Quotes of the Day:

 "People who know little are usually great talkers, while men who know much say little." 

- Jean-Jacques Rousseau

"Objects of the most stupendous magnitude, and measure in which the lives and liberties of millions yet unborn are intimately interested, are now before us. We are in the very midst of a revolution the most complete, unexpected and remarkable of any in the history of nations."

- Thomas Paine 

“And how we burned in the camps later, thinking: What would things have been like if every Security operative, when he went out at night to make an arrest, had been uncertain whether he would return alive and had to say good-bye to his family? Or if, during periods of mass arrests, as for example in Leningrad, when they arrested a quarter of the entire city, people had not simply sat there in their lairs, paling with terror at every bang of the downstairs door and at every step on the staircase, but had understood they had nothing left to lose and had boldly set up in the downstairs hall an ambush of half a dozen people with axes, hammers, pokers, or whatever else was at hand?... The Organs would very quickly have suffered a shortage of officers and transport and, notwithstanding all of Stalin's thirst, the cursed machine would have ground to a halt! If...if...We didn't love freedom enough. And even more – we had no awareness of the real situation.... We purely and simply deserved everything that happened afterward.

- Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn 

1.  RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 6 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (06.10.22) CDS comments on key events

3. How Far Will Xi Go to Help a Desperate Putin?

4. Biden: Nuclear 'Armageddon' risk highest since '62 crisis

5. 2 Russians fleeing military service seek asylum after arriving to Alaska

6. Putin Is Not Backing Down. He's Pivoting—to a New, Dreadful Kind of Warfare

7. US troops should be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia, UAE in wake of OPEC decision to slash oil production, Democratic lawmakers say

8.  #PRC: #AUKUS: Proposed Special Operations Forces for the Indo-Pacific at odd with #PRC.. David Maxwell, FDD (Parts 1 and 2)

9. How to reform America’s military sales process

10. Zumwalt-Class Can Become a Dominant 21st Century Destroyer

11. U.N. body rejects debate on China's treatment of Uyghur Muslims in blow to West

12. Fully Fund America’s International Affairs Budget

13. Japanese Warships Return Home Following First Phase of Indo-Pacific Deployment

14. Service members defend general who was chastised after contradicting Fox News host Carlson

15.  Austin Orders Renaming of Bases that Honor Confederate Rebels

16. USS Ronald Reagan’s new skipper takes command near Korea amid missile barrage

17. 2 brigade commanders fired at Fort Hood for loss of confidence

18. To Deter China, Pentagon Must ‘Marry’ New Tech With Legacy Systems, Flournoy Says

19. 419. Army Mad Scientist Conference — Back to the Future: Using History to Forecast, 8-9 November 2022

20. New website will help you debunk the misinformation you see posted on social media

21. Beyond COVID: China, Biotechnology, and Artificial Intelligence

22. US kills 3 Islamic State leaders in 2 Syria operations

23. Europe must trigger snapback of UN sanctions on Iran

24. FDD | A Match Made in Heaven: The Hezbollah-Amal Nexus

25. Israel-EU annual meeting after decade hiatus - opinion

26. Chinese President Xi's 'final purge' ahead of Communist Party congress

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 6 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6

Key Takeaways

• Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones is not generating asymmetric effects the way the Ukrainian use of US-provided HIMARS systems has done and is unlikely to affect the course of the war significantly.
• The Wagner Private Military Company announced the creation of its own private Telegram channel on October 6, indicating that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may want a voice that is clearly his own to compete with milbloggers and possibly Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov, who all have their own Telegram channels.
• Ukrainian forces likely continued counteroffensive operations in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast near Kupyansk and operations to threaten Russian positions along the Kreminna-Svatove road in western Luhansk Oblast on October 6.
• Russian troops are likely establishing defensive positions in upper Kherson Oblast following the collapse of the Russian line in northeast Kherson.
• Russian troops continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 6 and likely made incremental gains around Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued to conduct routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 6.
• Local Russian officials appear to be frantically looking for ways to fund their mobilized units as the Kremlin increasingly expects local administrations to pay for the war effort from their own budgets.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 6 that Russian forces began the forced mobilization of Ukrainian citizens in Russian-occupied Kremmina and Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 6

Oct 6, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 6, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones is not generating asymmetric effects the way the Ukrainian use of US-provided HIMARS systems has done and is unlikely to affect the course of the war significantly. The deputy chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated on October 6 that Russian forces have used a total of 86 Iranian Shahed-136 drones against Ukraine, 60% of which Ukrainian forces have already destroyed.[1] As ISW reported yesterday, Russian forces do not appear to be focusing these drones on asymmetric nodes near the battlefield. They have used many drones against civilian targets in rear areas, likely hoping to generate nonlinear effects through terror. Such efforts are not succeeding. Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Yuri Ignat stated that the Russian army is increasingly using the Iranian-made drones to conserve its stock of high-precision missiles.[2] Russian forces have likely used a non-trivial percentage of the Shahed-136 supply so far if the claims of an anonymous US intelligence official at the end of August were correct that Iran would likely provide ”hundreds” of drones to Russia.[3]

The Wagner Private Military Company announced the creation of its own private Telegram channel on October 6, indicating that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may want a voice that is clearly his own to compete with milbloggers and possibly Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov, who all have their own Telegram channels. A Telegram channel affiliated with Prigozhin shared the invitation to the Wagner channel, “Peacekeeper.” The Russian-language invitation reads “We arrived from Hell. We are WAGNER - our business is death, and business is going well.”[4] In addition to Peacekeeper, the channel suggested that followers subscribe to the “Novorossiya Z Project,” another private channel. The creation of a group for Wagner to share “uncensored materials from the front” may be in part a recruitment tool but is likely also an attempt to establish a formal means for Prigozhin and his allies to directly influence the information space in much the same way that Kadyrov and the Russian nationalist milbloggers use Telegram.

Key Takeaways

• Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones is not generating asymmetric effects the way the Ukrainian use of US-provided HIMARS systems has done and is unlikely to affect the course of the war significantly.
• The Wagner Private Military Company announced the creation of its own private Telegram channel on October 6, indicating that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may want a voice that is clearly his own to compete with milbloggers and possibly Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov, who all have their own Telegram channels.
• Ukrainian forces likely continued counteroffensive operations in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast near Kupyansk and operations to threaten Russian positions along the Kreminna-Svatove road in western Luhansk Oblast on October 6.
• Russian troops are likely establishing defensive positions in upper Kherson Oblast following the collapse of the Russian line in northeast Kherson.
• Russian troops continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 6 and likely made incremental gains around Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued to conduct routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 6.
• Local Russian officials appear to be frantically looking for ways to fund their mobilized units as the Kremlin increasingly expects local administrations to pay for the war effort from their own budgets.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 6 that Russian forces began the forced mobilization of Ukrainian citizens in Russian-occupied Kremmina and Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Ukrainian forces likely continued counteroffensive operations in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast near Kupyansk on October 6. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled “up to three [Ukrainian] battalion tactical groups [sic]” as they attempted to advance towards Pershotravneve (20km northeast of Kupyansk), Kyslivka (23km southeast of Kupyansk), and Berestove (30km northeast of Kupyansk).[5] Geolocated footage also shows Ukrainian troops in Hlushkivka, 14km southeast of Kupyansk, indicating that Ukrainian troops are continuing to make eastward gains around Kupyansk.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to extend the counteroffensive pocket around Kupyansk northeast towards Vilshana and east towards Orlianka (22km east of Kupyansk) and that Ukrainian troops are sending reinforcements to this pocket.[7] The deputy chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, reported that Russian troops are attempting to slow Ukrainian advances on the Kupyansk-Svatove direction, suggesting that Russian troops around Kupyansk are concerned that Ukrainians will use positions in this area to threaten Svatove from the northwest.[8]

Ukrainian troops likely continued counteroffensive operations to threaten Russian positions along the Kreminna-Svatove road in western Luhansk Oblast on October 6. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed that over 10,000 Ukrainian troops have amassed west of Kreminna, and that Russian forces have largely lost contact with Svatove and Kreminna.[9] Several Russian sources stated that Ukrainian troops are continuing sabotage and reconnaissance activities along the R66 (Svatove-Kreminna road) and that Russian troops are preparing for the defense of the Svatove-Kreminna line.[10] Local citizens and Russian troops have reportedly evacuated Svatove in anticipation of Ukrainian attacks.[11]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Russian troops are likely establishing defensive positions in upper Kherson Oblast following the collapse of the Russian line in northeast Kherson. Satellite imagery dated October 3 and 4 shows Russian trench lines and radar deflector systems in the Beryslav-Nova Kakovkha area, which suggests that Russian troops are falling back to reinforce defensive positions in central Kherson Oblast in the face of recent Ukrainian advances in northeast Kherson Oblast.[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces largely focused on regrouping in northern Kherson Oblast and did not conduct ground attacks on October 6.[13] The Russian MoD echoed claims made by some milbloggers that Ukrainian troops conducted limited ground attacks to break through new Russian defensive lines in northern Kherson, particularly from Piatykhatky (about 35km south of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border).[14]

Russian sources also suggested that Ukrainian troops conducted limited ground attacks northwest of Kherson City on October 6. A Russian milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting troop rotations northwest and west of Kherson City near Posad Pokrovske and Oleksandrivka in preparation for further attacks in the direction of Kherson City.[15] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian troops attacked Russian positions near Novohryhorivka, about 25km northwest of Kherson City.[16] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that a reinforced Russian tactical unit of an unspecified echelon attempted to attack in the direction of Lyubomirivka (27km northwest of Kherson City), likely in an attempt to push the frontline further north of Kherson City to afford Russian troops a wider buffer zone between Ukrainian positions and critical concentration areas near the Dnipro River on October 5.[17]

Ukrainian forces additionally continued their interdiction campaign in support of ground operations on October 6. Social media footage shows the aftermath of a HIMARS strike on a building used by Russian forces in Kherson City on the night of October 5 to 6.[18] Residents of Oleshky (5km southwest of Kherson City) reported smoke following Ukrainian strikes in the area.[19] Ukrainian forces also reportedly conducted strikes on the Antonivskyi Bridge.[20]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian troops continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 6 and likely made incremental gains around Bakhmut. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces took full control of Zaitseve (8km southeast of Bakhmut), but some milbloggers said that claims of the capture of Zaitseve are premature and that Wagner Group forces are continuing attempts to take full control of Zaitseve.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters took control of Vesela Dolyna (5km southeast of Bakhmut) and are advancing northwest towards Ivanhrad.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian troops continued ground attacks northeast of Bakhmut near Yakovlivka, Soledar and Bakhmutske and south of Bakhmut near Odradivka, Mayorsk, and Zaitseve.[23] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Russian forces fought along the western outskirts of the Donetsk City-Avdiivka area and conducted ground assaults near Krasnohorivka and Vodyane and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[24] Russian troops continued routine shelling around Bakhmut and the Donetsk City-Avdiivka area.[25]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 6.[26] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhia City, Nikopol, and Kryvyi Rih.[27] Ukrainian sources also reported that Ukrainian forces shot down Russian Shahed-136 drones and other unspecified loitering munitions in Mykolaiv and Odesa Oblasts.[28] Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed Russian ammunition depots in Melitopol on October 6.[29]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Local Russian officials appear to be frantically looking for ways to fund their mobilized units as the Kremlin increasingly expects local administrations to pay for the war effort from their own budgets, as ISW has previously reported.[30] A Russian opposition outlet reported on October 5 that the Ministry of Industry and Trade for the Republic of Mari El forced business owners to “donate” 1% of their earnings to fund mobilized personnel in the Republic.[31] The ministry reportedly threatened to mobilize the employees of businesses that did not comply. One businessman told the outlet that he had to transfer money despite personal opposition to the war in order to protect his employees, and that the stated purpose of the funds was "voluntary donations to provide humanitarian assistance to military personnel called up for partial mobilization." An anti-war Russian outlet reported that public employees and teachers in Krasnodar Krai were forced to "voluntarily” deduct one day of October pay to transfer to a fund to support mobilized personnel.[32] The outlet noted that authorities in Krasnodar previously forced public officials to donate parts of their salaries to repair a highway in Russian-occupied Crimea in 2014. Omsk Governor Alexander Burkov reported on October 5 that Omsk faced a budget deficit of more than 13 billion rubles and was unable to pay for the additional benefits for mobilized Omsk citizens—like childcare support—that other, wealthier regions of Russia were able to provide.[33] Burkov was responding to a video circulated by Omsk servicemembers who alleged that their salaries were unpaid.

It is unclear whether Omsk Oblast is providing any salary to its mobilized citizens, or which government entities are responsible for paying mobilized men—the Russian Ministry of Defense, the federal government, or local administrations. However, Moscow Oblast governor Andrei Vorobyov told mobilized men from Moscow on October 6 that the Moscow administration has purchased necessary equipment for them; his remarks received general acclaim from the milblogger community.[34] The Ministry of Defense is demonstrably not providing even basic military equipment to mobilized personnel. It appears to be leaving wealthy oblasts to fill that gap, while mobilized men from poorer oblasts may be going without non-crowdsourced equipment entirely.[35]

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 6 that Russian forces began the forced mobilization of Ukrainian citizens in Russian-occupied Kremmina and Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast. The Center reported that Russian forces are sending Ukrainians of all ages and health statuses to the frontlines without proper training or ammunition because Russian forces “benefit from [Ukrainian deaths] regardless of which side we are fighting for, because it breaks the mental ties between the regions.”[36]

Unidentified hackers used fake mobilization notices purportedly from military commissariats to install malware on Russian computers, according to a Russian cybersecurity company. KasperskyLabs reported on October 6 that men received fake subpoenas from military registration offices calling on recipients to urgently appear at a place and time, with a PDF download purportedly containing more information.[37] The PDFs contained malware used for corporate espionage data theft, which KasperskyLabs attributed to the Eastern Europe-oriented hacking group XDSpy. Russian military commissars are legally required to present mobilization notices in person, not via email.

Russian figures continue to poorly organize the nonconventional formation of volunteer battalions. Ultranationalist milblogger Igor Girkin announced on October 6 that his “Novorossiya” Societal Division would no longer oversee the creation and management of the “Nevsky” volunteer battalion detachment.[38] Girkin had commented on the progress of the ”Nevsky” detachment and its early October deadline for formation as recently as September 27.[39]

Newly-mobilized Russian citizens continued to arrive in all parts of occupied Ukraine to train “at training grounds in close proximity to areas where combat missions are being performed,” according to the Russian Ministry of Defense. Mobilized citizens reportedly arrived in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts for training on October 3 and 4.[40] Russian proxy outlets also showed video of unspecified personnel training in Kherson Oblast and newly mobilized personnel training in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[41] The People’s Militia of the DNR reported on October 6 that the newly mobilized men will undergo intensive on-the-ground training that takes into account Russia’s recent experiences with combat in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense had told Interfax on October 2 that ”after the training is completed, these units will begin to carry out tasks for the control and defense of the liberated territories and will also operate as part of reserve and reinforcement units.”[42]

Members of the Russian public continued to express their dissatisfaction with Russia’s “partial mobilization” through attacks and threats against military facilities across the country. An unidentified individual issued a bomb threat to the administrative building for the Military Commissariat in Ulan-Ude, the Republic of Buryatia on October 5.[43] Russian authorities found no signs of an explosive. An unidentified person in Moscow threw four Molotov cocktails at an uninhabited barracks on October 5.[44] Police also arrested an 11th grade girl on October 5 after she threw two Molotov cocktails at the military registration and enlistment office in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan.[45]

The Russian military’s policy of funneling new recruits into pre-existing units as individual-level replacements is continuing to create incohesive formations down to the team level. A Washington Post journalist reported that Ukrainian forces captured a Russian tank team near Mykolaiv with three soldiers from three different sources: a driver who was a mobilized prisoner with paratrooper experience in the Russian military, a commander from the Wagner Private Military Company, and a gunner who was a mobilized Ukrainian from Luhansk.[46]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation administration officials continued to restrict the movement of residents in Russian-occupied territories on October 6. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian and occupation administration officials implemented curfews and increased filtration measures in Rubizhne and Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast with the stated purpose of finding Ukrainian saboteurs and partisans.[47] Odesa Military Administration Spokesman Serhiy Bratchuk claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) continues to prevent residents of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts from entering the Russian Federation despite Russia’s recent policy change to officially recognize those territories as part of Russia.[48] The mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, reported that Russian and occupation administration officials are refusing to let Ukrainian civilians move through the Vasylivka checkpoint into Ukrainian-held Zaporizhia Oblast and that the queue at the checkpoint is now over 5,000 people long.[49] Russian and occupation administration officials will likely continue to increase restrictions on civilian movement as Ukrainian counteroffensives progress.

Russian and occupation administration officials began to set conditions for President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party to dominate politics in illegally annexed Russian-occupied territories on October 6. United Russia Party Chairman Dmitry Medvedev stated that the party will extend its programming to the illegally annexed territories and create regional party branches there as well.[50] The head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Denis Pushilin, announced on October 6 that he was the nominee for the post of the United Russia Regional Party Secretary for the DNR.[51] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian officials are coercing public sector employees in Russian-occupied territories to join the United Russia party with threats of dismissal and mobilization if they refuse.[52]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[36] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/06/okupanty-rozpochaly-pryshvydshenu-mobilizacziyu-na-novozahoplenyh-zemlyah-luganshhyny/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/6177

[42] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/865910

[43] https://www.baikal-daily dot ru/news/20/443269/

[52] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/10/06/okupanty-zmushuyut-byudzhetnykiv-na-tot-vstupaty-do-yedynoyi-rosiyi/

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (06.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (06.10.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

As of the morning of October 6, 2022, more than 1,205 Ukrainian children are victims of full- scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation, Prosecutor General's Office reports. The official number of children who have died and been wounded in the course of the Russian aggression is 418, and more than 787 children, respectively. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories.

Zaporizhzhia was shelled twice during the day with modified S-300 missiles. Currently, we know about 1 dead, 12 injured, and 21 rescued. But people may remain under the rubble. There were no military facilities nearby, said Oleksandr Starukh, head of Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration (OMA).

In the morning, the Russians fired two rockets at the Shepetivka district of the Khmelnytsky Oblast (northwestern part of Ukraine). One rocket fell near an infrastructure facility. The other fell on the wasteland.

At night, the enemy attacked the south of Ukraine with kamikaze drones. Nine kamikaze drones were destroyed by air defense forces, seven of them in the Mykolayiv Oblast. Also, during October 5-6, the Russians shelled the Mykolaiv and Bashtan districts of the Oblast. As a result, residential buildings, farm buildings, and infrastructure were damaged.

On October 6, a Ukrainian air defense unit destroyed three Shahed-136 kamikaze drones while approaching Odesa from the sea, reported the operational command "South".

During the night, the Russian occupiers struck several industrial facilities in Kharkiv. Deputy Head of the National Police of the Kharkiv Region, Serhiy Bolvinov, said the city was attacked by Iranian UAVs that night. This is the first recorded use of kamikaze drones in Kharkiv - the wreckage was seized on the spot. The Russians also shelled Kupyanskyi (3 wounded), Vovchanskyi, Bogodukhivskyi, and Kharkivskyi districts of the Oblast.

On October 5, the enemy fire killed 3 civilians in Torske and 1 in Zarichne in Donetsk Oblast.

The Russians shelled the Nikopol district of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast all night long with rocket launchers and heavy artillery. As a result, a dozen private houses, an enterprise and power lines were damaged in Nikopol. In addition, several private houses and farm buildings were damaged in Myrivska hromada.

Overall, in Nikopol and its region, 356 multi-story buildings and almost 1,000 private homes were destroyed due to enemy strikes.

Dnipropetrovsk Regional Council Chairman Mykola Lukashuk said this during a briefing. Lukashuk added that the enemy is shelling the Nikopol district almost every day. Shelling is conducted exclusively from the territory of Energodar. "They hit from Grady; sometimes they hit from heavy artillery. The distance from Energodar to Nikopol is up to 7 km, which is small. It is a fire damage zone from almost every [type] of enemy's weapons. From guns to rocket systems and mortars," he said. Before the war, 120,000 people lived in Nikopol, and the city was a fairly large industrial center. Today, almost 80,000 people have left.

In the de-occupied territory of the Kharkiv region, law enforcement officers have already discovered and inspected 22 torture chambers set up by the occupiers, Serhiy Bolvinov, head of the Investigative Department of the State Police in the Kharkiv region, reported this at a briefing. In almost all towns and large villages where military units of the Russian army were based, places of detention for civilians and prisoners of war were set up.

In recently liberated Lyman and Sviatohirsk, the payment of pensions was resumed, and the restoration of infrastructure and the repair of damaged buildings began. Deputy Head of the Office of the President Kyrylo Tymoshenko announced following the results of a trip to Donetsk Oblast, emphasized that among the priority tasks of local authorities is restoring the electricity supply and preparing for winter in those towns where people live. He noted that over 500 residents live in Sviatohirs, and about 15 thousand people remain in the Lyman community.

In the liberated city of Izyum of the Kharkiv Oblast, stable mobile and Internet connection has been resumed. However, the connection of electricity is complicated due to the minings. Deputy Mayor of Izyum, Volodymyr Matsokin, said at a briefing that humanitarian aid is sufficient and diverse. "Today, we are already moving to the stage when building materials are already arriving and being distributed among residents - for (restoration of) roofs, and windows, preparation for winter," Matsokin said.

Azov regiment defenders of Mariupol, recently released from Russian captivity, gave a press conference. More than two thousand defenders of Mariupol are currently in Russian captivity. The process of their liberation continues, said Bohdan "Tavr" Krotevych, chief of staff of the "Azov" regiment. He said that the operation of their exit from “Azovstal” was coordinated with the country's leadership. During the exit from "Azovstal", regiment commander Denys Prokopenko had contact with President Volodymyr Zelensky, General Valery Zaluzhny and the head of the Main Intelligence directorate Kyrylo Budanov. "It was very difficult for us to make this decision, but at that time, we had 600 wounded, and 300 of them were just ... dying very slowly. Therefore, the officers unanimously decided to exit in order to provide urgent medical aid to the soldiers who were in the bunker in the hospital," Krotevych noted, noting that at that time, the hospital did not have medicines and equipment to provide proper care to the wounded.

During the exit from "Azovstal", representatives of the Red Cross assured that civilians [who exited] would enter the territory controlled by Ukraine. But this did not happen. Suspilne writes about this with reference to the released fighters of "Azov".

Operational situation

It is the 225th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas").

The enemy is trying to maintain control over the captured territories and disrupt the intensive actions of the Ukrainian Defence Forces in certain directions. The enemy continues attempts to conduct offensive actions in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions and regroups its troops in some directions.

The Russian military fired at the positions of Ukrainian troops along the contact line, conducted remote mining of some parts of the territory, and conducted aerial reconnaissance. The enemy inflicts strikes on civilian infrastructure, violating the norms of international humanitarian law and the laws and customs of war.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian military launched 5 missile strikes and 8 air strikes and carried out more than 65 MLRS attacks. The Russian strikes affected the objects and civilian population of more than 30 Ukrainian towns and villages, including Bila Tserkva, Kupyansk, Bilohorivka, Siversk, Karlivka, Kryvyi Rih, Zaporizhzhia, Hulyaipole, Progress, Nikopol, and Myrne. Near the state border, the enemy shelled Rozhkovichi and Fotovizh of the Sumy Oblast. The threat of Russian air and missile strikes persists throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.

During the past day, the aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 15 strikes. Hits on 12 enemy weapons and military equipment concentration areas and 4 Russian anti-aircraft missile systems are confirmed. In addition, nine enemy UAVs were shot down.

Over the past day, Ukrainian missile forces and artillery hit 2 enemy command posts, 14 areas of manpower, weapons and military equipment concentration, an ammunition depot, and eight other important enemy targets.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the

RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps,

2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The enemy shelled with tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery Udy, Veterynarne, Strilecha, Krasne, Ohirtseve, Hlyboke, Neskuchne, and Milove.

As Ukrainian Defense Forces are gradually liberating the temporarily occupied territories, the accomplices of the occupation authorities are fleeing simultaneously with units of the Russian occupation forces. Thus, three buses of supporters of the [Russian] occupiers were noted moving from the village of Svatove to Novopskov, Luhansk Oblast.

In order to search for Ukrainian subversives and partisans, the occupiers imposed a curfew and intensified filtering measures in the village of Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

●  252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The enemy fired from mortars, barrel and jet artillery at Verkhnyokamyanske, Ivanivka, Serebryanka and Spirne.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy fired at the Ukrainian Defence Forces' positions near Bilohorivka, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Opytne, Odradivka, Mayorsk, New York, Yuryivka, Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Vodyane, Pisky, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Paraskoviivka, and Novomykhailivka.

Over the past day, units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine repelled enemy attacks in the areas of Vyimka, Soledar, Odradivka, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Krasnohorivka, Mayorsk and Novomykhailivka.

Zaporizhzhia direction

●  Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy fired at the areas of Novopil, Vremivka, Velyka Novosilka, Shakhtarske, Zolota Nyva, Poltavka, Hulyaipole, Chervone, Pavlivka, Hulyaipilske, Dorozhnyanka and Novoukrayinka.

Russian troops continue to mine the infrastructure facilities of the city of Energodar.

Tavriysk direction

Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 42, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7 km;

Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 37th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 10th, 16th, 346th separate SOF brigades, 239th air assault regiment of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331st parachute airborne regiments of the 98th airborne division, 108 air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault battalion of the 7th Air assault division, 11th and 83rd separate airborne assault brigade, 4th military base of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 7 military base 49 Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 126th separate coastal defence brigades, 127th separate ranger brigade, 1st and 3rd Army Corps, PMCs.

The Russian military continues to regroup and withdraw their units. More than 30 towns and villages along the contact line were shelled with tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery. In particular, Velyke Artakove, Biloghirka, Blahodativka, Andriivka, Pervomaiske, Lyubomyrivka, Soldatske, Pravdyne, Myrne and Oleksandrivka.

Due to the offensive of Ukraine's Defense Forces, representatives of private security campaigns [that arrived] from Crimea plan to evacuate back to the peninsula.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

On October 6, 10 enemy warships and boats were on a mission in the Black Sea, conducting reconnaissance and controlling navigation in the Azov-Black Sea waters. Up to 32 Kalibr missiles are ready for a volley on five carriers: three surface and two underwater (one frigate 1135.6, two "Buyan-M" missile corvettes and two submarines of project 636.3). In general, the current activity of the maritime groups of the Russian Federation is characterized by low intensity. The rocket threat to [the territory of] Ukraine remains high.

In the waters of the Sea of Azov, there are patrol ships and boats on the approaches to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports in order to block the Azov coast.

The enemy continues shelling Ukrainian ports and coastal areas. At night on October 6, the enemy attacked Odesa with Shahid 136 kamikaze drones. Some of the drones were shot down by air defense.

On the morning of October 5, a loud explosion was recorded in the area of the Belbek airfield. On the night of October 6, several loud explosions were heard at the Kacha airfield near Sevastopol. There were no official messages from the Russian authorities of Sevastopol. Kacha is a military airfield in Crimea, on the northern outskirts of Sevastopol within the city limits; the distance from the city center is about 23 km. Currently, the airfield belongs to the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, and the 318th separate mixed aviation regiment of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation is based at the airfield. It is armed with 5 Be-12 aircraft, 8 An-26 aircraft, 14 Ka-27 helicopters, 2 Ka-31R helicopters (long-range radar detection and control helicopters), and 4 Mi-8 helicopters.

Two Tu-154B-1 passenger planes (registration numbers RA-85586 and RA-85605) arrived at Crimea's military airfields from the Russian Federation's northern part, which delivered special forces and marines from the Northern Fleet. On the outskirts of the city of Sevastopol, repeated activations of air defense forces were recorded.

During the six months of the full-scale war, more than 750 different cruise missiles were launched from the occupied Crimea and the Black Sea, which destroyed at least hundreds of civilian objects: schools, universities, ordinary residential buildings, and hospitals.

The mobilization of residents of occupied Crimea is aimed at implementing the Russian Federation's long-term strategy to replace the peninsula's local population with Russian citizens.

The next waves of mobilization will be similar to those in the occupied Donbas, when men were grabbed at work, at home, and on the street.

"Grain Initiative": 8 ships with 137.8 thousand tons of agricultural products left Ukrainian ports for Asian and European countries. The bulk carriers HASAN G, UMIT G and the tanker MERA departed from the piers of the Pivdenny port. From the port of Chornomorsk - ANASTASIA, FALCON S, SERENITY IBTIHAJ, MAGNOLIA, SILVER LADY. Since the departure of the first ship with Ukrainian food, 6.39 million tons of agricultural products have been exported.

A total of 282 ships left Ukrainian ports with agricultural products that were sent to the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 06.10

Personnel - almost 61,330 people (+330);

Tanks - 2,449 (+14);

Armored combat vehicles – 5,064 (+26);

Artillery systems – 1,424 (+10);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 344 (+3); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 177 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,854 (+13); Aircraft - 266 (0);

Helicopters – 232 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,047 (+15); Intercepted cruise missiles - 246 (0);

Boats / ships - 15 (0).

Ukraine, general news

The United States will provide Ukraine with $55 million to prepare for the heating season in a war. This was stated by the head of the Agency for International Development (USAID), Samantha Power, who is visiting Kyiv. Also, as part of the Energy Security Project, Kyiv received pipes and pipeline fittings worth $1.3 million.

The World Bank will finance infrastructure "survival projects" in Ukraine. The cooperation of the World Bank and the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine is designed to meet the priority infrastructure needs of Ukraine. The projects are planned to be implemented within 6-9 months. Currently, the parties are discussing the possibility of attracting $100 million for the railway and road industry. The department is also cooperating with the World Bank to create a Trust Fund for the restoration of Ukraine and a project office to coordinate this process. The Ministry anticipates that the organization will become one of the primary sources of funds for reconstruction. At the same time, the government is implementing key reforms related to the relevant projects. In particular, public procurement reforms, pricing systems in construction, development of standard forms of subcontracts, etc.

The "electronic residency" will be implemented in Ukraine; a total of 252 Ukrainian MPs voted for draft law No. 5270 on special status for foreigners, which opens up the possibility of doing business in Ukraine online, said one of the authors of the document, MP Yaroslav Zheleznyak. He expects 1,000 e-residents in the first year of the law. The law on e-residency adopted by the parliament is another step towards building a strong IT brand of Ukraine worldwide and supporting the economy. This was announced by Deputy Prime Minister - Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov on his Telegram.

International diplomatic aspect

The EU has adopted a new sanctions package against Russia, which "is proof of our determination to stop Putin's war machine and respond to his latest escalation with fake "referenda" and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories," stated the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The package includes a price cap and further restrictions on the maritime transport of Russian crude oil and petroleum products to third countries. The EU also extends the import ban on steel products and further import restrictions on wood pulp and paper, cigarettes, plastics, and cosmetics. The sale, supply transfer, or export of additional goods used in the aviation sector will also be restricted. Seven entities, including defense enterprises, are sanctioned. Thirty individuals, including officials, a bunch of pop singers, and Alexander Dugin, a philosopher of Russian fascism, are added to the blacklist.

"Our enemies have realized that their sanctions are self-mutilation. A typical crossbow in your own ass," former Russian President Medvedev reflected on the 8th package of the EU's restrictive measures. The Russian statesman believes that the West, which has lost "in the economic battle," should "beg for mercy."

Valentina Matvienko, Chairperson of the Federation Council, proposed Ukraine hold negotiations within the framework of the "parliamentary G20" meeting in Indonesia. She accused NATO of bombing Yugoslavia, the West of wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lybia, as well as of blowing up Nord Stream gas pipelines (though she corrected herself by saying that someone did it), and the other Parliaments of ignoring "coup d'etat" in Kyiv in 2014. She expressed Russia's willingness to help to regulate the "Ukrainian domestic crisis." Last week, President Putin called on Ukraine to immediately cease hostilities and return to the negotiating table but stressed that "the choice of the people in Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson" would not be discussed.

The Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine advised Mrs Matvienko to think about her betrayal of the Motherland (originally, she is from Ukraine) and the line of defense in the Hague. "There will be negotiations, but only with the new Russian government. But then you will be very far away," he summarised. This week President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree defining the Russian annexation acts as null and void and stated that negotiations with Russia are impossible as long as Vladimir Putin is in office.

The Ukrainian Parliament called on the international community to support the indigenous peoples' right to self-determination on the Russian Federation's territory. The document emphasizes that in implementing its aggressive imperialist policy, Russia has been committing

genocide against enslaved peoples for centuries, ignores the principle of equality and self- determination of peoples, and grossly violates the rights of indigenous peoples and citizens belonging to national minorities. Even while waging a war of aggression against Ukraine, the Russian authorities are committing genocide against the peoples of the Russian Federation, in particular, using mobilization for this purpose. "Acknowledgement that the Ukrainian state will not be safe as long as Belarus is occupied by an internal usurper and an external occupier, while parts of Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are occupied, that the Ukrainian nation will not be free, safe and prosperous as long as Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, Buryats, Tuvans and all other peoples of the Russian Federation - is a huge step for Ukraine," wrote Bohdan Yaremenko, an MP who presented the motion.

Prague hosted forty-three European leaders for the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community (EPC), a brainchild of the French President. "This meeting is a way of looking for a new order without Russia," EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said. To turn the initiative into a "European community of peace," urged other leaders President Volodymyr Zelenskyi via video link. The UK Prime Minister stressed her "strong agreement on the importance of like-minded European democracies presenting a united front against Putin's brutality." "Those who are meeting here know that the Russian attack on Ukraine is a brutal violation of the security and peace order that we have had in Europe over the last decades," said the German Chancellor. "It is important that we reject this attack, that we do not accept that part of the neighboring country is annexed," Olaf Scholz added. "What you will see here is that Europe stands in solidarity against the Russian invasion of Ukraine," stated the Icelandic Prime Minister.

The European Parliament adopted a resolution that urges EU member states and other countries supporting Ukraine to increase their military assistance massively, particularly in areas requested by the Ukrainian government. "Hesitating" member states should provide their fair share of necessary military aid, which will help shorten the war. This part might refer to Germany, which gives Ukraine some weaponry needed but finds various justifications for not sending modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

The European Parliament called irresponsible and dangerous the recent Russian threats to use nuclear weapons. MEPs call on member states and international partners to be ready for a quick and decisive response should Russia go nuclear. Furthermore, the EU Parliament rejected Russia's claims that an attack on the illegally annexed territory of Ukraine is an attack on Russia itself and thus would serve as a justification for a nuclear attack.

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3. How Far Will Xi Go to Help a Desperate Putin?

Conclusion:

In short, Beijing will face paralysis by analysis, a quandary all too familiar from its current reticence to institute the painful but needed reforms to stabilize China’s rapidly cooling economy. And while China may yet hope that its economic woes will resolve themselves in due course, time may not be on Russia’s side. Just as troubling is that Beijing cannot fix what truly ills Putin’s war effort: massive failures of strategy, organization, command, and logistics, as well as severe shortages of manpower. As a result, Xi’s key challenge going forward may have less to do with making sure Putin wins, and more with figuring out just how far China is willing to go to make sure Putin does not lose. That may not sound much like a match made in heaven. But remember that no one ever said it would be.

How Far Will Xi Go to Help a Desperate Putin?

Foreign Policy · by Craig Singleton · October 6, 2022

Analysis

Cracks have emerged in their marriage of convenience, but the two autocrats are in it for the long haul.

By Craig Singleton, a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

President Xi Jinping is welcomed by his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin

President Xi Jinping is welcomed by his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin during an event in Moscow, on March 22, 2013. SERGEI ILNITSKY/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

Anyone who has been in a relationship knows there are good days and not so good days. While trust and respect are the bedrock of healthy partnerships, transactional and even toxic relationships have proven, time and again, to be just as durable. Sometimes more so. That is why Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s marriage of convenience will endure, not despite Russia’s recent battlefield setbacks, but because of them.

To be fair, Xi appears to be concerned about Putin’s accumulating losses in Ukraine. Chinese observers, like their Western counterparts, probably expected the war to last weeks, not months. Even fewer could have predicted Kyiv would mount successful counteroffensives striking deep into Russian-held territory. But these developments aside, Xi is unlikely to turn on Putin, even as Russia resorts to nuclear saber-rattling and sham referendums that challenge Beijing’s long-held anti-secessionist stance.

Indeed, Xi is wedded to Putin’s war because China has much to gain geopolitically from a Russian victory and potentially even more to lose from a Russian defeat. And, just as important, Xi supports Putin’s revisionism, despite the fact that Beijing has gone out its way to avoid violating sanctions which could harm its economy. That risk calculus could change, though, if Xi perceives Putin’s regime is starting to crumble, a prospect that no longer seems too remote to ignore. Even less understood is just how far Xi might go to save Putin, the results of which will test the durability of their “no-limits” partnership.

Unsurprisingly, neither Xi nor Putin attended Queen Elizabeth’s funeral in London or the United Nations General Assembly in New York last month. Their absence was intentional. Both men traveled instead to Uzbekistan for meetings of the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Xi’s and Putin’s travel priorities reflect their mutual disdain for the Western-led order, epitomized by trans-Atlanticism, Cold War-era alliances, and the established multilateral institutions. Their decision also signifies their burgeoning interest in constructing an alternate international architecture that not only reflects autocratic values but purposefully excludes the United States and its closest democratic allies. Already, Xi and Putin can boast that the SCO represents more than 40 percent of the world’s population, with more countries, like Iran and even NATO member state Turkey, seeking to join.

Xi and Putin’s marriage of convenience will endure, not despite Russia’s battlefield setbacks, but because of them.

Like the U.N. General Assembly, the SCO summit produced little in the way of tangible results. But, unlike the U.N., the SCO is an underachiever by design. The reason: Neither Xi nor Putin want the SCO to develop into a supranational behemoth capable of lecturing its members or resolving disputes. Instead, the SCO’s hands-off mandate embodies China’s—and to a slightly lesser-extent Russia’s—desire to reset and reshape global governance narratives, often under the banner of a more just and fairer multipolar world. So far, that framing has proven appealing to many countries, such as India, that feel either maligned or ignored by the U.N. and other multilateral bodies. The SCO’s growing allure demonstrates that Xi and Putin are, indeed, capable of cobbling together new international coalitions by not requiring Western-style “like-mindedness,” including tolerance for some members condemning Russia’s Ukraine invasion and China’s support for it. But more troubling is that SCO’s growing role has hardened Xi’s view that China needs Russia’s help challenging the United States and its alliance network to hasten the West’s retrenchment from their respective peripheries.

Nevertheless, the SCO and its agenda is not what garnered the most attention at the Uzbekistan summit. What did was Putin’s suggestion that Beijing had “questions and concerns” over Russia’s actions in Ukraine, a veiled admission that China harbors doubts about Moscow’s battlefield performance. Clearly, Moscow’s efforts to redraw Europe’s borders have not gone according to plan. But Putin’s statement and Xi’s reservations, to the extent they are being interpreted (or misinterpreted), do not reflect a seismic Sino-Russian schism. More likely, they signal the growing power asymmetry between the two countries and, ominously, Beijing’s desire for Moscow to take stronger actions to win the war, not to abandon it all together.

Yet a Russian escalation will test Beijing in ways it is unaccustomed to and unprepared for. To help underwrite Putin’s revanchism, Beijing may be forced to take actions that buck its own self-seeking instincts and undercut its own national interests. For instance, to keep Russia’s economy afloat, Beijing could accept rubles as payment for anything Russia needs to buy. Doing so would, however, represent a new credit risk to the People’s Bank of China, which would in effect be bringing the Russian economy’s liabilities and risks onto its own balance sheet. These and other potential sanctions-busting measures, in turn, could accelerate China being cut off from the very Western technology and capital needed to support its development.

China’s deepening support for Putin will also degrade its ability to convincingly play both sides. Exhibit A has been China’s conflicted economic response to the war. On the one hand, total goods traded between China and Russia surged 31 percent to $117 billion during the first eight months of 2022 compared to the same period last year, and they are on track to best last year’s record of $147 billion. Chinese semiconductor sales to Russia, as well as some commodity transfers, have similarly skyrocketed. And yet, China has balked at Russian pleas for explicit military support, as well as demurred in taking concrete measures that could result in China or Chinese entities being subjected to sanctions.

Meanwhile, Moscow’s growing reliance on China has been a boon for Beijing. Taking advantage of Russia’s growing isolation, Beijing has ramped up its purchases of steeply discounted Russian oil to meet China’s current and future demand. And those semiconductor transfers? China made a tidy profit from selling some surplus chips to Russia earlier this year, even if those gains could be short-lived after the U.S. Commerce Department banned such sales in August. China has even resorted to reselling its excess liquefied natural gas purchased from the United States to European countries desperately looking to diversify their energy sources, in effect undermining Putin’s strategy of weaponizing Europe’s reliance on Russian gas. But while such double-crossing may be typical of a Chinese business mindset in which China wins twice, there is reason to suspect that Beijing may soon approach the outer limits of its fence-straddling strategy, particularly as the war takes a turn for the worse.

Will Beijing, for example, defy U.S. sanctions on semiconductors or other technology by providing Russia with the types of assistance it desperately needs to sustain its war effort? How will Xi respond if Putin follows through on his threat to use tactical nuclear weapons? Relatedly, will China acknowledge the results of Russia’s sham referendums, even though doing so could undermine China’s presumed condemnation of a Taiwanese independence referendum in the future? These and other near-term unanswered questions lay bare that as Russia’s options dwindle, so too does China’s ability to have it both ways.

As a potential Russian defeat comes into view that threatens to undermine China’s grand revisionist agenda, Xi will, perhaps sooner than he would prefer, need to consider taking bolder steps to boost Russia’s economy and war-fighting capabilities. Such support, at least at first, will probably fall well short of violating sanctions. Should the war drag on, though, China could engage in more provocative actions likely to garner an international response, including limited sanctions breaking and perhaps even nonlethal military assistance.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to fathom a scenario in which China puts Russia’s needs squarely above its own, at least not without a clear return on investment or compelling evidence that such assistance will meaningfully shift the war’s momentum in Russia’s favor. Pushback from parts of China’s vast party-state may also inhibit more intense Chinese support, with different bureaucratic constituencies fearful that violating sanctions could seriously detract from their ability to meet Xi’s ambitious development targets.

In short, Beijing will face paralysis by analysis, a quandary all too familiar from its current reticence to institute the painful but needed reforms to stabilize China’s rapidly cooling economy. And while China may yet hope that its economic woes will resolve themselves in due course, time may not be on Russia’s side. Just as troubling is that Beijing cannot fix what truly ills Putin’s war effort: massive failures of strategy, organization, command, and logistics, as well as severe shortages of manpower. As a result, Xi’s key challenge going forward may have less to do with making sure Putin wins, and more with figuring out just how far China is willing to go to make sure Putin does not lose. That may not sound much like a match made in heaven. But remember that no one ever said it would be.

Craig Singleton is a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former U.S. diplomat. Twitter: @CraigMSingleton

4. Biden: Nuclear 'Armageddon' risk highest since '62 crisis

Strong words from the President. This is not a gaffe.

Are there off ramps for Putin? It certainly cannot be to cede Ukrainian territory.

Biden: Nuclear 'Armageddon' risk highest since '62 crisis

AP · by AAMER MADHANI and ZEKE MILLER · October 7, 2022

NEW YORK (AP) — President Joe Biden said Thursday that the risk of nuclear “Armageddon” is at the highest level since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, as Russian officials speak of the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons after suffering massive setbacks in the eight-month invasion of Ukraine.

Speaking at a fundraiser for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Biden said Russian President Vladimir Putin was “a guy I know fairly well” and the Russian leader was “not joking when he talks about the use of tactical nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons.”

Biden added, “We have not faced the prospect of Armageddon since Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” He suggested the threat from Putin is real “because his military is — you might say — significantly underperforming.”

U.S. officials for months have warned of the prospect that Russia could use weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine as it has faced a series of strategic setbacks on the battlefield, though Biden’s remarks marked the starkest warnings yet issued by the U.S. government about the nuclear stakes.

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It was not immediately clear whether Biden was referring to any new assessment of Russian intentions. As recently as this week, though, U.S. officials have said they have seen no change to Russia’s nuclear forces that would require a change in the alert posture of U.S. nuclear forces.

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“We have not seen any reason to adjust our own strategic nuclear posture, nor do we have indication that Russia is preparing to imminently use nuclear weapons,” White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said Tuesday.

The 13-day showdown in 1962 that followed the U.S. discovery of the Soviet Union’s secret deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba is regarded by experts as the closest the world has ever come to nuclear annihilation. The crisis during President John F. Kennedy’s administration sparked a renewed focus on arms control on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Biden also challenged Russian nuclear doctrine, warning that the use of a lower-yield tactical weapon could quickly spiral out of control into global destruction.

“I don’t think there is any such a thing as the ability to easily use a tactical nuclear weapon and not end up with Armageddon,” Biden said.

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He added that he was still “trying to figure” out Putin’s “off-ramp” in Ukraine.

“Where does he find a way out?” Biden asked. “Where does he find himself in a position that he does not not only lose face but lose significant power within Russia?”

Putin has repeatedly alluded to using his country’s vast nuclear arsenal, including last month when he announced plans to conscript Russian men to serve in Ukraine.

“I want to remind you that our country also has various means of destruction ... and when the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, to protect Russia and our people, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal,” Putin said Sept. 21, adding with a lingering stare at the camera, “It’s not a bluff.”

White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said last week that the U.S. has been “clear” to Russia about what the “consequences” of using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine would be.

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“This is something that we are attuned to, taking very seriously, and communicating directly with Russia about, including the kind of decisive responses the United States would have if they went down that dark road,” Sullivan said.

Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said earlier Thursday that Putin understood that the “world will never forgive” a Russian nuclear strike.

“He understands that after the use of nuclear weapons he would be unable any more to preserve, so to speak, his life, and I’m confident of that,” Zelenskyy said.

Biden’s comments came during a private fundraiser for Democratic Senate candidates at the Manhattan home of James and Kathryn Murdoch. He tends to be more unguarded — often speaking with just rough notes — in such settings, which are open only to a handful of reporters without cameras or recording devices.

—

Miller reported from Washington.

AP · by AAMER MADHANI and ZEKE MILLER · October 7, 2022

5. 2 Russians fleeing military service seek asylum after arriving to Alaska

2 Russians fleeing military service seek asylum after arriving to Alaska

Axios · by Sareen Habeshian · October 6, 2022

Two Russians who fled their country to avoid military conscription have requested asylum in the U.S. after arriving in Alaska.

Driving the news: The pair arrived in a small boat onto a remote island near Gambell in the Bering Sea, Sen. Lisa Murkowski’s (R-Alaska) office said Thursday.

• The senator's office has been in contact with the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection.
• Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska) said he spoke with officials at the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security's office "given current heightened tensions with Russia" and "encouraged them to have a plan ready" in the event that more Russians flee to Alaska.

What they're saying: "We are actively engaged with federal officials and residents in Gambell to determine who these individuals are, but right now, we already know that the federal response was lacking," Murkowski said.

• "This incident makes two things clear: First, the Russian people don’t want to fight Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine," Sullivan said. "Second, given Alaska’s proximity to Russia, our state has a vital role to play in securing America’s national security."

Axios · by Sareen Habeshian · October 6, 2022

6. Putin Is Not Backing Down. He's Pivoting—to a New, Dreadful Kind of Warfare

Seems like the Russian version of the Chinese "Unrestricted Warfare."

Excerpts;

Russian strategists have long been working on new generation warfare tactics, which include the so-called Strategic Operation to Defeat Critical Infrastructure of the Adversary (SOPKVOP), which prioritizes civilian instead of military targets, employs both kinetic and non-kinetic strikes, and can be used both in wartime and in peace time. The goal is to defeat a population's will to fight and unbalance a society by degrading facilities that are vital for its functioning.

...

Russia gave us another preview of SOPKVOP and new generation warfare this past weekend, shortly after Putin warned that he is prepared to use "all means" in Russia's arsenal, including "various destructive methods." The Nord Stream pipeline then gushed with gas leaks, creating an environmental disaster in the Baltic Sea. It was an act of industrial sabotage, which is highly likely the work of the Russian government.

On Monday, NATO reportedly warned members that the Russian special mission nuclear submarine Belgorod, armed with a bus-size "doomsday" weapon called Poseidon, left its Arctic harbor. There are fears that Putin may have deployed the submarine to test Poseidon, which is capable of creating a 1,600 foot radioactive tsunami, a tactic aimed at flooding and destroying coastline cities.

While Poseidon will probably not be operational until 2027, testing would be a clear signal by Putin that he is prepared to climb quite high on the escalation ladder to get Ukraine and the West to back down, rather than face defeat in a war he believes neither he nor Russia can lose.

Make no mistake: Putin will not back down. He is merely shifting strategy.

REBEKAH KOFFLER , PRESIDENT OF DOCTRINE & STRATEGY CONSULTING, FORMER DIA INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

ON 10/6/22 AT 8:52 AM EDT

Newsweek · by Jeff Charles · October 6, 2022

Those who think that Russia has lost the war in Ukraine given Ukraine's recent military victories need to think again. They don't understand Putin's mindset, his high-risk tolerance, and his willingness to fight and create mayhem to win a high stakes battle. The overwhelming advantage Ukraine is now enjoying, fueled by the U.S., which has supplied superior training and top-of-the-line military hardware, will result in Russia turning to a new strategy.

Energy has always been Putin's best weapon, and OPEC+ just handed Russia a massive win by announcing the biggest oil supply cut since 2020 amid soaring inflation in Eurozone and the U.S. If oil hits $100 a barrel—a real possibility now—Russia will make $1 billion a day, according to United Refining Company CEO John Catsimatidis. This will continue financing Putin's war machine and enable him to deploy his energy weapon against Europe, as winter is approaching fast.

All of which is to say, Putin is not backing down. He is recalibrating. When hounded, Putin's MO is to fight back to get out of his corner. "If you want to win, then you have to fight to the finish in every fight, as if it was the last and decisive battle," Putin once said. "You need to assume that there is no retreat." That's how Putin has always fought, and it's been his strategy since the beginning of this conflict.

He will not be backing down this time, either. Ukraine is part of what Russia considers its vital security perimeter, meaning this fight has existential stakes for Moscow and for Putin personally. Ukraine's victories on the battlefield will not result in Putin ending the war but rather a turn away from conventional warfare.

The only question is, what will he turn to?

Russian strategists have long been working on new generation warfare tactics, which include the so-called Strategic Operation to Defeat Critical Infrastructure of the Adversary (SOPKVOP), which prioritizes civilian instead of military targets, employs both kinetic and non-kinetic strikes, and can be used both in wartime and in peace time. The goal is to defeat a population's will to fight and unbalance a society by degrading facilities that are vital for its functioning.

Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a meeting on economic issues via a video link at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence outside Moscow on October 6, 2022. GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images

Having failed to understand Putin's mindset, our own government has naively or foolishly enabled SOPKVOP. Several years ago, the Department of Homeland Security posted on its website a list of 16 critical infrastructure sectors, which the Russians promptly scooped up. Those entities include energy, water, health care, emergency, chemical, nuclear, communications, government, defense, food, commercial facilities, IT, transportation, dams, manufacturing and financial services. Amazingly, in June 2021, following major Russian cyber attacks on Colonial Pipeline and the JBS meat processing facility, President Biden handed a list of critical U.S. infrastructure to Putin, asking him to spare those from cyber strikes.

It was a roadmap for how to weaken us.

The Russians believe that Western societies have a low threshold of tolerance for discomfort and hardship and that people will put pressure on the government to stop the pain. Expect Moscow to target Europe and the U.S. with cyber strikes on critical infrastructure to compel us to abandon our support for Ukraine.

They've been preparing for this for a long time. Russia has studied the U.S. and other countries' vulnerabilities and conducted "proof-of-concept" on critical infrastructure. In March, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted four Russian intelligence operatives and a cyber-hacker who worked for the Russian government and were conducting two separate "historical" hacking campaigns worldwide between 2012 and 2018. The key target of this clandestine program was the global energy sector. The Russians were doing what we call in the intelligence business "strategic targeting": mapping out access in order to disrupt and damage computer systems at a future time of its choosing, as part of the intelligence preparation of the battle space. Thousands of computers at hundreds of companies and organizations in approximately 135 countries were impacted.

Russia has already crossed the cyber Rubicon by temporarily shutting down Ukraine's power grid in a crippling operation during Christmas of 2015, causing a blackout for 250,000 people in freezing temperatures. This was the first recorded cyberattack on a power grid outside of a military conflict.

Russia gave us another preview of SOPKVOP and new generation warfare this past weekend, shortly after Putin warned that he is prepared to use "all means" in Russia's arsenal, including "various destructive methods." The Nord Stream pipeline then gushed with gas leaks, creating an environmental disaster in the Baltic Sea. It was an act of industrial sabotage, which is highly likely the work of the Russian government.

On Monday, NATO reportedly warned members that the Russian special mission nuclear submarine Belgorod, armed with a bus-size "doomsday" weapon called Poseidon, left its Arctic harbor. There are fears that Putin may have deployed the submarine to test Poseidon, which is capable of creating a 1,600 foot radioactive tsunami, a tactic aimed at flooding and destroying coastline cities.

While Poseidon will probably not be operational until 2027, testing would be a clear signal by Putin that he is prepared to climb quite high on the escalation ladder to get Ukraine and the West to back down, rather than face defeat in a war he believes neither he nor Russia can lose.

Make no mistake: Putin will not back down. He is merely shifting strategy.

Rebekah Koffler is the president of Doctrine & Strategy Consulting, a former DIA intelligence officer, and the author of "Putin's Playbook: Russia's Secret Plan to Defeat America." She also wrote the foreword for "Zelensky: The Unlikely Ukrainian Hero Who Defied Putin and United the World."

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

Newsweek · by Jeff Charles · October 6, 2022

7. US troops should be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia, UAE in wake of OPEC decision to slash oil production, Democratic lawmakers say

My uninformed and inexpert opinion is to ask why we don't decide to return to US energy self-sufficiency? I know enough to know the response will be that the global oil market is unique. But it seems to me we need our oil companies to invest in modern refineries and we need to open pipelines and reduce restrictions on drilling (which of course will cause pushback from climate change and environmental activists). But we should not be saying that the price rise is positive because it will force us to find and use alternative energy sources. I fear our economy will be destroyed long before effective (and efficient) alternative energy sources can be developed to replace oil. Energy is king and we need to ensure we have the most cost effective energy source to drive our economy and sustain our lives. 

US troops should be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia, UAE in wake of OPEC decision to slash oil production, Democratic lawmakers say

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · October 6, 2022

Air Force Brig. Gen. William Betts, the commander of the 378th Air Expeditionary Wing, and petroleum, oil and lubricants airmen assigned to the 378th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron drag a fuel bladder into place Sept. 6, 2022, at Bettsat Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (Noah J. Tancer/U.S. Air Force)

WASHINGTON — Three Democrats are calling for the removal of U.S. troops and defense systems from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates following a decision by the energy cartel OPEC to drastically cut oil production.

The move by the group on Wednesday to raise prices drew ire from some lawmakers who said oil production needs to increase to lower gas prices and replace Russian exports of crude blocked by sanctions.

Reps. Tom Malinowski, D-N.J., Sean Casten, D-Ill., and Susan Wild, D-Pa., swiftly introduced legislation in response, seeking to withdraw U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two of OPEC’s 15 member countries and longtime strategic partners of the United States.

“Both countries have long relied on an American military presence in the Gulf to protect their security and oil fields,” the lawmakers said in a statement. “We see no reason why American troops and contractors should continue to provide this service to countries that are actively working against us. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE want to help [Russian President Vladimir] Putin, they should look to him for their defense.”

The bill mandates the pullout of some 3,000 American troops in Saudi Arabia and 2,000 service members stationed in the UAE as well as the removal of all U.S. equipment, including Patriot missile batteries and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, systems. The U.S. also maintains fighter squadrons, F-35 fighters and other weapons systems operated by U.S. personnel in the two countries.

The missile defense systems would be moved to other areas in the Middle East with the aim of protecting American service members, according to the legislation.

Lawmakers described OPEC’s decision, after months of lobbying by the White House to stave off a production cut, as a “hostile act” against the U.S. that signals support for Russia in its war against Ukraine. Russia reaps enormous revenue from its exports of crude.

“By significantly boosting global oil prices, OPEC’s decision appears designed to increase Russia’s oil export revenues, enabling Putin to continue his war crimes in Ukraine, and undercutting Western sanctions,” the lawmakers said.

The cut ordered by OPEC — a reduction of 2 million barrels per day — is the largest decrease in oil production since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, when demand plummeted. The U.S. at the time exerted pressure on Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of OPEC, to lower oil supply or face potential legislation by Congress to remove troops from the kingdom.

OPEC’s actions this week dashed hopes of stabilizing global energy markets in the wake of Russia’s invasion and demonstrated a lopsided relationship between the U.S. and its Gulf partners that overwhelmingly benefits the Middle East, the lawmakers said.

President Joe Biden made a controversial visit to Saudi Arabia during the summer partly to convince Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to boost oil production and lower skyrocketing gas prices. The CIA implicated the crown prince in the killing of the U.S.-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi dissident who sharply criticized the kingdom's regime.

Lawmakers said the rejection of U.S. overtures was a “slap in the face” that will hurt American consumers and undermine national interests.

“It is time for the United States to resume acting like the superpower in our relationship with our client states in the Gulf,” they said. “They have made a choice and should live with the consequences. Our troops and military equipment are needed elsewhere.”

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · October 6, 2022

8.  #PRC: #AUKUS: Proposed Special Operations Forces for the Indo-Pacific at odd with #PRC.. David Maxwell, FDD (Parts 1 and 2)

My latest interview on the John Batchelor Show based on my recent paper on AUKUS SOF.

@Batchelorshow

1/2: #PRC: #AUKUS: Proposed Special Operations Forces for the Indo-Pacific at odd with #PRC.. David Maxwell, FDD

https://securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org/essays/aukus-special-operations-forces-in-strategic-competition-integrated-deterrence-and-campaigning-resistance-to-malign-activities/

https://audioboom.com/posts/8170650-1-2-prc-aukus-proposed-special-operations-forces-for-the-indo-pacific-at-odd-with-prc-da

The second part of my interview. 

2/2: #PRC: #AUKUS: Proposed Special Operations Forces for the Indo-Pacific at odd with #PRC.. David Maxwell, FDD

  https://audioboom.com/posts/8170651-2-2-prc-aukus-proposed-special-operations-forces-for-the-indo-pacific-at-odd-with-prc-da

9. How to reform America’s military sales process

Excerpt:

The DoD can start by developing a standalone, rapid contracting process for FMS programs implemented with foreign national funds. It can deepen the partnership with DIB executives to better understand their challenges with ramping up production, how best to smooth the peaks and valleys in DoD requirements, and assess Buy America mandates. Finally, DoD must ask the NSC to make good on leading a task force to improve the FMS process, as recommended by Secretary Gates years ago. True FMS transformation is a task for the interagency, in partnership with Congress. Absent a unified approach, true FMS transformation will remain elusive.

How to reform America’s military sales process

BY KEITH WEBSTER, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 10/06/22 11:00 AM ET

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL

The Hill · · October 6, 2022

Last month, the Pentagon announced the creation of a new task force to streamline inefficiencies long complicating U.S. sales of billions of dollars of weaponry to foreign countries. Alas, many of us who have worked in foreign military sales (“FMS”) for decades are skeptical as to what change is possible. The first red flag is that this is a Defense Department-led task force focused on transforming a State Department program. Tangible transformation will only be accomplished via interagency effort, in partnership with Congress.

Efforts to improve America’s FMS program extend back decades. In 1998, the Clinton administration pledged to cut much of the red tape entangling the FMS process. This marked the first launch of an FMS transformation task force—which resulted largely only in an agency name change and a controversial “Administrative fee reduction.” In 2013, once again the DoD announced an effort to streamline FMS—only to admit in 2016, that the program saw little improvement.

So, why have we failed over two decades to address the fundamental complaint that the FMS process simply takes too long? Early in the first presidential term of Barack Obama, the National Security Council signed a letter to then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directing the Department to improve the FMS process. The secretary’s assessment was that as the DoD only executes what is a State Department program, to actually achieve true FMS reform, a task force must be led by the NSC, as issues of concern cut across the entire interagency. Although the NSC agreed, such a task force never materialized, the State Department never embraced a reform effort, and DoD once again was forced to formulate solutions.

So why does the FMS process take so long? Look at the data, and one learns that the two long poles in the FMS process timeline are congressional notifications and contract award. State Department legislation governing the FMS process mandates that for major sales, State must formally secure congressional approval of the sale prior to proceeding. Congress itself long ago established an informal notification process whereby State must informally discuss a potential major foreign sale with congressional committees prior to a formal notification. The informal notification process can take months and, in some cases, years. In her first year as secretary of State, Hillary Clinton formally challenged congressional committees on the appropriateness of the informal congressional notification, demanding relief from the process. Congress made it clear that there would be no relief from the informal process and that if the administration did not comply, they would pass legislation formalizing the informal review.

Once the administration has an actionable FMS request from a foreign government which has secured congressional approval, a foreign government can sign the agreement which legally allows the DoD to contract with U.S. industry. Here lies the second long pole in the FMS timeline. On average, a DoD contract to implement an FMS program takes 18 months to be completed. Why so long? For almost two decades, the DoD contracting community has been understaffed annually by about 20 percent. And quite simply, most FMS contracts are not a priority within DoD.

Congress can ensure American manufacturers get a fair shake 2024 presidential contenders amplify high-stakes battle for control of Congress

Once on contract, U.S. industry is authorized to begin production. Earlier this year, the Pentagon met with Defense Industrial Base (DIB) executives to discuss the urgent need to increase production to restock U.S. and allied assets transferred to Ukraine, and to provide NATO allies with new U.S. capability. These three objectives alone are stressing the DIB, and do not include FMS requirements beyond NATO. So even if the administration could shorten the congressional notification process and greatly reduce the time it takes to award a contract, the Pentagon is still facing supply chain and industrial base challenges, as well as declining government investment, all compounded by continuing resolutions and an increasingly inefficient annual defense appropriation cycle.

The DoD can start by developing a standalone, rapid contracting process for FMS programs implemented with foreign national funds. It can deepen the partnership with DIB executives to better understand their challenges with ramping up production, how best to smooth the peaks and valleys in DoD requirements, and assess Buy America mandates. Finally, DoD must ask the NSC to make good on leading a task force to improve the FMS process, as recommended by Secretary Gates years ago. True FMS transformation is a task for the interagency, in partnership with Congress. Absent a unified approach, true FMS transformation will remain elusive.

Keith Webster is President of Defense and Aerospace Council at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The Hill · by Alexis Simendinger · October 6, 2022

10. Zumwalt-Class Can Become a Dominant 21st Century Destroyer

I have to say the USS Zumwalt is the coolest looking warship. But I know that is not a criteria for effectiveness.

Photos at the link: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/10/zumwalt-class-can-become-a-dominant-21st-century-destroyer/?mc_cid=8ac2397126

Zumwalt-Class Can Become a Dominant 21st Century Destroyer

19fortyfive.com · by Bryan McGrath · October 6, 2022

Yes, the Zumwalt-class can be rebooted: Months after the terror attacks of September 2001, the Navy announced a new three-vessel “Family of Ships” reflecting a post-Cold War sense of blue-water dominance. Those ships—the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the 21st-century destroyer (DD21, now the DDG 1000), and the 21st-century cruiser (CG(X))—emphasized operations in the littorals and in support of land campaigns, in addition to high-end Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). Two decades later, the fleet architecture envisioned in these ships does not exist, falling victim to strategic shocks that drove near immediate obsolescence—the extended “War on Terror” and the rise of China as a peer competitor—in addition to questionable programmatic decisions resulting in significant cost overruns.

PACIFIC OCEAN (Dec. 8, 2016) The guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), left, the Navy’s most technologically advanced surface ship, is underway in formation with the littoral combat ship USS Independence (LCS 2) on the final leg of its three-month journey to its new homeport in San Diego. Upon arrival, Zumwalt will begin installation of its combat systems, testing and evaluation, and operation integration with the fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Ace Rheaume/Released)161208-N-SI773-0401

The Navy canceled CG(X) outright, and while it produced the LCS class in numbers, the Navy is keen to decommission many of them as being unsuited to high-end conflict. This leaves the three ships of the Zumwlat-Class, 14,000-ton multi-mission warships featuring an integrated power system that both propels the ship and creates several times the amount of electricity found on even the Navy’s newest destroyer class, the Flight III DDG. The Zumwalts have had a rough go of it in joining the fleet, due to both program mismanagement and industrial base problems driven by the Navy’s decision to restart the DDG 51 line. Lately, though, there is momentum building to spend the money necessary to achieve the significant war-fighting advantages these ships could provide, as Hope Hedge Seck recently detailed here in a 19FortyFive article. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Navy should proceed aggressively to achieve these benefits.

The first of these benefits is the installation of Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missiles, work that is due to begin on USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) in late 2023 and is expected to take two years, with the remaining two hulls undergoing the CPS installation as schedules permit. Zumwalt is currently deployed in the Indo-Pacific, and it is likely that she will be equipped with an unspecified number of hypersonic CPS missiles on her next deployment.

Five to seven years after beginning work on Zumwalt, the Navy could modify all three hulls to employ this significant capability. Resources necessary to achieve these modifications will necessarily compete within the Navy’s budget with other priorities that include recapitalizing the ballistic missile submarine line, the airwing of the future, the next generation of helicopters and or unmanned vehicles employed by the surface fleet, and the next-generation destroyer. Given the rising importance of deterring Chinese aggression and the centrality of naval forces to this task, DoD should seek sufficient funding from the White House to ensure that the Navy does not make ruinous choices among current readiness and future capability investments.

Beyond CPS: The Maritime Dominance Destroyer

The fielding of CPS in the Zumwalts is only the beginning. As the Navy begins to evolve the AEGIS Combat System into the Integrated Combat System, the existence of a troubled, three-ship “unicorn” combat system in the ZUMWALT class cannot be long abided. Work must begin in earnest to reach a technical solution to integrating AEGIS into these ships without incurring undue risk to the aggressive CPS fielding plan. Additionally, the maintenance periods necessary to install CPS should target known Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (H, M&E) issues that have accumulated since the ships left their building yard. Most important of all though is that the Navy and its Pacific Fleet Commander must devise and implement a coherent concept of operations for this ship, one reflective of dedication to regional maritime dominance.

First, the Navy should determine whether the three-ship class can support one ship always deployed to the Indo-Pacific. This “1.0” presence goal would drive other decisions such as where to base the ships and what infrastructure enhancements are needed to accommodate them if any. The time is now for these decisions and concomitant investments.

Having a CPS-equipped DDG 1000 continuously deployed sends a strong message of conventional deterrence to both China and North Korea, as would the weapons employed (Tomahawk, Standard Missiles) from the eighty-cell Peripheral Vertical Launch System (PVLS) each ship fields. The ship would not be employed as part of a traditional Carrier Strike Group (CSG). Rather, it would be employed as the lead of surface and amphibious task groups comprised of unmanned ships, destroyers, LCS, and amphibious ships, and would normally embark a staff to perform these larger command and control (C2) functions.

Second, as part of the transition to AEGIS and then to the Integrated Combat System, the Navy should fit the ships with a proper air and missile defense radar. Options include variants of the SPY-6 AMDR or the SPY 7. This would increase the ship’s capability and lessen the burden of providing IAMD to this capital asset that would invariably fall to another ship.

Third, while all three ships are currently being outfitted to accommodate manned helicopters (and should be capable of receiving and employing them), they should primarily operate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). For the time being, each should employ several MQ-8C Fire Scouts to extend the range of the ship’s radars and other surveillance systems, and the Zumwalts should be first in line to receive longer-range Medium Altitude/Long Endurance (MALE) UAVs out of the Navy’s Future Vertical Lift Maritime Strike program. Moving beyond UAVs, as the Navy fields its desired fleet of Medium Unmanned Surface Vessels (MUSV) and Large Unmanned Surface Vessels (LUSV), the DDG 1000’s should serve as C2 “shepherds” to the unmanned “flock”, to include Sailors trained to perform corrective maintenance on unmanned platforms, as necessary. Fears of unprotected LUSVs equipped with dozens of missiles each falling into the hands of adversaries should be mitigated by the constant presence nearby of a powerful DDG 1000.

In peacetime, DDG 1000 and its embarked staff provide conventional deterrence by acting as a forward-deployed C2 node, and through the provision of forward-based combat power and hardened staying power. By integrating and coordinating the capabilities of other presence forces, the DDG 1000 anchors a more powerful presence force that deters adversaries through 1) the perception that aggression will be unsuccessful or dramatically delayed (denial); and or 2) the perception that the response will far outweigh the putative benefits of aggression (punishment). DDG 1000 accomplishes this deterrence through its ability to strike land and sea targets at range and with alacrity, by exercising command and control of widely dispersed forces, and by presenting a hardened but fleeting target to the adversary. In war, DDG 1000 leverages both theater and local ISR environments to seek out and destroy the enemy fleet while menacing his land-based formations at range. In certain situations, the ship’s stealthy profile when operating in a passive targeting network can provide for a fast response to events ashore such as the positioning of a land-based mobile cruise or ballistic missiles.

Zumwalt-class destroyer. Image Credit: Raytheon.

Conclusion: The Zumwalt-Class Can Be Rebooted

Visually menacing, electronically diminutive, and physically impressive, the upgraded DDG 1000 and an embarked command element will provide the Pacific Fleet Commander with an unmatched capability for the C2 of regional sea control and strike operations, and the deterrence punch of CPS and dozens of long-range strike weapons. This future will only be realized if the Navy plans for it and DoD resources it without hobbling other Navy priorities. The chance exists to create in the Zumwalt-class, a ship that while resembling the intentions of its designers, evolves into a truly dominant 21st-century destroyer. Now is not the time to wobble.

Bryan McGrath is the Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group, a national security consultancy. All opinions expressed are his own. You can follow him on Twitter: @ConsWahoo.

19fortyfive.com · by Bryan McGrath · October 6, 2022

11. U.N. body rejects debate on China's treatment of Uyghur Muslims in blow to West

China's influence in international organization must be countered (or neutered).

U.N. body rejects debate on China's treatment of Uyghur Muslims in blow to West

Reuters · by Emma Farge

• Summary
• Narrow defeat seen as blow to West, U.N. credibility
• First attempt to put China's rights record on agenda
• Muslim countries including Pakistan reject the motion
• China lobbied hard against debate on sidelines

GENEVA, Oct 6 (Reuters) - The U.N. rights council on Thursday voted down a Western-led motion to hold a debate about alleged human rights abuses by China against Uyghurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang in a victory for Beijing as it seeks to avoid further scrutiny.

The defeat - 19 against, 17 for, 11 abstentions - is only the second time in the council's 16-year history that a motion has been rejected and is seen by observers as a setback to both accountability efforts, the West's moral authority on human rights and the credibility of the United Nations itself.

The United States, Canada and Britain were among the countries that brought the motion.

"This is a disaster. This is really disappointing," said Dolkun Isa, president of the World Uyghur Congress, whose mother died in a camp and whose two brothers are missing.

"We will never give up but we are really disappointed by the reaction of Muslim countries," he added.

Qatar, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan rejected the motion, with the latter citing the risk of alienating China. Phil Lynch, director of the International Service for Human Rights, called the voting record "shameful" on Twitter.

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"Xinjiang-related issues are not human rights issues at all, but issues of counter-terrorism, de-radicalisation and anti-separatism," said China's foreign ministry late on Thursday.

The motion was an attempt by the United States and some Western countries to "use the UN human rights body to interfere in China's internal affairs," said the foreign ministry in a post on its official website.

NEW TARGETS 'TOMORROW'

Jamal Rehi chants with others during a rally to encourage Canada and other countries as they consider labeling China's treatment of its Uighur population and Muslim minorities as genocide, outside the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C., U.S. February 19, 2021. REUTERS/Leah Millis/File Photo

China's envoy had warned before the vote that the motion would create a precedent for examining other countries' human rights records.

"Today China is targeted. Tomorrow any other developing country will be targeted," said Chen Xu, adding that a debate would lead to "new confrontations". read more

The U.N. rights office on Aug. 31 released a long-delayed report that found serious human rights violations in Xinjiang that may constitute crimes against humanity, ramping up pressure on China.

Rights groups accuse Beijing of abuses against Uyghurs, a mainly Muslim ethnic minority that numbers around 10 million in the western region of Xinjiang, including the mass use of forced labour in internment camps. The United States has accused China of genocide. Beijing vigorously denies any abuses.

'ENORMOUS PRESSURE'

The motion is the first time that the rights record of China, a powerful permanent Security Council member, has been on the council's agenda. The item has stoked divisions and a diplomat said states were under "enormous pressure" from Beijing to back China.

Countries like Britain, the United States and Germany, vowed to continue to work towards accountability despite Thursday's outcome. read more

But activists said the defeat of such a limited motion, which stopped short of seeking an investigation, would make it difficult to put it back on the agenda.

Universal Rights Group's Marc Limon said it was a "serious miscalculation", citing the timing which coincides with a Western-led motion for action on Russia.

"It's a serious blow for the credibility of the council and a clear victory for China," he said. "Many developing countries will see it as an adjustment away from Western predominance in the U.N. human rights system."

The event raised political dilemmas for many poor countries in the 47-member council who are loath to publicly defy China for fear of jeopardising investment.

Reporting by Emma Farge; Editing by Jonathan Oatis and Christopher Cushing

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Emma Farge

12. Fully Fund America’s International Affairs Budget

I am sure there are those who will take exception to the statement in the subtitle.

I was unfamiliar with the organization that both authors belong to: Veterans for Smart Power. Here is their website: https://www.usglc.org/veterans-smart-power/

Fully Fund America’s International Affairs Budget

Few investments reap larger rewards than the less-than-1% we spend on diplomacy and development.

By PATRICK MURPHY and BLAIR MILO

OCTOBER 6, 2022 12:58 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Patrick Murphy

Airmen from the 387th Air Expeditionary Squadron Quick Reaction Team download USAID humanitarian supplies from a C-130 at Begum Nusrat Bhutto Sukkur Airport, Pakistan, Sep. 9, 2022. U.S. Air Force / Senior Master Sgt. David Salanitri

Few investments reap larger rewards than the less-than-1% we spend on diplomacy and development.

Right now, the world looks like a grim place. As war, humanitarian crises, energy shocks, food shortages, climate change, and economic turmoil dominate the headlines, it is more important than ever that America lead efforts to confront the threats to global stability. Our military alone cannot address today’s challenges; we must also maintain our leadership in diplomacy and development. That means fully funding the State Department and USAID.

The American Legion—our country’s largest wartime veteran service organization, at nearly two million members—recognizes this. For the first time in its 103-year history, the organization has passed a resolution to support a fully funded international affairs budget and is making this a legislative focus.

Americans across the country are seeing global crises affect their lives and families. One example is Russia’s war in Ukraine. Up to 323 million people around the world are expected to be acutely food-insecure by year’s end, up from 276 million before the war. Here in the United States, more than 38 million people are food-insecure, and unfortunately that number is expected to rise. Another example is the COVID-19 pandemic, which has killed nearly 15 million globally, including 1 million Americans, with more still dying every day.

Responding to such crises takes more than a strong military. Funding for diplomacy and development efforts must remain a national security priority. Every dollar spent to prevent conflict saves an estimated $16 on responding to conflict. This is the key to ensuring that our communities, our families, and our friends are safe, healthy, and prosperous.

In the coming months, Congress will set the funding for America’s international affairs agencies and programs. For 2023, the administration and both Congressional chambers are currently looking at spending between $66 billion and $68 billion for core civilian overseas programs. This is less than 1 percent of the total federal budget, yet would provide an important increase after years of effectively flat funding. In recent years, proposals for modest increases to these critical programs have been discarded in final budget negotiations.

Now is the time for smart, sustainable investments in our nation’s diplomacy and development budget – with full funding a top priority. The threats to our national security are emerging not only from malign actors such as Russia and China, but from the global food crisis, climate shocks, global pandemics, and more. These challenges to America’s interests require a bipartisan response to meet the moment. We know that America can do this. America wins by leading globally. And when America wins, veterans win and families win.

Patrick Murphy is the first Iraq War veteran elected to Congress. He served as the 32nd Under Secretary of the Army and in the United States House of Representatives, serving Pennsylvania's 8th Congressional district from 2007 to 2011. Blair Milo is was the mayor of La Porte, Indiana, from 2012 to 2017. He currently serves as the founding director of the Center for Talent and Opportunity at the Sagamore Institute. Both are veterans, members of the American Legion, and members of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition’s Veterans for Smart Power initiative.

13. Japanese Warships Return Home Following First Phase of Indo-Pacific Deployment

Japanese Warships Return Home Following First Phase of Indo-Pacific Deployment - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · October 6, 2022

Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Oyashio-class submarine with JMSDF destroyer JS Takanami (DD-110), U.S. Navy destroyer USS Higgins (DDG-76), Royal Canadian Navy frigate HMCS Winnipeg (FFH338) and JMSDF destroyer helicopter carrier JS Izumo (DDH-183) sail in formation in the South China Sea during exercise Noble Raven 22-2. Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Photo

Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s (JMSDF) first surface unit of its Indo-Pacific Deployment 2022 (IPD22) — helicopter carrier JS Izumo (DDH-183) and destroyer JS Takanami (DD-110) — returned home to Yokosuka this week.

The second surface unit, which includes destroyer JS Kirisame (DD-104) is currently at sea and not expected to return until later this month.

Izumo and Takanami left Japan on June 13 and have been deployed for almost four months, which included participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022 exercise held in Hawaii from June 29 through Aug. 4. The Japanese ships conducted bilateral and goodwill exercises with the navies of 25 countries in the Indo-Pacific region during the deployment, according to a Thursday JMSDF release.

“Through the activities of our forces, Japan demonstrated that it will not tolerate attempts to change the status quo by force, its strong ties with like-minded countries, and its contributions to the realization of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific,’ and the creation of a desirable security environment for Japan,” JMSDF Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Hideki Yuasa said in the release.

Prior to returning to Japan, the first surface unit, together with a JMSDF Oyashio-class submarine that was part of the overall IPD22 deployment, conducted multilateral exercise Noble Raven 22-2 with the U.S. Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy in the South China Sea from Sept. 23 until Oct 1.

An earlier Noble Raven exercise took place from Aug. 30 through Sept. 7 in the waters of Guam to the South China Sea, USNI News previously reported.

U.S. Navy destroyer USS Higgins (DDG-76) and replenishment ship USNS Big Horn (T-AO-198) participated in Noble Raven 22-2, while Canada was represented by frigate HMCS Winnipeg (FFH338). Along with tactical training, the exercise also included the first activity under the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), signed in 2018, where Izumo refuelled Winnipeg, according to a social media post by the JMSDF Escort Flotilla 4, of which Izumo is a part.

IPD22第１水上部隊｢いずも｣は南シナ海において日米加共同訓練｢NOBLE RAVEN22-2｣を実施しました。｢いずも｣は日カナダACSAとして初となるいずも型護衛艦からカナダ艦艇への給油を実施しました。写真はカナダフリゲート｢ウィニペグ｣への洋上補給の１コマです。#いずも #たかなみ #IPD22 #訓練風景 pic.twitter.com/hgASwmiGld

— 海上自衛隊　第４護衛隊群 (@JMSDF_4EL_HQ) October 5, 2022

“In this multilateral exercise, we improved our tactical capabilities and strengthened cooperation between the JMSDF, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy by conducting more practical multilateral exercises,” Rear Adm. Toshiyuki Hirata, commander of Escort Flotilla 4 and also the first surface unit, said in a Monday JMSDF release.

“Through this dispatch, we were able to embody Japan’s strong will not to allow unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, and demonstrate Japan’s strong determination to ensure the safety of maritime traffic in the region and thereby contribute to the prosperity of the international community,” Hirata said.

The JMSDF also announced in a Monday release that it will conduct the 2nd Dispatch Training (submarine) for its fiscal year 2022 with the deployment of submarine JS Toryu (SS-512) from Oct. 9 to Dec. 26, during which Japan will conduct training around Japan and Hawaii and in the waters around Joint Base Pearl Harbour-Hickam. It is the 84th time that the submarine dispatch training has been conducted since 1963.

Australia Conducting Annual Indo-Pacific Deployment

Royal Australian Navy landing helicopter dock HMAS Adelaide (L01) and frigate HMAS Darwin (FFG04) docked at Port Klang Cruise Center, Malaysia in 2017 during the inaugural Indo-Pacific Endeavour (IPE) deployment. Photo Courtesy of Dzirhan Mahadzir

Australia began its 2022 iteration of its annual Indo-Pacific deployment, Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2022 (IPE22), on Sept. 28.

The two-month regional engagement activity involves five ships, 11 helicopters and around 1,800 personnel from all three services of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) along with are representatives from across the Australian government, including the Australian Federal Police, Australian Border Force, Australian defence industry and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, according to a Sept. 29 release.

The exercises focus on strengthening military partnerships across southeast Asia and the northeast Indian Ocean, according to the release. Australia is committed to a open and resilient Indo-Pacific region, according to the statement.

Royal Australian Navy ships involved with IPE22 are the Landing Helicopter Dock HMAS Adelaide (L01), destroyer HMAS Hobart (DDG39), frigates HMAS Anzac (FFH150) and HMAS Arunta (FFH151) and replenishment ship HMAS Stalwart (A304).

Among the embarked personnel on Adelaide are troops from the Australian Army’s 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) air mobility aircraft will also be involved in the deployment.

Other countries involved in IPE22 include the Maldives, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Laos, Cambodia, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia .

The five RAN ships will not be operating together as a single surface action group but will split into a main task force comprising of an LHD and an escort, in this case Adelaide and Anzac, while the remaining ships will both conduct independent IPE taskings. They may also operate together with the main task force at certain periods or conduct non-IPE taskings as part of the RAN’s routine regional presence deployment.

Hobart, Stalwart and Arunta will participate in maritime exercises with regional partners and conduct port visits, according ton Australian Department of Defence release on Wednesday.

These routine deployments demonstrated Australia’s commitment and engagement with our partners in the region, Commander of the Australian Fleet Rear Adm. Jonathan Earley said in the release.

“Australia has maintained a robust program of international engagement with countries in and around the Indo-Pacific for decades,” Earley said in the release.

IPE has been an annual deployment since 2017, with Earley, then a captain, commanding the first deployment.

IPE was cancelled in 2020 and conducted through contactless activities in 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic with IPE22 marking the first full-scale IPE since 2019.

IPE22 activities have been carried out already in Mauritius and Timor-Leste, with staff talks between ADF and Australian Federal Police officers with government officials in the Maldives.

From Sept. 29-30, Stalwart, together with personnel flown by an RAAF C-130, conducted engagement activities in Timor Leste.

On Tuesday, Australia’s Department of Defence announced that it is deploying an RAAF P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) to the Mediterranean as part of a NATO operation.

Operation Sea Guardian 22 is an ongoing non-Article 5 NATO maritime security operation aimed at maintaining maritime situational awareness, deterring terrorism and enhancing capacity building in the Mediterranean region. The P-8A will be based in Italy and will operate in the Western and Central Mediterranean until mid-October 2022.

Related

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · October 6, 2022

14. Service members defend general who was chastised after contradicting Fox News host Carlson

This is why the US government and US military in particular will never become proficient in influence operations. We are pole vaulting over mouse turds on this. We are so risk averse to influence and information. I wonder how many senior leaders will be deterred from using any kind of social media (which whether we like it or not is now a modern tool of communications that leaders need to be proficient in using). You cannot put the genie back in the bottle and wish for the good old days or wear your Luddite declaration as a badge of honor.

Service members defend general who was chastised after contradicting Fox News host Carlson

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · October 6, 2022

Army Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe speaks at Clay National Guard Center in Marietta, Ga., April 22, 2021. Donahoe was criticized in a recent Defense Department Inspector General report for his 2021 Twitter posts in response to a right-wing pundit's comments that the Army was becoming "too feminine." (Bryant Wine/U.S. Army)

An investigative report that faulted a two-star general for publicly defending female troops following ridicule by a right-wing pundit has opened up the Army to blowback over its commitment to stand up for women in the ranks.

Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe, the former commander of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Ga., brought “negative publicity” to the Army in connection with his tweets directed at Fox News host Tucker Carlson and others, according to the Army report, which was obtained by Task and Purpose.

The controversy centered on Donahoe’s decision to take issue with Carlson over a March 2021 segment in which the Fox host described the U.S. military as becoming “more feminine” while China’s becomes “more masculine.”

Carlson complained about Pentagon efforts to make military service more appealing to women, such as changes to grooming standards that allow new hairstyles and the introduction of a flight suit for pregnant troops.

Maj. Gen. Patrick Donahoe speaks to soldiers at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, in May 30, 2020. Donahoe received criticism in a recent Inspector General report for comments he made on behalf of female service members on Twitter. (Steven Close/U.S. Army)

Donahoe was quick to respond, posting a video on Twitter in which he reenlisted a female staff sergeant at Fort Benning and wrote “just a reminder that @TuckerCarlson couldn’t be more wrong.” Several other Army leaders made similar remarks on Twitter.

The Army investigation, however, determined that the “national media coverage” that followed from Donahoe’s statements “brought a measurable amount of negative publicity to the Army, enough that (the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs) warned (the Secretary of the Army) of the fallout,” Task and Purpose reported.

The Army’s rebuke of Donahoe, which also included criticism of his public pushback on Twitter over COVID-19 vaccine mandates in the military, has sparked an outcry in military circles.

On Thursday, the Army was among Twitter’s top trending topics, with many of the 235,000 tweets related to the Donahoe case.

For the Army, the situation comes as the service struggles to attract sufficient numbers of new recruits. Some critics say its failure to back Donahoe in his defense of female service members could have a chilling effect.

“Army leadership is sending a very clear message: Pleasing gutless demagogues and loud mouthed extremists is more important than showing support for your brothers and sisters in arms,” wrote one popular military Twitter user who goes by Rising 1L Tom.

Army leadership is sending a very clear message:

Pleasing gutless demagogues and loud mouthed extremists is more important that showing support for your brothers and sisters in arms

This smacks of modern McCarthyism and I’m absolutely disgusted by the Army’s conduct https://t.co/bRF42tKreS

— Rising 1L Tom (@Lawmadillo) October 5, 2022

Another prominent military Twitter personality known as Lethality Jane made a similar observation: “Pretty depressing to consider that the military I’ve spent over a decade of my life serving in is now considering whether to punish a General Officer for stating that my existence does not make a mockery of the Army.”

Thousands of such messages flooded the social media site.

Pretty depressing to consider that the military I've spent over a decade of my life serving in is now considering whether to punish a General Officer for stating that my existence does not make a mockery of the Army.

— Lethality Jane (@LethalityJane) October 5, 2022

The situation has delayed Donahoe’s planned retirement while the Army investigated. It’s not clear what punishment, if any, he faces.

“Even just the suggestion that the Army would punish MG Donahoe for doing exactly what we should expect of good leaders undermines nearly everything the Army preaches,” wrote Mother of Tanks, another military Twitter user.

But investigators said that Donahoe’s tweets to Carlson “exhibited poor judgement” and that the “subsequent media coverage drew national attention … and it cast the Army in a negative light,” Task and Purpose reported.

The military has grappled for years with how leaders should engage with the public on social media sites like Twitter.

Donahoe was one of its earliest and most active practitioners. During a panel discussion in 2019 focused on social media use in the Army, Donahoe encouraged soldiers to be engaged.

“The richness of the discussion outweighs the risks,” he said at the time.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · October 6, 2022

15. Austin Orders Renaming of Bases that Honor Confederate Rebels

I agree with the overall effort though I disagree with some of the names chosen (e.g., Fort Liberty - anytime we miss an opportunity to honor a real soldier we lose. I wish we could have a Fort Benevides).

Austin Orders Renaming of Bases that Honor Confederate Rebels

military.com · by Steve Beynon · October 6, 2022

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Thursday signed off on an independent commission's recommendations to rename military bases that honor Confederate officers and scrub a long list of references commemorating the southern rebellion.

The Naming Commission, established by Congress last year, took inventory of all of the military's contemporary references to the Confederecy, which waged war against the United States to preserve the slave trade. It found nine Army bases and several buildings commemorating rebel officers, in addition to a monument honoring Confederate soldiers at Arlington National Cemetery.

"The names of these installations and facilities should inspire all those who call them home, fully reflect the history and the values of the United States, and commemorate the best of the republic that we are all sworn to protect," Austin, the first Black defense secretary, said in a statement in which he said he agreed with the commission's recommendations.

The order from Austin to follow the recommendations of the commission will be held up by a 90-day waiting period in most cases, per the congressional action that started the renaming process, but should be in place by 2024 at the latest.

In total, the commission found some 1,100 Confederate references across the Defense Department, including the missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville, which was named after a major southern victory in a battle against the Union.

The nine Army bases will be renamed after a diverse roster of historical figures, including women and minorities, a radical departure from mostly naming bases after white men.

Fort Polk, Louisiana, for example will be named after Sgt. William Johnson, a Black Medal of Honor recipient for valor during World War I. Fort Benning, Georgia, will be renamed Fort Moore in commemoration of Lt. Gen. Hal Moore, a famed cavalry officer depicted in "We Were Soldiers," and his wife, Julia Moore, who spurred the Army to create casualty notification teams. Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, will honor Dr. Mary Walker, the only female Medal of Honor recipient for her actions treating the wounded during the Civil War. She was also a prisoner of war.

The other bases with their planned new names are:

• Fort Bragg, North Carolina -- Fort Liberty
• Fort Gordon, Georgia -- Fort Eisenhower
• Fort Hood, Texas -- Fort Cavazos
• Fort Lee, Virginia -- Fort Gregg-Adams
• Fort Pickett, Virginia -- Fort Barfoot
• Fort Rucker, Alabama -- Fort Novosel

But not all references were automatically put on the chopping block. The Virginia National Guard's famed 29th Infantry Division, known for its legendary battle storming the beaches of Nazi-occupied France, has a yin yang unit insignia with blue and grey, referencing units that originally belonged to opposing sides of the Civil War forming together under a single banner during World War I. It will not be changed.

"The Commission has chosen names that echo with honor, patriotism, and history -- names that will inspire generations of Service members to defend our democracy and our Constitution," Austin said.

-- Steve Beynon can be reached at Steve.Beynon@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @StevenBeynon.

military.com · by Steve Beynon · October 6, 2022

16. USS Ronald Reagan’s new skipper takes command near Korea amid missile barrage

This would be a memorable change of command. I am sure the decision to have the change of command during a time of high tension will be questioned by some but I think it could be that the crew of the USS Ronald Reagan is well trained and that because of good leadership of the outgoing and incoming commander the carrier will not miss a beat. I also think that personnel turnover (and even turbulence) is a good thing because in war we will experience tremendous personnel turbulence through casualties so we had better be able to adapt to new leadership without interrupting operations.

USS Ronald Reagan’s new skipper takes command near Korea amid missile barrage

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · October 7, 2022

Capt. Daryle Cardone, left, congratulates Capt. Fred Goldhammer after his final flight as commander of USS Ronald Reagan, Oct. 3, 2022. (Michael Jarmiolowski/U.S. Navy)

Command of the USS Ronald Reagan changed hands Friday in waters east of the Korean Peninsula, where the aircraft carrier recently redeployed in response to an uptick in North Korean missile launches.

Capt. Daryle Cardone, of Nanticoke, Pa., took command from Capt. Fred Goldhammer, of New York, N.Y., during a ceremony inside one of the ship’s cavernous hangar bays, according to a news release from U.S. 7th Fleet.

The carrier’s schedule was altered Tuesday after North Korea launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile over Japan for the first time since 2017.

The 7th Fleet’s commander, Rear Adm. Karl Thomas, alluded to the about-face in a speech during Friday’s ceremony.

“Not only do we ask you to be ready at a moment’s notice, we often must change the plan, just like we did a few days ago when you sailed back into the Sea of Japan,” he said, according to the release. “That’s what makes these magnificent ships such a flexible and powerful deterrent - you adapt to world events.”

The Sea of Japan is known in Korea as the East Sea.

The nuclear-powered carrier and its strike group initially made a port call in and around Busan, South Korea, on Sept. 23, ahead of a four-day exercise with South Korean and Japanese warships aimed at preparing for “North Korean provocations,” according to the South’s Ministry of National Defense.

The strike group returned to the area on Wednesday to respond to the “highly unusual” timing of the North’s launches, the South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a news release the same day.

On Thursday, ships from the strike group, including the guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville and guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold, took park in a trilateral missile-defense exercise with South Korean and Japanese forces.

Those drills happened the same day Pyongyang fired two short-range ballistic missiles in the sea off its eastern coast.

During Friday’s ceremony, Goldhammer lauded the crew for its ability to adapt to such situations.

“The dedication and hard work of the 5,000 sailors onboard this ship and their families ultimately drive the combat readiness of our ship-air wing team, as we very effectively demonstrate our nation’s unflinching commitment to peace and stability in this region,” he said in the 7th Fleet release. “The team will be in excellent hands under the leadership of Capt. Cardone.”

After taking command of the Ronald Reagan in October 2020, Goldhammer faced significant challenges as the coronavirus pandemic raged on. Two months later, about 350 of his sailors were quarantined in Yokosuka after coming into close contact with others who tested positive for COVID-19.

As pandemic restrictions waned, the Ronald Reagan went on to participate in numerous military exercises. During its 2021 summer deployment, the carrier diverted to the Arabian Sea for three months to support the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

During that deployment, the Ronald Reagan trained alongside the Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth for the first time. It later trained alongside the Queen Elizabeth and the USS Carl Vinson during a rare three-carrier exercise that included 14 other warships from six countries.

Goldhammer’s time also saw an increase in tensions between China and the U.S., leading to numerous exercises and other operations in the South China Sea.

His next assignment is with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Director of Air Warfare staff, Ronald Reagan spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Phillip Chitty told Stars and Stripes on Friday.

While Cardone is new to Ronald Reagan, he has a long history with Goldhammer. The two started out serving together in Airborne Early Warning Squadron 125, now known as Airborne Command and Control 125.

“I am honored to take the helm of USS Ronald Reagan from my former squadron mate and longtime friend,” Cardone said, according to the release. “This crew will continue to build and demonstrate credible combat power, and we will continue to strengthen our regional alliances and partnerships as we further integrate with partner forces.”

Cardone comes to the Ronald Reagan after commanding the blue crew of the USS Lewis B. Puller, an expeditionary sea base, Chitty said. He previously served aboard the carriers USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, USS George Washington and USS John F. Kennedy, according to his Navy biography.

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · October 7, 2022

17. 2 brigade commanders fired at Fort Hood for loss of confidence

Sigh...

I bet the Meredith household is very tense.

2 brigade commanders fired at Fort Hood for loss of confidence

Stars and Stripes · by Rose L. Thayer · October 6, 2022

Col. Jon Meredith, left, and Col. Anthony Wilson were relieved as commanders of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division and 1st Cavalry Division Sustainment Brigade, respectively, at Fort Hood, Texas. (U.S. Army)

AUSTIN, Texas — Two brigade commanders within the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood have been relieved of command because of a loss of confidence in their judgement and ability to command, according to officials at the Texas Army base.

Maj. Gen. John Richardson, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, removed Col. Jon Meredith as commander of the division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team and Col. Anthony Wilson as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division Sustainment Brigade, said Col. Wayne Marotto, spokesman for Fort Hood.

“The cases are not related, and the reliefs were based on two separate investigations. To protect the privacy of the individuals involved, the Army does not comment on investigations,” Marotto said.

Those investigations are ongoing, he said.

Meredith took command of 1st Brigade in May 2021 while the unit was deployed to Poland. He stepped in after the previous commander, Col. Michael Schoenfeldt, was removed for bullying staff. At the time, Meredith pledged to “move forward and forge something new.”

Meredith’s past command positions included the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment at Fort Riley, Kan., from 2016 to 2018, according to his official Army biography. He was the armor branch chief at Human Resources Command from 2018 to 2020.

His wife, Col. Ann Meredith, is the commander of Fort Hood’s 89th Military Police Brigade and is not under investigation, Marotto said.

Wilson took command of the sustainment brigade in June 2021, according to his official Army biography. Before coming to Fort Hood, Wilson was the division chief of plans and integration for the Army’s logistics office at the Pentagon. He also previously commanded the 548th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion at Fort Drum, N.Y.

An external review of Fort Hood released in December 2020 put the spotlight on the leadership within the 1st Cavalry Division because many of its brigades were found to have little trust between soldiers and leaders. Maj. Gen. Jeffery Broadwater, then division commander, was suspended while a new investigation occurred. That investigation cleared him just as Richardson stepped into command in July 2021.

Stars and Stripes · by Rose L. Thayer · October 6, 2022

18. To Deter China, Pentagon Must ‘Marry’ New Tech With Legacy Systems, Flournoy Says

While I think this is smart I think we still need to focus on education and training, the perishable skills that must be sustained. Yes we have to outfight and outcompete with our adversaries, but we will be more effective if we can outthink them.

But this is a very important cautionary note:

“There’s a temptation because the Chinese military is untested from a combat perspective, to sort of say, well, maybe they’re just as feckless as the Russian forces were. I think that would be a mistake,” Flournoy said. “You know, I don’t think we should say they’re 10 feet tall, [and] they have their own problems and their own challenges, and they are untested. But they’ve also made tremendous strides in the professionalization of the force, particularly over the last decade, and I don’t think we should underestimate them.”

To Deter China, Pentagon Must ‘Marry’ New Tech With Legacy Systems, Flournoy Says - Air & Space Forces Magazine

airandspaceforces.com · by Greg Hadley · October 6, 2022

Oct. 6, 2022 | By

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As the Pentagon looks to deter China in the coming years, officials need to find ways to make new technologies and existing systems work together to build capacity, former Defense Department policy chief Michèle Flournoy said Oct. 6.

In particular, Flournoy—a top defense analyst who served as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2009 to 2012—touted the concept of manned-unmanned teaming as especially promising during a livestreamed fireside chat with the Atlantic Council about deterring China through the 2020s.

Manned-unmanned teaming is a technology area the Air Force has been pursuing for several years, a pursuit that’s heated up recently as Secretary Frank Kendall has pushed for cheap, autonomous drones to fly alongside fighters, an effort that has been dubbed collaborative combat aircraft.

Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. he has said.

Particularly within the context of deterring China, Flournoy said manned-unmanned teaming could be critical because in “trying to deter or fight in China’s backyard … they will always have a quantitative advantage. Lower-cost drones to pair with manned platforms could close that capacity gap and give the U.S. “greater mass in the near term,” Flournoy said.

The Air Force is aggressively pursuing such a concept—Kendall has said he wants to hold a competition for the CCA program in 2024—and that approach could be needed, depending on China’s strategic considerations for attempting to invade Taiwan, a scenario that could very likely draw the U.S. into a conflict.

Because so much of the Pentagon’s modernization plans focus on fielding capabilities in the 2030s, Chinese president Xi Jinping may decide that if a military confrontation is needed, “maybe there’s a window where it’s better to use force before the Americans and their allies have fully set the region with the right posture and capability mix,” Flournoy said. “Because that would [mean China will] have a better chance of success sooner than later.”

Such a scenario in the mid to late 2020s is a key issue the Pentagon needs to do a better job of preparing for, Flournoy said, starting with putting someone in charge of considering the medium-term outlook.

“The service chiefs have the 2030-and-beyond perspective. The [combatant commanders] have the next-two-or-three-years perspective,” Flournoy said. “There’s no one focused on this problem every day, accountable to the Secretary every day, for making progress in this area. So authorize someone to be in charge.”

In considering that mid-range timeframe, Defense Department leaders need to take an “Apollo 13” approach, Flournoy added—making the best use possible of what they have instead of waiting for future capabilities so that they can “meaningfully enhance deterrence, so that we undermine Xi’s confidence in using force and we avoid the conflict if at all possible.”

There has been plenty of speculation as to whether Xi and China’s calculus for a potential Taiwan invasion has changed after seeing Russia struggle to make gains after its invasion of Ukraine while the U.S. and its partners have banded together. But Flournoy warned against assuming Chinese forces would struggle as much as Russia’s have.

“There’s a temptation because the Chinese military is untested from a combat perspective, to sort of say, well, maybe they’re just as feckless as the Russian forces were. I think that would be a mistake,” Flournoy said. “You know, I don’t think we should say they’re 10 feet tall, [and] they have their own problems and their own challenges, and they are untested. But they’ve also made tremendous strides in the professionalization of the force, particularly over the last decade, and I don’t think we should underestimate them.”

National Security

Russia-Ukraine

airandspaceforces.com · by Greg Hadley · October 6, 2022

19. 419. Army Mad Scientist Conference — Back to the Future: Using History to Forecast, 8-9 November 2022

419. Army Mad Scientist Conference — Back to the Future: Using History to Forecast, 8-9 November 2022 | Mad Scientist Laboratory

madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil · by user · October 7, 2022

SAVE THE DATE! Plan on joining Army Mad Scientist and the National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA) for our Back to the Future: Using History to Forecast conference!

What: Army Mad Scientist’s first in-person conference in three years! This event will feature world-renowned expert speakers and panelists from industry, tech, academia, and the U.S. military and other Government agencies discussing how history and experience inform and shape our future thinking and decision-making on critical issues. Confirmed speakers include Amy Webb (Author and CEO, Future Today Institute), Dr. Vanessa Shannon (Director of Mental Skills, Cincinnati Reds), Sharon Weinberger (Author of “Imagineers of War”), Dr. Kathleen McInnis (Senior Fellow, International Security Program & Director, Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative, CSIS and Author), Dr. Ethan Rafuse (Professor of Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), and many more!

Why: Our presenters and panelists — historians, futurists, and thought leaders — will converge backcasting with futurecasting to provide penetrating insights regarding the Army’s people, materiel, readiness, and doctrine and concepts initiatives.

Where: The National Museum of the United States Army (NMUSA), 1175 Liberty Drive, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia — for directions and parking information, click here.

When: 8-9 November 2022 (Registration starts at 0730 EST on Tuesday and the conference runs through 1600 EST on Wednesday).

Who: Invitations to attend the conference in person at NMUSA are limited and have been sent out — be sure to check your email! That said, our entire Mad Scientist Community of Action is welcome to live stream this event, so even if you can’t attend in person, we would love to have your virtual presence (and participation!) — stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for additional information on how to stream this event!

madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil · by user · October 7, 2022

20. New website will help you debunk the misinformation you see posted on social media

I have not checked out this website yet. But I will. It seems promising.

New website will help you debunk the misinformation you see posted on social media

upworthy.com · by Tod Perry · October 7, 2022

The 2016 election was a watershed moment when misinformation online became a serious problem and had enormous consequences. Even though social media sites have tried to slow the spread of misleading information, it doesn’t show any signs of letting up.

A NewsGuard report from 2020 found that engagement with unreliable sites between 2019 and 2020 doubled over that time period. But we don’t need studies to show that misinformation is a huge problem. The fact that COVID-19 misinformation was such a hindrance to stopping the virus and one-third of American voters believe that the 2020 election was stolen is proof enough.

What’s worse is that according to Pew Research, only 26% of American adults are able to distinguish between fact and opinion.

To help teach Americans how to discern real news from fake news, The News Literacy Project has created a new website called RumorGuard that debunks questionable news stories and teaches people how to become more news literate.

\u201cLove this. We need to make it easy for people to know the difference between what is real and what is misinformation. It\u2019s especially helpful that @NewsLitProject shows the process of how they debunk these rumors.\u201d

— Melissa Luck \u2618 (@Melissa Luck \u2618) 1664976259

“Misinformation is a real threat to our democracy, our health and our environment. But too many people are not sure how to verify the news they come across and are convinced there is no useful action they can take to protect themselves and others from being fooled,” Charles Salter, NLP’s president and CEO, said in a statement. “We can confront these challenges by making sure more people have news literacy skills and the ability to collectively push back against the spread of false, misleading and harmful content.”

The site regularly posts debunked news stories to push back against the lies that spread online. The great thing is that the stories explain why the information shouldn’t be trusted.

Each post explains how to use five major factors of credibility to judge whether a claim is legitimate and walks the reader through the debunking process. The five criteria are a great thing to consider any time someone is reading a news article.

Source: Has the information been posted by a credible source?

Evidence: Is there any evidence that proves the claim is true?

Context: Is the provided context accurate?

Reasoning: Is the claim based on sound reasoning?

Authenticity: Is the information authentic, or has it been edited, changed, or completely made up?

The site also provides lessons to teach people how to identify misinformation so they don’t fall for it in the future. Studies show that the best way to combat misinformation is by inoculating people against it by teaching them how to spot the deceptive tactics used by illegitimate news sites.

\u201cFeel empowered \ud83d\udcaa\ud83c\udffe\nStop misinformation in its tracks \u274c\nJoin the #RumorGuard today! \n\n\ud83d\udd17 https://t.co/xLs55ws8HJ\u201d

— The News Literacy Project (@The News Literacy Project) 1664974988

A recent study highlighted by Upworthy from researchers from universities of Cambridge and Bristol found that “pre-bunking” was one of the most effective ways to stop the spread of misinformation.

“Across seven high-powered preregistered studies including a field experiment on YouTube, with a total of nearly 30,000 participants, we find that watching short inoculation videos improves people’s ability to identify manipulation techniques commonly used in online misinformation, both in a laboratory setting and in a real-world environment where exposure to misinformation is common,” the recently published findings note.

Over the past six years, there have been numerous attempts by social media platforms and fact-checking organizations to try to stop the spread of false information online as it slowly erodes our democracy. RumorGuard seems to be following the lessons we’ve learned over the past few years by providing fact-checks to big news stories in real time and by helping to inoculate people against fake news in the future.

Let’s hope we can stop the spread of misinformation while we still have a democracy to protect.

upworthy.com · by Tod Perry · October 7, 2022

21. Beyond COVID: China, Biotechnology, and Artificial Intelligence

From one of the "deans" of the Chin watcher community.

The 24 page report can be downloaded here: https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/2022-10-05-MWI_Chinese_Biotechnology_Wortzel.pdf

Beyond COVID: China, Biotechnology, and Artificial Intelligence - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by Larry Wortzel · October 7, 2022

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Much has been written about China’s recent advances in military prowess and proficiency. Whether it is at sea, in space, or conceptually with “Non-War Military Activities,” there is no doubt that China remains the pacing threat for the United States. With hypersonic missiles, aircraft carriers, and cyberspace capabilities, China has continually proven itself to be a near-peer threat.

In the midst of these advances, China has also been examining its strategy and defense in relationship to biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and the “intelligentization” of military operations. In the twenty-first century, Chinese military strategy tends to study biological warfare alongside technological advances in artificial intelligence and biomechanics. All are part of the same problem set and are treated as means to degrade enemy soldier performance or provide China’s own soldiers with advantages during military operations. Chinese authors and doctrinal texts have not been silent on the subject, instead publishing with relative frequency on the potential for advances in both biotechnology and intelligent systems in warfare to affect human capacity.

This MWI report analyzes recent writing from leading Chinese military thinkers and from both the Academy of Military Science and the National Defense University—two of the most authoritative institutions within the People’s Liberation Army. The Academy of Military Science writes for the Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department—previously, the General Staff Department—while the National Defense University educates high-level officers and serves as a finishing course or capstone for general and flag officers. In all these writings, the People’s Liberation Army expects the combination of developments in the “biological realm” and “intelligentization” to transform future war.

Read the full report here.

Larry Wortzel is a retired US Army colonel who spent much of his thirty-two-year military career in the Asia-Pacific region, including two tours of duty as a military attaché at the US Embassy in Beijing. His last military position was as Director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: PLA Pictorial

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mwi.usma.edu · by Larry Wortzel · October 7, 2022

22. US kills 3 Islamic State leaders in 2 Syria operations

US kills 3 Islamic State leaders in 2 Syria operations

militarytimes.com · by Lolita Baldor · October 6, 2022

Editor’s note: This story has been updated with additional information from U.S. Central Command about the second military operation.

U.S. forces killed three senior Islamic State leaders in two separate military operations in Syria Thursday, including a rare ground raid in a portion of the northeast that is controlled by the Syrian regime, U.S. officials said.

According to officials, U.S. special operations forces conducted a raid near the village of Qamishli, killing IS insurgent Rakkan Wahid al Shamman, wounding another and capturing two others.

Later Thursday, the U.S. conducted an airstrike in northern Syria, killing Abu Ala, the No. 2 Islamic State leader in Syria, and Abu Mu’ad al Qahtani, another IS leader, officials said.

A U.S. official said a small number of U.S. troops were on the ground near Qamishli for less than an hour to conduct the ground raid. The U.S. doesn’t often do missions on territory that is under the control of Syrian President Bashar Assad. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss details of the raid.

In a statement, U.S. Central Command said al Shamman was known to facilitate the smuggling of weapons and fighters in support of Islamic State operations. According to the statement, no civilians or U.S. troops or were killed or injured in the raid.

Additional information about the airstrike was not provided.

The U.S. continues to have about 900 forces in Syria to advise and assist Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against the Islamic State group.

One U.S. official said that, for the first time in a long time, the U.S. did not use its deconfliction phone line with Russia to notify them of the U.S. troop raid and presence there. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to provide details, said the lack of deconfliction was more the result of operational security and not a reaction to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The U.S. and Russia have used the deconfliction line to avoid any possible accidents or incidents when U.S. forces are in the northeastern region of Syria where Russian forces also operate.

23. Europe must trigger snapback of UN sanctions on Iran

Excerpts:

To be sure, Russia and China would refuse to implement previous UN sanctions. Thus, the E3 and United States would also need to resurrect their pre-JCPOA pressure campaign on Iran using all diplomatic, economic, and military tools at their disposal. They must sanction Russian and Chinese government entities, companies, individuals, and banks that violate the resolutions or aid Tehran’s nuclear, missile, and military programs. Reimposing UN sanctions and a coordinated European/American pressure campaign could be devastating for the Islamic Republic, whose economy is rebounding due to lax enforcement of sanctions but is still facing slow growth and inflation in addition to protests.

World powers are reluctant to declare an end to negotiations. Yet admitting failure provides an opportunity to reset Iran policy and support the people against the regime. All eyes turn to Europe to accept Iran’s “no” as the final answer.

Europe must trigger snapback of UN sanctions on Iran

BY ANTHONY RUGGIERO AND ANDREA STRICKER, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 10/06/22 9:00 AM ET

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL

The Hill · · October 6, 2022

France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States have pursued a bifurcated Iran policy: attempting to revive an expiring nuclear deal while tolerating the Islamic Republic’s brutal repression of the Iranian people. The latest protests and civil unrest in Iran raise an uncomfortable reality for the West: A new deal will provide significant sanctions relief that will fuel the regime’s violent crackdown. Tehran’s latest demands in nuclear talks have also frustrated the powers, with the Europeans noting that the regime’s foot-dragging over reviving a weaker version of the 2015 nuclear accord raises “serious doubts as to Iran’s intentions.” For 18 months, Europe and the United States negotiated in earnest, but as the months slipped by, Tehran’s outrageous demands periodically stalled the talks and provided the regime with room to expand its nuclear program.

America and the E3 — shorthand for London, Paris, and Berlin — tried the path of diplomacy, but Tehran is not interested in a deal, however generous its reported terms.

The West must now pivot from negotiations to pressure.

As the first step to shedding the remnants of the old deal and amassing necessary leverage to counter and roll back Tehran’s nuclear advances, Europe must trigger a “snapback” of prior UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. That step, coupled with additional diplomatic, economic, and military pressure, would frustrate Tehran’s efforts and hasten the demise of the Islamic Republic regime.

Iran has exploited negotiations over the accord, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), to place itself at the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. According to independent analysis of data gathered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), if Tehran decides to produce nuclear weapons, it could make weapons-grade uranium for three atomic bombs within a month, and two additional weapons within four months.

These accelerated timelines are due to Iran’s operation of faster, more advanced centrifuges, producing uranium enriched to 60 percent — Tehran’s highest level ever — and making uranium metal, a material used in nuclear weapons. At the same time, Tehran has reduced IAEA monitoring, making it more difficult for the agency to detect a breakout.

Iran has also refused to cooperate with a nearly four-year IAEA investigation into the Islamic Republic’s suspicious atomic work. Tehran’s actions are in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which supersedes its JCPOA obligations. Alarmingly, the IAEA reported last month that the agency is no longer “in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.”

Instead of demanding accountability for Iran’s nuclear malfeasance and NPT non-compliance, however, the E3, along with the Biden administration, have continued with diplomatic business as usual. Last June, the parties did support an IAEA Board of Governors censure resolution after Tehran failed to meet an agreed deadline to cooperate with the IAEA. Yet despite the agency’s latest dire warning, at the board’s meeting last month, the E3, the United States, and 52 countries issued only a joint statement calling for Iran’s cooperation. In other, words, Biden and the E3 backed down despite Tehran’s intransigence.

The Islamic Republic views the West’s timid response as a signal to push forward with the regime’s atomic work, while brutally quashing dissent. World powers must immediately declare the JCPOA dead and pivot — as rapidly as possible — to deterring, countering, and rolling back the Iranian regime and its nuclear weapons capabilities.

To begin, the E3 should initiate “snapback” to formally terminate UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which codified the JCPOA and suspended UN sanctions on Iran’s nuclear, missile, and military programs. The snapback would restore previous UN sanctions resolutions on Iran, including a requirement that Tehran halt uranium enrichment and come into compliance with its NPT obligations. Likewise, the resolutions prohibited Iran’s import or export of certain missiles, sensitive equipment, and materiel. The resolutions also imposed an arms embargo on Iran, which lapsed in 2020 but would be restored via snapback.

The United States exited the nuclear deal in 2018 and unsuccessfully attempted to enact a snapback in 2020. However, any one of the remaining JCPOA participants — the E3 plus Russia and China — could trigger the reimposition of UN penalties by notifying the UNSC of Iran’s significant non-performance under the deal. A complicated process prevents Tehran’s allies (Moscow and Beijing) from using their UNSC vetoes to maintain the suspension of the sanctions. The prior UN sanctions would become effective midnight on the 31st day after the original notification.

The UK government’s crisis: The consequences of being out of step globally No, we’re not already in World War III

To be sure, Russia and China would refuse to implement previous UN sanctions. Thus, the E3 and United States would also need to resurrect their pre-JCPOA pressure campaign on Iran using all diplomatic, economic, and military tools at their disposal. They must sanction Russian and Chinese government entities, companies, individuals, and banks that violate the resolutions or aid Tehran’s nuclear, missile, and military programs. Reimposing UN sanctions and a coordinated European/American pressure campaign could be devastating for the Islamic Republic, whose economy is rebounding due to lax enforcement of sanctions but is still facing slow growth and inflation in addition to protests.

World powers are reluctant to declare an end to negotiations. Yet admitting failure provides an opportunity to reset Iran policy and support the people against the regime. All eyes turn to Europe to accept Iran’s “no” as the final answer.

Anthony Ruggiero is senior director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and served as National Security Council senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense in the Trump administration. Andrea Stricker is the deputy director of the program. Follow them on Twitter @NatSecAnthony and @StrickerNonpro respectively. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.

The Hill · by Alexis Simendinger · October 6, 2022

24. FDD | A Match Made in Heaven: The Hezbollah-Amal Nexus

The 11 page report can be accessed here: https://ict.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Ottolenghi-Match-Made-in-Heaven_2022_10_06_0801.pdf

FDD | A Match Made in Heaven: The Hezbollah-Amal Nexus

fdd.org · by Emanuele Ottolenghi Senior Fellow · October 6, 2022

October 6, 2022 | International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)

A Match Made in Heaven: The Hezbollah-Amal Nexus

October 6, 2022 | International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)

A Match Made in Heaven: The Hezbollah-Amal Nexus

Emanuele Ottolenghi

Senior Fellow

Excerpt

Over the past decades, Hezbollah has built a well-oiled, multi-billion-dollar illicit finance and drug-trafficking machine in Latin America that launders organized crime’s ill-gotten gains through multiple waypoints in the Western Hemisphere, West Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, generating hundreds of millions of annual revenues. Those in charge back in Beirut, Baghdad, and Tehran, are party stalwarts who rake the profits to fund Hezbollah’s stranglehold on Lebanese society, sustain its mobilization as Iran’s regional proxy in multiple theatres of war, and plot terror attacks overseas.

Their lieutenants, however, are a different story: party lines are blurred in the murky waters of illicit finance. There, in the vast universe of trafficking, money laundering, and smuggling, the entrepreneur rises above the ideologue, the militant, and the militia fighter to take the front seat. Party membership matters little, where money is made for the cause. As my colleague, Tony Badran argues, “What matters is Hezbollah’s relationship with Shi’a society, both in Lebanon and in the diaspora, where familial ties, business connections, and patronage networks extend to Amal, the other Shi’a party in Lebanon.” In the realm of fundraising, Amal and Hezbollah followers have over time become so intertwined that telling them apart has become almost impossible. Especially across the Shi’a diaspora, it is often Amal businessmen who tend to Hezbollah’s fundraising needs.

Acknowledging this overlap, rather than proving a formal bond to Hezbollah’s party structure, is key to unmasking the terror-finance networks feeding into Hezbollah’s global fundraising efforts. Amal too, should be a target for U.S. sanctions. Without its members and their support, Hezbollah’s overseas illicit finance operations might not come to fruition so easily.

Emanuele Ottolenghi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Read in International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)

fdd.org · by Emanuele Ottolenghi Senior Fellow · October 6, 2022

25. Israel-EU annual meeting after decade hiatus - opinion

Excerpts;

Beyond the diplomatic shifts, however, is an even larger change that has happened in European-Israeli relations. The tiny Israel defined by its conflict with the Arabs that Europeans once knew is no more. When the first Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1975, Israel, with its three million people, was smaller than all the European member states save Luxembourg.

Sometime in the next two years, the Israeli population will cross the 10 million mark, making it significantly larger than Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Austria (among others), and roughly equal in population to Greece, Portugal and Sweden.

It is today a regional trading power, an energy exporter and a global technological leader. This necessarily changes the European approach to Israel in times of relative calm in the region, but will also necessitate a different approach even in times of trouble.

Israel-EU annual meeting after decade hiatus - opinion

Israel and the European Union held an Association Council meeting for the first time in a decade. How did Israel change in that time, and how did it affect the EU-Israel relationship?

By SHANY MOR Published: OCTOBER 6, 2022 00:50

Jerusalem Post

Israel and the European Union held an Association Council meeting On Monday, a ministerial-level dialogue that is supposed to occur once a year but has been on hold for nearly a decade.

As expected, there was no new agreement or major initiative to emerge from the session, nor was there any upgrading of ties. There was some grumbling from the Europeans both before and even during the meeting that Prime Minister Yair Lapid participated by video link rather than show up in person.

The big news is not what came out of the meeting but rather what led to it.

The 2013 meeting was abruptly canceled by then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, angry at a new EU restatement of its longstanding principle that agreements with Israel only applied to the pre-1967 borders.

The 2014 meeting was canceled by the Europeans, under pressure from certain member states’ governments to take symbolic action against Israel following the 51-day conflict in Gaza that summer. And since then, no real effort was made to reconvene the Association Council.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meets with Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, before he became prime minister, in the Knesset. (credit: MAYA ALLERUZZO/REUTERS)

The two cancellations turned into a mutual boycott, which neither side really wanted or was able to justify.

The Europeans, after all, had held multiple Association Council meetings with other Middle Eastern countries whose militaries and security forces were involved in actions at least as problematic as Israel’s, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. And diplomatic relations between Israel and the EU as a whole and its member states individually were actually much better in this period than they had been in decades.

In 2021, Lapid, then foreign minister and now both foreign minister and prime minister, made it a personal goal to see the Association Council reconvene. He was aided in this by a cross-party initiative in the European Parliament pushed by Spanish MEP Antonio López-Istúriz White. The result of both efforts was the meeting in Brussels.

The topics under discussion show just how much has changed in the Europe-Israel relationship in the last 10 years. These include counter-terrorism, defense technology, energy and the war in Ukraine.

What has changed between 2013 and today?

The relationship has changed because the world has changed. Notably, Israel has undertaken two methodical but dramatic diplomatic shifts.

The first is Israel’s place in the region. Israel is no longer the isolated and boycotted outpost in the Middle East that it was for most of its history. It has peace treaties with six Arab states now, four of which were signed since the last Association Council meeting. There are direct flights from Tel Aviv to major cities in the region and a burgeoning trade between Israel and Gulf monarchies, including those without official relations.

It is a player in the regional alliance systems of both the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean, just as it has also become a net energy exporter due to the discovery of large gas deposits of its shoreline. None of this was the case at the last council meeting in 2012.

The second Israeli diplomatic shift is in Europe itself. Israel has cultivated deep ties with a number of new member states in the EU from Central and Eastern Europe, whose presence in Brussels bridges cultural ideological gaps that were once much wider.

Many of the diplomats from Central Europe in particular share with their Israeli counterparts memories – sometimes selective and self-serving and sometimes entirely justified – of abandonment by hypocritical and pious elites in the West. It has also cultivated deep military ties with Greece and Cyprus and others on the union’s periphery with a stake in regional affairs that goes beyond principled pronouncements designed to placate domestic constituencies.

This new diplomatic approach yielded results. “The two countries that pushed hardest for this meeting to take place were Greece and the Czech Republic,” Pascaline Wagemans, director of the Forum for Strategic Dialogue told me last week.

The one thing that has not changed is that an eruption of Israeli-Palestinian violence, particularly violence centered on the emotive issue of Jerusalem, can stall and even, depending on its duration and its severity, partially reverse these two enormous shifts.

The comments of Josep Borrell, the EU high commissioner for foreign and security affairs, at the outset of the meeting made clear both how important the issue is to the Europeans and how different their view of some of the key aspects of it are from even the most moderate Israeli leaders.

Beyond the diplomatic shifts, however, is an even larger change that has happened in European-Israeli relations. The tiny Israel defined by its conflict with the Arabs that Europeans once knew is no more. When the first Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1975, Israel, with its three million people, was smaller than all the European member states save Luxembourg.

Sometime in the next two years, the Israeli population will cross the 10 million mark, making it significantly larger than Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Austria (among others), and roughly equal in population to Greece, Portugal and Sweden.

It is today a regional trading power, an energy exporter and a global technological leader. This necessarily changes the European approach to Israel in times of relative calm in the region, but will also necessitate a different approach even in times of trouble.

The writer is an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a research fellow at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University. Follow him on Twitter at @ShMMor.

Jerusalem Post

26. Chinese President Xi's 'final purge' ahead of Communist Party congress

Chinese President Xi's 'final purge' ahead of Communist Party congress

By Hermes Auto The Straits Times2 min

View Original

When he became leader a decade ago, Mr Xi vowed to root out dishonest officials. PHOTO: AFP

BEIJING - President Xi Jinping has embarked on a "final round of purges" ahead of a major Communist Party of China congress, wielding his long-running anti-corruption campaign to cement his grasp on power, analysts say.

When he became leader a decade ago, Mr Xi vowed to root out dishonest officials, both senior "tigers" and low-ranking "flies".

More than 1.5 million officials have been punished since then, according to data from the party disciplinary body, and China's ranking on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index has improved.

But critics say the campaign is also a thinly veiled political tool that has helped Mr Xi eliminate his rivals - and the build-up to this year's congress has seen more heads roll.

About 1,100 officials have been caught in the party dragnet since the beginning of this year, according to party data.

Among them are former deputy public security minister Sun Lijun and former justice minister Fu Zhenghua, who will now spend the rest of their lives behind bars.

"This final round of purges, masquerading as an anti-corruption campaign, will ensure that Xi will have tighter if not absolute control over personnel and policy issues (at the Congress)," said Mr Willy Lam, a political analyst at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Mr Xi is widely expected to secure a third term as party leader at the meeting, upending the succession norms in place since the 1990s.

"Despite all signs that his major goal of a third term is pretty much guaranteed, Xi is still paranoid about his control over appointments to key decision-making bodies within the party," Mr Lam added.

Once a trusted lieutenant of Mr Xi, Sun oversaw security in Hong Kong during months of unrest in 2019 and was even sent to Wuhan at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic.

But he reportedly fell from grace because of his political ambitions, and was officially accused of "seriously damaging the unity of the party".

Sun confessed on national television in January to taking bribes worth US$14 million (S$20 million), hidden inside boxes of what appeared to be seafood.

Others allegedly in his "political clique", including Fu and three former police chiefs, were also rounded up and given harsh sentences.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com