malligyong-1, from Tongchang-ri on the North's west coast the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · October 26, 2023
18. Hyesan residents turn to soy milk to make kimchi this year
Another potential instability indicator? But also shows the reliance of the Korean people in the north.
Hyesan residents turn to soy milk to make kimchi this year
“People facing economic hardship find it burdensome to buy chili powder, garlic, fermented shrimp and other ingredients,” a source told Daily NK
dailynk.com
Hyesan residents turn to soy milk to make kimchi this year | Daily NK English
FILE PHOTO: Examples of kimchi made by North Koreans in Yanggang Province. (Daily NK)
Hyesan residents are making their kimchi with soy milk rather than chili powder seasoning this kimjang season, Daily NK has learned.
Kimjang is the Korean tradition of preparing kimchi for winter.
“Some families in Hyesan have recently begun making kimjang kimchi for winter,” a source in Yanggang Province told Daily NK on Monday, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “However, due to hardship this year, they aren’t using chili powder seasoning in the kimchi. Instead, they use soymilk they make from ground fermented beans, which requires little money.”
The kimjang season begins in mid-October in North Korea, where it gets colder faster than in the South. Kimchi made during the kimjang is so important that people call it “food for half the year,” but with economic difficulties worsening after the COVID-19 pandemic, many families gave up on preparing kimchi for the winter.
However, the source said people have restarted making kimchi this year, no matter what it takes.
“After abandoning the kimjang for the winter during the COVID-19 crisis, people learned how important kimchi is,” he said. “So this year, many people will make at least a little kimchi, regardless of the tough times.”
During their year-end general reviews this year, state agency heads are expected to face evaluation of how much cabbage and radish they provided to workers. As a result, agencies and enterprises are working to scoop up from farms as much cabbage and radish for the kimjang as they can, regardless of the quality. Some enterprises have already supplied the cabbage and radish to their workers, according to the source.
“Most of the families currently making kimchi have designated workplaces and can do so because they’ve received from work cabbage and radish for the kimjang. However, when families have a tough time putting even two meals a day on the table, preparing the chili powder seasoning and salt needed for the kimjang is inevitably a burden.”
In these circumstances, word has been spreading that “making kimchi using soymilk from ground beans yields a pungent flavor even without the chili powder seasoning” and that people “kill two birds with one stone by making kimchi with soymilk — they can save money and still eat kimchi.”
People trying to make kimchi this way are preparing soymilk by soaking beans in water, grounding them up, boiling the mixture, and then letting it cool.
The source told Daily NK that one woman in Hyesan said that her husband received cabbage and radish from work this year, but they had planned to preserve it in salt water and eat it pickled in winter since they could not afford the seasonings.
“However, after hearing that kimchi tastes good if you put it in soymilk, we prepared beans to make kimchi this year,” the woman said, according to the source.
A kilogram of dried, fermented soybeans costs KPW 4,100 in Hyesan Market, while a kilogram of whole chili peppers costs between KPW 23,000 to KPW 30,000, and chili powder costs between KPW 27,000 and KPW 35,000. Cabbage for the kimjang costs KPW 1,000 to KPW 1,500 a kilogram, and radish costs KPW 1,000, but with the autumn harvest still ongoing, prices will likely fall even further.
“People facing economic hardship find it burdensome to buy chili powder, garlic, fermented shrimp and other ingredients,” the source said. “Since even hardpressed people can make kimchi if they use soymilk, which is much cheaper than chili powder, more and more people are making winter kimchi with soymilk.
“Household dependents and elderly households who receive no supplies of cabbage or radish can’t even think of making kimchi this year,” he added.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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Lee Chae Un
Lee Chae Un is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. She can be reached at dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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19. North Korean police arrest ten people for drug dealing
Wouldn't you turn to drugs if you lived in the hell of the north?
North Korean police arrest ten people for drug dealing
Since the 10 have committed serious narcotics offenses, they are expected to face an investigation running from six years to a year with severe punishments to follow
By Jong So Yong - 2023.10.26 5:21pm
dailynk.com
North Korean police arrest ten people for drug dealing | Daily NK English
FILE PHOTO: A scene from Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province. (Daily NK)
The North Korean police pulled off a sting that brought in more than ten people from a nationwide gang of drug dealers, Daily NK has learned.
“About a dozen dealers who have been producing and selling drugs for several years were simultaneously nabbed around the country. The Narcotics Bureau at the Ministry of Social Security oversaw the sting directly, working with provincial police bureaus to bring in the crooks. The bureau has reported this to the party as the successful apprehension of an anti-socialist and non-socialist group,” a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Oct. 20, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
The wholesale arrest of a nationwide drug gang was rated as a major achievement, especially since it coincides with Oct. 10, a North Korean holiday that celebrates the establishment of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea.
The criminals who were brought in had been organized into a team that sourced raw materials in Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province; a team that produced the drugs in Chongjin and Rason, North Hamhung Province; and teams of dealers in each province.
“In the past, gangs would produce drugs at factories and then ship them across the border. But this gang’s approach was to stockpile a huge amount of supplies for the manufacture of drugs in Chongjin and Rasan and then peddle them across the country while also smuggling them across the border in North Hamgyong Province into China,” the source said.
“When drugs are smuggled into China, they can command a price that’s two or three times higher than in North Korea. While this gang briefly halted smuggling during the pandemic, they got back into it with a vengeance this year. When that came to light, the authorities took the issue very seriously,” the source added.
Since the gang members have committed serious narcotics offenses, they are expected to face an investigation running from six years to a year with severe punishments to follow. Anyone implicated in their crimes is also likely to be arrested and prosecuted as well.
“Since plenty of people in the party, the police, the state security forces and the military have been covering for this gang, quite a few cadres are going to be arrested,” the source predicted.
Residents of North Hamgyong Province are being fed the following story as part of a government propaganda campaign: “Hostile forces have been producing and distributing drugs in the country to increase the number of users and addicts so as to shake the foundation of the state defended by generations of Koreans and to threaten its very survival.”
This campaign suggests that North Hamgyong Province will continue to see fallout from the drug bust for some time, the source said.
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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Jong So Yong
Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynk@uni-media.net.
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